Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes:
A Comparison of the Pittsburgh and Detroit Metropolitan Areas

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Visiting Scholar¹

July, 2002

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Executive Summary

In the 1970s, major American industrial cities began to lose much of their economic vitality as a result of economic globalization and affected regional economies. Since then, the issue of regional restructuring of these cities and their suburbs has become a focus of public discourse. Regional restructuring is defined as the economic actors' response to resolve a crisis on the regional level. The industrial cities of the Midwest and Northeast have tried to respond to the common impacts of economic crisis caused by de-industrialization, such as plant closings and mass unemployment.

However, while these cities experienced the common trend of de-industrialization, they followed different paths in their responses. Some cities have succeeded in revitalizing their economies, while others have failed to regain the vitality of their economy. This gives rise to several questions. Why have major industrial cities restructured their regions via different paths? Why have major industrial cities shown varying results from regional restructuring? To answer these questions, we will compare the regional restructuring that took place in two major American industrial cities, Pittsburgh and Detroit, and examine how the different paths gave rise to different outcomes. In other words, the objective of this study is to compare the regional restructuring of Pittsburgh and Detroit, focusing on the presence or absence of a regional coalition. A regional coalition is defined as a broadened governing coalition that is functioning at the regional level.

Analytical Framework

We made a new typology of urban regimes by combining structural and actor variables systematically. As shown in Table 1, we developed four types of urban regimes by combining these two variables: (1) the trend of regional restructuring related to the situation of manufacturing sector, and (2) the presence or absence of a regional coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend of Regional Restructuring</th>
<th>Regional Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing-centered</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type I (Pittsburgh)</td>
<td>Type II (Philadelphia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing-centered</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type III (Milwaukee)</td>
<td>Type IV (Detroit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic Differences between Pittsburgh and Detroit

Pittsburgh and Detroit are notable industrial cities that highly depended on one main industry (steel in Pittsburgh, automobiles in Detroit). However, a significant difference exists in the de-industrialization of these two cities. We have to consider the contrasting situations of the main industry in each city. The steel industry in the Pittsburgh region has
experienced near total collapse since the 1970s. During the globalization of the steel industry, the competitive edge of the steel industry in Pittsburgh rapidly weakened. From today’s perspective, the recovery of a steel-mill based economy in the Pittsburgh region seems impossible.

On the other hand, the automotive industry in the Detroit region has maintained its vitality since the 1970s. During the process of intensified competition, the automotive industry in the Detroit region has maintained its position as the headquarters of, and manufacturing centers for the Big Three automakers. In addition, many automotive suppliers have a presence in the Detroit MSA. This is the main reason that the manufacturing sector has stayed relatively high in Detroit.

Regional Politics and Regional Coalitions

The presence or absence of a regional coalition is one of two key variables determining the characteristics of an urban regime. Using this approach, we can compare the regional politics of Pittsburgh and Detroit, focusing on the regional coalition. The urban regimes of both cities are compared in terms of the relationships with local governments, business organization, and community organizations under the specific trend of regional restructuring.

The urban regime in the Pittsburgh region has tried to restructure the regional economy into one that is centered on the service sector, keeping a stable regional coalition. Through the presence of a regional coalition, the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region took a path of economic restructuring toward a relatively balanced economy between the central city and its suburbs. By coordinating the conflicting interests of different economic actors, the urban regime has provided not only the economic policies, but also the social policies for the balanced development of the Pittsburgh region. This kind of urban regime is clearly contrasted with the urban regime in the Detroit region that has tried to restructure its economy without forming a regional coalition.

The urban regime of Detroit failed to form a stable regional coalition including both the private and public sectors, and it completely failed to include community organizations at all. Even though the public-private partnership for downtown redevelopment was formed during the 1970s, it has not been extended into a broad governing coalition to solve the problems that the regional economy faced. Community organizations and labor unions also could not contribute to the formation of a regional coalition, because the former were relatively weak and the latter had a narrow self-interested perspective.

To achieve a regionally balanced economy, a regional coalition that coordinates the different interests of the economic actors is required. However, neither a regional coalition nor a functional equivalent to one has emerged in the Detroit region. Even though the regional economy based on the automotive industry regained its economic strength in the 1990s, it has developed unevenly lacking a comprehensive plan created by a regional coalition. If this kind of urban regime is sustained in the Detroit region, the problems of a regionally fractured economy will worsen in the future.

Social Results of Regional Restructuring
Given the trends in regional restructuring and the presence or absence of a regional coalition, the two urban regimes in Pittsburgh and Detroit produce quite different social results. Generally speaking, the regional economy of Detroit is more affluent than that of Pittsburgh, but the social gap between the central city and its suburbs is much wider in Detroit than in Pittsburgh in terms of income distribution, poverty status, and racial segregation. These outcomes might be due to the differences in the urban regimes of these two cities.

To find the reason for the differences in the urban regimes of these two cities, we expanded our study to include Philadelphia and Milwaukee as reference cases. As mentioned in the analytical scheme, Philadelphia is contrasted with Pittsburgh, because both have restructured toward a service-centered economy. Milwaukee is contrasted with Detroit, because both have restructured toward a manufacturing-centered economy. An extended analysis that includes Philadelphia and Milwaukee helps us find the differences in the urban regimes of Pittsburgh and Detroit. Therefore, the cases of Philadelphia and Milwaukee are used as secondary cases to further enlighten differences between Pittsburgh and Detroit.

Conclusions

In this study, we compared the regional restructuring of two major American industrial cities, Pittsburgh and Detroit from the perspective of urban regime theory. The social results of regional restructuring mainly depend on the characteristics of urban regimes in Pittsburgh and Detroit. The building of a regional coalition is circumscribed by the structural condition, that is, the specific trend of regional restructuring. However, the social results of regional restructuring are mainly produced by the economic and social policies that arise from the presence or absence of a regional coalition. By the presence of a regional coalition, the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region has taken a path of economic restructuring toward a relatively balanced economy between the central city and its suburbs. This kind of urban regime is clearly contrasted with the urban regime in the Detroit region. The Urban regime in the Detroit region has taken a path of economic restructuring toward a regionally fractured economy, without forming a regional coalition.

Based on our findings above, we proposed several hypotheses regarding regional restructuring in terms of urban regime theory.

Hypothesis 1. The trend of regional restructuring influences the characteristics of the urban regime. However, this variable does not determine the characteristics of urban regime, but just circumscribes the structural conditions in which the actors interact.

Hypothesis 1.1. In the case of a service-centered regional economy, the dominance of the service sector over the manufacturing sector becomes evident. However, the pace of de-industrialization influences the establishment of leadership within the private sector. If the pace of de-industrialization is rapid, the dominance of the service sector becomes evident. On the other hand, if the pace of de-industrialization is slow, conflicts between the newly emerging service sector and the declining manufacturing sector become protracted.
Hypothesis 1.2. In the case of a manufacturing-centered regional economy, the dominance of the manufacturing sector over the various kinds of service sector becomes evident. However, the extent to which manufacturing companies are rooted in the region influences the establishment of leadership within the private sector. If the manufacturing companies move their industrial base outside the region, they lose interest in regional restructuring. On the other hand, if the manufacturing companies maintain their industrial base within the region, they have much interest in regional restructuring.

Hypothesis 2. The characteristics of urban regimes mainly depend on the presence or absence of a diverse regional coalition. A diverse regional coalition is composed of local governments, business organizations, community organizations, and their relationships. The leadership of the coalition mainly arises from the private sector.

Hypothesis 2.1. In the case of a service-centered regional economy, the business organizations that represent the service sector show their leadership in forming a regional coalition. On the other hand, in the case of a manufacturing-centered regional economy, the business organizations that represent the manufacturing sector show their leadership in forming a regional coalition. Whether a regional coalition is formed or not depends mainly on how the business organizations that represent the dominant sector lead in the process of regional restructuring in a region.

Hypothesis 2.2. Local governments have an impact on the formation of a regional coalition, even though they are located in the fragmented structure of municipalities. During the formation of a regional coalition, support from local governments positively contributes to the establishment of a regional coalition. On the other hand, indifference by local governments hinders the development of a regional coalition.

Hypothesis 2.3. The participation of community organizations is an important factor that influences the formation of a regional coalition. If community organizations participate in forming a regional coalition, then the urban regime seriously considers the issues of social equality at the regional level. On the other hand, if community organizations do not participate in forming a regional coalition, then the urban regime disregards the issues of social equality at the regional level.

Hypothesis 2.4. The racial composition of the region is an important factor that influences the formation of a regional coalition. In a region in which the degree of racial segregation is relatively low, a regional coalition is easily formed. On the other hand, in a region in which the degree of racial segregation is relatively high, this works to hinder cooperation between the central city and its suburbs and makes it difficult to form a regional coalition.

Hypothesis 3. The social results of regional restructuring mainly depend on the characteristics of urban regimes. By the presence of a regional coalition including community organizations, an urban regime takes a path of economic restructuring toward a relatively balanced economy between the central city and its suburbs. On the other hand, in the absence of a regional coalition, an urban regime takes a path of economic restructuring toward a regionally fractured economy.
1. Introduction

In the 1970s, major American industrial cities began to lose much of their economic vitality as a result of economic globalization and affected regional economies. Since then, the issue of regional restructuring of these cities and their suburbs has become a focus of public discourse. Regional restructuring is defined as the economic actors’ response to resolve a crisis on the regional level. The industrial cities of the Midwest and Northeast have tried to respond to the common impacts of economic crisis caused by de-industrialization, such as plant closings and mass unemployment.

However, while these cities experienced the common trend of de-industrialization, they followed different paths in their responses. Some cities have succeeded in revitalizing their economies, while others have failed to regain the vitality of their economy. This gives rise to several questions. Why have major industrial cities restructured their regions via different paths? Why have major industrial cities shown varying results from regional restructuring? To answer these questions, we will compare the regional restructuring that took place in two major American industrial cities, Pittsburgh and Detroit, and examine how the different paths gave rise to different outcomes. In other words, the objective of this study is to compare the regional restructuring of Pittsburgh and Detroit, focusing on the presence or absence of a regional coalition. A regional coalition is defined as a broadened governing coalition that is functioning at the regional level.

Urban regime theory has been a dominant paradigm in the field of urban politics for more than a decade. Regime theory views regimes as the collaborative arrangements through which local governments and private actors assemble the capacity to govern. From its origins it has been a tool to explain public- and private-sector relationships in American cities. And the concept has been applied to other areas beyond this area.

According to Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 829), urban regimes are coalitions based on informal networks, as well as formal relationships, and they possess the following core properties:

- Partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources, but not limited to business participation;
- Collaboration based on social production – bringing together resources to accomplish tasks;
- Identifiable policy agendas related to the composition of the participants in the coalition;
- A stable pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition

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1 The historical roots of the American urban crisis can be found in racial inequality and conflicts since the 1950s. However, the scope of our study is limited to the economic crisis that is related to economic globalization since the 1970s.

2 An industrial city does not stand-alone. As industry spreads throughout the metro region, it is the metropolitan area as a whole, not just the central city, that is the functioning economic unit (Wood, Orfield, and Rogers, 2000: 5). In this study, the metropolitan area, including the central city and its suburbs, is the main analytical unit.
In this study, we will adopt the essentials of urban regime theory described above. For major industrial cities, the characteristics of urban regimes affect the consequences of regional restructuring, especially the social results, because specific regimes have specific policies that are related to the composition of the participants in the coalition. Therefore, the social results of regional restructuring in terms of class, race, and space depend mainly on the characteristics of urban regimes.  

2. Analytical Framework

Given this conceptualization of urban regimes, we will use urban regime theory to compare these cities.

2.1. Typology of Urban Regimes

Although regime theorists concede the importance of contextual factors in regime politics, changes in policy are explained as a result of regime activities, rather than as a consequence of changes in the economic or political environment that constrains regimes. As a result, diverse contextual factors are often overlooked by regime theories. To overcome this weakness in regime theory, Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock (1997) developed a typology of urban regimes by introducing three structural criteria. First, in their typology cities differ in their ability to induce private investment as a result of variation in their market position. Second, cities vary in respect to their intergovernmental environments. Third, cities vary in respect to the democratic conditions within which regimes bid for support to advance public programs. Over time, market conditions, intergovernmental environments, and democratic conditions influence the character of dominant regimes as players try to make use of the bargaining resources and opportunities afforded by their circumstances. Based on these three criteria, the authors described American and European cities (Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock, 1997: 350-354).

Even though the typology of Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock largely succeeds in correcting the weakness of previous regime theories, it does not precisely help us to achieve the goal of this study, that is, to compare major industrial cities in the U.S. The limits of this typology are the following: First, market position is too vague to explain the characteristics of economic restructuring of major industrial cities. To compare the economic restructuring of the traditional industrial cities, market position needs to be clarified into the relations of the manufacturing sector with the service sector. Second, major American industrial cities share many intergovernmental characteristics. For example, Pittsburgh and Detroit both have a highly fragmented structure containing hundreds of governmental units. Even though intergovernmental environments are an adequate variable to explain the differences between cities within different national

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3 However, the same type of urban regime can produce different social consequences within different national contexts. Therefore, urban regimes are best compared within the same national contexts, despite the minor differences of their regional contexts.
contexts, they are not an adequate variable to compare cities within the same American contexts. Therefore, this variable will not be considered in this study. Third, democratic conditions mainly describe the extent of participation of actors, although they partly explain the urban political structure. This variable is an actor variable rather than a structural variable. Therefore, we replace it with the presence or absence of a “governing coalition” that includes diverse actors and their interactions in the urban political structure.

Based on the above discussion, we can develop a new typology of urban regimes by combining structural and actor variables systematically. In Table 1, we introduce four types of urban regimes by combining these two variables: (1) the trend of regional restructuring related to the situation of manufacturing sector, and (2) the presence or absence of a regional coalition.

Table 1. Four Types of Urban Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Coalition</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trend of Regional</td>
<td>Service-centered</td>
<td>Type I (Pittsburgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring</td>
<td>Manufacturing-centered</td>
<td>Type III (Milwaukee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, the trend regarding which major industrial cities are changed by restructuring can be classified into two levels related to the manufacturing sector. The trend of regional restructuring can be different depending on whether the manufacturing sector can keep its strength or not. If the prospect of the manufacturing sector is fairly good, regional restructuring can be directed toward keeping its manufacturing sector. On the other hand, if the prospect of the manufacturing sector is poor, regional restructuring must be switched from keeping the manufacturing sector to developing the service sector. In sum, the trend of regional restructuring related to the manufacturing sector is a main variable that influences characteristics of urban regimes among major industrial cities.

Second, the presence or absence of a regional coalition is the other main variable that influences characteristics of urban regimes, which are composed of local governments, private actors, and their relationships. In this study, we extend the concept of a governing coalition composed of public and private sector participants into the scale of the metropolitan area by using the concept of a “regional coalition” (Orfield, 2002:180). We accept the presence of regional coalition only when it is composed of public and private sector participants and exist at the metropolitan scale. The presence or absence of a regional coalition decisively influences characteristics of urban regimes, because this variable influences how the actors respond to the economic crisis by forming a governing coalition in their region under the same structural conditions.
Combining these two variables, we can introduce four types of urban regimes as shown in Table 1. The trend of regional restructuring in the Type I and Type II urban regimes is toward a service-centered economy. Such cities are trying to develop the service sector to replace their declining manufacturing sector, which has lost its strength.

These two types of urban regimes can be further distinguished by the presence or absence of a regional coalition. The Type I urban regime has succeeded in forming a regional coalition. In this type, diverse economic actors participate in the regional coalition to respond to an economic crisis. A good case of this urban regime is Pittsburgh.

However, this kind of regional coalition is not formed in the Type II urban regime, even though the trend of regional restructuring that is centered on the service sector is the same as the first type of urban regime. In this type of urban regime, the economic actors do not cooperate, because they are competing to realize their specific economic interests. A good case of this urban regime is Philadelphia, as we shall see later.

Contrary to these two regime types, the trend of regional restructuring in the Type III and Type IV urban regimes is toward a manufacturing-centered economy. They have been unsuccessful in converting to services, because they are too entrenched in the manufacturing culture to change or have otherwise failed to grow their service sector. They are trying to maintain and regenerate manufacturing industries.

These types of urban regimes also can be distinguished by the presence or absence of a regional coalition. The Type III urban regime has succeeded in forming a regional coalition. In this type of urban regime, diverse economic actors participate in the regional coalition to respond to their economic crisis. A good case of this urban regime is Milwaukee, as we shall see later.

However, a cooperative regional coalition is not formed in the Type IV urban regime, even though the trend of regional restructuring is similarly centered on the manufacturing sector. In this type of urban regime, the economic actors do not cooperate together, because they are competing to realize their specific economic interests. A good case of this urban regime is Detroit.

Despite the risk of oversimplification, we are going to use these four types of urban regimes as the ideal types to compare the regional restructuring of major American industrial cities. This typology gives us a tool to analyze the characteristics of different cases.

2.2. Case-Oriented Comparative Method

In this study, we selected Pittsburgh (Type I urban regime) and Detroit (Type IV urban regime) as the notable cases of regional restructuring of major industrial cities, because they can show the contrasting paths of regional restructuring in the U.S. Even though
they have common characteristics as the traditional industrial cities, these two cities have experienced contrasting paths of regional restructuring.

Since the 1970s, these two cities both have experienced serious economic crisis, caused by de-industrialization of pre-existing manufacturing industries, that is, the steel industry in Pittsburgh and the automotive industry in Detroit. However, despite their similar appearance, these two cities have shown many contrasting aspects during the process of the regional restructuring. Pittsburgh has evolved into a postindustrial city that has almost nothing to do with traditional manufacturing industries. On the other hand, Detroit has regained the strength of its pre-existing manufacturing industry. In other words, while Pittsburgh is no longer called the "Steel City," Detroit is still called the "Motor City."

These two cities are also different in the social results of their regional restructuring. Pittsburgh has relatively succeeded in managing the social problems that arise from regional restructuring. On the other hand, Detroit has largely failed in managing these problems. Therefore, while Pittsburgh is regarded as a comeback city, while Detroit is not. How can we explain the contrasting aspects of these two cities? Why have these two cities experienced the different paths of restructuring? How can we explain the differences in the social outcomes of regional restructuring in these two cities? To answer these questions, we adopt a case-oriented comparative method.

This comparative method examines patterns of similarities and differences across a moderate number of cases. In this study, we define a "case" as a fundamental element of social research that is used most often to describe a set of comparable phenomena. The goal of a comparative study is to explain the diversity within a particular set of cases (Ragin, 1994: 105, 184).

We also define a "region" as an analytical unit of cases that designate the metropolitan area including the central city and its suburbs. By operational definition, a region is identified as a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, MSA requires the presence of a city with 50,000 or more inhabitants, or the presence of an Urbanized Area (UA) and a total population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in New England). The four MSAs that are selected as the cases in this study include the list of counties shown in Table 2. The list of counties that are included in the specific MSA has varied each year. Therefore, we arrange all data by the standard set in 2000.

In addition to the cases of Pittsburgh and Detroit, we select Philadelphia (Type II urban regime) and Milwaukee (Type III urban regime) as reference cases for the study. Philadelphia and Milwaukee have their own characteristics that belong to the different types of urban regimes (see Table 1). By just comparing Pittsburgh and Detroit, we do not know if the difference between these two cities is due to the trend of regional restructuring or the presence or absence of a regional coalition. Therefore, to control one of these two variables, we need to add the cases of Philadelphia and Milwaukee so that the comparison between Pittsburgh and Detroit can be elaborated. Philadelphia shows different social results from Pittsburgh, even though both have restructured toward a service-centered economy. Furthermore, Milwaukee shows different social results from Detroit, even though both have restructured toward a manufacturing-centered economy.
Table 2. Four Selected MSAs and their Counties (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>Counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh MSA</td>
<td>Allegheny County (PA), Beaver County (PA), Butler County (PA), Fayette County (PA), Washington County (PA), Westmoreland County (PA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia MSA</td>
<td>Bucks County (PA), Chester County (PA), Delaware County (PA), Montgomery County (PA), Philadelphia County (PA), Burlington County (NJ), Camden County (NJ), Gloucester County (NJ), Salem County (NJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee MSA</td>
<td>Milwaukee County (WI), Ozaukee County (WI), Washington County (WI), Waukesha County (WI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit MSA</td>
<td>Lapeer County (MI), Macomb County (MI), Monroe County (MI), Oakland County (MI), St. Clair County (MI), Wayne County (MI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: We use the MSA data for Pittsburgh and the PMSA data for Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and Detroit. Pittsburgh is classified as a MSA, because it does not meet the criteria of PMSA that has a population of one million or more.


As you see in Figure 1, a specific type of urban regime is composed of business organizations, local governments, and community organizations operating under the specific trend of regional restructuring. Being located within the same structural conditions, the different regimes can be distinguished by the presence or absence of a regional coalition. Furthermore, these regimes adopt specific economic and social policies that produce the different social results of regional restructuring.

Figure 1. Analytical Framework for the Comparison of Urban Regimes

For this study, we used several kinds of research methods related to the cases of major industrial cities. First, we surveyed a broad range of literature including academic articles, books, policy reports, and newspapers concerning these cases. However, it was difficult to balance the unevenness of literature between the cases, because the size and quality of the literature that we gathered depended on what had been published. Second,
we complemented the literature review by conducting interviews with specialists in this area. These specialists included academic scholars, local government officials, corporation managers, and community leaders who gave us useful insights and information that furthers our understanding of each case. Third, to compare these cases specifically, we used data from U.S. Bureau of the Census. Through careful and strategic use of the census data, we compared the process and social results of regional restructuring in terms of employment, income distribution, poverty status, and racial segregation.

3. Economic Crisis and Regional Restructuring

Based on the analytical framework presented above, we determine that an urban regime is composed of two variables (the trend of regional restructuring and the presence or absence of a regional coalition). The trend of regional restructuring is one of these key variables determining the characteristics of an urban regime. In this section, we compare the similarities and differences of regional restructuring between Pittsburgh and Detroit in their response to economic crisis since the 1970s.

3.1. Common Characteristics of Industrial Cities in the U.S.

Before comparing the differences between Pittsburgh and Detroit, we need to outline the common characteristics of regional restructuring that industrial cities share in the national context of the U.S. First, the national economy has been de-industrialized in the manufacturing sector (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). Even though some manufacturing industries are regaining their strength, the large trend toward the service sector seems irreversible. As can be seen in Figure 2, the proportion of the service sector employees continues to increase from 50% to above 70% of total U.S. employment since the 1960s, while showing variation by industrial city.

Second, as the federal government has transferred its power into state governments since the Reagan administration, state governments have become a central actor for regional restructuring (Pohlmann, 1993: 106-114). However, the fractured nature of local governments has prevented localities from forming regional coalitions to solve the regional problems. For example, 418 local governments, such as counties, municipalities and townships, exist in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area, and 335 local governments exist

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4 The interviews with specialists of four industrial cities were completed on the following dates.

These interviews helped me realize the characteristics of urban regimes in these cities. In this study, the names and quotes of the interviewees are not provided.
in the Detroit Metropolitan area (Orfield, 2002: 132-133). There has not been consolidation at the local level.

Figure 2. Change in Employment Composition by Industry for Detroit and Pittsburgh

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit MSA Manufacturing</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Manufacturing</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detroit MSA Service</td>
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<td>United States Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh MSA Manufacturing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh MSA Service</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Third, business organizations have taken the primary role in forming a governing coalition for regional restructuring. In the era of globalization, business leadership has gained public esteem as if business is “above politics” (Kanter, 2000: 167). Business leadership has been legitimated as the most important factor to help a region survive in this age of global competition.

Fourth, the influence of community organizations has not been strong enough to guide the direction of regional restructuring. Since the 1980s, urban regimes based on popular support channeled through community organizations have hardly emerged in any region in the U.S (Logan and Swanstrom, 1990).

Fifth, the situation of race relations has strongly influenced the regional polarization between inner cities and their suburbs. Furthermore, it has prevented local governments from forming a regional coalition to solve shared problems (Pohlmann, 1993: 86-91).

3.2. Economic Differences between Pittsburgh and Detroit

Pittsburgh and Detroit share all the characteristics of regional restructuring common to major American industrial cities. These are notable industrial cities that highly depended

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5 This data came from the 1997 Census of Governments. Pittsburgh and Detroit both have severe geopolitical fragmentation. The number of local governments per 100,000 residents is 17.7 in Pittsburgh, and it is 6.2 in Detroit.
on one main industry (steel in Pittsburgh, automobiles in Detroit). Therefore, they demonstrated these characteristics during the process of regional restructuring. Table 3 shows that the service sector is dominant in the employment composition of both the Pittsburgh and Detroit regions, accounting for 76.9% and 68.3% of the total employment in Pittsburgh and Detroit, respectively.

Table 3. Employment Composition by Industry (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Pittsburgh MSA</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Detroit MSA</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Philadelphia MSA</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Milwaukee MSA</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, and Mining</td>
<td>8,006</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6,692</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>143,106</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>461,298</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>291,620</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>150,488</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>824,698</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>1,397,122</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>1,833,313</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>532,736</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>41,169</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>74,236</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>96,138</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>33,789</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>143,834</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>241,414</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>274,035</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>82,233</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Utilities</td>
<td>64,305</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>86,361</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>103,285</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>30,144</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>31,056</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>54,767</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>72,474</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>22,334</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance and Real Estate</td>
<td>68,563</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>121,076</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>210,773</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>58,699</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Administrative</td>
<td>99,505</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>209,200</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>267,949</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>68,294</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational, Health and Social</td>
<td>243,045</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>350,040</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>542,314</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>146,864</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art, Entertainment and Food</td>
<td>77,756</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>166,994</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>157,512</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>55,307</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>55,665</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>93,034</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>107,833</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>35,072</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>37,365</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>66,332</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>95,532</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19,379</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,071,900</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,045,538</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,353,656</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>748,518</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, a significant difference exists in the de-industrialization of these two cities. As shown in Figure 2, while the manufacturing sector has decreased, the service sector has increased for both cities. In Pittsburgh, the percentage of manufacturing sector in total employment decreased to one third in 2000 of the 1960 percent. By contrast in Detroit, this percentage was above 20% in 2000, though it has decreased by almost half since 1960. While the proportion of service sector employment in Pittsburgh has increased above the average U.S. level since the 1980s, the proportion in Detroit has continued to increase below the average U.S. level since the 1960s.

Table 4 further shows this contrasting trend in the main industry of these two cities. The metal industry, which largely consisted of steel in Pittsburgh, has weakened since the 1970s. The percentage of metal industry employment has fallen off below 4% in 2000. This means that the steel industry has little significance in Pittsburgh’s economy. On the other hand, employment in the transport equipment industry, which is mainly composed of the automotive industry in Detroit, has continued to be about 10% of total Detroit MSA employment since the 1990s. In other words, in the Detroit region, the importance of the automotive industry has remained relatively high, even though the proportion of
jobs in the service industry increased during the last several decades. Furthermore, a large portion of the service industry, such as information, engineering, and financing, is considered related to the automotive industry.

Table 4. Employment Composition by Industry for Detroit and Pittsburgh, 1960-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pittsburgh MSA</th>
<th>Detroit MSA</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in Table 5, the change in population of these two cities reflects their different economic situations. Since the 1970s, the population of these two cities largely decreased with de-industrialization. However, the population gap between the central city and its suburbs is becoming wider in Detroit than in Pittsburgh. Since the 1990s, though the population of the Detroit MSA increased, the population of the Detroit central city decreased. In contrast, the population of Pittsburgh decreased in both the central city and the suburbs. The central city as percentage of total MSA population is rapidly decreasing in Detroit than in Pittsburgh.

Table 5. Population for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1960-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pittsburgh</th>
<th>Detroit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central City (A)</td>
<td>MSA (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>604,332</td>
<td>2,669,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>520,117</td>
<td>2,683,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>423,938</td>
<td>2,571,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>369,879</td>
<td>2,394,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>334,563</td>
<td>2,356,695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


How can we explain the contrasting aspects of these two cities? We have to consider the contrasting situations of the main industry in each city. The steel industry in the Pittsburgh region has experienced near total collapse since the 1970s. During the globalization of the steel industry, the competitive edge of the steel industry in Pittsburgh rapidly weakened. From today's perspective, the recovery of a steel-mill based economy

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6 In this study, we compare the gap between the central city and MSAs instead of the gap between the central city and the suburbs. The statistics of MSAs clearly show the characteristics of suburbs, even though MSAs include both the suburbs and the central city.
in the Pittsburgh region seems impossible (Giarratani and Houston, 1989; Beeson and Giarratani, 1998).

On the other hand, the automotive industry in the Detroit region has maintained its vitality since the 1970s, even though the share of the Big Three in the U.S. market has fallen to 62.8% since the 1970s (Automotive News, 2002). During the process of intensified competition, the automotive industry in the Detroit region has maintained its position as the headquarters of, and manufacturing centers for the Big Three automakers (McAlinden and Smith, 1996; Jacobs and Fasenfest, 2000). In addition, many automotive suppliers have a presence in the Detroit MSA. This is the main reason that the manufacturing sector has stayed relatively high in Detroit.

As can be seen in Table 6, in Pittsburgh the manufacturing industry is in third place among the largest industries in 2000. The metal industry, which includes the steel industry, is just one third within the manufacturing industry. However, in Detroit the manufacturing sector remains in first place among the largest industries in 2000. The transportation equipment industry, which mainly includes the automotive industry, is about 40% of the manufacturing sector.

Table 6. The Five Largest Industries in Pittsburgh and Detroit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Pittsburgh MSA</th>
<th>No. of Employee</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Detroit MSA</th>
<th>No. of Employee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Health care and social assistance</td>
<td>152,621</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>338,130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>131,652</td>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>240,382</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>121,654</td>
<td>Health care and social assistance</td>
<td>225,291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Accommodation &amp; food services</td>
<td>81,082</td>
<td>Admin, support, waste mgmt, remediation service</td>
<td>159,628</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Professional, scientific &amp; enterprises</td>
<td>65,032</td>
<td>Accommodation &amp; food services</td>
<td>140,872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,022,647</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,965,764</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1): Among manufacturing industries in the Pittsburgh region, the number of employees that the metal industry employs is 40,805.

2): Among manufacturing industries in the Detroit region, the number of employees that the transportation equipment industry employs is 133,955.


4. Regional Politics and Regional Coalitions

The presence or absence of a regional coalition is one of two key variables determining the characteristics of an urban regime. Using this approach, we can compare the regional politics of Pittsburgh and Detroit, focusing on the regional coalition. The urban regimes of both cities are compared in terms of the relationships with local governments, business organization, and community organizations under the specific trend of regional restructuring.
4.1. Pittsburgh: an urban regime producing a regionally balanced economy

4.1.1. Formation and Development of a Regional Coalition

Pittsburgh has developed a long tradition of public-private partnership to respond to the economic problems of the region (Stewman and Tarr, 1982). The early formation of a regional coalition can be emphasized as the main characteristic of the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region. In 1943, the Allegheny Conference on Community Development (ACCD) was initiated by the private sector with the support of the public sector. Richard King Mellon, who was the founder and chairman of Mellon Bank, took a leadership role in solving the problems of the regional economy. David Lawrence, who was the mayor of Pittsburgh until 1970, supported the leadership of Mellon. “[H]e consistently followed conference advice and leadership with regard to technical questions, timing, and goals” (Stewman and Tarr, 1982: 71). ACCD has tried to solve the diverse problems of the region in the long term. It built consensus around existing proposals and support for those initiatives (ACCD, 2002).

Since the founding of the ACCD, the regional coalition in Pittsburgh has consistently been led by the private sector. The local governments in the Pittsburgh region have continued to support the leadership of the private sector for regional restructuring, but they have not formed regional governance by themselves, and the region remains politically fractured. Based on the trust between the public sector and the private sector, the ACCD has led the regional restructuring efforts during the past 60 years. Especially since the 1970s, this tradition of regional coalition has facilitated the cooperative response to the de-industrialization of this region.

In Pittsburgh, the economic interests within the business community have diverged as de-industrialization continued after the 1970s. A significant divergence between the new service sector and the declining manufacturing sector took place in the regional economy. This divergence of economic interests was represented by two different strategies to restructure Pittsburgh’s regional economy. The first strategy was to forge a “New Pittsburgh” based on services and high tech industries. The economic plan based on the first strategy has mainly focused on downtown redevelopment. Corporations, civic leaders, and non-profit organizations such as universities and hospitals supported this strategy (Sbragia, 1990). The second strategy was to keep the “Old Pittsburgh” by mobilizing against economic disinvestments in the manufacturing sector. In contrast to their response to the first strategy, labor unions, churches, and neighborhood groups supported the second strategy (Jezierski, 1996).

4.1.2. Participation and Exclusion of Community Organizations

To understand the regional coalition in Pittsburgh, we need to pay attention to the voices of community organizations in response to plant closings and job losses since the 1970s. Although the public-private partnership called “Renaissance I” succeeded in preserving Pittsburgh as a corporate headquarters city, it failed to stop either the gradual decline of
steel and other manufacturing industries or the continued loss of jobs. Therefore, community organizations, such as community development corporations (CDCs), next participated in a new kind of public-private partnership, known as “Renaissance II” (1978-1988) (Metzger, 1998: 13-14). Richard Caliguiri, who was the mayor of Pittsburgh during this period, actively supported the participation of community organizations in Renaissance II (Sabragia, 1989: 109-110).

The Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development (PPND) that was created in 1983 was one of the earliest CDC networks in the U.S. PPND was an integral part of the Pittsburgh regional coalition during the decade of the 1980s. Regional economic planning has dominated the agenda of the regional coalition, because the Pittsburgh region had to survive the crisis caused by economic globalization. PPND has been recognized as an important institution for economic restructuring in this region. It created a peer-to-peer network among CDCs actively engaged in industrial retention and the small and medium sized manufacturing companies in the area (Metzger, 1998: 21-22).

Nevertheless, during the 1980s, the prevalence of New Pittsburgh had become evident, because the competitive edge of the region’s steel industry had been totally destroyed. The rapid collapse of the steel industry lessened the conflicts within business organizations. The trend toward service-centered economy was accepted by most of business leaders. The voice of Old Pittsburgh that represented labor unions and community organizations received little attention. The final report that the ACCD issued in 1984 provided the rationale for regional restructuring as follows (Jezierski, 1996: 172):

> The forces that caused Pittsburgh’s decline are irreversible, and the area will never return to primary metals and durable goods manufacturing. Nor will Pittsburgh be allowed to be so vulnerable to a single type of industry in the future. The economy must diversify to enjoy continued stability.

To diversify the regional economy means to develop a regional economy that is not based on one main industry, but instead is based on a diverse mix of industries such as services and high technology.

Based on this rationale, a bundled package of proposals called Strategy 21 was prepared by the ACCD in cooperation with local government officials. “Renaissance III (1982 to the present), based on Strategy 21, has driven regional restructuring toward a service-centered economy. In the 1990s, Tom Murphy, the Mayor of Pittsburgh, supported the strategic development approach led by ACCD (Jacobs, 2000: 91-92). Of course, “the coordination of multiple and fragmented corporate, municipal, state, and citizen interests in regional Pittsburgh has been fraught with conflict” (Jezierski, 1996: 179). However,

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1 Peter Flaherty, who was the mayor of Pittsburgh before Caliguiri, indicated the change in management philosophy, with more emphasis on neighborhoods and less on the downtown redevelopment (Stewman and Tarr, 1982: 89-94). Mayor Caliguiri adopted his predecessor’s philosophy and strengthened it.

4 Lubove suggested the elements of a diversified economy in Pittsburgh are: (1) a vigorous service, professional, and small-business sector; (2) advanced technology, research, and information processing; (3) a smaller but more efficient and technologically sophisticated manufacturing sector; and (4) attention to quality of life concerns (Lubove, 1996: 25).
the stable leadership of the private sector could succeed in coordinating various kinds of interests within the regional coalition.

As the trend toward a service-centered economy became clear, the regional coalition that included community organizations ceased to exist in the 1990s. The exclusion of community organizations from the regional coalition, however, was not just due to the structural change according to the regional restructuring. The position of the CDCs in the regional coalition was undermined by factors such as troubled projects and budget shortfalls. These groups faced the threat of becoming displaced as the Pittsburgh regional coalition was remade. Deitrick (1999:10) described the change in the public-private partnership as follows:

Its economic development partnership model evolved during this transition from exclusive relations with the business sector to inclusion of new nonprofit organizations in the education, research and community-based areas. The evidence from the 1990s is not so heartening, however. The dominant partner in Pittsburgh partnership model, the Allegheny Conference, reverted to its own fabled past in the recent Regional Renaissance Partnership effort – top-down, corporate-based planning.

4.1.3. Economic and Social Activities of Regional Coalition

In the 1990s, the business organizations exclusively took the leadership of the regional coalition in Pittsburgh. Nevertheless, the community organizations continued to influence the characteristics of regional restructuring, even though their power weakened. The urban regime in Pittsburgh had to consider neighborhood issues, such as public health, education, and housing, as a secondary agenda, while its primary agenda was to incubate and attract new companies.

In 1994, the ACCD formed a consortium, “Working Together to Compete Globally,” and shared its vision for regional development in Pittsburgh. Participants from all over the region helped to reach the consensus needed to revitalize the regional economy for the future. The Pittsburgh Regional Alliance (PRA) that was formed as a non-profit organization in 1995 tried to realize this vision for six years (1995-2000). Table 7 shows the economic and social activities of this consortium aimed at developing a balanced regional economy. As can be seen in the Table, while the main tasks are focused on growing new industries and providing infrastructure, social issues are also considered (ACCD, 1994). In the areas of “Human Capital” and “Building One Economy,” social activities that consider the lower class and minorities to develop cooperative industrial relations and to support new business are conspicuous.

In conclusion, the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region has tried to restructure the regional economy into one that is centered on the service sector, keeping a stable regional coalition. Through the presence of a regional coalition, the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region took a path of economic restructuring toward a relatively balanced economy between the central city and its suburbs. By coordinating the conflicting interests of different economic actors, the urban regime has provided not only the economic policies, but also the social policies for the balanced development of the Pittsburgh region. This kind of urban regime is clearly contrasted with the urban regime in the Detroit region that has tried to restructure its economy without forming a regional coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Initiative Areas</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Main Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Development</td>
<td>- Establish a regional economic development business plan</td>
<td>- Pittsburgh Regional Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support growth industry clusters and mobilize behind projects</td>
<td>- Pittsburgh Digital Greenhouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Regional Enterprise Tower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Advance Manufacturing Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Biomedical Business Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Hospital Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Climate for Job Creation</td>
<td>- Build cooperation among labor and management in the region</td>
<td>- Pittsburgh Pledge to Cooperate for Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prepare a blueprint for comprehensive restructuring of corporate and local taxes</td>
<td>- Pennsylvania Tax Blueprint Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Investment</td>
<td>- Maintain and improve the region’s transportation infrastructure</td>
<td>- Regional Industrial Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Formulate and implement strategies that provide public housing residents</td>
<td>- A Coordinated Regional Development Plan for Southwestern Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop a consensus investment agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital</td>
<td>- Train existing workforce</td>
<td>- Working Together to Connect Workers to the Jobs of the Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase the educational level and job readiness of graduating students</td>
<td>- Pittsburgh Region’s Occupation and Workforce Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Make early childhood education available</td>
<td>- Unified Workforce Investment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Southwestern Pennsylvania Industrial Resource Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Regional Education Index Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building One Economy</td>
<td>- Support new business start-ups by women and minorities</td>
<td>- National Education Center for Women in Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Insure that African American-owned businesses benefit from infrastructure development</td>
<td>- The Minority Enterprise Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- African American Chamber of Commerce of Western Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Marketing</td>
<td>- Develop a unified regional international marketing plan</td>
<td>- Regional Marketing Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Expand regional events</td>
<td>- Meetings and Hospitality Partnership of Western Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.2. Detroit: an urban regime producing a regionally fractured economy

4.2.1. Diverging Interests of Business Organizations

As a region highly dependent on the automotive industry, Detroit has experienced a severe economic crisis beginning in the 1970s due to globalization and competition from abroad. The region has responded to this crisis, but a broad range governing coalition geared toward diversifying the regional economy has never been formed. The basic reason that a regional coalition was not formed is the presence of conflicting interests in this metropolitan area.
Since the 1950s, the automotive companies have moved their plants to the suburbs and other regions. Efficient and cost effective shipment of freight by trucks, combined with cheap land costs in the suburbs, encouraged automotive companies to relocate outside the City of Detroit. Since the 1970s, the economic globalization of the automotive industry has facilitated this trend. Now, only two assembly plants remain in the City of Detroit (Jacobs and Fasenfest, 2001: 8). As the automotive companies have moved their industrial base outside the region, they have not been interested in the restructuring of the Detroit region. Even though the automotive industry is still dominant in this region, its interest for regional restructuring has become only a secondary interest. The automotive companies have not played a leadership role in solving regional problems.

Among business interests, immobile local elites, such as banking, utility, and real estate interests, have remained heavily involved in the redevelopment of the central city (Rich, 1991: 70). However, as many service companies have moved their base to the suburbs, key downtown interests have been conspicuously absent in Detroit, and those that are left have not succeeded in providing a base for regional cooperation. After the riots of 1967, business leaders created organizations such as New Detroit, Detroit Renaissance, and the Detroit Economic Development Corporation (Thomas, 1989: 149). Nevertheless, none of these business organizations developed overarching leadership to form a regional coalition in the Detroit region.

Detroit Renaissance and the Detroit Regional Chamber represent the white corporate community. Among these organizations, the Big Three automobile companies and others of the old corporate “nobility” have mainly influenced Detroit Renaissance. On the other hand, banks, utilities, and the rising service-based industries have mainly influenced the Detroit Regional Chamber. New Detroit and the Detroit Economic Development Corporation are seen as the structures for the articulation of black elite preferences and, in the latter case particularly, for the mayor (Orr and Stoker, 1994: 56-64). These business organizations have tried to realize their own economic interests, but do not share a common vision for the region.

4.2.2. The Role of the Detroit Mayor

Due to the failure of these business organizations, the regional economy in the Detroit metropolitan area has been restructured since the 1970s without the benefit of a regional coalition. Under the fractured structure of local governments, the City of Detroit and several business organizations in this metropolitan area have tried to form a regional coalition, however, their efforts have not been successful (Orr and Stoker, 1994; Indergaard, 1998).

In the mid-1970s, an ambitious effort took place to introduce regional governance legislation in the Michigan House of Representatives. This effort, however, did not succeed. After the failure of several attempts to form regional governance, the region’s

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9 Motor vehicles produced in the Detroit region in 2000 numbered 2,706,040. This was 21.1% of the total number of motor vehicles produced in the U.S. in 2000 (Automotive News, 2002).
municipalities remained as isolated as they were prior to these efforts (Darden, Hill, Thomas, and Thomas, 1987: 243-245).  

In Detroit, the city government power is concentrated in the mayor’s office. Coleman Young, who was elected as the first black mayor at Detroit in 1973, actively tried to redevelop downtown Detroit with the help of business leaders in the service sector during his early mayoralty. The strength of his electoral support and the increasingly black composition of Detroit’s electorate made him politically invincible. This base also gave him a certain independence, not just from business interests but also from labor, and community organizations (Orr and Stoker, 1994: 61). Nevertheless, the Young administration’s key ally in the politics of development was the white business establishment (DiGaetano, 1989: 273). Mayor Young did develop some ties to Ford (Henry Ford II, especially) and to GM (e.g., Poletown project). This kind of urban regime is characterized as a corporate centered, public-private partnership under the existing structural conditions, that is, the economic crisis of the Detroit region.

However, during the 20 years of his mayoralty, Young did not provide the leadership to repair the cleavage between the central city and the suburbs in this metropolitan area. In the environment of economic decline and racially divided politics, political tension disrupted the city’s corporatist cooperation with business organizations. Especially, the emergence and consolidation of black political power influenced his failure to form a regional coalition. The political autonomy based on racial segregation in the central city did not force Mayor Young to cooperate with suburban governments.

The next mayor Dennis Archer, who was elected in 1994, also actively tried to redevelop downtown Detroit. The Archer strategy had certain limitations. It was based on the entertainment and hospitality sectors, but not enough on manufacturing or other more productive, forms of service. Even though several projects, such as casinos, a new convention center, and new stadiums, were relatively successful, Mayor Archer did not provide better leadership than Mayor Young regarding metropolitan affairs (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999: 559-563).

Orr and Stoker summarized the failure to form a regional coalition in Detroit as problems on both sides of the public-private partnership (Orr and Stoker, 1994: 66-67):

The failure of Detroit’s regime to form a regional coalition cannot be reduced to the failure of an effective mayor-center coalition to emerge but reflects inadequacies on both sides of the public-private fence and in fence building.

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10 SEMCOG (Southeast Michigan Council of Governments) has a planning function for issues that extend beyond individual local government boundaries (SEMCOG, 2002). SEMCOG, however, has no power to implement its plans. MAC (Metropolitan Affairs Coalition) is also a multi-jurisdictional organization in the Detroit region (MAC, 2002). MAC, however, acts mainly as a catalyst for local governments to work together to solve regional problems, but it has no authority to implement or mandate solutions.

11 In Detroit, the 1973 charter ended much of the fragmentation in mayoral agencies and consolidated control in the mayor’s office. The mayor could ignore city council attempts at legislative oversight (Rich, 1989: 277-278).
4.2.3. Protests of Community Organizations

As previously discussed, neither the private sector nor the public sector provided the leadership to form a regional coalition in Detroit. The urban regime in Detroit is also characterized by relatively weak participation by community-based organizations. Detroit’s community movement has not served as a countervailing force to the downtown business establishment in regional politics (DiGaetano, 1989: 273). As time passed, community protests against a downtown focused redevelopment strategy abated, because of the overwhelming popularity of Mayor Young (Thomas, 1989: 154). The industrial crisis was so terrifying that the community organizations could not raise their voices. Furthermore, these organizations lacked their own programs for regional development in Detroit. They protested against specific issues during regional restructuring occasionally. For example, the Detroit Alliance for a Rational Economy (DARE), which was founded in the 1960s, did not succeed in forming an alternative regional coalition, though it was a “city wide, multiracial, community-based organization” with much potential (Hill, 1986: 112-113). The weakness of community organizations insulated the urban regime from popular control.

The influence of organized labor in this region also did not contribute to the formation of a regional coalition led by the economic elite (Thomas, 1989: 148-149). Labor unions in the manufacturing sector isolated themselves from the process of regional restructuring, even though they traditionally had the organizational power to realize their interests. For example, the United Automobile Workers (UAW), which represented the laborers of the major automotive companies, only expressed the parochial interests in raising their wages and keeping their jobs (Detroit Free Press, 2002).

In summary, the urban regime of Detroit failed to form a stable regional coalition including both the private and public sectors, and it completely failed to include community organizations at all. Even though the public-private partnership for downtown redevelopment was formed during the 1970s, it has not been extended into a broad governing coalition to solve the problems that the regional economy faced. Community organizations and labor unions also could not contribute to the formation of a regional coalition, because the former were relatively weak and the latter had a narrow self-interested perspective. Such an urban regime, characterized by multiple conflicting interests, is called “hyper-pluralism” (Orr and Stoker, 1994: 66).

To achieve a regionally balanced economy, a regional coalition that coordinates the different interests of the economic actors is required. However, neither a regional coalition nor a functional equivalent to one has emerged in the Detroit region. Even though the regional economy based on the automotive industry regained its economic strength in the 1990s, it has developed unevenly lacking a comprehensive plan created by a regional coalition. If this kind of urban regime is sustained in the Detroit region, the problems of a regionally fractured economy will worsen in the future.
5. Social Results of Regional Restructuring in Pittsburgh and Detroit

Given the trends in regional restructuring and the presence or absence of a regional coalition in Pittsburgh and Detroit, discussed in previous sections, we now link the characteristics of these urban regimes with the social results of their regional restructuring. As we shall see in the following tables and figures based on the U.S. census data, the two urban regimes we have studied provided quite different social results.

5.1. Income Level

The data in Table 8 shows that family income (based on median family income) in the Detroit MSA has been higher than the Pittsburgh MSA during the last several decades. This might arise from differences in the state of the preexisting main industry, as we mentioned above. However, as shown in Figure 3, the gap in income distribution between the central city and the suburbs has become wider in Detroit than in Pittsburgh. This means that the regional restructuring of Detroit has occurred more unevenly than in Pittsburgh. Especially as shown in Figure 4, while the income level of the City of Detroit was higher than in the City of Pittsburgh until 1970, the income levels of these two cities have reversed since 1980. The contrasting changes in these two cities can also be found in the employment rate. As can be seen in Figure 5, the gap between the central city and the suburbs in the employment rates of the Detroit region is much higher than in the Pittsburgh region. The differences in income distribution in these two regions may arise partly from the differences in their employment rates.

Table 8. Median Family Income Level between City and Region for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1960-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pittsburgh</th>
<th>Detroit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central city ($)</td>
<td>MSA ($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27,790</td>
<td>26,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>29,672</td>
<td>32,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>27,180</td>
<td>33,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27,484</td>
<td>33,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Median family income in each year was converted to 1990 constant dollars (1982-1984=100).
Figure 3. Median Family Income Level between City and Region for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1960-1990


Figure 4. Median Family Income Level between the City of Pittsburgh and the City of Detroit, 1960-1990

Figure 5. Employment Rate for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1960-2000


5.2. Poverty Status

We can further explain this characteristic by examining the poverty status of both cities. Figure 6 shows that the overall poverty level (percent below the poverty line) in the Detroit MSA is relatively lower than in the Pittsburgh MSA in terms of families and individuals. However, the gap between the central city and its suburbs is much wider in Detroit than in Pittsburgh. In other words, the poor people are much more segregated in the central city of Detroit than in the central city of Pittsburgh. As shown in Figure 7, the poverty status in both areas has worsened since the 1970s. Though the poverty status has relatively improved during the last 10 years, the gap between the central city and the suburbs in Detroit has not decreased as it has in Pittsburgh.

Figure 6. Poverty Status in Pittsburgh and Detroit (2000)

Note 1): Percentage of families below poverty level
2): Percentage of families with female householder below poverty level
3): Percentage of individuals below poverty level
Figure 7. Poverty Status for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1970-2000

![Graph showing poverty status for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1970-2000]

Note: Percentage of families below poverty level to all families

5.3. Racial Segregation

Figure 8 shows the contrasting patterns of racial segregation in the Detroit and Pittsburgh regions. The gap between the central city and the suburbs in the proportion of Blacks in Detroit rapidly grew between 1960 and 2000, but this did not occur in Pittsburgh. The percentage of Blacks in the central city of Detroit was 81.6% in 2000. Blacks are much more segregated in the central city of Detroit than in the central city of Pittsburgh, where they make up only 27.1% of the population. This clearly indicates the spatial segregation of races in the Detroit region. Admittedly, the proportion of Blacks in the entire Detroit MSA, at 22.9%, is higher than the proportion in the Pittsburgh MSA, at 8.1%.

Figure 8. Proportion of Black People to the total population for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1960-2000

![Graph showing proportion of Black people to total population for Pittsburgh and Detroit, 1960-2000]

The Pittsburgh case is not ideal, however. Regional restructuring led by the private sector may produce many social side effects, because business’ main concern is on economic efficiency, not social equality. For example, workers earned less in 1996, in real terms, than they earned in 1979 in the Pittsburgh region (Deitrick, 1999), as was the case throughout the nation. Nevertheless, in this region the social gap between the central city and the suburbs has decreased since the 1980s. This characterizes the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region as different from the urban regime in the Detroit region.

In summary, despite their similarities, there exist many differences in the social results of regional restructuring between Pittsburgh and Detroit. Generally speaking, the regional economy of Detroit is more affluent than that of Pittsburgh, but the social gap between the central city and its suburbs is much wider in Detroit than in Pittsburgh in terms of income distribution, poverty status, and racial segregation. These outcomes might be due to the differences in the urban regimes of these two cities. In the following section, we will discuss about variables that determine the characteristics of an urban regime.

6. Differences in Urban Regimes and Their Social Results

If we consider the trend of regional restructuring, that is, service-centered or manufacturing-centered, as the main reason behind the differences in urban regimes of Pittsburgh and Detroit, the social results of regional restructuring, according to conventional wisdom, should be the reverse of what actually occurred. While the service-centered economy has been criticized in terms of segmented labor markets and underemployment, the manufacturing-centered economy has been praised in terms of broad linkages and employment effects (Fingleton, 1999). Therefore, Detroit should be more socially equal than Pittsburgh. This is because in Detroit, the results of economic development might be more distributed throughout its region than in Pittsburgh. However, the present situation of these cities is the opposite of the expected result. How can we understand this phenomenon? What are the causes, given these differences?

To find the reason for the differences in the urban regimes of these two cities, we expand our study to include Philadelphia and Milwaukee as reference cases. As mentioned in the analytical scheme, Philadelphia is contrasted with Pittsburgh, because both have restructured toward a service-centered economy. Milwaukee is contrasted with Detroit, because both have restructured toward a manufacturing-centered economy. An extended analysis that includes Philadelphia and Milwaukee helps us find the differences in the urban regimes of Pittsburgh and Detroit. Therefore, the cases of Philadelphia and Milwaukee are used as secondary cases to further enlighten differences between Pittsburgh and Detroit.

6.1. Trend of Regional Restructuring

The trend of regional restructuring is only one of the two variables that determine the characteristics of an urban regime. Indeed this variable does not directly determine the
characteristics of an urban regime, but circumscribes the structural conditions in which the actors interact together. In Pittsburgh, as the steel industry had totally collapsed, the dominance of the service sector over the manufacturing sector became evident at an early stage in the process of restructuring. This means that the leadership in forming a regional coalition arose from the service sector.

6.1.1. Pittsburgh and Philadelphia

To further understand the role of the service sector, we need to compare Pittsburgh with Philadelphia. Philadelphia shares many similarities with Pittsburgh in that both leaned toward a service-centered economy in the process of regional restructuring. As shown in Table 3, the percentages of the service sector in Philadelphia (77.8%) and Pittsburgh (76.9%) are higher than the average U.S. level (72.4%).

The structural conditions of the service-centered regional economy were a little different in Philadelphia. The pace of de-industrialization was relatively slower in Philadelphia than in Pittsburgh, because the regional economy had a diverse manufacturing sector that did not depend on one industry. Therefore, the shock of de-industrialization was less acute in Philadelphia. Nevertheless, the slow pace of de-industrialization made the conflicts between the newly emerging service sector and the declining manufacturing sector protracted. As Philadelphia leaned toward a service-centered economy, significant divergence between the new service sector (real estate, bankers, lawyers, insurance companies) and the declining manufacturing sector took place in the regional economy. While the Greater Philadelphia Movement (GPM) represents the former set of interests, the Chamber of Commerce represents the latter set of interests (Adams et al., 1991: 139). As this social schism broadened, the building of a regional coalition to solve the problems during the regional restructuring became difficult (Bartelt, 1989). Of course, these structural conditions, such as the pace of de-industrialization and the composition of the manufacturing sector, did not determine, but negatively influenced, the building of a regional coalition.

6.1.2. Milwaukee and Detroit

In the manufacturing-centered economy, the trend of regional restructuring also functioned as the structural condition in forming a regional coalition. In Detroit, as the automotive industry regained its vitality, the manufacturing sector maintained its dominant status over the service sector. Thus the leadership in forming a regional coalition arose from the manufacturing sector. The service sector was fractured, even though its proportion grew strongly. However, as the automotive companies moved their industrial base outside the region, they lost interest in regional restructuring.

Milwaukee is similar to Detroit in that it leaned toward a manufacturing-centered economy in the process of regional restructuring. In Table 3, we see that the percentages of the manufacturing sector in Milwaukee (20.1%) and Detroit (22.6%) are much higher than the average U.S. level (14.2%).
The structural conditions of the manufacturing-centered regional economy were a little different in Milwaukee than in Detroit. The economic crisis in the 1980s was also serious in Milwaukee, because of its economic concentration in the metal working industry. Milwaukee suffered from the crisis less than Detroit, however, because Milwaukee depended less on one industry than did Detroit. Furthermore, in Milwaukee, because the major manufacturing companies such as Harley-Davidson had their broad industrial base in this region, they were very interested in regional restructuring (Norman, 1989: 196-197).

6.2. Presence or Absence of a Regional Coalition

The presence or absence of a regional coalition is the other variable, besides the trend of regional restructuring, which determines the characteristics of an urban regime. The economic actors and their relationships form a regional coalition under specific structural conditions, that is, the specific trend of regional restructuring.

6.2.1. Pittsburgh and Philadelphia

We find differences in forming a regional coalition between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, even though both of these cities are service-centered economy. How can we explain these differences?

During the 1980s, the city government of Philadelphia drove downtown redevelopment policy with the support of the Greater Philadelphia First Corporation (the present form of GPM). However, many nonprofit development agencies failed to coordinate their efforts for regional restructuring. Even though City Council, which historically represented the interests of community organizations, has veto power over the economic policies of the mayor, it could not transform the regional restructuring focused on downtown redevelopment into a more regionally integrated one. Labor unions also could not contribute to the formation of a regional coalition as in Detroit, striving to keep just their own interests. Therefore, the characteristics of urban regime in Philadelphia are described as “fragmented to the point of chaos” (Adams et al., 1991: 152). The absence of a regional coalition in Philadelphia is largely similar to the urban regime in Detroit, even though the trend of regional restructuring in Philadelphia is different from Detroit’s.

Philadelphia is similar to Pittsburgh, which also leaned toward a service-centered economy in the process of regional restructuring. However, the diverse political actors that represent the different economic interests in Philadelphia have not succeeded in forming a regional coalition to solve the regional problems. In Philadelphia, the slow pace of de-industrialization made the conflicts between the newly emerging service sector and the declining manufacturing sector stretch out over a lengthy time. When economic interests are diverse, more coordination based on mutual understanding is needed to build a broadly representative coalition. In Philadelphia, however, local governments and business organizations did not provide the leadership role to coordinate these diverse interests. The absence of leadership and coordination among the actors is considered to be the main reason for the failure to form a regional coalition in this region.
This leads to the conclusion that the difference in social results in two types of urban regimes, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, is mainly due to the presence or absence of a regional coalition, not the trend of regional restructuring.

The social results of regional restructuring in Philadelphia are much different from those in Pittsburgh. As shown in Figure 9, the income difference between the central city and the suburbs is much worse in Philadelphia than in Pittsburgh. Figure 10 also shows that poverty status is much worse in Philadelphia than in Pittsburgh. The regional economy of Philadelphia is more socially unequal than is the case in Pittsburgh. Therefore, Philadelphia resembles Detroit, not Pittsburgh, in the social results of regional restructuring.

**Figure 9. Income Distribution in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia (2000)**

![Income Distribution Graph](image)


**Figure 10. Poverty Status in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia (2000)**

![Poverty Status Graph](image)

Note 1): Percentage of families below poverty level
2): Percentage of families with female householder below poverty level
3): Percentage of individuals below poverty level

6.2.2. Milwaukee and Detroit

We also find differences in forming a regional coalition in Milwaukee and Detroit, even though the trend of regional restructuring of both cities is manufacturing-centered economy. Milwaukee has maintained a tradition of a regional coalition under the leadership of the private sector, the Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC), since 1948. The GMC has tried to diversify the regional economy as a way of overcoming the loss in manufacturing employment since 1970. After Milwaukee experienced an economic crisis in the 1980s, the guiding force behind regional restructuring has been the alliance between the business sector and local government. The city government also has formed a public-private partnership with business organizations that wanted to extend the partnership to include certain community organizations. By participating in the public-private partnership, these community organizations made changes that improved their relationships with business organizations (Norman, 1989: 178-198).

In the 1990s, some business organizations and neighborhood organizations cooperated to bring about regionally integrated economic development. The Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP) is one successful outcome of the regional coalition in the manufacturing sector in Milwaukee. The WRTP is a progressive partnership that includes employers, workers, and community-based organizations (Wood, Whitford, and Rogers, 2000: 13). It has received much support from non-profit organizations, such as the Annie E. Casey Foundation, for an education and training program to supply highly skilled laborers to the regional economy. Since its founding in 1991, the WRTP has grown to include 60 companies, 60,000 workers, and 56 labor unions as members. The WRTP is currently replicating its nationally recognized partnership in manufacturing in a wide range of other industries that account for nearly two-thirds of the workforce in the Milwaukee region (WRTP, 2002). These characteristics of the urban regime in Milwaukee are similar to those of the urban regime in Pittsburgh, even though the trend of regional restructuring in Milwaukee is largely opposite that of Pittsburgh.

In other ways, Milwaukee is similar to Detroit, which also leaned toward a manufacturing-centered economy in the process of regional restructuring. However, the diverse programs by the leadership of the private sector in Milwaukee have contributed to solving the social problems of regional restructuring. In Milwaukee, because manufacturing companies had the industrial base in the region, they had much interest in regional restructuring. Notwithstanding these characteristics in the structural conditions, the stable leadership and cooperation among the actors appear to be the main reasons for the building of a regional coalition in this region. This leads to the conclusion that the difference in social results in two types of urban regimes, Milwaukee and Detroit, is mainly due to the presence or absence of a regional coalition, not the trend of regional restructuring.

The social results of regional restructuring in Milwaukee are clearly different from Detroit. As shown in Figure 11, the income gap between the central city and the suburbs is much less in Milwaukee than it is in Detroit. Figure 12 also shows that poverty status is
much better in Milwaukee than in Detroit. The regional economy of Milwaukee is more socially equal than in Detroit. It resembles the regional economy of Pittsburgh, not Detroit.

Figure 11. Income Distribution in Milwaukee and Detroit (2000)

![Income Distribution Chart](image)


Figure 12. Poverty Status in Milwaukee and Detroit (2000)

![Poverty Status Chart](image)

Note 1): Percentage of families below poverty level  
2): Percentage of families with female householder below poverty level  
3): Percentage of individuals below poverty level  
4): Percentage of students with free school meal  

7. Conclusions and Discussion

In this study, we compared the regional restructuring of two major American industrial cities, Pittsburgh and Detroit from the perspective of urban regime theory. Table 9 summarizes the major findings of this study. As shown in the Table 9 and discussed in previous sections, the social results of regional restructuring mainly depend on the characteristics of urban regimes in Pittsburgh and Detroit. The building of a regional coalition is circumscribed by the structural condition, that is, the specific trend of regional restructuring. However, the social results of regional restructuring are mainly produced by the economic and social policies that arise from the presence or absence of a regional coalition. By the presence of a regional coalition, the urban regime in the Pittsburgh region has taken a path of economic restructuring toward a relatively balanced economy between the central city and its suburbs. This kind of urban regime is clearly contrasted with the urban regime in the Detroit region. The urban regime in the Detroit region has taken a path of economic restructuring toward a regionally fractured economy, without forming a regional coalition.

Finally, we must address issues how a regional coalition can be formed in other major industrial cities besides Pittsburgh and Milwaukee. Jeziersky maintained that the conditions for the success of regional restructuring in Pittsburgh are hard to replicate in other regions (Jeziersky, 1996: 178):

First, the particular and compelling leadership of the Mellon interests was crucial in organizing the private sector. Second, the corporate resources available in Pittsburgh are shared by only a few metropolitan areas. Third, local government had to extend decision making authority to private sector groups that could underwrite the planning process.

Although it will be hard to form a regional coalition in other areas, it is not totally impossible. First, strong leadership from the business sector based on its economic interests can be established in the specific area, if the companies commit themselves to the regional economy, whether the economic interests in the region are monolithic or diverse. When regional economic interests are diverse, more coordination is needed based on mutual understanding.

Second, whether or not available from the private sector, local governments appear to be unable to provide resources for regional restructuring on their own. To obtain sufficient resources, tax sharing and other programs at the regional level is needed, even if it does not extend to the formation of a metropolitan government. “Re-distributive metropolitanists are confident that planned and directed reform – large-scale government restructuring – can achieve social change” (Benjamin and Nathan, 2001: 42). “Issue by issue, bill by bill,” that is, by incremental cooperation, the coalition has to be forged (Orfield, 1997: 104).

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12 Other areas such as Minneapolis-St. Paul and Portland show successful cases of regional coalition (Orfield, 2002).
Table 9. Comparison of the Urban Regimes in the Pittsburgh and Detroit Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pittsburgh</th>
<th>Detroit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trend of Regional Restructuring</strong></td>
<td>Service-Centered Economy</td>
<td>Manufacturing-Centered Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steel Industry:</td>
<td>Automotive Industry:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally Collapsed</td>
<td>Relatively Recovered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Coalition</strong></td>
<td>Presence: Cooperation among Business Organizations, Local Governments, (Community Organizations)</td>
<td>Absence: Competition among Business Organizations, Local Governments, Community Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Business Organizations</strong></td>
<td>Stable Leadership:</td>
<td>Weak Leadership:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allegheny Conference, Regional Industrial Development Corporation, Pittsburgh Regional Alliance</td>
<td>Detroit Renaissance, Detroit Regional Chamber, New Detroit, Detroit Economic Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Local Government (Central City)</strong></td>
<td>Relatively Weak; Supportive to Business Sector</td>
<td>Relatively Strong; Independent from Business Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Structure of Municipalities</strong></td>
<td>Fractured: 418 Local Governments</td>
<td>Fractured: 335 Local Governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Public-Private Partnership</strong></td>
<td>Business Led, Stable; Renaissance I and II, Strategy 21</td>
<td>Business Led, Unstable; Detroit Renaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Community Organizations</strong></td>
<td>Relatively Strong; Participation in the Coalition</td>
<td>Relatively Weak; Outside the Coalition, Protest Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Results</strong></td>
<td>Relatively Balanced Economy between the Central city and its Suburbs</td>
<td>Regionally Fractured Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Social Disparities</strong></td>
<td>Income and Poverty: Less Inequality</td>
<td>Income and Poverty: More Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Race Relations</strong></td>
<td>Spatial Segregation Slowly Increasing; Social Gap between Poor Central City Blacks and Rich Suburban Whites Relatively Small</td>
<td>Spatial Segregation Rapidly Increasing; Social gap between Poor Central City Blacks and Rich Suburban Whites Relatively Big</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Bold parts show the characteristics of the two main variables describing urban regimes presented in this paper and their results in the Pittsburgh and Detroit regions.

Third, local government must do more than support the leadership of the private sector. For the local government to be more active, the participation of community organizations, including labor unions, in forming a regional coalition is necessary. "The process has been one of conflict, experimentation, sacrifice and loss, a furious level of organization building, and mobilization of consent (Jeziersky, 1996: 179)." The cases of Pittsburgh and Milwaukee prove the importance of the participation of community organizations, in providing positive outcomes.
Based on our findings above, we can propose several hypotheses regarding regional restructuring in terms of urban regime theory.

Hypothesis 1. The trend of regional restructuring influences the characteristics of the urban regime. However, this variable does not determine the characteristics of urban regime, but just circumscribes the structural conditions in which the actors interact.

Hypothesis 1.1. In the case of a service-centered regional economy, the dominance of the service sector over the manufacturing sector becomes evident. However, the pace of de-industrialization influences the establishment of leadership within the private sector. If the pace of de-industrialization is rapid, the dominance of the service sector becomes evident. On the other hand, if the pace of de-industrialization is slow, conflicts between the newly emerging service sector and the declining manufacturing sector become protracted.

Hypothesis 1.2. In the case of a manufacturing-centered regional economy, the dominance of the manufacturing sector over the various kinds of service sector becomes evident. However, the extent to which manufacturing companies are rooted in the region influences the establishment of leadership within the private sector. If the manufacturing companies move their industrial base outside the region, they lose interest in regional restructuring. On the other hand, if the manufacturing companies maintain their industrial base within the region, they have much interest in regional restructuring.

Hypothesis 2. The characteristics of urban regimes mainly depend on the presence or absence of a diverse regional coalition. A diverse regional coalition is composed of local governments, business organizations, community organizations, and their relationships. The leadership of the coalition mainly arises from the private sector.

Hypothesis 2.1. In the case of a service-centered regional economy, the business organizations that represent the service sector show their leadership in forming a regional coalition. On the other hand, in the case of a manufacturing-centered regional economy, the business organizations that represent the manufacturing sector show their leadership in forming a regional coalition. Whether a regional coalition is formed or not depends mainly on how the business organizations that represent the dominant sector lead in the process of regional restructuring in a region.

Hypothesis 2.2. Local governments have an impact on the formation of a regional coalition, even though they are located in the fragmented structure of municipalities. During the formation of a regional coalition, support from local governments positively contributes to the establishment of a regional coalition. On the other hand, indifference by local governments hinders the development of a regional coalition.

Hypothesis 2.3. The participation of community organizations is an important factor that influences the formation of a regional coalition. If community organizations participate in forming a regional coalition, then the urban regime seriously considers the issues of
social equality at the regional level. On the other hand, if community organizations do not participate in forming a regional coalition, then the urban regime disregards the issues of social equality at the regional level.

Hypothesis 2.4. The racial composition of the region is an important factor that influences the formation of a regional coalition. In a region in which the degree of racial segregation is relatively low, a regional coalition is easily formed. On the other hand, in a region in which the degree of racial segregation is relatively high, this works to hinder cooperation between the central city and its suburbs and makes it difficult to form a regional coalition.

Hypothesis 3. The social results of regional restructuring mainly depend on the characteristics of urban regimes. By the presence of a regional coalition including community organizations, an urban regime takes a path of economic restructuring toward a relatively balanced economy between the central city and its suburbs. On the other hand, in the absence of a regional coalition, an urban regime takes a path of economic restructuring toward a regionally fractured economy.

It may be risky to generalize the findings from regional restructuring of four industrial cities by inductive methods. To test these hypotheses, more research is needed. This study, however, are a good starting point from which develops an elaborated theory of regional restructuring of major U.S. industrial cities.
Bibliography


