Dear Comrade Mugabe:
Decolonization and Radical Protest in Divided Germany, 1960-1980

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in the University of Michigan
2019

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For Moishe Postone

(17 April 1942 - 19 March 2018)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No word of this dissertation would have been written without the life-long friendship, love, and support of my parents, Christine and Wilfried Spreen, and my sister Jana. No matter what the obstacles, they have never ceased to believe in me and have supported my choice to leave my hometown, first to attend high school in another town, then off to college in Scotland, and finally, across the Atlantic where I settled and found a new home. I know that the distance put between us has not been easy, and I thank them for their love. Notwithstanding the distance, I enjoy watching Jule grow up from afar. She clearly inherited her mother's ability to think on her feet.

The University of Michigan has been an incredible place to be a graduate student and become a historian. I have been blessed with a dissertation committee made up of some of the best scholars one can wish for. Geoff Eley has been an encouraging and supportive advisor. He was always ready to indulge me in discussions about a generation of scholars, who became experts on their own activist pasts—a generation to which he belongs, after all. His incredible capacity to think across historical fields and literatures continues to be an inspiration and sets the bar high for historical scholarship that thinks about broader, field-defining questions.

Kathleen Canning has worked hard to keep me honest throughout the years. Her advice that I think of this project as German history broadly conceived, rather than a project grounded merely in the history of the Left, guided my research in the archive. If this project pushes the boundaries of intellectual history and ventures into ethnography, this is in large part due to Kathleen's diligent insistence to think more broadly about the conflict and friction on the ground.

Throughout the project, Howard Brick has been an incredible mentor. In my first semester of teaching, I was lucky enough to be a Graduate Student Instructor for his class "History of American Radicalism." Both in undergraduate lectures and graduate seminars, Howard is a model of pedagogy and intellectual rigor. When I was thinking through my archival work, Howard often saw a vision in my ideas before I could and I owe much to his help.

Rita Chin is a brilliant intellectual and cultural historian, who has had an impact on my work from the very beginning of my time in graduate school. She has always set the bar exceptionally high and her feedback from early graduate seminars has been a continuous resource for my dissertation work. I don't expect this dissertation to live up to her standards, but I know that it is better for her help.

My archival work has forced me to engage with new fields of historiography. When I began to explore connections between European activists and the Zimbabwe African National Union, I was fortunate that Adam Ashforth agreed to join my dissertation committee and offer crucial feedback and criticism from an Africanist point of view. That some of that happened during happy hour at his local Whole Foods was an added bonus.

organized by the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C., the colloquium of the department "Communism and Society" and the doctoral colloquium both at the Center for Contemporary History in Potsdam, the Midwest German History Workshop, the Berlin Program Workshop, the Rutgers Conference "Social Movements after 1968," the "Contours of Transnationalism" project, the European History Workshop at Michigan, and the Social Theory and Evidence Workshop at the University of Chicago. Mark Loeffler deserves special mention for being a mentor, friend, and comrade ever since I arrived in Chicago in the Fall of 2009.

Although this dissertation does not rely on extensive oral history, much of the direction was provided by interviews and informal conversations with former activists and other living witnesses. For these I thank Wolfgang Schorlau (Stuttgart), Astrit Ibro (Tirana), Jochen Staadt (Berlin), Jochen Blanken (Hamburg), Anton Mlynczak (Frankfurt), Jürgen Schröder (Berlin), Andreas Hemming (Halle), Jochen Blanken (Hamburg), Michael Schmidt-Neke (Kiel) and a number who chose to remain anonymous. In the archive, I benefitted from the advice and generous help of archivists. To name just a few: in Freiburg, many a day of work started with conversations over espresso with Volkmar Vogt. Ulrike Gross led me through the stacks at the Archive for Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and Social Movements in Berlin. Martina Schulze provided tens of thousands of pages at the Stasi archive. Without the generous help of Sokol Çunga, I would have been entirely helpless at the Central State Archives in Tirana. None of this would have been possible without them.

Nobody survives without friends. For much needed balance, I thank the members of my indoor soccer teams, especially Guy Willoughby, Jessica von Hertsenberg, Leslie Hempson, Pedro Cantisano, Benedito Machava, Joost van Enden, Katie Hollihan, Jeremy Ledger,

Maren Spolum, Rory Neuner, and Jakob Hoellerbauer. Guy Willoughby and Chris Macdonald got me into bicycle racing which provided much needed distraction during the final years.

A couple of long-term friends are impossible to disentangle from this project. Jannis Bulian, who is a brilliant computer scientist and mathematician has been with me all of my adult life. Jaakko Immonen has sustained me with conversations ever since we first met at the University of Glasgow. Cory Williamson has been a source of support and criticism for many years, and I couldn't have done this without her. For more than a decade now, I have been privileged to know Nick Chambers, who has been a friend, comrade, and critic every step of the way. Perhaps more importantly, he taught me how to dress.

No single person has had more of an effect on my work than Hanna Folland. She taught me how to write, she challenges my every thought and she is a model for rigorous scholarship and evidence-based thinking. I am beyond lucky to be in daily conversation with such a capacious mind and brilliant scholar. I am beyond grateful for her love and generosity. May our struggle against "modular thinking" (her term) last forever!

Finally, a sad note. I met Moishe Postone briefly before I left Germany many years ago. I have been engaged with his thinking for most of my adult life and was lucky to be able to work with him while an M.A. student at the University of Chicago. He was generous with support, time, and criticism. I will miss his ability to see the big picture in the most minute archival detail. When he agreed to join my dissertation committee as an external member, it made sense to everyone. I am deeply saddened that he didn't live to see the result even though, undoubtedly, he would have identified all the ways in which "it needs work" and "working through." This dissertation is for him.

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ABSTRACT

Based on research in Germany and Albania, my dissertation "Dear Comrade Mugabe: Decolonization and Radical Protest in Divided Germany, 1960-1980" argues that Maoism and public and state responses to it showcase the ways in which decolonization and the global Cold War profoundly affected political life in the two Germanies. Driven significantly by people of color, Maoism occupied police and intelligence services, lawmakers, and government bureaucrats; worried business owners and educators; and entangled students and workers of color, Chinese and Albanian diplomats, Zimbabwean guerrillas, and West and East German activists. Officials' concerns with Maoism in West Germany were deeply entangled with the Cold War and were marked by anxieties over "foreign influence" in the Federal Republic.

By foregrounding connections between activists from the two Germanies, Zimbabwe, Iran, and officials from China and Albania, my dissertation puts postwar Germany into the context of the global Cold War and highlights the role of non-Europeans in shaping West German extra-parliamentary political culture. The study uses Maoism as a case study to show that not only activism itself, but the broader cultural and political contexts from which it emerged were profoundly affected and shaped by decolonization and the reshaping of the world it prompted. Even before student activists both from the Global South and the two Germanies put decolonization on the agenda, German-German competition over political

influence among decolonizing and post-colonial nation states meant that the issue was ubiquitous on university campuses in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Anxieties provoked by political activity by foreigners in both Germanies and the rise of China meant that although Maoists never came close to significant electoral success or their transformative objectives, public and state responses to Maoism could never be separated from the reordering of the world provoked by the collapse of European empires. However, the dissertation also shows that activists were not interested in decolonization per se, and certainly to no significant extent in postcolonial state-building, but their enthusiasm for anti-colonial politics remained bound up with a particular kind of revolutionary violence. Ironically, when that kind of enthusiasm became embarrassing to many, it was West German activists themselves who obscured the multi-ethnic character of their 1970s politics.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The current head of state in West Germany's Southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg, a leading member of Joschka Fischer's Foreign Ministry, the former editor-in-chief of a major German business paper, the president of Warner Brothers Germany, the former head shop steward at the automotive company Opel, the longest-serving head of the Green Party, numerous advertising and media executives, lawyers, the chairman of Germany's largest trade union, a logistics executive, the former director of the Namibian national archives, numerous teachers and academics, a former vice president of the German *Bundestag*. What do these people have in common apart from their illustrious careers among the political, business, and legal elites in the post-1989 Federal Republic of Germany?

In the period between roughly 1965 and 1980, all of the above were at one point or another members, sympathizers, or—more often—high functionaries of a West German Maoist cadre party or their various mass organizations.[1] When in the course of the late 1950s to early 1960s the Chinese Communist Party broke with Moscow—until then the undisputed ideological center of international communism—Beijing became an attractive point of orientation for

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[1] See Gunnar Hinck, *Wir waren wie Maschinen: die bundesdeutsche Linke der siebziger Jahre* (Berlin: Rotbuch-Verlag, 2012), p. 42-43, 160.

a diverse array of social movements frustrated with the Soviet Union. While some saw an alternative to Stalinism *in the very possibility* of a communist state's open criticism of the Moscow leadership, others saw in Mao an alternative to the Soviet Union's rhetoric of peaceful coexistence. After all, that rhetoric appeared to appease the West precisely at the time when anti-colonial movements in Africa were fighting wars for independence.[2] Yet others—particularly throughout the 1960s—saw in Mao's Cultural Revolution an expression of anti-authoritarianism that appealed precisely because it *appeared* to be directed against the fossilized bureaucracy that many saw as the fundamental problem with Soviet-style communism. But increasingly—and by the 1970s overwhelmingly—the fascination with Mao was also a fascination with violence, which connected radicals with the ongoing anticolonial struggles in the Global South.

Maoist cadre parties made up a large enough share of the so-called West German "1968"—a convenient shorthand for the array of diverse and often contradictory social movements from the 1950s to the late 1970s—that they would be worth a dissertation by themselves. Indeed, estimates of people who went through only the West German parties and their mass organizations throughout the 1970s range from 80,000 to 200,000. For the year 1975 alone, West German intelligence estimated about 15,000 members. Based on membership records of the largest of West Germany's Maoist parties, one writer estimates about 20,000 for that party alone. As Gunnar Hinck has pointed out, that is close to a third of what the Green Party had in 2012.[3] One might add that it is closer to half of the Green Party's membership during

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[2] As I will show throughout the dissertation, it is this latter reason that moved self-identified anti-Stalinists to identify with Mao's criticism of the Soviet Union, which was not least directed against *de-Stalinization.*

[3] Hinck, p. 41. Gerd Koenen has estimated 80-100,000 members in Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt: unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution, 1967-1977* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2001). For the intelligence figures, see Timothy Scott Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties: The Antiauthoritarian Revolt, 1962-1978* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 253-254.

their stint in the federal government as part of the "Red-Green coalition" from 1998-2005. Moreover, much of the tremendous financial wealth accumulated by Maoist parties found its way into the Green Party, whose steep rise from a party of the far Left to a party governing the country from 1998 to 2005 has been an object of research in its own right.[4]

But this is not a dissertation about the West German Maoist parties or *K-Gruppen* as they were called. This is because the people at the beginning of this introduction have something else in common: they are—with few exceptions—white German women and men who have—whether unwittingly or not—obscured this moment in the 1970s either by remaining silent about it or by downplaying it in an act of ostensible self-criticism. Given what we know about the regimes and politics Maoists supported in the 1960s and 1970s—the Khmer Rouge, the Palestinian Black September—and what we know about some of the postcolonial states whose right to self-determination they campaigned for, both willing and unwilling amnesia is understandable. But what they have obscured was a phenomenon that was far more diverse, and far more transnational than much of what has been written about Maoism in postwar Germany will have you believe. Maoists in West Germany not included in the above-mentioned membership estimates included the members of various Iranian and Arab student organizations, Turkish parties, and Zimbabwean activists and traversed the "Iron Curtain."

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[4] Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Gerd Langguth, *Der grüne Faktor: von der Bewegung zur Partei?* (Osnabrück: Fromm, 1984); Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Stephen Milder, *Greening Democracy: The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in West Germany and Beyond, 1968-1983* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Joachim Raschke, *Die Grünen: wie sie wurden, was sie sind* (Köln: Bund, 1993).

This dissertation is about this moment in the history of divided Germany, spanning roughly from the late 1950s to the early 1980s. As I argue in this dissertation, Maoism created a language of international solidarity in which West German radicals, and students and workers from the Global South could encounter each other with something resembling mutual respect. Furthermore, this was the case not *despite* but *because* of the degree to which Maoist imagery embraced violence. This is because from a global perspective, when violent conflict in Europe's former colonies seemed to finally yield emancipation, the purported pacifism of liberal democracy in the West and peaceful coexistence in the East must have appeared awfully out of touch. To say this is not to diminish the horrendous effect of actual violence. In the metropole, Maoist organizations—in contrast to the armed guerrillas of the Red Army Faction and Revolutionary Cells—largely limited themselves to violent demonstrations. But, as the chapters that follow show, support for violence in the Global South ranged from the naive (solidarity messages to Pol Pot) to providing material support for armed struggle and terrorism against civilians. But to *condemn* is not the same as to explain.

The global Cold War and Sino-Soviet competition also meant that from the early 1960s onwards, Maoism became a major concern for East German officials and intelligence that raised anxieties over the influence of foreign diplomats as well as the political effect of the presence of foreign students from Africa, Asia and Latin America. In West Germany, intelligence agencies first exploited the Sino-Soviet split to create political tensions within the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED). But by the 1970s, West German politicians were hotly debating the threat domestic and "foreign" Maoists posed to the political order of the Federal Republic. Albanian and Chinese diplomats relied on members of West German

Maoist parties to build a political opposition within the German Democratic Republic. Chinese and Albanian press and broadcasting relied on "foreign experts" willing to relocate to Beijing and Tirana and drawn from the membership and sympathizers of Maoist parties for their international propaganda efforts. Iranian student organizations—by the 1970s often dominated by their Maoist factions—relied on their German peers for mass demonstrations and solidarity campaigns. And the Zimbabwe African National Union found willing partners in an array of Maoist organizations. For West German Maoists, anti-colonial struggles and Chinese and Albanian propaganda work offered a sense of purpose that they largely failed to gain from their mostly unsuccessful efforts to organize the "working class."

But histories of West German Maoism have largely obscured the extent to which Maoism constituted a set of capillaries through which the global transformations of decolonization and divides in international communism infused the political landscapes of the two Germanies. When West German politicians argued that "foreign extremists" were bringing "foreign conflicts" to German soil, when prosecutors suggested that members of the Iranian Communist Party could be prosecuted because the ban of the German Communist Party should apply to them, and when the Foreign Ministry claimed that Maoists' support for Zimbabwean independence constituted an attempt to fulfill functions that are reserved for

the Foreign Ministry, what was at stake was no less than the national sovereignty of a state that found itself embedded in transnational transformations.[5]

Some Archival Challenges

The obfuscation of the transnational aspect of Maoism in the 1970s is itself deeply rooted in the archive of the postwar Left. If the protagonists of the memoir literature penned by former activists are almost exclusively white and West German, this is reflective of an absense of personal files by foreign activists in the so-called movement archives that would be the first stop for any historian of extra-parliamentary social movements. One may speculate about the extent to which this reflects on the substratum of former activists that is likely to be able or desiring to retain all their files or even deposit them for posterity. The fact is that most scholarship based on these archives is likely to privilege those that had relatively stable lives and those permanently in Germany.

At the same time, what was preserved in movement archives were the manifold foreign language publications of West German Maoist parties, often factory bulletins addressed to "Turkish colleagues" or similar. However, conversations with former activists and archivists did not reveal who translated these into the various languages, or what the nature of these interactions was. To me, this was reason enough to look elsewhere, and I sought out state

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[5]Of course, the problem of sovereignty is further complicated by the postwar occupation of the Federal Republic. But that is part of the problem: historians who have tried to explain the West German governments' response to the Left of the 1970s, including the armed conflict with the so-called Baader-Meinhoff gang, have (often unwittingly) reproduced the efforts of West German politicians to obscure the porousness of West German sovereignty and the extent to which much of German politics in the 1970s was indeed determined by global developments. To a certain extent, this is dealt with in Frank Fischer, "Von der 'Regierung der inneren Reformen' zum 'Krisenmanagement:' Das Verhältnis zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik in der sozial-liberalen Ära 1969-1982," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 44 (2004): 395–414, although Fischer focusses less on armed groups.

archives in the German Southwest. Looking at court cases involving West German Maoist parties, I was at first disappointed: from the names on record, this still seemed to be an overwhelmingly German story. But then I came across a number of files that were labelled "political activity of foreigners."[6] What these files revealed was that Maoism was widespread among foreign activists in West Germany but had been neatly separated from the activism *of West Germans* in police and intelligence work. As I show in the dissertation, it was ultimately the files of the former East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) that revealed that indeed foreign and West German Maoists operated out of the same spaces and attended the same demonstrations. Armed with this new knowledge, I returned to the archive of the former Communist League of West Germany and—now knowing what to look for—found copious evidence for this.

But this combination of archives poses some definitional challenges: throughout the text, I use the term "Maoism" in two different ways. Sometimes it will emerge from my sources. In rare cases, Maoists will self-identify as such, although most Maoist parties used the term "Marxist-Leninist" when describing their own objectives, even as they made clear references to Mao Zedong thought and extensive use of the language of Chinese propaganda. One place where Maoism does appear clearly is in the records of the intelligence agencies in East and West Germany. Quinn Slobodian has pointed out that for East Germany, the term Maoist became something of a of a catch-all for all left-wing critics in the GDR.[7] Some have argued that the West German state has miscategorized West German terrorists (the Red

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[6]"Politische Betätigung von Ausländern," Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (HStaSt hereafter), EA 2/303 Bü 133.

[7]Quinn Slobodian, "Badge Books and Brand Books: The Mao Bible in East and West Germany," in *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Alexander C. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 206–24.

Army Faction, for example) as anarchists, even though they are probably more accurately described as Maoists. But in my experience, currents, tendencies, and groups that appear in this dissertation have not been miscategorized, and if they have, I have marked this clearly.

That being said, I also use the term Maoism as my own analytic category, and here it is much broader and more inclusive. Not all "Maoists" in this dissertation were members of sympathizers of Maoist cadre parties. But they did broadly follow the main tendencies of Mao's critique of the Soviet Union: they spoke of the "revisionism" of the Soviet Union and its satellites (as well as pro-Moscow communist parties in the West); they railed against "peaceful coexistence"; and spoke of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." They defended Stalin. Sometimes they described themselves as Chinese-style socialists. Such broad definition risks the occasional misclassification, but for the purposes of this dissertation that risk is one worth taking: Maoism in this study is not a tightly-knit network of parties and self-identified activists but a broad milieu tied together by a common language. Moreover, Maoism *also* describes the specter of China's self-assertion on the world stage—a development that is inseparable from East and West German responses to activism on the ground. This approach leaves plenty of room for dissent and contradiction.[8] It also means that to avoid confusion, I continue to include those actors that after 1978 sided with Albania in the Sino-Albanian disagreement over the Three Worlds Theory in the field of Maoism.

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[8]See Robin D.G. Kelley and Betsy Esch, "Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution," *Souls* 1, no. 4 (1999): 6–41; Quinn Slobodian, "The Meanings of Western Maoism," in *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties: Between Protest and Nation-Building*, ed. Chen Jian et al. (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2018), 67–78.

Postwar or Postcolonial Germany?

The 1970s in Europe were a time in many ways reminiscent of our own: terrorism, recession, and uncertainty in the face of a transforming global economy caused widespread concern about the future. Moreover, the self-assertion of China on the world stage destabilized the European political categories of Left and Right. Scholars have begun to explore how transformations in economy and culture that centrally reshaped society in both Germanies took root during this decade.[9] But the effect of decolonization on postwar German political culture has hardly been explored at all.[10]

My work hinges on a simple premise: that the history of the Left in Germany—much like European history writ large—so far has been periodized according to European experiences of trauma, notably the two World Wars.[11] Maoism forces us to instead consider the collapse

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[9]For the West German context, see Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., *Das Ende der Zuversicht: die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008). For global accounts see Niall Ferguson et al., eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2011); Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

[10]The most important exception to this is Jason Verber's dissertation "The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany." Verber points out that both colonialism and decolonization were crucial contexts for German politics in the postwar period. See Jason Verber, "The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Iowa, 2010). Within the literature on the postwar Left, the most important exception is Quinn Slobodian's *Foreign Front,* which explores the constitutive role of foreign students within the 1960s Left in West Germany. But for Slobodian, the impact of students from the Global South ends in 1967, when West German students become increasingly inward-looking. My archival research suggests that the decolonial struggles of the 1970s were of great importance for Maoism in the divided Germany. See Quinn Slobodian, *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). More recently, Rita Chin, whose work was crucial in foregrounding questions of race in postwar German history, has directly criticized the historiography of the New Left in Europe for neglecting the importance of students from the Global South who were involved both in European New Lefts and decolonization struggles at the same time. See Rita Chin, "European New Lefts, Global Connections, and the Problem of Difference," in *A New Insurgency: The Port Huron Statement and Its Times*, ed. Howard Brick and Gregory Parker (Ann Arbor: Maize Books, 2015), 354–67.

[11]For examples see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Eric D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). A notable exception in this trend is Susan D. Pennybacker, *From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

of empire as a defining turning point in the European twentieth century.[12] During the so-called "imperial turn," scholars of colonialism explored the impact of colonies on the metropole.[13] More recently, scholars of European colonialism have begun to emphasize the simultaneity and mutual constitution of empire and nation in the genesis of European nation states.[14] In the British and French cases, historians have extended these lines of inquiry into the period of decolonization.[15] But ostensibly because Germany's colonial ambitions were largely frustrated in 1918, historians of postwar Germany have instead emphasized the legacies of National Socialism, European integration, and the economic, social, and cultural transformations of the 1970s. In such narratives, colonialism and decolonization appear largely as an Anglo-French anachronism.[16]

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[12]In this sense, my work heeds a call by Rita Chin to pay closer attention to the decolonial origins of the European New Left: Chin, "European New Lefts, Global Connections, and the Problem of Difference."

[13]For the much cited imperative to consider metropole and colony within the same analytic frame, see Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For an overview over this historiography, see the introduction in Antoinette Burton, *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 1-23.

[14]For the French case, see Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005); Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2015). For the German case, see Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[15]See Jordanna Bailkin, *The Afterlife of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Wilder, *Freedom Time.* For an argument about the French May '68 in this regard, see Kristin Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[16]In their agenda-setting work on the Global Seventies, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, for example, point to the "colonial program" of France, the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium as a "Fremdkörper" in the Western order. Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, p. 37. Ironically, while it is a central argument of Manteuffel and Raphael that historians have to be careful to not simply reproduce the *Zeitgeist* of the 1970s in their analyses, with respect to colonialism they do exactly that. The extent to which some West German academics thought colonialism to be an entirely non-German problem is striking. A case in point is the rejection letter by a publisher for a manuscript on German colonialism in the 1970s. The editor in question, political scientist and "China expert" Klaus Mehnert, argued that another volume on German colonialism was unnecessary since there were already a few, and—more importantly—because the generation that got to live in German colonies was dying and consequently so was interest in German colonialism. In his words: "The question is whether the colonial past is alive enough that a book about it would still be of interest to a broader audience. We believe this is not the case, particularly because those readers to whom

This kind of absence of the specter of decolonization in the postwar historiography of West Germany stands in contrast to the increasingly rich literature on German colonialism itself. Directed against arguments that because Germany's colonial empire lasted for less than forty years, Susanne Zantop famously demonstrated that "colonial fantasies" both preceded the colonial project and lastingly influenced German society in its aftermath.[17] To be sure, literature on "Third Worldism" has argued that identification of West German students with the "Third World" itself mirrors Zantop's colonial fantasies and served as a kind of subjective absolution from the guilt young Germans in the 1960s felt for the crimes of National Socialism.[18] But as Quinn Slobodian has pointed out, the argument that "Third World" politics in the 1960s were mostly about the fantasies of West German students completely ignores the fact that in the 1960s students from the Global South pioneered many of the practices later deployed by West German students and were themselves the ones bringing "Third World" concerns to the attention of West Germans.[19]

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colonial politics were a reality are no longer especially numerous." See Klaus Mehnert to Professor L.H. Gann (August 29th, 1977), Landesarchiv Baaden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (HStaSt hereafter), Q 1/30 Bü 115.

[17] See Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). Zantop's interventions had lasting impact on (and provoked further nuance in) German historiography and the historiography of colonialism. For examples see Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop, eds., *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Birthe Kundrus, "From the Herero to the Holocaust? Some Remarks on the Current Debate," *Africa Spectrum* 40, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 299–308; Bradley Naranch and Geoff Eley, eds., *German Colonialism in a Global Age* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Michael. Perraudin and Jürgen. Zimmerer, eds., *German Colonialism and National Identity* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011); John Phillip Short, *Magic Lantern Empire: Colonialism and Society in Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); George Steinmetz, "'The Devil's Handwriting': Precolonial Discourse, Ethnographic Acuity, and Cross-Identification in German Colonialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 1 (May 13, 2003); Jürgen Zimmerer, "The Birth of the Ostland Out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination," *Patterns of Prejudice* 39, no. 2 (June 1, 2005): 197–219.

[18] See Sara Lennox, "Enzensberger, Kursbuch, and 'Third Worldism:' the Sixties' Construction of Latin America," in *Neue Welt / Dritte Welt: Interkulturelle Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Lateinamerika und der Karibik*, ed. Sigrid Bauschinger and Susan L. Cocalis (Tübingen: Francke, 1994), 185–200. For an argument about the broader context, see Katrin Sieg, *Ethnic Drag: Performing Race, Nation, Sexuality in West Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

[19] Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012.

To be sure, the focus the 1960s as post-Nazism has done much to illuminate the transformation of West Germany from National Socialism to liberal democracy and from geopolitical pariah to leader in the project of European integration. In the historiography on the postwar Left, the emphasis on young Leftists' relationship to National Socialism has shed important light on the extent to which activists contended with—and did not contend with—the Nazi past.[20] Recent interventions, moreover, have shown that the generation of 1968 was able to draw on broader trends of liberalization set by earlier generations.[21] The focus on National Socialism has also helped illuminate the complicated relationship of young West Germans to "the West" and the United States, simultaneously admired for the Civil Rights movement and opposed as an occupying power in the postwar republic.[22]

But the same focus on National Socialism and German peculiarity has also obscured an important dimension both of the postwar Left in the two Germanies and the postwar German experience more broadly. For example, much-cited works by former-activists-turned-historians have attempted to explain both the alleged authoritarianism[23] of Maoist cadre

[20]See for example Belinda Davis et al., eds., *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. In the 1960s and 1970s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Dagmar Herzog, *Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Christina von Hodenberg and Detlef Siegfried, eds., *Wo "1968" liegt: Reform und Revolte in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Michael Schmidtke, "The German New Left and National Socialism," in *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975*, ed. Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis, Studies in German History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 176–93.

[21]Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*; Sean A. Forner, *German Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democratic Renewal: Culture and Politics After 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); A. Dirk Moses, "The Forty-Fivers: A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy," *German Politics and Society* 17, no. 1 (1999): 94–126.

[22]Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[23]It is of course true that the Maoist cadre parties were modelled on the Leninist concept of "democratic centralism" and there is plenty of evidence that the parties sought to suppress dissent and were able to exercise significant degrees of coercion. See for example Autorenkollektiv, *Wir warn die stärkste der Partein...: Erfahrungsberichte aus der Welt der K-Gruppen.* (Berlin: Rotbuch-Verlag, 1977). But as my dissertation shows, the reality on the ground was often more complicated. Local groups of the parties were often

parties and the terrorism of armed groups like the Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells, and the feminist *Rote Zora* with reference to the authoritarianism of the Nazi generation—the generation of their parents.[24] The problem with this explanation is that while students and workers from the Global South played crucial roles on the Left of the 1960s and 1970s, and Maoism in West Germany was not limited to the West German cadre parties but extended to a plethora of foreign organizations—the Confederation of Iranian Students/National Union, the Turkish Communist Party/Marxists-Leninists, and the Zimbabwe African National Union—the narrative of inherited Nazi authoritarianism is only available to white West Germans who have consequently remained at the center of histories of the German New Left.[25]

This dissertation tries to provide a corrective to this narrative in the historiography of the postwar Left and hopes to make a broader contribution to the emerging scholarship on the relationship of the two Germanies to the massive global transformations that came with the independence of Europe's former colonies. *Because* in the German-German context, the GDR had a state monopoly on anti-imperialist rhetoric, West German efforts to win the Global South for its side focused less on rhetoric and more on aid and development.[26] And because in so many cases the GDR has been shown to be more committed to the image of an

significantly removed from the influence of the central committee, and even among the higher echelons of the party, the reach of party discipline was far less pronounced than printed materials might suggest.

[24]The most well-known examples are Götz Aly, *Unser Kampf: 1968 - ein irritierter Blick zurück* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2008); Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt.*

[25]And that although people of color were the driving force at a number of crucial junctures of the postwar Left. As Quinn Slobodian has shown, while the demonstration against the Shah in 1967 and the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg is widely acknowledged as a turning point, little attention has been paid to the circumstance that the West German SDS was reluctant to protest against the Shah and only agreed after extensive lobbying by Iranian student organizations: Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012. While West German Maoist parties rarely saw eye-to-eye in the early 1970s, the Confederation of Iranian students managed to bring them together in mass demonstrations against emergency and foreigner laws. See Afshin Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Pub, 2001).

[26]On the German-German context, see Verber, "The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany.".

anti-imperial power than to confronting its own "race problems," historians have been able to dismiss East German anti-imperialism as "ideological" while accepting the West German self-image as pragmatic.[27] But, as Johanna Folland has pointed out, "the choice of whether to do business with the apartheid regime was ultimately one of the most morally freighted choices many states and individuals faced as the twentieth century progressed."[28] And of course, as Sebastian Gehrig has shown, "pragmatic" policy decisions were often accompanied by racist statements of leading politicians about the political inadequacies of African people.[29]

My dissertation joins the efforts of historians of race in West Germany that have emphasized not only that race was a major force in West German politics, but how it has been obscured. Critical race theorist David Theo Goldberg has argued that in Europe, race functions quite differently than in the United States. Indeed, as he has put it

> For Europeans, race is not, or really is no longer. European racial denial concerns wanting race in the wake of World War II categorically to implode, to erase itself. This is a wishful evaporation never quite enacted, never satisfied. A desire at once frustrated and displaced, racist implications always lingering and diffuse, silenced but assumed, always already returned and haunting, buried but alive. Race in Europe has left odourless traces but ones suffocating in the wake of their at once denied risinous stench.[30]

A range of scholarship on the role of race in Europe has shown that this denial was not merely "wishful thinking" but often wishful action. In the 1970s, European bureaucrats—faced with

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[27]On the question of race and the need for a more subtle reading of the GDR's internationalism, see the essays in Quinn Slobodian, *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Verber, "The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany.". See also Frank Bösch, Caroline Moine, and Stefanie Senger, eds., *Internationale Solidarität: globales Engagement in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2018).

[28]See her forthcoming dissertation Johanna Folland, "Globalizing Socialist Health: Africa, East Germany, and the AIDS Crisis" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2019), p. 79.

[29]Sebastian Gehrig, "Reaching Out to the Third World: East Germany's Anti-Apartheid and Socialist Human Rights Campaign," *German History* 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 574–97.

[30]David Theo Goldberg, "Racial Europeanization," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 331–64, p. 334.

the increasing multi-ethnic reality of their societies—deliberately denied those realities. In the West German case, this is most clearly visible in the continued insistence that the presence of guest workers in the country was only temporary, even when it became increasingly clear that guest workers were unlikely to leave. Although in 1973, recruitment of foreign workers was halted and the percentage of foreign workers in the economy did decline, foreign populations continued to increase to such an extent that by 1980 the number of foreigners had grown significantly.[31] Bureaucrats in Britain, France, and West Germany were negotiating the meaning of cohorts of guest workers from former colonies, Southern Europe, and Turkey for the identity of their nations. The result was—as one historian argues—a unanimous denial of the reality of multi-ethnic societies.[32] But this dissertation shows that the story of the erasure of multicultural realities in the 1970s is more than just a backroom conspiracy of lawmakers and administrators. Counterintuitively, Maoist activists themselves played a large part in obscuring this multicultural moment in practice as well as in their recollections.

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[31]Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, "Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 Until Its Halt in 1973," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 187–218, p. 210-211. On the debates surrounding guest workers see Rita Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). On Turkish guest workers in particular, see Ahmed Akgündüz, *Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974: A Multidisciplinary Analysis* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Gökçe Yurdakul, *From Guest Workers into Muslims the Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). For a study specifically of female guest workers, see Monika Mattes, *»Gastarbeiterinnen« in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren*, 1 edition (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2005). For a study on the anxieties surrounding family migration of guest workers, see Lauren Kelsey Stokes, "Fear of the Family: Migration and Integration in West Germany, 1955-2000" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Chicago, 2016).

[32]Rita Chin, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

Was the "New Left" Democratic?

The question of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s and their relationship to democracy in West Germany has been a central tenet of scholarly treatments of the period. Historians have focused on the extent to which students developed new forms of political participation, forged alliances, and found common cause with students from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Moreover, students led campaigns to highlight the presence of former Nazis in civil administration and the judiciary.[33]

Others have been more critical of the extent to which the postwar social movements contributed to the liberalization of West Germany. In the fifth volume of his *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (2008) Hans-Ulrich Wehler seeks to seriously qualify the idea of 1968 as central to the liberalization of the Federal Republic. He points out that while the moment of protest has been styled into a "second hour zero" or "deep caesura" by commentators, these commentators are likely reflecting on their own experience of the 1960s, and consequently tend to blow the significance of the protests out of proportion.[34] Rather than being transformed by student radicals and protest, the Federal Republic was already undergoing massive transformations throughout the 1960s. Although Wehler spends most of his time arguing that the protest movements of 1968 were irrelevant, delusional, and ended in fail-

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[33]On the first point, see Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*; Eley, *Forging Democracy*; Hodenberg and Siegfried, *Wo "1968" liegt*; Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney, *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Klimke, *The Other Alliance.* On the second point, see Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis, eds., *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955-1975* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Martin W. Kloke, *Israel und die deutsche Linke. Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen Verhältnisses* (Frankfurt am Main: Haag und Herchen Verlag, 1994); Schmidtke, "The German New Left and National Socialism.".

[34]Hans Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 5, 5 vol. (München: C.H. Beck, 1987), p. 310-11.

ure, he also highlights a number of contradictions. If they did accomplish something, it is that they "probably contributed to a broader social enthusiasm for critique."[35] Even though activists despised liberals, their objection to residual authoritarian norms and behaviors likely contributed to some kind of liberalization of West German society. Similarly, even though student radicals nurtured an obsession with neo-Marxist theorizing and proclaimed anti-capitalist intentions, their advocacy of radical hedonism and lifestyle reform, their innovative forms of propaganda, and their "crude individualism" permit the impression that despite their anti-capitalism, they were an "unwilling avant-garde of the capitalist consumer society."[36]

But for Wehler, these contradictions are no puzzle, they are merely evidence of the New Left's irrelevance. Even if he is right that the importance of the "68er" has been exaggerated, German historiography has certainly confirmed that the upheavals of 1968 were part of a much broader climate of transformation that started long before the revolt and involved much broader sections of West German society. Ulrich Herbert, for example, points out that processes of liberalization began before the youth revolts of the 1960s, even though they latched on to these processes. But far more central, according to Herbert, was the generation of so-called *Flakhelfer* (because of the draft of youth from this generation into anti-aircraft defense after 1943), who came of age around 1945. They were old enough to remember Nazism but young enough to undergo ideological reorientation after the war. Their experience of National Socialism and their deep distrust of ideologies after its collapse motivated their looking to the United States as a role model for liberalization and – equally

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[35]Wehler, p. 320.
[36]Wehler, p. 320.

important for Herbert - modernization. Given this interpretation, "those born in the forties – the core of the later '68ers' – appear rather as epigones, as fellow-travellers of the Flakhelfer generation."[37] Here, if what scholars mean by the democratization of the republic is the success of liberalism, Wehler and Herbert's interventions make sense. There is indeed much evidence that opposition to authoritarian institutions and illiberal political mentalities preceded the student revolts.[38]

Yet, if scholars now largely reject the idea that the student movement uniquely initiated the Federal Republic's crisis of legitimacy,[39] there is a sense that the New Left nevertheless engaged in important new forms of political participation. They see the Left as instrumental in furthering democratic practice by drawing into politics those parts of the population that had previously been excluded. Geoff Eley has argued that in the long history of the Left, it has secured European democracies by widening the spectrum of participation. Democracy, Eley argues, "requires conflict."[40] The Left—and up to the 1950s, that meant socialists—did most to contribute to the struggle for democracy. To be sure, socialist and Communist parties were not identical with the Left. But for the most part, progressive movements before the 1950s could not ignore these parties. Then, in the postwar period, a set of structural and political changes rapidly highlighted the shortcomings of this Old Left. Similarly, Gerd-Rainer Horn suggested that by 1956, the Old Left of Communism and Social Democracy had ceased to provide a space for popular political participation. In this view, what renders

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[37]Ulrich Herbert, "Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß. Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte - eine Skizze," in *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945-1980*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2002), 7–49, p. 45.

[38]See for example Forner, *German Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democratic Renewal*.

[39]For examples of this position, see Karl-Werner Brand, Detlef Büsser, and Dieter Rucht, eds., *Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft: neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt & New York: Campus, 1983); Wolfgang Kraushaar, *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000).

[40]Eley, *Forging Democracy*, p. 4.

the New Left "left" is not primarily a set of ideological continuities, but the participatory forms of their politics.[41]

Eley and Horn make this argument without painting an image of the student movement itself as a vanguard of democratization. The New Left has to be understood as embedded in cultural movements that preceded and helped shape the movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Tim Brown, as well, suggests that the "anti-authoritarian revolt" has to be understood as symptomatic of a much broader climate of social, cultural, and political transformation. Cultural imports from the United States, artistic and musical movements, the creation of new spaces in which youth could organize concerts and other creative events were all part of the broader climate of possibility of the 1960s in West Germany. In other words, rather than simply dismissing the politics of the anti-authoritarian debate, Brown urges us to broaden our understanding of politics, not least because youth in the 1960s *understood these issues as political.*[42] Cultural transformations in many places preceded explicit expressions of dissent and rebellion.[43]

While the emphasis on broader cultural movements and transformations has been important to broadening our understanding of the 1960s in West Germany (and Europe more broadly), the very framing of the scholarship on the New Left as a question of democratization and liberalization obscures activists' understanding of themselves in yet another way. In some ways, this reproduces tropes in autobiographical accounts of former activists, who have

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[41]Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, p. 154.

[42]Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 12.

[43]See also Mia Ching Lee, "Art and Revolution in West Germany: The Cultural Origins of 1968" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007); Uta G. Poiger, "Rebels with a Cause? American Popular Culture, the 1956 Youth Riots, and New Conceptions of Masculinity in East and West Germany," in *The American Impact on Postwar Germany*, ed. Reiner Pommerin (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

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since abandoned the political views they held in the 1960s and 1970s. They now are either defending their former activism as always already about the liberalization of the republic, or they are denouncing their former politics in absolute terms as misguided, as distractions from processes of transformation already underway, as authoritarian, and sometimes even as fascist. Gerd Koenen directly confronts the apparent contradiction between anti-liberal ideologies of the New Left and their supposed role in liberalizing the republic. In his view, ideologies of the student movement should not be taken seriously, but rather understood as sublimated ways of coming to terms with Germany's Nazi Past.[44] Götz Aly, who like Koenen was a member of a Maoist party in the 1970s, claims that there are clear formal parallels between the New Left and the youth movement of the Nazis in the 1930s.[45]

But most importantly, neither those who want to embed the story of the postwar Left neatly in a trajectory of West Germany from Nazism to the victory of liberalism in the post-1989 Federal Republic, nor those who suspect Nazi authoritarianism and ideological hangovers leave much room for the sheer diversity of New Left (and Maoist) actors in the postwar Germanies and beyond. To illustrate the way in which the narrative of democratization itself obscures the multi-ethnic reality of the postwar Left, take the following anecdote.

In 2001, a photograph showing West Germany's foreign minister Joschka Fischer hurling cobblestones at police officers led conservatives and other opposition politicians to question his commitment to democratic government. As he became the center of a controversy focused on his political activities in the 1970s, a member of his planning staff rushed to his defense in the Berlin daily *Der Tagesspiegel*. Hans-Gerhart (Joscha) Schmierer suggested that Fischer

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[44]Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt*, p. 112.

[45]Aly, *Unser Kampf*.

had nothing to apologize for. If there is evidence that students engaged in sometimes violent protest, he said, it was the West German police that usually struck the first blow. More importantly, he said

> I consider it crucial that with the partially violent conflicts in the late 1960s and early 1970s began a learning process with consequences: functionaries of the state, public authorities and students and teenagers who fancied themselves public enemies had to first learn to acknowledge and respect each other as individuals, as citizens, and to view the republic as their shared political arena.[46]

At the start of the millennium a career civil servant, in the 1970s Schmierer had been the chairman of one of West Germany's leading Maoist parties—the Communist League of West Germany (KBW). Perhaps he really did think that his time on the Left—first as a member of the anti-authoritarian SDS and later as the chairman of a Maoist cadre party—taught him about democracy. But what is more important here is that his story about the 1960s and 1970s Left is an entirely German one: "Former Nazis" (state functionaries and police) and "descendants of Nazis" (the student activists) converge into an origin story of West German democracy.

Schmierer's story is instructive because it provides a window into the way in which the question of whether the postwar protest movements contributed to the democratization and liberalization of the Bonn republic obscured the transnational and global contexts of these movements. Crucially, this was not always how Schmierer read his own past. Thirteen years earlier, and only a few years after his Maoist party, the Communist League of West Germany (KBW) had been dissolved, he reflected:

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[46]Joscha Schmierer, "68 und die Folgen: Demokratie ist kein Deckensticken," *Der Tagesspiegel*, January 15, 2001. Remarkably, the title of this article invokes Mao's famous quote "revolution is no dinner party," or in German "die Revolution ist kein Deckensticken," which Mao used to justify violence almost 80 years before.

> To think violence as a constitutive element of liberation meant and presupposed, to take one's conscience out of the white heaven of ideas, which always already posits [vorspiegelte] a civil society, and bring it down to the ground of colonial, racist, relations of oppression. The later impact of Frantz Fanon rested precisely in that he demanded this step of all radical thought and that he revealed how deeply even the common left-wing pacifism remained bound by eurocentric and colonial tradition.[47]

To disentangle a characteristically convoluted piece of German prose: First, in 1960s West Germany, the ideal of non-violence was something otherworldly. Second, non-violence only made sense in an imaginary world (or heaven) in which civil society was not only ideal but reality. Third, this imaginary world, as appealing as it might have been to metropolitan whites, was incommensurable with the *real* world of racial and colonial oppression. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, this insight was not born of the youthful rebellion of West German students—the protagonists of virtually all narratives about the postwar West German Left—but of the anti-colonial struggles in the Global South (here channeled by Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*).[48]

Liberal, Maoist, and Violent Women

Kristin Ross has warned against approaches to the New Left that rewrite activists' political ambitions into a pre-history of the present. She argues that in retrospectives on the French May '68, former participants have highlighted the ways in which it contributed to a liber-

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[47] Joscha Schmierer, "Der Zauber des großen Augenblicks: Der Internationale Traum von '68," in *Die Früchte der Revolte: über die Veränderung der politischen Kultur durch die Studentenbewegung*, ed. Lothar Baier (Berlin: K. Wagenbach, 1988), 107–26, p. 111.

[48] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963). Fanon was perhaps the most important decolonial writer for the 1960s Left alongside Amilcar Cabral. Even though the 1970s Maoist organizations strongly suggested that a return to the classics of Marxism-Leninism was crucial (alongside Mao's works, naturally), the debates surrounding the dissolution of the book stores the Communist League of West Germany had inherited from the 1960s "anti-authoritarian" Socialist German Student Association (SDS) suggest that by and large, reading habits had not changed that much.

alization of French society, as well as its importance for the rise of second-wave feminism. By prioritizing those aspects of 1960s radicalism that in some ways prefigured the status quo, however, accounts of 1968 have distorted the more radical ambitions of the students, including collaboration with workers, anti-capitalist politics, and anti-colonial politics.[49]

But the problem is not that feminism has "overshadowed" those aspects of the postwar Left that are not legible as a precursor to the (imperfect) advances in gender equality and reproductive rights that have been accomplished (and hard fought for) since the 1970s. Rather, this reading of the postwar Left as a precursor to those advances has *obscured the multiplicity of women's activisms themselves.* Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the question of violence. As Patricia Melzer has pointed out, since the 1980s, violence has been increasingly associated with patriarchy and masculinity, while non-violence has been increasingly associated with feminism and femininity. Melzer locates this shift in the 1980s peace movement. But what this shift veils is that the utility of violence was hotly debated by feminists in the 1970s, not least because at some points more than half of the members of the terrorist Red Army Faction (RAF) and Revolutionary Cells (RZ) were women. Indeed, public discourse repeatedly called terrorism an "excess of emancipation."[50] Melzer argues that by recoding violence as male and non-violence as female, scholars of feminism lose out on the opportunity to consider the extent to which women's participation in violence was itself a "feminist act" insofar as it challenged established gender norms.[51] And it further

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[49]Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives.*

[50]Patricia Melzer, *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl: Women's Political Violence in the Red Army Faction* (New York: New York University Press, 2015), p. 136.

[51]See also Katharina Karcher, *Sisters in Arms: Militant Feminisms in the Federal Republic of Germany Since 1968* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017).

obscures the extent to which women were inspired by the role African women played in anti-colonial wars.[52]

In some ways, women's participation in Maoist parties has raised similar issues. On the one hand, some sympathetic scholars have argued that the New Left in West Germany was instrumental in creating the contexts within which feminists would stake their own claims. At the SDS's 23rd national conference members of the *Aktionsrat zur Befreiung der Frauen* (Action Committee for the Liberation of Women) drew attention to the failure of both the traditional communist and the new anti-authoritarian factions of the SDS to recognize women's concerns as central to the movement. When the men denied the *Aktionsrat* time to speak, Siegrid Rüger proceeded to hurl a tomato at Hans-Jürgen Krahl, reportedly while shouting "Krahl, you are objectively a counter-revolutionary and an agent of the class enemy, too!"[53] Eley nonetheless stresses that the democratic practice of the New Left found its real legacy in the feminist movement of the 1970s.[54]

Approaches to the history of the postwar Left and feminism that champion liberal accomplishments are vulnerable to the argument that it is far from clear that the more liberal aspects of feminism had their roots in the radicalism of the New Left. Wehler rejects any notion that the activists of the 1960s had much to do with the rise of the women's movement at all. For him, imports from the United States were much more decisive. Moreover, if there is any reason for women's engagement with the SDS, it was because women hoped that the SDS's general desire to "change society" would lead them to recognize the women's cause as

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[52]Melzer, *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl*, chapter 1.

[53]Markovits and Gorski, *The German Left*. See also Alice Schwarzer, *So fing es an!: 10 Jahre Frauenbewegung* (Köln: Emma-Frauenverlag, 1981).

[54]Eley, *Forging Democracy*, p. 365.

worthy of their support.[55] But, as Brown has shown, many of the women in question were at the same time committed to socialist and anti-capitalist politics and rejected what they considered to be bourgeois feminism.[56]

In 1975, the largest Maoist organization in the Federal Republic was the leading organizer of West Germany's largest protest against the so-called "abortion paragraph" §218, ironically without the participation of most feminist women's groups. At the same time the Maoists anchored their opposition not in a woman's right to choose, but in the assertion that abortion itself was a specific pathology of capitalism (and presumably, that it would become unnecessary when the economic conditions were transformed).[57]

Of course, this complicated relationship between socialism and communism on the one side and women's political mobilizations on the other had a pre-history as long as socialism itself. As Kathleen Canning has shown for the nineteenth century, the universalism of the class category has systematically excluded women and defined "workers" with reference to male "skilled" labor.[58] The February Revolution in Petrograd in 1917 began with a women's strike. But while some applauded women's claim to be full political members of the community, others saw women's participation as a sign of the bankruptcy of the

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[55]Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, p. 318

[56]Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 299. Yet, Brown dismisses these flirtations with anti-capitalism as merely strategic. Relying on autobiographical accounts of Alice Schwarzer, he argues that the ideology in which feminist causes were embedded were simply the kind of language in which women could make claims in the context of the Marxist Left. But this really explains nothing! After all, there was liberal feminism, which the women involved rejected. Schwarzer, *So fing es an.*

[57]Kraushaar, *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur*. For a detailed study of the different ways Maoist groups related to women's politics, see Sebastian Kasper, "Nur mit der proletarischen Frau wird der Sozialismus Siegen: Das Frauenbild der K-Gruppen in den 1970er Jahren" (M.A. Thesis, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg, 2012).

[58]Kathleen Canning, *Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany, 1850-1914* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

Tsarist regime.[59] In Germany, Canning points to the participation of women in the German Revolution. The end of World War I may have reversed the penetration of traditionally male industrial sectors and brought women into the streets against the war economies failures to provide adequate food, as Ute Daniel and Belinda Davis have shown.[60] But Canning rejects the self-evident way in which historians of the German revolution have gendered the period between 1918-19 along a male/female council-revolutionary/suffrage dichotomy. Indeed, she argues that women were present in the revolution and attempted to make the councils more amicable to their own demands.[61]

Nevertheless, socialist and communist attitudes towards women remained disappointing. In Russia, the consequences of the revolution were at first promising. Women gained full citizenship, as well as the right (and obligation) to work, and the regime experimented with forms of sexual freedom. But within a few years anxieties about sexual freedoms led to a change of course.[62] More importantly, perhaps, consequences for women were highly uneven from the start, with urban and elite women benefiting the most, and among the peasantry, patriarchal institutions remained largely unchallenged.[63] In Germany, both Social Democrats and Communists reinforced the familial role of women, even though the KPD did in practice support important feminist campaigns such as the campaign to repeal the

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[59]Barbara Evans Clements, "Women and the Gender Question," in *Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921*, ed. Edward. Acton, V. IU. Cherniaev, and William G. Rosenberg (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 595.

[60]Ute Daniel, *The War from Within: German Working-Class Women in the First World War* (Oxford, & New York: Berg, 1997); Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill, 1992). Canning suggests that Daniel's account neglects the two decades of campaigns both by Social Democratic and bourgeois women for suffrage as well as the extent to which women employed the language of citizenship during the war. See Kathleen Canning, "Das Geschlecht der Revolution - Stimmrecht und Staatsbürgertum 1918/19," in *Die vergessene Revolution von 1918-19*, ed. Alexander Gallus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 84–116, p. 95.

[61]Canning, see n. 43, p. 106-113.

[62]Eley, *Forging Democracy*, n. 2, p. 188.

[63]Evans Clements, "Women and the Gender Question," n. 42, p. 597.

"abortion paragraph" §218.[64] Helmut Gruber detects similar contradictions for women in Red Vienna. On the one hand, women were members in the SDAP, participated in cultural initiatives, and union activities. On the other hand, the SDAP could nevertheless not move beyond the separateness of male and female spheres.[65]

When women who worked in Maoist organizations in the 1970s were happy to move on from socialism to devote themselves to women's causes, these ambiguities and tensions certainly played a part. The problem is that retrospective knowledge about the atrocities of the Cultural Revolution, the many that died by the hand of the Khmer Rouge, or the violence and poverty of Enver Hoxha's Albania provide plenty of incentives to fully distance oneself from one's activism in Maoist cadre parties. The problem is that this does not explain why the rise of China in international communism, the national liberation movements in the Global South, and ultimately, violence, were so appealing to so many. In this case, it obscures the inspiration Maoist women and men drew from the promise of emancipation in China (even though that promise remained largely unfulfilled) and women's claims to political participation that lies in their participation in anti-colonial violence in the Global South.[66]

The question of violence is ultimately where this dissertation differs from other approaches that have emphasized the role of foreign students in the Global Sixties. As I

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[64]Atina Grossman, "German Communism and New Women: Dilemmas and Contradictions," in *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe Between the Two World Wars*, ed. Helmut Gruber and Pamela M. Graves (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), p. 135. For the SPD, see Adelheid von Saldern, "Modernization as Challenge: Perceptions and Reactions of German Social Democratic Women," in *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe Between the Two World Wars*, ed. Helmut Gruber and Pamela M. Graves (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), 95–134.

[65]Helmut Gruber, ""The New Woman": Realities and Illusions of Gender Equality in Red Vienna," in *Women and Socialism, Socialism and Women: Europe Between the Two World Wars*, ed. Helmut Gruber and Pamela M. Graves (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).

[66]See Quinn Slobodian, "Guerrilla Mothers and Distant Doubles: West German Feminists Look at China and Vietnam," *Zeithistorische Forschung/Studies in Contemporary History*, no. 1 (2015): 39–65.

have already touched on, Quinn Slobodian has demonstrated that long before the West German "anti-authoritarians" began to adopt protest techniques from North America, these techniques were pioneered in West Germany by students from the Global South. But interestingly, Slobodian has little to say about revolutionary violence and its appeal. On the contrary, in highlighting the extent to which foreign students were engaged in human rights and liberal causes, he seeks to decenter violence from the narratives of "Third Worldism" by focusing on the 1960s.[67] Yet, as this dissertation shows, collaboration between foreign and West German activists was not disrupted at the end of the decade but continued well into the 1970s. Slobodian does point out that the story of the West German Left has been stripped off its multi-ethnic dimensions but arguably has little to say on why this is the case.[68] I argue that it is precisely because revolutionary violence held great appeal for broad sections of the postwar Left and beyond, and because this appeal was tied to decolonization, that this multi-ethnic dimension was ultimately repressed.[69]

The Peculiarities of (Postwar) German History

Considering the vast amount of scholarship that has been and is being produced on the "Global Sixties," I should note that there *are* some important specificities to the history of the German Left after 1945.[70] The enthusiasm with which 1960s Leftists embraced first the

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[67]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 201.

[68]Slobodian, p. 5.

[69]This mechanism has been observed in different contexts. See for example John Stauffer's study of white radical abolitionists who in the aftermath of John Brown's raid of the federal armory at Harper's Ferry come to identify their past enthusiasm for violence with their embrace of blackness. John Stauffer, *The Black Hearts of Men Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation of Race* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[70]For some examples of this vast literature see Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*; Samantha Christiansen and Zachary A. Scarlett, eds., *The Third World in the Global 1960s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); Alexander C. Cook, *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

symbolism and then various ideological mutations of Maoism has to—at least in part—be explained with the frontline position of both East and West Germany in the Cold War. The close relationships with people in state-socialist East Germany, the fact that many members of the Left were themselves East German refugees, and the constant indoctrination about the injustice of German-German division (as if that in itself was disproportionate to the mass murder Germans committed only 25 years prior) certainly rendered the Chinese challenge to Moscow's leadership in international communism particularly attractive.

But even more so than this, the context of East and West Germany as the successor states to the Nazi regime meant that Leftist politics would always take on a different valence. This is particularly so because after 1967 opposition to the state of Israel became an important aspect of the anti-imperialism of the postwar Left in West Germany, and—as Jeffrey Herf has pointed out—had been an important aspect of Soviet Bloc anti-imperialism since the 1950s.[71] Before the 1967 war, as Martin Kloke has shown, the West German student movement generally considered Israel in a positive light. The increasingly public debates about Nazi Germany's murder of over 6,000,000 Jews, this antagonistic relationship to the state of the

versity Press, 2014); Davis et al., *Changing the World, Changing Oneself*; Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring, eds., *Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Chen Jian et al., eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties: Between Protest and Nation-Building* (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2018); Klimke, *The Other Alliance*; Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth, eds., *Between Prague Spring and French May: Opposition and Revolt in Europe, 1960-1980* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); Hans Righart, "Moderate Versions of the "Global Sixties": A Comparison of Great Britain and the Netherlands," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 6, no. 13 (1998): 82–96; Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012; Anna Von der Goltz, *'Talkin' 'Bout My Generation': Conflicts of Generation Building and Europe's '1968*, Talking About My Generation (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011); Victoria Langland, *Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and the Making and Remembering of 1968 in Military Brazil* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2013); Pedro A. G. Monaville, "Decolonizing the University: Postal Politics, the Student Movement, and Global 1968 in the Congo" (Ph.D., University of Michigan, 2013).

[71]Jeffrey Herf, *Undeclared Wars with Israel: East Germany and the West German Far Left, 1967-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 20.

survivors was always going to take on a different meaning than it did in other parts of the world.

A few events raised the stakes for self-critical reflection by the West German Left. In 1969—to the day 31 years after the November Pogroms in 1938—a bomb was planted inside a Jewish community center in West Berlin. That it didn't go off was probably less fortunate accident than successful planning—the explosives had been provided by the West German intelligence service.[72] A letter in the far-Left periodical *Agit 883* claiming responsibility for the attack explained that although some people might confuse this with an attack from the far right, it was in fact an act of international socialist solidarity.[73] An article circulated in a national SDS periodical criticized the attack, but only for making the fight against Israel more difficult.[74]

The second key event was the joint hijacking of Air France Flight 139 from Tel Aviv to Paris on June 27th, 1976 by two members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and two members of the West German Revolutionary Cells (RZ) during which Israeli citizens as well as some non-Israeli Jews were detained while other hostages were released. The next year, former RZ member Hans-Joachim Klein—who had not been involved in the hijacking, but was part of the attack on an OPEC meeting in Vienna in 1975—sent a package to the German left-liberal weekly *Der Spiegel*. Aside from his gun, the package contained a letter that revealed RZ plans to assassinate the leaders of the Jewish community in Berlin and Frankfurt.[75] In his autobiography, parts of which were pre-released as a series of articles in

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[72]Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Die Bombe im Jüdischen Gemeindehaus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2005).

[73]Schwarze Ratten TW, "Schalom + Napalm," *Agit 883* 1, no. 40 (November 13, 1969), p. 9.

[74]Palästina Kommittee, "Erklärung zum Bombenattentat auf das Jüdische Gemeindehaus in Berlin," *SDS-Info*, no. 25 (December 1, 1969), p. 29–30.

[75]Hans-Joachim Klein, "Ich habe genug angestellt," *Der Spiegel* no. 20/1977, p. 33-34.

Der Spiegel, Klein likened the behavior of the West German hijackers in the Entebbe affair to that of Nazi concentration camp guards.[76]

For some on the Left, the following decade would lead to critical introspection and outward polemics over West German Leftists who—despite all anti-fascist posturing had yet again turned against Jews. Throughout the seventies, there were isolated voices worrying about the relationship between antisemitism and anti-Zionism and its significance for the post-Nazi Left. The most well-known author was left-wing journalist and polemicist—and the son of concentration camp survivors—Henryk M. Broder.[77] At the same time, a small number of groups formed around members of the (Maoist) Communist League (KB) and the

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[76]Hans-Joachim Klein, "Da bin ich ausgeklingt: Ex-Terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein über sein Leben im Untergrund (III)," *Der Spiegel*, no. 51/1979, p.79. See also the other two parts of the series, Hans-Joachim Klein, "Da bin ich ausgeklingt: Hans-Joachim Klein über sein Leben im Untergrund (I)," *Der Spiegel*, no. 49/1979; Hans-Joachim Klein, "Da bin ich ausgeklingt: Hans-Joachim Klein über sein Leben im Untergrund (II)," *Der Spiegel*, no. 50/1979, p. 90-113. For the full memoir, see Hans-Joachim Klein, *Rückkehr in die Menschlichkeit: Appell eines ausgestiegenen Terroristen* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1979).

[77]Henryk M. Broder, "Antizionismus — Antisemitismus von Links?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 24 (1976): 31–46.

self-declared "undogmatic" Socialist Office (SB),[78] whose members included later Adorno

biographer Detlev Claussen and the historian Dan Diner.[79]

These concerns increasingly made it into academic writing. On the one hand, there were

a number of North American left-wing academics who were generally sympathetic to the

West German postwar Left but increasingly bewildered at the extent to which the ongoing

characterization of America and Israel as "fascist" seemed to blind the West German Left

to some opportunities for self-critical introspection about their own status as the post-Nazi

generation. The most prominent example of this is US President Ronald Reagan's 1984

visit to Germany that included a photo opportunity for a public handshake between then

chancellor Helmut Kohl and the American visitor widely lauded as a gesture of postwar

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[78]The so-called *antideutsche* or anti-German movement continues to be a mystery to most activists around the world. A good history of the movement—named for their "No More Germany" in the aftermath of 1989 or their opposition to the "German Ideology" (depending on whom you ask)—is yet to be written and this introduction is not the place for the subtle analysis this phenomenon deserves. A decent overview is available in the essay Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss, "Of Anti-Zionists and Antideutsche: The Post-War German Left and Its Relationship with Israel," *Democracy and Security* 15, no. 1 (January 2, 2019): 49–74. Some frequently cited books that largely dabble in denunciation and polemics are Gerhard Hanloser, *Sie warn die Antideutschesten der deutschen Linken: zur Geschichte, Kritik und Zukunft antideutscher Politik* (Münster: Unrast, 2004); Robert Kurz, *Die antideutsche Ideologie: vom Antifaschismus zum Krisenimperalismus: Kritik des neuesten linksdeutschen Sektenwesens in seinen theoretischen Propheten* (Münster: Unrast, 2003); Anton Stengl, *Antideutsche: Entstehung und Niedergang einer politischen Richtung* (Frankfurt am Main: Zambon Verlag & Vertrieb, 2012). Of these, the standard of which is extremely low, Kurz's book is probably the best. Despite its polemics, Kurz shares a key intellectual influence with the anti-German movement in the late American critical theorist Moishe Postone. Indeed, Kurz's group of critical Marxists was one of two teams in the Federal Republic that translated Postone's *Time, Labor, and Social Domination* into German. The other one was the Freiburg-based anti-German publisher ça-ira. For the English, see Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For the German, see Moishe Postone, *Zeit, Arbeit und gesellschaftliche Herrschaft: Eine neue Interpretation der kritischen Theorie von Marx* (Freiburg: ça-ira-Verlag, 2003). For the anti-Germans, Postone's attempt (in the 1970s) to mobilize Marx's category of the value form to grasp how Jews could—in the antisemite's mind—be held responsible at the same time for international communism *and* global finance allowed for a theoretical foundation from which to grasp antisemitism on the Left. First published in 1979, the essay has since been reproduced numerous times, including in English. See for example Moishe Postone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to 'Holocaust'," *New German Critique* 19 (1980): 97–115. Recently, a number of activist academics have tried to tell the anti-German movement's pre-history from a largely sympathetic perspective. See Jens Benicke, *Von Adorno Zu Mao* (Freiburg: ça-ira-Verlag, 2010); Jan Gerber, *Nie wieder Deutschland?: Die Linke im Zusammenbruch des "realen Sozialismus"* (Freiburg: ça-ira-Verlag, 2010).

[79]For Dan Diner's work on antisemitism and anti-Americanism, see in particular Dan Diner, *Feindbild Amerika : über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002).

reconciliation. To the bewilderment of some observers, protests were mobilized against the visit of a US President, but activists were largely silent about the fact that this handshake took place at a military cemetery in Bitburg—the last resting place of 49 members of the Nazi *Waffen-SS*.[80]

In the meantime, other former activists have produced academic and quasi-academic work on the difficult question of the West German (and post-1989 German) Left and antisemitism as well as the ways in which the Nazi past is remembered in Germany. Among those count Wolfgang Kraushaar's numerous books on 1968 and West German terrorism and Martin Kloke's important dissertation, published in 1990 about the West German Left and its relationship to Israel.[81] Kloke has shown—convincingly, in my view—that in 1967 the student movement's views on Israel decisively changed. While before 1967, student groups were largely favorable to the state of Israel, after 1967 this rapidly changed.[82]

However, Kloke's book also describes the Left's attitudes after 1967 as "anti-Zionism as a worldview."[83] And his work has been used to justify a more absurd claim: that before 1967, no Left was as pro-Zionist, and after 1967, as Zionist as the West German one.[84] Notwithstanding the tremendous amount of effort necessary to prove this negative, Kloke's

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[80]For a published letter "to the West German Left," see Moishe Postone, "Bitburg, 5. Mai 1985 und danach. Ein Brief an die westdeutsche Linke," in *Deutschland, die Linke, und der Holocaust: Politische Interventionen* (Freiburg: ça-ira-Verlag, 2007).

[81]Kloke, *Israel und die deutsche Linke. Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen Verhältnisses*; Kraushaar, *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur*; Kraushaar, *Die Bombe im Jüdischen Gemeindehaus*; Wolfgang Kraushaar, ed., *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006). These are joint by less academic works, such as Hans Kundnani, *Utopia or Auschwitz: Germany's 1968 Generation and the Holocaust* (London: Hurst & Co., 2009).

[82]Kloke, *Israel und die deutsche Linke. Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen Verhältnisses*, p. 89.

[83]Kloke, p. 194.

[84]Jan Gerber, "Auf Der Suche Nach Normalität: Der Antizionismus Der Westdeutschen Stadtguerrilla," *Hallische Beiträge Zur Zeitgeschichte*, no. 10 (2001): 5–42. This claim was first made by another activist who only ten years later completed a dissertation at the University of Freiburg. See Thomas Haury, "Zur Logik des Bundesdeutschen Antisemitismus," in *Vom Antizionismus zum Antisemitismus*, by Léon Poliakov (Freiburg: ça-ira-Verlag, 1992).

work undertakes no sort of comparison whatsoever.[85] Indeed, as far as I know, no such project has been undertaken at all. Rather, instead of systematic comparison one finds—again and again—mere assertions of German peculiarity.

I don't mean to discredit non-academic writing on the issue in any way. On the contrary, much important detail has been carefully uncovered by former activists in memoirs and current activists. The point of this section is, rather, to show that the debates about "left-wing antisemitism" on the Left in the postwar Germanies traverse a range of academic and non-academic writing with the result that sometimes assertions that were intended as polemics made their way into historical scholarship. If, as it were, the Left(s) in West Germany were more anti-Zionist than in other parts of the world, or, anti-Zionism became the *sine qua non* of left-wing identification after 1967, this is not borne out by the evidence under investigation in this study.

That people on the Left are not immune to antisemitism should be a surprise to no one just as much as people on the Left are not immune to racism, sexism, or homophobia. There has been, over the course of the last half a century, theoretical work that has alleged that certain forms of right-wing *and* left-wing anti-capitalism that one-sidedly criticize capitalism's more intangible dimensions (such as credit, finance, etc.) but affirm its more concrete dimensions (industrial production, factory work, etc.) share certain structural similarities

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[85]Of course, the turn to anti-Zionism was real. The first SDS delegation travelled to El-Fatah in 1969, and we know about the collaboration between various Palestinian guerrilla organizations and West German armed guerrilla as well as the latters sympathy for the attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972. However, what is particular about these networks is that they can hardly be put into a national context. For really the first few attempts at writing a transnational history on West German armed guerrilla, see Petra Terhoeven, *Deutscher Herbst in Europa: der Linksterrorismus der siebziger Jahre als transnationales Phänomen* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014); Jeremy Peter Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). See also the forthcoming dissertation by Alexander Macartney at Georgetown University.

with the antisemitic critique of capitalism as articulated in the late nineteenth century and adopted by Nazi economists.[86] This question is beyond the scope and ambitions of this dissertation.

What is within the scope of this dissertation, however, is the extent to which the question of Nazi continuity in the postwar republic has obscured the transnationalism and multi-ethnic nature of the postwar Left. In so doing, the ostensible self-criticism of major protagonists and the oedipal break with them by those that came after have contributed to the whitewashing of 1970s postwar German history. This is not to dismiss the ongoing necessity to inquire over the extent to which antisemitism has survived in German society after 1945 or to continue to carefully examine the legacies of National Socialism including on the Left. It is—on the contrary—to call attention to one of the crucial dilemmas of post-1945 *and* postcolonial German history: that the crimes, the racial politics, and the ongoing afterlives of Germany's participation in European colonial projects have been overshadowed by the horror National Socialism. And that it is one of the ongoing legacies of Auschwitz that Germans of color continue to have a hard time making themselves heard amidst the self-congratulatory noise of generations of white West Germans that have yet to play catch-up with the (however inadequate) attempts by former European imperial powers to come to terms with the legacies of colonialism.

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[86]For an early study in this direction, see Paul W. Massing, *Rehearsal for Destruction; a Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany* (New York: Harper, 1949). See also George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology; Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964) and Postone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism."; Moishe Postone, "History and Helplessness: Mass Mobilization and Contemporary Forms of Anticapitalism," *Public Culture* 18, no. 1 (2006): 93–110. For an argument that does not simply look at Germany, see Mark Loeffler, "Producers and Parasites: The Critique of Finance in Germany and Britain, 1873-1933" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2012).

Outline of the Dissertation

Telling this story as a story of entanglements, spanning multiple sites in Africa, Asia, and Europe, necessitates some difficult choices. This dissertation will therefore not provide the reader with a detailed tree (or a massive forest) of hierarchies of West German Maoist parties across the Federal Republic from 1965 to 1985. Incomplete attempts at drawing such maps have been undertaken by other writers, generally less interested in the movements' embeddedness in the contexts that are the focus of this study.[87] West German Maoist parties, their national committees and local and regional cells only appear as they drift in and out of the broader stories of this dissertation. This dissertation is also not concerned with laying out the minute ideological differences in party positions at the national level, as has been done by others on several occasions,[88] in part because such approaches tend to present the parties as overly monolithic and neglect the dissent or simply indifference within the organizations, and in part because they are secondary to my arguments. Chapter 2, "Putting Maoism on the Map," will instead set the scene for the stories of the later chapters. It begins by briefly sketching the key international development leading up to Maoism as a viable alternatie on the Left: the Sino-Soviet split. Because of the role the Albanian government (and its embassies) played in the story of transnational Maoism in the two Germanies, this sketch

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[87]See Willi Jasper, *Der gläserne Sarg Erinnerungen an die deutsche "Kulturrevolution"* (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2018); Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt*; Andreas Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne: Die Lebenswelt der K-Gruppen in der Bundesrepublik der 70er Jahre* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2005); Anton Stengl, *Zur Geschichte der "K-Gruppen": Marxisten-Leninisten in der BRD der siebziger Jahre* (Frankfurt am Main: Zambon Verlag, 2011). However, no project—as far as I know—approaches the attention to detail at the local level of Jürgen Schröder and Dietmar Kesten's online database "Materialien zur Analyse der Opposition," which collects scans of primary source materials and tries to reconstruct the relationships of hundreds of groups that at one time or the other became or were part of a Maoist group including various mass organizations, factory cells, army cells, and so on. See Dietmar Kesten and Jürgen Schröder's "Materialien zur Analyse der Opposition (MAO)," https://mao-projekt.de/ (accessed: May 25th, 2019).

[88]Benicke, *Von Adorno Zu Mao*; Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne.*

necessarily involves particular attention to Albania's role in international communism during the early 1960s. I then introduce localities and different communities of "foreign" students in West Germany and introduce various foreign student organizations emphasizing the political diversity within the radical milieu.[89] Nonetheless, I will touch on the genesis of the West German organizations towards the end of the chapter that illustrates the fluidity of 1960s and 1970s politics. I want to complicate the narrative of the authoritarian formation of West German Maoism with a local example from the University of Freiburg. I will then follow one particular product of the student movement, the *Rote Zelle Germanistik* (RotZeG) at the university of Freiburg to illustrate how the one-directional image of authoritarian leaders and their victims is inaccurate. Ultimately, Chapter 2 argues that in a moment in postwar West Germany that knew many particulars, Maoism purported to serve as a "universal language" that tied together a diversity of concerns, struggles and mobilizations before becoming unavailable for that purpose by the end of the 1970s.

Chapter 3, "East Germany: Maoism in the Cold War," begins with the anxieties of the East German State about Maoism. For this purpose I use files from the Institute for Foreign Students at the East German Trade Union School in Bernau, where—beginning in 1960 and intensifying with the Cuban Missile Crisis—teachers began to notice a tendency of African students to "not understand" peaceful coexistence and side with China on the issue. At the same time, the West German intelligence service's department for communism

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[89]Paying close attention to the complexity of politics, for example, within the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union, my dissertation rejects the suggestion that foreign activists in the Federal Republic were merely "projection screens" for the hopes and dreams of West Germans, or the implication of much that has been written on the so called "K-Gruppen," that acknowledges foreign students but only as political capital for the West German comrades. This is particularly true of the accounts cited above. See Hinck, *Wir waren wie Maschinen*; Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt*; Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne*. For a critique of both of these shortcomings (albeit one that doesn't extend this argument to the 1970s), see Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012.

under the direction of Günther Nollau began to produce Chinese propaganda and send it to people in East Germany in the hope of dividing the SED. Finally, the Chinese and Albanian embassies became active distributors of propaganda and sought to mobilize opposition within the GDR. By the late 1960s, the defeat of Maoism had become a priority for the Stasi, which saw it as a threat both from the West and the East. The chapter uses Stasi files and Maoist publications to show the Maoists' attempts to build a network of party cells in East Germany with generous operational support from the Albanian embassy. The main argument of this chapter is that while the literature has portrayed West German Maoism in general as an uncomfortable exception to the globalism of the New Left, they actually tapped into and became involved in global Cold War politics that had been going on in East Germany for the better part of a decade.

Chapter 4, "West Germany: Governing the Cold War," returns to the West and focuses on the state's and the public's response to Maoism. The states, intelligence services and conservative parties of West Germany sought to ban Maoist organizations as well as organizations of "foreign extremists." This distinction is crucial. Ironically, the literature on the postwar Left has reproduced the distinction between "Maoists" and "foreign extremists" and consequently obscured the transnationalism of Maoism in Cold War Germany. The argument of this chapter is two-fold: First, the context of German-German rivalry and anxieties about East German influence on the political and economic lent layers of meaning to Maoism in West Germany that would hardly be justified by their ultimate political efficacy (at least measured in electoral outcomes). But more importantly, this chapter shows that from the very beginning, anxieties over the influence of foreigners and the import of "foreign political problems" were at the heart of the West German states' response to communist activists

in the Federal Republic from the very early 1960s, when Iranian communists disrupted the Federal Republic's relationship with Iran all the way to the 1970s, and when attempts to ban Maoist organizations became one piece in a complex puzzle of foreign policy considerations. Amidst these "crises of government," intelligence officials and bureaucrats carefully marked foreigners as foreign (even though they were themselves Maoists) and West Germans as Maoist extremists and well-meaning West German activists began to shield foreign peers from pro- and persecution—inadvertently erasing their names from the archival record.

Chapter 5, "China and Albania: Alternative Diplomacies," argues that Maoists entered into transnational spaces of knowledge production that allowed for the construction of Maoism as a common experience. Activists travelled to Albania and China and collaborated—often for years at a time—in the production of Cold War broadcasting in those countries. Who got to go was ultimately determined by the outcome of the competition among different factions for the good will and acknowledgment of the Albanian Party of Labor (PPSh) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). While recognition by these parties meant political capital in the West German milieu, it also tended to constrain the parties ideologically. But it would be false to suggest that cadres merely parroted slogans they picked up in Chinese literature. Rather, at the local level, Maoists were often left to their own devices in explaining the different turns in Chinese foreign policy, increasingly as those became harder and harder to reconcile with a vision of China as the leader of decolonial struggles. And rather than projecting their own hopes and dreams on to Chinese policy, Maoists took their questions to Chinese officials. One party regular feedback on their coverage of China in their party newspaper directly from "comrades" at the foreign language press in Beijing. Ironically, as this chapter will show, the more the Chinese Communist Party alienated those

continuing to be committed to liberation in the Global South, the more a small and among German Maoists widely ridiculed party—which had secured recognition by the Albanian government—increasingly gained the sympathies of Iranian students.

This small party has since become infamous for their alleged nationalism—advocating for German unification from the beginning—and siding with West German conservatives who sought China's alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. But the difficult debates sparked by Mao's Three Worlds Theory, China's decision to lend large sums of money to Pinochet in Chile, or their dealing with the Shah of Iran, and the increasing frequency with which conservatives in West Germany (but also—famously—Richard Nixon) visited China caused similar debates and factioning among Iranian Maoists. Chapter 6, "The Middle East: Anti-Capitalism and Space," argues that decolonization, Sino-Soviet Split, and the economic crises of the 1970s produced a set of contradictions that delimited but not determined a field of possible Maoist ideological positions. Nonetheless, Maoists increasingly articulated the class antagonism in geopolitical terms, substituting countries in the "Third World" for the global proletariat. The real political struggles of Iranian opposition students, and Maoists from the Middle East more broadly, made this position untenable: they sharply criticized West German activists' inability to see class antagonism in Iranian society and their view of the OPEC oil crisis that identified oil oligarchs with the international working class. To map the (desired) conflict between capital and labor onto different geopolitical formations obscured both the relationship between capital and labor and the real local and transnational struggles of people from the Global South.

Chapter 7 argues that decolonization lent unique appeal to Maoism and in some ways follows Sam Moyne and Ned Richardson-Little in arguing that disappointment of (unrealistic)

expectations of postcolonial regimes accelerated the decline of Maoism as a politics of mass appeal in Cold War Germany.[90] The chapter focuses on the work Communist League of West Germany did with African anti-colonial activists in West Germany as well as in Cape Verde and Southern Africa. Ultimately, the student movement had been preceded from 1960 onwards by increased interest in African national liberation on university campuses. With the end of the Portuguese empire in the mid-1970s, the KBW stepped up their efforts both in local solidarity groups and abroad. They sent doctors to Cape Verde, collaborated with ZANU delegates in Frankfurt to produce the ZANU's newspaper at the KBW's own industrial printing press, raised over a million dollars alone for weapons, shipped clothing to Maputo and finally sent delegates and industrial equipment to build an industrial printing facility in Mozambique and later in Zimbabwe. These efforts increased at the same time as the KBW's success domestically declined. But both, the success of anti-colonial wars to secure independence meant that this could not be a long-term strategy. This problem was likely exacerbated by the much greater difficulty to fit postcolonial states into a revolutionary worldview.

Taken together, these chapters not only recast what remains in the German political imaginary a marginal sectarian subculture as a symptom of the impact on the two Germanies of decolonization and the global Cold War, but prompt us to reconsider our approach to the big questions of the postwar period in the two Germanies: although Germany "lost" its overseas empire with the conclusive defeat of World War I, decolonization profoundly affected West and East German society. In the postwar period, increased mobility, student

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[90]Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Ned Richardson-Little, "Between Dictatorship and Dissent: Ideology, Legitimacy, and Human Rights in East Germany, 1945-1990" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2013).

exchange and aid programs, and—importantly—guest worker programs meant that foreigners were a consistent and visible presence in postwar German societies. Ironically, it was East Germany who—at least in ideological terms and however imperfectly—embraced that diversity. Perhaps, now that the Cold War is over, the Federal Republic can rethink its continuous denial that Germany was, is, and will be a multi-ethnic society.

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CHAPTER 2

Putting Maoism on the Map

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In 1978, someone[1] at the Women's Teacher's College in Yola, Nigeria composed a letter about the political differences between China and Albania. The envelope, marked *par avion* and addressed to "Radio Tirana, Tirana, Albania" made it to the Albanian capital—which at the time was by no means certain, judging from the numerous complaints about things getting lost in the mail among the correspondence collected at the Albanian State Archives in Tirana. The author had listened to a program about the Marxist-Leninist Party of Iran and its opposition to the Shah. Radio Tirana's programming raised some questions: were Albania and China developing in different directions? Why had the letter writer—despite being an avid listener of Radio Peking and a subscriber to the *Peking Review*—never heard of revolutionary parties in Iran, or, for that matter, Japan? When it came to Iran, the Chinese seemed to only "speak in terms of [the] Shah, one of their allies in the"Third World."[2] Was China changing? In any case, the author expressed their gratitude to Albania, "which

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[1]This chapter intentionally avoids naming even the most well-known protagonists of the movements discussed. The reason is this: German archival law does not permit the use of identifiable information before either the 30th anniversary of a person's death or the 100th anniversary of their birth. The only exception is if people are public figures and the information cited is in relation to their public persona. This does allow me to identify the most prominent members of the West German postwar Left milieu, but not those that this dissertation seeks to foreground.

[2]"[Anonymized] to Radio Tirana" (March 13th, 1978), Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (Central State Archives of the Republic of Albania, AQSh hereafter), Fondi 509, Viti 1978, Dosja 35, p. 12.

persistently backs the revolutionary movements."[3] The archive of Radio Tirana at the Albanian Central State Archives (AQSh) is full of such letters containing praise—and sometimes critique—not only from various European countries but also from such places as Algeria, Colombia, and Guadeloupe.

If they were still listening to the Albanian broadcaster five years later—in 1983—they would have received news of unrest in a major West German shipyard located in Hamburg. The shipbuilding industry was in a crisis that in September led to protests and occupations of shipyards in multiple West German cities. Major shipyards were asking the state for financial assistance and had planned large-scale layoffs to compensate for the decline in demand for ships "made in Germany."[4] The importance of this story, however, had little to do with the specific plight of the shipyard workers in Hamburg, Kiel, and Bremen. What Radio Tirana was assembling from the obscurest of sources was the impression of a global revolutionary movement around the world. Radio Tirana's Editorial Board West, the Editorial Board Africa-Asia, and the Editorial Board Latin America compiled lists of articles from Marxist-Leninist publications from all continents. Among articles from Colombia, Brazil, India, Benin, Togo and others there were a number of references to an obscure West German paper called *Roter Morgen* (Red Dawn).[5] The paper, which was the central organ of a relatively small Albanian-aligned party in West Germany, described the shipyard occupations as a "step forward for the West German working class" and emphasized the importance of the

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[3]Ibid. This letter foreshadows the timeline of the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Albanian splits. In the early 1960s, Albania played a crucial role in the Sino-Soviet Split and remained China's only official ally in Europe until roughly 1978. At that point, it broke with China's Three Worlds Theory which justified China's cooperation with authoritarian regimes in Chile and Iran.

[4]"Werften: Alles überflüssig," *Der Spiegel* No. 13, 1983, p. 114-116; "So was darf es doch nicht geben," *Der Spiegel*, No. 37, 1983, p. 30-31.

[5]Biweekly Plans for the Newsrooms West, East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, AQSh, Fondi 509, Viti 1983, Dosja 33, p. 44.

occupations far beyond their local contexts.[6] Reports of widespread activities and a hunger strike by female shipyard workers further amplified the story.[7]

By 1983, the Marxist-Leninist cadre parties of the 1970s—divided after 1978 over the Sino-Albanian split—had largely lost steam. Some had already dissolved, others were looking for new horizons. The largest of them would end up in a series of lawsuits over the party's accumulated wealth in 1985. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, political priorities shifted alongside the changing social base of Iranians living in Germany and Iranian Marxism-Leninism stopped being a prominent part of the Left in the Federal Republic.[8] So why begin this story with the broadcasts of Radio Tirana? And what is the significance of an international radio broadcaster that wildly exaggerates far-Left revolutionary potential in West Germany and—for that matter—misrepresents the extent to which workers in West Germany had revolutionary aims? Didn't Radio Tirana—to the extent that it didn't merely annoy the listeners of radio stations in Europe whose broadcasts it interrupted with long reports on purported advances in agricultural production—just create a transnational echo-chamber for fringe parties?

I begin this dissertation with the story of Radio Tirana because it illustrates the complexity of the story ahead. Rather than focusing on a set of fixed protagonists, this dissertation reconstructs networks of political interaction that span Africa, Latin America, the United

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[6]"HDW Hamburg besetzt," *Roter Morgen: zentralorgan der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands*, Vol. 17, No. 37, September 16th, 1983, p. 1. "Solidarität mit den HDW-Arbeitern," *Roter Morgen*, Vol. 17, No. 37, September 16th, 1983, p. 1. "Widerstand auf den Werften," *Roter Morgen*, Vol. 17, No. 37, September 16th, 1983, p. 2.

[7]"RGO-Betriebsrat bei HDW/Kiel entlassen," *Roter Morgen*, Vol. 17, No. 37, September 16th, 1983, p. 2; "KPD-Solidaritätsflugblatt zum Hungerstreik der Frauen: Hungerstreik der HDW-Frauen: ein Erfolg," *Roter Morgen*, Vol. 17, No. 37, September 16th, 1983, p. 3.

[8]Günter Schröder, Monika Schuckar, and Djavad Adineh, "Die Iranische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," in *Ethnische Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: ein Lexikon*, ed. Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen (München: Beck, 1995), 3.1.5–1–3.1.5–47, p. 3.1.5-30.

States, and Asia. The knowledge production of Cold War broadcasting from Beijing and Tirana as well as the numerous publications of China and Albania's foreign language press created a universal language in which regional, national, and decolonial conflicts could be expressed. But this is not just a story of the "circulation of ideas." This language was coproduced by a wildly diverse cast of characters in concrete spaces of transnational interaction in Frankfurt, Berlin, London, Tirana, Beijing, and Maputo, to just name a few. And even in the Cold War Germanies, the story is far from limited to the now well-known story of the West German student radicals who by the early 1970s had entered Maoist and pro-Albanian cadre parties. An indication is perhaps a letter in Turkish from Stuttgart to the offices of Radio Tirana.[9] More importantly, as this dissertation will show, foreign political groups and organizations as well as organizations representing foreigners in West Germany were a central part of the West German political landscape in the 1970s.

This chapter seeks to deconstruct the identification of West German Maoism with the leading cadres of a few select West German parties. This identification has created an image of top-down authoritarianism perpetrated by a small group of leaders. Rather than reconstructing the institutional particularities of these numerous parties, this chapter proposes to conceive of Maoism as a shared universal that allowed a large diversity of causes to be articulated in a way that allowed for shared political action by German and foreign students, Albanian and Chinese diplomats, Palestinian workers, and Zimbabwean guerrillas. I do so by first introducing the two key contexts of Sino-Soviet Split and decolonization and the ways they affected the experiences of students in Germany. The effects of these were uneven across the two Germanies and across a wide variety of locations. Finally, I will reveal some

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[9]"[Anonymized] to Radio Tirana" (October 9th, 1976), AQSh, Fondi 509, Viti 1976, Dosja 27, p. 47-49.

indications that even the West German parties might be mischaracterized by the stories told by their former leaders. A case study of a small group of German Studies majors in Freiburg reveals clues that Maoist "authoritarianism" was not quite as top-down as the conventional narrative suggests. Furthermore, there are early indications that even in the West German Maoist parties, foreign participation has been obscured from the outset.

Albania and the Sino-Soviet Split

None of what I discuss in this dissertation would be imaginable without China's challenge to Moscow's leadership in international communism and its partnership—until 1978—with the People's Republic of Albania. There is some disagreement over where to locate the origins of the Sino-Soviet split. Lorenz Lüthi's *The Sino-Soviet Split* begins, like many others, with the year 1956.[10] Sergey Radchenko, on the other hand, begins in 1962, where he locates the beginning of the speedy breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations. At the same time, he acknowledges that one could as well begin in 1949 because the uneven character of the alliance caused tension from the beginning.[11]

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[10]Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[11]For Radchenko, decentering 1956 in the story of the Sino-Soviet split serves to de-emphasize ideological causes of the conflict. Lorenz Lüthi has suggested that ideological disagreements were central while Radchenko argues that ideology mattered far less than competition for power in the communist world did. Other authors have argued that the foreign policy disagreements were subordinate to domestic issues. See Lüthi; Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009); one maybe forgiven for wondering what this difference in emphasis actually means, since wondering about the status of ideology in an overtly ideological conflict always entails attempts to disentangle ideology from other concerns as well as a certain amount of guesswork as to what certain people "really meant." For an attempt to sideline the question *if* ideology determines foreign policy in favor of the question *when* it does so more and when it does so less, see Mingjiang Li, *Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma* (London & New York: Routledge, 2012).

For histories of Europe's New Lefts, the year 1956 has quasi-mythical importance. Disappointment with the dual crises of Suez and Hungary—in the eyes of young Leftists discrediting any anti-imperial pretense by both sides of the Cold War—sparked the search for a Left beyond the Moscow-dominated socialist world.[12] Sympathetic accounts of the postwar Left have focused on 1956 because it dissociates the Left from the Soviet Union.[13] Historians taking this approach have highlighted the anti-Stalinist impulses within the New Left. Sometimes, this has allowed for easy assimilation of the postwar Left into the origin story of a more liberal Europe.[14] On the one hand, this matches the self-understanding of certain protagonists like the New Left members of the British Communist Party Historians Group, as well as the American and West German SDS. On the other hand, though, there is a different, less comfortable dimension to 1956 as a hallmark moment of the history of the Left and that is the story of the beginning of Sino-Soviet disagreements over de-Stalinization. The significance of 1956 is complicated by the Sino-Albanian critique of Moscow, which crucially entailed a rehabilitation of "Comrade Stalin."

Over the period from 1956-1969, tensions between China and the Soviet Union increased, and by the early 1970s the two communist countries had identified each other as major threats to world peace. Mao rejected de-Stalinization and the doctrine of peaceful coexistence with

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[12]See for example Horn, *The Spirit of '68*; Eley, *Forging Democracy*. In West Germany, the year 1956 would of course prove fateful for Soviet-style communists for an additional reason: it was the year the Federal Constitutional Court declared the West German Communist Party unconstitutional and ordered that it be dismantled.

[13]No doubt: the emphasis on the anti-Stalinism of the New Left by sympathetic postwar historians has helped to counter less sympathetic accounts of the Left that tended to equate the Left with Moscow and Stalinism. See particularly Horn, *The Spirit of '68*. Ironically, such accounts have—by explaining the rise of an anti-Stalinist Left with 1956—reproduced the tendency of histories of the interwar Left to marginalize non-Comintern-aligned left-wing and even Marxist movements.

[14]For a critique of this phenomenon in the French case, see Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives*.

the capitalist West.[15] By 1960 the Soviet Union withdrew all specialists from China. By 1962, Mao's concerns over "revisionism" at home played into his rejection of "revisionism" among the Soviet leadership. As Odd Arne Westad has pointed out, in the absence of allies in Eastern Europe — with the exception of Albania — Mao focused his leadership ambitions on the "Third World" and posed an increasingly global threat to the Soviet claim to leadership within the international communist movement.[16] Whatever the role of ideology in the genesis of these "quarrels," Mao's rejection of peaceful coexistence (expressed, for example, in the Chinese rejection of the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962) and Mao's critique of the Soviet Union's "betrayal of Stalin" were central to the way the PRC articulated its differences with the Soviet Union.[17]

In Europe, a more local development meant that while China was far away, the Sino-Soviet split was having a significant impact. For West German activists who sought to distance themselves from the World-War II generations, Albania, with its history of Nazi occupation and resistance proved a convenient reference point.[18] At the end of World War

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[15]Nevertheless, both parties made continued efforts to save the Sino-Soviet alliance. There is widespread agreement that the Soviet Union sought to repair the Sino-Soviet relationship. For the less common argument that at least until 1961 Mao ultimately sought unity with the Soviets despite his disregard for Khrushchev, see Dong Wang, *The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 49 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center International Center for Scholars, 2006); of course, as already noted above, there were plenty of disagreements before 1956. See David Wolff, *"One Finger's Worth of Historical Events:" New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 30 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center International Center for Scholars, 2000).

[16]Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 161; the lack of allies in Europe was not for lack of trying. See Elidor Mëhilli, "Defying de-Stalinization: Albania's 1956," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 4 (2011): 4–56, p. 54; for a study of Sino-Soviet competition in the Global South, see Jeremy Scott Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

[17]Other issues were the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1959 and the Soviet Union's deteriorating relationship with Albania, as we will see shortly.

[18]This, of course, is in no way meant to suggest that this distancing always went hand in hand with successfully confronting Nazism. Plenty of historians have shown the ways in which this distancing did

II, Stalin had found a willing partner and increasingly staunch defender in the small state of Albania, lodged between socialist Yugoslavia in the Northeast, Greece in the Southeast, and Italy to the West just across the Adriatic Sea. In the months immediately following World War II Albania was destined to become a Yugoslav Republic. But Stalin's increasing weariness of Tito's territorial ambitions created an opening for the ruling Albanian Party of Labor (PPSh).[19] As Elidor Mëhilli has suggested, Albanian leader Enver Hoxha sensed an opportunity to make Albania relevant within the communist world. Siding with Stalin allowed Albania to maintain its independence and security: "The Soviet-Yugoslav split — indeed, Stalinism — had made Tirana relevant, lifting it from isolation and culminating in the security guarantee of the Warsaw Pact."[20] Mëhilli argues that it was not before 1956 that these politics crystalized into a clear ideological doctrine, which provided some inspiration to the New Left's search for a new reference point after the disillusionment with the Soviet Union.

Originally, Enver Hoxha at least made overtures in the direction of de-Stalinization following Kruschev's speech "On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences," held at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. However, when it became clear that a revision of Stalin's legacy would also allow for a rehabilitation of Tito, fear of renewed Yugoslav attempts to annex or invade the People's Republic of Albania congealed into a steadfast defense of Stalin and a rejection of de-Stalinization and its associated reforms. In other words, Enver Hoxha rendered the defense of Stalin coterminus

frequently do more to obscure the nature of Nazism. See for example Herzog, *Sex After Fascism*; Gassert and Steinweis, *Coping with the Nazi Past.*

[19]The Albanian party was founded under Italian occupation in 1941 as the Communist Party of Albania, but was renamed to Party of Labor of Albania in 1948. For ease of reading, I use the latter denomination throughout the dissertation.

[20]Mëhilli, "Defying de-Stalinization," p. 37.

with the defense of Albania against foreign invasion.[21] In the following years, China sought a partner in Eastern Europe and Albania made continued attempts to attract Chinese sympathies.[22] By 1960, the Soviet Union cut economic aid to Albania following Albania's backing of the Chinese criticism of the USSR at the Bucharest Conference in June 1960. Even then, ideological alignment between Albania and China was far from guaranteed. But when Albania—desperate due to the Eastern Bloc's economic sanctions—turned to China for aid, China happily complied and adopted Albania as its only ally in Europe.[23]

For now it suffices to say that by the mid-1960s, the People's Republics of China and Albania had crystalized as significant threats to the Soviet Union's (and in the German-German context the Socialist Unity Party's) monopoly over the interpretation of socialism.[24] With Albania only two hours by air from Vienna and with embassies in Vienna and East Berlin, Maoist activists had a direct line to the alliance that—in their view—truly represented the interests of the decolonizing world.

Decolonization and Divided Germany

The number students from Africa and Asia at West German universities grew by a factor of 60 from 1951 to 1963.[25] Similar developments happened elsewhere: the number of students from Africa, Asia, and Latin America studying at universities in the United States grew

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[21]Mëhilli, p. 56.

[22]Mercy Kuo, *Contending with Contradictions: China's Policy Toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953-1960* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).

[23]Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, p. 172-174.

[24]For this argument see Quinn Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy: China's Challenge in 1960s East Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History*, July 21, 2015, 1–25; Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens.*

[25]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 17.

sharply in the 1960s and 1970s.[26] Although fewer in terms of absolute numbers, 44,000 people from the Global South studied in East Germany. In the early 1960s, most came from West Africa, although the GDR's priorities shifted with the shifting geopolitics of the Cold War in the Global South.[27]

While foreign student populations increased across the Western and Eastern bloc, the two Germanies had an added incentive to vie for the good will of newly forming postcolonial states. Naturally, the diplomatic skirmishes between West and East German Africa policies have to be put into the context of Cold War German politics. As both Jason Verber and Ned Richardson-Little have demonstrated, East German commitment to national liberation in the 1960s cannot be divorced from the East German struggle for international recognition and their attempt to defeat the Hallstein doctrine, by which West Germany refused to recognize the existence of another German state.[28] Conversely, West German interest in Africa was at least partially motivated by fear of the spread of communism in the newly decolonizing world.

This was true in other places as well. American governments hoped that exchange students from the Global South would—upon their return—help implement an American-style "modernity" in their home countries. Although many did return home to help effect change there, this did not always have the desired outcome. The lessons students drew from their

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[26]Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p. 37.

[27]Compare Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*, p. 201. On African students in the GDR specifically, see Sara Pugach, "African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German Democratic Republic," in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).

[28]Richardson-Little, "Between Dictatorship and Dissent."; Verber, "The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany.". On the Hallstein Doctrine see also Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973: aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien*, Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001).

experience in the United States frequently led them to seek alternatives to the American model, not least because of the staunch criticisms formulated by the Civil Rights movement.[29] As I will discuss in Chapter 3, East German officials struggled with similar issues, when, for example, African trade union cadres in training on stipends in Bernau were "eager students of Marxism-Leninism" and yet, when it came to key questions in the global Cold War, proved "ideologically unreliable."

While East Germany claimed ideological continuity with the purported anticolonialism of the Social Democrats (SPD) before 1914, and the Communist Party (KPD) in the interwar period, West Germany intensified its efforts to raise awareness about Africa and its needs to the future elites.[30] In October, the German Africa Society had organized the first German Africa Week. In 28 cities the society organized 50 events with guests from several African countries. The creation of the German Africa Society itself had been supported by the German Foreign Office in 1956 and the president of the German *Bundestag* Eugen Gerstenmeier served as its first president.[31] As Jason Verber has pointed out, from the beginning the Africa Weeks were shot through with references to Germany's own colonial past. When arguing that young West Germans did not know anything about Africa, the German Africa Society explained that the new generation lacked the kind of "professional engagement" with Africa that Germans had had before 1914.[32]

Such utterances by West German officials must have been a delight to their East German peers, who persistently accused West Germany's interest in Africa of being motivated

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[29]Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p. 37.

[30]The relationship between Social Democracy and colonialism was of course more complicated. See for example Short, *Magic Lantern Empire.*

[31]Verber, "The Conundrum of Colonialism in Postwar Germany," p. 62-64.

[32]Verber, p. 63.

by neocolonialism.[33] In 1961, the SED founded its own version of the "German Africa Society." In West Germany, the impetus for Africa policy was to raise interest in Africa among its domestic population. In East Germany, the priority was ideological work in the decolonizing world. The East German foreign office was therefore much more set on pointing to the hypocrisy of West German language of "friendship" with Africa given West Germany's support for the French in the case of Algeria.[34]

So issues of decolonization were carried to university campuses in the West in part by government initiatives motivated by German-German competition over the Global South and in part by the presence of foreign students. A particularly striking case in this regard is the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU). The Confederation was founded in Paris in 1962 as an international organization representing Iranian students abroad as well as at home. It was the result of a merger of the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe (CIS) founded in Heidelberg, West Germany, in 1960 and the North American Iranian Students' Association in the United States (ISAUS) founded in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1952.[35] By 1964, CISNU had chapters in Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States and a membership of roughly 2,500 students. Globally the number of Iranian students abroad grew from 15,000 in 1964 to 40,000 in 1973 and 67,000 in 1978. As Afshin Matin-asgari has pointed out "on the eve of the 1978-79 revolution, Iran had more students abroad than any other country in the world."[36] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the CISNU was characterized by conflicts between rivaling factions.[37] Yet, from the

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[33]Verber, p. 38.
[34]Verber, p. 64.
[35]Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah*, p. 51.
[36]Matin-Asgari, p. 131.
[37]See Matin-Asgari, especially Chapters 2, 6 and 9.

late 1960s on, Maoism was an influence on many factions and by 1969, CISNU's secretariat was entirely filled with Maoists. CISNU's headquarters in Frankfurt, West Germany put the organization right in the center of the West German "Global Sixties." Although CISNU ceased to be a unified international organization in the mid-1970s, competing factions and successor groups continued to figure prominently on the West German political stage and continued to mobilize to protests in East Germany throughout the second half of the 1970s.

Of course there were those that didn't have a strong presence in West Germany, but built networks across Europe to mobilize for their causes. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had had an office in London since it split from the Moscow-supported Zimbabwe African People's Union in 1963. As was the case for the West German Maoists and their predecessors in the student movement, ZANU built on (and sometimes inherited) structures of prior organizations—in this case of Zimbabwean nationalists. The London office had been established by the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC). The office was passed on to its successors the National Democratic Party (NDP) and later the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). However, in 1963 the leader of the London office sided with ZANU and it subsequently became ZANU's London office.[38] The London office became one of the hubs for organizing Zimbabwean nationalists in the United Kingdom, but not the only one: the milieu of Zimbabwean nationalist activists included ZAPU cadres and members of the Zimbabwe Student Union (ZSU) as well. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), black Zimbabwean women and men came to Britain, often as students. A few had fought as guerrillas or were trained to fight.[39] They worked with solidarity

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[38]Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, "ZANU's External Networks 1963–1979: An Appraisal," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 83–106, p. 93.

[39]JoAnn McGregor, "Locating Exile: Decolonization, Anti-Imperial Spaces and Zimbabwean Students in Britain, 1965–1980," *Journal of Historical Geography* 57 (July 1, 2017): 62–75, p. 64.

activists who organized speaking opportunities and helped with fundraising. But this did not mean that their effort remained limited to the far Left: some found a platform on the BBC and worked with Labour Party MPs. As was the case for West German Maoists at the Chinese embassy in East Berlin, ZANU representatives were regular guests at the Chinese embassy in London for social occasions.[40] ZANU's China orientation also created natural collaborators among other liberation movements: they shared their office with the South African Pan African Congress (PAC) as well as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).[41] While (as I will show in Chapter 7) travel to West Germany proved difficult for ZANU representatives, European hubs like London proved crucial for coordinating collaboration between Germans and Zimbabweans.

All of this, of course, is in addition to the growing numbers of foreign workers in the two Germanies. Between 1955 and 1973, the West German government sought to satisfy the need for labor with workers from abroad—first from Southern Europe, then increasingly from Turkey. The attempt to incentivize the return of those guest workers to their home countries remained—in the scheme of things—largely without success. While the recruitment stop in 1973 indeed led to a temporary decrease in the number of gainfully employed foreigners, the total foreign population continued to increase.[42] Considering Maoists attempts to build cells

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[40]McGregor, p. 67-70.

[41]McGregor, p. 69.

[42]Herbert and Hunn, "Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic.". On guest workers in West Germany, see Akgündüz, *Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe*; Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany*; Chin, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe*; Mattes, *»Gastarbeiterinnen« in der Bundesrepublik*; Stokes, "Fear of the Family."; Yurdakul, *From Guest Workers into Muslims the Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany*. On guest worker recruitment in East Germany, see for example Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime*.

in industry, it should come as little surprise that the recruitment of guest workers would be a major concern.[43]

From Divided Berlin to the University Towns of the South

In the story of the West German New Left, West Berlin has often figured as the center. And for good reason: the unique geography of the divided Berlin exhibits the spatial particularities of the West German student movement, which consistently positioned itself against East German state socialism in space and against the German past in time. Taken together, those two presences (the Nazi past and the East German present) shaped a student movement that—in Timothy Brown's words—"experienced the need to import elements of their revolution in a way that seems to have few parallels, at least in the West."[44] Moreover, West Berlin was the location of several key events that make up what now is referred to as the West German '1968': from early sit-ins at the *Freie Universität* to the shooting of a West German student during a demonstration against the Shah of Iran in 1967 to the International Vietnam Congress in February 1968, all eyes were on Berlin.[45]

But there are other, heretofore unexplored reasons to attend to Berlin that are central to my dissertation. As recent scholarship on the city and the German-German relationship itself has revealed, despite the violence at the border, the so-called "Iron Curtain" was a lot more

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[43]See for example "OG Sindelfingen der KPD/ML Sonderbericht ans LAK: Rolle und Bedeutung der Ausländischen Kollegen im Kampf," Archiv Soziale Bewegungen Freiburg (ASB Freiburg hereafter), 9.1.4.VIII.

[44]Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 77.

[45]On the role of the Shah demonstration and 1967 for the memory of the West German 1968, see Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012.

porous than the image suggests.[46] West Berlin was *also* the port of entry for many to East Berlin, the socialist republic's capital. This was of special significance for the protagonists of this dissertation who sought to mobilize Maoism against the East German republic and did so in myriad ways: as we will see in the following chapters, Iranian students disrupted events at Humboldt University, occupied the Iranian embassy in East Berlin, and protested at the World Youth Congress in East Berlin in 1973. West German Maoists, for their part, operated an illegal radio station addressing East Germans directly from a WWII anti-aircraft installation in Berlin-Wedding, a working-class neighborhood adjacent to the GDR.

But the significance of the border city transcends the German-German relationship. As Chapter 3 shows, East Berlin was home to a set of locations that connected activists based in the two Germanies with the global Cold War. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Maoists increasingly frequented the Chinese and Albanian embassies, the most direct connection to the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labor. Here their objectives intersected with that of Chinese and Albanian diplomats, who sought to find pro-Chinese sympathizers in the GDR following the Sino-Soviet split and collaborated with West German activists to do so.[47] Other activists sought out the representation of the North Vietnamese in East Berlin to drop off donations.

Finally, Berlin was a crucial site for East German anxieties over West German Maoism. Compared to other West German regions, the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) was disproportionately well informed about those groups that had a strong presence in West Berlin

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[46]Philip Broadbent and Sabine Hake, eds., *Berlin Divided City, 1945-1989.* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); Edith Sheffer, *Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Paul Steege, *Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946-1949* (New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[47]Quinn Slobodian has shown the extent to which the Chinese embassy became a local site for a global conflict in the 1960s. See Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015.

and those that actively worked towards a presence in the German Democratic Republic. The (Maoist) Communist Party of Germany (KPD)—which more or less directly grew out of the West Berlin student movement—was the largest of the Maoist organizations in West Berlin, but was far less significant in the rest of the country. Nonetheless, Stasi reports closely followed their political transformations and their ambitions to build connections to foreign parties and their plans for supporting opposition in the Eastern Bloc more broadly.[48]

The Stasi warned of Maoist attacks on GDR officials in West Berlin and instructed officials travelling and working in West Berlin to roll up the windows of their cars and not to frequent public restrooms without a companion.[49] But it was not simply that the GDR was an easy target for activists in West (and East) Berlin. Because West Germans had to travel through the GDR to reach West Berlin by car, there were unique opportunities for the Stasi to gather information about activists travelling to and from West Berlin for meetings and events. For example, during one party's convention in Cologne, the Stasi not only knew that 700 people from West Berlin travelled to the convention, but that they travelled in twelve chartered buses through the GDR.[50] In anticipation of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the Stasi instructed border guards to limit and filter the transit of members of one West German Maoist party. All cars with identified members were to be reported.[51] The opportunities for surveilling traffic between the Federal Republic and West Berlin meant

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[48]"Information über die Lage in der maoistischen 'KPD' vor ihrem ersten Parteitag am 29. Juni 1974" (June 4th, 1974), Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (BStU hereafter), MfS, HV A, Nr. 108, p. 30. "Information. Zur Situation innerhalb der maoistischen Kräfte Westberlins und zu einigen neuen Erkenntnissen über die von ihnen praktizierte antisozialistische Tätigkeit" (June, 21st, 1976), BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, AKG, Nr. 1122, p. 1-2.

[49]"Weisung zur Verhaltensweise der Angestellten der DDR und der Kuriere bei evtl. Angriffen und sonstigen gegen die DDR gerichteten Aktivitäten extremistischer Kräfte während der Aktion 'Meilenstein 76'" (May 13th, 1976), BStU, MfS, AG XVII, Nr. 4558, p. 17.

[50]"Information über Parteitag der maoistischen 'KPD' in der BRD" (July 12th, 1974), BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, AKG, Nr. 1002, p. 32.

[51]"HA VI/Stellvertreter an Leiter PKE Berlin" (May 12th, 1980), BStU, MfS, HA VI, Nr. 15351, p. 97.

that from the point of view of the East German secret police, Berlin's significance reached far beyond the immediate activism in the divided city.

A final reason to pay close attention to Berlin is a pragmatic choice. I have indicated in the introduction that the traces of foreigners within the Maoist milieu in the Federal Republic have largely been erased from the so-called movement archives. But the surveillance of Maoists in West Berlin by the Stasi reveals plenty of evidence that foreign and German Maoists not only existed side by side, but shared spaces and marched for common causes. In a rare set of reports about demonstrations in West Berlin, a Stasi informant describes a long march through Berlin that only stopped in Wedding, where the foreign participants chanted their slogans because many foreigners lived there. Furthermore, when taking pictures of the front of the demonstration made up largely of Iranians, Greeks and Turks, one of the organizers of the demonstration confronted the informant for taking pictures of the foreign delegations and subsequently had to cease taking photos altogether.[52] Apart from more abstract international connections between Maoist parties, Stasi records reveal the circulation of foreign print materials produced abroad and shipped to West Germany and office spaces shared between West German and Turkish Maoists.[53]

Nonetheless, an emphasis on the now-capital city has also obscured a lot. Too often the city's particular situation has become representative of the national. Again, as Tim Brown has put it, "the 'local' was by no means a mere synonym for the national."[54] The emphasis on

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[52]"Operative Information über festgestellte Aktivitäten maoistischer Kräfte während des 1. Mai in West-berlin" (May 5th, 1976), BStU, MfS, HA VII, Nr. 6482, p. 18.

[53]"Information zur Versendung von Agitationsmaterial der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens in der DDR" (November 3rd, 1979), BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 42075, p. 19; "Verbindung KPD/ML - Palästinenser (PFLP)," (May 5th, 1976), BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 42075, p. 31; "Information über Büro der KPD/ML in 1 Berlin 21, Wilsnacker Str. 41" (October 27th, 1978), BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 42075, p. 246.

[54]Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 77.

the big cities—foremost Berlin—has revealed some of the processes that lead to the founding of Maoist parties by former student leaders. But what it has veiled are the processes by which major Maoist parties grew out of already-existing small groups from all over the country. This view assumes from the outset that what matters about authoritarian cadre parties are "the authorities" and pays too little attention to the extent to which Maoist cadre parties were built "from below." The largest of the West German Maoist cadre parties of the 1970s was dramatically underrepresented in cities like Berlin (and consequently considered far less dangerous by the Stasi) but was strongest in the small university towns of the Southwest, where one of their alumni is—as of today—still Germany's only Green Party head of state.[55]

University towns and cities also increasingly became the home for many Iranians living in West Germany. While in the Weimar Republic and throughout the 1950s Iranians mostly lived in a few cities with Hamburg being the center of the Iranian community, the increasing percentage of students living in West Germany in the 1960s meant that more and more Iranians lived in smaller towns like the ones that will prominently recur throughout this dissertation.[56]

I will therefore pay close attention to towns like Freiburg and Heidelberg in the Southwest as well as the dense cluster of cities in the Rhineland, which—apart from including the West German capital of Bonn and the hometown of the domestic West German intelligence service (the Office for the Protection of the Constitution)—also was a focal point for mobilization by foreign activists. Dortmund, for example, was the site of a 15,000-person demonstration

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[55]See for example this report on Freiburg as a communist-Maoist base of operations: Landeskriminalamt Baden-Württemberg, "Arbeitspapier über Aktivitäten kommunistisch-maoistischer Gruppen im Raum Freiburg," (December 21st, 1976), Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (HSta hereafter), EA 2/302, Bü 63.

[56]Schröder, Schuckar, and Adineh, "Die Iranische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland," p. 3.1.5-18.

organized by the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union in 1972. In Cologne, auto-workers—the majority Turkish guest workers—struck under the leadership of Baha Targün in August 1973. That these events unfolded in the most densely industrial area of the Federal Republic is perhaps unsurprising. But that makes attention to these areas all the more important.

The city of Frankfurt is a special case. On the one hand, it has figured more prominently in histories of the so-called "undogmatic" Left or "Sponti" scene. In the memory of West German former activists, Frankfurt largely resisted the cadre party scene. Intuitively, this makes sense: in the time of the 1960s student movement, the influence of the Frankfurt School was disproportionately high. The most prominent student leader has also been said to have been Theodor Adorno's most cherished student before their falling out in the late 1960s.[57] On the other hand, the country's most numerous (and wealthy) Maoist party moved its headquarters to Frankfurt, where it also operated a printing press that—among other things—produced the *Zimbabwe Daily News* on behalf of the Zimbabwe African National Union.[58] More importantly, Frankfurt was the international headquarters for the CISNU. Within the CISNU, Iranian students fought out the politics of opposition towards the Shah. In the early sixties, conflicts were largely demarcated between the Moscow-oriented communist Tudeh party and anti-communists. However, by the 1970s the CISNU had several competing Maoist factions

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[57]John Abromeit, "The Limits of Praxis: The Social-Psychological Foundations of Theodor Adorno's and Herbert Marcuse's Interpretations of the 1960s Protest Movements," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. In the 1960s and 1970s*, ed. Belinda Davis et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 13–38; Detlev Claussen, "Intellectual Transfer: Theodor W. Adorno's American Experience," in *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. In the 1960s and 1970s*, ed. Belinda Davis et al., vol. 3, Protest, Culture and Society (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).

[58]Caro-Druck later printed the left-wing daily *taz* for Germany's Southern and Western regions. See "taz-Druckerei Caro: Der Kampf ist aus," *taz*, December 12th, 2012, http://taz.de/taz-Druckerei-Caro/!5076348/ (Accessed: February 24th, 2018).

before that position became increasingly untenable in face of Chinese acquiescence to the Shah of Iran, by which point some took up the Albanian position following Enver Hoxha's 1978 critique of China's foreign policy.[59]

This choice of key sites for exploring Maoism as a transnational phenomenon and language of multiculturalism should show clearly that even within the two Germanies, this may be a German story, but it is not a story of Germans. To fully understand Maoism as the promise of a (however inadequate) universal language that coincided with the apex of decolonization in the 1970s, I follow the protagonists of this dissertation to the international sites at which this language was produced. This includes the offices of the Albanian Radio Station "Radio Tirana," where West German cadres lived for two-year assignments, as well as the offices of China's foreign language press, Radio Beijing, and the International Friendship Hotel in the Chinese capital. But it also includes sites in the postcolonial world: West German cadres—who happened to be medical students—worked in post-independence Cape Verde and were faced not only with 14-hour days at the hospital but with the difficult task of life at the intersection of ideology and day-to-day practice. Others worked in Maputo at the headquarters of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union to build an industrial printing press to save the shipping costs of moving propaganda material from Frankfurt am Main to Southern Africa. Zimbabwean exchange students based in London organized meetings between Mugabe and West German activists when the West German government had declared ZANU representatives persona-non-grata due to their connections to West German Maoists.

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[59]On the period up to the mid-1970s, see Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah.* On the period after, see Chapters 4 and 6 of this dissertation.

The geographic complexity of this story requires compromises. At no point do I provide an extensive analysis of individual parties and their factional battles unless they pertain to the larger issues at stake in this dissertation. What emerges is a complex picture of the way in which the two Germanies negotiated decolonization, the global Cold War, and globalization. Ultimately, this is a dissertation about multicultural Germany, the global Cold War, and negotiations over a postwar *and* postcolonial world in two countries who are struggling to find themselves as sovereign nations after the defeat of World War II. To understand what that looked like, it is necessary to understand the ways in which West Germany became increasingly diverse over the course of the 1960s and 1970s and the ways this impacted on-the-ground politics. As I will show over the course of the following chapters, the West German state carefully obscured the extent to which the 1970s present was *already* a multicultural one. But the task of defining what it means to be "German" was not reserved for the Left. Inadvertently, Maoists—sometimes with good intentions—obscured the multicultural realities of their own milieus. Other times, conflicts erupted over who gets to define fascism. Indeed, some conflicts among Maoists in the 1970s can best be understood as a divide between those who sought to maintain the monopoly on defining fascism as Germans and those who—despite all orientalist projection—were willing to listen to vantage points emerging from the Global South.

(White) Authoritarianism from Below

It is in this set of overlapping contexts that the emergence of the West German Maoist parties has to be understood. But even in the familiar case of the West German Maoist so-

called *K-Gruppen*, there is evidence that "authoritarianism" was far from a one-way street and that from the beginning, foreign participation was obscured. In some ways, the term "party" is misleading here. At the end of the 1960s, the leading national organization of the West German student movement—Socialist German Student Federation (SDS)—was in disarray. But at the local and university level, its local personell and affiliated groups continued to exist. So-called *Basisgruppen* (base groups) in university departments and city neighborhoods continued to explore possibilities for radical politics. Overlapping with these were a number of Marxist circles that called for a return to working-class politics. One student leader in Heidelberg blamed the disintegration of the 1960s student movement on the excessive consumption of Adorno texts. In an article entitled "To drive the theoretical confrontation forwards and to decisively combat last vestiges of bourgeois ideology: the Frankfurt School and the student movement," he argued that the failure of the student movement consisted of their failure to connect their own mobilization to that of the working class. The only remedy now would be to shed the petty bourgeois ideology of the Frankfurt School and return to Marxism-Leninism.[60]

Eventually, that same leading figure of the student movement would be involved in the founding of West Germany's largest Maoist party. At a congress in Bremen in 1973, local groups from Bremen, Heidelberg/Mannheim, and Freiburg founded a national organization. This story is well-documented. Also well-documented are the stories of another post-SDS Maoist Party that formed in West Berlin in 1970. Even more notorious is the formation of a third party that involved students but also a few frustrated members of the illegal German

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[60] Joscha Schmierer, "Die theoretische Auseinandersetzung vorantreiben und die Reste bürgerlicher Ideologie entschieden bekämpfen: Die Kritische Theorie und die Studentenbewegung," *Rotes Forum*, no. 1/1070. p. 29-30.

Communist Party.[61] Historical narratives about the genesis of West German Maoism often focus on ideology reconstructed from published sources, or in the case of the latter party, by analyzing a defiant pro-Chinese publication from within the ranks of the KPD.

What has proven more elusive is the process by which the diverse and contradictory hodge-podge of post-SDS local groups, sometimes student groups, sometimes reading circles, sometimes neighborhood groups, turned into Maoist cadre parties that tolerated little dissent and the description of whom in the literature mirrors the fantasies of absolute power and control in the historiography of Soviet Union totalitarianism.[62]

To be clear, there is plenty of evidence that these organizations were extremely punitive, managed to seriously reduce their members' economic means (by garnishing wages above a certain 'proletarian baseline,' inheritances, and so on), and created states of anxiety in those who tried to leave the organizations. Demands for so-called "self-criticism" by the leadership at every level of the organizations and the tremendous working hours the parties demanded of their cadres would have been crushing to many. And indeed, as some former leaders reflected, careers were probably ended, and burnout was common.[63]

But we must resist a narrative whereby we take the two end points and connect them without sufficient evidence. When retrospectives by cadres at the very top of the party speak of the control the party had over the local groups, that may be because that was what they *sought* to do.[64] And when studies that are almost exclusively built on the publications of

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[61]See Benicke, *Von Adorno Zu Mao*; Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne.*
[62]Especially Kühn.
[63]Autorenkollektiv, *Wir warn die stärkste der Partein ..*
[64]See Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt*, for example.

the parties speak of their ideologically monolithic character, then that may well be because they are almost exclusively built on the publications of the party.[65]

What gets lost in this picture is the degree to which local party organizations of the major West German Maoist parties were often political groups before they were the local organizations of a Maoist party. Take the following example of the university town of Freiburg. Student representation at the university (as is common in German universities) proceeded as follows: the student body elected a student parliament, which in turn elected the student government. Local student politics at the university—much like in other parts of the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on the restructuring of higher education, the extent of student representation and involvement in the university's decision making, and the question of whether student representative bodies were restricted to topics of higher education or whether they had a right to political expression.[66] Throughout the late 1960s, the SDS had a relatively strong record in elections to the student council at the University of Freiburg but without winning the required majorities for student government. By late 1969, however, a new electoral force was increasingly competitive. In addition to the SDS, the ballot now offered the option to vote for candidates of the *Basisgruppen*. With 3219 votes, the *Basisgruppen* became the second largest caucus in the student parliament. Another roughly 1000 votes go went the SDS.[67] Among the candidates for the SDS were also several future leading cadres of the Communist University Group (KHG), which would later be the local student "mass organization" of Freiburg's most prominent Maoist party.

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[65]Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne.*

[66]These questions extended far beyond the local context in Freiburg. On a history of the Cold War politics of student representation, see Uwe Rohwedder, *Kalter Krieg und Hochschulreform: der Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften in der frühen Bundesrepublik (1949-1969)* (Essen: Klartext, 2012).

[67]*AStA Info*, Special Issue, February 3rd, 1969.

Importantly, though, the KHG itself preceded the founding of the Maoist organization by over a year. Founded in 1972, the KHG followed on the footsteps of a local Maoist group that also emerged from the rubble of the SDS and *Basisgruppen*.[68] Only when that other group joined with other groups from around the country to establish a national organization, the KHG Freiburg became the national organization's student cell. In particular because the KHG henceforth campaigned in association with the *Basisgruppen* for student elections, it is easy to assume that the students were merely swept up in the authoritarian enthusiasm of a few student leaders.

But that temptation has to be resisted, because it would obscure the degree to which Maoist organizations, particularly in this early stage, depended on preexisting groups that they had very little power over. Take for example the Red Cell German Studies in Freiburg. The group emerged as a loose association of former members of the *Basisgruppen* organized around different political issues without a "clear political line."[69] However, there was a shared sense that the *Basisgruppe* German Studies had mistakenly believed that students themselves could be the agents of revolution.[70] However, during a weekend seminar of the group, the decision was made to ideologically unify the group. The cell was divided into different subcommittees: the strategy group, the university group, and others. The archive left by the group contains endless reading notes, minutes of weekend seminars discussing texts in the Marxist tradition, but also papers by various other groups that are looking for a return to Marxism-Leninism and working-class politics.[71] Occasionally, the minutes of meetings

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[68]"Erklärung zur Gründung der Kommunistischen Hochschulgruppe," *Kommunistische Hochschulzeitung*, vol. 1, no. 1, November 7th, 1972.

[69]"Entwurf für ein vorläufiges Statut," ASB Freiburg, 5.4.6.III RotZeG 1970, p. 1.

[70]"Zur Entwicklung der RotZeG," ASB Freiburg, 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1971.

[71]"Rotzeg-Go Protokoll der Plenumssitzung vom 25.11." (November 25th, 1970), Archiv für Soziale Bewegungen Freiburg (ASB Freiburg hereafter), 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1970.

contain revisions that explicitly mention critiques voiced by other factions within the cell. The plan was for each subcommittee within the cell to work out a political standpoint. While the strategy group could supply reading lists, they were not to try to affect the standpoint of other committees.[72] Ultimately, each committee was supposed to have a debate about the way forward to develop class consciousness and build a communist party.[73]

The next step for the members of the group was the study of the platforms of various other organizations in different stages of forming national organizations. One of these was the group that emerged with the KHG, another one was a Maoist party that had been founded as early as 1968 and existed in various parts of the country and finally a party that had split from the second party and absorbed many of its local groups.[74] After forming a commission that represented members of all the committees in the cell and the study of these various organizations' materials, the commission met with representatives of the different organizations. Finally, in February 1971, the Red Cell German Studies dissolved with the majority joining the third of the three organizations above.[75] The process wasn't neat or straightforward. On the contrary, it was marred by practical and ideological conflict.

The point here is not that the Maoist organizations of the 1970s were not "authoritarian" or "centralist." They were. But in different parts of the country they inherited different local structures from the student movement, with their own personal dynamics, informal hierarchies, and priorities. In the case of another organization founded in 1973, the Communist League of West Germany (KBW), these structures included a network of left-wing book

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[72]"Protokoll der Strategiegruppe vom 3. November 1970," ASB Freiburg, 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1970.

[73]"Arbeitspapier zum Wochenendseminar 7./8.11." (November 7th-8th, 1970), ASB Freiburg, 5.4.6.III, RotZeg 1970.

[74]See for example "Plenum mit dem BKA vom 17.2.71," ASB Freiburg, 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1971.

[75]"Eine Richtige Entscheidung: Zur Auflösung der Roten Zelle Germanistik Freiburg," ASB Freiburg, 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1971.

stores that had been around since the 1960s. In Freiburg, the left-wing book store libro libre continued to be managed by the same personell. In the fall of 1974, the national organization of the KBW came to the decision to close the book stores it had inherited across the country. The problems were manifold. Not the least of them was that the book stores had accumulated considerable debt. But perhaps more importantly, the organization decided that book stores contained *too many books.* Instead of the "correct" literature, the booksellers had no power over which of the 1000-2000 books people would buy and read! Moreover, the central organization argued that the readers would mostly be intellectuals and not the workers, who understood that "generally, those who write books are not their friends."[76]

Finally, the records of the Red Cell German Studies reveal clues for one of the central questions of this dissertation. In one of the meetings, the notes emphasize that a "foreign comrade" instructed them to omit the names of foreigners from the cell's records. There was considerable anxiety that foreign intelligence services were monitoring political activity of Maoist foreigners and that naming foreign activists had severe repercussions for them. While the record shows neither his name—it merely specifies "foreign comrade D.,"—subsequent records continue to name German members of the group.[77] To be sure, I have no evidence that there was a large number of foreign members in the Red Cell German Studies. But this does indicate that we need to be careful to not take these records at face value.

The global contexts of decolonization and the Sino-Soviet split, the immediate social realities of a multi-ethnic society, the presence of anti-colonial activists and their causes

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[76]"Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschland (KBW) Ständiger Ausschuß, Organisationsabteilung an die Leitungen der Ortsgruppen und Ortsaufbaugruppen," (September 30th, 1974), ASB Freiburg, 5.3.5.II Libro Libre.

[77]"Rotzeg-Go Protokoll der Plenumssitzung vom 25.11." (November 25th, 1970), Archiv für Soziale Bewegungen Freiburg (ASB Freiburg hereafter), 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1970.

in West German universities and the complicated, fluid, and messy relationships between emerging Maoist organizations on the national level and their local and regional cells are the backdrop against which the story that follows unfolds. German Maoism, then, cannot be understood as simply a set of rigid party organizations but has to be grasped as an uncertain phenomenon that entangled many different groups of people, causes, local and national interests and provoked the anxieties of both Cold War German states. The causes, campaigns, and initiatives in the chapters that follow are as particular as causes get. The power of China's challenge to the Soviet leadership in international communism lay in the fact that "Maoism" emerged as a language that united people invested in these different causes in a different kind of universalism.

CHAPTER 3

East Germany: Maoism in the Global Cold War

In September 1983, two members of the West German Communist Party of Germany/Marxist-Leninists (KPD/ML)[1] travelled to Prague to meet two of their East German comrades. The most urgent business was to inform the East Germans of a change in leadership: one of them had heretofore been a member of the *Politbüro* and responsible for the instruction of the party's East German cells. He was now to be succeeded by his travel companion. The reasons for the transition were rooted in the profound crisis the party had found itself in since their last party convention in 1979. This crisis was to a significant extent caused by the KPD/ML's recent change of course: following the Sino-Albanian falling out in 1978, the KPD/ML had dropped its pro-Chinese line. Since then, membership figures had dropped by a quarter and this had had a significant impact on party finances. Now that the KPD/ML could no longer pay the former instructor, he had to dedicate more time to his farm. The

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[1]Maoists didn't make it easy for the Stasi. When I talk about the KPD, I am talking about two parties: in 1968, the KPD/ML was founded. In 1970, the KPD/AO formed. Now, in 1971, the KPD/AO dropped the "/AO" to claim the legacy of the Weimar-era Communist Party. In 1980, this party dissolved and the name "KPD" became available. Henceforth, the KPD/ML used "KPD" as its name. So: before 1980, "KPD" refers to the KPD/AO, after 1980 it refers to the KPD/ML.

two West Germans furthermore explained that the crisis necessitated new alliances with rival groups, including some who would not support active work against the GDR. This is why the party decided to formally detach the "Section GDR" from the West German party and to begin a process of turning the GDR cells into an independent party. Even though the West Germans nominated one of their East German peers to lead the new party, the East Germans showed little enthusiasm for the proposal and wondered whether it would not make more sense to discontinue the organization altogether.[2]

The rest of the meeting, which lasted multiple days, was dedicated to reports on the situation of other Maoist parties in West Germany and the particular details of the West Germans' journey to Prague. Using a forged passport had turned out to be too risky, and they weren't able bring any propaganda materials due to the CSSR's tight border controls. The secrecy of the KPD/ML may at the same time seem puerile and also raises difficulties for the historian. But in this case, the party may not have been secretive enough and the historian is in luck: the two East German comrades proposed for future leadership of the "Section GDR" as an independent party were known to the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) as IMB "Kern" and IM "Kern 2," and not only reported meticulously on their meetings with the West German instructors, but operated "according to instruction"[3] by the Stasi.

West German Maoists have sometimes been contrasted with the explosion of creative energy in the Global Sixties. According to a common story, sometime between the collapse of the so-called "anti-authoritarian phase" of the West German New Left and the mid-

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[2]"Treff der IMB 'Kern' und IM 'Kern II' mit Beauftragten der 'KPD'-Zentrale vom 21.9.83-24.9.83 in Prag," Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (BStU hereafter), MfS, Sekr. Neiber, Nr. 91, p. 258-283.

[3]"Treff der IMB 'Kern' und IM 'Kern II' mit Beauftragten der 'KPD'-Zentrale vom 21.9.83-24.9.83 in Prag," BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber, Nr. 91, p. 265.

1970s some West German Leftists ostensibly lapsed into dogmatism and became obsessed with the Weimar communist party, turning their back on the "global revolt."[4] This chapter tells a different story. Rather than focusing on their supposed dogmatism and insularity, I emphasize the ways in which Maoists became actors in a world of Sino-Soviet competition, of West and East German spy stories, and of Albanian sabotage.[5] I argue that despite their apparent conservatism, these Maoists had their own genuinely global moment and for a few years found themselves involved in the German Cold War, populating and contesting spaces opened by the self-assertion of the People's Republic of China on the world-political stage.

The global contexts of decolonization and the Cold War allow for a re-evaluation of the role of Maoists as part of "the opposition" in East Germany. The historiography on East German opposition has largely ignored the limited and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to build a network of Maoist cells in East Germany.[6] On the one hand, this is understandable: Maoists played no role in the mobilizations of the 1980s leading up to the collapse of state socialism and German unification in 1989.[7] More importantly, historians—after an initial focus on a few high-profile intellectuals—have since complicated the notions of opposition,

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[4]See for example Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*. See also Sven Reichardt, *Authentizität und Gemeinschaft: linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014). For a more nuanced view that emphasizes the shared milieu that both the "undogmatic" and Maoist Left shared, see Detlef Siegfried, "K-Gruppen, Kommunen und Kellerclubs: Sven Reichardt erkundet das westdeutsche Alternativmilieu," *Mittelweg 36*, no. 3 (2014): 99–114.

[5]This argument does not deny that the milieu of West German Maoism was exceptionally fluid. People fluctuated between different factions of the broader postwar Left, shared apartments and shared cultural spaces. See for example the recent biography of Dieter Kunzelmann: Aribert Reimann, *Dieter Kunzelmann: Avantgardist, Protestler, Radikaler* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009).

[6]There are two exceptions to this, both tendentious in different ways: Tobias Wunschik, *Die maoistische KPD/ML und die Zerschlagung ihrer "Sektion DDR" durch das MfS*, ed. BStU, BF Informiert, 18/1997 (Berlin: BStU, 1997); Herbert Polifka, *Die unbekannte Opposition in der DDR* (Gelsenkirchen: KPD/ML Roter Stern, 2005). Wunschik's study is detailed but focusses too narrowly on the KPD/ML. It also takes Stasi information at face value, for example that the KPD/ML was funded by the Albanians. There is indeed no evidence of this. Polifka's piece is a pamphlet written by a former activist who tends to exaggerate the dimensions of the KPD/ML and liberally reproduces Wunschik's prose without attribution.

[7]However, a turn towards anti-GDR activism and Solidarnosc solidarity in the 1980s is part of the post-Maoist rehabilitation narrative of many activists.

dissent, and resistance and emphasized the doubtlessly more representative everyday-life experiences, small-scale non-conformities and "normal" practices of East Germans *despite* rather than with or against socialism.[8] On the other hand, though, the erasure of Maoist "opposition" reveals an ongoing liberal bias of East German historians. Here, Kristin Ross's observation about May '68 in France is once more instructive: Ross had observed that in the public and historical memory of the French 1968, aspects of the movement that could easily be incorporated into the origin story of present-day liberalism obscured those aspects of the movement that were anti-liberal and perhaps violent (Ross counts decolonization struggles and working-class mobilizations among these). In East Germany, intellectual dissenters like Wolf Biermann and Rudolph Bahro were simply much more easily absorbed into narratives that equated "opposition" with West German liberalism or values understood as synonymous with it such as "free speech."

Maoist and Stalinist opposition to the SED regime, in contrast, is much more embarrassing to a narrative of liberal triumphalism than its more liberal counterparts. The KPD/ML's party-building project in the German Democratic Republic is easily dismissed not least because the Maoist mobilizations in West Germany have not been taken seriously as a moment in postwar German history. But by putting the activities of the East German section of the KPD/ML into the context of the global Cold War and, more specifically, Chinese and Albanian activity in East Germany, they can be understood as part of a genuinely global

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[8]For a very limited selection, see Thomas Lindenberger, ed., *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur : Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR* (Köln: Böhlau, 1999); Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, eds., *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); Eli Rubin, *Synthetic Socialism : Plastics & Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Mary Fulbrook and Andrew I. Port, eds., *Becoming East German : Socialist Structures and Sensibilities After Hitler* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013).

moment of disrupting Moscow-centric state socialism from the vantage point of the non-European communist movement.

The West and the "Collapse of World Communism"

It should come as no surprise that in the Cold War West, a major rift in the international socialist movement would come to be seen as an opportunity. One person who saw this opportunity was the later president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Günther Nollau recalled applying for work at the newly forming BfV in 1950 and presenting what he thought was the ideal resumé for an agency focusing on investigating right-wing and communist revolutionary ambitions in West Germany: his experience in navigating difficult political situations as a lawyer in Nazi-occupied Poland, where he claims his work brought him in repeated conflict with the local NSDAP office and the Gestapo, and his work as a lawyer in the East German city of Dresden, where he claimed to have acquired "intimate knowledge" of the circumstances in the "Eastern Zone."[9] Nollau wrote in his autobiography that he opposed the ban of West Germany's communist party, but for largely pragmatic reasons to do with intelligence gathering. Conversations with English and American intelligence officers had led him to believe that the East German support for the KPD meant that the party might be well-equipped to operate in the underground, while the newly formed West German intelligence office might be less well-equipped to keep up surveillance on a party watching its back.[10] Despite the report, the Federal Government proceeded to ask the Federal Constitutional Court — the only institution in the Federal Republic that

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[9]Günther Nollau, *Das Amt: 50 Jahre Zeuge der Geschichte* (München: Goldmann, 1979), p. 142.
[10]Nollau, p. 144.

has the power to ban political parties — to rule the Communist Party unconstitutional. As was to be expected, the KPD continued to operate illegally throughout most of the 1960s with the support of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED). With the KPD forced underground, Nollau sought new ways to weaken the party.

One effort to do this was the paper *Der Dritte Weg*, bankrolled by the BfV and largely staffed with refugees from East Germany. The writing staff, many of whom had been functionaries in the SED state before arriving in West Germany, attracted the attention of the Stasi.[11] The paper's editor, Heinz Lippmann, had survived Auschwitz and fled to the Federal Republic in 1953, where he was sentenced to several months in prison for taking money from the FDJ and bribing a police officer, but evaded years in prison resulting from a trial *in absentia* in the GDR.[12] An acquaintance of Lippmann from the time of *Der Dritte Weg* speculated in his own autobiography that it was likely this time in a West German prison that drove him into the arms of the BfV.[13] There is some disagreement over the editorial authority over the paper: the former president of the BfV, Günther Nollau, suggested in his memoir that the entire undertaking had been the product of the agency, right down to the content. He recalled that "the attacks against Stalinism came to us easily. But to be credible we also had to criticize capitalism and the politics of the Federal Republic."[14] It is difficult to determine how credible Nollau's account of this period is. There is cause for skepticism: Nollau's memoir—published in the 1970s—came at a time when many in West Germany's

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[11]"Betr. Renegatenzentrum 'Der Dritte Weg'" (June 22nd, 1961) BStU, MfS, AS, Nr. 101/77, BStU 000051.

[12]Michael Herms, *Heinz Lippmann: Porträt Eines Stellvertreters* (Berlin: Dietz, 1996), p. 182-187; Hermann Weber and Gerda Weber, *Leben nach dem "Prinzip links": Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten* (Berlin: Links, 2006), p. 205-206.

[13]Weber and Weber, p. 205.

[14]Nollau, *Das Amt*, p. 227.

conservative establishment turned to China because China's hostility to the Soviet Union appeared to provide an opening against Social Democratic *Ostpolitik*.[15] In other words, on the heels of his retirement, one can understand why Nollau might have felt the temptation to portray himself as a pioneer of this strategy. In any case, Hermann Weber, a former contributor to the paper, remembered the distribution of editorial power differently. To him, the paper had grown out of the desire of many communists after 1956 to find a third way beyond Stalinism and capitalism, a socialism with strong democratic commitments.[16] But there are also some good reasons to think that Nollau indeed felt that China provided an opening for anti-Soviet strategy. While Weber has called into question the idea that Nollau had any editorial control over the paper, one of the informants the Stasi had managed to place in Lippmann's immediate circle reported on the constraints that Nollau's demands put on Lippmann's direction of the paper.[17]

That the Stasi had not one but multiple informants within the context of *Der Dritte Weg* shows just how much of an ideological threat the GDR thought the paper to be. Ironically, at least two of the Stasi informants were simultaneously informants for the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* and diligently reported their interaction with the agency to the East Germans.[18] After initially suspecting the paper to be funded by the "Ostbüro" of the Social Democratic Party, by October 1960 the Stasi had determined that the funding came instead

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[15] Among them were personalities such as Franz Josef Strauß and Baden-Württemberg's head of state Hans Filbinger—himself the plaintiff in over 100 libel cases against the Communist League of West Germany (KBW). See Frank Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979: Als die Welt von heute begann* (München: C.H. Beck, 2019). Of course, their China journeys had a precedent in Richard Nixon's visit to the PRC in 1972.

[16] Weber and Weber, *Leben nach dem "Prinzip links"*, p. 201-202.

[17] Weber and Weber, p. 208. See also for example "Auszug aus Nr. 399 vom 11.3.63 Forts. von 395 'Kurt'" (5.4.1963), BStU, MfS, AS Nr. 143/72 Bd. 1, p. 55.

[18] "Ergänzung zum Bericht 349 — SPD Parteitag in Köln" (July 1962), BStU, MfS, AS 143/72, Band 2, p. 000050.

from the BfV.[19] Nollau suspected this to have gone unnoticed until December 1961. In 1961, the Stasi was developing plans of their own to sabotage the paper. One proposal suggests turning the West German postal service against the paper by producing 500-1000 issues of the paper and mailing them without postmark or return address to an address in Cologne.[20] Another proposal was to produce approximately 30 sheets of paper with the letterhead of the paper, and to send letters with "discriminatory content" to Social Democratic and conservative members of West Germany's *Bundestag* with the intention that they take legal action against the paper.[21]

It is conceivable that there was some tension between the intentions of the BfV and the editorial collective. According to Lippmann's biographer, Heinz Lippmann sought to help create an anti-Stalinist opposition within the SED. The name *Der Dritte Weg* itself was inspired by recent events in Yugoslavia and the determination to find a more democratic socialism.[22] Nollau, on the other hand, wanted to sabotage the SED without such commitments (hence, according to his own recollections, his relative difficulties in dreaming up content critical of the West).[23] It is not inconceivable either, that the monetary relationship with the BfV and the different objectives created some difficulties between the agency and Lippmann. The Stasi reports on *Der Dritte Weg* note that the agency was increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of Lippmann's work because much of what he wrote seemed to merely serve to fulfill quotas. By 1963, the agency reportedly asked Lippmann to find new

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[19]"HA V/2/II, Berlin" (October 22nd, 1960), BStU, MfS, AS, Nr. 101/77, p. 47.

[20]"Vorschlag Betr.: Renegatenzentrum 'Der Dritte Weg'" (February 8th, 1961), BStU, MfS, AS, Nr. 101/77, p. 000321.

[21]"Vorschlag Betr.: Renegatenzentrum 'Der Dritte Weg'" (February 21st, 1961), BStU, MfS, AS, Nr. 101/77, p. 000322.

[22]Weber and Weber, p. 201-204; Herms, *Heinz Lippmann*, p. 212-214.

[23]Nollau, *Das Amt*, p. 227.

work over the course of the following two years.[24] By the end of 1964, the paper *Der Dritte Weg* had run its course.

Lippmann reportedly had some misgivings about the end of the project, at the same time as he realized that anti-Stalinist opposition in the GDR had failed to form.[25] The priorities of the BfV began to shift towards a new project. According to the Stasi, Nollau directed Lippmann to foreground the differences between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties in the paper. The Stasi employed typesetting analysis to determine that Chinese brochures were likely produced in the Federal Republic, and informants revealed that the agency had asked the editors of the paper *Der Dritte Weg* to order anti-Soviet propaganda material in Beijing. Moreover, subscription cards for Chinese propaganda materials were reproduced at the printing press that was also producing *Der Dritte Weg* and sent to members of the illegal West German KPD. This was meant have two effects: a "Chinese" faction could grow within the West German KPD and divide the party or to at least to create the impression that there was such a faction to weaken the illegal work of the party. Finally, Chinese brochures were sent to East Germany, sometimes with a Chinese return address to give the impression the PRC was behind the propaganda.[26]

This is not without irony. Although we don't know to what extent Lippmann was still involved with these operations, the agency's objective to weaken the communist movement had now outweighed any anti-Stalinist ambitions of the East German writers. After all, it was not least about the "Stalin question" that the Sino-Soviet split developed. And there

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[24]See "Auszug aus Nr. 399 vom 11.3.63 Forts. vom 395 'Kurt'," (March 11th, 1963), BStU, MfS, AS 143/72 Bd. 1, p. 000055.

[25]Herms, *Heinz Lippmann*, p. 254-257; Weber and Weber, *Leben nach dem "Prinzip links"*, p. 210.

[26]"Einschätzung des Umfangs und der Wirkungsweise des Einflußes der dogmatischen und antimarxistischen Theorien der VR China." (November 15th, 1963), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 17563, p. 0157-0158.

is another irony: when engaging with Maoist activists in the 1970s, it was not uncommon for the SED and the Stasi to claim that the United States, West Germany, and China were one enemy or at least that "the West" was behind Maoism. Although this turned out to be false in the late 1960s, when a "Chinese faction" within the illegal KPD developed independently of the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, and Maoist parties formed out of the student movement and extra-parliamentary opposition, the West German agency did indeed have a history of exploiting the Sino-Soviet split.[27] However, as the next chapter will show, by that time the West German state undertook several efforts to petition the Federal Constitutional Court to declare West Germany's Maoist parties illegal.

Maoism, then, was from the beginning not only tied to Sino-Soviet competition, but also to the GDR's increasing anxiety over West German intervention in East German affairs. This, it turns out, is true even on a personal level. *Der Dritte Weg* appeared just on the heels of a leadership change at the Stasi that brought with it a new focus on alleged West German psychological warfare. After Erich Mielke succeeded his former superior Ernst Wollweber as Minister for State Security, the Stasi became increasingly focused on what they called 'political-ideological diversion.' Political-ideological diversion became the umbrella term for new methods employed by the enemy and first occured in Stasi documents in 1958. It was defined as methods the West employed to cause disintegration[28] within the SED and to weaken the centrality of the party to the GDR and the of Soviet Union to the socialist world.[29] Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the office of the Minister for State Security,

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[27] Of course, West German intelligence services were not alone in doing so. See for example Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, p. 6.

[28] I have settled on this translation for "Zersetzung."

[29] See Roger Engelmann and Silke Schumann, "Der Ausbau des Überwachungsstaates: Der Konflikt Ulbricht-Wollweber und die Neuausrichtung des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der DDR 1957," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 43, no. 2 (1995): 341–78, p. 354 esp. note 79.

when hearing that the people producing *Der Dritte Weg* were also acquiring and reproducing propaganda materials from the PRC, identified the paper as a center of political-ideological diversion.[30]

But there is another way in which *Der Dritte Weg* was remarkable to the Stasi and that has to do with the people producing it themselves. As I mentioned earlier, several of the contributors of the paper had been sentenced to jail in East Germany in connection with the so-called Harich affair. Wolfgang Harich had been the chief editor at an East German publisher who was arrested and sentenced to prison for the "conspiracy and the founding of a group hostile to the state" in 1957.[31] The Minister for State Security had been sick during this affair, and his first deputy Erich Mielke seized the opportunity to go above his head and report directly to the First Secretary of the SED, Walter Ulbricht. This came at a time when Ulbricht was increasingly suspicious of Wollweber's dedication to lead the Stasi and relatedly, that the vigilance of the Stasi with respect to enemy agencies had waned.[32] Ultimately, Mielke succeeded Wollweber as the head of the Stasi. When Mielke came across *Der Dritte Weg*, the fact that his earlier encounter with its contributors was an important moment in his ascent to the top of the Stasi may well have raised the stakes for the Stasi's response.

Perhaps this explains why the relatively minor operation of *Der Dritte Weg* got so much attention from the Stasi, all the way up to Erich Mielke demanding regular updates to

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[30]"Einschätzung des Umfangs und der Wirkungsweise des Einflußes der dogmatischen und antimarxistischen Theorien der VR China." (November 15th, 1963), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 17563, p. 0157-0158. See also the entry on "Politisch-Ideologische Diversion" in Siegfried Suckut, *Das Wörterbuch der Staatssicherheit: Definitionen zur politisch-operativen Arbeit* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1996).

[31]Engelmann and Schumann, "Der Ausbau des Überwachungsstaates," p. 342; Wolfgang Harich, *Keine Schwierigkeiten mit der Wahrheit: zur nationalkommunistischen Opposition 1956 in der DDR* (Berlin: Dietz, 1993); Herms, *Heinz Lippmann*, p. 206-207.

[32]Engelmann and Schumann, "Der Ausbau des Überwachungsstaates," p. 346.

his office. The paradigm of vigilance against "political-ideological diversion" became path-determining for the work of the Stasi. Of course one shouldn't overstate the extent to which this was rooted in actual operations of the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* even though, as I have argued above, it is true that Western security services sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict.[33] Andreas Glaeser has suggested the term "syllogism by analogy" to understand the doctrine of "political ideological diversion." To Glaeser, the theory of political-ideological diversion was based on the assumption that the capitalist countries were operating identically to the way socialist countries sought to operate. This does not mean that Western intelligence was not actively pursuing opposition in the GDR. But the Stasi fantasized about a monolithic conspiracy ranging from West German and American police and intelligence services, to peace activists to opposition figures in the GDR. That foreign Stasi operatives knew that Western intelligence services hardly had that kind of reach did little to disturb this fantasy structuring Stasi work. As Glaeser argues, this fantasy obscured the autonomy of East German opposition.[34] Nonetheless, the relatively small and unimportant project of *Der Dritte Weg* surely looked a lot like political ideological diversion: a paper, bankrolled and organized by the BfV exploiting rifts in global communism with the express goal of creating opposition within the SED.

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[33]It is probably an overstatement that West German intelligence services "spread Maoism," as the title of Mascha Jacoby's excellent article on the subject misleadingly suggests. Nonetheless, Jacoby is correct that about the intentions of the agency. Mascha Jacoby, "Frei Haus: Wie der Verfassungsschutz Anfang der Sechzigerjahre den Maoismus verbreitete," in *Ein kleines rotes Buch: die "Mao-Bibel" und die Bücher-Revolution der Sechzigerjahre*, ed. Anke Jaspers, Claudia Michalski, and Morten Paul (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2018), 117–30.

[34]Andreas Glaeser, *Political Epistemics: The Secret Police, the Opposition, and the End of East German Socialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 484-486.

"Quarrels" in East Germany

Stasi anxieties about Maoism, however, were not merely a reflection of East-West tensions, of course. Quinn Slobodian has documented what he called China's and East Germany's fight "over the right to interpret the truth of socialism."[35] The centrality of defeating Maoism to East German security led Slobodian to argue that the historiography of East Germany should pay closer attention to the Maoist challenge: "Histories of the 1960s have been focused overwhelmingly on the ways that the GDR defended itself from the West German and American alternatives, that is, challenges from its ideological right. In the Chinese, we see the potential of East Germans being outflanked from the left."[36] He shows that the struggle against Maoism was — from early on — linked to anxieties over race and foreign students in the GDR. For example, he cites one party member calling for a united Europe against the "yellow peril" and details the story of Alberto Miguel Carmo, who in the early 1970s hosted discussions of Mao's thought in East Berlin before being the target of a Stasi operation leading to the dissolution of the group.[37]

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[35]Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015, p. 2.

[36]Slobodian, p. 24; while I agree with Slobodian's call to attention of the Sino-Soviet's split's importance to East German security politics and indeed the challenge the Chinese post over the definition of socialism, I am not sure by his easy adoption of the Chinese challenge as a "left-wing" challenge. Certainly, the Maoists understood the Chinese challenge as anti-revisionist, preserving the true revolutionary legacy of Marx, Lenin and Stalin and the Stasi — like the BfV — classified Maoism as a form of (albeit anti-socialist or pseudo-revolutionary) left-wing extremism. See for example the 102-page report "Auskunftsbericht zu linksextrem-istischen und trotzkistischen Organisationen, Gruppen und Kräften und ihre gegen die DDR gerichteten Aktivitäten," BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 8104 & 8105. However, the conflation of political-ideological diversion from the West and Maoism as well as the varying interpretations of the Chinese line by Maoist activists in Cold War Germany which ranged at times from anti-authoritarianism to a ally with German nationalists against the Soviet Union renders the easy classification of left- and right-wing challenges implausible. for a sophisticated discussion of the difficulties of classifying postwar protest movements as left-wing and right-wing, see Belinda Davis, "What's Left? Popular Political Participation in Postwar Europe," *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 363–90.

[37]Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015, p. 15, 22.

Foreign students were a cause of anxiety for the Stasi from the very beginning of the Sino-Soviet Split. At the East German Trade Union Federation's (FDGB) university in Bernau near Berlin, teachers and administrators increasingly complained about the Chinese influence on students.[38] Particularly telling was a report on internships African and Asian students at the school absolved in different firms in Leipzig. The students were meant to study the organization of the leadership, the participation of workers in the life of the firm, and the tasks and nature of union liasones as well as gain practical knowledge of leadership.[39] Although the report claimed the internships were a huge success and happened "entirely in accordance with the VI. annual congress of the SED," it lists several political and ideological problems that surfaced in discussions. After a list of questions that were meant to signal African students' insufficient understanding of the apparatuses of the SED and the GDR state in general, the most important of these was students persisting rejection of the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence." Students complained that the USSR did not support China during the Indo-Chinese border conflict of 1962, but most of all demonstrated dissatisfaction that the USSR propagates "peaceful coexistence" with the West at exactly the moment where African countries fight for decolonization. As one student put it, "whoever speaks of peaceful coexistence says at the same time that the fight of Goa, Congo, Central Africa, and Algeria is wrong."[40]

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[38]I am grateful to George Bodie, PhD Candidate at the Socialism Goes Global project at Exeter University for drawing my attention to these files. For a much more detailed study of the "Institute for Foreign Students" at the FDGB's university in Bernau, see Bodie's forthcoming dissertation.

[39]"Information über den praktischen Einsatz der Afrikanischen und Asiatischen Studenten der FDGP-Hochschule 'Fritz Heckert' Bernau in Leipzig vom 12.1. bis 25.1.1963," Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Berlin (SAPMO-Barch hereafter), DY 79/2500.

[40]Ibid., p. 4.

The secretary of the African Union in the GDR—a student at the Karl-Marx University in Leipzig—tried to explain these views. In 1960/61, Patrice Lumumba asked the world for support, but the socialist countries only spoke out at the UN—an imperialist institution after all. Had the socialist world taken real measures, Lumumba might not have been murdered, the progressives in Congo might not have suffered defeat. Ultimately, these arguments persuaded students to sympathize with China, who they claimed had been unjustly dubbed a warmonger in East Germany.[41] Interestingly, the report understands this as a failure of education, even though the teachers had done everything in their power to answer all the questions correctly. The foreign students, so the report, were simply dissatisfied with all possible answers.

These were not isolated events. Throughout the early-to-mid 1960s, teachers at the university complained about Chinese influence on students. In a 1964 letter from the FDGB Department for International Connections to the university's "Institute for Foreign Students," the FDGB informed the teachers that all ten students from South East Asia that had been accepted will attend the union school. However, the letter urged the school to send the teacher responsible for this class to the Asia Division at the FDGB for a few months before the class would begin because the politics of the Chinese have found fertile ground in South East Asia as well.[42]

At the same time as complaints surfaced about Chinese influence on students, the Stasi's attention was largely directed at the embassies of the PRC and the People's Republic of Albania in East Berlin. At a time when as the Stasi worried about the ways Chinese pro-

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[41]Ibid., p. 5.

[42]"Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund -Bundesvorstand - Abt. Internationale Verbindungen to Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften 'Fritz Heckert', Institut für Ausländerstudium" (May 22nd, 1964), SAPMO-Barch, DY 79/405.

paganda was being used by the West German security services, a "secret employee" of the Stasi was having regular conversations with high-ranking officials at the Chinese embassy and meticulously reported on their attempts to modify his views and become a "better Marxist-Leninist" while maintaining his cultural work in the SED: among the fundamental tests laid out by the Chinese for a good Marxist-Leninists were

> one's attitude towards the Stalin question. Whoever agreed with the treatment of the Stalin question as it happened at the XXII. Congress, failed the test. He [the employee at the embassy] also stressed the great accomplishments of Stalin, the explosion of the socialist camp at the XXII. congress etc., as he had already done at our last conversation and during the last visit in Berlin.[43]

Other fundamental tests include the Chinese-Indian border conflict, one's attitude over Yugoslavia, and last but not least, whether or not one agreed with the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Over the course of the 1960s, the Chinese attempts at gathering support through their East German embassy dramatically increased.

From the early 1960s on, the Stasi tracked Chinese and Albanian propaganda back to the respective embassies and began to worry about the attitudes of Vietnamese students in East Germany.[44] Slobodian has documented the enthusiasm for Mao's ideas among students from the Global South in the GDR.[45] By 1966, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese embassy began criticizing the SED regime more openly.[46] In the following years, regular reports by the Stasi's *Hauptabteilung XX* — responsible for the areas of culture, churches, and underground activity — indicate increasing attempts by "Springer"

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[43]"Ministerium für Staatssicherheit Bezirksverwaltung Magdeburg an die Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Genossen Minister, Generaloberst Mielke" (December 12th, 1962), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 17469, p. 7.

[44]See "Information Nr. 57/63" (1963) and "Hinweise über das Verhalten vietnamesischer Studenten zu den chinesischen Fragen" (Magdeburg, 5. März 1963), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 17564, p. 147-149, 173-182.

[45]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 14.

[46]Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015, p. 15.

and "Lakai" (respectively the codenames for the Chinese and Albanian embassies) to reach out to East Germans and kindred souls in West Berlin. One report in Fall 1967 alerted Stasi officials to a dramatic increase of disintegrative measures. During the covered time period, 686 youth attended events at the Chinese embassy and were equipped with "[disintegrative] literature."[47] The report also explains that for the first time, the embassy held a film screening for people from West Berlin and West Germany that was advertised by prominent members of the West Berlin Left.[48] Moreover, the National Day Celebrations on October 1st were the site of several events that exceeded anything of the kind that had come before. Observers reported that the Chinese were stepping up their efforts to influence guests ideologially and gather information. The GDR, the SED, and in particular "comrade Honecker" were denounced. Finally, for the first time, the HA XX found indications that the Albanian embassy undertook their own efforts to influence citizens of the GDR.[49] By 1968, carefully kept records on people from West Berlin and West Germany who visited the Chinese embassy show many prominent members of the West Berlin Left, including several future high-ranking cadres of the not-yet-existing KPD/AO.[50]

Simultaneously, the Stasi was monitoring the early beginnings of Maoist party-building in West Germany, both among West Germans and foreigners currently residing there. In particular, the Stasi was interested in international connections. Two of the earliest explicitly Maoist parties in West Germany were the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) and the Free Socialist Party/Marxists-Leninists (FSP/ML), both of which were quickly on the

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[47]"Hauptabteilung XX/2, Berichterstattung für den Zeitraum vom 1.10 - 15.11.1967", BStU, MfS, HA XX 11054, p. 8-13.

[48]Ibid., p. 8.

[49]Ibid., p. 9.

[50]"Aufstellung der Personen aus der PK - West -, die mehr als 1x die Botschaft der VR China in der DDR aufsuchten" (January 8th, 1969), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 6226 Teil 3/3, p. 587.

radar of *Hauptabteilung II*. Both quickly reached out to the Albanian Party of Labor.[51] Erich Reimann, who founded the MLPD[52] in 1965, had visited Albania the year before. In a letter to the central committee of the PPSh sent from the coastal town of Durres, Reimann thanks the party for their hospitality and praises the unity of party, people, and army as well as the exposure of "revisionist lies" at the Lenin-Stalin museum.[53] When the FSP/ML was founded in 1967, their first secretary Günther Ackermann, later a member of the central committee of the KPD/ML (by the 1970s the official partner party of the PPSh in West Germany) was quick to inform the Albanians and ask for propaganda material.[54] The circumstance that communication between West German Maoists and the Albanian Party of Labor happened largely through Albania's embassies (in East Berlin, in Vienna, and sometimes in Paris), made it relatively easy for the Stasi to observe.

Up to 1969, West-German Maoists do not figure prominently in the efforts by Chinese and Albanian embassy employees to influence people in the GDR. But in 1969, the Stasi registered that the "object Springer" was taking an active interest in supporting the "sectarian ambitions" of parties and organizations in West Germany and West Berlin. Although

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[51]"Sachstandsbericht," BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 18382, p. 19-29.

[52]There continue to be some rumors that Erich Reimann and the MLPD were creations of the BfV. These rumours are partially inspired by Günther Nollau's admission of BfV's *Dritter Weg* project and likely emboldened by stories about a Dutch intelligence asset leading a Maoist party in the Netherlands. See "In from the Cold: He was a Communist for Dutch Intelligence," *Wallstreet Journal,* December 3rd, 2014. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the BfV had anything to do with the founding of this party. More importantly, it is irrelevant. The point of this chapter is that whether or not the BfV was involved in creating Maoist groups (and as this chapter shows, it certainly was interested in exploiting Maoism), their activities and Maoist politics were sometimes aligned through the global contexts of the Cold War. This, to my mind, is far more interesting than any fantasy of activists as dupes of intelligence agencies. Those fantasies, in any case, tend to drastically overestimate the resources, the investment, and the competence of intelligence.

[53]"Erich Reimann an das ZK der PAA" (August 1st, 1964), Fondi (f.) 14, Viti (v.) 1964, Lista (l.) 1, Dosja (d.) 1, p. 12, Arkivi Qnedror I Partisë.

[54]"Letter from Günther Ackermann, First Secretary of the FSP/ML to the State Publishing House Naim Frasheri" (August 21st, 1967) and "Letter from Günther Ackermann, First Secretary of the FSP/ML to the Albanian Party of Labor" (undated), Arkivi Qendror I Partisë, Fondi (f.) 14, Viti (v.) 1967, Lista (l.) 4, Dosja (d.) 1, p.2.

the report of the HA XX did not deem these parties a real threat in the sense that they would grow into mass organizations, they did worry about the effect these parties could have on the SED's "brother party" in West Germany, the *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (DKP) founded in 1968 as a successor to the illegal KPD.[55] Attached to the report was an intercepted letter by someone claiming to be a member of the DKP's municipal committee in Wiesbaden asking the Chinese embassy for material that could help the struggle against the "revisionist course" of the party.[56] Also attached was a letter from Ernst Aust—the head of the KPD/ML—sending the embassy instructions on how to subscribe to their party newspaper *Roter Morgen.*[57]

Maoists in East Germany

From its founding in 1968, the KPD/ML broke with the 1960s student movement on questions of German nationalism and German unification. The student movement had a complicated relationship with these questions in the 1960s. First there was the shadow that national socialism had cast on national identification. Many on the Left did not trust any form of national identification and sought alternative modes of identification in the postwar period.[58]

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[55]This slightly complicated. Since the KPD had been outlawed in 1956 it was important *legally* that the DKP did not appear as a mere change-in-name. Nevertheless, there was little doubt that the DKP was understood by its members as well as by its patrons in East Germany as the legitimate successor of the KPD in West Germany.

[56]"Einschätzung der Maoistischen Wühl und Zersetzungstätigkeit gegen die DDR und die SED im Zeitraum vom 1.1.1968-10.5.1969," (May 15th, 1969), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 13367, p. 105.

[57]"Letter Ernst Aust to the Chinese Embassy" (April 1st, 1969), BStU, MfS, HA XX, Nr. 13367, p. 106-107.

[58]Jennifer Ruth Hosek, ""Subaltern Nationalism" and the West Berlin Anti-Authoritarians," *German Politics and Society; New York* 26, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 57–81, 146–47, p. 59. On a nuanced discussion of the 1960s Left and the "nationalism question" see Tilman Fichter and Siegward Lönnendonker, *Dutschkes Deutschland: der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund, die nationale Frage und die DDR-Kritik von links: eine deutschlandpolitische Streitschrift mit Dokumenten von Michael Mauke bis Rudi Dutschke* (Essen: Klartext, 2011).

Another reason to not make unification a major political goal was certainly that the non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic remained a major policy objective of the federal government, and students had been inundated with propaganda against the SED regime throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[59] On the other hand, as Jennifer Hosek has pointed out, downplaying the role of nationalism in Rudi Dutschke's thought has also marginalized the contributions by the Global South to the West German New Left: in conceiving of West Berlin as a case for national liberation, Dutschke was importing revolutionary—or as Hosek calls it, subaltern—nationalism from the Global South as an alternative to what she calls (with Hart and Negri) bourgeois nationalism.[60] Nonetheless, it is true that for the anti-authoritarian SDS, German unification never became a major campaign issue before its collapse in the late 1970s.

This was a different story for the KPD/ML. In 1967, a newspaper emerged within the illegal Communist Party decrying Soviet "revisionism," postulating an alliance between the two "superpowers" USA and USSR, and championing the accomplishments of Mao Zedong. Throughout the first few issues of *Roter Morgen* [Red Dawn], the GDR played a subordinate role. The majority of articles focused on the relationships between China, the USSR, and

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[59]In fact, the SDS demanded the recognition of the GDR by the mid-1960s despite its goal to achieve a socialist unified Germany. Hosek, ""Subaltern Nationalism" and the West Berlin Anti-Authoritarians," p. 65.

[60]Hosek. Whether one shares Hosek's critique doubtlessly also depends on how one understands the nature of Dutschke's import of these ideas. After all, historians might be hesitant to "blame" Dutschke's nationalism on the Global South if they judge it to be a fairly opportunist attempt to recover national pride by articulating it through the likes of Che, Fanon, and Amilcar Cabral. Here I disagree with Quinn Slobodian's reading of Habermas. Slobodian has argued that Habermas accused the New Left of abandoning the European tradition by preferring Fanon over Sorel. However, the argument of Habermas's intervention is that Fanon's theory of violence bears eerie resemblance to Sorel's cult of violence. See Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 9. For Habermas's position see Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). For a contemporary critique in a similar vein, see Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcount, Brace & World, 1970). For a recent discussion of Sorelian violence and the Left, see Postone, "History and Helplessness.".

"US imperialism" and the failure of the West German Communist Party and the Socialist Unity Party West Berlin to play a part in the student movement. Decrying the Communist Party's intolerance towards dissenting views—particularly those that criticize the SED and CPSU—one article goes on to ask

> "Comrades, are you not ashamed?" one wants to occasionally say today to those who "made peace with the world," those who sit in front of the TV night after night on their fat butt, those who left it to the students to march for Vietnam. Then they complain that the class consciousness of the West German working class has declined. But what do they do to elevate it? Was it them who led the outstanding strike of Hanomag[61] workers in Hanover? Were they present when the murder shots were fired at Benno Ohnesorg? — on the contrary, the SED West Berlin had "ordered" the comrades to not support the Anti-Shah demonstration. Was it them, who attempted to pull down the Wissman statue[62] in front of Hamburg University to start a debate about colonialism? It wasn't them.[63]

The next issue contained an article called "In the wrong party" by the future KPD/ML's leader Ernst Aust reporting harassment of the editorial staff of *Roter Morgen*. Phone calls to the office threatened Mr. Aust with violence and reportedly contained anti-Chinese racial abuse by those outraged at the slander against the Soviet leadership published in the newspaper.[64] However, differences with the KPD, of which Aust was still a member, did not yet concern the question of German unification.

However, when the paper announced the decision to found the KPD/ML by the groups *Roter Morgen*, Free Socialist Party Marxists/Leninists (FSP/ML), and the Revolutionary Communists North-Rhine/Westphalia on April 27th, 1968, it did so under the title "Forwards

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[61]See for example Peter Birke, *Wilde Streiks im Wirtschaftswunder: Arbeitskämpfe, Gewerkschaften und soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik und Dänemark* (Frankfurt & New York: Campus Verlag, 2007).

[62]This refers to students tearing down the statue for colonial governor Hermann Wissman in front of Hamburg University. See Gordon Uhlmann, "Das Hamburger Wissmann-Denkmal: Von der kolonialen Weihestätte zum postkolonialen Debatten-Denkmal," in *Kolonialismus hierzulande: ein Spurensuche in Deutschland*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden and Joachim Zeller (Erfurt: Sutton, 2008).

[63]"An einen Bonzen," in *Roter Morgen* Vol. 1, Nr. 3/4, September/October 1967, p. 8-9.

[64]Ernst Aust, "In der Falschen Partei," in *Roter Morgen* Vol. 1, December 1967, p. 8.

on the way to a unified, socialist, Germany!"[65] Only a few months later, the paper called for "workers, farmers and students" to "unite" because the "enemy [was] standing inside [our] country." In a programmatic article composed and voted on by the preliminary leadership of the KPD/ML, they wrote that both the West German monopoly bourgeoisie and the East German rulers "[were] betraying the social and *national* interest of the German people [my emphasis]." The article reminded readers that the time for liberation from colonialism was now, as shown by the struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It concluded by calling for a People's Republic of Germany in alliance with the peoples of China, Albania, and revolutionaries of all countries.[66] Although the SDS itself aspired to a unified socialist Germany, the KPD/ML from the beginning elevated that demand to *the* central demand of their program. The title of the article itself signals the influence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles on the party: "The enemy is standing within the land" is a play on—and inversion of—Karl Liebknecht's famous May 1915 pamphlet "the enemy is standing in [one's] *own* country." Liebknecht's pamphlet was directed against those on the German Left who had let themselves be seduced by militarism and world war and ultimately sided with German imperialism. The KPD/ML's inversion identifies imperialism and the class enemy with foreign occupation powers. The official founding declaration of the KPD/ML articulated this sentiment even more clearly: they call the national situation in Germany "an exact mirror image" of the current global situation. West Germany, part of the sphere of influence of US imperialism, the declaration argued, was increasing "state terror" against the people. Growing profits were not matched by wage increases for workers, and the trade unions

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[65]"Vorwärts auf dem Weg zu einem einigen sozialistischen Deutschland," in *Roter Morgen* Vol. 2, May 1968.

[66]"Arbeiter, Bauern, Studenten Vereinigt Euch. Der Feind Steht im Land," in *Roter Morgen* October/November 1968, p. 1-5.

were collaborators in increasing the bourgeoisie's rising profits. In East Germany, the SED failed to eliminate the bourgeoisie and suppressed class struggle. In place of revolutionary leadership the SED developed bureaucracy and bourgeois intellectualism. The KPD/ML accused both countries of betraying the "national interests" of the West German working class.[67] If the SDS's contradictory negotiation of revolutionary nationalism and hesitation over West German patriotism led to muted articulations of a narrative that understood Germany as foreign-occupied, the KPD/ML's ostensible turn to Marxism completed the impact of revolutionary nationalism on the West German postwar Left. Nevertheless, despite the strong emphasis on rejecting East German state socialism as revisionist and a symptom of Soviet "social imperialism," the KPD/ML remained a product of the West German postwar Left without any ambitions for agitating within the GDR.

From the Stasi's point of view, it was this triangle of connections between rebellious East Germans, China/Albania, and West German Maoists that made West German Maoism an exceedingly pressing concern for the East German security apparatus. Wunschik's study of the Stasi's response to the KPD/ML's efforts in East Germany correctly identifies them as singularly daring. But as I have shown above, the Stasi was aware of the earliest Maoist party formations in the Federal Republic because they quickly entered the stage of the Sino-Soviet split through the social and political life of the Albanian embassy. In the 1970s, Maoism played an increasingly important role within the Stasi's information gathering about the Left in West Germany. A 1973 report on the strategies and methods of right- and left-wing extremists composed by the Stasi's Central Analysis and Information Group (ZAIG)

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[67]"Erklärung zur Gründung der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands/Marxisten-Leninisten (KPD/ML)," in *Roter Morgen* Vol. 3, December 1968/January 1969, pp 1-4.

evaluated forms of protest, violence, and psychological warfare employed by the far Left in recent years. The introduction pointed out that the Left takes its methods overwhelmingly from the concepts of Brazilian urban guerrillas but that the theoretical imperatives of Maoism played an increasing role "particularly in questions of war and violence."[68] And although the report covered the far Left more broadly and presented a broad spectrum of practices such as demonstrations, trespassing, assault, building occupations, attacks against insitutions and persons, kidnapping, prison-breaks, letter bombs and poison, and psychological warfare, the only group that was explicitly named in the contents of the report was the West Berlin-based Maoist Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Their occupation of the town hall in West Germany's capital Bonn earned them their own case study in the report.[69] A list of demonstrations held by the far Left almost exclusively listed protests organized by Maoist parties. With respect to Maoist demonstrations, the report noted that they exhibit an extraordinary level of discipline and organization:

> Every bloc of the demonstration of the Maoist "KPD/Marxists-Leninists" on the "red day of attack" on September 2nd, 1972 in Munich was divided into "front, wing, and rear guards." "Bloc leaders" were marked by blue, "troop leaders" by red armbands.[70]

This does not mean that everything outlined in the report was attributed to Maoists. Left-wing terrorism figured prominently in the report. However, it figured only in the abstract, while Maoist organizations and their activities were named explicitly.[71] The transnational dimension of Maoism wasn't lost on the Stasi either: the report interpreted a 10,000 people march in Dortmund against the so-called foreigner laws [Ausländergesetze] as a collaboration

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[68]Zentrale Auswertungs und Informationsgruppe (ZAIG), "Übersicht über Kampfformen, Mittel und Methoden links- und rechtsextremistischer Kräfte" (July 20th, 1973), BStU, MfS, HA IX, Nr. 4705, p. 2.

[69]Ibid., p. 8-10.

[70]Ibid., p. 13.

[71]The entire report mentions the Baader-Meinhof group only once. Ibid., p. 5.

of foreign organizations and West German Maoist parties.[72] Indeed, the KPD/ML's *Roter Morgen* had called for "organizing the common struggle hand in hand with our foreign class comrades and progressive foreign students and intellectuals" and attend the march in Dortmund.[73]

At this point, the urgent question about what one can really make of reports like the above-mentioned Stasi report is bound to interrupt the narrative of this chapter. Let me clarify the most important point at the outset: although the leaders of West German Maoist parties would likely have delighted at the impression conveyed by the report that *they* in effect *are* the West German Left of the 1970s, that is not what is at stake here. In fact, although it is one of the central arguments of this dissertation that the significance of Maoism in the context of the global Cold War and decolonization has been largely overlooked in the historiography of the New Left, historians of the postwar Left have done an excellent job of showing the pluralism and creativity of the 1970s Left beyond Maoism, for example with reference to those currents of the 1970s Left largely inspired by the Italian *Operaismo*.[74] Rather, what is significant about this report is that the Stasi reads all of far Left politics in the federal republic through the lens of the GDR's contending with the Sino-Soviet split. They employ the term Maoism in the broadest possible sense:

> The forces of the extreme Left take their forms of struggle, means, and methods to a large part from the tactical principles and experiences of Brazilian urban guerrillas or at least base their activities on these [lehnen sich an diese an]. The

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[72]Ibid., p. 10. Note here again the distinction between "Maoists" and foreigners.

[73]"8. Oktober: Sternmarsch nach Dortmund gegen das Reaktionäre Ausländergesetz," in *Roter Morgen* Nr. 19, September 25th, 1972, p. 11.

[74]Most importantly, see Sven Reichardt's study of the so-called alternative milieu. See Reichardt, *Authentizität und Gemeinschaft*. Reichardt's study is problematic in so far as it isolates this milieu from the Maoist milieu although in actuality there was plenty of crossover, shared personell, shared cultural and living spaces, and so on. For a critique of Reichardt's study along those lines see Siegfried, "K-Gruppen, Kommunen und Kellerclubs: Sven Reichardt erkundet das westdeutsche Alternativmilieu.".

theoretical directives of Maoism also play a certain role, particularly regarding questions of warfare and violence. This is indicated also by the militant activities of Maoist-inspired forces in particular. In [this] report, we consequently refer frequently to the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and quote passages from it.[75]

This passage would support Quinn Slobodian's contention that Maoism in East Germany was somewhat of an empty signifier that roughly meant "opposition from the Left," with little ideological content. After all, Carlos Marrighella's *Minimanual* inspired Leftists around the globe far beyond the confines of organized Maoist cadre parties.[76] Slobodian has argued—convincingly in my view—that the East German state read opposition from the Left automatically as Maoist and that Maoism in return provided an umbrella-narrative for those critical of the SED state.[77] Yet, there is something else going on here: the Stasi subsumes a diverse set of Left movements under the umbrella of Maoism *only to then* focus their practical efforts on Maoist cadre parties. And all this before these parties have made a genuine effort at organizing within the GDR. In other words, the Sino-Soviet split determines the Stasi's labelling of left-wing opposition as Maoist, which in turn raises the stakes for its focus on *actual* Maoist opposition.

Reports shared with the Stasi by its Russian "brother organs" repeatedly warned of the influence of Maoism on foreigners in the Soviet Union. By 1977, the Stasi's *Hauptabteilung*

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[75]Zentrale Auswertungs und Informationsgruppe (ZAIG), "Übersicht über Kampfformen, Mittel und Methoden links- und rechtsextremistischer Kräfte" (July 20th, 1973), BStU, MfS, HA IX, Nr. 4705, p. 2. For the *Minimanual* see Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (New World Liberation Front, 1970).

[76]On the other hand, the influence of Maoism and the presence of Maoist identification among groups of the far Left have also been understated. For an argument about Maoism within the Black Panther Party and the Black Power movement writ large, see for example Kelley and Esch, "Black Like Mao.".

[77]Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015. In a later article Slobodian moves beyond this and presents a broad classification of different kinds of Maoisms that more clearly acknowledges the Marxist-Leninist cadre parties that emerged in the 1970s. But what is significant in this case is that the Stasi report shows how the effects of different kinds of Maoisms (creative appropriation, party-building projects, and the state's tendency to subsume opposition under Maoism to discredit it) are constantly overlapping and interacting forcefields. See Slobodian, "The Meanings of Western Maoism.".

XX and the KGB's *Fifth Chief Directorate* agreed to regularly exchange information regarding the influence of Maoist organizations and groups on foreign students.[78] What Stasi reports like the above-cited one from 1973 indicate is that the broader contexts of the Sino-Soviet split are the context in which to understand the Stasi's obsession with West German (and foreign) Maoist parties in the 1970s. That the narrative of the Maoist enemy also allowed the Stasi to vilify dissidents that probably shared little ideology with Maoist cadre parties does not contradict this point. On the contrary, it emphasizes the way in which the threat of Chinese communism shaped the Stasi's understanding of the Left in West and East Germany.

But there were some reasons to suspect that East Germany would experience West German Maoist activity on their territory as early as 1973. That year, the East German capital would host the World Festival of Youth and Students under the slogan "For Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, For Peace and Friendship." In 1968, several members of the SDS had joined an FDJ delegation to the festival—then hosted by Bulgaria. Now, a few weeks before the East Berlin event in July 1973, the KPD's *Rote Fahne* printed a report about the 1968 festival by a participant who was now a member of the KPD. The tenor of the report was clear: international solidarity and unity with Moscow were fundamentally incompatible. The report mentions the silencing by the festival organizers of all those forces who demanded victory for the Vietnamese during the war and reported that Persian "comrades" were beaten and deported. The report also claimed that all demonstrations of pro-Chinese sentiments were met

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[78]Hauptabteilung X, "Zuarbeit zur Perspektivischen Arbeitsvereinbarung mit der V. Verwaltung des KfS beim Ministerrat der UdSSR", BStU, MfS, HA XX/AKG, Nr. 780, Teil 1/2, p. 256.

with repression, but that the SDS delegation together with Italian and other anti-imperialists managed to hold two events of their own and were supported by the Vietnamese.[79]

Considering that the date of the report is five years after the event—which happened before the widespread founding of Maoist parties in West Germany—it makes sense to be skeptical about the assertion of strong pro-Chinese sentiments in the report. But it is not implausible: the student Left of the 1960s had mobilized "Mao" imagery from the very beginning, albeit in ways less doctrinaire than the KPD.[80] Consequently, it is possible that 1960s creative appropriation of Mao symbolism was easily absorbed into narratives of ideological continuity in retrospect. In any case, the report served to mobilize West German Maoists for a renewed intervention at the festival. In an accompanying article entitled "World Festival of Youth and Students in Berlin, GDR: The Fear of the 'Yellow Peril'," the KPD accused the SED leadership of fearing Maoist intervention to such an extent that they sought to collude with the West German state. Comments by the East German foreign minister in Helsinki in 1973 that one had to prevent "a situation like Munich" were interpreted as anxieties about West German (and foreign) Maoists with reference to a series of protests by West German Maoists at the Munich Olympics in 1972. According to the article, what was meant was not only the attack by "Black September" but also the mobilizations by these Maoists.[81]

So the KPD did travel to East Berlin to distribute flyers and invite attendees in East Berlin to a follow-up meeting in West Berlin the day after. According to one KPD report,

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[79]"Mit der FDJ Delegation in Sofia 1968," in *Rote Fahne*, Vol. 4, Nr. 29, July 18th, 1973, p. 8.

[80]Sebastian Gehrig, "(Re-)Configuring Mao: Trajectories of a Culturo-Political Trend in West Germany," *Transcultural Studies* 0, no. 2 (December 22, 2011): 189–231; Gerhard Paul, "Das Mao-Porträt," *Zeithistorische Forschung/Studies in Contemporary History*, no. 6 (2009).

[81]"Weltfestspiele in Berlin, DDR: Die Angst vor der 'Gelben Gefahr'," in *Rote Fahne*, Vol. 4, Nr. 29, July 18th, 1973, p.8.

the activities in East Berlin were a resounding success: the party members had handed out thousands of flyers and despite the claims of the East German press that attendees stood united behind the message of the festival, the report claimed that the KPD activities were met with enthusiasm both by foreign delegations and East German workers.[82] Again, one might be skeptical: it was certainly in the interest of *Rote Fahne* to exaggerate the success of the party's activities. This is also true of the follow-up meeting, where Iraqis and members of the Iranian Confederation of Iranian Students/National Union (CISNU) came together with members of the KPD and its League against Imperialism (Liga) to discuss the importance of the struggle against the Soviet leadership.[83]

However, the Stasi paid close attention to the activities of Maoists and Maoist foreigners at the festival and confirmed both the transnational character of the activities and their reach across the Berlin wall. A secret report shortly before the opening of the festival on a planning meeting of the Liga reported that the Liga was committed to disrupting the festival with flyers and pamphlets against "revisionism." Concrete measures were not yet announced in order to keep them secret as long as possible, but several Liga members had been scoping out different locations in East Berlin for possible activities during the last few days. The group decided that security would be too tight during the first day of the festival and consequently the Stasi expected disruptions to happen largely between July 31st and August 3rd.[84]

During the proceedings, several foreign individuals and organizations were planning activities the Stasi was worried about. Part of the Swedish delegation had—in a secret meeting

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[82]"Festspielrummel Entlarvt," in *Rote Fahne*, Vol. 4, Nr. 32, August 8th, 1973, p. 8.

[83]"Proletarischer Internationalismus," in *Rote Fahne*, Vol. 4, Nr. 32, August 8th, 1973, p. 8.

[84]"Störaktion der 'Liga gegen den Imperialismus' gegen die X. Weltfestspiele" (July 25th, 1973), BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 11440, p. 242-243.

during the festival—attempted to push through a resolution condemning East Germany's recognition of Cambodia's current government.[85] Although the leadership of the West Berlin-based group "Rote Garde" (*Red Guards*) did not intend to travel to the festival, they announced other countermeasures to the festival. The corresponding Stasi report described the group as Arab and West Berlin citizens who held Maoist views, had direct connections to the Chinese Communist Party as well as having received training in China, and were led by an Iraqi. The group held regular meetings with leaders of other West German Maoist groups and Arabs.[86]

Most importantly, the Stasi confirmed the successful meetings in West Berlin. Roughly 2,500 members and sympathizers of several Maoist organizations affiliated in one way or another with the KPD came together on August 5th, 1973 in West Berlin to discuss the "demagogical and misleading character of the X. World Festival of Youth and Students" and the "treasonous role of social imperialism." Speakers included Iraqis, Danes and some members of the KPD. At the same time, the CISNU was supported by the *Liga gegen den Imperialismus* when distributing a flyer in East Berlin.[87] The CISNU praised the earliest iterations of the festival, but argued that with the turn of the Soviet Union towards peaceful coexistence (and therefore, against the liberation struggle against the oppressed peoples) the festival turned into a carnival. The program of the current festival in East Berlin, the CISNU claims, substituted dances, beauty pageants, and music parades for politics. Indeed,

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[85]Verwaltung für Staatssicherheit Groß-Berlin Abteilung II/5 "Sofortmeldung Nr. 9 — Aktion 'Banner'," (August 3rd, 1973), BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 11440, p. 17-18.

[86]"Auskunftsbericht zu ausländischen Gruppierungen und Einschätzung der Leitungsmitglieder" (August 2nd, 1973), Stasi, ZAIG, Nr. 11440, p. 69-73. Note here again the distinction between foreigners and Maoists.

[87]"Zu Aktivitäten linksextremistischer Organisationen in Westberlin" (August 6th, 1973), BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 11440, p. 83-84.

they claimed the GDR excluded progressive organizations from the outset to avoid any kind of political confrontation.[88]

On August 3rd, members of the KPD/ML along with members of the *Rote Garde* and several Turkish and Greek speakers met in West Berlin for their own meeting. A Turkish speaker contended that the delegations to the festival from Turkey, Spain and Greece were not representatives of 'progressive' forces in their respective countries, but rather groups of Turkish, Spanish and Greek youth in exile living in the GDR. A delegate of the *Rote Garde* with long hair and a striking Bavarian accent delivered a report from his visit to the festival. After crossing the border and being subjected to harsh border controls, him and his "comrades" visited the Chinese embassy. They were received by the ambassador, who answered their questions: according to him, the GDR was not a workers' and peasants' state but a bureaucracy, and the Chinese would view attending the festival in such a country as treason. After attending the embassy, the group moved on to *Alexanderplatz* to sing songs praising Stalin and Mao and argue with other youth and distribute propaganda they had acquired in the Chinese embassy. However, the reporting informant concluded that no more activities were planned by the attendees of this particular meeting because other than the KPD, the attendees of this meeting did not deem such interventions effective.[89]

Nonetheless, West German (and West Germany-based) Maoists were now solidly on the Stasi's radar. In 1975, a further Stasi report indicates that the agency observed increasing interest among West German Maoist groups to agitate within the GDR, at least during international events. The KPD's interventions at the Word Festival of Youth and Students

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[88][unitled CISNU text], BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 11440, p. 85-86.

[89]"Veranstaltung in 'Max und Moritz'-Restaurant, Oranienstraße 162 am 3.8.1973 18.30 Uhr" (August 5th, 1973), BStU, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 11440, p. 94-97.

figures prominently in the report. The KPD/ML, on the other hand, refused to participate or endorse such activities because they thought the "conditions within the GDR were not ripe."[90] Regardless, the Stasi suspected a consensus that activities against the GDR would increase. Objectives shared by Maoists in West Germany included the exploitation of difficulties and conflicts in the GDR, the amplification of dissatisfaction among East Germans, making contacts within the GDR—especially with unhappy students and workers and those who already share Maoist ideas—and winning contacts that can help build "bases" on East German territory.[91] Of course, as I have shown above, these activities had been on the to-do list of the Albanian embassy since the 1960s.

During this time, factions of the CISNU also increased their activities on GDR territory. On December 11th, 1975 Humboldt University's Asian Studies department hosted a private screening of the film *The Flame of Persia* (1972) about the anniversary festivities celebrating 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy. Among the attendees of the event were also two representatives of the Iranian embassy in East Berlin. During a break the attendants noticed that eight Iranian students had managed to sneak into the room while it was dark. One report complained that the student responsible for checking ids was knitting. Now, the unwanted guests began to incite a discussion about Reza Shah Pahlavi calling him "a murderer, a fascist, a CIA agent, and a traitor" and referring to the GDR as a "so-called socialist country" which was to be scolded for collaborating with the Shah's regime.[92] The informant responsible for the report claimed to have had a conversation with East German students who apparently had invited the West-Berlin-based activists and threatened that

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[90]"Einschätzung der Jüngsten Aktivitäten der Maoistischen Kräfte und die sich daraus für das Ergebenden Spezifischen Gegenmaßnahmen" (June 3rd, 1973), BStU, MfS, ZKG, Nr. 648, p. 87.

[91]Ibid., p. 80.

[92]"Bericht über besonderes Vorkommnis" (December 12th, 1975), BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 28751, p. 3-5.

should the Shah ever come to East Berlin, things were going to get a lot worse.[93] Another report identified a prominent member of a West-Berlin-based Iranian Maoist group (a faction of the CISNU), who had been known to the Stasi for a while.[94]

Over the second half of the 1970s, the CISNU developed several factions, some of which understood themselves as Maoists, some of which founded their own branch of the Trotzkyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and some of which maintained connections to the Iranian communist party.[95] When the Shah planned a visit to East Berlin in 1978, the Stasi urgently assembled information on these different factions in West Berlin and evaluated them with respect to their likely attempts to interfere with the visit in the GDR. It is important to note that the visit was not only opposed by Maoists and Trotzkyists, but that the GDR's relationship to the monarch increasingly caused tensions with the Iranian communist Tudeh party, which worried that the Shah had sufficient power to move the SED government to crack down on Moscow-aligned communists as well.[96] Two groups, in particular, were expected to become active vis-à-vis the Shah's visit and both of them were known to work closely with the KPD/ML.

But the CISNU did not only mobilize West German Maoists. When several members were arrested in East Berlin after the spectacular occupation of the Iranian embassy there,

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[93]Ibid.

[94]Hauptabteilung XX "Information Nr.: 1076/75: Provokation einer maoistischen iranischen Gruppe aus Westberlin bei einer Filmveranstaltung der Humboldt-Uni am 11.12.1875," BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 28751, p. 1-2.

[95]Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah.*

[96]"Aktivitäten linksextremistischer iranischer Gruppierungen in Westberlin zum beabsichtigten Schah-Besuch in der DDR," BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 28751, p. 10-11.

protest from CISNU members included telegrams from many West German cities as well as from Southern California, Paris, and Sweden.[97]

Meanwhile, within the GDR, two groups formed in East Berlin and Rostock to study Marxism-Leninism and grew increasingly critical of the East German claim to socialism. Tobias Wunschik pointed out that youthful rebellion might have played a part in motivating the members of these groups; most of their members were in their twenties. Like in the Federal Republic of the 1960s, they seem to have been "hungry for theory"[98] and looked for inspiration in the debates of the West German New Left at the time.[99] In this, they would have looked a lot like earlier, West German manifestations of oppositional reading circles during the 1960s. But also in the GDR, as Quinn Slobodian reports, old KPD members and foreigners were interested in Mao as a critic of East German socialism. He describes one group inspired and led by Alberto Miguel Carmo—the son of Brazillian refugees to West Berlin—who organized reading nights in East Berlin during which people sang Wolf Biermann songs and read Mao.[100] What unites these different circles in East Germany is that—not unlike student groups in 1960s West Berlin—they made creative use of Mao alongside other intellectual and cultural influences. That is, they reflected the characteristics of those groups that have dominated analytic accounts of Maoism in the historiography of the West German New Left. These accounts have stressed the undogmatic appropriation of Mao's iconography, the combination of Mao's little red book and hedonistic life practices, and highlighted the role Mao's image played in creating a space for opposition beyond the two

[97]"Telegrammkopien im Zusammenhang mit der Verhaftung iranischer Studenten," BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 28751, p. 28-38.

[98]Philipp Felsch, *Der lange Sommer der Theorie: Geschichte einer Revolte, 1960 - 1990* (Munich: Beck, 2015).

[99]Wunschik, *Die maoistische KPD/ML und die Zerschlagung ihrer "Sektion DDR" durch das MfS*, p. 10.

[100]Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015, p. 22.

blocs of the Cold War.[101] As Slobodian puts it, "as in the West, identification with Chinese communism in the GDR around 1968 was often more a gesture of defiant and voguish anti-authoritarianism than a sign of allegiance to Maoist doctrine as such."[102] Ironically, while there is evidence for this with respect to some of the groups within the 1960s New Left, the privileging of the "creative appropriation" of Mao iconography in the 1960s over the Maoist party building of the 1970s also serves to cleanse the memory of the postwar Left of an uncomfortable "Chinese" contamination.[103] But the tenor of Maoism was changing in the beginning of the 1970s with the formation of formation of formal Maoist parties in the Federal Republic and all over Europe and the United States. It is futile to speculate whether it was inspiration from West Germany or the escalation of sinophobic anxiety in East Germany itself that moved the members of the two study groups (in East Berlin and in Rostock) to themselves embark on the path of Maoist party-building in the GDR. What is known is that they reached out to several groups in West Berlin by their own initiative and sought inspiration in another place by now a familiar aspect of the story of the Sino-Soviet Split in East Germany: the Albanian embassy in East Berlin.[104]

This may explain why although it was the KPD that was pressing ahead with activism in East Berlin during the World Festival of Youth and Students, it was the KPD/ML that announced in 1976 that it had founded the KPD/ML (Section GDR). The declaration was published in *Roter Morgen* on February 7th, 1976. It denounced the GDR leadership along

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[101]Gehrig, "(Re-)Configuring Mao."; Paul, "Das Mao-Porträt."; Slobodian, "Badge Books and Brand Books.".

[102]Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy," July 21, 2015, p. 22.

[103]This is even the case in Slobodian's *Foreign Front*. While the rest of the book seeks to show that foreigners were not just empty projection screens for West German activists, Slobodian's chapter on the role of China privileges the anti-racist motivations of West Germans over the agency of the Chinese.

[104]Wunschik, *Die maoistische KPD/ML und die Zerschlagung ihrer "Sektion DDR" durch das MfS*, p. 10.

familiar lines and praises the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian PPSh for leading the fight against revisionism. The GDR was run by a "new bourgeoisie" that was controlled entirely from Moscow and helped establish "social fascism" in East Germany.[105] One year later, the "Sektion DDR" got its own version of *Roter Morgen.* The first issue reported on the KPD/ML's party conference and included solidarity messages sent to the conference both by the "Sektion GDR" and the Albanian PPSh.[106] But besides those articles, largely composed in the West, the paper also contained an article on East German athletes. The party elite, so the paper claimed, sought to make people believe that Olympic medals were the result of youth and mass sports. In reality, though, the article pointed out that children were screened and put under enormous pressure to compete before many had to reintegrate into ordinary life damaged both by the psychological pressure and "chemicals."[107]

Almost all activities that the KPD/ML undertook in the 1970s in East Germany — the mailing of so-called *Hetzmaterialien* — the attempt to find allies in the East German population, and the aggressive promotion of the Chinese and Albanian line, were activities that had been undertaken by the two embassies before. The KPD/ML became an integral part of these efforts for the embassies. At some point during the 1970s, the Albanian embassy reportedly made it a priority to help establish cells of the KPD/ML in East Germany.[108] Even in the historiographical literature on the postwar West German Left, Maoists are often caricatured as the most dogmatic and fossilized elements of that Left. Especially the

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[105]"KPD/ML in der DDR gegründet: Gründungserklärung der Sektion DDR der KPD/ML," in *Roter Morgen*, Vol. 10, Nr. 6, February 7th, 1976.

[106]"III. Parteitag der KPD/ML erfolgreich abgeschlossen," in *Roter Morgen Ausgabe DDR,* [undated but presumably 1977, articles refer to 1976 in the past and refer to the founding of the party as one year ago].

[107]"Sport in der DDR - Nur die Medaillen zählen," *Roter Morgen Ausgabe DDR*, [undated but presumably 1977, articles refer to 1976 in the past and refer to the founding of the party as one year ago].

[108]"Betreff: Information über das Vertreiben der Zeitung KPD/ML durch die Botschaft der VRA," BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 35331, p. 37-39.

KPD/ML — with their obsession with the interwar KPD and their brief period of endorsing a policy of "fatherland defense" — has been described as a merely anachronistic response to a global age. As this chapter shows, however, it is the global Cold War in the two Germanies that enabled and in many ways determined the KPD/ML's political practice. Their often contradictory attempts at making sense of the turnabouts of the international communist movement while maintaining their loyalties need to be explained rather than dismissed. Finally, these parties became a much more important aspect of the Cold War in East Germany than histories focused on their published materials have suggested.

CHAPTER 4

West Germany: Governing the Cold War

By 1980, after almost a decade of debates on whether or not to ban the three major West German Maoist parties,[1] it was becoming increasingly apparent that Maoism was in decline and probably not worth the complex and time-intensive legal procedures that would be involved in bringing a case to the Federal Constitutional Court (BVG). Up to this point, calls for the government or the BVG to outlaw these parties had come from many sources: conservative-led states, private citizens who were worried about communist cells (*Betriebszellen*) in factories, parents who were concerned about the Maoists' ambivalent relationship to terrorism, but also voices within the security apparatus of the federal government led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD). After the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) and the General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPA) were banned following the

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[1]Writing this chapter proved to be an extraordinary narrative challenge. Not only am I dealing with almost a dozen parties and organizations, the Maoist competition over the legacy of the Weimar-era Communist Party of Germany is making this narrative difficult. That being said, on the level of federal politics, parties that occur in this chapter are the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Much of the first half of this chapter deals with the politics surrounding the ban of the Weimar-era Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In 1968, the KPD was replaced by the also Moscow-oriented German Communist Party (DKP). This is complicated by the fact that after 1971, the Maoist Communist Party of Germany/AO changed it's name to KPD. When referring to this Maoist namesake, I will use the term "Maoist KPD." Worse yet, members of the original KPD were involved in the founding of the KPD/ML. Foreign parties and organizations include: The General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPA), the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU).

Munich attacks in 1972, there were also repeated calls for a ban of other foreign organizations of the New Left with strong Maoist currents.[2]

This chapter makes two arguments: first, the context of German-German rivalry and anxieties about East German influence on the political and economic life of the Federal Republic going back at least to the 1956 ban of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD)—founded in the Weimar era and receiving funding from East Germany—infused West German Maoists with layers of meaning that render plausible the wide-spread attention the parties gained in the press, in state and federal parliaments, and the public. Questions over the legality of communist parties and the SPD-led negotiations with the Eastern bloc in the 1970s meant that measures against Maoist parties in the 1970s were entangled in a web of foreign policy decisions of global significance.

Second, even though the immediate reference point for politicians was the German-German relationship, foreigners from the Global South—from the early 1960s on—disrupted domestic policy like the ban of the Communist Party, for example when politicians sought to apply the KPD-ban to members of foreign communist parties in the Federal Republic. Yet, the presence of foreign Maoists and their centrality to Maoist politics in the Federal Republic has been obscured by the knowledge production of West German intelligence, bureaucrats' denial of West Germany as a multicultural society, and the well-meaning attempts by West German Maoists to shield their foreign peers from prosecution under the politically restrictive Foreigner Law.

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[2]See for example this parliamentary discussion about the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU): "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Dregger, Erhard (Bad Schwalbach), Spranger, Dr. Langguth, Dr. Marx, Biechele, Dr. Laufs und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU" (February 27th, 1979), Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (HStaSt hereafter), EA 2/303 Bü 836, p. 4.

The Ban of the KPD and German-German Competition

Given the relative lull in Cold War hostilities during the 1970s, it is perhaps counterintuitive to argue that Maoism in West Germany has to—first and foremost—be put into the context of German-German competition rather than the context of terrorism in West Germany. But analogous to the East German story, the fear of communist interference in West German public life mobilized conservative politicians and anti-communist segments of the public who suspected that the East Germans were behind all manifestations of Marxist-Leninist politics and "homegrown" left-wing terrorism. In this first section, I will show how these anxieties produced the right-wing side of an anti-Maoist consensus that emerged throughout the 1970s in the Federal Republic before turning to the context of Social Democratic *Ostpolitik* as the left-wing side of that consensus.

The fear of communist East Germany's interference in West German affairs had already produced a situation particular to the Federal Republic: in 1956, the Federal Constitutional Court declared illegal the KPD that had formed in the aftermath of World War I and had heretofore been a rallying point for left-wing opposition at least to 1933, if not to the early 1950s. As Patrick Major has convincingly shown, by 1956 the party had been in sharp decline for several years owing to its strong alignment with the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and a campaign to remove critical voices in the early 1950s.[3] Major's study neverthe-less locates the "ban" of the party in the broader climate of West German anti-communism in

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[3]See Patrick Major, *The Death of the KPD: Communism and Anti-Communism in West Germany, 1945-1956* (Oxford & New York: Clarendon Press & Oxford University Press, 1997).

the 1950s. This anti-communist climate stretched far beyond parliamentary politics and the judiciary conspiring to outlaw party communism, moreover. Besides a Federal Ministry for All-German Questions, the West German Association of German Student Bodies (VDS) had its own office for all-German questions, and student governments in West German universities elected their own officers for all-German questions. The VDS, later briefly influential in the West German student movement, also collaborated with West German intelligence and the CIA on questions of East German infiltration.[4]

The banning of the KPD created a unique situation in West German politics. As Günther Nollau, the later president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, wrote in the 1970s, the strategy of outlawing the KPD was controversial at the time because East German funding for the party might have provided the resources to effectively work underground. At the same time, Nollau claimed to have voiced doubts that the West German intelligence apparatus—only then being built up—would be able to compete with the KPD given its funding from the East.[5] Indeed, as I have shown in Chapter 3, disrupting the organizational efforts of the underground KPD remained a high priority of West German intelligence in the 1960s.

In any case, it appears that Nollau's concerns proved justified throughout the 1960s, when security services were busy proving the continued activities of the illegal party. At a 1965 conference of intelligence analysts and "procurers" working on communism for the Federal and State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, participants developed strategies for proving that public events were clandestinely organized by the illegal party with the

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[4]Rohwedder, *Kalter Krieg und Hochschulreform*, p. 84-100.
[5]Nollau, *Das Amt*, p. 144.

support of East German functionaries.[6] Analysts debated the possibility of obtaining a court ruling that could serve as a precedent against organizers of those events where East German functionaries were among the participants. A local ruling like this could serve to suppress communist events in other locations. A high-ranking member of the federal office concurred, but argued that it would be hard to prove conspiracy at the level of small events, and consequently, the agencies should encourage measures against larger groups spanning multiple German states that organized larger, transregional events.[7]

The KPD itself, the analysts argued, was preparing a major offensive to gain new members in 1966. Research by the different state offices had determined that in 1964 the party had between 6,000 and 7,000 members. In addition to a membership drive, the illegal party intensified its efforts in youth work. Meetings of the Central Committee frequently happened abroad with reports of recent gatherings in Amsterdam and Strasbourg. The party also had an extensive apparatus for the distribution of its literature, with the party newspaper "Freies Volk" having a print run of 25,000 copies. Even though raids on KPD functionaries were able to establish these numbers and give the agencies concrete insights into the distribution of publications to regional offices across the country as well as KPD codenames for distribution centers, the agency lagged behind: the report the federal office promised for the future only contained insights into methods of distribution that had already been superseded in the summer of 1965. This lag was representative of broader problems with the observation of the KPD: while in some states the state office had good access to the KPD and in others there

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[6]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 24./25. November 1965 in Köln" (December 3rd, 1965), Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Barch hereafter), B/443/2366, p. 1.
[7]Ibid., p. 2-3.

were some prospects that they might gain access, the rest of the states couldn't penetrate the party's organization beyond the county level.[8]

These problems were also present in the KPD's work with respect to infiltrating trade unions. Following the federal elections of 1965, the KPD reportedly made the "work against trade unions" their highest priority.[9] According to one analyst, the party intended to use trade unions to develop their politics against the federal government and create an extra-parliamentary opposition. Supposedly, the KPD sought to send members of the German Trade Union Federation and the SPD to East Germany for training. The trade union work was coordinated by the Standing Committee of the German Workers Conferences, a joint project by KPD, SED, and the East German Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) since 1956. The analyst did have a list of 30 alleged members of the Standing Committee, but couldn't guarantee its accuracy because the agencies had only unsatisfactory access to the standing committee and no new insights at all after 1964. A representative of the federal office instructed the analysts to intensify their efforts to gain access to the standing committee and the KPD trade union commissions. But others were not so sure gaining access beyond the county level was possible.[10]

Chapter 3 has shown that in East Germany, concerns with Maoism were often particularly focused on foreigners. In West Germany, the political activities of foreigners were of no less concern and were central to the anxieties about communist infiltration. Legislation introduced in 1965 to restrict the political activities of foreigners had replaced a Nazi-era police order that had been used instead of proper laws. But, as Quinn Slobodian has convincingly

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[8]Ibid., p. 4-5.
[9]Ibid., p. 6.
[10]Ibid., p. 7-8.

shown, the law wasn't simply about "cleansing the law books of Nazi legislation."[11] Rather, constitutional rights that applied to foreigners made it difficult to respond adequately to pressures by foreign governments to suppress opposition among citizens of their countries organizing in West Germany. This anxiety had been validated by a 1964 court ruling in favor of Iranian student Mahmood Rassekh who had been charged with violating the law of assembly in 1963. The West German ambassador to Iran had explained that West German courts were particularly sensitive to executive overreach because of the role such overreach in the Nazi state.[12]

A second concern about the political activities of foreigners was the threat they posed to the effect of the KPD ban. Slobodian quotes the architect of the 1965 foreigner law, Werner Kanein, who worried that political activity among foreigners "who come in part from countries with strong communist parties" could pose a direct threat to the constitutional order of the Federal Republic.[13] Slobodian shows that foreigners played a much greater part in the extra-parliamentary politics of the 1960s and that they were of great concern to the state security services long before the iconic events of 1967-1968 that have come to stand in for the extra-parliamentary politics of the West German New Left. He and others have highlighted the ways in which the political agency of foreigners has been systematically concealed by administrators and legislators worried about "foreign politics" and multicultural society.[14]

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[11]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 41.

[12]Slobodian, p. 43-44.

[13]Slobodian, p. 36.

[14]See Chin, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe*; Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012; Quinn Slobodian, "The Borders of the Rechtsstaat in the Arab Autumn: Deportation and Law in West Germany, 1972/73," *German History* 31, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 204–224 among others.

But it is worth considering the anxieties over the political organization of foreigners more closely with respect to the KPD ban of 1956. To put it bluntly, what the above-cited Bavarian Ministry official recognized is that the effectiveness of banning the West German communist party was threatened by international communism in an era of increasing transnational exchange and integration in universities and the economy. What was the point of banning the KPD if communists from abroad could organize freely in West Germany? What was the right strategy to prevent foreign communists from doing the kind of subversive work their West German peers couldn't?

This question was at the heart of a number of rulings by the Federal Court of Justice in June 1964. The District Court in Cologne had sentenced two members of the Iranian Tudeh Party—the Communist Party of Iran—to six and eight months in jail respectively for conspiracy and leading an organization hostile to the constitution of the Federal Republic. While the sentence was suspended, both the state and the defendants appealed the courts decision. In its ruling from July 25th, 1963, the Federal Court of Justice found both appeals to contain reasons to overturn the ruling of the district court. After establishing that the lower court was well within its rights to establish the Tudeh party as hostile to the constitution because it did not enjoy the protection of political parties guaranteed by the constitution because its objectives fell largely outside West Germany and its members were not citizens, the Federal Court nonetheless sided with the state that the lower court made insufficient efforts to investigate whether the Tudeh party itself could be a "substitute organization" for the illegal KPD.[15] The charge of membership in a "substitute organization" had been used

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[15]Bundesgerichtshof (BGH hereafter), 25.07.1963 - 3 StR 64/62, online at https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bgh/1963-07-25/3-str-64_62/ (Accessed: February 26th, 2018).

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successfully before, for example when former members of the KPD created new organizations to run for re-election after the party had been ruled unconstitutional.[16] The question at hand was whether this could be extended to essentially declare foreign communist parties substitute organizations of the KPD and thereby extend the KPD ban to these parties.

The 1963 decision by the Federal Court of Justice set important benchmarks in this regard. In theory, foreign communist parties operating in West Germany *could be* substitute organizations for the KPD, even if they purported to be separate organizations with separate memberships. The court argued that it could conceivably be the case that in a country where the communist party is illegal, a foreign "brother party" could pursue its goals in its stead. For this to be the case the foreign party did not need to pursue all the goals of the illegal party. Rather, it would suffice for the foreign party to pursue one of the goals that led to the outlawing of the illegal party in the first place. The court was clear, however, that it was not enough to argue that the parties were connected by ideological pronouncements of Marxism-Leninism. But the lower court had already established that the Tudeh Party's publications contained propaganda against the constitutional order of the Federal Republic. Consequently, the court should have determined whether the Tudeh party intended to endanger the constitutional order of the Federal Republic with such propaganda as this was one of the reasons the KPD had been banned in 1956.

Ultimately, the case was sent back to the District Court in Cologne, which ruled again in June 1964. The Court came to the same conclusion: the Iranian students were guilty of conspiracy and the contents of publications they brought to the Federal Republic contained

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[16]BGH, 18.09.1961 - 3 StR 25/61, online at https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bgh/1961-09-18/3-str-25_61/ (Accessed: February 26th, 2018).

propaganda against the Federal Republic. But the court did reassess the question of whether the Tudeh party could be considered a substitute organization for the KPD. After thoroughly examining the activities of the Tudeh party in West Germany, the lower court decided that the Tudeh party pursued none of the goals that led to the ban of the KPD. Again, the state appealed the ruling, but this time they lost. They argued that because the Tudeh Party attempted to influence Iranian students in the Federal Republic according to the ideology of its brother party, the KPD, they were in fact taking over a function of the illegal party. However, the Federal Court of Justice in its ruling from June 24th, 1965, asserted that this was not enough: "if an organization pursues a goal that the illegal party itself pursued but that is not in conflict with the constitution, this does not suffice to judge the organization to be a substitute."[17]

Back at the conference of analysts working on communism, the latest ruling by the Federal Court of Justice was discussed with reference to the final point on the agenda: communist infiltration of foreign workers. Fortunately, a member of the federal office argued, the BGH ruling against the Persian students did not imply that communist activities among foreigners were not illegal. The offices should make every effort to investigate communist activities among foreigners. But another analyst disagreed. A representative from the state office in North Rhine-Westphalia argued that at the state level there was disagreement with the federal office and the Federal Interior Ministry because the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) lacked the legal backing to observe communist foreigners. Federal law authorized the office to investigate ambitions against the Federal Republic or its states

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[17]BGH, 24.06.1965 - 3 StR 60/64, 14. Available online at https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bgh/1965-06-24/3-str-60_64/ (Accessed: February 26th, 2018).

by federal or state-level organizations. The analyst argued that the offices should wait for the appropriate legal foundation, conversations to extend this law were already under way. But the rest of the analysts at the conference disagreed. Because they were not observing foreigners in general but communist foreigners and the objective was to investigate KPD infiltration of foreign workers, the legal framework was sufficient.[18]

In the concluding list of priorities for future work, the distinction between KPD activities and foreign communism, however, was blurred. The first was the intensification of efforts to gain contacts within the KPD and KPD trade union commissions as well as their contacts at the East German FDGB. The second priority was the investigation of conspiracies behind " 'open' communist work" and collection of evidence that enabled administrative action against them.[19] But the third priority was the investigation of all communist activity among guest workers in general. A future report on collaboration between the illegal KPD and communist guest workers would likely clarify questions concerning the jurisdiction of the offices.[20]

At the same conference a year later, these priorities were reduced to two. First, the offices were to continue their heretofore unsuccessful efforts to gain access to the higher echelons of the illegal KPD. Second, they were to intensify their attempts to gain contacts in associations of foreign workers. While the legal grounds were unchanged, the instructions were further emboldened by decisions the conference of interior ministers of the states had made regarding the issue: they had decided that the offices were indeed responsible for investigating the communist infiltration of foreign workers. Although the dissenting analyst from North Rhine-

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[18]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 24./25. November 1965 in Köln" (December 3rd, 1965), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 8-10.
[19]Ibid., p. 10.
[20]Ibid.

Westphalia was not attending the conference that year, one of his colleagues spoke up again and claimed that the legal situation was unresolved and the law did not authorize the offices to observe associations of foreigners in general. But again, he found no support among the other analysts.[21]

Communism and anti-communism in the 1960s blurred the lines of responsibility for the Federal Office because the agency had been conceived of as entirely inward-looking. They had to adjust to a reality in which the fight against communism involved targeting communist foreigners and collaborating with authoritarian regimes abroad. After the concerns of the representative from North Rhine-Westphalia had been dismissed, a representative of the federal office then proceeded to clarify:

> An effective investigation of communist activity among guest workers is—by the way—not possible without close cooperation with the security services of their home countries. Consequently, the BfV is in contact with these services.[22]

In the case of Turkey and Spain, this frequently meant collaborating with authoritarian governments. This complemented fears by the Foreign Ministry that political activity of foreigners in West Germany that offended the governments of their home countries posed a threat to West Germany's foreign relations.[23]

While the operations of the illegal KPD and communist foreigners were the central concern for the conference in 1966, analysts—for the first time—noted another emerging phenomenon: the increasing radicalization of youth beyond the sphere of influence of state-sponsored communism, in particular the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS). The

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[21]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 8. November 1966 in Köln" (November 21st, 1966), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 5-6.

[22]Ibid., p. 6.

[23]See Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 38. The latter argument was later also used in court against West Germans who cooperated with Maoists abroad.

Federal Minister of the Interior had ordered the federal office to begin observing the SDS, who partly was influenced by Chinese positions.[24] Nonetheless, even in discussing operational measures about the SDS and the emerging (West German) student movement, the conference focused on possible influence by the KPD.[25]

This trend continued in 1967, when analysts highlighted that the KPD was attempting to infiltrate the "extra-parliamentary opposition." Indeed, this was the first item on the agenda for the meeting. Investigations had shown that the KPD had some success at placing communists in certain key campaigns, such as the campaign against the emergency laws, against the war in Vietnam, or against the Springer Press. However, these successes had forced the KPD to compromise on positions to collaborate with non-communist organizations and the analysts noted that there are now increasingly radical circles that are not influenced by communists.[26]

Parallel to the attempts to work within the emerging extra-parliamentary opposition, communists founded a short-lived successor to the KPD. An analyst from the state office there reported that the party had paid close attention when drafting their manifesto and statute such that there were no obvious ways to reveal them to be a "substitute organization" of the KPD. A member of the federal office added that there was evidence that the central committee of the KPD was looking to establish a new communist party on legal footing, and this small party in Baden-Württemberg was likely a test run for these attempts.[27]

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[24]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 8. November 1966 in Köln" (November 21st, 1966), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 8.

[25]Ibid.

[26]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 27./28. November 1967 in Köln" (December 12th, 1967), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 1.

[27]Ibid., p. 4-5.

At the same time, some members of the illegal KPD began to break with the party in light of the radicalism of the student movement, which largely rejected the Soviet model of communism. Although they were critical of the anarchist currents and the lack of organization of the student movement, they credited the students with revealing the KPD's lack of radicalism stemming from its close alliance with the SED. Moreover, they claimed that the party's illegality forced them to act less like a revolutionary party—presumably because of the need to win over liberal sympathizers.[28] A year later, these members of the KPD would be involved with the West German Communist Party of Germany/Marxists-Leninists (KPD/ML)—the party ended up collaborating closely with Chinese and Albanian diplomats in East Germany[29] and became part of the Albanian Party of Labor's international broadcasting project in Tirana.[30]

Much has been made of the failure of traditional communist parties to anticipate and significantly shape the student radicalism of the late 1960s in West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.[31] This is largely reflected in the conference of analysts in 1968, where neither KPD nor communist guest workers any longer figured prominently on the agenda. Instead, the offices were concerned with adapting to a dramatically new situation because the methods for infiltrating the KPD were inadequate to deal with the decentralized structure of the SDS and the extra-parliamentary opposition including *Basisgruppen*.[32] As the KPD prepared for the founding of a new party, the SDS and extra-parliamentary opposition

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[28]"Ein Notwendiger Nachtrag (Zum SDS)," Roter Morgen: Marxistisch-Leninistische Monatszeitschrift (July 1967): 7.

[29]See Chapter 3.

[30]See Chapter 5.

[31]See Eley, *Forging Democracy*; Horn, *The Spirit of '68*; Klimke, *The Other Alliance.*

[32]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 11./12.6. in Köln" (July 17th, 1968), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 14-15. For a discussion of the *Basisgruppen* see Chapter 1.

became the central focus of intelligence analysts responsible for investigating communism in the Federal Republic.

But in West Germany, the decision in 1956 to outlaw the KPD had lasting consequences not only for the state's response to the post-1968 Left but also for a popular anti-communism that had been validated by the ban of the KPD. In 1968, members of the illegal KPD moved forward—pressed by the East German SED—with the founding of a new party on legal footing. From the outset, there was evidence that East German funds that had heretofore been earmarked for supporting the illegal KPD were now used to finance the newly founded the German Communist Party (DKP).[33] The founding of the DKP raised difficult questions about the meaning of the KPD-ban of 1956. To what extent did the DKP really constitute a new party rather than the continuation of the illegal party by another name? If it could be shown that the DKP was merely the old party in new clothing, did the 1956 court ruling still apply? If the DKP did indeed constitute a completely separate entity, what were the options to outlaw the new party? And, considering that there was controversy about the effectiveness of the KPD-ban in 1956, would a new ban even be desirable?

Naturally, these questions were of great concern for West German intelligence analysts. To be sure, at their annual meeting in 1969 the first item on the agenda remained the investigation of the SDS. But the founding of the DKP figured prominently during the talks. The DKP for all intents and purposes replaced the KPD: shortly after the DKP was to begin publication of their central newspaper, the KPD would cease all remaining publications. But the party was careful: there was no evidence at this point that DKP members would be trained in East Germany, and the organizational apparatus of the KPD was dissolved.

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[33]Michael Roik, *Die DKP und die demokratischen Parteien 1968-1984* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006).

It was now incumbent upon the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution to establish conclusively that the DKP was indeed identical with the illegal KPD. For this purpose, three kinds of evidence were necessary: first, the collection of all originals of declarations and publications by the DKP that might reveal the identity of goals of the two parties. Second, any kind of evidence of activity of former members of the KPD that remained members of the KPD after the 1956 ban. Third, any kind of evidence that the KPD was funding the DKP.[34]

The question of the identity of KPD and DKP were also debated extensively in the press, among politicians, and in consultations with the interior ministry. But the question of succession to the KPD was reignited by West German Maoists, who had always claimed to be the *true* successor of the Weimar-era KPD. The emergence of communists in factories, universities, and violent demonstrations created confusion over the legal status of communist parties in West Germany. Communist factory work first became a major question for the intelligence analysts in 1969, when they shifted their attention to the DKP's ambition to get members elected into shop councils and form groups within firms. But the attention quickly broadened to the factory politics of the SDS and *Basisgruppen*, who—albeit largely unsuccessfully—undertook similar ambitions in the late 1960s.[35] The nascent Maoist parties intensified these efforts after the dissolution of the SDS. They reignited anxieties about communists in factories. Confusion was compounded in the early 1970s, when the West Berlin-based Maoist Communist Party of Germany/Organization to Rebuild the KPD

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[34]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 26./27. Februar in Köln" (March 17th, 1969), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 2-3.

[35]"Kurzprotokoll der Arbeitstagung der auf dem Gebiet des Kommunismus tätigen Auswerter und Beschaffer am 25./26. November in Köln" (December 4th, 1969), Barch, B/443/2366, p. 14-15.

(KPD/AO) seized the opportunity granted by the dissolution of the illegal KPD to rename their party the Communist Party of Germany (KPD).

While intelligence services and the Interior Ministry were well aware of Maoists' hostility to the East German SED, the West German DKP, and Soviet-style communism across the world, the public continued to read their communism through the prism of German-German competition and the global Cold War. Members of the public repeatedly complained about communists in factories or agitators at the factory gates and denounced individuals as East German agents. These statements reveal a sense that any kind of communist activity ought to be shut down or at least surveilled by the state. In a letter to the interior minister of Baden Württemberg, for example, a woman working part time for the *Dynamit Nobel AG* in Rheinfelden dutifully reported that communists had been distributing leaflets at the factory gates twice a week for the past couple of months. Usually, a young girl was doing the leafletting while a male associate would hide behind a newspaper in a car parked a short distance away. The employee also noted long hair and a dark mustache. The morning the employee wrote the letter, the girl had been replaced by a male "with shoulder-length hair." Immediately, she got in her car to investigate who was accompanying him, but couldn't make out a car in the usual spot.[36]

A prominent business in Karlsruhe more clearly identified the communists who were agitating in front of and within their factory. They were members of the (Maoist) KPD. Since Spring 1972, they had repeatedly distributed flyers and newspapers. The company first contacted the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution in June 1972 to inform them

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[36]"Employee of Dynamit Nobel AG Rheinfelden [anonymized] to Herrn Innenminister Karl Schiess, Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg" (April 25th, 1977), HStaSt, EA 2/303 Bü 616, p. 957.

that employees felt harassed by the communists and to ask for protection from the office. According to a later complaint the executives of the company sent to the interior minister, the office had told them that nothing can be done against people distributing propaganda in front of their factories. Frustrated, they turned to the Trade Office in Karlsruhe hoping that since the communists charged for their newspaper, the city would shut them down for lacking an appropriate license. However, the trade office disappointed them too: an administrative court was still deciding if it was in the public interest to charge newspaper sellers with the lack of a trade license. When the company turned to the city's police president, they were told that the KPD in front of their factories was not identical with the illegal KPD banned in 1956 but instead was the Maoist KPD (formerly KPD/AO). Consequently, there was nothing to be done. But since then, the executives reported, the situation had gotten worse. Suddenly the communists were selling a newspaper supposedly produced by the KPD's cell within their own company. The complaint goes on. Wherever they turned, at no instance was the state willing to help them rid themselves of the communists. Only if physical violence would break out, the police argued, would they happily intervene. The executives concluded by saying that the degree of outrage against the communists had grown to such an extent that the company could no longer guarantee the physical safety of those that were "suspected of belonging to the KPD," nor would they promise that the "fury of our employees wouldn't unload outside of our facilities."[37]

To the regional government in Karlsruhe, the situation was simple: the KPD was not the banned KPD, and consequently could not be punished or removed from public spaces merely

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[37]"Company in Karlsruhe [anonymized] to Herrn Innenminister des Landes Baden-Württemberg" (November 5th, 1973), HStaSt, EA 2/303 Bü 856, p. 389.

because they were communists. That being said, in their response, the police in Karlsruhe pointed out that they had been surveilling communists in front of factories all over Karlsruhe all along, and were continuing to do so. They also informed the executives of the company that they could terminate the employment of anybody involved with communist agitation within the factory, although that might lead to a lawsuit. In any case, in their letter to the interior ministry, the regional government restated that as long as the KPD was not illegal, there was nothing they can do.[38]

Perhaps the interior ministry and police in Karlsruhe were indeed simply educating the executives of this company about the rights of political speech in the Federal Republic. Or perhaps this case would serve as evidence that efforts to ban the new communist parties were urgently necessary. Debates about the banning of both the DKP and the new Maoist parties were certainly about to take off both in Baden-Württemberg and at the federal level. But for now it suffices to note that were three important contexts for West German Maoism in the 1970s: German-German competition, the long pre-history of anxieties over East German intervention in West German affairs and public life, and the precedent set by the outlawing of the KPD in 1956.

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[38]"Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe to Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg" (December 3rd, 1973), HStASt, EA 2/303 Bü 856, p. 393.

Ostpolitik, Domestic Security, and Maoism as Common Enemy

The ban of the Communist Party left West Germany without a significant political force left of the Social Democrats, who in 1959 had rejected class-based politics and anti-capitalist politics to appeal to a broader electoral base. The combination of the Social Democrats' move towards the middle of the political spectrum and the ban of the KPD created a vacuum in West Germany that was compounded in 1966, when the coalition between the Christian Democrats/Christian Socialists (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrats (FDP) collapsed and was replaced by a so-called Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD. The members of the Grand Coalition controlled in excess of 90% of the West German *Bundestag*. It would certainly be an overstatement to explain the rise of the extra-parliamentary opposition merely with reference to this particular political situation for all the reasons already mentioned in earlier chapters: the mobilizations by students from the Global South that preceded the Grand Coalition as well as the global contexts of decolonization and global Cold War that saw student and working-class radicalism emerge even in countries with stronger—and legal—communist parties.[39] And—as Gerd Rainer Horn has argued—the movements of "1968" were in part so successful because they provided platforms for creative oppositional politics that the Communist Parties of Europe were no longer offering due to their close alignment with Soviet communism even in countries where communist parties continued to be strong.[40] Nonethe-

[39]On the former, see Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*; Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012; Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah*; see also the important collections Christiansen and Scarlett, *The Third World in the Global 1960s*; Jian et al., *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties*.

[40]Horn, *The Spirit of '68*, p. 154; in his history of the Left in Europe, Geoff Eley makes a similar point: it had been the role of the Left to widen political participation across the twentieth century. This role then

less, the particular absence of tangible opposition within the political spectrum certainly encouraged the search for opposition elsewhere.

By the 1970s, however, the political situation in West Germany had significantly changed. Following the federal election in 1969, the FDP played a key role in entering into a coalition government with the SPD. Although the new government under Willy Brandt (SPD) declared itself a government of "domestic reform," its key accomplishments were its so-called *Ostpolitik* (Eastern Policy) enshrined in the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw in 1970, the Four Power Agreement of 1971, and the Basic Treaty (with East Germany) in 1972. These treaties combined West German recognition of the postwar borders and the "European status quo" with policies to solve the "Berlin problem" and guarantee frictionless transit between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Brandt's *Ostpolitik* enabled German-German talks that ended in the official recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state by the Federal Republic and promised inter-state relationships on an equal footing.[41]

In some ways, the *Ostpolitik* was a personal success for Brandt. He was *Time* magazine's "Man of the Year" and won the Nobel Peace Price in 1971. But if the Grand Coalition of 1966-1969 had been characterized by a lack of meaningful political opposition in the *Bundestag*, Brandt's foreign policy—as one historian put it—polarized the West German republic like no other issue in its history.[42] In 1972, both SPD and CDU/CSU significantly increased their membership with growth rates above ten per cent and impeachment proceedings against Brandt in 1972—encouraged by Social Democrats switching sides and significantly weakening

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passed from the Old Left to the New Left. See Eley, *Forging Democracy*; for a critique of such a capacious (and formalistic) conception of the Left, see Belinda Davis's important essay Davis, "What's Left?"

[41]Fischer, "Von der 'Regierung der inneren Reformen' zum 'Krisenmanagement:' Das Verhältnis zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik in der sozial-liberalen Ära 1969-1982," p. 400-401.

[42]Fischer, p. 401.

the government's already slim majority—only failed because the CDU/CSU was missing two votes. Two members of the conservative opposition voted against impeachment after taking money from the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi).[43] In the aftermath of the student movement and conservatives' increasing sense that they were losing the universities to radicals enabled by social democratic support for university reform and democratization, *Ostpolitik* appeared to conservatives as a single threat spanning "left-wing radicalism, Soviet Communism, and German Social Democracy."[44]

If conservatives tried to make connections between Social Democratic foreign policy and increasing radicalism in universities and beyond in the realm of domestic policy, Social Democrats had good reasons to show that their negotiations with the Soviets did not mean sympathies for communism domestically. Consequently, on November 14th, 1970, the SPD passed the so-called *Abgrenzungsbeschluss* that drew a clear line between negotiations with communists abroad and precluded any collaboration with communists in the sphere of domestic politics. As Frank Fischer has suggested, this resolution was a direct response to the charge—by conservatives—that the SPD's foreign policy blurred the line between Social Democracy and Communism.[45]

This, however, was not enough to appease the skeptics. Both within the CDU/CSU and in the SPD, there was increasing anxiety about communist influence and the radicalism of the youth that could—in a generation—significantly reshape the political landscape of the Federal Republic. Especially if communists began to fill the ranks of teachers—who

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[43]Fischer, p. 401-402.

[44]Axel Schildt, "Die Kräfte der Gegenreformation sind auf breiter Front angetreten: Zur konservativen Tendenzwende in den Siebzigerjahren," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 44 (2004): 449–78, p. 456.

[45]Fischer, "Von der 'Regierung der inneren Reformen' zum 'Krisenmanagement:' Das Verhältnis zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik in der sozial-liberalen Ära 1969-1982," p. 402.

under West German law could attain the status of civil servants including tenure-like job security—the constitutional order could increasingly come under threat.[46] On January 28th, 1972, after extensive debates, the heads of all German states agreed with chancellor Willy Brandt on a decree that prevented applicants "hostile to the constitution were not to enter public service and—in particular—should not receive the status of tenured civil servant."[47] While enforcement of this decree—known as *Radikalenerlass* differed between states governed by CDU/CSU or SPD, the idea that highly qualified teachers should not be employed if they were members of a communist party was decidedly popular.[48]

The vague language of the *Radikalenerlass* was a compromise between those who did not think that membership in the DKP was enough to qualify as an applicant with ambitions hostile to the constitution and those that desired a more stringent policy preventing communists from becoming civil servants.[49] It allowed for both liberal and extremely intransigent interpretations.[50] Consequently, there emerged a gulf between its application in different states: SPD-led states soon ceased the screening of applicants for communist party membership while CDU/CSU-led states settled in practice for a much more capacious interpretation including Leftists not organized in a party and some left-wing Social Democrats.[51]

This interpretation was congruent with conservatives' understanding of the threat of communism more broadly. Beyond public demands for a ban of the DKP—whose hostility to the constitution nobody doubted and whose funding from East Germany was well-

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[46]Dominik Rigoll, *Staatsschutz in Westdeutschland* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013), p. 335-340.

[47]Schildt, "Die Kräfte der Gegenreformation sind auf breiter Front angetreten: Zur konservativen Tendenzwende in den Siebzigerjahren," p. 467.

[48]Schildt, p. 467.

[49]Rigoll, *Staatsschutz in Westdeutschland*, p. 339.

[50]Rigoll, p. 339.

[51]Schildt, "Die Kräfte der Gegenreformation sind auf breiter Front angetreten: Zur konservativen Tendenzwende in den Siebzigerjahren," p. 468.

established—conservatives repeatedly alleged the existence of a (lower-case) united front between Moscow, DKP, the SPD leadership, and increasingly West German Maoists. Commentators didn't necessarily deny the political differences between these parties as much as they claimed that in effect these differences didn't matter. For example, conservatives didn't doubt the sincerity of the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" but accused Social Democrats of confusing "peaceful coexistence" with peace and a Soviet abnegation of revolutionary violence as such.[52] In a 1974 article appropriately entitled "Foreign Legionaires of World Revolution," the conservative *Bayernkurier* painted a picture, which acknowledged all the differences between different currents on the Left but found them essentially meaningless. The SPD appeared as Moscow's pawn in the negotations over the *Ostverträge*—a situation from which the DKP benefitted domestically. The SPD and DKP misunderstood the emerging Maoist parties merely as riot tourists rather than what they were: ten thousand party cadres competing for the good will of the People's Republic of China. The author was well-aware of the Maoists' hostility to the DKP and Moscow and the infighting among their own ranks but warned against underestimating the extent to which they were committed to revolution by drawing an analogy to the Weimar Republic: its revolutionaries on the Right and the Left benefitted from being laughed at "until it was too late."[53] It wasn't that there were no differences but that by focusing on differences one risked losing sight of the overarching threat to the order of the Federal Republic.

In opposition to the SPD's *Ostpolitik*, conservatives repeatedly alleged that the reason the SPD-led government objected to a ban of the DKP was that they sought to avoid upsetting

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[52]Schildt, p. 456.

[53]Karl-Friedrich Grosse, "Fremdenlegionäre der Weltrevolution," *Bayernkurier*, October 12th, 1974.

their negotiation partners in East Berlin and Moscow. In September 1971, Ernst Benda, an appointed judge and later president of the Federal Constituional Court (BVG) claimed in an interview with the conservative *Die Welt* that it was no accident that the question over how to judge the DKP had become an issue of party politics: while the federal government continued to pretend that they were weighing all the options, Brandt had already ensured Brezhnev that the DKP was a legal party.[54]

As implausible as this monolithic view of the SPD may seem, banning Maoist parties—in the early 1970s—appeared to offer a less controversial way to demonstrate anti-communist commitment. As I discussed in Chapter 3, not only had Maoism become a major cause for anxiety in East Germany, but at least West German intelligence was well aware of Maoism's potential to disrupt Soviet-style communist parties. In the 1970s, this led to East German suspicion over West Germany's failure to properly police Maoist parties and their opposition to the GDR. In 1975, the GDR threatened to cease work in its five so-called "Visitor Offices" in West Berlin after members of the (Maoist) KPD allegedly vandalized a bus that was taking East German employees of one of the offices to work.[55] These offices, run by the Stasi, issued permits for entering East Germany to residents of West Berlin.[56] Internally, the Stasi suspected that the Federal Republic was intentionally turning a blind eye towards West German Maoists because of their hostility to the GDR. A top secret report from 1975, for example, complained that West German intelligence agencies were doing too little to reign in

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[54]Das Interview mit dem früheren Bundesinnenminister Ernst Benda: Regierung versucht Kampf gegen Lhksradikale zu verschleiern," *Die Welt*, September 25th, 1971.

[55]"DDR drohte mit Konsequenzen aus KPD-Aktion," *Aachener Nachrichten*, June 30th, 1975.

[56]Jens Gieseke, "Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (1950-1990)," in *Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR*, ed. Torsten Diedrich, Hans Gotthard Ehlert, and Rüdiger Wenzke (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1998), 371–422, p. 399; see also Hubertus Knabe, *West-Arbeit des MfS: Das Zusammenspiel von "Aufklärung" und "Abwehr"* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2012), p. 47-48.

the activities of Maoists.[57] Not content to just complain, Stasi agents even infiltrated West German Maoist groups with the intention of provoking the Federal Republic into clamping down on its far-Left organizations.[58]

Another reason for pursuing a ban on the Maoist parties was a legal one: While the DKP—whether or not it was deemed hostile to the constitution—was without doubt established as a political party, the focus on extra-parliamentary politics of West German Maoist parties made a ban potentially much easier. If it could be shown that (Maoist) KPD, the Communist League of West Germany (KBW), and KPD/ML among others were not actually parties by the letter of the law, they could be banned without petitioning the Federal Constitutional Court. In the federal government's response to an inquiry by the CDU/CSU regarding the Maoist KPD, a ban at the hand of the interior minister as authorized by the law governing clubs and associations was still on the table.[59] On May 9th, 1973, the Federal Court of Justice granted the request for a warrant to search the headquarters of the Maoist KPD in Dortmund. The attorney general's office had requested the warrant because the Maoist KPD was suspected of being a criminal organization. A month later, the attorney general requested that all items confiscated during the search would be held as evidence for further investigation in the case. But here the Federal Court of Justice intervened and threw a wrench in the works of easy measures against West German Maoism: A judge of the court ruled that the Maoist KPD was a party as defined by article 21 paragraph 1 of German

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[57]"Einschätzung der Jüngsten Aktivitäten der Maoistischen Kräfte und die sich daraus für das Stasi Ergebenden Gegenmaßnahmen," (June 3rd, 1975), Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU hereafter), MfS, ZKG, Nr. 648, Bl. 000082.

[58]"Einschätzung der Jüngsten Aktivitäten…," BStU, MfS, ZKG, Nr. 648, Bl. 000089.

[59]"Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Vogel (Ennepetal), Dr. Miltner und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU betr. Verbot der KPD durch den Bundesminister des Innern" (May 22nd, 1973), HStaSt, EA 2/303, Bü 856, p. 346.

Basic Law (GG), even if at this point, they had made no serious attempts to compete in elections.[60]

The court decided that it was sufficient that the will to participate in elections could be derived from party publications. Quoting the party's newspaper on the Federal Election, the court noted that the party's Leninism was a reason to take their ambition seriously. After all, Lenin had "repeatedly called the participation in bourgeois parliaments part of the revolutionary struggle."[61] Moreover, the court argued, new parties don't always have the resources to run in elections right away but that cannot be taken—by itself—to constitute a lack of electoral ambition crucial to the privileged status of political parties in the Federal Republic.[62]

By the mid-1970s, the participation of other Maoist parties in elections had put to rest any attempt to prosecute them as criminal organizations. Rather, debates focused on what case could be brought against them before the Federal Constitutional Court that would likely result in a ban of the parties similar to that against the KPD in 1956. In addition to establishing the parties' hostility to the constitution, their attitudes towards violence became the central questions of the debate. For example, during the summer recess of the West German *Bundestag*, member of the CDU/CSU minority Herbert Werner formally requested statements by the federal government in response to two questions: What is the federal government going to do about the KBW's recent activities in Heidelberg and Frankfurt and

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[60]"Beschluss des Bundesgerichtshofes in dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen führende Funktionäre der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (KPD) wegen Verdachts der Beteiligung an einer kriminellen Vereinigung" (January 9th, 1974), BArch, B/106/78864, p. 1-6.

[61]Ibid., p. 11.

[62]Ibid., p. 17.

does the federal government know that the leadership of the KBW recently declared that they did not "stand on the ground of the constitution?"[63]

In its response to Werner's questions, the federal government argued that existing laws were sufficient to punish illegal activities at protests, particularly violent excess. Regarding the KBW, in particular, the government stated that it was well aware of the anti-constitutional ambitions of the KBW. More importantly, the government views a ban against any party as the "ultimate and final measure of a constitutional stat [*Rechtsstaat*]" and "holds the conviction that potential considerations for a ban must not become subject to public debate."[64] In other words, a non-answer.

However, the discussions within the Federal Ministry of the Interior that preceded this response reveal that the ministry was indeed evaluating a ban on all Maoist parties. Moreover, they revealed that the relationships with Moscow and Beijing seriously complicated those considerations. The deputy department head of the ministry's Department for Public Security summarizes the situation as follows: the KBW was legally a political party after participating in parliamentary elections. But breaking the law was of no consideration in determining whether a party should be banned according to the respective articles of the constitution. A ban based on violent behavior was consequently unlikely. Moreover, it is unlikely that in legal proceedings these violent excesses at demonstrations could actually be attached to the parties themselves. Given all these considerations, the deputy department head recommended against a ban based on violent behavior.[65]

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[63]"Kabinettreferat to the Herrn Referenten Öffentliche Sicherheit 2: Anfragen während der Sommerpause des Deutschen Bundestages" (July 15th, 1975), BArch, B/106/124172.

[64]"Der Bundesminister des Innern to Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages Herrn Herbert Werner," (July 1975), BArch, B/106/124172.

[65]"SV Abteilungsleiter ÖS to Herrn Minister via Herrn Staatssekretär" (July 14th, 1975), BArch, B/106/124172, p. 1-2.

Given the anti-constitutional ambitions of the Maoist KPD, KPD/ML, and KBW, all measures against the KBW should also be applied to Maoist KPD and KPD/ML. But this raised the difficult question of what to do about the Moscow-oriented and SED-funded DKP.[66] The deputy acknowledged that there were real differences with respect to tactics: "the Maoist parties openly profess the necessity of violence, while the DKP distances itself from this necessity in the current historical situation."[67] Other differences included the backing of the DKP by Moscow and increasing evidence that Beijing began to openly influence Maoist KPD and KPD/ML.[68] These relationships of the DKP to Moscow and Maoist KPD and KPD/ML to Beijing complicated the question of legal proceedings against the parties. The deputy warned that a ban of the DKP could offend Moscow, a ban of the Maoist KPD and KPD/ML might offend Beijing. On the other hand, uneven actions against DKP and Maoist KPD and KPD/ML could be interpreted as the federal government taking sides vis-à-vis Sino-Soviet competition.[69]

Personally, the deputy stated, he preferred a ban against DKP, KBW, Maoist KPD, and KPD/ML while acknowledging that the situation made a balanced assessment extremely difficult. But if the government decided that a ban against the DKP was not in its interest, he suggested that a court ruling against the Maoist parties could serve as a deterrent to the DKP.[70] All this goes to show how in the 1970s, not only Maoism in the abstract, but the West German Maoist parties in particular were infused with layers of meaning grounded in the German-German conflict and the Social Democratic efforts to normalize relations with

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[66]Ibid., p. 3.
[67]Ibid.
[68]Ibid.
[69]Ibid.
[70]Ibid., p. 4.

East Germany and the Soviet Bloc. Over the next few years, debates about bans continued (and sometimes divided parties) while the interior ministry itself was preparing the cases to be brought before the Federal Constitutional Court.[71]

As the decade progressed, the Maoist parties' were increasingly at the center of these ambitions. Politicians and officials explored the possibility of legal cases against party newspapers that supposedly damaged the reputation of victims of the Red Army Faction (RAF)—even as they rejected terror as a strategy in the Federal Republic. Evidence of Maoist violence was largely limited to property damage and violent confrontations with the police. Yet, conservatives continued to try to connect terrorism, Maoism, and the threat from East Germany. For example, during question hour at the *Bundestag*, CDU/CSU member of parliament Carl-Dieter Spranger asked the federal government whether reports were accurate that there was "intensive contact" between KBW and the RAF and whether it is true that the KBW was exclusively funded by East Berlin.[72] The paper had claimed to have information according to which the KBW had such contacts. The paper also alleged that the federal government had evidence that the KBW was funded by the GDR. Finally, the article claimed that the RAF was undertaking attempts to gain KBW groups as local bases of operations. The evidence for this was supposedly a conversation between imprisoned RAF leader Andreas Baader and his lawyer on July 12th, in which Baader told the lawyer that when it comes to party politics, the RAF followed the KBW whose work he applauded.[73] For its response, the federal government consulted with the department for public security,

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[71]For example "Referat ÖS 2 to Herrn Minister: Verbotserwägung bezüglich KBW u.a. Vereinigungen der 'Neuen Linken.' Hier: Erörterung in der Kabinettssitzung am 23. März 1977 im Zusammenhang mit den ereignissen in Grohnde," BArch, B/106/124172.

[72]"Mündliche Fragen des Abgeordneten Carl-Dieter Spranger (CDU/CSU)," BArch, B/106/124172.

[73]Manfred Schell, "Wird der Terror mit Hilfe des KBW aus der 'DDR' finanziert?" *Die Welt*, April 9th, 1977.

Baden-Württemberg's State Office of Criminal Investigation (Baader was—at the time—imprisoned in a wing of Stuttgart's Stammheim prison built for the RAF prisoners), as well as the Federal Office for Criminal Investigation (BKA). The BKA confirmed the conversation between Baader and his lawyer, which had been recorded as part of prisoner surveillance.[74] Nobody knew of any connections between the KBW and the RAF and nobody thought there was any evidence for KBW-funding from East Germany. In fact, a memo stuck between the files of the interior ministry somewhat dismissively noted that nobody knew which "concrete insights of the federal government" the author based these claims on. A BKA report from April 1977 suggested that the KBW clearly rejected the concept of "urban guerrilla" practiced by the RAF.[75]

While the federal government did consider banning the Maoist parties throughout the 1970s, their efforts were constrained by the politics of German-German relations and their own foreign policy ambitions in the Cold War. This was not so for conservatives, who rejected Social Democratic *Ostpolitik* and after 1975 discovered China as an ally for anti-Soviet foreign policy.[76]

Maoism vs. Foreign Extremism

The attempts by intelligence analysts and courts to clarify the question whether the members of foreign communist parties in the Federal Republic could be affected by the KPD ban of 1956 betrayed the serious dilemmas that international communism posed to state officials

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[74]"BKA Bonn to Bundesministerium des Innern" (April 18th, 1977), BArch, B/106/124172.
[75]"Informationsvermerk," BArch, B/106/124172.
[76]See Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979*.

who sought a national solution to a transnational problem. But they also betrayed an awareness—at least in practice—of people of color in West Germany as political subjects: if the Iranian communist *Tudeh* party could serve as a political substitute for the West German KPD, Iranian communists were in fact acknowledged as part of a West German political culture.

Ironically, while the literature on the West German "Global Sixties" has begun to uncover the ways in which people of color contributed to the upheavals of 1968 and played a key part in the constitution of the West German New Left, the literature on West German Maoism entirely ignores non-German Maoists (unless they were members of the West German parties). Tim Brown, for example, constitutes West German Maoist groups as altogether the exception to the creativity and internationalism of the Global Sixties.[77] In the memoirs of former Maoists, the foreign parties that operated in West Germany played almost no part.[78]

In this, the narratives about Maoism in 1970s West Germany curiously mirror the categories of West German intelligence agencies at the time. While the KPD's alleged influence on guest workers in the 1960s constituted a major aspect of intelligence analysts' assessment of the threat of communism in the Federal Republic, by the 1970s the category of foreign extremism was neatly separated from left-wing extremism and Maoism. At a conference of intelligence analysts largely devoted to the investigation of Arab terrorism in Cologne federal and state-level LfV analysts discussed the observation of Arabs in Germany. They noted that this observation must not be limited to terrorist groups and activities, but all groups that *are* or *could be* banned for goals hostile to the constitution. Special targets for investi-

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[77]Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties.*
[78]See Aly, *Unser Kampf*; Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt.*

gations were the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) and the General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPA).

Foreign Maoist organizations are largely missing from reports on left-wing extremism. Yet, this is not to say that state organs were unaware that foreign groups understood themselves as Maoists or "pro-Chinese." Reports often contained references to the "foreign New Left" and explicitly pointed to their Maoism. A 1974 report on the "security-threatening ambitions of foreigners" compiled by the BfV, praised the success of the outlawing of the GUPS and GUPA after the 1972 attack on the Munich Olympics, but clarified that the Maoist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) continued to maintain underground cells in West German Cities.[79] The report further points out that the PFLP collaborated with Turkish and Japanese terrorists. More generally, the report stated that the foreign Left was dominated by Maoists.[80] The LfV Baden-Württemberg circulated detailed lists of the Maoist factions of the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU) including the identities of their leaders and their bases in German cities and their contacts to the Maoist KPD, KPD/ML, KBW but also the PLO and PFLP.[81] Carl-Dieter Spranger, who had led the question to the federal government about a ban of the KBW, participated in a similar formal question to the government about the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union: What did the government know about violent demonstrations of the CISNU? How should the CISNU be understood ideologically? And what is the government doing to ban

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[79]Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Sicherheitsgefährdende Bestrebungen von Ausländern" (1974), HStaSt, EA 2/303 Bü 133, 107, p. 19.

[80]Ibid., p. 24.

[81]"Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg to Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg: Conföderation Iranischer Studenten National Union (CISNU), HStaSt Stuttgart, EA 2/303 Bü 835, 67.

the CISNU mirrored the earlier inquiry about the KBW. But instead of inquiring about the organization's attitude towards the constitutional order, the authors of the questions inquired whether statements by the CISNU were interfering with West German domestic policies.[82] In a press release following the response by the federal government, the CSU complained that the government downplayed the extent to which the CISNU was a communist organization.[83]

The separation of Maoists into West German Maoist parties and "foreign extremists" is doubly mirrored in broader state practices in the 1970s and the historiographies that emerged in their aftermath. Quinn Slobodian has pointed out that the expansion of executive power in the 1970s is usually explained with the state's response to the "German Autumn"—as the culmination of the conflict with between the RAF and the West German state is commonly called. But a similar expansion of the executive happened five years before 1977 in what Slobodian calls the "Arab Autumn," most notably represented by the 1972 attack on the Munich Olympics by the Palestinian Black September. Historians have had an extremely difficult time fitting the story of the "Arab Autumn" into the history of West German terrorism even though it preceded the showdown of the "German Autumn" in 1977 by 5 years, produced a massive political response and transformed the relationship of the legislative and executive branch in West Germany.[84] A subsequent wave of more than 200 deportations

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[82]"Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Dregger, Erhard (Bad Schwalbach), Spranger, Dr. Langguth, Dr. Marx, Biechele, Dr. Laufs und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU" (February 27th, 1979), HStaSt, EA 2/303 Bü 836, p. 4.

[83]"CSU Presse-Mitteilungen: Nachrichten aus der CSU-Landesgruppe im Deutschen Bundestag" (March 9th, 1979), HStaSt, EA 2/303 Bü 836, p.1.

[84]Slobodian, "The Borders of the Rechtsstaat in the Arab Autumn," June 1, 2013. Slobodian mobilizes the term of the "Arab Autumn" as analogous to the term "German Autumn" which has come to refer to both the showdown of the conflict between the Red Army Faction and the State in 1977. In this series of events, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) demanded the freeing of several high-ranking members of the RAF. When their operation fails because the West German Border Protection Group 9 (GSG9) successfully ends a hostage crisis at the airport in Mogadishu, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe and Imrgard Schröder attempt suicide in their maximum security cells in Stuttgart Stammheim.

and the ban of several Palestinian organizations in Germany including the GUPS and the GUPA as well as broad protests organized by Maoists, Christian student groups and a coalition formed by Iranian, Palestinian and West German students against the Foreigner Law continue to play no role in the narratives of West German terrorism in the 1970s.[85]

To be sure, for actors within the state concerned with investigating and preventing both terrorism and communist and Maoist organization in West Germany, the separation of West German groups and foreign groups makes sense for strategic reasons. After all, the 1965 foreigner law and its revisions in the 1970s provided shortcuts for the criminalization and deportation of political foreign actors. And in the case of Maoist organizations, foreign groups never had the opportunity to shield themselves from prosecution by attaining the status of political parties according to the German constitution in the same way the West German Maoist parties did.

But these strategies matched a tendency among European bureaucrats in the 1970s to deny the reality of multicultural societies. Rita Chin has pointed out that across Western Europe administrators throughout the decade conceived of policies regarding foreigners "behind closed doors" as to not call much attention to the new reality of their societies as increasingly diverse. Among the cases she examines, West Germany stands out as an extreme case to such an extent that she terms the West German approach to managing a multicultural society "willful neglect."[86] A similar reluctance (or refusal) to acknowledge the reality of an increasingly multicultural society is betrayed by West German politician's understanding of foreign activism and Maoism: rather than acknowledging the ever-more in-

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[85]Slobodian, p. 215.

[86]Chin, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe*, Chapter 2 in particular.

terconnected world of global politics, they repeated the mantra that foreigners were bringing "non-German" conflicts to the Federal Republic and that these conflicts ought to be kept out.[87]

What is less clear is why the central role that foreign Maoist actors and groups played in the 1970s Maoist Left in West Germany—a role that is the subject of the next three chapters—has been so thoroughly erased from the memories of former West German Maoists and their archives. Perhaps a complaint by the LfV Baden-Württemberg from 1982 provides a clue to the archival enigma: in discussing the difficulties of cataloging activities by "Turkish left-wing extremists," the office points out that frequently Germans apply for permits for their events and sign responsible for their publications to shield their Turkish peers from prosecution.[88] An early meeting record of a group of German Studies majors just about to form a local cell of a minor Maoist party in Freiburg contains another clue: "A hint by our foreign comrade D. gives reason to be careful about naming foreign comrades. (Moles of foreign intelligence services!)"[89]

This chapter has argued that when West German Maoist parties appeared on the political stage of the Federal Republic in the early 1970s, they were infused with significance by a broader history of German-German competition and the transnational character of communism that stretches back at least to the KPD ban in 1956. The ban of the West German Communist Party by the Federal Constitutional Court not only fueled the formation of an

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[87]On a corresponding statement by Hans-Dietrich Genscher in his prohibition order against the GUPS and GUPA, see Slobodian, "The Borders of the Rechtsstaat in the Arab Autumn," June 1, 2013, p. 212. Similar statements were made by Franz Josef Strauß and others.

[88]"Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg to Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg" (July 20th, 1982), HStaSt, EA 2/303 Bü 838, 35.

[89]"Rotzeg-Go Protokoll der Plenumssitzung vom 25.11." (November 25th, 1970), Archiv für Soziale Bewegungen Freiburg (ASB Freiburg hereafter), 5.4.6.III, RotZeG 1970.

extra-parliamentary opposition by leaving no party-political space Left of the SPD but also continued to shape concerns about communism and communist interference in factories, the army, and education. State responses and public debates about Maoist parties in West Germany in the 1970s were crucially shaped not only by the legacy of the KPD ban, but also by the conflict over *Ostpolitik* and later considerations over West Germany's foreign policy vis-à-vis the Sino-Soviet Split.

Foreign activists were—from the beginning—part of this story, be it in the 1960s when officials and intelligence analysts tried to determine if the KPD ban could apply to any member of a foreign communist party in West Germany, or the states' anxieties to keep foreign political problems outside West Germany's borders. Yet, state policies, intelligence priorities, and the well-intended practices of West German allies to their foreign peers converged to erase foreign activists' significance from the story of the Global 1970s, which, as the next three chapters will show, were crucial in bringing decolonization to West Germany.

CHAPTER 5

China and Albania: Alternative Diplomacies

> Never will I forget the minutes, when I witnessed in Peking the announcement of
> the death of the great proletarian revolutionary and great leader of the Chinese
> people, Comrade Mao Zedong. Shortly after 4pm on September 9th, I heard
> suppressed commotion reach my office from the corridor of the building. Quiet
> voices, running people. My Chinese colleagues left one after the other. And then,
> suddenly, it was quiet. Only a male voice could be heard from the radio. I got
> up and entered the corridor. Almost all doors to offices to the left and the right
> of my office were closed. Usually it is afternoon break time between 4-4:15pm
> and the mood is relaxed. But now, everywhere there was only this carrying voice
> from the speaker on the radio, whom I didn't understand because I do not speak
> Chinese."[1]

This report reached the Communist League of West Germany (KBW) from a member of its

so-called "cell in Peking." The author had been working as a "foreign expert" with Beijing's

foreign language publishing unit since 1974 and had relied on the KBW's organizational

infrastructure to recruit other members to work at the publisher, the newspaper *Peking*

Review, and the international broadcaster *Radio Peking*. His reports for the KBW's paper

were the product of interviews, visits to various Chinese institutions, and conversations with

Chinese officials. In turn, articles published by the KBW were discussed with his Chinese

colleagues. Undoubtedly, the KBW's people in Beijing were an asset to the party. After

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[1]"Kräuter, Peking" [untitled; no date], Archiv für Außerparlamentarische Opporition und Soziale Bewegungen (APO-Archiv hereafter), APO-KBW 037.

all, the landscape of West German Maoism was characterized by intense competition over recognition by Mao's China.

China and its ally in Europe since the Sino-Soviet Split, the People's Republic of Albania were highly sought-after partners for the West German parties. In turn, the parties labor for various propaganda organs in need of German speakers in both countries. Another party, the KPD/ML, had been Maoist from its inception in 1968 until the Sino-Albanian split around 1978. But it is likely that the party's Maoism had always been determined by its close connection with the PPSh.[2] From the 1970s onwards, the KPD/ML sent members for two-year stays in the Albanian capital to collaborate in the production of Radio Tirana's West German broadcast, as well as to supply the raw material for reports on the state of Marxism-Leninism in West Germany to be broadcast around the world. Other Maoist parties—losing out to the KPD/ML because the Albanian party had no interest in juggling the various West German factions—sought their luck elsewhere and with varying success earned some attention from the Chinese Communist Party.

This chapter makes two arguments. In their attempts to collaborate with the Albanian and Chinese parties, West German Maoists entered into spaces of transnational collaboration in which exchanges with socialist state officials and Maoists from other countries allowed for the making of Maoism as a common experience. All the same, the broadcasts of Radio Tirana—building as they did on the often sectarian publications of Albania-aligned parties across the world—created a kind of global echo chamber for Marxists-Leninists that allowed Leftists from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe to feel that they were part of a global

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[2]The KPD/ML was playing a big part in Albania's GDR strategy. See Chapter 3 for an exploration of this collaboration.

revolutionary movement. Up to 1978, this movement was explicitly Maoist. In this sense, the chapter rejects arguments in the literature on Maoism in Europe that claim that Maoism was a mere projection of European hopes and dreams onto a blank canvas.[3] I have argued in other chapters that these arguments deprive actors from the Global South of their agency. But in this chapter, I want to suggest that even if only very few activists visited China in the 1970s, Maoism was a global community produced in spaces of transnational collaboration.

The second argument of this chapter concerns the ways in which activists often moved within fields determined by ideological constraints produced by the global Cold War. In their day to day activism, this meant that their local activities were infused with layers of global meaning. On the other hand, this also meant that they were frequently left to their own devices when making sense of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, which—in the 1970s—grew increasingly pragmatic. The often contingent alliances and chances for collaboration between West German Maoists and the Albanian Party of Labor or the Chinese Communist Party determined Maoists' political positions to a much greater extent than indeterminate European "hopes and dreams." On the one hand, recognition by foreign parties translated into political capital at home. On the other hand, the dependence on that recognition meant that when there emerged widespread disillusionment with the Chinese communist party, those parties that had the strongest connections to Beijing found themselves in a difficult position. As I will show, this meant that when the Chinese Communist Party had increasingly alienated people from the Global South originally attracted to Mao's

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[3]The most explicit version of this argument is put forward by Richard Wolin on Maoism on the French Left. See Richard Wolin, *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); interestingly, even Quinn Slobodian's chapter on China contains a version of this argument (albeit with respect to the 1960s Left). See Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, ch. 6.

promise to stand besides the people of the "Third World," it was the marginal KPD/ML rather than the much larger KBW that gained increasing sympathy among Iranian students.

I will begin this chapter by illustrating the way in which the KPD/ML emerged as the partner party of the Albanian Party of Labor in West Germany while other West German Maoist parties were competing over China's good will. I use the term "alternative diplomacy" for the tendency of these parties to appear as the legitimate representatives of a "socialist Germany." I then move to debates among West German and "foreign" Maoists over the shifting foreign policies of the PRC and pay particular attention to the debates about the Three Worlds Theory. Following Enver Hoxha's critique of Chinese "revisionism," many foreign Maoists as well as the KPD/ML condemned the Chinese policies, while KPD and KBW became increasingly unpopular among certain factions of foreign Maoists. Perhaps even more relevant for West German Maoists was China's support for Pinochet in Chile. This move appeared to test West German Maoists' anti-fascist commitments. Strikingly, they allowed Chinese diplomats to convince them that collaborations with right-wing authoritarians against the USSR was analogous to Stalin's collaboration with the West against Nazism three-and-a-half decades before. West German Leftists have sometimes been said to broaden the category of fascism to include Israel's policies in the Middle East or the American War in Vietnam. I argue in the context of the Chile debates that instead, West Germans lost the authority over the meaning of fascism in the context of decolonization.

Albania: "The Great Beacon of Socialism in Europe"

Although it was the Communist Party of Germany/Marxists-Leninists (KPD/ML) that eventually became the West German party most closely associated with the Albanian Party of Labor (PPSh), two small and short-lived parties both looked towards Albania long before the KPD/ML was founded in 1968: The Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) and the Free Socialist Party (FSP, later FSP/ML). The former was founded in 1965, the latter in 1967. Both parties described themselves as following the teachings of Mao Zedong and aligned themselves with Albania from the very beginning.

In 1965, Reimann himself wrote to the Albanian Party of Labor (PPSh) to announce the foundation of the new party. The letter congratulated the PPSh on the 21st anniversary of the People's Republic of Albania, and for Albania's victory over "revisionism." According to the letter, the MLPD was fighting both the regimes in East Germany and West Germany. In the party newspaper, *Sozialistisches Deutschland*, Reimann claimed to have revealed the revisionism of the East Germans. Consequently, he announced that the MLPD was taking up the legacy of Weimar KPD leader Ernst Thälmann and Stalin. On June 1st, 1965, the letter goes on, the MLPD inaugurated the "Movement June 1st" which would end in the liberation of West Berlin from its "illegal occupation by US imperialism and its Anglo-French lackeys." The letter praised Albania's cooperation with China and condemned the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence." For the future, Reimann predicted that just as the fight against fascism led to the People's Republic of Albania, the fight against US imperialism will lead to a People's Republic of Germany.[4] In a further letter in 1966, Reimann specifically criticizes the prospect

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[4]"Erich Reimann an den Ersten Sekretär der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens, Genossen Enver Hoxha, den Präsidenten des Präsidiums der Volkskammer der VR Albaniens, Genossen Haxhi Lleshi, den Vorsitzen-

of dialog between the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The letter lashes out against Tito, Soviet "revisionists," Indian "reactionaries," and those who advocate for peace in Vietnam. At the heart of the letter was a parallel construction of the Albanian struggle to remain independent after World War II and the situation in West Germany: just as the East Germans made peace with Tito, the "arch enemy of Albania," they were now going to make peace with West Germany, thereby legitimizing US occupation.[5]

The close alignment with Albania is perhaps unsurprising. Already in 1964, Reimann had travelled to Albania. While still in Durres, Reimann wrote to the Central Committee thanking them for their hospitality. He emphasized that he and the "English comrades" had greatly enjoyed the tour of the museum of the Party of Labor and the museum "Lenin-Stalin." The letter is, of course, indicative of the limitations on (or, more likely, complete absence of) freedom of movement inside the People's Republic for the West European visitors. But it also indicates that these trips served as transnational spaces in which visitors from different countries negotiated their impressions together.[6]

British Leftists also played a part in the second party's encounter with Albania. In May 1967, the newspaper *Die Wahrheit* announced the founding of the Free Socialist Party (FSP) in Frankfurt/Main. Apparently, the founding congress on April 22nd was plagued by chaos. The paper reported that "revisionists" loyal to Moscow showed up with a large contingent and sought to prevent the founding of the party. Whatever the actual situation on April

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den des Ministerrats er VR Albanien, Genossen Mehmet Shehu" (1965), Arkivi Qnedror I Partisë (AQP hereafter), Fondi 14, Viti 1965, Lista 2, Dosja 1, p. 1-5.

[5] Memo "Stellungnahme der MLPD zum SED-SPD Dialog," (1966), APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1966, Lista 3, Dosja 1.

[6] "Erich Reimann an das Zentralkomitee der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens" (August 1st, 1964), APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1964, Lista 1, Dosja 1, p. 12.

22nd, the paper likened the FSP founders to "the young Chinese" and their antagonists to the "leaders of the CPSU who are sending fascist thugs after the young Chinese."[7] The article described the party as aspiring to a socialist Germany "true to the teachings of Mao Zedong."[8]

The East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) estimated the size of the party at 15-20 after many of the attendees at the founding conference had left the room in protest. They had demanded that the members of the committee that had called the convention reveal their full biographies. After they failed to do so, the majority of the 100 people who showed up left and only returned to disrupt the press conference after the party had been established. It is unclear from the report if the participants also had political objections to the founding of the party as insinuated by *Die Wahrheit.* But another detail revealed in the Stasi report sheds some light on why the attendees were asked to provide so much personal information: the Stasi's report itself was compiled from articles in the West German press as well as information obtained from the broader social milieu surrounding the newly founded party. It is certainly possible that the audience was suspicious of the three members calling the convention. Out of the three members of the founding committee, Günter Ackermann, Werner Henzeroth, Gertrud Langerecht, Ackermann and Henzeroth were elected to first and second secretary of the central committee and were joined by Ruth Henzeroth as third member.[9]

A Stasi informant built a relationship with Ruth Henzeroth and was instructed to become close to Ackermann. The Stasi sought information on the goals of the party, connections to

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[7]"Revisionisten - Rowdys - Renegaten," *Die Wahrheit*, No. 1, May 1967 p. 1.

[8]Ibid.

[9]"Sachstandsbericht," (November 11th, 1967), Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU hereafter), MfS, HA XX, Nr. 18382.

the GDR, connections to other organizations in West Germany and abroad, and eventually to infiltrate the central committee, to "reveal its politics as hostile to workers, to prevent its growth, and to destroy the party."[10] Regarding foreign connections, the Stasi reported that the FSP/ML entertained a relationship to the United Kingdom, where the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Britain was founded in September 1967. According to the report, the FSP/ML held regular consultations with the British party.

Following the founding of the party, Günther Ackermann, First Secretary of the Central Committee, wrote to Albania to announce the new party and articulated a desire for "brotherly collaboration." He also sent a joint communique with the MLOB as well as a letter about the collaboration between the two parties. Ackermann followed up on his letter with a visit to Albania in November of the same year. Following his trip, Ackermann published his impressions about Albania in *Die Wahrheit* in December 1967. His report is largely representative of the genre of travel reports that West European communists penned about China and Albania throughout the 1970s. It mixes impressions from visits to factories and museums with conversations with (likely pre-selected) representatives of "the people." Ackermann praised the accomplishments of Albanian production despite the end of Eastern Bloc aid and recounted anecdotes about foreign experts who were impressed by the pace of Albanian developments. But more than anything, Ackermann's report was characterized by a fascination with violence beginning with the title "One Hand on the Rifle, the Other on the Spade." He paints a romantic picture of hard work and the people's will to fight:

> All aggressors get bloody heads in Albania because the people are vigilant and led by the PPSH which is deeply rooted in the hearts of workers and peasants. The PPSh and at its helm Enver Hoxha have led the people well so far and will

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[10]Ibid., p. 0029.

continue to lead them well. Nothing will distract them from Marxism-Leninism. Despite all hospitality, the Albanian people are not willing to give up their accomplishments—fought for with blood and tears, with effort and diligence. The Albanian people want and need peace so that they can build their fatherland. But it is equally willing and preparing to defend their freedom weapons in hand. So the slogan I chose as a title must not be understood merely as metaphorical but literal.[11]

I will return to the language of travel reports below. For now, it suffices to say that the very earliest West German Maoist organizations in the Federal Republic sought from the outset to establish relationships with the Albanian Party of Labor (PPSh), the PRC's only ally in Europe. Indeed, Ackermann's report, besides the admiration for the people's willingness to fight, contained references to Chinese aid picked up after the Sino-Soviet split: Chinese experts were involved in the construction of a power plant he visited and China provided the machinery. He also got to visit the textile state combine "Mao Tse-Tung."[12]

Although the FSP/ML and the MLPD did not survive the 1960s, the connections built by Günter Ackermann lived on in one of most long-lived Maoist parties in West Germany: the KPD/ML. The Albanian Party of Labor's files on relationships with foreign parties from the year 1968 contain both a press release about the founding of the KPD/ML as a merging of the FSP/ML, Ernst Aust's *Gruppe Roter Morgen* and a few other groups and a statement by a loose association of Marxist-Leninists in Hamburg criticizing the founding of the party as premature.[13] In February 1969, Ernst Aust, then writing on behalf of the Politburo of the KPD/ML, reported of initial successes of the party. According to his letter, the KPD/ML was

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[11]"Eine Hand am Gewehr, die Andere am Spaten," *Die Wahrheit*, No. 8, December 1967, [no page numbers].

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ernst Aust, Emil Ludwig, Werner Heutzeroth, "Pressemitteilung," APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1968, Lista 5, Dosja 1, p. 1-2; "Der Hamburger Initiativausschuss zur Bildung einer Marxistisch-Leninistischen Liga, für Westdeutschland und Westberlin gibt folgende Erklärung ab," APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1968, Lista 5, Dosja 1, p. 3-4.

gaining traction among disillusioned members of the illegal KPD. Nonetheless, there were vicious attacks from the Left against the party leadership. Considering these difficulties, Aust asked for help. Perhaps the PPSh would be willing to meet with a delegation of the KPD/ML in the Albanian embassy in Vienna to discuss their problems in detail such that the West Germans could learn from the Albanians? Apart from Aust, the delegation proposed consisted of Willi Dickhut, a former member of the KPD from the interwar period, another former member of the KPD who had joined in the 1950s, and Eszra Gerhard—a leader of the youth group *Rote Garde* in West Berlin that was close to the KPD/ML.[14]

Despite some difficulties with the mail traffic between Albania and the Federal Republic, the communications of the KPD/ML did not remain one-sided. In April 1969, *Rruga E Partisë* [Road of the Party] wrote to the editorial board of the KPD/ML's *Roter Morgen* and asked for ten issues of every number of the paper and invited a delegation of the newspaper to Albania. During the visit, the West Germans could get to know the country but also exchange views between the two papers.[15] Although the reply by Aust apparently did not make it to Tirana, eventually he accepted the invitation to Albania in a second reply in July 1969. The difficulties in communicating meant that the trip could not be scheduled for June as originally planned.[16]

The delegation finally travelled to Albania from November 27th to December 4th coinciding with the 25th anniversary of Albania's liberation from Nazi occupation during World

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[14]"KPD/ML an das Zentralkomitee der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens" (February 25th, 1969), AQP, Fondi 14, Viti 1969, Lista 6, Dosja 1, p. 1-4.

[15]"Redaksia, Rruge e Partisë (Organ teorik dhe politik i. K. Q. të P. P. SH.) an die Redaktion "Roter Morgen," Zentralorgan der Kommnistischen Partei Deutschlands Marxisten-Leninisten" (April 28th, 1969), AQP, Fondi 14, Viti 1969, Dosja 1, Lista 6, p. 5-6.

[16]"Redaktion Roter Morgen an 'Rruga e Partise (Organ teorik dhe politik i K. Q. the P. P. SH.) Redaktisia" (July 16th, 1969), APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1969, Lista 6, Dosja 1, p. 10-11.

War II. Simultaneously, *Roter Morgen* published a long article about the accomplishments

of the People's Republic of Albania their November issue. At this point, although the paper

announced a series on Albania that would include impressions of the party's delegation to the

country, the article did not include any such impressions but was limited to food prices and

the economy, some of which was based reports by Enver Hoxha, some of which on the semi-

annual report of the state planning commission.[17] Nonetheless, the subsequent issue—which

consists entirely of a speech by Enver Hoxha during the liberation festivities—reports that

the celebrations were attended by delegations of numerous Marxist-Leninist parties from

around the world.[18]

Following this initial relationship, the KPD/ML and the PPSh remained in regular con-

tact throughout the 1970s. The Central State Archives in Tirana contain regular briefs

about conversations between Behar Shtylla, assistant secretary to the central committee of

the PPSh and a delegation of the KPD/ML that always included Erst Aust and in 1970

also included Günter Ackermann.[19] In 1974, Erst Aust met with "Comrade Hoxha" for a

consultation.[20]

Other parties reached out to the PPSh. In 1971, another party, the *Kommunistischer*

Arbeiterbund/ML (KAB/ML) wrote to congratulate the PPSh on the 30th anniversary of

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[17]"Erfolge sprechen für sich: Albanien heute," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands / Marxisten-Leninisten KPD/ML*, November/1. December issue, 1969, p. 17-24.

[18]"Eine bedeutsame Rede Enver Hoxhas," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands / Marxisten-Leninisten KPD/ML*, Vol. 3, 2. December Issue 1969, p. 1.

[19]Transcript: Conversation between Behar Stylla, Assistant Secretary to the Central Committee of the PPSh and a Delegation of the KPD/ML, APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1970, Lista 2, Dosja 1, p. 1-22.

[20]Transcript: Conversation between Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Party of Labor and a Delegation of the Communist Party of Germany (M-L) on June 5th, 1974, APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1974, Lista 6, Dosja 4, p. 1-19.

its founding. The language, not atypical of West German Maoists in general, suggests that the party understood itself to represent the West German Working class:

> On the occasion of the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the glorious and correct Party of Labor of Albania, the Communist Workers Federation (Marxists-Leninists) West Germany sends you best wishes and fraternal greetings in the name of the working class and the masses in the Federal Republic.[21]

The rest of the letter contains praise for the Party of Labor. What is significant here is the pretense to speak for the West German working class, a habit that occasionally led to some confusion.

Similarly, when in 1970 the KPD/ML split into two factions, the newly formed *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands/Marxisten-Leninisten (Zentralbüro)* (KPD/ML (ZB)) wrote to the party of labor sending their solidarity but also advocating for Albanian sympathy with their side. The letter referenced a meeting between a member of their newly formed organization and an attaché to the Albanian Embassy in East Berlin. The new central office of the party had made good progress, the letter announced, and now it was time to reach out to the brother parties. The letter closes with a description of materials attached and the request to send a date for a prospective meeting.[22]

But it was Ernst Aust's KPD/ML, not the new party, that was invited to festivities in Tirana repeatedly and that appeared to have won the competition for an alliance with the Albanians early on. This was still true in the 1980s, when the party's *Roter Morgen* served as Radio Tirana's source for revolutionary news from West Germany.[23]

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[21]"Thomas Quest im Namen des Zentralkomitees des Kommunistischen Arbeiterbundes (Marxisten-Leninisten) an die Botschaft der Volksrepublik Albanien in Österreich" (October 29th, 1971), APQ Fondi 14, Viti 1971, Lista 3, Dosja 4, p. 12-13.

[22]"Zentralbüro der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands Marxisten-Leninisten an das ZK der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens" (September 16th, 1970), APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1970, Lista 2, Dosja 4, p. 7-9.

[23]Biweekly Plans for the Newsrooms West, East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, AQSh, Fondi 509, Viti 1983, Dosja 33, p. 44.

In turn, the Albanian Party of Labor was an important part of the KPD/ML's performance of revolutionary politics. In a letter by Ernst Aust in 1972 to the PPSh's Central Committee, Aust reported about a recent party congress. Again, the language characterizes the situation in West Germany as pre-revolutionary. Aust writes of the great coming "class battles" and claims that "even in West Germany, the main tendency is revolution."[24] He argued that although the party was young, they were always fighting on the front lines and preparing "the masses for armed struggle against West German imperialism."[25] Most importantly, though, the party would have to continue to be vigilant against modern "revisionism" because without its defeat, revolution would be impossible. Presumably referencing the German Democratic Republic, Aust wrote that "especially the German working class has had the bitterest of experience with these traitors."[26]

Moreover, the struggle for revisionism was not only to be waged against the party's external enemies. Rather, revisionism as well as opportunism was a problem in the KPD/ML's own ranks as well. He claims that there had been attempts to disintegrate the party from the inside, but that those elements have been purged from the party. The consequence was that there was now an even closer connection between the party and the masses. Moreover, the party had learned an important lesson: "If one doesn't ruthlessly remove the enemies of the party, the party cannot wage successful struggle."[27]

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[24]"Zentralkomitee Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands / Marxisten-Leninisten KPD/ML an das Zentralkomitee der Partei der Arbeit Albaniens" [no date but filed under 1972], AQP, Fondi 14, Viti 1972, Lista 4, Dosja 4, p. 5-6.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

Finally, Aust expressed his gratitude to the PPSh for their help in building the KPD/ML and in consulting the West German party on the "political line."[28] Whatever actual influence the Albanian party had on decisions to "purge" hostile elements from the party, and whether or not the PPSh bought the KPD/ML's revolutionary posturing, what is significant here is the PPSh's importance to the KPD/ML's performance of revolutionary politics of a particularly Stalinist type. And the PPSh played along with the KPD/ML's attempts to represent the true party of Marxism-Leninism in the Federal Republic and the party that is the legitimate representative of the West German working class.

I have laid out one possible motive for this in Chapter 3: KPD/ML cadres were willing to assist Albanian efforts to create pro-Albanian and pro-Chinese opposition in East Germany, collaborating with employees of the embassy and smuggling German language materials into the country. It is also plausible that the PPSh viewed the KPD/ML as a public relations opportunity because they were willing to distribute and republish Albanian propaganda in German.

But more importantly, the KPD/ML provided a pool of native German speakers that turned out to be useful for Albania's international broadcasting project Radio Tirana. The German-language broadcast of the international station went on air eight times several days of the week for thirty minutes. The schedule indicated that Mondays were reserved for a segment called "The Marxist-Leninist World Movement is Growing and Strengthening," Wednesdays were dedicated to Albania's progress within five-year-plans, Thursdays the sta-

[28]Ibid.

tion broadcast news on the liberation struggles of the peoples of the world, and on the weekends arts and music dominated the programming.[29]

In 1972, the KPD/ML sent members to Albania to work at Radio Tirana. Katharina from the central department of organization of the KPD/ML suggested two party members: Comrade F. and his wife C. About F. she wrote that he was a good candidate because he was loyal and reliable. "He has, in all difficult situations in the party—for example during the purge of the liquidationists—always taken a Bolshevist stand that was free from revisionism of all shades."[30] F.'s wife C. was not yet a member of the KPD/ML but of the youth organization *Rote Garde.* Like F. she had proven reliable in carrying out tasks bestowed on her by the party.

But contrary to what one might expect, this letter of recommendation did not stop with praise for the reliability of the comrades. On the contrary, the party's purpose for sending members to Albania to work for two years at Radio Tirana was the effect such work would have on the member's subjectivities. About F. the letter says that his class position was petty-bourgeois because he was a student of medicine. Worse yet, this class position had effects on his class consciousness. To be sure, F. diligently fought against the effects of his class position but nonetheless showed a "tendency towards intellectualism." His recommendation closed with confidence, "we are certain that comrade F. will be raised—through the influence of our glorious brother party—to overcome these errors."[31]

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[29] "Deutschsprachiges Programm von Radio Tirana," in *Ausgewählte Sendungen von Radio Tirana*, November/December 1971, [back cover].

[30] "A. Katharina Schubert-Loy, Zentrale Organisationsabteilung der KPD/ML an die Partei der Arbeit Albaniens" [nodate], APQ, Fondi 14, Viti 1972, Lista 4, Dosja 5, p. 2-3.

[31] Ibid.

C. had started from a much more difficult class position. While F. came from a family of peasants, C.'s parents worked for the state. Her parents as well as her colleagues (she was a teacher) had profoundly negative influence on her, such that she considered a career instead of understanding the necessity for revolution. Just as in the case of F., the party expressed optimism that the stay in Albania would have a positive effect on the character development of C.[32]

With regular exchanges and consultations between the KPD/ML and the PPSh, the KPD/ML's contribution of content for Radio Tirana, and their collaboration in the production of the international radio programs, the KPD/ML effectively established themselves as representing the "revolutionary West Germany." This early conclusion of the competition notwithstanding, Albania became an important destination for West German Maoists beyond Aust's party. Maoists across different factions engaged in a kind of revolutionary "tourism" to Albania, the only "truly socialist" country in Europe according to Chinese pronouncements. As long as Albania and China remained closely aligned in the early-to-mid 1970s, Albania served as China's proxy to West German Maoists who travelled to the country and diligently reported about the "accomplishments" of Albanian socialism. Only when in 1978 Enver Hoxha sharply criticized Chinese foreign policy and denounced the so-called Three Worlds Theory, the KPD/ML's close association with Albania meant that it became increasingly isolated among *West German* Maoists.

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[32]Ibid.

"Proletarian Tourism:" Trips to Albania

Other groups' interactions with Albania remained largely limited to organized trips to the country and work in the *Gesellschaft der Freunde Albaniens* (GFA). In 1974, following a trip to Albania organized by the GFA, N.,[33] a member of the Communist League of West Germany (KBW) petitioned the Central Committee to take a more active stand on the KBW's work within the GFA. According to the appeal, there were numerous reasons why communists should support trips to Albania in general. On the Albanian side, the trips helped establish friendly relations with the people of hostile governments and thereby reduced the risk of Western attacks on the country. West German communists could learn about and from the construction of socialist Albania and "be hardened" in their socialist convictions.[34] More importantly, the struggle of the Albanian people under the leadership of the PPSh and Enver Hoxha would help convince those on the Left that were "infected by idealism and anti-party currents of the student movement."[35]

The travel programming was put together by the Albanian Committee for Cultural and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries and included trips to factories and production facilities, a children's hospital, a farm, a pioneer camp and a number of museums including the Lenin-Stalin Museum, the Museum of Atheism, and memorials to the partisans of World War II. The groups were assigned a member of the committee fluent in their language. The GFA in turn provided two tour guides that discussed the programming details with the Albanian translator upon arrival. According to the petition to the KBW's CC, however,

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[33]Anonymized.

[34]Letter to the KBW's Central Committee "Bericht über die Albanienreise einer GFA-Reisegruppe" (August 31st, 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056, p. 1.

[35]Ibid.

the basic skeleton of the programming suggested by the Albanian committee was always the same.[36]

But it was in the mediating between the GFA's travel groups and the Albanian committee that N. located some serious obstacles to the success of the trips. The problem, to his mind, was the dominant role of the KPD/ML in the friendship society. He attached a report by the KBW group in West Berlin, which had decided to create a KBW faction inside the GFA. The report explained that the GFA was founded and headquartered in Munich but had sections in several West German cities. Although the organization shared some members with the KPD/ML, the report didn't suggest that the GFA was in any way identical with the party or simply one of their mass organizations.[37] A brief about the organization sent to the head of the KBW's central committee—Joscha Schmierer—made a similar argument: "I think that the rumor that the GFA is a front organization of the KPD/ML is false, first because of the GFA's correct practice and second, because there are several board members that are unorganized descendants of the student movement."[38] He went on to describe the GFA as an autonomous organization.[39]

Nonetheless, the relatively strong position of the KPD/ML posed a problem. N.'s letter suggested that the KPD/ML largely controlled the boards of the national organization as

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[36]Ibid., p. 1-2.

[37]"Bericht über die Gesellschaft der Freunde Albaniens e.V.," APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056.

[38]"[Anonymized in source] an den Sekretär des ZK des KBW" (December 4th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056.

[39]I will return to this theme in Chapter 6 with respect to the Africa societies. Even at the time, rumors were circulating that these solidarity groups were simply controlled by one or the other Maoist party. Sometimes, these rumors have found their way into the literature on West German Maoism. See for example Reinhart Kössler and Henning Melber, "The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: A (Self-)Critical Retrospective," in *Germany's Africa Policy Revisited: Interests, Images and Incrementalism*, ed. Ulf Engel and Robert Kappel (Munster & Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 103–26. But as I will show in this section, they were actually much more complicated organizations in which the different parties entered into political conflict and struggles over power.

well as the local groups. More importantly, the two West German tour leaders from the GFA were both members of the KPD/ML. This had some effect on the selection process for the travel groups. The leaders as well as participants of the trips were selected by the national board in Munich according to unknown criteria. But members of the KPD/AO were not allowed. During the preparations, the letter said, the leadership pretends that the GFA consisted only of party-less progressive people. This led to problems along the road because—as he put it—those visitors that were not organized in communist parties were entirely blindsided by the harsh fights during the trips. According to N., these fights resulted in a split within the group during the trip with those visitors that were members or sympathizers of the KPD/ML in one faction and everybody else in the other faction.[40]

Towards the end, the drama turned public. Some member from the KPD/ML in Bremen accused another participant in the trip of being "an enemy of Albania and a Trotzkyist."[41] The ensuing fights convinced the non-KPD/ML faction of the group to write a public statement about this and post the statement in the hotel lobby because other travel groups that were housed in the hotel at the same time needed to know that the GFA did not tolerate enemies of Albania. In other words, the reputation of the GFA was at stake and could only be saved by writing a statement and making it public. Ultimately, N. acknowledged that the statement was likely a mistake (and promised to undergo self-criticism within the GFA). Nonetheless, the letter also suggests that the KBW took a leadership role in the faction of the travel group that was not affiliated with the KPD/ML.[42]

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[40]Letter to the KBW's Central Committee "Bericht über die Albanienreise einer GFA-Reisegruppe" (August 31st, 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056, p. 2.

[41]Ibid., p. 3.

[42]Ibid., p. 2.

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Leaving aside the sectarian undertones of N's letter, the letter reveals the hotel as a public space in which groups friendly to Albania encountered each other in close quarters while trying to learn from the project of building socialism in Albania. N's letter included a transcript of instructions that a member of the Albanian committee had given regarding the work in the GFA in general. This transcript reveals that Albania supported the formation of friendship societies in Western Europe with such societies existing in France, Sweden, Austria, Italy and Germany and other places. The official stressed that friendship societies must be open to some people that do not agree with the ideology of the state: "Naturally members of such a society cannot be fascists, provocateurs, or cadres of a revisionist party," but he emphasized that instead of limiting the membership of the friendship societies, the societies should include people of different political persuasions such that the communist party could then win the masses within the organization.[43] N. (and other members) were anxious that travel groups from other countries could think the GFA tolerated enemies of Albania, or worse, Trotskyists. This anxiety reveals the extent to which the GFA was not only concerned with the "political capital" they might gain among activists in West Germany but also with their international reputation as representatives of a certain revolutionary faction of West German society.

Ironically, the conflict between KBW and KPD/ML was in direct contradiction to the expectations of the Albanian committee. Because the friendship societies were supposed to be open to all people sympathetic to Albania, the official made clear that the society should not be a site for political struggle among its members.[44] However, the accusation that the

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[43]"Gespräch mit einem Vertreter des albanischen Komitees für kulturelle und freundschaftliche Beziehungen mit dem Ausland," (September 1st, 1972), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056, p. 1-2.

[44]Ibid., p. 2.

KPD/ML forced their political line onto the friendship society was the very foundation of the petition to have a more coordinated nation-wide KBW policy to work within the friendship society. Indeed, one of the position papers on the friendship society to the Central Committee of the KBW suggests that one of the main objectives of the party's work in the friendship society should be to form a coalition within the group to ensure "that the public relations of the GFA doesn't pursue wrong tendencies."[45]

In reality, the KBW didn't merely seek to cooperate in the friendship society, but to develop its own relationship with the Albanian committee. The problem was that the committee didn't want competing friendship societies. As the same position paper suggested, "the Albanian comrades obviously view the GFA as the competent friendship society."[46] Indications of this were the special treatment the GFA travel groups were granted and the fact that they were treated similarly to the KPD/ML travel groups.[47] In the above-mentioned conversation with a member of the Albanian Committee on Cultural and Friendly Relations, the official made his preference clear as well. In Germany, there was a friendship society and that was the GFA. He saw no sense in founding new and competing organizations and instead encouraged the centralization of the GFA and the organization of its local groups under one national society. All friends of Albania had to be united in this one society.[48]

For the KBW this meant that to establish relationships with the PPSh, they had to work within the GFA. And some people within the context of the KBW certainly thought they should. H., a member of the KBW-affiliated *Kommunistische Hochschulgruppe* (KHG) in

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[45]"[Anonymized in source] an den Sekretär des ZK des KBW" (December 4th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid.

[48]"Gespräch mit einem Vertreter des albanischen Komitees für kulturelle und freundschaftliche Beziehungen mit dem Ausland," (September 1st, 1972), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 052, p. 1-2.

West Berlin was so impressed by his GFA-organized trip to Albania that upon his return he implored the KBW's *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* to build a relationship with the Albanian committee. He thought it would be crucial that besides the GFA, the KBW also organized their own trips to Albania, and that the KBW sought to travel to Albania to explain their political positions.[49] And N.'s petition to the Central Committee is evidence for the same desire to take leadership among those people who were friendly to Albania and (hopefully) susceptible to the KBW's own brand of Marxism-Leninism.

But as far as establishing a closer relationship with the PPSh goes, there is no evidence that the KBW ever succeeded. The files at the Albanian National Archives contain no evidence of a relationship akin to that between the KPD/ML and the PPSh. And it appears that although the KBW did locally organize within different branches of the GFA, they remained largely unsuccessful in establishing themselves vis-à-vis the KPD/ML. For example, in 1974 a number of members of the KBW organized an independent trip to Albania through an Austrian travel agency. After returning to West Germany, one of the organizers wrote an extensive report on the trip for the regional leadership and the KBW's Central Committee. The report complained about the behavior of the KPD/ML in Albania, which appeared to police all other West German travel groups. One travel group from West Berlin had brought a book of songs they said illustrated past and present class struggles in Germany. A member of the KPD/ML borrowed the book. But when returning the book, they had identified one song as "an insult for the West German working class."[50] Consequently, they tore up the whole book. During the writers' own trip to Albania, the KBW group held a discussion with

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[49]"H. an die Redaktion der KVZ" (November 12th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056.

[50]"Bericht an die Ortsleitung und das ZK des KBW zur Reise einer Gruppe Frankfurter Genossen des KBW und seiner Massenorganisationen im Sommer 1974 nach Albanien," APO-Arciv, APO-KBW 056, p. 8-9. The song was from the squatters movement in Berlin.

a group from Italy. The next morning, the KPD/ML showed up to investigate the content of the discussion. When the KBW members confronted their Albanian translators, it turned out that two of them "represented the line of the KPD/ML" and regularly read their newspaper. The third translator expressed some regret that the KBW had not learned from Albanian history and was attempting to splinter the communist movement.[51] Nonetheless, the KBW writer expressed sympathy: after all, when the PPSh had officially recognized the KPD/ML in 1968, they were the only significant party that was founded in the context of anti-revisionist debates in West Germany. Moreover, the PPSh was struggling with international isolation. Surely, he thought, once a proper and united communist party emerged from class struggle in West Germany, the PPSh would recognize them.[52]

All that being said, the KBW's leadership seems to have maintained a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the Albania question. The above report, which set out to explore why the KBW-organized trip to Albania was a disaster, complained that while individual colleagues had been encouraging, neither the regional leadership nor any other part of the organization had properly prepared the travelers for their journey. The result was that, according to the report, most participants treated their trip to Albania like an exotic vacation rather than studying in advance and preparing questions for visits in factories and museums. But given the limited amount of materials available about the state of things in Albania, that is precisely the work KBW members should have been doing to bring back information for the West German people and the working class.[53]

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[51]Ibid., p. 9.
[52]Ibid.
[53]Ibid., p. 2.

There is more evidence for the organization's ambivalence than just its failure to properly train cadres in advance of trips, though. While many members travelled to Albania in the context of GFA-organized trips and sent reports to be published in the party's national newspaper, the *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*, they met with a mixed response. While some reports were printed, one editor complained about the nature of the travel reports themselves. Responding apologetically to a woman who had submitted a report, the editors of the KVZ contrasted the quantity of Albania articles with their lack of quality. Few of these articles "leave a lively impression. Often one hardly notices that the comrades were there and asked questions."[54] Other shortcomings were the failure to address prejudices vis-à-vis Albania in the Federal Republic and that most articles didn't address the process of building socialism but only reiterated results and accomplishments.[55]

There were other problems with the reports from Albania. Generally, the KVZ seemed unhappy with the level of analysis more broadly. One article draft by a male KBW traveler entitled "How the Struggle against Bourgeois Ideology is fought in Socialism" is one of the rare reports in which the author actually deals with their own encounter with Albanian socialism. The topic of the article is an Albanian campaign against "indifference," which involved a campaign against long hair and Western fashion (including certain skirt lengths and pants styles). This posed problems for the KBW, which in parts emerged from the 1960s student movement. In the 1960s, long hair had been a symbol of anti-authoritarian resistance against teachers and bosses for many, including those who made their way into the

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[54]"Kommunistische Volkszeitung, Redaktion an [Anonymized] (1974?), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056.
[55]Ibid.

KBW. Consequently, the report stated that the issue of long hair was discussed extensively during the preparation for the trip.

The travelers had difficulty understanding why their long hair could be banned in socialism "where the greatest possible and free development of people is guaranteed."[56] He goes on to write that during the trip, however, it became clear to them why socialism had to be protected from long hair. After being thoroughly educated about the campaign, the writer went on:

> After we were informed extensively about the Campaign in Albania, after we understood much better, that our long hair was unwanted because it was a sign of decadent capitalist subculture and above all, after we saw the great revolutionary momentum of the Albanian people, all difficulties regarding short hair were overcome. (Two travelers went so far as [the word voluntarily is crossed out here -ds] having their hair cut even shorter after a week.[57]

After returning to West Germany, the writer had now fully comprehended that his long hair promoted individualism and prevented political engagement![58]

Why make so much of the hair? Another report explained that for foreigners traveling to Albania, long hair and beards were not allowed. Although this seemed to be known to the travel groups, travelers appeared to rely on the haircut on offer at the airport in Tirana. Similarly, appropriate dress could be purchased there. The report acknowledged that this might seem prude and dictatorial but there are several reasons for this measure. First was the historical context of long hair, which went back to Ottoman rule. During this time, the report stated, only the elites were allowed to wear long hair. The second reason was a suspicion that long hair was somehow related to the youth's indifference to class

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[56]"Wie im Sozialismus der Kampf gegen die Bürgerliche Ideologie geführt wird," APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056, p. 1.

[57]Ibid., p. 7.

[58]Ibid.

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struggle.[59] More importantly, though, the report claimed that long hair was not banned for Albanian youth. Rather, youth with long hair are publicly criticized and "educated" with wall newspapers about foreign fashion. Should a young person become too interested in fashion—to the extent that their interest in socialism waned—"comrades and friends" would "help" them understand their error.[60]

The utterly uncritical absorption of these euphemisms for public shaming in the first report—the one that claimed its writer had seen the error of his ways and could now understand that a campaign against long hair was equally necessary in West Germany—did not go over well with the editors of the *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*. In a reply to the article proposal, one editor wrote that "in short, I find the article about the liberalism campaign shit."[61] The editor pointed out that it was nice and good that the writer had been converted by the campaign, but criticized that at no point could the reader actually understand *why* it was convincing. That Albania was trying to defend itself against foreign influence had to be explained historically, there was nothing self-evident about this. The story about two travelers getting even shorter haircuts was "ridiculous" according to the editor. More than anything, "the article was an example of uncritical enthusiasm, which explains nothing and consequently can't convince."[62]

It appears that the tone of the letter meant that the editor had to undergo self-criticism. In a subsequent letter the editor apologized for his "subjectivist style" which obscured the constructive criticism of the article. After a discussion of this issue with the standing com-

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[59]"Bericht an die Ortsleitung und das ZK des KBW zur Reise einer Gruppe Frankfurter Genossen des KBW und seiner Massenorganisationen im Sommer 1974 nach Albanien," APO-Arciv, APO-KBW 056, p. 7.
[60]Ibid.
[61]"KVZ Redaktion an [Anonymized]." (Likely late 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056.
[62]Ibid.

mittee of the central committee of the KBW, he could see that it was wrong to send this letter.[63] This admission of guilt was followed by a more elaborate set of suggestions to make the article more convincing.

Be that as it may, this exchange is indicative of the difficulties that emerged from the KBW's trips to Albania and the way in which travelers reported on the country. But there was another, more structural problem with the way in which the trips would help West German Maoists understand China's ally in Europe. An early report on the GFA (cited above) pointed out a serious structural flaw in the way in which visits to Albanian factories could translate into the KBW's (and the West German masses') understanding of socialist progress in the country: among the members of the GFA and consequently among the travelers there were very few workers, who were actually familiar with the processes of industrial production. "Intellectuals are fairly helpless in assessing, for example, socialist industrial production."

For the KBW, Albania lost significance after the Sino-Albanian split in 1978, when the archival documents relating to the KBW's activities within the GFA stop. Up to that point, people repeatedly urged the leadership to pay more attention to Albania. A self-critical document from 1975 reiterates all the earlier issues: the KBW was not invested enough in Albania and thereby surrendered solidarity work to the KPD/ML, which could use the GFA as a ground for recruitment. Another problem was that work in the GFA, however, did ultimately look like support for the KPD/ML. Finally, in contrast to the Chinese friendship

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[63]"KVZ Redaktion an [Anonymized]," (Likely late 1974), APO-Archiv APO-KBW 056.

societies, the GFA enjoyed the full support of the PPSh as the only legitimate friendship society.[64]

Seeing is Believing: Maoists in China

Meanwhile, the KBW was more successful in developing a relationship with the People's Republic of China albeit by fortuitous accident. Again, the roots of this relationship are to be found within the student movement of the 1960s rather than the specific developments of the KBW. Although the national organization of the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS) was dissolved at a gathering in Frankfurt in March, 1970, various local groups continued to exist. In Heidelberg, the death knell to the local group came on Thursday, June 25th when the interior ministry of Baden-Württemberg banned the organization by decree. Although there had been continuous calls for a ban of the SDS, the Heidelberg group's mobilizations around the attendance of then World Bank-president and former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during a development congress only a week before certainly contributed. The protests had been part of a larger campaign against the Cabora Bassa in Mozambique.[65]

According to newspaper reports at the time, the protests began with paint bombs but soon escalated into violence on both sides, with the police utilizing truncheons and protesters making liberal use of the materials found at a local construction site.[66] An article in *Der Spiegel* called the reasoning of the ban into question and cast serious doubts on its sustainability: the arguments of the state were weak because it alleged that illegal activity was

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[64]"Albanien-Freundschaftsarbeit, GFA-Problem" (June 1st, 1975), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 056, p. 1.

[65]Niels Seibert, *Vergessene Proteste: Internationalismus und Antirassismus 1964-1983* (Münster: Unrast, 2008), p. 84. On Cabora Bassa see also Chapter 7.

[66]"Schlag gegen die Uni: Das SDS Verbot löst keine Hochschulprobleme," *Die Zeit*, No. 27, July 3rd, 1970.

the goal of the SDS as an organization on the basis that 15 out of 600 demonstrators had been identified as participants in violence and members of the SDS.[67] For the SDS in Heidelberg, this question would soon be moot considering its dissolution and the emergence of the *Gruppe Neues Rotes Forum/Mannheim Heidelberg*, one of the predecessors of the KBW.

Nonetheless, the events at the "Heidelberg Streetfight," as a local newspaper dubbed the occasion,[68] had consequences for the KBW in another respect. Out of the 15 persons identified, one woman and eight men were subsequently sentenced to prison without parole, among them five future cadres of the KBW.[69] The ruling (and its being upheld on appeal) disrupted the organization's hierarchy. Among the five were long-term leader Hans-Gerhart "Joscha" Schmierer, the editor of the KBW's newspaper *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*, Burkhart Braunbehrens, the editor of its theoretical journal, Dietrich Hildebrandt, and Uwe Kräuter. In 1975, the prosecution in Heidelberg ordered their imprisonment and four of them subsequently served their sentences.[70]

Not so Uwe Kräuter. The first verdict in the trial had come down in 1972. In 1974—faced with the prospect of eight months imprisonment without parole—Kräuter decided to take up a somewhat unusual offer at the time: one of his professors had made it possible for him to work at the *Institut für Fremdsprachliche Literatur* in Beijing.[71] Housed in the city's friendship hotel for foreign visitors, Kräuter began his work at the publishing house while

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[67] "Schlichter Schluß: SDS-Verbot," *Der Spiegel*, No. 27, June 29th, 1970, p. 73.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Seibert

[70] "Haftantritt Angeordnet: Erklärung des Zentralen Komitees des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland zur Anordnung des Haftantritts für fünf der Angeklagten im Cabora Bassa/MacNamara-Prozeß," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland*, Vol. 3, No. 23, p. 1-2. See also Hinck, *Wir waren wie Maschinen.*

[71] See Uwe Kräuter, *So ist die Revolution, mein Freund: Wie ich vom deutschen Maoisten zum Liebling der Chinesen wurde* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2012).

quickly establishing himself as a point of contact between West German Maoists and the PRC.

More specifically, after the KBW's founding in 1973, Uwe Kräuter began sending articles for publication in the party's newspaper, the *Kommunistische Volkszeitung.* Sensitive to rules for foreign journalists, the KVZ responded with measured enthusiasm: On the one hand, it was exciting to begin an article with "Peking" as the correspondent's location. On the other hand, the party had a vague sense that foreign journalists might have to be registered as such and urged him to clear his work for the KVZ with the "Chinese comrades."[72] However, only two weeks later, Kräuter replied with encouraging news: after asking the head of his department whether he could write about China for the paper, it only took fifteen minutes for his boss to return with permission to do so. To Kräuter's mind, this was validation that the paper had already made a positive impression among his colleagues. "Feel free to put Peking in the front and UK under correspondences."[73]

Apart from Kräuter's own journalism and his increasingly important role in mediating between the PRC and the KBW, he provided the opportunity for his Chinese comrades to voice criticism of the ways in which West German Maoists imagined and wrote about the People's Republic. In one of his early letters to the KVZ, Kräuter turned to an article about the Chinese Justice system published in January 1974. The article was based on conversations with somebody who had been in China during the Cultural Revolution and alleged that there were only about 70 prisoners in China and they essentially governed the prison themselves. Many crimes were solved without prisons. The article describes the

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[72]"Burkhart Braunbehrens an Uwe Kräuter" (August 28th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.
[73]"Uwe Kräuter an Burkhart Braunbehrens" (September 9th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

hypothetical case in which a worker had stolen because they were in need. Consequently, the article alleged, the worker was be criticized by a factory council and the fellow workers practiced self-criticism because they ignored the workers needs.[74]

Although fanciful articles about China were common in Maoist publications (not only in West Germany), China did not merely serve as an empty (and quiet) projection screen. Articles in the KVZ were distributed to the *Peking Review*, Beijing University, and an institute for foreign languages and discussed. Some KBW material was translated into Chinese. More importantly, colleagues at Kräuter's work offered feedback on the article about the justice system. According to him, they ridiculed the article "because in it the People's Republic appears as a paradise rather than a dictatorship."[75] Note that there is nothing in Kräuter's letter that dictatorship—in this context—was used in a pejorative sense. As will become clear later on, this was not the only instance in which Chinese officials attempted to shape the narratives about "building socialism" in the PRC.

But the editors of the KVZ themselves were concerned to avoid mere ideological pipe dreams. In the same letter that warned Kräuter about clearing his journalism with the appropriate authorities, Burkhart Braunbehrens criticized Kräuter's correspondence for being too abstract. If the "West German masses" ought to learn from the Chinese revolution, it wasn't enough to talk about China's victory over the capitalist way. Rather, Braunbehrens asked for concrete examples of what the capitalist way meant and what people did differently. "While writing your report, you always have to imagine you are in a discussion about the People's Republic of China while selling the KVZ."[76] In such a situation, Braunbehrens

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[74]"Strafen in der VR China," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland*, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 23rd, 1974, p. 9.

[75]"Uwe Kräuter an Burkhart Braunbehrens" (October 14th, 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

[76]"Burkhart Braunbehrens an Uwe Kräuter" (August 28th, 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

continued, "you cannot merely argue with the political terms."[77] In October, he elaborated the problem further. If the categories remained too abstract and left too much room for interpretation, they ran risk of "confirming the denunciations by the bourgeoisie."[78] He went on:

> I can illustrate this with a short example. We had a report from a comrade who had been to the PRC. Without any further elaboration he wrote that political consciousness was one criterium for pay. When the colleagues read this here, you can imagine that this is not self-evident to them at all. Or that they say, we're familiar with that, he who submits more gets more, or they say this is terror of conviction.[79]

What does this story reveal about the character of West German-Chinese knowledge production within the context of Maoism as a transnational community? On the one hand, it is tempting to dismiss the passage as evidence that West German Maoists were simply looking for ways to obscure forms of "ideological terror." This interpretation is largely consistent with the projection thesis that says that Maoists were ignoring or ignorant of the realities of Chinese communism and projected their hopes and dreams onto China, which was conveniently far away and offered few possibilities to disabuse Maoists of their misconceptions.

Yet, I argue that the conversations about the nature of reports from China reveal quite a sophisticated understanding of a problem Maoists were confronting in their work: the same abstract categories that allowed for a community of language that could span the globe, likely in part *because* revisionism could mean very different things in different contexts (Soviet

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[77]Ibid.

[78]Burkhart Braunbehrens to Uwe Kräuter (October 18th, 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

[79]Ibid. The term "Gesinnungsterror" has no equivalent in English and the translation "terror of conviction" is both clumsy and somewhat imprecise. The idea is that people are forced into certain ways of thinking, a form of ideological terror. In an editorial for an issue of *Bioethics*, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer have suggested the term "political correctness." Given the particular political charge of this term, I have resisted that translation because other than Kuhse and Singer, I do not share the view that contemporary debates about harmful effects of certain forms of speech qualifies as a form of ideological terror. See Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, "Editorial," *Bioethics* 13, no. 2 (2004): iii–vi.

support for the wrong liberation army in Zimbabwe, oppression in East Germany, the lapse of "Stalin's protection of Albania from Yugoslav territorial ambitions," etc.) meant that the same language could also quite easily be filled with content by the West German press or the GDR-oriented *German Communist Party* (DKP). In other words, the language that allowed Maoists and "Third World" critics of Soviet communism to immediately identify with each other could not be relied on when trying to communicate with people who don't already identify with Maoism. This is why Braunbehrens demanded that reports about Chinese success stories had to be as concrete as possible and not overly rely on the abstract categories of Maoism.

Moreover, what the projection hypothesis does not adequately grasp is the extent to which Maoists sought the help of Chinese officials for solving this problem. In the same letter, Braunbehrens instructs Kräuter to not only always keep in mind the questions people asked when they bought the party paper, but to carry these questions into discussions with his colleagues at the institute in Beijing, because their own experiences would make for the best answers.[80]

These were not purely academic concerns. From the beginning of the KBW's existence, the PRC's foreign policy caused confusion not only to outsiders and Leftists unsympathetic to Maoism, but to many members within different branches of the KBW themselves. One particularly contentious issue was China's response to the 1973 coup in Chile during which the left-wing Salvador Allende was deposed and replaced by military general Augusto Pinochet. Considering that many members of the KBW worked in Chile solidarity committees even before the organization's founding, China's recognition of Pinochet as legitimate and ex-

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[80]"Burkhart Braunbehrens an Uwe Kräuter" (October 18th, 1974), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

pulsion of Allende's diplomats from China was sure to be puzzling to many West German Maoists. And indeed local cells of the organization wrote to the leadership asking how China could possibly justify this. The *Aufbauzelle Handel* in Wiesbaden, the capital of Hesse, asked for clarification because there was "great confusion" among its membership regarding not only China's policy vis-à-vis Chile, but also their recognition of the military governments of Greece and Spain.[81] Similarly, the *Aufbauzelle Druck*, also from Wiesbaden, pointed out that in their cell, the question of whether the foreign policy of the PRC was "correct" had been challenged in recent discussions. Concretely, they asked whether China's continued diplomatic relationship to Chile did not "weaken the front against the military junta?"[82] A KBW member from Mannheim, one of the cities from which the KBW emerged, pointed out that from the abstract principles of Chinese foreign policy, he had a hard time making the connection to their concrete policies.[83]

A few issues earlier, the *KVZ* had laid out the principles of Chinese foreign policy. In general, the PRC sought solidarity with socialist countries, peaceful coexistence with non-socialist countries, and sought to support oppressed countries. However, the article suggested that the Soviet Union had changed its tune towards China and was therefore a danger to peace. vis-à-vis the European "imperialist countries," China saw them as developing a certain level of independence from the superpowers and this was—in their eyes—generally a positive development.[84]

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[81] "Diplomatische Beziehungen der VR China und Chile," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland*, Vol. 1, No. 7, November 22nd, 1973, p. 12.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] "Die Politik der Volksrepublik Chinas gegenüber den Supermächten und den imperialistischen Ländern Europas," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland*, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 10th, 1973, p. 14.

In truth, the foreign policy of the PRC was undergoing an apparent shift just around the time that the KBW was founded through the consolidation of several regional Marxist-Leninist groups in 1973. Already in 1972, US President Richard Nixon travelled to China to meet with Mao Zedong. In 1974, China's later leader Deng Xiaoping laid out the Three Worlds Theory, a doctrine that was hereafter to govern China's foreign policy.[85] According to this theory, the Cold War world was to be divided into three: the United States and the Soviet Union—the so-called superpowers striving for world hegemony—constituted the "First World". The "Third World" was made up of the "developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America." The developed countries that belong to neither of these were the "Second World". The "Third World" was the main force for world revolution while the "First World" was the source of a new world war that seemed inevitable. This division of the world would allow for strategic alliances with countries of the "Second World", which in some cases remained colonial powers, but were at the same time "in varying degrees controlled, threatened or bullied by the one super power or the other."[86] Although Deng Xiaoping insisted on the danger of *both* superpowers, he put particular emphasis on explaining the imperialist character of the Soviet Union which sought resource extraction and preyed on the weakness of particular countries in the "Third World." China's support for authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Chile were part of a foreign policy realignment that favored collaboration with parts of the West against the Soviet Union. This realignment would later—in 1978—also provide the ideological content of the Sino-Albanian split.[87]

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[85]Deng Xiaoping, *Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-Ping, at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974).

[86]Xiaoping, p. 4.

[87]Note that ideological content in this context doesn't necessarily mean "cause." It is beyond the scope of this study to determine the cause of the split.

It is hardly surprising that these shifts caused unrest among West German Leftists. After all, China, the ideological reference point for the party-building projects of the 1970s seemed to suddenly support those regimes the Left referred to as 'fascist.' After being urged repeatedly to address the concrete questions that "the masses" had about Chinese foreign policy directly in discussions with Chinese comrades, Uwe Kräuter—in 1975—sent notes from conversations with high-ranking CPC members back to the KBW in West Germany. Beginning with restating the principles of the Three Worlds theory, one Chinese official addressed the concerns of foreign Marxist-Leninists head on. He reminded people that the goal was to defeat the "First World", to win the Second, and to unite with the "Third World." But the concrete content for what exactly this means differed from country to country. While the Chinese thought that globally, the USSR was the main enemy, Kräuter learned that in individual countries views might differ. In Latin America, it may well be that US imperialism might have to be defeated first. This had to be evaluated on a case by case basis.

More urgently, the speaker addressed a contradiction that many European Marxists-Leninists struggled with: "How should one evaluate the relationship between the fight against the superpowers and the fight against one's own bourgeoisie?"[88] Again, there was no straight-forward answer. On the one hand, the fight against superpowers was in the interest of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe and that fight should be encouraged. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie ought to be fought if Marxist-Leninists "want to make revolution."[89] The speaker urged the parties in Europe to negotiate this complicated struggle themselves but also to

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[88]Uwe Kräuter, "Gespräch vom 6.9.75 über Außenpolitik," APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037, p. 2-3.
[89]Ibid., p. 3.

not neglect the important task of exposing the peace talk of the Soviet Union and preparing their own people for war. How these contradictory impulses would have to be resolved in concrete national cases had to be worked out by Marxists-Leninists in the specific countries and—most importantly—through struggle.[90]

What is worth noting in this context, though, is the specific interplay of ideological guidelines from the top and the ground work cadres had to do to then reconcile abstract principles with everyday news. Rather than clear top-down instructions, abstract ideological principles left plenty of room for concrete interpretations. In his conversation with the above cadre, Uwe Kräuter learned that the Chinese Communist Party would not do this work for foreign Marxist-Leninist parties. They themselves had to figure out how to apply the abstract principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete circumstances of their national situation and the specific class situation in their countries.[91]

So how was this supposed to appease critics of China's foreign policy in the early-to-mid 1970s? Remarkably, what was at the heart of Kräuter's transcript was a particular kind of separation of foreign policy from ideology. The specific contradiction between supporting the bourgeoisie in their fight against the two superpowers and the opposition to the bourgeoisie for the sake of revolution, the speaker claimed, did not exist in China. Because China had already established a dictatorship of the proletariat, it could separate the foreign policy needs of statehood from the abstract truths of Marxism-Leninism. He informed Kräuter that foreign policy happens outside the domain of ideological principles and consequently,

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[90]Ibid., p. 6.
[91]Ibid.

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the Chinese party did not expect European Marxist-Leninist parties to agree with, support, or adopt Chinas foreign policy.[92]

If that was unsatisfactory because it meant the absence of clear instructions, Kräuters message allows for a closer look at the way in which Chinese ideology worked for Maoists in entirely different situations. His accompanying letter points out to the readers at home that the three conversations were with three officials from different institutions and their interpretation of the international question differed substantially. Kräuter further explains

> The party leadership only provides guidelines. Theoretical clarification of specific questions is left to the cadres at different levels [of the state]. The people generally only discuss the general guidelines, but not the specifics.[93]

In other words, the negotiations of the implications of Marxist-Leninist ideology was much more complicated than discussions of the party's ideological rigidity and dogmatism would lead one to suspect. It is precisely *because* Maoist ideology lacked practical specificity that it served to connect such a large variety of actors.

Despite the communications from China and attempts to shape the narratives about China in Maoist ideological publications, articles about China largely remained abstract and highly ideological. In the absence of satisfying responses from China, the parties did not fill the gaps with their own imagination (although often they filled them with stories relayed to them from China). But in this context it is worth keeping in mind that the mainstream press had their own way of compensating for the lack of available information about China. As Quinn Slobodian has pointed out in *Foreign Front*, much coverage of the Cultural Revolution was ripe with racist stereotypes and language of the yellow peril. And as

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[92]Uwe Kräuter, "Gespräch vom 6.9.75 über Außenpolitik," APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.
[93]"Uwe Kräuter an Genossen Maier" (October 7th, 1975), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

he has argued—convincingly in my view—much of the early New Left enthusiasm for China had less to do with China as source of political doctrine than with attempts to counter the racism in the press.[94] By the 1970s, however, Maoist parties in West Germany did attempt to "learn from the Chinese experiences" even though the communication remained imperfect and was plagued by misunderstandings, propaganda, and the difficulties of a shared language outlined above.

Kräuter, who was finally made a full member of the KBW after serving as a correspondent for the KVZ for two years, did not remain the only member of the KBW in China. Just as in Albania, so in China, too, the foreign radio service employed native speakers for their programming in foreign languages, and translators were needed for the *Peking Review* and foreign language press. Tasked with identifying candidates, Kräuter turned to the central committee of the KBW. The result was the establishment of a small group of the KBW—eventually called "the cell."

The Sino-Albanian Split and the Three Worlds Theory

The detailed archives of the KBW continue to reveal the competitive nature of their relationships with the People's Republics of Albania and China. As had been evident from the conflicts within the German-Albanian Friendship Society as well as the Society of German Friends of China, other groups were always looming in the background. Over the years, Uwe

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[94]See Gehrig, "(Re-)Configuring Mao."; Sebastian Gehrig, Barbara Mittler, and Felix Wemheuer, eds., *Kulturrevolution als Vorbild? Maoismen im deutschsprachigen Raum* (Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang, 2008); Paul, "Das Mao-Porträt."; Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012.

Kräuter continuously pressed the KBW's leadership to take up contact with the Chinese embassy in Switzerland to arrange for an official delegation of the party to China. Long before this finally materialized, Kräuter wrote in 1975 that due to the international situation, this visit is now more important than ever. Although Kräuter had been meaning to press for this for a while, the ultimate reason was provided by a rival Maoist party. A delegation of the KPD/ML—already officially affiliated with Albania—was currently in China.[95] A year before, Kräuter had been asked to prepare a presentation on all the Marxist-Leninist organizations in West Germany and decided to talk about KBW, KPD, and KPD/ML.

When in the late 1970s the Albanian Party of Labor criticized China's foreign policy, the relationships that had been formed throughout the last decade would take on increasing ideological weight. Despite conflicts within the parties—as for example the above-illustrated "confusion" about the Three Worlds within local KBW groups—the official positions of the West German parties largely followed the ideological mandates of the respective allied parties in China and Albania. This was not lost on the authors of a comprehensive report on Maoist organizations in West Germany for the Stasi. According to the report, the attempts by different Maoist parties to make contact were met with varying success. "Only the KPD/ML was recognized as the sole "Marxist-Leninist party of Germany" by Albania, while China favored the KPD despite attempts for recognition by KPD/ML and KBW."[96]

The Three Worlds Theory played a particularly important role in these conflicts following the death of Mao Zedong and the increasing tension between the Chinese and the Albanian parties. The division of the world into superpowers, other imperialist countries, and the

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[95]"Uwe Kräuter an Burkhart Braunbehrens" (May 15th, 1975), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 037.

[96]"Analyse der Erfassung, Auswertung und Aufbereitung politisch-operativ bedeutsamer ERkenntnisse über maoistische und trotzkistische Organisationen, Gruppen und Kräfte," [undated], BStU, MfS, BV Berlin, AKG Nr. 4386," p. 108.

"Third World" was meant to encourage alliances between "Third World" and Europe against the Soviet Union. While KPD and KBW adopted the Three Worlds Theory, the KPD/ML rejected it as in stark conflict with revolutionary politics. After all—and as a Chinese official had explained to Uwe Kräuter—in the fight against the two superpowers, it was sometimes desirable to suspend class struggle in the "Second World" for the benefit of unity against the Soviet Union. In an article published late in 1977, the KPD/ML wrote—in accordance with the official Albanian position—that competing Maoist parties had abandoned the principle of class war in the name of collaboration between the Third and "Second World"s. Perhaps more importantly, the article complained that the theory was completely inadequate to properly account for *political* differences within the Third and "Second World"s. Not only did it offer no way to distinguish between socialist and capitalist countries within Europe—the example here being Albania, which neither neatly fits the pattern of an imperialist country of the Second, nor a colonized country of the "Third World"—but it also allowed for no differences between communist China and "fascist" Chile.[97] Although the article was mainly aimed at the KPD, which followed China's foreign policy closely, this would soon become an issue of contention between KPD/ML and KBW as well.

The conflict over the Three Worlds Theory would decisively shape the relationship between West German Maoists and organizations of foreign students, most importantly the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. The positions of KPD/ML, KPD, and KBW were molded by their divergent levels of success in gaining the recognition of their Chinese and Albanian mother parties. For Maoists from abroad, the stakes were, however,

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[97]"Zu den Thesen der neuen opportunistischen Strömung: Die 'Theorie der drei Welten' — eine marxistisch-leninistische Theorie?," in *Roter Morgen*, No 11, 1977, Supplement, p. 1-3.

often entirely different. As we will see, although the KPD/ML's reaction to the Three Worlds theory was born of their dogmatic adherence to the Albanian position, which by the late 1970s entailed the defense of Stalinism against China, their positions appealed to the Iranian activists for entirely different reasons: shifts in Chinese foreign policy that looked like a turn away from the opposition in Chile and Iran proved unpalatable for Iranian student activists in exile and led to a realignment of the already weakened Confederation with the pro-Albanian party.

CHAPTER 6

The Middle East: Anti-Capitalism and Space

By January 1978, the *Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (LfV) in Baden-Württemberg identified four distinct splinter groups of the Confederation of Iranian Students (CISNU) operating in West Germany, three of which the office classified as Maoist.[1] A report by the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) from the same year had a slightly more subtle ideological read on the CISNU: it identified many more factions, but categorized them largely around two main groups: the Federation of Iranian Students in the Federal Republic and West Berlin (FIS) and the Confederation of Iranian Students in the Federal Republic and West Berlin (CIS). According to Stasi intelligence work, the former had turned against China after Mao's death and sided with Albania in the Sino-Albanian Split, while the latter continued to align itself with China and had adopted the Three Worlds theory.[2] As it turns out, both agencies sought to impose clear ideological schemas on an organization that was in continuous flux throughout the 1970s. But such classification proved challenging because although China

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[1]Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg an das Innenministerium Baden-Württemberg "Conföderation Iranischer Studenten National Union" (January 26th, 1978), Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (HStaSt hereafter), EA 2/303, Bü 835, p. 67.

[2]Hauptabteilung XX/AGA, "Durch IM wurde folgende augenblickliche Struktur der politischen iranischen Organisatioen in Westberlin/BRD bekannt" (August 10th, 1978), Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU hereafter), MfS, HA II, Nr. 28751, p. 140-144.

provided an ideological reference point for the far Left—whose Cold War political geographies had been disrupted by processes of decolonization—China's foreign policy in the 1970s left Maoists around the world with increasingly difficult contradictions and in turn allowed for myriad contradictory positions.

In the West German case, the following episode is perhaps the most well-known. In 1975, the chairman of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) travelled to China to receive an audience with Mao Zedong himself. Franz Josef Strauß was one of a number of conservative politicians in West Germany who discovered China as an ally against the Soviet Union and—in the domestic context discussed in Chapter 4—against Social Democratic attempts to normalize relationships with the GDR.[3] Along with a number of Chinese foreign policy decisions (e.g. Nixon's visit in 1972 or China's expulsion of Allende's diplomats after the Pinochet coup in Chile), Strauß's visit posed a challenge to Maoists on the ground in West Germany, who now had to come up with ways to justify Mao's apparent flirtation with politicians that the Left had protested repeatedly.

Ernst Aust, chairman of the Communist Party of Germany/Marxists-Leninists (KPD/ML) saw no fault in Mao's invitation and subsequently called for a broad united front against both Cold War superpowers. Indeed, he argued that Marxists-Leninists should not shy away from alliances with nationalists. About Strauß's visit in particular, Aust wrote that he welcomed "that Comrade Mao Zedong received Strauß" because Strauß sought to strengthen West Germany's position vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union.[4] Anticipating a

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[3]On conservatives traveling to China, see Bösch, *Zeitenwende 1979*. For Maoism's significance for the context of *Ostpolitik*, see Chapter 4.

[4]Ernst Aust, "Kampf der Wachsenden Kriegsgefahr durch die zwei Supermächte: Für die Einheit und Solidarität der Europäischen Völker," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der KPD/Marxisten-Leninisten* (April 5th, 1975), 6-7.

massive backlash from within the Left, Aust explained that, in general, nationalists are potential allies as long as they oppose those forces that truly betray "the progressive, patriotic, and cultural traditions of the nation."[5]

The ensuing debate saw some groups side with Aust's KPD/ML, but there was also a fair amount of outrage among Maoist parties about Aust's suggestion that revolutionary workers should rally to defend their country against the USSR. The Communist League of West Germany (KBW) responded in their party newspaper by publishing a scathing critique calling Aust's rallying cry a dangerous mistake. The KBW argued that those calling for the defense of the country had distorted the imperialist character of the West German state. Second, they were wrong in assuming that the Soviet Union was the greatest danger to peace in the world. Third, and most importantly, the doctrine of national defense surrendered the principles of Marxism-Leninism according to which the best defense against world war was proletarian revolution.[6] Other groups that intervened in the debate included the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), and the Communist Federation (KB).[7]

If this were an exclusively German story, it would be tempting to invoke Germany's Nazi past in explaining why some Maoists in West Germany found themselves arguing for defending the "fatherland." But, as this chapter shows, it is not just a German story at all. Chinese foreign policy posed profound ideological contradictions for Maoists around

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[5]Ibid.

[6]Joscha Schmierer, "Ein gefährlicher Irrweg: Propagandierung der Vaterlandsverteidigung in der Imperialistischen Bundesrepublik," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* (April 24th, 1975), p. 8. See also Joscha Schmierer, "Verteidigung des BRD-Imperialismus: Gruppe Roter Morgen auf halben Weg zurück," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* (May 22, 1975), p. 16.

[7]"Das war vorrauszusehen: KPD/ML schwenkt offen ins Lager der Vaterlandsverteidiger," *Arbeiterkampf: Arbeiterzeitung des Kommunistischen Bundes* (April 29th, 1975), p. 28-29. "Wettrennen der 'Vaterlandsverteidiger': 'KPD' spurtet nach vorn," *Arbeiterkampf: Arbeiterzeitung des Kommunistischen Bundes* (April 29th, 1975), p. 29. "KBW - Führer: Mit Linken Phrasen im Interesse des Sozialimperialismus," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der KPD/Marxisten-Leninisten* (May 17th, 1975, p. 5.

the world. The Confederation of Iranian Students National Union confronted this problem already in 1971, when Mao invited the Shah's sister Ashraf Pahlavi.[8] In the United States, debates over the merits of revolutionary nationalism vis-à-vis proletarian internationalism divided African-American Maoists.[9] More importantly for this chapter, debates over the Three Worlds theory and the doctrine of national defense in West Germany were not primarily debates within and between the West German Maoist parties but involved the different factions of the CISNU, Arab student organizations and many others.

This chapter argues that what was at stake in these debates was an emerging geopolitics of anti-capitalism that sought to articulate class antagonisms in geopolitical terms. On the one hand, this geopolitics disrupted the geopolitical imaginaries of the global Cold War, which served as a precedent for understanding class struggle in terms of superpower antagonism.[10] On the other hand, the alternate geographies of 1970s Maoism often obscured internal conflict in those countries that served as the purported "geopolitical proletariat." Perhaps understandably, it was often activists from the Global South in West Germany that criticized this conflation. After all, for them the stakes were extraordinarily high. Finally, this chapter argues that the conjuncture of decolonization, Sino-Soviet split, and transnational economic integration produced a set of contradictions that delimited but did not determine the field of possible positions. These contradictions presented Maoists with a set

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[8]Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah.*

[9]Kelley and Esch, "Black Like Mao."

[10]Of course this had precedents in the history of communism at least since the Bolshevik revolution. As Douglas Northrop and other historians of the nationality question in Soviet politics have pointed out, the nation got to stand in for the proletariat in those areas of the Russian empire, in which an industrial proletariat was absent. See Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, First Edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Douglas Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia*, 1st ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (July 1, 1994): 414–52. But as this chapter argues, the Maoist "return" to class politics was increasingly substituting nation for class altogether.

of problems to solve, rather than a set of rigid doctrines. Hence, this chapter rejects the commonplace in the literature on the West German Left that Maoists parties were ideologically monolithic parties whose line was successfully dictated by the leadership.

After introducing the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU), this chapter will trace their relationship with the Communist League of West Germany (KBW). The source base for this chapter is largely drawn from the KBW's comprehensive archive, which includes correspondence, meeting records, negotiations, and propaganda material of both organizations. I will demonstrate the way in which anti-capitalism was re-articulated as geopolitical conflict in a debate spawned among Iranian and Arab students over the KBW's interpretation of the OPEC oil crisis of 1973. The chapter will close with a theoretical reflection on the debates over "revolutionary nationalism" and internationalism in Maoist discourse.

Iranian Leadership

Throughout the preceding chapters, there have already been glimpses of the role that Iranian students and dissidents played in the formation and maintenance of the West German New Left. The Confederation of Iranian Students were repeatedly leading protests in East Berlin (and indeed, Iran was an early obsession of West Germany's later domestic intelligence chief Günther Nollau). Chapter 4 addressed the ways in which in the early 1960s Iranian dissidents were central to debates and legal proceedings regarding the KPD-ban of 1956, debates in which I have argued the stakes were nothing less than debates over national sovereignty in the face of international communism. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian students

and dissidents were an important part of the Maoist milieu and were primary organizers of events that have come to represent "1968" in historical memory.

Specifically, it was the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union that organized the protests against the Shah during which Benno Ohnesorg was shot by a West German police officer (who later turned out to be on the payroll of the Stasi).[11] While Karl-Heinz Kurras's shooting of Ohnesorg has widely been credited as a watershed moment in the West German "1968," the Iranian activists' role in mobilizing for the event has only recently received historians' attention. As Quinn Slobodian pointed out, the West German Socialist German Student Federation (SDS)—which often stands in for the student movement of the 1960s—had originally been reluctant to support the CISNU's protest because they saw it as a distraction from the Vietnam War and because they were worried that support for the Iranians would fracture the movement.[12] Nonetheless, the SDS eventually did participate in the protests. As Quinn Slobodian has pointed out, however, while the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg galvanized the West German New Left, the massive attention it got within and outside the movement retroactively distorted the cause for the protest. Talk of a fascist state turned the events of 1967 into a (West-)German question where the perpetrators were the West German state and the victims were West German students.[13]

Historians of postwar Germany have paid increasing attention to the ways in which German ostensible self-criticism with respect to National Socialism and Holocaust has rendered violence against and the existence of people of color in German societies invisible.[14] The

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[11]See Timothy Brown's account of this in Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 1.

[12]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 102.

[13]Slobodian, p. 122.

[14]See for example Rita Chin, *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Heide Fehrenbach, *Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

point here is not to diminish pre- and post-1945 antisemitism but to reveal the myriad ways in which discourses over National Socialism have served as blinders to the reality of West Germany as a multi-ethnic society. In the case of the demonstrations against the visit of Shah Reza Pahlavi, imposing the category of National Socialism on to an event which indeed was produced by the conjunctures of the global Cold War and decolonization distorts the crucial role of Iranian dissidents played in the formation of the West German Left.

It is not true, however, that 1967 marked the end of West German students' receptiveness to Iranian concerns. Rather, both successful mass mobilization by the CISNU and West German failures to recognize their potential continue far into the 1970s. From the early 1970s, CISNU ramped up its mobilization in West Germany. As discussed in Chapter 4, West German diplomats had to repeatedly explain to the Shah why they could not prevent Iranian dissidents from operating in West Germany. But in the early 1970s, West Germany's position towards Iran changed. The SPD-FDP government was interested in improving economic relations with the Shah regime while CISNU feared that new, more repressive foreigner laws were in part intended to crack down on Iranian opposition. Protests organized by CISNU during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich were overshadowed by Black September's attack on Israeli athletes and the ban of several Palestinian organizations that had been allied with the CISNU became cause for increasing mobilization.[15] CISNU members went on hunger strike on behalf of their Palestinian peers and began mobilizing against the increasingly restrictive foreigner laws that were now turned against them. As Afshin Matin-asgari has pointed out in his study on the CISNU, while the West German SDS had dissolved into several factions (many of them competing Maoist party-building projects) who didn't see eye-

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[15]Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah*, p. 134-135.

to-eye with each other, CISNU managed to bring them together for a central demonstration in Dortmund in 1972.[16]

Among the Maoist groups mobilizing for the demonstration in Dortmund was the Communist Group Mannheim/Heidelberg (NRF), one of the more significant predecessors of the KBW.[17] The call to attend the demonstration mentioned primarily deportations of "progressive foreigners" who were often targeted with little to no justification. Although the NRF deemed the demonstration in Dortmund a big success in which over 30 organizations agreed on a basic platform against increasingly restrictive foreigner laws, it is worth mentioning that the organizers appear only as an ad-hoc coalition. And although the NRF praised this platform, in the aftermath of the march the competition between different Maoist groups immediately heated up. The NRF accused the KPD/AO of having divided the national organizing committee by creating their own national committee that only included them and their own mass organizations. The KPD/ML was criticized for making suggestions for the march that were mere provocations, and the NRF immediately decided to forego further coalitions with the KPD/ML.[18]

To a certain extent the report focusing on the conflict between rival Maoist parties is symptomatic of the competitive sectarianism of Maoist cadre parties. Only a few weeks before the NRF and a hand full of other groups from across the country had released a communiqué calling for the rebuilding of the German Communist Party (despite there al-

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[16]Matin-Asgari, p. 135.

[17]The leader of the NRF became the chairman of the KBW and remained so only interrupted by a prison sentence in the mid-1970s.

[18]"Kampf dem reaktionären Ausländergesetz," *Arbeiter-Zeitung: Zentrales Organ der Kommunistischen Gruppe (NRF) Mannheim/Heidelberg*, No. 9, November 1972, p. 12.

ready being two parties claiming to be doing just that).[19] It is consequently not surprising that this group was foregrounding its own role in such a broad-based coalition and that at the same time they heavily criticized both rival party-building projects: the KPD/ML and KPD/AO. The KPD/ML in turn wrote about the demonstration in Dortmund that 15,000 people followed *their* (and that of their European sister parties) call to action to demonstrate against the restrictive foreigner law and the persecution of progressive foreigners.[20] Like the NRF, the KPD/ML attacked the KPD/AO for dividing the movement and setting up their own committees. But beyond that, the KPD/ML was furious that the KPD/AO was yet allowed to partake in the central march. Worse yet, the organizers had allowed Trotsky-ists to form their own bloc during the demonstration.[21] The KPD/AO in turn praised the event before pointing out that the different "cults and circles" (meaning among others the NRF and KPD/ML) were dividing the march. Why was the event a success despite these divisions? Because the KPD/AO and their allies always prioritized solidarity with foreign comrades![22]

It is striking how in the narratives of the West German parties and "Marxist circles" foreign workers and students only appear in supporting roles or as the objects of solidarity. The KPD/AO seemed to at least recognize that the competition between the West German groups distracted from the purpose of the demonstration, which was solidarity with those

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[19]Bund Kommunistischer Arbeiter Freiburg, Kommunistischer Bund Bremen, Kommunistischer Bund Göttingen, Kommunistischer Bund Osnabrück, Kommunistische Gruppe Mannheim/Heidelberg (NRF), "Für den Wiederaufbau der Kommunistischen Partei!," *Arbeiter-Zeitung* Nr. 8, October 1972, p. 7.

[20]"Nieder mit den Ausländergesetzen: 15000 in Dortmund," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der KPD/Marxisten-Leninisten*, No. 21, October 23rd, 1972, pp. 1,6.

[21]"Nieder mit den Ausländergesetzen: 15000 in Dortmund," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der KPD/Marxisten-Leninisten*, No. 21, October 23rd, 1972, pp. 1, 6.

[22]"10,000 demonstrieren in Dortmund," *Rote Fahne: Zentralorgan der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (KPD)*, Vol. 3, No. 64, October 11th, 1972, pp. 1-2.

affected by the foreigner laws and the outlawing of the General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPA) and General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS). To be sure, there is a more generous reading than simply ignorance towards Iranian activists as crucial in building the nation-wide coalition that organized the Dortmund event. At different points, there is at least some evidence that the West Germans were acutely aware of the risks involved for foreign activists. After all, the laws being protested severely restricted political engagement for foreign students and workers. The debate about preparation for violence indicates that at least some activists thought that the "visibility" of foreign "comrades" could seriously harm them. Already in the planning phase of the demonstration, there had been an argument over whether protesters should bring helmets to protect themselves from the police. The NRF and other organizers turned this down as mere provocation.[23] But in the KPD/ML report on the demonstration, "visibility" is explicitly problematized. Besides criticizing the organizers' lack of ideological discipline that resulted in allowing the KPD/AO and Trotzkyists to partake in the march, the KPD/ML complained that organizers intervened when protesters attempted to put a stop to the activities of a police photographer. To avoid violence when the order of the day was to protect foreign comrades and colleagues from deportation was characteristic of the "dangerous pacifism" of the circle leaders.[24]

It is also true that foreign activists were not the only ones written out of the story. Following the coverage by NRF, KPD/ML and KPD/AO, the whole organizing committee seemed to only consist of Maoist parties, Maoist "circles" not yet unified into parties, and a vague allusion to progressive foreigners or foreign comrades and colleagues. Yet, the

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[23]"Kampf dem reaktionären Ausländergesetz," *Arbeiter-Zeitung: Zentrales Organ der Kommunistischen Gruppe (NRF) Mannheim/Heidelberg*, No. 9, November 1972, p. 12.

[24]"Nieder mit den Ausländergesetzen: 15000 in Dortmund," *Roter Morgen: Zentralorgan der KPD/Marxisten-Leninisten*, No. 21, October 23rd, 1972, pp. 6.

coalition against the foreigner law and against the ban of GUPS and GUPA that organized the Dortmund events was actually far broader and involved a moderate coalition of CISNU, GUPS, the German Student Federation (VDS) and Christian student groups.[25] All this is to say that there were myriad reasons for the eclipsing of foreign activists from this archive. Some of it was certainly Maoist posturing and attempts to claim ownership over a broad coalition that marginalized foreign activists and non-Marxist groups. Additionally, there were concerns over the visibility of foreigners that were an effect of policies and laws targeting foreign activists in particular. Nonetheless, the effect is the same: the coverage of the Dortmund events by scene publications obscured the role of foreign Maoists and other activists in the mobilizations of the early 1970s.

The archival records of the KBW, founded only one year after the Dortmund events by the several groups involved in producing the above-cited "Communique" (including the NRF), paint a much more complex picture of mobilization. In some ways, the call to join the Iran demonstration in Cologne on December 1st, 1973, looked similar to the coverage of the Dortmund event the year before: the Federal Republic was increasing collaboration with the Iranian regime and in that context, activists feared that after GUPS and GUPA the Federation of Iranian Students in the Federal Republic and West Berlin (FIS) was the next organization to be outlawed and their activists to be deported to Iran, where they would face torture. But beneath the call to attend the demonstration against the Shah's regime and for the release of political prisoners were no longer only the names of West German Maoist

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[25]Slobodian, "The Borders of the Rechtsstaat in the Arab Autumn," June 1, 2013, p. 215.

parties, but front and center were the FIS and the Turkish Student Federation in Germany (ATÖF).[26]

CISNU/FIS had called for a meeting to organize a "Solidarity Week for the Struggle of the Iranian People" in early November 1973. The meeting was meant to be a consultation on the organizing of several activities and events in different cities and a mass demonstration in Cologne on December 1st. From the outset, the central committee of the KBW supported the initiative of the Iranian federation and advocated for unity behind whatever was decided among the different groups.[27] In addition to the Iranian organizers, ATÖV, KBW, KPD/AO (and their mass organization "League Against Imperialism") sent delegates. The delegates agreed that all organizations should support the call to action as put together by the FIS and that all organizations would agree on a unified set of chants during the march. There should then be a talk by a representative of the FIS, and supporting organizations would give short 5-minute speeches. All organizations agreed to support the different events as well as the mass demonstration. In all cities that had local FIS groups, the supporting organizations agreed to collaborate with the FIS to organize events.[28]

The call to partake in a central demonstration in Cologne on December 1st—signed by all supporting organizations—highlighted contracts between the Federal Republic and Iran, particularly with regard to oil. The call quotes West German chancellor Willy Brandt as

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[26]"Aufruf zur Zentralen Demonstration am 1.12.1973 in Köln, 24 Uhr Neumarkt: Freiheit für alle politischen Gefangenen im iran! Weg mit den Drohenden Todesurteilen," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 1, No. 7, November 22nd, 1973, p. 11.

[27]"KBW an die Ortsleitungen, Befreundeten Organisationen zur Kenntnisnahme" (November 13th, 1973), Außerparlamentarische Opposition und Soziale Bewegungen, Freie Universität Berlin, Otto-Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft (APO-Archiv hereafter), APO-KBW 042.

[28]"KBW an die Leitungen der Ortsgruppen und Ortsaufbauguppen (befreundeten Organisationen zur Kenntnisnahme)" (November 15th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

saying that the Federal Republic would make sure that everybody knew that positions of Iranian dissidents were not those of the Federal Republic.[29] Not only did the FIS fear that this meant increased repression for their members in West Germany, but repression was already well under way according to the FIS: police were investigating members of the Iranian opposition and the state sought their deportation while agents of the Iranian intelligence service Organization of National Intelligence and Security (SAVAK) were harassing Iranian students in West Germany and breaking into their homes.[30]

Within the newly formed KBW, the decision of the central committee met with immediate and scathing criticism. According to a memo circulated by the central committee to the local KBW cells, the secretaries of the local groups in Northern Germany voiced open criticism of the decision to support the Cologne demonstration. In many ways, the criticism mirrored that of the SDS's reluctance to support the CISNU's demonstration against the Shah in 1967. But this time the reluctance to support the Iranians did not come from the leadership, but from the base. According to the complaint of one local group, the central committee's decision to support the FIS's demonstration violated a core KBW guideline regarding political campaigns and demonstrations. According to this guideline—agreed upon at the founding conference—West German communists should highlight connections between different struggles of the working class, but should initiate campaigns themselves or put themselves in the place of the working class.[31] The problem with the FIS-organized

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[29]"Weg mit den drohenden Todesurteilen! Freiheit für den Politischen Gefangenen im Iran! Aufruf zur zentralen Demonstration am 1.12.73 in Köln," APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Zentralkomitee des Kommunistischer Bundes Westdeutschland, *Ergebnisse der Gründungskonferenz des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland* (Mannheim: Kühl KG, Verlagsgesellschaft Kommunismus und Klassenkampf), 29, available at https://archive.org/details/ErgebnisseGrndungKBW (Accessed: May 14th, 2018).

demonstration was that there was not yet mass support for the Iranian cause, and consequently, to support the demonstration meant that the KBW in effect claimed to stand in for the working class.[32] The local group in Heidelberg voiced similar concerns: since there was no widespread support for the Iranian cause across the Federal Republic and West Berlin, a demonstration would likely only consist of the FIS, the KBW, and the KPD. Consequently, "the standing committee should have resisted the pressure of solidarity and turned down [the request of the FIS] based on the principles of the KBW's politics."[33]

Why does this matter? Scholarship on the postwar Left has taken the form of left-wing mobilizations to stand in for their content. This is to say that democratic forms of organizing were taken as self-evidently pro-democratic or liberal. Belinda Davis has pointed out that historians who define "the Left" by the extra-parliamentary spaces for political participation and grassroots mobilization ultimately lack the analytic capacity to define what's "Left" at all. After all, the same characteristics (bottom-up organizing, extra-parliamentary mobilization of "ordinary people," etc.) could be applied to a whole range of right-wing mobilizations of the interwar period.[34] When historians of the postwar Left in West Germany have paid attention to Maoist parties at all, they have largely focused on their authoritarian structure and ideological dogmatism.[35] What is interesting about the conflict provoked by the Iran demonstration in Cologne is that the alleged dogmatism (stubborn adherence to class pol-

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[32]"KBW Ortsgruppe Hannover Ortsleitung to the Standing Committee of the KBW" (November 21st, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

[33]"Beschlußvorlage für die OL HD zur Kölner Iran-Demonstration" (November 23rd, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

[34]Davis, "What's Left?".

[35]See Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*; Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt*; Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne*; Andrew Tompkin's book is an exception here, but his attempt to provide a more nuanced perspective on West German Maoism is itself entirely formal. Andrew S. Tompkins, *Better Active Than Radioactive!: Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Robert Gildea and Andrew Tompkins, "The Transnational in the Local: The Larzac Plateau as a Site of Transnational Activism Since 1970," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (2015): 581–605.

itics) comes from the organiztion's base, rather than their authoritarian leadership. Likely due to the centrality of Iranian activists to the pre-Maoist Left, the central committee did not hesitate to violate its own principles because—in their words

> the concern of the Iranian people is just and it is entirely justified if Iranians living in Germany bring their fight against Shah regime and imperialism to the streets here in West Germany.[36]

What was at stake here was not whether the FIS struggle was just or not; both sides agreed on this. What was at stake was much more fundamental: did the lack of working class interest in the concrete struggles of students from the Global South mean that a communist party should deny its solidarity? The KBW-affiliated Communist High School Students League (KOB) in Bremen perhaps articulated the critique most clearly. The task for the KBW should be to organize movements within the working class and to undermine the bourgeoisie's ambition to use national chauvinism to appease the workers. However, a central demonstration against the Shah of Iran despite the lack of a proletarian base would be merely "moralistic" and could not further the goal of turning West German workers against their own bourgeoisie.[37] West German Maoism—like Maoism in many other countries—was born of a return to Marxism-Leninism and class politics prompted by decolonization and the example of the Chinese Communist Party. But as I will argue for the rest of this chapter, the ground for such return to the "interest of the national proletariat" had been altered by the very conditions that produced it. The KBW leadership was negotiating this contradiction, which—as I will show now—was symptomatic of a tendency to understand geopolitical conflict *as* class conflict.

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[36]"KBW an die Leitungen der Ortsgruppen und Ortsaufbaugruppen (befreundeten Organisationen zur Kenntnisnahme)" (November 23rd, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

[37]KOB Bremen "Kritik am Beschluß des ZK des KBW zur Iran-Demonstration" (November 29th, 1973), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

OPEC, 1973: Crisis of Capitalism?

On the night prior to the December 1st demonstration in Cologne, the city's police president banned the demonstration.[38] This decision forced the FIS and their supporting groups to modify their plans. For fear of repression and already worried about a possible move by the Brandt government to ban the CISNU in West Germany, the Iranians decided that participating in the demonstration was no longer feasible. Without the leadership of the Iranians, the coalition fell apart. The KBW decided that it was best to rely on local groups to distribute a flyer that argued that the state's intention to ban the CISNU was prompted by West Germany's intention to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Iran.[39] Moreover, the KBW called for demonstrations in many cities for the 8th of December to protest the crackdown on members of the Iranian opposition. The KPD/AO, on the other hand, did not support the KBW's new plan. The party newspaper *Rote Fahne* reports that despite the ban, hundreds of German and foreign workers marched in Cologne. According to their coverage, among the protesters were Iranian and Turkish activists. More tragically, the police refused to return an Italian activist's residence permit after he was arrested at the demonstration.[40] It is unsurprising that the two organizations judged the success of the demonstration quite differently. For the purposes of this chapter, it is of no consequence whose strategy was more

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[38]"Erklärung von CISNU Ortsgruppe Frankfurt, KPD Ortsltg. Ffm., KSV Regionalkom. Hessen, Liga gegen den Imperialism. Ortsgr. Ff., Rote Hilfe, KBW, KSB, KSG, KLG, VDM-Betriebsgruppe, Solidaritätsgruppe Prengesheim, AStA Uni Frankfurt," APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 042.

[39]"Trotz Verbot: Protestaktion gegen das faschistische Schah-Regime," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 1, No. 8, (December 5th, 1973), p.2; "Flugblatt des KBW: Verteilt an die Bevölkerung in Köln am 1.12.," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 1, No. 8, December 5th, 1973, p. 3.

[40]"Köln, 1.12.1973: Trotz Verbot — Solidaritätsdemonstration für persische Patrioten," *Rote Fahne: Zentralorgan der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (KPD)*, Vol. 4, No. 49, December 5th, 1973, p. 1.

successful. What matters here is that (to some extent) left to their own devices, the West German Maoists withdrew into sectarianism.

When the police president disallowed the December 1st demonstration, he inadvertently provided the broader context in which Maoists would understand the Iran matter. According to the law governing assemblies (BVersG), the demonstration had to be registered with local authorities at least 48 hours in advance. Under the same law, the organizers of the demonstration also had to name the individuals responsible for the event. Presumably to shield Iranian activists of the FIS, the December 1st demonstration was registered by the KPD/AO-affiliated *Liga gegen den Imperialismus.* In the December issue of their paper, the *Liga* quoted the letter from Cologne's police president extensively. One reason for disallowing the protest was a supposed concern for public safety: the public, the police president claimed, might confront the protesters because there was a sense that Iran was helping the Federal Republic through the energy crisis by placing no restrictions on oil exports to West Germany. But in addition to the concern for public safety, the police had another concern:

> Besides the endangerment of public safety or order by the assembly the protest might endanger the foreign relations of the Federal Republic with Iran due to the announced slogans. This is all the more so because the Federation of Iranian Students in the Federal Republic and West Berlin (FIS) is partially responsible for the call for participation in the assembly on December 1st, 1973. The political participation of an Iranian student association is capable to burden the relationship between Iran and the Federal Republic. Such burden on that relationship
> would be irresponsible and contrary to the existential interest of the whole population considering the threat of the energy crisis and its consequences for jobs.[41]

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[41]"Auszug aus der Verbotsverfügung vom 29.11.73 des Polizeipräsidiums Köln gegen die Demonstration am 1.12.," *Internationale Solidarität: Zeitschrift der Liga gegen den Imperialismus*, Vol. 2, No. 20, December 1973, p.6.

At this point, the repression of Iranian opposition members in the Federal Republic became inextricably linked not only to campaigns against disenfranchisement of foreigners but to the broader context of the 1973 OPEC crisis.

The beginning of the 1970s in the Federal Republic saw increasing anxiety over the country's dependency on foreign oil. The national weekly *Der Spiegel* warned in November 1972 that West Germany was losing the race to secure oil reserves to Japan. The realization that the country's energy supply depended to a large extent on foreign oil had supposedly driven Brandt's negotiations with the Shah of Iran in March 1972 to secure national oil reserves by purchasing DM700,000,000 worth of oil from Iran. The article suggested that both the federal government and West Germany's energy companies are doing too little to secure oil for the future. Even nuclear energy, which might have paved the way out of the crisis, was not coming fast enough because the construction of plants was dragging on.[42] A second article only six months later seemingly confirmed the anxieties of the first. The issue of the magazine featured a photo of a gas pump featuring two options: gasoline and oil for domestic heating ovens. The title of the issue was printed in big red letters on the pump and read "expensive and in short supply." The article itself announced that America's oil crisis had effects on Europe. With short anecdotes of fuel shortages in the United States, the author of the article effected a quasi-apocalyptic image.

> At a gas station in Oakland in the state of California, a car rolls to the pump. 'Fill 'er up, please' [followed by German translation], the driver told the attendant. The clerk, however, pointed at his poster: 'no more than 5 gallons' [followed by German translation]. 'You dog,' replied the driver, reached for his gun and shot the attendant.[43]

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[42]"Energie: Drang zum Bohrloch," *Der Spiegel*, No. 48, November 21st, 1972.

[43]"Öl: Amerikas Krise schlägt auf Europa durch," *Der Spiegel*, No. 26, June 25th, 1973, p. 52.

Leaving aside the long tradition of West German fascination with images of the "Wild West," the message of this and a second anecdote about a fuel truck robbery was clear. Oil shortages in the United States were threatening law and order. Now, the author warned, the American crisis was reaching Asia and Europe. The nascent energy crisis was a central question for West German diplomacy. It dominated Willy Brandt's visit to Nixon and dictated restraint when visiting Israel (so as to not offend Arab suppliers). Undersecretary of State Paul Frank explained that Israel should not expect much from "an ally at whose home the energy shortage made the wheels stand still and sparked revolution."[44] Experts agreed, the "golden years" were over.[45]

Several months later, the Yom Kippur War caused the energy crisis to escalate. In order to force the West into a position more sympathetic to the Arab states, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries declared an oil embargo, sharply driving up the price of oil.[46] As Frank Bösch and Rüdiger Graf have pointed out, historians have largely understood the 1973 oil crisis as a singular turning point in the trajectory of the postwar period. Moreover, until very recently, the historiography of the crisis has largely treated the crisis within the boundaries of individual nation states.[47] Bösch and Graf note that historians were not the first to attribute profound importance to the 1973 moment. In fact, experts at the time almost immediately foreshadowed historic importance to what *they* called a crisis. Bösch and Graf acknowledge the transformative nature of the 1970s but caution scholars to take a more long-term perspective: "The shorter the narrative, it seems, the more

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[44]Ibid., p. 53.

[45]Ibid., p. 53.

[46]See for example Frank Bösch and Rüdiger Graf's special issue of *Historical Social Research* on the crisis. See the introduction Frank Bösch and Rüdiger Graf, "Reacting to Anticipations: Energy Crises and Energy Policy in the 1970s; an Introduction," *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 4 (2014): 7–21.

[47]Bösch and Graf, p. 8.

importance it attaches to the oil crisis, sometimes describing it as an essential cause of the more general transformations of the 1970s."[48]

It turns out, the anxieties over the oil supply in the 1970s did not come from nowhere. In 1956, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)'s Oil Committee negotiated with the US to secure US support in the face of declining oil supplies brought about by the Suez crisis. The OEEC's successor organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), anticipated oil crises for Western European countries. When in 1967 the OPEC declared an oil embargo, the United States responded by stepping in and supplying oil to Western Europe.[49] Nonetheless, it had become clear that Western Europe and the United States had to reckon with an increase in the power of oil-producing countries.[50] When in 1970 the United States announced that they could no longer mobilize their oil reserves to support European countries in times of crisis, the possibility of interruptions in the oil supply was all the more severe.[51]

In early 1972, Maoist attention to the energy crisis seems to have been largely determined by the activism of Iranian students. The April 1972 edition of the NRG's *Arbeiter-Zeitung* reported about Willy Brandt's visit to the Shah under the title "Bloody Terror in Iran on behalf of FRG Capital."[52] Similarly, *Internationale Solidarität*, the paper of the League

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[48]Bösch and Graf, p. 8.

[49]Henning Türk, "The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation Among Western Industrialized Countries," *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 4 (2014): 209–30, p. 211-212.

[50]Elisabetta Bini, "A Transatlantic Shock: Italy's Energy Policies Between the Mediterranean and the EEC, 1967-1974," *Historical Social Research* 39, no. 4 (2014): 145–64, p.146.

[51]Türk, "The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation Among Western Industrialized Countries," p. 213.

[52]"Blutiger Terror im Iran für BRD Kapital," *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, No. 3, April 1972.

against Imperialism reports on Brandt's visit and emphasizes West German energy companies' business in Iran.[53]

But by late 1973, another narrative increasingly overlapped with CISNU's emphasis on West German-Iranian cooperation. Shortly after the oil embargo by the Organization of Arab Oil Exporting Countries, the KBW's newspaper sharply criticized the West German press for blaming "the Arabs" for increasing oil prices. The paper argued that although there were two coordinated price increases—one being caused by the embargo—in 1973, the price of oil had been rising steadily throughout the years prior. The oil-producing countries were being squeezed while companies like Esso and other oil giants steadily increased their profits. Consequently, the article suggested that the oil-producing countries were right to be in bad spirits. Moreover, with the eruption of the Yom Kippur War, the oil companies were cynically exploiting the anxieties of citizens about oil shortages "called forth by the reports in the bourgeois press."[54] The cue had been delivered by Wolfgang Oehm, head of the West German Exxon subsidiary Esso. In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, Oehm had acknowledged that the oil companies had exploited the panic but called that behavior "legitimate in a market economy."[55]

Despite the language in the KVZ article—which suggested stark differences between the KBW's position and the coverage in *Der Spiegel* quoted exemplarily for the bourgeois press—the above-cited issue of the left-liberal mainstream magazine found at least one common target with the Maoists. Expecting government intervention, Esso had frozen oil prices

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[53]"Mord in Persien," *Internationale Solidarität: Zeitschrift der Liga gegen Imperialismus*, Vol. 1, No. 2, March 10th, 1972.

[54]"Nicht die Araber, sondern die Ölmonopole treiben die Ölpreise," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralrgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 1973, p.1.

[55]"Immer Knapper und Teurer: Esso-Generaldirektor Wolfgang Oehm über Ölversorgung und -preise," *Der Spiegel*, No. 43, October 22nd, 1973, p. 28.

in West Germany to stop the run on oil. The interview with Oehm allowed the executive to criticize foreign oil companies' "speculative pricing." While *Der Spiegel* saw dependence on Arab oil as the problem with little solution in sight, an article in the same issue found the real culprit to be the United States: even though oil companies had warned that the United States's oil resources were limited, the government did not act. The article called the US government "drunk on profits and consumption" and offered a rather contradictory set of accusations. First, the US had done nothing to restrict the cubic capacity of American cars to reduce their fuel consumption. Second, environmental regulations had again and again delayed the construction of an Alaska oil pipeline project connecting arctic oil fields with US refineries.[56] The KBW's critique of oil monopoly's was itself directed against the United States: "out of the seven largest oil monopolies, five are US monopolies."[57]

Nonetheless, *Der Spiegel* found the main problem to lie in the increased power of Arab oil-producing countries—now the only countries with an oil output large enough to satisfy American demand.[58] But to the KBW, the measures of the oil-producing countries was a response to decades-long exploitation by the oil companies of the West. It is perhaps surprising that in these early articles, the Yom Kippur War plays almost no part. *Der Spiegel* mentions in passing that during the 1967 oil embargo "by the anti-Israel coalition," West Germany could rely on alternate suppliers like Iran, whose oil exports can no longer provide sufficient surplus to fully compensate for the reduced output of the Arab states.[59]

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[56]"Nahost Öl: Die Krise dauert fünfzehn Jahre," *Der Spiegel*, No. 43, October 22nd, 1973, p. 25-26. In his study on the history of European anti-Americanism, Andrei Markovits has pointed out that European resentment against America has often taken such contradictory forms. Compare Andrei Markovits, *Uncouth Nation : Why Europe Dislikes America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[57]"Nicht die Araber…," p. 1-2.

[58]"Nahost Öl: Die Krise dauert fünfzehn Jahre," p. 25-26.

[59]Ibid., p. 26.

Nonetheless, a week later the KBW's paper left no doubt as to the importance of the war. In the article "Who benefits from the Anti-Arab agitation," the author first reiterates that the fight of the oil-producing states was a just one. oil-producing states standing up to the oil companies was not a new thing—after all, the OPEC had been founded for that purpose—but that the oil-producing states were standing up to US imperialism, European imperialism, and the "colonial state" of Israel. In this narrative, Israel was one of the most important means to keep the Arab states in a state of oppression. Consequently, the oil embargo by the OAPEC was the struggle for the Arab states' independence. It is this independence that the European countries cannot tolerate, and hence they try and turn the people against Arabs.[60]

In this view, the oil companies managed a state of continuous exploitation and kept the oil-producing states in a state of dependency. Israel's presence in the Middle East served to solidify this state of exploitation. The Arab states' assertion of power was consequently not only an act of anti-Zionism but of anti-imperialism as well. But Maoism emerged in the Cold War Germanies (as in other places) in part because Leftists in the 1960s were envisioning a return to the traditions (whether imagined or real) of Marxist-Leninist class politics in contrast to the politics of the 1960s that sought revolutionary agents in students, prisoners, or the marginalized/subaltern more broadly. So what would an analysis of the energy crisis that took this ambition seriously look like?

In 1974, the Near East Committee Heidelberg (NOK) published a brochure on the OPEC oil crisis that might help answer that question.[61] The brochure was published with the

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[60]"Wem nützt die Araberhetze," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 1, No. 6, 1973, p. 1-2.

[61]They're quite like the Africa Committees and Committees Southern Africa of Chapter 7. Basically, they are solidarity committees with supporters from a diverse array of left-wing groups and ideological spectrums that were founded in the 1960s, often with much personal overlap with the SDS. Like the Committees

KBW's publisher and printed by their printing company *Caro Druck.* The brochure had two authors, at least one of which was using a pseudonym for reasons that will become clear shortly. A third writer contributed a short preface that proved controversial with one of the authors.

R. Arasch[62] was an Iranian activist in Heidelberg and was active within the FIS. He contributed the last chapter entitled "The Contracts between the Oil-Producing Countries and Multinational Corporations" to the brochure. In it, he explained the mechanisms of profit-sharing that had governed the oil trade since the 1950s. According to the chapter, the mechanism had been designed in a way that would ensure that the oil companies retain the vast majority of profits. Moreover, the oil companies found ways to further reduce the amounts due to the oil-producing countries. Leaving aside the (perhaps uncontroversial) charge that the oil companies were exploiting the oil-producing countries, the chapter lacked the ideological abstractions of the two prefaces.[63]

But it was the rest of the brochure that tied together a return to class politics with claims that the OAPEC boycott constituted an act of anti-imperialism. The first preface criticized the position—until recently also held by the KBW—that the oil crisis was an artificial crisis conjured up by the oil companies to maximize profits. Granted, the author wrote, oil tanks are largely full. Nonetheless, this view obscured the actual crisis that lurked behind the so-called oil crisis. The crisis was in truth a political crisis brought about by

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Southern Africa, they were the target of Maoist power struggle. The NOK Heidelberg is likely to have been one with a strong KBW faction: their journal aggressively advertises the KBW's main publications.

[62]R. Arasch is the pseudonym used in the brochure. His name is revealed in the files of the publisher, available at the APO-Archiv. I have decided to retain the pseudonym even when referencing documents that reveal his identity.

[63]R.Arasch and C. Koch, *Ölkrise - Krise des Imperialismus,* (Heidelberg: Verlag Jürgen Semmler, 1974), p. 40-48.

a global tendency towards revolution. This tendency emboldened regimes in oil-producing countries to stand up to imperialism. That the oil-producing countries banded together within the OPEC meant that imperialism's control over the oil supply was threatened. This was why oil companies began to hoard oil and drove up prices. Saying there was no crisis meant failing to recognize how threatened imperialism really was.[64] When turning to the oil crisis in Chapter 1, the brochure stated that

> on the one hand, the "energy crisis" is a profit crisis of multinational corporations who are trying to drive up the prices in the importing countries by artificial means, most of all by shortening the oil supply. On the other hand, the crisis is nothing else than a crisis common to all capitalist modes of production in the moment in which they are confronted with the will of their producers.[65]

The language here differs substantially from language that merely refers to a political conflict between oppressor and oppressed. Rather, it mirrors the language of class conflict. By substituting oil-*producing* countries for producing classes, the oil-producing states can effectively take the place of a global proletariat. They are driven into this position despite the nature of their regimes by the global tendency for revolution. In the context of the Cold War, the writers of the brochure articulated the class antagonism in a geopolitical frame. If the Cold War had identified proletarian revolution with the Soviet Union, Maoists looking for alternatives to both Cold War Blocs sought to redraw the anti-capitalist map.

But how this map was drawn was hotly contested: in the pamphlet on the oil crisis and other publications relating to the KBW's oil crisis campaign, the regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran could appear as members of the global proletariat. But this assessment did not quite sit right with R. Arasch. Several years later, Arasch wrote to the publisher of the

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[64]Ibid., p. 9.
[65]Ibid., p. 30.

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brochure with a number of complaints. He had heard rumors that the publisher planned to print a new run of the brochure. Given the serious misgivings he had voiced about the preface as well as the general tenor of the text, he asked the publisher to no longer use his pseudonym on the cover of the brochure. When he voiced his criticism back in 1974, he claims to have been told that the brochure was already printed and that the proceeds from its sale were supposed to go to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). Now he learned that they never received any money. Worst of all, he heard that the publishers claimed that he stood behind the positions in the brochure.[66]

It is certainly possible that his criticism developed in hindsight. But it is also plausible that he indeed resisted the way his text was reframed in a brochure that drew the very regime that the FIS and CISNU were targeted by into a coalition of proletarian anti-imperialism. His letter speaks of disputes between himself and the NOK Heidelberg following his assertion that the Shah regime was indeed "fascist" and that neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia "could ever take a single step against the imperialists and their interests due to their utter dependence [on them]."[67] These disputes, in his view, should have been evidence enough to establish that he did not agree with the positions of the pamphlet. Consequently, if the brochure was reprinted, it should be done without his name and include a page in which his position is clarified.

The publisher's reaction was dismissive. The chairman of the KBW himself added an annotation to the letter indicating that they had no plans to produce any further copies of this brochure. In their reply, the publisher wrote Arasch's complaints off as hearsay and

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[66]"R. Arasch [pseudonymized] to Verlag Jürgen Sendler" (December 19th, 1977), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 098.

[67]Ibid.

assured him that no further copies would be printed. However, they also rejected any notion that promises were made concerning the proceeds of the brochure. More importantly—and without any argument—the response suggested that Arasch's positions regarding the "oil struggle" were "ridiculous." Nonetheless, the letter closes, the dispute should be resolved now that the brochure was no longer produced (or sold).[68]

Around the same time, the General Union of Arab Students (GUPS) wrote to the KBW regarding two articles published in the KBW's newspaper. The first one, "The Palestinian Revolution cannot be Crushed," is a report about the Eighth Arab League Summit in Cairo during which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The article struck a celebratory tone. The result of the conference was Arab unity behind the Palestinian struggle: "the inevitable struggle of the Arab peoples and states against the Zionist aggressors will destroy the chains with which the imperialists want to restrain the Palestinian people."[69] The second article, three issues later, acknowledged that the states of the Arab League were trying to restrain the Palestinian struggle, but nonetheless "it's the troops of the Arab states that are fighting for independence from imperialism."[70]

In their letter to the KBW, the GUPS took issue with both the positive evaluation of the Cairo Summit and the idea that the problem heretofore had been a lack of Arab unity. Regarding the former, the GUPS wrote that the Arab states had made declarations about the PLO's legitimacy before, but that had not meant they wouldn't or didn't undermine

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[68] "Friedemann Bleicher (Sendler Verlag) to R. Arasch" (January 10th, 1978), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 098.

[69] "The Palestinian Revolution Cannot be Crushed," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 4, No. 44, November 4th, 1976, p. 14.

[70] "Neue Umtriebe des Imperialismus," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung: Zentralorgan des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland (KBW)*, Vol. 4, No. 47, November 25th, p. 14.

the Palestinian struggle. "The clear victors of the conference are (unfortunately) not the revolutionary forces" but reactionary leaders.[71] The letter articulated a crushing critique of the KBW's claim that the Arab states were fighting for independence from imperialism, the most important reason being that the Arab monarchies "are strongly dependent on imperialist finance capital."[72] The implications, according to the GUAS were clear:

> So should the F. Polisario, PFLO, PLO and the persecuted progressive people of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Saudi-Arabia, Kuweit, Bahrein, Oman, Jordan, etc. unite with the feudal and reactionary regimes in their struggle against imperialism and zionism?[73]

The charge was clear: the KBW was ignoring the struggles in Arab states. Moreover, what did this mean for the return to class politics central to 1970s Maoism? According to the General Union of Arab Students, the KBW had failed. The KBW's position on the Cairo conference raised the question whether "for the KBW, the contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie existed in Arab countries."[74]

As far as Iranian students were concerned, the conflict with the KBW over the OPEC oil crisis was no exception. Rather, the KBW leadership's resolve to embrace every turn of Chinese foreign policy—likely strengthened by the political capital they derived from their cell in Beijing—meant that the KBW lost traction with the Iranians. This escalated in 1978. The KBW was becoming aware that their position was increasingly unpopular with the Iranians. The dispute was—again—over the Three Worlds theory, which the Iranians rejected for obvious reasons. China's acquiescence to the Shah while activists in Iran were tortured and murdered made the KBW's position untenable. A congress of the FIS was

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[71]"Generalunion Arabischer Studenten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland & Westberlin to the Central Committee of the KBW" (undated), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 001.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Ibid.

[74]Ibid.

aside from 200 Iranian students also attended by representatives of the KBW, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Union of Afghan Students, the Union of Progressive Arabs, and the KPD/ML. The KBW delegate noted with frustration that the representatives of the KPD/ML—who were rejecting the Three Worlds theory in line with their Albanian connection—got by far the most applause.[75] Similarly, at the World Congress of the CISNU, the board of the CISNU rejected the KBW's solidarity address but offered some suggestions on how the address could be modified to be admissible. Specifically, a representative of the board asked for the line "countries of the"Third World" to be removed from the address. After passing the demand on to the KBW leadership, the party decided to demand of the CISNU that either the address be read without modification, or the CISNU withdraw their invitation to the KBW. Moreover, the KBW demanded an apology from the Iranian comrades. But the Iranians stuck by their demands, did not apologize, and announced that they would keep a carbon copy of the address for future debates.[76] By 1979, the Iranian Revolution meant that the political landscape changed radically for Iranian students, but as Maoism declined in West Germany, so did the appeal of West German Maoist comrades for Iranian activists.

The Geopolitics of 1970s Anti-Capitalism

To understand the conflicts over interpreting the OPEC crisis of 1973, the Cairo conference, and the role of the "Third World" in proletarian revolution, it makes sense to consider

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[75]"20. Jahreskongreß der FIS," (January 14th, 1978), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 003.

[76]"Protokoll zu den Vorfällen beim CISNU 'Weltkongreß'" (March 4th, 1978), APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 003.

the 1970s more broadly. In their programmatic essay *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970*, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael have argued that the 1970s were a period of profound economic, cultural, and political transformation. Among the manifold contradictions characterizing that decade was that despite increasing transnational integration in the economy, the 1970s also saw a resurgence of appeals to the nation.[77]

Historian and anthropologist Gary Wilder has suggested that at the center of modernity's political forms is a contradiction between the universal and the particular. Even though Wilder's interest is in the French Empire in the interwar period, this model can help make sense of the ways in which the contradiction between universal and particular got reconfigured in the era of decolonization and increasing economic transnational integration. Wilder argues that universalism and particularism were both immanent to the imperial nation state in France. He draws on the language in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen*, which proclaims all men to be created equal and the nation as the sovereign. A contradiction between the universalizing idea of rights of men and the particularizing sovereignty of the nation was hence built into the imperial nation state. He takes a cue from Marx, who argued in Capital that capitalist society is characterized by a (socially) real contradiction between the abstract commensurability and concrete particularity of all things produced for exchange in capitalist society, albeit without giving primacy to either the imperial nation state or the commodity form.[78]

I want to suggest that the debates about the role of the international proletariat and the attempts to identify the international proletariat with individual nation states are symp-

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[77]Doering-Manteuffel and Raphael, *Nach dem Boom*, p. 69.
[78]Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*, p. 11-16.

tomatic of such a contradiction between universalism (ideas of proletarian internationalism and capitalism as a global social form) and particularism (ideas of "revolutionary nationalism" and the attempt to locate the international proletariat and capital geopolitically). In the 1970s, on the one hand, increasing transnational integration and the reassertion of the economy into everyday life through economic crisis posited capitalism as a universal, global, social formation that required an internationalist response. On the other hand, decolonization powerfully reconfigured nationalism as a political force on the world-political stage. Both of these movements were at the center of Maoist debates. Their apparent contradiction simultaneously set the boundaries for political discourse and enabled a wide variety of possible positions.[79]

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[79]Wilder has suggested that contingency cannot be presupposed but must itself be explained. Instead of choosing between reductive explanation and chaos, Wilder suggests that we should look for the way certain antinomies (universal and particular, abstract and concrete) are structural features that because of their contradictory character, allow for a great deal of historical specificity and dynamic possibility. See Wilder, p. 79. On debates about nationalism or universalism for a postcolonial world, see Wilder, *Freedom Time.*

CHAPTER 7

Africa: Decolonization and the 'Last Utopia'

In January 1977, a few months before hostilities between the RAF and the West German state culminated in the "German Autumn," an employee of the German Consulate in Durban, South Africa encountered an article in the *Daily News*. The paper claimed that a Portuguese freighter had just left Durban with unexpected cargo from Hamburg, Germany: on board the container ship were three armored "combat vehicles" (albeit without arms), apparently a gift of the Communist League of West Germany (KBW) to the "terrorist leader" Robert Mugabe, then based in Maputo, Mozambique. Not to be blind-sided, the consulate reached out for information to a high-ranking official of the South African security police. They learned the following: the sender of the freight was indeed the KBW. The vehicles were not, as claimed by the *Daily News*, of German make. Instead, they had been shipped from Sweden to Hamburg, where they were transferred to the Portuguese ship. On the side of the vehicles were big posters that showed "a black man and a black woman of the liberation movement." Another poster contained a solidarity address of the KBW to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).[1]

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[1]Report of the German Consulate in Durban (January 25th, 1977), Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Barch hereafter) B 106/124172.

Since the event caused uproar in South Africa, the German Consulate reported the story to the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic, which directed it to the Interior Minister. And because it seemed unlikely to both the South African security forces and the German Consulate that the KBW had the means for purchasing and shipping military equipment across the globe, the Foreign Office asked the Interior Ministry to comment on the likelihood that the vehicles were actually bought by East Germany or the Soviet Union.[2] Had the consulate read the solidarity address, they could have come to the conclusion that this was unlikely: as Maoists, the KBW were hostile to the Soviet Union. Both, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the intelligence service Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) did know from KBW publications that the KBW had collected money to support the armed liberation struggle of the ZANU.[3] The BfV thought it credible that the KBW would have been able to raise the money required and did point out that the GDR and USSR were extremely unlikely to financially support the Maoist KBW. However, whether vehicles were actually shipped they did not know.[4] In fact, the KBW had already shipped several Land Rovers to the ZANU in 1975, and was in the process of raising money for guns for the ZANU's armed wing—the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army.[5]

This chapter argues that while practical anti-colonial solidarity provided West German Maoism with a source of political capital and ideological legitimacy, when enthusiasm for "Third World" liberation waned in the 1980s, Maoism lost one of its major sources of

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[2]"Auswärtiges Amt an das Bundesministerium des Innern" (February 17th, 1977), Barch B 106/124172.

[3]"Bundeskriminalamt and den Bundesminister des Innern" (March 17th, 1977), Barch B 106/124172; "Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz an den Bundesminister des Innern" (March 18th, 1977), Barch B 106/124172.

[4]Ibid.

[5]See "Kleider für die ZANU," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*, January 23, 1975, 13; "Aufstellung: ZANU - Sammlungen" (July 14, 1978), Archiv Außerparlamentarische Opposition und Soziale Bewegungen (APO-Archiv hereafter), ZANU Rundreise 1978 (APO-KBW 023).

strength. The existing literature on West German Maoism usually explains their demise in the period from 1978-1985 with reference to two developments. First, the showdown between the Red Army Faction and the West German state—remembered as the "German Autumn"— led to a collective soul-searching on the Left that not only weakened Left-wing support for armed struggle but shifted momentum to less "dogmatic" and all-encompassing social causes embodied by the peace and green movements in the 1980s.[6] Second, both former participants and historians of the West German New Left allege a sort of "authoritarianism fatigue" that emerged at the end of the decade.[7] Both of those explanations certainly enrich our understanding of the history of the postwar Left. But both leave a lot to explain. It is true that the "German Autumn" in 1977 functioned as a kind of wake-up call for some, who had "secretly" been harboring sympathies for the RAF.[8] But it's not at all clear that the Left overall became more averse to violence. And if it is true that people in the late 1970s became fed up with the authoritarianism of Maoist parties, then why didn't they become fed up with it in the years before? Finally, why did Maoism decline in countries that did

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[6]For a discussion on the transformation of the Left in the Federal Republic in the aftermath of the German Autumn, see Karrin Hanshew, *Terror and Democracy in West Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); it has become customary to adopt Gerd Koenen's periodization of the New Left, whereby the "Red Decade" is bookended by the peak of the student movement in 1968 and the aftermath of the "German Autumn" in 1978. See Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt.*

[7]Much of this is certainly based on a short volume published by former cadre's of the "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands" (KPD), who reflected on the dogmatism of their organization. Through involvement with the nascent anti-nuclear movement, members allegedly learned a new culture of protest. But this does not explain why many moved into formal Maoist parties, who had known different cultures or protest from the 1960s. See Karl Schlögel, Willi Jasper, and Bernd Ziesemer, *Partei kaputt. Das Scheitern der KPD und die Krise der Linken* (Berlin: Olle & Wolter, 1983); see also a volume of former participants from 1977 reporting of the toll the parties took on their members. Autorenkollektiv, *Wir warn die stärkste der Partein ..*; for a historical perspective, see Timothy Scott Brown's *West Germany and the Global Sixties.* He emphasizes the TUNIX congress in February 1978 as marking the transition "from protest to creativity" both in response to the violence of the RAF and the dogmatism of Maoist parties. See Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties*, p. 354-362.

[8]The relationship between Maoism and violence also plays a role in Richard Wolin's comparison between the West German and the French case. He argues that violence put off the French and so Maoism went away quickly, while for some reason it didn't put off the Germans and that must have something to do with a great republican tradition. Wolin, *The Wind from the East.*

not have a German autumn?[9] By the early 1980s, developments within the global Cold War and the difficulties faced by postcolonial states rendered Maoism an increasingly implausible response to the challenge facing Marxist-Leninists in the 1970s: how can the seismic shocks of decolonization mobilize the West German working class.

But this practical solidarity was not just a question of abstract identification. This chapter pays close attention to the extent to which it was Zimbabwean exiles who led organizing efforts in European countries. Historians of Zimbabwe are faced with the difficult task to contextualize and decenter an "official"—and highly politicized—narrative of the country's history that continues to play a role in contemporary politics. They have noted how ZANU-PF's continued claim to ownership over the war, liberation, and independence continues to constrain oppositional politics in Zimbabwe to this day.[10] This claim to ownership has been enabled by a historiography that focused narrowly on ZANU leaders and the guerrilla war.[11] Consequently, historians have turned to recovering other groups and experiences that the more narrowly ZANU-focused narratives have eclipsed.[12] Another impulse has been to deconstruct ZANU-PF's claim that the ZANU "were their own liberators." Narratives focussing exclusively on the guerrilla war obscure the ZANU's massive reliance on foreign

[9]For the American case, see for example Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che* (London & New York: Verso, 2002).

[10]See Munyaradzi B. Munochiveyi, "Becoming Zimbabwe from Below: Multiple Narratives of Zimbabwean Nationalism," *Critical African Studies* 4, no. 6 (December 1, 2011): 84–108; Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Rethinking Chimurenga and Gukurahundi in Zimbabwe: A Critique of Partisan National History," *African Studies Review* 55, no. 3 (November 25, 2013): 1–26; Terence Ranger, "Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 215–34.

[11]The classic example for this is David Martin and Phyllis Johnson's account of the war published in 1981—only one year after independence. See David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London & Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981).

[12]See for example Tanya Lyons, *Guns and Guerilla Girls: Women in the Zimbabwean National Liberation Struggle* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2004); Eliakim M. Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005); or the collection of essays in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terrence Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Currey & Heinemann, 1995).

funding and their repeated attempts to not only solicit help from China, but also Britain and the United States.[13] Leaving aside the political urgencies fueling some of this scholarship, what has emerged is a multitude of historical approaches emphasizing women's experiences, the experiences of ordinary soldiers, or post-independence labor movements. But efforts have also been made to move away from the battle field and highlight other contributions to independence or to focus on contestations in post-independence Zimbabwe.[14]

The story of the collaboration between the ZANU and the KBW in the mid-to-late 1970s is a part of this story told from the point of view of a European historian. Yet, it is a complicated story as well. On the one hand, the KBW heeded the call for assistance and refused to take a stand in the disputes among different Zimbabwean factions and even praised the perceived unity signified by the 1976 creation of the Patriotic Front—an alliance between ZANU and the Soviet-backed Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). On the other hand, the KBW's insistence to read the Zimbabwean conflict in terms of their specific understanding of Maoism reinforced schematic narratives in which "Comrade Mugabe" was identical with the Zimbabwean people fighting for liberation. For example, in a private meeting between delegations of ZANU and KBW in London—the ZANU cadres had not been granted admission to West Germany—the KBW had to reassure themselves of the ZANU's correct line. With relief they learned that ZANU leaders agreed with condemning the "two superpowers" and Soviet imperialism. In practice, this meant that the KBW had

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[13]David Moore, "ZANU-PF & the Ghosts of Foreign Funding," *Review of African Political Economy* 32, no. 103 (2005): 156–62, p. 159.

[14]Gerald Chikozho Mazarire and JoAnn McGregor, for example, have focused attention on the networks of Zimbabweans abroad organizing support for the war and their experiences of race in postcolonial Britain. Mazarire, "ZANU's External Networks 1963–1979."; McGregor, "Locating Exile.".

clear ideas of who among liberation movements represented "the people" and this precluded support for a broader spectrum of Zimbabwean nationalists.

Decolonization and the 1960s

In December 1959—in the southwestern German university town of Freiburg—the student newspaper dedicated a whole issue to the emerging role of African countries on the world stage. Freiburg later became an important base of operations for the KBW.[15] Members of the editorial board at times included leadership of the local *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (SDS) and other student activists. But in the 1950s, the paper concerned itself with politics only to the extent that they directly impacted student life. Notable exceptions were the regular articles about the "all-German question". Even then, students were mostly concerned about the conditions of East German students. However, in December 1959, the paper was trying something new: "to explore the problems of our foreign colleagues and let them contribute themselves."[16] The stated impetus for this was the ongoing Algerian war of independence. The opening article complained that in the daily press, politics were still understood exclusively in terms of the conflict between East and West. "But too easily — and sometimes happily — do we overlook that for years the peripheral regions of civilization have developed their own political life, which impacts upon the inner structures of our alliances and ultimately changes them."[17] Setting aside, for a moment, the language describing Alge-

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[15]Landeskriminalamt Baden-Württemberg and Landespolizeidirektion Freiburg, "Arbeitspapier über Aktivitäten kommunistisch-maoistischer Gruppen im Raum Freiburg und Möglichkeiten staatlicher Gegenmaßnahmen," Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgarg (HStaSt hereafter), EA 2/302 Bü 63, p. 3.

[16]Hermann Bitzer, "Der Schlaf der Gerechten," *Freiburger Studentenzeitung*, December 1959, 1.

[17]Ibid.

ria as "the edge of civilization," students raised the issue of a new political force in the world that had profound impact on the trajectories of the Cold War. In explaining the purpose of the issue, the FSZ wondered if anybody ever stoped to think where the nearly 20,000 foreign students would go when their German colleagues went home to celebrate Christmas.[18]

Almost exactly one year later — from November 28th to December 12th, 1960 — the University of Freiburg held its first "Africa Week." In a special edition of the newsletter released by the executive committee of the student government (AStA), the student government's officer for information on Africa and Asia poignantly explained the need for more attention to the continent in a way that almost prophetically described the later trajectory of the student movement: "Political education is mostly limited to topics that concern Germany or perhaps Europe. But the world-political developments of today force us to see in new dimensions. The question is no longer: What does this mean for Germany? But what does this mean for the world."[19] The article went on to say that this was a period of global transformations and that these transformations were most prominent in Africa, Asia, and South America. Concretely, national economies were in the process of being transformed into global economies. The article optimistically called for students to learn about non-European culture, study African languages and start seeing Africans as equal partners.

None of this is to say that the article (and others beyond it) were free of condescension. Much of the later part of the text was dedicated to the need to educate West German experts to assist development, and that partnership with Africans not only required West Germans

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[18]"Liebe FSZ Leser!," *Freiburger Studentenzeitung*, December 1959, 2.

[19]Dagobert Soergel, "Zur Afrika-Woche: Die Universität und die Entwicklungsländer," *Informationen für Dozenten und Studenten der Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg im Breisgau* Nr. 1, Sondernummer zur Afrika-Woche vom 28.11.-3.12.1960, Archiv für Soziale Bewegungen Freiburg (ASB hereafter), 5.1.1.II, Zeitschriften, Informationen für Dozenten und Studenten der ALU Freiburg, 1960-1969.

to not underestimate them, but also to avoid overestimating them. The overall tone left little doubt about the nature and direction of the "partnership" that required students to learn about African culture so that they could take on the role of experts in developing countries. But this did not go entirely unchallenged. In their issue on the Africa Week, the *Freiburger Studentenzeitung* praised the event because "solidarity events matching the Africa Week in effort and diligence had been a rare occasion before" and the turnout was encouraging: 300 students had shown up. But the article also remarked that African culture was probably received more as an interesting curiosity and an end to the talk of "primitives" and "illiterates" was unlikely in the near future. The author condemned claims of "Africa having no history" and remained doubtful that the Africa Week would have changed much of that. Nevertheless, the author remained hopeful that the event was the beginning and not the end of new interest in the African continent.[20]

African decolonization was part of the New Left political landscape from the very beginning. Starting in the 1950s, when political engagement of West German students is generally understood to have been low, the Algerian Revolution put Africa on the map of a few left-wing journalists. In 1958, Klaus-Rainer Röhl's *konkret* first published articles by Algerians directly involved with the FLN.[21] Critical voices from France, particularly Jean-Paul Sartre were published as well. However, West Germans remained largely indifferent to the plight of the decolonizing world.

These early interventions have contributed to a tendency in the historiography on the West German New Left that has widely credited the postwar Left with raising the specter of

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[20]H.M. Schmid, "Ihr lieben Weißen aus Freiburg…," *Freiburger Studentenzeitung*, January 1961, 6.

[21]Dorothee Weitbrecht, *Aufbruch in Die Dritte Welt: Der Internationalismus Der Studentenbewegung Von 1968 in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress Gmbh, 2012).

anti-colonialism in West Germany. Reinhard Kössler and Henning Melber, for example, both

former solidarity activists, wrote in a recent retrospective on the solidarity movement that

it was probably with the publications of special issues of *Kursbuch* and *Das Argument*, both

central publications of the student movement, that one can speak of a solidarity movement

with Africa for the first time.[22] Gunnar Hinck, in his otherwise unsympathetic study of West

German Maoism, went a step further and claimed (without much evidence) that the New Left

in West Germany was probably the first to look upon the decolonizing world without colonial

ambition.[23] A particularly sophisticated version of this argument is Dorothee Weitbrecht's

Aufbruch in die Dritte Welt (2012), which emphasizes that "while there were only ten serials

before 1960 which were concerned with developing countries, after the student movement

there were 170 serials with titles related to development policy."[24] In SDS publications such as

Das Argument and *Neue Kritik*, Algeria began to figure more strongly in 1960 and 1961. But

focussing too narrowly on New Left actors distorts broader transformations of the 1960s with

global reach. In this sense, this chapter follows recent historiographical interventions that

try to locate the postwar Left within broader contexts of social and cultural transformations

of the 1960s.[25]

As I have laid out in Chapter 2, decolonization was not only an issue for the far Left,

but entered West German cultural and intellectual life through policies driven by German-

German Cold War competition. Like East German officials, students in Freiburg condemned

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[22]Kössler and Melber, "The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa," p. 105.

[23]Hinck, *Wir waren wie Maschinen.*

[24]Weitbrecht, *Aufbruch in Die Dritte Welt*, p. 47.

[25]See Timothy Scott Brown and Lorena Anton, *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe from 1957 to the Present* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011); Brown, *West Germany and the Global Sixties.*

West Germany's anti-colonial rhetoric at the same time as refusing to condemn the last attempts by the French to preserve French Algeria.[26] This broader German-German context also explains why despite this critical attitude, the Freiburg Africa Week was immediately connected to the question of German-German division. Only a month after the university's Africa Week, the student government announced "solidarity week," a week dedicated to solidarity with East German students. Determining that apathy was potentially a reason why Germans no longer have the "right to freedom and reunification," the student government proclaimed that large-scale solidarity events like Africa Week or Solidarity Week were the only time that people came together.[27]

It may appear counter-intuitive to begin with a story from the late 1950s. After all, it is one of the stated goals of this dissertation revise a historiography that—no doubt thanks to rules blocking access to archives for thirty years—has treated the 1970s Left as an appendix to the global 1960s. But it is simply not possible to understand the landscape of 1970s Africa solidarity without attending to the period in which decolonization first emerged as a broad focal point of mobilization for the extra-parliamentary Left in the West.[28] This is particularly important because many of the solidarity committees committed to support anti-colonial movements in the "Third World"—Vietnam, Latin America, and Africa—emerged in the context of the 1960s student movement and only later became sites of contestation both among rivaling Maoist factions and a broader spectrum of solidarity activists including faith-based groups and so-called "undogmatic" Leftists.

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[26]Hermman Bitzer, "Der Schlaf der Gerechten," *Freiburger Studentenzeitung*, December 1959, 1.

[27]Peter Cronenberg, "Warum Solidaritätswoche," *Informationen für Dozenten und Studenten der Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg im Breisgau*, no. 2 (1961).

[28]Of course this is not to say that issues of race and colonialism didn't matter to the Left before the postwar period. See for example the historiography on African-American and decolonial mobilizations into and within the Comintern in the 1930s. See Pennybacker, *From Scottsboro to Munich*.

The early 1960s were crucial years in the global Cold War as well—seeing the speedy breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations.[29] But more importantly, they saw two events that had major relevance for African and Asian students in West Germany: both the death of Patrice Lumumba and the shutdown of Tehran's University following protests there led to what Quinn Slobodian has designated "the first major intervention of African and Asian students and their first appearance in West German streets."[30]

Hence, the decolonizing world became part of students' immediate environment in a myriad ways in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This is not only true with respect to partly state-sponsored campaigns whose competition over alliances with the new emerging nation-states of decolonizing Africa were motivated by Cold War competition of the two Germanies. Rather, as Quinn Slobodian has shown, long before the apex of the student movement in the late 1960s, students from Africa, Asia and Latin America organized around their own issues within German universities and employed political practices in part derived from the Black Freedom and Free Speech Movements in the United States. In this sense, it was foreign students in West German universities that pioneered some of the tactics of the West German New Left, and Slobodian argues that they had a direct impact on the development of West German student leaders like Rudi Dutschke.[31] Slobodian's intervention is directed against those accounts of the West German New Left's "Third Worldism," that give no account of the role of actors from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in these movements and instead claim that solidarity with the global South was merely the projection of West German revolutionary hopes and dreams onto parts of the world that student activists had no access to and did

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[29]See Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens*. See also Chapter 2.

[30]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 19.

[31]Slobodian. For an argument about how women's participation in anticolonial struggle disrupted gendered notions of violence in the West German New Left, see Melzer, *Death in the Shape of a Young Girl*, ch. 1.

not understand.[32] The problem with these accounts, he argues, is that the uncovering of New Left orientalism comes at the expense of denying the agency of "Third World" actors in the formation of the 1960s Left.[33]

The cases of solidarity with Algeria and Vietnam, perhaps the most notorious cases of "Third World" solidarity throughout the 1960s have been well-documented by historians of the postwar Left.[34] Solidarity committees on Africa, Vietnam, and Latin America—often led by students from the Global South themselves—persisted into the 1970s and in some cases became sites of Maoist contestation. This chapter will now turn to two networks of such groups that would become central to the Zimbabwe Campaigns in the mid-1970s: the Committees Southern Africa and the Africa Committees.

Africa Committees and Solidarity in the 1970s

The *Komitee Südliches Afrika* (KSA) in Heidelberg emerged in 1971—one year after the debate that split the post-SDS Left in the university town. In the past, the KSA has been described as the KBW's Africa solidarity group. It is easy to see why: it came into being almost simultaneously with the *Neues Rotes Forum* (NRF)—one of the predecessors of the KBW and another product of the collapse of the SDS in Heidelberg. The KSA's first *Afrika-*

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[32]See Ingo Juchler, "Trikontinentale und Studentenbewegung: Antiimperialismus als Schibboleth," in *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, ed. Wolfgang Kraushaar (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006), 205–17; Schmidtke, "The German New Left and National Socialism.". A book-length version of this explanation with respect to Maoism and the French "1968" is Wolin, *The Wind from the East.*

[33]Slobodian, Verber and Brown's work all attempt to counter this to an extent. For a recent call to begin to explore the role of anti-colonial revolutions in the constitution of the European New Lefts, see Chin, "European New Lefts, Global Connections, and the Problem of Difference.".

[34]Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Niek Pas, "European Radicals and the 'Third World': Imagined Solidarities and Radical Networks, 1958-73," *Cultural and Social History* 8, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 449–72; Seibert, *Vergessene Proteste*; Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012; Weitbrecht, *Aufbruch in Die Dritte Welt.* For a critical perspective see Lennox, "Enzensberger, Kursbuch, and 'Third Worldism:' the Sixties' Construction of Latin America.".

Blatt was printed at *Caro Druck*, later the KBW's printing company and production facility for the *Zimbabwe News*.[35] And the NRF did sign responsible for the second issue of the *Afrika-Blatt*.[36] Consequently, one can reasonably assume a close relationship—and likely personal overlap—between the two groups.

But understanding solidarity groups in which Maoist cadres had significant amounts of influence as synonymous or subordinate to Maoist parties is misleading as well. When the KSA was founded within the council of economics students at the University of Heidelberg, the KBW didn't exist for another two years. As was the case with many of the Maoist party-affiliated institutions, the KSA itself had predecessors in the 1960s student movement in Heidelberg. Rather, the idea that the KSA was an arm of the KBW originates from within the complex debates within Africa solidarity networks in the 1970s, debates that also occurred within the KSA themselves. Monolithic accounts of West German Maoist parties and their so-called mass organizations not only brush over the tensions and local complexities that gave rise to Maoism in West Germany but also render invisible the ways in which West German Maoists were tightly entangled with the rest of the 1970s extra-parliamentary Left.

Because of the particularly rich source material, this chapter disproportionately focusses on the KBW's work in different Africa solidarity committees. But the conflicts within Africa solidarity committees the KBW was engaged in shows that a number of Maoist parties, other left-wing and socialist groups as well as religious organizations worked side-by-side with the KBW in these groups. In 1971, the KPD's *Liga gegen den Imperialismus*—which heretofore had remained focused on Vietnam—announced the first publication of the *Afrika-Komitees'*

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[35] *Afrika-Blatt* no. 1, 1971.
[36] *Afrika-Blatt* no. 2, May 1971.

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new periodical *Afrika Kämpft*.[37] The *Liga* was not exceptional in this. In the publication

of Ernst Aust's KPD/ML Africa played only a subordinate role for the first three years. In

1968 and 1969 there were only two dedicated articles about Africa: a short report about

new victories in African anti-colonial struggles that was taken directly from *hsin hua*, and a

solidarity letter from an African Marxist-Leninist currently in West Germany congratulating

the KPD/ML on its formation. Africa's significance remained abstract. For example a report

on the IX. Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party listed organizations that sent

solidarity messages to China: among them were several South African groups as well as the

Zimbabwe African National Union.[38]

But among the predecessors to the KBW, Portuguese colonialism had begun to be a

rallying point already in 1970. Together with the SDS's *Internationales Nachrichten und*

Forschungsinstitut (INFI)—founded in the aftermath of the international Vietnam Con-

ference in 1968—the Heidelberg SDS, and Heidelberg's group *Sozialistisches Asien, Afrika,*

Lateinamerika started a campaign against West German collaboration with Portuguese colo-

nialism that centered on West German military aid to Portugal and West German participa-

tion in the construction of the *Cabora Bassa* dam in Mozambique. The dam—a collaboration

of Portugal, South Africa and Mozambique—had been severely criticized by the United Na-

tions and the Organization for African Unity. Swedish and Italian companies withdrew

from the project after sustained pressure, British companies who considered participating in

the project also withdrew after pressure from the labor government and African liberation

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[37]See "Afrika Kämpft" in *Internationale Solidarität* Vol. 1, No. 5, 1972, p. 25. The fact that the *Liga* was managing subscriptions to *Afrika Kämpft* may have contributed to the narrative by which the *Afrika Komitees* were organizations of the KPD.

[38]"Neue Siege," in *Roter Morgen* Vol. 2, February 1968, p. 10; "Ein Gruß unserer Afrikanischen Genossen," in *Roter Morgen* Vol.3, March 1969, p.15; and "Ein Ereignis von Welthistorischer Bedeutung" in *Roter Morgen* Vol. 3, April 1969, p.3.

groups in the UK.[39] In West Germany, however, where the federal government had approved

financial support in form of credit for the West German companies involved, even a letter by

Marcellino dos Santos, vice president of FRELIMO, failed to have an effect.[40] Nonetheless,

the student movement, churches, youth groups, trade unions, peace groups and others joined

a broad-based campaign against the companies involved.[41]

For the story of the KBW, this campaign is of special relevance: when the Heidelberg SDS

decided to organize a protest against an international development aid conference in June

1970, during which protesters attacked a police barrier with rocks and paint and eventually

broke the windows of a local police station, nine members of the SDS were charged and

eventually sentenced to several months in prison. Among them several recurring characters

of this dissertation: later KBW leader Joscha Schmierer, and Uwe Kräuter, who moved to

China to avoid prison.

In the context of the Cabora Bassa campaign, it is then not surprising that Portuguese

colonialism was the early focus of the Heidelberg KSA. The KSA's *Afrika-Blatt* interpreted

West German arms shipments to Portugal as West German complicity in ongoing Portuguese

colonialism.[42] When the KBW was founded in 1973, the issue of Portuguese colonialism was

with them from the beginning. On September 24th, 1973, Luís Cabral declared indepen-

dence for Guinea-Bissau. The next issue of the newly founded KBW's *Kommunistische Volk-*

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[39]Konrad Kuhn, "Liberation Struggle and Humanitarian Aid: International Solidarity Movements and the "Third World" in the 1960s," in *The Third World in the Global 1960s*, ed. Samantha Christiansen and Zachary A. Scarlett (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), p. 75; for a longer—albeit fairly descriptive—account of the Cabora Bassa campaign in West Germany, see Seibert, *Vergessene Proteste*; Werner Balsen and Karl Rössel, *Hoch die internationale Solidarität: zur Geschichte der Dritte Welt-Bewegung in der Bundesrepublik* (Köln: Kölner Volksblatt Verlag, 1986).

[40]For a reprint of the letter, see Balsen and Rössel, pp. 286-290.

[41]Kuhn, "Liberation Struggle and Humanitarian Aid," p. 76.

[42]"Die Portugiesischen Kolonien und die BRD", *Afrika-Blatt* 1 (1971).

szeitung (KVZ) praised the long-ongoing resistance of the people of Guinea-Bissau against Portuguese colonialism as well as the *African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde* (PAIGC) for their education projects but also armed struggle for national liberation. One issue the KVZ highlighted in particular was that the UN General Assembly had declared the PAIGC the legitimate representatives of the people of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the West German government refused to recognize independence. The Social Democratic Party under Willy Brand was a particularly reviled offender in this case: as the KBW argued, the Social Democrats wanted to have it both ways. They proclaimed support for national self-determination on the international stage and even criticized the arms shipments to Portugal while at the same time being responsible for West Germany's undermining of national self-determination because they were part of the governing coalition.[43]

At the same time, local KBW-related groups began solidarity campaigns for Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in schools and among workers. In Wiesbaden, several KBW-affiliated agitate within the industry and related vocational schools. A solidarity resolution was passed by a local KBW group and similar resolutions are passed within the youth group of the postal service union and distributed among sympathetic workers.[44] One report to the KBW Central Committee told of successful attempts to get workers excited about the independence

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[43]"Guinea-Bissau ist Unabhängig! Ein Sieg über den Portugisischen Kolonialismus und Imperialismus," in *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* Vol. 1, Nr. 4, p. 10; "Militärische Unterstützung an Portugal durch die BRD," in *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* Vol. 1, Nr. 4, p. 11; "SPD-Regierung: Keine Anerkennung," in *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*, Vol. 1, Nr. 4; p.10.

[44]"Resolution der Solidaritätsveranstaltung zur Unterstützung des kämpfenden Volkes von Guinea-Bissau und der Kapverdischen Inseln" (October 26, 1973); Deutsche Postgewerkschaft Wiesbaden Jugendausschuß "Resolution zur Unterstützung des Unabhängigen Guinea-Bissau" (October 23rd, 1973) in APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 09.

of Guinea-Bissau in the changing room, and said that a hand full of workers came to attend a solidarity event.[45]

As two former Africa solidarity activists remember, the 1970s provided a different opportunity for Marxists, who had hopes for the revolutionary impact of the seismic shocks of decolonization on the world: on April 25th, 1974 a left-wing coup in Lisbon ended Portuguese resistance to the struggle for decolonization in its African colonies. By the end of 1975, activists now saw an opportunity to work towards socialism in Portugal's former colonies.[46] This work posed a different set of difficulties for the increasingly ideologically rigid KBW, who would not cede any ground to competing Maoists in West Germany but whose ideological positions turned out to be much more vague for people working abroad.

Sometimes this constituted real problems for those delegates of the party that were sent to Africa, who often did not feel adequately prepared for the difficulties that emerged from the KBW's ideological training and the concrete conditions on the ground in the new states. Take for example the case of two doctors the Central Committee of the KBW had dispatched in association with the *Komitee Südliches Afrika* in Heidelberg to Cape Verde shortly after the country's independence.[47] After one and a half years of working in a hospital in Cape Verde, both were back in the Federal Republic to recover from jaundice. Shortly before one

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[45]"Bericht zur Durchführung der Kampagne in Betrieb und Schule" (November 16th, 1973) in APO-Archiv, APO-KBW 09.

[46]An early alternative to work in former Portuguese colonies was work in the People's Republic of Albania. But due to the early success of the KPD/ML in securing the claim to being the PPSh's only legitimate partner in the Federal Republic, this avenue was open only to a very select number of people.

[47]Cape Verde was an attractive case for solidarity because the Cape Verdean nationalist revolutionary Amilcar Cabral had been an important theorist for the 1960s left. To protest the award of the Peace Price of the German Book Trade to Leopold Senghor, the SDS proposed Cabral instead in 1968. He had been published by the Berlin-based *Oberbaumpresse* in the same year. See Uwe Sonnenberg, *Von Marx zum Maulwurf: linker Buchhandel in Westdeutschland in den 1970er Jahren* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016), p. 91; of course, internationally, Cabral was among the widely recognized theoretical influences on the New Left together with Fanon, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and others. See for example the introduction to the recent volume Christiansen and Scarlett, *The Third World in the Global 1960s.*

of them was to return to their work in Cape Verde, they hurriedly requested a meeting with the Central Committee to discuss the future of their work. The KBW had sent them in response to a request for two doctors by the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) in December 1975. They were to be given political instructions by the Central Committee. The interdenominational aid organization *Dienste in Übersee* (Services Abroad) agreed to pay DM1,250 per person per month.[48]

However, they had gotten off to a rocky start. The promised political instruction by the KBW Central Committee and the KSA never took place. Before leaving for their trip, they received six months of theoretical training, which proved unhelpful for practice on the ground. "We have come to believe the course focused too much on theory, but there weren't even attempts to investigate whether the theory holds up to the realities of the country."[49] The two repeatedly reached out to the KBW back home to get further instruction, but those attempts were frustrated. Once, they received a letter asking them to write articles for the KBW's newspaper, the *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* (KVZ) about spontaneous initiatives of the Cape Verdean masses. But this hardly helped with their own ideological difficulties. And even the reports to the KVZ turned out to be less straight forward than hoped: Should one focus on conflicts between different lines within the PAIGC and analyze these with respect to class conflict between the petty bourgeoisie on the one side and workers and farmers on the other? Or was it better to leave those issues out and focus on the concrete successes and accomplishments in building a new society?

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[48]"Papier der zwei Arztgenossen in Kapverde," APO-Archiv, ZK - Internationale Beziehungen (APO-KBW 001).

[49]Ibid.

Further problems arose from the nature of the work itself: when were two doctors supposed to do the research on current events in Cape Verde when they were working from 8am to 8pm every day, with added night shifts every four days? Considering that neither of them spoke the local language, they wondered if they were the right people for the job. After all, why "waste" revolutionaries on this kind of work? They "were unsure whether their work couldn't be done by enthusiastic adventurers."[50] All this led the two doctors to consider whether it wasn't a better idea to return to the Federal Republic as quickly as they can, where the political situation was becoming increasingly heated and surely all hands were needed on deck.[51] It seemed to them, that it might be a bad idea to send two comrades to Africa.

What is remarkable about the letter by the two doctors is not only that they felt their Marxist ambition was wasted on medical work in Cape Verde. After all, much of these considerations could have been brought about by homesickness in a period of adjusting to radically different circumstances. What is remarkable is that read against much of the literature on West German Maoism, *these two doctors are complaining about a surprising amount of ideological freedom. Former participants, journalists and historians of Maoism have argued in the past that at least by the late 1970s, ideological dissent was not tolerated. The KBW made harsh demands on its cadres and sympathizers, bullying them into working long hours, and demanding a significant portion of their paychecks. Here, as well, the KBW was not exceptional. Other groups as well isolated those who were perceived to be following the wrong line. They denounced them as bourgeois intellectuals, who undermined the correct*

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[50]Ibid.

[51]During the second part of the 1970s, several German state governments and the Federal Government were renewing discussions on whether to push for a ban of the Maoist parties by the Constitutional Court.

proletarian line in the party.[52] *But as the desperation for guidance from the party in this letter reveals, it is less clear how ideology translated into the building of a socialist society and party cadres seemed to be granted a large amount of interpretive leeway. This is not to say that this led to dissenting views or the official toleration thereof. It is telling, that the activists' response to the absence of ideological guidance was "self-education" with the* Kommunistische Volkszeitung* and the KBW's theoretical journal, *Kommunismus und Klassenkampf.*

Eventually, however, they decided that they could be more useful in Cape Verde and that their absence in Germany would probably not significantly harm the proletarian struggle at home. Lacking ideological "guidance" they decided that they could best contribute to the strengthening of 'the proletarian line' if they empowered the masses to 'trust in their own strength' in the field of health policy.[53] Moreover, after a while the doctors felt more confident to compose reports on the progress of building a new society in independent Cape Verde, and in their ability to unmask "imperialist propaganda." One project they worked in on involved training so-called "barefoot doctors," who could operate with minimal equipment and fulfill basic medical tasks.[54] Moreover, they were taking part in general campaigns to improve hygiene, held weekly meetings with doctors and patients, helped setup office hours for people with eye problems (the only ophthalmologist had left the country in April 1974), and worked on campaigns against tuberculosis and scabies. To the two doctors of the KBW, this meant building a healthcare system from the bottom up.

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[52]See for example Kühn, *Stalins Enkel, Maos Söhne*; also see the two volumes by former participants mentioned above: Autorenkollektiv, *Wir warn die stärkste der Partein* ..; Schlögel, Jasper, and Ziesemer, *Partei kaputt. Das Scheitern der KPD und die Krise der Linken.*

[53]Ibid.

[54]The term 'barefoot doctors' comes from the Chinese Cultural Revolution and denotes doctors with little to no equipment and often only very basic medical training. It likely inspired similar projects in decolonizing Africa. On the Capeverdean case, see Patrick Chabal, *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*, African Studies Series.37 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 120.

In any case, the conditions of their work improved in December 1976, when they moved from the central hospital in Praia to the second largest island. They were now the only two doctors and delegates of the health ministry for the island with a population of 50,000. This allowed them a remarkable degree of independence.[55] And yet, confronted with this independence they returned to the central committee of the KBW for ideological instruction. Cape Verde, in the mid-1970s counting a population of approximately 300,000, remained an outlier among the support work of the KSA. In retrospect, the medical work the KBW doctors did appears to have been little different than the volunteer work of others who thronged to the newly independent Portuguese colonies. This is not the case with the campaign to support the Zimbabwean War of Liberation, to which I will turn now.

From London to Frankfurt to Maputo to Independent Zimbabwe

On May 24, 1982, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe embarked on his first official state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The federal government was optimistic: Since independence, the relationship between West Germany and Zimbabwe had developed in a positive direction. West Germany's recognition of the new state, and support for the reconstruction efforts after the war of independence had endeared West Germany to the new government. Also, Mugabe's government reportedly remembered the generosity of West German stipends to Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana during the

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[55] "Papier der zwei Arztgenossen in Kapverde," APO-Archiv, ZK - Internationale Beziehungen (APO-KBW 001).

war. More generally, developments with the new government were encouraging: Although Zimbabwe had "normalized" its relationship with the Soviet Union, and held diplomatic relations with East Germany, they maintained a position of non-alignment and remained much closer to the People's Republic of China. During the war, China had supported Mugabe's ZANU with military training. Its main competitor, the ZAPU was backed by the Soviets. During the three-day visit, the Prime Minister was on a tight schedule. Talks with the West German chancellor, the foreign minister, press conferences, formal dinners, and so on ensured limited free time.

However, the way the Prime Minister spent Tuesday afternoon turned out to be a source of irritation for the West Germans. Mugabe insisted on meeting with 3-4 cadres of the Communist League of West Germany (KBW), a Maoist party that several West German states had sought to ban. According to the Foreign Ministry, the government had encouraged efforts by Zimbabwe's ambassador to the Federal Republic to dissuade Mugabe from the meeting. It is unclear from the documents whether Ambassador Chambati *really* opposed the meeting as it is equally unclear whether he really thought of the KBW as a chaotic-disruptive organization. Although that is certainly possible. What is clear, however, is that Mugabe stuck to his plans. After some deliberation of the potential disadvantages of attempting to prevent the meeting from taking place, the West Germans decided to not interfere. One did not want to suggest that West German officials sought to mingle in Zimbabwean affairs, after all. Now, granted, the foreign ministry did *not* think a meeting with the KBW would have any serious consequences at all. But these documents do point to a pre-history to Zimbabwean-West German relations: the state's fraught relationship with

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Mugabe's ZANU during the second half of the 1970s, and ZANU's close partnership with West German Maoists.

The "Third World" in the 1970s was a battleground of Sino-Soviet competition.[56] In Zimbabwe in November 1965, Ian Smith's white minority government declared independence from the British. Smith's regime was engaged in a prolonged war against two insurrectionary forces, ZANU's Zimbabwe African Liberation Army and ZAPU's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZARPA). Indeed, the Zimbabwean Civil War proved a convenient conflict for West German Maoists. Not only did African nationalists lead an insurrection against a white settler regime that was — after 1969 — at least tolerated by the British, but the two warring factions of black nationalists were also backed by conflicting factions within the international communist movement: The ZARPA received military support from Moscow while the ZANU was backed by the Chinese Communist Party.[57] Especially after the collapse of the Portuguese empire, the KBW shifted its attention dramatically towards Zimbabwe. As the chairman of the Central Committee's, Joscha Schmierer, put it in the KVZ, "the Rhodesian settler regime is the next fortress which the African peoples have to storm and tear down."[58]

But an explanation based purely on ideological factors would obscure the tremendous efforts ZANU cadres in Europe made to solicit support for the war from European sympathizers. Before coming to London to study at the Institute of Transport, Rex Chiwara had been a shunter for Zambian Railways. He took over the London office as ZANU's representa-

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[56]See for example Friedman, *Shadow Cold War.*

[57]The classic account of the Zimbabwean War of Liberation remains Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*; for a critique and a call to shift the focus away from the elites, see Munochiveyi, "Becoming Zimbabwe from Below."

[58]Joscha Schmierer, "Es lebe der Befreiungskampf des Volkes von Zimbabwe gegen das rhodesische Siedlerregime," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*, October 16th, 1974, 16.

tive to Western Europe in 1972. Later, Chiwara served on the Zimbabwean Detainee Defence Committee, a committee consisting of several ZANU and non-ZANU activists for the purpose of securing money for legal aid.[59] Being thus at the hub for solidarity activity in Western Europe, Chiwara visited the KBW in 1974. To celebrate the anniversaries of Guinea-Bissau's declaration of independence and the one-year anniversary of the commencement of Mozambique's war of independence—on September 24th and 25th respectively—several European solidarity networks had agreed to host a solidarity week in their respective countries at a meeting in Oxford in April. During these events, Rex Chiwara met with KBW cadres in Mannheim on September 24th to solicit donations for several Land Rover vehicles. The vehicles were crucial to continue the military campaign waged by ZANLA in Southern Rhodesia. In October, the KBW's KVZ published a statement by ZANU's chairman Herbert Chitepo. In it, he weaved together a narrative of the history of colonialism and resistance in Southern Rhodesia. The same page included a letter to the KBW by Rex Chiwara referencing the September 24th meeting and urged the KBW to raise money for at least two vehicles. Next to Chiwara's letter was an urgent call to answer Chiwara's appeal by the KBW's chairman Joscha Schmierer.[60] Approximately one month later, the Committee Southern Africa published its first special issue on Zimbabwe including Chiwara's letter.[61] Thus began the relationship between the ZANU and the KBW.

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[59]Mazarire, "ZANU's External Networks 1963–1979," p. 94-95.

[60]"Bericht des Genossen Herbert Chitepo, dem Vorsitzenden des Zentralkommittees der Afrikanischen Nationalunion von Zimbabwe (ZANU), über den Befreiungskamp des Volkes von Zimbabwe;" Joscha Schmierer, "Es lebe der Befreiungskampf des Volkes von Zimbabwe gegen das rhodesische Siedlerregime;" Rex Chiwara, "Aufruf zur Unterstützung," all in *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* Volume 2, Nr. 21, October 16th, 1974, p. 16.

[61]Rex Chiwara, "Aufruf zur Unterstützung," *Afrika Zeitung* November 1974.

Over the following six years, the KBW and KPD coordinated a number of fundraising and information campaigns, printed the *Zimbabwe Daily News* and shipped them to the ZANU offices in Maputo, met with representatives of the ZANU in England and West Germany, and eventually dispatched members to build printing facilities in Mozambique. Donation campaigns ranged from collecting medical equipment and clothing to raising money for vehicles and finally to support the purchase of weapons for a "fully motorized company of the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army." The success of these campaigns was certainly in part due to the strict financial demands of the organization, but more than that entailed rigorous organization of regular fundraising events all across the country, multiple speaking tours with representatives of the ZANU including their founder, Ndabaningi Sithole, and later president Robert Mugabe. And it was also certainly not least due to a characteristic of the KBW that had proved an annoyance for much of the non-Maoist Left in West Germany: their propensity to infiltrate solidarity groups, *Bürgerinitiativen*, and neighborhood committees in an attempt to bring them closer to the party line. In 1978, for example, the *Kommunistische Volkszeitung* reported that multiple initiatives against the construction of nuclear power plants had contributed donations for the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army, the ZANU's armed wing.[62]

The ZANU did not forget this: When Zimbabwe hosted its first independence celebrations in 1980, the KBW was the only west German organization on the guest list apart from official representatives of the Federal Republic's government. While the KBW had not gained official recognition by either the Chinese Communist Party or the Albanian Party of Labor, they had

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[62]"Bürgerinitiative für die Unterstützung der ZANU," *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*, April 3, 1978. For the reverse argument, that the strict organization of the parties in combination with their wide networks was of help to the transnational anti-nuclear movement, see Gildea and Tompkins, "The Transnational in the Local.".

succeeded in becoming the official partner of the Zimbabwe African National Union before independence. In some way, the conditions of possibility for this to happen can be sought in West German policy towards Rhodesia since the declaration of independence and rule by Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front in 1965. Although the Federal Government officially maintained a position supportive of black self-government in Southern Africa, they also committed to non-interference in the conflict. Although several UN Security Council resolutions first condemned and then imposed sanctions on the Smith regime, West Germany — an observing member of the UN until 1973 — did not ratify sanctions against Rhodesia.[63]

The relationship between the KBW, the ZANU and the West German government turned tense in 1977-1978. In 1977, the KBW started a new campaign to "equip a fully motorized company of the ZANLA." The campaign faced legal challenges in multiple West German states — the most successful of which was the seizure of a KBW bank account containing approximately DM110,000 by the regional government (*Regierungspräsidium*) in Tübingen. After the seizure of funds, donations continued to trickle into the bank account for about a month, such that the total amount held by the government amounted to DM120,359.45. While both the KBW and the ZANU battled the seizure of funds in court, the KBW continued its collection. The result was that the sequestered money only amounted to approximately 10% of the raised funds. By November 1978, DM770,674 had been transferred to the ZANU, and an additional couple of hundred thousand DM were spent on shipping costs for material donations, telex communications, and reproduction of ZANU materials. In other

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[63]Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and Teresa Barnes, "Social and Economic Developments During the UDI Period," in *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008*, ed. Brian Raftopoulos and A. S. Mlambo (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009).

words, in 1978 alone, the KBW raised in excess of DM1,000,000 to support the forces of Robert Mugabe.[64]

The state originally based its injunction to sequester the funds on article 26 paragraph 1 of the constitution, which the state argued rendered all actions unconstitutional that endanger or disturb a state of peace.[65] The KBW's lawyers argued, by contrast, that article 26 of the constitution subjugated German foreign policy under international law and that Germany was bound by several UN resolutions since 1970 which legitimized "armed struggle" when it served the purpose of establishing national self-determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination.[66] Even though West Germany abstained in all votes on this matter, they still were bound by the results.[67]

A second reason the state brought forward in support of the injunction was that the support for the ZANU in the civil war conflicted with the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. In parallel suits in other states, the Foreign Office at first refused to comment on the matter, but eventually argued that the fundraising campaigns of the KBW interfere with the federal government's ambition to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Southern Africa. A solution would include an end to racist discrimination and eventual independence of Zimbabwe, but support for armed conflict endangered the foreign policy

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[64]KBW ZK Sekretariat an KBW ZK Org. und Statistik "Betrifft: Abrechnung ZANU-Sammlung, Ausrüstung einer vollmotorisierten Kompanie der ZANLA" (November 3rd, 1978), Archiv Außerparlamentarische Opposition und Soziale Bewegungen (APO-Archiv hereafter) ZANU Finanzen (APO-KBW 028).

[65]Landesanwaltschaft beim Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen an das Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen (April 10th, 1978), APO-Archiv, ZANU Rundreise 1978 (APO-KBW 023), 2.

[66]Eberhardt Kempf, H.Jürgen Borowsky, Birgit Laubach an das Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen "In der Verwaltungsstreitsache Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschland gegen das Land Baden-Württemberg" (April 15th, 1978), APO-Archiv, ZANU Rundreise 1978 (APO-KBW 023), 3-4.

[67]Ibid.

objectives of the Federal Republic. The fundraising campaign had to be prohibited because of this conflict.[68]

The KBW did not agree with this interpretation, not because it denied that their position was at odds with the West German official position on the conflict in Zimbabwe, but because they argued the conflict was irrelevant. According to the KBW's lawyers, laws pertaining to a conflict with the foreign policy of the federal government regulated which state instances had the right to represent the Federal Republic abroad (and here, the Foreign Office has an exclusive right), but to a non-state actor, these laws did not apply in the KBW's view. Furthermore, they argued that according to international law there must not be any relationships between the Federal Republic and the internationally unrecognized Rhodesian state, which according to them meant that there couldn't be interference with these relationships.[69]

Finally, the state argued that the fundraising campaign didn't only contribute to armed conflict abroad, but disturbed the peace at home. It was not sufficient for this to be the case to simply raise money for armed conflict abroad. But because the KBW had linked the struggle in Zimbabwe to the global struggle against capitalism with direct implications for the West German proletariat, the state argued that the KBW's fundraising campaign by its nature "constitutes a challenge to the consensus of non-violence that was foundational for West German society." The statements by the KBW encouraged a revolutionary situation

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[68]Landesanwaltschaft beim Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen an das Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen (April 10th, 1978), APO-Archiv, ZANU Rundreise 1978 (APO-KBW 023), 2.

[69]Eberhardt Kempf, H.Jürgen Borowsky, Birgit Laubach an das Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen "In der Verwaltungsstreitsache Kommunistischer Bund Westdeutschland gegen das Land Baden-Württemberg" (April 15th, 1978), APO-Archiv, ZANU Rundreise 1978 (APO-KBW 023), 1-2.

in West Germany, and although there was no such situation, violated the constitution which precludes a revolutionary situation in the Federal Republic.[70]

Ultimately the KBW failed to achieve a suspension of the injunction.[71] A parallel legal challenge by the ZANU, which avoided the political challenges of the KBW challenge and simply argued that the money was raised before the campaign had been prohibited, and the government now held on to funds that had already become the property of the ZANU failed as well.[72]

No decision was made in the case until 1980, when the ZANU invited delegates from all over the world to the first Zimbabwean independence celebrations. In March, the West German Foreign Office contacted the state of Baden-Württemberg and informed them that after the Federal Republic offered a friendly relationship to Robert Mugabe's new government, the Foreign Office had no objections to the funds being released to the ZANU.[73] On April 16th, the state and the KBW settled their conflict. The funds were released to the KBW lawyers and in late April 1980, the KBW lawyers transferred the funds to the ZANU.[74]

The KBW was not alone in its enthusiastic support of Zimbabwe. In fact, the ZANU campaign was one of the rare instances of cooperation between Maoist parties, with the KPD regularly contributing to the KBW's project. Others were less proactive, but generally supportive of the ZANU. The investment of hope into anticolonial revolution and the priv-

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[70]Landesanwaltschaft beim Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen an das Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen (April 10th, 1978), APO-Archiv, ZANU Rundreise 1978 (APO-KBW 023), 4.

[71]Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden Württemberg "Beschluß in der Verwaltungssache des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland vertreten durch das Zentrale Komitee, dasselbe durch den Sekretär Gerhard Schmierer gegen das Land Baden Württemberg" (June 6th, 1978).

[72]Eberhard Kempf, H.-Jürgen Borowsky, Birgit Laubach an das Verwaltungsgericht Sigmaringen "In der Verwaltungsstreitsache Dr. E. Zvogo gegen das Land Baden Württemberg" (April 15th, 1978).

[73]Auswärtiges Amt an die Vertretung des Landes Baden-Württemberg beim Bund (March 11th, 1980).

[74]"Zahlungsauftrag, Eberhardt Kempf an das ZANU-PF Department of Finance," APO-Archiv, ZANU Finanzen (APO-KBW 028).

ileging of nationalist revolutionary struggle in the "Third World"—timely as it would have seemed in the 1960s and early 1970s, and not only to members of the Marxist-Leninist Far Left—receded into the background with the problems posed by post-colonial statehood and the overwhelming failure of socialism to materialize in the aftermath of liberation struggles. Certainly Cambodia had dealt an early blow to the perhaps unrealistic expectations Maoists around the world had invested in the decolonizing world. And these events did not only traumatize the Far Left. As Sam Moyne has argued more broadly, and Ned Richardson-Little has demonstrated with respect to the development of human rights discourses in Cold War Germany, it was only in the late 1970s that conflicting interpretations of human rights based on either individual or national rights were decisively decided in favor of individual rights. This decision, they argued, was not least because of the disappointed hopes of those who had invested postcolonial regimes with (certainly unrealistic) utopian hopes.[75] Maoism's decline in the Cold War Germanies coincided with a turning point in postcolonial history, when the politics of solidarity in decolonial conflict would have had to have been replaced with the more tedious support for postcolonial societies rebuilding. But that, desirable as it may have been, seems to have prompted a lot less enthusiasm.

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[75]Moyn, *The Last Utopia*; Richardson-Little, "Between Dictatorship and Dissent."

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

This dissertation has argued that decolonization and its implications for power struggles within international communism significantly impacted the postwar Germanies. The case of Maoism is an instructive one for several reasons. Although Maoism in the 1970s never came close to significant electoral or even revolutionary success, it was widely discussed in both postwar German states. Unlike in Maoists in the United States, the so-called West German *K-Gruppen* are well known to Germans today. It is also well-known that a number of high-ranking personalities in politics, the press, and the economy are former cadres of Maoist parties. It is precisely *that* Maoists reached notoriety both in the 1970s and in the intervening decades despite existing overwhelmingly on the fringe of the political spectrum that the case reveals something fundamental about the period: that at the moment of collapsing European empires, what loomed behind the activism of German and foreign Maoists was the weight of a shifting world order brought about by the specte of decolonization and the rise of China.

While the dissertation uses the case of Maoism to make this claim, I have argued that the impact of decolonization has been far broader. It is not just that activists from former and current colonial contexts agitated in Germany, although I have shown that to be the case. Before even before the early formations of the so-called "anti-authoritarian" student

movement took root in West Germany, the issue of decolonization was brought to university campuses around the country by a West German government desperate to position itself as an ally of newly forming postcolonial states in an attempt to prevent international recognition of East Germany as a legitimate postwar state. As much as West Germany's "developmentalist" policies drew criticism from the far Left, the ubiquity of the issue of decolonization in the 1960s and 1970s raises serious questions about the relative absence of the issue in postwar German historiography.

In East Germany, the puzzlement expressed by a handful of foreign students from Africa and Asia over the Soviet handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis triggered concerns about a shifting global balance of power. In West Germany, the murder of Patrice Lumumba and African students' subsequent protests provoked immediate state anxieties over activism of students from the Global South.[1] Following the collapse of the Portuguese empire, the possibility of travel to new nation states like Mozambique drew West German and other European activists to countries that served as bases for struggles against the white minority regimes of southern Africa. In the second half of the 1970s, students and fellowship recipients from Zimbabwe built European networks of solidarity that drew a large part of Maoist activism and resources.

"Europe is literally the Creation of the "Third World," Frantz Fanon famously wrote. Recently, Gary Wilder has suggested that in the middle of the twentieth century, there were discussions over what a postcolonial universalism would look like. Specifically, Wilder writes:

> Like many of their contemporaries—"Third World" nationalists, regionalists, panethnicists, and socialist internationalists—they were acutely aware that decolonization would entail the reconfiguration rather than the elimination of impe-

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[1]Slobodian, *Foreign Front*, 2012, p. 61.

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rial domination. But rather than offer a territorial response to this threat, they formulated epochal projections and projects. Their ambition exceeded a commitment to protecting the liberty and improving the lives of the populations they represented. They also felt themselves to be implicated in and responsible for remaking the world and redeeming humanity. Their interventions thus remind us that during the postwar opening, the world-making ambition to reconceptualize and reorganize the global order was not the exclusive preserve of imperial policymakers, American strategists, international lawyers, or Third International Communists.[2]

This dissertation has opened up questions about different kinds of European integration produced by the concrete transnational networks built by anti-colonial activists based in the metropoles and operating across European borders. The extent to which European integration—on the ground—was coproduced by postcolonial subjects in the 1960s and 1970s remains an issue of further research with deep implications for how we understand European postwar integration and how we reconcile the reality of Europe as a collection of multi-ethnic societies with the continued insistence on *Leitkultur* and impervious borders. Further research is needed on these issues, but the questions themselves justify the approach to the postwar Left and decolonization taken in this study.

Maoism is also a useful prism through which to view the impact on decolonization because of the ways in which it provided a broader language through which activists and students from the Global South could articulate their concerns in anti-colonial terms even when they were not themselves from currently decolonizing countries. The best examples of this were the organizations of Iranian students who articulated the dependence of Iran on oil exports as neo-colonialism, but also included Turkish Maoists in West Germany. Of course, the limitations of the language of Maoism also posed problems that ultimately led to intense

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[2]Wilder, *Freedom Time*, p. 8.

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friction when China's shifting foreign policy abandoned the Iranian struggle against the Shah in the mid-1970s.

One question that remains open is that of the formative impact foreigners had on Maoism *as ideology* in the Cold War Germanies. As I have shown, foreign Maoists were involved in Maoist ideological production for West German parties, for example during the campaigns surrounding the persecution of Iranians and the OPEC energy crisis of 1973. Similarly, I have shown that the practice of Maoists in East Germany largely continued what Chinese and Albanian diplomats had done in the 1960s. Travel to Albania led to difficult—and in hindsight humorous—debates about the roots of Maoist cadre parties in the "anti-authoritarian" Left. But to pose the question of a formative impact on the ideology of German Maoism would undermine one of the key arguments of this dissertation, which is that the separation of Maoists and "foreign extremists" was itself a product of a state that was unwilling to accept its multi-ethnic character and that foreign Maoisms were themselves as sectarian and full of contradiction and debate as the purportedly West German Maoisms. What I have shown is that these debates crossed this artificial boundary even though cross-cultural communication remained fraught with misunderstandings, misappropriations, uneven exchanges, and stereotypical projections.

What Kind of Decolonization?

From February 11 to 14, 1999, researchers from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden met for a seminar on Robben Island off South Africa's West Coast. On the agenda were both the history of solidarity work by

state- and non-state actors with liberation struggles in Southern Africa and the present and future challenges for "solidarity and co-operation."[3] A member of the Zimbabwean delegation to the conference found little grounds for optimism. As he put it, most of the national liberation movements that drew support in the 1970s had since turned into ruling parties in their respective countries: the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. While national liberation movements tended to favor centralized models of organization and suppression of dissent out of military necessity, these were not characteristics that were promising for democratic transition. The author concluded that "there do not seem to be any success stories among these territories."[4] Further, he argued "Whilst Nordic and Socialist support for national liberation helped to removed colonial repression, the victorious nationalist parties seem to have eroded the gains of that support by developing new authoritarian systems following independence."[5] More important, however, is the author's indictment of those who engaged in solidarity in the 1970s but failed to show the same kind of support for the post-independence task of democratization.[6]

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[3]"Nordic-Southern African Partnerships into the 21st Century," in *Report of the Conference Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century* (Robben Island, South Africa, 1999), 2–6, p. 2.

[4]A.M. Kambudzi, "Zimbabwe: Nordic Solidarity, Nationalliberation and Post-Independence Problems and Prospects in Southern Africa," in *Report of the Conference Nordic Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa, and Challenges for Democratic Partnerships into the 21st Century* (Robben Island, South Africa, 1999), 66–79, 75.

[5]Kambudzi, 73.

[6]Kambudzi, p. 78.

Reflecting on the issues raised by the Zimbabwean scholar on Robben Island, two former West German solidarity activists diagnosed that:

> The growing disinterest seemed to suggest that the end of colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa was perceived from within the solidarity movement as the end of history, instead of merely the closing of one historical chapter in the ongoing process of social transformation.[7]

The irony is striking: two decades after students at the University of Freiburg had complained that Europeans continued to treat African nations as nations without history, activists' interest in the ongoing transformation of Europe's former colonies faded in accordance with European activists' own involvement. Put otherwise, the postcolonial societies in Southern Africa ceased to have history with waning involvement of Europeans be they solidarity activists or the representatives of defeated empires.

The point is not just the unevenness of relationships between Germans and non-Germans or the "orientalist projections" that were likely part of them (although, as I have argued, not the only or even most important part). The failure of West German activists to maintain an interest in postcolonial politics suggests that what was at stake for West German Maoists and other solidarity activists was never "decolonization" per se, but a particular kind of decolonization that necessitated revolutionary violence and armed struggle. Joscha Schmierer's transformation of his own narrative about the activism of the 1960s and 1970s from the supposed recognition that non-violence was itself a colonial fantasy to the activism being merely a rite of passage for West German students and police on their way to democratic citizenship is instructive in this sense: when the enthusiasm for political (and anti-colonial) violence became uncomfortable for former activists, the story of a multi-ethnic Left bound

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[7]Kössler and Melber, "The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa," p. 125.

up in the seismic movements of decolonization turned into a story of Germans transitioning from post-Nazism to liberal democracy.

"White Washing," the Archive, and Celebrity

As I have suggested in the Introduction, one of the key difficulties in writing this dissertation has been an archival paradox. On the one hand, movement archives contain evidence that West German Maoists made a serious effort to engage with foreign workers and students, for instance through publishing factory bulletins and other publications in Turkish, Italian, and so on. On the other hand, foreign Maoists were largely absent from the narratives of the memoir literature of former activists, and their files were absent from movement archives. The solution, as I have pointed out, was to go to state archives, which contain traces of interaction, shared spaces, and collaboration.

But state archives pose other problems. There is of course no longer anything new in Michelle Foucault and Jacques Derrida's arguments about the relationship between power and the archive, or Michel-Rolph Trouillot advice-turned-professional-imperative to pay as much attention to silences as to what's actually there.[8] But the precise mechanics and implications of how archives are "places of power and agency"[9] are still being explored by historians and archivists. Recently, though, Stefan Berger has pointed to an interesting paradox: while the creation of national archives was central to processes of European nation-

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[8]See Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past : Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).

[9]Terry Cook, "The Archive(s) Is a Foreign Country: Historians, Archivists, and the Changing Archival Landscape," *The Canadian Historical Review* 90, no. 3 (September 16, 2009): 497–534, p. 530.

building, interestingly most "master narratives" in European history have not relied on archival work whatsoever.[10]

Be that as it may, my attempt to write a dissertation that challenges the established narratives about the postwar Left in general and 1970s Maoism in particular has revealed a barrier that inadvertently reproduces the "whitewashing" of postwar German history: when I arrived at the reading facility for records of the former East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) at Karl-Liebknecht-Straße 31 in Berlin, I was at first elated. Contrary to what I had been told by colleagues who had had difficulty gaining access to relevant files and complained about endless waits, I learned that the archive had recently changed its policies for external researchers. Instead of waiting for files to be redacted, I gained access to massive amounts of unredacted files in exchange for a commitment to not publish or reveal anything I learned from the unredacted files without anonymization. Nor was I allowed to contact anybody whose identity I had learned from the archive.

Here's the thing: when I received the generous amount of copies I had ordered while at the archive, it became clear quite quickly that the only names I was going to be able to use were either people "of public interest," that is, people holding public office, or names attached to pieces of information that had been published before. In other words, the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic had taken a black pen to the diverse set of actors that had been revealed in the archive. What emerged was a set of names and actors who were already dominating the narrative of the postwar Left.

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[10]See Stefan Berger, "The Role of National Archives in Constructing National Master Narratives in Europe," *Archival Science* 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 1–22.

To be sure, the rule to protect the identities of non-official persons for at least ten years after their evident death or one hundred years after their birth exists for good reason. In fact, as I have shown in this dissertation, even activists were sometimes guilty of obscuring their collaboration with foreign peers *in order to shield them from persecution.*

But the politics of archival work and privacy do go some way to explaining the difficulty historians have encountered in telling a story that does justice to the diversity of experiences in German contemporary history. For the case of Maoism as a transnational phenomenon in the postwar Germanies, this dissertation has sought to work around this problem by attempting to decenter (and set aside) the established narratives about the postwar Left without disputing the enormous amount we can learn from them. But in doing so, it has brought to the fore practical questions for German contemporary history that have deep implications for the entire field.

CHAPTER 9

Epilogue

I don't remember 1989. What I do remember is the year 1992. A roughly 90-minute drive south of my hometown in Germany's most northern state lies the town of Mölln. It's a largely unremarkable town of 20,000 people. So unremarkable, in fact, that its only claim to fame is that Till Eulenspiegel, a legendary trickster—according to medieval myths—spent a single year of his life in Mölln. But in 1992, the town made national news: a small group of neo-Nazis firebombed the house of a local Turkish family and killed three: 10-year-old Yeliz Arslan, 14-year-old Ayse Yilmaz, and 51-year-old Bahide Arslan. Mölln is not in the former East Germany.

Then there was Solingen in 1993: four neo-Nazi skinheads committed an arson attack against the house of a Turkish family. Twenty-seven-year-old Gürsün İnce and 15-year-old Bekir Genç jumped out of a window (the latter while burning). Only Bekir survived the jump. 4-year-old Saime Genç, 9-year-old Hülya Genç, 12-year-old Gülistan Öztürk, and 18-year-old Hatice Genç burned to death. Solingen—a city of roughly 160,000 people famous for its swords, razors, and cutlery, and for being the birthplace of Holocaust architect Adolf Eichmann—is not in the former East Germany.

What continues to loom larger in the memory of Germans today is the attack in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, also in 1992. Thousands of Germans from the West and the former East descended on an apartment tower. The people who lived there were Vietnamese guest workers who had lived there since the time of state socialism. Among the protesters were hundreds of neo-Nazis from the former West and East who, over the course of four days, set the house on fire while thousands stood by watching.

In looking back on the year 1992, *Der Spiegel* mused whether the racist attacks in Mölln and Rostock marked the fragility of German democracy after World War II. The left-liberal paper made much of the "Nazi jargon" circulating among the crowds.[1] Understandably, many on the Left (including my family—I was too young to understand what that meant) feared a return of the past. But *Der Spiegel* quickly identified a different culprit:

> The climate, in which an organized right-wing extremism and confused hatred for foreigners flourishes is also determined by the constantly rising numbers of asylum seekers. Almost 500,000 crossed our borders in 1992, almost twice the number of last year. And the great majority is not escaping persecution but enters wealthy Germany because of economic need. The selection processes are still complicated and secure a long stay for many. The need for intervention is clear.[2]

Political amnesia is a powerful thing. The extent to which this mirrors current debates around the arrival of large numbers of refugees from the Syrian Civil War—again giving rise to general xenophobia and racist attacks—is striking. But what is more striking is that both narratives to explain the attacks of the 1990s are born from the "erasure of race" in 1960s and 1970s Europe. It is understandable that neo-Nazis celebrating Hitler and denying the Holocaust led to soul-searching, particularly considering that the West German mainstream

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[1] "Jahresrückblick 1992," *Der Spiegel*, no. 52/1992, p. 96.
[2] Ibid., p. 97.

had just begun to take the Holocaust seriously. Yet, anxieties over the return of National Socialism actually did very little to shed light on the violence perpetrated against families of guest workers who had lived in the two Germanies for a long time.

In an interview two years later, Iranian-German journalist and writer Bahman Nirumand invited an Iranian-German painter living in Berlin to reflect on the changes to the city since the fall of the Wall. The latter mused that while in some ways the city was much more open now, Germans seemed to be looking to build new walls—now between Germans and non-Germans. Considering this, Nirumand agreed. He remembered:

> I think that this development must be disappointing to those people whose work was meant to tear down walls and build bridges between cultures and effect a coming-together of nations. There were, at least in West Germany, times when one had the impression to be pretty close to this goal. Also from the East, from the former GDR, one repeatedly heard a call for friendship between nations and solidarity, particularly with the people of the so-called Third World. In these times, I mean the second half of the sixties and the seventies, foreigners could feel quite at home here.[3]

The story of a Maoist and postcolonial far Left that I have told in this dissertation attempts to recover this moment, where Germans and non-Germans acted in concert not in high offices but on the ground, in their everyday lives. In many cases, this entailed taking each other seriously, and trusting each other to make the right decisions. In other cases, it entailed racist and orientalist projections and uneven power relationships. Often, it entailed both. For some West Germans, this also entailed—as Joscha Schmierer suggested—to leave the white heaven of ideas and confront—on the ground—the violence of colonialism.[4]

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[3]Bahman Nirumand and Gabriele Yonan, *Iraner in Berlin* (Berlin: Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats, 1994), p. 42.

[4]Compare Chapter 1.

Other things were not so pretty. Maoism was—at times—characterized by an enthusiasm for violence and Maoist jargon was full of language that reeked of psychological terror and purges. Former activists have acknowledged this.[5] But I have made the case that this enthusiasm for violence has to be explained, not *just* condemned. It is easy to brush aside a far Left with ongoing support for the Khmer Rouge well into the 1980s. But as I have tried to suggest, understanding *why* violence held such appeal to a generation of activists yields benefits far beyond its implications for the Left.

I have also suggested that with the benefit of hindsight, one might want to resist the attempt to map the conflict between capitalism and labor onto geopolitical conflict and vice versa, because—as Iranian and Arab students suggested in Chapter 6—one runs the risk of obscuring both and in the case of the Iranian oil companies invest the wrong parties with tremendous moral authority. With the benefit of hindsight, the manichaeism of 1970s far Left politics appears misguided. But it would be one-sided to not also acknowledge that during and in the direct aftermath of the seismic movements of decolonization, support for the decolonizing world possessed a tremendous amount of moral urgency. And the emerging nation states, often formed by revolutionary movements under the banner of socialism, held a lot of promise.

In the 1970s, a lot went wrong. But as I have tried to suggest, both the good and the bad are worth remembering now. In 2002, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer wrote about Germany's denial to acknowledge the persistence of its multi-ethnic character that "the failure to incorporate experiences of migration into the national story has created a misleading historical consciousness that treats 'German' as a fixed category although it is

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[5] Autorenkollektiv, *Wir warn die stärkste der Partein ..*

rather fluid."[6] Fifteen years later, Rita Chin attests that the "basic recognition of shared histories and lived diversity is still missing in a majority of European countries."[7] It is my hope that this dissertation contributes a small piece to ongoing efforts to remedy that absence.

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[6]Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, eds., *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 198.

[7]Chin, *The Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe*, p. 304.

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ALBANIA

Central Archive of the Party (Arkivi Qendror I Partisë; AQP), Tirana
Fondi 14   Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, Relations with
                  Marxist-Leninist Groups in the Federal Republic of Germany

Central State Archives of Albania (Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror; AQSh), Tirana
Fondi 509   General Directorate of Radio and Television

GERMANY

Archive for Social Movements (Archiv für Soziale Bewegungen; ASB), Freiburg
5   Studentenbewegung
7   Frauenbewegung
9   Linke Gruppen nach 1968
14   Stadtteilentwicklung und Häuserkampf
16   Ausländer und Asylpolitik

Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic (Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR; BStU), Berlin
AGM   Arbeitsgruppe des Ministers
AG XXVII   Arbeitsgruppe XXVII
AS   Allgemeine Sachablage
BV Berlin, AKG   Bezirksverwaltung Berlin, Aufklärungs- und Kontrollgruppe
HA II   Hauptabteilung II, Spionageabwehr
HA VI   Hauptabteilung VI, Passkontrolle, Tourismus, Interhotel
HA VII   Hauptabteilung VII, Ministerium des Innern, Deutsche Volkspolizei

HA IX	Hauptabteilung IX, Untersuchungsorgan
HA XX	Hauptabteilung XX, Staatsapparat, Kultur, Kirchen, Untergrund
HA XX/AKG	Hauptabteilung XX, Aufklärungs- und Kontrollgruppe
HV/A	Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung
JHS Potsdam	Juristische Hochschule des Stasi Postdam
SdM	Sekretariat des Ministers
Sekr. Neiber	Sekretariat Neiber
ZAIG	Zentrale Aufklärungs- und Informationsgruppe
ZKG	Zentrale Kontrollgruppe

Federal Archives Koblenz (Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Barch), Koblenz

B/106	Bundesministerium des Innern
B/136	Bundeskanzleramt
B/138	Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft
B/443	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz

Foundation Archive of Parties and Mass Organizations of the German Democratic Republic at the Federal Archives (Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik im Bundesarchiv; Barch-SAPMO), Berlin

| DY 79 | Gewerkschaftshochschule |
| DY 30 | Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands |

Federal Archives Freiburg, Military Archives (Bundesarchiv Freiburg, Militärarchiv; March), Freiburg

| BW 1 | Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Leitung, zentrale Stäbe und zivile Abteilungen - Organisationsunterlagen |
| BW 2 | Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Generalinspekteur und Führungsstab der Streitkräfte |

State Archive of Baden-Württemberg, Central State Archive Stuttgart (Staatsarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; HStaSt), Stuttgart

EA 2/302	Innenministerium, Abteilung III: Landespolizeipräsidium
EA 2/303	Innenministerium, Abteilung III: Landespolizeipräsidium
EA 4/403	Justizministerium: Strafsachen von besonderer Bedeutung
Q 1/30	Nachlass Klaus Mehnert (1906-1984)

Archive Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and Social Movements (Archiv Außerparlamentarische Opposition und Soziale Bewegungen; APO-Archiv), Berlin

| APO-KBW | Archiv des Kommunistischen Bundes Westdeutschland |
| SDS-Archiv | Archiv des Bundesvorstandes des Sozialistischen Deutschen Studentenbundes |

NETHERLANDS

International Institute for Social History (International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis; IISH), Amsterdam
ARCH02181   Neue Linke, Studentenbewegung, Ausserparlamentarische Opposition
in Deutschland Collection

UNITED STATES

Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), Stanford
XX741   German Subject Collection

ONLINE

Many of the published primary sources and newspapers used in this dissertation are also available online at the online archive "Materialien zur Analyse der Opposition" (Materials for the Analysis of Opposition) at http://www.mao-projekt.de/.

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