Exiled Counterpoints: Cuban Exiles, Media Activism, and Latina/o Conservativism

by

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DEDICATION

Para Naz, mis Padres y Dios,

esto, y todo lo que hago, es para ustedes

Dedicado a los migrantes que sacrificaron su pasado, por su futuro
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although this dissertation bears my name, it is the sum efforts undertaken by many. The proverb “it takes a village to raise a child” is apt here. An immeasurable amount of support, love, kindness, and insight from many undergird the research, writing, and editing of this project. I want to take this time to show my appreciation to that village (or perhaps villages) and all they have done to make this dissertation possible.

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This dissertation examines the Truth About Cuba Committee (TACC) and their calculated attempts to manage the distribution of information about Cuba to Americans from 1961 to 1975. The TACC lead Cuban exile media activism by disseminating anti-Cuban Revolution information and thwarting what they deemed to be communist propaganda. In doing so, the TACC orchestrated political campaigns to alter the U.S. news media landscape and to pit sectors of the U.S. against the Castro regime.

To investigate this phenomenon, this study is guided by the following questions: what strategies, rhetoric, and coalitions did the TACC develop to shape U.S. public opinion and pit the U.S. against the Cuban state? How did the TACC lead other Cuban exile organizations and influential Americans, particularly ones with conservative values, in this endeavor? How does the TACC represent an engagement with conservative politics, which was unorthodox for their Latina/o activists contemporaries? In seeking out the answers to these questions, this dissertation argues that the TACC compelled news media professionals, U.S. authorities, organization leaders, and educators to exercise their authority to prohibit pro-Revolution portrayals and to send anti-Castro messages to audiences, the state, organizations’ networks, and U.S. students. In sum, the TACC sought to tarnish the reputation of the Revolution by facilitating the production and dissemination of anti-Castro information, for example, persuading news media professionals, or by prohibiting the distribution of pro-Revolution portrayals, like provoking U.S. officials to act as a regulatory body.
To increase their chances for success, the TACC purposefully targeted and eagerly emboldened anti-communists, Republicans, and Cuban exiles. In order to rally their support, the TACC formed race-, gender-, and class-based solidarity with Americans and utilized exile camaraderie with Cuban organizations. Without a megaphone of their own, the TACC relied on established networks, like broadcast media and national organizations, to relay their anti-Revolution message and hinder the dissemination of pro-Cuban state messages.
INTRODUCTION

The social movements of the 1960s-1970s in the U.S. took on many forms with racial minority activism often being placed on the fore of popular memory. Specifically, this meant the Civil Rights movement (followed by the Black Power movement) and, at times, the lesser known rural and urban activism of the Chicana/o movement. Many, if not all, activist organizations rightfully placed importance on the role of the media; visibility has always been fundamental to social movements. Yet, the media industry (along with the state and its institutions) were identified as instruments of oppression or, at the very least, noted as being historically hostile to racial minorities. The U.S. media was perceived as both a means to advance a social movement (most notably with the pairing of the Civil Rights movement and television) and the site that activists targeted for reform.¹

It suffices to say that the media has long been a site of political contestation and markedly so for the denigrative portrayals of marginal groups. Beginning in the 1960s; however, broadcast media and Hollywood were forced to navigate the growing influence of social activists. With new means at their disposal, Mexican Americans/Chicanas/os and Puerto Ricans media activists deployed a variety of strategies to shape film, television, and advertising across a spectrum from reformism to radicalism.²

Similar to Chicanos and Puerto Ricans, Cuban exiles who came to the US after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, were also politically active during the 1960s however,

² Mexican Americans/Chicanas/os and Puerto Ricans were the two Latina/o groups engaged with protesting the media during the late 1960s-1970s.
different from the aforementioned groups, Cuban media activism, in fact, their activism in
general, was entrenched in global Cold War politics and was decidedly motivated by exiles’ desire
to return home. As such, the shaping of U.S. media by Cuban activists is unique to Latina/o
media activism. Cuban exiles implemented alternative strategies that were unprecedented among
their contemporaries – like allying with U.S. conservatives.

This dissertation is a case study of the Truth About Cuba Committee (TACC) a political
organization formed by Cuban exiles in 1961 whose main objective was to manage the
distribution of information about Cuba to Americans. From 1961 to 1975, the TACC lead Cuban
exile media activism by centering the dissemination of anti-Revolution information and the
thwarting of, what they deemed, communist propaganda. To do so, the TACC not only
orchestrated campaigns (alone and collaboratively) to alter the U.S. news media landscape, but
also strategically pit sectors of the U.S. against the Castro regime.

This dissertation is animated by a set of central questions: what strategies, rhetoric, and
coalitions did the TACC develop to shape U.S. public opinion and steer the U.S. against the
Cuban state? How did the TACC lead other Cuban exile organizations and influential
Americans, particularly ones with “conservative” values, in this endeavor? How does the TACC
represent an engagement with conservative politics, which was unorthodox for their Latina/o
activists contemporaries? My secondary line of inquiry takes its cue from recent scholarship on
the Cuban diaspora that has posed questions about intra-communal politics. How did the
Committee participate in exile polemics and discourses, and how did that differ from their

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3 Nancy Raquel Mirabal states that “Although consistently understudied, race and gender were pivotal to the
formation of early Cuban exile and migrant communities.” Nancy Raquel Mirabal, “Ser De Aquí: Beyond the
interactions with outside groups, chiefly white Americans? Seeking out the answers to these questions has led to this project’s central argument.

This dissertation argues that the TACC compelled news media professionals, U.S. authorities, organization leaders, and educators to exercise their authority to prohibit pro-Revolution portrayals and to send anti-Castro messages to audiences, the state, organizations’ networks, and U.S. students. In sum, the TACC sought to tarnish the reputation of the Revolution by facilitating the production and dissemination of anti-Castro information, for example, persuading news media professionals, or by prohibiting the distribution of pro-Revolution portrayals, like provoking U.S. officials to act as a regulatory body.4

To increase their chances for success, the TACC purposefully targeted and eagerly emboldened anti-communists, Republicans, and Cuban exiles. In order to rally their support, the TACC formed race-, gender-, and class-based solidarity with Americans and utilized exile camaraderie with Cuban organizations. Without a megaphone of their own, the TACC relied on established networks, like ones connected to broadcast media and national organizations, to relay their anti-Revolution message and hinder the dissemination of pro-Cuban state messages.

Historical Materials and Theoretical Framework

This project relies on archival materials from the Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC) at the Otto G. Richter Library at the University of Miami. The CHC houses the Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. collection and the Luis V. Manrara papers – Manrara being the president and leading figure of the TACC. The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. collection was donated to the University of Miami by the TACC on June 21, 1976 with the stipulation that the Cuban state would not be given access until, “Cuba regains its independence from the USSR and has had an

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4 In the minds of the leaders of the TACC, this would eventually lead to a liberated Cuba allowing for émigrés to return home, however, never offered how this would transpire.
established government legally elected by its people, for a period of five consecutive years.”

The Cuban Heritage Collection was established four years later and was made responsible for much of the university’s materials surrounding the island-nation including the TACC and Manrara.

Widely distributed periodicals such as *The New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Miami Herald* were also utilized, along with local and conservative-leaning periodicals like *Human Events*, *The Wanderer*, *Newport Daily News*, and *Tucson Daily Citizen*. The Committee and in particular Manrara were featured and contributed to Spanish-language and bi-lingual newspapers, for example, *El Nuevo Herald*, *Diario Las Américas*, and *Acadiana Profile: A Magazine for Bi-Lingual Louisiana*. Media periodicals were less useful; however, *Variety* and *Broadcasting Magazine* did offer reviews and public responses to television programs that the TACC campaigned against like *Three Faces of Cuba* (1965). The TACC’s involvement with U.S. authorities was documented in CIA, FBI, and Congressional Records and gave rare glimpses into U.S. officials’ view of the TACC and their activism. These source materials necessitate interpretation to form a historical narrative of the TACC, theorize their activities, and place their activism within a larger historical context.

The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and his theories of hegemony and “war of position” are uniquely suited to comprehend the TACC’s political struggles to pit U.S. public opinion against the Cuba state, the Revolution, and communism. The shaping of dominant ideology or hegemony by a group to support their position within a nation was termed a war of position. Gramsci placed this notion of slow and steady acquisition of dominance in contrast to a “war of

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maneuver,” which is when power is taken by force, for instance, Fulgencio Batista’s military coup d’état of Cuba in 1952. The TACC believed they were mounting a war of position against the Cuban state within the U.S. which went well beyond Gramsci’s theorization since it were bound by national borders. Swaying public opinion was near impossible for one organization; however, by tapping into other networks (like ones connected to broadcast media and political organizations) the TACC were about to move the needle. The TACC were also able to aid in U.S. conservatives’ attempts to push U.S. popular opinion against communism. Doing so helped to grant conservatives more legitimacy and political power in the U.S. From a U.S.-centric conservative standpoint, the 1960s and 1970s were a disheartening time in which the nation was veering away from “traditional” American values; some may consider this era a “crisis of hegemony” in which conservatives were losing legitimacy and influence. Organized resistance by the civil rights, Black power, Chicana/o, feminist, and the anti-war movement as well as the sexual revolution were agents of that “crisis.” Considering this watershed moment in U.S. politics, the TACC were seen as allies for the U.S. conservatives they engaged with, particularly in regard to anti-communism.

Conservatives organizations, news professionals, and U.S. officials saw the TACC as a resource of support for their claims against communism, and to bolster containment as a geopolitical strategy to keep the U.S. safe during the Cold War. These struggles, for those on the political Right, also bled into their efforts against the New Left. The TACC’s propaganda and reports on Cuba were deployed as evidence of communism nearing or encircling the U.S., and thus used the TACC to argue against the New Left and their many reforms. Indeed, the TACC were utilized as eyewitnesses to the cautionary tale that was Cuba; a particularly useful

7 Herman Grey has theorized era such as this as “crisis of hegemony.” Herman Grey, Watching Race: Television And The Struggle For Blackness, (University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
maneuver for the New Right who maintained anti-communism as one of its pillars. Thus, the Committee played a role in conservative efforts to alter U.S. hegemony. For the TACC, working with U.S. conservatives was paramount since they were not able to mount a war of position against the Castro regime alone. If the TACC’s effectiveness hinged on convincing Americans in influential position, then working with U.S. conservatives was the best bet. In short, anti-conservativism was the linchpin in the TACC and U.S. conservatives partnership; more than any other concern or issue, anti-communism was the glue that kept these groups united.

Up to this point I have used the term conservativism as a political, ideological, and descriptive category (not as much as a term of self-identification) that refers largely to anti-communist convictions. However, the term also refers to Judeo-Christian beliefs and the preservation of social order; that is to say, the maintenance of social relations, social norms, traditions, and etiquette to ensure a stable and “civilized” society. This work recognizes that the notion and practice of conservatism is not static but rather varies throughout history and region. During the TACC’s years of operation, anti-communist fervor and communist containment were not only similarities with U.S. conservatives but also prevailing features. Both American and Cuban conservativism (and political consciousness for that matter) were much more complex than this one issue. Their cooperation hinged on this anti-communism commonality while their confidence in the U.S., adherence to a normative social structure, the similarities in their class cultures, and social identities facilitated their interactions, formed their mutual respect, and allowed the TACC to convince U.S. conservatives to aid them. Indeed, anti-communism was their prominent shared feature but their shared beliefs in notions such as American paternalism and Western society and adherence to middle- and upper-class propriety, business decorum, and

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8 Bruce Frohnen, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson, *American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia*. Wilmington, DE, 2006. A distinction of the first wave (1955-1964) and second wave (1964-2014) of the New Right is the fact that the latter had a populist style of thought and incorporated religious and emotional fervor.
notions of decency facilitated their partnership. We should note, however, not all U.S. anti-communists were conservatives; in this era the antipathy for communist could be found throughout the liberal-conservative spectrum (albeit fervor coming from the latter half) and cut across political parties. While the hysteria of McCarthyism weaned in the late 1950s, anti-communist vestige continued to linger and was modified during the Cold War with its global perspectives. Likewise, not all Cuban exiles were conservatives. While they were largely anti-communist, anti-Castro, and pro-democracy, the political diversity of Cuban exiles included Batistianos (advocates of Batista’s regime), Leftist, those on the Right, anti-Marxist revolutionaries, supporters of social change but not the extremism of the Revolution, and radicals that sought terrorism against the Cuban state. The TACC and the U.S. conservatives that they partnered with were made up of a specific section of their respective groups and their joint efforts and solidarity has eluded scholarly exploration despite their expansive research.

**Literature Review Field: Latina/o Media Studies**

The scholarship surrounding Latina/o and the media have experienced significant growth in recent years. Initially very much invested in the portrayals of Latinas/os and Latin Americans in Hollywood, the field continues to branch out. From its development, prominent threads have emerged one of which was concerned with the construction of the Latinas/os as an audience by media industries and Latinas/os’ actual responses to media objects.

This literature has examined the ways in which the U.S. and Latin American media industries constructed Latina/o as an audience, marketed to them as a demographic, and how (through these processes) the Latina/o identity was shaped. Scholars of Latina/o Media Studies

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such as Arlene Dávila (who observed the advertising industry) and América Rodríguez (who examined broadcast stations on U.S.-Mexico borderlands) have shown how the industry’s conceptualization ofLatinas/os shaped *Latinidad* and formed Latinas/os as an audience and an ethnic demographic. These processes were greatly shaped by the inherent transnationalism of the U.S. Spanish-language programming of radio and television. Initial ventures by Mexican entrepreneurs and later the systematic partnership between the U.S. and Latin American media industry supplied programs for Spanish-language media in the U.S. These partnerships would expend the geolinguistic region of Spanish-speaking Latin America to include regions like U.S.-Mexican borderlands and Miami.\(^\text{11}\)

Other scholars contributed to this literature by insightfully noting and exploring the discrepancy between the industry’s understanding of Latinas/os audiences and actual media responses by Latina/o groups.\(^\text{12}\) This development led to the study of Latina audiences and Latina/o as cultural readers, for example, Jillian M. Báez’s book *In Search of Belonging: Latinas, Media, and Citizenship*.\(^\text{13}\) It is important to note that responses to media objects by

\begin{itemize}
  \item *Making of a People*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001);
Latinas/os also came in the form of (not only criticism, but also) activism. Although the traditional scholarly works of media have largely excluded activism from the scholarly categorization of audiences and reception, I contend that media activism is yet another form of responding to media as audiences. In Latina/o Media Studies, media activism can be placed on a genealogy of the scholarly investigations of Latinas/os media responses. Activists’ efforts to alter media representation is a response to media objects, albeit a negative one and operating in the material world.

Indebted to Latina/o Studies and its investments in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, Latina/o Media Studies has explored Latina/o media activism with a focus on two national groups. In the anthology *The Ethnic Eye: Latino Media Arts* coedited by Ana M. López and Chon Noriega, the latter author reviews Chicanas/os’ resistance to damaging Latina/o portrayals and the development of Chicana/o-run media productions.\(^\text{14}\) In the same anthology, Lillian Jiménez explores media activism by Puerto Ricans in New York and, likewise, covered how this activism was geared towards access to media production.\(^\text{15}\)

Four years later, in 2000, Noriega published *Shot in America: Television, the State, and the Rise of Chicano Cinema* and expanded on his previous essay. In chapter three he covers

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campaigns by Chicanas/os media activists and the strategies they deployed. Following the same aforementioned trajectory, *Shot in America* examines Chicanas’/os’ organized protests, media-making, Chicanas/os incorporation into the media industry. Lastly, a project, that is underdevelopment, charts the pan-Latina/o media activism in the decades after the 1970s. In all these cases, Latina/o activists posit that their media activism is helping to combat the material oppression of Latinas/os within U.S. Cuban exile media activism is markedly different because it is less concerned with resisting symbolic oppression to then carve out a place within the U.S. Rather, as exiles, their main goal was to return home, this, along with their engagement with U.S. conservatism, made them distinct from other media activist organizations. Their commonalities with other Latina/o media activists, however, came from the inherent constraints of activism.

The strategies that activists deploy and how they are deployed are central concerns in the examination of activism; understanding activism hinges on understanding its practitioners’ tactics. The resources, capabilities, ingenuity, the conceptualization of what they are fighting for, and the ability to establish coalitions all dictate media activism. Examining activists’ agency, however, would be incomplete without exploring the prevailing forces that give shape to activism. Thus, it is important to investigate the ways in which they were *allowed* to engage in activism and how they made use of those affordances. The myriad forms of resistance that can be deployed are circumscribed by the historical, political, institutional, governmental, economic, industrial, and technical specificity of their contexts. Political groups’ agency (like any group or individual) will always be circumscribed by the context in which they operate. If scholars are to

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have a comprehensive picture of what it means for groups to shape media, it is paramount for them to contemplate the implications of perusing these two avenues of inquiry.

Another prominent thread that has developed in Latina/o Media Studies has been concerned with transitionalism, which includes discussions of transnational identities, migration, and media industries. While I will not provide a comprehensive summary of this sizable area of research, three works offer a productive model for understanding transnationalism’s role in the TACC’s activism. Mary Beltrán’s study of Latina/o as actors and actresses, Yeidy Rivero’s piece on Cuban television-makers and audiences, and Ana López’s essay on exiled Cuban filmmakers in the U.S. together show how events in Latin America shaped Latina/o immigrants’ relationship with media in the U.S.\(^\text{18}\) Grouping these works shows the value of investigating the circumstances of migrants’ experiences and their relationships with media in their nation of origin, migration, and resettlement. Within the context of this dissertation, this means reviewing the ways in which the TACC’s time in Cuba, their deterritorialization, and their resettlement shaped their conceptualization of media, their interpretive strategies and, consequently, their media activism. Areas of scholarship like Latina/o media activism and Latina/o media audiences have been circumscribed by national borders. Deploying a transnational lens elucidates the TACC’s activism and media reception.

Due to the TACC’s deep investments in irredentism their activism foregrounded transnational imperatives, which were markedly different than the popular and scholarly conceptualization of media activism. As previously stated, non-Cuban Latina/o activist organizations fought against systematic and symbolic oppression from the U.S. state and media industry in order to carve out a space within the U.S. At times, this meant aligning with the

Cuban state since the Revolution was a symbol of resistance for many in the 1960s and 1970s. Latina/o activists in particular drew from Cuban Revolution iconography as markers of their radicalism and Latin American heritage. Chicanas/os even received film training in Havana, albeit in 1979. For the TACC, media activism meant participating in their community’s irredentism. The TACC did so by tarnishing the image of the Castro regime so that the U.S. state, backed by U.S. public opinion, would feel inclined to liberate the island-nation. Thus, the TACC identified the Cuban state as their opponents and the U.S. state (and white conservatives) as their allies, while non-Cuban Latina/o media activists for the most part did the reverse.

This divergent attribute chiefly contributed to Cuban media activism being ignored by popular and scholarly discourses. Scholarship of Latina/o media activism and Latinas/os in general have failed to explore conservativism despite first-wave Cuban’s arrival in the early 1960s, the Republican National Hispanic Assembly (RNHA), and the Bolivarian diaspora and Venezuelan resettlement in the U.S. The field has been slow to catch up. Scholars in many fields have inherited leftist and Marxist legacies and viewed such groups as reactionaries. In fact, much ink has been spilled on behalf of the Cuban Revolution and its cultural productions, while research on nonrevolutionary media, for instance, has been viewed as undesirable and have been made to defend its existence more so than other subjects. This may in fact extend to the study of Cuban exile interpretive strategies; while research on the media reception of Cubans on the island has garnered attention, the ways in which members of the émigrés community draw

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19 Noriega, Shot in America, 145.
20 For a more direct link, the TACC sought to convince U.S. officials to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy against Cuba through correspondences.
meaning from media objects has not. Exploring their conservative standpoint can help us explore Cuban exiles’ reception of media objects. In short, the territory of Latina/o conservativism is wide open for exploration. Likewise the topic of the Cuban diaspora is largely unresearched for Latina/o Media Studies. As noted by leading scholars, the field has seldom, if ever, set its sights on Cubans in the U.S. Thus, I situate this project at the intersections of these scholarly vacancies, not only for the benefit of this work alone but also to contribute to these fields.

For these reasons, I consider this dissertation an examination of exiled counterpoints, not only in terms of Cubans’ exile status but also in regards to proffering the Cuban case of media activism, Latina/o conservativism, and Cuban media reception. It points to the fact that the TACC provides a stark difference, one might say the opposite side, of Latina/o media activism and its scholarship that has focused on Chicanas/os and Puerto Ricans. This dissertation also proffers an examination of a conservative Latina/o groups as opposed to the scholarly and popular associations between Latinas/os and liberalism, leftism, and Marxism. The subject of Latina/o conservativism will continue to grow in the next few years as conservatism as an avenue of inquiry spreads to different fields and disciplines. Lastly, this work is an exploration of exiled counterpoints because it investigates exiled hermeneutics. After 1959, interpretive strategies that were markedly anti-Marxist were banished from the island when early Cuban waves were expelled. On the island, as Hector Amaya has underscored, cultural workers wrestled with how to interpret revolutionary cultural productions and learned to fashion new means of understanding media in conjunction with Marxist thought. This was later continued, as a recent

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24 See Dávila and Rivero, Contemporary Latina/o Media, 2014.
study has shown, in the 1970s with the deployment of revolutionary hermeneutics on to Hollywood films, which was exemplified by the reception of the Godfather franchise.\textsuperscript{25} The Cuban Revolution and its exodus bifurcated not only a population but also the dominant means of making sense of media objects for Cubans.

While a counterpoint could be thought of as a means to undermine an original position, it also has the ability to prompt the desire for a fuller picture of a phenomenon. While complicating previous scholarship on Latinas/os and media activism, the Cuban case strengthens our understanding of previous works because it makes more obvious the mechanisms, avenues, methods and desires for resistance that did not exist or were differently conceptualized than in the Cuban exile case.

The Cuban Diaspora of 1959 and Immigration Policy

Cuban émigrés left in four major waves descending in social-class and mostly, but not exclusively, headed towards the United States.\textsuperscript{26} The initial group to leave were closely tied to the old regime: “political leaders, high ranking government officials and military officers of Fulgencio Batista’s government.”\textsuperscript{27} This was a small group that had much to lose if they stayed regardless of what economic or political system emerged in Cuba. The first wave, 1959-1962, was made up of Cuba’s elite, known by some as “the Golden Exiles.” Members of the first wave

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image1.png}
\caption{Second Wave Cubans Arriving in Miami, Cuban Refugee Center Records, Box 51, Folder 228, 1969.}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{26} Cubans also migrated to Spain and other parts of Latin America like Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela.

\textsuperscript{27} Pedraza, \textit{Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus}, 2007, 13.
were Eurocentric, well-educated professionals, executives, and landowners, and some with their family members.\textsuperscript{28} They were well-traveled and highly connected to U.S. companies and associations, and benefited from Cuba being entrenched in the U.S. capitalistic system—although they would not necessarily view it this way.

In \textit{Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus}, Silvia Pedraza documents each of the four waves’ perspectives on their migration and resettlement. According to Nelson Amaro and Alejandro Portes, there were two subcategories in the initial wave: “Those who wait” for the U.S. to help overthrow Cuba’s new government and “those who escape” from political turmoil, the silencing of the Catholic Church and the closing of electoral system.\textsuperscript{29} The founders of the TACC subscribed to these very sentiments. The TACC’s leaders let it be known their “Faith in American promises of protection,” even going as far as to regard the Monroe Doctrine as an altruistic declaration of protectionism rather than self-interested paternalism.\textsuperscript{30} Additionally, the TACC, who believed in democracy and identified as Christian, often claimed that communists’ atheism was evidence of their malevolence.

Silva Pedraza called the second wave (1965-1974) Cuba’s “\textit{La petite bourgeoisie}; they were employees, craftsmen, small merchants, skilled and semiskilled workers” (see figure 1).\textsuperscript{31} Credited to the joint policies of the U.S. and the Cuban government, this was the largest wave with almost a quarter of a million.\textsuperscript{32} Although this was the most idealistic era of the Revolution, in this period the Castro regime confiscated small businesses which pushed out entrepreneurs

\textsuperscript{28} While not covered here, the three waves decreased in social standing starting with the first wave. See Pedraza, \textit{Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus}, 2007.
\textsuperscript{29} Pedraza, \textit{Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus}, 2007, 3; and Nelson Amaro and Alejandro Portes (1972).
\textsuperscript{30} Truth About Cuba Committee. 1961a. \textit{Objectives and Plans} (Box 119, Folder 7) TACCR. In 1823, the United States initiated a policy of challenging European colonialism in the Americas called the Monroe Doctrine. An further acts of expansion would be viewed as hostility against the U.S.
\textsuperscript{31} Pedraza, \textit{Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus}, 2007, 3.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 5.
and their employees. During this wave, in 1966, the U.S. federal law enacted the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) which granted Cubans permanent resident status if they entered the U.S. legally, a year after arrival. Together the first and second wave would dictate the terms of exile politics, discourse, and rhetoric in South Florida for years to come. This project spans the first two waves since the TACC operated from 1961 to 1975. The leaders of the TACC were from the first wave while most of their Cuban members were from the second wave.

The influx of Cubans to South Florida in the 1960s and 1970s was initially met with anxiety; non-Cubans felt that American culture was being altered or pushed out. Some white residents were concerned over, what they believed, was an increase in crime due to the newly arrived Cubans. Exhibiting and exacerbating these concerns, a regionally broadcasted television documentary, Crisis Amigo (1961), depicted Cubans as drug dealers, prostitutes, and gang leaders. This is a representation of first and second wavers that is difficult to fathom today; however, Cubans, in this case, were subjected to Latina/o stereotypes that existed in the U.S. media long before 1959. After some years of establishing themselves, these sentiments subsided due to a host of factors; however, these stereotypes would be placed far more frequently on the third-wavers.

The third wave of Cubans arrived from the mid-1970s to 1980s from the Port of Mariel boatlift. Compared to the other waves the Marielitos had a higher percentage of Afro-Cubans and working-class Cubans as well as political prisoners and social “subversives.” The Balseros, the rafters, were the Cuban fourth-wavers that travelled in homemade rafts and had the highest concentration of Afro-Cubans and financially disadvantaged Cubans. Their dangerous journey was exacerbated by the turn in U.S. immigration policy that now viewed Cubans as illegal aliens.

33 See García, Havana, 1996.
34 Carlson, “Blurring the Boundaries of Cold War Foreign Relation,” 221.
which “contrasted sharply with the long-standing U.S. view that Cubans were victims of communism.” While these last two waves do not pertain to the TACC since they disbanded in 1975, briefly covering the third and fourth wave highlights the distinction with the first two waves.

From a myopic view, one might say that the U.S. government (namely the Kennedy and then Johnson administration) returned Cuban reverence by establishing immigration policies that favored Cuban immigration and supplied federal support for their resettlement. However, these measures were not only due to the U.S.’s contentious relationship with the Cuban state, but were also the results of the Cold War and Kennedy and Johnson’s obsession with the USSR – all of which were connected and laid the groundwork for a unique circumstance for Cuban émigrés in compared to other Latina/o immigrants. The U.S. drafted new immigration laws and devised the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP), which Maria Cristina Garcia described as “the most comprehensive refugee assistance program in American immigration history.” The CRP supported the incorporation of newly arrived Cubans with professional retraining and vocational programs and brought in millions of dollars into the local economy. The contentious relations between Cuba and the U.S. continue to mount and hit an apogee with the Bay of Pigs invasion in April of 1961 that could only be rivaled by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The insurgency against the Castro regime was orchestrated by the CIA and executed by the Cuban exile military force Brigade 2506. The operation was to place an exile-formed government into power. Its failure, however, accelerated the Cuban exodus along with the formation and reestablishment of anti-Castro groups in South Florida.

The Formation of the Truth About Cuba Committee

36 Ibid., 2.
On June 30, 1961, the Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. was legally incorporated in Miami, Florida as a non-profit and registered with the Federal Justice and Treasury Department. The TACC asserted that of their sustaining members 60% were Cuban and 39% were “American,” with the remaining from other nations. The Committee had chapters in different cities in the U.S., Puerto Rico, and in a few other nations. The founders of the TACC included a business administrator, an executive, an accountant, a lawyer, and a professor. Initially, they were financially supported entirely by personal donations from Cuban expatriates and anti-communist Americans, which were common in this era. The Committee proudly claimed no governmental funding, which was their attempt to avoid any support “that could hamper or constrain the Committee.” However, they were for “short periods” underwritten by the Lilly Foundation and the Bacardi Corporation. The connection to the latter was through Jorge Bosch, the vice president of the TACC, who was also the vice president of Bacardi Cooperation in San Juan, Puerto Rico and the executive director of the Bacardi Corporation in México, Brazil, and the Bahamas. As part of one of two families that ran the Bacardi empire, Bosch received an elite education overseas much like the rest of the leaders of the TACC.

The seven founding members – Luis V. Manrara, Jorge Bosch, James D. Baker, Fermin F. Peinado, Jorge Castellanos, Kenneth D. Campbell, and Jack F. Everhart – were highly educated for the era and attended some of the most prestigious American institutions such as Harvard University, Yale University, University of Chicago, and the California Institute of

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38 Luis V. Manrara, *The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc: Its Motives, Organization and Goals*, (Box 118), September 22, 1988, 2, TACCR.
39 Ibid., 2.
41 Truth About Cuba Committee, *Directors and Officers: Biographical Data*, (Box 9, Folder 4), TACCR. The Bacardi family were embroiled in the politics surrounding the Revolution. Initially supportive, when the Cuban state turned to Marxism-Leninism they turned against the Revolution and Bacardi’s leading figure, José “Pepin” Bosch, united exile groups against the Castro regime. Tom Gjelten, *Bacardi and the Long Fight for Cuba: the Biography of a Cause*. (New York: Viking, 2008.)
Technology. Their resumes also included internationally known schools, such as University of Madrid, University of Paris (Sorbonne), and, of course, University of Havana. Many of the leaders were also members of private organizations in Cuba like country and rotary clubs, foundations, and institutions, several with American affiliations. These institutions were largely inaccessible to people with marginalized backgrounds and these memberships further reveals the founders of the TACC’s social position and cultural capital on the island. For instance, the Havana Yacht Club, of which Luis V. Manrara was a member of, for years restricted Blacks and the lower-classes from entering. Elite social clubs like the Havana Yacht Club were called “upper-class bulwarks” for fortifying themselves against the lower socioeconomic strata in Cuba. Their educational, cultural, social, and professional training (along with their upbringings) served the TACC well when emboldening middle to upper-class U.S. news professionals, U.S. officials, and organization leaders to take anti-Cuban government positions.

More than any other member, Manrara was the leading spokesperson for the TACC; he appeared on radio and television programs, conferences, speeches, and participated in debates and interviews with prominent figures. In 1988, recalling his role, Manrara noted:

I estimate I gave 600 talks comprising of interviews to radio, television, magazines and newspapers. The talks were given free, upon invitation, to civic clubs, churches of various denominations, schools, colleges and universities, etc. I also participated as lecturer in seminars and symposiums which extended from Manitou Springs, Colorado, USA, to the Republic of South Africa. Occasionally an honorarium was offered in such cases they were donated by me to the Committee.

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42 Truth About Cuba Committee, Directors and Officers: Biographical Data, (Box 9, Folder 4), TACCR.
43 Truth About Cuba Committee, Directors and Officers: Biographical Data, (Box 9, Folder 4), TACCR.
44 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba, (The University of North Carolina, Press, 2001), 272.
Indeed, the extensive records on Manrara corroborate these claims while also making clear his devotion. Manrara was instrumental to the non-profit and served full-time for 10 years until December 15, 1971, when he stepped down for medical reasons. He was succeeded by Rafael Pérez-Doreste. However, the TACC disbanded just a few years after. It would not be a stretch to suggest that the TACC’s existence was heavily dependent on Manrara’s incumbency. Manrara authored nearly all of the TACC’s literature and all of the lengthier pieces, led their major campaigns like the one against the National Educational Television (NET) network, and personally sustained relationships with Americans in prominent positions to feed them information about developments in Cuba. After the TACC saw its end, Manrara faithfully continued their work; however, at a reduced capacity. He corresponded with U.S. authorities, media professionals, organizations’ leaders, and educators and continued to point them against the Castro regime. Parsing Manrara’s activist goals and strategies from that of the TACC is not only challenging but unproductive; their media activism was co-constitutive and their worldviews, values, and ideals were indistinguishable.

Like any other activist group, the TACC had a vision of the world they would have liked to come to fruition. Like many Cubans in the U.S., the TACC had complete faith in democracy; however, they did not specify what that meant. The TACC did, however, specify their admiration for Cuba’s well-regarded 1940 Constitution. This document made an attempt, after the Cuban Revolution of 1933, to be a more progressive and modern nation, one that was heavily influenced by Cuba’s perception of U.S. modernity. Manrara claimed that the constitution was evidence that the Revolution of 1959 did not dismantle economic oppression since, “Cuba’s 1940 Constitution was one of the most advanced in the world in protecting labor. Many labor

48 Cuban exiles expressed a variety of visions for the type of democracy they prefer. García, Havana USA, 1996.
benefits which are not even dreamed of in other countries, including the United States, were actually embedded in the Cuban Constitution of 1940, a technical monstrosity but, nevertheless, a reality.” Of course, written promises like constitutions do not equate to “reality.” Connected to democratic aspirations, the TACC was also a defender of Western society, capitalism, Christianity, and “decency,” all of which were thought of as pillars to a prosperous future yet were placed in jeopardy by communism.

The TACC identified international communism as the biggest problem facing the world and, of course, connected this issue with Cuba’s plights. In their writings, speeches, and media appearances the TACC posited or explicitly stated three foundational points. First, Cuba is a neocolony taken over by international communists, which is spreading geographically to other parts of the Americas endangering the U.S. Second, the Cuban state, led by Castro, is an authoritarian regime that lacked any freedoms for Cubans. Third, the communists’ strongest weapon is manipulation or, as they phrased it, psychological warfare, and this is both a national and international endeavor.

The first of their “truisms” remarkably argues against neocolonialism (much like the Revolution); however, they identify different colonizers and allies. A pillar of the Revolution’s legitimacy was resisting the U.S. empire and treating the Soviet Union as allies, while the TACC argued the opposite. In short, the TACC would argue that the Soviet Union, in cahoots with the Castro regime, established Cuba’s status as a neocolony. Manrara states accordingly: “The regime which controls Cuba today is, without the shade of a doubt, by their own admission and by their deeds, socialist or communist – two sides of the same coin – permanently and inextricably incorporated in Soviet Russia’s neo-colonial empire.”

Cuba was not only a colony

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49 Manrara, Life Line, Box 121, Folder 27, 2, TACCR.
50 Luis V. Manrara, An Exposé on the Insidious Film... ‘Three Faces of Cuba’, 61.
but a node for the distribution of communist propaganda. In an early pamphlet, the TACC reported that “A steady avalanche of propaganda materials is distributed from Cuba to other Latin American countries through Cuban State Department channels.” An apt analogy for the Cold War since it taps into the discourse of communist containment, while at the same time speaks to the specificity of TACC’s rhetoric, namely, that communism (the preverbal snow) is a foreign (Russian) imposition on a tropical nation.

What must be done against this dissemination of propaganda? According to a reoccurring footer in many of the TACC’s letters, “THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNISM IS KNOWLEDGE OF ITS METHODS” (their emphasis). The TACC identified communist propaganda, what they sometimes referred to as “psychological warfare” (which will be further examined in chapter two), as the preeminent threat to the world and the United States. The TACC also believed that this propaganda had already infiltrated the U.S. in programs like the television documentary *Three Faces of Cuba* (1965). Identifying the problem, the TACC offered solutions.

As made obvious by their name, the TACC focused their efforts on the production and dissemination of the “truth about Cuba” for, what they claimed to be, the safety of the American people. In one of their introductory pamphlets, the TACC states: “It is the opinion of The Truth About Cuba Committee that Americans need accurate information regarding events in Cuba and the Communist methods employed there.” The TACC’s legal and founding documents suggests the same: “According to the Articles of Incorporation, the general nature and purpose for which the TACC was organized were: (verbatim) a) To establish a non-political Christian organization to disseminate information to the citizens of the United States of America as to the effect of the

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51 Truth About Cuba Committee, *Objectives and Plans* (Box 9, Folder), September 1961, 5, TACCR.
52 For example, Luis V. Manrara, “Letter from Manrara to librarians,” December 13, 1966, TACCR.
53 Truth About Cuba Committee, *Objectives and Plans*, 1961, 1, TACCR.
pro-communist government in Cuba.”54 Others picked up on this as well, one of the initial archivists of the TACC’s collection wrote in the late-1980s: “Confronted with the incredible situation, a small group of Cuban exiles realized that the American people needed to learn the truth of what was happening in Cuba, as well as, the danger this represented to the security of the United States.”55 The Committee did legitimately care about the safety of the U.S. from communism, but this position was self-serving.

The TACC played on the U.S.’s anxiety over communist infiltration. Their rhetoric of protection garnered support from Americans; the Committee’s watchdog identity encouraged Americans to consider positions against the Cuban state. Additionally, the TACC unwittingly played on popular U.S. presumptions of nationality, ethnicity, and race; namely that the Committee’s national identity innately made them experts of Cuba. Such notions allowed the TACC to operate as representatives of all Cubans, both on and off the island. This maneuver, intentional or not, is an essential component of activism.

Prevailing in its assumptions and enduring in its utility, there exists an unquestioned notion that activist and advocacy groups represent the entirety of (or at the very least a large part of) their respective political or social population. In fact, it is fundamental to the success of activism that to the public, institutions, other organizations, and the state activist organizations appear to speak for a larger population. This assumption seems to only ossify in popular memory as time passes, while historians attempt to complicate that narrative.56 This tactic was not necessarily posturing for the TACC; they believed that they, indeed, represented all Cubans.

54 TACC 1961c, p. 2.
56 Angela D. Dillard has given numerous campus talks on the Black social activism and conservatism at the University of Michigan. She complicates the historical memory of the Civil Rights lead by groups that were uncontested by African-Americans. Black separatists like the Nation of Islam and Malcolm X is a notable departure from the more popular Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dillard’s Civil Rights Conservatism is currently under contract with University of California Press.
The Committee went as far as to suggest that Cubans that disagreed with them were brainwashed by communists and put into question their Cubanidad (the varying and non-essentialized attributes of being Cuban). The TACC suggested and helped to strengthen the notion that there was a singular and objective relation to Cuban authority: that of first wavers. Other relations, regardless of social positioning and identity, were erroneously subjective and thus should be subservient to their position.

In a sense, the TACC performed a “spectacle of unity;” that is to say, to Americans the TACC presented themselves and their émigré community as unified against the Castro regime. The TACC gave English-speakers the image of a politically and socially monolithic Cuban exile community without internal politics, polemics, or conflict. In short, the in-group was not the target demographic. The TACC aimed their anti-Castro message to Americans and they were able to spread that message by tapping into more extensive networks than their own.

**Chapter Organization**

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one proffer a sketch of the historical and geopolitical contexts to the TACC’s establishment and activism. Using secondary sources, this chapter covers the Cuban Revolution, the contentious relations between Cuba and the U.S., the four waves of Cuban migration, and their resettlement. These circumstances structured the formation of the TACC and their activist strategies while the Bay Pigs invasion directly sparked the founding of the TACC. This chapter aims to be an overview that lays the groundwork for the rest of the dissertation, which covers original work.

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57 Here I borrow from the conceptual categories of Broadcasting Modernity applied to Cuba and its television from Yeidy M. Rivero. However, here it is on a much smaller scale (the TACC and their ethnic community) and performed solely for an American audience. See Rivero, *Broadcasting Modernity*, 2015.

58 This can be seen throughout the TACC’s public appearances and rhetoric.
Chapter two covers the TACC’s evaluation and theorizations of the television documentary *Three Faces of Cuba* (1965) in their self-published book, *An Exposé on the Insidious Film... ‘Three Faces of Cuba’.* This work was an attempt to use media reception and the evaluations of three propaganda experts as an avenue for their activism by emboldening U.S. authorities. The TACC sought to pit U.S. officials against *Three Faces of Cuba* via the distribution of *An Exposé*. The TACC urged U.S. authorities with anti-communist affinities to act like a regulatory body and intervene in the broadcasting of *Three Faces of Cuba* and to investigate the makers of these television programs, the National Educational Television (NET). This tactic was at the center of the TACC’s campaign against NET. As media reception, *An Exposé* also provides a window into their transnational interpretive strategies that not only speaks to their exilic experience but that of first- and second-wavers.

Chapter three expands chapter two’s scope by tracking the TACC’s efforts to publicly refute the NET’s television documentary. To do so, the TACC established coalitions with fellow exile groups like Association of Cuban Exiles of St. Petersburg and likeminded U.S. conservatives, like the director of the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, Paul D. Bethel. Not without its challenges, their collective efforts included regional television and radio appearances and sending *An Exposé* to the press, periodicals, institutions of learning, and libraries. These efforts were animated by the hope of turning audiences against *Three Faces of Cuba*, NET, and the Castro regime.

The fourth chapter shifts the discussion from the TACC’s contentious activism to their more persuasive tactics to influence media in their favor. The TACC swayed South Floridian news coverage against the Castro regime with direct appeals to broadcasting stations. Members of the TACC established correspondences and sustained rapport with news professionals through the postal service, phone conversations, and in-person meetings. As a result, the regional news
industry shifted towards expression of anti-Castro regime sentiments in their coverage of Cuba and the Revolution. The TACC’s influence of the news landscape was indebted to, I posit, the TACC’s high propinquity with news professionals. Applicable in its dual meaning, the TACC shared a class-based kinship with U.S. news media professionals and the TACC headquarters were in close geographical proximity to broadcast stations. The TACC mobilized the remaining facets of their cultural capital, their shared identities with media professionals, and physical proximity to broadcast stations in order to pit the regional news media industry (and by extension their audience) against the Revolution.

Lastly, Chapter five covers the TACC’s propaganda and its dissemination to news professionals; U.S. officials and institutions; political, cultural, and religious organizations; and institutions of education and libraries. In doing so, the TACC compelled these groups to wield their authority against the Revolution. More than any other, this chapter is a microcosm of the entire dissertation; chapter five encapsulates the structure and strategies of the TACC’s media activism, however, with a focus on the dissemination of their propaganda. Using their literature, the TACC compelled Americans in prominent positions to exercise their influence and further disseminate the TACC’s anti-Castro message, implement a harsher foreign policy against the Cuban state, or interfere in pro-Revolution broadcasting. Like most of their endeavors, the TACC had no efficient means to reach large groups of Americans. Therefore, the Committee tapped into wider distribution networks in order to amplify their message and reach a large population.
CHAPTER ONE
The Making of Cuban Exile Media Activism:
Historical, Political, and Cultural Context of the Truth About Cuba Committee

This chapter provides the context to the Truth About Cuba Committee (TACC) with secondary sources, while eschewing the long-standing ideological divides between the U.S. and Cuba particularly as represented in popular discourse, scholarship, and media. It is with this guiding principle that I provide a brief sketch of the historical, geopolitical, and cultural contexts to the TACC’s establishment and activities from 1961 to 1975. The chapter pays particular attention to U.S.-Cuba relations and Cuban diaspora and resettlement. To that end, this chapter will begin with the turbulent 1950s Cuba and the factors that lead to the Cuban Revolution of 1959. This will be followed by the contentious geopolitics between the governments of the U.S. and Cuba that helped to engender immigration policy directed towards Cubans. The resettlement of South Florida and the formation of an ethnic enclave will then be covered, followed by a closer look at the TACC’s leaders.

A Decade of Political Turmoil

The 1950s was a particularly challenging time for Cuba in an already fraught history. The island saw the demise of the highly anticipated and herald 1940s constitution after the 1952 military coup led by the former president turned dictator Fulgencio Batista. His regime increased political radicalization, the discrepancy of wealth, and social strife as well as limited

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political and civil liberties. While narratives propagated by the Cuban state regarded him as a U.S. puppet, Batista had become intractable for Washington. U.S. authorities were particularly displeased with his continued cooperation with Cuban communists – a fact that does not neatly fit within the narratives of the Cuban state nor Cuban exiles. Growing tired of Batista, the U.S. condoned regime change on the island and sought not to interfere in the many uprisings. Although, the U.S. did imposed an arms band that hurt Batista’s armed forces in 1958.\textsuperscript{60} 1950s Cuba was an incubator for organized resistance; revolutionary and activist groups formed and worked against the Batista regime like Fidel Castro’s 26\textsuperscript{th} of July Movement. Universities and college were particularly a hotbed for opposition. One of the more prominent groups was the student organization Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directorate, DRE) from Havana University, which would later play a supporting role in Castro’s insurrection (see figure 2).

The 26\textsuperscript{th} of July Movement and Castro were previously exiled to Mexico and, in the mid-1950s, organized with other Cuban political exiles. Castro meet the Argentinean medical physician, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, and planned their voyage to the Sierra Maestra. It was here, in the mountain range in the most Southernmost part of Cuba, that they began their assault with guerrilla warfare tactics unlike their contemporaries, many of which fought in cities and less rural terrain. The official state narrative credits this decision for their success and regarded the mission sanctified by the Cuban patriot Jose Martí, who was martyred in the 1898 War of

\textsuperscript{60} Argote-Freyre, “In Search of Fulgencio Batista,” 2001.
Independence while post-1959 Cuban exile regarded the Martí-Revolution alignment as appropriation. In reality, the 26th of July Movement were able to outlast many of their insurgent contemporaries by engaging in guerrilla tactics in a tortuous terrain. As other groups were defeated by Batista’s forces, groups like the DRE joined the 26th of July Movement since they were still intact and Castro was well-known. Castro and his commanders (his brother Raul Castro, Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos, and Huber Matos) traveled the length of the island from the southeast to the northwest gathering local and national support along the way.

The 26th of July Movement gained support from other rebel groups, the communist party, and Cuban citizens, and greatly strengthened their military capabilities when they highjacked a train with military supplies. The revolutionaries gain traction and overcame Batista’s strongholds throughout the island. They took or freed (depending on your position) the cities of Yaguajay and Santa Clara, which were essential victories. Before the revolutionaries could take the fight to Havana, Batista absconded to the Dominican Republic. The Cuban Revolution came to an end in January of 1959 and the Cuban exodus commenced. A year later, the Cuban state’s official narrative stated that Cuba underwent a Marxist revolution and that the state was Marxist-Leninist, which then accelerated the diaspora.

**Cuban-U.S. Geopolitics and Cuban-USSR Relations**

While U.S. leaders condone the 1959 Revolution, they were wary of Castro and the installation of the revolutionary government. The Castro regime implemented agrarian reforms and expropriated foreign ownership and domestic property. Acts such as this in Latin America have historically been read as having communist intensions by Washington. Making matters

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61 Enrico M. Sant, “José Martí and the Cuban Revolution/ José Martí y La Revolución Cubana.” *Cuban Studies*, vol. 16, 1986, 139.

worse, President Dwight D. Eisenhower snubbed Castro by not meeting with him during a tour of the U.S. in 1959. Eisenhower opted to go golfing instead and sent Vice President Richard Nixon. In his memoirs, Nixon noted that Castro was “either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline.” Later, U.S. authorities would then restrict U.S. industrial processing plants from refining Soviet oil for Cuba, despite their owners’ willingness. Cuba then nationalized the foreign refineries, and Eisenhower retaliated by cutting sugar quota from the U.S. market and eventually the U.S. placed an embargo, that included their allies, against Cuba. The embargo was a massive blow for Cuba since the island-nation for years operated as a monoculture and were rebuilding after 1959. In the midst of all of this, Cuba began to strengthen ties with the USSR.

The Soviet Union pledged to purchase the full quality of the U.S.’s quota despite already possessing huge quantities of sugar. Cuba allied with the USSR, which correlated with Castro’s 1961 announcement that he was a Marxist-Leninist and so was the state. No elections took place, property and land were confiscated, and the Catholic Church was silenced for their opposition to the Revolution. Notwithstanding national cinema, print news, radio, and television became part of the state apparatus. These events accelerated the Cuban exodus and many developed resettlement based on irredentism since exiles believed this to be a passing circumstance.

68 Cinema was a special case because Cuba national film institute held an unprecedented level of autonomy due to their privileged relationship with Cuban authorities. See Michael Chanan, *Cuban Cinema* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2004), 17-18.
Under the authority of President Eisenhower, the Central Intelligence Agency organized, trained, and equipped a Cuban exile military to invade Cuba with the expectation of placing a “government-in-exile” in power. The effort was formed from different émigré fractions and their military force, Brigade 2506, was trained in Nicaragua, Panama, and Guatemala. Authorities in the U.S. sought to have the invasion led by Cubans from the beginning and with minimal support by the U.S. government. While commenters have pointed to many reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion on 17 April 1961, Maria Cristina García pinpointed the crux of their failure: “Misunderstandings over the nature of this [U.S.] support ultimately contributed to the invasion’s failure.”

García outlines the ways in which the mission was bound for failure by pointing out that the Brigade 2506 had inadequate equipment for landing and battling on the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs), counterrevolutionary groups in Cuba were not coordinated at the time of the invasion, and the Brigade 2506 was not informed that President Kennedy canceled the American air cover. To make matters worse, not only did the Cuban community in South Florida circulate rumors of the invasion but the press reported that it would happen months before it took place, giving the Cuban military ample time to prepare. The common view among exiles was that President Kennedy was to blame for the invasion’s failure; the president’s betrayal was a shared sentiment in the community. After the Cuban military’s victory, the captured exiles were ransomed to the U.S. and the Cuban community, and the Revolution gained not only $53 million in materials goods but also further solidify popular support among Cuban citizens. In their plight, Cuban exiles felt that Kennedy and Castro were not the only ones to blame, however.

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71 Ibid., 31.
72 Ibid., 32.
The more Cuban-USSR relations strengthen the more Cuban exiles felt that the island was under the control of communists in Moscow; for instance, members of the TACC went as far as to refer to the Soviet Union as *imperialismo-Ruso-comunista* (Communist-Russian-Imperialism).[^73] However, on the spectrum of sovereign and colony, Cuba’s agency oscillated between the extremes. Before the Five Grey Years in the early-1970s when Moscow had a tight grip on the island-nation, Cuba enjoyed far more agency than other nations and regions under the control of the Soviet Union.[^74] Cuba also gained economic and military aid; in other words, economic security and protection from the U.S. The exporting of sugar and importing of crude oil alone was monumental for Cuba. Leaders behind the Iron Curtain also gained advantages: they acquired a military base in the crown jewel of the Caribbean; Cuba has been a prized strategic territory for metropoles since the colonial era because of its centrality in the Americas. These advantageous came with a price when the Cuban leadership was left out of agreements between the U.S. and the USSR that affected the island.

For the USSR, Cuba was a military station that could threaten aggressive measures and surveil the U.S. much like the U.S. had with their military bases in Italy and Turkey against the Soviet Union. However, conflict ensued when the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, placed nuclear missiles in Cuba. Castro welcomed the nuclear weapons to gain further protection from U.S. invasion and to, literally, parade Cuba’s military with the new weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted twelve days in October of 1962 and ended due to secret proxy negotiations between USSR and U.S. leadership. The exclusion of

[^73]: Luis V. Manrrara, *Renuncia Al Gobierno Invasor Cubano*, (Box 13, Folder 9), TACCR.
Cuban leadership angered Castro. The two superpowers agreed to remove their ballistic nuclear missiles; the USSR would remove theirs from Cuba while the U.S. would do the same in Italy and Turkey. The only consolation that Cuba received was a U.S. agreement that they would never invade the island-nation unless directly provoked. As late as 1968, however, the TACC claimed that there were still missiles in Cuba, which conservative periodicals used as evidence to indict the Castro regime, the USSR, and the Kennedy/Johnson admiration. At this time, the Cuban exodus was well underway and their migration turned into irredentism as soon as they landed.

Irredentism and An Ethnic Enclave

Many anti-Castro groups formed after the failure of the Bay of Pigs in South Florida much like the TACC or continued in exile adding “en Exilio” to their original names. The TACC and their and cohort of Cuban organizations unknowingly contributed to a well-established geographical legacy of resistance. South Florida was a haven for political and military opposition to Cuban authorities in Havana. For example, well before the Revolution ousted Fulgencio Batista, South Florida was a sanctuary for those that opposed Spanish rule during the Cuban War of Independence in 1895. Likewise, during the 1950s, Miami was “a place where political manifestos were issued and revolutionary pact signed.” Cuban exiles and revolutionaries could conspire against or wait out Cuban authorities from relatively close by and in a city that the middle and upper-class Cubans were familiar with due to their travels. That the TACC and other anti-Castro political groups would form or reestablish in South Florida is unsurprising; the

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75 Khrushchev made up for the betrayal of Cuba, however, did so largely symbolically. Castro and other Cuban leaders were invested to Moscow, given a parade, and Castro, on 23 May 1963, was honored the Hero of the Soviet Union (the nation’s highest honor) and the Order of Lenin.
76 Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
77 Ibid., 99.
78 Ibid., 99.
hostility between Cuban exiles and the Cuban state after 1959 was yet another iteration in a historical pattern that exists today.

In some ways the political milieu of the 1950s was continued in the 1960s making South Florida an incubator for organized activism, resistance, and militancy from émigré. Some anti-Castro groups initially supported the Revolution but then were exiled and reorganized in the U.S. One important example was the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directorate, DRE), who was instrumental in the insurrection and were established on the island with students from the University of Havana and led by José Antonio Echevarría. The organization was a significant contributor to the Cuban Revolution; however, many students were subsequently exiled, and thus the group reestablished in Miami with the goal of “foment[ing] clandestine movements against the communist ideology of the Revolution.” To that end, the DRE made trips to the island during a time when communism’s role in Cuba was still up for debate until 1961. The group engaged in radical activity that ranged from terrorism and sabotage to the distribution propaganda, as well as campaigns to save political prisoners. The DRE were contributors to the Bay of Pigs invasion and worked with the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC). With the assistance of the FBI, the CRC functioned as a conduit between the DRE and U.S. officials during the time leading up to the Bay of Pigs Invasion.

Another example was Comité Ejecutivo del Frente Revolucionario Democrático which descended from the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD, Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front) from Cuba. They were led by the leaders of five major anti-Castro groups, and their

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79 During the revolution the specificity of what would be established after the Fulgencio dictatorship was vague which helped to unit insurrection groups and general resistance to the Cuban government.
80 en el Exilio
82 Ibid.
primary goal was to establish democracy in Cuba through military force. The FRD was established in Mexico with members recruited in Miami. Their radio broadcast station program “Por Cuba y Para Cuba” was directed by one of their founders: Andrés Vargas Gómez. Gómez later returned to Cuba and was subsequently jailed for twenty-one years for his part in the Bay of Pigs Invasion. These various organizations favored the ‘immediate war’ but some groups took extreme measures.

Terrorist groups like Alpha 66 and Omen 7 put up a continuous assault against the Cuban state including their best hopes of assassinating Castro. Groups such as these hijacked aircrafts, attacked pro-Castro speakers at events, and plotted the assassination of Cuban authorities. Alpha 66 and Omen 7, among others, united under the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations and bombed Cubana de Aviación (Flight 455) killing everyone on the plane. Terrorism were also directed at fellow Cuban exiles that did not toe the line. José Quiroga comments likewise: “Terrorism was the means by which the Patria o Muerte [the Cuban national] slogan was understood by el exilio, as it staged a war within itself and against the Cuban government. No dissidence was tolerated on either side.” In regards to this internal conflict, what Quiroga called the “Cuban civil wars,” from 1973-1976 one hundred bombs exploded in the Miami area. Motivated by absolution and sectarianism, terrorism was directed

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89 Ibid., 824.
90 Ibid., 824.
at those that facilitated any form of reconciliation with the Cuban state. Such was the fate of Viajes Varadero in Puerto Rico who organized Cuban exiles’ trip to Cuba.\(^91\)

The Cuban civil wars occurred during a watershed moment in the émigré community in the 1970s. Michael J. Bustamante expands: “As hopes of returning to the island fizzled away and a new generation came of age, pressures toward assimilation coupled with the rise of detente conspired to unleash a wave of not only intra-communal polemic, but also domestic and international violence.”\(^92\)

Representative of this liminal moment, the Agrupación Abdala (1968-1986) operated during this period and (unlike the other well-established anti-Castro groups) was staunchly against U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs (see figure 3).\(^93\) They also felt that previous groups and their attempts to end the Castro regime were antiquated, which was telling of their age compared to the older and more established exile organization. Abdala serves as a window into this particular time in Cuban exile politics. According to Bustamante, their position came from a tripartite influence: “the dilemmas of the detente era; alleged betrayals of U.S. leadership; and the group’s knowledge of the violent, arguably terroristic actions that had characterized Cuban insurgent politics in the 1950s.”\(^94\) Their activity ranged from acts of civil disobedience, for example, chaining themselves to furniture in

\(^{91}\) Ibid., 824.
\(^{92}\) Bustamante, “Anti-Communist Anti-Imperialism?,” 72.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., 71.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., 84.
the chambers of the Security Council, to calculated acts of violence. With seemingly countless émigré organizations, the TACC utilized coalitions to achieve their goals.

The TACC worked with cultural organizations and civic clubs that also participated in activism of their own, although they were not always centered or founded on those activities. Groups like the Association of Cuban Exiles of St. Petersburg (ACESP) and the Committee Pro Cuba Liberation (CPCL) mounted campaigns against the Castro regime with the help of the TACC, as we will see in Chapter Three. However, not all cooperative efforts went smoothly.

Similar to the TACC, the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba (CCFC) focused their energies on the distribution of information. Led by a former Press Attaché and Director of Public Relations for the U.S. in Cuba, Paul D. Bethel, the CCFC was made up of mostly white Americans and some Cubans. Due to the similarities in their organization and location in South Florida, Bethel and Luis V. Manrara frequently crossed paths. On more than one occasion, Bethel displayed a paternalism and hubris in his convictions about how to conduct anti-Castro activism; Bethel expressed the belief that he, more than Cuban exiles, could represent the case against the Castro regime.

Contrasting the TACC and the CCFC, the advocacy group Fair Play for Cuba Committee supported the Revolution and opposed U.S. involvement in Cuba. They disagreed with the U.S. governments’ involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion and Washington’s embargo against the island. The group became notorious when links were made between them and Lee Harvey Oswald, Kennedy’s assassin.95

Covered in this chapter were just a few of the many anti-Castro groups during the 1960s and 1970s. It was a common occurrence to form anti-Cuban state groups in the early years of the Revolution when the hope of returning was high. Even with the many organizations in this

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95 Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Appendix 13 1964, 728.
period, the TACC managed to be “a major anti-Castro organization.” They were able to do so despite the fact that they eschewed the ‘immediate war’ in favor of creating, distributing, and managing information about Cuba, which would lead to U.S. intervention, from their logic. In terms of the inter-communal polemics, the TACC’s rhetoric, public appearances, and writing made every attempts to veil the inner conflict of the Cuban exile community to Americans. The TACC represented themselves and their enclave as united under one noble cause; “The purposeful, singular outlook of Cubans in Miami was prompted by survival needs and was consistent with an irredentist ideology.”

Resettlement and an Ethnic Enclave

New immigration policies and the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP), the most wide-ranging assistance program in U.S. history, assuaged émigré resettlement throughout the U.S. but especially in South Florida. The Kennedy administration established the CRP, provided funds for resettlement, and programs for exiles; García explains that this included, “monthly relief checks, health services, job training, adult educational opportunities and surplus food distribution (canned meat, powdered eggs and milk, cheese, and oatmeal, among other food products).” The CRP was a conduit for the Kennedy administration to pumped millions of dollars into the local economy, provided vocational and professional retraining programs, and provide aid so that more Cubans could attend institutions of higher education.

The irony here is that while the Eisenhower administration may have established the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in downtown Miami, they provided no direct financial help to the Cuban community. The Kennedy administration, on the other hand, provided the most in

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99 Ibid., 23.
U.S. immigrant history; however, he was loathed in the Cuban community because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs.\textsuperscript{100} In addition to the federal help, Cuban exiles benefited from the donations and services of Christian organizations as well as from pre-1959 Cuban immigrants (places like Tampa and Key West had established Cuban communities albeit smaller than post-1959). U.S.-Cuba geopolitics engendered a unique political and privileged position for Cuban exiles in comparison to their immigrant counterparts.

Such a welcome was unprecedented in U.S. immigration history. Waves of immigrants to the U.S. were not afforded the same advantages, for example, Dominicans (1960-), Salvadorians (1980-), Argentines, (1950-), Haitians (1979-83), Cambodian, Chinese, and Vietnamese refugees (1975-), and Koreans (1965-).\textsuperscript{101} Sociologists Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou suggested that “Cuban Refugees of 1960-1980” faced the least resistance on the road to integration (and economic and political prosperity) than their immigrant counterparts, including the Cuban exiles that proceeded and followed.\textsuperscript{102}

Émigrés viewed their stay as temporary; however, the longer they stayed the more Cubans put down roots and, from the 1960s-1970s, formed one of the most well-known ethnic enclaves. In their resettlement, Cubans also sought to maintain their pre-1959 culture. They established businesses, alternative schools, and formed religious groups as well as cultural, social, and political organizations and civic clubs. The reestablishing of organizations and groups into the U.S. was very common and, in fact, 114 out of the 157 municipios (municipals) that divided pre-Revolution Cuba were reestablished in exile. All of which made attempts at preserving pre-1959 Cuba and were fueled by a deep desire to sustain their Cubanidad (the

\textsuperscript{100} Havana USA
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 84.
varying and non-essentialized attributes of being Cuban). Cubans organized community events, seminars on the island-nation, recreational sports, beauty pageants like “Miss Cuba Libre,” created cultural productions like the play *Añorada Cuba* (*Yearning for Cuba*) that celebrated a pre-Revolution Cuba, and organized anti-Castro protests.\textsuperscript{103} Having its roots in Cuba, media played a significant role in the formation of the émigré community.

Radio was the most prevalent medium among émigrés in South Florida; María Cristina García stated that “Of the various Spanish-language media in south Florida, radio had by far the largest audience and the greatest influence.”\textsuperscript{104} In Cuba, they routinely tuned into radio for news and entertainment, which was made possible because in the “1940s Cuban radio attained a high level of professionalism.”\textsuperscript{105} In greater Miami, the first two Spanish-language stations were WFAB “La Fabulosa” (The Fabulous One) and WQBA “La Cubanísima” (The Most Cuban).\textsuperscript{106} English-based stations began to recognize the regional demographic change and incorporated a few Spanish-language programs such as Manolo Reyes’ *News En Español* (news in Spanish) on Channel 4.\textsuperscript{107} Spanish-language television was originally isolated to Channel 23 WAJA-TV, which was independently owned until 1971 when it was sold to the Spanish International Network, which was later renamed Univision. The many radio and television programs helped to shape and sustain a sense of community.

\textsuperscript{103} https://merrick.library.miami.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/chc0218/id/3340/rec/3
\textsuperscript{106} Originally WMIE-AM, the station was later renamed WQBA “La Cubanísima” (The Most Cuban). In their respective studies, María Cristina García and Christine Lohmeier differ on which of the two stations, WFAB or WQBA, was the first and second Spanish-language radio station in South Florida. García, *Havana USA*, 1996, 106. Lohmeier, *Cuban Americans and the Miami Media*, 2014, 70.
\textsuperscript{107} Manolo Reyes’ news program was credited to being the first Spanish-Language station and Reyes credited Ralph Renick (the vice president of news, news director, and news anchor) for helping him establish the program.
The geopolitics, irredentism, and Cold War polemics surrounding Cubans of the 1960s and 1970s has overshadowed the cultural and popular facets of their Cuban community in U.S. discourses. Scholarship is guilty of doing the same by reducing Cuban exile culture to a wretched existence; Albert Sergio Laguna notes “most scholarship on Cuban America equated exile with melancholy, anger, and bitterness.” However, by examining stand-up comedy, radio and television programs, and festivals like Añorada Cuba (connected to the play of the same name), and comedians traveling between Cuba and South Florida, Laguna challenges the bleak understanding of exile, disrupts antiquated Cold War logics, and widens our conceptualization of Cubanidad. Conversely, the TACC speaks directly to the wounds of their émigré community and the TACC’s advocacy hinged on furthering that image, not only in South Florida but across the U.S. Along these lines, Cuban musicians, social clubs, and other cultural expression occupied spaces in New York City and Miami before and after 1959.

Christina D. Abreu’s examines this very phenomenon and the role of race in the performances and experiences of Black and white Cuban performers. The field’s turn to Afro-Cuban diaspora has revealed the Afro-Cuban communities that existed before 1959 in New York City, Tampa Florida, and other parts of South Florida. It also documented how their later generations encountered first and second wavers in the U.S. Periodization and region has always been central in limiting the scope of projects in Cuban Diasporic Studies. Cuban music, however, has alluded these boundaries. Mambo, for instance, circulated between New York,

Mexico, Jim Crow South, and California.\textsuperscript{112} Other Cuban genres and musical performers, Alexandra T. Vazquez explains, also reached Havana and New Orleans in their transnational travels.

It was been noted that the early, idealistic years of the Revolution engendered high levels of devotion among many Cubans that stayed; however, the efforts to sustain Cuban culture in South Florida displayed the same level of dedication among the Cubans that left. The preservation of \textit{Cubanidad} was supported by an ethnic enclave economy. Along with the aforementioned assistance, the formation of a business community among Cuban exiles was due to two class-based factors. García clarifies: “Two factors contributed to the Cubans’ creation of a viable economic enclave: their middle-class values and entrepreneurial skills, which transferred readily across borders.”\textsuperscript{113} These values and skills were particularly transferable to the U.S. because during the Cuban Republic (1901-1959) the island was folded into the U.S. capitalistic system when Cuba switched imperial hands from Spain to the U.S after 1898. Cubans established numerous small and large businesses and employed follow exiles, the latter being what some scholars have regarded as essential for an ethnic enclave economy.\textsuperscript{114} This was made possible by not only federal assistance that aided the local economy but loans from small banks that were owned by Cubans and other Latinas/os.\textsuperscript{115} This is while Cuban exiles had access to funds via the Small Business Administration and major banks lent money to wealthier Cubans without collateral.

Despite the fact that the early waves of Cuban exiles revitalized the local economy and significantly helped to make Miami a global city, non-Cubans were disgruntled with their

\textsuperscript{114} Portes, 1981.
\textsuperscript{115} García, \textit{Havana USA}, 1996), 87.
presence. García noted that “Non-Cubans accused the exiles of consciously trying to take over their city.” While there was surely problems of overpopulation and growing pains with areas like Dade County, these charges, along with calling Cubans loud and unruly, were rooted in xenophobia. Non-Cubans began moving out; white flight occurred in cities north of Dade County so much so that “thirty thousand non-Latin whites left Dade County between 1970 and 1980.” White-Americans were annoyed with, what they viewed as, Cubans’ unwillingness to learn English and assimilate – while Cubans felt that they were integrating themselves into U.S. society and had sacrificed a lot to do so. Media coverage, at times, exacerbated white anxiety, for example, the television documentary *Crisis Amigo* (1961) and the feature film *Scarface* (1983).

The U.S. government stepped in to assuage exiles’ negative image. In order to counteract this negative press, the federal government stepped up its own propaganda efforts, trying to portray the Cubans in a more positive light. Government reports emphasized the Cubans’ rapid adjustment to the U.S. as well as their gratitude at being welcomed into a democratic society.

The federally funded Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) mounted a national public relations campaign for Cubans as well. Initially, its goal was to find gainful employment and sponsors for Cubans in their resettlement. Their campaign also served to increase positive associations with Cubans. The CRP aimed to stir emotions and make non-Cubans feel empathy for the plight of Cuban émigrés in their literature and public visibility. In a speech to the Downtown Rotary Club, the director of the U.S. Cuban Refugee Center (CRC, the locale of the CRP), Marshall Wise, reassured members that Cubans were not problematic for Dade County. Early on Wise directly response to the negative comments about Cubans:

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116 Ibid., 88.
117 Ibid., 88, 233.
118 Carlson, “Blurring the Boundaries of Cold War Foreign Relation,” 221.
However, from where I sit, and from what I see, I’ve never believed these cries, and right here today I want to say to you, as members of the leading civic organization in this community, that we have not been, and we are not now sitting on a powder keg because of the Cuban refugees living in our midst.\footnote{Marshall Wise. “The Cuban Refugee Situation in Dade County” Speech Made to Downtown Rotary Club, Director, U.S. Cuban Refugee Center Box 121 Folder 17}

Finally, the CRC published the periodical \textit{Resettlement Re-Cap} offering positive stories about Cuban refugees, highlighting the achievements of the CRC, and proffering figures that were favorable to Cubans – essentially functioning as public relations for the Cuban community and the CRC.\footnote{Marshall Wise. “The Cuban Refugee Situation in Dade County” Speech Made to Downtown Rotary Club, Director, U.S. Cuban Refugee Center Box 121 Folder 17} In general, Cuban exiles carved out a space for themselves in the U.S. while organizing efforts to return to their native county; resettlement and irredentism were, paradoxically, the two major features of the Cuban community. Geographically, the TACC established themselves at the heart of these activities with their headquarters in the city of Miami. Their leadership placed the TACC in an advantageous position to influence regional broadcasting, and they recognized this strategy in part because of their time in Havana and their personal experience.

\textbf{The Leaders of the Truth About Cuba Committee}

By 1961 the TACC’s leadership included: President and Executive Director Luis V. Manrara, Vice President Jorge Bosch, Secretary-Treasurer James D. Baker, Director and Chief of Publications Fermin F. Peinado, Director Jack F. Everhart, Director Kenneth D. Campbell, and Director of the Bureau of Statistics and Information Jorge Castellanos. As stated in this dissertation’s introduction, Manrara was the most prominent figure.
Manrara was born in Havana, Cuba and after graduating from the University of Havana with a Public Accountant Degree founded a leading public accountant firm: Manrara y Perez Daple (see figure 4). Manrara was affiliated with the Cuban Institute of Public Accountants and International Associate of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. He was also the national director and president of the Cuban chapter of the National Association of Accountants. In resettlement, Manrara was noted as a strict and disciplined exile activist.

Manrara believed that Cubans were better serviced in placing their time, energy, and funds towards la causa Cubana (the Cuban cause). When Archbishop Carroll called on Cubans to help construct a shrine to La Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre in Biscayne Bay, Manrara expressed to the exile community that the effort was misguided. In his study of Latina/o immigrants, David A. Badillo documented Manrara’s concern: “While conceding that it was a ‘beautiful idea’ to honor the Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre, he said he would reserve his support until ‘after the liberation of Cuba from Imperialist Russian Communism.’” Badillo continues by noting that Manrara advocated for Cubans to rid themselves of “frivolous entertainment” in favor of dedication and sacrifice. At one event full of Cubans, Manrara proclaimed that “sin sacrificio no hay redención” (without sacrifice there is no redemption). The phrase, with its Christian undertones, likens the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ to the sacrifice that exiles must make to reclaim their homeland.

Jorge Bosch was also born in Havana and attended the prestigious Phillips Exeter Academy, an independent secondary school, and received a B.S. in Engineering from Yale University. In his return from his American schooling, Bosch worked in the family business: the

122 David A. Badillo, Latinos and the New Immigrant Church (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 103.
123 Ibid., 106.
124 Ibid., 107.
Bacardi Corporation. From 1958-1959, Bosch was the vice president of Bacardi in San Juan, Puerto Rico and from 1959-1960 was the Executive Director of Bacardi in Santiago de Cuba. After the Revolution, he was the Executive Director of Bacardi Corporation in Mexico, Brazil, and Nassau. Bosch was not wholly stripped of his wealth and was motivated by the desire to return home and reclaim company property.

James D. Baker, the Secretary and Treasurer of the TACC, was born in Greenville, Kentucky, and received a B.A. from Miami University (Oxford, Ohio) and an M.A. from Harvard University. While on the island, Baker established the Ruston-Baker Foundation and was the director of the Ruston Academy, an American school in Havana. Baker used his position at the Ruston Academy to helped smuggle children out of Cuba during Operation Peter Pan.\(^\text{126}\) Baker was also on the board of the directors for the Instituto Cultural Cubano Norteamericano (Cuban American Cultural Institute).

The Director and Chief of Publications, Fermin F. Peinado, was born in Guantánamo, Cuba and studied at Madrid University in Spain and Paris University in France. He held an LL.D. degree (Doctor of Laws) and was the head of the law firm Bufete Peinado (1940-1960). Peinado was also the dean of the Guantánamo Bar Association and president of the Rotary Club of Guantánamo. He held membership in a long list of organizations and country clubs in Cuba and was bestowed the Knight of Saint Gregory the Great by Pope Pius XII.

Before the Cuban Revolution, Jorge Castellanos was a professor of ancient history and a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Oriente in Santiago de Cuba. Considering that he trained and worked in education, Castellanos’ position as the Director of the Bureau of Statistic and Information at the TACC seemed fitting. He also wrote a few of the TACC’s written

propaganda including two lectures that were turned into pamphlets: *How Cuba Was Communized* and *Cuba and the Destiny of the United States*.

Born in Union City, New Jersey, Kenneth D. Campbell move to Cuba as a child, returned to the U.S. for schooling at the Georgia Institute of Technology and then returned to the island. While in Cuba, before becoming a director of the TACC in 1961, Campbell was the president of *Publicidad Inter-Americana* for international advertising agencies in 1937-42 and 1945-1960. He was also the president of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Cuban chapter, an international nonprofit business organization.\(^{127}\)

Finally, Jack F. Everhart worked as an English teacher with Baker at the Ruston Academy from 1935-1938. Born in Pueblo, Colorado, Everhart attended Yale University and later worked and lived in Cuba. He was the president of St. Marks Ranch and Cattle Company in the Pinar del Rio province of Cuba from 1938-1960.

Gaining elite education, being members of country clubs and organizations, and participating in professional organizations granted the TACC leaders an excellent sense of professionalism, class-based knowledge, and cultural practices of the middle- and upper-class. While the Cuban state appropriated the wealth and property of some of the leaders of the TACC, the revolutionary government could not take their social and cultural practices, decorum, values, and (in some cases) their credentials. These attributes were strongly associated with a higher stratum in Cuba and in the U.S. These affordances allowed the TACC to be viewed as legitimate members of American society and played a vital role in having media professionals, governmental authority, leaders of organizations, and educators view the TACC as reliable sources for information about Cuba. The leaders of the TACC, like their cohort of first-wavers, were a part of the Cuban elite and had cultural capital that was legible by not only Cubans but

\(^{127}\) Ibid., 51.
also Americans. This was furthered by the fact that the leaders of the TACC lived transnational lives, largely between the U.S. and Cuba, due to their education, careers, and vacations. By June 30, 1970, the TACC had 19 chapters operating in the U.S. and two in Puerto Rico and made headway into convincing sectors of the U.S. of the ills of the Castro regime.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I presented an overview of the historical, political, and cultural underpinnings of the formation of the TACC and their media activism. The relationship between Cuba, the U.S., and the USSR shaped U.S. immigration policies that dictated much of the exiles’ journey. Displeased with the Cuban state’s declaration of Marxism, the Kennedy administration devised immigration policies that were favorable for entering the U.S. After the CIA coordinated insurrection failed in the Bay of Pigs, relations between Cuba and the U.S. became more contentious. They continued to worsen with the alliance of Cuba and the USSR and became dangerous for the U.S. with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Since many Cuban exiles believed their time in South Florida was temporary and hoped to take back the island, irredentism quickly formed. However, the longer they stayed and the more their population grow, the more resettlement became an established community.

The TACC participated in their émigré community’s assault of the Castro regime, not by plotting militarily against the state, but by alerting U.S. authorities to intervene in U.S. media. Members of the TACC swayed U.S. officials to refute positive images of the Revolution and facilitate anti-Cuban state sentiments to sully the Cuban state’s reputation. Regarding the former, the TACC mounted a campaign against the National Educational Television network due to their television documentaries that depicted the Cuban state in a favorable light. Of NET’s documentaries, *Three Faces of Cuba* (1965) garnered the most attention from the TACC, which included a 104-page analysis of the ways in which the documentary was communist propaganda.
aimed at brainwashing its audiences. This report was sent to U.S. authorities with well-known histories of fighting communist infiltration.
CHAPTER TWO
An Exposé on an Insidious Film:
Television Reception as Activism and Exilic Interpretive Strategies

Figure 5. Karl Baarslag, Oliver Carlson, Hunter Edward, and Luis V. Manrara, *An Exposé on the Insidious Film... Three Faces of Cuba*, The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. Records, Box 123, Folder 23, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida, Cover Page.

On March 23rd, 1973, Luis V. Manrara, the president of the Truth About Cuba Committee (TACC) asked Edward Hunter, the U.S. military propaganda expert, to publicize an analysis of a television documentary they had done eight years prior. Manrara hoped that Hunter would print the evaluation of *Three Faces of Cuba* (1965) in his monthly periodical *Tactics*, which evaluated developments in psychological warfare and American national security. The analysis was a part of the TACC’s concerted effort to halt the broadcasting of the documentary.
In his letter to Hunter, Manrara also recounted his first exposure to psychological warfare: a military theory of media propaganda. Manrara wrote, “In your editorial comments you may like to touch on the evaluation you made in 1965 of the documentary film ‘Three Faces of Cuba’, remember? Working hand-and-hand with you on this evaluation was a privilege that gave me tremendous insight on psychological warfare.”

Four years into their establishment, the TACC found a novel means of examining media that dovetailed with their previously acquired notions of media and reinforced their political agendas in the U.S.

As I covered in this dissertation’s introduction, the TACC’s overarching strategy was to sway the U.S. officials, media professionals, U.S. organizations, and educators against the Cuban state by either facilitating anti-Cuban State sentiments or impeding “pro-Revolution” representations. As a microcosm of the latter, the TACC mounted a campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba* and its makers at the National Educational Television (NET) network. Their agenda was to engender contempt for the “pro-Castro” documentary, its communist propagandists, and the revolutionary government. The TACC’s analysis of *Three Face of Cuba* and its delivery to U.S. officials were part and parcel to this campaign. Indeed, the TACC’s means of persuasion centered around the self-published 104-page film analysis *An Exposé on the Insidious Film…‘Three Faces of Cuba’* (see figure 5).

*An Exposé* examines the production, distribution, exhibition, and form of the television documentary, while taking every opportunity to condemn the Cuban state. Drawing from the TACC’s exilic experience, *An Exposé* offers a kind of lay textual analysis based on a formal, historical, authorial, political, and psychoanalytical analysis. That is to say, *An Exposé*

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129 Media activism from Latina/o, and from other marginalized peoples, typically focus on the negative representation of their social group. See for example Chon A. Noriega, *Shot in America: Television, the State, and the Rise of Chicano Cinema*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

130 These are intellectual categories and not in-group terms, they are attempts to articulate the TACC’s logic.
examines and parcels out different cinematic registers (editing, sound, lighting, etc.) to deconstruct the film-text and find hidden meaning. While doing so, the authors connect the encoding process with the political motives of international communists, bolster their claims with historical accounts of pre-1959 Cuba, and assign authorship to the documentary’s director and producer Robert Cohen. These were lines of arguments that were used to prove that *Three Faces of Cuba* was psychologically manipulating its viewers. The TACC used a U.S. military theory of propaganda acquired during their resettlement which complemented the TACC’s means of media interpretation previously gained from Cuba. According to the TACC, *An Exposé* proffered U.S. authorities a “technical” and “scientific” analysis of *Three Faces of Cuba*. The TACC’s campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba* centered around *An Exposé* and its distribution.

This chapter examines the TACC’s analysis of *Three Faces of Cuba* via *An Exposé* and the ways in which it was deployed to halt NET’s broadcasting of the television documentary. This chapter argues that the TACC sought to use *An Exposé* as a means to embolden U.S. authorities to act as a regulatory body and intervene in the broadcasting of *Three Faces of Cuba* as part of a larger scheme to curtail positive portrayals of the Revolution. They sent and personally addressed *An Exposé* to U.S. authorities with anti-communist affinities, for example, J. Edgar Hoover, to provoke and embolden them to act against *Three Faces of Cuba* and its makers.\(^{131}\) Copies were sent to the FBI, the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), and other anti-communist government committees. On more than one occasion Manrara proudly claimed that the TACC sent 4,000 copies of *An Exposé* to congress and public libraries.\(^{132}\) The TACC felt that they could pit U.S. authorities against the television documentary

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\(^{131}\) Morales 1965. Swaying U.S. public opinion against *Three Faces of Cuba* was part of their larger agenda to pit the U.S. against the Cuban state.

by sending a film analysis that deconstructed the elements of propaganda and revealed the communist threat hidden within the film-text. While *An Exposé* was still under develop, the TACC hatched this plan and tested it out with the help of the Committee Pro Cuba Liberation (CPCL) from Hartford, Connecticut. They collectively compiled a report with evidence against *Three Faces of Cuba*, which included sections of the yet-to-be-published *An Exposé*. They then sent that report to the FBI, CIA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and, again, the HCUA in an attempt to spark action. Not only a call to action, the TACC’s assessment of *Three Faces of Cuba* also reveals their strategies for understanding media objects.

As I elaborate in this chapter, I position *An Exposé* as an expression of the TACC’s transnational interpretive strategies and a window into the TACC’s exilic experience. We can understand these strategies through their leaders’ tripartite process of migration: their positionality and the development of their conceptualization of the media while in Cuba, the circumstances of their deterritorialization and those responsible for it, and the discovery of psychological warfare in their host nation.\(^{133}\) This tripartite process cultivated the TACC’s interpretive strategies for media and literature, and it became their prevailing narrative that framed and gave meaning to their activism. These factors are most evident in *An Exposé*. In addition to the analysis of *Three Faces of Cuba*, this transnational process drove the TACC’s framing, editing, and distribution of the book as well as the decision to attain propaganda experts.\(^{134}\)

I am not suggesting that the TACC’s one-directional experience with migration is representative of the exchange between the U.S. and Cuba. Indeed, the TACC’s home and host

\(^{133}\) A war of position is typically applied to a single group, yet this case study reveals the ways in which two groups (the TACC and white U.S. conservatives) can work together to alter public opinion due to their overlapping political interests.

\(^{134}\) It is important to note that the TACC’s activism against *Three Faces of Cuba* not only included their written response, but also the making and distribution of *An Exposé*. Both of which were shaped by their migration.
nations experienced transnational exchange before and after the Cuban exodus of 1959. Rather, I am underscoring that the TACC’s interpretive strategies is deeply rooted in the specificity of their travels to the U.S.; the their time in Cuba, the reasons for their exile, and their resettlement in the United States formed their conceptualization of media and their means of media interpretation. The next few sections will build and elaborate on the deployment of hermeneutics as seen in *An Exposé*, and cover how the text was sent to U.S. officials as a call to action.

To better understand *Three Faces of Cuba* not as an anomaly, but rather as part of a purposeful departure from traditional programming, I first provide an overview of U.S. television documentaries from the late-1950s to the 1960s. This first section also pays particular attention to NET’s campaign to become the fourth network by offering provocative programing like *Three Faces of Cuba*. Then I present a brief description of *Three Faces of Cuba* and the Cuban exile community’s reaction to the documentary. This discussion will provide a background for examining the ways in which the TACC deployed *An Exposé* to embolden U.S. authorities to work against *Three Faces of Cuba* and NET. This chapter will then examine the TACC’s cultivation of their interpretive strategies via their migration, which will build towards a close analysis of *An Exposé*. Taking the bulk of the chapter, the examination of *An Exposé* will cover its main arguments and its application of psychological warfare, the conceptualization of *Three Faces of Cuba*’s target audience, who is responsible for this propaganda, and lastly *An Exposé*’s analysis of the representation of race and gender.

**U.S. Television Documentaries and NET’s Campaign to be the Fourth Network**

In the early 1960s, the *Educational Television and Radio Center’s* division of National Educational Television (NET) participated in a significant increase of television documentaries in the U.S. An era marked by a substantial commitment by the three major commercial networks – ABC, NBC, and CBS – to increase news reporting and television documentaries for the benefit
of public interest. U.S. commercial television played a major role in Cold War discourse and public opinion on foreign policy, and these stations did so while operating at a financial loss. Television scholar Michael Curtin has described this period as “a distinctive and complicated moment when political and corporate leaders, as well as network officials, embraced the television documentary in an explicit attempt to mobilize public opinion behind a more activist foreign policy.” Topics like the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and the Civil Right movement received more visibility on American television. For Cuba in particular this meant a substantial increase in visibility.

Before the “golden age” of television documentaries, Cuba lacked presence on U.S. televisions. From 1955-1959, commercial networks aired a total of five documentaries and news reports involving the island. However, with the triumph of the Revolution and the U.S.’s new devotion to television documentaries, from 1959-1963 that number jumped to nearly fifty (see figure 6). Twenty-one of those documentaries and reports came in 1962, only a year after Fidel Castro ended his denial of the state’s communist intentions and publicly proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist and the same year as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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136 Curtin, 3.
138 Network interest in the Cuba subside after 1963.
This increased visibility of Cuba was produced and shaped by journalism’s code of conduct that bolstered the U.S.’s position in the Cold War. The network’s explicit attempt in “redeeming the wasteland” greatly shaped the representations of Cuba and other “controversial issues.” Commercial networks felt that important social issues could only be entrusted to professional broadcasting newsmen – and yes they were almost always men.\textsuperscript{139} Journalistic professionalism dictated that public service was best regulated by network news professionals, especially with sensitive and socially important issues.\textsuperscript{140} Likewise, Curtin has stated, “the networks claimed exclusive prerogative to control access to the public airwaves based on the professional judgment of their news personnel. One’s right to speak about public issues on television, they argued, should best be regulated by network news professionals.” The reinforcement of this ideal meant that a small group within each network (along with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{139} Curtin, \textit{Redeeming the Wasteland}, 1995, 141.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 141.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
influence of political and corporate leaders) would control the production and broadcasting of news reports and television documentaries that were seen nationwide. It also meant that producers and directors of this content faced difficulties getting their work on network television if they did not adhere.

Those that were well-regarded in the industry were not exempt from the rule; not even David Wolper and Robert Drew who were thought of as “two of the most prolific and influential independent documentary producers of the period.”141 When they did manage to get their documentaries picked up by the aforementioned networks their works were greatly altered by networks in postproduction. A good example can be seen in ABC’s modifications of Yanki No! (1960). NET’s television documentaries did not follow the same paradigm.

The role the NET played during this era and the way in which they departed from network standards is outside the parameters of the written histories of television. The newly appointed president, John White, and his administration, made aggressive attempts to make themselves the “fourth network.”142 They produced “controversial” programming that would become their trademark. Norah Carolyn Brooks elaborates this very point: “The attempt to establish a fourth network identity by employing a strategy based on the production and distribution of controversial and in-depth public affairs material was a radical departure from American programming traditions.”143 Unable to compete with finances, infrastructure, and journalistic “integrity,” NET implemented this plan to nab television viewers. With the Cold War, the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Revolution, and a myriad of

141 Curtin, 139.
143 Brooks, 3.
political protests, NET recognized that they could benefit from the polemic epochs with provocative yet educational programming.

Thus, the way in which NET departed from the major networks as a competitive strategy, also meant that their documentaries did not make “an explicit attempt to mobilize public opinion behind a more activist foreign policy,” as was the case with NBC, CBS, and ABC. For instance, NET’s documentary series Changing World attempted to present an honest exploration of lived-experience within Marxist states while offering historical contexts. This, at times, was read as controversial as they did not follow the Cold War grand narrative of evil communist and brainwashed masses from postcolonial nations. By representing a more complex image of foreign peoples, for example in Cuba and Vietnam, NET offered a more nuanced portrait. They also showed reverence for the intellect of television audiences, and their ability to arrive at conclusions outside of Cold War paradigms.

Beyond competitive and financial motives, NET also offered idealism wrapped in nationalism as a reason for airing controversial topics. In their National Educational Television Program Philosophy and Purpose, NET states:

Conflict of ideas is implicit in a democracy, and controversy is the soul of democracy. Ideas are to be countered by ideas and not by repressive techniques. Open minds, free discussion, vigorous debate--these are essential to good citizenship and effective community action. N.E.T., in its public affairs, must give exposure to controversial views and must probe and analyze the significant issues and conditions of society wherever they appear....Often N.E.T. must seek to stimulate controversy where none has existed because of lack of knowledge or lack of concern. That is part of the overall purpose: to challenge Americans to accept the obligations of citizenship.144

NET positioned their provocative programming as catalysts for U.S. citizenship; thus, in a sense, it was not television that needed redeeming but rather American’s sense of social responsibility and public discourse. NET proclaimed an effort to protect democracy at home not by eradicating

144 Brooks, 1.
communism or Marxism, but rather by addressing these controversial issues with an open mind to spark critical conversations. This was a bold and progressive standpoint coming towards the end of the delirium of McCarthyism in the U.S. The documentary series Changing World (the program that aired Three Faces of Cuba) was certainly a part of this campaign; they focused on foreign regions undergoing drastic political change.\(^{145}\) Brooks further elaborates:

Thus, each individual program in Changing World attempted to provide a historical sketch of the country in question as well as a sense of daily life. In this manner, audience members were offered a context for understanding the pressures and transitions confronting the countries chosen by NET due to their potential impact on U.S. foreign policy.\(^{146}\)

Part rhetorical strategy and part competitive tactic, NET broadcasted “controversial” subject matters in their campaign to become the “fourth network.”

Clearly, some groups in the U.S. read these programs as siding with the enemy. NET faced a backlash from U.S. conservatives and Cuban exiles for their provocative programming. In a sense, these were the consequences of not following commercial television’s redeeming project. Notwithstanding two dissertations, NET’s role in the history of U.S. television documentaries has yet to be fully explored, and nor has the reception of and resistance to these documentaries by the ethnic groups they portray.

It is worth noting that the TACC was instrumental in placing U.S. public television on the radar of conservative-minded Americans and U.S. officials. The TACC helped to begin a legacy of conservative and Republican criticisms of public television when the Committee went up against the NET. Laurie Ouellette tracks the history of conservative and Republican-led administration’s oppositions to “liberal bias” in federally-funded television.\(^{147}\) Prior to the temporal scope Ouellette lays out, the TACC called attention to these concerns for U.S.

\(^{145}\) Brooks, 162.
\(^{146}\) Ibid., 163.
\(^{147}\) Laurie Ouellette, Viewers Like You?, 2002, 6.
conservatives and Republicans in office when they accused NET, PBS’s predecessors, of broadcasting communist propaganda. For the TACC, *Three Faces of Cuba* was a primary example of communism emanating from Cuba and infiltrate the U.S. and the documentary being shot on-location only confirmed that accusation.

**Three Faces of Cuba and an Outraged Ethnic Enclave**

*Three Faces of Cuba* was a 1965 production of National Education Television and a part of their documentary series *Changing World.*\(^{148}\) Producer and director Robert Carl Cohen, producer William Manschot, and a film crew traveled to Cuba to shoot *Three Faces of Cuba* in the summer of 1964.\(^{149}\) Cohen proudly claimed to be the “first US citizen authorized by the US State Department & the Cuban Foreign Ministry to film in Cuba.”\(^{150}\) Per NET’s press release, the documentary was first broadcasted on March 8\(^{th}\), 1965,\(^{151}\) however, the TACC dates its first appearance in South Florida on the 22\(^{nd}\) of the same month. The discrepancy of dates points to the semi-autonomous nature of local NET stations; to a degree, stations made decisions over what programs to air and when to air them. This is critical to note because later NET stations across the country would elect not to broadcast documentaries about Cuba after the TACC gained traction in their campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba.*

Today no known copies of *Three Faces of Cuba* exist, a fact that Cohen blames on Cuban exiles. Currently, what remains is a re-edited film from existing footage titled *Three Cubans* (1966-1971), and a discourse surrounding the original television documentary. For instance, NET’s press release offered a description of *Three Faces of Cuba* to spur viewer interest:

> The exclusive documentary report, filmed entirely in Cuba, examines the current conditions under which the Cuban people today live, their attitudes with regard to the ‘26\(^{th}\) of July’ Revolution, and the changes that have taken place since the 1959 advent of

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\(^{149}\) Ibid., 2 and 7.


Fidel Castro. These conditions, attitudes, and changes are viewed through the eyes of three Cubans: a former member of the upper middle class, now in exile; a member of the current middle class—a revolutionary; and a member of the continuing lower class—a worker.\footnote{National Educational Television, “Changing World: Three Faces of Cuba,” press release, 1965.}

If a reader did not know any better they would think this description was of *Three Cubans*; NET’s descriptions, the criticism found in *An Exposé*, and TACC’s transcript of *Three Faces of Cuba* all corroborate that the two documentaries were very similar. Indeed, both documentaries open with a brief explanation of what it will cover and its structure. They are cut into three parts each one devoted and narrated by the abovementioned Cubans: an anonymous exiled professor from the upper-class, Jose Garcia Nicolas from the middle-class, and Francisco Consuegra Salgado from the working-class.

There are a few small discrepancies between the documentaries, for example, their introductions. In *Three Faces of Cuba*, a third person narrator lays out the premise of the documentary:

> The following program is from ‘NET,’ The National Educational Television Network. This is the story of three Cubans. This is the story of three Cubans, three men from different levels of Cuban society whose lives have been changed by Fidel Castro’s revolution. It is the story of Cuba today told by the three Cubans in their own words.

However, in *Three Cubans* it is the exiled professor that describes the premise: “In fact, the story of Cuba today. One of them myself representing those that fled. Another one, a man of the low-middle class, representing those that accepted the socialist revolution. The third one, the peasant worker type, a man from the lower strata.”
Replacing the third person narrator with one of the three Cubans seems like a minute detail until we consider the informative text that appears 46 seconds into *Three Cubans* which claims that, “All of the events depicted were filmed as they took place. All the comments are by the Cubans themselves” (see figure 7). *Three Cubans* attempts to conceal its own production. It claims objectivity that is akin to a direct cinema style whereby the documentarian is an objective observer, the proverbial fly on the wall. The original documentary, as it were, was more forthcoming about its own production – more self-reflective. Cohen counterintuitively makes the TACC more correct about their criticisms that the documentary attempts to conceal the maker’s intentions and political position, albeit not communist brainwashing.

In Cohen’s reconstructing of his original documentary, he attempts to defend himself and his account of post-Revolution Cuba by removing the appearance of non-Cuban contribution and allowing Cubans to speak for themselves, so to speak. In either case, both documentaries (like all media objects) are constructed are not, therefore, “the Cubans themselves;” Cohen and his crew picked which Cubans to film, what questions to ask, which responses to include, what images to use, and how to put them all together. The differences between *Three Faces of Cuba* and *Three Cubans* gives insight into how Cuban criticism affected Cohen’s reediting. However, it is important to note that the similarities outweigh the differences.

After the aforementioned introduction to the documentaries, the anonymous exile begins with some personal information while remaining cryptic. He explains that he fears retaliation from the state and thus wanted to remain antonymous to protect himself and his family in Cuba. The professor then lays out some basic information: a brief review of the leading figures of the Revolution like Fidel Castro, his brother Raul Castro, and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. The first

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153 Robert Cohen’s defensiveness is displayed clearly in the beginning of *Three Cubans* with a timeline of historical events that conveniently shows positive reviews of *Three Faces of Cuba*, that called it “fair and realistic.”
Cuban then covers the state’s official reason for the Revolution, the conditions before 1959, and how the middle-class was hurt by the new policies of the state. The exile offers the general experiences of the upper and middle-class in Cuba while trying to keep out any personal information that could identify him. He mentions that he was a university professor and that he had already fled. If he left Cuba recently this would make him a part of the second wave since the documentary was made in 1964, which makes sense with his concerns of the middle-class.

The exiled professor’s commentary, however, do not align with widespread sentiments by Cuban exiles in the U.S. For instance, in the same breathe that he calls Castro a demagogue, the professor remarks on Castro’s charisma and devotion to improving Cuba. He recognizes that the state took wealth from first and second wavers but also acknowledges the vices of U.S. neocolonialism and the U.S. capitalistic system imposed on Cuba that helped to create wealth discrepancies. These positions very clearly marked differences from the Cuban community. The other two parts of the documentary were far more quotidian as they followed a middle-class and a working-class Cuban and their views on the Revolution. These two sections were not very concerning to the TACC; An Exposé hardly addresses the last two Cubans. In general, the TACC were outraged with the first Cuban and the many claims Three Faces of Cuba makes about the Castro regime, and the Cuban ethnic enclave mirrored those sentiments.

While NET frames the documentary as an exploration of the lived experiences of three Cuban citizens in post-Revolution Cuba, Cuban exiles from New York, Delaware, and Miami quickly eschewed this reading and protested. The most concerted effort came from the TACC, and the most detailed analysis came from An Exposé. We should note that An Exposé is more

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than an example of (albeit rarely explored) film reception by Cuban exiles and U.S. conservatives.\textsuperscript{155} An Exposé is an artifact that is both a product and an expression of the TACC’s transnational interpretive strategies on media. Strategies to understand media that may, in fact, extend to first-wave U.S. Cuban exiles in general.\textsuperscript{156} The TACC’s mobilized their reception of Three Faces of Cuba by distributing An Exposé to U.S. authorities so they would act against the documentary and its makers.\textsuperscript{157}

\textbf{Mobilizing U.S. Authorities with Film Reception}

From its onset, the TACC frames An Exposé and its intentions. The TACC made an explicit attempt to mobilize U.S. governmental committees against Three Faces of Cuba. In an open letter format, the book is addressed to:

[The] Honorable James. O Eastland, Chairman, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate; [the] Honorable Edwin E. Willis, Chairman, House Committee on Un-American Activities;” [and the] “Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.\textsuperscript{158}

In notifying the FBI and the heads of special interest government committees that target internal national threats, the TACC intentionally provoked authorities with anti-communist affinities to intervene. The Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws organized for the purposes of uncovering communism and other “subversions” within the United States by enforcing the Internal Security Act of 1950.\textsuperscript{159}


\textsuperscript{156} The TACC’s interpretive strategies were a part of a dominant exilic discourse that influenced (and one could argue dominated) the other three waves of émigrés and continues to shape American’s image of Cubans in the U.S. today.

\textsuperscript{157} Hector Morales, ”Three Faces of Cuba’ Is Pro-Castro Film,” \textit{Fort Lauderdale News}, April 26, 1965.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 7.

\textsuperscript{159} Please note that the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary was more commonly known as Senate Internal Security
House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) was a notorious U.S. committee that investigated suspected subversion and propaganda against the U.S., which often targeted communism. J. Edgar Hoover was the first and longstanding director of the FBI, the leading domestic intelligence and security agency of the U.S. Since the TACC could not directly intervene in any meaningful way, mainly because they pursued results outside their sphere of influence, they sought to persuade these organizations that yielded more authority and shared common ideological enemies.

The TACC continued:

As the evaluations of the three experts clearly point out, the exhibition of the film ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ is fraught with dangerous, pro-communist and anti-American propaganda. It is for this reason that we bring it to your attention in case you might wish to probe the persons and institutions responsible for its production, distribution and exhibition.

Their intentions for An Exposé, as expressed above, also strikes at the heart of the TACC’s core activist strategy. That is to say; the TACC sound the alarm against pro-Castro “propaganda” so that Americans in more prominent positions would be galvanized to take action. According to the TACC’s logic, the documentary’s makers would then have to answer to the state, not unlike their homeland. Although they did not specify how U.S. authorities should intervene, the TACC did point to Three Faces of Cuba’s production, distribution, and exhibition as viable avenues.

An Exposé leaves the specificity of the intervention up to U.S. authorities while steering them towards ending the distribution of Three Faces of Cuba and eluding to the prevention of similar productions by NET. In short, An Exposé’s goals reached well beyond its confines and the TACC placed the book in an advantageous position to accomplish these goals. Even before

Subcommittee (SISS). During the 1950s they also held public hearing to question journalists suspected of having communist affictions.

160 In 1935, the Bureau of Investigation was reorganized and placed into the Department of Justice and renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation. J. Edgar Hoover as its director for the next 36 years.
161 Ibid., 8.
162 Ibid., 7.
hitting the printing press sections of *An Exposé* made it to government agencies that had vested interests in national security.

The TACC collaborated with the Committee Pro Cuba Liberation (CPCL) of Hartford, Connecticut to notify U.S. officials via a report on *Three Faces of Cuba* that included fragments of *An Exposé*. The CPCL was like any other exile group working towards the liberation of Cuba; however, they also advocated for Cubans in Hartford. Using sections of the inchoate *An Exposé*, the TACC and the CPCL put together a report on *Three Faces of Cuba* and sent it to the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), and Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut. *An Exposé’s* strategy seems to have gotten its logic from the TACC’s and the CPCL’s report. The two groups together targeted U.S. agencies and official with investments in national security and anti-communist affinities in the hopes that these agencies would investigate NET and end the broadcasting of *Three Faces of Cuba*. It is unclear which of the two came up with this strategy, but the logic is certainly consistent with the TACC’s activity.

The report was attached to a letter that was individually addressed to the directors of the abovementioned agencies with 45 signatures of support. These copies explained to the addressee that *Three Faces of Cuba* “relayed the Communist message” and immediate action was needed.163 The letter claimed to represent not only the Cuban exiles of Connecticut but all Cuban exiles. Hector Lagomasino (the president of the CPCL and author of the letter) outlined their intentions: “We are confident that this report will be thoroughly scrutinized and that justice will be done regarding the investigation of all parties found guilty of treasonable actions which would

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163 Letter from Committee Pro Cuba Liberation to Senator Thomas Dodd, April 15, 1965, General CIA Records, RDP73-00475R000102950001-0.
endanger the security of this remaining citadel of freedom and democracy.”\textsuperscript{164} Manrara contributed three parts of the report: an analysis of \textit{Three Faces of Cuba}, suggestion on how to conduct an investigation, and a transcript of a tape recording of \textit{Three Faces of Cuba}, all of which are in \textit{An Exposé}.

In a moment that foreshadowed \textit{An Exposé} written by members of the CP\textit{CL}, the report refutes the documentary’s comments about racial discrimination before and after the Castro regime.

The greatest affront is to have the ‘Second Face’ [the second Cuban] say that before the Revolution the negros in Cuba were discriminated and we quote ‘as in some parts of the United States’, followed by his statement of ‘Imagine a negro managing a factory before the Revolution’. As it is well known to all that lived in or visited Cuba, there was practically no discrimination of negroes in our country during the pre-Castro days.\textsuperscript{165}

The claim that Cuba had “practically no discrimination” before 1959 is bold and points to the ways in which the early émigrés, which were often white Cubans, used race as a means to discredit the Revolution with little regard to Afro-Cubans’ actual lived-experience and history. This is not to say that Cuba reached racial equality after 1959, but that the CPCL and the TACC exploited race politics for their political agendas, not unlike the Cuban state has done. The TACC made a similar argument in \textit{An Exposé}, which we will soon see. While there is no conclusive evidence that the TACC’s and the CPCL’s efforts came to fruition, one U.S. Senator was emboldened by \textit{An Exposé} during the reestablishment of national educational broadcasting.

The Republican Senator from South Carolina, Strom Thurmond, also received a copy of \textit{An Exposé} from the TACC and he used it as evidence in the formulation of national broadcast education.\textsuperscript{166} On May 17\textsuperscript{th} of 1967, parts of \textit{An Exposé} found its way into congressional record

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
during the hearings for the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. This bill would establish the funding and structure for a national broadcasting network for both radio and television. Later this would establish the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and in turn lay the groundwork for PBS and the National Public Radio. Designed to amend the Communications Act of 1934, on this day in May the Public Television Act of 1967 was still only a bill.

The Senate continued the consideration of the amendment that would allow for the construction of facilities for educational television and radio broadcasting, establish a nongovernmental corporation to oversee operations, increase availability to educational programming, and aid in the operation of facilities for educational broadcasting. This hearing was the latest part of a series of discussions and debates among the educational media industry (namely Educational Television [ETV]) and governmental officials about the role of educational television in the U.S. These discussions were largely initiated and shaped by the Carnegie Commission’s report.168

The Senator from Rhode Island, John O. Pastore, led the bill and worked towards its passing into law as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications. On this day, Pastore, building on the Carnegie Commission’s report, made clear the need for interconnection if NET was going to be truly effective. This meant a restructuring of NET’s broadcast system to become a nationwide system, which, of course, would be costly. However, for Pastore, the benefits to the nation far outweighed the price tag. “The opportunity before the Congress and the challenge of this issue are of paramount importance for the future growth of this Nation. It is an opportunity and a challenge that may be forever lost if we turn our backs against the propositions outlined in

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this legislation.” Seizing this opportunity would have to begin with gaining the Senators’ approval of the three titles that constituted the bill, and it was here that Pastore saw resistance. First let us briefly review each of these titles.

Title I increased funds and offered plans for building infrastructure. Title II established an independent central organization in charge of operations. Title III mandated studies to be done on their educational programming for efficiency and the application of formal education. Surprisingly, it was not Title I that drew protest from Thurmond. Rather, it was Title II that was contested, which was originally conceived by the Carnegie Commission for Educational Television. Title II reads: “to establish a nonprofit, private corporation to improve the quality of educational and cultural programs and make them available to local stations.” Eventually, this would become the CPB. A seemingly innocuous stipulation, however, Thurmond feared the seizure of this corporation by ideologues. “Nothing in this bill safeguards against the capture of the corporation by a small clique with definite ideological biases. The bill actually facilitates such a capture.” As Thurmond continued, his anxiety over communism slowly became clearer. “The capture of this corporation by an anti-American minority is more remote, but quite possible” this was true for Thurmond because he felt that “the Corporation for Public Broadcasting would be a vital target for radical and revolutionary ideologies.” Thurmond had seen this before and so he offered a cautionary tale:

Let me give one example of a case which has already taken place. Two or three years ago National Education Television, known as NET, the present private educational TV network, distributed a program entitled “Three Faces of Cuba.” This program had been filmed mostly in Cuba, under the supervision of Castro’s henchmen. Presumably, it was approved by his Communist propaganda experts. Its producer was a well-known American leftist, Robert Cohen, known for his attacks on the House Committee on Un-

169 Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, May 17, 1967, S 7015, Congressional Record Archive, United States of America. 170 Strom Thurmond was no stranger to controversy, noteworthy was his flight of the Democratic party due to their support of civil rights legislation. 171 Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, May 17, 1967, S 7013, Congressional Record Archive, United States of America. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid.
American Activities and sympathetic documentaries on Red China and East Germany. The final product was a notorious film extolling Castro. Yet it was shown to thousands of innocent schoolchildren all over the country as an objective evaluation before a storm of protest caused its withdrawal.\textsuperscript{174}

Title II, for Thurmond, would give a single entity centralized control over the production and distribution of educational programming for the nation. He was concerned that without the right safeguards in place, this could result in the takeover by communists or some other anti-American group.

During the hearing, Thurmond asked for two sections of \textit{An Exposé} to be placed into record: the transcript of \textit{Three Faces of Cuba} and Edward Hunter’s contribution: “Anatomy of a Film Analyses of ‘Three Faces of Cuba.’” Neither of these sections included the TACC’s remarks about the film nor did Thurmond mention the TACC at all in his comments. Much like Bethel and \textit{Human Events} had done, Thurmond omitted the Cuban contribution to the published work. This despite the fact that all of the information in Thurmond’s comments was taken from other parts of \textit{An Exposé}. Manrara and the TACC were recorded in the Congressional Record, but only because their names were mentioned in Hunter’s section.

Foretelling Laurie Ouellette’s study on public TV, conservatives like Thurmond had a history of viewing public educational television as hostile to their political views.\textsuperscript{175} In regards to former, conservative-leaning publications like \textit{Human Events} came to the defense of conservatives. They expressed concerns over their access to media production in what would become PBS. Similar to Thurmond, they presented \textit{Three Faces of Cuba} as an example of the mismanagement of educational television and evidence that conservatives would continue to be left out of educational programming if the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 preceded as


planned. An article titled “Operation Brainwash” from *Human Events* stated that “There is nothing in the measure, for example, to ensure that certain producers won’t be discriminated against because of their political views. If conservatives came to the Public Corporation for funds, therefore, the corporation could deny them the money with impunity.” Later, the article, like the Senate hearing, sites *Three Faces of Cuba* as evidence of NET’s depravity. Once again, there was no mention of Cuban exiles.

**The Formation of Exiled Interpretive Strategies**

While on the island and before their formation, the TACC’s leadership unknowingly initiated a transnational process cultivating their interpretive strategies. The TACC developed these strategies through their time in Cuba (informed by their positionality on the island and shaped by popular notions of media), their deterritorialization (their political agendas due to their exile) and their resettlement (the discovery of psychological warfare). The formation of the TACC’s interpretive strategies was a *process* formulated through the specific contexts and political agendas of the TACC and, to a lesser extent, their contributors. This model is beneficial since, frequently, readings of media-text are less about the actual media objects and more about the reader’s worldview, politics, and lived experiences. The TACC’s interpretive strategies are constitutive of their time in Cuba, the conditions of their departure, and their means of incorporation into the US. Not only did this process form their means of media reception, but it also shaped how the TACC arranged the components of *An Exposé*.¹⁷⁸

In pre-Revolution Cuba, the leaders of the TACC grew up and formed their political views and their notions of media.¹⁷⁹ Telling of their conceptualization of media and drawing

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¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 4.
¹⁷⁸ This included the framing of the text, the attainment of experts, editing of the text, writing their own film analysis, and the book’s distribution.
from the zeitgeist, media in Cuba was thought of, mainly by authorities and elites, as a set of persuasive vehicles for mass influence, indoctrination, and propagandizing. This mode of thought guided Cuban elites, revolutionaries, and institutions to frame and use radio, television, and film for didactic, hegemonic, and self-serving purposes, variously serving or subverting regimes and economic structures. This also included foreign entities that utilized media to influence the Cuban population for their own geopolitical interests. These notions of media were certainly not exclusive to Cuba nor encompassing of the island’s many ways of understanding media. However, they did represent the TACC’s understanding of media within the political sphere. They, like others on the island that sought to undermine “messages” in media objects, pointed out the “messages” in media and often connected them to the self-serving intensions of its makers.

This meant that the decoding of media objects had significant implications for media-makers. Notions such as authorship, intentionality, and culpability were commonly attributed to media production. Quite simply, if there is a message, there is a messenger. The TACC often expressed these sentiments along with the assumption that they, like Cuban authorities and elites, could objectively decode “intentional” messages encoded by media-makers. Since the TACC chose to focus their anti-Castro activism on media objects, it is unsurprising that, as first-wave Cuban exiles, they would indict *Three Faces of Cuba* and its makers. These notions of media were not unique to Cuba but rather transcended national borders; the U.S. government and research institutions as well as Soviet Union scholars were invested in media as a means for mass persuasion. For the TACC, these prevailing notions about media were shaped by the historical specificity of the turbulent political struggles of 1950s Cuba. Entrenched in those struggles,
television was a site of political contestation over Cuban modernity that correlate with the TACC’s preferred vision for television.

The TACC subscribed to Cuban pre-Revolution modernity, namely, what Yeidy Rivero has termed “spectacles of decency.” Here Cuban elites are fueled by the belief that cultural productions should adhere to their Eurocentric, Catholic, and sexually restrained ideals. The term was initially created to theorize pre-Revolution elites and their resistance to and desires for Cuban entertainment television. However, concerning the TACC, the term is helpful in conceptualizing their demands and desires for U.S. non-fiction television. In fact, these groups were one and the same since they both lived in Cuba during the 1950s and, as pointed out earlier, were both in Cuba’s higher stratum. They were both Cuban elites that worked against, what they regarded as, indecorous representations on television. For the TACC, this also meant the proper media representations of political-economic systems; namely, positive images of democratic-capitalism and negative images of communism. Since Three Faces of Cuba did not fit these criteria, An Exposé regarded the film as not only subversive but also a “trashy and a fifth-rate production.”

The TACC’s deterritorialization also shaped their media analyses and readings. However, first we must note that the TACC’s exile and those they identified as the culprits were the impetus behind their formation and the motivation behind their activism. From their view, they and their Cuban exiles were forced to flee their homes due to the repression of the Castro regime – a state supported by international communism. The TACC’s understanding of their exile experience, identity, and moral obligation were not only driving factors but shaped their

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interpretations of media. For these reasons, much of the TACC’s reception was cautionary and alarming; calling attention on the most hyperbolic of terms. This, then, necessitated a media analysis that hinged on a communist/anti-communist binary that would then build from that position. For this reason, we must stray from simply labeling them reactionaries, which would be reductive. Rather, An Exposé displays the complexities of the TACC’s exilic experience, positionality, and conceptualization of media.183

The TACC’s experience in Cuba and their political agendas helped them to identify a worthwhile theory to analyze media while in the U.S. Their positionality in their home nation and their trust in the U.S. allowed them to seek out experts from the U.S. military to examine, what they believed to be, communist propaganda. Psychological warfare built on the TACC’s conceptualizations of media and advanced their political agendas as activists.184

The term “psychological warfare” emerged during a post-World War II moment in which the U.S. military intelligence, government agencies, and research institutions placed their efforts in investigating methods of mass persuasion. As pointed out by Christopher Simpson, “At least six of the most important U.S. centers of postwar communication studies grew up as de facto adjuncts of government psychological warfare programs.”185 This included Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia University, Hadley Cantril’s Institute for International Social Research (IISR) at Princeton, and Ithiel de Sola Pool’s Center for International Studies (CENIS) program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to name a

183 The TACC’s motives are further dramatized by their performance as moral, American-loving, Christian Cuban activists. This is not to say that the TACC did not despise communism in Cuba, but rather to consider the performative nature of expressing loss and obligation in their activist strategies.
Similar to Cuban authorities and elites, U.S. military and intelligence agencies viewed mass communication as a tool for persuading targeted groups. Simpson elaborates:

They understood ‘communication’ as little more than a form of transmission into which virtually any type of message could be plugged (once one had mastered the appropriate techniques) to achieve ideological, political, or military goals. Academic contractors convinced their clients that scientific dissection and measurement of the constituent elements of mass communication would lead to the development of powerful new tools for social management, in somewhat the same way earlier science had paved the way for penicillin, electric lights, and the atom bomb.

On the other side of the iron curtain, the Soviet Union conducted research on communications and propaganda. These efforts resemble early 20th century U.S. communication theories like the ‘hypodermic needle model’ and ‘magic-bullet theory,’ which some have noted have never been truly elaborated in scholarly discourse.

In the same era, work on media effects and mass media spread to a number of disciplines that even went beyond the fields of film, media and communications such as political sciences, psychology, and sociology. For example, the Frankfurt School crossed many disciplines and their seminal writings on the cultural industry and applications of critical studies had their origins in trying to understand Nazi propaganda. In fact, the post-World War II era helped to form incubators in different disciplines for the research of media’s effect on populations, each with their own distinctions and histories. This included the aforementioned communication research; Film Studies’ tripartite Apparatus Theory (psychoanalysis, semiotics, Marxist film theory); Media Studies; Latin American Studies; and the scholarships of post-colonialism and decolonialization, which has engaged with the cultural and media imperialism thesis. Even Cultural Studies with its imperatives for looking at actual audiences had investments in

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187 Ibid., 6.
188 Ibid., 6.
190 Buonanno, 2008; Wolf, 1992.
semiotics. Most, if not all, of these works used top-down approaches. The TACC’s *An Exposé* is a rare example of a group, and their collaborators, making use of these notions in their political struggles.\footnote{Chon Noriega briefly mentions that National Mexican-American Anti-Defamation Committee sought government, industry and foundation support to research the impact of negative depictions on racial minorities. This could be another avenue to expand this area of study.}

The TACC regarded psychological warfare as a scientific fact; it was a technique to be mastered and applied or detected and decoded.\footnote{Unique to this case study, the literature on mass persuasion and social management is largely from the top-down, focusing on institutions. Operating from the bottom-up, the TACC is a rarely explored case of a smaller organization utilizing these work for their own political goals.} This, then, necessitated the attainment of experts in psychological warfare to examine a propaganda film like *Three Faces of Cuba*. “Not wanting to depend only on our own appraisal of this insidious film, we retained Edward Hunter, one of the Nation’s best known experts in psychological warfare, to analyze and evaluate the film. We have also obtained evaluations from two other top, reputable experts in ‘psywar,’ Messrs. Karl Baarslag and Oliver Carlson.”\footnote{Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, *An Exposé*, 7.} Modestly, the TACC suggest that their analysis would not be enough, however, at the same time they attain experts to substantiate their condemnation of *Three Faces of Cuba*. It was also an attempt to hail U.S. government officials by highlighting the participation of propaganda experts with military backgrounds. In fact, by their calculation, this would not only increase their chances of getting the attention of U.S. officials but also have them regard the television documentary with reprobation.

It would be tempting to claim that the TACC simply found and applied psychological warfare as a means of interpretation, which is common in the study of media reception. Instead, this study contends that the TACC used psychological warfare theory as a concluding stage in the cultivation of their transnational interpretive strategies. The last layer in an imbrication of meaning-making shaped by their migration and, thus, an expression of their exilic experience.
While non-TACC members (the psychological warfare expects) contributed to the book, it is the TACC that orchestrated its publication: editing, framing, obtained experts, controlled distribution, and provided a film analysis.

Pier to An Exposé, psychological warfare was not a well-formed analytical tool, but rather a lens to criticize propaganda by military intelligence. Thus, the TACC tasked themselves and their collaborators to detail the ways in which the media-texts manipulate audiences from a particular media object and under more specific contexts. As a result, An Exposé provided a close analysis that was unprecedented in previous applications of psychological warfare, especially from the three contributors.

The TACC’s attainment of Edward Hunter, Karl Baarslag, and Oliver Carlson as experts of psychological warfare helped to legitimize An Exposé. Their contributions, the TACC suggested, were an objective, technical, and scientific examinations of Three Faces of Cuba. This points to the TACC’s understanding of knowledge and interpretation as objective, and therefore they dismiss the subjective premise of a documentary like Three Faces of Cuba. The TACC’s acquiring of psychological warfare experts attempted to draw attention to government officials and legitimize their claims. It communicated to their readership the severity of NET’s transgressions and did so with experienced propaganda experts.

The TACC handpicked Hunter, Baarslag, and Carlson based on their experience with propaganda. Hunter was the consultant for psychological warfare to the U.S. Air Force (1953-54) and the Committee for Un-American Activities. He was also the Propaganda Warfare Specialist for the Army of the United States and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and later for the

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194 Non-scholarly publications on psychological warfare or psychological operation often theorized propaganda, including media, in more general and theoretical terms. These works scarcely analyzed specific media objects closely and certainly not with a formal analysis. See for example, Edward E. Hunter, *Brain-washing in Red China: the calculated destruction of men’s minds*. New York: Vanguard Press, 1951.
CIA.\textsuperscript{195} Also, Hunter offered “History-making testimonies” for congressional committees which included “The New Drive Against the Anti-Communist Program,” and “Communist Psychological Warfare (Brainwashing).”\textsuperscript{196} Hunter was credited in bringing the term “brainwashing” into existence, despite the fact that he admittingly “borrowed” the term from a local Chinese group who used it when criticizing their government. Baarslag was recruited because of his experience as a Lieutenant Commander in the office of Naval intelligence (1941-1944) and was “assigned to the ‘Communist Desk.’”\textsuperscript{197} Finally, with no military affiliations and the smallest section in \textit{An Exposé}, the TACC claimed that Carlson was a specialist in propaganda techniques by communists, fascists, and Nazis. \textit{An Exposé} also noted Carlson’s testimony in the 1947 hearings on “Communist Infiltration into the Film and Radio Industries of Hollywood” and, in fact, Carlson was an informant for the U.S. government that served in the effort against the Communist infiltration of Hollywood.\textsuperscript{198} Interestingly, he gained his skillset as the founder of the Young Communist League of America.\textsuperscript{199} Being such an authority, he did not have to watch the film to assess its insidious nature. After Manrara’s opening section, each of the propaganda experts had a section in \textit{An Exposé}, with the TACC and Hunter having the largest parts.

\textit{An Exposé and Psychological Warfare}

\textit{An Exposé} very early on declares that \textit{Three Faces of Cuba} was deceitfully and skillfully made to brainwash Americans:

The film ‘3 Faces of Cuba’ has been made by extraordinarily skilled experts in the Pavlovian science of manipulating the thoughts and reactions of human beings.

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\textsuperscript{195} Carol Harrington, \textit{Politicization of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping}. Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 98; Truth About Cuba Committee, ed.1965a. \textit{An Exposé of the Insidious Film "Three Faces of Cuba"} (Box 123, Folder 23), 44, TACCR.
\textsuperscript{196} Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, \textit{An Exposé}, 44.
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Commercial propaganda professionals call it ‘subliminal’ advertising, or ‘hidden persuaders.’ This is the technique by which ideas are suggested to the viewer and listener by indirect, subtle and insidious means, sometimes positively and others negatively, having its biggest impact thru films because they combine both, the visual and audio senses.200

Much like Cuba’s national film institution declared in its establishment, An Exposé posits that cinema presents the most potent form of persuasion, which, for the TACC, is only further exacerbated by the pervasiveness of broadcast media.201 An Exposé posit a singular objective message, an authority that can intervene in the dissemination of that message, and an author responsible for encoding the message, all of which were common notions in Cuba

The theorization here also includes an additional layer of complexity, one that can be attributed to psychological warfare. Not only were these audiovisuals persuasive, as posited by An Exposé, but they were compelling on the subconscious level; precluding rational decision-making and any alternative interpretations on the part of the viewer.202 Furthermore, the above box quote also displays the way in which the analysis of Three Faces of Cuba adds an imperativeness to the “technical” means of decoding the film-text. Thus, they underscored the importance of having a sort of mechanical precision which could be likened to an enigma machine decoding an encrypted message from an enemy. For the TACC, their expertise, along with their contributors, allowed them to decipher the otherwise unperceivable message hidden in the text. In sum, for the authors, deciphering Three Faces of Cuba was not a matter of opinion or perspective, but rather a scientific certainty. Psychological Warfare theory is deployed to detect and critically examine pro-communist methods of mental and emotional manipulation via the media objects, dovetailing with the TACC’s previously established notions of the media. Also,

200 Ibid., 63.
201 This is very similar to Cuba’s national film institute that proclaimed the influential prowess of cinema in their founding document: Ley 169.
202 The TACC did claim that some viewers could not be so early duped. They included Cuban exiles and knowledgeable Americans. Thus, drawing limitations on Three Faces of Cuba and by extension Psychological Warfare.
this manipulation of the spectator, as suggest by *An Exposé*, is persuasive because it combines the visual and audio.

Pointed out as post-production maneuverings, images with sound were placed on top of one another for psychological manipulation.

These sound effects are the film’s most revealing clues. The soundtrack added to the film in Cuba, and the speech that apparently was dubbed in, constitute the most effective part of the propagandist impact. These background effects are inserted time and time again, and always with obvious intent. A typical scene is that of the smiling faces of children in the so-called new Cuba, with the voice of Castro dubbed in as if a revolutionary chorus. The subliminal intent, of course, is to attribute the happiness of the children to Castro. Otherwise why juxtapose the two? Such calculated coincidence takes place throughout the production, and had to be planned this way. It could not have happened accidentally.\(^\text{203}\)

Edward Hunter theorizes that sound laying on top of or juxtaposed to images produces a message or an idea in the mind of the unbeknownst spectator. Hunter giving no real avenues for alternative interpretations and concludes that the images of smiling Cuban children with Castro’s voiceover inexorably leads the viewer to conclude that Fidel Castro is the source of the children’s happiness. Moments like this were disconcerting for the authors because they were evidence of the ways in which the film was constructed and the powerful ways it engender positive emotions toward communism.

Later, to further bolster their thesis that sound plays a vital role in psychological warfare, *An Exposé* offers “Analysis of Solo Music and Sound Effects of the Film ‘Three Faces of Cuba’” (see figure 8). This chart displays when music and sounds effects could be heard in the film.

Curiously this data was not explicitly used in their analysis, instead it was proffered towards the end of *An Exposé*, and left there as if self-evident of the audio’s role in manipulation. Also, the chart signals to readers that the authors conducted quantitative analysis and thorough research. The authors often considered their readership in their writing and, with the same detail, they also theorized *Three Faces of Cuba*’s audience.

**Conceptualizing Audience**

Despite their apparatus-like and media effects-like theorization, the authors of *An Exposé* do not exactly theorize a universal, theoretical spectator. That is to say, the authors’ analysis of *Three Faces of Cuba* does not posit audiences as monolithic, rather the contributors make
distinctions between groups of viewers and then conceptualize the documentary’s effects on them. However, *An Exposé* also does not survey audiences or use their written reception. Instead, *Three Faces of Cuba*’s audience is conceptualized into groups based on the level of vulnerability and identified through nationality. *Three Faces of Cuba*’s viewers are envisioned as either Americans (adults and the young) or Cubans, with concern placed on the former. They insightfully concluded that the film targeted Americans due to its monolingualism and since the Cuban exile community was too knowledgeable to be duped.

The film is clearly aimed at the brainwashing of the American people, using Red Cuba as a medium. It can hardly be aimed at Cuban exiles, whose views certainly run counter to those interviewed in the picture. That Cubans abroad are not the target is shown, too, by the fact that the film is produced only in English, with no known Spanish version. Its producers surely realized they could not fool the well-informed Cuban exile community, and so sought to ignore it.  

They rightfully point to the film’s English preference over Spanish; from the existing re-edited version of the film the narrators spoke in English (with no Spanish subtitles) and, conversely, all Spanish was translated to English. This insight may have come from the TACC’s strategy of targeting English-speaking Americans. The majority of their publicized literature was in English while internal documents and some correspondences were written in Spanish.

As presented in the above quote, much of *An Exposé* frames Cuba exiles as a united and monolithic group. Jettisoning nuance and complexities in the political views of Cuban exiles, the TACC and their work propagate the image of a unified group and act as their representatives. Hence, when *An Exposé* made comments like *Three Faces of Cuba* “submits the minds of viewers to a diabolical softening-up” they are often addressing Americans and especially their youth.

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204 Ibid., 39.
An Exposé expresses concern over the youth in the U.S. and stressing their impressionable minds and their affinity for accepting information. “This is a most dangerous situation. The characteristics of young minds is that they accept words and facial expressions at face value, which is in the American tradition, and is one of our most prized traits, that we are struggling to preserve and safeguard.” Continuing along these lines, Hunter states “We should not allow advantage to be taken of this natural goodness in youth, so as to exploit and mislead it. That this can be done behind the sugar, bamboo and iron curtains is sad enough, but we betray our youth when we stand back and let it happen here.” To the dismay of the TACC and their collaborators Three Faces of Cuba was not only broadcasted by affiliated NET stations throughout the U.S. but also shown to students in junior high school, high school and colleges as an educational resource.

An Exposé displays the urgency of protecting defenseless adolescents; the TACC and their film consultants were heavily invested in cautioning the American public about Communist indoctrination of the youth. These concerns were not uncommon for U.S. conservatives who felt children were inherently in need of protection from Communism, leftism, and pornography. For Cubans, however, communists targeting children were particularly troubling for two reasons: the growing fear of communist indoctrination on the island and the enduring belief of political generations in Cuba.

Despite their expulsion, the TACC continued to gain information from Cuba through newly arrived members, informants on the island, and surveillance of Cuban national media.

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206 Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, An Exposé, 36.
207 Ibid., 36.
209 The TACC’s weekly publication, “True Flashes,” reported on events in Cuba. Here is an example of one: “True Flashes,” April 22, 1964, The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. Records, Box 121, File 39, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.
would not be a stretch to say that the members of the TACC knew and kept track of the fears of communist indoctrination of children in Cuba in the early 1960s. On the island, this concern was coupled with the anxiety that the state would also take over parental rights of children. In large part, these fears were either fabricated or exacerbated by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Operation Pedro Pan. The CIA’s campaign to discredit the Cuban state, from 1960-1962, included disseminating the notion that Cuban children were being indoctrinated by communist. Indeed, the state mandated Marxism to be taught in school; however, the CIA campaign also fabricated and spread the notion that the Cuban state was going to take control over patria potestad: Cuban’s legal rights over children.

In her study of Operation Pedro Pan and Cuban children, María de los Ángeles Torres documented a Cuban citizen appealing to a U.S. embassy official on the grounds of communist indoctrination:

> The struggle in Cuba today is one between Christianity and freedom and the hammer and sickle and slavery of Russia. If the United States does not act forthrightly in Cuba with a more firm policy now, tomorrow will be too late. There is a program today in Cuba, the object of which is to actively “brainwash” thousands of impressionable Cuban youths between the ages of 12 and 20. This program will in the near future results in these young people becoming devout members and supporters of the Communist Party and then Cuba will be forever lost.\(^{210}\)

Interestingly, this particular Cuban shared values and concerns with the TACC and, much like them, an appealed to an American institution. Ángeles Torres also pointed out that “Throughout November 1960, Radio Swan, a CIA station beamed at Cuba, reported night after night that the Cuban government had plans to abolish parents’ patria potestad and take children away from mothers.”\(^{211}\) These anxieties over the revolutionary government were both actual and

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\(^{211}\) Ibid., 89.
fabricated. These anxieties also played out in the TACC’s interpretation of media, as exemplified by An Exposé, which also helps to explain their focus and conceptualization of young audiences as addressed above. For this reason, An Exposé had a section on the dangers of Three Faces of Cuba on young minds with the concern also popping up in other sections. The TACC’s imperative on protecting the youth can be traced back to these concern on the island.

Secondarily, the TACC’s anxiety over the indoctrination of the young was connected to the prevailing self-organization of Cubans into political generations. Maurice Zeitlin argues as much when she notes that “From the standpoint of our analysis, it is particularly significant that the Cubans themselves see their history to a great extent in generational terms, a fact that is not at all surprising given the dramatic and profoundly traumatic nature of the events that formed several Cuban generations.” Not solely in terms of politics, the TACC was concerned with the morality of the next generations and the future of Western civilization. The TACC conflated democracy, capitalism, Judeo-Christian morality, and modernization and thought of them as in direct opposition to communism. The fight against communism needed to be continued, for the TACC, and thus members of the TACC placed the future of civilization on the small shoulders of the next generation.

Manrara expressed concern over generations of Cubans in “Report on Activities” when he states, that “Whether we, our children, grandchildren and many generations to come will live

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212 Teaching children Marxism and the Cuban Revolution from a Marxist perspective was communist indoctrination from the perspective of most Cuban exiles and some Cubans on the island. However, we must note that, in a sense, all education for the youth is indoctrination. States take this opportunity to indoctrinate their citizens in a national history that supports their legitimacy, this than collaborates with the support of the state’s governing and economic system. For example, teaching democracy and capitalism from an idealist prospective in the United States.

in chains and serfdom, or be free to worship God and to live peacefully, depends entirely on what each and everyone [sic] of us is willing to do and sacrifice NOW, before it is too late!"\textsuperscript{214}

The TACC envisioned themselves working to secure future generations of Cubans and possibly increasing their chances of regaining Cuba one day.

An Exposé frames young and uninformed adult American audiences as vulnerable to psychological warfare and therefore unable to recognize the manipulation of Three Faces of Cuba. The authors do not posit interpretive agency to adolescents since they believe that the young lack a critical lens to apply to media and the objective truth about Cuba. In reality, many idealist college students admired the Cuban Revolution and saw it as inspiration for their resistance against the various ways they conceptualized the establishment. In the simplest terms, the TACC would regard these students as brain washed. An Exposé concludes that young Americans were particularly unequipped to detect the “false” information and formal techniques manipulating their thoughts. The same extended to unknowledgeable adult Americans.

Hunter notes, “The target is the American people generally, who lack the means to check up on what is in the film, and are without sufficient knowledge of propaganda tactics to detect the professional use of it against them.”\textsuperscript{215} From their view, Cuban exiles and “knowledgeable” Americans, being well-informed, would be able to detect the deception in this communist propaganda. The U.S. youth were not the only ones that were intoxicated with the Revolution; adults in the New Left in the U.S., Latina/o activists like the Brown Berets and Black Panthers, for example, looked up to Cuba as a symbol of resistance. More than naiveté, these views, for the authors, were products of communist manipulations and the culprits were the encoders of these media objects.

\textsuperscript{214} The Truth About Cuba Committee, “Report on Activities” Series 4, Box 121, Folder 2.
\textsuperscript{215} Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, An Exposé, 17.
Media Authorship and Culpability

Culpability is a frequently appearing motif in An Exposé and played a significant role in the TACC’s campaign against Three Faces of Cuba. Regarding representation, for instance, the book lambasts the exiled professor, which was the first of the three Cubans featured in the documentary. Garnering the most attention, An Exposé critiques the anonymous exile for making strawman arguments; he is considered a duplicitous representation of Cuban exiles whom really represents the interests of the Castro regime. Hunter notes, “The alleged professor is supposed to present the opinions of an exile, but actually he repeats the hackneyed, red propaganda line as regards [to] both Cuba an[d] the United States.”216 Later in the same vain he states, “It is the faked [sic] exile who really does the job of selling communism to the American people, while at the same time deriding the non-communist Cubans and the Americans as well, for good measure.”217 It would be safe to say that as editors the TACC paid close attention to moments like this one when their collaborators commented on Cubans exiles and their depictions in Three Faces of Cuba. An Exposé strongly proclaimed that the professor’s comments do not represent Cuban exiles but rather “red propaganda.”218 These qualms were at the heart of their case against the exiled professor.

In the existing footage, however, the exiled professor vacillates between critique and giving credit to the Revolution and thus proffered a more complex picture of Cuba’s new governance. However, since those insights did not entirely align with the stark political views of the TACC, the first Cuban’s identity is not only put into question but outright rejected in an effort to essentialize exile Cubanidad. In fact, An Exposé labors in closing off alternative avenues of political thought by Cuban exiles and thus attempts to further circumscribe exile

216 Ibid., 7.
217 Ibid., 7.
218 Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, An Exposé, 28.
Cubanidad. These efforts drew from and further facilitated the image of Cuban exiles as a monolithic political block. That premise allows for the TACC to claim that they represent all Cubans, as they have done throughout their existence. Beyond representation, the TACC held the makers of *Three Faces of Cuba* responsible for creating communist propaganda.

Established early on, *An Exposé* is explicit in their accusations of NET’s cinematic propaganda. Much like Cuban authorities on the island, the authors of *An Exposé* assumed authorship and an objectively decodable text. Since they were experts, they felt they could decipher this message. For this reason, *An Exposé* indicts NET and Robert Carl Cohen for creating and disseminating the film’s insidious message. Baarslag goes a bit further and suggests that American authorities should not stop just at *Three Faces of Cuba*, but instead look into their other productions. “I believe that it is high time that some competent Congressional investigating committee have a good hard look at other N.E.T. productions.” Unequivocally, Baarslag calls on government committee’s for action against NET productions and, in all likelihood, in the hope that they would preempt the production and broadcasting of future programs of this nature. Such blows were also aimed at Robert Cohen.

*An Exposé* suggests that Cohen was, a kind of, communist auteur by underscoring the documentaries he made in and about “Red China,” East Germany, and Cuba. By emphasizing this subversive oeuvre, they further connected Cohen with international communism. Despite the collective effort that goes into making a documentary like *Three Faces of Cuba*, Cohen was the only individual targeted. Later, *An Exposé* offers details on *Committee on Un-American Activities* (1962) a documentary by Cohen that heavily criticizes the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC). This being the only case in which An Exposé listed the names that were involved in the production, however, even then Cohen is attributed liability.\footnote{Listing the names that were involved with the production of Committee on Un-American Activities (1962) was probably done to spur action on the part of the reader.}

An Exposé further denigrates Cohen by discrediting his journalistic integrity. Oliver Carlson states plainly that “Mr. Cohen’s method of selecting, interviewees is just the opposite of the method that would be used by any reputable and objective reporter.”\footnote{Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, An Exposé, 56.} In this and other eras, the idea of objective reporting was part and partial to the notion of journalistic integrity. During the Cold War, this meant subscribing to commercial network’s redeeming project.\footnote{The chairman of the Federal Communication Commission, Newton N. Minow, publicly condemned commercial network television by calling it “a vast wasteland.”} That is to say, in an effort to redeem the television medium, U.S. public opinion was mobilized for a more aggressive foreign policy by embracing the television documentary and special report.\footnote{Curtin, Redeeming the Wasteland, 3.}

NET broadcasted Three Faces of Cuba in this distinct moment, however, did not follow this endeavor, which was led by commercial networks as well as political and corporate leaders.

NET’s decision to diverge from this redeeming project was due to their concerted effort to become the fourth network and compete with the dominance of ABC, CBS, and NBC.\footnote{Norah C. Brooks, “Documentary Programming and the Emergence of the National Educational Television Center as a Network, 1958-1972” (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1994), 3.} They attempted to do so by producing controversial programming such as Three Faces of Cuba and empowering a filmmaker like Cohen whose interests laid in documenting lived-experiences under Marxist states. Clearly, the TACC had conflicting investments with NET and Cohen based on the portrayals of Cuba. The denigration of Cohen’s journalistic integrity was one means to undermine him, NET, and Three Faces of Cuba. Along with condemning the production of Three Faces of Cuba, An Exposé also examines the role of psychological warfare in its representations of race in gender.
The “Film Follows a Racist [and Sexist] Line”?224

Hunter’s analysis of race and gender is less concerned with the symbolic violence against marginalized groups and more concerned with the ways in which their representations are used to further communist goals. For instance, *An Exposé* offers a close analysis of a montage of cabarets with Cuban cultural performances, which include an Afro-Cuban woman. For a lingering moment, the camera gazes at the woman dressed in a two-piece gem-covered costume. Her erotic dance was much like the performances in variety shows that Cuban elites and television critics railed against in an effort to civilize the Cuban female body.225

Likewise, Hunter criticizes these moments, not in defense of the recorded Cuban woman and certainly not on the grounds of sexual objectification. Hunter notes, “The strip-tease girl wriggling in a bikini in an Americanized nightclub scene is apparently a Negress. The film is full of such indirect allusions and slurs. They are subliminal in nature, irrelevant to the proclaimed purpose of the film, usually consisting of asides or reactions circuitously aroused” (my emphasis).226 Beyond the obvious racism, sexism, and cultural ignorance, Hunter picked up on a narrative break in the film-text; a crucial observation in Laura Mulvey’s theorization of the male gaze. It is safe to say that Hunter did not beat Mulvey to the punch when he suggests that the camera’s gaze is a textual interruption of the documentary’s narrative. However, as Hunter notes, it is not a break from the film’s cunning subliminal agendas but rather in narrative continuity. According to *An Exposé*, this cinematic technique aims to seduce the spectator (which is presumed to be a cisgendered, heterosexual male) into a feeble state allowing for the inception of communist notions. Therefore, according to Hunter, the male gaze further veils the actual

224 *An Exposé* has a section dedicated to the analysis of race and gender as represented in *Three Faces of Cuba*. However, the title only includes race: “Film Follows a Racist Line.”
225 Rivero, *Broadcasting*.
226 Baarslag, Carlson, Edward, and Manrara, *An Exposé*. 
communist manipulation. In short, Hunter suggests that the film-text seemingly breaks from the “proclaimed purpose” of the film. However, this is, once again, a ruse and actually a continuation of *Three Faces of Cuba*’s psychological warfare techniques. Unsurprisingly, Hunter is more concerned with the film’s communist deception and less concerned with the racialized sexual objectification of the Afro-Cuban woman, of which he most likely did not recognize.

Later, in an almost semiotic analysis, Hunter argues that the mere appearance of a black person in the film becomes the unconscious signifier of the notion that Afro-Cubans gained racial equality under Castro – i.e., the signified. The author argues that the propagation of this Cuban state myth is a typical communist ploy. While doing so he also reveals his sentiments for racial politics in his own country. Hunter notes,

> The film parallels the communist propaganda lines in practically all respects. One giveaway is the disproportionate stress put upon the Negro as a black man, and his supposed good life in present-day Cuba, as contrasted with the bad life he is supposed to be leading in the United States now, actually likened to his position in Cuba before Castro came on the scene and purportedly rescued him!\(^{227}\)

Hunter makes a visible effort to discredit the Revolution as saviors of Afro-Cubans. According to the Cuban state’s official narrative, the Revolution did away with repressive capitalism and neocolonialism and thus attained racial equality. While debunking that notion was valid, the impetus behind it lacks any actual concern over the marginalization of Afro-Cubans. Revealing of his dubious intentions, Hunter also suggests that African-Americans’ plight in the U.S. was speculative. Undermining his point, he states this during the height of the Civil Rights movement. Later, Hunter continues to untactfully reveal his political views when he discloses his fears that “the socialist-communist political complex in the United States is inciting racial

disorders. A conservative notion of the time, he expresses anxieties over a Black revolution in the U.S. pointing towards the proverbial fear of a Black planet.

In sum, their claim that the “film follows a racist line” is a ploy to use racism and sexism to discredit and expose *Three Faces of Cuba*; it is a superficial critique of the film’s representation of race and gender and a thin veil for their political agendas. As editors, the TACC condoned this logic, which is not much of a surprise considering their positionality in Cuba, the absence of women in leadership roles in their organization, and Manrara’s support of South African apartheid.229

**Conclusion**

An Exposé was a vessel to garner attention and incite action against *Three Faces of Cuba*. The TACC used their critical film analysis to provoke U.S. authorities to intervene in the distribution of *Three Faces of Cuba* and possible open an investigation of NET. Ten years prior, during the height of the Hollywood blacklist, the TACC’s allegations would have held more weight. However, the vestiges of McCarthyism continued to loom in sectors of the U.S. government allowing the TACC’s campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba* to gain traction, as chapter three will elaborate. NET would have to answer to the House Sub-Committee on Latin American Affairs, rather than the TACC’s intended target the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The TACC also managed to get NET on the radar of the FBI and the CIA, as reflected by their records. More than this, the An Exposé an oft-overlooked glimpse into Cuban exile media reception.

The TACC’s writing provided a window into Cuban exile experience via the TACC’s transnational interpretive strategies. Their homeland, the circumstances of their expulsion, and

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228 Ibid., 32.

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their resettlement help to witness the formation of the TACC exile reception. The era before the TACC’s departure in Cuba was one in which the control of media and the meanings behind media objects carried weight, which reflected the two superpower’s preoccupation in mass persuasion as well as scholarly fields. The reason for the TACC’s deterritorialization was at the center of their media activism. It also helped them, along with their conceptualizations of media, to identify a military media theory to analysis *Three Faces of Cuba*. These three sites formed the TACC means of media interpretation, which was more than a collection of reactionary attacks of the television documentary. At the center of their efforts against NET nonetheless, the TACC’s reception of *Three Faces of Cuba* was part of their media activism which diverges from other Latina/o groups in the U.S.\textsuperscript{230} The TACC’s activism was a part of their ethnic enclave’s irredentism; they sought to ruin the reputation of the Revolution in a broader effort to return home, which was tied to Cold War geopolitics. In doing so, the TACC also participated in conservative politics of the era by allying with conservative organizations, advocates, U.S. officials, and news professionals. In this case, the TACC collaborated with self-proclaimed propaganda experts to write *An Exposé*. Initially the TACC’s involvement in conservative struggles in the U.S. was unintentional; however, it became calculated when they recognized their mutual interest: eradicating all forms of communism threatening the U.S.

The TACC’s main objectives, political positions, immigrant status, partnerships with conservative white Americans, and their relationship with the U.S. and Cuban state together delineated the boundaries between the TACC and their Latina/o contemporaries. Even while they

\textsuperscript{230} Latinas/os in the U.S. has made concerted and individualized efforts to resist U.S. media portrayals with film reception which date back as early as the 1910s. For example, Mexican nationals in the U.S. used film criticism to notify their government officials of derogatory images of Mexicans and Mexico as part of a national project to deter denigrating films from Hollywood. While critiques of deplorable representations precede the TACC, the form of interpretation used on *Three Faces of Cuba* marks the distinction between them and their contemporaries. See Laura Isabel Serna, “As A Mexican I Feel It’s My Duty’: Citizenship, Censorship, and the Campaign Against Derogatory Films in Mexico, 1922-1930.” *The Americas*, vol. 63, no. 2 (2006), 225-244.
shared concerns with the on-screen images of themselves and their country of origin, the way in which their reasons, logic, and objections differed. Also, the TACC, unlike other Latina/o activist groups, were unconcerned with Hollywood but rather focused their energy on broadcast news media due to its ability to reach a wide audience daily and quickly. This is not to say that Latina/o activists were not concerned with representations in the news media (they were) but rather that the TACC exclusively focused on broadcast and print media, foregrounding the former. Moreover, the TACC were outliers among their Latina/o media activist contemporaries because of their methods of analysis.

*An Exposé* was a part of a larger campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba* and NET. The next chapter outlines the TACC’s concerted effort with other Cuban exile groups, much like their efforts with CPCL of Hartford, and U.S. conservatives. The TACC and their collaborators from other organizations gained visibility on television and radio to explain their case against *Three Faces of Cuba* and NET. They also used these opportunities to tell audiences about their anti-communist anti-Castro cause.

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231 The TACC was invested in the “truth about Cuba” and did not express value in hegemonic messages in fictional narrative.
CHAPTER THREE

The Fourth Face of Cuba:
The Campaign Against National Educational Television and Three Faces of Cuba

Figure 9. Madison Wisconsin State Journal, March 8, 1965, n/a.

On the 26th of March in 1965, the president of the Truth About Cuba Committee (TACC), Luis V. Manrara, appeared on Channel 2 WTHS-TV, the Miami station affiliated with the National Educational Television (NET) network. Representing the Cuban exile activist group, Manrara read a prepared statement cautioning NET viewership about the documentary

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232 Founded as the National Educational Television and Radio Center, NET provided programming for public broadcasting in the US. In 1963, they changed their name to NET to function more as a television network.
Three Faces of Cuba (1965), which was set to air that night (see figure 9).\(^{233}\) Manrara and the TACC considered the film to be pro-communist, pro-Castro, and anti-American propaganda masquerading as an objective account of post-Revolution life in Cuba. From the TACC’s standpoint, audiences of the film would be easily duped about the state of the island-nation.\(^{234}\) The TACC, speaking for their ethnic enclave, felt that they deserved the right to protect Cuba against, what they believed to be, biased and misleading representations.\(^{235}\) The TACC received this airtime largely due to the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine.\(^{236}\) This policy granted voices of dissent “equal time” to present opposition to a topic that was covered on television in order to have balanced coverage.\(^{237}\) Manrara’s appearance on Channel 2, a panel titled the Fourth Face of Cuba (1965), was but one part of the TACC’s broader campaign against Three Faces of Cuba.

This chapter discusses the TACC and Manrara’s efforts to rebuke Three Faces of Cuba and NET by appearing on locally broadcasted programming. To further sully NET’s reputation, they also disseminated damning reports of the documentary to radio programs, television stations, institutions of learning, libraries, and organizations, as well as took out ad space in The Miami Herald. This chapter argues that the TACC attempted to sway the U.S. public against Three Faces of Cuba, NET, and the Castro regime by tapping into broadcast media, the press, periodicals, institutions of learning, and libraries. They did so by partnering with likeminded anti-Castro and anti-communist organizations and individuals with overlapping political interests. Even with the help of other groups, these endeavors were tall orders for newly arrived


\(^{234}\) Manrara acknowledged that it was not only the efforts by the TACC, but also outraged Cuban exiles in the Dade County and the Miami region.


\(^{236}\) The Fairness Doctrine was a FCC policy that required broadcasted licenses holders, regarded as “public trustees,” to present contrasting positions on polemical matters to be equitable and balanced in their coverage.

\(^{237}\) The TACC also gave credit to Floridian Cuban exiles in general for helping to obtain equal time.
émigrés; reaching the public on the national-level was a major challenge. However, due to their headquarters in Miami, which had a close proximity to broadcast stations, the TACC were able to reach South Floridians. In the TACC’s pursuit to stop the broadcasting of *Three Faces of Cuba*, they appeared on South Floridian television and radio, and gained visibility in periodicals, libraries, colleges, universities, and a publicized screening of the documentary at a local educational center in the Miami-Dade school district. Acts such as these were meant to bring awareness of their concerns about *Three Faces of Cuba*. However, they also show that the TACC put their trust in the U.S. public (and not only U.S. authorities as we have seen in the previous chapter) to have *Three Faces of Cuba* withdrawn and prevent the distribution of future documentaries of its kind. The TACC’s tactic in getting television appearances was indebted to the public broadcast policy and activism of the era.

The strategies and agency of activists are circumscribed not only by their political clout, finances, and resources but also by the legal, technical, historical, industrial, and political specificity of their circumstances. Like any organization, the TACC’s activist strategies and actions were limited but also draw from activism of the era. For example, the FCC introduced the fairness doctrine in 1949, which obligated broadcast license holders to air “controversial” topics in an even and balanced manner. This allowed political and social groups to demand visibility on television to refute political views that were aired on programs – this was commonly referred to as “equal time.” In turn, this afforded the Chicana/o and Puerto Rican media activists (among other activists) a means to gain visibility for their cause. For the TACC it did the same, but in their case, this meant opportunities to undermine pro-Revolution representations and the Castro regime. Without the fairness doctrine, the TACC would not have appeared on television as frequently as they did.²³⁸

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²³⁸ The fairness doctrine was established in 1949 and popularized by activists in the 1960s.
Members of the TACC were able to tap into broader networks and reach a large number of Americans. To do so, the TACC enlisted allies. As they have done in their other campaigns, the TACC worked with other anti-Castro groups and U.S. conservatives (such as Edward Hunter, the U.S. military expert in psychological warfare) to shape U.S. public opinion motivated by their overlapping political interests. The TACC and these groups worked together and made attempts to alter popular opinion by targeting media. This cooperative “war of position” (a group’s attempt to change conventional wisdom) were attempts to shift hegemony (the dominance of ideas that sustains the power of privileged groups over others) in their favor.

This case study suggests that while groups may have dissimilar central agendas like Cuban exiles (irredentism) and U.S. conservatives (pushing the U.S. further right), they can and have worked collaboratively based on an intersecting interest (anti-communism) to sway public opinion.

The TACC also worked with a host of individuals without overlapping or explicit political interests but with personal incentives; media professionals, the Miami-Dade school district, and James I. Keller (director of the Miamian NET station) may not have necessarily saw eye to eye with the TACC but gave them access to resources due to their own self-interests. For example, radio programs gained a controversial story with local interest by hosting the TACC, Miami-Dade school district cooperated with the publicized screening of Three Faces of Cuba at the request of the TACC to assuage the outrage by the Cuban community, and Keller may have been obligated to give voices of dissent visibility on NET, but it also gave the station an opportunity to increase rating by organizing and broadcasting the Fourth Face of Cuba.

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239 Scholars of media have focused on single groups and the way they make attempts to alter popular ideas by targeting media in order to gain more prominence for themselves and their ideals.

Even with these affordances, the TACC strategy was not without its challenges. First, while the U.S. government’s official position was opposition to the Cuban state, not all sectors of the U.S. agreed. Those with left-leaning sensibilities like the Students for a Democratic Society or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee certainly did not, and they had national prominence. Second, while the TACC impressively widened the reach of their anti-NET message (notably reaching federal institutions and U.S. authorities), their efforts to sway public opinion were restricted to South Florida. Their visibility in this issue appeared more so regionally than nationally. Second, the TACC were forced to quickly learn how to navigate the complications that arose from collaborative efforts, which at times proved difficult. In one case, Paul D. Bethel, the leader of another Cuban activist group, felt that he was better equipped to represent the anti-Cuban state position than Manrara or any Cuban. Despite this negative experience, the TACC drew from their collaborations with different groups and persons and advanced their political agendas.

The chapter is divided into four main parts that begin by covering the events leading up to Manrara’s appearance on *Fourth Face of Cuba*, then leads into an examination of the actual program. Building on this experience, Manrara participated in equal time in Tampa, Florida in a collaborative effort with the Association of Cuban Exiles of St. Petersburg (ACESP) against *Three Faces of Cuba*. The next section will examine the publicized events surrounding the writing and distribution of *An Exposé of the Insidious Film... ‘Three Faces of Cuba’*. Lastly, this chapter will cover some of the significant results of the TACC’s activism against *Three Faces of Cuba* and NET.

“Stumbling Stones:” Fighting *Three Faces of Cuba* in Regional Television Stations

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241 I should not that some Americans did not nor care to take a position for or against the Cuban Revolution.
The anecdote that opened this chapter with Manrara valiantly winning equal time and coming to the aid of his home nation is a bit romanticized. In reality, this moment was the accumulation of false starts, backtracks, gradual progress, and a few leaps forward. This could characterize the TACC’s efforts against NET in general. As newly arrived immigrants, it was an effort that included navigating the uncharted territory of media activism against an uncooperative (or at times simply reluctant) television network. Convincing the American public and authorities of the dangers of pro-Castro communist propaganda within its media industry would be challenging. Thus, it was unsurprising that the TACC was confronted with obstacles.

In fact, in Manrara’s personal notes he recounted, what he called, the “Stumbling Stones” that interfered with their protest of Three Faces of Cuba. For instance, upon hearing about its initial broadcast on the 22nd of March in 1965, the TACC attempted to send an urgent telegram to the WTHS-TV station to preempt their second broadcast, which was scheduled for the next day.\footnote{Swan Song, June 30, 1967, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 10, Folder 5, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida, 15.} Much to the dismay of Manrara, Miami’s Western Union Station refused to transmit their telegram to channel 2 and only offered apologies three months later. One is left to wonder how a telegram could have thwarted a second broadcast, however, this was Manrara’s contention.

After the initial two showings of Three Faces of Cuba, Manrara requested that NET provide a private screening of Three Faces of Cuba for himself and a selected few in order to closely examine the documentary. It was here that the TACC flew in Edward Hunter to examine the documentary. Based on this viewing, Hunter would later contribute his own section in An Exposé of the Insidious Film... ‘Three Faces of Cuba.’ Manrara felt that the screening was purposefully being denied and then delayed despite WTHS-TV’s agreement to cooperate. Manrara placed this blame squarely on James I. Keller, the director of the Miamian NET station.
the president of the Community Television Foundation of South Florida. It was this organization that operated NET’s local station WTHS-TV in Miami. Manrara documented this event for the TACC’s record and stated, “Mr. James I. Keller, responsible for operation of ‘educational’ Channel 2, tried as hard as he could to prevent us from showing ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ in a private exhibition where we offered to analyze the film and prove our contention that it was pro-communist and anti-American.”

Addressing Channel 2 viewers, Keller claimed to have given Manrara several opportunities to view Three Faces of Cuba, however, the venue was never satisfactory because Manrara continuously made additions to his guest list. Keller recounts this event:

Mr. Manrara requested that the film be made available for a private showing. Arrangements were made for this preview to take place on Friday, April 2, at 10 a.m. Mr. Manrara then requested that the preview be changed to later in the afternoon of that same day. Arrangements were made to have the showing at 3 p.m. that day in a room which would accommodate 20 people. Again, this was not agreeable to the protesting representatives as they said they planned on anywhere from 100 to 150 people to view the film. Mr. Manrara asked that the preview be delayed until the following week when a suitable viewing area could be found to accommodate the anticipated audience.

Unafraid to name names, Kelley sought to defend Channel 2 WTHS-TV from the criticism that they were uncooperative with voices of dissent. They outlined their cooperation while, of course, taking the opportunity to paint themselves in a favorable light. The WTHS-TV station shifted blame to Manrara and, later in the same document, tactfully slighted NET for sending the documentary in the first place. In this regard, the TACC did not seem to offer a response to Keller other than to archive the circulation letter sent to Channel 2 viewers.

The next “Stumbling Stone” was with The Miami Herald. The TACC and Cuban exiles, in general, had somewhat of a turbulent relationship with the prominent newspaper; the more

244 Newsletter from Channel 2 WTHS-TV to Channel 2 Viewers by James I. Keller, Jr., April 5, 1965, The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. Records, Box 123, Folder 9, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.
conservative Cubans nicknamed the newspaper “Moscow Herald.”\textsuperscript{245} In this case, the president of the TACC pointed a finger to the Knight Newspaper, Inc (owners of \textit{The Miami Herald} among other newspapers) and their refusal to run the TACC’s advertisement. This “advertisement” was actually an early and abridged version of \textit{An Exposé} in which the TACC, representing all Cuban exiles, denounced \textit{Three Faces of Cuba}. \textit{The Miami Herald} would eventually publish the advertisement on August 8th, 1965 under the title “Here’s why so many were shocked by the showing of ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ on Educational TV Channel 2 – Miami.”\textsuperscript{246} \textit{The Miami Herald}’s initial reluctance to print a political message under the thinly veiled guise of an advertisement may have come from a position of journalistic integrity. Certainly, these spots were meant for the advertisement of goods and services. Allowing a denunciation that could be mistaken for an article could have compromised the integrity of the newspaper, if only slightly. Still, this was not enough for Manrara who felt that the printed ad came too late and should have never been refused in the first place. He was further reassured about his position when an associate, an unidentified “advertising specialist,” evaluated the ad and gave it a positive review. If I were to speculate, it is very likely that this was a fellow Cuban exile employed in advertisement.\textsuperscript{247} The TACC would prove to be more effective in their joint endeavors; however, the Manrara would soon learn that collaborations would not be without its challenges during a televised panel with leaders of anti-Castro organizations.

\textbf{The \textit{Fourth Face of Cuba}: Equal Time in Miami}

Due to “considerable amount of protest,” NET’s Channel 2 in Miami hosted and televised an hour-long program titled \textit{Fourth Face of Cuba} (1965) so that representatives of the Cuban

\textsuperscript{245} María Cristina García, \textit{Havana USA} p105
\textsuperscript{246} The Truth About Cuba Committee, “Here’s why so many were shocked by the showing of ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ on Educational TV Channel 2 - Miami,” \textit{The Miami Herald}, August 4, 1965, 11-A.
exile community could voice their grievances. Participating in a televised response to *Three Faces of Cuba* was a significant moment for the TACC and their ambitions to pit the U.S. public against the documentary and NET. They regarded television as the most pervasive medium and sought out every opportunity to gain visibility to its viewers. Participating in equal time was paramount for the TACC’s campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba*. However, we should note that the *Fourth Face of Cuba*, of course, was not nationally televised. Rather, the panel and by extension the TACC’s potential reach would be circumscribed by the broadcast range of Channel 2 WTHS-TV in Miami. This fact was not lost on Manrara. Nevertheless, to reach the Greater Miami area was substantial. However, before gaining this access, Manrara would have to navigate the racially charge undercurrent of working with his anti-communist white counterparts. This realization would dawned on Manrara when preparing for the *Fourth Face of Cuba*.

According to Manrara, James I. Keller, Jr. was forced to give equal time to Cuban exiles representatives, which included the TACC. If one were to have asked Paul D. Bethel, the executive director of the Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, it was he who obtained equal time. Yet Keller tactfully suggested it was not by force but rather a sense of obligation that Channel 2 *gave* equal time to voices of dissent. In a letter to Channel 2 viewership, Keller states “A considerable amount of protest from our viewing audience prompted us to give these objectors an opportunity to voice their opinions of the ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ on Channel 2.” For each of them, taking credit for equal time was a part of an effort to shape public perception of their organizations. The heads of the two activist groups wanted to be seen as making tangible

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progress and, as we will see, Bethel did so at the expense of Cuban exiles. Keller, on the other hand, wanted it to be known that the WTHS-TV was not contesting but rather cooperating with voices of dissent, much in the spirit of the fairness doctrine.

Hence, Keller assigned José Borrell, a WTHS-TV employee, to organize a panel of representatives of local Cuban exile organizations to be televised under the title the Fourth Face of Cuba (1965). When Borrell telephoned Manrara the offer, he promptly agreed. He then asked Manrara if extending an invitation to Bethel was a good idea, which Manrara replied in the affirmative. Within the hour, according to Manrara, an associate and newly added panelist Henry Sanz asked Manrara if he knew that Bethel had obtained equal time from Channel 2. Manrara was surprised to hear this news, however, not as shocked when, later, Borrell called Manrara back with the suggestion that he should be removed from the panel altogether. This recommendation was not Borrell’s alone. Manrara states, “Bethel suggested that there should be only American citizens in the panel since the press and the public had some animosity against the Cuban exiles.”

Here and in the future, Bethel implied that he (and the other white panelists) were more capable of participating in the debate against Three Faces of Cuba. This was the first of many attempts from Bethel to silence and shape Cuban exile voices.

What made Bethel so certain about this assessment? Why was he convinced that he, in particular, could represent Cuba better than any Cuban? The source of Bethel’s hubris may have been his experience as the Press Attaché and Director of Public Relation to the American embassy in Havana from 1958-1961, his service to the U.S. Information Agency in Florida, where he interviewed Cuban exiles for two years, or from being the editor of the “Cuba Research

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“Report” and a number of books on Cuba. Bethel was certainly qualified and knowledgeable, and he felt this granted him the authority to remove Cubans from the popular discourse surrounding their native country and to speak on their behalf and without their consent.

With that said, there was a kernel of truth in his previous statement, one that needed to be qualified and contextualized. Hearing arguments from white males about Cuba would have been more palatable to white Floridians since they did express skepticism and anxiety over their new immigrant neighbors. One example of this expression came in the form of the television documentary titled *Crisis Amigo* (1961). It claimed to be an honest exploration of the issues surrounding the arrival of Cubans in Miami. However, Cuban observers stated that documentary claimed that Cubans were drug dealers, prostitutes, and gang leaders. Also recognizing the negative bias against Cuban exiles, the Cuban Refugee Program put together a PR campaign addressing the positive impact Cubans were having on the community and local economy.

The presumptions about Cuban immigrants were used against Manrara to silence and shape his contributions in the *Fourth Face of Cuba*. Surely, Manrara, the TACC, and many other Cuban exiles were capable of making convincing arguments and conducting themselves with a level of propriety that resonated with white middle to upper-class viewers. This is not to promote respectability but rather to suggest that many Cubans, in general, and Manrara,

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253 “Crisis, Amigo Special,” *The Miami Herald*, December 5, 1961, 18-A.


255 Marshall Wise and Cuban Refugee Center.

256 This is not to promote respectability but rather to suggest that Manrara, the TACC, and many other Cubans strongly adhered to these standards and would have done so on *Fourth Face of Cuba*, which would have resonated with white middle to upper class audiences.
specifically, strongly adhered to these standards and would have done so on the *Fourth Face of Cuba*. Bethel’s action here, and in the future, would suggest he was better equipped to defend and represent Cuba.

To the suggestion that only Americans be present on the panel, Manrara replied: “I thoroughly disagreed with Bethel in the first place, and that, precisely, if the press and the people were attacking us it was incumbent upon us to defend ourselves.”257 Borrell was in agreement and continued to play intermediary between Manrara and Bethel. In one instance, Borrell asked for a favor of Manrara, which was to voluntarily withdraw from the panel.258 Once again, Manrara defended his right to be present and, finally, it was settled. Manrara would appear along with three other anti-communist panelists and representatives of anti-Castro groups: Bethel, Henry Sanz, and Jay Mallin. Leaving Manrara as the only Cuban panelist.

Two hours before the program was to air, all the panelists were to meet in Bethel’s office to prepare a press release. All the non-Cuban panelists met first and once Manrara arrived they began to work on the press release. Unsurprisingly the other panelists rejected Manrara’s contributions. Manrara eventually accepted what was written “for the sake of peace.”259 Once the press release was done, the panelists then rehearsed for the *Fourth Face of Cuba*; they attempted to stage the panel discussion as much as possible. Without fail, when Manrara finished reading his prepared statement, a small section that would later be incorporated in *An Exposé*, Bethel protested. This time it was about the length of the statement, the other panelists and an assistant of Bethel agreed with the objection. At this moment, Manrara stood his ground and told them that he “was going to read the whole statement whether they liked it or not.” All this while

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258 Ibid., 1.
259 Ibid., 2.
attempting to keep his composure. Manrara knew that Americans had perceived Cubans as overtly emotional. He expressed as much in his report to members of the TACC, stating that he did not want to be perceived as “highly emotional” to American. Coincidently just the day before this meeting, Jack E. Anderson, the television critic for *The Miami Herald*, conveyed similar sentiments. Anderson commented, “Neither [Three Faces of Cuba] nor Channel 2 – and particularly not the latter – deserves the kind of intemperate attacks being made on them by their emotionally supercharged critics.” Earlier in that article, Anderson identified “the local Cuban refugee colony” as those critics. Knowing that this was a prominent stereotype of Cubans, Manrara knew that when he had objections they could not be presented in a way that could be read as too emotional.

The irony here was that during their rehearsal for equal time, Bethel, frustrated at Manrara for not taking his suggestions, left abruptly and threatened to pull out the panel all together. Bethel would eventually return and they all agreed upon on the statements they were going to read and points they were to make. When the time came, the panel went as planned, however, Manrara felt he received less time than expected. Yet, he still managed to quickly finish his statement towards the end of the program. Manrara’s assessment of the final product was positive, although he had wished the panel included more of an analysis and criticism of *Three Faces of Cuba*. His main objection, however, was with Keller acting as moderator. Manrara felt that Keller was the opposition and could not remain unbiased.

In his report, Manrara posed the following questions: “Isn’t the Moderator supposed to be an impartial person? How could Mr. Keller be impartial when we were attacking him, his station and his program?” Manrara was a bit overzealous in his conflation of the three because, as we

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260 Ibid., 2.
know, *Three Faces of Cuba* was not created or produced by Keller or this particular NET station, Channel 2. Keller and WTHS-TV only condoned the program by accepting to broadcast it locally. Returning to Manrara’s criticism of Keller, he states that “of course, Mr. Keller was anything but an impartial Moderator. And I, more than any other member of the Panel, suffered Mr. Keller’s impartiality.”²⁶² How exactly did Keller’s impartiality effect Manrara more than the other panelists? Was it because as the only Cuban he felt that he could not protest Keller’s presence on the program the way he would have liked? In another report of that evening, Manrara brought some clarity to these questions: “Mr. Keller, who was supposed to be the Moderator, was actually the advocate for the film, and, acting as Moderator, had all the advantage on his part. I thought this was unfair of Mr. Keller although I did not tell him, or protest it, so as to avoid further criticism of the Cubans being highly emotional” (my emphasis).²⁶³

This is a rare example of the way a stereotype can shape a person’s behavior. Being highly emotional was a pervading stereotype for Latinas/os in the U.S. Throughout the history of U.S. television and film an impulsive temperament was associated with the Latina/o image.²⁶⁴ This notion can be traced to a lineage of U.S. mediated stereotypes, particularly an ancestor to the hotblooded Latina/o image, which was so pervasive that it permeated varying types of mediated stereotypes. The Mexican greaser, *el bandido*, the Harlot, and the Latin Lover were mediated stereotypes with extreme emotions and uncontrollable actions.²⁶⁵ However, these categories are not static, rather, they are continuously reimagined and redeployed by (often more

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privileged) cultural producers and to their financial, creative, and hegemonic benefit. They also do not solely live within a diegesis; rather, they can have real world consciences as they are deployed in, for example, political struggles to undermine a Latina/o immigrant group. Stereotype can be reconfigured to the convenience of the dominant group’s needs, which are also shaped by the specificity of the historical moment.

To be fair, there was a grain of truth about Cubans being expressive and the Latina/o stereotype. There are marked differences in acceptable argument styles between white-American hegemonic culture and cultural practices in Cuba. Whereby Americans attempt to verbally best opponents, all the while remaining composed. Cubans, on the other hand, can view displays of passion and even outbursts as acceptable performative practices. Rather, than read as a cultural difference, it was expressed and deployed as a negative feature. In addition, this stereotype, as they all do, failed to recognize the complexity of groups; surely not all Cubans argued in this manner. All this to say, it is true that American television audiences could have read a Cuban-style argumentation as representative of a weak or extreme position. However, member of the TACC, particularly Manrara, knew the value of presenting themselves in front of Americans. Despite this, critics of Three Faces of Cuba used this reasoning for their own benefit and attempted to silence and ultimately shape the position of Cuban exiles, in this case, the TACC.

This dismissive stereotype was not only mobilized by anti-Communist allies but also liberal observers of Cuban protests to NET. Those that disagreed with the TACC’s assessment of NET’s programming used the overtly emotional stereotype in an attempt to undercut Cuban’s positions altogether. They made the argument that Cubans were overreacting and that documentaries like Three Faces of Cuba were actually fair. While these notions were discreetly conveyed, their impact was felt and ever-present in the mind of Manrara. Manrara was forced to
navigate the negative perceptions of Cubans by white Floridians and some white conservative allies.

Later, speaking on behalf of not only the TACC but all Cubans, Manrara responded to these accusations by answering more directly to the complaints about their hyperbolic criticism of NET.

“Finally, I would like to say a word of justification for the Cuban legitimate, authentic, anti-communist exiles who have been so indignant with the exhibition of this brainwashing film, for which we have been unjustly criticized. True, we are emotional and speak loud ... but, who isn’t?”

The essentialization of Cuban exiles aside, Manrara turns the stereotype on its head by arguing that they are passionate for good reason. He then poses the question: wouldn’t you be, too?

Evoking sentimentality, Manrara explains,

Just imagine…and please be understanding with us Cubans ...How would you feel if you lost your country. If loving and close members of your family have been assassinated or arbitrarily arrested and abused, physically and morally... your home and friends and everything that had any meaning to you forcibly and unjustly taken away from you. How would you feel? Would you be calmed and collected if, after suffering all that misery and having found a haven in a friendly country you are confronted with the shocking spectacle that the communists are attempting to do to your American friends what they did to you? Would you not protest? Would you not be indignant and terribly concerned? I know you would, for you are, like us, human beings, created by the same God and we are, at heart, close brothers!!

Manrara suggests that this expression of concern is not irrational nor inherently Cuban, but rather sensible and universally human. In doing so, in typical Manrara fashion, he redirects conflict with white Americans and reminds them that they and the Cubans are one and the same. Despite Manrara’s remarks and the contributions of Cubans in South Florida, New York, Boston, and Delaware, Bethel among others continued to erase Cubans’ efforts against *Three Faces of Cuba.*

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For example, published in a reader’s column titled “Public Letters,” Bethel condemned *Three Faces of Cuba* and purposefully left out Manrara, the TACC, and Cuban exiles in general. Yet, Bethel cited the denouncement of Ralph Renick, a famous news anchor in South Florida. Likewise, *Human Events*, a conservative-leaning newspaper based in Washington D.C., reported Bethel’s actions against *Three Faces of Cuba* while ignoring Cuban exiles. An article titled “Castro Praised on ETV” stated that “The Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba, Inc.,…issued a strong protest to NET and asked the Federal Communications Commission to give equal time to respond under the FCC’s own controversial ‘fairness doctrine.’” Bethel was a regular contributor of *Human Events* and together, in the coming years, continued to condemn NET and their Cuban documentaries with no mention of Cubans to be found.

Despite this erasure, the TACC considered the *Fourth Face of Cuba* a success in that they were able to read a shortened version of their prepared statement on television informing the U.S. public of the ills of *Three Faces of Cuba*. The *Fourth Face of Cuba* was televised on at least two occasions on channel 2: March 26th and April 2nd. This visibility of their organization and their crusade would lead to another televised panel.

**Equal Time in Tampa, Florida**

Learning from their experience in Miami, in early April the TACC partnered with another Cuban exile group in St. Petersburg, Florida. The president of the Association of Cuban Exiles of St. Petersburg (ACESP), Juan T. O’Naghten, was impressed with Manrara’s performance on The *Fourth Face of Cuba*. So much so that he ask Manrara to appear and help organize another panel.

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269 Ibid., 5.
270 Ibid., 5.
against *Three Faces of Cuba*.272 O’Naghten, a Cuban exile with Irish descent, and the ACESP had won equal time and was tasked with organizing an appearance on WEDN-TV Channel 3 in Tampa, Florida.273

Only a month before this joint effort, on the 27th of March, O’Naghten mailed a three-page condemnation of *Three Faces of Cuba* to U.S. authorities, with copies sent to members of the ACESP.274 The ACESP identified four categorizations of influential individuals, organizations, and institutions. In their own words, these categories comprised of thirteen different “Funcionarios Públicos” (Public Workers) which were mostly Senators but also included the director of U.S. information Agency, the State Department of Education, and the Mayor of Tampa; nine “Periódicos, periodistas, estaciones de radio y TV” (News Publications and radio and television stations), including John F. White the president of NET; fifty-four “Colleges & Junior Colleges & Universidades del Estado de la Florida” (Universities of the state of Florida); and thirty-two “Civic Clubs” in St. Petersburg.275

In this letter, O’Naghten argued that the film was communist propaganda, veiled the truth about the Castro regime, and should not be labeled educational. Much like the TACC will do in the future, however, without textual arguments. Months before the TACC, ACESP attempted to get the attention of U.S. officials and asked them to get involved in the efforts against *Three Faces of Cuba*. While it is unclear if the TACC discovered this tactic here, they did have documents of these letters in their record.

Returning to early April, O’Naghten and Manrara communicated over mail and telephone to organize their television appearance. Early on, they determined that they needed to include an

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273 Ibid.

274 Circulation letter from Juan T. O’Naghten to Sustaining Members, March 27, 1965, Box 17, Folder 13, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.

275 Ibid.
“American” (code for white-American male) on the panel for more legitimacy. O’Naghten had already recruited Manuel J. Alayón, the president of the Cuban Civic Club in Tampa, to appear on the panel, which meant they had three Cuban in total. Interestingly, O’Naghten was reluctant to include Bethel because he felt it was not a good idea to have two panelists from The Fourth Face of Cuba. One could only wonder if Manrara had nudged him in that direction over the course of their conversations, however, no letter indicated as such. Passing on Bethel, Manrara sent the Chairman of the Florida chapter of the American Legion, Robert A. Francis, an invitation to participate. Francis also had ties to the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which had appeal for Manrara. Unfortunately, Francis declined the invitation citing a lack of flexibility in his work. Manrara then moved on to Sumter L. Lowry a retired General, this also did not pan out. However, in his failed attempts, we gain insight into the types of “American” collaborators Manrara viewed as viable options, which foreshadowed the attainment of the contributors in An Exposé. Ultimately, they rounded out their panel with James M. Newton, who O’Naghten had picked, but seemed to lack extensive knowledge about Cuba other than his four years of experience in Cuba as a U.S. Naval Reserve.

In a letter to the program director of WEDU-TV, Holt Riddleberger, O’Naghten confirmed the details of the panel. Of particular interest were the agreed upon topics to be addressed. O’Naghten listed three topics: “1) our analysis and evaluation of the ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ program; 2) a comparison of living conditions in Cuba before communism and now; 3)
the significance and threat to the American people of a communist regime existing in the heart of America. These general topics were quite common for antagonists of Three Faces of Cuba.

The day of the panel, Manrara was pleasantly surprised at the generous amount of time NET’s Tampa station allotted for the discussion. Beginning at 9 p.m. and running to 11:30 P.M., the discussion generally followed the prearranged topics. The conversation, however, lacked a close analysis of the documentary. This prompted Manrara to address the film more directly; he stated that “I tried as hard as I could to analyze the film ‘3 Faces of Cuba’ and I had some success at it.” While the TACC and their collaborators in An Exposé attributed a lot of importance to the formal construction of the documentary, this was not common practice among non-TACC members when they were critical of Three Faces of Cuba. Reflecting on the panel, Manrara felt that the program was satisfactory, however, he had his reservations about its effectiveness. Manrara placed this shortcoming on O’Naghten’s public speaking. He expressed remorse that O’Naghten had taken up most of the conversation. Manrara stated, “He consumed more time than any other member of the panel. O’Naghten has a tremendous disadvantage to public speaking because he speaks so fast that it is difficult to understand him in English or in Spanish.” In addition, Manrara also pointed out the fact that Newton had not watched Three Faces of Cuba and was “completely unprepared.” While not fully satisfied with the program, this experience did not stop Manrara and the TACC to continue to seek out further partnerships.

An Exposé of the Insidious Film… ‘Three Faces of Cuba’

The events leading up to the publishing of An Exposé and its distribution after displays the TACC’s attempt to shape public opinion albeit circumscribed within the boundaries of South

281 Ibid., 1.
282 Ibid.
Florida. The TACC’s circulated sections of the book and spoke out against *Three Faces of Cuba* as *An Exposé* was being development. After it was published, the TACC distributed *An Exposé* as wide as possible. An abridged version of the TACC’s analysis of *Three Faces of Cuba*, found in *An Exposé*, was first read by Manrara on the *Fourth Face of Cuba*. The statement was then read at length on two radio programs: the “Alan Courtney” program on station WINZ on March 27, 1965, and the “Norb Gariety” program on station WMIE on April 4, 1965. The TACC also used parts of that statement during their attempts to shape media news professionals. For instance, Eduardo Ulacia, the treasure of the TACC, wrote to WCKT Channel 7 television station and the Sunbeam Television Corporation. He attempted to convince their media professionals to oppose *Three Faces of Cuba* using the same arguments as their initial statement. All the while refining their argument and analysis of the film that would then be published in *An Exposé*.

The TACC received more exposure to their cause and their developing analysis of *Three Faces of Cuba* on the 20th of April when the TACC received their private viewing. The screening was held at the school board auditorium at Lindsey Hopkins Educational center. It was here that they invited Edward Hunter, their premier psychological warfare expert, to evaluate the film. Some members of the press were present and reported on the TACC and Hunter’s joint efforts to refute the film. James I. Keller was also there but had no comment other than to say he eagerly

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awaited Hunter’s evaluation.\textsuperscript{285} Tangent aside, parts of \textit{An Exposé} continued to be disseminated while the book was under development.

Finally, on July 13\textsuperscript{th} 1965, \textit{An Exposé} was published and the TACC immediately began sending it out. While they sold the 104-page book for a dollar, the TACC often mailed it out at no cost to recipients. Educational institutions was an important target for the TACC; just as U.S. officials received \textit{An exposé} so did institutions of learning. In a letter to the co-founder of the Christian non-profit Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation, Manrara states that “Copies of the Exposé have been forwarded by us to three thousand Colleges, Universities and Public Libraries throughout the United States.”\textsuperscript{286} Moreover, records from a board meeting makes the claim that “The chairman [Manrara] stated that in April the Committee distributed information to expose the film ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ to approximately 4,000 libraries as well as members of the United States Congress and had succeeded in the withdrawals of the film from National Educational Television.”\textsuperscript{287}

Additionally, on August 4th \textit{The Miami Herald} finally published the TACC’s advertisement which had excerpts from \textit{An Exposé}. The ad opens by speaking on the behalf of “thousands of exiled Cubans and many informed Americans” and stating that they “were shocked last March 22\textsuperscript{nd} and 23\textsuperscript{rd} when their own Educational Television Channel 2 in Miami…WTHS, sponsored by COMMUNITY TV FOUNDATION…showed a film called ‘Three faces of Cuba.’”\textsuperscript{288} Note that the TACC mentioned the station and their financial backing,"

\textsuperscript{286} Luis V. Manrara, Letter to Eleanor Schlafly and Phyllis Schlafly, Box 17, Folder 6, Luis V. Manrara Papers. Manrara Three Faces of Cuba B17F6
Find the sources for the quote, the source above is for the 4,000
\textsuperscript{288} The Truth About Cuba Committee, “Here’s why so many were shocked by the showing of ‘Three Faces of Cuba’ on Educational TV Channel 2 - Miami,” \textit{The Miami Herald}, August 4, 1965, 11-A.
almost suggesting that these could be viable targets if the reader was so inclined to act – not unprecedented in activist literature. The rest of the advertisement read like a summary of *An Exposé*.

Interestingly, no names of the individuals involved in the making or broadcasting of *Three Faces of Cuba* were including. The TACC nor their collaborators shied away from publicizing the names involved, they certainly did so in *An Exposé*. More than speculation, *The Miami Herald* most likely refused to present those names and asked for them to be omitted, exercising their right to censor as to avoid defamation. Despite the anonymity of the media-makers, this advertisement, placed in one of the most prominent newspapers in South Florida, was a part of a larger effort by the TACC to spread their warning of *Three Faces of Cuba*. They also did so by sending their materials to partners organizations.

*An Exposé* was also sent to like-minded organizations. For instance, the TACC mailed *An Exposé* to the John Birch Society a well-known (what some might call notorious) advocacy groups for the political Right. They also sent their book to lesser-known organizations like the Young Americans for Freedom, another conservative advocacy group. In addition, copies of *An Exposé*, among other publications, accompanied Manrara in his many interviews, events, and speaking engagements. He visited civic clubs, churches, schools (colleges and universities), and conferences and gave away and sold copies of the TACC’s publications. The TACC also sent *An Exposé* to selected members of the organizations, however, sending a copy to every member would have been far too costly. The TACC made use of the limited resources and avenues at their disposal to send out *An Exposé* as far as they could. The TACC’s campaign against NET had some expected and unexpected results for them.

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Results of the Truth About Cuba Committee’s Media Activism

When reflecting on the TACC’s campaign against *Three Faces of Cuba*, Manrara considered it a victory and, indeed, it was in many ways for the Cuban exile group. Manrara stated, “because of our intense and justified protest, [*Three Faces of Cuba*] was withdrawn by NET.”290 This setback did not deter NET from making and airing documentaries about Cuba regardless if Cuban exiles did not agree with them. Between pitting U.S. authorities like the FBI, the CIA, the DOJ, and the HCUA against *Three Faces of Cuba* (as previously addressed) and gaining regional broadcast visibility, the TACC did see some results.

In response to the TACC’s activism and the protest from others, the NET’s Channel 2 station created the Program Advisory Committee (PAC).291 This 16-member committee, comprising of Americans and Cubans, reviewed and evaluated programs and determined if they should be broadcasted on Channel 2. When *Report from Cuba* (1967) was offered by NET to the Channel 2 station in Miami, PAC ruled against its broadcasting.292 They stated that “It was the opinion of the committee, consisting of leading citizens of the community, that the contents of the program were not an objective presentation of the facts and therefore could tend to be misleading.”293 By having a broad of so-called representatives of local communities to evaluate programming, Channel 2 attempted to avoid outraging local groups, particularly the Cuban ethnic enclave. The creation of PAC was evidence that the TACC’s local activism made a difference but also showed the limitations of such activism since *Report from Cuba* was shown

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291 “’Report From Cuba’ Nixed By Miami ETV Advisory Committee as ‘Misleading,’” *Variety*, vol. 219, no.1, November 22, 1967, 42.
293 “’Report From Cuba’ Nixed By Miami ETV Advisory Committee as ‘Misleading,’” *Variety*, vol. 219, no.1, November 22, 1967, 42.
elsewhere in the nation and even in other parts of Florida. While TACC began to see the fruits of their labor, NET and Cohen felt the repercussions for making and distributing *Three Faces of Cuba*.

According to professor Jane M. Loy, NET had to answer to the House Sub-Committee on Latin American Affairs while Robert Cohen was repeatedly audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Known copies of *Three Faces of Cuba* mysteriously disappeared leaving Cohen to reconstruct the film with existing footage, which was then retitled *Three Cubans*. Later, when NET released the documentary *Fidel* (1969), it was picked up by only 1/3 of local NET stations in the country. We should note that with NET’s semi-autonomous structure it was the prerogative of local affiliated stations across the country to decide when to pick up programs offered by NET’s headquarters. While their reasons for passing on *Fidel* may have varied, an article by *Variety* alluded to audience disapproval. Yet another product of the TACC’s media activism against NET was Manrara’s invitation to testify before a congressional hearing on communism.

On the 19th of October in 1972, Manrara was asked to speak in a series of hearings called “Theory and Practice of Communism in 1972” by the Committee on Internal Security of the House of Representatives. Manrara along with a group of witnesses were asked to testify before this committee. Included in this group were Paul D. Bethel, Manolo Reyes (news anchor to the first Spanish-language news program in South Florida) and Juan M. Clark (Cuban sociologist and veteran of the Bay of Pigs). During Manrara’s testimony, he offered *Three Faces*

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296 *Congressional Records - Theory and Practice of Communism*, October 19, 1972, Congressional Record Archive, United States of America.
Manrara argued that communism was not only a foreign threat but rather one that has manifested within the U.S. and in the form of documentaries. Notably, Manrara also took the opportunity to mention the efforts of the TACC and, in a sense, promote his Cuban exile organization.

**Conclusion**

The TACC utilized equal time on Miami’s WTHS-TV Channel 2 with a panel of representatives and on Tampa’s WEDN-TV Channel 3 with the ACESP. They also read a prepared statement on two radio programs and cautioned media professionals about the vices of *Three Faces of Cuba*. The TACC private screening of the documentary also draw regional attention and Edward Hunter was flown in from out os state to evaluate the film. Copies of *An Exposé* were sent copies to thousands of universities, colleges, and public libraries. The TACC placed a large ad in *The Miami Herald* for *An Exposé* that also served to notify readers about the threat that was *Three Faces of Cuba*, even if they decided to purchase the book. This while the TACC sent free copies to their allies like the John Birch Society, and a few to sustaining members of the TACC.

The TACC’s campaign against the NET was contentious; however, it also displayed their ability and savvy to work collaboratively with likeminded organizations and individuals. The
TACC’s media activism was both combative and persuasive. The TACC cultivated rapport with regional news media professionals and convinced them to take anti-Castro positions and express them on their news programs. In this way, the TACC were able to shape Miami’s news industry and reach a wide audience.

NET’s response to the protest against *Three Faces of Cuba* was sparing, to say the least. As briefly mentioned earlier, at the private screening of the documentary exclusively arranged for Manrara and his guest, James I. Keller was present but said that he had no comment about the evaluation of the film. However, he did state, “I shall wait with interest Mr. Hunter’s written evaluation which will be forwarded to National Education Television in New York” later he continued “I feel sure they will respond.” The comment almost seemed like a threat, as if to say they (the TACC and Hunter) would have to answer to Channel 2’s parental figure: NET’s headquarters in New York. Another response came in the form of a circulation letter address to Channel 2 viewers, which was mentioned earlier in the chapter. To reiterate, Channel 2 attempted to make it known their efforts to cooperate with voices of dissent and redirect blame to Manrara for the rescheduling of the private screening.

A month later Keller would have another response along with NET president John F. White. Seemingly frustrated with Cuban exile protest, Keller stated that he “had the feeling that the only thing that would satisfy the exile group would be an invasion of Cuba by the Marines and the re-establishment of Batista.” This while *The Era* reported that “John F. White, president of NET, has said that he intends to keep on running films like *Three Faces of Cuba* no matter what.”

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Still, Manrara felt that they had gained a victory, if only regionally. He said as much when addressing the TACC’s sustaining members. Through the process of working against *Three Faces of Cuba* and NET, the TACC strung together partnerships with local anti-communist and Cuban exile groups as well as individuals. With each cooperative project, the TACC learned from these partnerships and as a result, strengthened and solidified their media activism. The TACC’s double-prong attack on NET consisted of gaining media visibility to refute *Three Faces of Cuba* and, as we saw in the previous chapter, notifying U.S. authorities to intervene in the broadcasting of the documentary and investigate its makers. The TACC’s relationship with many other broadcast stations was much different than their interactions with NET. As discussed in the next chapter, the Committee would use persuasion and class-based kindship with news media professionals to shape the landscape news in the Greater Miami era.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Seducing Greater Miami: Cuban Exile Media Activism, Broadcast News in Miami, and Class-Based Kinships Between Cubans and White Americans

Figure 10. Luis V. Manrara meeting with an unknown radio host, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box, Folder, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.

From the mid-1960s to the 1980s, news media professionals in the Miami metropolitan area received seemingly unprompted accolades from members of the anti-Castro group the Truth About Cuba Committee (TACC). The lead anchor and vice president of news for Channel 4, Ralph Renick, and the newscaster credited with establishing one of the first Spanish-language news programs in South Florida, Manolo Reyes, routinely received letters of encouragement. Unbeknownst to the reporters receiving praise, these correspondences were a part of the TACC’s concerted effort to shape news coverage in the Greater Miami area.301 As covered throughout this dissertation, the TACC’s overarching efforts were to compel Americans (and at times

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301 In their more contentious campaign, the TACC provoked U.S. officials to enter into the regulatory arena and censor, what they are regarded as, pro-communist television broadcasting.
Cubans) in prominent positions to use their authority to intervene against “pro-Revolution” messages and to facilitate the dissemination of anti-Castro information. An example of the latter, the TACC made direct appeals to broadcast stations to enlist news professionals in a campaign against the Cuban state.\textsuperscript{302}

Since the TACC prioritized the dissemination of propaganda, information, and news coverage, they not only rebuked media objects but attempted to steer media broadcasting. As a reminder, the TACC was not the only Cuban exile group concerned with disseminating their message. Indeed, as Maria Cristina García has pointed out, many of the hundreds of \textit{periodiquitos} (small newspapers) that circulated in the Cuban community served as propaganda for the numerous political organizations.\textsuperscript{303} The TACC was an outlier in the way they not only centered the production and distribution of anti-Castro propaganda, but also the ways in which they used ingenious ways to amplify their message beyond the social and political borders of their ethnic enclave.

Likewise, in the case of Miamian news coverage, the TACC aimed their sights on news media professionals despite having no direct and consistent access to mass communications. The TACC was able to tap into broader distribution networks and disseminate their anti-Revolution message. Shifting opinions of the Cuban Revolution, however, was not without its challenges. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the triumph of the Revolution \textit{did} have a notable status in many sectors of the U.S., particularly for left-leaning political groups such as the New Left or the United Farm Workers, but notwithstanding staunch anti-communists. Cuban revolutionaries


\textsuperscript{303} García, \textit{Havana USA}, 1996.
graced the pages of the *New York Times* in 1957, for example, and the *Times* had a grandiose illustration of Fidel Castro on the cover of its January 1959 issue.\(^{304}\) The TACC sought to alter this perception by tapping into broadcast news media and steadily feeding news media professionals anti-Cuban state information. This strategy diverged from their strategies with the National Educational Television network.

Chapter two and three covered the more contentious strategies of the TACC, whereby they sought to pit U.S. authorities and public opinion against, what they deemed to be, pro-communist media. This chapter, however, examines the TACC more tactful means of debasing the Revolution’s reputation; they attempted to convince media professionals rather than embolden U.S. authorities to act against them. This chapter argues that the TACC shaped broadcast news in the Greater Miami area from the 1960s to 1970s by emboldening news media professionals to present anti-Castro and anti-communist positions on-air.\(^{305}\) The TACC was a leading force in changing South Floridian public sentiment on the Castro regime, particularly for white Americans, by targeting English-language broadcast news in the Greater Miami area. Leaders of the TACC influenced broadcast stations in Miami and convinced their news personnel to express anti-Revolution sentiments on their programs. Leaders of the TACC utilized class-based kinships (bolstered secondarily by racial and gender solidarities) with U.S. news media professionals to pit them against the Castro regime. Media professionals took the TACC seriously because of their strict adherence to professionalism, middle- to upper-class etiquette, and normative standards, all of which gave the TACC a “trustworthy” quality that was formed by and entrenched in a deeply stratified society.\(^{306}\) The TACC’s strategies in coaxing news

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\(^{305}\) This was an unorthodox method for Latina/o media activist the era. See Noriega, *Shot in America*, 2000; Jiménez, “Moving from the Margin to the Center,” 1996). It was also an anomaly for their Cuba exile contemporaries who favored militarism and sabotage, see Quiroga, “The Cuban Exile Wars,” 2014; Bustamante, “Anti-Communist Anti-Imperialism?,” 2015.

\(^{306}\) One might be tempted to place the TACC’s way of navigating the U.S. in respectability politics.
professionals oscillated between intentional and seemingly natural behavior from class-based cultural practices. The combination was useful when leaders of the TACC initiated and maintained rapport with news professionals via letters, phone conversations, and in-person meetings.

The TACC’s direct appeal to broadcast stations via news media professionals took on three distinct forms: 1) steering news media professionals against the Cuban state and communism while also flattering them when they did so on their own, 2) inviting news anchors and hosts to endorse an anti-Cuban state or anti-communist subject on their programs, and 3) sending press releases and written propaganda to news divisions. When they were able to get stations to comply, the TACC broadcasted their political message under the guise of objective news reporting. Such a feat was impactful considering that journalism of the era was held to a high standard and was thought of as being objective. By pitting Miami metropolitan broadcast news against the Castro regime, the TACC believed they could sway public opinion against the Revolution, notably monolingual English-speakers, albeit if only for the region. However, doing so hinged on convincing U.S. news professionals, and the leaders of the TACC were equipped to do just that.

The TACC exhibited upper scale proclivities and an affinity for westernized propriety. Case in point, in a public display of hostility to communists and their propaganda, one member, Gerardo Abascal, called them “the common enemy of Civilization: the new Barbarians.” For the TACC, the preservation of civilization was predicated on access to “accurate” information; conversely, the proliferation of communist propaganda would bring barbarism. The TACC

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hoped that U.S. news coverage of Cuba would procure “correct” reporting; in other words, an objective account of the island-nation that mirrored the TACC’s account of the Cuban state. In addition, the TACC conformed to conventionally accepted standards of social and business etiquette, which were associated with the U.S. middle- and upper-class. Adherence to these standards, particularly in correspondences, allowed the TACC to be taken seriously by news media professionals.

Each of the sections that follow build towards an examination of the TACC’s efforts to shape regional news media. First, this chapter covers the relationship between regional audiences and news media professionals and the role it plays in the TACC’s strategy. Second, an examination of the TACC and Cuban exiles’ responses to the television documentary _Crisis Amigo_ (1961). The TACC felt that this documentary could threaten their credibility because of its derogatory representations of Cubans. Third, this chapter will explore the TACC’s correspondences and personal relationships with news media professionals in the greater Miami area and the ways in which they were used to reach English-speaking Americans. The final section will discuss the TACC’s participation in their émigré community’s discourse via radio and at times television.309

The TACC’s Tactics, Regional Audience, and Media News Professionals

In attempting to shape regional news, the TACC targeted broadcast news, while privileging television in order to maximize their reach of English-speaking Americans. This strategy was advantageous since television had recently become the most prominent source for receiving news in the U.S.310 Undoubtedly language played a prominent role in targeting specific groups. Americans were the TACC’s primary audience which necessitated tapping into English-

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309 These discourses also played out in the written word; however, this study is focusing on how the TACC influenced broadcast media for their political agendas.

310 Curtin, _Redeeming the Wasteland_, 1995.
based broadcasting. Conversely, Spanish-based broadcasting was the TACC’s way of reaching Cubans and other Spanish speakers; however, they rightfully saw their fellow exiles as not in need of convincing. Rather, Spanish-language radio served as a vehicle for intra-communal mass communications and participation in in-group polemics and discourse. Radio already played a prominent role in the Cuban émigré community as it did with other Latina/o immigrant communities in different regions. In addition, English-language radio, for the TACC, was another conduit to reach Americans like most of television. Still yet some messages were sent indiscriminately; press releases, for example, were targeted at both Spanish- and English-speakers. Influencing and appearing on Spanish-language radio programs was far more feasible than doing so with television, since there were many more radio programs and television was attributed more importance. However, the TACC would have to influence television to reach the broadest audience of Americans.

Regarding their direct appeal approach, the TACC’s radius of influence was circumscribed by their limitations in resources, funding, and political clout resulting in the shaping of broadcast news in the Miami Metropolitan area. The TACC worked within these restraints and fostered cordial relationships with news media professionals that held positions of power such as the executive vice president of Channel 2, the vice president of news of Channel 4, the chairperson of the Community Television Foundation, the Director de Noticias Latinas (Director of Latino News), television and radio directors, program managers, and reporters. They also reached on-air talent that included Larry King, Barbara Walters, Ken Taylor, and other television and radio personalities, anchors, and hosts. While they would accept any media

311 Émigré community’s discourse also played out in periodicals and cultural productions; however, these areas are outside the parameters of this study.
312 Radio occupied a special place in the émigré community which stemmed from their time in Cuba. See (Garcia). Casillas, Sound of Belonging, 2014.
313 There were moments in which members of the TACC made attempt to influence news media professionals outside of South Florida, however, were frequent and occurred only in their travels for guest speaking.
professional, the TACC’s preferred news directors because they had control over production. Such was the case with Renick who was also well-regarded in the news industry and, for instance, spoke on behalf of esteemed news directors during a prominent debate within the news industry as to whether business consultants should be incorporated into news programs.\(^{314}\)

Renick was also credited with helping Manolo Reyes, a former lawyer and broadcaster in Cuba, establish the first Spanish-language newscast. News directors like Renick, Ken Taylor, and Lee Waller kept correspondences with the TACC and the latter benefited greatly from it. It bears mentioning that these news professionals had similar backgrounds: they were middle- to upper-class white males, the dominant demographic of newsrooms in the era.

Anything but fortuitous, the TACC’s headquarters was advantageously located in Miami and within a six-mile radius of four television stations: Channel 2 WTHS-TV, Channel 4 WTVJ-TV (CBS affiliated), Channel 6 WCIX-TV, and Channel 10 WPLG-TV (ABC affiliated). Channel 23 WAJA-TV, the Spanish-language station that would later be acquired by Univision, was the furthest station and even then it was only fifteen miles away.\(^{315}\) Also, two of the most prominent Spanish-language radio stations, WFAB “La Fabulosa” (The Fabulous One) and WQBA “La Cubanísima” (The Most Cuban), were two miles away and three blocks away from the TACC’s headquarters, respectively.\(^{316}\) Not only did the TACC have proximity in their favor, but Miami’s growing urban landscape was not unlike their native Havana. These were cities with sizeable populations, notable stratification, and a concentration of broadcast stations.\(^{317}\) Along with these advantages, the TACC leaders’ social status while in Cuba afforded them particular

\(^{314}\) Allen, 2007, p427. Ralph Renick foray into politics had him at a loss of $100,000 of his own funds.

\(^{315}\) I arrived at these distances by plotting the addresses of the TACC’s headquarters and broadcast stations into a digital map service from the TACC’s correspondences.

\(^{316}\) García, Havana USA, 1996, 106.

class-based knowledge, skills, and attributes that were on par with (and at times above) those of news professionals.

Despite the differences in nationality, ethnicity, and citizenship, the leaders of the TACC had high propinquity with news professionals in the U.S., regarding not only proximity but also the kinship fostered by similar social standings. In other words, the TACC’s success in providing anti-Revolution immediacy to local broadcast news was due to both the closeness of broadcast stations to their headquarters and class-based affinities, among other similarities. The TACC’s cultural capital being legible to U.S. news professionals was imperative for the TACC to legitimize themselves and their information about Cuba in the eyes of the news industry. The TACC’s social positions in Cuba and their transnational lives particularly between Cuba and the U.S. before 1959 significantly contributed to their American sensibilities; simply put, the leaders of the TACC had much more in common with middle- to upper-class Americans like media professionals than they did with Cubans from the lower strata. The TACC’s vision for U.S. news was furthered along by Cuban media professionals. Cuban patriotism was cleverly invoked to make sure that these exiles, now working in the news industry, felt inclined to have their anti-Cuban state positions shape their reporting. Whether it was with white American or Cuban media professionals, it was the TACC’s high propinquity with news professionals that provided the physical and social avenues to shape the news industry in Miami. While their advantages in proximity are self-evident, the TACC’s retainment of cultural capital is not.

As members of an elite class, there was ample grist to attest to the TACC’s social status while in Cuba. However, one might question why or how the cultural capital of newly arrived exiles were legible to media professionals in the Greater Miami area, or in the U.S. for that matter. The leaders of the TACC acquired professionalism and middle- to upper-class decorum (in U.S. fashion), during their socialization, education, and professional training during the
Cuban Republic 1902-1959. During this era, the Cuban economy was folded into the U.S. capitalistic system in Cuba and U.S. companies dominated the island. Subsequently, professionalization in Cuba meant an adherence to U.S. business decorum, which was connected to neocolonial structures that transitioned high-class culture from European to American with vestiges of the latter. As such, the leaders of the TACC (along with other affluent Cubans) gained cultural capital legible to Americans because they learned to be well-versed in U.S. business practices and American cultural standards. In fact, the members of the TACC, and first-wavers, were a premier example of an exile group with higher cultural capital than financial capital.

The TACC chiefly had four members establish and maintain relationships with news media professionals: Luis V. Manrara, Rafael Pérez Doreste (appointed president after Manrara stepped down in the early-1970s), Gerardo Abascal (head of public relations), Jesús M. Guzmán (executive director). All four were professionals while in Cuba, had impressive resumes, and an affinity for propriety and professionalism. In fact, in his many public appearances, Manrara was never seen without a suit and tie (see figure 11). Although featured less frequently, the same could be same for Doreste, Abascal (see figure 12), and Guzmán who were always shown in business attire. The appearances of these four members (which included their clothing, haircuts, clean shaven or well-groomed facial hair, and accessories, such as wedding rings, glasses, and watches) amalgamate and signaled to others that these men had a certain level of cultural capital and that they adhered to normative standards.

Figure 11. Luis V. Manrara and Dr. Charles Miligan host of Channel 6’s biweekly talk show, Dialogues in Limbo, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 14, Folder 19.
Each of these elements in their appearances constituted a “status symbol;” not in the conventional sense, but rather as signs of one’s membership in a professional social-economic class. Likewise, Erving Goffman informs us that,

Status symbols provide the cue that is used in order to discover the status of others and, from this, the way in which others are to be treated. The thoughts and attention of persons engaged in social activity therefore tend to be occupied with these signs of position. It is also a fact that status symbols frequently express the whole mode of life of those from whom the symbolic act originates. In this way the individual finds that the structure of his [or her] experience in one sphere of life is repeated throughout his [or her] experiences in other spheres of life.\footnote{Erving Goffman, \textit{The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life}, 1956, 304.}

Status symbols are not objective or universal. For Cuba, as with other regions greatly influenced by the U.S., status symbols were accompanied by and entrenched in westernized notions of high culture, tastes, and value systems, while at the same time emblematic of U.S. commercial culture. It is worth mentioning that the TACC’s status symbols (along with their community’s) were in many ways in contrast to the guerrilla war attire of the Cuban leadership. Fidel Castro was particularly famous for donning revolutionary apparel with a full beard in public (see figure 13). While exiles and conservative Americans saw this as a self-indictment, green fatigues and bread were a status symbol that had value for Cubans on the island and had subcultural capital.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure12.png}
\caption{Gerardo Abascal, The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. Records, Box 9, Folder 3, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.}
\end{figure}
for left-leaning political groups in the U.S. like the Brown Berets. Another set of signs that are not addressed above can be found in professionalized communications.

The letter writers for the TACC’s direct appeal followed convention in their correspondences. Letters are a genre of communications with a specific structure and form, and with particular expectations for writers and recipients. These standards have been set and maintained by formal education and professional training. Thus, while it may seem frivolous to point out, it is important to note that the TACC’s letters almost always conformed to conventionally accepted standards, which was also representative of their presentation of themselves when conversing with U.S. professionals.

The TACC’s ability to do so increased the probability that news media professionals would consider their suggestions since, in the professional realm, presentation weighs heavily in the acceptance of information, particularly in the initial contact. To the TACC’s advantage, middle- to upper-class Americans could decode the TACC’s status symbols, identity, practices,

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319 Sarah Thornton, *Club Cultures: Music, Media, and Subcultural Capital*, (Wesleyan University Press, 1995). Arcelia Gutiérrez pointed out that media activists utilize an “aesthetics of protest;” that is to say, the attire that activists wear during protest, campaign, and negotiations (purposefully or unintentionally) can be a part of their efforts. 320 Not to mention that many other groups and individuals made requests of media professionals.
and modes of communications and conclude they also had cultural capital and, thus, social value. Consequently, this legitimized the TACC’s claims, requests, and constructive criticism in the eyes of media professionals. These advantages, however, were put to the test when anti-Cuban and anti-immigrant attitudes pervaded South Florida during the early years of the exiles’ arrival.

**Before Kinship Came a *Crisis Amigo* (1961)**

Late in 1961, Channel 7 WCKT broadcasted a 30-minute television documentary, *Crisis Amigo*, which reflected and exacerbated South Floridian’s concerns over their new exiled neighbors. *Crisis Amigo* did not create but rather expressed and tapped into xenophobic sentiments about immigrants in the U.S. that certainly predated 1959. These anxieties proved to be an unforeseen barrier for the TACC and their agendas to sway media professionals against the Castro regime. Gaining favor with news professionals that were often white Americans hinged on a certain level of respectability. *Crisis Amigo* and the anti-immigrant sentiments that it espoused threatened that respectability, whether it was accurate or not. In fact, the popularization of anti-Cuban attitudes would undermine the TACC’s overarching quest to pit sectors of the U.S. against Cuba. However, the TACC turned this obstacle into opportunity when they appeared on Channel 7 via equal time and denounced *Crisis Amigo*. The TACC eschewed racial and xenophobic indictments of white Americans (vis-a-vis non-Cuban Latina/o media activism) in favor of underscoring Cubans’ and Americans’ commonality and unity against international communism. In this way the TACC contributed to their émigré community’s challenge to *Crisis Amigo*, while attempting to secure their own credibility. They sought to take the opportunity to reframe the conversation and “remind” U.S. television viewers of their common enemy: communism.

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321 At the same time, these efforts were bolstered by the presumptuous notion that they, as Cubans, were experts of the island, a notion that had its root in popular notions of race/ethnicity of the time.
White South Floridian residents held serious reservations about the influx of Cubans to their region, which could possibility curtail the kinship between the TACC and U.S. media news. White anxiety over the arrival of Cuban exiles included concerns over an increase in crime, overpopulation, and a cultural takeover, of sorts; García states, “Non-Cubans accused the exiles of consciously trying to take over their city.” She continues by showing how “The social and demographic changes produced a ‘white flight’ to cities north of Dade County. (Blacks were more likely to remain in Dade.)” 322

To be clear, the inrush of Cubans indeed created population issues in public schools and residential areas, for instance; however, Cuban observers of the program felt different. Seemingly innocuous, Channel 7’s advertising for the documentary described the documentary as “a look at the social, economic, and educational problems created in Miami by the influx of Cuban refugees.” 323

Not unlike *Three Faces of Cuba* (1965), *Crisis Amigo* marketed itself as an honest exploration. *Crisis Amigo* troubled the TACC and outraged the Cuban enclave, and for good reason. 324 Drawing heavily from U.S. Latina/os stereotypes, *Crisis Amigo* depicted newly arrived Cubans as drug dealers, prostitutes, and gang leaders, years before *Scarface* (1983) projected denigrative images of third-wavers. 325 Before examining the TACC’s and Cuban’s response to *Crisis Amigo*, it is vital to review the preferred image of South Florida in the years leading up to 1959. Exemplifying just that, in 1955 the Dade County Development Board and its advertising agency produced the promotional video *Where the Sun Reigns*, which displayed greater Miami as

322 García, Havana USA, 1996, 88.
323 “Crisis, Amigo Special,” The Miami Herald, 5 December 1961, 18-A.
325 Carlson, “Blurring the Boundaries of Cold War Foreign Relation,” 221.
a white-hetero-middle-to-upper-class wonderland. Designed to entice U.S. vacationers, the advertising video was filmed mainly in establishing and aerial shots to display the tropical geography and extreme close-ups to display the inviting smiles of affluent white-American families. Excluded from this promotional video, however, were communities of color or any groups with marginal identities. This is notwithstanding the gaze of the “respectable” family woman and “the famous and colorful seminal Indians” who were shown entertaining tourists with their “exotic” cultural practices.

Considering that these ideals dovetailed with conventional wisdom of the era and in the region, it was no wonder that white anxiety was expressed at the arrival of thousands of Cubans in the Miami area. Crisis Amigo seems to reflect and exacerbate those racial concerns; they projected racialized and gendered prejudices in terms that were chiefly reserved for non-Cuban U.S. Latinas/os and Latin American immigrants. With no sizeable Cuban population in the U.S. before this time, Crisis Amigo had a rare opportunity to shape American’s and particularly South Floridian’s view of Cubans, along with similar documentaries in the era. Despite Channel 7’s apolitical and seemingly objective description of the television documentary, with a critical eye, one could surmise something more at play. For Cuban émigrés, the discrepancy between Channel 7’s framing of Crisis Amigo and their interpretation of the documentary amounted to more than a peccadillo.

In her dissertation on Cold War foreign relations, Joana Renée Carlson notes that “According to critics of the documentary, [Crisis Amigo] implied that all Cuban refugees were narcotics dealers and thugs, that Cuban women were prostitutes, and that Cuban schoolchildren

326 “Film: Film Distribution,” Broadcasting, Telecasting (Archive: 1945-1957) Vol. 49, Iss. 16, 17 October 1955, 65-66. According to Where the Sun Reigns, the promotional video was under the supervision of “Dade County Commission, Dade County Advertising Advisory Board” and distributed by Reela Films. as stated in the film’s credits.
328 Carlson, “Blurring the Boundaries of Cold War Foreign Relation,” 221.
were gang leaders and juvenile delinquents.” Indeed, Cubans expressed similarly when given the opportunity; they wrote letters to Channel 7’s local station, op-eds in newspapers, and spoke to any journalists willing to listen. One Cuban spectator came to the defense of this community: “maybe we speak a little loud, but that doesn’t make us bandits.” This is an interesting word choice here considering that el bandido has been a longstanding media stereotype of Latinos in the U.S. It is possible that the viewer interpreted in the film a conflation of U.S. Latinas/os stereotypes with that of a Cuban cultural tendency. Another Cuban observer, Jorge A. Theye, also let his grievances be known in the “Voice of the People,” the reader-response section of the Miami Herald, but was surprisingly unconcerned with appeasing Americans. Theye writes:

The Cuban people were insulted when television Channel 7 spent 30 minutes in a special program called “Crisis Amigo” trying to convince the American public that the Cuban refugees are a bunch of no-good villains that are going to corrupt the innocent Americans. I want to remind the persons responsible for this program that we didn’t come to the United States because we thought it was a better country than our homeland. We came because our own country was stolen from us by a group of international Communists, and as the United States is supposed to be the greatest foe of communism we arrived at the nearest gate, Miami.

Theye’s willingness to express antipathy for a U.S. television station was similar to that of the TACC with National Educational Television. However, his expression of contempt for the U.S., although mild, was a stark difference than the TACC’s response. While the TACC was also troubled by these depictions, they took an opposing line of argument that purposefully avoided

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329 Ibid., 221.
330 “Crisis Amigo’ An Insult to Cuban Refugees” The Miami Herald, 8 December 1961, 6-A.
332 Jorge A. Theye, “‘Crisis Amigo’ An Insult to Cuban Refugees” The Miami Herald, 8 December 1961, 6-A.
aliening Americans. On the contrary, they attempted to foster solidarity on political and ideological grounds.

Rather than argue against Crisis Amigo on the grounds of racism, xenophobia, or symbolic violence, much like other Latina/o political groups have done, the TACC pivoted to Cuban exiles’ commonality with Americans.333 In charge of the TACC’s public relations, Gerardo Abascal appeared on a 30-minute television program by WCKT Channel 7 on December 14th of 1961. In the spirit of equal time, the station gave a platform for voices of dissent and invited representatives from the émigré community to criticize Crisis Amigo. Jack E. Anderson of the Miami Herald reported on the broadcast and stated that “Abascal emphasized that Cuban and Americans have a common objective – the frustration and defeat of the Communists.”334 Abascal’s notes of that day corroborate this one-line summary. In fact, he overemphasizes this point so much so that one could forget that there was a film involved at all. Reiterating his main argument, painstakingly so, Abascal states “Let us keep united and close by the bonds of traditional friendship; in this spirit, we shall be serving true Democracy and helping defeat COMMUNISM. May soon Cuba be FREE again! Long LIVE AMERICA!” (his emphasis).335 In a sense, Abascal placates Americans by swapping anti-immigrant hostilities for anti-communist animosity.

For one brief moment, Abascal did seem to respond directly to Crisis Amigo by describing Cuban exiles as model immigrants. That is to say, he claimed Cuban exiles were respectful to the law, grateful for American hospitality, and capable of contributing to U.S.

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335 Gerardo Abascal, Notes by Gerardo Abascal, 18 December, Box 9, File 3, Truth About Cuba Committee Collection, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Florida.
society. While Abascal did attempt to assuage white anxiety in response to the documentary, he was more concerned with pivoting to what the TACC considered to be Cuba’s and America’s shared interest and greatest goal: the eradication of communism. Abascal’s and the TACC’s response to Crisis Amigo was well-thought out, however, its reach certainly was not wide enough to shift popular attitudes in favor of Cubans. Fortunately, Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) and its director, Marshall Wise, ran a public relations campaign on behalf of the Cubans; they reassured South Floridians that the exiles were not invading but rather could positively contribute to the region if not the country. The TACC’s efforts against Crisis Amigo contributed to a larger effort to convince South Florida of the respectability of Cubans.

Only a month after his television appearance, Abascal received a letter from Richard R. Salzmann, the director of Public Services for the Research Institute of America. Underlined by Abascal is Salzmann’s advice to the TACC, “The main suggestion I have is to increase your coverage in the general press of the United States by instituting a systematic process of feeding them current information on developments inside of Cuba.” Salzmann continues, which was also underlined by Abascal, “Such an operation need not be an elaborate or an expensive one.” This advice was advantageous and realistic considering the TACC’s limitations.

It was also a piece of advice that they had been put into motion two months prior. In an internal memo, the TACC tasked their employees to compiled a list of media news outlets in the greater Miami area and specified that it should include:

- Newspaper editors – English and Spanish
- 1) Local radio and TV stations’ Directors – English and Spanish
- 2) Writers and commentators interest in the Cuban affairs and communism – English and Spanish.
- 3) Representatives of National and International news services

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336 Correspondence from Richard R. Salzmann to Gerardo Abascal, 11 January 1962, Box 9, File 3, TACCR.
4) Representatives of National and International newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations.³³⁷

While the TACC may have listed local, national, and international media, their success was largely limited to the local, particularly within the contexts of influencing news media professionals. Salzmann’s letter reaffirmed Abascal and the TACC of their strategy and let them know that they were on the right path.

**Seducing a Regional News Industry en Inglés**

The TACC felt that targeting Americans with anti-Castro regime propaganda in English was a viable means to spread their message. The TACC’s executive director, Jesús M. Guzmán, expressed just that in a letter to News Director Salvador Lew of *La Cubanísima*:

> In the morning I heard your editorial commentary, among other aspects relating to the Cuban issue, the need for the exile to understand the importance of directing our propaganda in the English language, and to that effect pointed to the desirability of establishing contact with Americans friends that could be useful in such an important task (my translation).³³⁸

Another member of *La Cubanísima*, José Luis Masó, confirmed this strategy and extolled Manrara’s efforts in executing it. Masó proclaimed that “The Cuban, compatriot Luis Manrara, is one of those men who, in the course of this brutal decade, has made one of the most notable efforts in favor of the freedom of the Cuban homeland.” He continues:

> Our fellow countryman – who honor us as a *Buenos Días* listener – is the president, the soul, and the passion of the TACC, the same one who has maintained a systematic campaign in English on personalities, educational centers, publications, companies, and businessmen of the United States.³³⁹

Masó insightfully identifies the TACC’s overarching strategies for disseminating their political message: sending their anti-Revolution message to those in prominent positions in the hopes that

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³³⁷ This is a direct quote, it is displayed numerically as it was found in Memorandum No. 34 by Luis V. Manrara, October 16, 1961, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 34, Folder 2, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.
³³⁸ (Manrara, 1970).
³³⁹ (Guzmán, 1969).
they would be inclined to distribute that message to their more extensive network (albeit he identifies a few sites that the TACC did not prominently target). Part and parcel to this strategy, the TACC targeted news media professionals with Manrara leading the effort with the help of Jesús M. Guzmán, Rafael Pérez Doreste, and Gerardo Abascal.

While they always used flattery, their efforts took on three general forms: emboldening and praising news media professionals to steer them towards anti-Cuban state positions, suggesting television hosts and anchors endorse an anti-Revolution subject on their program, and offering anti-Cuban state propaganda to news professionals. The TACC targeted four major regional television stations: Channel 4 WTVJ (CBS affiliated), Channel 6 WCIX-TV, Channel 10 WPLG-TV (ABC affiliated), and Channel 23 WAJA-TV.\textsuperscript{340}

As mentioned previously, on 17 November 1961 Ralph Renick, Channel 4’s leading anchor and vice president of news, received a letter of encouragement. Manrara wrote:

Our Committee, engaged in fighting Communism using Cuba as a Case-history, wishes to congratulate you for the fine program broadcasted at 10:00 p.m. by your Channel 4. It is reassuring that the important TV stations, the top ranking commentators and forward looking business enterprises should join their efforts to fight Communism.\textsuperscript{341}

Comments like this were typical, and Manrara cultivated a strong relationship with Renick chiefly because of his position as vice president of Channel 4’s news, his visibility as a well-known news anchor, and because Renick was also a writer for the local publications like The Voice. Thus, having his ear on Cuban and communist issues went a long way.

Likewise, Manrara sent letters to the staff of the religious television program I May See on Channel 7. For their anti-communist comments, Manrara wrote: “We wish to congratulate you for the excellent program entitled “I May See” broadcast on Sunday morning, September 1st.

\textsuperscript{340} National Educational Television’s (NET) Miami station, WTHS-TV Channel 2, and the TACC had a contentious relationship over NET’s airing of the provocative series Changing World, which included three television documentaries that the TACC called communist propaganda.

\textsuperscript{341} (Manrara, 1968f)
We are happy that this Station and the Catholic Church have joined forces in exposing the evils of Communism.”

Regarding their fellow exiles, the TACC tapped into their national loyalty for motivation.

Not unlike letters to white Americans, Manrara praised Norman Díaz of Channel 23 for displaying an “upstanding Cuban anti-communist position” (my translation). Manrara then preceded to ask if he could promote an event by the TACC and if he could appear on Díaz’s television program. Likewise, the TACC’s second president, Doreste, commended reporter Humberto A. Estévez for his coverage of a Soviet ship that docked in Miami and the way he rebuked the *Miami Herald* and *Miami News* for not doing the same. In both cases, the TACC also played on Cuban exile camaraderie, which we will further explore. In addition to kind words of motivation, the TACC also made requests of news media professionals just as Manrara did with Díaz.

Along with encouraging Renick’s anti-communist sentiments, the TACC also requested Renick to endorse anti-Cuban state positions on television. In a letter sent to Renick, Manrara stated, “I hope you can publicize the attached letter to Senator Pope or excerpts thereof, in your very widely known program.” The letter to the Senator addressed “the communist menace from Cuba.” While it is unclear if Renick obliged (records of broadcasted news reports can be hard to come by), there are a number of examples in which news professional did answer the TACC’s requests.

In yet another letter to Díaz, Manrara states his appreciation: “I am very grateful for the act of kindness by offering to broadcast on your very popular television program information by

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342 Manrara, 1963b.
343 Manrara, 1969c.
344 Doreste, 1972.
345 Manrara, 1967b.
the TACC in defense of *our homeland*” (my translation and emphasis).346 The letter is also
telling of how the TACC played on Cuban patriotism and exile solidarity. Manrara reassures
Díaz of his decision by tactfully suggesting it was a patriotic act, as indicated by the use of
“nuestra Patria.” Thus, the TACC played on Cuban media professional’s national loyalties, here
and elsewhere. Correspondences such as this one were purposefully written in Spanish and sent
to fellow Cubans and other Latinas/os. We cannot overlook the impact of correspondences
written in the native tongue and with cultural reference from an immigrant’s nation of origin.

Further elaborated in chapter five, the TACC also sent media professionals anti-
Revolution propaganda in the form of publications. The TACC recognized the popularity of one
book, *Betrayal Opened the Doors to Russian Missiles in Red Cuba*, among U.S. conservatives
across the nation and sought to deliver it to every broadcast station in their region. After 1962,
the U.S. public was eager to understand the Cuban Missile Crisis that threatened their nation and
the TACC exacerbated their anxieties by claiming that ballistic nuclear missiles remained in
Cuba.347 Manrara sent *Betrayal Opened the Doors* to WTVJ-TV’s program manager Lee Waller,
Channel 10’s news director Ken Taylor (and radio director), and Channel 4’s news anchor and
vice president of news, Ralph Renick.348

At times, Manrara gave a personal touch by dropping by the station and chatting with the
personnel and leaving publications. Such was the case with Larry Lunker, the sales manager of
WMIE, who thanked Manrara for dropping off the TACC’s biweekly report on Cuba: “Bulletin
on Cuba.”349 The TACC sent issues of the same literature to WMIE’s Community Services
Director, Ron Miller, this time through the postal service.350 The general manager of WMIE,

346 Manrara, 1969b.
347 Manrara 1968a.
348 Manrara, 1969a, 1968d.
349 Manrara, 1962.
350 Manrara, 1963a.
Jack Noble, received the TACC’s *Communist Methodology of Conquest and Report on South Africa*. The latter being Manrara’s account of traveling around apartheid South Africa and concluding that Eurocentric modernity was in its rightful place. In many letters, the TACC did not specify which publication they sent, only that they were addressed to radio and television personnel, in fact, this practice that held true for every type of recipient.

**Spanish-Language Radio and Intra-Communal Conflict**

When shaping televisions and English-listeners, the TACC often represented Cuban exiles as a politically monolithic group that aligned with American concerns of national security and anti-communism sentiments. However, contrary to popular belief, Cuban émigrés of this time varied greatly in their political views and their desires for Cuba. The perception of a unified and monolithic ethnic group had benefits for their activism, since institutions and the general public are prone to listen and adhere to demands to an organization that seems to represent the majority of their social group. This was proven true in the late-1960s to the 1980s with other Latina/o organizations. However, Spanish-language radio functioned differently. We know from chapter two that the TACC considered Cubans to be well-aware of the problem on the island. Radio served a special function: to communicate with their ethnic enclave and participate in their discourse.

The TACC was well-aware of the special relationship that Cubans had with radio and sought to tap into that popularity to engage in in-group discourse. Of the 89 letters written by the TACC and sent to radio stations (at least the ones that were preserved and made available to the public), 78 were mailed to Spanish-language radio stations while the other eleven were to

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351 Manrara, 1967a.
English-language stations. In fact, when WMIE had more English-language programs it only received eight letters, after the station became “La Cubanisima” that number jumped to 43. Clearly, the TACC was targeting Spanish-language radio stations in the greater Miami area. The two exceptions in television were still connected by language. The letters received by members of Channel 23 WAJA-TV (the Spanish-language television station) and Manolo Reyes of WTVJ-TV (host of the Spanish-language news programs on channel 4) were written in Spanish functioned similarly to the TACC’s letters in Spanish-language radio.354

With some exceptions, the TACC felt that the place for public debate was on radio and in Spanish to ensure that the discourse was kept within the Cuban enclave.355 A prime example of just that, all of which occurred in Spanish, was the polemics surrounding José Elías de la Torriente, a counterrevolutionary leader with grandiose plans for the future of Cuba. On February 21, 1970, he publicly announced his “Plan Torriente” a strategic series of events that would result in the overthrow of Fidel Castro.356 For this task, Torriente acquired the former Cuban Army General Eulogio Cantillo, armed forces, and funds collected from South Florida and around Latin America that some estimated was up to $4 million.357 Torriente also attempted to garner support from the Cuban ethnic enclave in a rally with 40,000 in attendance at the Miami stadium.358 Despite this, however, many anti-Castro exiles saw fault with his plan to overthrow Castro and needed further clarification and dialog.359

354 The Channel 23 WAJA-TV station was sold to Spanish International Communications Corporation (the predecessor to Univision Communications) in 1971.
355 This is not to say that all of the TACC’s comments on radio were contentious, as was the case with Torriente. Some message sent to radio stations to be broadcasted to the Cuban ethnic enclave were simply participating in their Cuban community.
356 Torriente-FBI-1970, 2
358 An Air War With Cuba, 35.
359 In addition, are reports that claim Torriente was not very well-known in the Cuban community and not charismatic enough to garner support from them.
On March 24 in 1970, Jesús M. Guzmán, executive director of the TACC, went on WFAB’s program *Opinión Publica* and urged Torriente to participate in a public debate with Luis V. Manrara. In a letter to Salvador Lew of WQBA radio, Guzmán explained the reason this debate was necessary: “For the sake of respect and to think through and clarify fundamental confusions and unsettling attitudes expressed by Mr. Torriente.” Later, Torriente responded in a message sent to journalist Antonio Arias, which was read on *Opinión Publica*. Torriente stated,

> I would like to clarify that due to my multiple occupations in relation to the cause of liberation of our homeland, I do not have the necessary time for discussions with any Cuban who is not already persuaded in the need to be united in the interests of the liberation of Cuba from communism. Mr. Manrara has every right to disagree with my views, private or publicly, exercising his right as a free man their right to dissent and I only refuse the debate because I believe that it will only benefit our common enemy, communism.

Remarks such as this might have been the reason as to why Torriente was not very well liked by in the Cuban community. Torriente’s unwillingness to engage in their in-group debate was not received well. The TACC would respond in a press release:

> What we proposed to Mr. Torriente was not to know his opinion about the rights afforded to each Cubans to give a responsible opinion, above all with regard to patriotism; this is obvious, besides, we lived in a democratic country. We insist to Mr. José Elías de la Torriente, if his true goal is to inspire the TRUE LIBERATION OF CUBA from Russian-Communist Imperialism, that he does not shy away from the constructive debate essential for public clarification, not the so-called “Torriente Plan”… which could involve very serious consequences for the glorious destiny of Cuba. (his emphasis).

This press release was sent to WQBA and WFAB and Channel 23.
Attached with it was two other documents: a transcription of the abovementioned response by Torriente and the letter to Lew, however, addressed to the respective recipient. The TACC documented this exchange and sent it to these Spanish-language broadcasting stations to make it perfectly clear that Torriente refused to engage in dialog and, in a sense, was not playing by the in-group, unspoken rules.\footnote{This notion was supported by Torriente’s television appearances on Channel 7 and 10 in which he expressed issues and positions that the community did not completely agree with and were also in need of in-group dialog.}

Unsurprising, Torriente’s plan failed to materialize which only added to his unpopularity and the number of his enemies. For some years later, Torriente was at home in Coral Gables watching television with his wife when he was assassinated with a shot in the back of his head by a sniper and an investigation followed.\footnote{Cero-FBI Assassination of Torriente}

To get their messages across, the TACC placed less effort in persuasion and rhetoric with Spanish-language stations. It was not as necessary with Spanish-language stations since many were largely operated by and listened by fellow Cubans, who were also anti-Castro. The TACC used their Cuban émigré solidarity to their advantage and were able to establishing rapport with Spanish-language radio professionals far easier than with white-Americans. The TACC cultivated cooperation, partnerships, and even friendships with those that worked in regional Spanish-speaking radio stations. Unsurprising considering that they were a part of a tight knit community.

In one letter to radio personality and reporter Juan Amador Rodríguez, Manrara thanked him “for the generous hospitality that you have always been given me in your popular newscast.”\footnote{My own translation. TACC + WQBA Radio 2 B35F26, 36.} Then, in a cryptic manner, Manrara “Suggest[ed] that the comments that will be made about our ‘wakeup call’ to the exiles, should be done with delicacy. I trust in your
journalistic intelligence to touch on it in the most convenient way.” The vagueness about the message suggest that this was a continuation of a conversation between them. More than likely it was a follow-up to a face-to-face meeting or phone call, since members of the TACC often meet with radio professionals and visited their stations.

In another press release, which was addressed to the journalist Tomás García Fusté of WFAB’s News Department, the TACC made a general announcement asking if anyone in their community could translate Scandinavian. According to Manrara, a group of “young people” had somehow received their publications in their native country and wrote back to the TACC. However, the TACC had no way of translating the correspondents. In part, this was also a way to show their enclave that groups were reading their work halfway across the world. In another press release again addressed to Fusté, Manrara sent a message about Poland’s resistance of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. In yet another message, this time broadcasted by WQBA, the TACC stated that they were in search of a bilingual typist: Spanish and English. The request to broadcast this message was very informal and for someone as pedantic as Manrara, this meant that he felt very comfortable asking for the favor.

Lastly, one press release was aimed for an audience on the island: the political prisoners on hunger strikes in Cuba. Manrara sent them “a message of solidarity from the TACC.” While one might question the feasibility of this message reaching those prisoners, radio signal could reach from South Florida in Havana. In fact, the TACC monitored Cuban state media through the help of the Miami Radio Monitoring Service. In addition, Manrara claimed that he had once

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369 My own translation. TACC WFAB Radio Fabulosa B35F17, 14
370 My own translation. TACC WFAB Radio Fabulosa B35F17,8
371 For some sociologist that study Cuba’s community in South Florida, employing fellow Cubans was the constitutive property for an ethnic enclave. TACC + WQBA Radio 2 B35F26, 34
received word that a friend of his, incarcerated in Cuba, heard Manrara on a broadcasted program with a smuggled radio. Thus, Manrara believed it was possible at the very least.

Another means to shape regional news media that the TACC employed was sending their press releases and propaganda to television stations. Their press releases chiefly concerned the TACC and their ethnic enclave, and for this reason, many of them were sent to the only Spanish-language television and radio; however, at times there were meant for both in-group (Cubans) and out-group (American). Such was the case when Channel 23 WAJA-TV and Channel 6 WCIX-TV received a press release and propaganda by the TACC endorsing “a march for freedom, against communism and for the triumph of the free world and believers in God” (my translation).372 This event was organized by Carl Curtis McIntire, Jr. a well-known conservative clergyman and radio preacher. This march was to begin in front of City Hall at 2 p.m. in Miami and end in Bayfront Park by 5 p.m. The TACC called on all of their members, residents of the area, and the entire “Latin colony living in Miami” to attend.373 The TACC also shared a press release when Manrara declined membership in Gobierno Invasor Cubano (Cuban Invading Government), one of many anti-Castro exile political groups. The message was sent to the stations that broadcast for channels 2, 4, 6, 10, and 23.

Finally, Spanish-language radio received TACC propaganda like English-language programs. Copies of Betrayal Opened the Doors was sent to radio professionals like Abilio Felipe and José Luis Masó of WMIE and Sergio Vidal Cayro, the director of WFAB, and Julio E. Méndez, from the department of production of WMIE.374 In these exchanges, Manrara fed their ego while fanning the flames of anti-communism, all in an effort to highlight the threat from the Cuban state.

373 This presumable meant all Cuban exiles and Latin American exiles living in Miami.
374 Manrara, 1968b, 1968c, 1968e.
Conclusion

The TACC made direct appeals to broadcast stations employing attributes, knowledge, and skills gained from and associated with a higher social position, which was further leveraged by racial and gender hierarchies in the U.S. Once we witness the TACC’s cultural capital (along with their whiteness, and masculinity) we can witness and the ways in which the TACC was granted legitimacy in the eyes of U.S. media professionals. The TACC’s social position and proximity to broadcast stations not only created avenues to influence broadcast news but also afforded them the right to be considered reliable sources of information about Cuba.

Shaping the Miamian news industry allowed for the TACC to proliferate anti-Cuban State sentiments in the region and reach Americans outside their community. The TACC regarded English-language broadcast media, particularly television, as a forum to shape the opinion of Americans and give the perception of unity among Cuban exiles. At times radio functioned in the same way for the TACC; however, it was mostly a means to tap into Spanish-language broadcast media, typically radio, as a means to communicate with their émigré community and participate in intra-communal polemics. Further elaborated in chapter five, the TACC sent their propaganda to English- and Spanish-language television and stations, as well as periodicals.
CHAPTER FIVE

Amplifying the Signal:
The Distribution Strategies of the TACC’s Anti-Cuban State Propaganda

Figure 14. The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. Records, Box 47, Folder 11, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.

The dissemination of anti-Revolution publication was an integral part of the TACC’s many campaigns against the Cuban state. Distributing written propaganda was a key component in their concerted efforts against National Educational Television (NET) television. Circulating TACC literature was also part and parcel to their coaxing of media professionals to have them broadcast anti-Revolution news coverage. The TACC’s strategies for the distribution of their anti-Castro and anti-communist propaganda was a macrocosm of their overarching agenda: convince Americans in influential positions to use their authority against the Castro regime. At
first glance it would seem that the TACC sent their literature indiscriminately, which did correspond with their rhetoric and conviction that all Americans needed to know the “truth about Cuba.” However, once the routes of distribution are mapped out, we can see that the TACC were intentional in the way they identified and targeted recipients for their propaganda (see figure 14).

This chapter examines the TACC’s dissemination of propaganda to news professionals; U.S. officials and institutions; political, cultural, and religious organizations; and institutions of education. For these reasons, I argue that the TACC sent their propaganda to members of the aforementioned categories to compel them to wield their authority against the Castro regime by tarnishing the Cuban state’s reputation and by placing harsher foreign policy on the island-nation. These strategies were born from necessity. The TACC had no efficient means to reach large groups of Americans thus they sought to tap into wider distribution networks than their own in order to disseminate their propaganda far beyond their immediate reach. Likewise, understanding their lack of political clout, the Committee sought to antagonize anti-communist U.S. authorities to do their bidding through tougher foreign policy against Cuba. With the U.S. having no official foreign relations with Cuba, this meant provoking U.S. officials to intervene militarily in Cuba despite the impossibilities of such a plan. The TACC’s dissemination of their literature to the abovementioned groups began a few years into the 1960s as the TACC established their operations and published their first set of works. The TACC continued self-publishing right up until their disbandment in 1975; however, the publications continued to be sent out until the early 1980s with Luis V. Manrara working as a one-man advocacy group as his health declined.

With some imagination, the TACC’s strategies to send propaganda is analogous to networks broadcasting nationwide programming, whereby a central headquarters sends out content for local affiliated stations to then broadcast to the viewers in their area. Similarly, the
TACC’ sought to send their propaganda to various entities with the hope that they would pass on that message (or the entire publication) to those in their region and political circles. This method was markedly effective with news professionals and conservative periodicals and activists. The TACC, however, did not have any official agreements with these entities and individuals; the Cuban exile group did not have any guarantee that media professionals, U.S. officials, organizations or educators would oblige. However, the TACC used moral obligation, patriotism, political ideology, propriety, and charisma to convince the recipients that their literature was not only worth reading but worth disseminating.

The recipients of these materials are categorized into four groups: news media professionals, U.S. officials, the directors of organizations, and educators; each of which correlated with four distinct types of appeals made by the TACC: direct appeals, interventionist appeals, appeals to allies, and pedagogical appeals. First, the TACC’s direct appeals targeted broadcast stations and periodicals with the aim of shaping news coverage of Cuba within and beyond South Florida. The TACC did so by mailing (at times even hand delivering) their literature to news professionals for the possibility that they would integrate this information into their television and radio programs and their periodicals. These professionals included positions such as television and radio executives, vice-presidents of news, directors, news directors, chairpersons, general managers, program managers, television and radio hosts, editors of periodicals, reporters, and journalists. While this was partially covered in Chapter 4 in terms of South Florida, this chapter goes beyond those geographical boundaries and tracks the distribution of TACC literature throughout the U.S. In addition, I examine the numerous responses to the Committee’s publications from periodicals.

375 My own translation.
Second, the TACC also used, what I will be calling, an interventionist appeals whereby they provoked the U.S. empire to implement harsher foreign policies against Cuba (and even at times suggest invasion). The Committee impressively mailed their written propaganda to Congresspersons, Senators, former and servicemen, and members of anti-communist committees in the U.S. government. The TACC purposefully targeted U.S. officials that showed anti-communist sentiments, many of which were often Republican. In their correspondences, the TACC reminded U.S. officials of their moral and national obligation to act against a communist force that had overtaken Cuba and had its sight on the U.S. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 2 and outlined in Chapter 3, the TACC antagonized U.S. officials and institutions to act like a regulatory body and intervene in the broadcasting of media objects that the TACC found problematic. However, this chapter builds on those previous findings by adding the distribution of all of the TACC’s publications, not only those that were involved in the TACC’s attempts to censor NET broadcasting. Thus, by looking at the way in which the TACC used their literature to mobilize foreign policy (and recalling the way in which they provoked state censorship), we can recognize the broader impact of the dissemination of their propaganda to U.S. officials.

The term interventionist appeal is used, not only because it literal refers to the act of appealing to U.S. authorities for the purposes of intervention, but also to evoke postcolonial notions of empire and the ways in which the TACC attempted to mobilize that empire against Cuban authorities. The TACC, however, would frame this undertaking as a moral act of kindness, one that could save their nation from the clutches of Communists. This maneuver is not unlike how other Latin American elites and authorities in the past have allied with Washington to thwart and dismantle the influence of Marxism, Leftism, and socialism in their nations. Furthermore, this term is particularly apt when considering the TACC’s affinity for

Yeidy said to add a citation.
appropriating postcolonial notions and using them for their own political agendas, such was the case with their oft-used term *imperialismo-Ruso-comunista* (Communist-Russian-Imperialism).\(^{377}\)

Third, the TACC made appeals to allies from political, cultural, and religious organizations, which were often populated up by Cubans and U.S. conservatives. Organizations like the right-wing John Birch Society (JBS) and the Committee Pro Cuba Liberation (CPCL) from Hartford, Connecticut received, and even requested, materials from the TACC. The TACC made appeals to these groups, which often led them to share resources and information and, at times, engage in cooperative efforts. The TACC tap into other regional, social, and political networks through these groups, which in turn allowed the TACC to further distribute their publications and broadening their readership. The flow of information, however, was not one-directional; the TACC and Manrara often exchanged literature with organizations, which also contributed to the circulation of conservative discourse of the era.\(^{378}\)

Lastly, the TACC’s pedagogical appeals targeted universities, colleges, educators, and librarians and sent them propaganda. Members of the TACC argued that they attempted to protect the “vulnerable” young from communist indoctrination.\(^{379}\) Events on the island-nation also helped develop the TACC’s concern over the young, such as the CIA-led campaign that deployed fearmongering. They claimed that Cuban parents would lose parental rights over their children and that the state was indoctrinating children in Marxism – only the latter was true. In the U.S. the Committee’s anxieties over the young were exacerbated by claims that the same indoctrination was happening on college campus. For these reasons, the TACC attempted to

\(^{377}\) TACC + All Letter Channel 23 (no duplicates) (f) B13F9.  
\(^{378}\) The TACC collected written materials pertaining to Cuba, communism and conservative politics. They would then incorporated them into their work.  
\(^{379}\) The concern over the young was also expressed in U.S. conservative discourse of the time.
counter communist propaganda, within an American context, by aiming their propaganda at institutions of higher learning.

It is worth noting that the TACC also sought to appeal to those in their own network. The TACC sold and gave away their literature to sustaining members and acquaintances with no disillusionments about the impact of doing so. These individuals were neither gatekeepers of media nor had political clout; however, the TACC thought it important to cover their bases and make sure to send their literature to those in their network.

What follows are seven sections that explore the TACC’s efforts to disseminate their political message throughout the U.S. The first two sections will provide an overview of the Committee’s literature and its distribution; a synopsis of their most popular works and a general overview of the distribution of their literature. The chapter will then follow each of the four appeals. Lastly, the final section will conclude by covering how the TACC sent propaganda to their sustaining members and acquaintances so that they could keep them well-informed of developments in Cuba.

Overview of the Truth About Cuba Committee’s Publications and their Distribution

The TACC’s aimed to inform the public of their cause and urge them to act.

Undoubtedly, the TACC attempted to make the U.S. public aware of la causa cubana and the need for action, like the Frente Revolucionario Democrático (Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front), Alpha 66, Agrupación Abdala, and other Cuban activist groups. In fact, addressing the issues facing the island and the possible solutions, were a major facet of the Cuban enclave’s quotidian experience.380 What makes the TACC’s distinct, however, was their conviction that the distribution of information must and should be at the forefront of the struggle against the Cuban

state. The TACC placed the management of information about Cuba (the dissemination of the “truth about Cuba” and the thwarting of “communist propaganda”) at the center of their activism. This, from their view, would subsequently lead to the down fall of the Cuban state via U.S. military intervention, despite the implausibility of this plan. The production and distribution of the TACC’s literature played a significant role in this endeavor.

In their inventory of their literature, the TACC listed 286 publications that included books, booklets, pamphlets in English and Spanish, and informational cards. Later the TACC claimed nearly twice this amount: “Besides providing information, literature and/or advice to many youngster and adults, we issued and distributed a large number of publications, conservatively estimated at over one million copies from about 550 books, brochures, reports, fliers, etc. both in English and Spanish.” These writings were largely in English (to target Americans) while the rest were in Spanish (to spread awareness of their group within the Cuban ethnic enclave.) In fact, public literature was almost always in English while their internal correspondences and records were largely in Spanish. The above number is certainly an estimate, the TACC did not keep consistent records of publications sold or given away.

Nearly all of the TACC’s publications were authored by Luis. V. Manrara, another aspect that made him co-constitutive to the TACC. Manrara sustained most correspondences for the TACC, which certainly included offering and selling literature. He continued this effort well after he stepped down as president due to his decline in health and even after the termination of

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381 The invasion of Cuba by the U.S. was an impossibility after the secret negotiations between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, however, it is important to knowledge the TACC’s intentions and logic despite the implausibility.

382 The Truth About Cuba Committee, “Circulados más de un millón...distributed more than...million,” 31 August 1969, The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. Records, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.

the TACC – a testament to his dedication to the exile cause. Furthermore, Manrara wrote the TACC’s four most prevalent publications: *Betrayal Opened the Door to Russian Missiles in Red Cuba*, *Communist Methodology of Conquest*, *An Exposé of the Insidious Film ‘Three Faces of Cuba,*’ and *Cuba Disproves the Myth that Poverty is the Cause of Communism*. These works examined, underscored, and raised the alarm about the communist takeover of Cuba and their intentions to do the same to the U.S.

The TACC’s most prevailing publication was *Betrayal Opened the Door to Russian Missiles in Red Cuba* (see figure 15). In its opening pages, the book states that 20,000 copies were printed: 10,000 in January with the first edition and the other half in March with the second edition. Giving a precise number of the copies sent out for this and other materials is challenging due to the recordkeeping of the TACC and Manrara. A set of Manrara’s records shows a list of 104 individuals, publications, organizations, educational institutions, media outlets, and U.S. officials that were sent *Betrayal Opened the Door*. In another set of his records, he accounts for 1,000 copies being sent to prominent groups and individuals. Neither includes the information about the dissemination of *Betrayal Opened the Door* that was scattered throughout the rest of Manrara’s records and the TACC’s documents. However, from the various correspondences, the few invoices, the many receipts, the references found in periodicals, and the many book reviews, we can say with certainty that *Betrayal Opened the Door* resonated with conservative readers.
For instance, Emerite O. Perret of *The Wanderer* and Medford Evans of *American Opinion* (the periodical of the John Birch Society) gave positive reviews of the book. In a letter to Manrara, Evan addresses *Betrayal Opened the Door*: “I was, and am, very much impressed by our work.” Conservative responses to the book gives us a window into their lingering feelings that even in 1968 the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was far from over, as was the case with articles from local newspapers like *Newport Daily News* from Newport County, Rhode Island and *Independent Star* from Pasadena, California. Their responses also expressed feelings of disappointment in U.S. leadership stemming from the way in which they handled the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Considered by some as the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a nuclear war, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The conflict began when Nikita Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, agreed to place nuclear missiles in Cuba after the U.S. deployed ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey. Through a series of events far too long and intricate to address here, the U.S. agreed to remove their missiles if the Soviet Union did the same in Cuba. This agreement was achieved through clandestine negotiations between the two superpowers and largely without Fidel Castro’s consent, however, as a consolation, Cuba gained a U.S. agreement to never invade the island-nation unless directly provoked. While the tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba were crated to the Soviet Union in December of that year, the TACC and conservatives expressed skepticism of their removal as late as 1968. These concerns will be addressed in later sections.

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385 Commendation for Manrara B4F6, 28
In *Betrayal Opened the Door*, Manrara’s biggest claim, and the book’s feature attraction, was that the soviet missiles still resided in Cuba. To support this assertion, *Betrayal Opened the Door* claims to have eyewitness accounts and photographs. Manrara regards this as strong evidence, however, both claims were a bit misleading. In terms of the former, *Betrayal Opened the Door* offers quotes from testimonials originating from anti-communist hearings from governmental subcommittees and U.S. conservative periodicals. In terms of the latter, the book displays newspaper clippings with photographs of missiles still on the island including images from Cuban national newspapers, such as *Revolución*. These pieces of evidence seem to harbor reasonable doubt, however, to those that were anti-Castro or disgruntled at the U.S. administration for their military inaction with Cuba, this was undeniable evidence.

Considering that the TACC was foreigner-born and that they were criticizing the U.S. government, Manrara attempted to avoid resentment or animosity by American readers by having a preface by Major General Thomas A. Lane that supposed Manrara’s claims and, in a sense, giving him the stamp of approval. This was followed by a brief statement by Manrara titled “Our Gratitude” that ended with a heartfelt message: “I feel that making this information available is a way to show our [i.e. Cuban’s] gratitude to the people of the United States and to its Government for the haven offered to those of us who were fortunate to have escaped from communist terror.” The rest of the book focuses on the U.S. leadership’s dealings with the Soviet Union.

Manrara gives contexts and reviews the ways in which Khrushchev “won the Cuban Missile Crisis through a pact with President John F. Kennedy” and how Fidel Castro was able to gain cessations to U.S. policies that aimed to put pressure on the Cuban state. This level of

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387 Manrara Betrayal B13F1.
388 In both cases the evidence provided does not take into account the political motives in the presentation of this information.
contempt for the U.S. government (more specifically the administration) was unprecedented for the TACC; from the very beginning of their existence they publicly aligned with and showed complete appreciation for the U.S. and its government. In 1968, disappointments in U.S. policy towards Cuba and a growing alignment with U.S. conservative discourse fostered disenchantment with two democrat controlled administrations in the 1960s. *Betrayal Opened the Door* goes as far as to call say that the “Moscow-Washington-Cuba cabal” has deceived Americans and Cubans alike. A far cry from the rhetoric of their initial literature and founding documents, however, to their credit, it was a more nuanced position.

*Communist Methodology of Conquest* is a 40 page pamphlet published in 1966 and derived from a talk delivered by Manrara at the International Symposium on Communism held in the city of Pretoria in South Africa from September 27-30 (see figure 16). True to its name, the pamphlet addresses international communism’s methods of world domination.

Manrara begins with a quote from Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin, which makes the claim that communism will take over Europe then Asia then encircle, “the last bastion of capitalism, the United States.” Manrara uses this quote to set up his claim about communism’s method of assault. Common for this era, Manrara posits that communism spreads geographically. Adding to this notion, he also claims

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that communism began in 1917 in Moscow, the epicenter, and then spread out, like a ripple, over the globe. Having yet arrived at its final destination, however, international communism aimed its sights on the United States (see figure 17). The notion of communist contentment is nothing new to the Cold War; credited to the Truman Doctrine, this term proliferated among anti-communist and referred to the efforts to prohibit the geographical expansion of communism.\footnote{Pieper, Moritz A. "Containment and the Cold War: Reexamining the Doctrine of Containment as a Grand Strategy Driving US Cold War Interventions." Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse 4.08 (2012).}

Manrara then argues that the communist’s method for conquest has evolved over the years. In general, it started with uprisings and revolutionaries i.e. armed conflict, however, later they used psychological warfare, deceit, and deception. Put simply, Manrara argues that communism seeks to win over the hearts and minds of people rather than through military efforts.

Indeed, their ultimate goal is political: world domination. True, they have declared that it must be accomplished by revolution, by the use of force. But the way to do it, the ‘methodology of conquest’, is based on psychology attack on the enemy, and their most deadly weapons are not The Bomb of their huge military establishment, but deceit,
infiltration and propaganda, the Three Horsemen of the Communist Juggernaut! (his emphasis).

This logic allows Manrara to claim that communists can never be trusted. For example, the campaign for coexistence among members of the two world powers was reduced to simply a red ploy by Manrara and many others. Communist’s real incentive was to disrupt Western society from the inside and then take them over militarily in their weakened state. These were the reoccurring notions in Communist Methodology of Conquest which were the bolstered by frequently presenting monolithic binaries of good and evil and the free world and communism.

As discussed in Chapter 2, An Exposé of the Insidious Film ‘Three Faces of Cuba,’ is a film analysis of the National Educational Television (NET) network’s documentary Three Faces of Cuba. Along with their ethnic enclave, the TACC was outraged with the broadcasting of NET’s television documentary and felt there was a need for “expert” analysis of this propagandist documentary. For that reason, the TACC invited specialists of Psychological Warfare with U.S. military backgrounds to contribute a lay film analysis which examined the documentary on multiple registers. Manrara included his own examination of the documentary and later sent the book to U.S. officials with anti-communist affinities.

Lastly, Cuba Disproves the Myth that Poverty is the Cause of Communism was originally an address to the University Club of Winterpark in Florida and later published (see figure 18). Manrara, representing the TACC, makes the case that communism’s true goal is to seize and centralize power within a nation not economic equality. True to its name, the pamphlet goes to great length to debunk, what the TACC regards as, the myth that poverty causes communism to establish itself in a given nation. Manrara takes Cuba as a case study (or what he called a “case-

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392 These categories are meant to be descriptive rather than referential to terms in formal scholarship.
393 A more detailed description and analysis can be found in Chapter 2 while the context surrounding the making of this book was outlined in Chapter 3.
history”) to demonstrate his thesis. He proffers evidence that economic inequality was not a problem in pre-Revolution Cuba and yet it still fell to communism. In fact, according to Manrara, the economy in pre-communist Cuba was one of the best in Latin America. A comparative claim that loses its impact when considering that Latin American had the largest discrepancy of wealth in the world during this era.

To prove Cuba’s pre-1959 prosperity they point to agriculture outputs; high wages; and legal protection and benefits for the working-class, women, and children (with no mention of Afro-Cubans). *Cuba Disproves the Myth* attributes these benefits to the 1940 Cuban constitution. However, the TACC conveniently left out the fact that Cuban communists like Blas Roca fought for worker’s equality, and that Afro-Cuban organizations fight for racial equality in Cuba. The pamphlet also attacks one of the tenets of anti-imperial Marxism by posing and answering the question: “Was Cuba a Rich Country ‘Exploited’ by Foreign Investors? Of course not!” Present in other publications but more so here. Manrara held strong to the Cuban Exile model, which, as scholars like Nancy Raquel Mirabal have argued, operates with the assumption that there is an historical disjunction between pre- and post-1959 Cuba.

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394 De La Fuente, *A Nation for All.*

395 See Nancy R. Mirabal, “‘Ser de Aquí’:Beyond the Cuban Exile Model,” *Latino Studies* 1: 2003) 366–382. One way to undermine this publication would be to evaluate the sources of their information and their means of appraising Cuba’s prosperity and poverty.
Manrara’s categorization of the TACC’s activities all were in some way reliant on or furthered by the production and distribution of their writing. For these reasons, Manrara stated that the TACC’s literature was “by far, the best known of our activities as our publications have traveled far and wide and made a tremendous impact.”  

Manrara, in the same internal document to the TACC, identifies their intended recipients:

Our regular mailing list included:
- a) Our sustaining Members
- b) U.S. Senators and Representatives
- c) Governors and Attorneys General.
- d) Authors, Columnists, Professors, Newsmen
- e) Patriotic Organizations, both in USA and abroad
- f) Diplomats
- g) Religious leaders
- h) Cuban Organizations in Exile.

Here the TACC clearly lays out their targeted groups for their publications. However, these categories could be condensed into four categories, which are of my own construction, however, better demonstrate the TACC’s strategies in sending their written materials. Those four groups of recipients and the TACC’s strategies to appeal to them are as follows:

1. Media professionals (direct appeal).
2. U.S. officials (interventionist appeal).
3. Activist, political, cultural, and religious organizations (appeals to allies).
4. Educators and institutions of learning (pedagogical appeal).

With an honorable mention, the TACC also sent their works to sustaining members and acquaintances. When organized in this way we can better see the intentions of sending these

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397 I have reprinted this (grammatical errors and all) as it is displayed in the document. Luis V. Manrara, “Swan Song”, June 30, 1967, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 10, Folder 5, p6, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.

398 I recognize that by using my own categories I risk losing meaning inherent in keeping an in-groups’ categories.
groups anti-Cuban state propaganda.\textsuperscript{399} In fact, in 1988, eleven years after the disbanding of the TACC, Manrara reconceptualized the TACC’s target audiences in a similar fashion: ‘‘All publications were sent, free, to our Sustaining Members, to public and educational libraries, to every branch of government and to other important people, as well as to patriotic organizations in the USA and abroad, and, of course, to the Media.’’\textsuperscript{400} Writing with some distance, this list further clarifies the TACC’s strategies in sending their propaganda. An important audience were those with access to large audiences and thus the TACC sent their works to news professionals.

**Direct Appeal: Broadcast Stations, Periodicals, Conservative Newspapers, and their Responses**

As addressed in Chapter 4, the TACC used persuasion, their proximity to broadcast stations, and their cultural capital to shape the regional news industry. Their direct appeal consisted of correspondences, visitations to stations, and invitations for event with news professionals. However, for stations outside of the greater Miami area, the TACC’s access was limited and thus their contact was far more contingent on correspondences and speaking engagements. Travelling to these stations outside of South Florida was usually only done if a member of the TACC was promised airtime. While they did visit different television and radio stations from around the nation, their literature reached much further and wider than they ever could. A major part of the TACC’s direct appeal was providing literature through the postal service. These efforts were motivated by the hope that news professionals would feel compelled to incorporate that material into their programs.

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\textsuperscript{399} This was a product of Manrara having some distance from the TACC in 1988. For the research, this perspective some from the analysis of numerous materials throughout the TACC’s and Manrara’s record as well as historical distance.

In one of their earliest implementation of that strategy, the TACC spread the word about their newly formed activist group to media professionals with letters and enclosed literature. For instance, Channel 4’s news anchor and vice president of news, Ralph Renick, received a letter from Manrara introducing himself and his committee. Manrara first complimented Renick’s show then mentioned the enclosed pamphlet titled *The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc.: Objectives, Plans*, all of which was very formulaic for his letters. This pamphlet identified and explained the plight of the Cuban émigré and offered solutions that conveniently corresponded with the TACC’s objectives legitimizing their existences. Towards the end of the letter Manrara offered to send Renick more publications at his request. Renick would later take him up on that offer in what would become a budding friendship. Having the Renick’s ear was an advantageous for the TACC considering his influence in the news production of Channel 4, his fame within the region, and since he was a contributor to local periodicals. *Objectives, Plans* was sent to others in prominent positions with means to disseminate information, however, not at the same rate as the TACC’s most popular work.

Covered in more detail in the previous chapter, the TACC sent *Betrayal Opened the Door to Russian Missiles in Red Cuba* to Channel 4’s Ralph Renick, WTVJ-TV’s program manager Lee Waller, and Channel 10’s news director Ken Taylor.401 Each time flattering the recipient in the hopes that they would make use of the enclosed literature. In terms of radio, Abilio Felipe, José Luis Masó (journalist), and Julio E. Méndez (department of production) of WMIE and Sergio Vidal Cayro, the director of WFAB, received copies of *Betrayal Opened the Door*.402

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401 Correspondence from Luis V. Manrara to Lee Waller, 22 January 1968, Box 13, Folder 12, TACCR; Correspondence from Luis V. Manrara to Ken Taylor, 22 January 1968, Box 13, Folder 10, TACCR; Correspondence from Luis V. Manrara to Ralph Renick, 22 January 1968, Box 13, Folder 12, TACCR.

Noble, the General Manager of WMIE (the predecessor to WQBA, La Cubanísima) received a copy of *Communist Methodology of Conquest* along with *Report on South Africa*.\(^{403}\)

Beyond the parameters of the previous chapter, television stations outside of South Florida also received copies, for instance, Mario Alvarez of KRMA-TV Channel 6 in Denver, Colorado.\(^{404}\) Likewise Manrara visited and distributed literature to television and radio stations in Acadiana, Louisiana, which will be further covered shortly. Additionally, *Life Line* and *Manion Form*, two periodicals that transcribed radio programs, both addressed and reprinted the TACC’s written propaganda.\(^{405}\) The former had a thrice a week bulletin from different radio programs and the latter had a weekly periodical. This means that each time the TACC’s literature or Manrara was featured on *Life Line* or *Manion Form* the Committee received double-exposure for their political message. There were some examples of *Life Line* only reporting news in print like when they offered a summary of *Betrayal Opened the Door* and suggested the book’s reliability by highlighting its sources.\(^{406}\)

Before exploring periodicals, the TACC’s internal records show that they targeted conservative publishers. In one document they wrote a list of “Conservative Publishers to Offer ‘Betrayal.’”\(^{407}\) This list included Viewpoint Books, Paperback Library, Monarch Books, International Publishers, Van Guard Books, and Dell Publishing, to name a few. In their letter to Viewpoint Books, the TACC asked if they were “interested in making a paperback edition and, if


\(^{406}\) Manrara Betrayal in Publications B13FS, 5

\(^{407}\) The TACC’s list read: “Editoriales Conservadoras Para Ofrecer “Betrayal.”
The TACC sent Canadian Intelligence Publications and Cross Publications copies of other works, as well. The TACC was searching for a publishing house to make and distribute their future manuscripts, however, did so without success since their works were all self-published.

Numerous periodicals were also sent *Betrayal Opened the Door*. Such was the case with *National Review, Free China Weekly, Sunday Advertiser, National Business and Financial Weekly*, and *North Baton Rouge Journal* to name a few. This was done in the hopes that their staffers would incorporate *Betrayal Opened the Door* into their publications. In a letter to Parks Rusk of the *Daily Sun*, Manrara stated:

> Since you are a newspaperman, I think that you might be interest in having further news about the situation in Cuba. Thus, I am taking the liberty of enclosing our Bulletins No. 1 and 2, and a special issues on the Second Declaration of Havana, as well as a circular letter explaining the objectives of such publication.

*Bulletins* was a short-lived periodical by the TACC, it would be renamed *True Flashes* and print transcriptions from the Cuban national media while the Second Declaration of Havana was on an anti-imperial conference in Cuba.

In another example, the *Acadiana Profile: A Magazine for Bi-Lingual Louisiana* plugged *Betrayal Opens The Door* in their interview with Manrara. This magazine was aimed at the Cuban community in Acadiana, Louisiana with single issues in both English and Spanish. The article titled “Manrara Sounds Alarm In Acadiana TV, Daily News Papers and Radio Interviews” also mentions other publications by Manrara, while singing his praises with statements like “Mr. Manrara is a fulltime patriot and one of the Western Hemisphere’s leading authorities on

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international subversion.”

This interview was a part of a four day trip to five cities (included Acadiana, Louisiana) in which Manrara was interviewed by three publications and participated in six television programs. In these events and interviews Manrara referenced *Betrayal Opened the Door* and other publications from his committee. In all likelihood, Manrara also brought literature to distribute to those he meet on his trip. Photographs, internal memorandums, and personal notes indicates that Manrara rarely traveled without the accompaniment of TACC literature.

Manrara also sent *Communist Methodology* to Contributing Editor, John J. Ward; Editor, George H. Monahan; and Spanish News Editor, Gustavo Pena Monte of *The Voice*. Each time he did so, Manrara offered some flattery in exchange for their consideration of the enclosed materials. Recipients of the Committee’s written works responded to the TACC’s literature with gratitude. Such was the case with the editor of *The Village Post*, Lewis Dorn, who was pleased to receive the TACC’s writing and eager for more. Dorn writes, “Thank you for your letter of July 10th and the various enclosures concerning ‘The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc.’. I am most happy to receive these copies of your publications and certainly am interested in continuing to receive future publications as they are available.”

Dorn’s response was unsurprising considering the TACC and *The Village Post* shared political views, so much so they would publish articles by Manrara.

Conservative-leaning newspapers also responded positively to the TACC’s publications. Undoubtedly, the TACC was delighted to see not only their publications talked about in print

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news but done so with positive reviews (along with their contact information). Hence, the Manrara was pleased when Emerite O. Perret of The Wanderer had nothing but kind words for evaluation of Communist Methodology. She stated “This booklet should be must reading for our officials; should be studied by every American. It could well be used as a text in high schools and colleges. A masterpiece of concise expression and orderly presentation, it puts into forty pages what some writers might say in four hundred.” This glowing review did not go unnoticed by Manrara. He reached out to thank Perret and took the opportunity to send her an additional publication. The opportunist that he is, Manrara suggested that she write another review. Manrara states, “If your review of ‘Betrayal’ causes the same impact as the one on ‘Communist Methodology of conquest,’ I am sure we will get quite a number of orders. I appreciate very much your interest in writing such fine reviews of my works.”\textsuperscript{414} Indeed, Perret obliged the offer.

In a much longer and more detailed book review, Perret summarized Betrayal Opened the Door and gave it a positive review.\textsuperscript{415} Once again, Manrara was so pleased with Perret’s evaluation of Betrayal Opened the Door that he wrote to her stating, “Just a few lines to express my deep appreciation for your excellent review of my book.”\textsuperscript{416} He then joyfully stated that “We have already received several orders for ‘Betrayal’”, which Manrara attributed to the “large and loyal following among the readers of The Wanderer.” These reviews added to the positive visibility the TACC was getting from their publication, which, according to Manrara, increased the readership for Betrayal Opened the Door. To their satisfaction, The Wanderer also reviewed some other publications with similar results. The number of book reviews were far too great to cover them all here, however, most were positive and almost exclusively coming from

\textsuperscript{414} Manrara Betrayal Letters4 B13F3, 17.
\textsuperscript{415} Emerite O. Perret, “The Book Shelf: Betrayal Opened the Door to Russian Missiles in Cuba,” The Wanderer, Vol. 101, No. 29, July 18, 1968, 3. This can also be found in the Luis V. Manrara Papers in Box 13, Folder 6.
\textsuperscript{416} Luis V. Manrara, Letter from Luis V. Manrara to Emerite O. Perret, 23 July 1968, Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 13, Folder 3, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Coral Gables, Florida.
conservative publications. There were some exceptions such as the politically centrist newspaper *The Miami Herald*.417

Beyond a positive/negative assessment, periodicals used the *Betrayal Opened the Door* as a platform to criticize the U.S. government and their policies towards Cuba. These reviewers saw *Betrayal Opened the Door* as a reassurance to their belief that military aggression not diplomacy would keep the U.S. safe from communist attacks. Here, and elsewhere, criticism was reserved for the U.S. government and its decisions involving Cuba, since the administrations of the 1960s favored diplomacy. To support their claims, conservative periodicals turned to the TACC’s literature.

Conservative-leaning newspapers referenced, cited, and reproduced information from the TACC’s written works. In other occasions they interviewed members of the TACC or relied on them as sources for their stories, which often draw from the TACC’s publications. This while more left-leaning publications often ignored the TACC and certainly did not regard them as a reliable source. Their conservative counterparts, however, used the TACC, particularly their written propaganda, to bolster anti-communist arguments and strengthen their political positions. Before examining these newspaper’s references to TACC literature, let us take a step back and think through the implication of newspapers relying on the TACC for information about Cuba.

White conservative newsmen (and the very few newswomen) perceived and operated under the assumption that the TACC (and other Cubans like them) were authorities on the subject of Cuba and its post-Revolution circumstances. These conjectures were indispensable to conservatives periodicals in their attempts to legitimize their claims about Cuba and

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417 Manrara Betrayal in Publications B13F6, 44. This review was published in the *Miami Herald* section titled “The Cuban Beat” by Carlos Martinez, which was the newspaper’s early attempt to accommodate the growing Cuban population before the establishment of their Spanish-language newspaper.
communism. The TACC was viewed as authentic and representative of all Cubans (both those that were expelled and those that remained) and, indeed, the TACC played into these assumptions for the benefit of their activism. By characterizing and identifying themselves as authentic and representative, they were able to gain legitimacy and their claims were taken seriously. The TACC maintained that they spoke on behalf of Cubans, which was one of the reasons they presented Cuban exiles as politically monolithic to American. In fact, I would argue, activist groups advocating for a social identity almost always position themselves as speak on behalf of that larger group. These were contrived notions purposefully mobilized to concealed the different relations that Cubans had with the Cuban state. Admittingly, the TACC would have seen these other positions as being incorrect or a part of some communist propaganda campaign.

The TACC used that conjecture to their benefit, while white conservative did so to rival their opponents. Conservatives in the U.S. used TACC literature to attack the U.S. government and the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Quite often, these newspapers also utilized the TACC’s propaganda to support their pressing concerns of the spread of Communism to U.S. shores. They regarded and utilized Manrara’s claims as an eyewitness account of the terrors of communism: unimpugnable evidence. As such, when conservative newspapers suspected that the Cuban Missile Crisis was far from over in 1968 and used the TACC’s publications to bolster their accusations.

Published in “Letters to the Editor” of The Pantagraph Sun, Amado C. Nieto claims that the October Crisis has been revitalized in 1968.418 Nieto writes, “A new book, ‘Betrayal Opened the Door to Russian Missiles in Red Cuba’ by Dr. Louis [sic] Manrara, president of ‘The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc.,’ proves with evidence and photos that the Russian missiles were returned to Cuba after the missile crisis and are piling up more every day.” This assertion was

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echoed by other conservative newspapers like Rhode Island’s *Newport Daily News* by the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Edgar Ansel Mowrer. In an article titled “Evidence Mounts On Deception,” he noted that,

Luis V. Manrara, president of a refugees organization called itself the Truth About Cuba Committee, has brought together and published at the committee’s expense a slim but terrifying volume purporting to show that from the time Castro’s first appearance, certain American officials have defended him, that Kennedy did make humiliating deals with Mr. K [Nikita Khrushchev] and that – worst of all – middle range Soviet missiles remain in Cuba and have been steadily increased by arrivals from the Soviet Union.  

This appraisal exhibits two major threads that run throughout conservative reports that incorporated *Betrayal Opened the Door*: the restocking or collecting of missiles in Cuba from the Soviet Union and criticism of the administration and other U.S. governmental institutions for not doing enough to protect the U.S.

In terms of the latter, conservative publications expressed concern and condemnation for the clandestine negotiations between Cold War leaders that were not made public to the U.S. In the same article, Mowrer states:

Secretary of State [David Dean] Rusk recently stated that his proudest achievement has been the avoidance of major war, a process which demanded keeping a number of things secret from the American people. But it is one thing to keep certain details of policy unrevealed, quite another deliberately to deceive the American people about secret American concessions to “those who choose to consider themselves our enemies.”

These insights were then juxtaposed with his analysis of *Betrayal Opened the Door*, which he regarded as a more reliable source. One might be perplexed to see a conservative publication publicly take the word of a foreigner over their own government, however, when recognizing the overlap in political investments between the two groups (the TACC and *Newport Daily News*)

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Mowrer’s writing comes into focus. Likewise, in an article reprinted in at least four local periodicals, Dr. George Benson states:

Our information on Communist Cuba has been augmented with the readings of a new book, ‘Betrayal’ (the full title: ‘Betrayal Opened the Door to Russian Missiles in Red Cuba’). The author is Luis V. Manrara, Cuban exile President of The Truth About Cuba Committee. For years, he has been one of the leaders of the Cuban freedom Fighters, whom, he says, the U.S. Government has utterly neutralized, hindered, not helped. 421

Benson places his trust in the TACC while tactfully disregarding the U.S. governmental. Such sentiment was were not uncommon in conservative periodicals.

The article “Skepticism on News About Cuba” printed in The Post-Tribune via Independent Star displayed clairvoyance in December of 1962 when it suggested that a TACC publication “provides sufficient grounds for checking the accuracy and the motive behind any release from the Department of Defense.” 422 Foreshowing its fellow conservative newspapers, The Post-Tribune suggest that the TACC’s writing casts doubts on the statements of a U.S. government department. The only difference here being that the article was referring to the TACC’s Bulletin on Cuba No. 18.

Undoubtedly, when the TACC offered evidence that Soviet missiles were still in Cuba it received attention. It testified to the immediate and present danger coming from the island-nation and concerns over national security is a time honored tradition for conservatives. Betrayal Opened the Door also helped conservatives make their case against an administration run by democrats, who continued to priorities diplomacy over military conflict. For conservatives and the TACC this policy was at the expanse of the nation. Conservative discourse and the TACC’s

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literature expressed approval of intervention since it clearly favored their political agendas and their predilection for armed conflict in Cuba.

Other publications by the TACC was also addressed in local newspapers, for instance: *Cuba Disproves the Myth that Poverty is the Cause of Communism.* A fundamental tenet of Marxist revolutions is that capitalism is an inherently oppressive and unsustainable economic system that creates huge economic inequalities. The TACC and their white conservative counterparts sought to debunk that notion.

An article offered by the Coplay News Service, which was picked up by various newspapers around the country, made the same claim with the help from the TACC. The “Hemisphere Report” quotes directly from *Cuba Disproves the Myth:*

> “To conquer the world,” Manrrara insists, “Communist are not depending on military might, although this is also as a psychological weapon, as happened in Cuba with the missiles” last October. He says that the Communist have created a number of myths to confuse world public opinion. One of the strongest and most effective is that poverty is the cause of Communism.423

Likewise the *Tucson Daily Citizen* used the same TACC publication, however, this time to attack the Kennedy administration. The unnamed staffer states that “Policy makers on the New Frontier have peddled the myth that poverty causes communism” and then continues by using *Disproves the Myth* as ammunition against the administration.424 The term “New Frontier” derives from a speech given by John F. Kennedy at the 1960 Democratic National Convention during his presidential election. Later it referred to a number of policies, laws, and programs passed under his presidency (and continued with Johnson) that were comparable to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal of the early 1930s.425 The conflation of communist rhetoric with the

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423 1963-7-30 - The_San_Bernardino_County_Sun_Tue__Jul_30__1963 (Cuba Disproves) (Check - Hemispher Report)
424 1963-6-12 - Tucson_Daily_Citizen_Wed__Jun_12__1963__
425 “The New Frontier” was also used to refer to the “Space Race” between the Soviet Union and the U.S., which was also tied to the Kennedy administration.
efforts of an administration run by Democrats was no accident. After quoting and referencing
different parts of the *Disproves the Myth*, the article continues:

Despite these facts, officials of the Kennedy administration still preach that social reform
and the elimination of poverty will prevent communism. They preach a false doctrine.
The way to halt communism is to use forceful and effective measures to prevent
Communists from seizing power – and to prevent those in power from exporting
subversion.426

This assertion and conflation so closely resembled the TACC’s claims that the exile group could
not ask for more from an article.

Other TACC publications were also mentioned and referenced, however, not at the same
rate as *Betrayal Opened the Door* or *Disproves the Myth*. For instances, *Facts, Data and
Statistics on Pre-Communist Cuba* was also addressed. In sum, conservative newspapers utilized
the TACC’s works to bolster their agenda and propagate their political views. Conversely, the
TACC tapped into a larger network of readers when their works were picked up by local
newspapers. In this way, they had a mutually beneficial relationship due to shared anti-
communisms ideals and overlapping, but not identical, agendas.

The TACC’s direct appeal sought to shape U.S. broadcast media and periodicals by
influencing media and print news professionals with anti-Cuban state propaganda. In this way
the TACC was able to amplify their message to television viewers, radio listeners and readers of
conservative periodicals. However, rather than placing their concern in ruining the Cuban state’s
reputation, the TACC’s interventionist appeal raised the stakes by attempting to motivate U.S.
officials to act directly against the Cuban government.

**Interventionalistic Appeal: U.S. Officials**

Years before Cuban exiles and Cuban American refined their means of shaping and
weaponizing U.S. foreign policy against the Cuban revolutionary government, the TACC

426 - Tucson Daily Citizen, Wed, June 12, 1963, 1
provoked U.S. officials to take action against the Cuban state. When the TACC contacted U.S. officials through their correspondences and sent them publications, the Committee caused them to think through the imperatives in extinguishing communism in Cuba.

To give their propaganda the highest possibility of making an impact, the TACC kept track of, researched, and composed lists of members of congress and the senate. In doing so the TACC targeted potential U.S. officials to send their propaganda. One of the TACC’s records showed two lists of U.S. senators with track records of voting anti-communist. One was a list of 17 senators that voted “80% or more” of the time, while the other was made up of 16 members that voted “50% or better.” All of those that were listed received literature from the TACC, and often more than one. Another of their records listed 115 individuals with various influential positions – including members of congress and senators – that were sent *Betrayal Opened the Door*. These documents further illustrates the lack of centralized records of the TACC’s sent materials.

Exceeding the distribution of *An Exposé*, the TACC’s internal records claimed to have sent every member of congress *The Tricontinental Conference: A Declaration of War* in April of 1966. This pamphlets, however, did not have much in the way of responses. *The Tricontinental Conference* was originally converted from talks given to various civic clubs in Puerto Rico in March of 1966. As the name suggest, this pamphlet covered the Tricontinental Conference, which was a symposium held in Havana, Cuba for anti-imperialism. It was participated by delegates from nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and one of its primary focuses was to promote socialism and communism in developing countries.

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427 Senators and Congressmen Correspondence5, 30.
428 “…Folder: Congress,” 25 April , The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 5, Folder 8, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Florida.
In addition, in a letter to congressman Tom G. Abernethy, Manrara commended his recently delivered speech and offered to send him *Betrayal Opened the Door*. Manrara also made sure to mention to him that every member of Congress was already sent a copy.\(^{429}\) The TACC’s and Manrara’s records suggest this to be true and offer multiple responses from members of the congress. Many members of congress responded with gratitude such as Odin Langen, from Minnesota, and John J. Rhodes, from Arizona. They both thanked Manrara for sending them *Betrayal Opened the Door* and Langen added, “It shall be my purpose to review the information contained therein as time permits.”

Certain groups of representatives of congress and the senate also received copies of *Betrayal Opened the Door* like the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws. They were more commonly known as Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) and they were the same group that received *An Exposé*. As a subcommittee they sought to uncover communism and other “subversions” within the United States.\(^{430}\) Members of the SISS were pleased to receive these publications. Their Chief Council, Senator J. G. Sourwine, thanked Manrara for sending *Betrayal Opened the Door* and wrote “It was good of you to think of me in that connection.”\(^{431}\) Furthermore, the Vice President of this subcommittee stated “Thank you for your recent letter and for sending me a copy of your paper, ‘Communist Methodology of Conquest.’ I read it with interest, and congratulate you upon this thoughtful presentation.”\(^{432}\)

\(^{429}\) Luis V. Manrara, Letter from Luis V. Manrara to Tom G. Abernethy, 3 January 1969, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 5, Folder 8, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Florida.

\(^{430}\) During the 1950s they also held public hearing to question journalist suspected connections to the Communist Party.

\(^{431}\) Luis V. Manrara, Letter from J.G. Sourwine to Luis V. Manrara, 16 January 1968, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 5, Folder 8, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Florida.

\(^{432}\) Luis V. Manrara, Letter from Thomas J. Dodd to Luis V. Manrara, 18 April 1967, The Luis V. Manrara Papers, Box 5, Folder 8, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami Libraries, Florida.
The TACC also received many positive responses for *Communist Methodology of Conquest* from members of congress and senator; they responded back to the TACC with encouraging words about the free anti-Cuban communism literature that they received. Congressmen Abraham J. Multer, New York; Charles E. Bennett, Florida; Dante B. Fascell, Florida; and Frances P. Bolton, Ohio (member of Foreign Affairs Committee) all shared their support. In terms of Senators, Spessard L. Holland, Florida (D); Ernest F. Hollings (D), South Carolina; Joseph S. Clark (D), Pennsylvania; and Strom Thurmond (R), South Carolina did the same. About a third of the members of congress and the senate that received *Communist Methodology of Conquest* also received *Report from South Africa*. The latter was Manrara’s report of visiting South Africa for the National Council to Combat Communism, more specifically his speaking engagement and “observations about the people and country” during his visit to South Africa. Still, the most encouraging words came from U.S. Senators in their responses to *Communist Methodology of Conquest.*

Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R) of Oregon stated “Certainly it is necessary for us all to be ever aware of the threats to our United States. You may be assured I shall do my part in protesting our fine country and our form of government.” 433 Likewise, Senator Samuel N. Friedel of Maryland stated, “As your letterhead proclaims ‘the best defense against communism is knowledge of its methods.’ And you are to be commended for you efforts to bring the truth to public attention.” 434 Similarly Senator, Peter H. Dominick of Colorado wrote, “Many thanks for our recent letter and the pamphlet entitled ‘Communist Methodology of Conquest.’ I appreciate your keeping me informed of your activities and welcome any further comments you might have on some of these key issues of the day.” 435 Lastly the Texan Senator and member of the

433 Senators and Congressmen Correspondence5, 22.
434 Senators and Congressmen Correspondence5, 28.
435 Senators and Congressmen Correspondence5, 24.
Committee on Armed Services, John G. Tower, noted “I appreciated very much your courtesy in sharing with me the material and information you felt would be of interest to me. I am sure it will prove to be very worthwhile reading. Your continuing advice and suggestions are most welcome.” These letters surely went over well with Manrara.

Copies of the TACC’s literature circulated the U.S. congress and senate (particularly among Republicans) during the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. However, a pivotal question for the TACC was whether or not these letters and publications were having an effect on U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. One thing is getting publications in the hands of U.S. officials, another is getting these officials to take action. Giving the TACC some reassurance, Congressman Jerry L. Pettis expressed his optimism in this regard:

Thank you for the publications I’ve received from The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc. and for your comments commending me on my views concerning the Castro regime in Cuba. I’m please to enclose a copy of my resolution on the subject. This proposal is presently pending before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and no action has been scheduled as of this date.

Likewise, Patrick T. Caffery of Louisiana, a recipient of Betrayal Opened the Door and Communist Methodology of Conquest, stated to Manrara: “it is my hope that positions such as I have taken and those taken by many of my colleagues similarly expressed, will bring about more steadfast foreign policy in the future.” However, Manrara did not share their optimism; his response to Pettis gives us a window into his diminishing faith in the U.S. government.

Early in the TACC’s existence Manrara would have most likely responded with optimism, rhetoric, and generalizations. He would have claimed something to the effect that with the full support of the American people and the strength of the U.S. government, Cuban exiles

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would be able to exorcise Cuba of its communist demons. However, the late-1960s saw Manrara grow impatient towards the Johnson administration for their lack of shift removal of the Castro regime. These sentiments manifest in Manrara’s responses to Pettis:

Your Concurrent Resolution aiming to eradicate communism from Cuba is very commendable. It describes the aggressions of the communist regime of Cuba and its trampling upon the O.A.S., proposing the right and legal solution. Nevertheless, dear Congressman, I am afraid that your Resolution would run the same fate as the Joint Resolution No. 230, adopted in September and signed into law by President John F. Kennedy on October 3, 1962. As long as the Executive Branch of Government and the Administration (meaning the entrenched Civil Service bureaucracy) pursue a policy of collaboration with the U.S.S.R., it would require more than a two thirds majority in Congress to overrides the Executive. Unfortunately, this is not the case.  

There are three key observations to make here: 1) Manrara’s response to Pettis displayed a better understanding of the way in which the U.S. government functioned. Viewing the government, not as a single entity that can be motivate solely through morality obligation but rather, as a three branch government with conflicting views and political agendas. Albeit not extremely nuanced, however, it was a far cry from his previous rhetoric and conceptualization of the U.S. government as a single entity making decision based on morality. 2) Manrara’s criticism of the administration’s pursuit of “a policy of collaboration with the U.S.S.R.” is motivated by his strong conviction that complete dismantling of communism (not the sustainment of diplomatic relations) was best for the world. Manrara’s comments here and elsewhere participated in a larger discourse that attacked an approach referred to as “coexistences”: a current effort to mollify the conflict between the two superpowers. 3) By reserving criticism for the Executive Branch, Manrara did not have to abandon all hope in the U.S. government but simply place it with Republicans and other staunch anti-communist in the government. This marked a shift in politics for Manrara from Cuban conservativism to corresponding more with Republican beliefs and positions. However, some political scientists have shown that the inverse is true of Cubans.

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439 Senators and Congressmen correspondence4, 14.
that is to say, the longer they stayed in the U.S. the more likely they were to stray away from Republican affiliations.\textsuperscript{440} Tangent aside, in this specific case Manrara’s shift is marked by his disdain for the Executive Branch i.e. the Kennedy/Johnson administration.

In the same letter to Pettis, Manrara continues to criticize the U.S. government, however, this time eschews nuance and reverts back to his old tendencies.

It is utterly impossible to save our civilization, Congressman Pettis, unless the policy towards socialism/communism of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government is reversed. The Washington-Moscow Axis is too powerful. One end must be broken. And we only have access to Washington. Fortunately, it is by far the strongest of the two. So, if it breaks away from the U.S.S.R., we may win yet. But time is awfully short.\textsuperscript{441}

Manrara resorts to hyperbolic conspiracy theories. Even if were to entertained the possibility that he simply used hyperbole to make the point that Washington’s policy towards Soviet Union was dangerously favoring the Soviet Union, Manrara still fails to recognize the complexity of Cold War politics of which Cuba only plays a part in a larger global game of chest between leaders of the superpowers.

For the once optimistic activist such as Manrara, this is a bleak expression which begs the question: why continue to send congress and the senate TACC publications? Why engage with any U.S. official for that matter? Manrara did reserved some hope in this regard: he stated to the TACC’s board members that their committee was successful in removing \textit{Three Faces of Cuba} from broadcasting by provoking U.S. official, for example.\textsuperscript{442} Manrara also witnessed parts of \textit{An Exposé} play a (albeit modest) role in the hearings leading to the passing of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.\textsuperscript{443} The TACC had Strom Thurmond to thank for using \textit{An Exposé} as

\textsuperscript{441} Senators and Congressmen correspondence4, 14
\textsuperscript{442} TACC By-Laws3 B118F1 (Covered for Three Faces of Cuba)
\textsuperscript{443} \textit{Public Broadcasting Act of 1967}, May 17, 1967, S 7020, Congressional Record Archive, United States of America.
evidence in those hearings and Manrara to thank for having initiated correspondences with Thurmond. However, these were more media oriented concerns.

Manrara’s disappointment was in the arena of geopolitics and was more rooted in the administration. So, what would it take, according to Manrara, for U.S. officials to heed the warning and take action against this great evil? He wrote that it would take “a group of patriotic Americans to take the leadership and mobilize the great number of honest, sincere and patriotic Americans who are completely mesmerized and unaware of the imminent danger threatening them.”

Faith in patriotic leadership and the will of the American people is more in tune with Manrara during the early years of the TACC. However, the logistics of this plan is lost in the ambiguity of the writing. Is Manrara suggesting that these officials, as “patriotic Americans,” should put pressure on the administration by mobilizing popular anti-communist beliefs from Americans? Or, quite possibly, Manrara is asking Pettis to organize and find a way to circumvent or undermined the administration’s foreign policy. Either way, Manrara suggests that additional action must be taken by a group of patriotic U.S. officials from congress, the senate, and U.S. institutions. For this reason other U.S. authorities were also sent literature.

For example, Betrayal Opened the Door was sent to J. Edgar Hoover, Earl E.T. Smith (major of Palm Beach and former ambassador to Cuba), and Robert C. Hill (ambassador to Argentina). Likewise, current and former servicemen such as Sergeant Henry J. Lacour, Major Edgar C. Bundy, Admiral Carlos Penna Botto, and Major General Thomas A. Lane (the writer to Betrayal Opened the Door’s preface) were also sent copies. While Manrara showed discontent with the U.S. government, rooted in the Executive branch, clearly Manrara and the TACC did not lose faith in the U.S. state considering the amount of letters between the TACC and U.S. authorities were in the hundreds.

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444 Senators and Congressmen correspondence4, 14.
As previously covered, the TACC also provoked U.S. officials to act against “pro-Revolution” media objects. As covered in Chapter 2 and 3, the TACC (with allies) notified U.S. authorities about the “insidious film” *Three Faces of Cuba* and called for action against its makers: National Educational Television (NET). The TACC specifically sent their analysis of the television documentary to U.S. officials that directed or were members of anti-communist government groups. Furthermore, working with the Committee Pro Cuba Liberation (CPCL), the TACC notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and (once again) the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). As analyzed below, the TACC found that allyship allowed them to extend their reach of their propaganda and aided their activist projects.

**Appeals to Allies: Activist, Political, Religious, and Cultural Organizations**

The Truth About Cuba Committee kept close ties with activist, advocacy, religious, and cultural organizations within the United States, many of which were populated by Cuban exile and U.S. conservatives. The Committee worked with these organization to either rebuke media objects and incentives U.S. officials to intervene in “pro-Revolution” broadcastings or to further spread their propaganda to members of these organizations and their followers. In terms of the former, as outlined in Chapter 3, this was the case with the CPCL and the Association of Cuban Exiles of St. Petersburg (ACESP), each of which worked jointly with the TACC to publicly condemn and remove a NET television documentary about Cuba. While coalitions like these were common for the TACC, far more common (and affordable) was the TACC’s distribution of literature to these organizations. Their motivation in doing so was to broaden their reach, a strategy that is corroborated by a TACC newsletter:

> Through such well known, reputable and patriotic organization, your Committee reaches an audience of millions, scattered throughout the length and breadth of the United States, bringing the plight of our country before a large portion of the American public which
would not otherwise know the truth about the Cuban communist regime and the role it plays as a Soviet Satellite in the subversion of this hemisphere. Many of these organizations were founded and ran by Cuban exiles either established after 1959 in the U.S. or were established on the island and continued in the U.S. These groups were political, cultural, and social in nature and unified under shared exilic experiences, similar political views (while not identical), Cuban nationality, and a collective endeavor to form a small pre-1959 Cuba in South Florida. The TACC shared their publications with them not only to further spread their written work, but also to support their fellow Cuban exiles and participate in their events. Through correspondences, events, meetings, and collaborative endeavors the TACC proffered their literature to Cuban organizations.

One example of this was Manrara’s visit to Tampa, Florida for the Cuban Civic Club meeting held in the Tampa Bank Building. In his notes to the TACC leadership, Manrara estimated that about 60 Cubans attended from the area including the president of the ACESP, Juan O’Naghten. Manrara spoke a few words to those in attendance and after he distributed Spanish-language literature from the TACC and recruited for members. In other occasions the TACC shared their literature as part of a collaborative effort.

In their joint crusade against Three Faces of Cuba, the ACESP received all of the TACC’s literature on the television documentary. This included sections of the An Exposé which was still underdevelopment. Likewise, when the TACC partnered with the CPCL, the group from Hartford received similar materials. While working and sharing information with their fellow émigrés was important, the TACC felt it was imperative to keep contact with right-wing U.S. political groups and send them propaganda.

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445 TACC × the end of TACC B122F40, 2.
446 See García, Havana USA, 1996.
448 Manrara TV B17F13, 19.
Loading them with ammunition against the U.S. Left, the TACC sent conservative organization literature with evidence that supposed the ills of communism and the Castro regime. Organizations like the far-right John Birch Society (JBS) received *Betrayal Opened the Door* and *An Exposé* on the 17th of January 1968, for example. These letters were addressed to Marian P. Welch (wife to the founder of the JBS and) the editor of the JBS two magazines: *American Opinion* and *The News Americans*. This contact’s importance were two-fold: tapping into JBS’s network and reaching the readership of their publications. Indeed, some cases included more than one type of appeal, in this case an appeal to an ally and a direct appeal to their publications. The members of the JBS tasked with reading and evaluating the TACC’s literature took it seriously.

Following the trend of other conservative-leaning publications, *American Opinion*’s evacuation of *Betrayal Opened the Door* in was favorable. Medford Bryan Evans, college professor and frequent contributor to conservative publications, writes: “I’m convinced that Señor Luis V. Manrara is on the level” and then states “[Manrara’s] book has a lot in it that you and I ought to know.” Evans explains why “you” (presumably U.S. citizens) “ought to know.” For one the American presidencies during the 1950s and 1960s failed the U.S. and Cubans in their dealings with the island-nation. She writes, “Eisenhower put Castro in power, Kennedy guaranteed his position, and Johnson has kept the guarantee.” Such statements lead Evans to conclude that “Señor Manrara’s support of the proposition that Russian military control of Cuba is a result of betrayal in America is quite solid.” Evans summarizes Manrara’s concerns over national security for the U.S. and then concludes with “if we will learn the truth about Cuba, some of the truth about ourselves may dawn on us.” An axiom that was proposed by Manrara

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449 TACC John Birch Society B47F8, 14.
and agreed upon by Evans is that the administration is not to be trusted with information about Soviet Missiles in Cuba. Evans takes the word of foreign born anti-communists over his own government, a doubt that would be a pattern among conservative-leaning newspapers. The JBS and American Opinion would continue to receive publications from the TACC; they agreed to exchange publications rather than buy them from each other, an arrangement that Manrara sought out with other groups, too.\footnote{451}

Despite the contentious relationship with Manrara during the televised panel Four Face of Cuba (1965), Paul D. Bethel was also sent a copy of Betrayal Opened the Door.\footnote{452} Considering his dismissal of Cuban’s contribution to la causa Cubana, it would be unsurprising that he disregarded the text all together. This points to the fact that acceptance to the TACC’s literature varied. Bethel, the head of the Citizens Committee to Free Cuba (CCFC), felt that his expertise of the island-nation made Cuban exiles’ insight unnecessary.\footnote{453} As we have seen, white and conservative organizations and periodicals would disagree.

The TACC also had exchanges with religious groups and churches. Edgar C. Bundy of the Church League of America and former U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer Major was sent a copies of Betrayal Opened the Door.\footnote{454} Likewise, the TACC sent a copy to Reverend Ceferino Ruiz, a Spaniard exiled from Cuba in 1961, and a high school teacher at the Jesuit Preparatory School in Miami.\footnote{455} As a community leader, Ruiz not only had access to his congregation but also high school students. The TACC used Christian allies to further spread anti-Communist propaganda just as they did with institutions of leaning.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnotemark[451] TACC John Birch Society B47F8, 32
\item \footnotemark[452] Manrara + Distribution list for Betrayal B13F6, 2
\item \footnotemark[454] Manrara + Distribution list for Betrayal B13F6
\item \footnotemark[455] Manrara + Distribution list for Betrayal B13F6,1 and Random - 5-29-1964 - The Voice volVI, No. 11 (LVM send Father Ceferino Ruiz Betrayal)
\end{itemize}
Pedagogical Appeal: Educators and Institutions of Learning

Late in 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) radio station, Radio Swan, beamed reports to the island-nation that the Cuban state had intentions of abolishing parents’ patria potestad. Doing so would legally allow the revolutionary government to take children away from parents.\footnote{María de los Ángeles Torres, The Lost Apple: Operation Pedro Pan, Cuban Children in the U.S., and the Promise of a Better Future (Beacon Press, 2003), 89.} This fearmongering campaign was intensified by the state’s actual shift in school curriculum from bourgeois to Marxist – a characterization per the official state narrative.

Members of the TACC was still in Cuba at this time, however, soon migrated to South Florida. While in the U.S. the TACC continued to stay abreast of occurrences on the island from incoming émigrés, Cuban monitoring services surveilling Cuban state media, and (although they denied it) informants in Cuba. Through these channels the TACC continued to receive reports of the Cuban state indoctrinating the young into Marxism. Considering the TACC’s strong convictions on the power of information, the TACC took these reports seriously and sought to make sure the same would not happen in the U.S.

Aforementioned in chapters two and three, Manrara stated in a letter to the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation that 3,000 U.S. libraries and institutions of higher learning received An Exposé of the Insidious Film ‘Three Faces of Cuba’.\footnote{Luis V. Manrara, Letter to Eleanor Schlafly and Phyllis Schlafly, Box 17, Folder 6, Luis V. Manrara Papers. Manrara Three Faces of Cuba B17F6} The librarian of Biscayne College, father John F. Bresnahan, received 170 publications at the suggestion of Manrara’s nephew, Alfredo Manrara, Jr, who was a student of Bresnahan.\footnote{TACC Alfredo Manrara Jr 2 B23F18, 60-63. Biscayne College was first founded in Havana, Cuba as Universidad Católica de Santo Tomás de Villanueva.} They sent these publications to Bresnahan to be added to the college’s library. Other colleges and universities would also receive propaganda such as the Department of Acquisitions from Cornell University and the campus bookstore for Northeast Missouri State College. While the TACC’s anxieties over the indoctrination (and the
potential kidnapping) of the young was certainly sparked by reports from and about Cuba, they were exacerbated by conservative reports of college campuses being havens for Leftism, Marxism, and communism.

For these reasons, Manrara did not fully trust higher education distributing information about Cuba or examining its contemporary circumstances. He expressed as much in a letter to Mike Moore of KTLN radio. Manrara writes, “Unless I am a poor judge of people, I am sure that you are going to take up a serious study of contemporary Cuban History just to make sure that what you have been reading and what you studied in College does not, unfortunately, tell the truth about the Cuban situation.”459 Exacerbating his skepticism of college campus was the student activists’ support of the Cuban Revolution, which came from, for example, the Students for a Democratic Society and African-American groups like the Black Student Union (BSU) from the San Francisco State College. Historian Martha Biondi showed how the latter was inspired by “Events in Cuba and Vietnam” which “appeared to confirm that well-organized, nationalist forces could withstand the military might of the United States, while domestic dissent had helped to bring down President Johnson.”460 Student activism that tied their domestic struggles to international resistance like the Cuban Revolution, along with the general anti-establishment sentiments on college campus warranted Manrara’s distrust considering his political positions. Manrara was also not shy about voicing his cynicism of higher education, he also publicly challenged a professor for the comments he made about Cuba.

Prompted by a conference on Cuban affairs in Indiana University on April 25, 1964, Manrara took to task a professor of Latin American history, Dr. Samuel Shapiro, for his remarks on Cuban communism.461 Manrara called Shapiro “thoroughly confused and misinformed” in

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459 Manrara Denver TV Photo B14F19, 13
461 Scholastic, Notre Dame University, vol. 105, Iss. 22, 13.
regards to Cuba’s circumstances and challenged him to an on-campus debate. However, Manrara’s bias against higher education seemed to have gotten the best of him in this case. On May 15th of the same year, Shapiro responded in an issue of *Scholastic* by stating that they were not actually in disagreement but rather it was merely a misunderstanding. The “inaccuracies” cited by Manrara were the professor’s attempt to present the Communist’s argument, not his own views. The article, “…Nothing More Than the Truth,” explains: “In the instance of the two passages, [Shapiro] was simply giving the Communist view in the language the Communists use. He personally agrees with neither their premises nor their conclusions.” Here, the Notre Dame publication certainly came to the defense of their own.

Yet, not all exchanges with faculty were contentious, Manrara sent Dr. Anthony Kubek of the University of Dallas a flattering letter with *Betrayal Opened the Door* enclosed. Manrara writes, “As you may remember I brought your excellent book ‘How the Far East Was Lost’ and have often referred to it in my talks and writings.” What scholar would not love to receive a message such as this one? Likewise, William M. Gabard of the Department of History at Valdosta State College invited Manrara to campus for a talk on the Tricontinental Conference, in which Manrara used parts of his publication of the same name to address the audience. When Gabard sent Manrara the detail about the visit and lecture, he added that “You could distribute your literature at the time of you lecture.” While individual professors would of course vary on their position on Cuba, communism and Marxism, however, Manrara found success in the libraries of higher education. In a board meeting on September 7, 1971, Manrara summarized the “highlights of the year,” and stated that “the literature from the Committee is being sought by

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462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
464 Manrara, Box 17, Folder 15.
465 Manrara, Box 17, Folder 15, 30
college and University Libraries, especially the brochure ‘Communist Methodology of Conquest.’”

To conclude, the TACC’s and Manrara’s concerns over the education of the young was certainly owed to the reports they received about communist indoctrination in Cuba. However, after migration these anxieties were exacerbated and situated within the U.S. with the help of conservative discourse. Manrara, being an avid reader of conservative publications, certainly knew of the disparaging reports on higher education. These were more than enough reasons for sending the TACC’s publications to these sites; simply put, they hoped to “educate” young college students before the communist reached them. They sought to do so by influencing educators and by making available TACC publications to institutions of education. For the TACC, this was yet another means of boarding their audience, however, this time with a moral imperative for the future generations.

**Sustaining Members and Acquaintances**

The TACC prioritized individuals, groups, and organizations with members in more prominent positions over those with less influence, as we have witnessed. For sustain members and acquaintances that were not a part of the four categories covered in the sections above, the sending of literature was aimed to keep them abreast of the developments in Cuba and the plight of Cubans due to the Castro regime. The TACC understood that sending their all of their reading materials to their sustaining members would be too costly and inefficient. For the larger and, therefore, the more costly publications the TACC was more selective when sending them out at no cost. Conversely shorter works were given out free such as newsletters which were routinely mailed out. By 1969 the TACC began a more strict policy of charging for publications that were more costly and popular. This policy was another marker of the TACC’s financial decline.

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466 TACC By-Laws 3 B118F1 (Covered for Three Faces of Cuba), 27.
most expensive items listed were two books: *Betrayal Opened the Door* ($1.50) and *An Exposé* ($1.00). This was followed by pamphlets in English and Spanish then cards (information postcards). Before this time many of these publications were give out free to who the TACC identified as influential persons as well as sustaining members that wanted to be well-informed about Cuba.

Such was the case with letters to L.F. Heimburger from Springfield, Missouri and Alicia P. Stockelberg from nearby Deerfield Beach, Florida, both of which received multiple publications.\(^{467}\) Noteworthy here, Stockelberg was not only a donator, she also briefly offered her services to the TACC by monitored NET programing. In another case, a fellow Cuban exile, Mario Lazo, received literature and commented on how one publication spoke to his exile experience. Lazo states, “Yes, my story is very similar to that contained in your *Betrayal*” (his emphasis).\(^{468}\) This was a rare, albeit very brief, expression of lived-experienced that was connected to the TACC’s writing.

The TACC’s written works certainly could have been a source of bonding with their compatriots, however, this probably did not happen very frequently. These publications were created with white Americans in mind, they were more informative and analytical in nature, and the TACC’s English-language literature were so often fundamental to exiles that many must have been bored by the lack of nuance (however, the TACC’s Spanish-language publications were a different story). Members of the Cuban enclave navigated a plethora of political positions. In sum, the TACC’s writing, while informative about occurrences on the island, lacked a certain political specificity among a diversity of positions in Cuban exile politics.

\(^{467}\) Manrara - TV Three Faces of Cuba Channel 2 + CPrograms B6F6, 25. TACC Alicia Stockelberg 2 B32F28, 4-5.

\(^{468}\) Manrara Betrayal Letters B13F3, 46.
While the TACC may have gave and sold their writing materials to their none-influential members and individuals, they could not help but send publications to those that promise to distribute them, even if modestly. For instance, one couple from Long Island, New York, Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Duany, asked for literature from the TACC to send to their “American friends.” Gerardo Abascal’s memorandum quotes the Duany’s letter that was originally written in Spanish which reads: “We are interested in the TACC to send us propaganda or pamphlets, because we have made many American friends here, and I think, as they are money people, educated, influential, they would be interested to know the truth about the current Cuban situation.”\textsuperscript{469} Likewise, Dr. Jorge C. Mestre, Jr. also promised to circulate their materials. In a cryptic message, the dentist from Waukesha, Wisconsin asked for the TACC’s literature and then stated: “I find myself in the position of being able to distribute and make this propaganda available to a large group of the Wisconsin population.” Marking its importance, this sentence was underlined in red by a TACC member. Marked in the same way was a part of the letter where Mestre specified that he wanted English language reading materials “to distribute it to many of the ‘intelligent’ people of the state I live in.”\textsuperscript{470} Despite never disclosing why Mestre had access to a large group in his home state, the TACC obliged the request, as well as the request from the Duany, and clearly for the possibility of reaching a larger population.

\textbf{Conclusion}

As an activist group, the TACC sought to get the word out about their cause as far as possible. Early in their existence the TACC reached out to various individuals and entities to set the record straight about the Castro regime. In the late-1960s, the TACC developed groups of recipients with intensions to tap into their networks in order to further disseminate anti-Cuban

\textsuperscript{469} My translation. TACC Gerardo Abascal B9F3, 46.
\textsuperscript{470} TACC Gerardo Abascal B9F3, 2.
state propaganda or to tap into their authority to shape U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Those categories and the TACC’s intentions for deploying them are as follows: 1. media professionals (direct appeal); 2. U.S. officials (interventionist appeal); 3. activist, political, cultural, and religious organizations (appeals to allies); and educators and institutions of learning (pedagogical appeal). These strategies allowed for the TACC to widen their audience substantially. It also shaped U.S. officials’ actions against Cuba; however, there was a cap on altering foreign policy by the Kennedy/Johnson administrations of the 1960s.

There appears to be no complete record of neither the Committee’s publications that were given or sold nor a complete list of the recipients of that literature. The records of how many and which publications the TACC shared and sold came from incomplete and unsystematic accounts in internal documents and correspondences. Moreover, Manrara also handed an unrecorded number of publications during his estimate 600 speaking engagements as well as his frequent visits to broadcast stations in Miami, which does not account for the other TACC members doing the same.471 Considering these events and the TACC’s correspondences with organizations, the TACC was able to significantly widen their readership and further disseminate their message.

While the primary focus in this chapter was to examine the ways in which the TACC used other entities to help distribute their propaganda, we should not lose sight of the fact that their spreading of publications was a part of a much larger phenomenon. The TACC’s dissemination of literature to news professionals, U.S. officials, activists, organizations, and educators participated in a circulation of conservative discourse in the U.S. The TACC’s exchange of literature with Cuban and U.S. conservative organizations, for example. The TACC’s distribution of literature offers us a small window to see a larger discourse circulating

during the Cold War. Once we recognize the TACC’s dissemination of conservative discourse, we could extrapolate and envision their participation in a much larger system of conservative and anti-communist discourses with the TACC constituting one (albeit small) node in the network.
CONCLUSION

Each chapter of this dissertation commenced with an overview of the Truth About Cuba Committee’s (TACC) historical circumstances or an anecdote that helped to illustrate its primary focus and engage the reader. The collective anecdotes of the previous four chapters demonstrate the TACC overarching strategies. Respectively, they began with the following: first, delineating the historical and political contours of the TACC and the contexts in which they operated in during the 1960s to the 1970s. Second, Luis V. Manrara, the then president of the TACC, sending a letter to Edward Hunter asking him to reprint a section of a TACC publication in his periodical titled Tactics. Third, Manrara’s appearance on Channel 2 WTHS-TV in which he denounced the television documentary Three Faces of Cuba (1965) by reading an excerpt of his manuscripts, which would later be mailed to U.S. authorities. Fourth, sending letters encouragement to two influential newscasters: Ralph Renick and Manolo Reyes; emboldening news professionals to express anti-Cuban state messages on their programs. Fifth, the production and dissemination of propaganda to Americans and Cubans in influential positions in the U.S.; a thread that runs throughout the dissertation and cascades in the final chapter. In fact, the structure of chapter five is a microcosm of the entire project.

This dissertation has argued that the TACC compelled Americans and Cubans in prominent positions such as U.S. officials, media professionals, organizations’ leaders, and educators to use their authority to tarnish the reputation of the Cuban state. By reaching these figures, the TACC were able to extend their anti-Castro message to radio and television
audiences, the state’s institutions, networks connected to various organizations, and U.S.
students. The TACC also worked towards prohibiting the distribution of pro-Revolution
portrayals by provoking anti-communist U.S. officials to act as a regulatory body. These efforts
were targeted to the National Educational Television (NET) network and their documentaries,
particularly *Three Faces of Cuba*. The Committee’s strategies offer insight into an unexplored
facet of the émigré community.

While the links between Cuban exiles and U.S. conservatives seems clear to conventional
wisdom, the TACC’s activities is a concrete example of the connection. As this project has
shown, the TACC worked with white U.S. conservatives unified by their antipathy of
communism, which feed into their respective political agendas. Some scholars in the field of
Cuban and Cuban Diasporic Studies have debated the exceptionalism of the island and its
migration. What is not up for debate is the political diversity of U.S. Latinas/os that also
includes conservativism. First- and second-wavers were not the only group with Latin American
roots that expressed and participated in conservativism within U.S. borders. Long before Cuban
politicians like Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz took the national stage, Latinas/os brought with them
from Latin America conservative views to the U.S. Some others have adopted conservative
ideals from the U.S. This project opens up fruitful avenues of inquiry in Latina/o conservativism
and its multiple relationships to media. These inroads can be tracked by the movement of
conservative Latina/os from Latin America and its emergence in U.S. politics.

A recent study published by the Pew Research Center shows that older and foreign-born
Latina/o voters are more conservative in their political views. This claim has a historical

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473 Mark Hugo Lopez, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Jens Manuel Krogstad and Gustavo López, “4. Latinos and the political
political-parties/
presence not only with Cubans but other subnational groups. If we locate the same political motives that brought conservative-leaning Cubans to the U.S., we find other case studies in Chile, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Salvador Allende was the first democratically elected Marxist president in Chile. He and his Socialist Party sparked departures and forced expulsions. Chilean exiles listed political and economic reasons for leaving. Zuzana M. Pick has examined the cinema of exiled Chileans from 1973 to 1983; however, other relations between Chilean exiles and U.S. media have yet to be explored. Similar to Cuban exiles, Venezuelan immigrants left after the Bolivarian Revolution of 1999 and espoused anti-communist beliefs. The Bolivarian diaspora was considered by news outlets like the *New York Times*, *the Washington Post*, and *Al Jazeera* as the largest refugee crisis in the Americas.\(^\text{474}\) Opposition to the socialist Venezuelan government, religious affiliations, and years of evangelical missionaries from the U.S. have fostered conservativism among Venezuelans which they brought with them in migration. In Bolivia, Evo Morales was also elected to the highest office backed by a socialist party. The nation underwent a series of socialist reforms that limited free enterprise causing political dissents and emigration. However, the size of that migration could not compare to the 1950s-1960s wave of emigration after the 1952 Bolivian National Revolution. This political and economic transformation also sparked departure from conservative-minded citizens.

I am not implying a cause and effect argument whereby with the initiation of a socialist, Leftist, or Marxist government in Latin America there is a migration of conservatives to the U.S. that form the basis of a community. Instead, I am suggesting that these are worthwhile areas of exploration. The fact is that many of the anti-capitalist uprisings in Latin America in the 1960s

and 1970s failed to produce socialist revolutions. However, Latin American nations without prominent socialist leadership also housed conservatism.

Political scientists and Latin Americanist have formed a body of literature on conservative and Right-wing politics. For instance, Timothy J. Power’s work on Post-authoritarian Brazil and Kevin J. Middlebrook’s edited collection on conservative parties and Democracy in Latin America. These works, among others, suggest that conservatism is not a static concept but rather one that has many iterations that are shaped by the specificity of the region, historical and political formations, and geopolitics. Indeed, American-centric notions of conservatism should not be imposed on the study of Latin American politics. However, U.S. involvement in the continent throughout the twentieth century is undeniable and also link U.S. and different Latin American conservativisms together. They, just like the political left, travel and migrate to the U.S. and at times resettle there. There are some important unasked questions regarding this phenomenon: how do Latin American conservative immigrants incorporate themselves into the U.S. and what are their relationships with media? The circulation of persons and politics between Latin American and the U.S. will lead scholars of Latina/o and media to uncharted territory. Tracking these transnational currents are essential; however, we should not lose sight of the fact that Latina/o has been in the U.S. for generations and have adopted U.S. conservatism.

At the same time that Cuban and Latina/o media activism were occurring in the 1960s and 1970s, the Republican National Hispanic Assembly (RNHA) was gathering support from

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Latinas/os on behalf of the Republican Party.\footnote{Geraldo Cadava “Hispanic Conservatism: Its Rise—and Fall?,” \textit{NACLA Report on the Americas}, 48:4, 2016, 385-393.} This conservative-leaning organization was formed from first- and the second-generation Latina/o immigrants and represented Hispanic communities and their concerns.\footnote{Hispanic was their preferred identification.} The RNHA built coalitions with oft-conservative politicians in media advocacy campaigns for the Republican Party. At their founding, they sought to increase Latina/o involvement in politics but were not recognized by the Democratic and the Republican Party. The RNHA would soon be incorporated into the Republican Party after helping Richard Nixon widen his support base with Hispanic voters and win the 1972 presidential election. Not much has been written about the RNHA; a single none-refereed article by historian Geraldo Cadava who is also in the process of researching and writing a book-length project titled \textit{The Silenced Minority: the Rise and Fall of the Hispanic Conservative Movement}.\footnote{Cadava, “Hispanic Conservatism,” 2016.}

Cadava’s current project, recent panels like “Latino/a Conservatism from the GOP to the Alt-Right” from the Latina/o Studies Association conference, and a trend of connected fields venturing into conservatism like American history and Media Studies suggest that Latina/o Studies maybe varying closer to the subject. By situating this project within the study of Latinas/os and the media and examining Cuban conservatism, this dissertation can open up avenues for the exploration of Latina/o media and conservatism. In fact, this work’s future development hopes to bring conservatism to the field of Latina/o Media Studies so that we may have a more complete picture of the political diversity of Latinas/os and their numerous relationships to the media.
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