

**Fear, Anger, and Voting for the Far right:
Evidence from the November 13, 2015 Paris Terror Attacks**

Abstract: The conjecture that negative emotions underpin support for far right politics in Europe is common among pundits and scholars. However, the conventional account holds that authoritarian populists catalyze public anxiety about the changing social order and/or deteriorating national economic conditions, and this anxiety subsequently drives up support for the far right. We propose that while emotions do indeed play an independent causal role in support for far right parties and policies, that support is more likely built upon the public's anger rather than fear. This article explores the relative impact of fear and anger in reaction to the 2015 Paris terror attacks on the propensity to vote for the French far right party, the Front National, in the 2015 Regional Elections. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find anger is associated with voting for the FN, while fear is associated with voting against the FN. Moreover, anger boosts the FN vote most powerfully among far right and authoritarian voters. On the other hand, fear reduces support for the far right among those same groups.

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Introduction

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The notion that public support for the far right in Europe springs directly from anxiety is commonplace among journalists, pundits, and scholars.¹ These public fears, it is often assumed, are triggered by perceived threats from immigration, terrorism, economic insecurity or some combination (Kriesi et al., 2006; Mughan & Paxton, 2006; Van den Brug & Fennema, 2007; Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou, 2012; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers, 2012). These threats, sometimes real but sometimes imagined, become tools for strategic elites. And so the familiar story goes, far right parties stoke anxiety, especially among authoritarian-minded citizens by presenting economic downturns, cultural change, and both domestic and international security incidents as existential threats.

In this article we offer an alternative model, one that focuses on a different emotional substrate, to explain the recent rise in support for the far right in Europe and perhaps elsewhere as well. We propose that it is public anger, rather than anxiety, that motivates support for the far right vote. While many may indeed react to economic uncertainty, terrorism, and immigration with anxiety, the nature of these threats - often blamed by elites on disliked groups who violate cherished societal norms - is also likely to trigger anger (Marcus et al 2000; MacKuen et al 2010; Valentino et al 2011; Banks, 2014; Banks & Valentino, 2012; Lambert et al., 2010).

Furthermore, Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) (Marcus et al., 2000; 2002; 2011) and work by various other scholars (Valentino et al, 2011; Banks, 2014; Banks & Valentino, 2012; Lambert et al., 2010) suggests that increases in anxiety are unlikely to drive support for the far right vote. On the contrary, authoritarians who experience anxiety in response to threats may be *less* attracted than usual to the far right, since anxiety inhibits reliance on established predispositions (Marcus et al 2000).

Our test bed for these hypotheses is the December, 2015 French regional elections that took place in the shadow of the Paris attacks. The coordinated November 13 attacks involved shootings and suicide bombings in bars, restaurants and a concert venue. These constituted the deadliest attacks in France since the second World War, leaving 130 dead and 368 people

¹ Throughout the document we elect to follow a taxonomy of emotions based on the theory of Affective Intelligence (Marcus et al, 2000). Therefore, we use both terms, *fear* and *anxiety* interchangeably. People do not seem to discriminate between these two emotions in practice (Watson et al., 1988; Rusting & Larsen, 1995). Finally, measures of anxiety and fear load on the same dimension in a factor analysis (see table A1 in the Appendix).

wounded. One day later ISIS claimed responsibility. If our main conjecture is correct, support for the far right Front National (FN) in the subsequent election should be highest among those who experienced high levels of anger in response to these attacks, while authoritarians experiencing fear should have been less likely to endorse the FN.

Elections take place every six years to elect regional councilors for each of France's 18 regions. In line with the electoral system for national presidential and legislative elections, they are conducted in two rounds in the case that no candidate receives a majority of the vote. The terror events of November 13th occurred just three weeks prior to the first round of nationwide elections for regional offices that took place on December 6, 2015. This conjunction allows us to test the impact of distinct emotional reactions on the propensity to vote for the FN. In the first round of the 2015 regional elections the FN garnered nearly 28 percent of the vote, coming out on top in six out of 13 metropolitan regions.² We obtained measures of how angry and how anxious people felt soon after the attacks, allowing us to compare their impact on voting for the Front National in general, and also to explore how the effects of each emotion vary across levels of important political predispositions such as authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification.

Substantial evidence identifies two important dispositional predictors of far right support: Authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification. Authoritarian personalities, those eager to defend social norms and punish rule-breakers, are far more likely than less authoritarian citizens to be FN voters (Vasilopoulos & Lachat, 2018). Voters who self-identify as ideologically far right are also more inclined to support Front National candidates (Mayer, 2013; Mayer & Perrineau, 1992; Lewis-Beck & Chlarson, 2002). In addition, those who hold anti-immigration and ethnocentric policy attitudes are quite responsive FN's electoral appeals (Mayer, 2013; 2014). This is hardly surprising, given the salience of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam statements in the party's platform (Stockemer and Amengay, 2015).

² In general, due to the French run-off system non-mainstream parties cannot take advantage of the incumbency effect (Golder et al., 2017). Specifically, in the case of the FN the chances of winning a region were further reduced as for the first time in Regional elections, the French socialist party decided to withdraw its lists of candidates who had qualified in the second round when it was ranked third or below to prevent the election of FN candidates by supporting the center-right candidates.

An array of sociodemographic factors have been linked to support for far right leaders, parties and policies. Support is typically highest among those with the least education and income (Perrineau 1997; Mayer, 2002, 2014; Gougou & Mayer, 2013; Stockemer & Amengay, 2015). Moreover, perhaps due to its aggressiveness and doctrinal views about gender roles, the Front National often performs particularly well among men (Mayer, 2013, 2014).

Fear, Anger and Political Behavior

Fear and anger are often jointly triggered by different types of social and political threats (MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2008; Vasilopoulou and Wagner, 2017; Rico et al., 2017), including terrorist attacks (Smith, Rasinski, and Toce, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003; Huddy, Feldman, and Taber, 2005; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, and Foucault, 2018; Vasilopoulos, 2018). As we show below, both emotions are experienced by many French citizens in reaction to the attacks. However, each emotion recruits a different psychological process for addressing a threatening target (Marcus et al., 1995; Marcus et al., 2006).

There are two dominant approaches in the literature regarding the causes of emotional arousal: cognitive appraisal theories and Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT). Cognitive appraisal theories argue that specific emotions each generated by a specific sequence of evaluations of the environment. For example, if a threat is appraised as stemming from an intentional act by another person, and the target feels she is able to cope with the threat head on, anger will result (e.g. Lazarus 1991; Frijda 1986; Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009). When the threat comes from an unfamiliar, uncontrollable source, or one that cannot be overcome, anxiety will dominate (Lazarus 1991). In other words, standard appraisal theories anticipate that people will report a singular affective state, i.e., being angry *or* fearful, in response to a given threat.

On the other hand, Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) and subsequent efforts offer a different account of affect. In this theoretical approach, affect is driven by separate, concurrent, but distinct neural systems yielding the expectation that people commonly experience concurrent emotions (Marcus, 2002; MacKuen et al., 2010). Thus, rather than feeling angry *or* fearful, this perspective expects that it is rather common for people, when facing threat, to experience both anger *and* fear. That is so, because two neural systems are concurrently active. The first of these systems, the primary foci of the original theory, relies on anxiety to signal the extent to which

circumstances are unfamiliar or uncertain. Another system, relies on enthusiasm to assess the success of habits of thought and actions in securing desired goals.³

A third system, appearing in the more recent work both in and outside AIT (Marcus et al. 2010; Valentino et al 2011, and Banks and Valentino 2012), is focused on the presence of threat to familiar norms and practices of thought and action. When cherished group norms and identities are under recurring attack by familiar out-groups, increased anger is generated (indeed this is the principal identifying appraisal of the presence of such threats see Phan et al, 2002; Zahn et al. 2009, see Nitschke et al. 2006). Anger regulates behavior aimed at securing familiar goals by relying on previously learned routines. On the other hand, anxiety helps us identify novelty or uncertainty, and when found, inhibits reliance on prior routines and directs greater attentiveness to and learning about new the threat which could facilitate novel behavioral solutions (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015).

The key insight of Affective Intelligence is that multiple affective appraisals, but of special importance in conditions of threat, anger and anxiety, occur very soon after the brain begins processing incoming sensory and somatosensory signals (Marcus, 2013). These emotions therefore represent pre-conscious signals in the brain which lead quite automatically to either solidarity and commitment to defend core norms and values (in the case of anger) or decision-making more open to contemporary information (in the case of anxiety). Which process dominates depends on which reaction is stronger in the moment. Thus, to understand the impact of either on how people response to terror attacks it is necessary to secure reliable and valid measures of both emotions, anger and of anxiety.

Affective Intelligence and cognitive appraisal theories of emotion both predict similar consequences for both fear and anger in decision making and behavior. Cognitive appraisal scholars have found that fearful individuals have a heightened perception of risk, and thus engage in risk-aversive strategies vis-à-vis the threatening target (Eysenck, 1992; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; 2001). On the other hand, when it comes to information-processing, fear increases attention and heightens information-seeking processes, while on the contrary anger evokes

³ Though unlikely to be pertinent to how the French public might use this third dimension of appraisal in regard to the Paris November attacks, we nonetheless measured enthusiasm. Including this dimension in our various models alters none of the results reported.

simpler processes and increased reliance on cognitive heuristics and stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al. 1994; Lerner and Keltner, 2001).

These behavioral qualities of fear and anger have been illustrated in the realm of political decision-making and behavior. Several studies in political psychology, that generally align with Affective Intelligence have found that fear enhances information-seeking, making citizens more likely to question their prior habits and become more open to persuasion (Brader 2005; Valentino et al., 2008; Redlawsk et al., 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; 2014; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Vasilopoulos, 2018). One stream of research has found that fear – including fear stemming from terror attacks – increases motivation to follow the news and obtain political information about that topic (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Brader, 2005; Valentino et al., 2008; Vasilopoulos, 2018). Another has shown that fearful voters are less likely to rely on established convictions such as party identification or ideology and instead place more weight on contemporary assessment such as specific political issues or candidates (Marcus et al., 2000; Brader, 2005; MacKuen et al., 2007; Vasilopoulos and Marcus, 2017). Similarly, others have found that fear primes make individuals more likely to reconsider their prior opinions and accept counterarguments coming from ideologically opposed sources (Redlawsk et al., 2010; Nai et al., 2017).

Research in political psychology has shown that anger also impacts political choices: Huddy et al., 2007 illustrated that anger decreased individuals' perceived casualty risk of sending troops to fight in Iraq and made individuals more likely to support the war (2007). Banks and Valentino found that anger caused by a non-political trigger primes racial considerations and, in turn, heightened opposition to redistributive policies such as affirmative action (Banks and Valentino, 2012; Banks, 2014). Recently, Rico et al. (2017) found that angry voters were more likely to vote for anti-establishment populist parties, seeking to punish the political status quo. Finally, investigating the impact of emotions on attitudes toward the EU in the UK, Vasilopoulou and Wagner (2017) showed that anger was positively associated with support for leaving the EU, while fear was associated with the more moderate option of renegotiating the UK's relationship with the EU.

Anger also inhibits interest in new political information (Valentino et al., 2008; MacKuen et al., 2010). Moreover, angry individuals tend to discard political information that is discordant with their prior views (MacKuen et al., 2010; Suhay & Erisen, 2018). As a consequence, anger

makes citizens more likely to decide on political issues based on their prior dispositions such as ideology. Vasilopoulos, Marcus, and Foucault (2018) tested this hypothesis in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, finding that experiencing anger in the aftermath of the attack increased the impact of right-wing ideology on endorsing authoritarian policies. On the contrary, and in line with the Theory of Affective Intelligence, fear led left-wing individuals to attitude change making them more likely to endorse authoritarian policies. In short, fear decreased, while anger increased the impact of dispositions on political attitudes. Finally, in a recent examination of support for candidate Donald Trump in early 2016, (Valentino et al., 2018) discovered a very similar pattern, with anger boosting and fear suppressing the impact of support for predispositions like ethnocentrism and sexism.

But though agreeing, in the main, on the downstream effects of fear and of anger, the key difference is that Affective Intelligence holds, as we discussed above, that threats elicits two appraisals, is it novel and is it noxious. Hence, research on threat compels that both be measured so as to get accurate estimates of the effect of anger and the effect of fear, while holding constant the effects of the other.⁴

Based on the theoretical framework presented above, we hypothesize that fear and anger will have quite different impacts on the propensity to vote for the far right. Conventional wisdom holds that most citizens will respond to terrorist attacks with fear (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). A second, account, holds that those who hold authoritarian attitudes are more likely than others to respond to threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). And, this claim has been extended to argue that those who are more conservative, because they are especially sensitive to threat, are also more likely to experience fear which in turn drives support for policies, parties, and leaders that promise security (Jost, 2003, 2017; Hibbing, et al. 2014). This focus on fearfulness, either as a

⁴ There is a further issue, that of mis-specification. If cognitive appraisals normally produce a singular ‘discrete’ affective states, or if affective appraisals simultaneously active, but are orthogonal, then the risk of mis-specification is modest. But, as we discuss and test below, our theoretical lens leads us to expect that the normal circumstance in facing threat is two concurrent affective appraisals, anger and fear, that are not orthogonal, elevating the risk of mis-specification is very substantial if only fear or only anger is studied in isolation.

dispositional sensitivity or as a situational reaction to an imminent threat, has dominated the approach to understanding threat and the political responses generated.⁵

However, if many citizens experience anger in reaction to these attacks, but anger goes unmeasured, we risk misestimating the impact of fear. As our account holds that many people will experience both fearfulness and anger in reaction to a threat, we include measures of both so that we can explore the independent consequences for each. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Anxiety evoked by the attacks should have a negative impact on voting for the FN

The FN discourse is characterized by a generalized aggressive, vindictive, and exclusionary discourse that is still central to the party communication strategy despite Marine Le Pen's efforts to distance herself from the extreme views of her father and party founder Jean Marie Le Pen (Shields, 2013; Stockemer, 2017). The FN has long advocated aggressive, radical, and previously untested policies such as withdrawing from the EU, returning to a French national currency, minimizing immigration, denying any form of healthcare for illegal immigrants, and targeting Muslims with policies such as as lifting the policy that provided Muslim children with lunches that didn't contain pork. In the wake of the November 13 attacks, the FN swiftly blamed Muslims and immigrants (despite the French citizenship status of several of the attackers). They proposed aggressive and punitive actions against these groups, such as banning Islamist organizations and shutting mosques. According to the approach we described above, fear evoked by the attacks should make voters more attentive to whether proposals are likely to be successful, i.e., become more critical. Consequently, we hypothesize that these voters should be less appealed by the aggressive, and untested policies advocated by the FN.

Hypothesis 2: Anger prompted by the attacks should boost support for the FN

If the threat is experienced as a familiar assault on cherished values then the FN, the party long advancing the need to defend nationalist values, will likely be appealing to angry voters. As we mentioned above, anger has often been linked to risky, vindictive, and aggressive

⁵ Two excellent meta-analyses that test these claims (Jost et al, 2003, 2017) do not consider anger as an independent emotional conduit for support for far right politics. Since the two emotions are correlated, we suspect including only one of them could lead to incorrect inferences about the impact of fear.

behavior. This is consistent with our approach as anger, evoked by the Paris terror attacks, signals the need to protect and defend core values. Critically, we will model the impact of fear and anger simultaneously.⁶

But beyond their situational effects (modeled as direct effects), changes in either will also impact on the prominent dispositions, though in different ways. This leads to two additional hypotheses.

Hypothesis 3: Fear will reduce the effect of authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification on the propensity to vote for the FN.

As discussed in the theoretical section, this claim follows from the role of anxiety as defined by the theory of Affective Intelligence and has been confirmed in a number of studies. Past research has found that increased fear inhibits reliance on dispositions such as ideology or party identification (Brader 2005; Marcus et al, 2000). Similarly, we anticipate that fear will lessen the impact of authoritarianism and ideological identification on the propensity to vote for the French far right.

Similarly, we expect that anger will also impact on the reliance on the relevant dispositions.

Hypothesis 4: Anger will increase reliance on these same dispositions, authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification.

Much as anxiety *inhibits* reliance on standing patterns of thought and action, heightened anger *strengthens* reliance on the proven habits of thought and action. In sum, and in line with past research reported above, by shifting attention to the contemporary, anxiety should inhibit reliance on otherwise relevant traits (here authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification), reducing their impact on voting for the FN. However, as anger increases reliance on past convictions, angry respondents will find more compelling their long-term psychological dispositions.

Methodology and Data

⁶ The need to do so flows from more than their concurrent activity. They are not expected to be orthogonal and indeed the evidence shows them to be both co-active and are highly correlated (Marcus, et al. 2006, Marcus, et al. forthcoming).

The data to test these hypotheses come from the first two waves of the 2017 French Election Study (Enquête Électorale Française), a panel study conducted approximately every month between November 2015 and the French legislative elections in June 2017.⁷ The survey was conducted between November 20 and 29 2015 (Wave 1) and January 22 to February 3rd, 2016 (Wave 2) using Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) in a nationwide representative sample of 24,369 respondents, 21,555 of which answered both waves. The sample was quota-controlled for age, gender, professional status, and stratified by size of community and region (Ile de France, North- West, North-East, South-West, South-East). Sample descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.⁸ The dependent variable is the reported vote in the first round of the 2015 French regional elections, measured in Wave 2. In the first round of the French regional elections, French citizens voted for a party candidate to serve as the regional councilor. Along with the FN candidates, voters could choose from all four major French political parties, namely the far left *Parti de Gauche* ('PdG'), the incumbent center-left *Parti Socialiste* ('PS'), and the center right *Les Republicains* ('LR'). A variety of minor parties were also available (scored as 'Other'), as well as a category of those who chose to abstain ('Abstained').

{TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE}

All of the independent variables were measured in Wave 1. We measure emotional reactions to the terror attacks using the affect terms proposed by Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (forthcoming), presented in random order. The level of anxiety/fear is measured with three items, tapping the extent to which respondents felt worried, scared, or fearful when thinking about the November 13 attacks on a scale running from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely).⁹ Adding up these three items produces the fear scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.82$). Anger reactions are measured in a similar way, with items tapping the anger, hatred, bitterness and resentment respondents felt about the attacks (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.83$).¹⁰ Factor analyses confirmed that the items used to tap

⁷ The study was conducted for the Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po by the polling institute IPSOS MORI and was sponsored by the French Ministry of the Interior.

⁸ The data resemble the French adult population in all comparisons with the census and the results of the 2012 French Presidential election, with the exception of the underrepresentation of respondents with low levels of education, which constitutes a typical limitation of internet panel studies (e.g. Craig et al., 2013)

⁹ The French terms are "inquiétude", "peur" and "effroi"

¹⁰ The French terms are "colère", "haine", "amertume" and "ressentiment"

fear and anger form two distinct dimensions.¹¹ Unsurprisingly, the November attacks evoked very strong emotional reactions in the French population. The two scales are coded so that they ranged from low (0) to high (1). As shown in Figure 1, the mean of fear is 0.71 and the mean of anger is 0.69. And, as expected, fear and anger are positively correlated but not multicollinear (Pearson's $r = .47$).¹² Therefore, as expected, the attacks of November 13th simultaneously elicited anxiety *and* anger in many respondents. This offers a useful intermediate test of the presumptions made by the cognitive appraisal school that, at any given moment, affective responses are typically singular discrete experiences.

[Figure 1 about here]

We measure authoritarianism using the child-rearing values scale (Feldman & Stenner 1997. See also Federico et al., 2011; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Vasilopoulos and Lachat, 2018). The child-rearing values scale asks respondents whether it is more important for a child to: a) be independent than respectful of his/her grandparents; b) to have an enquiring mind than to be well mannered; c) to be well behaved than creative; and, d) to be obedient than autonomous. Ideology has been measured by an item asking respondents to place themselves on a ten position scale ranging from far left to far right.¹³ Finally, our models include the relevant demographic characteristics to see if those characteristics, here, perform much as they have in prior research. Hence, we include measures for age, gender, social class, and education. All variables are coded to range from 0 to 1 so as to enhance comparability of coefficients and hence of effect size.

Results

¹¹ See Appendix table A2. A confirmatory factor analysis, shown in Figure A1 also supports the same conclusions. The calculated reliabilities for these seven indicators all fall within a narrow and acceptable range, from a low of .72 to a high of .84.

¹² The Variance Inflation Factor between the two emotional reactions is 1.23. Since both fear and anger are highly pertinent to threats of any sort they are strongly positively correlated as numerous studies have shown (Marcus et al 2006; Huddy et al. 2007, MacKuen et al 2010; Vasilopoulos, 2018). That is to say, our brains are quickly determining whether immediate circumstances are familiar or not (and reporting the appraisal's results by changing levels of fear) *and* determining whether core norms are being violated (and reporting those results by changing levels of anger).

¹³ We chose to treat ideology as a continuous variable for simplicity. The analyses have been replicated treating ideology as a categorical variable that includes those who refuse to place themselves on the scale. Results are identical.

In order to investigate the emotional foundations of support for the FN we build three models.¹⁴ In the first, we assess the baseline impact of demographics, authoritarianism, ideology, and fear on the propensity to vote for the FN. This model is our representation of the standard account highlighting the role of fear in response to threats.

Models 2 and 3 elaborates Model 1 by adding anger as a concurrent influence, along with anxiety. In Model 2 we examine the direct influence of anxiety and anger to the terrorist attacks so as to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (while controlling for the effects of socio-demographic factors). In Model 3 we add four interaction terms to examine the conditional effect of fear and anger with authoritarianism and with right ideological identification on far right voting. These interactions test the validity of Hypotheses 3 and 4. Since the dependent variable is categorical we employ multinomial logistic regression. This is method is deemed most suitable for analyzing multi-party elections as it allows the comparison of the electoral pool of voters who are drawn to one party (the Front National in this case) as against the pools of voters drawn to each of the other parties.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 displays the results of the first model that includes demographics, self-placement on the left-right scale, authoritarianism, and fear. Entries are multinomial logistic coefficients. Negative coefficients indicate a greater propensity to vote for the FN compared to the party in comparison. For ease of comprehension, parties have been arranged from left to right.

Beginning with the impact of demographics on the propensity to vote for the FN, our findings suggest that in the 2015 French regional election, the far-right party appealed to its typical demographic base consisting of male voters, voters with lower levels of education and lower levels of income compared to voters of the center-left and center-right parties. This is in line with past literature on the demographic correlates of the French far right vote. Further, the analysis suggests that FN voters place themselves to the right end of the left-right scale, with the effect being statistically significant across all party comparisons. Again, this is consistent with a broad literature on the FN electoral pool and consists a long-term characteristic of the French far right voter (Mayer, 2013, 2018; Mayer and Perrineau, 1992). Finally, and again in line with past

¹⁴ As a robustness check we replicated the analysis adding political attitudes measuring ethnic intolerance. Results are provided in the Appendix.

research (Vasilopoulos and Lachat, 2018) the results indicate that authoritarianism runs high among the FN voters, more so than the voters of any other French party.

To this point we have shown that in the 2015 French Regional elections the FN appealed to its typical electorate consisting of low socioeconomic status and authoritarian voters who place themselves on the far right. These results affirm the influence of long term dispositional factors that identify the kinds of voters more prone to voting for the far right. How do situational appraisals however impact far right voting? The results from Model 1 suggest that when anger is omitted, fear in reaction to the attacks does seem to increase the propensity to vote for the FN. This pattern seems to confirm conventional wisdom that fear increases the likelihood of casting a vote for the FN, compared to the center-left PS, the center-right LR, and even compared to abstaining altogether. However, as reported in the theoretical section, given that fear and anger correlate, and anger has different behavioral qualities compared to fear, we believe omitting anger is a serious misspecification.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 includes all the variables included in the first analysis (Table 1), but importantly adds anger to the model. The results confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2. Incorporating anger in the analysis, we find that fear reduces the likelihood of an FN vote compared to casting a vote for the PS, LR, or abstaining from the voting. This confirms our first hypothesis. On the other hand, anger in response to the attacks powerfully increased the propensity to vote for the French far right compared to all other parties and to abstaining in the 2015 Regional elections. This is fully in line with our second hypothesis. Further, the effect of anger is similar across different electoral groups, with the exception of abstainers where it is slightly weakened. This is in line with past research over the positive effect of anger on political participation in the light of the Paris terror attacks (Vasilopoulos, 2018) The associations of fear and anger with the propensity to vote for the FN are displayed in Figure 2. The figure clearly illustrates the strong and contrary associations between the two emotional reactions and voting for the far right. Furthermore, Figure 2 suggests that the effect of fear and especially anger robustly alters the propensity to vote for the FN.

[Figure 2 about here]

We next turn to the interactive effects of emotions and predispositions - authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification - on support for the FN. Our third hypothesis leads us

to anticipate that fear will reduce the impact of both authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification on the propensity to vote for the FN. Our fourth hypothesis anticipates that experiencing anger will increase the impact of the same dispositions on voting for the far right. Interaction coefficients, on their own, are insufficient as the significance of the coefficients is only weakly related to the substantive effects of interest (Brambor, Clarke, and Golder, 2006). Hence, we present two marginal effects plots, Figures 3 and 4, to illustrate the impact of authoritarianism and ideology on the probability of voting for the French far right at different levels of fear and anger. These results represent tests of the third and fourth hypotheses respectively.¹⁵ The regression models on which these figures are based are presented in the Appendix.

[Figures 3 and 4 about here]

Overall, the results in Figure 3 confirm hypotheses 3 and 4. The left side of Figure 3 reveals that fear *reduces support* for the FN among respondents who score high in authoritarianism. At the same time, among respondents who score low in authoritarianism, fear is rather weakly associated with a change in the probability of voting for the FN. The right side panel of Figure 3 shows the effect of anger. Among respondents high in authoritarianism, anger in response to the attacks increases support for the FN. As we expect, the effect of anger is smaller among non-authoritarian voters, though not dramatically so. This is, as we predicted: People who do not subscribe to authoritarian values should be *less* likely to become mobilized for the far right even if they experience anger in reaction to the attacks.

The distinct conditioning effects of these emotional reactions are even larger when we examine the interaction of the two situational affective appraisals on the influence of conservative ideological identification. Figure 4 replicates the presentation shown in Figure 3. The interaction results are displayed for four groups of voters: Those who place themselves in the far left (position 2 on the ten point the left-right scale), center left (position 4 on the left-right scale), center right (position 6 on the left-right scale), and far right (position 8 on the left-right scale). The figure shows that as fear increases, far right respondents become *less likely* to vote

¹⁵ Following Berry et al. (2012) we also estimated the effect of ideology at different levels of fear and anger. (figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix). Results confirm our expectations: Anger increases, while fear decreases the effect of authoritarianism and ideology on the probability of voting the FN.

for the FN. Same is the case with center right supporters although the effect is not as strong, while fear does not make any difference among those who place themselves in the center or the far left. On the other hand, anger boosts support for the FN among all voters, but especially among those who place themselves on the right end of the ideology scale. All in all, ideology has the highest impact on the FN vote at the maximum value of anger. It is noteworthy that angry center left respondents have the same probability of voting for the FN as non-angry far right respondents.

These results confirm Hypotheses 3 and 4. Increased anger is associated with strengthened reliance on both dispositions, authoritarianism and conservative ideological identification. To the contrary, increased fear reduces reliance on both dispositions. As result, fear reduces the gap between the most and least authoritarian as well as left and far right respondents on the probability to vote for the FN. We consider the implications of these findings more fully in the conclusion.

Conclusion

Popular and scholarly attention to the rise of far right authoritarian parties in Europe has long focused on the role of anxiety as the critical psychological causal mechanism. The rise of the far right is frequently attributed to the careful deployment of anxiety by charismatic politicians, often by scapegoating oppressed minority groups. Conventional wisdom holds that threats generate a singular appraisal: is this threat substantial? The answer is thought to be found in increased levels of fear. That is indeed a useful question. But it is not the only pertinent question. Our interpretation of the theory of Affective Intelligence leads us to expect that threats are examined by two different pertinent questions. One appraisal considers whether this threat is novel. The answer is given by increasing anxiety when that appraisal is positive. When the answer is yes, then stored habits are not likely to secure the expected outcomes that those habits have previously secured. Further, greater anxiety inhibits reliance on those habits of thought and action and initiates a search for pertinent information, among them being the character of the threat, what options and what alliances are most promising (MacKuen, et al., 2010; Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). The other concurrent question is: Does this threat challenge valued norms and values, marked by increased anger? If the answer is yes, then the habitual defensive routines are marshaled and partisan solidarity is strengthened (Valentino et al., 2011).

We tested this approach to terror threat in this study. We analyzed the distinct impacts of fear and anger on voting for the French far right in the elections held just weeks after the 2015 French terror attacks. Our results suggest a new explanation for far right voting. While both anger and fear appeals are common in far right discourse, our results show that anger evoked by the terrorist attacks has the far stronger and positive impact on support for the far right, while anxiety, weakens support for far right voting. Further, our results also show that these two affective reactions each interact with dispositional traits but in different ways. Anger strengthens the role of the convictions that align with far right voting. Anxiety, on the other hand, weakens the influence of the dispositional convictions that encourage voting for the far right.

Our results suggest that once fear is evoked, it leads to a reassessment of supporting dispositions by inhibiting this otherwise automatic propensity to vote for the far right.¹⁶ Right-wing identifiers and authoritarians are also likely to experience increased anger. And once anger kicks in, it strengthens the public's reliance on dispositional traits, boosting their probability of voting for the far right. In this sense the findings of this study provide an explanatory framework for understanding political polarization (Bartels, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2012). To the extent that anger dominates the political landscape, among those all along the ideological spectrum, polarization is likely to be made more evident, as each ideological tribe advance the rightness of its convictions with greater fervor. On the other hand, our findings suggest that when fear ascends publics will become more attentive to political issues and the actual attributes of the candidates, as citizens will tend to rely less on their dispositions,. Thus anxious citizens will become less partisan in their vote choices (MacKuen et al., 2007).

A recent stream of research has shown that citizens experience heightened fear and anger in response to threats other than terrorism. These include economic conditions (Wagner, 2014; Rico et al., 2017), their country's membership in supranational political institutions such as the EU (Vasilopoulou and Wagner, 2017), legislative acts (Valentino and Neuer, 2017), media content (MacKuen et al, 2010; Marcus et al., 2018) or politicians (Ragsdale, 1991; Marcus et al., 1993; 2000). Other research has illustrated that fear and anger stemming from stimuli unrelated to politics also shape political decision-making (Banks and Valentino, 2012; Banks, 2014).

¹⁶ We use the term “automatic” in the sense that John Bargh and colleagues apply, that is to say fast un-reflexive reliance on established habits (Bargh et al., 1992, 1999).

Consequently, we anticipate that the findings of this study may well be generalized in contexts other than terrorist threat. More generally, our results are in line with a growing literature that demonstrates the differential effects of fear and anger in political behavior (MacKuen et al., 2010; Wagner, 2014; Valentino et al., 2008, 2011; Vasilopoulos et al., 2018; Vasilopoulos, 2018). Further, they provide evidence on the distinct behavioral effects of fear and anger on political behavior from a European setting, illustrating that affect has similar political consequences across contexts (see also Erisen, 2013; Wagner, 2014; Vasilopoulos, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). Overall, these findings highlight the need to include measures both of anger and anxiety in the study of the association between threat and the endorsement of different facets of the conservative and authoritarian ideologies (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Jost et al., 2003; 2017).

If we turn our attention to theoretical models that guide scholars, we can build on these insights to derive other implications. As politics, especially democratic politics, is inherently combative - reflecting the natural clashing of social, private interests and the differing visions of the public interest - then this duality of anger and anxiety is likely common. The thrust of this work points to a need for a new theoretical formulation that more fully captures the distinct affects of anger and fear. Rather than focusing on the usefulness of emotion as directing the search for information, as the theory of Affective Intelligence has done, we see a more expansive role for emotion, that of animating the human capacity for agency, though of two kinds. Much of the interest in emotion in political science, psychology, and political psychology has focused on information gathering, both at the outset (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) and since (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015; Cheung-Blunden & Ju, 2016). Therefore, we propose the theory of Affective Agency to accommodate the core insight that information of all sorts, affective and semantic, serves human agency.

The intention of this theoretical perspective is to identify how affective processes prepare people to act. Our focus expands beyond information gathering to explore how some situational affective appraisals strengthen reliance on habituated pattern of action, while other concurrent affective situational appraisals diminish reliance thereupon for, instead, reflexive consideration of the circumstances, the available options for action, allegiance and purpose. In sum, emotion, as Hume (1984, p. 462) famously asserted, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” That

observation may turn out to be both perspicuous but also to lead to a more optimistic result for politics than is commonly thought.

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
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
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Figure 1: Co-joint Emotional Reactions to the November 2015 Attacks




Source: Enquête électorale française (Wave 1)

Figure 2: The direct effect of fear and anger on the probability of voting for the FN




Source: Enquête électorale française

Figure 3: The Impact of Authoritarianism on the Probability of Voting for the FN at Different Levels of Fear and Anger



Source: Enquête électorale française

Figure 4: The Impact of Different Ideological Self Placements on the Probability of Voting for the FN at Different Levels of Fear and Anger



Source: Enquête électorale française

APPENDIX

TABLE A1: Comparisons between the sample, the French census, and the results of the 2012 French Presidential Election

		Difference between sample and census			Difference between sample and census			Difference between sample and the 2012 French Presidential election results
Gender x Age	Men / 18-24	-0.5	Region	Île-de-France	0.7	Vote in the First round of the 2012 French Presidential Election	N. Arthaud	-0.1
	Men / 25-34	-1.6		Centre Val de Loire	0.4		P. Poutou	-0.1
	Men / 35-49	1.1		Bourgogne France-Comté	-0.1		JL. Melenchon	-2
	Men / 50-64	-0.2		Normandie	-0.4		F. Hollande	2.9
	Men / 65 +	-2.6		Nord Pas-de-Calais Picardie	0.6		E. Jolly	0.8
	Women / 18-24	0.7		Alsace Champagne-Ardenne Lorraine	0.3		F. Bayrou	0.7
	Women / 25-34	2		Pays de la Loire	0.8		N. Sarkozy	-0.3
	Women / 35-49	4		Bretagne	0.4		N. Dupont-Aignan	0.3
	Women / 50-64	1.5		Aquitaine Limousin Poitou-Charentes	-1		M. Le Pen	-1.6
	Women / 65 +	-4.4		Languedoc-Roussillon Midi-Pyrénées	-0.8			
Social Class	Farmers	-1		Auvergne Rhône-Alpes	0.2			
	Independent professionals	-0.6		Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur	-1.3			

Managers	4.2	Level of education	No diploma	-19.1
Intermediate professions	4.2		BEPC, CAP, BEP	-7.3
Employees	4.2		Bac.	1.7
Workers	-5		High education degree	24.7
Retired	-6.9			
Inactive	0.9			

Table A2: Coding and wording of authoritarianism and ethnic intolerance items

Authoritarianism

It is more important for a child to be independent or respectful of his/her parents or grandparents?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Be independent 2. Be respectful of his/her grandparents
It is more important for a child to have an enquiring mind or be well-mannered?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Have an enquiring mind 2. Be well mannered
It is more important for a child to be well-behaved or creative?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Be well behaved 2. Be creative
It is more important for a child to be obedient than autonomous?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Be obedient 2. Be autonomous


Source: Enquête électorale française

Table A2. Rotated Factor Loadings of the Fear and Anger Dimensions

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Worry (<i>inquiétude</i>)		0.78
Fear (<i>peur</i>)		0.81
Fright (<i>effroi</i>)		0.66
Bitterness (<i>amertume</i>)	0.71	
Anger (<i>colère</i>)	0.70	
Resentment (<i>ressentiment</i>)	0.78	
Hatred (<i>haine</i>)	0.70	
Variance proportion	0.79	0.72

Note: Oblique rotation (promax). Only factor loadings over 0.3 are shown.

Figure A1: Confirmatory factor analysis of the emotional reactions to the November 13 attacks



SEM Model of Fear and Anger Dimensions

Note: $N = 24,325$; $\chi^2 (13 \text{ df}) = 1840.52$, $p > \text{chi}^2 = 0.0001$; $RMSEA = .076$; $CFI = .976$; $SMSR = .032$

Note 2: A single factor solution, that is a single latent factor (Negative Affect) with all seven indicators treated as measuring this one latent factor does not fit the data. $\chi^2 (14 \text{ df}) = 19359.82$, $p > \text{chi}^2 = 0.0001$; $RMSEA = .238$; $CFI = .741$; $SMSR = .114$

Source: Enquête électorale française

Table 1. The standalone effect of fear on the probability to vote for the FN (full results)

	FDG	PS	Other	LR	Abstained
<i>Dispositional</i>					
Left-Right scale	-14.02** (0.31)	-10.11** (0.16)	-6.72** (0.14)	-1.35** (0.12)	-5.57** (0.14)
Authoritarianism	-1.52** (0.16)	-0.92** (0.09)	-0.97** (0.09)	-0.65** (0.08)	-0.72** (0.09)
<i>Situational</i>					
Fear	-0.62** (0.21)	-0.17 (0.12)	-0.59** (0.12)	0.00 (0.11)	-0.26* (0.12)
<i>Demographics</i>					
Age	0.17 (0.46)	-0.28 (0.25)	-0.43 (0.24)	0.80** (0.22)	-2.34** (0.24)
Female	-0.00 (0.11)	0.43** (0.06)	0.35** (0.06)	0.39** (0.05)	0.52** (0.06)
Income	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.06** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Middle education	0.64**	0.22*	0.27**	0.29**	0.05

	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
High education	0.52**	0.59**	0.66**	0.79**	0.32**
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Farmers	-13.97	0.25	0.44	0.14	0.18
	(701.80)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Self-employed	-0.24	-0.01	0.26	0.41**	0.30*
	(0.39)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Managers	0.55**	0.71**	0.47**	0.61**	0.35**
	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Middle professionals	0.57**	0.31**	0.35**	0.21**	0.21*
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Manual workers	0.10	0.03	-0.02	-0.13	0.14
	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Pensioners	0.60**	0.63**	0.37**	0.51**	0.28**
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Other non-labor	0.28	0.22*	0.26**	0.21*	0.18*
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	4.52**	4.95**	4.26**	-0.50**	4.30**
	(0.37)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Observations	20,013	20,013	20,013	20,013	20,013
Pseudo R ²			0.17		

Table entries are unstandardized multinomial logistic regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parentheses). The base outcome is voting for the FN. Negative coefficients indicate an

increase in the probability of voting for the FN, while positive coefficients suggest an increase in the probability of voting for the other party in comparison. Reference group in social class is clerical and service staff. **: $p < 0.01$; *: $p < 0.05$.

Source: Enquête électorale française

Table 2. The standalone effect of fear and anger on the probability to vote for the FN (full results)

	FDG	PS	Other	LR	Abstained
<i>Dispositional</i>					
Left-Right scale	-13.69** (0.31)	-9.78** (0.16)	-6.39** (0.14)	-0.98** (0.12)	-5.27** (0.14)
Authoritarianism	-1.40** (0.17)	-0.79** (0.09)	-0.87** (0.09)	-0.55** (0.08)	-0.63** (0.09)
<i>Situational</i>					
Fear	0.25	0.75**	0.21	0.79**	0.43**

	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Anger	-2.23**	-2.36**	-2.08**	-2.12**	-1.85**
	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
<i>Demographics</i>					
Age	0.45	0.01	-0.17	1.05**	-2.12**
	(0.47)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Female	-0.07	0.36**	0.29**	0.33**	0.47**
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Income	0.05**	0.06**	0.01	0.06**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Middle education	0.62**	0.20*	0.25**	0.28**	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
High education	0.45**	0.52**	0.60**	0.75**	0.28**
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Farmers	-14.05	0.17	0.38	0.09	0.12
	(704.93)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Self-employed	-0.25	-0.03	0.24	0.39**	0.29
	(0.39)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Managers	0.49*	0.65**	0.43**	0.56**	0.31**
	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Middle professionals	0.54**	0.28**	0.33**	0.19*	0.19*
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Manual workers	0.10	0.03	-0.02	-0.13	0.14
	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)

Pensioners	0.61**	0.65**	0.38**	0.52**	0.29**
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Other non-labor	0.32	0.26**	0.29**	0.24**	0.21*
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	5.17**	5.63**	4.87**	0.11	4.86**
	(0.37)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Observations			20,013		
Pseudo R ²			0.18		

Table entries are unstandardized multinomial logistic regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parentheses). The base outcome is voting for the FN. Negative coefficients indicate an increase in the probability of voting for the FN, while positive coefficients suggest an increase in the probability of voting for the other party in comparison. Reference group in social class is clerical and service staff. **: $p < 0.01$; *: $p < 0.05$.

Source: *Enquête électorale française*

Table A3: Interactive model- The indirect effect of fear and anger along ideology and authoritarianism on the probability to vote for the FN

	FDG	PS	Other	LR	Abstained
<i>Dispositional</i>					
Left-Right scale	-19.29**	-13.15**	-11.43**	-2.02**	-8.90**
	(1.10)	(0.68)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.63)

Authoritarianism	-0.68	-0.04	-0.91*	-0.04	-0.90*
	(0.56)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)
<i>Situational</i>					
Fear	-0.70	0.77	-0.06	0.43	0.51
	(0.66)	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.51)
Anger	-4.15**	-4.47**	-5.64**	-2.17**	-5.11**
	(0.72)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.59)
<i>Dispositional X Situational</i>					
Left-Right scale x Fear	4.12**	0.45	0.41	0.59	-0.16
	(1.45)	(0.77)	(0.68)	(0.60)	(0.69)
Left-Right scale x Anger	3.35*	3.80**	6.31**	0.58	4.87**
	(1.48)	(0.86)	(0.80)	(0.71)	(0.80)
Authoritarianism x Fear	-0.05	-0.53	0.02	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.74)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.45)
Authoritarianism x Anger	-1.01	-0.57	0.13	-0.64	0.56
	(0.79)	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.51)
<i>Demographics</i>					
Age	0.44	0.01	-0.19	1.07**	-2.14**
	(0.47)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Female	-0.08	0.36**	0.29**	0.33**	0.47**
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Income	0.05**	0.06**	0.01	0.06**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Middle education	0.59**	0.18*	0.24**	0.28**	0.03

	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
High education	0.43**	0.50**	0.59**	0.75**	0.26**
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Farmers	-14.33	0.18	0.37	0.10	0.12
	(815.37)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Self-employed	-0.23	-0.01	0.26	0.40**	0.30*
	(0.39)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Managers	0.51**	0.66**	0.43**	0.56**	0.30**
	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Middle level professionals	0.55**	0.28**	0.33**	0.19*	0.18*
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Manual workers	0.11	0.02	-0.03	-0.13	0.14
	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Pensioners	0.63**	0.65**	0.38**	0.53**	0.29**
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Other non-labor force	0.34	0.26**	0.29**	0.24**	0.21*
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	7.43**	7.36**	7.71**	0.54	7.25**
	(0.61)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.48)
Observations			20,013		
Pseudo R ²			0.18		

Table entries are unstandardized multinomial logistic regression coefficients (with their standard errors in parentheses). The base outcome is voting for the FN. Negative coefficients indicate an increase in the probability of voting for the FN, while positive coefficients suggest an increase in

the probability of voting for the other party in comparison. Reference group in social class is clerical and service staff. **: $p < 0.01$; *: $p < 0.05$.

Source: Enquête électorale française

ROBUSTNESS CHECK

We construct a scale of ethnic intolerance from five items: “there are too many immigrants in France”; “Islam is a threat to the West”; “French natives should have priority in employment compared to foreigners”; “immigration is a source of cultural enrichment”; and, “Children of immigrants born in France are as French as anyone else.” Each of these items is measured with five point Likert scales while the last two items are reverse scored. The Cronbach’s alpha for the five items is 0.88.

	FDG	PS	Other	LR	Abstained
<i>Political Attitudes</i>					
Ethnic intolerance	-6.57** (0.27)	-6.60** (0.16)	-5.37** (0.16)	-5.27** (0.15)	-4.70** (0.16)
<i>Dispositional</i>					
Authoritarianism	-0.64** (0.17)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.30** (0.10)	0.00 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)
Left-right scale	-11.89** (0.31)	-7.93** (0.16)	-4.92** (0.15)	0.56** (0.14)	-4.02** (0.15)
<i>Situational</i>					
Fear	0.13 (0.25)	0.63** (0.15)	0.07 (0.14)	0.65** (0.13)	0.29* (0.14)
Anger	-0.47	-0.60**	-0.66**	-0.77**	-0.62**


	(0.26)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
<i>Demographics</i>					
Age	1.04*	0.58*	0.23	1.42**	-1.79**
	(0.47)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Female	-0.13	0.30**	0.25**	0.30**	0.43**
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Income	0.04*	0.05**	-0.00	0.06**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Middle education	0.56**	0.14	0.24**	0.29**	0.04
	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
High education	0.25	0.33**	0.51**	0.71**	0.22**
	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Farmers	-14.21	0.17	0.35	0.06	0.09
	(763.46)	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Self-employed	-0.27	-0.03	0.28	0.45**	0.34*
	(0.40)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Managers	0.34	0.50**	0.33**	0.49**	0.24*
	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Middle level professionals	0.41*	0.15	0.24**	0.11	0.11
	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Manual workers	0.11	0.04	-0.00	-0.11	0.15
	(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Pensioners	0.57**	0.63**	0.38**	0.54**	0.29**
	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)

Other non-labor force	0.34	0.27**	0.31**	0.27**	0.24*
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	6.47**	6.92**	6.08**	1.25**	6.01**
	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Pseudo R ²			0.21		
Observations			19,999		

Table entries are multinomial logit coefficients are (with their standard errors) in parentheses. The base outcome is voting for the FN. Negative coefficient values indicate an increase in the probability of voting for the FN, while positive coefficient values an increase in the probability of voting for the other party in comparison. Reference group in social class is clerical and service staff. **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05;


Source: Enquête électorale française

Figure A2. Interactions of fear and anger with ideology on the probability to vote for the FN controlling for ethnic intolerance attitudes




Source: Enquête électorale française

Figure A3. Interactions of fear and anger with authoritarianism on the probability to vote for the FN controlling for ethnic intolerance attitudes





Source: Enquête électorale française

Figure A4: The impact of fear and anger on the propensity to vote for the FN for different values of ideology





Source: Enquête électorale française


Figure A5: The impact of fear and anger on the propensity to vote for the FN for different values of authoritarianism




Source: Enquête électorale français




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pops_12513_f2.jpg



pops_12513_f3.jpg



pops_12513_f4.jpg