Papal Polls: Parochial High Schools and Catholic Voting Patterns in Detroit, 1960-1972

By

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Abstract

This thesis examines the intersection of religious identity, education, partisanship and community institutions through a case study of Catholic voting patterns in Detroit from 1960 to 1972. I build off prior literature investigating the decline in Democratic Party loyalty among American Catholics to situate the mobilizing role of Catholic parishes as a missing link between demographic and voting trends. By creating a model with fifty-one neighborhoods that combined precinct-level presidential election data, demographic data from the census, and the locations of Catholic high schools in Detroit, I argue that the presence of Catholic high schools acted as a moderating force to stem the tide of suburbanization and diverging Catholic voting patterns. With open Catholic high schools as a proxy for parish power and influence, I find strong evidence that parishes with Catholic high schools prevented white flight from those neighborhoods and inhibited the sharp decline in Democratic voting experienced by Catholics nationwide.
I. Catholics, Parochial Schools, and the Democratic Party

Introduction

Places of worship and schools serve essential functions as pillars of communities, but historically Catholic parishes specifically have taken on further importance to their neighborhoods. From their inception that followed nativist sentiment and discrimination experienced by Catholic immigrants, Catholic parishes were central community anchors that informed a century of policy preferences, political ideology, and party identification. This relationship between institution and identity for Catholics lasted until the end of the twentieth century, when voting patterns that were consistent for a century changed over the course of just a few decades.¹ During this time, Catholic schools were confronted with financial constraints and unsustainable enrollments that led many to close or relocate to the suburbs.² This parochial

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school crisis took on further importance due to the influence of Catholic parishes the in the social, political, and spiritual lives of Catholics and the communities in which they are located. General suburbanization, the elevation of social issues, and the improving socioeconomic status among Catholics all contribute to this phenomenon. However, scholarship on these topics contradict and undermine each other, and none of these explanations are specific to Catholics. The decline of Catholic schools correlates with these as well, but the centrality of parochial schools to Catholic life presents a causal mechanism that can bridge this gap, help explain other potentially confounding variables, and relate these circumstances specifically to Catholics. The role of parochial schools in the political and social identity of Catholics provides the connection between the closing of Catholic schools and shifting Catholic voting patterns. These phenomena

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4 Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228; McAndrews, “Unanswered Prayers,” 81, 89-95; Stepan-Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 373, 374.
describe national patterns, but the City of Detroit presents a compelling case study to test the relationship among these evolutions.

Through this thesis, I argue that Catholic parishes – using Catholic high schools as a proxy for church power and influence – play critical roles in the demographic and political shifts among American Catholics in the 1960s and 1970s. By geocoding the locations of open Catholic high schools in 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 and comparing precinct-level presidential election returns and census tract demographic data, I illustrate these connections. Where Catholic high schools closed, the black population share increased amid white flight. Where Catholic high schools remained open, Democratic vote share decreased – but to a far lesser extent than among Catholics nationwide. These results logically flow from previous research regarding Catholic voting and demographic patterns, and position Catholic parishes as central to these trends as influential mobilizing institutions.

The demographic changes Detroit underwent in the twentieth century reflect other major cities in the Midwest and Northeast United States, and the city can be seen as a prime example of the effects of white flight during the 1960s and 1970s. In using Detroit as a case study, the results can be compellingly applied to other cities as well. Yet Detroit also stands out; from 1960 to 1990, the Catholic population in Detroit fell from over 1,000,000 to just 100,000.6

As changing Catholic voting patterns, the importance of parochial schools, and the role of parishes as community institutions intersect with the literal and symbolic significance of a high school’s presence, investigating the role of urban high school closings provides an opportunity to

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find these answers. The existence of an open Catholic high school can serve as a proxy for parish power and influence. When financial crises hit diocese, high schools close first, followed by elementary schools, and finally the actual churches. Examining the impact of Detroit Catholic high schools closing or moving outside the city grants a specific, detailed study of the political and demographic impact of the intersection of the three phenomena that characterize the evolution of American Catholic culture after World War II.

An important caveat is that my thesis only focuses on white ethnic Catholics. White ethnic Catholics here are defined as descendants of European immigrants primarily from Eastern and Southern Europe and Ireland that are racially classified as “white,” yet ethnically distinct from the mainly Anglo-Saxon ancestry of Protestant, white Americans at the time. These white “ethnics” typically consist of Irish, Italian, Polish, German, and Slavic Catholics, among countless others. The growth in the Latino population, especially outside the South, is a relatively recent phenomenon. By 1980 in Detroit, the Latino population had only grown to 2.6%, and nationwide that number had only reached 10% by 1985. Therefore, the growing Latino population in the United States today skews the Catholic vote as they lean heavily Democratic but were not yet a large enough part of the Detroit population to account for in my thesis.

The question of what led Catholics to abandon their Democratic Party loyalty in the 1960s and 1970s, after maintaining fierce allegiance for over a century remains. This puzzle goes beyond simple partisan or ideological politics; the Democratic and Republican Parties evolved significantly from the 1850s through the 1950s, even trading positions on many issues.\textsuperscript{11} Despite this, Catholics remained steadfast Democrats until the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{12} Learning how and why this shift occurred, along with the role of parochial schools and the socializing effects of parishes, will allow for a deeper understanding of the intricacies of identity politics. The goal is to learn when, how, and why partisan identification and political preferences shift and lose significance as central aspects of social identity.

By compiling precinct-level voting data in Detroit for presidential elections and comparing the results in areas surrounding open Catholic high schools, the relationship among these historical evolutions can become quantified. A more nuanced understanding of the national trends of Catholic political identity can then be extrapolated and applied to other cities that experience similar levels of Catholic prominence and subsequent suburbanization, such as Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{13}

The introductory chapter of this thesis continues with a review of the scholarly literature regarding the shift in Catholic voting patterns, the importance of parochial schools, and the role of parishes as tools of political mobilization. The theoretical argument defending my hypotheses, and my methodology come after the literature review to finish the introduction. I will then

examine the results of my data in the subsequent four chapters, covering the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 presidential elections, respectively. Finally, I conclude with a chapter summarizing the aggregate results, contextualizing the implications, and suggesting prospects for future research.

Literature Review

Catholic Voting Patterns

Detroit offers a compelling case study for the relationship between parishes, parochial school, and Catholic voting patterns due to its prominence in prior research, historically powerful Catholic population, and continued Democratic party loyalty. To set the stage for the case study, evidence must be presented for three developments that led to the circumstances that defined Detroit and other major American cities in the 1960s and 1970s. The historical dominance of Catholics by the Democratic Party until the 1970s, the centrality of parochial schools to the social, political, and spiritual life of Catholics, and the role of Catholic parishes as tools of political mobilization all contribute to portray Detroit as a persuasive case study that can accurately represent the relationships among these phenomena.

While Catholics ceased voting in such strong Democratic numbers by the 1980s, the exact timing of the shift in voting patterns has been debated. Greer investigates whether the upward social mobility experienced by ethnic Catholics since the New Deal and the subsequent suburbanization of Catholic communities has led to a breakdown in the New Deal coalition.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\) Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 611-625.
Using a case study in metropolitan St. Louis, Missouri, Greer finds that party preference among Catholics in the central city and suburbs remains strongly Democratic, but suburban Catholics do show some signs of weaker party loyalty and different policy preferences than urban Catholics.\textsuperscript{15} Greer attributes these differences to a mix of country of origin, generations since migration, and education, but acknowledges that the trends experienced by suburban Catholics were also reflected in non-Catholics as well.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, this shift among suburban Catholics might simply be a reflection of a nation-wide trend regardless of religious affiliation.

Greeley counters the conception that ethnic Catholic voters began to drift away from the Democratic Party, epitomized by the defection from McGovern during the 1972 presidential election.\textsuperscript{17} Greeley summarizes a variety of studies, surveys, and presidential voting data to conclude that the evidence runs contrary to this myth.\textsuperscript{18} The primary puzzle Greeley seeks to solve is the popular myth of the conservatism of blue-collar Catholic ethnics who have elevated social classes, moved to the suburbs, and consequently based their vote on social issues owned by the Republican Party.\textsuperscript{19} The data, however, highlights that even in 1972, Irish, German, Italian, and Polish Catholic were still more likely to support McGovern and other Democrats than the average American.\textsuperscript{20} Further data regarding Catholic policy positions on the Vietnam War, racial integration, support for unions, and an extensive welfare state corroborate the voting data.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{15} Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 623-625.
\textsuperscript{17} Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 199-218.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Greeley, “How Conservative Are American Catholics?,” 212-218.
Penning also investigates the conventional wisdom surrounding the supposed conservative shift among American Catholics from 1972 through 1983, finding that ideological positions had only changed slightly while party identification has shifted more significantly among American Catholics.22 While acknowledging Democratic loyalty as a tradition among Catholics, Penning argues that ideological homogeneity has never been an aspect of Catholic allegiance to the Democratic Party.23 Using national survey data related to party identification, policy positions, and political ideology, Penning shows that ethnic white Catholics were still more liberal than the average American despite slightly more conservative and politically independent behavior throughout the 1970s.24

Rae provides a history of cultural cleavages that shaped the American political arena throughout the twentieth century.25 The end of the New Deal era with Nixon’s victory in 1968 signaled a shift in the voting patterns of the traditional foundations of the New Deal coalition – especially ethnic Catholics.26 Through the initial embrace of Catholic immigrants, the power wielded by the city bosses of political machines, and the broad support for organized labor and government action through the New Deal, the Democratic Party managed to maintain strong loyalty of white ethnic Catholics until signs of dissent first appeared in 1952.27 Rae asserts that civil rights, abortion, and church-state issues came to the political forefront because of the stage set by the 1952 presidential election.28 As Republicans exploited these social issues for their benefit, Democrats lost their grip on the vote of white Catholics.29 Rae concludes by

24 Ibid, 29-49.
26 Ibid, 629, 630.
27 Ibid, 637.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
acknowledging that remnants of the New Deal coalition remain but emphasizing that the cultural issues that tore it apart in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s will continue to shape party allegiances, just as the 1920s did for the New Deal coalition.\textsuperscript{30}

Similarly, McGreevy investigates the historical origins of the contemporary partisan split among Catholics from the initial Catholic affiliation with the Democratic Party, through the fight over birth control access, and finally to modern Catholic suspicion of liberalism.\textsuperscript{31} Attributing this shift to birth control, McGreevy asserts that the seeds of division began to sprout as early as the 1940s – significantly earlier than much of the literature on Catholic voting patterns.\textsuperscript{32} State laws and court cases throughout the middle of the twentieth century provide the evidence for his hypothesis.\textsuperscript{33} Most striking, however, is McGreevy’s claim that the Democratic Party itself shifted far to the left on abortion and birth control.\textsuperscript{34} This suggests that it was not simply the elevation of social issues to the political forefront, but particular policy positions chosen by the Democratic Party that helped encourage Catholic Democratic rejection, although much of the other scholarly work directly contradicts this theory.

In providing a revisionist Catholic history in the United States, Appleby instead emphasizes the shift in Catholic worldview that coincided with changing voting patterns and ideological preferences.\textsuperscript{35} Catholic institutions, lay people, and clergy – including bishops in some cases – were all but formal extensions of the Democratic Party from the middle of the nineteenth century through the 1960s.\textsuperscript{36} As their historical struggles and discrimination faded

\textsuperscript{30} Rae, “Class and Culture,” 637-644.
\textsuperscript{31} McGreevy, “Catholics, Democrats, and the GOP in Contemporary America,” 669-681.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} McGreevy, “Catholics, Democrats, and the GOP in Contemporary America,” 669-681.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Appleby, “The Forgotten American?,” 160.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
further into the past while incomes, social status, and acceptance as fully white and American grew, Catholics refashioned themselves with a white-collar perception and reputation.\textsuperscript{37}

Marger traces the role that ethnicity and political identification played in this social elevation through the evolution of Detroit political power from 1900-1950.\textsuperscript{38} The results suggest a heavy ethno-religious political split; white Protestants and Catholics were predominantly Republicans and Democrats, respectively, while black Detroiters voted overwhelmingly Democratic since the New Deal.\textsuperscript{39} The Irish and Polish Catholics dominated Detroit politics through variations of union and machine politics, which casts Detroit in a similar light as other major cities throughout the Midwest and Northeast United States.\textsuperscript{40}

Sigel scrutinizes these roles of race and religion in President Kennedy’s 1960 election in Detroit.\textsuperscript{41} As the first Catholic president, Kennedy’s election can be seen as the zenith of Catholic political power and influence – the culmination of over a century of struggle into the American cultural and political mainstream. As the New Deal coalition fought to maintain itself after consecutive defeats to Eisenhower, Detroit’s voting bloc for Kennedy represented a possible renewal of the New Deal coalition.\textsuperscript{42} Detroit, like other large cities, voted heavily Democratic due to large Catholic and black populations.\textsuperscript{43} Kennedy’s strong victory in Detroit

\textsuperscript{37} Appleby, “The Forgotten American?,” 160.
\textsuperscript{38} Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 340-361.
\textsuperscript{40} Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 340-361.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, 447.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 436.
allowed him to barely carry the state, and he owed that victory to overwhelming Catholic and black support.\textsuperscript{44}

An important note is that even in the Eisenhower elections, Detroit Catholics remained far more Democratic than other white Christians.\textsuperscript{45} In Lenski’s case study of religiosity in Detroit, 57\% of Catholics identified as Democrats compared to only 19\% as Republicans in his study, which included both the city and its suburbs.\textsuperscript{46} The coalition responsible was reflected in large cities across the United States, especially the Midwest and Northeast.\textsuperscript{47} In Detroit, this New Deal coalition, comprised of primarily of African Americans, Jewish people, and Catholics along with labor power, ascended with Frank Murphy’s mayoral race in 1930 and the solidification of these voting blocs following his victory.\textsuperscript{48}

Again, scholars differ on the timing and causes of eventual diverging Catholic voting patterns. Brewer, Marlin, and Prendergast chronicle the history of American Catholic voting patterns and their political impact.\textsuperscript{49} Democratic Party identification among Catholics from 1952 to 1978 barely changed, declining from 68\% to 65\%.\textsuperscript{50} Brewer reaffirms this consistency in party identification, also noting that House of Representatives voting remained more heavily Democratic than presidential voting among Catholics.\textsuperscript{51} These contradictions and wide-ranging explanations suggest that suburbanization and social issues may not have affected party loyalty

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{McGreevy} McGreevy, \textit{Parish Boundaries}, 194.
\bibitem{Lenski} Lenski, \textit{The Religious Factor}, 138.
\bibitem{Tentler} Tentler, \textit{Seasons of Grace}, 486-488.
\bibitem{Marlin} Marlin, \textit{The American Catholic Voter}, 271.
\bibitem{Brewer} Brewer, \textit{Relevant No More?}, 34.
\end{thebibliography}
or political ideology to such a drastic extent. In the City of Detroit, however, demographic change had a substantial impact as suburbanization eventually led almost all white Catholics out of the city, though not by 1972.⁵²

The prior literature regarding Catholic voting patterns in the United States from the middle to the end of the twentieth century presents a clear pattern. Importantly, this trend holds up when narrowed to the City of Detroit during the same period, supporting the use of Detroit as a case study. By the 1980s, Democratic loyalty was no longer a guarantee among America Catholics. Changing demographics and the elevation of social issues surely accelerated this process, but a decline in the amount of parochial schools accompanied these changes and is vital to a more complete understanding.

**Parochial Schools**

Green details the relationship between church and state throughout the 1800s, highlighting the introduction of parochial schools as one of the defining issues.⁵³ By providing a historical basis of Catholic dedication to their parochial education system, Green advances the theory of schools as central anchors in Catholics communities.⁵⁴ The anti-Catholic sentiment that influenced laws and social norms to exclude Catholics from the public school system and intense legal battles surrounding parochial schools drove Catholics to relish their schools as safeguards against further marginalization.⁵⁵

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⁵³ Green, “Church and State in Nineteenth-Century America,” 81-87.
⁵⁴ Ibid.
⁵⁵ Ibid.
McAndrews chronicles the wave of support and later defeat of public funding of parochial and nonpublic schools throughout the country in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{56} By studying the principles and politics that led to the issue’s prominence and subsequent abandonment, McAndrews highlights the widening split among American Catholics in the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{57} Frequently citing a 1971 poll showing parochial school aid as the most important issue to Catholics, McAndrews presents the Nixon and Republican courting of Catholic votes by championing this issue as the main cause of political turmoil among Catholics.\textsuperscript{58} The necessity of public funding of parochial schools stemmed from the unsustainable increase in Catholic school enrollment from the 1940s until the 1960s then the rapid closing of over 1000 Catholic schools from 1963 through 1969 as enrollment plummeted.\textsuperscript{59} Catholics were naturally impassioned about saving their school system from collapse, but the fiscal advantages of Catholic schools garnered significant support from political conservatives as well.\textsuperscript{60} McAndrews emphasizes that this and other social issues increased the fractioning of the New Deal coalition, with liberal and conservative Catholics conflicted about the causes and solutions to the crisis of the Catholic school system.\textsuperscript{61} This struggle combined lingering Democratic loyalty and a lack of consensus among Catholic leaders in Congress, preventing federal action that resulted in over 100 bills failing to pass through the legislature.\textsuperscript{62}

Madaus and Linnan consolidate prior research on the outcomes of Catholic schools to illustrate the crossroads at which Catholic schools were stuck in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{63} The financial

\textsuperscript{56} McAndrews, “Unanswered Prayers,” 81-95.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 81.
\textsuperscript{59} McAndrews, “Unanswered Prayers,” 82-83.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 81-83, 89-95.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 93.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 95.
\textsuperscript{63} Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228.
hardships, demographic changes, and shifting worldviews away from their historical base all contributed to this crisis. Madaus and Linnan review studies that claim Catholic schools are desirable due to higher educational outcomes than their public school counterparts, thoroughly covering the shortcomings of these studies which fail to prove definitively that Catholic schools directly cause those results. The popular conception of divisiveness regarding Catholic schools in public opinion – even among Catholics themselves – is also highlighted, with Madaus and Linnan conflicting the later assertions of McAndrews, citing the lack of extensive research on the topic. Madaus and Linnan do not resolve these crossroads for Catholic schools, but, importantly, they point out two vital changes in parochial schools: the spread out from urban centers and the shared goal to qualify for federal support. Although some parts of the study conflict with Greeley, McAndrews, and other scholars, they critically acknowledge that demographic and geographic shifts of the Catholic population and schools are essential to the concurrent shifts in Catholic voting patterns.

O’Keefe and Scheopner take this issue to a modern case study on the educational achievement gap between parochial and public schools. As parochial schools close due to financial struggles, the results for the communities they serve harken back to the financial crises of Catholic parishes in the 1970s. The increased student achievement among minority students mostly served by these Catholic schools disappears when the resources of the schools vanish as

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64 Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228.
65 Ibid.
67 Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228.
their doors close.\textsuperscript{70} Greeley also discusses the roles of parochial schools as the influence and financial strength of parishes declined over the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{71} Despite declining Catholic enrollment in parochial schools, political, economic, and emotional support for the Catholic school system remained strong among American Catholics.\textsuperscript{72}

Tentler highlights the impact of parochial aid in Catholic voting patterns.\textsuperscript{73} Parochial aid was an issue mainly important to Catholics, so the Catholic split over the issue essentially reflected a fight over Catholic exceptionalism or continued assimilation.\textsuperscript{74} Mirel corroborates this idea in his study of Detroit schools from 1907 to 1971.\textsuperscript{75} Schools and taxes were important issues that split the New Deal coalition for Democrats, and the financial crises of Catholic parishes had taken its toll on the Archdiocese of Detroit by the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{76} By 1973, 137 of 360 Catholic schools shut their doors for good.\textsuperscript{77} Cohen investigates the financial implications of the crises in Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia.\textsuperscript{78} If all Catholic schools in Detroit closed in the early 1970s, Detroit Public Schools would have needed at least $108,500,000 to cover the costs to integrate those students into the public school system.\textsuperscript{79}

This literature advances the idea that American Catholic schools have been essential components of American Catholic social identity and community relationships. As parochial schools faced crises in the 1960s and 1970s, the divergent ideas for solutions exacerbated

\textsuperscript{70} O’Keefe and Scheopner, “Bridging the Gap,” 15-29.
\textsuperscript{71} Greeley, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church, 6.
\textsuperscript{72} Greeley, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church, 6.
\textsuperscript{73} Tentler, Seasons of Grace, 486-488.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 520-521.
\textsuperscript{75} Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, 270.
\textsuperscript{76} Cohen, The Financial Implications of Changing Patterns of Nonpublic School Operations, 92; Greeley, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church, 6; Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, 270; O’Keefe and Scheopner, “Bridging the Gap,” 15-29; Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 8, 18.
\textsuperscript{77} McGreevy, Parish Boundaries, 209-216.
\textsuperscript{78} Cohen, The Financial Implications of Changing Patterns of Nonpublic School Operations, 92.
\textsuperscript{79} Cohen, The Financial Implications of Changing Patterns of Nonpublic School Operations, 92.
political differences that began to spring out of changing demographics and suburbanization among white Catholics. And similar to voting patterns, Detroit’s history with parochial schools reflects the national trend and further sets itself up as a compelling case study. The correlation exists, and following logically therefore suggests that Catholic schools – physically and spiritually – were of utmost importance to urban Catholic communities, and in-turn their political preferences.

**Parish Institutions**

Religious institutions as tools of political mobilization and community engagement have been well-documented, with case studies on major cities consistently showing these effects. Specifically, Catholic parishes constituted the physical anchors of neighborhoods and the centers of both spiritual and social life for Catholics and the surrounding communities. In her analysis of Irish racial relations in Chicago, McMahon asserts that Catholic churches offered more than religious services.²⁰ Catholic churches were the heart and souls of neighborhoods, “vital to Catholic subculture.”²¹ In his Detroit case study, Lenski claims that Catholic schools increase ties to this Catholic subculture.²² In her book on urban Catholic schools, Brinig speaks of Catholic schools as community institutions that “bolster neighborhood social cohesion.”²³ The losses of these schools, consequently, hurt the typically poor, under-served neighborhoods in which they were located.²⁴ In his Youngstown, Ohio examination of Catholic grade schools, Welsh goes even further, declaring the urban parochial school as possibly the most important

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²¹ Ibid.
²³ Brinig, *Lost Classroom*, 3, 57, 67, 70-72, 86.
²⁴ Ibid, 3, 146, 158.
community institution.\textsuperscript{85} These Catholic communities were ethnically diverse, but were all built in “broader ‘Catholic’ culture,” which began to wilt in the 1960s as a result of school closings.\textsuperscript{86}

In their report on politics and religion in postwar Detroit, Stepan-Norris and Southworth suggest Catholic parishes’ roles in integration and neighborhood stabilization as community anchors contributed to their Democratic loyalty. In using Detroit in the 1950s as a case study, separating religious denominations, and studying electoral outcomes, Stepan-Norris and Southworth find that religious denomination is influential among their constituencies, with the socioeconomic statuses of their geographic location causing some variation in the impact.\textsuperscript{87} Democratic loyalty among Catholics developed initially as a means to provide social and financial support in a society traditionally antagonistic toward Catholicism, which led to skepticism regarding the impact of Catholicism on political influence.\textsuperscript{88} Stepan-Norris and Southworth find, however, that Catholic churches increased political activity among members and positively contributed to Democratic vote share in their neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, Catholic churches are vital resources for political organization and mobilization.\textsuperscript{90}

The role of Catholic schools in the desegregation of urban communities throughout the United States created deeper ties to parishes’ surrounding communities. As financial crises hit diocese throughout the country and parochial school enrollment dropped, Catholic schools began to serve the non-Catholic and minority communities of their neighborhoods. Greene and O’Keefe study Catholic school enrollment patterns and find that school closings from the latter

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, 9, 15.
\textsuperscript{87} Stepan-Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 345-347.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, 352, 353.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 368-374
\textsuperscript{90} Stepan-Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 352, 353.
half of the twentieth century onward primarily affected minority students\(^91\). Already by 1983, 58\% of students in parochial schools were minorities.\(^92\) These communities were becoming increasingly diverse, and despite the wishes of some Catholic homeowners, the clergy and Catholic hierarchy largely encouraged inclusion and integration.\(^93\)

In a study of the decline of the New Deal coalition in Chicago, Carl emphasizes the role of Catholic schools as community institutions that provided a ladder to elevate black leaders in the city.\(^94\) Community leaders that came from Catholic schools – whether black Protestants or white ethnic Catholics – opposed the closing of parochial schools when funding required cutbacks in education.\(^95\) Newman describes a similar situation in the Catholic Diocese of Richmond.\(^96\) Although Virginia may not spring to mind as a center of American Catholic culture, Newman’s case study bolsters the argument of Catholic importance in the process of desegregation.\(^97\) Catholic clergy became vocal supporters of integration in Richmond, which led to action in parochial schools when public schools lagged behind with continued dedication to segregation.\(^98\) McDonald’s study of the impact of urban Catholic schools arrives at similar conclusions as Carl, Newman, and Stepan-Norris and Southworth.\(^99\) Operating as essentially public institutions that serve the common good, parochial schools have provided support and

\(^91\) Greene and O’Keefe, “Enrollment in Catholic Schools in the United States,” 165.
\(^92\) Ibid.
\(^94\) Carl, “Harold Washington and Chicago’s Schools,” 323, 338.
\(^95\) Carl, “Harold Washington and Chicago’s Schools,” 323, 338.
\(^97\) Ibid.
\(^98\) Ibid.
\(^99\) McDonald, “Pluralism and Public Policy,” 212, 213
services to minority communities. From their historical role in desegregation to modern urban Catholic parishes that now serve predominantly Latino or non-Catholic populations, Catholic churches and schools have simply evolved in their roles as urban community anchors.

Riddle, Tentler, Mirel, Lenski, McGreevy, and Sugrue follow Stepan-Norris and Southworth and put this evidence further to the test by investigating Catholics in Detroit. Riddle examines the reactions before and after the *Bradley v. Milliken* Supreme Court decision that ended cross-district busing solutions for racial integration. Detroit Archbishop John Dearden led Catholic hierarchy in vocally supporting racial integration – and busing as one potential solution – and went so far as to prevent Catholic schools from capitalizing on the situation and becoming a refuge for opponents of integration. Riddle highlights how Dearden’s commitment to integration coincided with the closing of four Catholic schools in suburban Macomb County in order to maintain three schools in the City of Detroit that served increasingly non-Catholic and mostly black communities. This vital role in desegregation spearheaded by Catholic hierarchy and organizations is further supported by the findings of Greeley that parochial school graduates are less racist and less anti-Semitic than the public and other Catholics as a whole. It logically follows that the clear support among Catholic leaders for integration permeated schools and influenced Catholic opinion.

In Tentler’s history of the Archdiocese of Detroit, she highlights the changing role of Catholic parishes as the demographic makeup of the city evolved. As the black population in

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100 McDonald, “Pluralism and Public Policy,” 212, 213.
104 Ibid.
105 Greeley, *Catholic Schools in a Declining Church*, 6; Greeley, *The American Catholic*, 185.
the city increased, so did positive opinions of Catholics among African Americans.\textsuperscript{107} This coincided with Archbishop Dearden’s shift to focus on War on Poverty programs and increased support for integration and inner-city social services.\textsuperscript{108} Mirel follows this, discussing the role of parochial schools in the evolution of Detroit Public Schools as some middle-class African Americans abandoned public schools in favor of parochial schools still open.\textsuperscript{109} The logic behind this improved perception is supported by Lenski, who asserts that black Protestants’ favorable views of Catholics are due to Catholic hierarchy’s vocal stance in favor of integration.\textsuperscript{110} By the mid-1980s, the Catholic heyday was over, and schools and services both served predominantly non-Catholic communities.\textsuperscript{111}

McGreevy scrutinizes the understandings of urban Catholic community and racial relations.\textsuperscript{112} In both a literal and figurative sense, Catholic neighborhoods centered around a church, with a school and recreational facilities often attached.\textsuperscript{113} This allowed parishes to cast a broad range of influence over those living in surrounding neighborhoods, which in turn facilitated Catholic leadership and participation in community organizations.\textsuperscript{114} Catholic leaders – clergy and lay – such as Fr. John Coogan of the University of Detroit, Hope Brophy, who led the Archbishop’s Commission on Human Rights, and Archbishop John Dearden encouraged parishes to welcome black community members, promoted student support for the freedom riders, and took an active role in the administering programs for the War on Poverty.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{107} Tentler, \textit{Seasons of Grace}, 514.  
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{109} Mirel, \textit{The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System}, 270, 367.  
\textsuperscript{110} Lenski, \textit{The Religious Factor}, 67.  
\textsuperscript{111} Tentler, \textit{Seasons of Grace}, 520-521.  
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, 75-78.  
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{115} McGreevy, \textit{Parish Boundaries}, 137-140, 209-216.
In his seminal work on the racial relations, inequality, and urban decline of postwar Detroit, Sugrue continues the work of McGreevy and underscores the importance of physical and spiritual community for Catholics that were tied together in neighborhoods with a parish and parochial school at the center.116 Yet he focuses on the tension brought about by these intense communal bonds.117 This had the juxtaposed effect of Catholic leaders and organizations encouraging and supporting racial integration while many Catholic lay people fiercely opposed integration into their sacred neighborhoods, leading to conflict and racial resentment.118 The Catholic desire for the mainstream emphasized by Appleby took physical shape in these neighborhoods.119 Catholic neighborhoods on the surface were not unlike the rest of the city; communal neighborhoods were the norm.120 But in Wayne County, which was 65% Catholic by the 1950s, Catholic neighborhoods took on out-sized importance culturally and physically.121 “Family, parish, and neighborhood” were the three spheres of Catholicism, from which spiritual and social life flowed as a reflection of pride in their Catholic identity.122 These deep roots in physical locations prevented Catholics from simply leaving to avoid integration, as was possible for Jewish people and white Protestants.123 Though this led to inevitable and constant conflict, it also facilitated positive Catholic action in support of integration through the Catholic Interracial Council and the leadership of Archbishop Dearden, among others.124

Parishes were therefore true community anchors in every sense of the word. Their effects on Catholic political mobilization, relationships with the parochial schools they operated, and

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118 Ibid, 213.
121 Ibid, 342.
122 Ibid, 213.
interactions with the rapidly-changing surrounding neighborhoods illustrate their massive influence. In Detroit as in cities across the country, the power of Catholic parishes to impose change and give direction to their communities – for good and bad – can hardly be disputed.

The shift was gradual, imperfect, and far from a complete Democratic abandonment, but from the 1960s through the 1980s, white Catholics became more ideologically moderate and less partisan – reflecting political preferences typical of a generic white American rather than their historically liberal views and Democratic loyalty. Social wedge issues, suburbanization, and improved socioeconomic status among Catholics all contributed to this trend in some form.

Still, the decline of parochial schools reflects this same pattern of the Catholic Democratic vote share. Whether they exacerbated an initial division or were more instrumental in the political shift, parochial schools were vital to their communities. As financial crises gripped diocese, enrollment in parochial schools plummeted, and neighborhood makeups drastically shifted, Catholics never forgot the historical importance of the parochial school system. However, the divergent opinions on possible solutions proved too divisive, and the once-unifying issue morphed into a battle for the political soul of Catholics.

Nevertheless, these physical structures – parochial schools and their churches – anchored neighborhoods, connected parishes to traditionally marginalized communities, and consequently facilitated Catholic political activity and Democratic Party loyalty. Catholics saw their schools close and parishes shrink but social standing increase as they moved out to the suburbs. In turn, they lost the ability and desire to mobilize in favor of integration, government services, and other social justice issues intimately related to hardships confronting cities that historically connected them to the Democratic Party.
The Argument for Catholic Parishes as the Missing Link

Social issues, white flight, and evolving demographics have all been suggested by prior literature as components of changing Catholic voting patterns, but their contradictions and broad explanations lack the causality to fully encompass why Catholics specifically departed from their historical Democratic loyalty. As the correlation exists, it’s possible – even likely – that the closing or suburban relocation of urban Catholic schools directly contributed to shifting voting patterns among white Catholics. The causal mechanism facilitating this effect is the centrality of Catholic schools in relation to Catholic identity, their surrounding neighborhoods, and shaping Catholic political preferences. The premises that provide the basis for causality are the historical Democratic loyalty among Catholics, the consistent importance of the parochial school system to Catholics, and the socializing effects and broad influence of Catholic parishes in their surrounding neighborhoods. These factors existed nationwide as in Detroit, making the city a compelling case study. The role of parishes in political and social organizing as the central connection for evolving Catholic voting patterns and the importance of Catholic schools persuasively suggests that declining parish power and influence caused these phenomena. Schools closing and the subsequent drop in parish influence accelerated white flight and permitted the divergence of Catholic voting patterns.

This shift in Catholic voting patterns is been well-documented above, with changing Democratic Party platforms, evolving social issues, and growing social status and suburbanization all hypothesized as affecting Catholic voting patterns in the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars have found some slight consensus that social issues and suburbanization have played a role, though magnitude remains uncertain. The logic behind the timeline, however, simply does
not hold. Catholics were overwhelmingly Democratic since mass immigration into northern metropolises in the middle of the nineteenth century, and this pattern sustained through vast, dramatic political party changes.\textsuperscript{125} Of course, pure ideological homogeneity was not quite a staple of political parties yet, as shown through the Democratic Solid South that fiercely opposed the growing influence of African Americans in the Democratic Party after the New Deal.\textsuperscript{126} Nevertheless, Catholics remained loyal Democrats until the latter half of the twentieth century.

The specific issues that caused the splitting Catholic vote are still debated as well. As divisive social issues such as abortion, and later gay marriage, came to prominence in American politics, Catholic voting patterns began to diverge.\textsuperscript{127} This correlation does not imply causality. The elevation of social issues’ prominence did not alter Catholic social teaching on the topic, or the historical Catholic focus on social justice issues and the allocation of social services that traditionally aligned them with the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{128} Further, the effect of these social issues on actually changing the voting patterns of Catholics has been disputed by scholars.\textsuperscript{129} Finally, lending the utmost importance to social issues while discounting other correlating and potentially more compelling variables, such as elevated social status in the American mainstream, creates a logical gap. Again, parties change and evolve throughout history, issues come and go in

importance, and yet to assume these specific issues trump historical patterns seems to be a fallacious argument.

The most plausible of the traditional explanations is the elevated social status of American Catholics by the end of the twentieth century. With their leadership in political machines, from Tammany Hall in New York to Chicago and Detroit, Catholics had been climbing the ladder and slowly assimilating into the American mainstream to lose their status as “other” – essentially becoming fully white and therefore American.130 Appleby, Riddle, Sugrue, and Tentler also suggest that as their initial struggles and discrimination faded further into history, Catholic worldview and self-images shifted as well.131 The focus on social justice issues that characterize life in working class urban neighborhoods were no longer prioritized by many Catholics.132 Suburbanization, therefore, is the manifestation of this phenomenon. Catholics literally leaving their former working-class homes as the black population in cities increased with a corresponding increase in Republican voting among Catholics presents a potentially persuasive case for this theory. But because only the richest Catholics showed strong signs of a shift toward true Republican Party loyalty over the 1960s and 1970s, this is far from representative of overall Catholic political behavior.133

Furthermore, this claim coincides with the closing of Catholic schools, the ensuing loss of “otherness” as Catholics, and the unique communal bonds that kept Catholic communities together throughout much of American Catholic history. The causality of white flight and

132 Brewer, Relevant No More?, xvii, 44.
133 Ibid, 44.
suburbanization presents another issue with this theory. Brinig, Greeley, McMahon, Mirel, McGreevy, Neary, Prendergast, Stepan-Norris and Southworth, Sugrue, and Welsh all discuss the importance of the physical location of parishes and their influence on surrounding neighborhoods.134 Because of this, Catholics could not simply pack their bags and move away. A more logical sequence, then, is that strong Catholic parishes were buttresses against white flight and for continued Democratic support among Catholics. When parochial schools closed and parishes became weaker and less influential is when the effects of white flight likely began to take hold.

Catholics were still far more Democratic than other white Christians even during this period of suburbanization and diverging Catholic voting.135 If social issues, elevated social standing, and suburbanization were truly responsible, then contemporary Catholic voting patterns directly contradict these arguments. Even when adjusting for only non-Hispanic white Catholics, they are still more likely to vote Democratic than other white Protestants.136 This further limits possible explanations, but far from rules out the argument that if a parochial high school remained open and the parish was therefore able to exert out-sized influence in the surrounding

134 Brinig, Lost Classroom, 3, 57, 67, 70-72, 86; Greeley, The American Catholic, 213, 225; McGreevy, Parish Boundaries, 75-78; McMahon, What Parish Are You from?, 2; Mirel, The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System, 270; Neary, “Black-Belt Catholic Space,” 76-91; Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 8-30; Stepan-Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 343-348; Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 9, 213, 238; Welsh, Closing Chapters, 4, 9, 10, 15.
community, Catholics would have continued to vote more Democratic than otherwise and suburbanization among Catholics would have been mitigated.

Catholic education was traditionally a central component to Catholic identity because of their historical exclusion from public education and the emphasis on social justice issues present in urban parochial schools, not because of any educational advantages.\(^{137}\) Catholic schools arose to protect from discrimination in public schools and to provide a sense of community in the face of political abandonment.\(^{138}\) For most of their history, Catholic schools were a democratizing force in education, stabilizing communities by educating marginalized, impoverished, and minority communities otherwise neglected.\(^{139}\)

Even as Catholic enrollment in parochial schools fell and urban parishes began to serve predominantly minority and non-Catholic communities, the issue of parochial aid and the importance of the Catholic school system never fell as a priority for Catholics. Parochial aid was not an issue for non-Catholics, but it managed to divide the Catholic community, proving to be a wedge issue similar to abortion and other social issues that gained prominence during this time.\(^{140}\)

\(^{137}\) Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228.
\(^{138}\) Brinig, Lost Classroom, 18; Greeley, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church, 6; Greeley, The American Catholic, 164, 165; Green, “Church and State in Nineteenth-Century America,” 81-87; Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 340-361; McMahon, What Parish Are You from?, 2; Prendergast, The Catholic Voter in American Politics, 8-30; Welsh, Closing Chapters, 4, 5, 7, 9.
Yet even in the 1962, near the height of the power and scope of the parochial school system, only 52% of Catholics were enrolled in parochial schools.\textsuperscript{141} This suggests that Catholics had already been contemplating the future of the parochial school system, and that Catholic schools had long been serving the needs of non-Catholics. Both are key points in understanding a more symbolic – yet important – role of parochial schools in the minds of Catholics. First, the closing of parochial schools in 1962 would have affected roughly half of Catholics – a number that would decrease each subsequent year. So for many Catholics, the importance of parochial aid represented a symbolic institution of their own, which they did not wish to see weakened or failing. Second, the connection to other historically marginalized communities – especially African Americans – forced Catholics and their institutions into a more progressive, social justice-oriented worldview.\textsuperscript{142} Although racism was often prominent and conflict consistently arose between the two communities throughout the country, including Detroit, both Catholics and African Americans were part of the same voting coalition since the New Deal and had several overarching aligning priorities.\textsuperscript{143}

This leads to the critical causal mechanism connecting the emblematic importance of parochial schools to shifting voting patterns: the role of parishes as community institutions. Fundamental to Catholic identity, parishes and parochial schools have served as sources of

\textsuperscript{141} Greene and O'Keefe, “Enrollment in Catholic Schools in the United States,” 162.
stability in the face of anti-Catholic sentiment, institutions promoting social mobility and integration of marginalized communities abandoned by public schools, and as resources of political organization. Schools represent more than places of education. They are symbols of parish influence and strength, further solidifying them as pillars of the community. The strongest parishes have the largest number of parishioners and therefore the funding for high schools in addition to elementary schools. This ties back to the causality question with suburbanization. Funding for schools, social services, and other community programs fall if Catholics leave the neighborhood. But Catholics leave neighborhoods with weaker parishes that do not operate parochial schools, especially in dense urban neighborhoods where parishes wield the most influence. A vicious cycle results, leaving financially-strapped parishes serving increasingly minority communities without the requisite resources, therefore adversely affecting those communities even further.

The history of Catholic political power and the case studies of their roles in political machines, the labor movement, and integration efforts illustrate the mobilizing capabilities of parishes. In detailing political histories of American Catholics, Appleby, Greeley, Marger, Marlin, Prendergast, and Tentler discuss the rise of Catholics in organized, machine politics made capable due to the mobilizing power of parishes. In case studies of Chicago, Richmond, and Youngstown, Carl and McMahon, Newman, and Welsh highlight the key roles played by groups and leaders that grew out of parishes through their central location and importance in

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144 Greeley, Catholic Schools in a Declining Church, 6; Greeley, The American Catholic, 213, 225; Green, “Church and State in Nineteenth-Century America,” 81-87; Madaus and Linnan, “The Outcome of a Catholic Education?,” 207-228; McAndrews, “Unanswered Prayers,” 81-83; Stepan-Norris and Southworth, “Churches as Organizational Resources,” 352, 353.

working-class Catholic and increasingly black neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{146} And most importantly for this Detroit case study, Stepan-Norris and Southworth, Sugrue, McGreevy, Sigel, Marger, Lenski, and Tentler emphasize the political power of Catholic institutions in Detroit.\textsuperscript{147} Catholic community leaders, such as Cardinal Edward Mooney, Archbishop Dearden, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Fr. John Coogan, and Hope Brophy set examples for lay people to follow. And through Catholic participation in and with organizations such as the Catholic Interracial Council, the Archbishop’s Council on Human Rights, the United Auto Workers, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Mayor’s Interracial Committee, the Michigan Council of Churches, and the Northwest Community Organization, Catholic social involvement grew from their spiritual and physical centers in their parishes.\textsuperscript{148}

These examples of political mobilization in pursuit of social justice would logically lead to the Democratic voting patterns that Catholics nationwide and in Detroit exhibited. As prior research has pointed out, Detroit Catholics were both more politically active and far more Democratic than other white Christians, even as some landslide swing elections caused fluctuations in overall Catholic voting patterns.\textsuperscript{149}

Thus informs the two central premises of this thesis. Catholic parishes were so significant in the lives of Catholics, that their decline likely facilitated and exacerbated the suburbanization and white flight among Catholics in the 1960s and 1970s. And as these parishes declined and

Catholics moved, their connection to their own political history, the social justice issues that inspired that it, and the proximity to other marginalized communities with common political goals all faded from memory and relevance. These dual suppositions through parish influence present the case for causality between the importance of parochial schools and changing Catholic voting patterns. By studying Detroit as a model and using the presence of Catholic high schools as a proxy for parish power and influence, the interactions between these phenomena can be quantitatively examined.

Hypotheses

H1: In neighborhoods where Catholic high schools closed, the black population share among the population increased.

H2: In neighborhoods where Catholic high schools remained open, the Democratic vote share among the population decreased.

Methodology

To test these two hypotheses with Detroit as my case city, I compared election patterns of neighborhoods containing Catholic high schools in the 1960s and early 1970s. I focused on neighborhoods surrounding the locations of Catholic high schools that were open in 1960. I used precinct-level election returns and precinct boundary maps from the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972
presidential elections to determine these neighborhood boundaries. Finally, I used census data from the 1960 and 1970s to create demographic profiles of the neighborhoods in order to control for the population and demographic changes that followed white flight. This process allowed me to test my first hypothesis, with closed Catholic schools in each presidential election year acting as the independent variable and the black population share as the dependent variable. For my second hypothesis, open Catholic high schools in each year serves as the independent variable, with Democratic vote share as the dependent variable. With these parameters, I am able to test for both the impact on Democratic voting patterns and demographic changes while controlling for confounding variables in each case.

In order to explain the methodology as clearly as possible, it’s necessary to define terms I will be using going forward and the reasoning behind their uses and definitions. The term “parish” will serve as the neighborhoods that surround the locations of the Catholic high schools. According to the Official Catholic Directory, there were fifty-one Catholic high schools in the City of Detroit in 1960. That number fell to forty-nine, thirty-four, and fifteen in 1964, 1968, and 1972, respectively. The term parish was chosen purposefully instead of “school,” or even simply “neighborhood.” The role of the parish as an institution is the causal mechanism tying the issue of parochial schools and Catholic voting together with the communities they serve. The use of parish also reflects the influence of churches over several neighborhoods, not simply the

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150 Steven Manson, Jonathan Schroeder, David Van Riper, and Steven Ruggles, “National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 12.0” (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2017).
immediate surroundings of the church. And neighborhood boundaries themselves were often defined by those of the local parishes.¹⁵³

The use of high schools for the purposes of this thesis is two-fold. First, parochial schools are essential to understanding Catholic social and political behavior. But the second a more important reason for my methodology is that parochial high schools are essentially proxies for church influence. I am not interested in the student enrollment in each high school. I am not studying any effects of Catholic high schools’ educational or social outcomes, but rather the influence of the pertinent parish; the student profile of each school is therefore irrelevant. The largest, most financially secure, and most powerful Catholic parishes operated parochial elementary schools and high schools. When that power waned, or financial crises hit, high schools closed first, then elementary schools, before the church itself last. Thus, using Catholic high schools narrows the study to a smaller subset of only the most influential churches.

The fifty-one parishes can be further split into two types. The majority of parishes are what I will classify as “neighborhood parishes.” These neighborhood parishes consist of high schools that form part of a larger community that serves the local neighborhoods. Neighborhood parishes consist of a church, elementary school, and the high school. These are the most vital to my thesis because of their more clear-cut connections to their surrounding communities. The other parishes are “magnet parishes.” These consist of parishes that are solely comprised of the high school, and they primarily cater to the school itself. These magnet parishes draw students and support from all over the city and from suburbs, rather than the local neighborhoods. The distinction between neighborhood and magnet parishes was not arbitrary but based on their placement in the Official Catholic Directory of 1960.¹⁵⁴ Neighborhood parishes came from high

¹⁵³ McGreevy, Parish Boundaries, 20, 22, 75-78; Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 234.
schools that were categorized under the “Clergy, Parishes, Missions and Parochial Schools” label, while high schools under the “High Schools, Diocesan,” or “High Schools, Private” labels were designated magnet parishes.\textsuperscript{155} Both still served the same purpose as community institutions, so my analysis counts all parishes together and also separates neighborhood parishes.

The dependent variable for my first hypothesis is the black population share. This data comes from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, which limits my analysis to only comparing demographic data the 1960, 1964, and 1968 elections to the 1972 election without any comparisons among elections in the 1960s. The use of the black population is due to its growth in the City of Detroit in the 1960s and 1970s after white flight and suburbanization accelerated. Using the white population share would accomplish the same goal, but the use of the black population share makes for an easier, more straightforward test and subsequent interpretation of my first hypothesis. The data for the black population share is simply the percentage of African Americans of the total population of these parishes according to the 1960 and 1970 Censuses.

It is important to acknowledge an assumption inherent in utilizing demographic data. The white population in the City of Detroit, specifically the population used in my thesis surrounding Catholic high schools, is assumed to be Catholic. That is due to the prominence of Catholics in Detroit before suburbanization and white flight, and this simplification makes the analysis cleaner. The black population, therefore, is also assumed to be Protestant. Although this is the case for the large majority of African Americans, several prominent Catholic churches in Detroit

\textsuperscript{155} The Official Catholic Directory for the Year of Our Lord 1960.
served predominantly black parishioners. But for the sake of simplicity, the black population is assumed non-Catholic for the purposes of this study.

The dependent variable for testing my second hypothesis is Democratic vote share. This terminology and the focus on the Democratic, rather than Republican, vote share reflect the consistently high Democratic vote percentage in the City of Detroit, and the historic Democratic Party loyalty of Catholics. The data behind Democratic vote share is the percentage of Democratic votes of the total Democratic and Republican votes in the presidential elections of 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972. The use of only Democratic and Republican vote totals, rather than total votes including third-party candidates is simply due to data availability limitations. For the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections, only the Democratic and Republican precinct-level election returns were accessible. Consequently, I continued to use only Democratic and Republican vote totals for the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections to maintain consistency throughout the data analysis.

The first step in actually testing these hypotheses was to determine which areas would make up these fifty-one parishes. I consulted the Official Catholic Directories for 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 to compile a list of Catholic high schools that were open in those respective years during which presidential elections also occurred. I then used ArcGIS to geocode the list of addresses to form the bases for the voting precincts and census tracts that would constitute my fifty-one parishes.

Once the addresses were geocoded, I needed to determine which precincts’ voting returns would be used for each parish. I sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Michigan Secretary of State, Wayne County Clerk, and Detroit City Clerk to obtain the precinct-

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level election returns and the precinct boundary maps for the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 presidential elections.\textsuperscript{157} For these elections, the City of Detroit was split into larger wards, with varying numbers of precincts within each ward. The ward and precinct boundaries changed with each election, requiring four maps to be made with the geocoded high school addresses in ArcGIS. In order to maintain consistency and eliminate any subjective decisions from the process, I used a standard rule for determining the precincts included in the boundaries of each parish. For each election year map, I used ArcGIS to draw the precincts that included the fifty-one high schools open in 1960. Any precinct that bordered the precinct containing each high school was included in the parish boundaries. This rule crossed ward boundaries and did not matter if a precinct were included in the boundaries of multiple parishes; this was the case for several precincts in each year. Once the precincts were determined for each parish in 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972, the next step was simply to aggregate the Democratic and Republican vote total for the relevant precincts and calculate the Democratic vote share for each parish in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 presidential elections.

Aggregating the demographic data was a similar process, albeit with its own set of complications and decisions. I obtained the 1960 and 1970 data from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS).\textsuperscript{158} The most specific data available for the time period is census tract-level data. To determine which census tracts should be included in the demographic makeup of the fifty-one parishes, I downloaded census tract shape-files of the 1960 and 1970 Censuses, and overlaid them onto the four maps for 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 in


\textsuperscript{158} Manson, Schroeder, Van Riper, and Ruggles, “National Historical Geographic Information System.”
ArcGIS. I again used the locations of the Catholic high schools open in 1960 as the bases. However, I could not use the same rule for census tracts as I did for voting precincts because census tracts are much larger than most precincts and would produce inaccurate analyses. I used a one-third mile radius from the Catholic high schools as the range within which to include census tracts for each parish. This choice of one-third of a mile was essentially arbitrary but led to results that roughly matched the aggregation of the precincts and balanced the more spacious west side of Detroit with heavily dense areas downtown and along Woodward Avenue. Because of the limitations of only two censuses, the demographic profiles for 1960, 1964, and 1968 are all the same, with 1972 then having unique parish characteristics.

Once these steps were complete, I was left with fifty-one data points – the parishes – each with a unique Democratic vote share and racial makeup. The final stage was the data analysis. I used the statistics program STATA to complete my various analyses. Through a diverse set of t-tests and regressions utilizing the data from each presidential election year, I was able to test my two hypotheses. And to provide the context and critical implications of my results, I compared the parish demographic and voting patterns to those of the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and Catholics in the United States.159

The methodology of this thesis is of course imperfect. Although in the design of my thesis and methodology, I tried to cover all requisite bases as much as possible, but three issues loom and overshadow any other possible inconsistencies or errors I did not account for: data limitations, scope limitations, and confounding variables. These three issues intersect and inform

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one another, but I will attempt to explain the problems caused by each of these and how I tried to overcome them.

The most critical limitation of this study is the lack of data analyzed due simply due to inaccessibility or nonexistence. My original research design was to study the presidential elections in the twenty-year period from 1960-1980, which would have expanded the analysis to cover a couple more of the most significant years of suburbanization. Although through the FOIA request I was able to obtain the election returns for the 1976 and 1980 elections, the precinct boundary maps for each election simply do not seem to exist. Attempting to stretch the FOIA request to compel assistance obtaining these maps, I contacted the Archives of the State of Michigan, the Burton Historical Collection at the Detroit Public Library, and the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan; no organization had the maps or knew where they might be. The most consequential shortcoming as a result is the limited demographic data and time-series analysis possible. The 1976 and 1980 presidential elections would allow a comparison of six elections over twenty years and the use of three censuses. 1980 itself would have been supremely valuable due to the relevance of the census data for that year, which would have allowed for more accurate tests of the change in Democratic voting patterns due to accurately controlling for demographic changes in the parishes.

This is a case study of one city over four presidential elections and twelve years. The results of this case study of Detroit can by no means be universally applied to every city in the United States, the Midwest, or even Michigan. This thesis undoubtedly has implications for future research and evaluating current understandings of the political history of American Catholics and identity politics more generally. But to use these results to claim any universal
causality and then apply to situations elsewhere, with their own unique demographic, political, and social histories, would be irresponsible and erroneous.

Finally, confounding variables may still exist in my analyses. In looking at patterns of Democratic vote share, race is clearly a consequential variable that I was able to account for. However, income, education, family size, party platforms, and issue prominence are several potentially important confounding variables affecting either the population or political atmosphere that were likely influential in determining demographic and voting patterns.

This thesis cannot account for these three shortcomings, but in acknowledging and understanding these issues, I do not aim to account for them. This study is limited in range and purpose by design. The historical phenomenon of Catholic voting patterns cannot be explained by two hypotheses in one study. But illuminating one piece of that puzzle is within reach.
II. 1960: Kennedy v. Nixon

Introduction – 1960

Fifty-One Catholic high schools were open in 1960.\textsuperscript{160} The geographic distribution is shown in Figure 1. They varied in size, influence, and neighborhood profile. Of the fifty-one parishes, thirty-eight were neighborhood parishes and thirteen magnet parishes. The year that

saw the election of the first and only Catholic American president, 1960, represents the baseline year that set the stage for analysis compared to the 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections.

My data analysis, through t-tests and regressions run with STATA, makes use of information from all open parishes combined in addition to only the neighborhood parishes. On the whole, the results are comparable and often complementary. But separating them makes for a more thorough and nuanced analysis, with the neighborhood parishes more fundamental to my two hypotheses.

Figures 2 and 3 compare Democratic vote share and the black population share of magnet and neighborhood parishes. Neighborhood parishes are in Group 0 and magnet parishes in Group
1. As seen through this t-test, neighborhood parishes are 4.99% more Democratic in 1960 yet 1.57% more African American, on average. The voting results make sense and match up with predicted outlooks of neighborhood and magnet parishes, but the demographics stand out. Still, the difference is small, allowing these baselines for the initial differences between the two types of parish to inform the interpretations of data going forward. Neighborhood parishes should reflect a more accurate Catholic community – that means lower a Democratic vote share and lower black population share than the City of Detroit at large, the aggregate demographics of all parishes open in a given year, and the parishes that had schools close before the next presidential election.

An important caveat is that these t-tests in Figures 2 and 3 are not statistically significant at the most commonly used 95% significance level. The relevant p-values of 0.1055 and 0.4374 are greater than 0.05, so the results are only good for giving a baseline comparison of the mean Democratic vote share of 1960 to add context going forward.

Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United States – 1960

As the 1960 election results primarily serve to set parameters for future comparisons, measuring the voting and demographic information for the City of Detroit, along with the Democratic vote share of the State of Michigan and Catholics nationwide, provides more context to this baseline profile of Detroit Catholic voting patterns.
Table 1 compares the Democratic vote share, the black population share, and the white population share in the City of Detroit, the fifty-one parishes with open Catholic high schools, and the thirty-eight neighborhood parishes in 1960. The 1960 Census allows for accurate demographic information for this election year, giving definitive demographic profiles. 28.87% of Detroit’s population, 30.35% of all parishes’ population, and 30.75% of neighborhood parishes’ population were African American in 1960. At first, this might seem counterintuitive and contradictory to both my first hypothesis and prior assertions. But 1960 is simply the baseline year for future comparisons. The demographic outlook of 1960 is less important to my first hypothesis and thesis than the demographics of the parishes that had schools close by 1972, with the 1970 Census providing updated information.

The City of Detroit voted 70.97% Democratic, while all parishes voted 74.84% and neighborhood parishes voted 76.11% Democratic. Likewise, the Democratic vote share also appears anomalous at first – at that’s because it essentially is. The 1960 election of Kennedy – the first Catholic – likely inspired greater energy and mobilization in the Catholic communities. This explains the increased Democratic voting in the parishes over Detroit as a whole.

Additionally, 1960 is before the full effects of white flight took shape and before Nixon’s southern strategy further realigned the political parties. Nevertheless, the difference is only 3.87% and 5.14% for all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. This table essentially

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presents the City of Detroit and Catholic parishes as similar demographically and politically in 1960, setting up future comparisons with evolving demographics and voting patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960 Parishes vs State of Michigan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Parishes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: 1960 Parishes and the State of Michigan

Table 2 focuses only on the Democratic vote shares of all parishes and neighborhood parishes contrasted with that of the State of Michigan. Reflecting the razor-thin vote margin of the election nationwide, Michigan only voted 51.01% Democratic. The Catholic parishes decimated this figure. All parishes had a 23.83% increase in Democratic vote share, while neighborhood parishes saw an even larger 25.10% increase compared to the State of Michigan. This information does little to prove either of my hypotheses but helps establish the Democratic voting tendencies of Catholics in Detroit and provide a deeper context for these political patterns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1960 Parishes vs US Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Catholics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Parishes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: 1960 Parishes and Catholics in the United States. U.S. Catholic voting data is an average of Gallup Poll and ANES election estimates.

Finally, table 3 presents the same comparison but with Catholic Democratic vote share nationwide. Catholics nationwide had the highest 1960 Democratic vote share of any group at 80.00%. Unlike the City of Detroit or the State of Michigan, this translates to a 5.16% and 3.89% decrease in Democratic vote share among all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. This is possibly simply due to greater excitement and engagement among cities with larger

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162 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.”
163 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.”
Catholic populations. Detroit also had a historically small – though relatively powerful – Irish Catholic population, while its Polish Catholic population constituted the majority of Catholics.\footnote{Marger, “Ethnic Succession in Detroit Politics,” 347-352.} This also suggests that Catholics who had already moved to suburban or rural communities by 1960 still exhibited Democratic loyalty. This is supported by some case studies of Catholic political behavior at the time.\footnote{Greer, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” 611-625; Penning, “Changing Partisanship and Issue Stands among American Catholics, 29-49; Rae, “Class and Culture,” 629-650.} Most importantly, however, this information sets the initial Catholic Democratic vote share so high that the future drop off is significant and therefore invites explanations for the precipitous decrease.

\textit{Conclusion – 1960}

In many ways, the 1960 presidential election is atypical. The higher Democratic vote share among Catholics nationwide than either category of parishes or the City of Detroit is unique in this thesis. However, the 1964, 1968, and 1972 elections are also exceptional in different ways, with curiosities in the data throughout. This 1960 data sets an important benchmark, though, with initial profiles necessary for future comparison. In 1960, Catholic parishes with open high schools were predominantly white and overwhelmingly Democratic. How these trends change as parishes’ schools close and neighborhoods diversify will tell the story of the evolution Catholic voting and demographic patterns through these four elections.
III. 1964: Johnson v. Goldwater

Introduction – 1964

Of the fifty-one Catholic high schools that were open in 1960, only two closed by the 1964 presidential election, shown in Figure 4. Both of the schools that closed were in neighborhood parishes. This makes the data analysis and comparisons between the 1960 and

1964 elections helpful for completing the profiles of Catholic political behavior and neighborhood demographics in Detroit. That both closings were in neighborhood parishes also adds credence to the greater role neighborhood parishes play in my hypotheses. Neighborhood parishes are more reflective of changing demographics and evolving Catholic voting patterns than magnet parishes.

Figure 5: 1964 Black Population Share, All Parishes

Figure 6: 1964 Black Population Share, Neighborhood Parishes

Figures 5 and 6 compare the black population share in parishes with schools that have closed and are still open in 1964. Group 0 consists of the closed parishes, while Group 1 is open. Figures 5 and 6 compare all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. In both Figures,
the average black population share is far greater in parishes where the schools have closed. With all parishes in Figure 5 the difference is 27.16%, and it is 27.12% for just neighborhood parishes in Figure 6. The caveat here is that these t-tests use the same 1960 Census data as 1960 and 1968, due to data availability limitations. The p-values of 0.11 in Figure 5 and 0.09 in Figure 6 are also not statistically significant. Nevertheless, important information is transmitted here. These Figures show the relationship that parishes with open Catholic high schools have with changing demographics. Parishes where schools closed led to higher concentrations of African Americans. This provides early support for my first hypothesis.

```
. ttest dem1964, by(open1964)
Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>.87707</td>
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<td>.0164433 1.024807</td>
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<td>.0175544</td>
<td>.122881   .8049015 .8754926</td>
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<td>combined</td>
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<td>.0168926</td>
<td>.1206375</td>
<td>.8077132 .8755729</td>
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<td>.0366729</td>
<td>.0877527</td>
<td>-.1394727</td>
<td>.2132185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 49
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.6619 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6762 Pr(T > t) = 0.3381

Figure 7: 1964 Democratic Vote Share, All parishes
```

```
. ttest dem1964, by(open1964)
Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.87707</td>
<td>.0116272</td>
<td>.0164433 1.024807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.8585105</td>
<td>.021719</td>
<td>.1303137 .8144187 .9026423</td>
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<tr>
<td>combined</td>
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<td>.0205764</td>
<td>.1268412</td>
<td>.8177956 .9011789</td>
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<td>.0185595</td>
<td>.0933678</td>
<td>-.1707992</td>
<td>.2079182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 36
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.5782 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8436 Pr(T > t) = 0.4218

Figure 8: 1964 Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes
```
Figures 7-10 show the voting profile of the parishes open in 1964. Similar to Figures 5 and 6, these t-tests are not statistically significant, but still chronicle early relationships between open schools and voting patterns that set the stage for more meticulous tests of my second hypothesis. Figures 7 and 8 show the mean 1964 Democratic vote share of all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. And Figure 9 and 10 do the same but use the percent change in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1964.

As seen with Figures 7 and 8 in the two parishes that had schools close by 1964, mean Democratic vote share was larger than in the parishes with open schools. This follows my second
hypothesis, as declining Catholic Democratic voting patterns are still expected along with increased Democratic voting as neighborhoods become more African American. More interestingly, Figures 9 and 10 show that the parishes with closed schools experienced only an average 0.70% increase in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1964, while parishes with open schools saw an average of 16.26% increase for all parishes and 17.08% for neighborhood parishes. This discrepancy also follows from my hypotheses and matches the demographic data. Those parishes with a high initial black population share were already more Democratic and therefore had less room to increase in 1964. Although these comparisons and t-tests are not statistically significant and do not provide concrete evidence for my hypotheses, they again provide more context for these parishes going forward.

Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United States – 1964

As with 1960, comparing the parish voting data with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and Catholics in America go further to create the profiles that characterize my hypotheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1964 Parishes vs City of Detroit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Parishes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: 1964 Parishes and the City of Detroit

Table 4 again compares the demographic and voting characteristics of the City of Detroit, all parishes with open schools, and neighborhood parishes with open schools in 1964. Although the demographic data is still just from 1960, Table 4 expands upon the t-tests in Figures 5 and 6. Most significant about Table 4 is that neighborhood parishes have higher Democratic vote shares and higher black population shares than the city at large and all parishes together. Neighborhood parishes were more Democratic than the city overall by 5.01%. This may be chalked up to the wave election of 1964, which might have particularly inspired Catholics with President Kennedy’s assassination christening him a Democratic martyr. Nevertheless, the city, all parishes, and neighborhood parishes still do not show vast difference in demographic or political outlooks. Table 4 mostly serves to continue expanding the profiles of these parishes.

Table 4: City of Detroit, all parishes with open schools, and neighborhood parishes with open schools in 1964.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1964 Parishes vs State of Michigan</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>dem</th>
<th>dem-diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5684</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parishes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.8402</td>
<td>0.1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Parishes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.8585</td>
<td>0.1901</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 makes the same voting comparison but with the State of Michigan rather than the City of Detroit. Here, the difference is stark. Although Michigan voted 15.83% more Democratic in 1964 than 1960, that number is far lower than either measure of parishes. All parishes with open schools voted 17.18% more Democratic than the state, while neighborhood parishes voted 19.01% more Democratic. These numbers show the beginning of the gap in Democratic vote share that Detroit Catholics will maintain compared to much of the nation. Although Democratic vote share declines in parishes in 1968 and 1972, the voting patterns remain steadier and more consistently Democratic than Michigan and Catholics nationwide.

168 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.”
Table 6 once again follows the pattern by comparing parishes with US Catholics. American Catholics as a whole differed slightly from the Detroit parishes in Democratic voting, with a decline of 2.50% from 1960 to 1964. With a 77.50% Democratic vote share among Catholics nationwide, Detroit Catholics in all parishes outperformed that by 6.52% and in neighborhood parishes by 8.35%. This is the first sign of the stark divergence again seen in 1968 and 1972 between Detroit parishes with open schools and Catholics nationwide. A slight decrease in Catholic Democratic voting could be expected without a Catholic leading the ticket as in 1960, but only this slight increase amid a Democratic wave was more telling of coming trends.

Tables 7 and 8 dive deeper into these evolutions, showing the percent change in Democratic vote share among all parishes and neighborhood parishes from 1960 to 1964. The U.S. Catholic percent change was calculated simply from the 1960 and 1964 data, the parish variable was run as a t-test in STATA, and the parish with control variable was run as a regression through STATA. Those regressions tested the percent change in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1964 regressed to parishes with an open high school, the black population

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169 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.”
share, and the total population. U.S. Catholic Democratic vote share declined by 3.13%. Without controls, parishes with open Catholic high schools saw increases of 16.20% and 17.30% for all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. But those figures decrease to 9.55% and 11.83% when controlling for those confounding variables. Similar to other STATA tests, none of these regressions produced statistically significant results, but accomplish the same goals as those earlier tests. These simply show the data in another light, that the trend of Catholic voting nationwide contrasts with parishes with open high schools in Detroit.

Conclusion – 1964

The data for 1964 does not add much to 1960 but allows for progress in evolving the profiles of these parishes and how they interact with rapid shifts in demographics and voting patterns. The most important takeaway from the 1964 presidential elections is the gap between national Catholic voting results and the parish Democratic vote shares. Those differences foreshadow the more significant tests and analyses in 1968 and 1972.
IV. 1968: Humphrey v. Nixon

Introduction – 1968

The presidential election of 1968 was the first after the Detroit uprising in 1967. The aftermath of that event, likely more than any other, encapsulates the mindset of the height of white flight in Detroit. This aligns with the steep decline in the number of parishes with open Catholic schools in the 1968 presidential election. As illustrated by Figure 11, only thirty-four
parishes remained with schools – twenty-six of them neighborhood parishes. This drop in schools and further distance from the 1960 election allow for deeper analyses of these parishes and how they fit into the broader trends around them.

Figures 12 and 13 present more t-tests of the black population share of all parishes and neighborhood parishes with schools open and closed in 1968. Continuing the trend of Figures 5 and 6, the parishes with schools no longer open have much higher mean black population shares in 1968. For all parishes, the mean black population percentage is 31.51% higher where schools

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have closed, and that mean difference is 32.69% in neighborhood parishes. These two Figures are still using the 1960 Census demographic data, but with greater sorting due to distance of time and the trends continuing, these results are more meaningful. The relevant p-values for Figures 12 and 13 are 0.0001 and 0.0002, respectively, which are both lower than the standard .05 significance level. Figures 12 and 13, therefore, illustrate that among all parishes and neighborhood parishes, the mean black population percentage where schools have closed by 1968 is statistically significantly higher than where Catholic high schools remained open. These Figures present the first concrete, statistically significant evidence supporting my first hypothesis. This correlation does not, however, presume causality. These Figures use 1960 data, which suggests that the initial demographic profiles of parishes are important if not predictive. But these results also imply that white flight causality is at least two-sided.

```
.ttest dem1968, by(open1968)
Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>0.8584007</td>
<td>0.0316955</td>
<td>0.1306839</td>
<td>0.7912092 - 0.9255921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.7975091</td>
<td>0.022367</td>
<td>0.1304211</td>
<td>0.752003 - 0.8430151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

   diff = mean(0) - mean(1)      t = 1.5707
Ho: diff = 0     degrees of freedom = 49
Ha: diff < 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9387
Ha: diff != 0 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1227
Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T > t) = 0.0613
```

*Figure 14: 1968 Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes*
Figure 15: 1968 Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes

\[
\text{. ttest dem1968, by(open1968)}
\]

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.0304857</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0.8179483</td>
<td>0.0244668</td>
<td>0.1247566</td>
<td>0.767558 - 0.8683386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.8367547</td>
<td>0.0196144</td>
<td>0.1209091</td>
<td>0.7970129 - 0.8764965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{diff = mean(0) - mean(1)} \quad t = 1.4312
\]

Ho: diff = 0  degrees of freedom = 36

Ha: diff < 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.9195  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1610  Pr(T > t) = 0.0805

Ha: diff = 0

Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.0847  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1610  Pr(T > t) = 0.9195

Figure 15: 1968 Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes

Figure 16: 1960-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes

\[
\text{. ttest demperch19608, by(open19608)}
\]

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.0622622 - 0.1392681</td>
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\[
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\]

Ho: diff = 0  degrees of freedom = 49

Ha: diff < 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.2324  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4647  Pr(T > t) = 0.7353

Ha: diff = 0

Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.4647  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2324  Pr(T > t) = 0.7676

Figure 16: 1960-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes

Figure 17: 1960-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes

\[
\text{. ttest demperch19608, by(open19608)}
\]

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
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<td>0.0951604</td>
<td>0.0237077 - 0.1446318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.1226228</td>
<td>0.0317254</td>
<td>0.1617684</td>
<td>0.0572831 - 0.1876259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.1104797</td>
<td>0.0233408</td>
<td>0.1438821</td>
<td>0.0631868 - 0.1577726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{diff = mean(0) - mean(1)} \quad t = -0.7614
\]

Ho: diff = 0  degrees of freedom = 36

Ha: diff < 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.2257  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4514  Pr(T > t) = 0.5486

Ha: diff = 0

Ha: diff > 0  Pr(T < t) = 0.4514  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2257  Pr(T > t) = 0.7743

Figure 17: 1960-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes
Figures 14-19 show the voting patterns of the parishes still open in 1968, with the longer time length allowing for deeper analyses. Figures 14 and 15 are simple t-tests of the Democratic vote share in all parishes and neighborhoods parishes comparing those with schools closed and still open. Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19 present similar comparisons, except with the percent change in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1968 for Figures 16 and 17 and from 1964 to 1968 for Figures 18 and 19. Unlike the t-tests of Figures 12 and 13, Figures 14-19 are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the trends they continue to illuminate set the stage for the final comparison in the next chapter with 1972.
The trend of areas with closed schools becoming more Democratic continues in Figures 14 and 15, with the difference in average Democratic vote share 6.09% and 5.96% for all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively. And with p-values of 0.061 and 0.081, these are close to statistically significant, and even would be with the less-common significance level of 0.10. Consequently, Figures 14 and 15 support my second hypothesis.

Figures 16-19 tell that Democratic voting in these parishes is not as strong in 1968 as 1964, yet still higher than 1960 using percent change in Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1968 for Figures 16 and 17 and from 1964 to 1968 for Figures 18 and 19. Similar to Figures 9 and 10, Figures 16 and 17 show that from 1960 to 1968, parishes with open schools actually increased Democratic vote share regardless of measuring all parishes or only neighborhood parishes. These results add more evidence that areas where schools had closed were more Democratic to begin in 1960.

Conversely, Figures 18 and 19 show that while parishes where schools closed by 1968 saw increases in Democratic vote share over 1964, parishes with schools remaining open fell. This decline was greater when comparing all parishes, however. The average Democratic vote share percent change was -2.84% for all parishes with open schools, but only -1.23% for neighborhood parishes with schools. Neither result is statistically significant, but neighborhood parishes continue to remain distinct from – and slightly more Democratic than – the data of all parishes. Again like Figures 9 and 10, the results of areas with schools closed in Figures 18 and 19 reflect the demographic outlooks of those areas in Figures 12 and 13.
The pattern is becoming more difficult to deny with each election. Where parishes’ schools are closing, the areas are exhibiting higher black population shares and higher Democratic voting percentages. Parishes that are maintaining schools, especially neighborhood parishes, are staying whiter and slowly becoming less Democratic.

Table 9: 1968 Parishes vs City of Detroit

Table 9 is another juxtaposition of parish and Detroit demographic and voting data. Once again, both groups of parishes with schools open outperformed the City of Detroit in Democratic vote share – all parishes by 2.13% and neighborhood parishes by 4.17%. Both groupings of parishes have become much whiter than the city as a whole by 1968 as well. This is the final election to still use the 1960 Census, so the data here is not as accurate as 1960 or even 1964. Nevertheless, Table 9 builds off Figures 12-15. Parishes with schools open, especially neighborhood parishes, are less African American than the rest of the city or areas with former Catholic high schools. This Table shows some decline in Democratic vote share among Detroit parishes, though the decline is far from that of Michigan or U.S. Catholics. These conclusions add to the cases for both of my hypotheses.

Table 10, like Tables 2 and 5, compare the parishes with the State of Michigan’s Democratic voting. Michigan experienced a sharp decline in Democratic voting from 1964 to 1968 of 13.09%. All parishes and neighborhood parishes had Democratic vote shares 26.00% and 28.04% higher than the State of Michigan. These results follow the trends of Tables 2 and 5. The gap that first arose in 1964, with Michigan trending downward regarding Democratic vote share and parishes with open schools are remaining strong against that tide, is even more clear in 1968.

More immediately relevant to this thesis, Table 11 contrasts Catholic Democratic vote share among the parishes and Catholics nationwide. Perhaps starker than any previous table, American Catholics voted only 57.50% Democratic in 1968 – a difference of -20% from 1964. This decline bluntly stands opposed to the 1968 results of all parishes and neighborhoods parishes. Parishes in general voted 22.25% more Democratic than Catholics across the nation, while neighborhood parishes voted 24.29% more Democratic. Although Catholics as a whole still voted Democratic in 1968, the slight decrease in 1964 turned out to be the top of a slippery

---

172 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.”
173 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.”
slope. Yet these Detroit parishes have resisted similar patterns, lending strong evidence in support of my second hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Parishes</th>
<th>Neighborhood Parishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US Catholics</td>
<td>Parishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1968</td>
<td>-28.13%</td>
<td>3.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1968</td>
<td>-25.81%</td>
<td>-5.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 12: 1960-1968; 1964-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Catholics</th>
<th>Parishes</th>
<th>Parishes w/ Controls</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>p-control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1968</td>
<td>-28.13%</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
<td>9.86%</td>
<td>0.4510</td>
<td>0.1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1968</td>
<td>-25.81%</td>
<td>-3.22%</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>0.6680</td>
<td>0.8000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 13: 1960-1968; 1964-1968 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes*

Like Tables 7 and 8, Tables 12 and 13 present a subtler interpretation of these voting evolutions. Looking at all parishes with open schools in Table 12 and only neighborhood parishes in Table 13, both compare the percent change in democratic vote share from 1960 to 1968 and 1964 to 1968. The variables were calculated the same way as in Tables 7 and 8, using the US Catholic voting data and t-tests and regressions in STATA.

From 1960 to 1968, Catholics nationwide experienced a -28.13% change in Democratic vote share. In the same span of elections, all Detroit parishes with open schools saw a 3.01% increase, and neighborhood parishes had a 3.85% increase. When controlling for the black population and total population, these figures jump to 6.58% and 9.86%.

From 1964 to 1968, the -25.81% change in US Catholic Democratic vote share contrasts again with the changes of parishes. When not controlling, all parishes had a 5.77% decrease, and just a 0.11% decrease with controls. Neighborhood parishes fared even better, with a 3.22% decrease without controls and a 2.51% *increase* with controls.

None of four t-tests or regressions in Tables 12 and 13 are statistically significant, but they still tell important parts of this story. Not only are parishes in general much more Democratic than the trends of American Catholics broadly speaking, but neighborhood parishes
exhibit even stronger Democratic tendencies. The results in Tables 12 and 13 present the most compelling support yet for my second hypothesis. Neighborhood parishes with schools still open – signifying the power and influence of the parish itself – are maintaining their Democratic profile while the trends of the State of Michigan and Catholics across American rush the opposite way.

**Conclusion – 1968**

With 1968 adding stock to the initially insignificant results of 1964, the patterns are taking shape. 1960 and 1964 created profiles of parishes – in general and neighborhood-specific – along with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and U.S. Catholics. 1968 proved the importance of time series data for analyzing how the results fit together. The hints of trends in 1964 are expanded upon in 1968, setting up the consequential analysis of the 1972 election. What is becoming clear is that both of my hypotheses seem to be supported by data. With the updated demographic information of the 1970 Census and a fourth election to scrutinize, the next chapter of the 1972 election is the most critical to rigorous tests of my hypotheses and understanding the puzzle of Catholic voting evolutions.

Introduction – 1972

By 1972, white flight and suburbanization had firmly taken foot and changed the City of Detroit, which Figure 20 puts into contrast with the maps of Figures 1, 4, and 11. Of the fifty-one Catholic high schools open in 1960, only fifteen were still open by the 1972 presidential election.
– and only nine neighborhood parishes.\textsuperscript{174} The stark decline from 1964 to 1968 continued into 1972, which grants further importance to this analysis of the impacts of these schools closing.

\begin{verbatim}
. ttest black1972, by(open1972)
Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>.5932486</td>
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<td>.2662147</td>
<td>.5031745 -.6833227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.2086939</td>
<td>.0232919 .2344336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.094774</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)  t = 5.8876
Ho: diff = 0  degrees of freedom = 49

Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0  Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000  Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

Figure 21: 1972 Black Population Share, All Parishes

. ttest black1972, by(open1972)
Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>.4821385 .6815649</td>
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<td>-.0004895 .1899794</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)  t = 5.3537
Ho: diff = 0  degrees of freedom = 36

Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff != 0  Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000  Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

Figure 22: 1972 Black Population Share, Neighborhood Parishes
\end{verbatim}

Figures 21 and 22 show the black population share in 1972 for parishes with open Catholic high schools, with Figure 21 dealing with all parishes and Figure 22 only neighborhood parishes. With the 1970 Census providing updated demographic information, these t-tests are more accurate than those in 1964 and 1968. The black population in areas where Catholic high schools had closed by 1972 were either 45.44% blacker or 48.71% on average, whether for all

\textsuperscript{174} “Archdiocese of Detroit School Records;” “List of Active and Defunct High Schools in the Archdiocese of Detroit;” \textit{The Official Catholic Directory for the Year of Our Lord 1972}.
parishes or just neighborhood parishes. The relevant p-values for Figures 21 and 22 are both 0.00, meaning these differences in the black population are statistically significant. Similar to Figures 12 and 13 in 1968, this data provides statistically significant support of my first hypothesis, that white flight was exacerbated by the closing of Catholic high schools. The updated census data of 1970 also means that the causality is less ambiguous than with the 1964 and 1968 data. With more current demographic information, this data no longer reflects the initial conditions of the 1960 black population shares in these parishes.

\[
\text{. reg black1972 open1972 black1960}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Source} & \text{MS} & \text{df} & \text{MS} & \text{Number of obs} = 51 \\
\hline
\text{Model} & 3.25290543 & 2 & 1.62645271 & \\
\text{Residual} & 2.02341999 & 48 & 0.042154479 & \\
\hline
\text{Total} & 5.27632042 & 50 & 0.105526408 & \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{black1972} & \text{Coeff.} & \text{Std. Err.} & \text{t} & \text{P>|t|} & [95\% \text{ Conf. Interval}] \\
\hline
\text{open1972} & -0.2232887 & 0.0781542 & -2.85 & 0.007 & -0.3755282 & -0.0652492 \\
\text{black1960} & 0.5918638 & 0.1764999 & 5.50 & 0.000 & 0.3552938 & 0.8283938 \\
\text{cons} & 0.0999847 & 0.099847 & 5.76 & 0.000 & 0.2248019 & 0.4660164 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\text{Figure 23: 1972 Effect of All Parishes on Black Population Share}

\[
\text{. reg black1972 open1972 black1960}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Source} & \text{MS} & \text{df} & \text{MS} & \text{Number of obs} = 51 \\
\hline
\text{Model} & 2.5267265 & 2 & 1.26336325 & \\
\text{Residual} & 1.1939859 & 35 & 0.033286874 & \\
\hline
\text{Total} & 3.72071209 & 37 & 0.099367894 & \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{black1972} & \text{Coeff.} & \text{Std. Err.} & \text{t} & \text{P>|t|} & [95\% \text{ Conf. Interval}] \\
\hline
\text{open1972} & -0.257307 & 0.0819604 & -3.14 & 0.003 & -0.4236953 & -0.0909186 \\
\text{black1960} & 0.6580981 & 0.1254038 & 5.23 & 0.000 & 0.3294127 & 0.9867776 \\
\text{cons} & 0.0595602 & 0.0595602 & 5.46 & 0.000 & 0.2041584 & 0.4459865 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\text{Figure 24: 1972 Effect of Neighborhood Parishes on Black Population Share}

Figures 23 and 24, however, go even further by comparing the effects of parishes on the black population share in 1972, holding the initial conditions of the 1960 black population share fixed. Figure 23, using all parishes, shows that the mean black population share in open parishes
was 22.24% lower than in parishes where schools had closed by 1972. In Figure 24 this becomes a mean 25.37% difference between open and closed neighborhood parishes. These Figures again illustrate the variances between parish categories. That both Figures 23 and 24 had larger increases in the black population share among parishes with schools closed, lends further credence to my first hypothesis.

These results suggest that the initial conditions of 1960 were not entirely predictive of school closings and future demographic and political profiles of these areas. The fate of parochial high schools had clear effects on the demographic outlook of their parishes. And with p-values of 0.007 and 0.003, both Figures produced statistically significant results. Figures 23 and 24 therefore appear to uncover more evidence surrounding my first hypothesis. The large increase in the black population share seen is not simply a reflection of the demographic changes from white flight and suburbanization of the 1960s and early 1970s in Detroit. Whether parishes remained open or closed by 1972 had drastic effects on these patterns. White flight no longer seems exogenous to the status of parochial schools.

Figures 25 and 26 compare the same parishes’ Democratic vote shares in 1972. Continuing earlier trends, in both Figures the areas with closed Catholic high schools have higher mean Democratic vote shares in 1972 – all parishes were 28.94% more Democratic and neighborhood parishes 29.69% more Democratic. Both p-values of 0.00 and 0.0001, respectively, make these differences statistically significant. As seen in Figures 21, 22, 25, and 26 these communities were significantly more African American than parishes with open high schools and consequently more Democratic, as expected.
. ttest dem1972, by(open1972)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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</table>

\[
diff = \text{mean}(0) - \text{mean}(1) \quad t = 5.0642
\]
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 49

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000

Figure 25: 1972 Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes

. ttest dem1972, by(open1972)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.4867342 .6878378</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.0698291</td>
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</table>

\[
diff = \text{mean}(0) - \text{mean}(1) \quad t = 4.2520
\]
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 36

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9999 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001 Pr(T > t) = 0.0001

Figure 26: 1972 Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes

. ttest demperch196072, by(open1972)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

\[
diff = \text{mean}(0) - \text{mean}(1) \quad t = 3.3881
\]
Ho: diff = 0 degrees of freedom = 49

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9993 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0014 Pr(T > t) = 0.0007

Figure 27: 1960-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes
. ttest desperch196072, by(open1972)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.146216</td>
<td>0.0905758</td>
<td>0.273376</td>
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<td>0.0804783</td>
<td>0.151427</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
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<td>0.078854</td>
<td>0.088862</td>
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</table>

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)  \[ t = 3.0191 \]
Ho: diff = 0  \[ degrees of freedom = 36 \]

Ha: diff < 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.9977 \]
Ha: diff != 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.0046 \]
Ha: diff > 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.0023 \]

Figure 28: 1960-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes

. ttest desperch196472, by(open1972)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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Ho: diff = 0  \[ degrees of freedom = 49 \]

Ha: diff < 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 1.0000 \]
Ha: diff != 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.0001 \]
Ha: diff > 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.0000 \]

Figure 29: 1964-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, All Parishes

. ttest desperch196472, by(open1972)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>[95% Conf. Interval]</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>-0.275618</td>
<td>0.0853691</td>
<td>0.2561074</td>
<td>-0.4724796 - 0.0787565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-0.0562531</td>
<td>0.097064</td>
<td>0.2758885</td>
<td>-0.1268368 - 0.0533005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diff</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3136506</td>
<td>0.0929096</td>
<td>0.1252213</td>
<td>0.50208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)  \[ t = 3.3759 \]
Ho: diff = 0  \[ degrees of freedom = 36 \]

Ha: diff < 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.99991 \]
Ha: diff != 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.00178 \]
Ha: diff > 0  \[ Pr(|t| > |t|) = 0.00099 \]

Figure 30: 1964-1972 Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share, Neighborhood Parishes

69
Figures 27-32 illustrate the most important t-tests for this thesis. The t-tests compare the mean percent change in Democratic vote share between areas with closed or open Catholic high schools in 1972, similar to Figures 25 and 26. These Figures cover the percent changes from 1960, 1964, and 1968 to 1972 in Figures 27 and 28, Figures 29 and 30, and Figures 31 and 32, respectively. Figures 27, 29, and 31 compare all parishes, while neighborhood parishes are covered in Figures 28, 30, and 32. Each of these Figures produces statistically significant results at the 95% significance level, with p-values of 0.0007, 0.00, and 0.0008 for Figures 27, 29, and 31, and p-values of 0.0023, 0.0009, and 0.0026 for Figures 28, 30, and 32. Therefore, the percent
changes in Democratic vote share in these Figures provide statistically significant insight into the evolving voting patterns of Catholics, despite not utilizing controls for confounding variables.

As shown in Figures 27 and 28, from 1960 to 1972, areas with open Catholics schools had -12.79% and -14.17% changes in mean Democratic vote shares for all and neighborhood parishes, compared to increases of 13.15% and 14.69% for parishes where schools had closed by 1972. From 1964 to 1972, as in Figures 29 and 30, the differences are even wider. All parishes and neighborhood parishes saw -27.53% and -27.56% changes in mean Democratic voting where schools were still open, while areas with closed schools had 3.98% and 3.80% increases. Finally, Figure 31 shows that from only 1968 to 1972 average Democratic vote share among all parishes with open schools changed by -17.59% but slightly increased by 0.74% where schools had closed. And as in Figure 32, neighborhood parishes with open schools’ average Democratic vote share fell by 18.63% but increased by 1.36% in areas with closed schools.

These results build off Figures 25 and 26, along with the data from the three prior elections. Communities where Catholic schools closed saw increases in the black population share and subsequent increases in Democratic vote share. This pattern bears itself in statistically significant ways in Figures 25-32. Whether taking the 1972 alone or comparing the percent change from previous elections, the pattern holds. Democratic vote share fell in parishes that still had Catholic high schools operating, regardless of comparing all parishes or simply neighborhood parishes.
### Figure 33: 1960-1972 Effect of All Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share

```
. reg damperch196072 open1972 blackperch196072 popperch196072

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Number of obs = 50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.69114593</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.216038198</td>
<td>F(3, 46) = 3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>2.57711464</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.056024231</td>
<td>Prob &gt; F = 0.0153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.25225923</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.065581005</td>
<td>R-squared = 0.2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| open1972 | -0.2551353 | 0.0787883 | -3.24 | 0.002 | -0.419278 | -0.0910927 |
| blackperch-2 | 0.0000349 | 0.0000533 | 0.82 | 0.416 | -0.0000633 | 0.0000521 |
| popperch-196072 | 0.0016067 | 0.1235794 | 0.01 | 0.990 | -0.2471458 | 0.2503592 |
| _cons | 0.1117336 | 0.0425509 | 2.63 | 0.012 | 0.0260851 | 0.1973891 |
```

### Figure 34: 1960-1972 Effect of Neighborhood Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share

```
. reg damperch196072 open1972 blackperch196072 popperch196072

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Number of obs = 37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.86318898</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.28771965</td>
<td>F(3, 33) = 3.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>1.70584488</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.055647409</td>
<td>Prob &gt; F = 0.0262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.53863386</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.069819555</td>
<td>R-squared = 0.2413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| open1972 | -0.3043351 | 0.0985863 | -3.14 | 0.003 | -0.493247 | -0.115315 |
| blackperch-2 | 0.0000386 | 0.0000533 | 0.72 | 0.478 | -0.000067 | 0.0000647 |
| popperch-196072 | 0.22988 | 0.1240726 | 0.18 | 0.858 | -0.24813 | 0.707793 |
| _cons | 0.151911 | 0.0524587 | 2.80 | 0.007 | 0.0451626 | 0.2586594 |
```

### Figure 35: 1964-1972 Effect of All Parishes on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Share

```
. reg damperch196472 open1972 blackperch196072 popperch196072

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Number of obs = 50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>1.1221023</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3740341</td>
<td>F(3, 46) = 6.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>2.62444322</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.057061509</td>
<td>Prob &gt; F = 0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.74654552</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.076462786</td>
<td>R-squared = 0.2995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Coef. | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-------|-----------|-------|-------|----------------------|
| open1972 | -0.3022094 | 0.0795145 | -3.80 | 0.000 | -0.4622638 | -0.142155 |
| blackperch-2 | 0.0000368 | 0.0000533 | 0.81 | 0.419 | -0.0000644 | 0.0000552 |
| popperch-196072 | -0.1242901 | 0.1247185 | -1.00 | 0.324 | -0.3753254 | 0.1267553 |
| _cons | 0.0206932 | 0.0429431 | 0.48 | 0.633 | -0.0657468 | 0.1071332 |
```
The results of Figures 27-32 should not be ignored, but without controlling for confounding variables, their results are potentially biased. Thus, Figures 33-38 relay the results.
of regressions of Democratic vote share percent changes from 1960, 1964, and 1968 to 1972 that control for the percent change of the black population from 1960 to 1972 and the total population percent change from 1960 to 1972. Figures 33 and 34 test the percent change from 1960 to 1972, with 1964 to 1972 covered by Figures 35 and 36, and 1968 to 1972 by Figures 37 and 38. All parishes are tested by Figures 33, 35, and 37, with neighborhood parishes in Figures 34, 36, and 38. The regression results for all parishes in Figures 33, 35, and 37 are all statistically significant with p-values of 0.002, 0.00, and 0.005. Similarly, the results of Figures 34, 36, and 38 are statistically significant with p-values of 0.003 for Figures 34 and 36 and 0.006 for Figure 38. The statistical significance for all six of these regressions in Figures 33-38 provides the strongest support for my second hypothesis and goes a long way toward firmly establishing the extent of the decline in Catholic Democratic vote share in Detroit.

The results of these regressions in Figure 33 reveals that among all parishes that still operated Catholic high schools in 1972, Democratic vote share decreased by 25.51% since 1960 compared to those with closed schools. Figure 34 shows that decline becoming 30.43% for only neighborhood parishes. As in Figures 35 and 36, open Catholic schools in 1972 saw Democratic vote share decreases of 30.22% and 32.78% for all parishes and neighborhood parishes, respectively, compared to closed parishes. Figure 37 shows that among all parishes and compared to those with closed schools, open Catholic high schools in 1972 led to a decrease of 16.93% in Democratic vote share from 1968 to 1972, with a -20.52% difference in only neighborhood parishes according to Figure 38.

Each of these results provides further evidence that Catholic voting patterns diverged drastically from their historic Democratic preferences during the 1960s and early 1970s. While Democratic vote shares increased in the same areas that had Catholic high schools open in 1960
but had closed by 1972, parishes that still operated Catholic high schools in 1972 experienced drastic declines in Democratic voting from 1960, 1964, and 1968. These results follow the trends of the earlier elections and don’t seem to immediately challenge the traditional story of increasingly split Catholic voting patterns.

The results of the Figures in this chapter illuminate the final characteristics of the profile of these fifty-one parishes that had open high schools in 1960. The demographic and political patterns over the twelve years and four elections from 1960 to 1972 is now complete and ready for comparisons with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and U.S. Catholics. The context gained from these comparisons highlights the importance of these parishes to stemming the tide of both white flight and divergent Catholic voting patterns. The directions of these waves are now clear as well. Where Catholic schools closed, the black population share and Democratic vote share rose alike, while parishes with open schools remained far whiter and became less Democratic.

Parishes and the City of Detroit, the State of Michigan, and the United States – 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>#</th>
<th>dem</th>
<th>black</th>
<th>white</th>
<th>dem-diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7145</td>
<td>0.4206</td>
<td>0.5432</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parishes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.5832</td>
<td>0.1389</td>
<td>0.8324</td>
<td>-0.1313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Parishes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.5873</td>
<td>0.0947</td>
<td>0.8749</td>
<td>-0.1272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 14: 1972 Parishes and the City of Detroit*

---

Table 14 shows that the trends of earlier elections finally resulted in a much larger Democratic vote share in Detroit than among Catholic parishes in 1972. The City of Detroit was 13.13% more Democratic than all parishes with open schools, and 12.72% more Democratic than neighborhood parishes. These differences reflect the demographic makeup of the city compared to the parishes. According to the 1970 Census, the City of Detroit was 42.06% black, while parishes were just 13.89% or 9.47% African American if comparing all parishes or neighborhood parishes. As a community’s black population share rose, so did its Democratic vote share. But importantly for my thesis, neighborhood parishes were both whiter than the city at large and all parishes combined, yet slightly more Democratic than all parishes but of course less Democratic than the rest of Detroit.

Table 15, as in Tables 2, 5, and 10 before, simply provides more context of the voting patterns of these parishes when compared areas that are less Democratic but more demographically similar to them than the rest of the City of Detroit in 1972. This election was the first to feature a Michigan Democratic vote share less than 50%, with neighborhood parishes voting 16.07% more Democratic and all parishes 15.66% more Democratic than the State of Michigan. As both categories of parish were still very white, evidence in favor of white Catholics remaining Democratic with the operation of an urban Catholic high school per my second hypothesis seems apparent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1972 Parishes vs State of Michigan</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>dem</th>
<th>dem-diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4266</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parishes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.5832</td>
<td>0.1566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Parishes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.5873</td>
<td>0.1607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: 1972 Parishes and the State of Michigan

Table 15 shows that the trends of earlier elections finally resulted in a much larger Democratic vote share in Detroit than among Catholic parishes in 1972. The City of Detroit was 13.13% more Democratic than all parishes with open schools, and 12.72% more Democratic than neighborhood parishes. These differences reflect the demographic makeup of the city compared to the parishes. According to the 1970 Census, the City of Detroit was 42.06% black, while parishes were just 13.89% or 9.47% African American if comparing all parishes or neighborhood parishes. As a community’s black population share rose, so did its Democratic vote share. But importantly for my thesis, neighborhood parishes were both whiter than the city at large and all parishes combined, yet slightly more Democratic than all parishes but of course less Democratic than the rest of Detroit.

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176 Manson, Schroeder, Van Riper, and Ruggles, “National Historical Geographic Information System.”
177 Haddad, “Here’s How Michigan Has Voted in Every Presidential Election since 1836.”
Table 16 shows similar data as Table 15, which is critical for my second hypothesis. As with the State of Michigan, 1972 was the first election that Catholics voted less than 50% Democratic. The difference in Democratic vote share was 15.23% for neighborhood parishes and only a slightly smaller 14.82% for all parishes. These differences follow from the 1968 election, and solidify the steep, downward Democratic trend of Catholics nationwide contrasted with the still relatively high Democratic vote share among Catholic parishes with open high schools in Detroit in 1972. Table 16 directly supports my second hypothesis, putting the differences between Detroit Catholics and US Catholics right next to one another.

As Tables 12 and 13 did for Table 11 regarding the 1968 election and Tables 7 and 8 for 1964, Tables 17 and 18 further quantify the divergence between Catholics nationwide and in Detroit. Table 17 covers all parishes and their percent changes in Democratic vote share from 1960, 1964, and 1968 to 1972 compared with Catholics nationwide, while Table 18 does the same with only neighborhood parishes. Both Tables again use the U.S. Catholic voting data and

---

178 “Presidential Vote of Catholics.”
STATA for the results. The parish percent changes without controls and p-values come from the t-tests of Figures 27-32, and the percent changes with controls and corresponding p-values are drawn from Figures 33-38. Again, all of the results aggregated in Tables 17 and 18 are statistically significance. Thus, these comparisons in Tables 17 and 18 provide vital evidence in favor of my second hypothesis.

Catholics nationwide had stark declines in Democratic vote shares through the 1972 presidential elections. From 1960 to 1972, this was a -45.63% change. From 1964 to 1972, this change was -43.87%. Finally, from just 1968 to 1972, there was a substantial -24.35% change in American Catholic Democratic vote shares. These figures dwarf the corresponding declines among parishes with open high schools in 1972. Among all parishes, those decreases in percent change of Democratic vote share are 25.94%, 31.51% and 18.33% from 1960, 1964, and 1968, respectively, to 1972. And for just neighborhood parishes, those percent changes drop to -25.51%, -30.22%, and -16.93%.

Despite these massive declines across the board, Democratic vote shares of parishes with schools open in 1972 were still much higher than that of Catholics nationwide. Even when accounting for the demographic makeup of the areas, Catholic Democratic vote share decreased less in these Detroit parishes than across the nation. Tables 16, 17, and 18 succinctly sum up my second hypothesis and the accompanying implications. Even though where parishes were large and strong enough to still operate Catholic high schools Democratic vote share assuredly declined among Catholics in Detroit, the difference is far from the extent seen nationwide.
Conclusion – 1972

The 1972 presidential election serves as the last point of statistical analysis for this thesis. This election is vital to my hypothesis by allowing for time series tests of demographic and voting shifts since 1960. From these tests came the most statistically significant results that finished the portraits of these parishes that started with the 1960 presidential election. The evolutions of the racial makeup and party preferences of these areas where parishes operated a Catholic high school in 1960 were fully realized. This allowed for more accurate comparisons between these parishes, the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and Catholics throughout America.

The t-tests and regressions run that cemented this data – increased black population shares where Catholic high schools closed and declining Democratic vote shares where those schools remained open – established the trends implicated. The data for Detroit, Michigan, and the American Catholics already existed, and much analysis was unnecessary outside of simple comparisons. Their voting patterns from 1960 to 1972 were not mysteries. The specificity of the demographic and political characterizations of these parishes – down to census tracts and precinct-level election returns – required thorough statistical analysis. That analysis compiled a vast amount of election and demographic data to demonstrate the impact of Catholic parishes on their communities. With statistically significant results, clear correlations among other tests, and stark contrasts with the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and Catholics nationwide, the 1972 election provided the last piece of the puzzle that illustrates the effects of Catholic parishes as community institutions and tools for political mobilization.
VI. Twelve Years Later: The Effects of White Flight, Parochial School Closings, Catholic Democratic Rejection in Detroit

Overview of Results

The t-tests, regressions, and tables point to the same conclusion: the closing of Catholic high schools had profound effects on the surrounding neighborhoods. The trends illustrated from 1960 to 1972 for all parishes are even more pronounced when limiting analyses to neighborhood parishes. White flight and Democratic party decline among Catholics – both phenomena thoroughly documented and researched – are shown to be related to Catholic high school closings in Detroit. Statistical significance of this correlation was not universal, and causation is not proven; but the statistical analysis corroborates both of my hypotheses.

In neighborhoods where Catholic high schools that were open in 1960 closed by 1972, the black population share dramatically increased. This population growth is notable compared to neighborhoods with open Catholic high schools and even when compared to the general demographic trends of the City of Detroit. On the other side, in neighborhoods where Catholic high schools remained open from 1960 to 1972, Democratic vote share decreased. This decline contrasts both with neighborhoods where the schools had closed by 1972 and the City of Detroit as a whole. These results cast my two hypotheses as essentially two sides of the same coin. The bridge that links the two – white flight and Catholic Democratic rejection – is the role of parochial schools as extensions of parish institutions that wield outsized influence in their communities.
Figure 39: 1964-1972 Black Population Share Difference by Parish Type

Figure 40: 1960-1972 Black Population Share by Parish Type and the City of Detroit
Figure 39 displays the differences in the mean black population share between neighborhoods with closed and open Catholic high schools from 1964 to 1972. Whether looking at all parishes or eliminating magnet parishes, from 1964 to 1972 the black population share rises much more rapidly in neighborhoods with closed schools than those with open schools. This increasing divergence is shown by the upward trend of the all parishes and neighborhood parishes in Figure 39.

Figure 40 tells the same story in a dissimilar way. Figure 40 shows the mean black population share in the City of Detroit and only among neighborhoods with open Catholic high schools from 1960 to 1972. While the black population share in Detroit increased considerably over this time, it actually declined in a correspondingly noticeable manner in neighborhoods with open Catholic high schools. Once again, the divergence is clearest when only focusing on neighborhood parishes.

Both Figures 39 and 40 are limited by the data of the census. The population statistics for 1960, 1964, and 1968 only differ in the geographic parameters set for them. As schools closed from 1960 to 1972, those neighborhoods no longer factor into the analysis for Figure 40, which accounts for the data shown. The City of Detroit, however, is stuck with only the two censuses for data.

Despite these data limitations, support for my first hypotheses is evidenced in these two graphs. Figures 39 shows unequivocally that the mean black population share increased in neighborhoods where Catholic high schools had closed by 1972. Figure 40 puts this assertion into the broader context of white flight and Catholic demographic patterns. Because the black population share decreased with open parishes, this suggests that parochial schools had a more essential role in white flight. Here, the closing of Catholic high schools appears to have spurred
on or at least accelerated suburbanization among Catholics in Detroit. As the schools went, so did Catholics.

Neither of these graphs, nor my first hypothesis, discounts the factor of white flight in causing these school closings. It is nevertheless possible that population loss caused these schools to close, which in-turn led Catholics to flee – forming a vicious cycle that contributed to white flight. Figure 40 even provides some support of this. In 1960, the black population share in these parish neighborhoods – regardless of parish type – was higher than the City of Detroit as a whole. This itself is unsurprising given the historical relations between the Catholic and black communities in Detroit and America. But due to the census data limitations, the decline in black population share among open parishes in 1964 and 1968 suggest that the initial conditions of parishes were somewhat important. Parishes with larger black population shares in 1960 seemed to close earlier than those with a whiter population.

This presents and chicken and egg situation, with neither answer fully satisfying the question of white flight. Still, entirely explaining white flight is not to purpose of this thesis or my first hypothesis. Rather, pointing out the nuance, subtlety, and inherent complexity of the situation is the goal that Figures 39 and 40 suggest has been achieved. These Figures provide evidence in support of my first hypothesis and develop the context for a tricky two-sided relationship between white flight and parochial schools. The initial demographic conditions of parishes were important, but the effects of the closing of Catholic high schools on suburbanization must not be ignored.
Figure 41 provides the counterpart of Figure 39 for my second hypothesis. Figure 41 shows the difference in Democratic vote share between neighborhoods with Catholic high schools that closed between 1964 and 1972 and those that remained open. The trends for all parishes and only neighborhood parishes are unsurprisingly similar. Reflecting the trends of the City of Detroit and Catholics nationwide, neighborhoods with Catholic high schools that remained open between 1964 and 1972 experienced declining Democratic vote shares, while closed parishes saw the opposite occur. These results again make sense given the historical context and demographic changes. As parochial schools closed and some neighborhoods became predominantly African American, the Democratic vote share increased, while it stagnated and then declined in still-white and -Catholic neighborhoods.
Figure 42 aggregates the comparisons between parish and Detroit voting patterns from 1960 to 1972. This graph is noticeable for the similarities among the data – until 1972. Democratic vote shares in Catholic neighborhoods overperformed the City of Detroit in 1960, 1964, and 1968 before steeply dropping in 1972. The trends of the all parishes, neighborhood parishes, and Detroit appear to mirror each other for the first three elections. The Democratic vote share of the parishes somewhat reflects the national election trends – with a Democratic landslide in 1964 and Republican rout in 1972. The 1972 election, though, is the most important to focus on. Despite a 10-point difference in Democratic vote share, Catholics in Detroit still appear overwhelmingly Democratic in the midst of a dominant Republican victory nationwide. So as with Figure 40 for Figure 39, Figure 42 provides more context surrounding my second hypothesis and the illustration in Figure 41.
Figure 43 accomplishes a similar task but uses the State of Michigan as a contrast rather than the City of Detroit. Again, the trends seem to mirror one another, only with a gulf between the Democratic vote share of parishes and the State of Michigan in each election. Michigan only voted for a Republican with Nixon in 1972, but the Democratic vote share was much less than the large majority seen in Detroit parishes. 1972 is again the most critical election in this graph. The 10-point margin between Detroit and parishes in Figure 42 is translated into Figure 43 but between parishes and Michigan. This shows that while Catholics in Detroit ceased voting as Democratic, they still overwhelm the Democratic vote share of Michigan, which had voted Democratic in the previous three elections.
Figure 44: 1960-1972 Democratic Vote Share by Parish Type and US Catholics

Figure 45: 1960-1972 Parish-US Catholic Democratic Vote Share Difference
Figures 44 and 45 bottle the essential elements of my thesis into two graphs. Figure 44 follows from Figures 42 and 43 in comparing Democratic vote share among all parishes, neighborhood parishes, and Catholics nationwide. While Figures 42 and 43 provided context surrounding the decline in Democratic vote share among Detroit Catholics, Figure 44 goes one step further to compare trends among only Catholics. Democratic voting declines for all three groups from 1960 to 1972, but the drop is far more pronounced for Catholics across the country. Catholics voted majority Democratic in 1960, 1964, and 1968, but Detroit Catholics stand apart in 1972 by still voting nearly 60% Democratic compared to less than 45% for all American Catholics. Figure 44 clearly illustrates the relationship between Catholic high schools and Catholic voting patterns. Where parishes remained open, Catholics stayed. When Catholics stayed, they continued voting more Democratic than did Catholics nationwide.

Figure 45 emphasizes that final point by showing the difference in Democratic vote share between Detroit parishes and U.S. Catholics. As shown in Figures 44 and 45, the difference in 1960 was actually negative as Catholics nationwide voted more Democratic than Detroit Catholics. But each subsequent election saw Detroit parishes outperforming national Catholics by large margins – growing to a peak difference of nearly 25% in 1968 and remaining around 15% in the Republican landslide of 1972. These Detroit parishes continued voting Democratic in the face of opposing national Catholic trends.

Figures 39-45 summarize the data presented in the previous four chapters of this thesis. They encapsulate the argument my thesis and lend support and essential context for my two hypotheses. The evidence explicitly suggests that parishes – with open Catholic high schools as a proxy for influence – acted as critical community institutions, connecting religious identity, education, and partisanship.
In the broader discussion of Catholic voting patterns and demographic trends, parochial schools must no longer be seen simply as one abstract political issue among several more that divided Catholic voters and politicians. Parochial schools – and what they mean for the institutional power of their corresponding parishes – may be essential to understanding the decline in Democratic voting among Catholics along with their desertion of cities.

The Archdiocese of (Suburban) Detroit: Contemporary Catholics in Metropolitan Detroit and the United States

Figure 46: Map of Open Catholic High Schools in Detroit, 2018
Detroit in 2018 looks far different than in 1960 or 1972. Figure 46 conveys this in a map of the three Catholic high schools remaining in Detroit. Only one school, University of Detroit Jesuit High School, has stayed open since 1960. The other two, Detroit Cristo Rey High School and Loyola High school, operate in the buildings of the former Catholic high schools of Holy Redeemer and St. Francis de Sales, respectively. Cristo Rey opened only a decade ago in 2008, while Loyola was started in 1993. In a city that is today 84% African American, 7% Latino, and only about 3% non-Hispanic white, these schools primarily serve minority communities.

Cristo Rey and Loyola were founded to serve as another option for the people in Detroit living around the schools and in the city. This honors the legacies of their predecessors, as Holy Redeemer and St. Francis de Sales were part of neighborhood parishes. University of Detroit, however, is a magnet parish that fulfills a different role with a focus mainly on its high school and seventh- and eighth-grade academy operations rather than a larger church or parish community. Nevertheless, the social and economic contexts are vastly different between Detroit parishes and high schools today and from 1960 to 1972 that any comparisons must be taken with a grain of salt.

Another important note is that throughout this thesis I occasionally referred to the Democratic vote share in parishes with open Catholic high schools as the voting of “Detroit

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Catholics.” Due to the specificity and limited scope of this thesis, I could not fully represent all the voting and demographic profiles of all Catholics in the City of Detroit. If my hypotheses are correct as the evidence in this thesis suggests, then several thousands of Catholics from 1960 to 1972 likely remained in neighborhoods with Catholic elementary schools at the very least, and they were left out of my study. The data itself does not capture the full white population under the “Detroit Catholic” vote. Among all parishes, the total white population in 1972 was 385,994, but the white population that was designated as Catholic for living near parishes with open high schools was only 192,397. For only neighborhood parishes those figures drop to 267,351 and 112,826, respectively. These numbers seem drastic at first, with only half of the white population categorized as Detroit Catholics, but the concentration is much greater in 1972 due to the far few number of open parishes compared to those that had closed. The assumption that all white Detroiter were Catholic is also unlikely to hold in reality but was necessary for my study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City of Detroit</th>
<th>State of Michigan</th>
<th>US Catholics</th>
<th>White Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.9815</td>
<td>0.5480</td>
<td>0.5067</td>
<td>0.4300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.9726</td>
<td>0.4987</td>
<td>0.4700</td>
<td>0.3850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 19: 2012 and 2016 City of Detroit, State of Michigan, and U.S. Catholic Democratic Vote Share.*

The voting behavior of Catholics in America has also drastically changed since the time of my analysis. Figure 47 displays the Democratic vote share of the City of Detroit, State of Michigan, all U.S. Catholics, and only non-Hispanic white Catholics in 2012 and 2016. The City

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of Detroit and State of Michigan voted rather similarly to the elections in my study, but the Catholic vote is where we see an interesting divergence. The t-tests, regressions, and comparisons in this thesis attempted to show that white Catholics in Detroit living near open Catholic high schools remained more Democratic than their national counterparts. The map in Figure 46 and Detroit demographic data clearly illustrate that suburbia is where the vast majority of white Catholics now reside. This logically suggests that without that moderating electoral force connecting white Catholics to inner cities, the national trend of growing Republican voting soon applied to Metro Detroit as well. Yet, white Catholics still vote more Democratic than white Protestants, though still much less than black Protestants and Jewish people.\textsuperscript{182} Whether it’s due to the communal nature of Catholicism, historical ties that cannot seem to break completely, or simply due to any number of other reasons, white Catholics have not fully shaken their Democratic identity.

This divergence in Latino and white Catholic vote raises new questions regarding the intersection of religious, social, and political identity. Whereas in the past, the diversity of white ethnic Catholic cultures led to some conflict due to differing customs and political behavior, but an overarching Catholic culture and political identity still connected them. From the 1850s when the Catholic Church in America was an immigrant church, the Democratic Party won the loyalty of Catholics. As that has generally subsided among white Catholics, the tremendous Democratic support among Latino Catholics recalls the repetitious nature of history. In recent op-eds, Cardinal Timothy Dolan of New York, Cardinal Joseph Tobin of Newark, New Jersey, Sean O’Malley of Boston, and Archbishop Vigneron of Detroit have urged support for immigration

reform and empathy for immigrants, citing the Church’s roots in immigration and the nativist backlash that ensued. 183

This is not to say that the experiences of white ethnic Catholics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be compared to the modern challenges of Latinos in the United States. Like white ethnics, “Latinos” is a broad descriptor of a plethora of rich, diverse, peoples with various backgrounds and Latin American heritage. Racism affects the Latino Catholic community in ways that white ethnic Catholics were mostly able to avoid, despite their own encounters with discrimination. And the American Catholic leadership represented the Catholic population in its infancy. Parishes and neighborhoods sprung from tightknit groups of ethnic white Catholics, giving them some ownership over the direction and culture of the Church. Whether immigrants or multiple-generational citizens, Latino Catholics have generally had to enter and re-form parish cultures rather than simply start ones in their image. Catholic leadership and membership remains older and whiter – and therefore more conservative – than the younger, majority-Latino and more liberal future face of the Church. 184

What cues from the past are taken up by Catholic leaders going forward to shape the future of the Church are unknown. What cannot be denied, however, are the attempts of prominent clergy to steer Catholic political involvement. Though the difference here is the issue-


To be Catholic is no longer to be a Democrat. The diversity of Catholics prevents such simple statements from even having meaning anymore. The Church is evolving as it always has, and the role of Catholic leaders and institutions for the future feel both unfamiliar yet more important than ever. Comparisons cannot be easily made, and caution should be exercised when doing so, but perhaps looking back can provide a way forward. This case study is detached from contemporary social, political, and religious contexts and is narrowed to just one city. But the implications that accompany the results can be a source of wisdom and inspiration through hindsight.
The goal of this thesis, through these t-tests, regressions, and data comparisons, was not to refute the decreasing Democratic vote share among Catholics in the United States, State of Michigan, City of Detroit, or in neighborhoods surrounding parishes with or without Catholic high schools. But putting the decline in a crucible to firmly establish the effects of Catholic parishes on these patterns was the mission. Limiting this thesis to the City of Detroit for a case study and using high schools to represent parish size, power, and influence allowed for such an assessment.

My two hypotheses allowed me to examine the influence of parishes on the communities around them. My first hypothesis argued for a causal function for Catholic parishes in white flight. My second hypothesis asserted a similar role in maintaining Democratic Party loyalty among Catholics. These hypotheses were tested by looking at the black population share and Democratic vote share from 1960 to 1972, but the deeper implications involved suburbanization and Catholic Democratic rejection. I found strong support for both hypotheses. This does not assume causality, but convincingly suggests that substantial relationships among social institutions, suburbanization, partisanship among Catholics exist, with parishes at the center.

The results of this thesis are still limited in their scope. Demographic variables, specifically population and race, were taken into account. But other potentially confounding variables could not be controlled for and therefore could have potentially skewed the results. Income, education, family size, generation, and occupation among a plethora of other variables all have likely effects on both of my hypotheses.
Nevertheless, these results and the research design provide a pathway for future research on this subject. I see two fruitful routes to follow the lead of this thesis. The first would be to repeat the same methodology with other cities during the same time period. While a direct relationship will be impossible to demonstrate definitively given the various confounding variables, reaffirming my results in cities throughout the country would build a more secure case for causality. Cities such as Boston, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Cleveland, and St. Louis could each be studied with the same methodology as this thesis. If parochial schools can be similarly used to illustrate the institutional effects of parishes on demographic and voting patterns of Catholics nationwide by following the example of this thesis, the argument taking the correlations to causality becomes more robust.

The other path of broadening this analysis would be to use Catholic elementary schools as proxies rather than high schools. Catholic elementary schools are far more numerous than high schools and eliminate the category of magnet schools. Testing the effects of parishes with elementary schools would therefore require reducing the size of neighborhoods through fewer precincts and census tracts. Although this would limit the potential influence of parishes involved due the lower bar for inclusion in the study. Still, this process would allow for a more detailed and wide-ranging study and could more thoroughly examine the results of this thesis. Detroit could be studied once again for even more accurate profiles of demographic and electoral shifts among neighborhoods, or other cities could be studied with elementary school proxies as the base.

That my results not only allow for future research but actively invite further corroboration and potential criticism is exciting. I have argued throughout this thesis that parishes are institutions that wield tremendous power in the lives of their parishioners and the
surrounding communities. With clear pathways for additional analyses of this parish influence, a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the interactions of institutions, religion, race, and politics seems warranted.

My thesis built off previous research, bridging gaps in the literature and providing a causal mechanism that provides a more overarching grasp of the demographic and political shifts that uprooted Catholic social identity in the 1960s and 1970s. I have shown through meticulous statistical analysis of t-tests and regressions, along with contextual comparisons, that the presence of a Catholic parish operating a high school has statistically significant effects on the black population share and the Democratic vote share. Parishes essentially functioned as moderating forces against white flight and diverging voting patterns.

American Catholics constituted a loyal voting bloc of the Democratic Party for over a century, and the rather abrupt end of this stark partisanship in the twentieth century represents a puzzling phenomenon. Religion and politics have always been intertwined. Social identity flows from and is informed by these factors. Parochial schools have historically held a fundamental place in the social, spiritual, and political lives of Catholics. Their representation of more than just an education – a fight against bigotry, an opportunity for growth, and an invitation for community – exemplifies the institutional importance of Catholic parishes.

What this connection means today is uncertain. The faces, identities, and politics of those served by these institutions continue to change. Yet the institutions remain, though not as great in number. This thesis presents an opportunity for a slightly revisionist understanding of community institutions – specifically Catholic parishes – and their functions in the broader context of surrounding communities. How we imagine the roles they can play will determine what forces will shape our lives going forward.
Archives Referenced


Bibliography


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