

**Agenda Control and Policy Change in American Legislatures:
How Partisan Unity and Electoral Competition Encourage
Change and Stasis in U.S. Politics**

by

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DEDICATION

S.D.G.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication	ii
Acknowledgments	iii
List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	viii
List of Appendices	x
Abstract	xi
 Chapter	
1 Introduction	1
2 Stalemate in the States: Agenda Control Rules and Policy Output in American Legislatures	11
2.1 Legislative Gridlock: Parties and Preferences	13
2.2 Theoretical Expectations: How Does Negative Agenda Control Work to Slow Policy Change?	17
2.3 Agenda Control, Adjusted Core Size, and Policy Change	20
2.4 Does Negative Agenda Control Influence Policy Change Apart from Institutional Polarization?	34
2.5 Implications and Conclusions	42
3 Mandate to Message: Partisan Competition, Bill Sponsorship, and Position-Taking in Congress	43
3.1 Bill Sponsorship, Position-Taking, and Electoral Competition	47
3.2 A Theory of Policy Change and Sponsorship Type	49
3.2.1 Electoral Expectations and Partisan Agenda-Setting Decisions	50
3.3 How Do Electoral Prospects Influence Policy Change Under Possible Power Transitions?	55
3.3.1 Scenario 1: AS Maintains Agenda Control and Makes Gains with Reciever	56
3.3.2 Scenario 2: AS Remains the Same, but Receiver Moves Away from AS	62
3.3.3 Scenario 3: Control of AS Changes	66
3.4 Viable Bill Introduction: Measurement and Data	70
3.4.1 Identification and Measurement of AS , R , AS' , and R'	71

3.4.2	Electoral Expectations and Power Transition Scenarios	74
3.4.3	Measurement of Status Quo Locations and Viable, Messaging Legislation	77
3.4.4	Additional Independent Variables	80
3.5	Empirical Approach and Results	82
3.5.1	H_1 : Policy Deceleration	84
3.5.2	H_2 : Policy Acceleration when <i>AS</i> Does Not Change	90
3.5.3	H_3 : Policy Acceleration when <i>AS</i> Changes	94
3.6	Discussion and Conclusion	96
4	Elections and (In)action: Partisan Competition and the Timing of Major Legislative Reauthorizations in Congress	99
4.1	Gridlock in Congress: A Failure to Change, or a Failure to Try?	103
4.2	Reauthorizations and Leaders' Decisions to Set the Agenda	106
4.2.1	Predictability and Interpretability of Inaction among Reauthorization Opportunities	107
4.2.2	Regularity and Frequency of Reauthorization Opportunities	112
4.3	Electoral Prospects and Reauthorization Opportunities	114
4.4	Reauthorization Opportunities and Policy Change: Data and Measurement	118
4.4.1	Dependent Variable: Significant Reauthorization	120
4.4.2	Acceleration and Deceleration Intervals: Pivotal Actors' Preferences and Status Quo Policy Locations	121
4.4.3	Other Variables	128
4.5	Empirical Approach and Results	129
4.6	Discussion and Conclusions	134
5	Conclusions, Implications, and Directions for Future Research	137
	Appendices	144
	Bibliography	230

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1	Agenda Control and Calculation of the Core	23
2.2	Core Size and Predicted ACA Legislation	34
2.3	Map of Treated and Controlled Units	37
2.4	Covariate Balance between Treated and Control Groups	39
3.1	Common Power Distribution and Electoral Change Scenarios; Scenario 1	57
3.2	R' More Favorable to AS	59
3.3	AS Loses Ground with R'	63
3.4	Identity of AS Changes	68
3.5	AS and R by Congress	72
3.6	cIGscores v. DW-NOMINATE, 110th - 114th Congresses	74
3.7	Percentage of Proposals Located within $[AS, R]$, By Congress	83
4.1	Static Gridlock Interval ($[AS, R]$ Region), 81st - 114th Congresses	126
4.2	Reauthorization Ideal Points v. DW-NOMINATE, 1951-2016	127
A.1	Negative Agenda Control and Core Size	145
A.2	Marginal Effects for Modelling Assessment of H3 Using Matching Variables - Enactments	152
A.3	Marginal Effects for Modelling Assessment of H3 Using Matching Variables - ACA Compliance	152
A.4	Balance Statistics for Matching Analysis	157
A.5	Constructing the ACA Implementation Measure	162
B.1	Predicted Probability of Attaining Filibuster-Proof Majority in Senate	176
C.1	Coding Protocol for Reauthorizations Identification	184
C.2	Parameter Constraints for Proposal and Status Quo Estimation	187
C.3	\hat{R} Point Estimates	224
C.4	Reauthorization Ideal Points v. Votes-Only IRT Ideal Points	225
C.5	Election Scenario Classifications	226

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	Bill Enactments and Core Size	28
2.2	Movement of the ACA Compliance Status Quo	33
2.3	Matched Sample	40
2.4	ATT and ATC for Negative Agenda Control (ACA Compliance)	41
3.1	Policy Deceleration and Viable Proposals (Scenario 1)	85
3.2	Scenario 1 Results with Fixed Effects	87
3.3	Policy Acceleration and Viable Proposals (Scenario 2)	92
3.4	Scenario 2 Results with Fixed Effects	93
3.5	Policy Acceleration and Viable Proposals (Scenario 3)	95
4.1	Policy Acceleration, Deceleration, and Significant Legislative Reauthorizations . .	132
4.2	Electoral Scenarios and Significant Reauthorizations	133
A.1	Negative Agenda Control and Core Size	146
A.2	Legislative Productivity, Controlling for Legislative History	150
A.3	Results - ATT/ATC for Negative Agenda Control (Non-Partisan Distances) . . .	151
A.4	Results - ATT/ATC for Negative Agenda Control (Partisan Polarization Distances)	151
A.5	Results - ATT/ATC for Negative Agenda Control (Using Bill Enactments)	152
A.6	Modelling Assessment of H3, Using Matching Variables (Enactments)	153
A.7	Modelling Assessment of H3, Using Matching Variables (ACA Implementation) .	154
A.8	Decomposition of Core Analysis (Enactments)	155
A.9	Decomposition of Core Analysis (ACA Compliance)	156
A.10	Filibuster Pivots and Policy Change	161
B.1	Unified Acceleration Models (H2 and H3)	164
B.2	Policy Deceleration Among Long-Serving Members	167
B.3	Policy Acceleration (H2) Among Long-Serving Members	168
B.4	Policy Acceleration (H3) among Long-Serving Members	169
B.5	Policy Deceleration (Scenario 1)	171
B.6	Policy Acceleration (Scenario 2)	172
B.7	Policy Acceleration (Scenario 3)	173
B.8	Predictive Models for Iowa Electronic Market Prices	174
B.9	Predictive Model for Control of Filibuster Pivot	176
B.10	Policy Deceleration, Leveraging Only Within-Member Variance	179
B.11	Policy Acceleration (H2), Leveraging Only Within-Member Variance	180
B.12	Policy Acceleration (H3), Leveraging Only Within-Member Variance	181

C.1 Policy Acceleration, Deceleration, and Significant Legislative Reauthorizations . . 227
C.2 Investigation of Selection Effects 229

LIST OF APPENDICES

A Chapter 2 Appendix	144
B Chapter 3 Appendix	163
C Chapter 4 Appendix	182

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how partisan control of the voting agenda generates far-reaching and significant consequences for both macro-level policy outputs and individual legislator behaviors within U.S. legislatures. More specifically, I show how institutions and elections combine to influence the timing and incidence of policy change, as well as the effort that individual members expend in their lawmaking endeavors. In Chapter 1, I investigate how partisan control of the voting calendar itself dramatically depresses policy change. I provide strong evidence that such control, which enables majority party leaders to prevent fractures on key votes, introduces an additional veto player to a political system and drives policy change downward. After establishing this baseline effect of partisan agenda control, I next examine in Chapters 2 and 3 how competition over such agenda-setting institutions influences a majority party's propensity to set the agenda, given their expectations about the upcoming electoral cycle. To do so, I develop a dynamic formal theory of policy change, wherein majority-party agenda-setters make decisions over whether to grant agenda space to a bill, based not only on the ideological content of the legislation but also on the favorability of the policymaking environment they anticipate after the upcoming election. This theory demonstrates that agenda-setters face differential incentives to speed up or slow down the policymaking process based on their expectations about future electoral results. I investigate these predictions directly in Chapter 3, where I rely on an original dataset of reauthorization opportunities to examine agenda-setters' decisions regarding whether to change or maintain the current status quo. While results from these tests are inclusive, I find strong support in Chapter 2 for the notion that individual members respond to these different agenda-setting environments by adjusting their bill sponsorship behaviors accordingly. Using a new dataset of bill proposal and status quo location estimates, I show that members facing electoral dynamics encouraging policy deceleration will refrain from costly viable bill-writing,

instead drafting bills that provide position-taking value alone. Conversely, when electoral dynamics encourage more aggressive agenda-setting, members introduce more viable legislative proposals. Taken together, these results speak to the breadth and depth of the externalities associated with empowering partisan actors with agenda control in U.S. legislatures.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The ability to change policy in response to economic challenges, environmental crises, or changes in public sentiment is a core competency of popular government. Indeed, when new information, contextual changes, or other factors render a status quo policy unpalatable, healthy democratic institutions should possess at least some ability to change policy accordingly—even if such change is slow or incremental. Nevertheless, while widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo across many policy areas suggests ample opportunity for policy change, American political institutions appear more frequently mired in stalemate than engaged in policy innovation and change. Indeed, in spite of mounting national debt, intense debates over the immigration system, rising health costs, and a host of other potential public policy challenges, American legislatures—and Congress in particular—often have met such challenges with inaction.

While a legislature’s inability to change policy derives from a wide variety of factors, legislative inaction is most commonly attributed to ideological polarization. That is, American legislatures frequently fail to address public policy challenges because Republicans and Democrats simply agree less and less in their visions for the size, scope, and role of government. To be sure, ample scholarly evidence undergirds this claim: indeed, evidence of growing polarization has

been found in examinations not just of roll call voting, but from elite surveys (Lewis, Poole, Rosenthal, Boche, Rudkin and Sonnet, 2019), patterns in campaign finance (Bonica, 2013, 2014), and speechmaking behavior (e.g., Diermeier, Godbout, Yu and Kaufmann 2012). Still, before polarization acts to slow the policymaking process, a different process—that of agenda-setting and gatekeeping—frequently stymies policy change in American legislatures. In this dissertation, I underscore the depth and breadth of this effect on policymaking in American legislatures, demonstrating how America’s agenda-setting institutions dramatically influence both macro-level policy outputs and individual legislator behaviors. More specifically, I illustrate how empowering *partisan* agenda-setters—who exhibit a combination of policymaking *and* electoral concerns—influences the timing, amount, and focus of policymaking activities beyond what polarization alone might predict.

Control of the policy agenda, as has been amply documented for decades, is among the most fundamental sources of power within a political system. Indeed, as Schattschneider (1960) summarizes, the ability to define the substance and scope of policy debates deeply influences who wins in American politics, and how frequently they do so. Of greatest interest in this dissertation are the ramifications for policy change and stasis, as well as for individual legislator behavior, implied by the application of gatekeeping or negative agenda control in U.S. legislatures. Long before polarized partisans have the opportunity to spar over proposed policy changes, agenda-setters in Congress and the state legislatures decide whether to consider individual proposals at all. Moreover, legislators’ *expectations* over such agenda-setting decisions influence the sincerity of their legislative proposal-making efforts. I investigate how each of these dynamics influence the incidence and timing of policy change across American legislatures.

The focus of this dissertation departs from current scholarly and popular debates by trac-

ing the ramifications of agenda-setters' specific identities. That is, I focus on the consequences of American legislatures' tendency to empower partisan actors with agenda control in American legislatures. In many U.S. legislatures, including the U.S. Congress, control of the voting agenda—as well as, in some cases, the committee consideration agenda—is held by leaders of the two major political parties, as has been documented in previous research (e.g., [Cox Gary and McCubbins 1993](#)). Although parties pursue policymaking goals like many political actors, I argue that their underlying goal to elect copartisans to office in pursuit of majority control distorts their agenda-setting activities in a variety of ways, generating a wide range of consequences not only for macro-level outcomes in a legislature, but even for the decisionmaking of individual legislators.

As I argue throughout the dissertation, these ramifications arise regardless of whether or not the parties themselves are polarized and even apart from the ideological content of the bills themselves. To be sure, as I detail in all three chapters hereafter, polarization accentuates the agenda-setting and policymaking dynamics I describe. However, the partisan identity of legislative agenda-setters itself deeply impacts how American legislatures make policy. Whether by blocking legislation that could make public embarrassing rifts within the caucus, or by rendering agenda-setters cognizant of how future bargaining environments compare to current conditions, the partisan nature of agenda-setting in American legislatures interacts with electoral considerations to dramatically alter when, where, and how often public policy changes. By more carefully examining the ramifications of empowering partisan actors with agenda control, then, the research presented here contributes new theoretical perspectives on which factors, such as specific legislative rules and competition over control of a legislature, influence policy outputs and legislative behaviors.

In the first chapter, I examine the first of the aforementioned questions about partisan agenda-setting: to what extent does a party's desire to present a unified brand influence policy outputs in American legislatures? To examine this question, I leverage institutional variation within the U.S. state legislatures, documenting how partisan agenda-setting via control of the voting calendar depresses policy change. More specifically, I show that equipping party leaders with gatekeeping or negative agenda power introduces an additional veto player to a political system, thereby potentially increasing the size of the gridlock interval. By increasing the total set of status quo policies that are immovable, this addition of a partisan veto point frequently depresses policy change within a state.

That parties filter the legislative agenda in order to present a unified brand is not an especially new assertion within the study of American legislatures. Indeed, for years now, research on partisan gatekeeping has debated the extent to which such filtering may influence policy change. Nevertheless, no previous study has leveraged actual differences in these institutional features across legislatures to trace the influence of partisan agenda-setting over policy change. In doing so, I provide not only strong evidence that partisan agenda-setting slows policy change, but also the first measurement of the magnitude of this effect. Indeed, regardless of whether I measure policy change via simple bill passage counts, or whether I adopt a policy-specific measure more sensitive to bill significance, I find a consistent and significant association between the presence of partisan agenda control and the volume of policy change that a state experiences.

I examine the influence of partisan control of the voting calendar in three separate ways. First, as noted above I examine whether the size of the agenda-control-adjusted gridlock interval negatively predicts policy change, as measured by bill passage counts in U.S. state legislatures from 1993 to 2014. I find a strong negative association between the gridlock interval and bill

passage counts. In this analysis, a shift from the 10th to 90th percentile in the agenda-control-adjusted gridlock interval is associated with approximately 13 percent fewer bill enactments within the average state biennium—which amounts to a difference of nearly 200 bill enactments in the average state legislature.

Given that bill enactments vary considerably in terms of their significance (and, consequently, how much they shift the status quo), I next examine whether the gridlock interval negatively predicts a different measure of policy change that accounts for such differences in bill significance. I base this measure on a National Conference of State Legislatures data set of Affordable Care Act (ACA)-related bills introduced between 2011 and 2013, within which bills are classified into multiple ACA compliance categories. By invoking the assumption that bills addressing multiple categories represent larger policy changes, I develop a new dependent variable by adding together the number of ACA-compliance categories addressed by a bill, accounting for bill significance in a way that raw bill passage counts cannot. Using this measure, I again uncover a negative association between the agenda-control-adjusted gridlock interval and policy change. Here, I find an even larger negative association: approximately a 43 percent decrease when shifting from the 10th to 90th gridlock interval percentile.

In the final test in the chapter, I use nearest-neighbor matching and a decomposition of the agenda-control-adjusted interval to more directly demonstrate the ramifications of agenda control specifically. That is, in these tests, I demonstrate that the association between calendar control and policy change is not merely a result of preference polarization, carefully controlling for the overall preference distribution in a legislature. This final test underscores the key insight of the chapter: not only do agenda-setting institutions matter for policy change, apart from what polarization alone predicts, but they matter appreciably. Among other findings, these

tests reveal that *additions* to the gridlock interval from differences in agenda-control institutions specifically are associated with as much as 15-20 percent fewer bill enactments and 50 percent less ACA implementation activity (again shifting from the 10th to the 90th percentile in gridlock interval additions).

After establishing the first-order importance of partisan agenda-setting for top-line policy change rates in American legislatures in this first chapter, I next delve more deeply into the far-reaching ramifications of partisan agenda-setters' dual electoral and policymaking aims, demonstrating how party leaders' ability to anticipate electoral shifts influences their approach to policymaking. That is, by introducing dynamism into the model underlying Chapter 2's analysis, Chapters 3 and 4 further explicate the consequences of partisan agenda control for both the timing of policy change and individual legislators' behaviors within the policymaking process. More specifically, in these third and fourth chapters, "Mandate to Message" and "Elections and (In)action," I examine how competition over agenda control influences a majority party's propensity to set the legislative agenda—again beyond what polarization alone might predict.

Although elections are fundamental to a wide variety of legislator behaviors, these chapters are among the first accounts of how *macro-level* competition over majority control—and agenda-setters' expectations thereof—may influence the policymaking process and individual legislator behaviors. Current work examining the effect of such competition (e.g., [Lee 2016](#)) has gained ample attention from legislative scholars, as it demonstrates how competition may influence key political outcomes such as the level of observed polarization in a legislature and how much focus party leaders place in fundraising and communications. Yet in spite of these advances, the research presented in this dissertation builds considerably on these findings. Per-

haps the most important advancement is that, rather than highlighting how shifts from eras of non-competition to competition may influence policymaking, I develop a formal theory for how expectations about electoral outcomes can dramatically influence policymaking on a Congress-to-Congress basis. Second, I use this model to generate and execute the first-ever tests of individual-legislator effects of macro-level electoral dynamics, showing that macro-level electoral expectations influence how seriously members attempt to draft viable (as opposed to messaging) bill proposals. Finally, these chapters develop a wide variety of new empirical approaches and datasets, each of which I discuss at greater length within their respective chapters.

To demonstrate how such competition may influence policymaking, I develop a model of policy change wherein majority-party agenda-setters make decisions over whether or not to grant agenda space to a bill, based not only on the ideological content of the legislation but also on the favorability of the policymaking environment they anticipate encountering after the upcoming election. The model is among the first spatial models of policymaking to consider more than one round of play, and the theory establishes two agenda-setting dynamics of interest: policy “acceleration” and “deceleration. First, when partisan agenda-setters expect to face a more desirable policymaking environment after the upcoming elections, they will block legislation that could pass into law, if brought up for a vote—a phenomenon I call policy deceleration. Conversely, when partisan agenda-setters expect to face a less desirable policymaking environment following the upcoming elections, they will focus their policymaking efforts more aggressively—a phenomenon I call policy acceleration.

This theory produces several notable implications about policymaking activity. In “Mandate to Message,” I trace these differential agenda-setting environments through to individual lawmaker incentives regarding bill introductions. Understanding that electoral expectations

influence whether a bill receives agenda space, individual legislators face differential incentives regarding whether and how to introduce viable legislative proposals under different electoral conditions. My theory implies that when members face electoral dynamics encouraging policy deceleration, they will refrain from costly, viable bill-writing. In order to draft legislation that could conceivably pass into law if brought up for a vote, members must compile and process a wide variety of policy-specific and political information. Indeed, even beyond policy details, members must gather information about which actors in the legislature are most likely to block their legislation, what their preferences are, and how they might best appeal to those preferences. Taken together, compiling such information is costly, and drafting legislation that incorporates such information likely entails compromises from the member's most preferred policy.

Consequently, I argue, members will refrain from drafting such costly legislation when they suspect agenda-setters are unlikely to move on it. Policy deceleration thus discourages members from drafting and introducing viable legislative proposals. Instead, such dynamics encourage members to draft bills that provide position-taking value. These bills require none of the costly information gathering associated with viable bill-writing, as the bills themselves are not meant to pass. Moreover, given that such bills are not written as passable legislation, members need not compromise from their most preferred policy outcome. Conversely, when electoral dynamics encourage more aggressive agenda setting (i.e., policy *acceleration*), members are more likely to introduce viable legislative proposals.¹ Under such conditions, agenda-setters are more likely to move on passable legislation, generating greater impetus for legislators to pay the costs of

¹By "viable," I mean legislation that should reasonably be expected to pass into law, based on its spatial properties. Put differently, viable legislation will be conceptualized as bills that improve upon the status quo for all veto players within the legislature. Further details about this concept and its measurement may be found in Chapter 3.

viable bill-writing. Indeed, if and when the bill becomes law, legislators benefit from actual policy gains, rather than position-taking value alone.

To test these predictions, I draw upon a unique data set of point estimates for bill locations, status quo locations, and member ideal points, which I have developed in a separate paper (Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz, n.d.), using a joint scaling of co-sponsorship, roll call, and interest-group position-taking data. As my theory predicts, I find that conditions for policy deceleration encourage position-taking bill introductions, while conditions favorable to aggressive agenda-setting encourage viable bill introductions that all veto players could support. Taken together, the findings demonstrate how electoral expectations—apart from actual ideological disagreement—influence legislative behaviors as fundamental as how seriously members engaging with the legislative process.

Finally, in “Elections and (In)action,” I focus directly on the implications of electoral competition for agenda setting by examining the legislative reauthorization process. Unlike data focusing on all sponsored legislation—which is itself endogenous to legislators’ beliefs about the agenda-setting process, as the previous chapter demonstrates—the reauthorizations process allows one to determine when an agenda-setter next has an opportunity to alter the status quo, as well as whether or not the agenda-setter has in fact attempted to do so. That is, when faced with an expiring set of program authorizations, Congress must decide whether it will enact a substantive reauthorization and change policy, or whether it will maintain the status quo. Using a carefully assembled dataset of major reauthorization opportunities (i.e., instances of expiring authorizations), along with point estimates for associated status quo and bill proposal locations, this chapter tests whether or not electoral dynamics influence policy change dynamics as predicted. More specifically, using an application of Clinton and Meirowitz’s (2001)

agenda-constrained estimation method to measure the location of reauthorization opportunities' associated status quos, I examine whether agenda-setters respond to conditions for policy acceleration and deceleration by enacting significant reauthorizations or maintaining the status quo, respectively. While findings from the chapter are inconclusive regarding the influence of electoral expectations on agenda-setting within the reauthorizations process, the data provide an excellent opportunity for further exploration of agenda-setting and policy change dynamics in Congress.

Taken together, although the strength of my empirical findings vary across the three chapters, both the theoretical and empirical findings of the dissertation underscore the far-reaching consequences of granting agenda control powers to political parties. Unlike other types of agenda-setters, partisan agenda-setters face a variety of electoral incentives that influence their willingness to set the legislative agenda, ranging from their desire to maintain a unified brand to their forward-looking aims to maximize policy gains across elections. These incentives generate the potential to influence both individual legislative behavior and collective legislative outcomes, as the three chapters of this dissertation detail. Beyond these theoretical and empirical contributions, I also develop a wide variety of new data, including state-level measures of policy change, estimates of status quo and bill locations in Congress, and monthly estimates of majority-change probabilities, that will contribute to future studies of bill sponsorship, agenda-setting, and policy change, beyond those examined in the pages that follow.

CHAPTER 2

Stalemate in the States: Agenda Control Rules and Policy Output in American Legislatures

Abstract: This chapter examines how the power of majority party leaders to set the legislative voting calendar influences policy change in American state legislatures. By generating an opportunity for party leaders to exercise gatekeeping or negative agenda control, such rules introduce an additional partisan veto player into a system of governance. This addition typically increases the size of the core or gridlock interval, which drives policy change downward. Using both traditional data on bill passage counts and new data on Affordable Care Act compliance, I find strong support for these claims. More specifically, when I calculate core sizes that are sensitive to agenda rules, I find that core size is negatively correlated with policy change, as expected. Moreover, even when I match states on their overall preference dispersion or polarization, the ability of party leaders to exercise negative agenda control is strongly negatively associated with policy change.

Over the past three decades, scholars of American political institutions have invested much time and effort into exploring the causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Within the study of gridlock, however, few topics have generated the level of disagreement as the role that political parties do or do not play in the policy change process. For some, parties simply represent ideological coalitions, themselves contributing little to policy change dynamics (Krehbiel 1998). For others, however, political parties are central to policy change, as they exert control over the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Yet in spite of the fact that competing theories of political parties and policy change generate specific, testable empirical implications, studies to date have often struggled to delineate how much (if at all) political parties matter for policy change.

At least part of this struggle derives from previous studies' focus on policy change dynamics in Congress alone. To be clear, insofar as the goal of these studies is to test whether partisan agenda control occurs in Congress, focusing solely on Congress makes sense. However, as a means of testing the broader implications of partisan agenda control for aggregate policy change, Congress has clear limitations as a setting for such examinations. Among these limitations is the fact that proponents of party-centric theories of Congress argue that partisan agenda-control developed as far back as the 1880s (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007)—preceding the period over which empirical analysis is often conducted.

In this chapter, I provide one of the first broad empirical documentations of the powerful implications partisan agenda control has for aggregate policy change. To do so, I turn to the institutional richness found in the American states and trace the influence of the presence (and absence) of agenda control institutions through the policymaking process. In doing so, I demonstrate that institutional features enabling negative or gatekeeping agenda control sig-

nificantly slow policy change, even beyond what preference polarization alone might predict. More specifically, I find that 1) by increasing the size of the “core” or gridlock interval,¹ the presence of partisan gatekeeping drives policy change downward, and 2) even when conditioning on distance between traditional institutional pivots, the presence of partisan agenda control institutions negatively predicts policy change. Taken together, these findings build upon Anzia and Jackman’s (2013) work on agenda control and roll rates and develop support for the idea that negative agenda control introduces a new, partisan veto player into a system of governance, thereby decreasing policy change. These findings also improve upon earlier work on agenda control in the states by Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins (2010), by extending the analysis of agenda control past roll rates and individual policy shifts in two states to aggregate-level policy change in across many state legislatures, from 1995-2014.

2.1 Legislative Gridlock: Parties and Preferences

The importance of political parties to policy change and legislative gridlock has long remained a key topic of debate among legislative scholars. Beginning with Mayhew’s (1991) extended exchange with Binder (1999, 2003) and others regarding the importance of divided government, much scholarship has disputed whether and how political parties contribute to legislative gridlock. But while much of the early discussion regarding parties and policy change focused on divided government, Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) and Krehbiel (1998) extend this discussion to the role that parties play within the legislature itself. According to Krehbiel’s account

¹The term “core” comes from Tsebelis (2002) and is more commonly used in studies of comparative politics (though Tsebelis himself drew the term from Hammond and Miller’s 1987 analysis of the U.S. Constitution). I use the term interchangeably with “gridlock interval” (Krehbiel 1998) in this analysis, as the terms are conceptually identical, even though Tsebelis’s core can include partisan veto players (while Krehbiel introduces no such players).

of the policymaking process, parties themselves serve primarily as ideological preference aggregators. Consequently, it is the policy preferences of pivotal institutional actors—and not party actors per se—that ought to influence policy change. In order to make predictions about policy change, then, one should first delineate which actors are pivotal, and then measure preference distances between them. The larger the distance between these actors, the larger the set of immoveable status quo policies—and the less policy change should occur—regardless of an actor’s political party.

Cox and McCubbins (2005) provide a sharp response to this claim: far from mere preference aggregators, parties in Congress are instruments of reelection that create a well-coordinated party brand. In order to maintain a healthy party brand, majority party leaders are enfranchised with gate-keeping or “negative” agenda control, allowing them to prevent bills that fracture the party from ever reaching the floor. Naturally, this conception of parties and agenda control has strong ramifications for the amount of policy change a political system ought to experience. Indeed, as I argue here (and as others, such as Chiou and Rothenberg 2003 and Woon and Cook 2015 have explored), negative agenda control effectively adds pivots to Krehbiel’s party-less model. That is, because of the majority’s desire to allow votes only on legislation with a majority of their party’s support, chambers that enfranchise the majority with negative agenda control exhibit a partisan pivot or veto player located at the majority median—in addition to the usual pivot found at the chamber median. Adding this pivot grows the theoretical gridlock interval, leading Cox and McCubbins’s model to predict more gridlock than does Krehbiel’s: some policies that might pass under Krehbiel’s model would not even receive consideration for a vote under Cox and McCubbins’s model.

Several studies have attempted to adjudicate whether and how majority parties exercise neg-

ative agenda control, most often focusing on majority roll rates (e.g., Anzia and Jackman 2013, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 2006). Others have attempted to discriminate between the Krehbiel and Cox and McCubbins frameworks by following each theory through the policy-making process and examining which model better predicts observed levels of policy change, using a variety of innovative methodologies (e.g., Chiou and Rothenberg 2003, Richman 2011, Peress 2013, Woon and Cook 2015). Most find support for some kind of gatekeeping role for majority leaders in Congress.

Each of these studies make important contributions to the study of how parties operate in Congress. However, as examinations of agenda-control institutions, their implications, and their general effects, they are limited by their sole focus on Congress.² First, as an institutional setting for studying agenda control, Congress presents a variety of empirical challenges. Notably, congressional data are sometimes poorly suited for making fine empirical distinctions between models of policymaking: insofar as analyses focus on the last 100 years of congressional history, they are confined to an era in which agenda control institutions are not thought to have varied.³ Relatedly, within a single institution such as Congress, predictions from differing theoretical models sometimes turn out to be observationally equivalent, as Woon and Cook (2015, p. 1) underscore. Additionally, because of the difficulty of collecting historical data, congressional studies are handicapped by small sample sizes, rendering fine distinctions between theoretical predictions even more difficult (e.g., Peress 2013). But beyond the empirical limitations implied by a singular focus on Congress, federal-level work also typically focuses on determining *which* models fit policy change data best, rather than tracing the overall *effect*

²Anzia and Jackman (2013) and Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins (2010) provide notable exceptions.

³Anzia and Jackman (2013) make a similar point regarding party power in Congress versus the states.

of partisan agenda control on policy change. In this way, previous studies teach us a great deal about the inner-workings of Congress, but less about the broad ramifications of partisan agenda control for a system of governance.

I therefore focus my analysis on the American states. Unlike Congress, state legislatures vary considerably in the presence of partisan agenda control institutions. This variation (and much larger sample size) generates an excellent environment to examine how partisan agenda control (and the exercise of negative agenda control specifically) is tied to policy output. Within this context, I can measure directly whether or not individual chambers in each state possess partisan agenda control institutions, and then trace the overall influence of these institutions on policy change. In this way, I build upon work by Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins (2010), who determine that the introduction of agenda-control institutions in state legislatures (namely, Colorado and select bills in California) dramatically influences majority roll rates and the direction of policy shifts in those states.

Beyond the empirical contributions of this approach to the study of negative agenda control and its ramifications, my approach also contributes new knowledge on policy change in state legislatures. To date, research on policy change in the states has examined a number of factors that are distinctive from national-level studies of policy change. Gray and Lowery (1995) and Bowling and Ferguson (2001), for example, examine the influence of interest-group density and diversity on legislative gridlock. Gray and Lowery find that the number of interest groups positively influences legislative productivity, while Bowling and Ferguson find that interest diversity stymies policy change. Additionally, Rogers (2005) and Hicks and Smith (2009) examine how factors such as term limits and direct democracy might influence policy change at the state level. In spite of these advances, few if any studies have examined how pivotal

actors' preferences influence policy change in the states—much less how partisan institutions might do so. By examining these factors, this study contributes to our current understanding of policy change dynamics in state legislatures, in addition to its contribution to current work on partisan agenda control.

2.2 Theoretical Expectations: How Does Negative Agenda Control Work to Slow Policy Change?

In general, negative agenda control is defined as the ability of an actor to keep an item from receiving a final decision, most commonly a vote (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005, Gailmard and Jenkins 2007). In the legislative context, majority parties are thought to exercise negative agenda control by disallowing votes on legislation that fractures the party caucus. Here, I focus on negative agenda control wielded by a chamber's floor leaders via their ability to set the voting agenda as bills emerge from committee. I focus on this institutional feature because it captures well the concept of partisan gatekeeping, and because of its apparent effectiveness at slowing roll rates according to previous research (Anzia and Jackman 2013, Jackman 2013, Cox et al. 2010). Indeed, when party leaders can prioritize and deprioritize legislation on the floor voting agenda, they may effectively avoid votes that roll the majority party. Conversely, when the voting calendar is set by an "automatic" rule, roll rates are found to be considerably higher. Such automatic rules include "first-come-first-served" arrangements, as well as the use of alphabetical order by sponsor name.

I argue that the presence of such partisan agenda control introduces a new, partisan veto player into a system of governance, located at the median of the majority party. That is, if the

median of the majority party (and therefore a majority of the majority party) disapprove of a piece of legislation, it will not receive a vote in a chamber with partisan gatekeeping. This addition should increase policy stability, for as Tsebelis (2002) demonstrates, the more veto players in a lawmaking system, and the more preference distance between them, the larger the “core,” or set of status quo policies that cannot be defeated by any policy proposal in a political system. The larger the core or gridlock interval, the more policy stability a system should encounter on average.⁴

However, additional veto players do not always increase policy stability: if a veto player is “absorbed” by another veto player, that veto player will not increase policy stability. A veto player is absorbed if she would not choose to independently veto a change to the status quo. Put differently, in the cases for which an absorbed veto player might choose to veto legislation, there will always exist another veto player who also would choose to veto that piece of legislation. In the context of American legislatures, a moderate Republican executive may be absorbed in a political system that features one Democrat-controlled legislative chamber and one radical Republican-controlled chamber. While such an executive may object to, say, a liberal piece of legislation originating in the Democratic chamber, the radical Republican chamber will also oppose such legislation. In this scenario, the Republican executive, as an absorbed veto player, has no incentive to unilaterally veto any proposal and does not add to the political system’s policy stability.

Most American legislatures are thought to have three main institutional veto players: a

⁴Note that these predictions regarding gridlock interval size and policy change derive from static models of policy change. In each of these models, Nature selects a status quo policy for consideration by the relevant veto players. Consequently, while the size of the gridlock interval *generally* should correlate with negatively with policy change, the distribution or “supply” of status quos could in practice change over time and thereby influence the observed amount of policy change. I thank an anonymous reviewer for underscoring this challenge, which I address below.

lower chamber median, an upper chamber median, and an executive.⁵ Given these similarities across state governments, it is theoretically true by construction that the negative agenda control core therefore “covers” the institutions-only core that incorporates chamber medians alone. However, because I leverage *cross-state* variation in the presence of negative agenda control in this chapter, core size may not necessarily correlate strongly with the presence of negative agenda control, due to absorption. That is, if states without negative agenda control were to exhibit more overall preference polarization than states with negative agenda control, the correlation between agenda-control institutions and core size would be weak or non-existent. Such a phenomenon would restrict one’s ability to use cross-state data to examine the influence of negative agenda control on policy change.

Thus, it is important to test whether such a correlation exists. This claim is summarized in H1:

H1: American state legislatures with majority parties that exercise negative agenda control should, *ceteris paribus*, have larger gridlock intervals than do those without agenda control.

Given that H1 is true by construction *within* any given state, I relegate tests of H1 to Online Appendix A. Indeed, even though cross-state differences in preference polarization may obfuscate the relationship between agenda-control institutions and core size, H1 serves more as a data “check” than a traditional hypothesis test.⁶ Within Online Appendix A, I find support for H1: the presence of negative-agenda-control institutions is indeed positively associated with

⁵Nebraska’s unicameral legislature serves as a clear exception.

⁶Another way to think of H1 is through the framework of experimental research. If negative-agenda-control institutions serve as the “treatment” in the study, testing H1 is akin to an experimental researcher ensuring that treated units did not fall victim to treatment failure. In the legislative context, H1 ensures that the “treatment” is positively associated with the theorized causal mechanism, core size, thought to influence policy change.

core size.

Given this finding regarding core size, the data therefore are suitable for testing the first of two hypotheses concerning negative agenda control, the core, and legislative gridlock:

H2: The larger the agenda-control-adjusted core, the more gridlock (less policy change) a system will encounter.

Finally, in addition to demonstrating that the agenda-control-adjusted core best predicts policy change, my analysis aims to show that the presence of partisan agenda control institutions consistently predicts differences in policy output between states that are otherwise similar in their levels of preference polarization. To do so, I will show that negative agenda control does indeed matter for gridlock, *even when accounting for the size of a party-free gridlock interval*:

H3: Even conditional on distance between institutional veto players, negative agenda control should lead to higher levels of gridlock in states with legislative majorities that possess it.

2.3 Agenda Control, Adjusted Core Size, and Policy Change

I argue that in order for agenda-control institutions to influence policy change, they do so by increasing the size of the core or gridlock interval (H2). I test this central expectation in two ways: first by using the most widespread measure of legislative productivity in studies of state legislatures (bill passage counts), and then using a new measure of policy change based on Affordable Care Act (ACA) implementation. First, however, I detail how I measure core size in each state-year, accounting for whether or not a state possesses legislative institutions enabling partisan agenda control.

Measuring the Agenda-Control-Adjusted Legislative Core

In order to measure the agenda-control-adjusted core, I first determine whether or not a chamber's majority party may wield negative agenda control, using information found in Anzia and Jackman's (2013) replication data. More specifically, I measure whether majority leaders enjoy control of the legislative floor-vote calendar. Under this rule, majority party leaders decide which bills, among all of the bills that could come up for a vote, will actually receive a floor vote—and when. Using the presence (or absence) of this rule, I code each legislative chamber in a binary fashion, with a chamber taking on a value of 1 (majority party possesses calendar control) or 0 (majority party lacks such control). When pooled across entire legislatures, this variable may therefore take on three possible values: 2 (negative agenda control in both houses), 1 (control in just one chamber), or 0 (no negative agenda control).⁷ Given that all American states (besides Nebraska) have the same number of institutional veto players, differences in this negative agenda control variable will also represent overall differences in a state's total number of veto players. The identities of states coded as “1” and “0” are depicted in Figure 3.

Core or gridlock interval size, however, is a function of more than just the number of veto players in a system: preference distance between veto players also influences the size of the core (Tsebelis 2002). Thus, to measure the size of the gridlock interval, one first needs a measure of veto player preferences. I utilize Shor and McCarty's (2011) NPAT scores to measure these preferences. As Clinton (2012) states, using roll-call-based measures of preferences to test partisan theories carries with it potential limitations, given that parties themselves filter the voting agenda. In spite of these limitations, however, Shor and McCarty's scores provide the best


⁷As noted earlier, when a majority party lacks calendar powers, the agenda is most commonly set by automatic rule—very often a “first come, first served” arrangement.

means for measuring state-level gridlock intervals, which have yet to be examined at the state level. In using these scores, I assume unidimensionality of issue space in the state legislatures. Determining gridlock interval size in unidimensional policy space is quite straightforward: once one determines the number and position of veto players in a system of governance, unidimensional core size is simply the maximum distance between any two veto players. Thus, calculating core size in each state proceeds by first determining how many chambers (if any) have majority parties with negative agenda control, then measuring the locations between each relevant veto player, and finally selecting the maximum distance between veto players in the state-year in question.⁸ Instead of identifying which of the intervals will serve as the core, the number of veto players simply identifies which veto players (and therefore which set of preference distances) must be *maximized over* in order to calculate the core. Here, one should note that, were ideal points for governors available, distances between the governor and relevant legislative veto players would be included among this set of distances to be maximized over. However, given that such scores are unavailable, I incorporate the preferences of the governor via a *Divided Government* measure, detailed below. Each of these measurements are calculated biannually for each state, from 1995 to 2014.

Figure 1 provides greater detail on this process. In theory, chambers exhibiting partisan, negative agenda control carry with them the potential for much larger cores than the average

⁸To be clear, this strategy does not take into account the presence of filibuster and override pivots. There are two primary reasons for this exclusion. First, with regard to filibusters, the presence and location of a filibuster pivot is not as clearly defined in the states as it is in the U.S. Senate. While this problem is further detailed in Appendix E, there is limited consensus on which states have a filibuster pivot: while some states appear to have rules akin to cloture, the vast majority of states have either strict, automatic limits on speech, or no rules pertaining to speech whatsoever. Moreover, these rules speak little to the actual practice of filibustering and invocation of cloture in state legislatures. These challenges notwithstanding, I present models in Appendix E that attempt to control for the presence of a filibuster pivot in a legislature. Substantive results remain unaffected. With regard to veto override pivots, I argue that such actors are often absorbed and thereby do not decrease policy change. Further still, without a measure of the governor's preferences, it is difficult to know a priori whether to include the override pivot or governor in core calculations, as both cannot simultaneously be pivotal.

Figure 2.1: Agenda Control and Calculation of the Core



Note: C_{hm} and C_{sm} refer to the lower and upper chamber medians respectively, and M_{hm} and M_{sm} refer to the majority party medians in the lower and upper chambers.

chamber lacking such a feature, because agenda control increases the total number of veto players. In Cases 3 and 4 of Figure 1, for example, majority parties in both chambers exercise negative agenda control. Were legislatures in such states exposed to a divided legislature, Cases 3 and 4 should produce a larger core than those depicted in the other cases in Figure 2. The same logic applies for Cases 5 and 6 (just one chamber with negative agenda control), which should create a larger core than Case 7 (no negative agenda control), all else equal. Legislatures with larger numbers of veto players do not always possess larger cores, however, due to the logic of absorption highlighted above. Cases 1 and 2 (two chambers with negative agenda control, controlled by the same party) provide an example. Here, the distance between the party medians is zero—the majority parties in these chambers are very similar. Instead, the relevant gridlock interval or core distance is a tie between $|M_{hm} - C_{hm}|$, $|M_{sm} - C_{sm}|$, $|M_{hm} - C_{sm}|$, and $|M_{sm} - C_{hm}|$ (the distances between the lower house majority party and chamber medians, upper house majority party and chamber medians, lower house majority party and upper house chamber medians, and upper house majority party and lower house chamber medians, respectively).

In measuring the core in this fashion—the maximum distance between relevant veto players—I build on the approach developed by Krehbiel (1998), Chiou and Rothenberg (2003), and others.⁹ That is, I compare the size of the gridlock interval to levels of policy change over time. It is important to note, however, that this approach carries with it a key assumption regarding the distribution of status quo policies. More specifically, I adopt the assumption that status quo policies are drawn from a uniform distribution, just as Krehbiel (1998) and Chiou

⁹My approach is also similar to Tsebelis's (2002), though there are some differences due to the wider availability of data and measurements available today.

and Rothenberg (2003) do. All results presented in this chapter should be interpreted with this assumption in mind, as it renders the results most directly comparable to studies that make similar assumptions (e.g., Covington and Barga 2004, Chiou and Rothenberg 2003, 2006, and 2009). However, as Tsebelis (2002), Clinton (2012), and Krehbiel (1998) suggest, this assumption may not always hold true, particularly if the previous legislature dramatically changed the supply of alterable status quo policies. Consequently, I present in Appendix B a series of robustness checks that control for some of this potential variation. The results presented in this section are robust to each check. Moreover, as detailed below, the results are also substantively similar when I use a dependent variable that is more sensitive to the distribution of the status quo.

Test 1: Measuring Policy Change Using Bill Enactments

Using these core size measurements, I test H2 using two different outcome variables: one that draws from previous work on state-level gridlock, and another that addresses common concerns with the traditional approach. To date, models of legislative gridlock in the American states have frequently relied upon raw bill enactment counts as a means for measuring gridlock (see, for example, Bowling and Ferguson 2001, Gray and Lowery 1995, Hicks and Smith 2009, Rogers 2005). As Tsebelis, Binder, and Mayhew (among others) each detail, this measure possesses a number of important flaws. Nevertheless, due to the difficulty of collecting data on “significant” legislation in all 50 state legislatures, studies have focused on raw productivity numbers. Thus, I first test H2 with these measures, in order to relate my findings to these studies of gridlock. For these tests, bill enactment counts are taken from the Council on State Government’s *Book of the States*, for the years 1995-2014. Under this measurement, the more

bills passed, the greater the movement of the status quo.

Before examining the relationship between core size and bill passage, a final aspect of core size merits attention. That is, as noted above, core size does not pertain just to legislative veto players: because of the veto power of governors, the location of the governor matters for the size of the core. Given that Shor and McCarty's ideology scores do not extend to governors, I introduce a divided government variable into my empirical models. The variable takes on the value "1" if the governor is of a different party than both chambers of the legislature and "0" otherwise.¹⁰ I expect that, *ceteris paribus*, divided government will positively correlate with gridlock.

I estimate a variety of models to test the robustness of the relationships in the data. First, I estimate a simple negative binomial model. Second, to better account for unmeasured factors specific to each state and year, I estimate models using state- and year-specific effects. Because such effects present challenges to estimating negative binomial models, I use logged bill passage counts as the dependent variable in these models and then estimate the models using OLS. In these models, I use state random effects and year fixed effects, along with robust standard errors.¹¹ Finally, I estimate linear models of logged enactments, using panel-corrected standard errors alone. In each model, data span from 1995 to 2014, and core size and enactment data are grouped biannually, to account for legislatures that meet only once every other year. In addition to the core size and divided government covariates noted above, I also include variables found in previous models of bill enactments: state's gross domestic product, interest group popula-

¹⁰Divided government is calculated in this way because, while legislative elections occur at the district level, governors are elected at the state level. As a result, governors are likely more moderate than legislators, rendering them absorbed by any system that features one Democratic and one Republican legislative chamber (per the example of absorption articulated above).

¹¹A Hausmann test affirmed the choice to include state-level random effects in the model, instead of fixed effects.

tion, number of initiatives, number of bill introductions, legislative professionalism, partisan dominance, state population, average legislator ideologies in the upper and lower chambers, and total number of legislators.

With regard to *State GDP*, I expect that all else equal, states with larger economies should exhibit a higher number of enactments. I anticipate this variable to function similarly to another variable in the model, *State Population*. Moreover, I anticipate the larger bill “supply” associated with *Bill Introductions* and *Professionalism* should drive enactment counts upward. Conversely, *Number of Interest Groups* should be negatively associated with policy change.¹² As Gray and Lowery (1995) argue, a more crowded interest environment can stymie policy change. Additionally, insofar as the number of initiatives indicates the ease of the initiative process, I anticipate that *Initiatives* will be negatively associated with enactments (see Gerber 1996 and Tsebelis 2002). Finally, I include *Average Ideology*¹³ of the upper and lower chambers in order to account for the possibility that conservatives prefer less policy change overall.

Table 1 summarizes the results. As predicted, core size is negatively associated with bill passage rates across all model specifications. In fact, holding other variables at their means, a shift from the 10th percentile in *Size of Core* to the 90th percentile corresponds with a predicted reduction in output of nearly 140 enactments (706 to 566, good for a $\approx 20\%$ reduction). Without state-level effects, the results are significant at the $p < .01$ level; with state-level effects, the estimates remain significant (p approximately 0.05). Still, a reasonable objection here may be that core size is simply proxying for divided legislatures: that is, an institutions-only (i.e., chamber-medians-only) gridlock interval could explain policy change just as well, and

¹²Data drawn from Strickland (2018). The author wishes to thank James Strickland for providing these data in advance of publication.

¹³The midpoint between each gridlock interval’s endpoints.

Table 2.1: Bill Enactments and Core Size

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Enactments		Logged Enactments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Size of Core</i>	-0.363*** (0.086)	-0.278*** (0.090)	-0.157* (0.087)	-0.157** (0.087)
<i>Bill Introductions</i>	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
<i>Professionalism</i>	-1.219** (0.500)	-1.046 (0.648)	-0.183 (0.524)	-0.183 (0.648)
<i>Initiatives</i>	0.020 (0.013)	0.028** (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.013)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	1.037** (0.405)	1.287** (0.524)	1.081** (0.420)	1.081** (0.524)
<i>State GDP</i>	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)
<i>Divided Government</i>	0.016 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.050 (0.035)
<i>State Population</i>	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)
<i>Average Ideology (Upper Chamber)</i>	-0.041 (0.087)	0.023 (0.115)	-0.029 (0.098)	-0.029 (0.115)
<i>Average Ideology (Lower Chamber)</i>	-0.034 (0.091)	-0.128 (0.117)	-0.105 (0.098)	-0.105 (0.117)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	-0.0001 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.017)	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.017)
Constant	6.558*** (0.161)	6.315 (.080)	6.308*** (0.383)	6.308*** (0.385)
Observations	357	357	357	357
R ²		0.247	0.277	0.277
Adjusted R ²		0.220	0.232	0.232
Log Likelihood	-2,607.334			
θ	3.548*** (0.256)			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,240.667			
State/year effects?	N	N	Y	Y
Robust standard errors?	N	Y	N	Y

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

states with negative agenda control may just be correlated with the presence of a divided legislature. In supplemental analyses, however, I find this not to be the case. That is, when I substitute the agenda-control-adjusted core for other preference distances (such as the distance between chamber medians), no other preference distance but “Size of Core” reaches statistical significance. In other words, the agenda-control-adjusted core is uniquely able, compared to the institutions-only core, to predict policy change in a statistically significant fashion. This result holds for both this dependent variable, and the significance-adjusted variable presented below.

Interestingly, *Divided Government* does not negatively predict enactments at a statistically significant level in any of the models. *Initiatives*, *State GDP*, and *State Population* also exhibited fairly inconsistent results, failing to reach statistical significance in most cases. Moreover, *Number of Interest Groups* exhibits the predicted negative relationship in just one of the four models. *Bill Introductions*, on the other hand, behaves as expected.

A few other results from the regression bear mentioning. First, *Professionalism* unsurprisingly falls out of significance when the panel structure of the data is accounted for (using either panel-corrected standard errors, or more importantly, state-level effects). This is likely due to the fact that the data present little within-state variation in professionalism during this time period. Interestingly, though, in Model 1, professionalism is strongly negatively correlated with enactments—in spite of the fact that professional states are often more populous and have larger economies than unprofessional ones. Additionally, *Partisan Dominance* is strongly positively associated with enactment rates. Perhaps counterintuitively, the more dominated a state is by a single party, the more productive they appear to be.

Taken together, these results are consistent with H2, that agenda-control-adjusted core size

does indeed decrease policy change.¹⁴

Test 2: ACA Implementation as a Measure of Policy Change

While enactment counts provide suggestive evidence of a negative relationship between core size and policy change, such counts exhibit several shortcomings as a measure of policy change. Indeed, many studies of policy change and gridlock have avoided measuring policy change via enactment counts, due primarily to concerns about bill significance. Enactments relay only limited information about status quo movements: one government could pass 10 incremental laws that do not move the status quo as much as another government's single piece of landmark legislation. Thus, Tsebelis, Mayhew, and others have chosen not to measure policy stability via raw bill counts and instead focused on major enactments.

Given these challenges, I retest H2 taking policy significance into account. To do so, I follow Tsebelis (2002) and focus on a single policy area: health policy. In particular, I focus on implementation of the Affordable Care Act in the states, from 2011 to 2013. Focusing on this specific policy area offers a number of benefits. First, it allows for better data collection regarding bill significance. Second, it offers a partial means for dealing with the problem of the status quo. Indeed, just because a government does not move the status quo does not mean that it is *unable* to do so. Rather, relevant veto players may simply prefer the status quo to feasible alternatives. By subjecting all 50 states to all implementation requirements and incentives, the ACA shifts the health policy status quo in such a way that all 50 states must respond in some way (even if only to deny funds or offer ACA alternatives).

¹⁴It should be noted that, although California is an outlier in many of the enactments models, the results presented here are robust to exclusion of California from the models. Results in the following empirical tests also behave similarly, even when California is excluded from the analysis.

In order to measure bill significance in this context, I utilize the National Council of States Legislatures's (NCSL) database on ACA-related bills in the state legislatures. NCSL has developed 10 policy categories for ACA-related bills, with which they classify bills according to their intended response to ACA directives. For instance, NCSL would categorize a bill twice that addresses both Medicaid and insurance exchanges: once in the Medicaid/CHIP category, and once in the insurance exchange category. Classifying bills in this manner offers a means by which one may create a measure of bill significance: because significant bills are "double-counted" (or triple- or quadruple-counted) under this classification scheme, one may utilize the sum total of relevant bills in each category as a means of measuring a state's ability to move the status quo on ACA compliance. This, then, is the approach I use to measure policy change and gridlock. For each legislature, I count the total number of bills listed in each NCSL ACA implementation category. Subsequently, I add together the bill counts from each category to arrive at a single count for each state. This number represents the total amount of ACA Implementation passed in each state, as the double-counting of more complex legislation allows it to capture bill significance in a way that raw bill counts cannot.¹⁵¹⁶

Using this measure of policy change, I retest the relationship between core size and policy change (H2). The data again provide support for the idea that core size drives policy change downward.¹⁷ Beyond the covariates found in the raw bill enactment models, I include in the ACA compliance models the partisanship of the state's governor. I do this to account for differences in ACA compliance due to distaste for or strong opposition to the ACA (a controversial

¹⁵The figure in Appendix F depicts the search interface used to collect these data, along with an example of how the dependent variable was calculated.

¹⁶These are cross-sectional data and are calculated by adding up all enactments over the three-year period covered by the data (2011-2013).

¹⁷It should be noted that H1 was also retested on these data from 2011-2013 and again received support.

bill, passed entirely by Democrats). Table 2 summarizes the results. Here, I estimate a negative binomial model, using clustered standard errors by state. Most variables behave as expected. Here again, core size is negatively associated with policy change ($p < .05$). Indeed, even when adjusting for bill significance, a larger core size is associated with less policy change. The same may be said about *Divided Government*, which is (moderately) negatively associated with policy change ($p < 0.1$). In addition to these findings, the model offers support for the idea that states with Democratic governors and states with larger economies experience more policy change under this ACA measure. The former is perhaps not surprising, as one particularly important aspect of ACA implementation, Medicaid expansion, vested a great deal of implementation power with governors. Interestingly, though, the model's measure of legislative liberalism, *Mean Core Ideology*, did not reach statistical significance in these models. The same is true for *Partisan Dominance*.

These results again provide support for my theoretical expectations regarding core size and gridlock. Larger core sizes appear to be associated with smaller changes to the status quo. Figure 2, a marginal effects plot of core size and predicted policy change, captures the estimated magnitude of this relationship. There, a move from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile in core size corresponds with a decrease of approximately 6-7 units of ACA status quo movement—equivalent to a roughly 42 percent reduction.

Yet while these results are consistent with expectations, these models are not entirely able to address the role that negative agenda control itself plays in the increase of gridlock. Thus, the final analysis attempts to establish that the addition of a partisan veto player via negative agenda control is responsible for higher levels of gridlock in state governments.

Table 2.2: Movement of the ACA Compliance Status Quo

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	ACA Compliance
<i>Size of Core</i>	-0.464** (0.231)
<i>Party of Governor</i>	0.479*** (0.177)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	-0.0002* (0.0001)
<i>Professionalism</i>	-3.277** (1.385)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	-0.103 (1.528)
<i>State GDP</i>	3.89e-06** (1.77e-06)
<i>Divided Government</i>	-0.128* (0.074)
<i>State Population</i>	-5.81e-08 (6.82e-08)
<i>Mean Core Ideology</i>	-0.144 (0.131)
Constant	2.950*** (0.313)
Observations	49
Log pseudolikelihood	-158.802
Wald χ^2	186.43***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 2.2: Core Size and Predicted ACA Legislation

2.4 Does Negative Agenda Control Influence Policy Change Apart from Institutional Polarization?

The foregoing analysis appears to establish a connection between the agenda-control-adjusted legislative core and the amount of policy change a political system experiences. However, as Krehbiel (1993) argues, those findings may simply be a relic of overall preference polarization: perhaps it is the case that states with agenda control institutions happen to be more polarized or are more likely to have divided legislatures. In order to assess the impact of negative agenda control on gridlock, then, one needs account for how polarized institutional pivots are, and then assess whether or not negative agenda control displays a negative relationship with policy change (H3). I undertake a matching analysis to address this challenge.¹⁸ In addition to the

¹⁸I present additional empirical tests in Appendix C.

benefits typically attributed to matching, such as an avoidance of structural interpolation and a sensitivity to data (non)overlap, matching suits H3 particularly well. Indeed, H3 claims that even when conditioning on institutional distances and other characteristics that matter for gridlock, systems with negative agenda control still exhibit lower levels of policy change (higher levels of gridlock) than do systems without negative agenda control.

Here, I examine one primary type of treatment: I match and compare systems with any amount of negative agenda control ($W_i = 1$) with systems lacking any kind of negative agenda control ($W_i = 0$). In order to match treated and control units, I aim to condition on an \mathbf{X} vector that includes: 2008 presidential vote share, party of the governor, divided government, size of state economy, and number of interest groups.¹⁹ Importantly, this \mathbf{X} also includes five different preference distances: $|M_{hm} - M_{sm}|$, $|M_{hm} - C_{sm}|$, $|M_{sm} - C_{hm}|$, $|M_{hm} - C_{hm}|$, $|M_{sm} - C_{sm}|$, and $|C_{hm} - C_{sm}|$ (see Figure 1). These distances capture all the possible inter- and intra-chamber combinations of institutional and partisan veto players in a system with the maximum number of veto players. Of course, not all of these distances should matter in all states. However, conditioning on these distances ensures that I am matching state governments with maximally similar ideological spacing. If differences are found between cases matched on these distances, even when some distances are (theoretically) irrelevant in a given state, such a result would (and does) suggest that negative agenda control itself impacts gridlock, beyond the impact of preference polarization alone.

Before discussing the results from this analysis, however, it is important to underscore that this test is not meant to establish an effect of negative agenda control *apart* from its impact on

¹⁹For robustness, I also match on the three filibuster variables found in Online Appendix E, with results strengthening upon inclusion of those variables.

the size of the core or gridlock interval. Rather, it is meant to address the possibility that the demonstrated correlation between policy change and my agenda-control-adjusted gridlock interval is simply an artifact of preference polarization. As noted above, proponents of party-free, preference-only theories of policy change contend that policy change can be explained on the basis of preference dispersion among institutional pivots alone. Therefore, a reasonable objection to the H2 analysis might be that the results are driven primarily by cross-state differences in overall preference dispersion in the legislature. In response, this test (and an additional test in Appendix C) seeks to demonstrate that negative agenda control (and the size it adds to the core) slows policy change, above and beyond what preference polarization alone might predict. To this end, the matching analysis conditions on two different kinds of preference dispersion: institutional polarization (derived from divided legislatures) and partisan polarization (large distances between the political parties).²⁰ Should negative agenda control demonstrate a negative association with policy change even after matching on these preference dispersion measures, the results would suggest that negative-agenda-control legislatures are not simply more polarized.

Below, I estimate both the average treatment effect on the treated and average treatment effect on the controls:

$$ATT = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|W_i = 1]; \quad ATC = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|W_i = 0]$$

I argue that my analysis meets the requirements of strong ignorability and adherence to the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), required of matching analysis. SUTVA is

²⁰As noted above, I match on both institutional and partisan polarization simultaneously. However, in Appendix C, I present matching results for which I match on institutional polarization (distance between chamber medians) and partisan polarization (distance between party medians) separately. In both bases, the results remain substantial and significant, as in the analysis below.




Figure 2.3: Map of Treated and Controlled Units

violated if the assignment of negative agenda control in one state affects the outcome (policy change) in another. The map in Figure 3 suggests that geographically similar states have similar treatment assignments; however, it does not necessary suggest that a given state’s assignment affects that state’s outcomes. Instead, the presence of negative agenda control in, say, Arizona, would have to influence policy change in, say, Nevada, in order for SUTVA to be violated. This, of course, is entirely possible: if Arizona is unable to overcome negative-agenda-control-induced gridlock and pass something like a time-sensitive tax policy, Nevada may more vigorously pursue such policies, perhaps to attract regional businesses.

For a number of reasons, however, this concern is a minimal one for this study. First, every state has to comply with the ACA, so the aforementioned race is unlikely to occur. Second, because of absorption, negative agenda control may not affect gridlock such that it would become noticeable and influence a neighboring state’s actions. In the first place, many states have possessed their negative agenda control rules for decades—long before current legislative

leaders ever took office. Thus, it would be difficult to attribute differences in gridlock to the presence or absence of negative agenda control. Moreover, even if agenda-setting powers are present in one state and not the other, negative agenda control need not lead to gridlock. If it doesn't, then it is unlikely that legislative production in the neighboring state will respond in any meaningful way to the presence of a single procedural rule.

In addition to SUTVA, the assumption of unconfoundedness also merits attention. That is, after conditioning on X , outcomes should be orthogonal to treatment assignment. While it is impossible to test for the presence or absence of unobserved confounders, I attempt to account for a wide variety of covariates commonly found in studies of legislative gridlock. By conditioning on these common determinants of gridlock, confounding from these variables should be accounted for. Finally, matching analysis rests crucially on the presence of overlap in each of the dimensions of X . That is, the conditional distribution of controlled units ought to share a common support with treated units on pertinent covariates. Figure 4 examines the overlap assumption graphically. Observing the treatment versus control density plots for each of the elements of X , the data in this study appear to possess healthy levels of overlap overall. In fact, the covariate with the weakest balance, number of interest groups, generates a t -test that does not achieve significance at the $p < .10$ level. Table A7 in the Appendix provides more detailed balance statistics, and Table 3 lists the actual matched cases in the treatment and control groups. When combined with the unconfoundedness assumption, this presence of overlap suggests that the data in this study meet the criteria for strong ignorability necessary for matching analysis.

In order to match treated and control units, I implement nearest neighbor matching, using the `GenMatch()` function in R (Diamond and Sekhon 2013). With these matches, I esti-




Figure 2.4: Covariate Balance between Treated and Control Groups

Table 2.3: Matched Sample

(from GenMatch function)	
AK	VA
AL	ND
AZ	LA
CT	LA
DE	VT
FL	CA
GA	LA
HI	ND
IA	OR
IL	OR
IN	UT
KS	SC
KY	VA
MA	LA
MD	LA
MI	LA
MN	CO
MO	NV
MS	ME
MT	NV
NC	AR
NH	AR
NJ	NV
NM	ME
NY	CO
OH	LA
OK	ID
PA	CA
RI	ND
SD	UT
TN	UT
TX	CA
WA	OR
WI	UT
WV	VT
WY	ND

mate the ATT and ATC. As Table 4 indicates, a difference-in-means *t*-test between treated and control groups is statistically significant ($p < .05$) and substantial. The approximately 13-unit difference points in the expected direction and represents a wide divergence in ACC implementation (which ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 87 movements) among treated and control units. This result is consistent with the claim that negative agenda control does contribute to gridlock in the American state legislatures.^{21 22}

Appendix C also features an alternative test of H3 that considers directly the mechanism by

²¹It should be noted that this result has been substantiated with tests conducted on the bill enactments data. In the first such test, reported in Appendix C, I substitute the ACA measure of policy change for enactments, and then rerun the matching analysis. The results are again negatively and highly significant, with a difference in means of nearly 400 bills—a substantial difference.

²²These results also hold if a modeling approach is instead taken. In Appendix C, I regress both enactments and the ACA policy change measure on all of the aforementioned preference distances, along with a variable indicating the number of chambers with party leaders controlling the calendar. In spite of the inclusion of all possible preference distances, the agenda control variable remains negatively and statistically significantly associated with policy change.

Table 2.4: ATT and ATC for Negative Agenda Control (ACA Compliance)

	ATT	ATC
<i>Estimate</i>	-13.222	-13.538
<i>AI Standard Error</i>	5.9143	6.6016
<i>T-statistic</i>	-2.2356	-2.0508
<i>p-value</i>	0.0254	0.0403
<hr/>		
Original Number of Observations	49	49
Original Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	36	13
Matched Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	36	13

which negative agenda control ought to influence policy change (core size increase). There, I decompose the core into an institutions-only component, including the distance between legislative chambers as its own term in a regression model of enactments and ACA implementation. Because the institutions-only core is by definition a subset of the agenda-control-adjusted core, I then include a separate term in the model that represents the added distance attributed to the core by the presence of negative agenda control institutions. For both dependent variables, this added distance negatively and significantly predicts policy change, as expected. Moreover, in all cases, model fit improves upon inclusion of this added distance term. Thus, like the matching analysis, this test lends support to H3: that negative agenda control contributes to policy change, above and beyond the level of policy change predicted by institutional pivots alone.

2.5 Implications and Conclusions

Policy change and stability matter in a representative democracy. Indeed, while some research shows that policy stability allows the economy to grow and prosper (e.g., Henisz 2000, Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), many other studies also document the negative ramifications of a legislature's inability to address a polity's problems (e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991, Mann and Ornstein 2012). In America's federal system, state governments wield power over a number of important policy areas, so their ability to address policy problems remains an issue of vital interest. To be sure, a wide variety of factors may influence how much policy change occurs within a system of governance, including public opinion shifts and preference polarization. However, this analysis demonstrates that even seemingly "small" institutional differences governing legislative agenda-setting have a substantial impact on the amount of policy change or gridlock a political system encounters. Indeed, when legislative parties are empowered to set a chamber's voting calendar and thereby exercise negative agenda control, significantly less policy change occurs.

By tracing the influence of partisan agenda control through the policymaking process, this study therefore advances current knowledge not only on legislative institutions but on aggregate-level policy change as well. By moving beyond roll rates, the results suggest not just that political parties use agenda-setting rules to benefit their party brand, but that these institutional features carry with them important ramifications for a political system's ability to change policy. Future research should further examine how these and other partisan institutions alter the ability of a legislature not only to make policy but also to fulfill other duties such as executive oversight.

CHAPTER 3

Mandate to Message: Partisan Competition, Bill Sponsorship, and Position-Taking in Congress

Abstract: In this paper, I show how partisan competition over majority control of Congress influences the viability of legislators' lawmaking activities. More specifically, I develop a dynamic pivotal politics model of policy change, delineating the conditions under which partisan agenda-setters will respond to competition over majority control by slowing policy change, discouraging members from expending effort to draft viable, compromise legislation. I then test the predictions of this model using an original set of spatial point estimates for status quo and bill proposal locations, based on co-sponsorship and interest-group position-taking data. Using these data, I find strong support for my model's predictions. In particular, I find that members of Congress are far more likely to offer messaging bills when the theory suggests party leaders will block otherwise viable legislation, for partisan competitive reasons. The findings speak to a growing literature tying the insecurity of legislative majorities to a wide variety of legislative outcomes.

Aside from voting, bill sponsorship is among the most fundamental behaviors in which a legislator may engage. Indeed, before a legislature ever considers a bill for passage, lawmakers and their staff must first draft it, often making difficult decisions about which provisions to include or exclude, based on policy goals and the prevailing political climate. Members exercise this care for good reason: presumably they want to draft a bill that can pass. Indeed, sponsoring successful legislation redounds to the member's benefit in numerous ways, even beyond policy gains: legislative successes generate opportunities for credit-claiming, and they raise a member's profile among her peers.

In spite of the centrality of this goal, members do sometimes sponsor legislation that they understand will not pass. Progressive members, for example, introduced bills to implement a single-payer health care system in 2009. Similarly, some Democratic members have recently introduced bills that would abolish Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—despite the fact that Republican leaders were highly unlikely to move on such bills. Further still, in nearly each year since its passage, Republicans have introduced legislation meant to fully repeal the Affordable Care Act, while other conservative Republicans have even sponsored bills to abolish the IRS in recent Congresses.¹

Given members' positions as lawmakers, the introduction of such nonviable legislation is puzzling, at least from a policymaking perspective: why do members expend effort in drafting bills they understand will not become law? In the abstract, previous literature has offered a plausible baseline explain for the value of such bills to members: sometimes termed “messaging” bills, nonviable legislation offers members the opportunity to position-take before key

¹Such bills have become so common, in fact, that some research has even referred to them as “dead on arrival” bills (Gelman, 2017).

electoral constituencies. Still, in spite of the importance of this baseline explanation, previous research has not provided a means for understanding the *trade-off* between position-taking and policymaking that members face when drafting legislation.

In this chapter, I argue that such decisions are a function of members' reactions to the institutional constraints and electoral climate surrounding them. More specifically, I argue that electoral competition over major institutional pivots sometimes encourages members to carefully draft viable legislation with the highest probability of passage, while it at other times discourages members from doing so. Given that individual members understand when party leaders face incentives against setting the legislative agenda, members respond rationally by adjusting their bill sponsorship strategies, understanding the wastefulness of drafting costly viable bill-drafting under such conditions—instead offering nonviable “messaging” legislation.

To demonstrate how electoral context and congressional institutions influence members' willingness to draft viable legislation—legislation that, if afforded agenda space would pass through Congress—I develop and test a bill-level theory that ties traditional spatial models of policy change with the differential policymaking incentives encouraged by the recent rise in competition over majority control of Congress. The theory demonstrates how expectations over future control of Congress influences party leaders' willingness to set the legislative agenda for status quo policies lying within certain subsets of the policy space, which in turn influences the kinds of bills members introduce for these status quos. Using a new dataset of point estimates for both status quo and bill proposal locations derived from a joint scaling of cosponsorship, roll call, and interest group position-taking data (and generated on the same scale as preference estimates for members of Congress), I test and find support for the theory's bill-level predictions—namely that members draft viable legislation when electoral incentives and the

location of a bill's associated status quo encourage party leaders to set the agenda, and resort to non-viable messaging bills (bills that do not improve upon the status quo for key veto players in Congress) otherwise.

Even beyond understanding why and when legislators engage in earnest lawmaking, these findings point to the policymaking ramifications of heightened competition over control of a legislature, which enables agenda-setters to consider post-electoral dynamics in the first place. Much like its level of preference polarization, Congress's level of competitiveness has fluctuated dramatically over its history. This study ties members' sponsorship activities to this competition, demonstrating that changes in Congress's competitiveness may have far-reaching consequences for member behavior. Moreover, given the new estimation strategy introduced in the empirical tests of the theory, the study provides valuable data that allow for the a priori measurement of status quo locations—even when bills do not ultimately receive a roll call vote.

I proceed as follows. First, I review relevant literature on sponsorship activity, demonstrating the need for a better understanding of both the electoral foundations of bill sponsorship activity in general, as well as the determinants of whether members sponsor viable legislation in specific. Second, I develop a theory of the underlying agenda-setting process that bills face, given various electoral expectations faced by partisan leaders. The theory suggests that when partisan agenda setters believe a status quo policy is better moved after the upcoming election, legislators are more likely to introduce non-viable messaging bills. Third, I detail the data and measurement strategy used to test the theory's specific hypotheses regarding electoral expectations, the spatial locations of bills and status quo policies, and the introduction of viable legislation. Finally, I provide empirical evidence in support of my theory, showing that the agenda-setting incentives generated by partisan electoral context appear to influence how

and when members offer viable or messaging legislation. I conclude by discussing the study's implications for the study of legislative behavior.

3.1 Bill Sponsorship, Position-Taking, and Electoral Competition

Traditionally, research on bill introductions has conceptualized sponsorship as a tool for achieving policy goals. Wawro (2000), for example, features bill sponsorship prominently in his examination of legislative entrepreneurship in the U.S. House. Similarly, Volden and Wiseman (2014) incorporate a member's bill sponsorships directly into their measure of legislative effectiveness. Such a focus makes sense, given the lawmaking responsibilities of members of Congress; consequently, most examinations of bill sponsorship feature explanatory variables situated within the policymaking process rather than in the electoral process or in communications. Such factors include majority status, committee membership and status, proximity to key institutional pivots, and investment in legislative staff (Schiller, 1995; Garand and Burke, 2006; Cox and Terry, 2008).

Still, members of Congress do occasionally employ primarily legislative behaviors for non-legislative purposes. Hall (1996), for instance, argues that member participation in committee is not uniformly motivated by a desire to influence policy outcomes. Instead, some "showhorse" members use the committee as a means for magnifying their communications efforts and better position themselves for re-election. More specific to bill sponsorship, Sulkin (2005) finds that politicians' promises on the campaign trail translate to actual sponsorship activity: when politicians make promises to address particular issues while campaigning, they frequently sponsor related legislation once they take office.

These findings provide some context for the otherwise puzzling observation that members occasionally draft legislation that is not politically viable and would not likely pass through Congress even if voted upon. That is, apart from policymaking, such findings underscore that bill sponsorship offers position-taking value to the member. In fact, [Rocca and Gordon \(2010\)](#) show that members frequently use bills sponsorship as a means for public position-taking, especially before interest groups. Yet while position-taking value provides a rationale for why members expend effort drafting nonviable legislation, few studies have offered a theory for why and when the position-taking value of bill sponsorship predominates over its policymaking value.

Understanding the conditions under which sponsorship serves policy-change versus position-taking goals is important for a wide variety of reasons. First and foremost, most scholars consider policymaking to be the primary representational function that members of Congress serve in American democracy. Insofar as members expend valuable time and resources drafting legislation that stands little chance of passing, one must wonder how it affects their ability to discharge other key duties of the office. Second, while bill sponsorship is frequently incorporated into measures of legislative effort and effectiveness, the presence of non-viable legislation should count for less in such measures than bills carefully crafted to maximize chances for passage. Moreover, given that bill sponsorship factors prominently in some measures of legislator homestyle, understanding how bill sponsorship is used for legislative versus non-legislative purposes once again proves integral to accurately capturing home style among modern legislators. Finally, in an era of insecure majorities ([Lee, 2016](#)), both individual members and parties have increasingly emphasized messaging over policymaking, in an effort to maximize reelection chances and seat share in Congress. Consequently, understanding how and when members

deploy messaging *legislation* is central to capturing how increases in competition over majority control have altered legislative activity within Congress.

In this chapter, I develop a bill-level theory of legislative viability, which links the contemporary insecure congressional majorities to members' bill-specific decisions to pursue different types of bill sponsorships. More specifically, I offer a dynamic spatial theory of policy change that delineates how agenda-setters in Congress may strategically speed up or slow down changes to specific status quo policies, based on their party's anticipated electoral gains or less in the coming election. These agenda-setting expectations, then, determine whether members are willing to expend the effort necessary to draft viable legislation. Using a new dataset of bill proposal locations and their associated status quo locations, I show that when members expect agenda-setters to *slow down* the policymaking process for a specific status quo location, they are less likely to meet that status quo with a viable proposal—that is, a proposal that, on the basis of its spatial location improves upon the status quo for all relevant veto points in Congress. Conversely, when members expect agenda-setters to *accelerate* the policymaking process for a specific status quo location, members meet such status quos with viable proposals that improve upon the status quo for all congressional veto players. Put differently, they offer legislation that, if brought up for a vote, should be expected to pass through Congress.

3.2 A Theory of Policy Change and Sponsorship Type

Typically, theories and empirical examinations of bill sponsorship focus solely on members' decisions regarding whether or not to sponsor legislation at all. That is, based on the member's own goals, or her issue commitments during the campaign (Sulkin, 2005), a member simply

selects which status quo policies to target and sponsors legislation accordingly. Here, I argue that members make an additional decision when sponsoring legislation, deciding whether or not to invest in write a *viable* legislative proposal that could conceivably pass into law. That is, while the decision of whether to sponsor legislation is largely a function of campaign promises and other electoral considerations made by the member at the beginning of her term in office, her decision of how seriously to pursue these lawmaking goals hinges on her expectations of whether agenda-setters will move on proposed changes.

In determining whether to pair specific status quo policies with viable or nonviable proposals, I argue that members weigh how *electoral* and *institutional* dynamics influence the probability that their bill will receive agenda space. Thus, to understand when members should offer viable legislation, I develop a dynamic spatial theory that delineates when agenda-setters are likely to speed up or slow down the policymaking process. In short, I show that when partisan electoral expectations encourage agenda-setters to slow down the policymaking process, members face little incentive to pay the steep costs associated with drafting viable legislation. Conversely, when electoral conditions encourage agenda-setters to *speed up* the policymaking process, members face a greater incentive to sincerely pursue their lawmaking goals. To more precisely articulate this dynamic, I develop a unidimensional spatial theory of agenda-setting and policy change with an endogenous (between rounds) status quo and two actors, an agenda-setter (AS) and a receiver (R).

3.2.1 Electoral Expectations and Partisan Agenda-Setting Decisions

Before members decide on their sponsorship strategies for a given status quo policy SQ_i , they observe the following agenda-setting game. In the first or “present” round, the agenda-setter

(AS) must decide for SQ_i whether or not to propose an alternative a (“propose” versus “hold back”).² If she does propose an alternative, the game shifts to the receiver (R), who must then select whether to “accept” or “reject” a . If the receiver chooses to accept the alternative, the game ends, the equilibrium policy $SQ^* = a$, and payoffs are realized via a quadratic loss function comparing the new policy to each of the players’ ideal points. Should the receiver choose to reject the alternative, the status quo SQ persists. Thus, the result of Round 1 can be either a new policy or the status quo, much as in any traditional spatial model.

Unlike traditional spatial models, however, if SQ is reached because of “holding back” behavior by AS , the game does *not* end.³ Instead, an election occurs, shifting the location of agenda-setter to AS' and the receiver to R' .⁴ In the second round, the game proceeds as in Round 1: AS first whether or not to propose an alternative to the status quo, and R decides whether to accept or reject that proposal. If the proposal is accepted, the game ends with a new policy of $SQ_i^* = a$. If the proposal is rejected, the game ends with the same status quo policy, $SQ_i^* = SQ_i$.

A key feature of this game’s structure is the fact that the game only reaches the second round if the status quo persists—a feature designed to more closely replicate the trade-offs that agenda-setters face within. Substantively, this structure creates a key decision for AS : she must choose between what she believes she can gain by proposing a new policy in this round, versus what she believes would occur (for each SQ_i) following the next election. The rationale behind this

²Note that status quo policies are indexed by i , in order to indicate that the agenda-setter encounters many status quo policies within a given legislative period.

³Technically, the game could reach the second round if R rejects AS ’s offer a . However, because R is not dynamically sophisticated and AS knows R ’s preferences, AS chooses not to make offers in the first round that she knows will not be accepted, assuming an infinitely small proposal cost.

⁴Notationally, then, if a shift in AS or R does occur in Round 2, I will refer to said second-round actors as AS' and R' . If, however, no change occurs, I will simply refer to AS and R similarly in both rounds.

feature is drawn from substantive observations of the American legislative system: when policy change occurs for a status quo policy in the present legislative session, it is highly unlikely to occur again in the next session. Policy change for a specific status quo policy area can either occur *now* or *later*, but not both. Policy advocates and, increasingly, political researchers (e.g., [Buisseret and Bernhardt \(2017\)](#)) denote this feature of legislative politics frequently, and further justification for this structural decision is provided in Supplemental Information E.

3.2.1.1 Key Model Features

Members of Congress observe these agenda-setting dynamics before deciding whether to pair a particular SQ_i with a viable or non-viable proposal. However, before discussing how such agenda-setting dynamics influence members' sponsorship decisions, I first underscore some key features of the agenda-setting model as presented above.

First, while previous models of policy change, such as [Krehbiel \(1998\)](#), include a larger number of players with specific identities, I keep the number of players (and the specificity of those players low), in order to increase the flexibility of the theory. That is to say, because the specific identities of the agenda-setter and pivotal actor are fluid, subject to intense scholarly debate, or some combination of the two, my design simplifies the bargaining environment into two key players—an agenda-setter and a single veto agent—who do not have to take on any specific identity. Doing so allows one to make a specific theoretical point and extend to a variety of political contexts.

In order to eventually interpret the dynamics of the theory in the American context, however, I do include a few key assumptions with regard to player locations and identities. More specifically, I assume that agenda control rests in political parties, much in the same way as [Cox](#)

and McCubbins (2005). With respect to the receiver, I rely upon the fact that, in one dimension, a single actor is ultimately pivotal for any particular legislative decision. In this model, then, R lies at the pivotal actor located farthest from AS in the opposite ideological direction (rightward if AS is leftist, leftward otherwise). This setup generates an asymmetry between AS and R . That is, while AS is a collective actor (a party, or set of party leaders) that persists across elections, R is most often an individual legislator, concerned about reelection. This asymmetry has important consequences for how the two players approach the game. Given that party leaders are likely to remain in place (either as minority or majority leaders) following the next election, they are enabled to think dynamically about policy change and weigh the advantages and disadvantages associated with proposing or holding back various pieces of legislation. Consequently, AS is a dynamically sophisticated player who considers Period 2 consequences to its actions in Period 1.

This conceptualization of AS stands in sharp contrast to R . As an individual actor, R faces the real possibility that she may not remain in office following the upcoming election. If the current actor R fails to remain in office, then future policy gains are of little use to her. Put differently, insofar as reelection concerns remain as the individual legislator's primary concern (Mayhew, 1974), dynamic considerations regarding policy gains likely fall to the wayside. Therefore, given that the individual, pivotal legislator R faces such pressures in the present round (that AS does not face, at least at the same level), R is modeled as a "static" player in the game. In other words, R votes in accordance with her present-round incentives, accepting policy proposals that move the status quo in her direction and rejecting ones that do not.

It may initially seem tempting to think of R in terms of a dynamically sophisticated minority party: if the majority party is dynamically sophisticated, why is the minority party not

thinking dynamically and whipping R accordingly? To be clear, it is indeed likely that minority parties are dynamically sophisticated in some sense: minority parties want to maximize their chances of taking back the majority. However, *even if* they were able to whip moderate members located near the R pivot, doing so is not likely to improve the minority's chances at taking the majority. To see why, consider what might happen if R did vote dynamically—in other words, to occasionally vote *for* policies that move the status quo *away* from his/her ideal point or *against* policies that move the status quo *closer*. Such votes are not likely to improve the chances that the minority party regains power: voting against her own preferences (and potentially the preferences of the district) is unlikely to improve R 's reelection chances. Understanding this, marginal members occasionally respond quite colorfully to the prospect of their being whipped in this fashion. For example, moderate Sen. Joe Manchin (D - WV) recently took umbrage at the idea of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer influencing his vote: “I’ll be 71 years old in August, you’re going to whip me? Kiss my you know what.”⁵ Assuming that the minority party does not view losing incumbent seats as a viable strategy for regaining power, then, it may choose against cross-pressuring R in her vote choice. Thus, rendering R a static player makes sense, even if one thinks of her as under the power of the minority party.⁶

The analysis will rely upon a few other assumptions worth mentioning. First, the model setup implies that the agenda-setter can never be “crossed” by the receiver, if/when the receiver moves in the direction of the agenda-setter. Operationally, this simply means that R lies to the right of a left-leaning AS and to the left of a right-leaning AS . Additionally, I assume that AS and R cannot share an ideal point. These are weak assumptions that improve model

⁵<https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/13/schumer-supreme-court-fight-centrist-democrats-716654>

⁶It is worth noting that, practically speaking, this feature mirrors an assumption made by [Buisseret and Bernhardt \(2017\)](#) in their recent paper.

interpretation.

3.3 How Do Electoral Prospects Influence Policy Change Under Possible Power Transitions?

Given the structure and features of the agenda-setting game, what sorts of agenda-setting dynamics do members of Congress observe as electoral dynamics change? As is common for spatial models, the equilibria of this game vary considerably with regard to status quo location and the locations of AS , R , AS' , and R' . Thus, to illustrate the sorts of agenda-setting behavior members of Congress should expect for a given SQ_i , I detail how three power transition scenarios influence AS 's willingness to set the legislative agenda.⁷ Much like [Krehbiel \(1998\)](#) and others, my discussion of the theoretical dynamics underlying these regimes will remain abstract, for illustrative purposes; regardless, the scenarios underscore conditions under which members of Congress can expect specific SQ_i to be met with accelerated or decelerated agenda-setting (terms I define below), which influences members' willingness to draft costly viable legislation. For each scenario, I delineate the conditions under which AS ought to set the agenda, comparing results to those from a traditional, static model. Next, I develop three main predictions regarding agenda-setting activity, highlighting when party leaders will speed up or slow down policy change. Finally, I trace out relevant implications for bill sponsorship activity from these predictions, ultimately arguing that future gains for the majority party encourage sincere policymaking, while future losses may discourage it.

⁷I eventually argue that all post-WWII elections each fall into one of these regimes.


3.3.1 Scenario 1: AS Maintains Agenda Control and Makes Gains with Receiver

In the first power transition scenario, *AS* is expected to maintain agenda control following the upcoming election. However, *R* is expected to *move closer* to *AS*. Here, without loss of generality, suppose that *AS* lies left of center and *R* to the right. As noted above, the upcoming election is expected to be a positive one for *AS*'s party: in addition to retaining control of *AS*, *R* is expected to move closer to *AS*. That is, by making gains in *R*'s legislative chamber (and, say, capturing the filibuster pivot, for instance), *AS* and her party expect to experience a closer *R'* after the upcoming election.⁸ Should the expected shift in *R*'s location occur, players in the game have a reasonably reliable idea about where the new receiver, *R'*, would be located.

How does this possibility of change of control influence *AS*'s actions in the present round? Consider how *AS* ought to act if the probability of *R* moving closer is equal to 1 ($\Pr(R' - AS < R - AS) = 1$). In this scenario, *AS* must backward induct from the second round, to determine where policy would move should she opt against offering a policy alternative in the present round. Consider first a status quo policy lying far to the left of *AS*. For such status quo policies, *AS* can offer an alternative policy located at her ideal point, because such an alternative is a net improvement for the Republican receiver. Because *AS* can do no better in the second round by holding back, she instead should always propose her ideal point in the first round for any such status quo policy.

⁸As Figure 3.1 depicts, *AS*'s retention of agenda control is captured by the persistence of *AS* in the second round. That is, the location of *AS* in the second round is equivalent to that in the first round. In reality, this is unlikely to be the case. If, for example, Democrats add seats to their majority, the location of *AS* is likely to shift slightly leftward. However, because such intraparty shifts are typically small, *AS* is held in place here, for ease of exposition.

Figure 3.1: Common Power Distribution and Electoral Change Scenarios; Scenario 1



This dynamic changes for SQ_i lying at AS and rightward. Indeed, if the status quo lies close to but to the right of AS , AS may desire to move the status quo but cannot do so: R will reject any movement away from her (R 's) right-leaning ideal point. Moreover, for all policies located between AS and R' , SQ will persist through both rounds, as neither the first-round nor second-round agenda-setter will be able to make improvements upon the status quo. In the present round, AS will be unable also to move status quo policies between R and R' in her direction, so her best response is simply to allow the status quo to persist.

However, for policies lying to the right of R , AS faces an interesting incentive. Policies lying to the right of R are moveable in the first round: R will accept any proposal at least as good as the status quo. However, for these SQ to the right of R , SQ is even less desirable for R' than it is for R . Consequently, AS can extract more policy concessions in the second round than the first. Taken together, AS faces an incentive to *hold back from offering a policy alternative* when


the status quo is to the right of R , even though she can improve upon the status quo in the first round by making an offer. This dynamic is not limitless, however. Indeed, eventually a status quo policy is so far to the right that $AS \geq SQ - 2|SQ - R|$ —i.e., that AS 's ideal point lies within the leftward reflection of SQ over R . Under such conditions, AS can propose and obtain her ideal point in the first round, rather than having to wait until the second round. This means that for any weak preference of present gains over future ones, AS should propose her ideal point in the first round, which R will accept.

The results are summarized in the upper portion of Figure 3.2. Here, the horizontal axis represents the location of the SQ , while the vertical axis represents the location of the equilibrium policy outcome, SQ^* . The dark line tracks the equilibrium outcome SQ^* for each SQ along the horizontal axis. Finally, the gray portion of the graph covers the region of SQ values for which no policy change occurs in the first round of play. As Figure 3.2 depicts, policy stasis occurs not only for SQ between AS and R , but also for policies lying to the right of R .⁹ This region is quite large, indicating that policy change should slow significantly when AS expects to face a more favorable R in the future. Compared to the static mode (bottom panel of 3.2), the dynamic model predicts considerably less agenda-setting and eventual policy change.

These results hold for any scenario under which AS remains the same and makes some kind of gains with the receiver in the upcoming election. Under these scenarios, less policy change will occur than what models based on static preferences alone would predict: for SQ policies lying to the right of R , AS is at best indifferent between Round 1 and Round 2 policy outcomes, opting against Round 1 policy change for all policies to the right of R and to the left

⁹Here again, it is worth noting that while the equilibrium outcome ($SQ^* = AS$) is unambiguous for policies lying to the right of the reflection of AS over R , whether or not such change occurs in the first or second round depends upon assumptions about temporal preferences on the part of AS .

Figure 3.2: R' More Favorable to AS



of $R + |AS - R|$. In empirical tests in later sections, I call this phenomenon *policy deceleration*.

This phenomenon is summarized in Proposition 1:

Proposition 1 (Policy Deceleration): AS will refrain from attempts to change status quo policies lying to the right of R but to the left of $R + |AS - R|$ when AS anticipates her party will remain in control of AS and R will move closer to her.

In other words, when AS realizes she can achieve a more favorable change to SQ_i after the upcoming election, she will elect to postpone movements of SQ_i after the election.

3.3.1.1 Bill Sponsorship Under Scenario 1

Clearly, at least in the abstract, dynamic electoral considerations may dramatically influence how agenda-setters think about the legislative agenda. Given that the game detailed above is

one of full information, it stands to reason that the game's dynamics should also influence how members think about bill sponsorship. Indeed, when a member finds herself in a situation like Scenario 1 and wishes to address a particular status quo by introducing legislation, she does so with an understanding that *AS* faces incentives to decelerate policymaking for certain regions of the policy space.

How might individual members respond to such conditions of policy deceleration? Consider the costs associated with the two types of bill-writing discussed above: viable and non-viable sponsorship. As noted throughout, a piece of *viable* legislation is a bill that should pass into law, should it be brought up for a vote. Within the context of the spatial model, viable legislation must be spatially acceptable to all pivots or veto players: that is, *viable legislation must serve as an improvement upon the bill's associated status quo for all veto players within the political system*. Such legislation therefore moves the status quo toward the center of the political spectrum (relatively speaking). Conversely, non-viable legislation is not an improvement for one or more veto players, meaning the sponsor has elected to move the status quo away from the center of spectrum—typically close to their own ideal point.

In order for members to draft truly viable legislation, they therefore must compile a large amount of political and policy-specific information. Indeed, beyond grasping the legal, economic, and social ramifications of various policy instruments, a member must explore how pivotal legislators and interest groups are likely to react to policy proposals. Compiling such information is costly, occupying a sizable portion of a member's time and legislative resources. Ultimately, the member does receive a benefit from sponsoring this type of legislation: should the bill pass, the related policy gains would benefit her. Moreover, she may gain the respect of her colleagues, and she may be viewed as productive by her constituents. Still, because she will

likely need to compromise from her preferred policy outcome, her position-taking payoff with her reelection constituency is limited.

By contrast, non-viable bills do not require the member to compromise on her preferred policy outcome. Indeed, sometimes termed “messaging” bills, the primary purpose of such bills is to offer an opportunity for a member to signal her alignment and commitment to the ideological principles of her reelection constituency (Gelman, 2017; Rocca and Gordon, 2010). Unlike viable legislation, the member recognizes that messaging bills are not likely to pass into law, even if they do receive a vote in Congress. Consequently, the member need not expend valuable legislative time and resources compiling information about key legislative actors. Instead, she need only ensure she maximizes position-taking benefit from sponsorship such legislation. Thus, while she forfeits potential policy gains by offering messaging legislation, she scores political points with key supporters, potentially aiding in her reelection.

I argue that the relative value of viable and non-viable legislation therefore depends upon the probability that movements of specific SQ_i will occur, all else equal. More specifically, the value of viable and non-viable proposals fluctuates based on the likelihood that agenda-setters will actually move on legislation that alters a given status quo. Scenario 1 generates conditions under which viable proposals, at least for some SQ_i , the development and introduction of a viable proposal makes little sense. That is, when a status quo policy lies within the *deceleration region*, members should offer non-viable or messaging legislation: because AS is unlikely to move on such legislation, paying the legislative costs associated with introducing viable legislation makes little sense. Instead, she should maximize the non-policy benefits of bill sponsorship, offering messaging legislation.

Taken together, the trade-offs associated with viable and messaging legislation therefore in-

teract with expectations over future electoral outcomes to translate Proposition 1 into a testable hypothesis about bill sponsorship activity:

H₁ : When *AS* is not likely to change but *R* is expected to move **closer** to *AS* after the upcoming election, legislators aiming to change policies within the deceleration region will be *less* likely to offer viable proposals.

That is, when electoral incentives and the location of pivotal actors render a specific status quo policy subject to policy deceleration (i.e., *SQ* opposite *AS*), members should be systematically more likely to offer non-viable or messaging legislation, all else equal.


3.3.2 Scenario 2: AS Remains the Same, but Receiver Moves Away from AS

Unlike Scenario 1, *AS* loses ground with *R* in Scenario 2. Here, *AS* and *R* both lie on the leftward portion of the political spectrum; however, following the election, *R* is expected to move away from *AS*, rendering Round 2 far less advantageous to their policymaking endeavors.

How does this potential shift influence the strategic calculus made by *AS* in the present?¹⁰ As in Scenario 1, status quo policies lying to the left of the agenda-setter are moveable to *AS*'s ideal point in the first round: *R* will accept any movement of these status quo policies to the right. Similarly, policies located between *AS* and *R* are immovable, regardless of the location of *R*—meaning that the status quo remains in place within this range. But what about status quo policies lying to the right of *R*? In Scenario 1, *AS* opted to hold back from policy change. But unlike in Scenario 1, *AS* should no longer hold back on these status quos. In fact,

¹⁰Considering again the scenario wherein the rightward shift of *R* is guaranteed to occur ($\Pr(R' - AS > R - AS) = 1$).

Figure 3.3: *AS* Loses Ground with R'



one might argue that *AS* should accelerate her policymaking efforts on a subset of these status quos. Following the election, status quo policies lying between R and R' become immovable. Therefore, if *AS* wants to lock in policy gains in this area, she needs to propose changes now. Of course, as in Scenario 1, this dynamic is not equally true of all SQ to the right of R : for SQ to the right of the reflection of *AS* over R' , *AS* can achieve her ideal point in either round. Because *AS* cannot improve upon this outcome under such conditions, she can make an offer in Round 1 and the game ends.

Figure 3.3 summarizes these results and compares them to the static case. For the present-round static case, nothing has changed: status quo policies lying between AS and R will remain unchanged. Strictly speaking, rendering the game dynamic did not increase or decrease the number of moveable status quo policies in equilibrium. However, the game's dynamism accelerates policymaking in a different way (or, at very least, focuses it): that is, because *AS* knows that policies between R and R' may become immovable in the immediate future, she may ex-

ert additional effort in moving these policies. Whether or not this results in more policy change overall depends on how scarce agenda space is, but the theory's dynamism at very least suggests where AS is likely to focus her policymaking efforts. More specifically, AS is likely to accelerate policymaking efforts for policies located to the right of R , but to the left of $R' + |R' - AS|$. I refer to this phenomenon as *policy acceleration*, which stands in stark contrast to the *policy deceleration* encouraged in Scenario 1. I define policy acceleration as follows:

Definition 1 (Policy Acceleration): the choice by AS to focus her policymaking efforts on a particular set of status quo policies, due to her belief that future changes of these policies will benefit her less than current ones.

A necessary condition for policy acceleration, of course, is limited agenda space. Were agenda space unlimited, AS could successfully address all moveable status quo policies, regardless of whether such policies become immovable following the upcoming election. Consequently, the probability that AS will move any particular SQ would not differ other moveable SQ . With limited agenda space, however, AS must prioritize. Given that her payoffs are a function of her proximity to the eventual SQ^* , AS can ensure the best possible two-round policymaking outcome by focusing on SQ_i movements that differ substantially between Round 1 and Round 2. For Scenario 2, these policies are located to the right of R , where Round 2 gains are either impossible or minor. Proposition 2 summarizes this phenomenon:

Proposition 2: When AS expects to retain control of the AS position but lose ground with R , she will focus her policymaking efforts on status quos located to the right of R but to the left of $R' + |AS - R'|$.

In other words, for status quo policies that AS understands will become immovable following the upcoming election, she will accelerate her efforts to address those policies.

3.3.2.1 Bill Sponsorship under Scenario 2

As underscored above, members' decisions between viable and non-viable sponsorship are in part a function of their beliefs over the probability that their proposed legislation will actually be put up for a vote by majority party leaders. Unlike Scenario 1, conditions of policy *acceleration* render payment of viable legislation's costs more beneficial. That is, given that legislation is *more* likely to move for certain SQ_i within Scenario 1, members should capitalize by offering legislation that could pass, were it brought up for a vote—opting against messaging for the time being. More specifically, when interested in addressing SQ_i located inside the acceleration region, members of Congress are better served to offer viable legislation than they would be under other electoral conditions. Formally:

H₂ : When AS is not likely to change but R is expected to move *farther* from AS after the upcoming election, legislators aiming to change SQ within the acceleration region will be *more* likely to offer viable proposals.

That is, when a member has committed to addressing a status quo policy that is subject to policy acceleration dynamics (SQ opposite AS , under the aforementioned electoral conditions), she should be systematically more likely to pair that SQ_i with a viable—and not messaging—piece of legislation.

3.3.3 Scenario 3: Control of AS Changes

In Scenarios 1 and 2, AS is expected to remain unchanged. In these scenarios, AS therefore considers only how changes in R influence her policy change options in present and future legislative periods. However, when control of AS is competitive, policymaking dynamics grow more complicated. Under this scenario, control of AS is competitive: it is expected to switch from Democratic to Republican control. Due to the definition of R described earlier, the location of R will therefore also change. That is, because the identity of R is defined as the farthest veto player from AS , a change in AS necessitates a change in R . In this example, if AS lies leftward and R rightward, a shift in AS will move R *leftward*.

How do such major changes affect the policymaking dynamic? Consider first the status quo policies lying to the left of AS . In spite of the potential for coming changes, AS 's dominant strategy for these status quo policies remains unchanged from previous scenarios. Indeed, AS can achieve her ideal point in the first round, because R accepts any rightward movement in these status quo policies. Because AS cannot improve upon this result, she will always offer AS in the first round for status quo policies lying to her left.

For slightly more conservative status quo policies, however, a different dynamic begins to emerge. Consider what might happen if status quo policies lying between AS and R' are allowed to persist into Round 2. For these status quos, AS' may exploit the favorable R location and move policy rightward by $2|SQ - R'|$. This result is far worse for AS than the status quo. How, then can AS respond? Recall that *any* new policy change in Round 1 ends the game for that particular status quo. Given this feature of the game, AS can protect against rightward movements of status quo policies in this range by offering $SQ^* = SQ$ to R . In other words,


by offering a policy that is identical to SQ , AS can achieve an outcome that is better for herself than what would occur in the second round. While this strategy may seem at first unrealistic, a practical application of this sort of dynamic may occur when a majority party chooses to reauthorize a program without making major changes to the program's structure. Instead of allowing to the next Congress to take the reauthorization, the current agenda-setter can lock in, say, 5 more years of the current program structure and policies.

This incentive for AS to make SQ -equivalent offers disappears for status quo policies lying to the right of R' . First, whereas policies lying between AS and R' were vulnerable to rightward movements by AS' , policies lying between R' and R are located within the Round 2 gridlock interval. No offer AS could make in the present round would improve upon these status quo policies, so policy change does not occur within this interval. Status quo policies to the right of R , however, are moveable, just as in the static case.

Figure 3.4 depicts these equilibrium policymaking outcomes, SQ^* . In this case, dynamic outcomes differ very little from those in the static case. As the gray regions of the figure demonstrate, the set of immovable status quo policies in the dynamic case differs only slightly from that in the static case. Indeed, aside from the SQ -equivalent offers made within the $[AS, R']$ interval, there is no set of SQ_i for which AS 's ability to pursue would differ from the static case. Similarly, as the dark lines clearly demonstrate, the equilibrium policy outcomes do not differ at all between the static and dynamic cases.

These similarities notwithstanding, much as in Scenario 2, AS does face incentives in Scenario 3 to accelerate policymaking for a certain subset of status quo policies in the first round of play. This incentive is depicted in Figure 3.4. Consider first SQ policies lying to the right of R . Given that status quo policies to the right of R will be either immovable ($R' < SQ < AS'$)

Figure 3.4: Identity of AS Changes



or moved to AS' ($SQ > AS'$), AS should accelerate her reform of status quo policies to the right of R , out of concern for poor Round 2 outcomes if no new policy is adopted. Her reason for doing so is clearly illustrated by the difference between the dark and light lines found in the bottom half of Figure 3.4. For policies to the right of R , the light line (which represents the equilibrium outcome if AS allows a given SQ to persist to the second round) lies consistently farther away from AS on the vertical axis than does the dark line, which represents the equilibrium outcome associated with AS deciding to change a given SQ in the first round. As the distance between these lines grows, AS faces an increasing incentive to accelerate policymaking in the first round.

As the distance between the light and dark lines demonstrates, incentives for policy acceleration are also strong for status quo policies lying to the left of AS . For such policies, rather than AS achieving her ideal point by changing such SQ s in Round 1, AS' can move SQ significantly rightward. Given that R' is, by assumption, located to the right of AS , such rightward

shifts will always result in a policy change that is worse for AS than her Round 1 outcome (her own ideal point).¹¹ Consequently, for SQ located to the left of AS , the discrepancy between the dark and light lines is considerable: AS stands to lose a great deal if she fails to address SQ within this region. Given this discrepancy, AS may wish to especially accelerate policymaking efforts for SQ to the left of AS .

The policy acceleration incentives associated with Scenario 3 are summarized in Propositions 3a and 3b.

Proposition 3a: When AS expects that her party will lose agenda control, she will accelerate policymaking efforts throughout the policymaking space.

Proposition 3b: AS will focus her policy acceleration on SQ policies for which the difference between a and SQ' is greatest—namely, policies located to the extremes of AS and AS' .

In other words, a shift in control of AS generates strong incentives for the agenda-setter to accelerate policymaking for all non-gridlocked status quos. Though not examined directly in this paper, this incentive is especially strong for extreme status quo policies that lie opposite the agenda-setter.

3.3.3.1 Bill Sponsorship under Scenario 3

Similar to Scenario 2, the policy acceleration throughout much of the policy space in Scenario 3 generates conditions favorable to the introduction of viable legislation. Indeed, because members understand that AS faces incentives to set the agenda for bills lying outside

¹¹Recall that, by assumption, AS is always more extreme than R . Therefore, when R shifts toward AS , it remains more moderate in its preferences than AS . In this case, when R' shifts to the left due to the change in AS , we can say that R' will lie to the right of AS 's current location.

$[AS, R]$, they should be more likely to pay the costs associated with viable bill sponsorship, all else equal. Here, the sponsorship dynamics are similar to Scenario 2 in theory, though policy acceleration—and therefore, viable bill introduction—extends throughout a much larger portion of the policy space in Scenario 3. In sum, the dynamics in Scenario 3 lead to a third and final hypothesis:

H₃: When AS is likely to change hands, legislators aiming to change SQ outside the interval $[AS, R]$ will be *more* likely to offer viable proposals.

That is, members interested in addressing status quo policies lying outside the static gridlock interval should be systematically more likely to offer viable proposals when they expect control of AS will change after the upcoming election.

3.4 Viable Bill Introduction: Measurement and Data

As this theory demonstrates, institutions and elections may combine to influence agenda-setting behaviors in Congress. This behavior in turn alters individual members' calculus regarding bill sponsorship and how carefully they craft bills for passage. Translating this abstract account of agenda-setting and consequent sponsorship behavior into empirical tests within the congressional context implies several theoretical and long-standing methodological challenges. I address these challenges in several distinctive ways, which I discuss below. First, I delineate how I identify AS and R within a particular Congress, discussing relevant assumptions made about player identities and information within the policymaking process. Second, I identify how I measure players' contemporaneous beliefs about electoral prospects, using information from electoral betting markets. Finally, I outline how I measure individual bill introduction


spatial locations and type—i.e., whether a member has elected to offer viable or messaging legislation for a particular SQ_i . With these measurements, I am then able to test whether electoral prospects do indeed influence bill introduction activity as hypothesized.

3.4.1 Identification and Measurement of AS , R , AS' , and R'

In order to identify the locations of AS and R within a given Congress, one must first identify which actors in Congress count as pivotal. The U.S. Constitution identifies several such pivotal actors: the median member of each chamber of Congress, the president, and (when relevant) the veto override pivot. However, legislative scholars also recognize other veto points in the U.S. policymaking system. First, most recognize the 60th vote in the Senate—the filibuster pivot—as a veto player. Additionally, previous studies have posited that partisan control of the voting agenda introduces additional veto points into the political system. In particular, the application of the Hastert Rule¹² in the U.S. House renders the median of the majority party pivotal (see, for example, [Woon and Cook 2015](#) and [Crosson 2019](#)). While some accounts of the U.S. Congress argue that similar agenda control may exist within the U.S. Senate, considerably more debate exists on this point. Consequently, for the purposes of this empirical analysis, I assume the following actors are pivotal in U.S. federal policymaking: both chamber medians, the U.S. House majority median, the Senate filibuster pivot, the president, and the veto override pivot. However, given the measurement concerns underscored below, I focus solely on legislative veto players in this analysis, meaning AS and R are located at the House chamber median, House majority median, Senate chamber median, or Senate filibuster pivot.

¹²Whereby the Speaker selects to keep off the voting agenda bills that do not attain majority support from the majority caucus.

Figure 3.5: AS and R by Congress




Given that only one of these veto players—the House majority median—is an explicitly *partisan* actor, my empirical analyses assume *AS* is located at the House majority median. Spatial models always include assumptions about agenda power, and previous models have sometimes placed agenda-setting power in the hands of a chamber median (e.g., [Krehbiel, 1998](#)). However, given that recent literature finds that policy change models with partisan agenda control tend to generate the most realistic empirical predictions, my model places this power in the hands of the majority median.

With *AS* located at the House majority median, *R* is much easier to identify on the basis of the model’s assumptions. That is, because *R* is defined as a single actor pivotal in determining whether *AS*’s proposal passes, I define *R* as *the veto player lying farthest away from the AS*. Using this set of player-identification rules, Figure 5 outlines the locations of *AS* and *R* over the five Congresses examined in this study. In each of the Congresses included in this study, *R* happens to be located at the filibuster pivot opposite *AS*.

Beyond measurements of AS and R , of course, calculating the acceleration and deceleration regions requires an estimate of R' 's location. For most of the above scenarios, the precise location matters little, if at all. For example, in Scenarios 2 and 3, players need only know, should a change in R or AS occur, which *direction* each actor will shift. For Scenario 1, however, players need to form an expectation regarding the location of R' . To generate such measurements, I lean on the assumption that members will typically understand how electoral changes will influence who is pivotal after the upcoming election. Thus, I measure the expected location of R' as the actual location of R , should the predicted electoral outcome (discussed below) transpire.

Ideal points for these pivotal actors are measured via the preference estimates found in [Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz's \(n.d.\)](#) study on interest groups and bill locations in recent Congresses. While the generation of these scores is detailed at greater length below, Crosson et al. generate preference estimates for members of Congress on the same scale as a large set of point estimates for bill proposal and status quo locations. These preference estimates correlate strongly with existing preference measures based on roll call data alone. For example, Crosson et al.'s preference estimates (which they call cIGscores) for sponsors of legislation from the 110th - 114th Congresses correlate with first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores at $\rho = .945$. This correlation is particularly strong, considering the fact that the estimation matrix includes many bills, actors (interest groups), and member behaviors (cosponsorship) not found in the matrices used to calculate DW-NOMINATE. Further still, when one compares the members' cIGscores with their roll-call-only IGscores, cIGscores are even more highly correlated with previous measures, this time at $\rho = .977$. Figure 3.6 plots of sponsor cIGscores against DW-NOMINATE scores. As with DW-NOMINATE, cIGscores remain quite bimodal in distribution and correlate strongly with NOMINATE.

Figure 3.6: cIGscores v. DW-NOMINATE, 110th - 114th Congresses



3.4.2 Electoral Expectations and Power Transition Scenarios

An additional requirement for testing the above hypotheses relates directly to the dynamic structure of the game itself: in order to code whether or not acceleration or deceleration dynamics apply, one needs to measure expectations about the upcoming congressional elections. To do so, I turn primarily to an electoral futures market, the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), in order to best measure contemporaneous changes in electoral expectations—and, therefore, whether members should expect proposals to be met with policy acceleration, deceleration, or neither.

IEM solicits “investments” from private citizens on a wide variety of political outcomes, including whether particular candidates will win the presidency and how Senate races will end within particular states. Most useful for this analysis, IEM has solicited wagers on partisan control of Congress since 1996. While political scientists have used these data in the past, such studies typically assess the markets as prospective predictors of electoral outcomes—and not as

a measure of how electoral expectations might influence the policymaking process. However, these data are especially useful for this study's purposes, as they capture contemporaneous *beliefs* regarding potential electoral changes, rather than actual changes observed in hindsight. Most importantly, because the contracts are priced within $[\$0, \$1]$, the resulting contract prices may be interpreted as a collective belief regarding the probability that a chamber of Congress will be under control of either party, following the upcoming election.¹⁴

These measurements—both real and extrapolated—are ideal for capturing the probability of *AS* change (i.e., whether or not the majority in the House will shift). But, because *R* is routinely located at the filibuster pivot, they are less well-suited for the measurement of *R*'s probability for change. When the majority in the Senate is expected to change, thereby altering the location of the filibuster pivot, the application of IEM to measure *R*'s change probability is straightforward. However, if the current majority in the Senate is expected to *gain* the 60th vote in the Senate, majority change probabilities are not appropriate to measure the probability of change in *R*. In these cases, I adopt an approach similar to the IEM extrapolation process, this time modeling and extrapolating Senate vote *share*, using Bayesian poisson regression analysis. Doing so allows me to generate a posterior distribution of predicted seat shares for each time period in my data, which I use to generate likelihoods that either party will gain more than 60 seats. Details on this procedure are included in Appendix D.

Taken together, then, *AS* and *R* are coded as “likely to change” according to the following rule:

¹⁴Unfortunately, while IEM exists for the full time period covered in this study, there are gaps in the IEM data near the beginning of each congressional session (before new markets were opened). To address this problem, I have extrapolated the IEM measures, using information that may inform politicians' contemporaneous beliefs regarding probabilities of partisan control. A more detailed recounting of this strategy is included in Appendix D.

$$C_j^{AS} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p(P_j^{AS} \neq P_j^{AS}) > 0.5 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$C_j^R = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p(P_j^R \neq P_{j+1}^R) > 0.5 \text{ or} \\ & p(VS_j^R < 0.6 < VS_{j+1}^R \vee (VS_j^R > 0.4 > VS_{j+1}^R) > 0.5 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where C_j^{AS} and C_j^R represent the binary variable indicated whether or not AS or R are expected to change, P_j^{AS} and P_j^R represent the party of AS and R during Congress j , and VS_j^R represents the vote share of R 's party in the Senate during Congress j . These conditions stipulate that, if the interpolated IEM probability (averaged over every month within a Congress) suggests that the relevant actor will change parties with probability greater than 0.5, C is coded as 1 (and zero otherwise). For actors located at a chamber median, this means capturing the 50th percentile vote in the chamber; for the filibuster pivot, this means capturing the 60th vote away from the expected AS .

If either $C_j^{AS} = 1$ or $C_j^R = 1$, then Congress j is placed into the relevant agenda-setting scenario articulated above. More specifically:

Scenarios 1, 2: $C_j^{AS} = 0$ and $C_j^R = 1$;

Scenario 3: $C_j^{AS} = 1$

Note that if R is projected to move closer to AS , then Scenario 1 obtains. Conversely, if R is projected to move farther from AS , Scenario 2 obtains.

Using this measurement strategy, *AS* is coded as competitive in the 111th Congress (after which control of the House switches from Democratic to Republican control), placing the 111th Congress in Scenario 3 (policy acceleration). *R* is competitive (and *AS* is not) in the 110th, 112th, and 113th, and 114th Congresses. Since *R* was predicted to move closer to *AS* in the 110th, 112th, and 113th Congresses, these Congresses face Scenario 1 (policy deceleration), while the 114th Congresses lies within Scenario 2 (policy acceleration).

3.4.3 Measurement of Status Quo Locations and Viable, Messaging Legislation

A final requirement for testing whether bills exposed to acceleration or deceleration are systematically more or less viable, of course, is bill-specific information regarding not only a bill's targeted *SQ*, but also the spatial location of the bill proposal itself. That is, my interest is not in measuring *which* SQ_i the member chooses to target (which Sulkin 2005 and others have demonstrated is frequently determined via campaign promises and is therefore exogenous to my model), but rather the *seriousness* with which they attempt to change their targeted SQ_i . To date, widespread measures of bill proposal and status quo locations have proven highly elusive. As (Clinton, 2017) summarizes in his review of strategies for measuring the content and direction of policy changes, common methodologies for generating ideal point estimates (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004) fall short of producing reliable estimates for proposal and status quo locations.

In this study, I make use of an original dataset of bill proposal locations and status quo locations provided by Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz (n.d.)—the largest data set of bill proposal

and status quo point estimates generated to date. Crosson et al. generate their estimates by jointly scaling cosponsorship, roll call, and interest group position-taking data throughout the legislative process, which allows them to identify proposal locations, cutpoints, and (consequently) status quo locations for each bill possessing the required cosponsorship, roll call, and position-taking data. As noted earlier, the approach also generates ideal points for members of Congress and interest groups, on the same scale as the bill proposal and status quo locations.

This information, when combined with information regarding the ideological locations of pivotal actors, provides the final keys for the measurement of the primary variables of interests: measurements of whether or not a bill's associated status quo lies within the deceleration or acceleration intervals and whether a bill is viable or messaging.

Using these data, measurement of my dependent variable, the introduction of *viable or messaging legislation*, proceeds as follows. As defined earlier, a proposal counts as viable *when it would pass through both chambers of Congress (on the basis of its spatial properties), were it to be brought up for vote*—and nonviable or messaging otherwise. Thus, assuming perfect information about the locations of pivotal actors, proposals are viable *when the actors located at the left and right end-points of the gridlock interval would both prefer the proposal to the associated status quo*. Because Crosson et al.'s estimation procedure generates ideal points for members on the same scale as proposals, proposals are coded as viable if the following conditions hold:

$$Y_{ijm} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } |SQ'_{ijm} - L_j| \geq |SQ_{ij} - L_j| \ \& \ |SQ'_{ijm} - L_j| \geq |SQ_{ij} - R_j| \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where Y_{ijm} is the binary variable representing whether or not a member m 's bill proposal is

coded as viable, SQ'_{ijm} corresponds to the member's bill proposal i 's spatial location in Congress j , SQ_{ij} refers to bill i 's associated status quo, L_j refers to the location of the most liberal pivotal actor in Congress j , and R_j refers to the most conservative pivotal actor. Because my theory assumes a unidimensional policy space, if a proposal improves upon SQ for the two most extreme pivotal actors in Congress, it should pass through Congress if brought up for a vote. Viable proposals, then, are sensitive to these preferences and improve upon the status quo for each pivotal actor.

As an example, suppose that a right-leaning member wishes to propose legislation to address a SQ that is located to the left of $[AS, R]$. Suppose further that AS is also right-leaning, but that the member in question is even more conservative than AS . If the member elects to propose a new policy at his conservative ideal point, and if this proposal is farther away from R 's ideal point than is the SQ in question, the proposal counts as *nonviable*. That is, were it brought up for a vote, R would elect to veto the legislation. If, however, the member decides to draft legislation that moves the status quo closer to R (likely, but not necessarily, inside of $[AS, R]$), the proposal would be coded as viable.

My primary independent variables, acceleration/deceleration indicator variables, are coded as follows. First, status quo policies are subject to policy deceleration within the 110th, 112th, and 113th Congress (given the electoral scenario codings described above) when they lie beyond R within the policy space (H1). Status quo policies are subject to acceleration in the 114th Congress when they lie beyond R (H2). Finally, status quo policies are subject to policy acceleration in the 111th Congress, anywhere outside of $[AS, R]$ (H3). As stated in the aforementioned hypotheses, members of Congress are expected to offer viable proposals during conditions of policy acceleration and messaging proposals during conditions of policy deceleration.

ation. In sum:

H_1 : Status quo policies in the 110th, 112th, and 113th Congress lying beyond R in the opposite direction of AS will be met with *messaging legislative proposals*. Other SQ in these Congresses will be met with viable proposals.

H_2 : Status quo policies in the 114th Congress lying beyond R in the opposite direction of AS will be met with *viable legislative proposals*.

H_3 : All status quo policies in the 111th Congress lying outside $[AS, R]$ will be met with viable proposals.

3.4.4 Additional Independent Variables

Beyond the hypothesis-specific variables highlighted above, a variety of other considerations may well also help to explain the incidence of viable and messaging proposals, each of which I control for in the following analyses. Perhaps the most important such variables again deal directly with the location of SQ . In particular, I control for the ideological location of SQ and how extreme SQ is. Some theoretical models (e.g. [Dziuda and Loeper, 2018](#)) suggest that political systems with large numbers of veto players (such as the U.S.) can exhibit over-time policy biases. Therefore, I consider whether conservative or liberal policies appear more or less likely to be met viable or messaging proposals. Second, I control for the overall extremity of the status quo policy in question, captured by the absolute value of the SQ *Location* term. Here, the expectation is that the estimated coefficient is positive: for policies that are to the far right

or far left, it is easier to make a proposal that both AS and R would accept. Not only is the range of possible such offers larger, but the chance is greater that this range will include the proposer's ideal point.

In addition to these SQ -related variables, I include a variety of variables related to the proposer herself. First, I control for majority status. Assuming that majority members face an added incentive to pass legislation (in order for their party to be viewed as competent), such members may be more willing to settle for less than their ideal point. Moreover, since it is likely that agenda-setters (themselves members of the majority party) are more likely to move on legislation authored by their copartisans, majority members may face a higher potential payoff for introducing viable legislation, all else equal.

Second, I control for a member's gender. Recent research (Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013) has suggested that female members are more effective legislators, which could be related to their propensity to offer viable legislative proposals. If so, the coefficient on *Female* would be positive. Third, I control for party (captured by the binary variable *Democrat*). Given that previous literature has underscored the fact that Republicans have polarized to a greater extent than have Democrats (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2008), and given that some literature has suggested that Republicans are more ideologically motivated than are Democrats (Grossman and Hopkins, 2016), Republicans may be more likely to make messaging proposals which more faithfully reflect their ideal points. Finally, I control for a sponsor's ideological extremity. Members on the far reaches of the ideological spectrum not only may be less interested in compromise, but they also have, mathematically speaking, fewer opportunities within the policy space for offering viable proposals (assuming they wish to offer policies that also improve upon the status quo for themselves as well). Consequently, I expect *Ideological Extremity* to be


negatively associated with viable proposals. In place of these member-level covariates, I also estimate a series of models with member-specific fixed effects, summarized in Appendix F, which uncover substantively similar results to those presented below.

3.5 Empirical Approach and Results

In order to test H_1 , H_2 and H_3 , I run a series of bill-level logistic regression models, designed to predict whether a member met a targeted status quo policy with a viable proposal. Given that my theory makes predictions about the locations and timing of bills—and not individual legislators’ propensities to offer certain kinds of proposals per se—a bill-level model is more appropriate for this analysis than, say, a member-level model.

In order to test the above hypotheses, I run three series of logistic regressions with cluster-robust standard errors by Congress. In particular, I regress the binary Y_{ijm} (viable proposal) variable on each of the three indicator variables associated with each hypothesis separately. One possibility would be to estimate a single model with all three variables. However, given that H_2 and H_3 both respond to policy acceleration, a unified model would disallow separate testing of these two hypotheses. As a result, it would be impossible to discern whether both hypotheses receive support, or whether one type of acceleration is driving any observed result. Moreover, because the policy acceleration and deceleration variables are exhaustive and mutually exclusive in these data, inclusion of all terms in the same model would force one of the terms into the model’s constant term. This would obfuscate the interpretation of the model, for either policy deceleration or acceleration. These challenges notwithstanding, I do estimate a unified deceleration-acceleration model in Appendix A, the results of which are consistent with each

Figure 3.7: Percentage of Proposals Located within $[AS, R]$, By Congress



of the above hypotheses.

Within each of the models presented below, I vary the subsample, fixed effects, and clustering of standard errors in several different ways, in order to demonstrate the robustness of the results. I provide additional context about these results in each respective section. However, the overall sample of bills I include in the models presented here is of particular note. That is, in all models, I remove SQ policies located within $[AS, R]$ (the static gridlock interval), since such policies cannot—by definition—be met with a viable proposal. Indeed, no proposal exists that would improve upon such status quo policies for both the left and right end points of the static gridlock interval.¹⁵ Interestingly, though, the percentage of all proposals found in $[AS, R]$, depicted in Figure 3.7 is highest within Congresses exposed to policy deceleration, lending some support to the notion that policy deceleration encourages the introduction of non-viable proposals.

¹⁵Which, of course, is why this interval is considered in equilibrium in static policy change models.

3.5.1 H_1 : Policy Deceleration

According to the logic delineated in Scenario 1, AS faces incentives to decelerate policy change when she anticipates that she will retain control of AS and gain ground with R (i.e., face a more proximate R), following the upcoming election. In particular, AS has incentives to put off changes to status quo policies located on the opposite side of R from AS (see Figure 2). Understanding this incentive structure, I argue, members of Congress will be reticent to engage in viable bill-writing. Inasmuch as such legislation is costlier to draft than legislation lying closer to the member's ideal point, when members do decide to address SQ in this region, they will be unlikely to offer viable proposals. Instead, they may be better served to propose messaging legislation closer to their ideal point.

Table 3.1 displays strong evidence in favor of strategic member behavior when facing a deceleration environment. Indeed, throughout all model specifications, the association between SQ 's location within the deceleration interval and the introduction of viable proposals is negative and statistically significant. Model 1 makes the fullest use of the entire available sample of bills located outside $[AS,R]$, as noted above, and they each display a strong, negative association between the introduction of viable proposals and a SQ 's location within the deceleration region.

These results are robust to a wide variety of robustness checks, some of which are also displayed in Table 3.1. First and foremost, given that R is typically located within the Senate, I rerun all models using only bills originating in the House of Representatives. Implicit in H_1 is the assumption that bill sponsors—regardless of chamber—consider the location of R , as they decide how they will respond to policy acceleration and deceleration. This assumption is

Table 3.1: Policy Deceleration and Viable Proposals (Scenario 1)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Introduction of Viable Proposal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>SQ ∈ Deceleration Region</i>	−0.735*** (0.263)	−0.827** (0.387)	−1.994*** (0.358)	−1.485*** (0.458)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.755*** (0.373)	3.466*** (0.778)	−1.120 (0.735)	−4.302** (2.152)
<i>SQ Location</i>	−0.059 (0.068)	−0.020 (0.102)	0.005 (0.171)	−0.218 (0.247)
<i> SQ Location </i>	1.860*** (0.155)	2.026*** (0.264)	2.437*** (0.232)	2.528*** (0.343)
<i>Female</i>	−0.390 (0.280)	−0.900** (0.402)	−0.948** (0.416)	−0.966* (0.573)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.743*** (0.285)	1.878*** (0.529)	2.121*** (0.640)	3.365*** (0.938)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	−1.113*** (0.242)	−1.156** (0.456)	−1.193*** (0.374)	−1.720*** (0.664)
Constant	−4.840*** (0.614)	−7.080*** (1.123)	−2.726** (1.151)	0.073 (2.666)
Observations	753	445	507	320
Sample	Full	House	Opposite AS	House/Opp. AS
Log Likelihood	−286.574	−147.314	−154.140	−88.533
Akaike Inf. Crit.	589.147	310.628	324.281	193.066

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

most reasonable for sponsors in the Senate, given that R is located within the sponsor's own chamber. In the House, however, it may be less reasonable to assume that sponsors bear in mind the preferences of R , when it is located in a different chamber. Thus, to demonstrate that the results are not driven solely by sponsorship behavior in the Senate alone, Models 2 and 4 are estimated with House-only data, with similar results to those found in Model 1.

In addition to this robustness check, I rerun Models 1 and 2 using only SQ policies located *beyond R on the opposite side of AS* . That is, because the deceleration region is located outside of $[AS, R]$ to the opposite side of AS , restricting the analysis to these regions ensures that control units are drawn from as similar an ideological region as possible. I restrict the sample in this way in Models 3 and 4, which provide perhaps the most rigorous test of H_1 found in Table 3.1. Indeed, by holding the SQ region fixed, Models 3 and 4 test specifically whether the theory isolates the proper *timing* for deceleration—not just spatial bill location. As Table 3.1 indicates, the theory performs quite well. Across both models, policy deceleration Congresses experience far fewer viable proposals, given their associated status quos. This time, however, the effect size is much larger than in Models 1 and 2.

Table 3.2: Scenario 1 Results with Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>											
	Introduction of Viable Proposal											
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)				
<i>SQ</i> \in <i>Decel. Region</i>	-0.889*** (0.302)	-0.983** (0.444)	-2.574*** (0.471)	-2.339*** (0.629)	-0.572** (0.276)	-0.679* (0.387)	-2.022*** (0.378)	-1.415*** (0.503)				
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.843*** (0.448)	3.600*** (0.991)	-1.308 (1.146)	-5.908* (3.355)	1.965*** (0.334)	4.065*** (0.630)	-0.754 (0.614)	-3.623** (1.628)				
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.137 (0.084)	-0.095 (0.136)	-0.014 (0.276)	-0.322 (0.382)	-0.095 (0.070)	-0.077 (0.104)	-0.041 (0.149)	-0.298 (0.296)				
<i>SQ Location</i>	2.081*** (0.206)	2.265*** (0.368)	3.320*** (0.417)	3.448*** (0.622)	2.051*** (0.179)	2.412*** (0.276)	3.003*** (0.323)	3.231*** (0.467)				
<i>Female</i>	-0.361 (0.306)	-0.845* (0.469)	-1.063** (0.499)	-1.381 (0.904)	-0.368 (0.326)	-0.901* (0.541)	-1.022** (0.521)	-1.039 (0.792)				
<i>Democrat</i>	0.882** (0.352)	2.005*** (0.672)	2.304** (1.042)	3.685*** (1.356)	0.896*** (0.298)	2.518*** (0.514)	2.605*** (0.605)	4.439*** (1.285)				
<i>Ideo. Extremity</i>	-0.968*** (0.297)	-1.136** (0.558)	-1.363** (0.632)	-1.915* (1.117)	-1.201*** (0.260)	-1.455*** (0.481)	-1.093*** (0.368)	-2.170*** (0.724)				
Constant	-6.718*** (1.140)	-8.371*** (1.797)	-4.642* (2.697)	-0.431 (4.388)	-5.676*** (0.688)	-8.382*** (1.139)	-4.721*** (1.074)	-1.969 (1.867)				
Observations	710	419	478	299	753	445	507	320				
Effects	Issue	Issue	Issue	Issue	Comm.	Comm.	Comm.	Comm.				
Sample	Full	House	Opp. AS	House/Opp. AS	Full	House	Opp. AS	House/Opp. AS				
Log Likelihood	-246.540	-127.722	-118.617	-65.262	-264.986	-127.237	-131.377	-73.006				
Akaike Inf. Crit.	547.079	309.443	291.235	184.524	613.973	332.474	346.754	224.013				

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

The results in Table 3.1 are similarly robust to the introduction of fixed effects into the base model, depicted in Table 3.2, ensuring that unobserved confounds at the issue-, committee-, and (in the appendix) member-level are not driving the observed results. Fixed effects by a bill's primary issue area are drawn from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson, 2006), which uses classifications provided by the Policy Agendas Project. Fixed effects by committee of referral are also drawn from the Congressional Bills Project.¹⁶ Here, it is notable that the magnitude of the association between location in the deceleration interval and probability of offering a viable proposal does vary based on fixed effect type. However, the results remain substantively and statistically significant, again providing evidence in favor of H_1 .

Finally, the basic result captured in Model 1 is robust to tests that account for potential differences between long-serving and new members of Congress. Though not presented here, I replicate each of the above analyses and subsequent robustness checks solely using bills authored by members who served for all five Congresses in the sample, an analysis I summarize in Appendix B. Much as with the other robustness checks above, the results remain statistically and substantively similar to the results presented in the tables above.

In sum, while the effects sizes vary somewhat between the models, each of the models exhibits a substantively meaningful association with the introduction of viable proposals. In Model 1, which includes the smallest association between deceleration region, status quo policies within the deceleration region are 15 percent less likely to be met with a viable proposal than similar bills not subject to deceleration dynamics, holding all other variables at their means or (in binary cases) their optimal levels. In Model 5, the association is even larger: bills subject

¹⁶In addition to these fixed effects, I estimate a separate set of models with errors clustered by issue area and committee of referral. Results from these models are nearly identical to the primary results presented here, so they are not presented here.

to deceleration are 24 percent less likely than similar bills to be met with a viable proposal. When members face a scenario under which they should expect policy deceleration, then, they appear to be introduce bills that are systematically less likely to improve upon the status quo for pivotal actors.

Before discussing policy acceleration dynamics, a few other results merit mention. First, as expected, majority party members are significantly more likely to offer viable proposals, all else equal—at least in Models 1 and 2. In Models 3 and 4, however, the opposite trend emerges. Indeed, for policies that lie *opposite AS*—and therefore, opposite most or all majority party members—legislators within the majority are *less* likely to offer viable proposals. In other words, when Republicans seek to address liberal status quo policies (and vice versa) as members of the majority, they appear to be attempting to move policy beyond what *R* will tolerate. This, of course, does not mean that amendments and committee activity will not moderate the bill, but this trend reversal is notable nonetheless. The pattern holds in Table 3.2, when fixed effects are included.

Beyond majority party membership, *|SQ Location|*, *Democrat*, and *Ideological Extremity* all behave as expected. Democrats do appear systematically more likely to offer viable proposals, consistent with asymmetries highlighted in previous work. Similarly, more extreme members demonstrate a lower propensity for offering viable proposals, all else equal. Also, consistent with spatial constraints associated with moderate versus extreme status quo policies, moderate status quo policies are less likely to be paired with a viable proposal (and extreme status quos more likely). Interestingly, however, female members of Congress do not appear to offer more viable proposals than do their male counterparts. While the effect is not consistently significant, female members are if anything *less* likely to offer such proposals.

Taken together, the evidence presented in Table 1 is consistent with theoretical expectations. Under conditions of policy deceleration, members of Congress appear less likely to offer viable proposals for consideration.

3.5.2 H_2 : Policy Acceleration when AS Does Not Change

As detailed above, when AS is not expected to change but R is expected to move away from AS , AS faces an incentive to accelerate policymaking for a particular set of SQ . More specifically, AS should focus her policymaking energy on $SQ > R + |SQ - R|$,¹⁷ as movements of those SQ will become either impossible or smaller following the upcoming election. Understanding this dynamic, members of Congress will, I argue, propose legislation that is viable, rather than messaging, within this region. That is, they will generate proposals—for SQ within the acceleration region specifically—that would pass through Congress if given the opportunity, since the overall probability of those policies receiving agenda space should be higher.

Table 3.3 investigates whether or not SQ_i within the acceleration region are in fact met with viable proposals at a higher rate than those outside of that region. As in Table 3.1, Models 1 and 2 make full use of all data outside the static gridlock region, with Model 2 focusing on House-only proposals and Model 1 making use of all proposals. As Table 3.3 depicts, support for H_2 is mixed. In particular, while the results are positive and significant in Model 1 (as well as models in the robustness checks that also pool over both chambers), results in Model 2 (and other models restricting the sample to the House bills) are not significant. These positive results are consistent with H_2 , although the weak House-only results indicate that incentives for viable proposal-making are not as strong as in the other cases.

¹⁷When Democrats control AS ; the analogous region for Republican control is $SQ < R - |SQ - R|$.

One reason for this relative weakness might be due to the uncertainty associated with the electoral outcomes of the treated Congress under this scenario, the 114th Congress. Under this scenario, the IEM predicted for most of 2015 and 2016 that Republicans would incur losses in the Senate, due in part to the unpopularity of their presidential candidates. Such a dynamic should have led Republicans to push policymaking forward; however, many Republicans may have reasonably believed that the threat of losing the Senate was not as great as some worried.¹⁸

Consequently, given the uncertainty of 2016 electoral prospects, the support for H_2 shown here is perhaps understandably weaker than in the other scenarios. Nevertheless, among models exhibiting a statistically significant association between viable proposal-making and SQ location in the acceleration region, acceleration-region bills are between 7 and 11 percent more likely to be met with viable proposals than are similar bills outside this region.

These results are similar in the first set of robustness checks, found in Models 3 and 4. As in Scenario 1, these models focus only on SQ lying opposite R from AS . Here again, Models 3 and 4 offer the most difficult test of the theory, as they compare SQ that are similar in spatial location and other factors, but differ in their exposure to electoral incentives for acceleration. Like with Models 1 and 2, the results are positive across both models, with only the pooled-chamber results (Model 3) achieving statistical significance. Similarly, the results do not change appreciably when fixed effects are incorporated, reported in Table 3.4. That is, an SQ 's location within the Scenario 2 acceleration region is consistently positively associated with the introduction of a viable proposals in all but a handful of the House-only models.

¹⁸In fact, Republicans surprisingly did not incur losses in 2016 and even won the White House.

Table 3.3: Policy Acceleration and Viable Proposals (Scenario 2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Introduction of Viable Proposal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>SQ ∈ Acceleration Region</i>	0.700** (0.333)	0.590 (0.475)	1.225*** (0.402)	0.623 (0.574)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.691*** (0.368)	3.380*** (0.763)	-0.640 (0.581)	-4.567 (3.325)
<i>SQ Location</i>	0.032 (0.063)	0.068 (0.093)	0.155 (0.138)	-0.268 (0.258)
<i> SQ Location </i>	1.869*** (0.155)	2.026*** (0.259)	2.262*** (0.226)	2.340*** (0.302)
<i>Female</i>	-0.391 (0.281)	-0.893** (0.412)	-0.800** (0.376)	-0.893 (0.548)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.877*** (0.298)	1.984*** (0.521)	2.205*** (0.554)	4.015*** (1.019)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-1.098*** (0.237)	-1.182*** (0.440)	-1.030*** (0.335)	-1.562** (0.612)
Constant	-5.283*** (0.628)	-7.432*** (1.165)	-4.237*** (0.890)	-0.621 (3.605)
Observations	753	445	507	320
Sample	Full	House	Opposite AS	House/Opp. AS
Log Likelihood	-288.616	-149.441	-170.486	-94.761
Akaike Inf. Crit.	593.231	314.882	356.973	205.522

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.4: Scenario 2 Results with Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Introduction of Viable Proposal							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Accel. Region</i>	0.890** (0.385)	0.835 (0.552)	1.510*** (0.477)	1.255* (0.691)	0.644* (0.367)	0.590 (0.515)	1.273*** (0.448)	0.595 (0.633)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.770*** (0.439)	3.534*** (0.998)	-0.728 (0.787)	-6.385 (5.840)	1.923*** (0.336)	4.015*** (0.632)	-0.256 (0.564)	-3.297* (1.760)
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.025 (0.074)	0.018 (0.118)	0.177 (0.189)	-0.380 (0.374)	-0.019 (0.071)	0.005 (0.106)	0.107 (0.144)	-0.336 (0.313)
<i>SQ Location</i>	2.079*** (0.205)	2.271*** (0.370)	2.856*** (0.366)	2.981*** (0.524)	2.065*** (0.179)	2.415*** (0.275)	2.848*** (0.306)	3.068*** (0.442)
<i>Female</i>	-0.368 (0.308)	-0.850* (0.481)	-0.812* (0.439)	-1.162 (0.805)	-0.373 (0.326)	-0.881 (0.537)	-0.888* (0.483)	-1.092 (0.755)
<i>Democrat</i>	1.071*** (0.366)	2.220*** (0.678)	2.431*** (0.767)	4.813*** (1.475)	1.027*** (0.314)	2.621*** (0.522)	2.708*** (0.590)	5.057*** (1.358)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-0.973*** (0.298)	-1.227*** (0.539)	-1.152** (0.494)	-1.686* (0.907)	-1.193*** (0.259)	-1.522*** (0.480)	-1.025*** (0.341)	-2.193*** (0.723)
Constant	-7.138*** (1.162)	-8.782*** (1.882)	-5.874*** (1.864)	-1.022 (6.260)	-6.077*** (0.690)	-8.651*** (1.160)	-6.241*** (0.996)	-2.987 (1.839)
Observations	710	419	478	299	753	445	507	320
Effects	Issue	Issue	Issue	Issue	Comm.	Comm.	Comm.	Comm.
Sample	Full	House	Opposite AS	House/Opp. AS	Full	House	Opp. AS	House/Opp. AS
Log Likelihood	-248.982	-129.846	-137.978	-74.182	-265.656	-128.165	-144.205	-76.869
Akaike Inf. Crit.	551.965	313.691	329.957	202.364	615.311	334.330	372.410	231.738

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Given that the models presented here are highly similar to those examined in the deceleration analysis, most of the additional covariates behave similarly in Table 2 as in Table 1. However, it is worth noting that, for Models 5 and 6, *Majority Status* falls out of statistical significance in the opposite-AS models. Apart from this difference, though, much remains similar. Here again, sponsor characteristics such as *Ideological Extremity* and party (*Democrat*) are associated with a lower and higher probability for viable proposals, respectively. *SQ* extremity is also again positively associated with viable proposal-making.

Taken together, these models provide support for the hypothesis that agenda-setting dynamics generated by electoral expectations—this time providing incentives for acceleration— influence members’ propensities for offering viable or messaging legislation.

3.5.3 H_3 : Policy Acceleration when *AS* Changes

Whereas *AS* is expected to remain under control of the same party in Scenarios 1 and 2, *AS* is expected to change in Scenario 3. This anticipated change generates significant discrepancies in expected policy outcomes in Periods 1 and 2, across large portions of the policy space. Indeed, as captured in Proposition 3, *AS* faces an incentive to accelerate policymaking for all *SQ* lying outside the static gridlock interval. Consequently, for status quo policies located outside the static gridlock interval, members of Congress should be more likely to offer viable proposals when they expect *AS* to change parties—as described in H_3 .

Tests of H_3 reveal strong support for the idea that members of Congress respond to possible changes in *AS* by proposing viable—and not messaging—legislation. Table 3.5 summarizes these results. As in the previous two analyses, Model 1 makes full use of the dataset, while Model 2 focuses on House bills alone. As illustrated in Table 3.5, H_3 receives strong support

across each of these models. Indeed, when members target SQ inside the acceleration region, they appear far more likely to offer a viable proposal than when they target otherwise similar bills not located within this region. This association remains strong regardless of whether or not the models pool across a bill's chamber of origin. Here again, the results are also robust to the inclusion of fixed effects: Models 3 and 4 include issue-area fixed effects while Models 5-6 include committee fixed effects, with each model displaying the same basic (negative) result.

Table 3.5: Policy Acceleration and Viable Proposals (Scenario 3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Introduction of Viable Proposal					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$SQ \in Acceleration Region$	2.789*** (0.410)	2.450*** (0.622)	3.196*** (0.466)	3.061*** (0.874)	2.949*** (0.372)	2.353*** (0.543)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.234*** (0.421)	2.389*** (0.890)	1.336*** (0.513)	2.195* (1.240)	1.482*** (0.359)	2.962*** (0.653)
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.023 (0.078)	0.011 (0.107)	-0.101 (0.099)	-0.072 (0.149)	-0.072 (0.074)	-0.060 (0.104)
$ SQ Location $	2.207*** (0.174)	2.217*** (0.272)	2.582*** (0.253)	2.551*** (0.383)	2.423*** (0.206)	2.618*** (0.298)
<i>Female</i>	-0.340 (0.320)	-1.029** (0.481)	-0.291 (0.354)	-1.120** (0.539)	-0.326 (0.348)	-1.020* (0.573)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.308 (0.385)	0.580 (0.691)	-0.342 (0.490)	0.314 (0.958)	-0.228 (0.353)	1.245** (0.585)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-1.141*** (0.281)	-1.110** (0.480)	-0.978*** (0.326)	-0.897 (0.590)	-1.253*** (0.292)	-1.356*** (0.489)
Constant	-5.407*** (0.671)	-6.896*** (1.228)	-8.118*** (1.360)	-8.961*** (1.898)	-6.191*** (0.755)	-8.158*** (1.152)
Observations	753	445	710	419	753	445
Effects	None	None	Issue	Issue	Committee	Committee
Sample	Full	House	Full	House	Full	House
Log Likelihood	-250.768	-136.182	-208.411	-114.561	-228.792	-118.775
Akaike Inf. Crit.	517.535	288.363	470.821	283.122	541.584	315.549

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Holding all other variables at their means or optimal values, bills with *SQ* located in Scenario 3's acceleration region are viable with probability between 0.91 or 0.93 (depending upon the specific model referenced). Similar bills located outside the acceleration region are met with a viable proposal with a much smaller probability, between 0.40 and 0.53. This means that electoral incentives for acceleration are associated with an impressive 48 - 51 percentage increase in viable proposal-making instead of messaging proposal-making.

Much as in previous models, *Ideological Extremity* of the proposer and the extremity of the *SQ* are negatively associated with viable proposal-making. Moreover, *Majority* status again remains a positive and significant predictor of the introduction of viable proposals. Sponsor gender, on the other hand, is inconclusively associated with viable proposal-making—though again, if anything, female members are less likely to introduce viable proposals. Finally, there does not appear to be an association between party and viable or message proposal-making in these models—a result that differs from the two previous analyses.

Taken together, the results from this third and final analysis are strongly consistent with H_3 . When control of *AS* is expected to change from one party to the other, *AS* faces strong incentives to accelerate policymaking for *SQ* lying outside the static gridlock interval. Understanding this dynamic, members of Congress appear more likely to offer viable proposals for consideration, rather than messaging bills.

3.6 Discussion and Conclusion

For several decades now, Washington journalists and scholars of Congress have derided the apparent lack of seriousness with which members engage with the lawmaking process, under-

scoring how policymaking activity only occasionally exhibits actual potential for altering the status quo. Still, in spite of these observations, academic research has generally neglected to explain when and why members offer viable or messaging legislation—or how electoral expectations may influence their legislative activities more broadly. In this study, I provide a theoretical framework for understanding how fluctuations in competition over partisan control of pivotal actors in Congress influence members' bill sponsorship activity. Empirical examinations of this framework demonstrate that expectations over future partisan advantages and disadvantages seem to influence the types of legislation members are willing to sponsor.

More than influencing observed sponsorship patterns, these results speak to how Congress's most fundamental *institutional* features influence a core responsibility of *individual* legislators. Indeed, given Congress's frequent elections, the possibility for changes in pivotal actors' preferences is inherent to institutional designs established in Article I of the Constitution. Moreover, for over 100 years, party leaders have wielded agenda control within the House of Representatives (Gailmard and Jenkins, 2007). When combined with highly insecure majority control, these factors generate incentive structures that alter members' rational calculations about how and when they should engage with the policymaking process. Consequently, while members do ultimately decide whether and how to draft legislation, this study demonstrates that such lawmaking decisions derive not simply from members' personal style or skill, but also from contextual factors that can coax members into more or less productive patterns of legislative activity.

The influence of electoral and institutional context on individual behavior, of course, complicates the measurement of member-level attributes, such as effectiveness (Volden and Wiseman, 2014). Not only may members' revealed legislative effectiveness derive from more than

their individual skills and best practices, but the context that influences their application of those skills *changes* from Congress to Congress. Thus, comparing a member's observed effectiveness across Congresses may prove more difficult than previously suggested. Further still, given that moderate members of Congress are, by assumption, more comfortable than other members to offer viable legislation (since policy movements to their ideal point are more likely to be acceptable to pivotal actors in Congress), some members may enjoy inherent advantages in how effective they appear to outside observers. This is *not* to say that outcomes-based measures of effectiveness cannot be useful, nor that legislative best practices cannot be gleaned from members who score highly in these metrics. Rather, future research should build upon these measures by incorporating more context-invariant information, such as data on policy *valence* (c.f., [Hitt, Volden and Wiseman 2017](#)), into measures of legislator effectiveness.

More broadly, given that Congress's electoral history has varied considerably in terms of competitiveness, understanding how electoral dynamics influence legislative behavior remains a crucial topic for future research. Indeed, while Congress has experienced prolonged eras of partisan dominance (e.g., Democratic rule for much of the 20th Century), intense competition over control of congressional majorities has developed since the 1980s and 90s, fundamentally altering how members of Congress approach their work as legislators ([Lee, 2016](#)). In spite of these dramatic differences over time, however, current models of policy change and bills sponsorship activity rarely consider how electoral competition might influence the strategic environment within which lawmakers propose laws and policy change occurs. This study provides a framework for understanding how these electoral dynamics influence not only when bills should pass into law, but also how members of Congress may respond to the differential incentives introduced by various electoral regimes.

CHAPTER 4

Elections and (In)action: Partisan Competition and the Timing of Major Legislative Reauthorizations in Congress

Abstract: In this paper, I examine how partisan competition over majority control of Congress influences agenda-setters' willingness to pursue policy changes. More specifically, I test empirical implications from Chapter 3's dynamic model of policy change, delineating the conditions under which partisan agenda-setters will respond to competition over majority control by slowing or speeding up the policymaking process. To do so, I make use of an original set of nearly 150 reauthorization opportunities from 1951 to the present, along with point estimates for each opportunity's associated status quo and final proposal locations, to capture whether agenda-setters have decided to set the legislative agenda. Such data circumvent selection effects associated with testing theories of agenda-setting, and they represent a sizeable increase in the sample size associated with bill-level measurements of policy change. Using these data, I find little support for electoral effects on agenda-setting behavior, instead finding the ideological extremity of reauthorization opportunities to more consistently predict significant policy changes.

For the past two to three decades, legislative gridlock has proven more the rule than the exception in the U.S. Congress. Whether one views such gridlock as cause for concern or celebration, most observers of the Congress—expert and casual alike—have described Congress as some combination of inefficient or dysfunctional, with some accounts even claiming that Congress’s struggle is “even worse than it looks” (Mann and Ornstein, 2016). Most commonly, such accounts attribute slow policy change to a rise in elite-level polarization. Indeed, when politicians’ policy preferences diverge, it is less likely that they will agree to change status quo policies.

Yet while ideological polarization undoubtedly plays an important role in explaining the prevalence of legislative gridlock, policy disagreement alone certainly does not fully explain recent trends of legislative inaction. Indeed, as headlines such as “Speaker Boehner says he will not bring up any eventual House-Senate immigration compromise for a vote”¹ and “Paul Ryan Pledges: No Immigration Reform under Obama”² indicate, legislation is frequently halted by partisan gatekeepers before debate ever occurs. In other words, some legislative stasis materializes not because of policy disagreements *between* political parties, but rather because of political dynamics *within* majority parties.

To be sure, there are a variety of reasons why partisan gatekeepers may block a piece of legislation from consideration, including a desire to avoid public in-fighting among copartisans (e.g., Cox and McCubbins (2005); Cox Gary and McCubbins (1993)), an inclination toward reserving agenda space for partisan (or presidential) legislative priorities (Lee and Curry, n.d.), or a desire to exaggerate disagreement with the opposite party for electoral purposes (Lee,

¹<https://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/john-boehner-hastert-rule-immigration-093511>

²<https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/10/paul-ryan-promises-no-immigration-reform-obama-administration/>

2016). However, examining the extent to which legislative inaction results from any of these mechanisms has proven challenging, given that the legislative stasis resulting from ideological polarization and partisan gatekeeping is often observationally equivalent—especially when measured by counts of substantive or significant bill passages.

In this study, I leverage the predictable structure of the reauthorizations process to measure partisan agenda-setting decisions, and how they relate to Congress's legislative inaction. More specifically, I examine the extent to which partisan agenda-setters pursue the policy change opportunities generated by expiring authorizations, or whether they instead choose to maintain the status quo. For the vast majority of governmental programs funded through discretionary spending, Congress must authorize spending in order for a program to operate: that is, Congress must pass legislation detailing how specific programs should function, and how much money agencies may use to achieve those functions. Typically, Congress places fixed expiration dates on program authorizations (e.g., a four-year expiration date on the Farm Bill), after which it must decide whether to update the program or maintain the status quo.

These expiration dates generate a predictable sequence of events especially useful for investigating the sort of agenda-setting of interest in this chapter: policy deceleration and acceleration in response to electoral expectations about partisan control of the legislature (see Chapter 3). As I demonstrates formally in the previous chapter, partisan agenda-setters face incentives to speed up or slow down the policymaking process, based on their expectations over how well or poorly their party will fare in the upcoming election. Given that members of Congress are aware of prevailing electoral dynamics, Crosson shows that bill sponsorship patterns are themselves endogenous to the partisan agenda-setting process and expectations thereof. However, because program authorizations expire at predetermined intervals, such expirations offer an op-

portunity (which I refer to as “reauthorization opportunities” throughout) to observe partisan agenda-setters’ decisions about whether or not to pursue relevant policy changes. Thus, in this study, I circumvent the challenge of strategic bill introduction by relying upon the exogeneity of the policy change opportunities provided by authorization expirations.

More specifically, I examine whether policy acceleration and deceleration dynamics influence agenda-setters’ propensity to pursue significant reauthorizations (i.e., whether they move policy) when presented with expiring program authorizations. To do so, I make use of an original dataset of nearly 150 reauthorization opportunities across 23 policy areas from 1951 to 2016, along with point estimates for the ideological locations of reauthorization opportunities’ associated status quos. Ultimately, I do not find strong evidence that electoral expectations influence the incidence of significant reauthorizations specifically, but rather that the extremity of the status quo appears the most relevant consideration for when to pursue policy changes. This latter finding is consistent with other bill-level examinations of policy change, such as Clinton’s (2012) examination of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I detail the challenges associated with examining the sources of legislative gridlock and stasis, underscoring the particular difficulty of examining the electoral foundations of policy change—in spite of the importance of electoral expectations to agenda-setters’ strategic calculations. Second, I demonstrate how legislative reauthorizations offer a useful context within which to examine agenda-setting behavior in response to electoral expectations. Third, I summarize my Chapter 3 predictions regarding electoral expectations and agenda-setting and restate them in terms of reauthorization activity. Fourth, I outline my measurement strategy and subsequent empirical tests of these predictions, based on an application of Clinton and Meirowitz’s (2001, 2004) methodology for measuring status quo locations to

the reauthorizations process. Finally, I execute my reauthorizations-based tests of Crosson's agenda-setting predictions.

4.1 Gridlock in Congress: A Failure to Change, or a Failure to Try?

Since at least the 1990s, ideological polarization has commonly been cited as the most prevalent explanation for Congress's inability to change policy. Beginning with [Mayhew's \(1991\)](#) and [Binder's \(1999\)](#) exchange on divided government and policy change and continuing with spatial models of policy change and other congressional activities posited by [Ferejohn and Shipan \(1990\)](#), [Krehbiel \(1998\)](#), and [Tsebelis \(2002\)](#), a central finding of the policy change literature has been as follows: as the ideological distance between pivotal actors grows, policy change decreases. Several empirical studies (e.g., [Woon and Cook \(2015\)](#), [Chiou and Rothenberg 2003](#)) have since supported, in large part, the assertion that ideological polarization of pivotal actors in Congress has driven policy change downward.

Yet as a variety of other examinations of the American policymaking process have shown, ideological polarization alone likely explains only a portion of Congress's (in)ability to legislate. Indeed, as noted above, *agenda-setting* contributes significantly to Congress's observed legislative activity. As Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) demonstrate, for example, party leaders engage in aggressive gatekeeping of bills that would fracture their party caucus—even though many such bills could ultimately pass through Congress ([Ballard, 2018](#)). Such filtering slows policy change in legislatures where parties retain such agenda power, as [Crosson \(2019b\)](#) demonstrates for state legislatures and [Chiou and Rothenberg \(2003, 2009\)](#) find for the U.S. Congress. Of course, maintenance of a unified party brand is not the only reason why party

leaders may wish to filter the legislative agenda. Indeed, they may do so in order to maintain political capital or agenda space for their party's (or co-partisan president's) policy priorities (Lee and Curry, n.d.) or maintain a conflictual posture toward the opposing party (Lee, 2016). Most recently, and the focus of this paper, Crosson (2019a) has posited that agenda-setters' expectations about their party's electoral prospects may influence their willingness to move on legislation. Here, I examine how this kind of gatekeeping influences Congress's propensity to change policy, while remaining mostly agnostic about the various other motivations for partisan gatekeeping.

Regardless of the underlying motivation for filtering the agenda, previous work clearly suggests that gatekeeping should have important consequences for observed patterns policy change and stasis in a legislature. Nevertheless, examining the extent to which agenda-setting is responsible for patterns of change and stasis remains challenging. Not only is inaction resulting from agenda control and partisan polarization often observationally equivalent (Peress, 2013), but making inferences from observations of *inaction* is itself challenging methodologically. As Tsebelis (2002) summarizes, policy change may fail to occur because polarized veto players disagree over the direction policy should move for a wide variety of status quo policies—or simply because previous legislatures have repositioned status quos in a largely unobjectionable fashion, precluding the need for much change at all. Binder's (1999; 2003) examination of divided government and gridlock gestures at this challenge, by arguing that the truest measures of gridlock account for both the numerator (i.e., bill passage counts) of policy change, as well as the *denominator* or set of policy changes Congress even wishes to confront.

These methodological challenges are compounded when attempting to test how dynamic *expectations* about electoral prospects influence agenda-setting behavior. Indeed, given that elec-

toral expectations are common knowledge to members of the legislature, members can tailor their sponsorship strategies accordingly, as [Crosson \(2019a\)](#) argues. Based on their expectations about agenda-setters' willingness to speed up or slow down the policymaking process, members of Congress appear more or less willing to offer legislative proposals that are actually viable—that is, bills that could pass through Congress, if brought up for a vote. Consequently, even when using bill-level data, bias in the data generating process underlying the sponsorship process renders empirical tests of the theory's agenda-setting predictions especially challenging.

Taken together, to examine whether and to what extent electoral expectations influence agenda-setting and, ultimately, policy change, an empirical strategy must confront a list of key challenges. First, it must address the existing desirability of the status quo ([Woon and Cook, 2015](#)). Second, it must provide a context within which inaction is directly interpretable. In other words, the empirical strategy should measure clear *opportunities* for policy change, and whether or not agenda-setters actually capitalized on those opportunities. Finally, the empirical strategy should offer more power than is typically available to Congress-level studies of policy change (where $n \leq 40$ frequently). This is especially true when testing Crosson's predictions, as his policy acceleration and deceleration dynamics are contingent on both the spatial location of a bill's associated status quo *and* the prevailing electoral dynamics when the bill is under consideration.

In this study, I develop an empirical strategy based on the reauthorizations process in Congress that addresses each of these requirements, in order to examine how partisan leaders' electoral expectations influence their willingness to set the legislative agenda. This strategy relies upon an application of [Clinton and Meirowitz's \(2001; 2004\)](#) double-indexing methodology for estimating bill proposal and status quo locations to an original data set of nearly 150

reauthorization opportunities faced by Congress from 1951 to present day. The reauthorization opportunities include both successful and unsuccessful attempts (as well as non-attempts) at renewing expiring reauthorizations spanning 23 unique issue areas—from Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) reauthorization to reauthorization of the Defense Production Act (DPA). Below, I detail how this methodology and these data confront common challenges to studies of agenda-setting, as well as unique challenges associated with studying electoral anticipation, highlighted above. Subsequently, I restate Crosson’s agenda-setting predictions in terms of the reauthorizations process, and then test those predictions in a variety of ways.

4.2 Reauthorizations and Leaders’ Decisions to Set the Agenda

The process of program authorization and reauthorization is a vital part of Congress’s policy-making responsibilities. Indeed, Congress builds expiration dates into thousands of individual program authorizations, and many such programs are bundled into major pieces of reauthorizing legislation. Examples of such major legislation (which I later refer to as reauthorization “streams”) include the farm bill, the highway bill, and the aforementioned ESEA and DPA reauthorizations. As [Adler and Wilkerson \(2013\)](#) demonstrate, these reauthorizations constitute some of Congress’s most important policy changes from year to year, and they provide major opportunities for cooperation between members of both parties.

Despite their importance, reauthorization opportunities differ from other major policy-making efforts in a few important respects, which allow them to meet the list of requirements for studying agenda control highlighted above. I discuss each requirement in turn below, and demonstrate how reauthorization opportunities fulfill these requirements.

4.2.1 Predictability and Interpretability of Inaction among Reauthorization Opportunities

First and foremost, reauthorization opportunities arise from *authorization expirations*, which must be readdressed—even if Congress’s response is to ignore expiration—at *regular* and *predictable* intervals. Such intervals are plausibly exogenous to the actions of the present Congress, and they provide a context within which legislative *inaction* (and not simply action alone) is fully interpretable.

More specifically, when presented with an expiring program authorization, Congress must choose whether and how it will reauthorize the programs in question. I argue that Congress undertakes one of three responses to these expirations. Perhaps the easiest response to such expirations is to simply ignore the expiration date and *maintain the current program through unauthorized appropriations*. While Congress’s regular budgetary processes eschew such unauthorized spending, funding programs with expired authorizations has grown in popularity over time. Under such an arrangement, Congress may not change the authorized spending limits, and they may not change the underlying program structures established by the previous authorization. However, they can maintain the status quo, even though they have not passed any kind of extending legislation.

If Congress does not wish to enact substantively significant changes to an expiring set of programs (i.e., if it wishes to maintain the status quo) but does *not* wish to maintain programs via unauthorized appropriation, it may opt for a second—and more technically sound and conventional—option: a simple extension of the expiration date associated with the expiring programs in question. Such legislation is frequently one page in length (or shorter) and indi-

cates that the previous authorizing legislation “is amended by striking [the original expiration date] and adding [the new expiration date].” Though this approach is more conventional and respectful of Congress’s budgetary institutions than are unauthorized appropriations, the outcome of simple extensions is functionally the same as unauthorized appropriation: Congress has elected to maintain the status quo.

Finally, if Congress *is* interested in *actively changing policy*, it may do so by *enacting substantively significant reauthorizing legislation*. Beyond simply extending the expiration deadline for the programs in question, such legislation alters the actual functioning and structure of programs themselves. A particularly prominent example of this sort of reauthorization came in 2001, with the enactment of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. Although technically a reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, NCLB fundamentally altered education policy in the United States, tying federal education funds to a wide variety of testing and accountability requirements and reorganizing offices within the Department of Education. Thus, Congress clearly chose to actively change policy when presented with an expiring authorization, in this particular case.

Should Congress choose to pass reauthorizing legislation, either to make substantive changes or as a simple extension, it must next specify an *authorization term*. That is, Congress must indicate the fiscal year within which spending authority for the programs in question will expire. During the fiscal years specified within the authorization term, *authorization levels* then set the limits for spending that can be used to run a program. Congress then determines the final funding levels for a program via its committee’s final appropriation bill³, and Congress may even choose a funding level lower than a program’s actual authorization level.

³Or, more recently, the single omnibus appropriations bill.

Nevertheless, years ahead of time, the reauthorizations process sets a fixed date by which future Congresses must readdress a given set of program authorizations, either by deciding to change existing policy or by opting to maintain the status quo. Such dates are so important, in fact, that lobbyists routinely place expiration dates on their calendars ahead of time, in order to tailor the timing of their advocacy efforts accordingly (Crosson and Heaney, n.d.). Expiring authorizations therefore generate a large number of policy change opportunities that are *plausibly exogeneous* to the legislative behaviors and agendas developed within the Congress during which the programs are set to expire. Put differently, the Farm Bill (for instance) is slated to expire in four years, regardless of the political contexts surrounding Congress four years in the future. Congress will, at that time, need to address the expiring authorization, the existence of which was entirely a function of previous actors' decisions.

Crucially, this predictability and quasi-exogeneity renders meaningful both action *and* inaction on the part of agenda-setters in Congress. Indeed, because programs will expire if no action is taken, agenda-setters must decide whether they should extend and alter the programs in question, offer a simple extension (with few substantive changes) for the programs, or maintain program continuity through unauthorized appropriations. Thus, rather than sponsorships that arise endogenously from strategic anticipation of electoral competition and other factors, reauthorizations offer distinct and measurable opportunities for which agenda-setters must decide how they will proceed. In this paper, I model agenda-setters' decisions to pursue *significant reauthorizations* when presented with expiring authorizations, as such actions constitute a decision to *change policy*, in response to the acceleration and deceleration dynamics discussed at greater length below.

4.2.1.1 Does Congress Allow Program Authorizations to Lapse Altogether?

To be clear, this account of the reauthorizations process (and, ultimately, the measurement strategy I build upon it) assumes that Congress does not seriously consider a fourth option in response to expirations: simply allowing a program or set of programs to die completely. I argue that this assumption is firmly grounded in Congress's observed behavior within the reauthorizations process, as well as the existing empirical research on the reauthorizations process. First, according to [Adler and Wilkerson \(2013\)](#), major legislative reauthorizations have developed well-defined, strong, and (oftentimes) sympathetic constituencies, each of which expect Congress to maintain—and improve—their favored programs. Trade associations and advocacy organizations for teachers, school boards, and parent-teacher associations, for instance, expect Congress to renew federal support programs for education via periodic Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorizations; and, members of Congress would face steep electoral consequences were they simply to terminate all programs encompassed within ESEA reauthorization bills. Instead, when Congress is unable or unwilling to update the content of a piece of reauthorizations legislation, they simply opt to maintain current programming and spending limits, running the programs through unauthorized appropriations. In the case of the ESEA, Congress maintained programs authorized through the 2007 update of the No Child Left Behind Act for *seven years* on unauthorized appropriations, eventually updating the ESEA reauthorization with the Every Student Succeeds Act in 2015.

In addition to the political intractability of wholesale program termination, the major reauthorizations included in this study influence major components of the American economy. The highway bill, for instance, is responsible for maintain the millions of miles of roadway found

in the United States' expansive Interstate system. The Amtrak reauthorization influences commute cost and practicality for citizens in some of the largest cities in the U.S. The farm bill keeps hundreds of thousands of family farmers afloat, while also keeping U.S. megafarms competitive with heavily subsidized agricultural entities in other countries. And the Higher Education Act ensures that millions of students can afford⁴ to attend American colleges and universities, which improve the human capital of the U.S. workforce and provide opportunities for research and development on topics as vital as agenda-setting and policy change in U.S. politics. In short, were the reauthorizations included in this analysis simply terminated, rather than extended through unauthorized appropriation, the U.S. economy would decline—in some cases, catastrophically. I argue that Congress is simply unlikely to allow funding to fully lapse, given these potential consequences.

Finally, in addition to these theoretical reasons for avoiding outright termination of programs, my research team and I uncovered no examples of fully lapsed authorizations in the more than 1,600 reauthorization opportunities we examined. Congress did seriously consider terminating one major governmental entity, the Export-Import Bank, during reauthorization debates in 2015. However, the Bank was ultimately reauthorized as part of a highway funding bill in the same year. Taken together, while only suggestive, this empirical evidence suggests that Congress does not seriously consider termination of authorized programs as a serious option, when faced with an expiring authorization. Thus, such expiring authorizations offer an excellent opportunity to directly interpret inaction by Congress: if Congress chooses not to update a program's authorization, it has implicitly elected to maintain the program's status quo for another fiscal year.

⁴Or, at least, take out loans.

4.2.2 Regularity and Frequency of Reauthorization Opportunities

Besides the interpretability of inaction and the quasi-exogeneity of reauthorization opportunities within a given Congress, such opportunities are regular and frequent. Thus, were one able to measure the spatial location of an expiring authorization's associated status quo, doing so would provide many more data points with which to test models of agenda-setting and policy change than are typically available in Congress-level studies. Indeed, expiring authorizations provide an especially useful context for testing theories of agenda-setting if one can successfully determine to where policy would revert, were the current authorization to be simply maintained.

Fortunately, [Clinton and Meirowitz's \(2001; 2004\)](#) methodology for locating status quo and proposal locations for legislation in Congress provides a suitable means by which one may assign ideological locations to reauthorization opportunities before Congress. As detailed at greater length in the Data and Measurement section below, this approach leverages the structure of the voting agenda to locate the spatial positions association with 'yea' and 'nay' roll call votes, thereby better identifying both the final proposal location and previous status quo location associated with particular bills. This method is most effective when applied to streams of similar policy changes, making it especially useful for scoring reauthorization bill and status quo locations. To date, the methodology has been applied to the Compromise of 1790 ([Clinton and Meirowitz, 2004](#)), the Fair Labor Labor Standards Acts (1971-2000, [Clinton \(2012\)](#)), and even votes at the U.S. Constitutional Convention ([Pope and Treier, 2011](#)). In this study, I am able to use the methodology to locate status quos associated with approximately 150 reauthorization opportunities from 1951 to present day, across 23 policy areas.

Taken together, I argue that the reauthorizations process, particularly when joined with ideological estimates for bill and status quo locations, provides an excellent context within which to test not only agenda-setting behavior, but also agenda-setters' responses to dynamic electoral considerations. First, the predictability of reauthorization opportunities provide policy change opportunities that are plausibly exogeneous within a particular Congress. Second, this predictable nature itself renders meaningful action and inaction alike, given that agenda-setters must make observable decisions regarding whether or not to move the status quo at identifiable points in time. Third, the frequency of reauthorization opportunities provide potential for more statistical power than standard Congress-level tests of policy change models. Finally, when paired with Clinton and Meirowitz's methodology for locating bill proposal and status quo locations, reauthorization opportunities allow one to measure directly whether policy change occurs simply because institutional pivots cannot agree on policy changes, or whether parties have themselves filtered the agenda beyond what ideological polarization alone might predict.

Thus, I use the aforementioned dataset of reauthorization opportunities to test Crosson's predictions about how electoral expectations influence partisan agenda-setters' willingness to set the legislative agenda. More specifically, I test whether agenda-setters respond to policy acceleration and deceleration electoral dynamics by enacting significant reauthorizations or, alternatively, choosing to maintain the status quo. Below, I rearticulate Crosson's predictions about electoral expectations and agenda-setting terms of the reauthorizations process, after which I further detail the data used to test the resulting hypotheses.

4.3 Electoral Prospects and Reauthorization Opportunities

In order to examine how expectations over electoral prospects might influence agenda-setting, Crosson details a dynamic *Pivotal Politics*-style model of policy change between an agenda-setter, AS , and a single pivotal veto player (the receiver, R). The model proceeds in a fashion similar to typical spatial models, except that the model continues into a second round of legislating, instead of a single period. Between the two periods, an election reassigns the locations of AS and R , forcing the first-round AS to consider how such changes will influence policy outcomes following the upcoming election. AS therefore chooses to strategically slow down or speed up the policymaking process, in order to maximize policy gains between the two rounds. In this chapter, I examine whether agenda-setters choose to pursue significant reauthorizations when faced with these policymaking dynamics.

Chapter 3 analyzes three basic electoral scenarios that AS may confront, delineating specific conditions under which she faces incentives to speed up or slow down the policymaking process (in this case, the reauthorizations process). In short, Crosson establishes that when AS expects to retain agenda control and make gains with R (i.e., experience a receiver that is closer to her after the election), she faces incentives to *slow down* the policymaking process, understanding that better policy changes may be had after the election. Conversely, when R is expected to move away from AS —or, worse, if AS does not expect she will retain agenda control—she faces incentives to speed up the policymaking process, understanding that certain policy changes become less advantageous or even impossible after the upcoming election.

Formally, Crosson develops the following propositions regarding policy acceleration and deceleration:

Proposition 1: *AS* will refrain from trying to change status quo policies lying to the right of R but to the left of $R + |AS - R|$, when *AS* anticipates her party will remain in control of *AS* and R will move closer to her.

That is, if *AS* realizes she can achieve a better policy outcome by waiting until the next election transpires—moving R closer in her direction—she will opt against changing some movable status quos within the present Congress. Conversely, if R is expected to move farther away, Proposition 2 applies:

Proposition 2: When *AS* expects to retain control of the *AS* position but lose ground with R , she will focus her policymaking efforts on status quos located to the right of R but to the left of $R' + |AS - R'|$.

In other words, *AS* should aggressively change a particular set of status quo policies that will become immovable (or only minutely moveable) once R shifts away from her following the next election. A similar dynamic develops when *AS* expects to lose agenda control altogether, as described in Proposition 3:

Proposition 3: When *AS* expects that her party will lose control of *AS*, she will accelerate policymaking efforts throughout the policymaking space.

Should *AS* lose agenda control, the new agenda-setter can move a large number of status quo policies in an undesirable direction for the current *AS*. Realizing this, *AS* faces incentives to change as many of these status quo policies as possible while she still retains agenda control.

These propositions are straightforward to apply to the reauthorizations process. In general, for cases in which agenda-setters are expected to slow down the policymaking process

(Proposition 1), Congress should be more likely to *maintain the status quo*, either through the *unauthorized appropriations* or *simple extensions* described above. Conversely, for cases in which agenda-setters are expected to speed up the policymaking process (Propositions 2 and 3), Congress should be more likely to enact *significant reauthorizations*. That is, conditional on substantive change being spatially possible, we should observe substantive and significant legislative reauthorizations under conditions of policy acceleration.

Thus, it is possible to recast Crosson's propositions into three testable hypotheses about the reauthorizations process:

H_1 : AS will refrain from significant reauthorizations for status quo policies lying to the right of R but to the left of $R + |AS - R|$, when AS anticipates her party will remain in control of AS and R will move closer to her.

H_2 : When AS expects to retain control of the AS position but lose ground with R , she will be more likely to engage in significant reauthorizations for status quos located to the right of R but to the left of $R' + |AS - R'|$.

H_3 : When AS expects that her party will lose control of AS , she will be more likely to engage in significant reauthorizations throughout the policymaking space than she would otherwise.

More directly, when AS understands she could obtain a better or more favorable reauthorization after the upcoming election, she is more likely to opt for a simple program extension, or no reauthorization at all. Reauthorization opportunities that fall into this category are said to have associated status quos inside the *deceleration region*. If, however, AS understands that reauthorizations after the election are likely to be paired with *worse* outcomes, she should be

more likely to pursue significant program reauthorizations in the present Congress. Reauthorization opportunities that fall in this category have status quos that lie within the *acceleration region*.

While the dataset I use to test the above hypotheses is considerably larger than previous applications of Clinton and Meirowitz's methodology, it still provides limited power for testing both components—spatial location *and* prevailing electoral dynamics—associated with policy acceleration and deceleration. Therefore, for my empirical tests, I collapse H_2 and H_3 into a single hypothesis about policy acceleration, namely:

H_2 : When AS expects to incur *any* major losses (either with R or the future AS), she will be more likely to engage in significant reauthorizations than should would otherwise. More specifically, she will be more likely to change policy for status quos located to the right of R but to the left of $R' + |AS - R'|$ when AS is not expected to change, and throughout the policymaking space when she expects control of AS will change.

That is, instead of testing each type of policy acceleration separately, this modified H_2 collapses both types of policy acceleration into a single prediction about policy acceleration and agenda-setters' decisions about reauthorization opportunities.⁵

⁵One type of which, Scenario 2, is fairly rare in the data.

4.4 Reauthorization Opportunities and Policy Change: Data and Measurement

Given the aforementioned benefits of reauthorizations data, a large research team and I compiled an original dataset of reauthorizations opportunities ranging from 1951 to present day. I use these data to measure the primary outcome variable of interest: whether Congress chose to enact a significant reauthorization (or maintain the status quo) when presented with an expiring authorization.

Coding of these reauthorization opportunities proceeded as follows. Beginning in May of 2018, my research team and I began cataloging authorization expirations faced by Congress over the past several decades. While I detail the specific search procedure used to identify expirations in greater detail in Appendix A, research assistants were assigned one “stream” of reauthorizations at a time and were asked to document the length of each authorization term throughout the stream’s reauthorization history. Though not an official term within the reauthorizations process, a reauthorization stream refers to a set of programs that are historically authorized together—and therefore expire together. Examples of such streams include the many farm bills passed by Congress, reauthorization of surface transportation programs (commonly referred to as the “highway bill”), and biannual reauthorizations of the Defense Production Act. Within these streams, research assistants perused the legislative language in each piece of authorizing legislation, in order to determine when the bill in question would next expire. After making this determination, the assistants then searched Congress.gov for related legislation in the Congress during which the bill expired. I refer to these expirations as reauthorization *opportunities*, and

they serve as the basis of my dependent variable, described below.

In total, data were collected for over 200 reauthorization streams and over 1,600 reauthorization opportunities/expirations. While Appendix A provides greater detail on how these data were collected and cleaned, a total of 23 of these streams and 148 reauthorization opportunities are used in the final dataset analyzed here. Unfortunately, the common usage of voice votes in place of roll calls for reauthorizations bills precludes usage of a large number of our reauthorization streams in this analysis—a challenge detailed at greater length in Appendix G, where I investigate potential sources of selection bias introduced by the prevalence of voice votes. Nevertheless, this dataset represents the largest set of policy changes ever captured by Clinton and Meirowitz's double-indexing spatial measurement method; and, if anything, the major reauthorizations presented here understate the gravity of the policy debates captured the reauthorizations process.

Using this set of reauthorization opportunities, I am able to measure whether Congress has opted to pass a *significant* reauthorization when presented with an expiring authorization. This measure, as detailed in the above hypotheses, constitutes the means for capturing whether or not agenda-setters have actively chosen to change policy. Next, I explain how I measure whether individual reauthorization opportunities have been exposed to acceleration or deceleration dynamics. As I detail, such measurements require me to first capture several underlying variables, including prevailing electoral dynamics and the spatial location of a reauthorization opportunity's associated status quo. With these measurements, I am finally able to execute a variety of tests to investigate whether acceleration and deceleration dynamics do in fact influence the incidence of substantive reauthorizations, as posited in H_1 and H_2 .

4.4.1 Dependent Variable: Significant Reauthorization

For each reauthorization opportunity identified by my research assistants, I measured whether or not agenda-setters have selected to enact a significant reauthorization (i.e., whether they chose to change policy) in the following way. As noted above, after identifying the Congress within which a reauthorization opportunity has arisen, research assistants determined whether legislation was introduced to extend the expiring authorization. When students had finished compiling relevant legislation introduced in response to the reauthorization opportunities in our data set, I proceeded by determining which authorization response category described earlier—substantively significant reauthorization, simple extension, or maintaining the status quo through appropriation—best described the introduced legislation in question. If no reauthorization bill passed but the programs were maintained through appropriations,⁶ the opportunity was coded as “maintained through unauthorized appropriation.” If Congress did pass legislation, however, I further investigated the content of bill text itself. If the text included only a change in expiration date (and no changes to the program itself), the reauthorization opportunity was coded as a “simple extension.” Conversely, if Congress passed a bill that included substantive changes to the programs in question, the reauthorization was coded as a “significant reauthorization.”

This code serves as the basis for measurement of the primary outcome variable—the decision to change policy—described in the above hypotheses. That is, because the primary dependent variable of interest is whether or not agenda-setters were able to enact significant reauthorizations when presented with the opportunity to do so, I use the reauthorization classi-

⁶In cases where no reauthorization legislation passed, research assistants located the programs in question within the contemporaneous appropriations bill, in order to confirm that the program did not lapse.

fications described above—namely, whether Congress chose to enact a substantively significant reauthorization—as my dependent variable. Formally, I define the dependent variable, *Significant Reauthorization* or A_{jt} , as follows. First, if Congress fails to reauthorize a program altogether and instead merely passes related appropriations, $A_{jt} = 0$, for stream j and Congress t . Second, if Congress does reauthorize a program, but with a simple extension of the expiration date (with no accompanying substantive changes), $A_{jt} = 0$. Finally, if Congress successfully reauthorizes a program with legislation that makes substantive changes from the previous authorization, $A_{jt} = 1$.⁷

As an example, the aforementioned series of ESEA reauthorizations were coded as follows. First, because it significantly altered underlying programs and procedures within education policy, the No Child Left Behind Act was coded as $A = 1$. The same was true in 2015, when Congress passed major alterations to the previously extended NCLB authorization. However, in the intervening period between 2007 and 2015, Congress maintained NCLB and ESEA-related programs via unauthorized appropriations. For those reauthorization opportunities, $A = 0$ since Congress chose to maintain the status quo instead of enacting substantive changes through reauthorization legislation.

4.4.2 Acceleration and Deceleration Intervals: Pivotal Actors' Preferences and Status Quo Policy Locations

While generating the measurements necessary to capture Congress's policy-change decisions was relatively straightforward in the course of coding reauthorization opportunities, measurement of the primary independent variables of interest—whether or not the opportunities' associated

⁷Further details on this coding process are available in Appendix A.

status quo locations fell within the acceleration or deceleration regions—required considerably more information. In spite of this difficulty, such measurements are indispensable, as they allow me to determine whether specific reauthorization opportunities should (in theory) be met with policy acceleration or deceleration.

In order to develop these measurements, I needed to compile the following list of underlying measurements. First, in order to determine whether prevailing electoral expectations in a given Congress favored acceleration or deceleration, I required a measure of contemporaneous beliefs about how each party would fare in the upcoming election, for each of the Congresses in my dataset. Second, for Congresses subject to acceleration or deceleration dynamics, I needed to identify and measure the preferences of *AS* and *R*, in order to construct the bounds of the acceleration and deceleration regions. Finally, to determine whether each reauthorization opportunity's associated status quo itself fell within the acceleration or deceleration regions, I needed to develop a set of point estimates for status quo locations on the same scale as *AS* and *R*'s preference measurements. Taken together, these components allowed me to determine whether the spatial properties and surrounding electoral dynamics associated with each reauthorization opportunity exposed *AS* to acceleration or deceleration dynamics. I detail each component in turn below.

4.4.2.1 Electoral Dynamics

In order for acceleration or deceleration dynamics to apply, *AS* must be exposed to the appropriate electoral conditions. Consequently, the first measurement step I executed was to place each Congress in my data set into of the three electoral scenarios depicted in the above hypotheses. Here, I borrow the same methodology used in Chapter 3 to place Congresses into

such scenarios, by relying upon interpolated Iowa Electronic Market share prices associated with each party's chances for obtaining the majority in a given chamber of Congress. However, unlike Chapter 3's examination of viable bill-writing, which was confined to the 110th through 114th Congresses, the extrapolations of IEM prices here must extend far before the founding of the IEM (1996). Here, I use 50 percent as my cutoff for assigning whether *AS* and/or *R* are expected to move from one party's control to the other:⁸

$$C_t^{AS} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p(P_t^{AS} \neq P_{t+1}^{AS}) > 0.5 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$C_t^R = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p(P_t^R \neq P_{t+1}^R) > 0.5 \text{ or} \\ & p(VS_j^R < 0.6 < VS_{t+1}^R \vee (VS_t^R > 0.4 > VS_{t+1}^R)) > 0.5 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where C_t^{AS} and C_t^R represent the binary variable indicating whether or not *AS* and *R* are expected to change, P_t^{AS} and P_t^R represent the party of *AS* and *R* during Congress t , and VS_t^R represents the vote share of *R*'s party in the Senate during Congress t . If either $C_t^{AS} = 1$ or $C_t^R = 1$, then Congress t is placed into the relevant agenda-setting scenario articulated above. More specifically:

Scenarios 1, 2: $C_t^{AS} = 0$ and $C_t^R = 1$;

Scenario 3: $C_t^{AS} = 1$

⁸In practice, while this cutoff does alter whether a handful of Congresses are coded within specific electoral scenarios, it does not change the results presented below in any substantive way.

Appendix E summarizes how each Congress, from the 81st to 115th, was ultimately classified. Given the specific challenges associated with measuring the probability that the filibuster pivot will move locations after the upcoming election, I adopt Crosson's Bayesian approach for assigning change probabilities to the filibuster pivot. This approach models seat share directly as a function of the IEM shares and other observable factors, and then estimates a posterior around the predicted seat share to be held by each party. Using this posterior, I determine the probability that one party or the other will ultimately control the filibuster pivot.

4.4.2.2 Identification and Measurement of AS and R

After capturing the contemporaneous electoral expectations in this fashion, my measurement strategy next requires me to identify and measure the preferences of AS and R , in order to generate end points for the acceleration and deceleration intervals. Like Crosson, I place AS at the majority median in the House and R at the pivotal actor located the farthest from AS . This generates static gridlock intervals (i.e., $[AS, R]$) which shift significantly over time, primarily in the rightward direction depicted in Figure 4.1. For simplicity, I assume that AS' and R' are expected by players in the game to be located near the actual locations of AS and R , should the predicted electoral outcome transpire.

To generate the ideal points found in Figure 4.1, I develop an original dataset of 3,087 reauthorizations-specific ideal points, by applying Clinton and Meirowitz's (2001) agenda-constrained estimation technique (discussed at greater length below) to 753 roll call votes on the reauthorizations opportunities in my data. As is evident in Figure 4.2, the ideal points that result from this estimation procedure differ both substantively and empirically from NOMINATE and other common scores. That is, while typical ideal points are calculated in an uncon-

strained fashion using all available votes, the scores associated with this procedure are specific to the reauthorizations process—a process that is far more bipartisan than are other aspects of the policymaking process (Adler and Wilkerson, 2013). Interestingly, the ideal points estimated in this paper appear to corroborate this claim, as depicted in the center-heavy (orange) histogram found on the top of Figure 4.2.⁹ This distribution clearly differs from the sharply bimodal distribution exhibited by the NOMINATE scores, depicted in the histogram on the right-hand (green) side Figure 4.2. Despite these apparent differences, though, the ideal points estimated here still correlate at a fairly high rate with DW-NOMINATE, with $\rho \approx 0.87$ — as depicted by the scatter plot in Figure 4.2. Thus, while the estimates I generate appear to accurately capture the consensual nature of reauthorizations politics, they also recover fairly similar underlying preferences for the legislators in the study, lending additional credibility to the resulting ideal points.

4.4.2.3 Reauthorization Opportunities' Associated Status Quos

As noted above, the agenda-constrained estimation procedure used to generate these ideal points produces status quo location estimates that are better identified than the standard parameters generated in an unconstrained model. Thus, to measure whether each reauthorization's associated status quo lies within the acceleration or deceleration regions, I make use of the status quo location of generated via Clinton and Meirowitz's method. Clinton and Meirowitz's methodology identifies status quo locations by constraining model parameters according to substantive

⁹This center-heavy shape persists even if one generates ideal points by estimating traditional, unconstrained model on these roll call votes, shown in Appendix D. Indeed, the correlation between these agenda-constrained estimates and traditional, unconstrained IRT estimates developed using the same voting data is quite high, with $\rho \approx 0.95$. This suggests that the moderation displayed in Figure 4.2 derives from the consensual nature of reauthorizations politics, and not from the constraints placed on the parameter estimation.

Figure 4.1: Static Gridlock Interval ($[AS, R]$ Region), 81st - 114th Congresses





Figure 4.2: Reauthorization Ideal Points v. DW-NOMINATE, 1951-2016



features of the voting agenda. As Clinton (2012) states, “[b]y identifying a series of votes where the same proposal is being voted upon, constraining the appropriate alternatives helps identify the location of the final proposal if legislators vote based on the policy proposal they expect to emerge from the process.” Indeed, while typical ideal point models impose no constraints on the spatial locations associated with each “yea” and “nay” vote, Clinton and Meirowitz’s approach leverages information about the sequence and substantive relations (e.g., substitute amendments, first-/second-degree amendments, etc.) of individual roll call votes, in order to constrain these spatial estimates. Thus, rather than estimating a difficulty (α_j) and discrimination (β_j) parameter for each bill j , I estimate individual yea and nay vote locations $\theta_{y(t)}$ and $\theta_{n(t)}$ which can be constrained to refer to the same spatial location.

I apply this methodology to my reauthorizations by first cataloging each bill intended to serve as reauthorizing legislation and then compiling relevant roll call votes for each reautho-

ricing bill in the dataset. Next, using information available from Voteview.com (Lewis et al., 2019) and the *Congressional Record*, I coded the roll calls according to the double-indexing methodology detailed by Clinton and Meirowitz. In sum, I coded 753 roll call votes in this fashion. My application of this methodology to the reauthorizations data decreased the number of yea/nay parameters estimated from over 1500 to under 1000. Parameters were estimated using MCMC and Metropolis sampling, thinning two chains of 40,000 iterations each by 100. Stationarity and convergence diagnostics are available in Appendix C, and the specific agenda coding decisions underlying the estimates can be found in Appendix B.

Using this methodology on these 753 roll call votes from 23 major reauthorizations streams, I generated a total of 981 location estimates and 3,087 accompanying time-invariant legislator ideal points. For Congress-streams that included scoreable roll call votes, the status quo location was pulled directly from these estimates. For Congress-streams that lack such scores, I follow Clinton (2012) and linearly interpolate the location of the status quo between the enacted policy location at Congress t and the estimated status quo at Congress $t + 1$. With these scores, I was finally able to determine whether the status quo associated with a given reauthorization opportunity lies within the acceleration, deceleration, or neither region.

4.4.3 Other Variables

In addition to these primary independent variables, I include several control variables in my analysis that deal directly with the location of SQ . In particular, I control for the ideological location of SQ and how “extreme” SQ is. Some theoretical models (e.g., Dziuda and Loeper, 2018) suggest that political systems with large numbers of veto players (such as the U.S.) can exhibit over-time policy biases. Therefore, I consider whether conservative or liberal policies

appear more or less likely to be met with significant reauthorizations. Second, I control for the overall extremity of the status quo policy in question, captured by the absolute value of the *SQ Location* term. Here, the expectation is that the estimated coefficient will be positive: for policies that are to the far right or far left, agenda-setters may be less likely to allow electoral considerations to influence their decisionmaking. Finally, I include a variable, *Previous Majority Match*, which indicates whether the previous authorization of a set of programs was introduced under a majority of the same party as the present reauthorization attempt. I include this variable to account for the possibility that parties take issue ownership over specific reauthorization streams, leading certain majorities to be systematically more likely to pursue such reauthorization opportunities than others.

4.5 Empirical Approach and Results

Using these measurements, I estimate a series of logistic regressions, in order to investigate whether agenda-setters decided to enact significant reauthorizations as predicted by the acceleration and deceleration hypotheses outlines above. In each model, the dependent variable captures whether agenda-setters decided to enact a significant reauthorization ($A_{jt} = 1$) or maintain the status quo ($A_{jt} = 0$), and the primary independent variable of interest indicates whether the status quo was located in the acceleration, deceleration, or neither region. When a reauthorization opportunity's associated status quo lies within the acceleration region, I expect to see a higher rate of significant reauthorizations—or a positive coefficient on the acceleration region indicator variable. Conversely, when the status quo lies with in the deceleration region, *AS* should choose to maintain the status quo with higher probability—or a negative coefficient

on the deceleration region indicator variable.

Across all models, I cluster standard errors by Congress, and the results presented below do not meaningfully change if errors are clustered instead by reauthorization stream.¹¹ Each model also controls for a variety of opportunity-specific factors, such as how extreme the status quo appears relative to pivotal actors' preferences and whether the previous authorization was passed by a majority of the same party as the current majority. In the models below, I include a control variable for whether or not the status quo lies within $[AS, R]$ (the static gridlock interval), since such policies should be less likely to move than other policies, all else equal. However, in the models presented in the appendix, I remove SQ policies located within $[AS, R]$ entirely. Second, while the primary models I present below include terms for both policy acceleration and deceleration together, I also present individual models for acceleration and deceleration.

I present the results of these models in Table 1. In Table 1, Model 1 includes both acceleration region and deceleration region terms in the same regression, while Models 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 test deceleration and acceleration hypotheses separately. Across all models, the expectations laid out in H_1 and H_2 receive little support. With regard to policy deceleration, the presence of SQ in the deceleration region takes on the expected negative sign in just one of the models. That is, the models reveal little evidence that policy deceleration dynamics are systematically associated with agenda-setters' decisions to maintain the status quo when confronted with expiring authorizations. The same pattern obtains for policy acceleration, with relevant model parameters taking on the expected positive sign in just two of the three models. Policy acceleration dynamics do not seem to encourage significant reauthorizations as expected.

¹¹Given that reauthorizations are generally handled by the same congressional committee(s) from year to year, clustering by reauthorization stream also addresses the possibility of heteroskedasticity by congressional committee of origin.

In all cases, the results do not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Across all model terms, in fact, the most consistent result comes from the extremity of each reauthorization opportunity's status quo: in each model, the more extreme the status quo policy, the more likely Congress is to change policy. This finding is in line with previous literature (e.g., Clinton 2012) and appears to indicate that SQ_i far to the left or right of most pivotal actors are likely to change, regardless of electoral scenario.

These results do not change appreciably when H_1 and H_2 are tested in models with $SQ \in [AS, R]$ removed, found in Appendix F. There, as with the models presented in Table 1, the extremity of the status quo is most consistently related to significant reauthorizations, exhibiting a consistent positive association with the dependent variable, regardless of electoral scenario.

One potential reason for the weak results presented in Tables 1-3 could derive from the relatively high statistical power required to examine Crosson's hypotheses. Indeed, given the specific timing and locational components of treatment assignment (i.e., location in the acceleration or deceleration intervals), small sample sizes may struggle to generate a sufficient number of treated cases. While the sample presented here provides approximately four times the sample size typically generated using Clinton and Meirowitz's methodology, the specificity of the treatment conditions presented in H_1 and H_2 strain the sample of reauthorizations presented here. In response, I run a series of alternative models below, removing the location component of H_1 and H_2 . That is, instead of testing whether location within the acceleration or deceleration *region* is associated with policy movements, I test whether the electoral scenarios themselves—which encourage acceleration and deceleration—are associated with policy movements. Doing so allows me to use a larger number of bills as “treated” units, given that they need not satisfy the locational requirements associated with the acceleration and deceleration regions.

Table 4.1: Policy Acceleration, Deceleration, and Significant Legislative Reauthorizations

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Significant Reauthorization				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Accel. Region</i>	0.026 (0.466)			0.020 (0.457)	−0.009 (0.576)
<i>Prev. Majority Match</i>	0.555 (0.453)	0.552 (0.452)	0.131 (0.598)	0.553 (0.449)	0.959 (0.655)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Decel. Region</i>	0.043 (0.839)	0.034 (0.826)	−0.031 (0.934)		
<i>SQ</i> ∈ [<i>AS</i> , <i>R</i>]	0.614 (0.554)	0.611 (0.547)	0.548 (0.696)	0.611 (0.551)	1.849* (0.965)
<i>SQ Location</i>	−0.126 (0.159)	−0.127 (0.157)	−0.002 (0.176)	−0.128 (0.148)	−0.138 (0.243)
<i>SQ Location</i>	0.500* (0.257)	0.500** (0.254)	0.606** (0.297)	0.504** (0.245)	0.560 (0.359)
Constant	−0.306 (0.587)	−0.294 (0.544)	−0.168 (0.783)	−0.301 (0.581)	−0.777 (0.836)
Observations	145	145	100	145	93
Log Likelihood	−79.206	−79.207	−57.788	−79.207	−50.233
Akaike Inf. Crit.	172.411	170.414	127.577	170.414	112.466

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results of these tests are presented in Table 4. Here, Model 6 includes indicator variables for all three electoral transition scenarios, with the uncompetitive electoral scenario (i.e., no possibility of major pivotal actor changes) serving as the reference category. Models 7-8 focus on Scenario 1 (policy deceleration) specifically, while Models 9-12 examine Scenarios 2 and 3 separately. Much like those presented above, the results in these models provide little support for H_1 or H_2 . Reauthorization opportunities arising within Scenario 1, which generates conditions for policy deceleration, are no less likely to be met with policy movements than opportunities arising under other scenarios, according to Models 6-8. Likewise, opportunities arising within Scenarios 2 and 3, both of which generate conditions for policy acceleration, are no more likely to be met with policy movements.

Table 4.2: Electoral Scenarios and Significant Reauthorizations

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Significant Reauthorization						
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Scenario 1 (Deceleration)</i>	-0.189 (0.481)	0.381 (0.741)	0.288 (0.760)				
<i>Scenario 2 (Acceleration)</i>	0.136 (0.786)			-0.698 (2.604)	-0.734 (2.488)		
<i>Scenario 3 (Acceleration)</i>	-0.159 (0.564)					-0.346 (0.589)	-0.393 (0.684)
<i>Prev. Majority Match</i>	0.374 (0.468)	0.478 (0.419)	0.150 (0.549)	0.452 (0.423)	0.752 (0.578)	0.448 (0.437)	0.722 (0.655)
Constant	0.656 (0.513)	0.412 (0.360)	0.712 (0.491)	0.472 (0.358)	0.358 (0.506)	0.496 (0.392)	0.422 (0.632)
Observations	137	141	101	141	95	140	94
Log Likelihood	-82.887	-86.719	-61.326	-86.760	-55.546	-86.179	-54.904
Akaike Inf. Crit.	175.775	179.437	128.652	179.519	117.093	178.358	115.808

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.6 Discussion and Conclusions

Congress's electoral history has varied considerably in terms of electoral competitiveness. Indeed, Congress has experienced prolonged eras of partisan dominance (e.g., Democrats for much of the 20th Century) and intense competition over control of congressional majorities (e.g., the mid-1990s to present day). In spite of these dramatic differences over time, current models of agenda-setting and policy change have rarely considered how electoral competition might influence the strategic environment within which policy change occurs. Yet, as Crosson's model, as well as those of [Dziuda and Loeper \(2018\)](#), [Buisseret and Bernhardt \(2017\)](#), and others demonstrate theoretically, changes in electoral competition and uncertainty can influence fundamental behaviors and outcomes within legislatures, such as agenda-setting dynamics, voting, and sponsorship patterns.

In spite of theoretical advances into the legislative ramifications of electoral competition, few studies have examined these ramifications empirically, due to selection effects and measurement challenges. Such challenges are especially difficult to address when examining agenda-setting, given that actual observations of gatekeeping are typically unattainable. In this paper, I provide an empirical strategy and series of tests to address these challenges, in order to examine the agenda-setting ramifications of electoral competition. To do so, I make use of the reauthorizations process, wherein opportunities for policy change are predictable and measurable—allowing one to determine whether or not agenda-setters have chosen to change policy when presented with the opportunity to do so. I pair an original dataset of nearly 150 reauthorization opportunities with Clinton and Meirowitz's method for scoring bill proposal and status quo locations, generating data capable of testing Crosson's predictions about strategic acceleration

and deceleration of agenda-setters' policy change efforts.

Ultimately, while the results presented from this method provide little evidence about the electoral underpinnings of agenda setting, they are consistent with previous bill-level tests of policy change. Much like [Clinton \(2012\)](#), for instance, the findings presented here are largely inconsistent not only with the dynamic spatial model posited by Crosson, but also with the static models proposed by [Krehbiel \(1998\)](#), [Chiou and Rothenberg \(2003\)](#), and others. In fact, the most consistent finding here, and in other bill-level tests of policy change, is that policy change is considerably rarer than is typically predicted, only occurring when the status quo lies far out of equilibrium.

Given that the dataset presented here represents a nearly five-fold increase in size over those employed in similar studies, these data on reauthorizations will remain useful in examining other predictors of policy change at the bill level. Given the particular benefits of focusing on the reauthorizations process, the data should prove especially useful for researchers interested in agenda-setting—particularly if additional reauthorization streams, and consequently additional reauthorization opportunities, are added to the existing data. Still, it should be noted that the selection issue highlighted both in the results section and in the appendix below should not be underestimated. Indeed, given that the selection models reveal *more* status quo movements under voice votes than under scorable roll calls, a key portion of the reauthorizations story is clearly not told in the preceding analysis.

Unfortunately, given the measurement strategy adopted here, roll calls remain necessary for measuring whether reauthorization opportunities should be met with acceleration or deceleration. Strategies for addressing such potential selection bias therefore remain outside of the scope of this study. Nevertheless, given the many advantages to studying reauthorizations

specifically, future studies should explore possible solutions to these challenges. One strategy may be to develop *SQ* measures that rely less heavily on roll call data, such as those offered by [Crosson, Furnas and Lorenz \(n.d.\)](#). Such measures would require a great deal more position-taking data than are currently available, but they would help to circumvent challenges presented by voice votes. Short of such new preference measures, one option may be to abandon the spatial component of policy acceleration and deceleration entirely, testing only whether exposure to acceleration or deceleration electoral dynamics appears to be correlated with significant reauthorizations (similar to a robustness check executed above). Finally, as a middle ground, one could conceivably locate reauthorization-opportunity status quos using locational point estimates for broad issue areas, a la [Richman \(2011\)](#). Though not bill specific, these estimates could provide some spatial information on reauthorization status quos, which could be paired with the electoral information generated in this paper to again test potential acceleration and deceleration agenda-setting dynamics.¹²

Regardless of the specific approach, I argue that the importance of understanding electoral effects on agenda-setting remains a crucial topic for future research, particularly as competition over majority in Congress intensifies. Given the usefulness of the reauthorizations process for understanding congressional agenda-setting, future adaptations of the reauthorizations data developed in this study should prove useful to continued examinations of the electoral underpinnings of policy change in the U.S. Congress.

¹²Given that [Lowande \(n.d.\)](#) has vastly expanded Richman's original dataset in a current working paper, this approach may be even more plausible than was previously the case.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions, Implications, and Directions for Future Research

Few modern scholars have generated more knowledge on both agenda-setting and political parties in American politics than E.E. Schattschneider, who famously claimed that “democracy is unthinkable, save in terms of parties” (Schattschneider, 1942). Parties, as Schattschneider argued, “define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process” (Schattschneider, 1960). Inasmuch as party control of the voting agenda in legislatures helps parties more clearly define these alternatives, one may reasonably argue that empowering political parties with such agenda control serves important, positive democratic ends.

Nevertheless, as with any other allocation of power within a political system, partisan agenda control carries with it potential externalities—some of which may be viewed as negative. This dissertation has posited theoretically and examined empirically some of the far-reaching externalities of partisan control of the agenda in American legislatures, finding evidence that partisan agenda control influences several fundamental legislative outcomes. Crucially, these externalities materialize *apart* from the influence of partisan polarization alone.

First, given a party's desire to maintain a strong, unified brand, partisan control of the voting agenda stymies policy change in American legislatures. Particularly when *paired* with ideological polarization, such partisan agenda-setting institutions appear able to stymie policy change at a surprisingly substantial rate. While previous research has suggested that parties' pursuit of a unified brand likely influences the content and frequency of policy change, studies focusing on Congress alone struggled to investigate the magnitude of this effect. By leveraging the institutional richness of the U.S. state legislatures, I demonstrate that the association between partisan agenda-setting rules and overall policy change is a substantial one.

In itself, a desire for partisan unity need not be a negative characteristic of political parties. Insofar as parties provide voters with "alternatives of public policy," partisan unity even clarifies these alternatives, ensuring that voters understand how their vote will eventually translate into public policy. Moreover, when partisans wield clear control of the legislative agenda, voters may more easily attribute particular policy proposals to a majority party and hold it accountable accordingly. However, insofar as voters hope for policy *change*, partisan agenda control may hamper a legislature's ability to provide some of these changes. Whether such slowing of policy change harms a legislature's *responsiveness* to public opinion, of course, remains an important empirical question for future research. Indeed, it may be possible that legislatures with strong partisan agenda-setters change policy less frequently but are nevertheless better able to coordinate around programmatic policy goals in response to electoral mandates. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 ("Stalemate in the States") provides strong evidence that partisan agenda control slows policy change in a notable manner. More than simply aiding parties in maintaining a unified brand, partisan agenda control has strong implications for overall policy output in a legislature.

Beyond the policymaking ramifications of partisan unity, my dissertation also provides reasons to suspect that parties' *forward-looking* electoral perspectives generate additional externalities associated with empowering parties with legislative agenda control. As I detail theoretically in Chapter 3 ("Mandate to Message") and Chapter 4 ("Elections and (In)action"), parties face incentives to strategically speed up or slow down the policymaking process, based on their assessments of how outcomes of the upcoming election will materialize. To be clear, the empirical evidence offered in "Elections and (In)action" is inconclusive at best on this point. Nevertheless, the potential for differential agenda-setting based on electoral scenario seems plausible and raises interesting questions about supposed electoral mandates and accountability.

Irrespective of agenda-setters' actual responses to such electoral dynamics, individual legislators do appear to factor electoral dynamics and their potential policymaking ramifications into how seriously they engage with the lawmaking process. As I argue in "Mandate to Message," legislators offer viable legislative proposals more frequently when conditions for policy acceleration obtain, while offering less costly position-taking legislation when conditions for policy deceleration obtain. This set of findings suggests not only that members use traditional lawmaking activities for non-legislative ends, but that electoral competition itself occasionally discourages members from faithfully pursuing policy changes on behalf of their constituents.

Here again, the desire to maximize policy gains over multiple legislative sessions is not itself a negative feature of political parties. However, insofar as voters support particular political parties due to their electoral promises to address specific policy issues, postponing policy change seems unresponsive at best and dishonest at worst. Indeed, while Schattschneider is undoubtedly correct in his assertion that "[t]he people are powerless if the political enterprise is not competitive," a potentially ironic ramification of such partisan competition is that party leaders

may choose *against* moving forward with viable policy changes—at least when they are empowered by agenda control institutions. Perhaps even more ironically, under some conditions members may be *less* likely to engage seriously with the policymaking process when partisan competition is heightened, instead drafting entirely non-viable legislation in an appeal to key electoral constituencies. Sulkin (2005) does find that voters are typically satisfied with bill sponsorship alone as a fulfillment of campaign promises (in that they do not punish legislators who offer legislation that fails to gain traction); yet, nonviable messaging legislation certainly provides fewer tangible benefits to voters, in terms of policy representation.

Taken together, the findings in this dissertation underscore some potentially unintended consequences of empowering legislative parties with agenda control. Still, as Aldrich (1995) argues in a gesture toward Schattschneider’s famous remark about parties, “democracy is *unworkable* save in terms of parties” (emphasis mine). Apart from the representational benefits that well-organized parties provide, the organizational and coordinating work that parties do within legislatures reasonably prompts the question: even if partisan agenda control carries with it potentially negative externalities, is functional agenda control in America legislatures feasible, apart through political parties? Fortunately, a variety of non-partisan reforms throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries provide avenues for future investigation in this regard.

Most radically, Nebraska famously abolished parties altogether within its legislature, beginning in the Progressive Era, when parties were seen as undemocratic machines that rewarded loyalty more than policy innovation or faithful representation. Short of this extreme measure, though, many other legislative chambers manage to organize their voting agenda via nonpartisan means. In some states, votes are granted via chronological order by introduction date, while in others votes are allotted via alphabetical order of primary sponsor. Still others even employ

a random draw. Most recently, Colorado took non-partisan agenda control a step further, shifting from strong partisan agenda control institutions to a system of guaranteed votes on all legislation arising from committee. These changes were instituted through the GAVEL (“Give a Vote to Every Legislator”) Initiative of 1988, suggesting that states with active referendum systems could implement similar changes through the initiative process, if interested. While the overall effectiveness of these institutions remains a subject for future study, partisan control of the legislative agenda does not appear to be the only feasible—or perhaps even the best—means for setting the legislative agenda. This dissertation provides a rationale for why citizens may wish to reassess the role that legislative parties play in the control of the policymaking agenda in U.S. legislatures.

Beyond this critical assessment of the role of political parties in the policymaking process, the research presented in the preceding pages provides a wide variety of new and useful data to future studies of agenda-setting and policy change in both state legislatures and the U.S. Congress. In state legislatures, “Stalemate in the States” generates not only a large number of agenda-control-adjusted gridlock intervals, but also a template for generating significance-adjusted measurements of policy change that are comparable across state lines. The latter offer a means by which future studies may explore other determinants of policy change between the states, as well as the extent to which policy change may influence other outcomes such as economic growth. The former are useful for examining outcomes besides policy change, such as cross-state differences in executive oversight.

Similarly, the many new measures developed in “Mandate to Message” and “Elections and (In)action” enable future investigations of the policymaking process in Congress. First and foremost, these two chapters each develop new measures of status quo and bill proposal lo-

cations, useful for examining theories of policymaking at the bill level. In “Elections and (In)action,” I introduce reauthorizations data useful for a wide variety of applications, including policy specific investigations like those executed by [Clinton \(2012\)](#) as well as studies that may compare policymaking dynamics *across* a diverse set of issue areas. “Mandate to Message,” on the other hand, provides both a large dataset of bill proposal and status quo locations for more individual bills than ever available before, as well as a framework for extending such measures to earlier time periods. Indeed, were one to collect additional interest group position-taking data, an endeavor within my own future research agenda, such point estimates could theoretically extend back as far as roll call data and cosponsorship information are available.

Whether with these data or new data on both Congress and state legislatures, my aim is that the ramifications of partisan agenda control underscored in this dissertation encourage further critical assessment of partisan agenda control in American legislatures, beyond the canonical findings about partisan unity. As I have argued here, partisan control of the voting agenda in a legislature carries with it potentially far-reaching consequences, including the observed level of policy change within a political system and even individual legislators’ engagement with the lawmaking process. Still, these ramifications scratch only the surface of the many potential ramifications of party agenda control in a legislature. In the state legislative context, for example, strong legislative party leadership likely influences inter-branch relations and sharpens the consequences of divided government. In both Congress and the state legislatures, partisan control of the agenda serves to centralize electoral efforts and focus within the legislature (as [Powell \(2017\)](#), [Heberlig and Larson \(2012\)](#), and others have underscored) and it may well influence how third-party actors such as interest groups interact with the legislature. Moreover, for most of these potential consequences, the rise of insecure majorities in Congress (and even

some state legislatures) deepens the potential impacts of partisan control of the agenda. Beyond accentuating the value of partisan unity and messaging, for example, insecure majorities raise interesting questions for parties about how and when to change policy, as I begin to explore here.

In sum, although political parties—including legislative parties—generate numerous societal benefits, polarization and insecure majorities raise a wide variety of questions about the consequences of empowering parties with agenda control. In theory, parties bring a broader perspective to public policy than do interest groups or even individual legislators, for example. However, in practice, their focus on winning elections and maintaining control of government both at the federal and state levels generates incentives that are occasionally perverse. By tracing some of these incentives through the policymaking process, this dissertation has provided evidence that these incentives serve to slow policy change and, at times, encourage messaging over lawmaking. Using the new data and measurement strategies developed in each preceding chapter, new studies may continue to investigate how partisan control of the agenda influences democratic rule.

APPENDIX A

Chapter 2 Appendix


A: Negative Agenda Control and Core Size (H1)

According to H1, the presence of negative-agenda-control institutions should positively predict core size. I find support for this assertion.

Figure A1 plots the number of additional veto players due to negative agenda control (ranging from zero to two) against core size. As expected, an increase in number of veto players correlates with an increase in core size. However, as demonstrated by the core size overlap between the agenda-control categories, absorption is a very real phenomenon in the data, as are cross-state differences in the overall level of preference polarization.

To examine whether or not this relationship between negative agenda control and core size is robust to the incorporation of other covariates relevant to core size, I estimate a linear model of core size, first using panel corrected standard errors, and then using state-level random effects with year fixed effects. Along with the number of veto players/negative agenda control, I include the variables *Bill Introductions* (number of bills introduced during a state-biennium), *Number of Interest Groups*, *Professionalism*, *Initiatives* (number of initiatives passed in a state-year), *Partisan Dominance* (folded six-year Ranney Index), *State GDP* (economic output in a state-year, in

Figure A.1: Negative Agenda Control and Core Size



Note: Each of the three shapes above are kernel density plots at each value of the independent variable, and the blue diamond represents the mean of the dependent variable at that value.

chained 1997 dollars), a *Divided Government* dummy, state-year *Population*, *Average Ideology* in both the upper and lower chambers, and total *Number of Legislators* in a state. Table A1 summarizes the results.

As Table A1 demonstrates, the presence of negative agenda control does indeed positively correlate with a state's core size. This result is significant at the $p < .01$ level. As predicted, negative agenda control appears to matter for core size in the aggregate: a larger number of veto players (via the introduction of negative agenda control) is associated with larger core sizes. This is not a surprising result, given that the presence of negative agenda control is used to calculate core size itself. However, it does establish that these data square with theoretical expectations regarding veto players and core size and offer an opportunity to test H2 and H3.

Table A.1: Negative Agenda Control and Core Size

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Size of Core	
	(1)	(2)
<i>Negative Agenda Control</i>	0.105*** (0.023)	0.100*** (0.035)
<i>Bill Introductions</i>	0.00002*** (0.00000)	0.00001* (0.00000)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	0.00004 (0.00005)	0.00003 (0.0001)
<i>Professionalism</i>	-0.441 (0.305)	0.045 (0.306)
<i>Initiatives</i>	-0.0001 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	-1.612*** (0.232)	-1.030*** (0.249)
<i>State GDP</i>	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)
<i>Divided Government</i>	-0.032 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.020)
<i>Population</i>	-0.000 (0.00000)	0.000 (0.00000)
<i>Average Ideology (Upper Chamber)</i>	-0.085 (0.053)	-0.220*** (0.058)
<i>Average Ideology (Lower Chamber)</i>	0.086 (0.056)	0.138** (0.058)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.001 (0.001)
Constant	0.447*** (0.096)	0.274** (0.120)
Observations	357	357
R ²		0.136
Adjusted R ²		0.105
Log Likelihood	-99.829	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	225.658	
State effects?	N	Y

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B: Policy Change, Core Size, and the Distribution of Status Quos

As I note throughout my analysis, the distribution of status quo policies—and the potential uneven nature of this distribution across states and time—presents a challenge to results presented in Section III especially. Indeed, if a low amount of policy change is observed, for example, it could be the result of what the *previous* legislature accomplished: should the previous legislature have accomplished many of the potential objectives of the current legislature, the current legislature is not likely to change policy a great deal. The opposite holds true if the previous legislature moved policy in a direction opposed that desired by the current legislature: in that case, an abundance of opportunities for policy change exist. As noted in Section III, Clinton (2012) and Tsebelis (2002) both note this possibly.¹

To address this potential challenge, I have introduced two key control variables into variables found into the models presented in Table 1. The variables are designed to address the possibility that the *availability* changeable status quo policies vary, depending on the actions of the previous legislature. The first variable, *Core Shift* represents the absolute value of the difference between the midpoint of the gridlock interval in time t , compared to time $t - 1$:

$$Core\ Shift = \left| \left[\frac{Core_{leftedge} + Core_{rightedge}}{2} \right]_t - \left[\frac{Core_{leftedge} + Core_{rightedge}}{2} \right]_{t-1} \right|$$

This variable resembles the “alternation” variable employed by Tsebelis (2002, chapter 7) and, to a lesser extent, the “Change in Governmental Regime” used by Krehbiel (1998). Bawn (1999) also employs a similar variable in her analysis. Tsebelis’s alternation variable represents

¹The importance of this consideration notwithstanding, Clinton (2012) does show that the distribution of status quo policy may not ultimately influence *on average* findings regarding gridlock interval size and policy change.

the distance between the midpoints of the current and previous governments within a country. Krehbiel's governmental regime variable delineates whether there was a change from unified to divided, divided to unified, or no change in government. The aim of these variables is to capture how the previous configuration of veto players may influence the distribution of status quo policies. In Tsebelis's case, a shift in government preferences implies that a great deal of opportunities exist for policy change, on the assumption that the previous government moved policy in an undesirable direction. In Krehbiel's case, a switch from divided to unified government may imply that little policy change occurred in the previous Congress, leaving ample opportunity for such change in the current Congress—and vice versa.² In the case of this study, the *Core Shift* variable attempts to measure how different the previous legislative regime was ideologically, compared the present regime. If, for example, veto players were primarily conservative in the previous legislature and are primarily liberal in the current one, the distribution of status quo policies may favor policy change: the previous legislature may have moved policy in an “undesirable” direction. The converse applies if veto players in the current legislature are similar to those in the previous legislature. Thus, the expectation is that *Core Shift* should be positively associated with policy change, all else equal.

The second variable, *Lagged Enactments*, captures a related, though different, potential correlate with the distribution of status quo policies. Here, the inclusion of a simple lag of the dependent variable measures how much actual policy change occurred prior to the current legislature. Were the previous legislature successful in changing a great deal of status quo policies, it may be possible that fewer such status quo policies are available to the current legislature for

²It is important to note that, while Krehbiel includes this variable, he hypothesizes that it should not influence policy change—a finding that is supported in his data.

changing. On the other hand, it is possible that such productivity pulled the status quo farther away from the current legislature. Thus, to this variable, I add an interaction term (Models 4-7) between *Core Shift* and *Lagged Enactments*: perhaps *Core Shift* only influences the desirability of the status quo, conditional the previous legislature actually successfully changing it (captured with *Lagged Enactments*).

Table A2 summarizes the results. As is clear throughout all model specifications, *Core Size* remains negatively and statistically significant in its association with policy change. The new variables encounter more mixed results. *Core Shift*, for example, exhibits the hypothesized positive association, although the effect diminishes with the inclusion of state- and year-level effects. However, *Lagged Enactments* is consistently and positively associated with bill enactments. This may suggest that productivity in the previous session moved the status quo in such a way that created greater opportunities for policy change. Finally, the interaction term exhibits no significant relationship in any of the models. Taken together, these results provide evidence that Section III's results regarding negative-agenda-control adjusted core size and policy change are robust to possibility irregularities in the distribution of status quos.

Table A.2: Legislative Productivity, Controlling for Legislative History

	<i>Dependent variable: Logged Enactments</i>						
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>negative binomial</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Core Size</i>	-0.203** (0.086)	-0.202** (0.086)	-0.203** (0.086)	-0.189** (0.082)	-0.205** (0.087)	-0.200** (0.086)	-0.201** (0.087)
<i>Lagged Enactments</i>	0.594*** (0.039)	0.578*** (0.039)	0.593*** (0.039)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.606*** (0.046)	0.573*** (0.044)	0.585*** (0.044)
<i>Core Shift</i>	0.243* (0.127)	0.169 (0.124)	0.242* (0.289)	0.395 (0.284)	1.112 (1.742)	0.102 (0.289)	0.151 (0.292)
<i>Lagged Enactments* Size of Core Shift</i>				-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.132 (0.265)	0.00009 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)
<i>Bill Introductions * 1000</i>	0.1*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.009)	0.05*** (0.009)	0.1*** (0.01)	0.1*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.009)	0.05*** (0.009)
<i>Legislative Professionalism</i>	-0.724 (0.462)	-0.856* (0.451)	-0.724 (0.462)	-0.735* (0.430)	-0.742 (0.464)	-0.848* (0.453)	-0.713 (0.464)
<i>Initiatives</i>	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.451)	0.011 (0.010)	0.024** (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)
<i>Electoral Competition</i>	-0.104 (0.344)	-0.122 (0.346)	-0.105 (0.344)	0.272 (0.329)	-0.110 (0.345)	-0.115 (0.348)	-0.096 (0.346)
<i>Size of State Economy * 1000</i>	0.00 (0.00)	0.0007 (0.0007)	0.0008 (0.0007)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.0007 (0.0007)	0.0008 (0.0007)
<i>Divided Government</i>	-0.048 (0.034)	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.048 (0.034)	-0.026 (0.030)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.044 (0.032)	-0.048 (0.034)
<i>State Population</i>	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-1.52e-08 (2.37e-08)	-2.14e-08 (2.49e-08)	0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-1.51e-08 (2.37e-08)	-2.11e-08 (2.50e-08)
<i>Median Senate Ideology</i>	0.086 (0.079)	0.093 (0.080)	0.086 (0.080)	0.061 (0.079)	0.088 (0.079)	0.093 (0.080)	0.086 (0.079)
<i>Median House Ideology</i>	-0.039 (0.080)	-0.059 (0.081)	-0.039 (0.080)	-0.057 (0.077)	-0.039 (0.081)	-0.059 (0.081)	-0.040 (0.081)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0005)	-0.0003 (0.0004)
Constant	2.470*** (0.315)	2.792*** (0.283)	2.479*** (0.315)	5.895*** (0.135)	2.397*** (0.348)	2.822*** (0.306)	2.522*** (0.340)
Year Fixed Effects	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
State Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338	338
R ²	0.588	0.565	0.588		0.588	0.565	

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C: Robustness Checks for H3 Analysis

Table A.3: Results - ATT/ATC for Negative Agenda Control (Non-Partisan Distances)

	ATT	ATC
<i>Estimate</i>	-18.333	-14.308
<i>AI Standard Error</i>	7.0692	5.0399
<i>t-statistic</i>	-2.5934	-2.8389
<i>p-value</i>	0.0096	0.0045
Original Number of Observations	49	49
Original Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	36	13
Matched Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	36	13

Table A.4: Results - ATT/ATC for Negative Agenda Control (Partisan Polarization Distances)

	ATT	ATC
<i>Estimate</i>	-21.25	-13.769
<i>AI Standard Error</i>	7.0448	6.7273
<i>t-statistic</i>	-3.0164	-2.0468
<i>p-value</i>	0.0026	0.0407
Original Number of Observations	49	49
Original Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	36	13
Matched Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	36	13

Table A.5: Results - ATT/ATC for Negative Agenda Control (Using Bill Enactments)

	ATT	ATC
<i>Estimate</i>	-341.36	-394.22
<i>AI Standard Error</i>	78.031	89.017
<i>t-statistic</i>	-4.3747	-4.4286
<i>p-value</i>	0.000012	0.000009
Original Number of Observations	359	359
Original Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	265	94
Matched Number of Treated (Control) Obs.	265	94

Figure A.2: Marginal Effects for Modelling Assessment of H3 Using Matching Variables - Enactments




Figure A.3: Marginal Effects for Modelling Assessment of H3 Using Matching Variables - ACA Compliance




Table A.6: Modelling Assessment of H3, Using Matching Variables (Enactments)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Logged Enactments
<i>Negative Agenda Control</i>	-0.237*** (0.040)
<i>Distance between Chamber Medians</i>	-0.468 (0.385)
<i>House Majority Median to Chamber Median</i>	0.106 (0.274)
<i>Senate Majority Median to Chamber Median</i>	0.239 (0.277)
<i>Distance between Chamber Majority Medians</i>	-0.010 (0.212)
<i>House Chamber Median to Senate Majority Median</i>	0.142 (0.337)
<i>Senate Chamber Median to House Majority Median</i>	-0.003 (0.275)
<i>Bill Introductions</i>	0.00004*** (0.00001)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	-0.0001 (0.0001)
<i>Legislative Professionalism</i>	-1.222** (0.518)
<i>Initiatives</i>	0.009 (0.014)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	1.581*** (0.446)
<i>State GDP</i>	-0.00000 (0.00000)
<i>Divided Government</i>	0.023 (0.042)
<i>State Population</i>	0.00000* (0.00000)
<i>Average Upper Chamber Ideology</i>	0.042 (0.097)
<i>Average Lower Chamber Ideology</i>	-0.146 (0.101)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	0.0003 (0.001)
Constant	6.416*** (0.208)
Observations	358
Year Fixed Effects?	Y
R ²	0.336
Adjusted R ²	0.282
Residual Std. Error	0.561 (df = 330)
F Statistic	6.183*** (df = 27; 330)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Modelling Assessment of H3, Using Matching Variables (ACA Implementation)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	ACA Implementation
<i>Chambers with Negative Agenda Control</i>	-0.359*** (0.079)
<i>Distance between Chamber Medians</i>	-2.222** (1.069)
<i>House Chamber Median to Majority Median</i>	-1.999*** (0.630)
<i>Senate Chamber Median to Majority Median</i>	-1.584*** (0.588)
<i>Distance Between Majority Medians</i>	-3.034*** (0.668)
<i>Senate Majority Median to House Chamber Median</i>	2.869*** (0.883)
<i>Senate Chamber Median to House Majority Median</i>	3.446*** (0.806)
<i>Democratic Governor</i>	0.258* (0.157)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	-0.0001 (0.0001)
<i>Legislative Professionalism</i>	-3.420*** (1.002)
<i>2008 Obama Vote Share</i>	0.973 (1.028)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	0.524 (0.971)
<i>State GDP</i>	0.00000*** (0.00000)
<i>Divided Government</i>	-0.159** (0.076)
<i>Average Core Ideology</i>	-0.133 (0.150)
Constant	2.614*** (0.598)
Observations	49
Log Likelihood	-147.296
θ	14.349* (7.325)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	326.591

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 ; model is Negative Binomial

Table A.8: Decomposition of Core Analysis (Enactments)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Logged Enactments			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Core Size - Chamber Distance</i>		-0.588*** (0.160)		-0.610*** (0.161)
<i>Distance between Chamber Medians</i>	-0.228* (0.126)	-0.129 (0.127)	-0.233* (0.126)	-0.132 (0.127)
<i>Bill Introductions</i>	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)
<i>Legislative Professionalism</i>	-0.940* (0.502)	-1.149** (0.497)	-0.939* (0.520)	-1.143** (0.514)
<i>Initiatives</i>	0.037*** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.038*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	1.262*** (0.405)	1.055*** (0.403)	1.269*** (0.408)	1.061*** (0.405)
<i>State GDP</i>	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)
<i>Divided Government</i>	0.015 (0.038)	0.014 (0.038)	0.006 (0.041)	0.006 (0.040)
<i>State Population</i>	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)	0.00000** (0.00000)
<i>Average Ideology - Upper Chamber</i>	0.023 (0.088)	0.027 (0.087)	0.012 (0.089)	0.014 (0.088)
<i>Average Ideology - Lower Chamber</i>	-0.136 (0.094)	-0.133 (0.092)	-0.125 (0.095)	-0.119 (0.093)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)	0.00000 (0.001)
Constant	6.184*** (0.158)	6.253*** (0.157)	6.193*** (0.259)	6.269*** (0.256)
Observations	419	419	419	419
R ²	0.214	0.239	0.228	0.255
Adjusted R ²	0.193	0.217	0.189	0.215
Residual Std. Error	0.592 (df = 407)	0.583 (df = 406)	0.594 (df = 398)	0.584 (df = 397)
F Statistic	10.062*** (df = 11; 407)	10.626*** (df = 12; 406)	5.867*** (df = 20; 398)	6.454*** (df = 21; 397)

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A.9: Decomposition of Core Analysis (ACA Compliance)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	ACA Implementation Counts	
	(1)	(2)
<i>Distance between Chamber Medians</i>	-0.297 (0.271)	-0.096 (0.243)
<i>Core Size - Chamber Distance</i>		-1.292** (0.598)
<i>Democratic Governor</i>	0.449** (0.185)	0.470*** (0.162)
<i>Legislative Professionalism</i>	-3.184** (1.322)	-2.564** (1.223)
<i>Partisan Dominance</i>	0.243 (1.471)	0.304 (1.379)
<i>State GDP*</i>	0.00000 (0.00000)	0.00000* (0.00000)
<i>Divided Government</i>	-0.109*** (0.071)	-0.107* (0.062)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0002* (0.0001)
<i>State Population</i>	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)
<i>Average Core Ideology</i>	-0.119 (0.169)	-0.171 (0.158)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)
Constant	2.881*** (0.267)	2.767*** (0.267)
Observations	49	49
Log Likelihood	-161.063	-158.372
θ	4.500*** (1.292)	5.201*** (1.556)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	344.125	340.745

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

D: Balance Statistics for Matching Analysis

Figure A.4: Balance Statistics for Matching Analysis

Covariate Balance Before and After Matching			
	<i>Before Matching</i>	<i>After Matching (-ATT)</i>	<i>After Matching (ATC)</i>
Majority Median Distances			
Mean Treatment	0.31868	0.31868	0.30546
Mean Control	0.38054	0.33033	0.38054
Standardized Mean Differences	-14.406	-2.7141	-14.512
T-test p -value	0.73341	0.82652	0.146
Majority to Chamber - Lower House			
Mean Treatment	0.23439	0.23439	0.20416
Mean Control	0.24964	0.23503	0.24964
Standardized Mean Differences	-8.2186	-0.34426	-42.591
T-test p -value	0.80268	0.97807	0.17567
Majority to Chamber - Upper House			
Mean Treatment	0.21928	0.21928	0.25764
Mean Control	0.28851	0.25968	0.28851
Standardized Mean Differences	-42.041	-24.53	-13.892
T-test p -value	0.26446	0.11971	0.47024
Lower House Majority to Upper Chamber			
Mean Treatment	0.371	0.371	0.44479
Mean Control	0.46531	0.39955	0.46531
Standardized Mean Differences	-25.765	-7.799	-4.6275
T-test p -value	0.49346	0.23697	0.57153
Lower House Chamber to Upper Majority			
Mean Treatment	0.31708	0.31708	0.29805
Mean Control	0.34474	0.30781	0.34474
Standardized Mean Differences	-8.5254	2.8569	-11.004
T-test p -value	0.84268	0.81438	0.42549
Distance between Chambers			
Mean Treatment	0.22419	0.22419	0.27979
Mean Control	0.26644	0.224	0.26644
Standardized Mean Differences	-15.155	0.066424	3.7593
T-test p -value	0.6556	0.9946	0.80653
Divided Government			
Mean Treatment	0.44444	0.44444	0.23077
Mean Control	0.38462	0.36111	0.38462
Standardized Mean Differences	5.8277	8.1172	-18.49
T-test p -value	0.84132	0.25604	0.15013
Governor's Party			
Mean Treatment	0.44444	0.44444	0.30769
Mean Control	0.38462	0.33333	0.38462
Standardized Mean Differences	11.872	22.048	-16.013
T-test p -value	0.71828	0.24726	0.31847
Size of State Economy			
Mean Treatment	236858	236858	211963
Mean Control	230507	241205	230507
Standardized Mean Differences	2.751	-1.8829	-7.1752
T-test p -value	0.95976	0.93854	0.75644
Interest Group Population			
Mean Treatment	1173.6	1173.6	979.73
Mean Control	905.73	1006.6	905.73
Standardized Mean Differences	28.453	17.742	9.4972
T-test p -value	0.29136	0.10241	0.3988
2008 Obama Vote Share			
Mean Treatment	0.51136	0.51136	0.45007
Mean Control	0.49475	0.48222	0.49475
Standardized Mean Differences	17.892	31.391	-63.051
T-test p -value	0.61687	0.18347	0.1262

E: Controlling for Possibility of Filibuster

While very little literature exists on filibustering activity in state legislatures, at least two accounts of debate length rules exist: a 2009 report compiled by a researcher with the Connecticut state legislature (<https://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0249.htm>, hereafter, the “Connecticut Report”) and a 2007 report by two researchers with the National Conference of State Legislatures. These sources provide useful information on possible supermajoritarian practices in state legislatures, but including them in the analysis implies some key ambiguities and difficulties. I detail these difficulties below and demonstrate that the main results concerning core size and policy change remain unchanged.

According to both the Connecticut and NCSL reports, a filibuster is impossible in the vast majority of states across the U.S. (36 in total), as most chambers possess strict, written limits on the length of time any legislature or debate may last. In the remaining 14 states, a filibuster is *possible*, indicating that filibuster activity could drive policy change downward in those states. However, this connection between policy change and the presence and absence of such rules is ambiguous: just because filibustering is possible does not guarantee that filibustering has ever occurred in the chamber in question (Kurtz 2007). Further complicating the measurement of a filibuster pivot is the presence or absence of cloture rules. That is, in at least four of the cases for which a filibuster is possible, no cloture rule appears to exist, according to the Connecticut report on debate limitations.³ Finally, in some states, there is ambiguity on what kind of vote is needed to invoke cloture, even when such a rule exists. Indeed, if the cloture requirement is a simple majority, then filibustering may not add to policy change. However, as Fong and

³In the extreme, this could suggest that every legislator is a veto player.

Krehbiel (2018) underscore, even small inconveniences or acts of obstruction can have dramatic influence on policymaking. Taken together, these difficulties and ambiguities constitute the primary reasons for not formally including filibuster pivots in my gridlock interval calculations: whether or not a filibuster pivot exists in a state is itself ambiguous, and even if a filibuster is possible, cloture rules (which are necessary for locating the filibuster pivot) are not universally clear or available.

In spite of these difficulties, I introduce three variables to control for possibility that the presence of a filibuster pivot slows policy change. The first variable, drawn from the Connecticut Report, is a three-way categorical variable that accounts for whether or not a chamber has predetermined limits on speech. The variable takes on the value “2” if both chambers lack a speech limit, “1” if only one chamber lacks such limits, and “0” if neither chamber lacks such limits. Thus, higher values of this variable, which I call *Filibuster Possible*, indicate a higher probability that filibustering occurs within a state. I expect this (and all filibuster-related variables) to be negatively associated with policy change. The second variable, *Filibuster Rule*, indicates whether or not a state possesses explicit cloture rules governing “unlimited” speech. This variable is drawn from a combination of both the Connecticut and NCSL reports and takes on a “2” if both of a state’s chambers possess a cloture rule, “1” if just one chamber possesses such a rule, and “0” otherwise. Because cloture rules imply that debate limitations are necessary (i.e., that filibusters actually occur), higher values of this variable should indicate a larger probability of filibustering. Finally, the third variable I employ, *Cloture Threshold*, incorporates supermajoritarian cloture thresholds more directly. For this variable, I first gather available measures on supermajoritarian cloture thresholds, found within the NCSL reports. Then, for the states in which supermajoritarian cloture requirements exist, *Cloture Threshold* takes on the value of that

requirement—and zero otherwise. Thus, for a state with a Senate requiring three-fifths majority to invoke cloture, *Cloture Threshold* = .6. If both chambers possess supermajority requirements, *Cloture Threshold* takes on the value of the sum of supermajorities. Thus, in a state where both chambers require three-fifths majority to end debate, *Cloture Threshold* = 1.2. Assuming that higher majority thresholds strengthen the power of a filibuster, I again expect that higher values of this variable should be negatively associated with policy change.

Table A12 summarizes the results. Models 1-3 are negative binomial models with no state- or year-level effects, models 4-6 are OLS models of logged enactments with year-level effects, and models 7-9 are OLS models of logged enactments with both year- and state-level effects. In all cases, the presence of any filibuster-related variable strengthens the statistical relationship between core size and bill enactments, which remains negative and statistically significant across all model specifications. The filibuster variables themselves, however, exhibit less consistency. In models not including state-level effects, all three filibuster variables exhibit a negative and statistically significant relationship with policy change, as expected. However, when state-level effects are introduced, the variables fall out of significance. Nevertheless, the filibuster variables appear to function largely as expected.

Taken together, these results indicate that, while filibuster rules may play a part in determining how much policy change occurs within a state, they do not serve as a confounder for the observed relationship between the agenda-control-adjusted core variable and policy change. Future research may consider further exploration of debate rules in state legislatures, in order to determine if and where actual filibuster pivots exist—thereby better enabling their inclusion in gridlock interval calculations.

Table A.10: Filibuster Pivots and Policy Change

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Count of Enactments <i>negative binomial</i>				Logged Enactments <i>OLS</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
<i>Size of Core</i>	-0.391*** (0.087)	-0.389*** (0.086)	-0.323*** (0.089)	-0.341*** (0.096)	-0.333*** (0.096)	-0.257*** (0.098)	-0.167*** (0.072)	-0.167*** (0.072)	-0.150*** (0.074)
<i>Closure Threshold</i>	-0.175*** (0.069)	-0.175*** (0.066)		-0.173*** (0.077)			-0.155 (0.154)		
<i>Closure Rule</i>					-0.145** (0.073)		-0.134 (0.137)		
<i>Filibuster Possible</i>			-0.103* (0.057)			-0.103 (0.064)			-0.106 (0.117)
<i>Bill Introductions</i>	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00005*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
<i>Number of Interest Groups</i>	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.00008)	-0.0001 (0.00008)	-0.0001 (0.00008)
<i>Professionalism</i>	-1.327*** (0.499)	-1.423*** (0.503)	-1.059** (0.508)	-1.246*** (0.574)	-1.294** (0.579)	-0.897 (0.586)	-0.134 (0.624)	-0.154 (0.622)	-0.054 (0.646)
<i>Initiatives</i>	0.015 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.022* (0.013)	0.021 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.027* (0.014)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)
<i>Electoral Competition</i>	1.187*** (0.403)	1.175*** (0.403)	1.024** (0.404)	1.362*** (0.447)	1.366*** (0.448)	1.232*** (0.448)	1.080* (0.564)	1.085* (0.562)	1.016* (0.557)
<i>Size of State Economy</i>	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	-0.00000 (0.00000)	7.14e-07 (7.25e-07)	6.74e-07 (7.34e-07)	7.45e-07 (7.23e-07)
<i>Divided Government</i>	0.015 (0.037)	0.019 (0.037)	0.016 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.043)	-0.052 (0.038)	-0.051 (0.038)	-0.053 (0.038)
<i>State Population</i>	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)	2.51e-09 (2.89e-08)	4.69e-09 (2.93e-08)	1.98e-09 (2.82e-08)
<i>Average Senate Ideology</i>	-0.040 (0.087)	-0.046 (0.087)	-0.052 (0.088)	0.003 (0.096)	0.001 (0.096)	-0.013 (0.097)	-0.039 (0.071)	-0.038 (0.071)	-0.044 (0.072)
<i>Average House Ideology</i>	-0.057 (0.091)	-0.071 (0.091)	-0.14 (0.092)	-0.138 (0.101)	-0.141 (0.101)	-0.092 (0.102)	-0.113 (0.070)	-0.114 (0.070)	-0.102 (0.070)
<i>Number of Legislators</i>	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)
Constant	6.654*** (0.166)	6.679*** (0.168)	6.579*** (0.161)	6.580*** (0.463)	6.571*** (0.464)	6.482*** (0.463)	6.369*** (0.322)	6.372*** (0.328)	6.350*** (0.310)
State Fixed Effects	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	357	357	357	357	357	357	357	357	357

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

F: Search Interface for Calculating ACA Measure

Figure A.5: Constructing the ACA Implementation Measure

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- Access to Primary Care
- Authorize/Plan/Fund
- Challenging and Alternatives
- Essential Health Benefits
- Health Centers
- Health Information Technology
- Health Insurance Exchanges
- Health Insurance Reform
- Medicaid and CHIP
- Other

STATES [Clear](#)

- All States
- Alabama
- Alaska
- Arizona
- Arkansas
- California
- Colorado
- Connecticut
- Delaware
- District of Columbia
- Florida

KEYWORD:

STATUS: BILL NUMBER: YEAR: AUTHOR:

Powered by [Lexipol/Novia State Node](#)

State	Access to Primary Care	Authorize/Plan/Fund	Challenging and Alternatives	Essential Health Benefits	Health Centers	Health Info Technology	Insurance Exchanges	Insurance Reform	Medicaid and CHIP	Prevention and Wellness	Workforce	Total Policy Change
Arkansas	0	4	0	0	0	0	6	5	7	0	2	24

APPENDIX B

Chapter 3 Appendix

A: Unified Acceleration Models

While the primary analysis in the paper separately examines policy acceleration under H_2 and H_3 , the results are robust to inclusion of all terms in a single model. Indeed, when all policy-acceleration-related variables are included in a single model, conditions for policy acceleration are consistently positively associated with the introduction of viable proposals. Here again, because all Congresses in the sample are subject to either policy acceleration or deceleration, inclusion of a unified policy acceleration term forces policy deceleration into the constant of the model. Even still, the constant term points in the expected (negative) direction.

Table A1 summarizes these results. In the table, odd-numbered models make use of all available data (less bills included in [AS,R]), while even-numbered models make use of bills first introduced in the House—analogueous to the presentation of results in the main text. Models 1 and 2 include no fixed effects, Models 3 and 4 include major issue topic fixed effects, and Models 5-6 include fixed effects for primary committee of referral. Finally, Models 7 and 8 winnow the sample to bills introduced by members who served in all five Congresses in the sample. In each model, errors are clustered by Congress.

Table B.1: Unified Acceleration Models (H2 and H3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Introduction of Viable Proposal							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Policy Acceleration</i>	2.117*** (0.274)	1.618*** (0.354)	2.493*** (0.328)	2.039*** (0.409)	2.233*** (0.299)	1.618*** (0.354)	2.058*** (0.370)	1.382** (0.572)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.224*** (0.404)	2.803*** (0.798)	1.275** (0.501)	2.727** (1.075)	1.454*** (0.357)	2.803*** (0.798)	1.195** (0.518)	3.624*** (1.056)
<i>SQ Location</i>	0.108 (0.074)	0.112 (0.102)	0.027 (0.091)	0.038 (0.138)	0.061 (0.073)	0.112 (0.102)	0.029 (0.097)	-0.017 (0.154)
<i> SQ Location </i>	2.130*** (0.170)	2.171*** (0.271)	2.522*** (0.251)	2.555*** (0.396)	2.358*** (0.201)	2.171*** (0.271)	2.065*** (0.214)	2.485*** (0.376)
<i>Female</i>	-0.398 (0.314)	-0.935** (0.453)	-0.363 (0.356)	-0.963* (0.537)	-0.339 (0.344)	-0.935** (0.453)	-0.204 (0.396)	-1.572** (0.664)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.462 (0.317)	1.383*** (0.525)	0.604 (0.395)	1.390** (0.675)	0.700** (0.313)	1.383*** (0.525)	0.714* (0.400)	2.703*** (0.792)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-1.270*** (0.260)	-1.294*** (0.446)	-1.250*** (0.326)	-1.290** (0.558)	-1.362*** (0.283)	-1.294*** (0.446)	-0.906** (0.394)	-0.287 (0.878)
Constant	-5.911*** (0.686)	-7.431*** (1.160)	-8.018*** (1.379)	-9.069*** (2.086)	-6.764*** (0.751)	-7.431*** (1.160)	-6.130*** (0.891)	-10.390*** (1.704)
Observations	753	445	710	419	753	445	409	225
Effects	None	None	Major Topic	Major Topic	Committee	Committee	None	None
Sample	Full	House Only	Full	House Only	Full	House Only	None	None
Log Likelihood	-254.075	-138.824	-211.030	-117.081	-233.456	-138.824	5-term Members	5-term Members
Akaike Inf. Crit.	526.150	293.647	476.059	288.163	550.913	293.647	-145.398	-58.890
							306.797	133.781

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The analysis presented in the body of the paper presents three sets of models, such that each hypothesis may be examined individually. However, the results in the paper are robust to the inclusion of both acceleration and deceleration variables in the same model. Indeed, as shown in Table A1, a unified policy acceleration term is strongly positively associated with the introduction of viable proposals, across a wide variety of model specifications. Here again, though, because all Congresses in the sample are subject to either policy acceleration or deceleration, the deceleration term is forced into the constant term. Even still, the constant exhibits the expected (negative) sign.

Table A1 demonstrates that these results are robust to a wide variety of model specifications. Models 1 and 2 include no effects, while Models 3 and 4 introduce issue area fixed effects and Models 5-6 introduce committee fixed effects. Each model exhibits a strong, positive relationship between exposure to conditions for policy acceleration and members' propensity to introduce viable legislation. Models 7 and 8 confine the sample to bills introduced by members who served in all five Congresses in the sample. Despite the sample restriction, the results remain substantively and statistically significant.

B: Bill Sponsorships by Members Serving in All Five Congresses

One possible confound for the observed patterns of viable and messaging legislation is that new members in a given Congress could be artificially deflating the number of viable proposals, due to their relative lack of legislative effectiveness. That is, rather than being attuned to the strategic dynamics generated by differences in agenda-setting behavior, newer members simply lack the information and skill necessary to draft legislation that could pass into law, if brought up for a vote. To address this possibility, I re-estimate each of the paper's models using only bills

introduced by members who served in all five Congresses in my sample.

Table A2 summarizes these results for tests of H_1 (policy deceleration). Even when restricting the sample to bills introduced by the aforementioned five-term members of Congress, the results remain largely robust, with seven of the models exhibit main results that are statistically significant. Models 1-4 include no effects, while Models 5-8 introduce issue area fixed effects and Models 9-12 introduce committee fixed effects. Additionally, as in the main text, odd models make use of the full sample, while even models restrict the sample to House bills alone. Moreover, Models 3-4, 7-8, and 11-12, further restrict the sample to include only SQ_i lying opposite the static gridlock interval relative to AS. The strongest results are found in these opposite-only models, perhaps due to the fact that they provide the most realistic comparison points for treated bills of interest.

Table B.2: Policy Deceleration Among Long-Serving Members

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>											
	Introduction of Viable Proposal											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>SQ ∈ Decel. Region</i>	-0.574 (0.362)	-1.008 (0.648)	-2.279*** (0.515)	-1.672** (0.709)	-1.051** (0.484)	-2.029** (0.880)	-3.399*** (0.866)	-4.242** (1.831)	-0.481 (0.401)	-0.663 (0.695)	-2.988*** (0.738)	-1.978 (1.216)
<i>Majority</i>	1.702*** (0.458)	4.186*** (1.044)	-1.223 (0.933)	-18.013*** (2.340)	1.849*** (0.606)	5.196*** (1.153)	-1.229 (1.793)	-21.840 (3,588.091)	1.915*** (0.437)	4.688*** (1.009)	-1.036 (1.070)	-21.489 (4,074.615)
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.132 (0.087)	-0.138 (0.161)	-0.168 (0.255)	0.145 (0.499)	-0.343*** (0.127)	-0.724** (0.292)	-0.402 (0.545)	-0.643 (1.043)	-0.221** (0.099)	-0.208 (0.183)	-0.493* (0.275)	-0.393 (0.821)
<i> SQ Location </i>	1.807*** (0.188)	2.398*** (0.367)	2.601*** (0.359)	2.850*** (0.547)	2.309*** (0.319)	3.655*** (0.690)	4.194*** (0.821)	5.729*** (1.751)	2.046*** (0.237)	2.826*** (0.459)	3.669*** (0.579)	4.397*** (0.993)
<i>Female</i>	-0.221 (0.363)	-1.599** (0.638)	-0.395 (0.473)	-1.459* (0.855)	-0.267 (0.461)	-1.679* (0.887)	-0.977 (0.864)	-1.604 (1.813)	-0.152 (0.431)	-1.521* (0.894)	0.185 (0.880)	-0.866 (1.735)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.821** (0.363)	3.076*** (0.879)	3.221*** (0.998)	3.001 (2.006)	1.141** (0.479)	4.280*** (1.017)	4.034** (2.051)	4.032 (3.280)	1.051** (0.410)	4.089*** (0.965)	4.982*** (1.174)	7.856** (3.854)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-0.582 (0.369)	-0.139 (1.066)	-0.703 (0.491)	-1.370 (0.930)	-0.567 (0.497)	-0.327 (0.962)	-1.013 (0.844)	-2.410 (1.604)	-0.617 (0.408)	-0.587 (1.057)	-0.718 (0.687)	-4.498* (2.726)
Constant	-5.368*** (0.817)	-10.079*** (1.555)	-4.140*** (1.515)	13.198*** (3.537)	-9.831*** (1.819)	-20.728*** (7.778)	-11.609*** (4.156)	1.118 (3,588.314)	-6.341*** (1.040)	-11.183*** (2.283)	-7.694*** (2.218)	14.718 (4,074.620)
Obs.	409	225	260	152	384	212	247	143	409	225	260	152
Effects	None	None	None	None	Issue	Issue	Issue	Issue	Comm.	Comm.	Comm.	Comm.
Chamber	Both	House	Both	House	Both	House	Both	House	Both	House	Both	House
Sample	All	All	Opp. AS	Opp. AS	All	All	Opp. AS	Opp. AS	All	All	Opp. AS	Opp. AS
Log Like.	-162.624	-60.806	-74.257	-34.337	-128.713	-42.167	-48.913	-18.940	-146.028	-47.775	-51.786	-18.354
AIC	341.248	137.612	164.515	84.673	311.426	138.334	151.826	91.880	372.056	169.549	183.572	110.708

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:

Table B.3: Policy Acceleration (H2) Among Long-Serving Members

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>											
	Introduction of Viable Proposal											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>SQ ∈ Accel.</i>	0.641 (0.482)	0.926 (0.962)	2.120*** (0.684)	1.059 (1.077)	1.051* (0.558)	2.436** (1.109)	3.102*** (1.084)	2.905* (1.731)	0.633 (0.534)	0.435 <i>Region</i> (1.005)	0.435 (1.005)	2.488*** (0.924)
<i>Majority</i>	1.642*** (0.460)	4.119*** (1.013)	-0.917 (0.877)	-16.693*** (2.276)	1.785*** (0.593)	5.208*** (1.153)	-0.986 (1.541)	-16.366 (2,280.062)	1.860*** (0.442)	4.659*** (1.021)	4.659*** (1.021)	-0.483 (1.074)
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.053 (0.080)	-0.006 (0.150)	0.033 (0.223)	0.029 (0.465)	-0.193* (0.105)	-0.377 (0.244)	-0.050 (0.399)	-0.631 (0.916)	-0.151 (0.100)	-0.132 (0.183)	-0.132 (0.183)	-0.194 (0.258)
<i> SQ Location </i>	1.819*** (0.189)	2.388*** (0.347)	2.427*** (0.341)	2.677*** (0.486)	2.292*** (0.313)	3.687*** (0.680)	3.637*** (0.650)	4.618*** (1.238)	2.057*** (0.237)	2.829*** (0.455)	2.829*** (0.455)	3.441*** (0.550)
<i>Female</i>	-0.248 (0.370)	-1.736*** (0.673)	-0.358 (0.490)	-1.566* (0.844)	-0.281 (0.463)	-2.202** (0.886)	-0.586 (0.726)	-2.252* (1.325)	-0.176 (0.433)	-1.661* (0.883)	-1.661* (0.883)	0.146 (0.783)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.937** (0.402)	3.282*** (0.800)	3.606*** (0.913)	4.268** (2.041)	1.295** (0.515)	4.909*** (1.107)	4.604*** (1.745)	6.951** (3.395)	1.178*** (0.439)	4.203*** (1.012)	4.203*** (1.012)	5.097*** (1.210)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-0.534 (0.355)	-0.220 (0.951)	-0.421 (0.570)	-1.399 (0.924)	-0.500 (0.471)	-0.705 (0.998)	-0.436 (0.937)	-2.250 (1.403)	-0.582 (0.402)	-0.701 (1.062)	-0.701 (1.062)	-0.408 (0.624)
Constant	-5.784*** (0.828)	-10.472*** (1.564)	-6.124*** (1.529)	10.721*** (3.475)	-10.387*** (1.885)	-22.573** (11.211)	-13.081*** (3.653)	-3.208 (2,280.139)	-6.737*** (1.018)	-11.313*** (2.249)	-11.313*** (2.249)	-10.265*** (2.139)
Obs.	409	225	260	152	384	212	247	143	409	225	225	260
Log Like.	-162.987	-61.685	-80.794	-36.790	-130.108	-42.734	-57.138	-22.250	-146.063	-48.151	-48.151	-58.635
AIC	341.974	139.369	177.587	89.580	314.215	139.467	168.277	98.500	372.127	170.301	170.301	197.269

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table B.4: Policy Acceleration (H3) among Long-Serving Members

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Introduction of Viable Proposal					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Accel.</i> <i>Region</i>	2.460*** (0.496)	1.457** (0.695)	3.204*** (0.713)	1.835** (0.883)	2.838*** (0.489)	1.254 (0.795)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.363** (0.537)	3.562*** (1.078)	1.336* (0.686)	3.865*** (1.180)	1.589*** (0.479)	3.973*** (1.077)
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.100 (0.100)	-0.095 (0.149)	-0.354** (0.152)	-0.473** (0.235)	-0.223** (0.104)	-0.176 (0.172)
<i>SQ Location</i>	2.086*** (0.224)	2.457*** (0.386)	2.860*** (0.456)	3.450*** (0.633)	2.384*** (0.277)	2.886*** (0.463)
<i>Female</i>	-0.096 (0.384)	-1.516** (0.657)	-0.194 (0.517)	-1.764* (0.910)	0.068 (0.466)	-1.393 (0.901)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.017 (0.463)	2.302*** (0.870)	0.134 (0.617)	2.992*** (1.069)	0.137 (0.457)	3.230*** (1.070)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-0.787** (0.376)	-0.189 (0.875)	-0.792* (0.446)	-0.464 (0.936)	-0.778* (0.432)	-0.501 (1.039)
Constant	-5.701*** (0.838)	-9.972*** (1.619)	-11.343*** (2.174)	-19.588** (9.110)	-6.861*** (1.124)	-10.929*** (2.282)
Observations	409	225	384	212	409	225
Log Likelihood	-144.790	-59.602	-109.668	-42.932	-126.715	-47.017
Akaike Inf. Crit.	305.581	135.204	273.337	139.864	333.430	168.034

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C: Introduction of Additional Control Variables

The models presented in the main text each include a set of control covariates that may influence the introduction of viable proposals, most of which behave as expected. However, I considered a variety of other potential confounds, which I present in the tables below. These include a sponsor's status as a committee chair or ranking member, subcommittee chair or ranking member, and member seniority. By and large these variables are not significantly associated

with the introduction of viable or messaging proposals and were therefore not included in the primary analysis.

Tables A5, A6, and A7 summarize the results of regressions including these additional variables. A5 focuses on conditions for policy deceleration (Scenario 1), while A6 and A7 deal with policy acceleration (Scenarios 2 and 3). Each table considers the same combinations of full-sample and House-only-sample examinations as presented in the paper's main analysis. These specifications do not appear to alter the models' primary findings in any notable fashion.

D: Iowa Electronic Market Prices and Extrapolations

Table A8 presents the models used to extrapolate the betting price data generated by the Iowa Electronic Markets. The extrapolations both extend the data backward in time (generating monthly probabilities for partisan control by chamber, from 1940 forward) and between individual election markets (i.e., the months after one election ends and before the next election market opens for betting). The models regress monthly price averages for each relevant IEM (along with actual partisan control outcomes, in order to better anchor the historical predictions) on a variety of covariates that may influence a politician's assessment of each party's chances to capture the majority in a chamber. Both models are logistic regressions estimated via Maximum Likelihood, and they were selected based on an iterative process that compared predicted electoral probabilities with those actually observed in the IEM data. Various automated model selection techniques, such as LASSOPlus (Ratkovic and Tingley 2018), were used in the building of these models, though the machine-fit specifications typically returned models that were far too overfit to the dependent variable.

Using these models, I generated monthly predicted probabilities of Republican and Demo-

Table B.5: Policy Deceleration (Scenario 1)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	reasonable_prop			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Deceleration Region</i>	−0.839*** (0.289)	−0.876** (0.402)	−1.990*** (0.364)	−1.518*** (0.422)
<i>Majority Status</i>	2.148*** (0.741)	2.418 (1.492)	−2.029 (1.250)	−4.630*** (1.544)
<i>SQ Location</i>	−0.078 (0.071)	0.008 (0.105)	0.002 (0.173)	−0.278 (0.265)
<i>SQ Location</i>	1.907*** (0.166)	2.082*** (0.264)	2.469*** (0.243)	2.542*** (0.346)
<i>Female</i>	−0.356 (0.294)	−1.197** (0.519)	−0.907** (0.450)	−0.736 (0.688)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.766** (0.324)	1.700*** (0.549)	2.159*** (0.653)	3.448*** (1.135)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	−1.178*** (0.252)	−1.054** (0.483)	−1.273*** (0.415)	−1.689*** (0.551)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	0.133 (0.265)	−0.315 (0.370)	0.067 (0.360)	−0.363 (0.480)
<i>Ranking Member</i>	−0.263 (0.530)	−3.406*** (1.214)	−0.428 (1.204)	3.802 (8.827)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>	−0.538** (0.246)	−0.590 (0.369)	0.244 (0.326)	−0.332 (0.450)
<i>Sub-Comm. Ranking Member</i>	0.479 (0.582)	−0.312 (1.277)	−0.873 (1.221)	−2.063 (2.054)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.00003 (0.00003)	0.00004 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00004 (0.00006)
Constant	−5.214*** (0.946)	−6.094*** (1.689)	−1.939 (1.570)	0.255 (1.466)
Observations	753	445	507	320
Log Likelihood	−283.181	−139.762	−152.904	−87.402
Akaike Inf. Crit.	592.362	305.525	331.808	200.804

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Policy Acceleration (Scenario 2)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Introduction of Viable Proposal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Acceleration Region</i>	0.737** (0.357)	0.630 (0.488)	1.121** (0.437)	0.695 (0.548)
<i>Majority Status</i>	2.055*** (0.747)	2.438* (1.478)	-1.475 (1.186)	-4.716*** (1.739)
<i>SQ Location</i>	0.024 (0.064)	0.106 (0.094)	0.154 (0.143)	-0.282 (0.275)
<i>SQ Location</i>	1.907*** (0.165)	2.077*** (0.257)	2.284*** (0.229)	2.340*** (0.316)
<i>Female</i>	-0.367 (0.293)	-1.195** (0.524)	-0.820** (0.410)	-0.723 (0.640)
<i>Democrat</i>	0.917*** (0.332)	1.865*** (0.526)	2.274*** (0.580)	4.038*** (1.186)
<i>Ideological Extremity</i>	-1.150*** (0.248)	-1.089** (0.465)	-1.098*** (0.351)	-1.560*** (0.529)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	0.148 (0.273)	-0.306 (0.376)	0.248 (0.369)	-0.301 (0.469)
<i>Ranking Member</i>	-0.215 (0.543)	-3.370*** (1.193)	-0.198 (1.009)	5.515 (882.746)
<i>Sub-Comm. Chair</i>	-0.460* (0.242)	-0.610* (0.359)	0.187 (0.314)	-0.451 (0.428)
<i>Sub-Comm. Ranking Member</i>	0.477 (0.594)	-0.222 (1.279)	-0.786 (1.126)	-1.808 (2.228)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.00002 (0.00003)	0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.00005)	0.00003 (0.0001)
Constant	-5.674*** (0.966)	-6.520*** (1.725)	-3.427** (1.433)	-0.436 (1.560)
Observations	753	445	507	320
Log Likelihood	-285.914	-141.998	-169.325	-93.646
Akaike Inf. Crit.	597.827	309.996	364.650	213.292

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.7: Policy Acceleration (Scenario 3)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	reasonable_prop	
	(1)	(2)
<i>SQ ∈ Acceleration Region</i>	2.813*** (0.436)	2.467*** (0.584)
<i>Majority Status</i>	1.428* (0.759)	1.340 (1.289)
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.022 (0.080)	0.020 (0.106)
<i> SQ Location </i>	2.237*** (0.182)	2.315*** (0.267)
<i>Female</i>	-0.373 (0.335)	-1.299** (0.589)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.276 (0.426)	0.543 (0.671)
<i>Ideolgoical Extremity</i>	-1.214*** (0.291)	-0.992* (0.516)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	0.408 (0.267)	-0.195 (0.389)
<i>Ranking Member</i>	-0.120 (0.618)	-3.721*** (1.302)
<i>Sub-Comm. Chair</i>	-0.149 (0.255)	-0.545 (0.406)
<i>Sub-Comm. Ranking Member</i>	0.604 (0.628)	-0.488 (1.252)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.00000 (0.00003)	0.00002 (0.0001)
Constant	-5.718*** (0.997)	-6.075*** (1.533)
Observations	753	445
Log Likelihood	-248.755	-128.856
Akaike Inf. Crit.	523.509	283.713
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table B.8: Predictive Models for Iowa Electronic Market Prices

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Pr(Rep. House)	Pr(Rep. Senate)
	(1)	(2)
<i>Number of Current Republican Members</i>	0.027 (0.018)	0.330*** (0.093)
<i>Republican President and Majority</i>	0.584 (2.508)	
<i>Senate Seats Defended</i>		-0.212*** (0.071)
<i>Presidential Approval</i>	0.051 (0.053)	-0.007 (0.041)
<i>Democratic President</i>	7.107 (5.130)	5.269 (3.925)
<i>Presidential Approval * Democratic President</i>	-0.091 (0.087)	-0.066 (0.070)
<i>Presidential Election Year</i>	-1.162 (1.100)	0.588 (0.921)
<i>Democratic President * Presidential Election Year</i>		-2.160 (1.414)
<i>Congressional Time Trend</i>	0.004 (0.054)	
<i>Generic Vote Poll Differential</i>	2.132 (1.942)	0.066 (0.062)
<i>Congressional Time Trend * Generic Vote Poll Differential</i>	-0.020 (0.018)	
<i>Republican President and Majority * Presidential Election Year</i>	2.684* (1.586)	
Constant	-10.217 (7.022)	-12.868** (5.566)
Observations	92	92
Log Likelihood	-26.069	-35.440
Akaike Inf. Crit.	74.138	88.880
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

cratic control of the House and Senate, from 1940 to 2016. Figure A1 presents these extrapolations, as well as the IEM market prices where available. In the figure, the light colors represent extrapolations of the market prices, while the darker colors represent the actual IEM prices. Figure A2 presents the same information, but it breaks down the projections by presidency rather than Congress. In both graphs, the predicted probabilities comport nicely with contemporaneous reports about the upcoming election, and they serve as the basis for assigning Congresses to the various Scenarios delineated in the theory section.


As noted earlier, however, these majority control probabilities do not provide all of the predictions necessary to measure which electoral scenario applies at a given point in time. In particular, they do not cleanly translate into predictions regarding whether either party will capture the filibuster pivot. To measure this probability, I build a third model, this time regressing actual seat share in election following a given Congress on a variety of covariates similar to those presented in Table A8. In addition to these covariates, I include the predicted majority control probabilities generated in Table A8 in the model. Crucially, to estimate the model, I employ a Bayesian estimation of a Poisson count model, as doing so allows me to calculate a *distribution* of predicted Senate seat counts for each observed combination of covariate values. By calculating the percentage of this distribution for which either party is predicted to attain 60 or more Senate seats, I can produce a probability that the filibuster pivot will be captured by either Republicans or Democrats. This provides the final piece of electoral information needed to assess which electoral scenario members face at a given point in time.

Table B.9: Predictive Model for Control of Filibuster Pivot

	<i>Dependent variable: Republicans in Senate</i>				
	2.5%	25%	50%	75%	97.5%
(Intercept)	2.8382887	2.9408208	2.9810628	3.026467	3.123543
<i>IEM Projection (GOP)</i>	-0.1755138	-0.1170642	-0.0880277	-0.060353	-0.006238
<i>GOP in Senate</i>	0.0189805	0.0216515	0.0229784	0.024354	0.027087
<i>Seats Defended by GOP</i>	-0.0215998	-0.0188637	-0.0172997	-0.015993	-0.013463
<i>Gen. Vote Share Poll Differential</i>	0.0025487	0.0034628	0.0039521	0.004442	0.005259
<i>Presidential Approval</i>	-0.0002599	0.0005496	0.0009262	0.001387	0.002132
<i>Democratic President</i>	0.3032922	0.3691468	0.4024813	0.434416	0.494369
<i>Presidential Election Year</i>	0.0393485	0.0569597	0.0659358	0.075781	0.096964
<i>Pres. Approval *Dem. President</i>	-0.0056338	-0.0047145	-0.0042138	-0.003619	-0.002686
<i>Dem. President*Pres. Election Year</i>	-0.2463468	-0.2148064	-0.1975603	-0.183207	-0.158368

Observations = 38
Sample size per chain = 10000
Thinning interval = 1; Number of Chains = 1

Figure B.1: Predicted Probability of Attaining Filibuster-Proof Majority in Senate



1

E: Justification for Advancement Asymmetry

As noted in the main text, the agenda-setting game to which members respond features an asymmetry in whether or not the game advances to a second round. In particular, the game only advances to a second round if the SQ persists, forcing AS to make a decision between what she can achieve in the present Congress, versus what she could achieve in future Congresses. Here, I provide additional justification for why this design choice is appropriate.

In their recent paper on policymaking, for example, [Buisseret and Bernhardt \(2017\)](#) underscore the following commentary offered by environmental advocates from TheClean.org, regarding proposed cap-and-trade legislation that they opposed: “Will [the public] see [the legislation] as a ‘win’—that the problem is solved? If so, what will that mean for pushing for the needed steps later?” In other words, if compromise legislation prevails today, such progress will preclude further reforms in the future. Policy advocates from other issue areas echoed a similar sentiment in interviews for [Crosson and Heaney’s \(2016\)](#) study on coalition lobbying, stating that, “Passing legislation as close as possible to our ideal policy is important, because if we go back to Congress next year and ask for the rest of what we want, they will deny us and tell us they have already ‘done’ [issue redacted].”² In other words, Congress has already addressed the problem brought forth by the public and interest community, and they must allocate scarce agenda space to some other issue yet to be addressed. Consequently, policy entrepreneurs and interest group leaders understand the importance of not squandering their window of opportunity by ceding too much to the opposition.

This observation also receives some support within the empirical literature. According to

²The specific issue area is here redacted due to IRB agreements to preserve the anonymity of interviewees.

Maltzman and Shipan (2008), a large majority of major laws were not amended within four years of passage. In fact, only about 25 percent were amended within 1 to 3 years. Insofar as amendments serve as a good measure of attempts to alter a targeted *SQ* more than once, these data would seem to confirm that repeated policy movements within on the same, specific *SQ* issue area are rare. Taken together, then, both qualitative and quantitative evidence provide a strong justification for the aforementioned asymmetry in game continuation. Moreover, they provide some anecdotal evidence for the idea that political elites do in fact consider future policy change possibilities in their present policy-change calculus.

It is worth noting that a possible addition or alternative to this design might be to tie electoral fortunes to the majority party's policy success in the present round. In other words, one may consider endogenizing electoral outcomes to policy decisions in the present round. In this model, I do not endogenize elections however, for a few key reasons. First, the conditions under which policy change or stasis harm a majority party are unclear. If little policy change occurs, the majority party may be punished for a refusal to compromise. If, however, the majority party does make major changes, they may be punished for unpopular policies or poor outcomes (such as Democrats in the 2010 election). Second, many gains and losses to a majority party's seat holdings are cyclical and predictable. For example, the president's party typically loses seats in midterm elections. It is the effect of this sort of predictable change, upon which majority party leaders can reliably condition their actions, that is the focus of this study. Future work, however, may well examine how endogenous elections further complicate majority agenda-setting and aggregate policy change.

F Regression Results with Member-Level Fixed Effects

Table B.10: Policy Deceleration, Leveraging Only Within-Member Variance

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Introduction of Viable Proposal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>SQ</i> ∈ <i>Deceleration Region</i>	−0.914** (0.450)	−0.807 (0.698)	−4.233*** (0.950)	−3.278*** (1.261)
<i>SQ Location</i>	−0.129 (0.113)	−0.191 (0.191)	0.471 (0.422)	−0.250 (0.653)
<i>SQ Location</i>	2.220*** (0.243)	2.281*** (0.365)	4.340*** (0.667)	3.967*** (0.909)
Constant	−5.905*** (1.119)	−6.508*** (1.543)	−9.314*** (1.892)	−10.323*** (3.052)
Member-Level FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	753	445	507	320
Log Likelihood	−155.514	−68.375	−44.622	−22.890
Akaike Inf. Crit.	925.028	568.751	613.244	421.780

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.11: Policy Acceleration (H2), Leveraging Only Within-Member Variance

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Introduction of Viable Proposal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>SQ</i> \in <i>Acceleration Region</i>	1.677*** (0.633)	1.286 (1.069)	1.932** (0.961)	0.952 (1.511)
<i>SQ Location</i>	0.015 (0.109)	-0.111 (0.182)	0.324 (0.378)	-0.345 (0.624)
<i>SQ Location</i>	2.260*** (0.244)	2.339*** (0.377)	3.503*** (0.515)	3.433*** (0.788)
Constant	-7.351*** (1.286)	-7.743*** (1.956)	-9.695*** (1.956)	-10.318*** (3.149)
Member-Level FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	753	445	507	320
Log Likelihood	-154.136	-68.350	-58.263	-27.290
Akaike Inf. Crit.	922.272	568.699	640.525	430.579

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.12: Policy Acceleration (H3), Leveraging Only Within-Member Variance

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Introduction of Viable Proposal	
	(1)	(2)
<i>SQ</i> \in <i>Acceleration Region</i>	5.158*** (0.732)	5.171*** (1.061)
<i>SQ Location</i>	0.023 (0.122)	-0.050 (0.212)
<i>SQ Location</i>	3.114*** (0.341)	3.019*** (0.496)
Constant	-7.567*** (1.278)	-7.818*** (1.745)
Member-Level FE	Y	Y
Observations	753	445
Log Likelihood	-118.561	-50.175
Akaike Inf. Crit.	851.121	532.350
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

APPENDIX C

Chapter 4 Appendix

A: Collection and Coding of Reauthorizations Data

In order to build the dataset of reauthorization opportunities used in this paper, my research assistants and I first compiled a list of reauthorization streams using a series of simple search on Congress.gov. Using search terms such as “authorization” and “expiration,” I provided my team with a large list of bills that may have served as part of a stream of reauthorizations. Research assistants then proceeded to determine whether each bill did in fact serve as part of a stream of reauthorizations. If so, they would then trace the stream of reauthorizations back to a single “parent” bill for the stream, collecting information on other bills related to that reauthorization stream along the way.

After building this list of reauthorization streams, research assistants then proceeded to build reauthorization timelines for each stream. That is, they mapped out when each reauthorizing bill was due to expire, and then documented whether Congress introduced and passed legislation to address those expiring authorizations. As part of this process, research assistants and I ensured that each opportunity within a given stream dealt primarily with similar issues. That is, we ensured that the reauthorization stream in question was not folded into an omnibus

reauthorizing bill with other, unrelated streams. Moreover, we ensured that reauthorization streams were not split into smaller, separate streams.

If in the course of building these reauthorization timelines a research assistant determined that Congress *failed* to reauthorize a program, the assistant would search within appropriations legislation in the same fiscal year, in order to determine whether the program was continued by unauthorized appropriation. During this process, reports from the Congressional Research Service, available at everycrsreport.org, were especially helpful, in addition to information available through Congress.gov. As noted in the main text, such scenarios were then coded as Congress having chosen the status quo over policy change. If successful reauthorizing legislation was identified, however, I proceeded to examine the relevant bill text, to determine whether actual changes were made to the programs in question, or whether the bill simply served as an extension of existing programs (by a simple change of expiration date). If substantive changes were pursued, I collected all roll call data associated with the bill in question. Using information from the *Congressional Record* and Voteview.com, I then coded voting alternatives within the reauthorization stream, in a fashion similar to that advocated by Clinton and Meirowitz.

Below is a copy of the coding protocol provided to research assistants, as they built the aforementioned reauthorization timelines. The research team met weekly to discuss challenges and ambiguities in various reauthorization streams, ensuring the cleanest possible reauthorization streams were used in the final estimation process.

Figure C.1: Coding Protocol for Reauthorizations Identification
**CODING REAUTHORIZATIONS OPPORTUNITIES
WITHIN MAJOR AUTHORIZATION STREAMS**

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Last updated: October 3, 2018

STEP 1: Setting Up Your Data

- 1) **Navigate to the “Reauthorization History”** document, shared via Google Sheets. Open it up side-by-side with the “Reauthorization Attempts” sheet.
- 2) As you’ll see, the “Reauthorization History” document is set up “horizontally,” with individual rows representing entire reauthorization “streams.” The parent bill in these streams represents the earliest authorization of a major program or group of programs that previous RAs could locate, along with a standardized bill identifier. Each subsequent cell to the right, then, represents an *attempt* at reauthorizing the program or set of programs in question, through the present Congress.
- 3) **Select a parent bill and copy the name of the parent bill and its number** into the corresponding columns in the “Reauthorization Attempts” sheet. When you select a reauthorization stream, place your initials in the “Student” column of the “Reauthorization History” document. Leave the “Reauthorization Number” column of the attempts document blank for the moment.
- 4) **Create a new row for every cell associated with a particular parent bill.** To do so, you will copy the contents of the “Parent Bill Name” and “Parent Bill Number” columns for every new row, and then fill in the “Reauthorizing Bill” column with the corresponding cells from the “Reauthorization History” sheet.
- 5) **Code whether the bill has passed.** If a bill is highlighted in yellow, it means the bill did not pass. If this is the case, place a “0” in the “passage” column. If the cell is white, place a ‘1’ in that column.

STEP 2: Fill in the Reauthorization Blanks

- 1) Once you have completed Step 1 for a reauthorization stream, you are ready to do some investigating. Recall that the data found in “Reauthorization History” are incomplete: they list only *attempts* at reauthorizing a program. If members simply decided not to reauthorize (and not introduce a bill), this would not be recorded. Your job in this step is to fill in these “gaps.”
- 2) To do so, you’ll need to **search for the bill on congress.gov.**
- 3) Once you’ve found the appropriate entry, you need to **figure out how long the authorization you’re investigating lasts**, before the program/set of programs expires. You can do so by searching both the bill summary and bill text for authorizing language. Once you find such language, **enter the term length into the “Reauthorization Term” column.** If there is also a specific date mentioned, place this date in the “Expiration Date Column.”
- 4) In some cases, bills with multiple program reauthorizations will display different reauthorization lengths for different components of the bill. If this is the case, **write “Yes” in the “Multiple Terms” column, and highlight the row yellow.** You can record the first reauthorization term you locate in the columns noted in (3), but use the “Comments” column to denote how many additional reauthorization terms there are, and any other pertinent information you’d like to share with me. We will discuss these on a case-by-case basis in lab.
- 5) Repeat Step 2 (and 3, if applicable) for **every row within a reauthorization stream**, before returning to the Step 1 for a new reauthorization stream.

STEP 3: Dealing with Appropriations

- 1) In some cases, you'll notice that Congress fails to pass a reauthorization, even when they have created a deadline for doing so. In most to all cases, however, the program(s) doesn't(don't) just die. Instead, Congress frequently chooses to fund the programs through appropriations, even while the authorization of the program remains the same.
- 2) To determine whether this is the case, **search for the stem of the parent bill or most recent authorization**, using the *advanced search* feature at Congress.gov.
 - a. Look below the search bar at the top of the page. Click on "MORE OPTIONS."
 - b. Paste the bill name into the "Words & Phrases" box.
 - c. Select the Congress that includes the year in which your stream is supposed to expire, and click search.
- 3) Typically, you'll see two things in this case: a couple of failed attempts at reauthorization, and a bill called something like "Omnibus Appropriations Act." Click on that one—assuming that it actually passed through Congress.
 - a. If this bill did not pass and you cannot find an authorization, please highlight the row, and we will talk through it together.
- 4) Search for the name of your bill/program within the text.
- 5) If it appears, **type "appropriation only" under the "Reauthorizing Bill" column, and then record the number of the appropriations bill into the "Comments" column.**
- 6) You can copy down all of the other column values, as those remain unchanged by the appropriations legislation.

As always, please ask questions liberally! Accuracy is much more important than speed in general, but this is especially true for this project!

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B: Bill Parameter Constraints

Below, I detail individual indexing/constraint decisions I made for each of the 753 roll calls associated with the reauthorization opportunities in my dataset. These constraints were read directly into JAGS during the estimation of ideal points and status quo locations, with adapted code shared by Clinton (2012).

Figure C.2: Parameter Constraints for Proposal and Status Quo Estimation

Stream	Congress	Proposal	Date	Roll Call	Chamber	Action	Y	N
National Cultural Center Act	85	S3335	8/22/1958	190	House	Passage	2	1
National Cultural Center Act	91	HR11249	7/8/1969	45	House	Motion to recommit (rejected)	3	2
National Cultural Center Act	91	HR11249	7/8/1969	46	House	On passage	2	1
National Cultural Center Act	91	HR11249	10/6/1969	93	Senate	Smith amendment (rejected)	5	4
National Cultural Center Act	91	HR11249	10/6/1969	94	Senate	Modified Smith amendment	4	6
National Cultural Center Act	91	HR11249	10/6/1969	95	Senate	On passage	4	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	81	HR9176	8/10/1950	224	House	on amendment of Mr. Wolcott to bill (H.R. 9176) to enact (definition of credit)	3	2
Defense Production Act of 1950	81	HR9176	8/10/1950	225	House	Wolcott amendment, "consumer or real estate"	4	3
Defense Production Act of 1950	81	HR9176	8/10/1950	226	House	Cooley amendment on commodity exchanges	5	6
Defense Production Act of 1950	81	HR9176	8/10/1950	227	House	on passage	5	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	5/29/1952	240	Senate	Dirksen amendment on replacing wage stabilization components(rejected)	3	2
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	249	Senate	Douglas amendment to replace lves amendment (rejected)	4	5
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	250	Senate	lves amendment	5	6
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	251	Senate	Table the motion of lves to reconsider	5	6
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	252	Senate	Second Dirksen amendment -- rent controls	7	5
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	253	Senate	Ferguson amendment (commodity purchase restrictions)	8	7
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	254	Senate	Capelhart amendment -- wage and price controls tied to CPI (rejected)	9	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	255	Senate	Third Dirksen Amendment -- suspension of price controls for specific industries	10	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	256	Senate	Mundt amendment -- select import restrictions (rejected)	11	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	257	Senate	Schoepel Amendment -- definition of fair and equitable (rejected)	12	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/4/1952	258	Senate	Alken amendment -- modified import restrictions	13	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/5/1952	259	Senate	Fourth Dirksen amendment on suspension of price controls (rejected)	14	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/5/1952	260	Senate	Cain amendment on rent control	15	8
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/10/1952	269	Senate	Morse amendment on settlement of steel strike (rejected)	17	16
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/10/1952	270	Senate	Maybank amendment on settlement of labor disputes (rejected)	18	16
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/10/1952	271	Senate	Monroney amendment (settlement of labor disputes)	19	16
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/10/1952	272	Senate	Humphrey amendment (settlement of steel strike)	20	16
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/10/1952	273	Senate	Byrd amendment (invoke Taft-Hartley Act in steel dispute)	16	21
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/11/1952	274	Senate	Second Morse amendment on labor relations	21	16
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/11/1952	275	Senate	Ferguson-Fulbright amendment	22	23
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/11/1952	276	Senate	Schoepel amendment -- statement of underlying administrative facts	24	22
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/12/1952	278	Senate	On passage	22	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	82	S2594	6/28/1952	168	House	On passage	22	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	83	S1081	5/19/1953	22	Senate	Byrd amendment -- price control conditions	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	83	S1081	5/19/1953	23	Senate	Bricker amendment -- repeal Title VIII	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	83	S1081	5/19/1953	24	Senate	Second Bricker amendment	3	2
Defense Production Act of 1950	83	S1081	6/18/1953	45	Senate	Motion to consider conference report	4	5
Defense Production Act of 1950	83	S1081	6/18/1953	46	Senate	Motion to reconsider	6	7
Defense Production Act of 1950	83	S1081	6/22/1953	47	Senate	On passage of conferece report (failed)	6	7
Defense Production Act of 1950	84	S2391	7/19/1955	70	Senate	Conflict of interest provision	8	9
Defense Production Act of 1950	84	S2391	8/1/1955	86	Senate	On motion to recommit to conference	3	2
Defense Production Act of 1950	84	HR9852	6/28/1956	117	House	On passage	5	4
Defense Production Act of 1950	89	HR14025	6/16/1966	276	House	Amendment to instate consumer credit controls (rejected); reversion point is simple	6	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	90	HR17268	6/26/1968	480	Senate	Proxmire amendment to re-add uniform accounting standards from House version (after which the bill was read and passed)	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	91	S3302	8/13/1970	336	House	On agreement to conference report; appear to be changes on cost accounting	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	94	S1537			House	On agreeing to conference report (quite a few changes)	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	98	S1852	10/4/1983	359	House	On suspending rules and passing	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	102	S347	2/21/1991	16	Senate	Dodd amendment to Ex-Im Bank	2	1
Defense Production Act of 1950	113	HR4809	7/29/2014	1102	House	to suspend the rules and pass	2	1

93	S1769	10/9/1974	974	House	Agreement to conference report	3	1
93	S1769	11/2/1973	460	Senate	On passage	2	1
95	HR11291	5/15/1978	974	House	On passage	2	1
102	HR2042	6/3/1991	119	House	Suspend the rules and pass	2	1
106	HR1550	5/11/1999	120	House	Suspend the rules and pass	2	1
107	HR3210	#####	455	House	Call to question	3	2
107	HR3210	#####	456	House	On passage of resolution	3	2
107	HR3210	#####	457	House	LaFolce Amendment	4	3
107	HR3210	#####	458	House	Motion to recommit	5	3
107	HR3210	#####	459	House	On passage	7	1
107	HR3210	#####	631	Senate	On cloture	8	9
107	HR3210	#####	632	Senate	Agree to conference report and pass	8	1
109	S467	12/7/2005	610	House	Motion to suspend the rules	2	1
110	HR2761	9/19/2007	875	House	Pearce amendment (rejected)	3	2
110	HR2761	9/19/2007	876	House	Motion to recommit	4	2
110	HR2761	9/19/2007	877	House	On passage	2	1
110	HR2761	#####	1169	House	Suspend rules and agree to conference report	5	1
114	HR26	1/7/2015	7	House	Suspend the rules and pass	2	1
114	HR26	1/8/2015	1	Senate	Senate Amendment 1 (rejected)	3	2
114	HR26	1/8/2015	2	Senate	On passage without amendment	2	1
93	S2957	2/26/1974	630	Senate	to amend s. 2957, calling for transfer from overseas private investment corporation to private insurance companies the issuance of political risk insurance for overseas investors, by striking provision of the bill terminating o.p.i.c. authority to insure u.s. investors in rumania and yugoslavia.	3	2
93	S2957	2/26/1974	631	Senate	to amend s. 2957 by removing penalty for opic's inability to meet specified goals.	4	5
93	S2957	2/26/1974	632	Senate	to amend s. 2957 by providing for elimination of mandatory deductible on opic reinsurance, rejected	6	4

93	S2957	2/26/1974	633	Senate	to amend s. 2957 by providing authorizations for opic for a 2 year period, instead of 6 years.	7	8
<p>An Act to amend the title of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 concerning the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend the authority for the Corporation, to authorize the Corporation to issue reinsurance, to terminate certain activities of the Corporation, and for other purposes.</p> <p>An Act to amend the title of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 concerning the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend the authority for the Corporation, to authorize the Corporation to issue reinsurance, to terminate certain activities of the Corporation, and for other purposes.</p> <p>An Act to amend the title of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 concerning the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend the authority for the Corporation, to authorize the Corporation to issue reinsurance, to terminate certain activities of the Corporation, and for other purposes.</p> <p>An Act to amend the title of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 concerning the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend the authority for the Corporation, to authorize the Corporation to issue reinsurance, to terminate certain activities of the Corporation, and for other purposes.</p> <p>An Act to amend the title of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 concerning the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend the authority for the Corporation, to authorize the Corporation to issue reinsurance, to terminate certain activities of the Corporation, and for other purposes.</p> <p>An Act to amend the title of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 concerning the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to extend the authority for the Corporation, to authorize the Corporation to issue reinsurance, to terminate certain activities of the Corporation, and for other purposes.</p>							
93	S2957	2/26/1974	634	Senate	to pass s. 2957.	7	1
95	HR9179	11/2/1977	672	House	to amend h.r. 9179, the overseas private investment corporation (opic) amendments act of 1977, so as to require prior congressional approval of any loans or guarantees made to the national finance corporation of panama, rejected	3	2
95	HR9179	11/3/1977	673	House	to amend h.r. 9179 so as to require that at least 50% of all financial activities of the opic go to american small businesses. h.r. 9179 is the overseas private investment corporation amendments act of 1977.	2	4
95	HR9179	2/23/1978	768	House	to amend h.r. 9179, the overseas private investment corporation amendments act of 1977, by prohibiting opic loans or guarantees to the national finance corporation of panama unless the house adopts a resolution of approval, rejected	5	6
95	HR9179	2/23/1978	769	House	to amend h.r. 9179 by prohibiting opic from offering any financial support to projects expanding the production or processing of crops of palm oil, sugar or citrus fruits for export in competition with the same u.s. crops.	6	7
95	HR9179	2/24/1978	770	House	to pass h.r. 9179.	8	1

95	HR9179	4/11/1978	881	House	to agree to the conference report on h.r. 9179, the overseas private investment corporation amendments act of 1978.	9	1
108	HR1298	5/1/2003	154	House	On Agreeing to the Stearns Amendment	3	2
108	HR1298	5/1/2003	155	House	On Agreeing to the Smith Amendment (rejected)	4	3
108	HR1298	5/1/2003	156	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	5	3
108	HR1298	5/1/2003	157	House	On Passage	6	1
108	HR1298	5/15/2003	177	Senate	Amendment Rejected	8	7
108	HR1298	5/15/2003	178	Senate	Motion Rejected	9	7
108	HR1298	5/15/2003	180	Senate	Amendment Rejected	10	7
108	HR1298	5/16/2003	181	Senate	Amendment Rejected	11	7
108	HR1298	5/16/2003	182	Senate	Amendment Rejected	12	7
108	HR1298	5/16/2003	183	Senate	Amendment Rejected	13	7
110	HR5501	4/2/2008	1332	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	3	2
110	HR5501	4/2/2008	1333	House	On Passage	3	1
110	S2731	7/11/2008	616	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	5	4
110	S2731	7/15/2008	617	Senate	Motion to Table Amendment agreed to	5	7
110	S2731	7/15/2008	618	Senate	Amendment Rejected	8	5
110	S2731	7/16/2008	620	Senate	Amendment Rejected	9	5
110	S2731	7/16/2008	621	Senate	Amendment Rejected	10	5
110	S2731	7/16/2008	622	Senate	Amendment Rejected	11	5
110	S2731	7/16/2008	623	Senate	Amendment Rejected	12	5
110	HR5501	7/16/2008	624	Senate	Bill Passed	5	1
110	HR5501	7/24/2008	1706	House	Concur in the Senate Amendment	5	1
92	S1163	#####	376	Senate	to amend s. 1163 by requiring the president to stabilize interest rates whenever he stabilizes wages and prices (rejected)	3	2

92	Older Americans Act of 1965	S1163	2/7/1972	338	House	to pass s. 1163, a bill to serve low cost and nutritionally sound meals to elderly americans act, with instructions that it be reported back forthwith without title ix, older american community service employment program, and title x, middleaged and to pass s. 50, a bill to strengthen and improve programs under the elderly, by to amend h.r. 11105, a bill to extend and revise nutrition programs for the elderly, by deleting section 2, prohibiting the commissioner on aging from delegating any of his functions to new regional directors, rejected	4	1
93	Older Americans Act of 1965	S50	2/20/1973	16	Senate	to suspend the rules and pass h.r. 3922, extending the authorization contained in the older americans act of 1965.	2	1
93	Older Americans Act of 1965	S50	2/20/1973	17	Senate	to table the modified kennedy amendment #2499 (see rc 239) to s. 2850.	2	3
93	Older Americans Act of 1965	HR11105	6/19/1974	843	Senate	to agree to a modified amendment to s. 2850 that provides for a separate authorization of \$100 million in fiscal year 1979 and \$120 million in fiscal year 1980 for amendment #1485 to s. 2850, the javits amendment authorizes the use of 0.5% of the title iii authorization or up to \$5 million for payment of the "excess costs" of providing services to elderly people living in rural areas, the modified domenic amendment #1485 alters the formula for distributing title iii funds so as to provide greater aid to states that must provide services to older americans living in rural areas.	4	3
95	Older Americans Act of 1965	HR12255	7/24/1978	878	Senate	to pass h.r. 12255, after striking all after the enacting clause and substituting in lieu thereof the text of s. 2850.	4	1
110	Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996	HRES633	9/6/2007	855	House	Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2786) to reauthorize the programs for housing assistance for Native Americans.	3	2
110	Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996	HR2786	9/6/2007	856	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (rejected)	4	3
110	Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996	HR2786	9/6/2007	857	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	5	6
110	Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996	HR2786	9/6/2007	858	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (rejected)	7	5
110	Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996	HR2786	9/6/2007	859	House	On Passage	5	1
114	Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996	HR360	3/23/2015	129	House	On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended	2	1
82	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	S2006	9/25/1951	88	House	s 2006. increase the lending authority of export-import bank of washington and extend the period within which the bank may make loans. passage.	2	1
88	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	HR3872	7/30/1963	49	House	h.r. 3872, extend for five years the life of the exportimport bank and increase its lending authority. patman (d-texas) motion insisting that the house conferees disagree to a senate amendment continuing "backdoor financing" for the agency.	2	1
90	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	S1155	8/9/1967	148	Senate	to amend s. 1155 (failed), the export-import bank act amendments of 1967, so as to prevent the export-import bank from using its facilities and money to provide credit for the sale of military hardware to "less developed" countries.	2	1
90	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	S1155	8/10/1967	149	Senate	to amend s. 1155 (failed). s. 1155 says that it is the policy of the congress that the bank shall not extend credit to a communist country, unless the president states that it would be in the national interest. sen. dirksen's amendment removes the "policy of the congress" phrase in order to give legal force to the prohibition.	3	1
90	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	S1155	8/10/1967	150	Senate	to amend s. 1155, by providing that the bank shall not participate in any credit transactions with any country with which u.s. is engaged in armed conflict, or with any country giving aid to a country in armed conflict with u.s.	4	5

Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	90	S1155	8/11/1967	151	Senate	to amend s. 1155, the bill, as pending, states the congress' policy that the bank will not engage in credit transactions with communist countries unless president says it is in the national interest. dirksen's amendment provides that the congress shall have the authority to pass a resolution in either house, disapproving the transaction and if they do, the transaction will not be permitted. since it is a tie vote, the amendment is to amend s. 581, a bill expanding export trade of the united states, by keeping the export-import bank in the federal budget as it is in the present time.	6	5
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	92	S1155	4/5/1971	30	Senate	to amend s. 581, a bill expanding export trade of the united states, by keeping the export-import bank in the federal budget as it is in the present time.	3	2
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	92	S1155	4/5/1971	31	Senate	to amend s. 581, a bill expanding export trade of the united states, by keeping the export-import bank in the federal budget as it is in the present time.	4	2
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	92	S581	8/5/1971	166	House	to adopt the conference report on s. 581, export expansion finance act of 1971.	5	1
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	8/21/1974	915	House	to amend h.r. 15977, a bill to amend the export-import bank act of 1945, by placing the bank's receipts and expenditure within the unified budget(failed)	3	2
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	8/21/1974	916	House	to amend h.r. 15977, by requiring congressional approval of transactions with communist countries (failed)	4	2
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	8/21/1974	917	House	to pass h.r. 15977.	2	1
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	9/19/1974	990	Senate	to amend h.r. 15977, extending for 4 years the life of the export-import bank, by declaring sense of the senate that the president should declare turkey ineligible for any foreign aid in view of its recent military activities in cyprus.	6	5
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	9/19/1974	991	Senate	to table sen schweiker amendment to h.r. 15977 providing that the bank conduct its operations on a self-sustaining basis and requiring payment of interest on any unpaid balances at prevailing market rate on loans of comparable maturity.	7	6
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	9/19/1974	992	Senate	to amend h.r. 15977 by restoring the bank to the federal budget and subjecting it to annual expenditures and net lending limitations.	8	6
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	9/19/1974	993	Senate	to pass h.r. 15977.	8	1
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	12/3/1974	1081	Senate	to close further debate on the conference report on h.r. 15977, a bill to extend for 4 years the life of the export-import bank (failed)	9	10
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	12/4/1974	1083	Senate	to close further debate on the conference report on h.r. 15977 a bill to extend for 4 years the life of the export-import bank (failed)	9	10
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	12/4/1974	1084	Senate	to table the conference report on h.r. 15977, further insist on senate amendments and request another conference with the house.	10	11
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	#####	1108	Senate	to close further debate on the conference report on h.r. 15977, a bill to extend for 4 years the life of the import-export bank (failed)	12	13
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	#####	1109	Senate	to recommit the conference report on h.r. 15977, a bill to extend for 4 years the life of the import-export bank (failed)	14	12
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	#####	1110	Senate	to close further debate on the conference report on h.r. 15977 (failed)	12	15
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	#####	1111	Senate	to instruct conferees on h.r. 15977 to insist on co-called church amendment, requiring congressional approval of any bank assistance to a communist country in connection with production of fossil fuel energy resources.	16	17
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	#####	1112	Senate	to instruct conferees on h.r. 15977 to insist on so-called proxmire amendment to restore the export-import bank to the federal budget and subject it to annual expenditure and net lending limitations.	18	19
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	93	HR15977	#####	1067	House	to agree to the conference report on h.r. 15977, amending the export-import bank act	19	1
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	107	HR2871	5/1/2002	626	House	On agreeing to the Sanders amendment (A004) Failed	3	2
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	107	S1372	6/5/2002	716	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	4	1
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/9/2012	1168	House	On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended	2	1
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/15/2012	326	Senate	Amendment Rejected	4	3
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/15/2012	327	Senate	Amendment Rejected	5	3
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/15/2012	328	Senate	Amendment Rejected	6	3
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/15/2012	329	Senate	Amendment Rejected	7	3
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/15/2012	330	Senate	Amendment Rejected	8	3
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	112	HR2072	5/15/2012	331	Senate	Bill Passed	3	1

114	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	HRES450	#####	569	House	On Motion To Discharge	3	2
114	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	HRES450	#####	572	House	On Ordering the Previous Question	3	2
114	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	HRES450	#####	573	House	On Agreeing to the Resolution	3	1
114	Export-Import Bank Act of 1945	HR597	#####	574	House	On Passage	3	1
105	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR1385	5/16/1997	135	House	training, and literacy enhancement act of 1997 (house rejected the owners amendment that sought to separate the summer youth employment program from the disadvantaged youth block grant program..)	3	2
105	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR1385	5/16/1997	136	House	On Passage	2	1
105	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR1385	5/15/1998	417	Senate	On passage	4	1
108	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR1261	5/8/2003	172	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	3	2
108	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR1261	5/8/2003	173	House	On Motion To Recommit with Instructions (failed)	4	3
108	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR1261	5/8/2003	174	House	On Passage	3	1
109	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HRES126	3/2/2005	41	House	Providing for the consideration of H.R. 27, Job Training Improvement Act	3	2
109	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR27	3/2/2005	43	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	4	3
109	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR27	3/2/2005	44	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	5	3
109	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR27	3/2/2005	45	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	6	3
109	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR27	3/2/2005	46	House	On Motion To Recommit with Instructions (failed)	7	3
109	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR27	3/2/2005	47	House	On passage	3	1
113	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR803	3/15/2013	72	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (rejected)	3	2
113	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR803	3/15/2013	73	House	On Motion To Recommit with Instructions (failed)	4	2
113	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR803	3/15/2013	74	House	On passage	2	1
113	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR803	6/25/2014	503	Senate	Amendment Rejected	6	5
113	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR803	6/25/2014	504	Senate	Amendment Rejected	7	5
113	Workforce Investment Act of 1998	HR803	6/25/2014	505	Senate	Bill Passed	5	1
94	National Sea Grant College and Program Act of 1966	HR13035	5/3/1976	779	House	to suspend the rules and pass	2	1
95	National Sea Grant College and Program Act of 1966	HR10822	4/17/1978	892	House	Suspend the rules and pass	2	1
96	National Sea Grant College and Program Act of 1966	HR6614	4/17/1980	839	House	On passage	2	1
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/6/1973	164	Senate	to amend s. 1888, the proposed agriculture and consumer protection act of 1973, by establishing consumer and marketing reserves of wheat, feed grain, and soybeans	2	3
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/6/1973	165	Senate	to amend s. 1888, to strike from the bill provisions relating to milk marketing, except those which would provide 1) continuation of class i base plans; 2) for hearing on petition of 1/3 or more of producers; and 3), consideration of future needs in fixing minimum milk prices under marketing orders.	3	4
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/6/1973	166	Senate	to amend s. 1888 to make the repeal of wheat processors payment effective on date of enactment instead of jan. 1, 1974.	5	6
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/6/1973	167	Senate	to amend s. 1888 to eliminate the mandatory 80% parity price supports for dairy products for the 1973 marketing year (failed)	5	7
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/7/1973	168	Senate	to amend s. 1888 to retain the target price program for the 1974 crop, phase out production incentive program by the 1977 crop, and authorize a set-aside program for the 1975-78 crops on a cropland basis.	8	5
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/7/1973	169	Senate	to amend s. 1888 to strike from the bill provisions limiting dairy imports to 2% of the domestic consumption for food (failed)	9	5
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/7/1973	170	Senate	to amend s. 1888 to strike from the bill provisions recommending that the president initiate an international conference to negotiate world grain agreements (failed)	10	5
93	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S1888	6/7/1973	171	Senate	to amend s. 1888 to adjust the value of food stamp allotments to reflect changes in the prices of food	11	12

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/7/1973	172	Senate	13	11
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/7/1973	173	Senate	14	11
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/7/1973	174	Senate	15	16
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/8/1973	175	Senate	17	15
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/8/1973	176	Senate	18	19
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/8/1973	177	Senate	20	18
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/8/1973	179	Senate	21	18
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/8/1973	180	Senate	22	18
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	6/8/1973	181	Senate	18	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	7/24/1973	268	House	23	24
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	7/24/1973	269	House	23	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	7/31/1973	348	Senate	26	27
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	7/31/1973	349	Senate	28	29
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	8/3/1973	311	House	28	30
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	93	S1888	8/3/1973	312	House	31	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	160	Senate	3	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	161	Senate	4	3

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	162	Senate	to amend s. 275 by mandating the use of a photo i.d. card, a national application cross-check and an earnings clearance system in the food stamp program.	5	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	163	Senate	to amend s. 275 by extending the duration of the food stamp program for five years instead of two.	6	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	164	Senate	to amend s. 275 by reducing the target price for the 1977 wheat crop from \$2.90 per bushel to \$2.65 per bushel.	7	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	165	Senate	to amend s. 275 by restoring the purchase requirement for food stamps that is now in existing law, the purchase requirement states that a family of four with a poverty level income must pay up to 30% of their income for their monthly allowance of \$1.66 in years 1979 through 1982.	8	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	166	Senate	to amend s. 275 by reducing the target prices for wheat and for feed grains for fiscal years 1979 through 1982.	9	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	167	Senate	to amend s. 275 by restricting the eligibility for food stamps to those families whose incomes do not exceed 125% of the poverty level income.	10	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	168	Senate	to amend s. 275 by further restricting the availability of food stamps to college students.	11	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	5/24/1977	169	Senate	to pass s. 275.	3	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	95	S275	9/16/1977	517	House	to agree to the conference report on s. 275, the food and agriculture act of 1977.	12	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	10/7/1981	239	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by reducing by \$1 billion the committee-approved fiscal 1982 outlays for farm programs, by lowering sugar and dairy price support levels and by making certain farm programs discretionary instead of mandatory. (motion agreed to)	3	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	10/7/1981	240	House	to amend the frank amendment to h.r. 3603, so as to set the minimum dairy price support level at a minimum of 70 percent of parity but no less than \$13.10 per hundredweight in fiscal 1982, the frank amendment sets dairy price support levels at a minimum of 70 percent of parity for fiscal years 1982-1985 with mandatory annual readjustments, except that the secretary of agriculture could forgo the annual adjustment to bring the actual payment rate back up to 70 percent of parity in years when anticipated expenditures for surplus dairy purchases exceeded \$750 million. the effect would be to permit dairy price supports to rise in fiscal 1983 to a minimum of 75 percent of parity for fiscal years 1982-85 with mandatory annual readjustments, except that the secretary of agriculture could forgo the annual adjustment (to bring the actual payment rate back up to 70 percent of parity) in years when anticipated expenditures for surplus dairy purchases exceeded \$750 million. in such years, actual payment rates could not go below the previous year's level or \$13.10 per hundredweight, whichever to amend h.r. 3603, by providing that the dairy price support shall not exceed the support in effect for the previous year, unless the secretary estimates that net government purchases of dairy products in any fiscal year through 1985 will equal or exceed 4.5 billion pounds of milk equivalent. (motion failed)	4	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	10/7/1981	241	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by providing that the dairy price support shall not exceed the support in effect for the previous year, unless the secretary estimates that net government purchases of dairy products in any fiscal year through 1985 will equal or exceed 4.5 billion pounds of milk equivalent. (motion failed)	5	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	244	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by repealing the poundage quota and acreage allotment system for peanuts and eliminating a specified loan rate for peanuts, and instead authorizing the secretary to determine the loan rate. (motion passed)	6	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	246	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by striking the price support program for sugar. (motion passed)	7	8
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	247	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by providing discretionary authority to establish a bank to finance u.s. grain exports and permitting the secretary of agriculture to set a minimum price for u.s. grain sold abroad. (motion failed)	9	10
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	255	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by providing discretionary authority to establish a bank to finance u.s. grain exports and permitting the secretary of agriculture to set a minimum price for u.s. grain sold abroad. (motion failed)	11	12
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	257	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by repealing the tobacco price support loans. (motion failed)	13	14

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	260	House	to amend h.r. 3603, by requiring most food stamp recipients to pay for a portion of their stamps. (motion failed)	15	16
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	261	House	to amend the daschle amendment to h.r. 3603, by striking a provision that requires imported meat to be labeled as to country of origin, as amended, the daschle amendment would require that meat produced abroad and sold in the united states be produced without drugs or agricultural chemicals that are barred for health reasons in the united states, unless the president determines that such action would harm u. s. to amend h.r. 3603, by requiring that meat produced abroad and sold in the united states be produced without drugs or agricultural chemicals that are barred for health reasons in the united states. (motion agreed to)	17	18
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	262	House	to pass s. 884, the senate version of h.r. 3603, the food and agriculture act of 1981, to reauthorize for four years price support and other farm programs and food stamps. (motion agreed to)	20	21
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	350	House	to pass h.res.303, a bill waiving certain points of order which limit the contents of committee reports to the scope of the differences between the two houses, against the conference report on s.884, the agriculture and food act of 1981. (motion passed).	22	23
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	97	S884	#####	351	House	to agree to the conference report on s.884, to revise and extend programs to provide price support and production incentives for farmers to assure an abundance of food and fiber. (motion passed).	22	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	9/20/1985	287	House	to approve h res 267, a rule leading to floor consideration of h r 2100 which would fund agricultural development programs and programs to provide food assistance to eligible persons. (motion passed)	2	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	9/26/1985	289	House	to amend h r 2100 by lowering price supports for sugar and removing transportation costs from the spectrum of factors determine the market price of sugar. (motion to amend h r 2100 by reducing dairy price support until surpluses reach specified levels, the amendment would also eliminate a minimum for the prices of federal marketing orders for milk. (motion failed)	5	4
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	9/26/1985	290	House	to amend h r 2100 by allowing dairy farmer to mandate their own production controls in return for higher prices; the mandate would require support from 60% of the dairy farmers in a national referendum. (motion failed)	7	4
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/1/1985	293	House	a substitute amendment to a prior amendment to h r 2100 which increases price supports for wheat farmers to \$4.50 per bushel for the first 15,000 bushels and to \$4.00 a bushel for more than 15,000 bushels, the amendment also would allow farmers to repay loans at a rate equal to the market price of their crops. (motion to amend a prior amendment to h r 2100 by holding support prices for wheat at \$4.38 per bushel and reducing support by 5% annually until 1990. (motion failed)	8	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/1/1985	294	House	to amend a prior amendment to h r 2100 by requiring that 60% of those who farm wheat, feed grain, cotton, rice and soybean approve prices before those in the bill become effective after 1986. (motion failed)	10	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/3/1985	301	House	to amend h r 2100 by removing provisions which established farmer referenda for deciding production limits on corn and wheat, as well as grain export subsidies.	11	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/3/1985	302	House	to amend h r 2100 by phasing out the peanut price support program over the next four years, gradually less of the peanut crop would be affected by the quota and gradually more farmers who did not have quotas would be permitted to sell in markets from which they are presently barred. (motion failed)	12	13
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/3/1985	303	House	an amendment to h r 2100 food and security act exempting agricultural products from cargo-preference requirements, under these requirements, half the exports that come from government programs must be shipped on u.s. vessels, this is a substitute to a prior amendment. (motion failed)	14	13
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/3/1985	303	House	to amend h r 2100 by phasing out the peanut price support program over the next four years, gradually less of the peanut crop would be affected by the quota and gradually more farmers who did not have quotas would be permitted to sell in markets from which they are presently barred. (motion failed)	15	13

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/3/1985	304	House	an amendment to h r 2100 food and security act requiring the maritime administration to pay excess freight charges that result from cargo-preference requirements for government subsidized agricultural exports. under these requirements, half the exports that come from government programs must be shipped on u.s. vessels. the amendment establishes that the maritime administration would pay the difference between required charges and what the charges would have been without the amendment to h r 2100 food and security act requiring farmers of eroded land to apply a conservation plan to their soil in order to be eligible for government farm aid. the farmers must act by 1990 or within two years after the soil conservation service has mapped the land, whichever comes first. the amendment applies to land cultivated or set aside under subsidies between 1981 and 1985.	16	13
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/3/1985	305	House	an amendment to h r 2100 food and security act that would abolish federal subsidies to tobacco growers, beginning in 1986. (failed)	17	18
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/7/1985	306	House	an amendment to h r 2100 food and security act that sets separate referendums on production controls for grain, soybean, rice, and cotton crops. the control programs must gain support from at least 60% of the farmers of each crop. if the programs do not pass the referenda, the loan repayments by farmers (calculated per bushel) must not exceed the crop's average market price in the farmer's state. (failed)	20	19
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/7/1985	307	House	an amendment to h r 2100 food security act that reduces federal aid to farmers who do not provide sanitation facilities and drinking water to their employees. the law applies only to farmers who have 10 or more employees. (failed)	21	19
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/7/1985	308	House	to approve h r 2100, a bill containing programs for price-supports, agricultural exports, soil conservation, farm loans, and food assistance to the needy. (motion passed)	22	23
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/8/1985	310	House	to adopt the conference report for h r 2100 to extend agricultural price support programs through fiscal 1990 and to provide programs for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and research. the report also continues food assistance to low income persons and ensures an abundance of food and fiber at reasonable prices.	24	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/8/1985	311	House	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to modify the acreage reduction requirements for wheat and feed grains that are triggered by soybean farmers reject or approve through a referendum every four years, until 1997, the production program outlined in the amendment. if the program is rejected, the secretary of agriculture will create an alternative program. (failed)	26	24
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/8/1985	312	House	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	27	24
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/8/1985	313	House	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	28	24
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	10/8/1985	314	House	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	29	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	99	HR2100	#####	378	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	24	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/19/1990	474	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	26	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/20/1990	475	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	2	3
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/23/1990	476	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	4	5
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/23/1990	477	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	6	7
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/23/1990	477	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide an alternative approach towards the authorization of low-input sustainable agriculture (lisa) with an emphasis upon sustainability (failed)	7	8

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/24/1990	478	Senate	to table the bradley (d, ni) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend the current sugar program for five years and decrease the loan rate from 18 cents to 16 cents.	9	10
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/24/1990	479	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to modify the loan and purchase authority for wheat and feed grains (failed)	11	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/24/1990	480	Senate	to table the chafee (r, ri) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to direct the secretary to phase out the honey support provisions over a four year period (failed)	12	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/24/1990	481	Senate	to table the symms (r, id) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to allow cargo preference requirements to be lifted if determined to prevent the completion of an agricultural sale from the united states.	13	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/24/1990	482	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to target deficiency payments and acreage limitation requirements for wheat and feed grains	14	9
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/24/1990	483	Senate	to table the grassley (r, ia) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide for additional flexibility in the planting program of crops, oilseeds, or other crops on reduced acreage (failed)	15	16
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/25/1990	484	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to modify the method of calculating the support price for milk and deficiency payments for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton and rice (failed)	17	16
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/25/1990	485	Senate	to table the roth amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to repeal the existing quota and price support program for peanuts and to authorize the secretary of agriculture to support the price of peanuts at a level to be determined by the secretary of agriculture	18	19
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/26/1990	488	Senate	to table the daschle (d, sd) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to improve the operations of the federal crop insurance program	20	21
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/26/1990	489	Senate	to table the glenn (d, oh) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to exempt certain great lakes vessels from the cargo preference requirements and provide for the phase out of the great lakes set-aside (failed)	22	21
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	490	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to prohibit u.s. financial institutions, whose deposits are insured by the united states taxpayer, from extending credit to the soviet union at interest rates below those offered to american companies	23	24
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	491	Senate	to amend the d'amato (r, ny) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to require a report to congress describing total u.s. petroleum purchases from iraq, and an assessment of the economic consequences for the u.s. and iraq of a ban on the importation of iraq petroleum into the united states.	25	26
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	492	Senate	to table the gramm (r, b) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to ensure that restrictions on credit to iraq are not imposed so as to hurt american farmers and workers more than they hurt iraq.	25	27
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	493	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to deny iraq financial credits and benefits, including guarantees made by the commodity credit corporation of loans, until the president certifies that iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations under international law.	25	28
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	494	Senate	to table the symms (r, id) amendment to s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to require that the possibility of private property being taken for public purposes be assessed prior to imposition of regulations on the use of that property	29	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	495	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to establish price support for loans, purchases, and other operations for each of the 1991 through 1995 crops of honey (failed)	30	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	101	S2830	7/27/1990	496	Senate	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide for the establishment of a grading program for imports of chilean fruits and vegetables	31	25

101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	7/27/1990	497	Senate	32	25	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to provide the president with authority to enter cooperative agreements with heads of states to establish grading programs for horticultural crops, in accordance with domestic trade act of 1990, to provide that in the administration of certain cargo preference laws, a united states-flag vessel may not charge a rate greater than 110 percent of the lowest bid by a foreign-flag vessel.
101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	7/27/1990	498	Senate	25	33	to pass s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and fiber at reasonable support and related programs extension, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs (failed)
101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	7/27/1990	499	Senate	25	1	to instruct house conferees on the house amendment to s 2830, agricultural price support and related programs extension, to insist on the provisions related to public education concerning the danger of tobacco use.
101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	#####	796	House	34	35	to adopt the conference report on s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990.
101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	#####	797	House	35	37	to adopt the conference report on s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990.
101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	#####	851	House	35	1	to adopt the conference report on s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and h.r.2854 by roberts, pat (r-ks) -- federal agriculture improvement and reform act of 1996 agricultural market transition act national natural resources conservation foundation act commodity promotion, research, and information act of 1996 canola and rapeseed research, promotion, and consumer information act national kiwifruit research, promotion, and consumer information act popcorn promotion, research, and consumer information act (farm bill) (pub. l. 104-127, approved 4/4/96) (house rejected the chabot amendment that sought to terminate the marketing loan program for cotton producers beginning in 1999 and to require farmers who currently hold (house rejected the shays amendment that sought to phase out the peanut program over seven years, and provide diminishing loan rates each year for the program by \$610 per ton in 1996; \$550 per ton in 1997; \$490 per ton in 1998; \$430 per ton in 1999; \$370 per ton in 2000, and \$310 per ton in 2001 and repealing the entire quota (house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to phase out the sugar program over five years by establishing loan rates for cane and beet sugar through 1999, then prohibiting any federal loans to sugar producers in the year 2000 or (house agreed to the solomon amendment that deletes dairy programs provisions and replaces them with provisions that phase out over five years price supports for butter, powdered milk and cheese with the authorization for dairy price support to expire in the year 2001; that require current federal milk marketing orders to be consolidated into 10 to 14 orders by december 31, 2000; that allow the state of california to maintain its own fluid milk standards; and that repeal the federal milk manufacturing allowance restriction on states that was contained in the 1990 farm bill.)
101	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	S2830	#####	629	Senate	35	1	to establish an environmental conservation acreage reserve program designed to protect environmentally sensitive land, and improve farm management and operation, while preserving profitability for farmers.)
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/28/1996	899	House	2	3	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and h.r.2854 by roberts, pat (r-ks) -- federal agriculture improvement and reform act of 1996 agricultural market transition act national natural resources conservation foundation act commodity promotion, research, and information act of 1996 canola and rapeseed research, promotion, and consumer information act national kiwifruit research, promotion, and consumer information act popcorn promotion, research, and consumer information act (farm bill) (pub. l. 104-127, approved 4/4/96) (house rejected the chabot amendment that sought to terminate the marketing loan program for cotton producers beginning in 1999 and to require farmers who currently hold (house rejected the shays amendment that sought to phase out the peanut program over seven years, and provide diminishing loan rates each year for the program by \$610 per ton in 1996; \$550 per ton in 1997; \$490 per ton in 1998; \$430 per ton in 1999; \$370 per ton in 2000, and \$310 per ton in 2001 and repealing the entire quota (house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to phase out the sugar program over five years by establishing loan rates for cane and beet sugar through 1999, then prohibiting any federal loans to sugar producers in the year 2000 or (house agreed to the solomon amendment that deletes dairy programs provisions and replaces them with provisions that phase out over five years price supports for butter, powdered milk and cheese with the authorization for dairy price support to expire in the year 2001; that require current federal milk marketing orders to be consolidated into 10 to 14 orders by december 31, 2000; that allow the state of california to maintain its own fluid milk standards; and that repeal the federal milk manufacturing allowance restriction on states that was contained in the 1990 farm bill.)
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/28/1996	900	House	4	3	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and h.r.2854 by roberts, pat (r-ks) -- federal agriculture improvement and reform act of 1996 agricultural market transition act national natural resources conservation foundation act commodity promotion, research, and information act of 1996 canola and rapeseed research, promotion, and consumer information act national kiwifruit research, promotion, and consumer information act popcorn promotion, research, and consumer information act (farm bill) (pub. l. 104-127, approved 4/4/96) (house rejected the chabot amendment that sought to terminate the marketing loan program for cotton producers beginning in 1999 and to require farmers who currently hold (house rejected the shays amendment that sought to phase out the peanut program over seven years, and provide diminishing loan rates each year for the program by \$610 per ton in 1996; \$550 per ton in 1997; \$490 per ton in 1998; \$430 per ton in 1999; \$370 per ton in 2000, and \$310 per ton in 2001 and repealing the entire quota (house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to phase out the sugar program over five years by establishing loan rates for cane and beet sugar through 1999, then prohibiting any federal loans to sugar producers in the year 2000 or (house agreed to the solomon amendment that deletes dairy programs provisions and replaces them with provisions that phase out over five years price supports for butter, powdered milk and cheese with the authorization for dairy price support to expire in the year 2001; that require current federal milk marketing orders to be consolidated into 10 to 14 orders by december 31, 2000; that allow the state of california to maintain its own fluid milk standards; and that repeal the federal milk manufacturing allowance restriction on states that was contained in the 1990 farm bill.)
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/28/1996	901	House	5	3	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and h.r.2854 by roberts, pat (r-ks) -- federal agriculture improvement and reform act of 1996 agricultural market transition act national natural resources conservation foundation act commodity promotion, research, and information act of 1996 canola and rapeseed research, promotion, and consumer information act national kiwifruit research, promotion, and consumer information act popcorn promotion, research, and consumer information act (farm bill) (pub. l. 104-127, approved 4/4/96) (house rejected the chabot amendment that sought to terminate the marketing loan program for cotton producers beginning in 1999 and to require farmers who currently hold (house rejected the shays amendment that sought to phase out the peanut program over seven years, and provide diminishing loan rates each year for the program by \$610 per ton in 1996; \$550 per ton in 1997; \$490 per ton in 1998; \$430 per ton in 1999; \$370 per ton in 2000, and \$310 per ton in 2001 and repealing the entire quota (house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to phase out the sugar program over five years by establishing loan rates for cane and beet sugar through 1999, then prohibiting any federal loans to sugar producers in the year 2000 or (house agreed to the solomon amendment that deletes dairy programs provisions and replaces them with provisions that phase out over five years price supports for butter, powdered milk and cheese with the authorization for dairy price support to expire in the year 2001; that require current federal milk marketing orders to be consolidated into 10 to 14 orders by december 31, 2000; that allow the state of california to maintain its own fluid milk standards; and that repeal the federal milk manufacturing allowance restriction on states that was contained in the 1990 farm bill.)
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/28/1996	902	House	6	7	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and h.r.2854 by roberts, pat (r-ks) -- federal agriculture improvement and reform act of 1996 agricultural market transition act national natural resources conservation foundation act commodity promotion, research, and information act of 1996 canola and rapeseed research, promotion, and consumer information act national kiwifruit research, promotion, and consumer information act popcorn promotion, research, and consumer information act (farm bill) (pub. l. 104-127, approved 4/4/96) (house rejected the chabot amendment that sought to terminate the marketing loan program for cotton producers beginning in 1999 and to require farmers who currently hold (house rejected the shays amendment that sought to phase out the peanut program over seven years, and provide diminishing loan rates each year for the program by \$610 per ton in 1996; \$550 per ton in 1997; \$490 per ton in 1998; \$430 per ton in 1999; \$370 per ton in 2000, and \$310 per ton in 2001 and repealing the entire quota (house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to phase out the sugar program over five years by establishing loan rates for cane and beet sugar through 1999, then prohibiting any federal loans to sugar producers in the year 2000 or (house agreed to the solomon amendment that deletes dairy programs provisions and replaces them with provisions that phase out over five years price supports for butter, powdered milk and cheese with the authorization for dairy price support to expire in the year 2001; that require current federal milk marketing orders to be consolidated into 10 to 14 orders by december 31, 2000; that allow the state of california to maintain its own fluid milk standards; and that repeal the federal milk manufacturing allowance restriction on states that was contained in the 1990 farm bill.)
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/29/1996	903	House	8	9	to amend s 2830, food, agriculture, conservation, and trade act of 1990, to extend and revise agricultural price support and related programs, to provide for agricultural export, resource conservation, farm credit, and agricultural research and related programs, and to ensure consumers an abundance of food and h.r.2854 by roberts, pat (r-ks) -- federal agriculture improvement and reform act of 1996 agricultural market transition act national natural resources conservation foundation act commodity promotion, research, and information act of 1996 canola and rapeseed research, promotion, and consumer information act national kiwifruit research, promotion, and consumer information act popcorn promotion, research, and consumer information act (farm bill) (pub. l. 104-127, approved 4/4/96) (house rejected the chabot amendment that sought to terminate the marketing loan program for cotton producers beginning in 1999 and to require farmers who currently hold (house rejected the shays amendment that sought to phase out the peanut program over seven years, and provide diminishing loan rates each year for the program by \$610 per ton in 1996; \$550 per ton in 1997; \$490 per ton in 1998; \$430 per ton in 1999; \$370 per ton in 2000, and \$310 per ton in 2001 and repealing the entire quota (house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to phase out the sugar program over five years by establishing loan rates for cane and beet sugar through 1999, then prohibiting any federal loans to sugar producers in the year 2000 or (house agreed to the solomon amendment that deletes dairy programs provisions and replaces them with provisions that phase out over five years price supports for butter, powdered milk and cheese with the authorization for dairy price support to expire in the year 2001; that require current federal milk marketing orders to be consolidated into 10 to 14 orders by december 31, 2000; that allow the state of california to maintain its own fluid milk standards; and that repeal the federal milk manufacturing allowance restriction on states that was contained in the 1990 farm bill.)

104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/29/1996	904	House	(house rejected the dooley amendment that sought to reserve \$1.9 billion over seven years from funding authorized for market transition contracts to allow the secretary of agriculture to award grants which foster the development of progressive food production methods which increase domestic competitiveness abroad; facilitate the development of new products; and increase domestic long term productivity while encouraging environmentally sound farming practices.)	10	8
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/29/1996	905	House	(house agreed to the foley amendment that authorizes \$200 million for land acquisition in the everglades for the purpose of environmental restoration.)	11	12
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/29/1996	906	House	(house rejected the stenhelm en bloc amendment that sought to strike provisions repealing the permanent agricultural law of 1949; to authorize the usda to spend up to \$3.5 billion to conduct rural development, conservation, research, education, and extension activities; and to establish the loan rate for oilseeds at 85 percent of the average price over the last five years, excluding the highest and lowest years.)	13	11
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/29/1996	907	House	(house rejected the stenhelm motion as modified, that sought to recommit the bill to the committee on agriculture with instructions to report it back forthwith containing language including establishing a system of fixed but declining payments to farmers in lieu of traditional subsidies; reauthorizing the federal sugar and peanut programs; reauthorizing various federal agricultural conservation programs by establishing several new usda conservation initiatives; excluding language providing for revisions to the dairy program and retaining the permanent agriculture law of 1949.)	14	11
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	2/29/1996	908	House	(house passed h.r. 2854, to modify the operation of certain agriculture programs.)	11	1
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	3/28/1996	670	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	15	1
104	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2854	3/29/1996	973	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	15	1
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/3/2001	360	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	2	3
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/3/2001	362	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	4	5
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/4/2001	363	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	6	5
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/4/2001	364	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	7	5
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/4/2001	365	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	8	5
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/4/2001	366	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	9	10
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/4/2001	367	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	11	12
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	10/5/2001	368	House	On Passage	11	1
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	2/13/2002	410	Senate	Bill Passed	13	1
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	4/18/2002	606	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	14	15
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	4/23/2002	611	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	16	17
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	4/23/2002	612	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	18	19

107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	5/2/2002	628	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	21	20
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	5/2/2002	629	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	20	1
107	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2646	5/8/2002	483	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	20	1
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/26/2007	741	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	3	2
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	743	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	5	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	744	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	6	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	745	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	7	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	746	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	8	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	747	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	9	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	748	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	10	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	749	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	11	4
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	7/27/2007	750	House	On Passage	4	1
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	417	Senate	Amendment Rejected	13	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	418	Senate	Amendment Rejected	14	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	419	Senate	Amendment Rejected	15	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	420	Senate	Amendment Rejected	16	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	421	Senate	Amendment Rejected	17	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	422	Senate	Amendment Rejected	18	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	423	Senate	Amendment Rejected	19	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	424	Senate	Amendment Rejected	20	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	426	Senate	Amendment Rejected	21	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	427	Senate	Amendment Rejected	22	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	428	Senate	Amendment Rejected	23	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	429	Senate	Amendment Rejected	24	12
110	Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	HR2419	#####	431	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	12	25

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	#####	434	Senate	Bill Passed	12	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	4/9/2008	1350	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	26	27
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/1/2008	1413	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees (failed)	28	26
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/6/2008	1422	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees (failed)	29	26
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/6/2008	1423	House	Table Motion to Reconsider	30	31
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/6/2008	1433	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	33	30
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/6/2008	1434	House	Table Motion to Reconsider	30	34
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/8/2008	1479	House	On Flake Motion to Instruct Conferees (failed)	35	36
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/8/2008	1480	House	On Cantor Motion to Instruct Conferees (failed)	37	36
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/14/2008	1489	House	Recommit Conference Report with Instructions	38	39
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/14/2008	1490	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	39	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/15/2008	572	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	39	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/21/2008	1521	House	Passage, Objections of the President Not Withstanding	39	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	110	HR2419	5/22/2008	582	Senate	Veto Overridden	40	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	7/11/2013	349	House	Table Appeal of the Ruling of the Chair	3	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	7/11/2013	350	House	Table Appeal of the Ruling of the Chair	4	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	7/11/2013	351	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	5	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	7/11/2013	352	House	On Passage	2	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	#####	545	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees (failed)	6	7
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	1/29/2014	670	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	8	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	2/3/2014	311	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	9	10
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	113	HR2642	2/4/2014	312	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	9	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	900	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	3	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	901	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	4	2
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	902	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	5	2

Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	903	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	6	7
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	904	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	8	6
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	905	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	9	10
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/17/2018	906	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	11	12
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/18/2018	907	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	14	13
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/18/2018	908	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	15	13
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/18/2018	909	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	16	17
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/18/2018	910	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	18	19
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/18/2018	911	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	20	18
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	5/18/2018	912	House	On Passage (failed)	18	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	6/21/2018	991	House	On Passage	21	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	6/28/2018	466	Senate	Motion to Table Agreed to	22	23
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	6/28/2018	467	Senate	Amendment Rejected	24	22
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	6/28/2018	468	Senate	Bill Passed	22	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	7/18/2018	1043	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	26	25
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	#####	584	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	27	1
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (The Farm Bill)	115	HR2	#####	1141	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	27	1
Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998	105	HR2870	3/19/1998	692	House	On agreeing to Vento amendments	2	3
Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998	105	HR2870	3/19/1998	693	House	On passage	2	1
Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998	115	S1023	#####	1195	House	To suspend the rules and pass the bill	2	1
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	12/2/2010	1587	House	On motion that the House agree with an amendment to the Senate amendment	3	2
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	12/4/2010	655	Senate	Cloture on Senate Amendment 4727 (failed)	5	4
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	12/4/2010	656	Senate	Cloture on Senate Amendment 4728 (failed)	6	4
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	12/9/2010	668	Senate	Motion to table Reid's motion to refer House message to committee	7	8
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	669	Senate	Cloture on motion to concur in the House amendment, via SA 4753	9	10
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	670	Senate	Coburn motion to suspend and consider SA 4765 (failed)	12	11
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	671	Senate	DeMint motion to suspend and consider SA 4804 (failed)	13	11

Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	672	Senate	Sanders motion to suspend and consider SA 4809 (failed)	14	11
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	673	Senate	Senate motion to concur in House amendment, via SA 4753	11	1
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HRes1766	#####	1626	House	On agreeing to the Slaughter amendment	12	13
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HRes1766	#####	1627	House	On agreeing to the resolution	12	14
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	1629	House	On agreeing to the Levin amendment (failed)	15	12
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	111	HR4853	#####	1630	House	On motion to agree to Senate amendments and pass bill	12	1
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	112	HR8	8/1/2012	1486	House	On agreeing to the Levin amendment (failed)	3	2
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	112	HR8	8/1/2012	1487	House	On motion to recommit with instructions (failed)	4	2
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	112	HR8	8/1/2012	1488	House	On passage	2	1
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	112	HR8	1/1/2013	1602	House	On agreeing to final version	5	1
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010	112	HR8	1/1/2013	486	Senate	On agreeing to final version	5	1
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	98	HR4164	3/8/1984	533	House	to amend h.r. 4164, a bill strengthening and expanding the economic base of the nation, developing human resources, reducing structural unemployment, increasing productivity, and strengthening the nation's defense capabilities by assisting the states to expand, improve, and update high-quality programs of vocational-technical education. the roukema amendment prohibits the use of funds to acquire equipment that results in a direct financial benefit to any organization for representing the nation, developing human resources, reducing structural unemployment, increasing productivity, and strengthening and expanding the economic base of the nation, developing human resources, reducing structural unemployment, increasing to expand, improve, and update high-quality programs of vocational-technical education. the bartlett amendment prohibits the use of funds to maintain existing programs without substantial change. (motion failed)	3	2
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	98	HR4164	3/8/1984	534	House	to pass h.r. 4164, a bill strengthening and expanding the economic base of the nation, developing human resources, reducing structural unemployment, increasing productivity, and strengthening the nation's defense capabilities by assisting the states to expand, improve, and update high-quality programs of vocational-technical education. (motion failed)	3	1
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	101	HR7	5/9/1989	43	House	On agreeing to the Danmeyer amendment (A009) Agreed to by recorded vote	2	1
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	105	HR1853	7/22/1997	284	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (FAILED)	3	2
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	105	HR1853	7/22/1997	285	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (FAILED)	4	2
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	105	HR1853	7/22/1997	286	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	5	2
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	105	HR1853	7/22/1997	287	House	On Passage	6	1
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	109	HR366	5/4/2005	152	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	3	2
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	109	HR366	5/4/2005	153	House	On Passage	2	1
Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act	109	S250	7/12/2006	1034	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	4	5
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	110	HR2272	7/31/2007	764	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees	3	2

The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	110	HR2272	8/2/2007	794	House	Recommit Conference Report with Instructions (failed)	5	4
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	110	HR2272	8/2/2007	795	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	4	1
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/12/2010	1248	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	3	2
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/12/2010	1249	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	4	2
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/12/2010	1250	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	5	4
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/13/2010	1252	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	6	5
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/13/2010	1255	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions	7	8
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/28/2010	1311	House	First Portion of the Divided Question, Proposing to Strike Section 228 (FAILED)	10	9
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/28/2010	1312	House	Second Portion of the Divided Question, Proposing to Strike Sections 406(b) and (c) (FAILED)	11	9
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/28/2010	1313	House	Sixth Portion of the Divided Question, Proposing to Amend Section 702	12	13
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/28/2010	1315	House	Eighth Portion of the Divided Question, Proposing to Add a Section 705	14	15
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/28/2010	1316	House	Ninth Portion of the Divided Question, Proposing to Add a Section 706 (FAILED)	16	14
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	5/28/2010	1317	House	ON PASSAGE	14	1
The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act of 2007	111	HR5116	#####	1642	House	On Motion to Concur in the Senate Amendment	17	1
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	251	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	3	2
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	252	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	4	5
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	253	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	6	4
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	254	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	7	4
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	255	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	8	4
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	256	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	9	4
COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010	114	HR1806	5/20/2015	257	House	On Passage	4	1
Sober Truth on Preventing Underage Drinking Act Of 2005	109	HR864	#####	1189	House	On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended	2	1

114	HR34	#####	1292	House	On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended	2	1
114	HR34	12/5/2016	495	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	3	4
114	HR34	12/7/2016	496	Senate	Motion Agreed to	3	1
101	S2240	5/15/1990	403	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	2	3
101	S2240	5/15/1990	404	Senate	Amendment Rejected	4	2
101	S2240	5/16/1990	405	Senate	Amendment Rejected	5	2
101	S2240	5/16/1990	407	Senate	Amendment Rejected	7	6
101	S2240	5/16/1990	409	Senate	Bill Passed	6	1
104	S641	7/27/1995	333	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	3	2
104	S641	7/27/1995	334	Senate	Amendment Rejected	4	2
104	S641	7/27/1995	336	Senate	Amendment Rejected	6	5
104	S641	7/27/1995	337	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	7	6
104	S641	7/27/1995	338	Senate	Bill Passed	7	1
109	HR6143	9/28/2006	1171	House	On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Pass, as Amended	2	1
92	S2770	11/2/1971	259	Senate	to amend s. 2770 by authorizing construction of waste treatment facilities by the authorization-appropriation method, rather than by contract authority, (rejected)	3	2
92	S2770	11/2/1971	260	Senate	to amend s. 2770 by deleting requirement that a state pay by grant 10 percent of the cost of treatment works to increase federal share therefor from 60 to 70 percent	4	2
92	S2770	10/4/1972	610	House	to agree to the conference report on s. 2770, a bill to amend the water pollution control act.	5	1
92	S2770	#####	955	Senate	to override the presidential veto of s. 2770 proposed federal water pollution control act amendments of 1972.	5	1
92	S2770	#####	648	House	to override the president's veto of s. 2770, the 1972 amendments to the federal water pollution control act.	5	1
95	HR3199	4/5/1977	111	House	to pass h.r. 3199 (see rc 128).	2	1
95	HR12140	6/5/1978	1054	House	to suspend the rules and pass h.r. 12140, the bill providing additional authorizations for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 for great lakes water quality monitoring and for other water quality surveillance and information dissemination activities.	2	1
92	HR11417	3/15/1972	366	House	to amend h.r. 11417, a bill to provide financial assistance to the national railroad passenger corporation for the purpose of purchasing railroad equipment, by providing that all officers paid in excess of \$60,000 be paid only from the net profits of the corporation.	3	2
92	HR11417	3/15/1972	367	House	to pass h.r. 11417, providing financial assistance to the national railroad corporation.	4	1
92	HR11417	4/27/1972	564	Senate	to amend h.r. 11417, a bill to provide financial assistance to the national railroad passenger corp, by providing for rail service to the largest standard metropolitan statistical area in each state, when each such area has a population in excess of 100,000.	5	6
92	HR11417	4/27/1972	565	Senate	to pass h.r. 11417, a bill to provide financial aid to national railroad passenger corp.	6	1

93	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	S2016	#####	396	House	to agree to the conference report on s. 2016, the amtrak improvement act of 1973.	2	1
93	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR15427	7/11/1974	806	House	to pass h.r. 15427, a bill to provide financial assistance financial assistance to the national railroad passenger to the national railroad passenger corporation.	3	1
93	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR15427	8/8/1974	938	House	to pass h.r. 15427, the house companion bill to s.3569, authorizing fiscal 1975 funds for amtrak, after striking all after the enacting clause and inserting the test of s.3569, to agree to the conference report on h.r. 15427, amtrak authorizations.	4	1
93	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR15427	#####	995	House	to amend h.r. 4975, proposed amtrak improvement act, by deleting the section increasing the salary of the amtrak president from \$60000 to \$85000. (rejected)	5	1
94	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR4975	4/24/1975	110	House	to pass h.r. 4975, proposed amtrak improvement act.	3	2
94	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR4975	4/24/1975	111	House	to agree to the conference report on s. 3040, the amtrak improvement act of 1978.	2	1
95	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	S3040	9/19/1978	1411	House	to amend the eckhardt amendment to h.r. 3996, amtrak authorization. the eckhardt amendment establishes criteria for the retention of short-distance trains and establishes regional balance criteria to achieve more balanced passenger train service.	2	1
96	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR3996	7/24/1979	343	House	the gore amendment provides for a one-year moratorium on any amtrak route cuts. to amend h.r. 3996, amtrak authorization, by requiring amtrak to calculate total expenses of the corporation and establish fares for intercity rail service to produce revenues equal to 40% of total expenses in fiscal 1980. (motion failed)	2	4
96	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR3996	7/25/1979	345	House	of appropriations for amtrak. (motion passed)	4	1
96	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR3996	7/25/1979	346	House	h.r.2247 by molinari (r-ny) - amtrak reform and privatization act of 1997 (house rejected the bonior (d-m) motion to rise.)	1	2
105	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR2247	#####	522	House	house rejected the quinn substitute to the latourette amendment that sought to clarify that the labor reform provisions only apply to amtrak which would hold freight and transit workers harmless.	3	1
105	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR2247	#####	523	House	Providing for consideration of the bill (S. 738) to reform the statutes relating to Amtrak, and for other purposes.	4	5
105	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	S738 (HRES319)	#####	622	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	3	2
110	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR2095	#####	972	House	On Passage	2	1
110	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR2095	9/29/2008	651	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	4	5
110	Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970	HR2095	10/1/2008	652	Senate	Motion Agreed to	4	1
89	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	HR2362	3/26/1965	25	House	to recommit h.r. 2362, a bill to strengthen and improve educational quality and opportunity in the nation's elementary and secondary schools, to education and labor to pass h.r. 2362, the elementary and secondary education act of 1965.	3	2
89	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	HR2362	3/26/1965	26	House	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by requiring in title iii, which dealt with supplementary education centers, that the state education agency give prior approval before federal grants go directly to the local education formula in title ii (supplementary education centers and services) for apportionment of funds among the states. (failed)	5	4
89	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	HR2362	4/8/1965	37	Senate	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by providing a more gradual reduction of payments under public law 874 in impacted areas, resulting from the closing of defense installations. (failed)	7	4
89	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	HR2362	4/8/1965	38	Senate	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by altering the formula in title i (financial assistance to local school agencies for children of low-income families) for apportionment of funds among the states. (failed)	6	4
89	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	HR2362	4/8/1965	39	Senate	to amend h.r. 2362, elementary and secondary education act of 1965, by authorizing individual taxpayer's suits in the u.s. district court for the district of columbia challenging the constitutionality of any proposed payment or grant under the act.	8	4
89	Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	HR2362	4/9/1965	41	Senate		9	4

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	42	Senate	10	4	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by altering the formula in title i (financial assistance to local school agencies for children of low-income families) for apportionment of funds among the states. (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	43	Senate	11	4	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by altering the formula in title i (financial assistance to local school agencies for children of low-income families) for apportionment of funds among the states. (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	44	Senate	12	4	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by respecting interpretation guidelines, required of the commissioner of education for use by state educational agencies, in making determinations on applications by local educational agencies for assistance under title i. (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	45	Senate	13	4	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act of 1965, by adding a new title which would extend gi benefits to veterans who served in southeast
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	46	Senate	14	4	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, (substituting for other language) by barring payment for the construction of facilities or hiring of teachers at schools or institutions where there was religious worship or sectarian
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	47	Senate	15	4	to amend h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act, by requiring that all title iii grants be for supplemental services and centers in school attendance areas having a high concentration of educationally and economically deprived children.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	89	HR2362	4/9/1965	48	Senate	4	1	to pass h.r. 2362, the 1965 elementary and secondary education act.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	4/23/1969	20	House	3	2	to adopt as a substitute to h.r. 514, a bill which extends programs of assistance for elementary and secondary education, an amendment that (1) extends the elementary and secondary education act for 2 years in lieu of 5 years, (2) eliminates federal matching requirements and institutes block grants to the states for library books, innovative programs, science equipment, and guidance and counsel; and (3) eliminates
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	4/23/1969	21	House	3	1	to pass bill h.r. 514, to extend programs of assistance for elementary and secondary education.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/6/1970	280	Senate	5	4	to amend h.r. 514, a bill to extend programs of assistance for elementary and secondary education, by deleting from the bill any provisions including children residing in low-rent public housing in the impact aid program. (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/16/1970	282	Senate	6	7	to adopt perfecting amendment to stennis amendment to h.r. 514, to insure uniform application of federal guidelines throughout the u.s. in dealing with racial school
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/18/1970	283	Senate	8	9	to agree to substitute for stennis amendment to h.r. 514, the substitute providing to insure uniform application of federal guidelines in dealing with school segregation, and prohibiting forced bussing of students.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/18/1970	284	Senate	10	8	to amend stennis amendment to h.r. 514, by deleting the words "without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation." (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/18/1970	285	Senate	11	12	to amend h.r. 514 to insure that federal guidelines throughout the u.s.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/19/1970	288	Senate	13	11	to amend h.r. 514, by adding new section to bar courts and federal departments from requiring bussing of students to alter the racial composition of a public school. (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	2/19/1970	289	Senate	11	14	to table modified ervin amendment to h.r. 514, to secure the right of any child to attend the public school nearest his home.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	4/1/1970	346	Senate	16	15	to recommit the conference report on h.r. 514, a bill extending assistance for elementary and secondary education. (failed)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	4/1/1970	347	Senate	15	1	to adopt conference report on h.r. 514.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	91	HR514	4/7/1970	213	House	15	1	to adopt the conference report on h.r. 514, which extends programs of assistance for elementary and secondary education.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	8/6/1971	189	Senate	2	3	to table dominick (r. colo.) amendment to s. 659 adding provision for the establishment of a foreign service scholarship program.

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	8/16/1971	190	Senate	to amend dominick amendment to s. 659, by striking language authorizing monthly subsistence payments to married foreign service trainees.	3	4
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	8/6/1971	191	Senate	to amend mondale (d, minn) amendment to s. 659, higher education bill. mondale amendment calls for desegregation requirements of s. 659 to be applied uniformly across the nation, whether the segregation in question was the result of law or other factors such as neighborhood housing patterns. the motion is to agree to section a of the scottmansfield amendment to the mondale amendment. the section bars funds for the purpose of busing students in order to overcome racial school imbalances, with	5	6
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/24/1972	474	Senate	to amend mondale (d, minn) amendment to s. 659 by agreeing to section b of scottmansfield amendment, setting guidelines and standards for the conduct of federal officials or agencies in the matter of busing school children.	7	8
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/25/1972	476	Senate	to amend mondale (d, minn) amendment to s. 659 by agreeing to section c of scottmansfield amendment, postponing effectiveness of any court-ordered busing until all appeals in connection therewith have been exhausted .	9	10
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/25/1972	477	Senate	to amend sen. mondale's amendment to s. 659, so as to bar federal courts from issuing orders to require busing of school children on basis of race, religion, or national origin.	11	9
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/28/1972	479	Senate	to amend s. 659 to provide that a school in a disadvantaged neighborhood may qualify as a "prize" school. (failed)	12	9
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	481	Senate	to amend s. 659 by agreeing to the mondale amendment which embodied scott (r, pa) mansfield (d, mont) amendment (rc 58, 59, 60) and griffin (r, mich) amendment (rc 61).	13	9
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	482	Senate	to amend allen (d, ala) amendment to s. 659 by barring federal courts from issuing orders to require busing of schoolchildren on basis of race, religion, or national origin. allen amendment to s. 659 provides that no provision of this or any other act shall be construed to require assignment or transportation of students or teachers for purpose of changing the racial composition of any school. (failed)	14	9
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	483	Senate	to amend (as a substitute for allen (d, ala) amendment) s. 659 by agreeing to sections a, b, and c of scottmansfield amendment. (see rc 5,8,59,60)	15	16
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	484	Senate	to amend, as amended by scottmansfield amendment, s. 659. (see rc 58, 59, 60)	17	18
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	485	Senate	to amend s. 659 to provide a ten-year plan for school integration. (failed)	19	17
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	486	Senate	to amend, as a substitute to baker (r, Tenn) amendment, s. 659, by postponing effectiveness of court-busing orders until plans providing for racial desegregation of schools without regard to the origin of segregation shall have been adopted uniformly throughout the united states by the appropriate local educational agencies thereof. the baker amendment to s. 659 postpones effectiveness of u.s. district court busing orders until all appeals in connection therewith have been exhausted or until time for such appeals or time therefore have been exhausted. (failed)	20	17
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	2/29/1972	487	Senate	to amend s. 659 so as to strike from the bill provisions calling for the establishment of a foreign service scholarship program.	21	17
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	489	Senate	to amend s. 659 so as to provide the right for a student to attend the public school nearest his home. (failed)	22	23
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	491	Senate	to amend s. 659 so as to provide a student the right to attend the neighborhood public school of his choice. (failed)	24	22
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	492	Senate	to amend s. 659 so as to grant the right of class actions to reopen or intervene in court ordered school busing cases.	25	22
	92	S659			Senate		26	27

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	493	Senate	to amend s. 659 by requiring the report of the attorney general and secretary of health, education, and welfare 120 days after enactment of s. 659, describing conditions of segregation and desegregation in all u.s. public schools. (failed)	28	26
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	494	Senate	to amend s. 659 to provide that schools under desegregation orders may qualify for desegregation funds without further qualifications imposed by hew. (failed)	29	26
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	495	Senate	to amend s. 659 to bar federal courts from issuing orders to require busing of schoolchildren on account of race, and postponing effectiveness of any such orders until all appeals in connection therewith have been exhausted. (failed)	30	26
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/1/1972	496	Senate	to pass the house substitute amendment to s. 659, proposed omnibus education amendments of 1972, as amended by committee amendment in the nature of a table a motion to instruct conferees to insist on the house anti-busing amendments to s. 659, omnibus education amendments of 1972. (failed)	31	32
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/8/1972	358	House	to instruct conferees to insist on the house anti-busing amendments to s. 659.	33	34
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	3/8/1972	359	House	to instruct conferees to insist on the house anti-busing amendments to s. 659.	34	35
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	5/11/1972	413	House	to table motion to instruct the conferees to insist on the house anti-busing amendments to s. 659, omnibus education amendments of 1972. (failed)	36	37
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	5/11/1972	414	House	to instruct conferees to insist on house anti-busing amendments to s. 659.	37	36
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	6/8/1972	451	House	to agree to the conference report on s. 659, higher education act of 1972.	38	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	5/23/1972	588	Senate	to table griffin (r, mich) motion to recommit the conference report on s. 659, proposed omnibus education amendments of 1972, with instructions that senate conferees recede from the position of the senate with respect to title viii and concur in stronger anti-busing provisions in house report.	39	40
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	92	S659	5/24/1972	589	Senate	to agree to conference report on s. 659.	40	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/26/1974	611	House	to amend the comm. amendment to h.r. 69, a bill to extend and amend the elementary and secondary education act of 1965, by providing that title i funds be distributed according to the number of children from families with incomes below \$4000 plus 100% of children from families with incomes over \$4000 receiving adfc funds. (failed)	3	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/26/1974	612	House	to amend the comm. amendment to h.r. 69 so that 2/3 of the title i funds would be distributed on the basis of the school age population, and 1/3 according to the comm. amendment formula. (failed)	4	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/26/1974	613	House	to amend h.r. 69 by inserting language containing the text of h.r. 13915, the equal educational opportunities act, as passed by the house on aug. 17, 1972. the amendment is aimed at prohibiting busing for the purpose of achieving racial balance.	5	6
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/27/1974	615	House	to amend h.r. 69 by extending impact aid programs through fiscal 1977 rather than fiscal 1975.	7	8
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/27/1974	616	House	to amend h.r. 69 by prohibiting the use of any funds to implement busing plans.	9	10
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/27/1974	617	House	to amend h.r. 69. by prohibiting any school district from receiving assistance if employment in that district is contingent upon membership in a union or professional	11	9
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	3/27/1974	618	House	to pass h.r. 69.	9	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	6/5/1974	729	House	to agree to a motion to instruct house conferees to insist on house provisions relating to busing of students embodied in title ii of h.r. 69, amending the elementary and secondary education act of 1965.	10	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	6/27/1974	774	House	to instruct the house conferees on h.r. 69, a bill amending and extending the elementary and secondary education act of 1965, to insist on house passed provisions on busing, embodied in title ii.	12	13

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	6/27/1974	786	House	to instruct house conferees on h.r. 69 to insist on provisions of title iv with respect to federal assistance provided to school districts enrolling children whose parents work or live on the federal property. (failed)	14	12
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	7/22/1974	819	House	to instruct house conferees on h.r. 69 to insist on provisions of title iv with respect to federal assistance provided to school districts enrolling children whose parents work or live on the federal property. (failed)	15	16
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	7/24/1974	908	Senate	to recommit h.r. 69 a bill amending the elementary and secondary education act of 1965, to the conference committee with instructions that the senate agree to the original house provisions with regard to transportation of schoolchildren. (failed)	18	17
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	7/24/1974	909	Senate	to agree to the conference report on h.r. 69. a bill amending the elementary and secondary education act of 1965.	17	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	93	HR69	7/31/1974	839	House	to agree to the conference report on h.r. 69. a bill extending and amending the elementary and secondary education act of 1965, and declaring that students should not be bused beyond the school next closest to their homes.	17	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	95	HR15	7/12/1978	1173	House	to amend h.r. 15, the bill extending the elementary and secondary education act for an additional five years, by allowing local educational agencies who have compensatory education programs to qualify for incentive grants, even if an identifiable state-wide compensatory education program does not exist. (failed)	3	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	95	HR15	7/12/1978	1174	House	to amend h.r. 15 by retaining a provision in current law that counts two-thirds, rather than 100%, of the children from atdc families for the purpose of allocating state compensatory education funds. (failed)	4	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	95	HR15	7/13/1978	1176	House	to agree to an amendment offered in the nature of a substitute for the holt amendment to h.r. 15, the kidee substitute amendment prohibits community education grants for any program that duplicates or competes with public services already offered by state or local agencies, except when the commissioner of education determines that collaboration exists between the local education agency and the other public agencies. the holt amendment prohibits the awarding of federal community education grants to programs that duplicate existing public services, but allows the general local government, rather than the commissioner of education, to waive this to agree to an amendment offered in the nature of a substitute for h.r. 15, the ashbrook substitute provides for the distribution of the authorized funds by means of block grants to the states. (failed)	7	5
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	95	HR15	7/13/1978	1178	House	to pass h.r. 15.	5	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	95	HR15	8/24/1978	998	Senate	to pass h.r. 15, after striking all after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof the amended text of s. 1753.	8	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	95	HR15	#####	1534	House	to agree to the conference report on h.r. 15, the bill extending through fiscal year 1983 most of the major federal programs of aid for elementary and secondary schools.	9	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	2/24/1994	628	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	3	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/2/1994	631	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	5	4
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/3/1994	635	House	ON AGREEING TO THE AMENDMENT (failed)	7	6
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/3/1994	636	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	8	6
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/3/1994	637	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	9	6
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/9/1994	639	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	11	10

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/9/1994	640	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	12	10
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/9/1994	642	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	15	14
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/9/1994	643	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	16	17
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/21/1994	667	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	18	16
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/21/1994	668	House	(house rejected the williams amendment to the johnson of texas amendment that sought to prohibit funding of state school systems that adopt policies denying prayer in schools that do not permit voluntary prayer on school grounds.)	19	16
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/21/1994	669	House	(house agreed to the johnson of texas amendment that prohibits federal funding to schools that do not permit voluntary prayer on school grounds.)	20	21
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/22/1994	670	House	(house agreed to the unsoeld amendment to the doolittle amendment, providing that teaching sex education programs in schools should not be construed as federal control of curriculum or curriculum-related activities in schools.)	22	23
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/22/1994	671	House	(house agreed to the doolittle amendment, as amended.)	24	22
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/24/1994	685	House	on agreeing to the amendment	25	26
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/24/1994	686	House	(house agreed to the hancock amendment, as amended.)	27	28
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/24/1994	687	House	(house rejected the miller of florida amendment that sought to eliminate a \$200 million fiscal year 1995 authorization for low-interest loans to poor school districts for renovation or construction.)	29	27
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/24/1994	688	House	(house rejected the michel amendment in the nature of a substitute that sought to reduce funds allocated to the school districts; cancel all new programs offered; eliminate the authorization of funds for use in family planning and reproductive services and provisions for opportunity-to-learn standards; and retain provisions for magnet school assistance, bilingual education and indian education.)	30	27
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	3/24/1994	689	House	On Passage	27	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	8/2/1994	647	Senate	Bill Passed	31	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	9/20/1994	1015	House	on motion to instruct conferees	32	33
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	9/30/1994	1043	House	motion to recommit the conference report (failed)	35	34
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	9/30/1994	1044	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	34	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	10/5/1994	715	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	34	36
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	103	HR6	10/5/1994	716	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	34	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/22/2001	129	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	3	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/22/2001	131	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	5	4
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/22/2001	132	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	7	6
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	134	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	8	7

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	135	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	9	7
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	136	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	10	7
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	137	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	11	12
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	138	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	13	14
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	140	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	15	16
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	142	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	17	15
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	143	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions (failed)	18	15
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	5/23/2001	144	House	On Passage	15	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	6/14/2001	192	Senate	Bill Passed	19	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	7/18/2001	236	House	Table Motion to Instruct Conferees	20	21
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	#####	492	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	22	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	107	HR1	#####	371	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	22	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/8/2015	223	Senate	Amendment Rejected	3	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/8/2015	224	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	4	2
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/8/2015	225	Senate	Amendment Rejected	5	4
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/9/2015	226	Senate	Amendment Rejected	6	4
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/14/2015	232	Senate	Amendment Rejected	8	7
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/14/2015	233	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	9	10
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/14/2015	235	Senate	Amendment Rejected	12	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/14/2015	236	Senate	Amendment Rejected	13	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/15/2015	237	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	11	14
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/15/2015	238	Senate	Amendment Rejected	15	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/15/2015	239	Senate	Amendment Rejected	16	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/15/2015	240	Senate	Amendment Rejected	17	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/15/2015	241	Senate	Amendment Rejected	18	11

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	242	Senate	Amendment Rejected	19	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	243	Senate	Amendment Rejected	20	11
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	244	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	21	22
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	245	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	23	24
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	246	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	25	26
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	247	Senate	Amendment Rejected	27	25
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	248	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	25	28
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	7/16/2015	249	Senate	Bill Passed	25	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	#####	308	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	29	30
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	12/2/2015	662	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	31	1
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	12/8/2015	333	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	31	32
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965	114	S1177	12/9/2015	334	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	31	1
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	92	S3419	6/21/1972	636	Senate	to amend s. 3419, a bill to protect consumers against unreasonable risk of injury from hazardous products, so as to vest in an administrator for health (in the department of new functions proposed to be vested in the newly created agency, (failed)	3	2
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	92	S3419	6/21/1972	637	Senate	to amend s. 3419 so as to provide that enforcement proceedings under the act be the responsibility of the department of justice. (failed)	4	2
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	92	S3419	6/21/1972	638	Senate	to amend s. 3419 so as to delete authority for attorneys for the new agency to prosecute criminal cases. (failed)	5	2
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	92	S3419	6/21/1972	639	Senate	to amend s. 3419 so as to extend provisions of the bill to mobile homes. (failed)	6	2
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	92	S3419	6/21/1972	640	Senate	to pass s. 3419, consumer product safety bill.	2	1
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	92	S3419	9/20/1972	588	House	to pass s. 3419, in lieu of h.r. 15003, a bill to protect consumers against unreasonable product hazards, after being amended to contain the language of h.r. 15003.	7	1
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	94	S644	7/18/1975	296	Senate	to amend s. 644, authorizing funds for the consumer product safety commission through fiscal 1977, so as to permit the application of consumer product safety information standards in the labeling of ammunition. (failed)	3	2
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	94	S644	7/18/1975	297	Senate	to pass s. 644, authorizing funds for the consumer product safety commission through fiscal 1977.	2	1
Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972	94	S644	7/18/1975	300	Senate	to table motion to reconsider vote by which the bill s. 644 was passed.	2	4
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	94	HR8235	#####	598	House	to amend h.r. 8235, a bill providing federal aid for highway construction, by reducing the annual authorization for the interstate system for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 by \$750 million per year and deleting language which gives the secretary discretion of to agree en bloc to three amendments to h.r. 8235 which require the cost and design of the interstate project being withdrawn in favor of mass transit to be included in the 1972 interstate budget estimate, and provide that interstate mileage withdrawn in one state be available for redesignation only in another state and which strike the prohibition against "pay-back" to the highway trust fund of federal funds expended on an interstate segment subsequently withdrawn.	2	1
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	94	HR8235	#####	599	House		3	1

94	HR8235	#####	600	House	to amend h.r. 8235 by rolling back the maximum truck weights from 80,000 pounds to 73,280 pounds.	4	1
94	HR8235	#####	601	House	to amend h.r. 8235, so as to allow cities of over 200,000 population that supplied over 50% of funds for an area program to plan a highway project and to submit a plan directly to the transportation department for funding if the state had not forwarded the plan to the department within a year of the plan's approval.	5	1
95	HR11733	9/21/1978	1426	House	to amend h.r. 11733, the surface transportation assistance act of 1978, by requiring that the annual authorization for programs to be financed by the highway trust fund must be closely related to anticipated annual receipts. (failed)	3	2
95	HR11733	9/22/1978	1430	House	to agree to several amendments to h.r. 11733, the surface transportation assistance act of 1978, the kostmayer amendments delete language that mandates federal compensation for billboards removed in compliance with the highway beautification act and for billboards removed as a result of local zoning and land use ordinances.	5	4
95	HR11733	9/28/1978	1454	House	to amend h.r. 11733 by striking language that would give the federal aviation administration access to national driver register information. (failed)	6	5
95	HR11733	9/28/1978	1455	House	to pass h.r. 11733.	5	1
97	HR3210	9/24/1981	211	House	to pass h.r. 3210, the authorizations of \$3.1 billion in fiscal 1983 for interstate highway constructions and the limit of \$8.2 billion on obligations from the highway trust fund in fiscal 1982. (motion agreed to)	2	1
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	743	House	to amend h.r. 6211, transportation assistance act of 1982, by striking language providing for contract authority and requiring appropriations for all funding. (motion failed)	3	2
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	744	House	to amend h.r. 6211, by waiving the davis-bacon wage provisions in federal surface transportation programs. (motion failed)	4	2
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	745	House	to amend h.r. 6211 by restricting davis-bacon wage provisions to initial highway construction. (motion failed)	5	2
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	746	House	to amend h.r. 6211 by striking language permitting the secretary to prioritize allocation of interstate discretionary funds for completion of high cost interstate projects. (motion failed)	6	2
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	747	House	to amend h.r. 6211 by providing that the davis-bacon wage provisions should not be used to limit, or in the opinion of the secretary, have the effect of limiting legitimate job opportunities. (motion passed)	7	8
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	748	House	to amend h.r. 6211 by revising the present highway user taxes, increasing the gasoline tax by 5 cents, extending the highway trust fund through sept. 30, 1988, and establishing a mass transit account. (motion passed)	9	10
97	HR6211	12/6/1982	749	House	to pass h.r. 6211. (motion passed)	9	1
97	HR6211	#####	812	House	to agree to conference report on h.r. 6211, authorizing funds for fiscal 1983-1986 for highway construction and repairs and increasing gasoline and other highway taxes.	11	1
100	HR2	1/21/1987	11	House	to pass hr 2, highway reauthorization, a bill to authorize approximately \$90 billion in funds for highway construction and safety programs, and for mass transportation programs in fiscal years 1987-91.	2	1

100	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2	2/4/1987	21	Senate	3	1	to adopt hr 2, the federal-aid highway act of 1987, a bill to provide funds for highway construction and safety programs, mass transportation programs, and the expansion and improvement of the relocation assistance program. previously, the senate replaced the language of hr 2 for that in s 387.
100	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2	3/18/1987	32	House	4	1	to adopt the conference report on hr 2, highway reauthorization, a bill to authorize \$88.6 billion in aid for highways and mass transit programs through fiscal 1991.
100	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2	3/19/1987	33	Senate	4	1	to adopt the conference report on hr 2, the federal-aid highway act of 1987, a bill to authorize funds for highway construction and safety programs, mass transportation programs, and the expansion and improvement of the relocation assistance program.
100	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2	4/1/1987	51	Senate	4	1	to adopt over the president's veto hr 2, the federal-aid highway act of 1987, a bill to authorize funds for highway construction and safety programs, for mass transportation programs, and for expansion and improvement of the relocation assistance program.
100	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2	4/2/1987	60	Senate	4	1	to adopt over the president's veto hr 2, the federal-aid highway act of 1987, a bill to authorize funding for highway construction and safety programs, for the expansion and improvement of the relocation assistance program, and for mass transportation programs. two-thirds of the senate having voted in the affirmative, the senate
102	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2950	#####	322	House	3	2	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)
102	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2950	#####	323	House	4	2	On Agreeing to the Amendment
102	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2950	#####	324	House	5	4	On Agreeing to the Amendment failed
102	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2950	#####	325	House	4	1	On Passage
102	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2950	#####	424	House	6	1	On Agreeing to the Conference Report
102	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	HR2950	#####	277	Senate	6	1	On Agreeing to the Conference Report
104	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	S440	6/20/1995	269	Senate	3	2	Amendment Agreed to
104	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	S440	6/20/1995	270	Senate	2	4	Motion to Table Agreed to
104	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	S440	6/20/1995	271	Senate	5	2	Amendment Rejected
104	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	S440	6/20/1995	272	Senate	6	7	Amendment Agreed to
104	An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes	S440	6/21/1995	275	Senate	8	9	Motion to Table Agreed to

104	S440	6/21/1995	277	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	10	11
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
104	S440	6/21/1995	278	Senate	Amendment Rejected	12	11
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
104	S440	6/21/1995	279	Senate	Motion to Table Motion to Reconsider Agreed to	11	13
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
104	S440	#####	582	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	14	1
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	4/1/1998	722	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	3	2
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	4/1/1998	723	House	(house agreed to davis of illinois amendment that allocates an additional \$108 million for the access to jobs challenge grant pilot program designed to transport welfare recipients to and from jobs and activities related to their employment.)	4	2
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	4/1/1998	724	House	(house rejected the graham amendment that sought to reduce highway project authorization funding and transit project authorization funding by approximately \$18 billion during fiscal years 1998 through 2003.)	5	4
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	4/1/1998	725	House	(house rejected the spratt amendment in the nature of a substitute that sought to extend funding for an additional two months for each of the programs for which an extension was provided under the surface transportation extension act of 1997.)	6	4
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	4/1/1998	726	House	(house rejected the kasich amendment in the nature of a substitute that sought to establish the transportation empowerment act that provides a four year transition period to return to the states maximum discretionary authority and fiscal responsibility for all elements of the national transportation systems not within the direct purview of the federal government and lowers the federal gas tax by 11 cents per gallon and	7	4
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	4/1/1998	727	House	(house passed h.r. 2400, to authorize funds for federal-aid highways, highway safety programs, and transit programs.)	4	1
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	5/21/1998	812	House	(house rejected the obey motion to instruct house conferees on h.r. 2400, building efficient surface transportation and equity act, to limit the aggregate number of earmarked highway demonstration projects included in the conference report on h.r. 2400 to a number that does not exceed the aggregate number of such highway demonstration projects earmarked during the 42 years since the enactment of the	5	6
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	5/21/1998	813	House	(house rejected the minge motion to instruct house conferees on h.r. 2400, building efficient surface transportation and equity act, to ensure that spending for highways and transit programs authorized in the conference agreement on h.r. 2400 is fully paid for using estimates of the congressional budget office, to reject the use of estimates from any other source, to reject any method of budgeting that departs from the budget enforcement principles currently in effect, or the use of the budget surplus to	7	8
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	5/22/1998	819	House	Recommit Conference Report With Instructions rejected	10	9
An Act to Provide that the United States shall aid the States in the construction of rural post-roads, and for other purposes							
105	HR2400	5/22/1998	820	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	9	1

105	HR2400	5/22/1998	445	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	9	1
109	HR3	3/9/2005	55	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	3	2
109	HR3	3/9/2005	56	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	4	2
109	HR3	3/9/2005	57	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	5	6
109	HR3	3/9/2005	58	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	7	5
109	HR3	3/9/2005	59	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	8	9
109	HR3	3/10/2005	61	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	10	11
109	HR3	3/10/2005	62	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	12	13
109	HR3	3/10/2005	63	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions rejected	14	12
109	HR3	4/26/2005	110	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	15	16
109	HR3	4/28/2005	113	Senate	Motion to Table Agreed to	17	18
109	HR3	5/11/2005	119	Senate	Motion to Table Agreed to	19	20
109	HR3	5/11/2005	120	Senate	Amendment Rejected	21	19
109	HR3	5/11/2005	121	Senate	Amendment Rejected	22	19
109	HR3	5/12/2005	122	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	19	23
109	HR3	5/17/2005	123	Senate	Amendment Rejected	25	24
109	HR3	5/17/2005	124	Senate	Amendment Rejected	26	24

109	HR3	5/17/2005	125	Senate	Bill Passed	24	1
109	HR3	5/26/2005	226	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees (rejected)	28	27
109	HR3	7/29/2005	220	Senate	Conference Report: Agreed to	29	1
110	HR1195	4/16/2008	546	Senate	Motion to Table Motion to Recommit Agreed to	3	2
110	HR1195	4/17/2008	547	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	4	5
110	HR1195	4/17/2008	548	Senate	Amendment Rejected	6	4
110	HR1195	4/17/2008	550	Senate	Bill Passed	4	1
110	HR1195	4/30/2008	1404	House	On Motion to Suspend the Rules and Agree to the Senate Amendment	4	1
112	HR4281	3/29/2012	1091	House	On Passage	2	1
112	HR4348	4/18/2012	1112	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	3	2
112	HR4348	4/18/2012	1113	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions REJECTED	4	3
112	HR4348	4/18/2012	1114	House	On Passage	3	1
112	HR4348	4/25/2012	1123	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees (Rejected)	4	5
112	HR4348	5/18/2012	1236	House	On Barrow Motion to Instruct Conferees	7	6
112	HR4348	5/18/2012	1237	House	On Rahall Motion to Instruct Conferees	8	7
112	HR4348	6/6/2012	1286	House	On Flake Motion to Instruct Conferees	9	8
112	HR4348	6/6/2012	1287	House	On Doggett Motion to Instruct Conferees (rejected)	10	9

112	HR4348	6/8/2012	1321	House	On Broun of Georgia Motion to Instruct Conferees rejected	11	9
112	HR4348	6/20/2012	1334	House	On Walz of Minnesota Motion to Instruct Conferees	12	9
112	HR4348	6/21/2012	1354	House	On McKinley of West Virginia Motion to Instruct Conferees	13	12
112	HR4348	6/26/2012	1357	House	On Hoyer of Maryland Motion to Instruct Conferees rejected	14	13
112	HR4348	6/26/2012	1358	House	On Black of Tennessee Motion to Instruct Conferees	15	13
112	HR4348	6/29/2012	1394	House	On Agreeing to the Conference Report	15	1
112	HR4348	6/29/2012	407	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	15	1
113	HR5021	7/15/2014	1051	House	On Motion to Recommit with Instructions rejected	3	2
113	HR5021	7/15/2014	1052	House	On Passage	2	1
113	HR5021	7/29/2014	535	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	4	5
113	HR5021	7/29/2014	536	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	6	7
113	HR5021	7/29/2014	537	Senate	Amendment Rejected	8	6
113	HR5021	7/29/2014	538	Senate	Amendment Rejected	9	6
113	HR5021	7/29/2014	539	Senate	Bill Passed	6	1
113	HR5021	7/31/2014	1111	House	On Motion to Disagree to the Senate Amendment	10	11
113	HR5021	7/31/2014	546	Senate	Motion Agreed to -- to recede amendment	10	1
114	HR22	7/27/2015	256	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	3	2

114	HR22	7/27/2015	257	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	4	5
114	HR22	7/29/2015	258	Senate	Amendment Agreed to	4	6
114	HR22	7/29/2015	259	Senate	Cloture Motion Agreed to	4	7
114	HR22	7/30/2015	260	Senate	Bill Passed	4	1
114	HR22	11/3/2015	583	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	9	8
114	HR22	11/3/2015	584	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	10	8
114	HR22	11/3/2015	585	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	11	8
114	HR22	11/3/2015	586	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	12	13
114	HR22	11/3/2015	587	House	rejected	14	12
114	HR22	11/3/2015	588	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	15	12
114	HR22	11/3/2015	589	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	16	12
114	HR22	11/3/2015	590	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	17	12
114	HR22	11/4/2015	591	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	18	12
114	HR22	11/4/2015	592	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	19	12
114	HR22	11/4/2015	593	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment rejected	20	12
114	HR22	11/4/2015	596	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	21	12
114	HR22	11/4/2015	597	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	22	12


114	HR22	11/4/2015	598	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	23	24
114	HR22	11/4/2015	599	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	25	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	600	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	26	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	601	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	27	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	602	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	28	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	603	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	29	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	604	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	30	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	605	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	31	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	606	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	32	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	607	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	33	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	608	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	34	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	609	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	35	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	610	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	36	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	611	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	37	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	612	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	38	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	613	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	39	23
114	HR22	11/4/2015	614	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	40	41

114	HR22	11/4/2015	616	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment (failed)	42	40
114	HR22	11/4/2015	617	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	43	44
114	HR22	11/5/2015	618	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	45	46
114	HR22	11/5/2015	619	House	On Agreeing to the Amendment	47	48
114	HR22	11/5/2015	620	House	On Agreeing to the Amendments En Gros	49	50
114	HR22	11/5/2015	622	House	On Motion to Instruct Conferees (failed)	51	50
114	HR22	12/3/2015	331	Senate	Conference Report Agreed to	50	1

C: Model Diagnostics

Figure A1 presents the results from a Gelman diagnostic test for convergence. The results suggest that, while a slightly longer run may have elicited further convergence, the model appears to have to have reasonably converged.


Figure C.3: \hat{R} Point Estimates



D: Votes-Only Ideal Points

To demonstrate that the agenda constraints imposed on the estimation process do not unduly influence the legislator ideal points generated therein, I compare here the agenda-constrained ideal points to ideal points generated from a traditional, votes-only estimation procedure (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). As the scatterplot and histograms suggest, the same moderate trend in revealed preferences remains among these scores—even absent the agenda constraints. Given that these scores correlate at a high rate ($\rho = 0.952$), it appears as though the agenda constraints do not seem to have fundamentally altered the legislator ideal points themselves.

Figure C.4: Reauthorization Ideal Points v. Votes-Only IRT Ideal Points



E: Electoral Classification of Congresses

Below is a summary of how each Congress in the reauthorizations data was coded, according to extrapolated IEM electoral probabilities.

Figure C.5: Election Scenario Classifications

<u>Congress</u>	<u>Upcoming Election</u>	<u>Scenario</u>
81	1950	None
82	1952	3
83	1954	3
84	1956	None
85	1958	1
86	1960	None
87	1962	None
88	1964	None
89	1966	None
90	1968	2
91	1970	None
92	1972	None
93	1974	1
94	1976	None
95	1978	None
96	1980	2
97	1982	None
98	1984	None
99	1986	1
100	1988	None
101	1990	None
102	1992	None
103	1994	3
104	1996	3
105	1998	None
106	2000	3
107	2002	1
108	2004	None
109	2006	3
110	2008	1
111	2010	3
112	2012	1
113	2014	1
114	2016	2
115	2018	3

F: Alternative Model Specifications

Table C.1: Policy Acceleration, Deceleration, and Significant Legislative Reauthorizations

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Significant Reauthorization	
	(1)	(2)
$SQ \in \text{Accel. Region}$	0.026 (0.466)	-0.179 (0.574)
<i>Prev. Majority Match</i>	0.555 (0.453)	0.718 (0.566)
$SQ \in \text{Decel. Region}$	0.043 (0.839)	-0.053 (0.865)
$SQ \in [AS, R]$	0.614 (0.554)	
<i>SQ Location</i>	-0.126 (0.159)	-0.164 (0.182)
$ SQ \text{ Location} $	0.500* (0.257)	0.563** (0.279)
Constant	-0.306 (0.587)	-0.417 (0.714)
Observations	145	100
Log Likelihood	-79.206	-57.747
Akaike Inf. Crit.	172.411	127.495
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

G: Selection Effects for Scorable Roll Calls and Voice Votes on Reauthorization

As I discuss in the main text, the consensual nature of reauthorization politics generates a large number of voice votes for final passage, rather than roll call votes. Because my SQ measurement strategy relies upon the presence of (ideally, multiple) roll call votes, these voice votes severely restrict the size of my sample. Perhaps even more pernicious, this pruning of the sample carries with it the possibility for selection bias. To investigate this concern, I run selection models for whether or not a particular reauthorization opportunity was included in the final sample for empirical analysis. These logistic models, presented below, examine whether inclusion in the analysis is systematically associated with exposure to a particular electoral scenario, reauthorization term length, and most consequentially, whether a significant reauthorization was enacted.

Table C.2 displays the results of these models. As the table suggests, some selection concerns do arise when investigating whether particular opportunities are pruned from the final sample. Rather than favoring simple extensions and other means for maintaining the status quo, however, the results suggest that bills *not* included in the empirical analysis are *more* likely to have been a significant reauthorization—not less. This means that voice votes may be artificially masking disagreement within the reauthorizations process. Still, one cannot be certain whether or not this is the case, given that Congress could have other reasons for relying on voice votes.

Table C.2: Investigation of Selection Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Included in Analysis	
	(1)	(2)
<i>Scenario 1</i>	0.104 (0.239)	0.046 (0.253)
<i>Scenario 2</i>	-0.865** (0.414)	-0.565 (0.436)
<i>Scenario 3</i>	-0.171 (0.245)	-0.199 (0.258)
<i>Significant Reauthorization</i>	-0.653*** (0.194)	-0.744*** (0.213)
<i>Reauthorization Term</i>		-0.135*** (0.038)
Constant	-0.146 (0.205)	0.888*** (0.295)
Observations	504	462
Log Likelihood	-321.825	-290.321
Akaike Inf. Crit.	653.649	592.642

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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