

The Future of Democracy:
Perception of Corruption and
Youth Political Participation

by

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ABSTRACT

The majority of scholars are pointing out the alienation of young people from the political arena. Are young people really politically apathetic, disengaged and cynical? Do young people practice their given democratic rights as citizens? In order to find out the impact of perception of corruption on young people's political participation, this research conducted statistical analyses with survey data that were collected in 2004 and 2014. This paper argues that perception of corruption generates mistrust which impacts the political participation of young people. A two-time period analysis and an age comparison analysis were conducted in order to find out how young people's *formal* and *informal* political participation were influenced by lowered political trust. The research shows that young people are indeed a politically engaged population who are actively participating in politics via both *formal* and *informal* participation. This research is the first attempt in the field of political science to connect two major topics relating to democracy, which are the perception of corruption and youth participation.

Chapter 1: THE INTRODUCTION

What marks the difference between democracy and other regimes? Abraham Lincoln once said, “Government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Respecting this famous quotation by Lincoln, I believe it is a civic engagement that marks the difference between democracy and other regimes. One of the most fundamental ideas of democracy is that the people rule. Citizens exercise power over the government by choosing leaders in elections, and on some occasions, expressing their preferences on matters of policy directly (Brader & Wayne, 2015). How well leaders and political institutions respond to the needs and desires of the people and how effectively citizens participate in the process of self-government are remarkably crucial to the quality of democracy (Brader & Wayne, 2015). In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) also featured the importance of political activeness of the average citizen. He argued that the French Revolution failed due to the overwhelming administration centralization, which severely limited the citizens’ ability to exercise their freedom. Tocqueville emphasized the importance of local liberties for the exercise of democracy. Moreover, Robert Putnam (1993) claimed in *Making Democracy Work* that social capital, the existence and cultivation of civic community, is a condition for a working democracy. This paper aims to explore the relationship between two significant topics that are deeply related to the security of democracy: political participation of young adults and perception of corruption.

Reporters, pundits, and other public figures raise the question “Can we really expect changes from our young people? Aren’t they just too ignorant, too apathetic, too selfish, too lazy to vote? Are they really up to the task for reshaping our democracy?” to address a mounting concern over youth participation in politics (Mitchell, 2018). While civic engagement is the most

crucial and necessary democratic feature that marks the difference between democracy and other regimes, youth participation is an essential area of study especially when many scholars argue that young people's political participation is declining (Pattie & Johnston, 2003; Strama, 1998; Denmark & Niemi, 2012; Kimberlee, 2002; Henn & Foard, 2012).

Young people's political disengagement seems real when you walk around the campus during the election period. In order to encourage young voters to exercise their voting rights, random people ask students whether they are registered to vote, professors allow students to leave the lecture hall to vote, and projects such as Campus Vote Project and Campus Election Engagement Projects are launched. These phenomena explain that there is an urgent need to actively promote young people to engage in politics. In fact, it was found that younger voters' turnout typically drops in midterm election in comparison to older voters' turnout (Bennion & Michelson, 2018). Between 2012 and 2014, the turnout rate of people whose age is between 18 to 29 fell 25 points while the turnout of people who are 60 and older fell only 16 points (Bennion & Michelson, 2018). The United States Elections Project by Michael McDonald also shows that when the turnout rates throughout 1986 and 2016 are sorted by age, the turnout rates of young voters, whose ages are from 18 to 29, had been almost 30% lower than the turnout rates of voters who are 60 and older.

The studies that indicate a decline in young people's political participation as well as low voter turnout rate of young voters urge us to understand why young people choose not to engage with their civic duties actively. Knowing the driving factor of young people's political participation would yield a more accurate anticipation of the future participation of young people, and would help to secure future participation. Further, the study of youth participation would help young people to realize how their generation is participating in the society, and help

the government to judge whether they are accomplishing a governmental duty of promoting civic participation.

Studying the influence of corruption perception on people's political behavior is important because it yields the understanding of how corruption perception plays its role as a major threat to democracy. While corruption is a violation of the democratic norm, and an indication of a deficit of democracy, perception of corruption refers to the measurement of people's judgment of the pervasiveness of political corruption in a society (Warren, 2004). The perception of corruption and the objective level of corruption may or may not be correlated with the reality of political corruption (Navot & Beeri, 2017). Both of these concepts will be introduced in more detail in the later section of the paper.

This research focuses on the perception of corruption rather than the corruption itself. This is because even though both of them have a pernicious impact on democracies, they cause different impacts. It is the perception of corruption that influences whether and how the public will participate (Navot & Beeri, 2017). Also, the perception of political corruption is associated with the public's attitude towards the government such as cynicism and mistrust (Navot & Beeri, 2017). The perception of corruption is directly related to people's political participation because people first have to be informed about corruption in order to experience any changes in their political attitudes and political behaviors. Rather than the objective level of corruption, it is how people perceive corruption that shapes their political attitude and behavior. The study of the influence of corruption perception on people's political behavior yields the understanding of the significance of the impact of corruption perception, what the public expects from the government, and why the public participates in politics.

Recognizing the importance of understanding the influence of corruption perception on youth political participation, the goal of this paper is to empirically examine why and how corruption perception shapes young people's decision-making, whether corruption perception fuels younger generation's indignation or resignation in politics, and how the impact of corruption perception on youth participation differs by different participation fields, specifically *formal* and *informal* participation. The overarching argument is that the perception of corruption lowers young people's trust towards the government which in effect decreases formal participation of youth but increases informal participation of youth.

I identify people's political trust as a causal mechanism that impacts youth political participation (In the conclusion, I address the drawbacks inherent in using survey data to make inferences about political trust as a causal mechanism). Political trust, especially declining political trust, is a critical topic of study in the field of political science. Since the late 1960s, and especially since Watergate, the public's antipathy towards the government has been generated and continued (Hetherington, 2007). According to Marc Hetherington (2007), declining political trust has had such profound effect on American politics that, in many ways, it has defined American political landscape over the last several decades. Hetherington (2007) argued that a declining political trust matters profoundly because it affects people's choice of a president, and it plays the central role in the demise of progressive public policy in the United States. Hetherington's findings are interesting, but I wonder how a declining political trust impacts youths' political participation.

The focus population of this research is young people of America. As an international student of American politics, I've long been interested in the causes of low turnout rate of American young people especially after witnessing the election of President Trump in 2016. On

social media, news articles, and streets, I observed young people's strong opposition to Donald Trump, which made me believe that he would not be elected. However, the outcome was different from my anticipation. I expect to provide an explanation for the gap between my observations of young people's opposition against Trump and his presidential election by studying American young adults' political participation.

Also, studying American population has a benefit of replication. Although the United States has some unique political systems such as the Electoral College and two-party systems, an important political feature that marks the similarity between the United States and other countries is that it is a representative democracy. Thus, it is expected that the results shown in America are applicable to other countries which, similar to the United States, demand citizens to elect representative officials who would work on behalf of them, and provide ordinary citizens a high access to information.

In the next chapter, this paper presents what previous literature have found about youth participation and corruption perception, and draws the connection between them. In chapter three, it makes a theoretical argument by laying out assumptions about youth population, identifying a causal mechanism, and explaining the relationships between perception of corruption, political trust and youth political participation within a framework of cost and benefit analysis. Four hypotheses based on the theoretical argument are introduced in the same chapter. In chapter 4, this paper explains the source of data, measurements of each variable, and methodology. The paper then presents three result tables. In the discussion section, it assesses political trust as a causal mechanism, and discusses the findings. The thesis ends with conclusion that summarizes the whole thesis and discusses a way to move forward.

Chapter 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

<YOUTH PARTICIPATION>

The literature about youth participation commonly found that the shape of contemporary youth participation is affected by young people's negative attitude towards the government (Kimberlee, 2002; Henn et al., 2005; Henn & Foard, 2012; Denmark & Niemi, 2012; Strama, 1998; Sika, 2012; Gozzo, 2014; Gordon & Taft, 2011). Young people do not believe that political parties and politicians are aware of their needs and demands nor believe that political parties and politicians are willing to make changes in better ways for them (Kimberlee, 2002; Henn et al., 2005; Henn & Foard, 2012; Denmark & Niemi, 2012; Strama, 1998; Sika, 2012; Gozzo, 2014; Gordon & Taft, 2011). However, literatures make different conclusions on how young people's belief about the government affects their participation. The two schools of thoughts identified in youth participation literature are *Disengaged Youth* and *Engaged Youth*.

The first school of thought, *Disengaged Youth*, claims that young people are disengaging in politics (Pattie & Johnston, 2003; Kimberlee, 2002; Henn et al., 2005; Henn & Foard, 2012; Denmark & Niemi, 2012; Tilley, 2003). It asserts that young people's negative attitude towards the governments leads to political apathy of youths (Pattie & Johnston, 2003; Kimberlee, 2002; Henn et al., 2005; Henn & Foard, 2012; Denmark & Niemi, 2012; Tilley, 2003). Henn and Foard (2012) conducted a national online survey and gained empirical evidence for the disengaging trend in youth political participation as well as worsening political attitude of the youth. Their survey results show that young people's confidence in the knowledge or understanding of the government and politics as well as confidence in their political power and influence are declining (Henn & Foard, 2012). Also, an extreme majority (70%) of young

participants answered that they would not give money to any political parties nor work for the party or candidates (Henn & Foard, 2012). Kimberlee (2002) argued that young people's distrust in government shifts their interest from formal politics to other values that they find more interesting, which ultimately results in the decline of youth political participation.

However, studies in *Disengaged Youth* fail to test their ideas adequately. Matt and Foard (2012) presented the survey results individually without drawing connections between the results. The absence of connection between survey results limits the understanding of the causal impact of political attitude on political behavior. Further, Kimberlee (2002) did not support her arguments with sufficient empirical evidence such as survey results or statistical numbers.

The second school of thought is called *Engaged Youth*. Engaged Youth argues that young people are engaging in politics (Gozzo, 2014; Strama, 1998; Sika, 2012; Sloam, 2014; Gordon & Taft, 2011). The studies in Engaged Youth describe young people as an ardent population who are aware of political issues, desire to make contributions to society, and hope to make changes (Gozzo, 2014; Strama, 1998; Sika, 2012; Sloam, 2014; Gordon & Taft, 2011). They support their argument using young people's political engagement via informal political participation. Gozzo (2014) found that youth political participation had grown in unconventional and self-oriented political participation areas, such as demonstrations, rallies, and political debates. Gordon and Taft (2011) studied youth activists and presented young people's active socializations that encourage political engagement.

The consideration of informal political participation in *Engaged Youth* studies broadens the scope of participation, thus adds detail in participation knowledge. It also gives the explanation of why young people's negative attitude towards the governments does not always result in political alienation. Gozzo (2014) argued that the unconventional and self-orientated

participation shows a constant increase despite young people's mistrust in the political institutions because informal participation does not imply trust in political institutions. She also argued that young people's cynicism rather fuels their political involvement and demand for informal participation (Gozzo, 2014). Similarly, Gordon and Taft (2011) found that young people's cynicism towards the government does not hurt their beliefs that they can make changes.

Nonetheless, there are some limitations in these *Engaged Youth* literature. Gozzo (2014) did not specify the source of young people's mistrust in institutions. Also, Gordon and Taft (2011) focused their study specifically on activists to argue against a common conceptualization of the youth, which depicts young people as a politically apathetic and indifferent population. By doing so, they overlooked the fact that there are indeed young people who genuinely fit with such conceptualization, and that the population proportion of activists is relatively small compared to the whole population of the youth.

<CORRUPTION>

The central claim among scholars who studied the perception of corruption and people's political behavior is that people's perception of corruption affects their political behavior and it is clearly negative, meaning people think corruption is a harmful phenomenon (Kostadinova, 2009; Ypa, 2016; Lianjiang, 2001; Stockemer et al., 2011; Bauhr & Grimes, 2014; Chong et al., 2015). However, literatures yield two conflicting conclusions about the impact of the perception of corruption on people's political behavior. The two schools of thoughts identified in the literature of corruption are *Mobilization* and *Demobilization*.

The first school of thought is called *Mobilization*. It identifies the mobilizing effect of corruption perception (Kostadinova, 2009; Ypa, 2016; Lianjiang, 2001). It claims that the perception of corruption fuels political participation as people tend to use mobilization as a means to explicitly express their anger against the government and to eradicate corruption when they perceive it (Kostadinova, 2009; Ypa, 2016; Lianjiang, 2001). Kostadinova (2009) studied the voter turnout after the perception of corruption, and found that the corruption perception causes mobilization of voter turnout. Even though she identified both mobilization and demobilization effects of the corruption perception, her finding showed a slight net gain for the mobilization effect. Kostadinova (2009) claimed that people mobilize to vote because people want to punish corrupted politicians and give power to politicians of greater integrity. Additionally, Ypa (2016) found that people choose to mobilize to challenge the governments, and to demand government accountability for corruption when they perceive it. She also found that people's participation does not depend on the experience of loss from corrupt actions, but it rather depends on people's expectation of others to join them in demanding accountability (Ypa, 2016).

However, the studies in *Mobilization* fail to incorporate the impact of corruption perception on both *formal* and *informal* participation, and do not specifically focus on the influence of corruption perception on youth population. For example, Kostadinova (2009) only measured voting turnout to show the mobilizing effect of corruption perception, and Ypa (2016) only measured the mobilizing effect of corruption perception on informal participation by looking at experiment participants' mobilizing behavior in the experimental setting.

The second school of thought is called *Demobilization*. It claims that corruption perception yields a demobilization effect in that people choose to abstain from any form of

political participation when they perceive political corruption (Stockemer et al., 2011; Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Bauhr and Grimes (2014) studied the association of political transparency with the levels of political activities. They found that the increased transparency and information of corruption practices led to more political resignation rather than indignation (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014). Their findings are that the transparency and information of corruption do not improve people's interest in politics, do not enhance institutional trust, and do not promote more political involvement. Most importantly, Bauhr and Grimes (2014) found that that the transparency was in fact associated with lower levels of political activities. Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs (2011) studied the impact of corruption on voter turnout in democracies and found that as corruption increases, the percentage of voters who go to the polls decreases in a statistically significant manner.

However, the studies in *Demobilization* possess limitations in variables. Bauhr and Grimes (2014) limited the dependent variable to just informal participation in that the political involvement variables in their study only include boycotting, signing the petition, and attending demonstrations. This is because they overlooked the possibilities of formal political mobilization of citizens when they perceive corruption. Additionally, Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs (2011) proved the demobilization effect of corruption, not corruption perception. They used a data from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which only takes a financial corruption into account.

<LITERATURE VALUE OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN>

Although political scholars, acknowledging the importance of two topics, have created an extensive amount of work on both topics of youth participation and corruption perception, they have not adequately addressed the relationship between these two topics. Youth participation studies have not identified one specific source that impacts the participation, and corruption perception studies have not identified a specific population that corruption perception may influence their political behavior in certain ways. Also, previous studies have not incorporated both *formal* and *informal* participation to show how the impact of corruption perception may differ by different forms of participation. Thus, this paper's research on the influence of corruption perception on young people's *formal* and *informal* participation will be a new contribution to both areas of studies.

Chapter 3: THEORITICAL ARGUMENT

The theoretical argument intends to explain how corruption perception affects young people's trust in the government, thus influencing their participation in different ways for different forms of participation. A theory for this research is: corruption perception lowers young people's trust towards the government, which decreases their *formal* participation and increases *informal* participation.

<ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT YOUTHS>

The theory is based on assumptions about young people's characteristics. The first assumption is that young people are interested in politics (Sloam, 2014; Strama 1998; Henn & Foard 2012; Kimberlee, 2002; Gozzo, 2014). Young people realize that politics influence their everyday life. They are especially showing concerns for issues that are relevant to them, for example youth unemployment, poverty, economic recession, university tuition, youth services and benefits, education budgets, health care, racism, and AIDS (Kimberlee, 2002, Sloam, 2014, Gozzo, 2014). With their active technology consumption, they are exposed to various information sharing activities. They are actively engaging in political debate on social media, and with their family and friends about the issues listed above (Sloam, 2014; Strama, 1998; Henn & Foard 2012; Kimberlee, 2002; Gozzo, 2014).

The second assumption is that youths have a strong networking tendency. A networking tendency here refers to the inclination to belong to a group and build relationships with other individuals. An enthusiastic usage of social media sites and an engagement in continuous communication with others are reflections of young people's networking tendency. Young

people interact with other individuals for a sense of belonging and a sense of social inclusion (Seo, Houston, Tylor Knight, Kennedy & English, 2014). Seo and others (2014) identified collective self-esteem, need to belong, and social self-efficacy as social psychological factors that motivate young people's interactive actions. Young people build networks among themselves, and influence each other's political interest through interaction. As a group, young people behave as keen citizens, critically observing and responding to political issues that are relevant to their everyday life.

The third assumption is that young people are more responsive than elder people. Young people and elder people belong to different generations. According to Mannheim's (1970) romantic historical formulation approach of interpreting generation, generation is a state of being subjected to similar influences. It is true that different generations live at the same time in that both elder people and young people are living through the 21st century. However, this 'same time' is indeed 'different time' to each generation as the period of oneself can only be shared with people of one's own age (Mannheim, 1970). In other words, every moment is experienced differently by different generations because they are at different stages of development.

Young people comparatively lack experience, and their formative forces are just coming into being (Mannheim, 1970). On the other hand, elder people have already formed their framework from their rich past experiences, which mediate the impact of incoming experience (Mannheim, 1970). Thus, even when both the younger generation and the older generation are living through the same period and are exposed to the same external influence, there is a high possibility that the younger generation reacts more intensely than the older generation.

Young people have two possible choices when they perceive political corruption: participate in politics or abstain from any form of participation. Based on these assumptions

about youths, this theory focuses on the impact of corruption perception on participation considering that participation itself implies interests in politics, willingness to make change, and responsiveness to perceived information.

<CORRUPTION AND PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION>

Many scholars define corruption in similar but yet different manners. Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs (2011) characterized corruption as “when a public office holder is induced by monetary or other rewards to take actions in favor of whoever provided the reward and thereby damage the public interest,” which focuses explicitly on the public interest dimension of corruption. Several scholars identified the most widely used concept of corruption to be “the misuse of public office with the purpose of making private gains” (Melgar, Rossi & Smith, 2010; Navot & Beerli, 2017).

Recognizing the definitions of corruption by other scholars, this paper comes up with a broad concept of corruption: an inappropriate use of common power and authority for the purpose of individual or group gain (Warren, 2004; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Stockemer et al., 2011; Melgar et al., 2010; Navot & Beerli, 2017). This definition of corruption incorporates the notion of wrongly getting an advantage in violation of official duty and the rights of others (Melgar et al., 2010). Corruption indicates public officials’ weak professional ethics, and their departure from people’s normative expectations for the governments, which require the governments to run for the benefit of the public interests and not be responsive to their own private needs and demands (Warren 2004; Stockemer et al., 2011; Denmark & Niemi 2012).

On the other hand, perception of corruption refers to citizens’ belief about the degree to which politicians, public officials, and political institutions engage in corrupt practices (Navot &

Beeri, 2016). By incorporating the meaning of corruption as defined earlier, the perception of corruption in this research refers to young people's belief about how widespread is an inappropriate use of common power and authority for the purpose of individual or group gain among politicians, public officials and political institutions.

It is critical to understand the difference between *absolute corruption* and *perception of corruption*. People's perception of corruption and the actual level of corruption can be correlated, but they are not always the same. In other words, corruption perception does not always reflect the actual level of corruption in that a person's perception of corruption can be lower or higher than the actual level of corruption and how individuals perceive corruption can be different from one another. This is because individuals' perception of corruption depends on various factors such as life circumstances, personal values, and morality (Melgar et al., 2010). For example, low salaries and poor monitoring in the public sector can instigate corruption perception even when a corruption action does not occur (Melgar et al., 2010).

The perception of corruption also depends on individuals' sensitivity and conceptualization of corruption. Even though people generally agree that political corruption is a bad thing, individuals possess different levels of sensitivity and different conceptualizations, which yield different levels of corruption perception (Navot & Beeri, 2016). Navot and Beeri (2016) defined the sensitivity to corruption as "the tendency of a respondent to classify abuses of power for private gain as instances of political corruption." Navot and Beeri (2016) also distinguished three conceptions of corruption, which are a conventional conception, broad conception, and restrictive conception. Navot and Beeri (2017) argued that we should not presuppose that citizens necessarily share the conceptions because the meaning of the term political corruption is not self-evident.

Both *perception of corruption* and *objective corruption* are harmful to the security of democracy, but in different ways. Political corruption threatens democracy by undermining the influence of citizens on decision making, diminishing their well-being, and hampering the effectiveness of collective action as well as the functioning of government (Navot & Beerli, 2017; Warren, 2004). It is noteworthy that while many scholars featured destructive effects of perception of corruption on democracy, Melgar, Rossi, and Smith (2010) even argued that the high level of corruption perception generates more devastating effects than corruption itself. The known impacts of perception of corruption are the deterioration of the relationships among individuals, institutions, and states; the growth of institutional instability; the instigation of grievances and anger; the deterioration of legitimacy of the political system; and limiting citizens' willingness to oppose corruption actively. (Melgar et al., 2010; Peiffer & Alvarez, 2016; Navot & Beerli, 2017; Hacek & Kukovic & Brezovsek, 2013).

This paper focuses on the impact of young adults' corruption perception on their political participation rather than the impact of actual level of corruption on youth political participation. It examines how the perception of corruption abuses democracy by undermining trust and accountability of political leadership, and influencing whether and how the public participates in politics (Navot & Beerli, 2017; Hacek et al., 2013). People have to be informed about corruption first in order to experience any behavioral change. Thus, rather than an objective level of corruption, it is how people perceive corruption that shapes their political attitude and behavior.

<TRUST, DISTRUST AND LACK OF TRUST>

Behavioral change is the product of psychological change. Corruption perception influences young people's political participation by imposing a severely negative impact on their

trust in the government. People's trust in the government depends on their evaluation of how well the government is operating according to the democratic norm (Morris & Klesner, 2010). The democratic norm is an expectation of the government to act in response to the public benefits. Young people trust the government when they believe that the government has the public interest in mind, runs for the benefits of public interests, and is not responsive to private needs and demands (Denemark & Niemi 2012; Walle & Six, 2013).

The political trust is a necessity for a democratic government. A high level of public's political trust is regarded as an element that promotes active citizenry, and as evidence that the government performs effectively, efficiently, and democratically since a high level of political trust allows the government to operate effectively (Walle & Six, 2013; Hacek et al., 2013). According to Hacek and others (2013), the public's trust in government enables a more practical governing since the government is not required to obtain the specific approval of citizens for every decision. A high level of political trust also promotes a democratic society as it encourages individuals to participate voluntarily in collective institutions, which is a form of self-government (Hacek et al., 2013).

Many scholars well recognize the negative impact of corruption perception on people's trust in the government (Melgar et al., 2010; Hacek et al., 2013; Navot & Beerli, 2017; Henn & Foard, 2012; Denemark & Niemi, 2012; Strama, 1998; Ypa, 2016; Bauhr & Marcia, 2014; Kostadinova, 2009; Krishnamurthy, 2015; Morris & Klesner, 2010). Noteworthy, perception of corruption is identified as one of the primary sources of political distrust. For example, Melgar and others (2010) argued that high levels of corruption perception generate a "culture of distrust." However, it is crucial to distinguish the difference between lack of trust and distrust.

Lack of trust and distrust are different psychological concepts as distrust is not a simple negation of trust (Krishnamurthy, 2015; Walle & Six, 2013). Distrust is an attitude in itself. It is a confident belief and a negative expectation that another individual, a group, or an institution will not act justly or as justice requires but will engage in harmful behaviors (Krishnamurthy 2015; Walle & Six, 2013). When young people distrust the government, it means they confidently believe that the government fails to represent their interest and concerns.

Young people's distrust is closely related to their interpretation of corruption. Young people interpret corruption as a reflection of the government's self-interested attitude as well as the neglect of their job as civil servants (Walle & Six, 2013). Distrusting young people also anticipate damages in public benefits, view failures in the deliberation of public services as the results of corruption, and confidently believe that the government will not produce, deliver, and secure public goods and services (Sloam 2014; Warren 2004).

Nonetheless, a generation of distrust is not what this paper identifies as a result of young adults' corruption perception. Distrust is closely associated with the withdrawal from politics. Walle and Six (2013) argued that distrust causes an alienation from all forms of political participation. The known behavioral effects of distrusts are abstaining from the vote, lower tax and legal compliance, refusal to government database registration, and engagement in resistance against government influence, as well as politically challenging behavior (Walle & Six, 2013). These behaviors may become even more extreme and can result in physical withdrawal from the state (Walle & Six, 2013).

An alienation from political participation and resisting to comply with a social system are not what this paper expects to observe from young people after they perceive corruption. This paper argues that perception of corruption, which is government's inappropriate use of common

power and authority for the purpose of making individual or group gain, significantly lowers young people's trust in the government. These young people, who display a lack of trust in the government, do not find the government highly reliable as representatives of their interests and concerns, and do not expect efficiency in deliberation and production of public services. The difference between *distrust* and *lack of trust* is that the latter does not cause an alienation of young people from the whole political arena. Although the lack of trust will decrease young people's *formal* participation, it will still increase their *informal* participation.

<POLITICAL PARTICIPATION>

Political participation does not only mean private citizens are turning up to vote in elections. Political participation refers to any lawful behavior that aims to influence government decisions and actions. Largely, political participation is divided into *formal* and *informal* participation. However, there is not a clear distinction between *formal* and *informal* participation in the current field of political science. For example, some studies indicate "contacting politicians" as formal participation, while others indicate it as informal participation. For the purpose of this research, it is important to illustrate a clear definition of both forms of participation. Formal participation is a traditional, conventional, and institutional way to empower the government by giving a democratic entitlement to authority and showing support to the leaders. Informal participation, on the other hand, is an unconventional and non-institutional form of political participation which people use as a mechanism to influence politics. Informal participation is usually collective, direct-action-oriented, and specific-issue-oriented (Sloam 2014; Strama 1998, Kostadinova 2009; Gozzo, 2014).

Some existing literature identifies contacting politician and media, belonging to organizations like churches, and engaging in political discussions also as forms of informal participation (Sloam, 2014; Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995). However, based on the illustrated definitions of political participation and identified characteristics of *formal* and *informal* participation, this research does not recognize contacting politicians and media, belonging to organizations, and engaging in political discussions as an informal participation. Firstly, both contacting politicians and contacting media are not collective movement, so they do not fit with the identified characteristic of informal participation in this research. Secondly, a status of belonging to organizations such as church does not explicitly prove one's political participation by itself. One may engage in a political activity with other people in a church, but the primary motivation behind such organization is not political. Thus, a mere status of belonging to organizations such as church and voluntary association has limitations for proving one's informal political participation. Lastly, the political discussion does not fit with the general definition of political participation in this research. Political discussion is not an activity that aims to influence government decisions and actions. Even though political discussion can serve as an intermediate activity that aims to promote political participation which intends to influence government decisions and actions, the underlying motivations of political discussion are information transmission, mutual exchange of opinions, or even sentiment sharing.

Both *formal* and *informal* participation are based on interest in politics, willingness to make change in more favorable ways, and trust in a democratic system. Trust in a democratic system indicates a belief that the government has an obligation to comply with people's desire and demand. Nonetheless, formal participation and informal participation indicate different levels of trust in the government. While formal participation indicates young people's high level

of trust in the government, informal participation indicates young people's low trust in the government.

Formal participation is a way of supporting and empowering the leaders and patiently waiting for the government to work for them. It is reasonable to argue that people empower and support the government because they believe politicians to be reliable and efficient civic servants who are well aware of people's needs and demands and work hard to realize those needs and demands. Contrastingly, informal participation is the action of directly expressing policy concerns and urgently demanding the government's attention on some issues. People make a direct expression and urgently demand the government's attention because they do not believe that the government at status quo is not working in accordance with people's demands, and are not satisfied with the government's work. In this sense, informal participation indicates people's unwillingness to merely wait for the government to deal with people's concerns.

Nonetheless, informal participation still indicates some level of trust in the government. Informal participation is a form of communication method. While demonstrators and petitioners are appealing the significance of issues and aiming to influence government decisions, they are well aware of the fact that their informal participation can bring actual changes only when the government responds to it. This is because the final policy decisions are still in the hands of the government. People still engage in informal participation because they trust the government to behave as they demand once they make a loud, direct, and focused voice. Politicians' motivation behind consensus may not be sincerely for the public benefit but to secure the public office. People trust that the government would listen to their demands because politicians are mindful of the people's power in a democratic society, and interested in power, authority and benefits of the public office.

The next question is then how different levels of trust in the government lead to different forms of political participation. Some political scholars viewed political participation as a result of costs and benefits calculations. Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Dijk (2009) defined political participation as “a reflection of a belief that a situation can be changed through collective action at affordable costs.” This paper will analyze how participation is a result of cost and benefit calculation. Further, it looks into how young people’s lack of trust in the government influences their cost and benefit political participation calculation in a way that yields different results depending on the forms of participation.

< COST & BENEFIT IN PARTICIPATION >

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) expanded a theory of calculus voting in their paper by identifying both negative and positive effects for which the magnitude is *dependent* and *independent* on the individual contribution to the outcome. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argue that voters operate a cost and benefit analysis, and decide whether to participate or not based on the calculated reward. The calculus of voting they offer is as follows:

$$R = pB - C + D$$


The positive benefit (B), of which the magnitude is *dependent* on individual’s contribution to the outcome, is the gain from the success of one’s favored candidate. The contribution of this benefit (B) to the final reward (R) from voting depends on the probability (p) that the citizen will, by voting, bring about the benefit (B). There is also another positive benefit (D), of which the magnitude is *independent* of individual’s contribution to the outcome. This positive benefit (D) is a positive satisfaction that comes from the action of voting. Such satisfaction comes from compliance with ethics of voting, affirmation of allegiance to the

political system, affirmation of a partisan preference, social satisfaction of going to the polling booth, and affirmation of one's efficacy in the political system. For clarification, the positive benefit (B) will be called the *dependent benefit* and the positive benefit (D) the *independent benefit*.

The cost (C), of which the magnitude is *independent* of the individual's contribution to the outcome, is time and energy spent on the voting decision as well as on the act of voting itself. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) also identified cost (A), of which the magnitude is *dependent* on the individual contribution to the outcome. For example, the amount of reprisal that the employee gets by not voting for whom employer wanted them to vote. However, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) considered formal incorporation of cost (A) in the analysis would yield little payoff, so they neglected it.


This paper expands the calculus of voting to calculus of *formal* and *informal* political participation. A diagram below is a categorization of effects on the expected utility of participation. It is created based on Riker and Ordeshook's (1968) categorization of effects on the expected utility of voting.

Diagram 1. Categorization of Effects on the Expected Utility of Participation



Perception of corruption leads to decline in young people’s formal participation because corruption perception negatively impacts the cost and benefit calculus of formal participation. Perception of corruption decreases political trust, which significantly diminishes the reward (R) of formal participation that participants would get. This is because low political trust depreciates the probability (p) of young people gaining the dependent benefit (B) and deteriorates the value of independent benefit (D). A diagram below illustrates the relationship between perception of corruption, political trust, and their effects on the expected utility of formal participation.

Diagram 2. Illustration of the relationship between perception of corruption, political trust, and their effects on the expected utility of formal participation.



In the cost and benefit calculus of formal political participation, the dependent benefit (B) is what participants will get from having a responsive government. The presumed probability (p) of gaining dependent benefits (B) from formal participation remains high when people have a high level of trust in the government. A high level of trust in the government means people believe that the government is responsible and sensitive to people needs and demands (Sloam 2014; Kostadinova 2009, Stockmer, et al. 2011; Denmark and Niemi 2012; Gozzo 2014).

When young people perceive corruption, their presumed probability (p) of gaining dependent benefit (B) is significantly reduced because they no longer find the government highly reliable as representatives of their interests and concerns, and they do not expect efficiency in deliberation and production of public services. In other words, young people's external efficacy, a belief about the responsiveness and reliability of governmental authorities, drops after perceiving political corruption (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006). Perception of corruption makes young people mistrust the promises made by the government as it generates an expectation of the government to be more interested in winning elections than in governing afterward. Also it damages their expectation of the government to neglect their role to promote public benefits and to deliver public services once they get elected (Warren, 2004; Henn & Foard, 2012).

Perception of corruption also leads to a decrease in young people's expected value of positive independent benefit (D), which participants would get by the action of participating. This is because perception of corruption diminishes young people's confidence in formal participation as an efficient political control instrument (Sloam 2014; Kostadinova 2009, Stockmer, et al. 2009; Denmark and Niemi 2012; Henn and Foard 2012). In other words, young people who perceive corruption stop consider formal participation as an effective way to influence the government and to bring positive outcomes. With a low or even no confidence in formal participation, young people expect a low or no positive satisfaction from engaging in formal participation. The ineffective political participation does not affirm the participant's efficacy in the political system. Young people also expect a low or no positive satisfaction from supporting and empowering officials whom they know are not going to be reliable representatives. Further, when the perceived ineffectiveness of formal participation is shared among others, positive social satisfaction from allegiance to the political system disappears.

With a low expectation of gaining *dependent benefit* (B) and *independent benefit* (D), young people withdraw from formal participation because when the amount of benefits from participation diminish while the cost of participation stays the same, the amount of reward (R) from participation is going to be very minimal, none or even negative.

Problematically, perception of corruption leads to the general decline of youths' formal participation since young people become skeptical of not only those officials who engage in corruption, but most or all public servants whether they are guilty or not (Stockmer, et al. 2011; Morris & Klesner, 2010). No citizens prefer to bear the cost associated with empowering the government that will not bring enough benefit. Young people who are lack of trust in the government after perceiving corruption, stop consider formal participation as an instrument of democracy that worth their time and effort as it is albeit a useless activity that requires them to scarifies personal time to empower just another set of rascals (Kostadinova 2009; Stockmer, et al. 2011).


The impact of perception of corruption and lowered political trust on cost and benefit calculus of formal participation explains how alienation from formal participation becomes a rational choice for young people who have perceived corruption. Young people find formal participation ineffective and unattractive, thus become cynical to the effect of it and withdraw from it (Morris & Klesner, 2010; Kostadinova 2009; Stockmer, et al. 2011; Strama 1998, Denmark and Niemi 2012, Kimberlee 2002, Henn 2012; Gozzo 2014).

Perception of corruption, however, does not erode young people's desire to influence the government and to bring changes to the society (Sloam 2014; Kostadinova 2009; Strama 1998; Henn and Foard 2012; Gozzo 2014). Young people still desire to make their voices heard and to

address the perceived problems. Therefore, young people, who have a low confidence in the effect of formal participation, seek for an alternative form of political participation.

Unlike how political trust influences probability (p) and independent benefit (D) in formal participation calculus, political trust does not influence probability (p) and independent benefit (D) in informal participation calculus. A diagram below illustrates the relationship between perception of corruption, political trust, and effects of these on the expected utility of informal participation.

Diagram 3. Illustration of the relationship between perception of corruption, political trust, and their effects on the expected utility of informal participation



Young people recognize informal participation as an adequate alternative of formal participation because the benefits (B and D) in informal participation calculus are not influenced by the erosion of trust in the government. The concepts of *dependent benefit* (B) and *independent benefit* (D) change in informal participation calculus. While the dependent benefit (B) in the formal participation calculus is the gain from the success of one's favored candidate and from the government, the dependent benefit (B) in informal participation calculus is the gain from the success of informal participation itself, such as increase in youth employment and increase in

youth service and benefits. Similar to the independent benefit in formal calculus, the independent benefit (D) in informal participation calculus equals to the satisfaction that comes from the action of participation such as sense of belonging, social inclusion, being cooperative, and increasing internal efficacy.

Perception of corruption increases informal political participation of youths because youths find it more effective than formal participation. As young people do not trust the government to fairly and adequately represent their concerns, they choose to speak out about their concerns and demands by themselves. Informal participation is a means to give an immediate impact on the government by directly expressing their concerns and demands to the government (Sloam 2014; Kostadinova 2009; Gozzo 2014). Informal participation in most cases is an expression of young people's anger on specific issues that directly and negatively impact their lives such as worsening youth unemployment and increasing university tuition. As the specific-issue-oriented form of participation, informal participation enables angry young adults to make a loud and focused voice, and make demands directly to the government. Believing the informal participation to be a straightforward appeal to redress their condition, young people perceive it to be more powerful and effective way to bring positive changes than merely relying on untrustworthy governments to represent them. Thus, youths find the probability (p) of gaining positive dependent benefit (B) to be high in informal participation calculus, which ultimately results in a higher expected reward (R).

Perception of corruption increases young people's informal participation because they find informal participation more attractive than formal participation. Perception of corruption does not diminish the positive independent benefit (D) of informal participation. Informal participation has a collective characteristic since activities such as demonstrations, boycotts, and

petitions require a group of individuals to work collaboratively in order to achieve a common goal, and these activities become more recognized and powerful as more people join. The collective characteristic of informal participation satisfies young people's networking tendency in that young people can gain a social satisfaction they need through the informal political participation. These social satisfactions include sense of belonging and sense of empowerment. These satisfactions are not eroded by mistrust in the government, thus youths find informal participation more meaningful and interesting than individualized formal participation (Gozzo, 2014).

As illustrated, positive benefits (B and D) in the informal participation calculus are not impacted by perception of corruption as these benefits are not associated with trust in the government. After perceiving corruption, young people recognize that informal participation has a higher probability to redress the problematic status quo, and generates more satisfaction than formal participation. Thus, informal participation becomes a rational choice that would yield a higher reward and is worth the associated costs for young people.

<The HYPOTHESES>

Based on the theoretical argument above, four hypotheses are made.

H₁: Perception of corruption among politicians causes mistrust among the youth, thereby decreasing the latter's incentive for *formal participation*

H₂: Perception of corruption among politicians causes mistrust among the youth, thereby increasing the latter's incentive for *informal participation*

H₃: Younger people's informal political participation is greater than that of older people

H₄: Younger people's participation change more radically than older people

Chapter 4: MEASUREMENTS AND METHODOLOGY

<DATA & MEASUREMENTS>

For the purpose of this research, I conducted statistical analyses with survey data sets. A survey is known for providing a high level of representativeness and possessing a valuable description of the general population's characteristic since a large number of people participate. A survey with a large sample size also makes it easier to find statistically significant results. I used the data collected by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Among many studies conducted by the ISSP module, this study picked Citizenship I and Citizenship II that were conducted in the year of 2004 and 2014 respectively. Both of them focus on issues such as political attitudes and behavior. The ISSP collects data from across the globe, but this research focuses on the American population. The data of American citizens were collected by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) that is located in Chicago. The sample size of Citizenship (2004) is 1,472, and the sample size of Citizenship II (2014) is 1,264.

This research primarily focuses on young people's political behavior. To serve the research purpose, it is important to establish the concept of youths clearly. In this research, 'youths' refers to a group of young adults who are legally recognized as adults but have not yet reached a complete maturity such as marriage and parenthood. The age range of youths varies by country and organization. While the United Nations indicates youth age range to be 15 to 24, the South Korean government sets youth age range to be 15 to 29. This research defines the age range of youths to be 18-29. The minimum age is 18 because it is the age which people become eligible to vote in public elections in the United States. The maximum age is 29 because renowned research institutions such as Pew Research Center and the Center for Information &

Research on Civic Learning and Engagement define the age range of youth to be 18 to 29.

The dependent variables in this research, political participation acts, are operationalized into *formal* and *informal* participation. While the ISSP questionnaire provides respondents with a list of different types of political participation, formal participation measurements include 1) voting, 2) donating money or raising funds for social or political activity, and 3) belonging to a political party. It is unfortunate that the ISSP Citizenship 2004 and 2014 data set do not include campaign-related activities. However, each of the three measurements is a reliable indicator of respondents' formal participation in politics. Informal participation measurements include 1) signing a petition, 2) boycotting certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, 3) taking part in the demonstration, and 4) attending political rally or meeting. The ISSP Citizenship series included data about contacting a politician, contacting a media, and joining an internet political forum also as forms of political participation, but this research does not include them as informal participation because of the reasons explained earlier in this paper.

Table I. Formal Participation and Informal Participation Measurements

Formal Participation Measurements	Informal Participation Measurements
Vote	Petition
Financial Contribution	Boycott
Belonging to Political Party	Rally or Meeting
	Demonstration

For each political activity, respondents were asked to indicate whether they (1) Have done it in the past year; (2) Have done it in the more distant past; (3) Have not done it but might do it; or (4) Have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it. In case of voting, respondents were asked to self-report whether they (1) voted or (2) not voted in the 2000 and

2012 national elections. The question that asks respondents' status of belonging to a political party provided four scale answers, which are (1) Belong actively, participate; (2) Belong, don't participate; (3) Used to belong; (4) Never belonged.

It is noteworthy that Citizenship 2014 includes one more answer choice, 'can't choose', which Citizenship 2004 does not include. Due to the 'can't choose' answer option, more missing values were generated in 2014 data set. I dropped people who picked 'can't choose', 'don't know', or 'no answer' as their answer choice.

The independent variable in this research is the perception of corruption. The ISSP directly asks respondents' perception of corruption with the question "How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in the United States?" The possible answer choices are (1) Hardly anyone is involved; (2) A small number of people are involved; (3) A moderate number of people are involved; (4) A lot of people are involved; and (5) Almost everyone is involved.

Measuring people's corruption perception by survey data may raise a concern due to its limited ability to catch people's conceptions of corruption as well as people's sensitivity to corruption. However, since survey data is a representation of large population, it is reasonable to believe that the individual difference in corruption perception is mediated in the survey data.

A causal mechanism, trust in the government, was attained with a combination of questions that ask respondents' level of agreement to the statement. These statements include "most of the time we can trust people in the government to do what is right", "most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally", and "I don't think the government cares much what people like me think." Some of these statements seem closely related to the external efficacy, but since this research argues that young people's trust in the government

depends on their evaluation on how well the government is operating according to the democratic norm, which is a normative expectation in the governments to act in response to public benefits, it finds trust in the government and the external efficacy closely related, and finds it compelling to measure trust in the government with external efficacy questions.

Young people's interest in politics and their networking tendency were also captured. In order to find out respondents' networking tendency, their status of belonging was collected. This includes respondents' belonging to a 1) political party, 2) trade union, 3) church or other religious organization, 4) sports, leisure or cultural group, and 5) voluntary organization. Acknowledging that some scholars identify political party affiliation as a factor that affects people's political behavior, Appendix F presents result tables with a networking tendency variable that excludes political party belonging status as one of the measurements. For each organization, respondents were asked to indicate whether they (1) Belong, actively participate; (2) Belong, don't participate; (3) Used to belong; (4) Never belonged. Additionally, respondents' engagement in information and viewpoint sharing was measured via two questions that ask the frequency of discussing politics and attempts to persuade. Respondents were asked to choose one of four choices; often, sometimes, rarely or never.

Respondents' interest in politics was captured with a question that directly asks the level of political interest "How interested would you say you personally are interested in politics?" The possible answer choices for respondents were (1) Very interested; (2) Fairly interested; (3) Not very interested; (4) Not at all interested.

I also captured respondents' individual information such as sex and education as control variables. For detailed information on question wordings and answer choices for each variable measurement, see Appendix A.

<METHODOLOGY>

I conducted three analyses with the collected data. The first analysis is a two-time period analysis to compare political participation of young people in 2004 and in 2014. While a simple one-time analysis has a limitation in proving the relationship between the level of corruption perception and engagement in political participation, the two-time analysis allows to identify the trends in people's corruption perception, level of trust in the governments, and engagement in political participation. Identifying these trends is crucial for justifying the relationship between variables. When it is found that the level of corruption perception and informal participation increased, and the level of public trust in government and formal participation decreased within the same time frame, the findings will solidify the causal relationship between these variables. Additionally, the two-time period analysis yields a benefit of replication.

One of the concerns about the two-time period analysis in this research is that the time gap between two datasets is only ten years. However, ten years of time gap will still yield the information about increase or decrease in variables, thus able to identify trends in variables. According to the Pew Research Center, public trust in the government was higher in 2000s than in 2010s. With the constructed hypotheses, it is anticipated that formal participation of youths in 2004 would be higher than that of youths in 2014 as youths in 2004 had higher trust in the government than youths in 2014.

The second analysis is the comparison between different age groups within the same time frame. In other words, it compares *formal* and *informal* political participation of young people and elder people of the same period. This comparison is to highlight the characteristics of youth participation by showing the difference between younger people and elder people.

The third analysis is looking at the political participation of the subsets of youth

population, which are politically interested youths, networking youths, and politically interested and networking youths. Two analyses above are testing the theory using a sample of young people with a variation in their interest in politics and networking tendencies. However, the third analysis is testing the theory on sub-samples of youths that have scored relatively high on interest in politics and networking tendencies. This testing strategy may work positively to the validity of the theory because even though the research result indicates the failure of the theory for the full sample, the theory may work for the latter sub-sample.

In order to evaluate the relationship between corruption perception and political participation, it conducted a statistical regression analysis using the collected data. Regression analysis helps to examine the influence of the independent variable on a dependent variable. In this research, independent variable is the perception of corruption and dependent variables are formal participation and informal participation.

The paper ran regression with both continuous age variable and categorized age variable. For categorized variable, age was sorted into three categories. The first age group is youths, which includes people of age from 18 to 29. The second group is mid-age group, which includes people of age between 30 and 59. The last group is elders, which includes people who are 60 and over. Categorization of age helps to identify the mean participation of each age group, which eases the comparison between age groups. When using the categorized age variable, 'mean centering' technique was applied on control variables. On the other hand, continuous age variable helps to identify the general trend of participation based on people's age.

Chapter 5: FINDINGS

Table II. Linear Regression Results of Political Participation by Continuous Age Group

Formal Participation in 2004				Formal Participation in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,241				Number of Observation: 1,036			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	0.013	0.001	0.000	Age (18-89)	0.005	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	0.095	0.030	0.002	Political Trust	0.042	0.030	0.163
Sex	0.102	0.036	0.005	Sex	0.095	0.038	0.013
Education	0.109	0.019	0.000	Education	0.111	0.016	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.129	0.025	0.000	Interest in Politics	0.176	0.024	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.330	0.015	0.000	Networking Tendency	0.302	0.016	0.000
Informal Participation in 2004				Informal Participation in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,240				Number of Observation: 1,060			
Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	-0.005	0.001	0.000	Age (18-89)	-0.007	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	-0.001	0.036	0.971	Political Trust	-0.095	0.038	0.012
Sex	0.090	0.044	0.040	Sex	0.033	0.047	0.481
Education	0.126	0.023	0.000	Education	0.114	0.020	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.144	0.030	0.000	Interest in Politics	0.165	0.030	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.307	0.018	0.000	Networking Tendency	0.321	0.20	0.000

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table II shows the regression relationship between political participations and age. For these linear regression results, dependent variables are formal participation and informal participation, independent variable is age, and controlling variables include political trust, interest in politics, networking tendency, gender, and education level. In other words, Table II shows how people's *formal* and *informal* political participation changed as they get older by one year when their political trust, interest in politics, networking tendency, gender, and education level are held same. In order to identify the trends of political participations across time, Table II presents the relationship between political participations and age in both 2004 and 2014. Table II presents regression coefficient, standard error, statistical significance, and number of observations for each year.


The regression coefficients of age indicate by how much political participation increased or decreased as people get one year older. These numbers should be interpreted with the understanding of full participation scale of both *formal* and *informal* participation. The participation scale of formal participation ranges from 0 to 3, and informal participation scale ranges from 0 to 4. 0 indicates no participation, and the bigger number represents more active participation. More detailed information about scales for each variable is in Appendix B.

According to Table II, people's formal participation increased by 0.013 points in 2004 and by 0.005 points in 2014 as they get one year older. On the other hand, people's informal participation decreased by 0.005 points in 2004 and by 0.007 points in 2014 as they get one year older. These results show that people engage in formal political participation more actively as they get older, but engage in informal participation less actively as they get older. In order to help the understanding, graphs below present the simple regression of age and political participations.


The coefficient of each controlling variables indicates the relationship between the controlling variable with political participation. Table II reveals that political trust is positively associated with formal participation, which means people with higher political trust engage in formal participation more actively than people with lower political trust. Contrastingly, political trust is negatively associated with informal participation, which tells that people who highly trust the government do not actively participate in politics informally than people whose political trust is low. Other controlling variables such as political interest, networking tendency, and education level are all positively associated with both forms of political participation. Also, it is found that women more actively participate in politics than men, especially informally.

Graph I&II.

Scatter Plot with a Predicted Line of Formal Participation and Age in 2004/2014




Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004




Source: ISSP Citizenship 2014

Graph III&IV.

Scatter Plot with a Predicted Line of Informal Participation and Age in 2004/2014



Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004



Source: ISSP Citizenship 2014

Table III. Linear Regression Results of Political Participation by Different Age Groups

Formal Participation in 2004				Formal Participation in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,241				Number of Observation: 1,036			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	0.719	0.103	0.000	Youth (18-29)	0.757	0.095	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	1.090	0.049	0.000	Mid-age (30-59)	0.927	0.059	0.004
Elder (60-89)	1.342	0.059	0.000	Elder (60-89)	1.037	0.064	0.000
Political Trust	0.099	0.031	0.001	Political Trust	0.042	0.030	0.165
Sex	0.098	0.037	0.008	Sex	0.092	0.024	0.017
Education	0.094	0.019	0.000	Education	0.107	0.016	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.141	0.025	0.000	Interest in Politics	0.178	0.024	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.333	0.015	0.000	Networking Tendency	0.302	0.016	0.000
Informal Participation in 2004				Informal Participation in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,240				Number of Observation: 1,060			
Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	1.348	0.122	0.000	Youth (18-29)	1.422	0.117	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	1.285	0.058	0.279	Mid-age (30-59)	1.267	0.070	0.028
Elder (60-89)	1.095	0.070	0.000	Elder (60-89)	1.089	0.077	0.000
Political Trust	-0.002	0.036	0.953	Political Trust	-0.0945	0.376	0.012
Sex	0.090	0.044	0.040	Sex	0.036	0.048	0.451
Education	0.124	0.023	0.000	Education	0.117	0.020	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.147	0.030	0.000	Interest in Politics	0.162	0.030	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.306	0.018	0.000	Networking Tendency	0.319	0.020	0.000

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table III shows the average political participation of three different age groups, which are youth, mid-age, and elder. These three age groups are mutually exclusive in that youth group fall into constant term when running a regression on STATA. Table II shows the results after mathematical calculation is completed.

Table III is similar to Table II in that dependent variables are *formal* and *informal* participation, and controlling variables are political trust, interest in politics, networking tendency, sex, and education. Table III also includes information of both 2004 and 2014. The difference between Table II and Table III is the independent variable in that Table III categorized age while Table II represents age as continuous variable.

The first group, youth, is a group of people whose age ranges from 18 to 29. The second group, mid-age, is a group of people whose age is from 30 to 59. The last group, elder, is a group of people whose age is 60 or over. For both 2004 and 2014 data sets, 18 is the minimum age and 89 is the maximum age. The sample sizes of three age groups in 2004 and 2014 dataset can be viewed at Appendix C.

By categorizing age groups, Table III allows to understand and compare different age groups' engagement in *formal* and *informal* political participation. The coefficient of each age group indicates the average political participation of the group. For example, 0.719 is the average formal participation engagement of youth in 2004. The coefficients in Table III also should be interpreted with the understanding of full *formal* and *informal* participation scales which had been illustrated above.

Complying with the results shown in Table II, the average formal participation of the youth group was lower than that of the other two groups in both 2004 and 2014. On the other hand, the elder group's average formal participation was the highest among three age groups in both 2004 and 2014. Contrastingly, the youth group showed the most active engagement in informal participation compared to the other two age groups, whereas the elder group demonstrated the least engagement in informal participation in both 2004 and 2014.

Table III also allows to compare how the same age group's political participation changed over time. This comparison can be done by looking at the coefficient of age group in 2004 and 2014. Interestingly, the youth group's participation trend is different from that of the mid-age and elder groups. While the youth group's *formal* and *informal* participation increased over 10 years, the mid-age and elder groups' *formal* and *informal* participation decreased over same period of time.

Since the difference between Table II and Table III is only whether the age variable is presented as continuous variable or categorized variable, the relationships between controlling variables and political participations in Table III remain the same as Table II.

It is noteworthy that some of the political trust regression results are not at a statistically significant level. For example, the statistical significance level of political trust in 2014 formal participation result table is 0.165 and that in 2004 informal participation result table is 0.953. The regression result is understood as statistically not significant when the p value is higher than 0.05. Investigation showed that the cause of a statistical insignificance for some political trust regression results is a high correlation between political trust and other variables such as networking tendency and education. Appendix E presents result tables without education and networking tendency variables to make sure that the regression result of political participations and political trust is statistically significant.

Table IV. Linear Regression Results of Political Participation by Politically Interested Youth

Formal Participation of Politically Interested Youth in 2004				Formal Participation of Politically Interested Youth in 2014			
Number of Observation: 274				Number of Observation: 143			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Politically Interested Youth	0.339	0.101	0.001	Politically Interested Youth	0.549	0.121	0.000
Sex	0.045	0.095	0.635	Sex	0.281	0.118	0.190
Education	0.238	0.045	0.000	Education	0.268	0.058	0.000
Informal Participation of Politically Interested Youth in 2004				Informal Participation of Politically Interested Youth in 2014			
Number of Observation: 275				Number of Observation: 170			
Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Politically Interested Youth	0.487	0.115	0.000	Politically Interested Youth	0.522	0.133	0.000
Sex	-0.052	0.109	0.630	Sex	0.009	0.128	0.942
Education	0.194	0.052	0.000	Education	0.222	0.061	0.000

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table V. Linear Regression Results of Political Participation by Networking Youth

Formal Participation of Networking Youth in 2004				Formal Participation of Networking Youth in 2014			
Number of Observation: 225				Number of Observation: 136			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Networking Youth	0.822	0.123	0.000	Networking Youth	0.767	0.194	0.000
Sex	0.068	0.099	0.493	Sex	0.200	0.121	0.101
Education	0.177	0.051	0.001	Education	0.236	0.064	0.000
Informal Participation of Networking Youth in 2004				Informal Participation of Networking Youth in 2014			
Number of Observation: 227				Number of Observation: 159			
Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Networking Youth	1.042	0.129	0.000	Networking Youth	0.585	0.230	0.012
Sex	0.007	0.104	0.944	Sex	-0.014	0.136	0.916
Education	0.091	0.053	0.090	Education	0.200	0.067	0.003

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table VI. Linear Regression Results of Political Participation by Politically Interested and Networking Youth

Formal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2004				Formal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2014			
Number of Observation: 104				Number of Observation: 86			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Poli Int and Networking Youth	0.779	0.152	0.000	Poli Int and Networking Youth	1.096	0.226	0.000
Sex	-0.024	0.136	0.860	Sex	0.215	0.149	0.152
Education	0.303	0.077	0.000	Education	0.175	0.080	0.032
Informal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2004				Informal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2014			
Number of Observation: 107				Number of Observation: 106			
Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Poli Int and Networking Youth	1.098	0.159	0.000	Poli Int and Networking Youth	0.984	0.261	0.000
Sex	0.130	0.142	0.360	Sex	-0.032	0.158	0.839
Education	0.187	0.080	0.021	Education	0.149	0.082	0.071

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table IV, V, and VI show the linear regression results of political participation of three sub-groups of the youth population. These sub-groups are which satisfy the assumptions about youths that were illustrated earlier in the paper. These three sub-groups are: youths who are interested in politics, youths with a strong networking tendency, and youths with both of these characteristics. These three sub-groups are independent variables, dependent variables are *formal* and *informal* participation, and the controlling variables are sex and education.

Table IV and V reveal that networking tendency is a more effective motivator than political interest for political participation, since young people with a strong networking tendency showed more active engagement in both *formal* and *informal* political participation than young people who are interested in politics.

Interestingly, all sub-groups' activeness in *formal* and *informal* participation changed over 10 years. In 2004, all three sub-groups' coefficients for informal participation were higher than their coefficients for formal participation. These results tells that sub-groups of youth participated in politics more actively through informal participation than formal participation. However, it changed in 2014. In 2014, all three sub-groups' coefficients for formal participation were higher than their coefficients for informal participation. In other words, all sub-groups of youth participated in politics more actively through formal participation than informal participation in 2014.

Chapter 6: DISCUSSION OF CAUSAL MECHANISM AND RESULTS

<ASSESSMENT OF CAUSAL MECHANISM>

This paper identifies the causal mechanism that explains the influence of perception of corruption on youth political participation as political trust. In order to assess political trust as a causal mechanism, I tested the relationship between perception of corruption and political trust. Furthermore, I compared the relationship of political participations and trust with the relationship of political participations and perception of corruption (In the conclusion, I also address the drawbacks inherent in using survey data to make inferences about political trust as a causal mechanism). Table VII is a simple linear regression result of political trust and perception of corruption.


Table VII. Linear Regression Result of Political Trust and Perception of Corruption

Political Trust by Perception of Corruption in 2004				Political Trust by Perception of Corruption in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,428				Number of Observation: 1,142			
Political Trust	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Political Trust	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Perception of Corruption	-0.315	0.015	0.000	Perception of Corruption	-0.302	0.018	0.000

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014


Table VII shows that political trust and perception of corruption are negatively correlated, which means people's political trust decreases as their level of perception of corruption is higher. In more detail, people's political trust decreased by 0.31 points as their perception of corruption increased by 1 point in 2004. Similarly, people's political trust decreased by 0.3 points as their perception of corruption increased by 1 point in 2014. Below are graphs of political trust and perception of corruption linear regression to visualize their relationships.

Graph V. Scatter Plot with Predicted Line of Political Trust and Perception of Corruption 2004



Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004

Graph VI. Scatter Plot with Predicted Line of Political Trust and Perception of Corruption 2014



Source: ISSP Citizenship 2014

The relationship between political trust and perception of corruption can also be assessed by looking at the trends of perception of corruption and political trust over the same period of time. In order to do this, mean values of perception of corruption and political trust of both the general public and youth population were calculated. Before talking about mean values, it is important to know that the scale of corruption perception is from 0 to 4 and the scale of political trust is from 0 to 3. 0 indicates very low or no corruption perception and very low or no political trust, 4 indicates the highest level of corruption perception, and 3 indicates the highest level of political trust. For more information about mean, frequency, and scale of political trust and perception of corruption, refer to Appendix B.

The mean value of corruption perception of the general public was 2.06 in 2004 and 2.22 in 2014. Similarly, the mean of corruption perception of the youth population was 2.008 in 2004 and 2.22 in 2014. Meanwhile, the political trust of the general public was 1.33 in 2004 and 1.1 in

2014, and that of youths was 1.39 in 2004 and 1.03 in 2014. Thus, it is clear that people's political trust dropped and their perception of corruption increased within the same period.

Table VIII. Linear Regression Results of Political Participations and Perception of Corruption

Formal participation by Perception of Corruption in 2004				Formal participation by Perception of Corruption in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,420				Number of Observation: 1,003			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Perception of Corruption	-0.116	0.026	0.000	Perception of Corruption	-0.095	0.028	0.001
Informal participation by Perception of Corruption in 2004				Informal participation by Perception of Corruption in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,418				Number of Observation: 1,118			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Perception of Corruption	-0.051	0.028	0.063	Perception of Corruption	-0.032	0.032	0.322

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table IX. Linear Regression Results of Political Participations and Political Trust

Formal Participation by Trust in 2004				Formal Participation by Trust in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,443				Number of Observation: 1,099			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Political Trust	0.333	0.038	0.000	Political Trust	0.171	0.041	0.000
Informal Participation by Trust in 2004				Informal Participation by Trust in 2014			
Number of Observation: 1,441				Number of Observation: 1,141			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t	Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Political Trust	0.258	0.041	0.000	Political Trust	0.036	0.046	0.442

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004/2014

Table VIII and IX show that political trust is more strongly associated with political participations than the perception of corruption is. The coefficients in table VIII represent by how much *formal* and *informal* participation increases or decreases as perception of corruption increases by 1 point. Similarly, the coefficients in table IX represent by how much *formal* and *informal* participation increases or decreases as political trust increases by 1 point. A bigger

coefficient number indicates a stronger association with political participations. A comparison of coefficients of political trusts and perception of corruption reveals that political trust has a stronger association with political participations than perception of corruption.

Additionally, Table VIII and IX show that the higher level of political trust leads to more active *formal* and *informal* participation, but higher level of corruption perception causes alienations from both *formal* and *informal* participation. Interestingly, formal participation is more influenced by political trust and corruption perception than by informal participation. A higher level of political trust leads to more active *formal participation* than *informal participation*, and a higher level of perception of corruption leads to more withdrawal from formal participation than informal participation.

<DISCUSSION OF RESULTS>

By conducting statistical analyses with 2004 and 2014 survey data sets, I was able to obtain both expected and unexpected results. I will start my discussion section by discussing the expected results, then discuss unexpected results.

The expected results are informal participations of young people. The second hypothesis of this paper is: perception of corruption among politicians causes mistrust among the youth, thereby increasing the latter's incentive for informal participation. In order to test this hypothesis, a two-time period analysis was conducted, which looks at how young people's political participation changed over 10 years. Table III shows that youths' average informal participation increased by 0.07 points over 10 years, since the average youth informal participation was 1.35 points in 2004 and 1.42 point in 2014. Thus, the result shown in Table III supports the second hypothesis in that youths' informal participation increased while youths'

perception of corruption increased, and youths' political trust decreased as shown in Appendix B.

Young people's active engagement in informal participation compared to older people was also an expected result. The third hypothesis of this paper is: younger people's informal political participation is greater than that of older people. It was expected that younger people prefer informal participation over formal participation for two reasons. First, they have a strong networking tendency, which collective characteristic of informal participation satisfy. Second, the generation of mistrust makes them view informal participation as an attractive alternative method to raise up their voices and influence government decisions and actions. In order to test this hypothesis, an age-comparison analysis was conducted, which allows an understanding of how young people's participation in politics is different from older people.

As expected, Table II and III demonstrate that young people are more actively engaging in informal participation than older people, whereas older people are more actively engaging in formal participation. The regression coefficient of formal participation and age is positive in Table II, which means people more actively engage in formal participation as they get older. On the other hand, the regression coefficient of informal participation and age is negative in Table II, which indicates that younger people more actively engage in informal participation than older people. The size of the regression coefficient in Table III represents the average political participation of the age group. Table III shows that the size of the regression coefficient of formal participation and youth group is the smallest among three categorized age groups (youth, mid-age, and elder). Meanwhile, the size of the regression coefficient of formal participation and elder group is the most significant compared to the other two age groups. However, the size of the regression coefficient of informal participation and youth group is the greatest among three

age groups, and the size of the regression coefficient of informal participation and elder group is the smallest. These results solidify that young people are more actively engaging in informal participation than older people. Thus, the third hypothesis of this paper is supported.

The difference between 2004 and 2014 informal participation of youth is also more significant than that of older people. As illustrated above, youths' informal participation increased by 0.07 points from 2004 to 2014. During the same period, the mid-age group's informal participation decreased by 0.02 points, and the elder group's informal participation also declined by 0.011 points. However, these results only partially satisfy the fourth hypothesis, which is "younger people's participation change more radically than that of older people." It was hypothesized that young people's participation would change more radically than older people's participation, because one of the assumptions about youths in this paper is that younger people are more responsive to external influences. Supporting this hypothesis, youths' informal participation experienced a more significant change from 2004 to 2014 than mid-age and elder informal participation. However, the fourth hypothesis is not fully supported by the results, since youths' formal participation experienced a minimal change from 2004 to 2014 compared to the mid-age and elder groups' formal participation. Youths' formal participation only increased by 0.04 points from 2004 to 2014 while the mid-age group's formal participation decreased by 0.16 points and the elder group's formal participation decreased by 0.3 points. These results show that in the case of formal participation, older people showed a more responsive political behavior change than younger people.

Overall, youth informal participation results comply with expectations. Youth informal participation increased over time, youth more actively engaged in informal participation than older people, and youth informal participation changed more radically than that of older people.

Nonetheless, there were some unexpected results found as well. These results are youths' formal participations.

The results indicate young people's unexpected engagement in formal politics. The first hypothesis of the paper is: perception of corruption among politicians causes mistrust among the youth, thereby decreasing the latter's incentive for formal participation. However, Table III shows that youths' incentive for formal participation did not decrease, even though their perception of corruption increased and their political trust decreased. Indeed, youths' average formal participation increased by 0.04 points from 2004 to 2014 in that it grew from 0.72 to 0.76. While it was hypothesized that young people would shift from formal participation to informal participation as they perceived corruption and mistrust the government, young people, in fact, continued their engagement in formal participation and even became more active as their perception of corruption increased and their political trust decreased.

Interestingly, the results are opposite to the first and second hypotheses of the paper when looking at the mean values of youths' *formal* and *informal* participation without taking account of controlling variables. The mean of youths' formal participation increased from 1.058 in 2004 to 1.146 in 2014 while the mean of youth informal participation actually decreased from 1.729 in 2004 to 1.674 in 2014. The mean and frequency of youths' *formal* and *informal* participation can be viewed at Appendix B.

Youths' unexpected engagement in formal participation is also shown in Table IV, which presents how sub-groups of youth, that fit with the assumptions of youth made in this paper, participate in *formal* and *informal* participation. Interestingly, a preference for political participation of all sub-groups changed from 2004 to 2014. The regression coefficient in Table IV represents the average participation rate of the sub-groups. Sub-groups' regression

coefficients of informal participation were bigger than those of formal participation in 2004, but the regression coefficients of formal participation were bigger than those of informal participation in 2014. In other words, politically interested youths, youths with a strong networking tendency, and youths with both characteristics engaged in informal participation more actively than formal participation in 2004. However, in 2014, all three sub-groups showed more active engagement in formal participation over informal participation.

It was expected that youths who are interested in politics and have a strong networking tendency would actively participate in politics via both forms of political participation and would especially show a great political engagement through informal participation. However, when youths with both political interest and a strong networking tendency was compared to the general youths, the results were opposite to the expectation. In both years of 2004 and 2014, politically interested and networking youths' formal participation was higher than the general youths' formal participation. However, politically interested and networking youths' informal participation was lower than the general youths' informal participation. While the general youths' informal participation increased by 0.07 points, politically interested and networking youths' informal participation decreased by 0.19 points over 10 years. Unlike the expectation, youths with political interest and a strong networking tendency chose to be politically active via formal participation.

Overall, results show that young people are politically engaging in that they are demonstrating their political participation with both *formal* and *informal* participation. Youth *formal* and *informal* participation increased over 10 years. Youths' active political participation shows that they are aware of their civic rights and duties as well as the power which they are entitled to as citizens of a democratic nation.

Nonetheless, youths' increased engagement in *formal* and *informal* politics should not be a reason to neglect the importance of highlighting a negative impact of lowered political trust and worsening perception of corruption. It is critical to note that the general population's *formal* and *informal* participation decreased over 10 years. The mean value of the general population's formal participation was 1.515 in 2004, but it decreased to 1.481 in 2014. On the other hand, the mean value of the general population's informal participation was 1.768 in 2004, but it decreased to 1.714 in 2014. Refer to Appendix B for more detailed information about the general population's *formal* and *informal* political participation. A decline in political participation is also presented in Table III. While young people's *formal* and *informal* participation increased from 2004 to 2014, that of the mid-age and elder groups decreased. Decreasing *formal* and *informal* political participation of people proves a devastating effect of perception of corruption and lack of political trust. It surely is a critical issue that requires special attention.

Chapter 7: THE CONCLUSION

This thesis starts off by arguing that civic engagement is a crucial feature that makes democracy valuable and marks the difference from other regimes. Acknowledging the mounting concern for decreasing youth political participation, this research focuses on how perception of corruption influences young people's political participation by impacting people's political trust. Political participation is largely divided into two areas, formal participation and informal participation. The central theory of this thesis is constructed based on the expectation that the effect of perception of corruption on youth political participation would be different by the type of political participation. The theory of this thesis is: perception of corruption lowers young people's trust towards the government, which decreases their formal participation, whereas it increases their informal participation.

Building on Riker and Ordeshook's (1968) theory of calculus voting, this thesis creates a calculus of political participation in order to explain how the influence of perception of corruption on political participation is different by the type of participation. It argues that perception of corruption negatively influences formal political participation but does not negatively influence informal political participation. This is because while political mistrust unfavorably impacts the benefits in the calculus of formal participation, it does not impact the benefits in the calculus of informal participation.

Following the theory, four hypotheses were made: 1) Perception of corruption among politicians causes mistrust among the youth, thereby decreasing the latter's incentive for formal participation. 2) Perception of corruption among politicians causes mistrust among the youth, thereby increasing the latter's incentive for informal participation. 3) Younger people's informal political participation is greater than that of older people. 4) Younger people's participation

changes more radically than older people. The third and fourth hypotheses are based on the assumptions about young people made in this paper. This paper assumes that young people are interested in politics, have a strong networking tendency, and are more responsive to external influence than elder people do.

In order to check the thesis and test out the hypotheses, statistical analyses were conducted with two survey data sets (Citizenship I and Citizenship II). Using these survey data sets allows to test how specific age group participated in politics and how it changed over time.

The statistical analyses yielded both expected and unexpected results. The results support the second and third hypotheses, and partially support the fourth hypothesis. Like expected, young adults demonstrated their active engagement in informal participation. However, unlike the first hypothesis, young adults also demonstrated their increasing engagement in formal participation. The average formal participation of young people increased over ten years. Furthermore, the sub-groups of the youth population were even found to be more active in formal participation than informal participation in 2014.

These results show that young people are indeed a politically engaging population who are well aware of their civic rights and duties, and who are practicing those rights and duties, although their political trust decreased as a result of the increased perception of corruption. However, this does not mean that lack of political trust doesn't affect political behavior nor leads to positive political behavior. Both *formal* and *informal* participation of the general population dropped over 10 years. This decline in the general population's political participation is due to the decline in political participation of the mid-age and elder groups.

This research is the first attempt in the field of political science to connect two major topics relating to democracy, which are the perception of corruption and youth participation.

Thus, the findings in this research add to the general participation literature, as well as youth political participation literature, perception of corruption literature, and political trust literature.

In the introduction, while identifying political trust as a causal mechanism, I stated that I would address the limit face by survey data. This research uses survey data and focuses on exploring the correlation between perception of corruption, political trust, and different forms of political participation. Nonetheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that a simple correlation has a limitation to prove causality. This is why an increasing number of political scientists are practicing other forms of methodology such as experiments, which yield credible estimates of causal effects with, they hope, minimal assumptions (Faulkner, Martin & Peyton, 2014).

This research can move forward by conducting an experiment that can more persuasively point to the causal importance of political trust and its role in the relationship between perception of corruption and different forms of political participation. Faulkner, Martin, and Peyton (2014) designed an experiment that examines the causal effect of information about government probity on political trust. The findings indicate that “both political trust and trust in institutions, commonly measured in survey research, can be changed by having subjects read an article emphasizing the probity of politicians and having them complete a word-association task” (Faulkner, Martin & Peyton, 2014). For my experiment, I would randomly assign participants into two groups. One group would receive information about high probity, responsiveness and reliability of politicians. The other group would receive information about low probity and corruption scandal. Then, a survey would ask participants of both groups about their willingness to engage in *formal* and *informal* political participation. I believe conducting the experiment would resolve an inherent problem in using survey data to make inferences about political trust as a causal mechanism, and would solidify the findings.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A. Question and Coding of Variables

Variable	Composed variable code name	Question Wording	Answer Choices	Coded
Formal Participation	voted (v297)	In 2000, you remember that Gore ran for President on the Democratic ticket against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?	0 Not applicable 1 Yes 2 No 8 Don't know 9 No answer	0 = No 1 = Yes
	party (V25/V27)	People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. For each type of group, please indicate whether you: belong and actively participate; belong but don't actively participate; used to belong but do not anymore; or have never belonged to it - A political party	1 Belong actively, participate 2 Belong, don't participate 3 Used to belong 4 Never belonged 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Never belonged 0.3 = Used to belong 0.67 = Belong, don't participate 1 = Belong actively, participate
	donate (V22)	Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can take. Please indicate, for each of one, whether: you have done any of these things in the past year; you have done it in the more distant past; you have not done it but might do it; or have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it. - Donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity	1 Have done it in the past year 2 Have done it in the more distant past 3 Have not done it but might do it 4 Have not done it and would never do it 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Have not done it and would never do it 0.3 = Have not done it but might do it 0.67 = Have done it in the more distant past 1 = Have done it in the past year
Informal Participation	petition (V17)	Signed a petition	1 Have done it in the past year 2 Have done it in the more distant past 3 Have not done it but might do it 4 Have not done it and would never do it 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Have not done it and would never do it 0.3 = Have not done it but might do it 0.67 = Have done it in the more distant past 1 = Have done it in the past year
	boycott (V18)	Boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	1 Have done it in the past year 2 Have done it in the more distant past 3 Have not done it but might do it 4 Have not done it and would never do it 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Have not done it and would never do it 0.3 = Have not done it but might do it 0.67 = Have done it in the more distant past 1 = Have done it in the past year
	demonstration (V19)	Took part in a demonstration	1 Have done it in the past year 2 Have done it in the more distant past 3 Have not done it but might do it 4 Have not done it and would never do it 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Have not done it and would never do it 0.3 = Have not done it but might do it 0.67 = Have done it in the more distant past 1 = Have done it in the past year
	rally (V20)	Attended a political meeting or rally	1 Have done it in the past year 2 Have done it in the more distant past 3 Have not done it but might do it 4 Have not done it and would never do it 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Have not done it and would never do it 0.3 = Have not done it but might do it 0.67 = Have done it in the more distant past 1 = Have done it in the past year

Perception of Corruption	corruption (V59/V61)	How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in (COUNTRY)?	1 Hardly anyone is involved 2 A small number of people are involved 3 A moderate number of people are involved 4 A lot of people are involved 5 Almost everyone is involved 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Hardly anyone is involved 1 = A small number of people are involved 2 = A moderate number of people are involved 3 = A lot of people are involved 4 = Almost everyone is involved.
Political Trust	trust1 (V43/V49)	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? - Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right	1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Neither agree nor disagree 4 Disagree 5 Strongly disagree 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Strongly Disagree 0.25 = Disagree 0.5 = Neither agree nor disagree 0.75 = Agree 1 = Strongly Agree
	trust2 (V44/V50)	Most politicians are in politics only for what they can get out of it personally	1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Neither agree nor disagree 4 Disagree 5 Strongly disagree 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Strongly Agree 0.25 = Agree 0.5 = Neither agree nor disagree 0.75 = Disagree 1 = Strongly Disagree
	trust3 (V37/V42)	I don't think the government cares much what people like me think	1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Neither agree nor disagree 4 Disagree 5 Strongly disagree 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Strongly Agree 0.25 = Agree 0.5 = Neither agree nor disagree 0.75 = Disagree 1 = Strongly Disagree
Networking Tendency	party (V25)	People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. For each type of group, please indicate whether you: belong and actively participate; belong but don't actively participate; used to belong but do not anymore; or have never belonged to it - A political party	1 Belong actively, participate 2 Belong, don't participate 3 Used to belong 4 Never belonged 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0.= Never belonged 0.3 = Used to belong 0.67 = Belong, don't participate 1= Belong actively, participate
	trade union (V26/V28)	A trade union, business, or professional association	1 Belong actively, participate 2 Belong, don't participate 3 Used to belong 4 Never belonged 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0.= Never belonged 0.3 = Used to belong 0.67 = Belong, don't participate 1= Belong actively, participate
	church (V27/V29)	A church or other religious organization	1 Belong actively, participate 2 Belong, don't participate 3 Used to belong 4 Never belonged 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0.= Never belonged 0.3 = Used to belong 0.67 = Belong, don't participate 1= Belong actively, participate

Networking Tendency	sports (V28/V30)	A sports, leisure or cultural group	1 Belong actively, participate 2 Belong, don't participate 3 Used to belong 4 Never belonged 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0.= Never belonged 0.3 = Used to belong 0.67 = Belong, don't participate 1= Belong actively, participate
	voluntary association (V29/V31)	Another voluntary association	1 Belong actively, participate 2 Belong, don't participate 3 Used to belong 4 Never belonged 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0.= Never belonged 0.3 = Used to belong 0.67 = Belong, don't participate 1= Belong actively, participate
	political discussion - frequency (V47/V53)	When you get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers how often do you discuss politics?	1 Often 2 Sometimes 3 Rarely 4 Never 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Never 0.3 = Rarely 0.67 = Sometimes. 1 = Often
	political discussion-convince (V48/V54)	When you hold a strong opinion about politics, how often do you try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?	1 Often 2 Sometimes 3 Rarely 4 Never 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Never 0.3 = Rarely 0.67 = Sometimes. 1 = Often
Political Interest	interest (V42/V47)	How interested would you say you personally are in politics?	1 Very interested 2 Fairly interested 3 Not very interested 4 Not at all interested 8 Can't choose, don't know 9 No answer, refused	0 = Not at all interested 1 = Not very interested 2 = Fairly interested 3 = Very interested
Age	age (v201/AGE)	Age of Respondent		29 = 18-29 59 = 30-59 60 = 60-100
Gender	sex (v200/SEX)	Sex of Respondent	1 Male 2 Female 9 No answer, refused, don't know	1 = male 2= female
Education Level	education (v205/DEGREE)	What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you finished and got credit for? Did you ever get a high school diploma? Did you ever complete one or more years of college? How many years did you complete? Do you have any college degree? What degree?	1 Lowest formal qualification attainable 2 Qualifications which are above the lowest qualification, but below the usual entry requirement for universities (intermediary secondary completed) 3 (Usual) Entry requirement for universities (higher secondary completed; the German Abitur, the French Bac, English A-level, etc.) 4 Qualifications which are above the higher secondary level, but below a full university degree; other education 5 University degree completed 8 Don't know 9 No answer	0 = No formal qualification 1 = Lowest formal qualification 2 = Above lowest qualification 3 = Higher secondary completed 4 = Above higher sec level, other educ 5 = University degree completed

Appendix B. Scale, Frequency, and Mean of Variables

Variable	Scale	2004				2014			
		General Population		Youth (18-29)		General Population		Youth (18-29)	
		Frequency	Mean	Frequency	Mean	Frequency	Mean	Frequency	Mean
Formal Participation	0	133	1.515	30	1.058	122	1.481	15	1.146
	0.33	148		66		86		27	
	0.67	79		30		44		8	
	1	212		49		186		33	
	1.3	149		26		127		17	
	1.67	125		17		131		15	
	2	191		23		167		15	
	2.3	143		10		107		5	
	2.67	163		13		114		7	
	3	110		11		57		4	
Informal Participation	0	87	1.768	12	1.729	100	1.714	12	1.674
	0.33	61		14		50		9	
	0.67	108		16		98		9	
	1	155		35		115		15	
	1.3	192		49		146		30	
	1.67	167		40		145		25	
	2	185		28		133		22	
	2.3	155		20		118		20	
	2.67	129		24		114		16	
	3	82		15		75		5	
	3.33	71		11		56		6	
	3.67	25		4		18		1	
4	33	8	20	3					
Corruption Perception	0	18	2.059	5	2.008	9	2.221	1	2.217
	1	418		80		270		36	
	2	573		109		449		71	
	3	309		50		353		58	
	4	115		21		98		9	
Political Trust	0	46	1.334	3	1.385	86	1.101	15	1.03
	0.25	63		7		91		13	
	0.5	93		11		107		15	
	0.75	156		31		178		30	
	1	173		42		151		25	
	1.25	214		46		176		30	
	1.5	197		34		138		19	
	1.75	213		44		121		14	
	2	152		32		92		10	
	2.25	114		20		45		6	
	2.5	27		5		12		.	
	2.75	7		1		2		.	
	3	3		.		.		.	

Networking	0	4	3.086	1	2.81	53	2.577	6	2.187
	0.33	16		4		36		7	
	0.67	31		9		49		10	
	1	55		7		83		17	
	1.3	74		15		81		15	
	1.67	84		24		86		17	
	2	101		19		96		20	
	2.3	103		20		99		15	
	2.67	107		25		89		13	
	3	114		23		79		10	
	3.3	107		20		98		14	
	3.67	72		9		73		9	
	4	100		12		65		9	
	4.3	68		10		46		2	
	4.67	58		11		40		2	
	5	54		6		38		3	
	5.3	43		6		29		1	
	5.67	35		3		9		.	
	6	21		2		13		1	
	6.3	13		2		1		.	
6.67	1	.	.	.					
7	1	.	.	.					
Political Interest	0	145	1.805	34	1.67	174	1.584	41	1.242
	1	299		68		354		73	
	2	717		132		525		58	
	3	304		44		186		14	

Appendix C. Number of respondents for each age group

Age	2004	2014
18-29	279	191
30-59	862	699
60-89	356	371

Appendix D. Codebook for sub-group of youth

Variable	Code name	Coded	Coded-detail	Coded-detail
Politically Interested Youth	intyouth	1 = politically interested. 0 = not interested	1 if age under or same as 29, and political interest level is 2 or 3	0 if age under or same as 29, and political interest level is 1 or 2
Networking Youth	netyouth	1 = high networking tendency 0 = low networking tendency	1 if age is under or same as 29, and networking score is same or bigger than 4 but smaller than 7	0 if age is under or same as 29, and networking score is same or bigger than 0 but smaller than 4
Politically interested & networking youth	intnetyouth	1 = politically interested & high networking tendency 0 = not politically interested & high networking tendency	1 if age under or same as 29, and political interest level is 2 or 3, and networking score is same or bigger than 4 but smaller than 7	0 if age under or same as 29, and political interest level is 1 or 2, and networking score is same or bigger than 0 but smaller than 4

Appendix E. Result tables without Education and Networking Tendency variables to make sure that the regression result of Political Trust is statistically significant

**a) Linear Regression result of Formal Participation and Continuous Age in 2014
Formal Participation in 2014 (without Education)**

Number of Observation: 1,036

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	0.005	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	0.065	0.030	0.034
Sex	0.109	0.039	0.005
Interest in Politics	0.178	0.024	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.346	0.015	0.000

**b) Linear Regression result of Informal Participation and Continuous Age in 2004
Informal Participation in 2004 (without Education and Networking Tendency)**

Number of Observation: 1,437

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	-0.005	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	0.170	0.039	0.000
Sex	0.083	0.048	0.084
Interest in Politics	0.394	0.028	0.000

**c) Linear Regression of Formal Participation and Categorized Age in 2014
Formal Participation in 2014 (without Education)**

Number of Observation: 1,036

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	1.120	0.079	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	1.305	0.060	0.002
Elder (60-89)	1.388	0.065	0.000
Political Trust	0.064	0.030	0.037
Sex	0.105	0.039	0.007
Interest in Politics	0.179	0.024	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.345	0.015	0.000

**d) Linear Regression of Informal Participation and Categorized Age in 2004
Informal Participation in 2004 (without Education and Networking Tendency)**

Number of Observation: 1,437

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	1.645	0.092	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	1.722	0.062	0.215
Elder (60-89)	1.430	0.075	0.004
Political Trust	0.170	0.039	0.000
Sex	0.082	0.048	0.086
Interest in Politics	0.395	0.028	0.000

Appendix F. Result tables that has Networking Tendency variable without Political Party as one of its measurements

Though there are differences between results tables in appendix F and result tables in the result section of the thesis, it is found that those differences are minor. In other words, using political party belonging status as one of the measurements of networking tendency does not affect the overall result to a considerable extent.

Formal Participation in 2004

Number of Observation: 1,241			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	0.015	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	0.118	0.033	0.000
Sex	0.108	0.040	0.007
Education	0.161	0.021	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.200	0.027	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.261	0.019	0.000

Formal Participation in 2014

Number of Observation: 1,036			
Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	0.006	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	0.044	0.033	0.176
Sex	0.087	0.041	0.036
Education	0.156	0.017	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.239	0.025	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.240	0.020	0.000

Informal Participation in 2004

Number of Observation: 1,240

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	-0.004	0.001	0.007
Political Trust	0.012	0.037	0.756
Sex	0.096	0.045	0.032
Education	0.148	0.023	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.185	0.030	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.310	0.021	0.000

Informal Participation in 2014

Number of Observation: 1,069

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Age (18-89)	-0.006	0.001	0.000
Political Trust	-0.092	0.038	0.016
Sex	0.044	0.048	0.361
Education	0.136	0.020	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.197	0.030	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.332	0.023	0.000

Formal Participation in 2004

Number of Observation: 1,241

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	0.470	0.113	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	0.879	0.054	0.000
Elder (60-89)	1.160	0.064	0.000
Political Trust	0.122	0.034	0.000
Sex	0.102	0.040	0.012
Education	0.145	0.021	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.213	0.027	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.262	0.019	0.000

Formal Participation in 2014

Number of Observation: 1,036

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	0.590	0.103	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	0.778	0.064	0.003
Elder (60-89)	0.911	0.069	0.000
Political Trust	0.044	0.033	0.178
Sex	0.830	0.041	0.046
Education	0.152	0.018	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.241	0.026	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.241	0.020	0.000

Informal Participation in 2004

Number of Observation: 1,240

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	1.227	0.125	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	1.185	0.060	0.482
Elder (60-89)	1.020	0.071	0.004
Political Trust	0.011	0.037	0.772
Sex	0.096	0.045	0.033
Education	0.146	0.023	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.189	0.030	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.309	0.021	0.000

Informal Participation in 2014

Number of Observation: 1,069

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Youth (18-29)	1.297	0.118	0.000
Mid-age (30-59)	1.170	0.071	0.073
Elder (60-89)	1.021	0.078	0.000
Political Trust	-0.092	0.038	0.016
Sex	0.046	0.048	0.342
Education	0.139	0.020	0.000
Interest in Politics	0.195	0.030	0.000
Networking Tendency	0.331	0.023	0.000

Formal Participation of Networking Youth in 2004

Number of Observation: 225

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Networking Youth	0.525	0.149	0.001
Sex	0.048	0.106	0.655
Education	0.235	0.053	0.000

Formal Participation of Networking Youth in 2004

Number of Observation: 136

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Networking Youth	0.661	0.247	0.008
Sex	0.166	0.125	0.186
Education	0.276	0.064	0.000

Informal Participation of Networking Youth in 2004

Number of Observation: 227

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Networking Youth	0.886	0.157	0.000
Sex	-0.010	0.111	0.931
Education	0.147	0.056	0.009

Informal Participation of Networking Youth in 2014

Number of Observation: 161

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Networking Youth	0.664	0.287	0.022
Sex	-0.031	0.135	0.817
Education	0.219	0.066	0.001

Formal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2004

Number of Observation: 91

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Politically Interested and Networking Youth	0.512	0.160	0.002
Sex	-0.145	0.140	0.304
Education	0.353	0.076	0.000

Formal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2014

Number of Observation: 85

Formal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Politically Interested and Networking Youth	0.905	0.253	0.001
Sex	0.226	0.149	0.134
Education	0.229	0.081	0.006

Informal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2004

Number of Observation: 94

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Politically Interested and Networking Youth	0.953	0.172	0.000
Sex	-0.041	0.149	0.782
Education	0.269	0.081	0.001

Informal Participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth in 2014

Number of Observation: 107

Informal Participation	Coef.	Std. Err.	P> t
Politically Interested and Networking Youth	1.054	0.296	0.001
Sex	-0.019	0.158	0.905
Education	0.145	0.083	0.084

Appendix G. Screenshots of STATA regression result tables

a) 2004 Formal participation and continuous age. Used for table II.

```
. reg formalP age_con trust sex education interest networking
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,241
Model	500.032878	6	83.3388131	F(6, 1234)	=	204.87
Residual	501.968764	1,234	.406781819	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4990
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4966
Total	1002.00164	1,240	.808065841	Root MSE	=	.63779

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age_con	.0131202	.001136	11.55	0.000	.0108916	.0153488
trust	.0952788	.030424	3.13	0.002	.0355903	.1549673
sex	.1023059	.0364137	2.81	0.005	.0308663	.1737454
education	.1091541	.0190222	5.74	0.000	.0718347	.1464734
interest	.1294508	.024665	5.25	0.000	.0810608	.1778408
networking	.33044	.0149955	22.04	0.000	.3010206	.3598594
_cons	-.9702384	.1134078	-8.56	0.000	-1.192732	-.7477449

b) 2014 Formal participation and continuous age. Used for table II.

```
. reg formalP age_con trust sex education interest networking
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,036
Model	396.552802	6	66.0921337	F(6, 1029)	=	182.83
Residual	371.981764	1,029	.361498313	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.5160
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5132
Total	768.534566	1,035	.742545474	Root MSE	=	.60125

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age_con	.0053664	.0011407	4.70	0.000	.003128	.0076047
trust	.0419613	.030034	1.40	0.163	-.0169735	.1008962
sex	.0952181	.0381054	2.50	0.013	.020445	.1699912
education	.1113541	.0163737	6.80	0.000	.0792244	.1434838
interest	.1761218	.0238277	7.39	0.000	.1293655	.2228782
networking	.3015109	.0159771	18.87	0.000	.2701595	.3328624
_cons	-.4507317	.102392	-4.40	0.000	-.6516526	-.2498108

c) 2004 Informal participation and continuous age. Used for table II.

```
. reg informalP age_con trust sex education interest networking
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,240
Model	388.288232	6	64.7147053	F(6, 1233)	=	110.45
Residual	722.421117	1,233	.585905205	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	1110.70935	1,239	.896456295	R-squared	=	0.3496
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3464
				Root MSE	=	.76544

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age_con	-.0048564	.0013674	-3.55	0.000	-.0075392	-.0021736
trust	-.0013053	.0364696	-0.04	0.971	-.0728547	.070244
sex	.0899299	.0437133	2.06	0.040	.0041692	.1756907
education	.1255394	.0228223	5.50	0.000	.0807645	.1703143
interest	.1439148	.0296865	4.85	0.000	.0856732	.2021565
networking	.3072699	.017921	17.15	0.000	.2721109	.3424288
_cons	.265369	.1362207	1.95	0.052	-.0018809	.532619

d) 2014 Informal participation and continuous age. Used for table II.

```
. reg informalP age_con trust sex education interest networking
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,060
Model	404.27959	6	67.3799316	F(6, 1053)	=	118.40
Residual	599.227682	1,053	.569067125	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	1003.50727	1,059	.947598935	R-squared	=	0.4029
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3995
				Root MSE	=	.75437

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age_con	-.007283	.0013959	-5.22	0.000	-.0100221	-.0045438
trust	-.0945741	.0375109	-2.52	0.012	-.1681788	-.0209694
sex	.0333508	.0472985	0.71	0.481	-.0594593	.1261609
education	.1135981	.0201323	5.64	0.000	.0740941	.153102
interest	.1648639	.0295358	5.58	0.000	.1069081	.2228197
networking	.3206978	.019759	16.23	0.000	.2819264	.3594693
_cons	.6296265	.1259667	5.00	0.000	.3824521	.8768008

e) 2004 Formal participation and categorized age. Used for table III.

```
. reg formalP i.age_cat centered_trust centered_interest centered_networking sex
> ducation
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,241
Model	492.919581	7	70.417083	F(7, 1233)	=	170.55
Residual	509.082061	1,233	.412880828	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4919
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4891
Total	1002.00164	1,240	.808065841	Root MSE	=	.64256

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval
age_cat					
59	.3715627	.0493063	7.54	0.000	.2748292 .4682961
60	.6232373	.0585364	10.65	0.000	.5083953 .7380791
centered_trust	.0994121	.0306755	3.24	0.001	.0392303 .1595911
centered_inte~t	.1410111	.0249905	5.64	0.000	.0919825 .1900391
centered_netw~g	.3333992	.0150936	22.09	0.000	.3037872 .3630111
sex	.097506	.0366814	2.66	0.008	.0255411 .1694701
education	.0942466	.0192226	4.90	0.000	.056534 .1319591
_cons	.7186954	.1031631	6.97	0.000	.5163008 .9210891

f) 2014 Formal participation and categorized age. Used for table III.

```
. reg formalP i.age_cat centered_trust centered_interest centered_networking sex
> ducation
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,036
Model	395.69188	7	56.5274114	F(7, 1028)	=	155.86
Residual	372.842686	1,028	.362687438	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.5149
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5116
Total	768.534566	1,035	.742545474	Root MSE	=	.60224

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval
age_cat					
59	.1703705	.0586565	2.90	0.004	.0552704 .2854701
60	.2805949	.0639541	4.39	0.000	.1550993 .4060901
centered_trust	.0418245	.0300843	1.39	0.165	-.0172092 .1008581
centered_inte~t	.1778733	.0238834	7.45	0.000	.1310076 .2247391
centered_netw~g	.3023253	.0159987	18.90	0.000	.2709316 .3337191
sex	.0916758	.0382155	2.40	0.017	.0166865 .1666611
education	.1071235	.0164079	6.53	0.000	.0749268 .1393201
_cons	.7566467	.0954169	7.93	0.000	.5694126 .9438801

g) 2004 Informal participation and categorized age. Used for table III.

```
. reg informalP i.age_cat centered_trust centered_interest centered_networking sex
> education
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,240
Model	390.09097	7	55.7272814	F(7, 1232)	=	95.27
Residual	720.618379	1,232	.584917516	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3512
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3475
Total	1110.70935	1,239	.896456295	Root MSE	=	.7648

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval
age_cat					
59	-.0634099	.0584871	-1.08	0.279	-.1781552 .0513354
60	-.2530601	.0697618	-3.63	0.000	-.3899252 -.1161949
centered_trust	-.0021431	.0364634	-0.06	0.953	-.0736803 .0693941
centered_inte~t	.1473914	.0297979	4.95	0.000	.0889312 .2058516
centered_netw~g	.3060041	.0178966	17.10	0.000	.270893 .3411152
sex	.0897875	.0436741	2.06	0.040	.0041037 .1754714
education	.1238181	.0228761	5.41	0.000	.0789377 .1686981
_cons	1.348191	.1224058	11.01	0.000	1.108044 1.588331

h) 2014 Informal participation and categorized age. Used for table III.

```
. reg informalP i.age_cat centered_trust centered_interest centered_networking sex
> education
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,060
Model	400.646165	7	57.2351664	F(7, 1052)	=	99.88
Residual	602.861107	1,052	.573061889	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3992
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3952
Total	1003.50727	1,059	.947598935	Root MSE	=	.75701

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval
age_cat					
59	-.1538436	.0699789	-2.20	0.028	-.2911576 -.0165291
60	-.3322685	.0770716	-4.31	0.000	-.4835 -.181037
centered_trust	-.0945394	.0376469	-2.51	0.012	-.1684109 -.0206671
centered_inte~t	.1624045	.0296884	5.47	0.000	.1041493 .2206597
centered_netw~g	.3193152	.0198215	16.11	0.000	.280421 .3582091
sex	.0358025	.0475119	0.75	0.451	-.0574263 .1290311
education	.117414	.0202418	5.80	0.000	.0776952 .1571321
_cons	1.4216	.1174303	12.11	0.000	1.191176 1.652021

i) 2004 Formal participation of Politically Interested Youth. Used for table IV.

`. reg formalP intyouth sex education`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	274
Model	29.979816	3	9.99327198	F(3, 270)	=	16.66
Residual	161.965446	270	.599872022	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	191.945262	273	.703096197	R-squared	=	0.1562
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1468
				Root MSE	=	.77451

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intyouth	.3392304	.1013246	3.35	0.001	.1397437	.5387172
sex	.045266	.0952662	0.48	0.635	-.142293	.232825
education	.2376605	.0451583	5.26	0.000	.1487532	.3265677
_cons	-.0967047	.2282769	-0.42	0.672	-.5461338	.3527243

j) 2014 Formal participation of Politically Interested Youth. Used for table IV.

`. reg formalP intyouth sex education`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	143
Model	24.6057267	3	8.20190888	F(3, 139)	=	16.83
Residual	67.7408195	139	.487344025	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	92.3465462	142	.65032779	R-squared	=	0.2664
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2506
				Root MSE	=	.6981

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intyouth	.5493327	.1208373	4.55	0.000	.3104159	.7882495
sex	.2813921	.1183055	2.38	0.019	.0474811	.5153032
education	.2677196	.0583912	4.58	0.000	.1522697	.3831695
_cons	-.4339844	.2790693	-1.56	0.122	-.985754	.1177852

k) 2004 Informal participation of Politically Interested Youth. Used for table IV.

. reg informalP intyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	275
Model	33.6433526	3	11.2144509	F(3, 271)	=	14.29
Residual	212.734028	271	.784996414	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.1366
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1270
Total	246.377381	274	.899187521	Root MSE	=	.886

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intyouth	.4871496	.115386	4.22	0.000	.2599827	.7143165
sex	-.0524306	.1087751	-0.48	0.630	-.2665822	.161721
education	.1936467	.0516972	3.75	0.000	.0918674	.295426
_cons	.7950003	.2590025	3.07	0.002	.2850874	1.304913

l) 2014 Informal participation of Politically Interested Youth. Used for table IV.

. reg informalP intyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	170
Model	23.3687238	3	7.78957459	F(3, 166)	=	11.31
Residual	114.281608	166	.688443421	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.1698
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1548
Total	137.650332	169	.814499003	Root MSE	=	.82972

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intyouth	.5215335	.1334703	3.91	0.000	.2580154	.7850516
sex	.0093931	.128231	0.07	0.942	-.2437807	.2625669
education	.2214465	.061308	3.61	0.000	.1004026	.3424904
_cons	.7136845	.294403	2.42	0.016	.1324278	1.294941

m) 2004 Formal participation of Networking Youth. Used for table V.

. reg formalP netyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	225
Model	42.46404	3	14.15468	F(3, 221)	=	25.92
Residual	120.674731	221	.546039506	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	163.138771	224	.728298084	R-squared	=	0.2603
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2503
				Root MSE	=	.73894

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
netyouth	.8222428	.1226271	6.71	0.000	.5805747	1.063911
sex	.068237	.0993665	0.69	0.493	-.1275901	.2640642
education	.1770148	.0510335	3.47	0.001	.0764401	.2775894
_cons	.1970938	.2456636	0.80	0.423	-.2870493	.681237

n) 2014 Formal participation of Networking Youth. Used for table V.

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	136
Model	22.9932623	3	7.66442075	F(3, 132)	=	15.33
Residual	65.9797801	132	.499846819	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	88.9730424	135	.659059573	R-squared	=	0.2584
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2416
				Root MSE	=	.707

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
netyouth	.7670148	.193659	3.96	0.000	.3839381	1.150091
sex	.2003314	.1213773	1.65	0.101	-.0397649	.4404277
education	.2361515	.0636815	3.71	0.000	.1101831	.3621198
_cons	-.0756819	.282825	-0.27	0.789	-.6351377	.483774

o) 2004 Informal participation of Networking Youth. Used for table V.

. reg informalP netyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	227
Model	50.868698	3	16.9562327	F(3, 223)	=	27.99
Residual	135.076485	223	.60572415	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	185.945183	226	.822766298	R-squared	=	0.2736
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2638
				Root MSE	=	.77828

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
netyouth	1.041929	.1290579	8.07	0.000	.7876 1.296258
sex	.0073174	.1042107	0.07	0.944	-.1980462 .2126811
education	.0909956	.0534125	1.70	0.090	-.0142622 .1962535
_cons	1.288793	.2557893	5.04	0.000	.7847197 1.792867

p) 2014 Informal participation of Networking Youth. Used for table V.

. reg informalP netyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	159
Model	16.0490771	3	5.34969236	F(3, 155)	=	7.31
Residual	113.436602	155	.731849043	Prob > F	=	0.0001
Total	129.485679	158	.819529612	R-squared	=	0.1239
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1070
				Root MSE	=	.85548

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
netyouth	.5850049	.2299288	2.54	0.012	.1308066 1.039203
sex	-.0143741	.1360311	-0.11	0.916	-.2830881 .2543399
education	.2004457	.0667565	3.00	0.003	.0685757 .3323156
_cons	.9675531	.3087946	3.13	0.002	.3575643 1.577542

q) 2004 Formal participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth. Used for table VI.

. reg formalP intnetyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	104
Model	35.590304	3	11.8634347	F(3, 100)	=	25.78
Residual	46.0240137	100	.460240137	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	81.6143177	103	.792372017	R-squared	=	0.4361
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4192
				Root MSE	=	.67841

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intnetyouth	.7787992	.1521585	5.12	0.000	.4769211	1.080677
sex	-.0240557	.1364449	-0.18	0.860	-.2947584	.2466471
education	.303123	.0769176	3.94	0.000	.1505207	.4557254
_cons	-.1721296	.3400483	-0.51	0.614	-.8467758	.5025166

r) 2014 Formal participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth. Used for table VI.

. reg formalP intnetyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	86
Model	21.9533415	3	7.31778051	F(3, 82)	=	15.94
Residual	37.6500192	82	.459146575	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	59.6033607	85	.701216008	R-squared	=	0.3683
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3452
				Root MSE	=	.6776

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intnetyouth	1.096196	.2264102	4.84	0.000	.6457936	1.546598
sex	.2149228	.1486894	1.45	0.152	-.0808678	.5107134
education	.1751103	.0804834	2.18	0.032	.0150032	.3352175
_cons	-.0933725	.3517784	-0.27	0.791	-.7931717	.6064267

s) **2004 Informal participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth. Used for table VI.**

. reg informalP intnetyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	107
Model	44.7034558	3	14.9011519	F(3, 103)	=	29.36
Residual	52.2830461	103	.507602389	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4609
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4452
Total	96.9865019	106	.914966999	Root MSE	=	.71246

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intnetyouth	1.098054	.1589461	6.91	0.000	.782822	1.413286
sex	.1303593	.1417072	0.92	0.360	-.1506836	.4114022
education	.1874173	.0796459	2.35	0.021	.0294585	.3453762
_cons	.6602803	.3478567	1.90	0.060	-.0296113	1.350172

t) **2014 Informal participation of Politically Interested and Networking Youth. Used for table VI.**

. reg informalP intnetyouth sex education

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	106
Model	17.9756489	3	5.99188297	F(3, 102)	=	9.29
Residual	65.8157583	102	.645252532	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.2145
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1914
Total	83.7914072	105	.798013402	Root MSE	=	.80328

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
intnetyouth	.9838132	.2606469	3.77	0.000	.4668214	1.500805
sex	-.0321964	.1583896	-0.20	0.839	-.3463614	.2819686
education	.1494306	.0820002	1.82	0.071	-.0132165	.3120777
_cons	1.002919	.3608088	2.78	0.006	.2872569	1.718582

u) 2004 Regression of Political Trust and Perception of Corruption. Used for table VII.

. reg trust corruption

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,428
Model	123.601958	1	123.601958	F(1, 1426)	=	415.96
Residual	423.729799	1,426	.297145722	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	547.331758	1,427	.38355414	R-squared	=	0.2258
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2253
				Root MSE	=	.54511

trust	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
corruption	-.3147138	.0154308	-20.40	0.000	-.3449832	-.2844443
_cons	1.980443	.0349007	56.75	0.000	1.911981	2.048906

v) 2014 Regression of Political Trust and Perception of Corruption Used for table VII.

. reg trust corruption

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,142
Model	88.1248304	1	88.1248304	F(1, 1140)	=	278.56
Residual	360.645146	1,140	.316355391	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	448.769976	1,141	.393312862	R-squared	=	0.1964
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1957
				Root MSE	=	.56245

trust	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
corruption	-.3020635	.0180983	-16.69	0.000	-.3375731	-.2665538
_cons	1.763118	.0434856	40.54	0.000	1.677797	1.848439

w) 2004 Regression of Formal Participation and Perception of Corruption Used for table VIII.

`. reg formalP corruption`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,420
Model	16.8181482	1	16.8181482	F(1, 1418)	=	20.38
Residual	1169.91514	1,418	.825045941	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	1186.73329	1,419	.836316627	R-squared	=	0.0142
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0135
				Root MSE	=	.90832

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
corruption	-.1161316	.0257217	-4.51	0.000	-.1665884 -.0656749
_cons	1.772701	.0581921	30.46	0.000	1.658549 1.886853

x) 2014 Regression of Formal Participation and Perception of Corruption. Used for table VIII.

`. reg formalP corruption`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,083
Model	8.24480548	1	8.24480548	F(1, 1081)	=	11.13
Residual	801.132472	1,081	.741103119	Prob > F	=	0.0009
Total	809.377277	1,082	.748038149	R-squared	=	0.0102
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0093
				Root MSE	=	.86087

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
corruption	-.0949217	.0284587	-3.34	0.001	-.1507622 -.0390812
_cons	1.728087	.0688836	25.09	0.000	1.592926 1.863248

y) 2004 Regression of Informal Participation and Perception of Corruption. Used for table VIII.

`. reg informalP corruption`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,418
Model	3.24142483	1	3.24142483	F(1, 1416)	=	3.45
Residual	1329.42411	1,416	.938858832	Prob > F	=	0.0634
Total	1332.66553	1,417	.94048379	R-squared	=	0.0024
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0017
				Root MSE	=	.96895

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
corruption	-.0512996	.0276087	-1.86	0.063	-.1054579 .0028588
_cons	1.889859	.0622983	30.34	0.000	1.767652 2.012066

z) 2014 Regression of Informal Participation and Perception of Corruption. Used for table VIII.

`. reg informalP corruption`

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,118
Model	.950139396	1	.950139396	F(1, 1116)	=	0.98
Residual	1080.11092	1,116	.96784133	Prob > F	=	0.3220
Total	1081.06106	1,117	.967825482	R-squared	=	0.0009
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0000
				Root MSE	=	.98379

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
corruption	-.0317331	.0320274	-0.99	0.322	-.0945738 .0311075
_cons	1.832013	.0770286	23.78	0.000	1.680876 1.98315

aa) 2004 Regression of formal participation and political trust. Used for table IX.

. reg formalP trust

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,443
Model	61.6235555	1	61.6235555	F(1, 1441)	=	76.86
Residual	1155.30649	1,441	.801739411	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0506
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0500
Total	1216.93005	1,442	.843918201	Root MSE	=	.8954

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
trust	.3331168	.0379962	8.77	0.000	.2585831 .4076506
_cons	1.074093	.0558886	19.22	0.000	.9644617 1.183725

bb) 2014 Regression of formal participation and political trust. Used for table IX

. reg formalP trust

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,099
Model	12.8978861	1	12.8978861	F(1, 1097)	=	17.45
Residual	810.670038	1,097	.738988184	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0157
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0148
Total	823.567924	1,098	.750061862	Root MSE	=	.85964

formalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
trust	.171205	.0409804	4.18	0.000	.0907962 .2516138
_cons	1.304556	.0518141	25.18	0.000	1.20289 1.406222

cc) 2004 Regression of informal participation and political trust. Used for table IX.

. reg informalP trust

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,441
Model	36.7901673	1	36.7901673	F(1, 1439)	=	39.86
Residual	1328.30741	1,439	.92307673	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.0270
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0263
Total	1365.09758	1,440	.947984432	Root MSE	=	.96077

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
trust	.2578957	.0408505	6.31	0.000	.1777628 .3380286
_cons	1.429378	.0601034	23.78	0.000	1.311478 1.547277

dd)2014 Regression of informal participation and political trust. Used for table IX

. reg informalP trust

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,141
Model	.574823744	1	.574823744	F(1, 1139)	=	0.59
Residual	1106.96286	1,139	.97187257	Prob > F	=	0.4420
				R-squared	=	0.0005
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0004
Total	1107.53768	1,140	.971524282	Root MSE	=	.98584

informalP	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
trust	.0357603	.0464985	0.77	0.442	-.0554719 .1269926
_cons	1.693556	.0589917	28.71	0.000	1.577811 1.8093