

STRATEGICALLY SIMPLE MECHANISMS

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ABSTRACT. We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents’ preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents’ rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.

KEYWORDS: Mechanism design, strategic simplicity, first-order belief, local dictatorship, voting, bilateral trade.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In mechanism design it seems useful to distinguish mechanisms in which agents face a straightforward choice problem from mechanisms that require agents to engage in complex thinking if they want to determine their optimal choices. In some cases, the mechanism designer might prefer a mechanism of the former type. There are several conceivable reasons for such a preference. For example, the mechanism designer might not be able to predict the behavior of agents who are not capable of complex thinking. Or the mechanism designer might find it desirable that the outcomes of a mechanism don't depend much on the cognitive abilities of the agents. Of course, one can also imagine settings in which the mechanism designer prefers mechanisms that make it hard for agents to find an optimal strategy.

In this paper, we introduce a property of mechanisms that is intended to capture the idea that strategic choices are simple in a particular way: agents don't need to have much strategic sophistication to determine their optimal strategies. Here we mean by "strategic sophistication" the ability to reason about the other agents' preferences, the other agents' beliefs, their beliefs about beliefs, etc. That forming higher-order beliefs is difficult seems plausible from everyday experience, and there is also some recent experimental evidence that points into this direction; see, for example, Alaoui and Penta [1].

There are, of course, many other dimensions to simplicity. For example, the sheer size of the strategy space and the complexity of the mapping that assigns outcomes to strategy combinations may make a mechanism difficult to understand. One may also consider the computational complexity of finding optimal strategies. In settings in which the agents interact repeatedly, one may consider how easy it is for the agents to learn through repeated play.¹ The purpose of this paper is to isolate just one dimension of simplicity, and to consider one possible formalization of this dimension.

One class of mechanisms which require little strategic sophistication is the class of dominant strategy mechanisms.² In dominant strategy mechanisms, agents need not think at all about the motives of the other agents, or the other agents' rationality.

¹Mathevet [22] introduces an approach to construct supermodular mechanisms. Supermodular mechanisms are desirable in settings in which the agents interact repeatedly and in settings in which learning and adjusting are important.

²A dominant strategy mechanism is a mechanism in which each agent has a dominant strategy regardless of her preference. We use the phrase "dominant strategy" in the sense in which it is used in mechanism design theory, that is, a strategy that is optimal regardless of what the other agents do. This is slightly different from "weakly dominant" or "strictly dominant" strategies as these

This is because each agent has at least one strategy that is optimal regardless of what the other agents do, and she can just choose such a strategy.

For many mechanism design problems, the class of dominant strategy mechanisms is quite small, and only includes mechanisms that are rather unattractive for a mechanism designer who wants to maximize, say, revenue, or welfare.³ We therefore introduce in this paper a new class of mechanisms that includes, but is strictly larger than, the set of dominant strategy mechanisms. We call the mechanisms in this class “strategically simple.” We argue that for mechanisms in this new class the strategic sophistication needed to find optimal strategies is quite limited. Our results show that in applications the set of strategically simple mechanisms includes mechanisms that are more attractive to a mechanism designer concerned with fairness, efficiency, or revenue, than dominant strategy mechanisms.

The following example illustrates our idea. Consider the well-known problem of designing a mechanism that allows a seller of an indivisible object to trade with one potential buyer. Both agents have quasi-linear preferences. It is known from Hagerty and Rogerson [18] that the only dominant strategy mechanisms that satisfy ex post budget balance and individual rationality are posted price mechanisms. In a posted price mechanism, the designer chooses a (possibly random) price, without taking into account any of the agents’ private information. The outcome depends on agents’ private information only through their decision to trade, or not to trade, at the price proposed by the mechanism designer. Trade comes about only when both agents agree. Obviously, this is a rather unappealing mechanism for a welfare maximizing mechanism designer.

Now consider an alternative mechanism that we call “price cap mechanism.” The mechanism designer sets a price cap. The seller can refuse to trade, or choose a price less than or equal to the mechanism designer’s price cap, and indicate that he is willing to trade at this price, or at a lower price. If the seller is willing to trade, then the buyer can decide whether or not to trade at the price chosen by the seller. Trade takes only place if both agents agree to trade.

Whether or not to reduce the price, and how far to reduce the price, depends on the seller’s belief about the buyer’s willingness to pay. But, regardless of her belief, the seller will never reduce the price below her reservation value, and the buyer will

terms are defined in game theory. Dominant strategy mechanisms are also called “strategy-proof” mechanisms in the literature.

³See the examples in Chapter 4 of Börgers [7].

never agree to trade if the potentially reduced price is above his willingness to pay. In comparison to the posted price mechanism, this mechanism facilitates more efficient trade.⁴

In the price cap mechanism, the buyer faces a straightforward choice problem. The buyer agrees to trade if and only if his willingness to pay is weakly higher than the price offered. The seller's problem is arguably not too complicated either. If she believes that the buyer accepts the trade if and only if his willingness to pay is weakly higher than the price offered, then all that she needs to do is to consider her belief about the buyer's willingness to pay. This problem is equivalent to the standard monopoly problem with a price ceiling, as taught in undergraduate microeconomics. For any belief that the seller might have, it is a straightforward optimization problem. Our formal definition of strategic simplicity will imply that the price cap mechanism is strategically simple.

On the other hand, the double auction described in Chatterjee and Samuelson [10] is, in our terminology, not strategically simple. To see why, note that in the double auction, the seller has to form her belief about the price that the buyer offers. Ideally, she would like to ask for a price that is as close as possible to, but not above the price that is offered by the buyer, provided that this price is above her reservation value. But to form her belief about the price that the buyer offers, presumably the seller first has to form her belief about the buyer's belief about the seller's reservation value. Similarly, the buyer has to form his belief about the seller's belief about the buyer's willingness to pay. Potentially, infinitely many layers of such beliefs matter. Mechanisms that require of agents this level of depth of thinking will, in our terminology, not be strategically simple.

Motivated by this example, we define in this paper a mechanism to be strategically simple if optimal choices can be determined using first-order beliefs alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. Here, we are referring to beliefs about the other agents' utility functions and rationality. Thus, a "first-order belief" of agent i is agent i 's belief about the other agents' ($j \neq i$) utility functions, and about the other agents' rationality. "Higher-order beliefs" are, for example, agent i 's belief about agent j 's belief about agent i 's utility function, and about agent j 's belief about agent i 's rationality. We shall call a mechanism strategically simple if for each agent i , her

⁴This mechanism was discussed in Börgers and Smith [9].

belief about the other agents' ($j \neq i$) utility functions, combined with certainty that the other agents are rational, imply which choices are optimal for agent i .⁵

Our definition of strategic simplicity allows for the possibility that only some subset of all utility functions and some subset of all first-order beliefs are considered relevant for the determination whether or not a mechanism is strategically simple. Our main result shows that, under a “richness” condition on the domain of relevant utility functions and first-order beliefs, strategic simplicity is equivalent to a “local dictatorship” property. The richness condition will be formally defined later, but we emphasize that it is much weaker than the requirement that all possible utility functions and all possible first-order beliefs are in the domain. In contrast with (classical) dictatorship, local dictatorship means, roughly speaking, that there is some agent who dictates the outcome if we restrict attention for every agent to a certain subset of her strategy set. The identity of the dictator may depend on the subsets that we consider. Every dictatorship mechanism is a local dictatorship mechanism, but there are many more local dictatorship mechanisms than dictatorship mechanisms, including mechanisms that are far from what in everyday language is called a “dictatorship.” For example, a voting mechanism in which one agent selects two alternatives from a larger set of several alternatives, and the other agents then vote over those two alternatives using majority voting, is in our language a local dictatorship.

Our characterization result suggests a natural division of strategically simple mechanisms into two categories: mechanisms in which there is some agent who is a local dictator at all restrictions that we consider, and mechanisms in which this is not the case. We shall call the former “type 1 strategically simple mechanisms,” and the latter “type 2 strategically simple mechanisms.” Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms are easy to characterize. One can think of type 1 strategically simple mechanisms as “delegation mechanisms:” the mechanism designer delegates the choice of the mechanism to a “delegate,” who chooses a mechanism from a given set of dominant strategy mechanisms that the designer has specified. Then the other agents play this dominant strategy mechanism. The delegate’s choice will depend on her first-order belief, while the other agents’ choices don’t require any belief formation. Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms include, as a subclass, all dominant strategy mechanisms. The price cap mechanism presented above is also a type 1 strategically simple mechanism.

⁵It is, of course, somewhat arbitrary to restrict attention to mechanisms for which only first-order beliefs matter. We might instead allow first- and second-order beliefs to matter, for example. We discuss such variations in Section 7.

Type 2 strategically simple mechanisms are harder to characterize in general. Instead of attempting such a general characterization in this paper, we shall analyze type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in two applications. For these applications we will be able to characterize not only type 1 but also, under some assumptions, type 2 strategically simple mechanisms.

The first application that we study is the bilateral trade problem. We show that the type 1 strategically simple mechanisms are those in which one agent proposes terms of trade, and the other agent accepts or rejects. We then show that there are no type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment. Thus, we fully characterize strategically simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment.

The second application that we study is the voting problem. In the voting environment, the class of strategically simple mechanisms is much larger than the class of dominant strategy mechanisms. By the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite [16, 25] Theorem, in the voting environment as we define it here, a mechanism has dominant strategies if and only if it is dictatorial. There are many more strategically simple voting mechanisms. In this paper, we characterize type 1 strategically simple voting mechanisms and we characterize type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms when there are two agents and three alternatives. For this special case we show that there is a type 2 strategically simple mechanism that is anonymous, that is, that treats both voters equally. By contrast, no type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and, in particular, no dominant strategy mechanism, is anonymous in this setting.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the formal definition of strategic simplicity. Section 3 presents general characterizations of strategically simple mechanisms under a richness condition on the domain of utility functions and beliefs. Sections 4 and 5 consider strategically simple mechanisms in two applications, the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem. Section 6 reviews the related literature. Section 7 is a discussion of open questions.

2. DEFINITIONS

There are n agents: $i \in I = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and a finite set A of outcomes. A mechanism consists of a finite strategy set S_i for each agent i , and an outcome function $g : \times_{i \in I} S_i \rightarrow A$ that describes for each choice of strategies which outcome will result. We define $S \equiv \times_{i \in I} S_i$ with generic element s , and, for every $i \in I$, we define $S_{-i} \equiv \times_{j \neq i} S_j$ with generic element s_{-i} . We assume that there are no duplicate

strategies: for every $i \in I$, for all $s_i, s'_i \in S_i$ with $s_i \neq s'_i$, there is some $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) \neq g(s'_i, s_{-i})$.

A von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function of agent i is a function $u_i : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. We define \mathcal{U} to be the set of all utility functions such that: $u_i(a) \neq u_i(a')$ whenever $a \neq a'$, $\min_{a \in A} u_i(a) = 0$, and $\max_{a \in A} u_i(a) = 1$. Thus we rule out indifferences and normalize utility. This simplifies arguments below. We write $u \equiv (u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$ and $u_{-i} \equiv (u_j)_{j \neq i}$.

For every agent i , there is a non-empty and Borel-measurable set $\mathbf{U}_i \subseteq \mathcal{U}$ of utility functions that are possible utility functions of agent i . We allow for the possibility that $\mathbf{U}_i \neq \mathcal{U}$ to be able to capture assumptions such as the assumption that agents' utility functions are monotonically increasing in money. We define $\mathbf{U} \equiv \times_{i \in I} \mathbf{U}_i$, and, for every $i \in I$, we define $\mathbf{U}_{-i} \equiv \times_{j \neq i} \mathbf{U}_j$.

For a given mechanism, for every i and every $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$, we denote by $UD_i(u_i)$ the set of all strategies that are not weakly dominated for agent i with utility function u_i , where weak dominance may be by a pure or by a mixed strategy. If $u \in \mathbf{U}$, we define $UD(u) \equiv \times_{i \in I} UD_i(u_i)$. For every $i \in I$ and every $u_{-i} \in \mathbf{U}_{-i}$, we define $UD_{-i}(u_{-i}) \equiv \times_{j \neq i} UD_j(u_j)$. To avoid tedious detail, we assume that for every agent $i \in I$ and every strategy $s_i \in S_i$, there is at least some $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$ such that $s_i \in UD_i(u_i)$.

A “utility belief” μ_i of agent i is a Borel probability measure on \mathbf{U}_{-i} . We interpret μ_i as agent i 's “first-order” belief. Higher-order beliefs would be beliefs about other agents' beliefs about utility functions, etc. As indicated in the introduction, we want to focus on mechanisms in which higher-order beliefs play no role. Therefore, we don't formally define such beliefs here.

For any finite set (or Borel subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space) X , we shall denote by $\Delta(X)$ the set of all (Borel) probability measures on X . The set of all possible utility beliefs of agent i is some non-empty subset \mathbf{M}_i of $\Delta(\mathbf{U}_{-i})$. We allow for the possibility that $\mathbf{M}_i \neq \Delta(\mathbf{U}_{-i})$ to be able to capture assumptions such as the assumption that every agent believes that the other agents' utility functions are stochastically independent. We define $\mathbf{M} \equiv \times_{i \in I} \mathbf{M}_i$, and, for every $i \in I$, we define $\mathbf{M}_{-i} \equiv \times_{j \neq i} \mathbf{M}_j$, and we denote typical elements of these sets by μ and μ_{-i} respectively.

A “strategic belief” $\hat{\mu}_i$ of agent i is a probability measure on S_{-i} : $\hat{\mu}_i \in \Delta(S_{-i})$. Strategic beliefs are needed for agents to determine expected utility maximizing strategies. The next definition will describe how agents may derive a strategic belief

from a utility belief. We assume that agents are certain that the other agents do not play weakly dominated strategies. Then, loosely speaking, a strategic belief can be obtained from a given utility belief by dividing the probability assigned to any utility function u_j ($j \neq i$) in some arbitrary way among the not weakly dominated strategies of agent j with utility function u_j . We call a strategic belief that can be derived in this way from a utility belief “compatible with the utility belief.” Obviously, for a given utility belief, there may be many compatible strategic beliefs. We formally define the compatibility of strategic beliefs with utility beliefs as follows:

Definition 1. A strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$ is *compatible with a utility belief* μ_i if there is a probability measure ν_i on $S_{-i} \times \mathbf{U}_{-i}$ that has support in

$$\times_{j \neq i} \{(s_j, u_j) \in S_j \times \mathbf{U}_j | s_j \in UD_j(u_j)\}$$

and that has marginals $\hat{\mu}_i$ on S_{-i} and μ_i on \mathbf{U}_{-i} .

In this definition, ν_i is agent i 's joint belief about strategies and utility functions of the other agents. Agent i 's certainty that the other agents don't play weakly dominated strategies is captured by the support restriction in Definition 1. The belief ν_i must also reflect the given utility belief μ_i of agent i , that is, ν_i 's marginal on \mathbf{U}_{-i} must be μ_i . The marginal on S_{-i} is then a compatible strategic belief. We denote the set of all strategic beliefs that are compatible with a given utility belief μ_i by $\mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)$.

Given a utility function $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$ and a strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i \in \Delta(S_{-i})$ of agent i , we denote by $BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$ the set of all strategies in $UD_i(u_i)$ that maximize expected utility in S_i .

We are now ready to provide the key definition of this paper.

Definition 2. A mechanism is *strategically simple* with respect to \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{M} ⁶ if for every agent i , every utility function $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$, and every utility belief $\mu_i \in \mathbf{M}_i$,

$$\bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i) \neq \emptyset.$$

What we require here for every agent i , every utility function u_i of agent i , and every utility belief μ_i of agent i , is that agent i has at least one strategy that maximizes expected utility regardless of which compatible strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$ agent i picks. Thus,

⁶Whether a given mechanism is strategically simple or not depends on the domain of utility function \mathbf{U} and the domain of first-order beliefs \mathbf{M} that we study. For simplicity, we sometimes drop the quantifier “with respect to \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{M} ” when there is no confusion.

there is no need for agent i to try to distinguish more plausible from less plausible compatible strategic beliefs. If that was necessary, it may be helpful for agent i to form higher-order beliefs. But if a mechanism is strategically simple, there is no benefit to agent i from forming higher-order beliefs.

Remark 1. *If agent i with utility function u_i has a weakly dominant strategy, then this strategy is included in $BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$ regardless of what $\hat{\mu}_i$ is, and the intersection referred to in Definition 2 is non-empty because it includes the dominant strategy. Dominant strategy mechanisms, in which all agents for all utility functions have dominant strategies, are therefore trivially “strategically simple.”*

Remark 2. *In the definition of compatible strategic beliefs (Definition 1), we allow agents to incorporate correlations into their beliefs about the other agents’ strategies that go beyond the correlations implied by correlations in utility beliefs and the requirement that not weakly dominated strategies are played. As is well known, without allowing for arbitrary correlations in strategic beliefs, the equivalence between not dominated strategies and expected utility maximizing strategies need not hold. This equivalence is invoked in our proofs. We have not pursued how our analysis would change if we did not allow such correlations.*

Remark 3. *One might conjecture that our definition of strategic simplicity of a mechanism is equivalent to the requirement that the mechanism, appropriately transformed into an incomplete information game, is dominance solvable in two steps, where the first step eliminates weakly dominated strategies and the second step eliminates strictly dominated strategies. A statement very similar to this is indeed true, except that we do not require that after two steps of the elimination procedure for every type⁷ a single strategy is left over, but rather, that every type has at least one strategy that is optimal for every strategic belief about the other types’ remaining strategies. This perspective on our definition facilitates comparison with the requirement that every type have a dominant strategy, because that just means that the elimination of dominated strategies stops after one step. Nonetheless, we have found the definition used in this paper in terms of first-order beliefs expresses more directly the intuitive idea on which this paper is based.*

Often a mechanism designer’s interest is not in the mechanism itself, but in the outcomes that result when agents pick their strategies rationally. For strategically simple mechanisms, which strategy maximizes expected utility will depend not only on an agent’s utility function, but also on this agent’s utility belief. It is therefore

⁷Here, a “type” must be interpreted as a pair consisting of a utility function and a utility belief.

natural to focus on correspondences that map utility functions and utility beliefs into sets of outcomes. We call such correspondences “outcome correspondences.”

Definition 3. The *outcome correspondence* associated with a mechanism that is strategically simple with respect to \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{M} is the correspondence:

$$F : \mathbf{U} \times \mathbf{M} \rightarrow A$$

defined by:

$$F(u, \mu) \equiv g \left(\times_{i \in I} \left(\bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i) \right) \right) \text{ for all } (u, \mu) \in \mathbf{U} \times \mathbf{M}.$$

The following definition will be useful:

Definition 4. Two strategically simple mechanisms are *equivalent* if the outcome correspondences associated with these two mechanisms are the same.

The literature already contains the concept of a “social choice correspondence.” Social choice correspondences are similar to “outcome correspondences,” except that their domain consists of profiles of utility functions (or preferences) only, and does not include profiles of first-order beliefs. Focusing on utility functions in the domain seems natural if one gives the correspondence a normative interpretation, as a reflection of the outcomes that the mechanism designer regards desirable. Here, however, we give our correspondence a positive interpretation: it is a description of the end result of a given mechanism. By including the first-order beliefs in the domain, we give a more detailed description of the consequences resulting from rational choice in a given mechanism than we would obtain if only preference profiles were in the domain.

Our definition of outcome correspondences assumes that for any given utility function u_i and utility belief μ_i agent i will only choose strategies from the set

$$\bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i).$$

This implies that an agent i will not choose a strategy if it is a best response to only some strategic beliefs compatible with the agent’s given utility belief, but not to all compatible strategic beliefs. This assumption is in the spirit of our basic hypothesis that agents find it costly to refine their strategic beliefs, beyond making it compatible with their utility belief, and will avoid doing so if they can.

One can interpret singleton-valued outcome correspondences as direct mechanisms in which agents report their utility functions and their utility beliefs. Using this interpretation, one can then ask whether a revelation principle holds, i.e.: If a singleton-valued outcome correspondence is implemented by a strategically simple mechanism, is then the direct mechanism defined by the outcome correspondence itself a strategically simple mechanism, and is truth telling an optimal strategy for all utility functions and first-order beliefs, regardless of higher-order beliefs, in this mechanism? Unfortunately, a technical problem that we encounter when asking this question is that we have defined strategically simple mechanisms only for the case that a mechanism has a finite strategy set for each agent, whereas we have allowed the sets of pairs of utility functions and beliefs to be infinite, and thus the direct mechanism may have infinite strategy sets. This problem is bypassed if attention is restricted to the case of finite $\mathbf{U} \times \mathbf{M}$. In this case, one can then verify that the revelation principle as described above holds. Some of our analysis below is specifically about the case of infinite $\mathbf{U} \times \mathbf{M}$ and finite mechanisms, and therefore the revelation principle will not play an important role in our analysis, in contrast to the conventional theory of mechanism design.

The formal framework developed in this section suggests two possible focuses for our analysis: the characterization of strategically simple mechanisms and the characterization of outcome correspondences that are associated with strategically simple mechanisms. We find it convenient to focus on mechanisms themselves. But we shall explain some of the implications of our results for outcome correspondences.

3. CHARACTERIZATION

We now provide a characterization result for strategically simple mechanisms under a richness assumption regarding the sets of relevant utility functions and first-order beliefs. We denote by \mathcal{R} the set of all reflexive, complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric preference relations over the set of alternatives A . A generic element of \mathcal{R} will be denoted by R_i , where the index refers to agent i , and we denote by P_i the asymmetric part of R_i . Every utility function $u_i \in \mathcal{U}$ induces a preference relation in the following way: $aR_ib \Leftrightarrow u_i(a) \geq u_i(b)$ and $aP_ib \Leftrightarrow u_i(a) > u_i(b)$. We denote by $\mathcal{U}(R_i)$ the set of all utility functions in \mathcal{U} that induce R_i .

Next, we extend the notion of weak dominance to the case that only pure strategy dominance is considered. In this case, only the preference R_i induced by agent i 's utility function u_i matters.

Definition 5. Let $R_i \in \mathcal{R}$. A strategy $s_i \in S_i$ is *weakly dominated given R_i* if there is another strategy $\hat{s}_i \in S_i$ such that

$$g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}) R_i g(s_i, s_{-i})$$

for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ and

$$g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}) P_i g(s_i, s_{-i})$$

for some $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$.

For any $R_i \in \mathcal{R}$, we denote by $UD_i(R_i) \subseteq S_i$ the set of strategies of agent i that are not weakly dominated given R_i . For any $R = (R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n) \in \mathcal{R}^n$, we define $UD_{-i}(R_{-i}) \equiv \times_{j \neq i} UD_j(R_j)$ for every $i \in I$.

Theorem 1. *Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set $\mathcal{R}_i \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ such that $U_i = \bigcup_{R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i} \mathcal{U}(R_i)$, and suppose $\mathbf{M}_i = \Delta(\mathbf{U}_{-i})$ for all $i \in I$. Then a mechanism is strategically simple with respect to \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{M} if and only if for every $R \in \times_{i \in I} \mathcal{R}_i$ there is an agent $i^* \in I$ such that for every strategy $s_{i^*} \in UD_{i^*}(R_{i^*})$ there is an alternative $a \in A$ such that:*

$$g(s_{i^*}, s_{-i^*}) = a \text{ for all } s_{-i^*} \in UD_{-i^*}(R_{-i^*}).$$

In words, the condition that is necessary and sufficient for strategically simple mechanisms says the following. Whenever we fix a vector of preferences $(R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n) \in \times_{i \in I} \mathcal{R}_i$ and consider the mechanism restricted to the strategy sets $UD_i(R_i)$ for all $i \in I$, then, in the restricted mechanism, some agent i^* is a dictator. That is, for each of the alternatives that are possible when agents choose their strategies from $UD_i(R_i)$, agent i^* has a strategy that enforces that alternative if all other agents choose from $UD_i(R_i)$, and each of agent i^* 's strategies enforces some alternative. We call agent i^* a ‘‘local dictator,’’ because in the restricted game agent i^* dictates which alternative is chosen.

The theorem applies only to certain domains of utility functions and beliefs. Specifically, the theorem assumes that for each agent the set of relevant utility functions is the set of all utility functions that induce some preference from a given set of preferences, and that for each agent the relevant beliefs are all beliefs that have support in the set of considered utility functions. We thus allow restricted domains of strategic simplicity, but domains that still satisfy strong ‘‘richness’’ conditions. In some settings, such as voting settings, these assumptions may be plausible, whereas in other settings, they may be less desirable. For example, when the allocation of money is part of the specification of alternatives, our assumption on the set of utility functions rules out that only risk neutral agents are considered, even though that is a popular

case in the mechanism design literature. The assumption on the set of relevant beliefs rules out that each agent regards the other agents' preferences as stochastically independent. Our proof of Theorem 1 makes strong use of these assumptions, and we have not yet found useful results for smaller domains.

Theorem 1 characterizes strategically simple mechanisms in terms of the local dictatorship property. The local dictatorship property is useful in several aspects. First, it provides a powerful tool to check whether a given mechanism is strategically simple. Second, the local dictatorship property can be used to establish several further properties of strategically simple mechanisms. These properties are contained in Appendix C. Third, we use the local dictatorship property to further study strategically simple mechanisms in two applications. In the bilateral trade environment that we study in Section 4, we fully characterize the class of all strategically simple mechanisms. In the voting environment that we study in Section 5, we fully characterize the class of all strategically simple mechanisms when there are two agents and three alternatives. All these results build on the local dictatorship property that we established in Theorem 1.

Furthermore, the local dictatorship property implies that certain outcome correspondences cannot be associated with any strategically simple mechanism. Loosely speaking, the set of alternatives can depend on at most one agent's vNM utilities and utility beliefs when we hold a preference profile R fixed. We formalize this property in the following definition. We say that a profile of utility functions u_{-i} induces a profile of preference relations R_{-i} if for every $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$, u_j induces R_j , and that a profile of utility functions u induces a profile of preference relations R if for every $i \in I$, u_i induces R_i .

Definition 6. Let $i \in I$ and $R \in \mathcal{R}^n$. An outcome correspondence $F : \mathbf{U} \times \mathbf{M} \rightarrow A$ is *non-responsive to the vNM utilities and utility beliefs of agents $j \neq i$ at R* if, whenever $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$ induces R_i , $u_{-i}, \hat{u}_{-i} \in \mathbf{U}_{-i}$ both induce R_{-i} , $\mu_i \in \mathbf{M}_i$, and $\mu_{-i}, \hat{\mu}_{-i} \in \mathbf{M}_{-i}$, then:

$$F((u_i, u_{-i}), (\mu_i, \mu_{-i})) = F((u_i, \hat{u}_{-i}), (\mu_i, \hat{\mu}_{-i})).$$

In words, the outcome correspondence is non-responsive to agents $j \neq i$ at R if, as long as agents' utility functions represent the preferences in R , then the von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions and beliefs of agents $j \neq i$ have no impact on the set of outcomes. The following result follows directly from Theorem 1. We don't give a formal proof.

Corollary 1. *Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set $\mathcal{R}_i \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ such that $\mathbf{U}_i = \bigcup_{R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i} \mathcal{U}(R_i)$, and suppose $\mathbf{M}_i = \Delta(\mathbf{U}_{-i})$ for all $i \in I$. If an outcome correspondence $F : \mathbf{U} \times \mathbf{M} \rightarrow A$ can be associated with a mechanism that is strategically simple, then for every preference profile $R \in \mathcal{R}^n$ there is some agent i^* such that the correspondence F is non-responsive to the vNM utilities and utility beliefs of agents $j \neq i^*$ at R .*

Agent i^* in this corollary is obviously the local dictator at R . This corollary implies, for example, that it is typically impossible to find a strategically simple mechanism that on its whole domain implements alternatives that maximize ex post utilitarian welfare, that is, the sum of agents' utilities.

We now partition the set of all strategically simple mechanisms on domains that satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1 into two subsets. This provides a further understanding of strategically simple mechanisms. If the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold, then, for any $R \in \mathcal{R}_1 \times \mathcal{R}_2 \times \dots \times \mathcal{R}_n$, we denote by $I^*(R)$ the set of local dictators at R .

Definition 7. Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set $\mathcal{R}_i \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ such that $\mathbf{U}_i = \bigcup_{R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i} \mathcal{U}(R_i)$, and suppose $\mathbf{M}_i = \Delta(\mathbf{U}_{-i})$ for all $i \in I$. Then a strategically simple mechanism with respect to \mathbf{U} and \mathbf{M} is of *type 1* if:

$$\bigcap_{R \in \times_{i \in I} \mathcal{R}_i} I^*(R) \neq \emptyset.$$

Otherwise, it is of *type 2*.

In words, in a type 1 strategically simple mechanism, there is an agent who is local dictator at *all* preference profiles, whereas this is not the case for type 2 strategically simple mechanisms.

Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms can be easily characterized. To state this characterization, we first introduce a class of mechanisms that we call “delegation mechanisms.”

Definition 8. A mechanism is a *delegation mechanism* if it is the reduced normal form of an extensive form mechanism of the following type: First, some agent $i^* \in I$ chooses an element s_{i^*} from some finite set S_{i^*} . All agents observe s_{i^*} . Then, for every s_{i^*} , a subgame with simultaneous moves follows in which the players are the agents in $I \setminus \{i^*\}$, and in which a dominant strategy mechanism with outcomes in A is played, where the mechanism may depend on s_{i^*} .

In a delegation mechanism, the mechanism designer delegates the choice of the mechanism to some agent i^* . This agent has to choose a mechanism from a given set of dominant strategy mechanisms that the mechanism designer has specified. Clearly, in a delegation mechanism, all agents except i^* have dominant strategies, and therefore do not even have to form first-order beliefs, and for agent i^* therefore only first-order belief is relevant to the optimal choice. It is worth noting that dominant strategy mechanisms, in which all agents, for all relevant utility functions, have dominant strategies, are trivially delegation mechanisms.

Theorem 2. *Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set $\mathcal{R}_i \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ such that $U_i = \bigcup_{R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i} \mathcal{U}(R_i)$, and suppose $\mathbf{M}_i = \Delta(U_{-i})$ for all $i \in I$.*

- (1) *Every delegation mechanism is a type 1 strategically simple mechanism.*
- (2) *For every type 1 strategically simple mechanism, there is an equivalent delegation mechanism.*

We do not have a characterization result for type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in the general framework, but we do have results about type 2 strategically simple mechanisms for the two applications that we consider in the next two sections. For the bilateral trade problem we show in Section 4 that no strategically simple mechanisms of type 2 exist. For the voting problem, we characterize in Section 5 all type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in the case that there are 2 agents and 3 alternatives.

4. BILATERAL TRADE

We first consider an example of an environment in which outcomes include money payments, and in which it is therefore natural to restrict attention to preferences that are monotonically increasing in money, and to beliefs that attach probability 1 to preferences that are monotonically increasing in money. The set of agents is: $I = \{S, B\}$, where S is the seller, and B is the buyer. The set of outcomes is: $A = \{\phi\} \cup T$, where “ ϕ ” stands for “no trade,” and T is a finite subset of \mathbb{R}_{++} . An outcome $t \in T$ corresponds to trade at price t . We require trade to be voluntary. We refer to any mechanism for this setting as a “bilateral trade mechanism” if each agent has a strategy that enforces the no trade outcome.

The preferences R_S over A that we consider for the seller are indexed by some value $v_S > 0$, and the preferences R_B over A that we consider for the buyer are indexed by some value $v_B > 0$. We assume that for $i = S, B$ the set of possible values of v_i is a finite subset V_i of \mathbb{R}_{++} such that $V_i \cap T = \emptyset$ for $i = S, B$, so that no agent is ever indifferent between trade and no trade. The preference with index v_S is such that

the seller prefers outcome ϕ to outcome t if and only if $t < v_S$, and the seller prefers larger elements of T to smaller ones. The preference with index v_B is such that the buyer prefers outcome ϕ to outcome t if and only if $t > v_B$, and the buyer prefers smaller elements of T to larger ones.

In the notation of Section 3, we have now specified the sets \mathcal{R}_i for $i = S, B$. The sets of admissible utility functions \mathbf{U}_i and admissible beliefs \mathbf{M}_i are as given in the first sentence of Theorem 1. Note that the model that we have described does not assume quasi-linear preferences. Rather, arbitrary risk attitudes are allowed.

Theorem 2 implies the following characterization of type 1 strategically simple bilateral trade mechanisms:

Proposition 1. *A bilateral trade mechanism is type 1 strategically simple if and only if it is equivalent to the normal form of a mechanism of the following type: Agents play a two-stage game of perfect information.*

1. *Agent i^* either chooses a price t from some finite set $\hat{T} \subseteq T$, or chooses to reject trade. If agent i^* rejects trade, then the game ends. No trade takes place, and no transfers are paid. Otherwise, Stage 2 is entered.*
2. *Agent $-i^*$ accepts or rejects trade at the price t proposed by agent i^* . If agent $-i^*$ accepts, then trade takes place, and the buyer pays the seller price t . Otherwise, no trade takes place, and no transfers are paid.*

To obtain the class of mechanisms described in Proposition 1, consider the following simple argument. When there are only two agents, the second-stage dominant strategy mechanisms as referred to in Theorem 2 are single agent mechanisms in which the agent $-i^*$ chooses among alternatives offered by agent i^* . Among the options offered that do include trade, the seller, if she is agent $-i^*$, will always pick trade at the highest price, and the buyer, if he is agent $-i^*$, will always pick trade at the lowest price. Therefore, offering trade at more than one price is redundant. Moreover, the mechanism that the seller offers must always include the no trade option.

Proposition 1 in fact provides a complete characterization of all bilateral trade mechanisms that are strategically simple, as the following result, which we prove in Appendix D, shows:

Proposition 2. *There are no bilateral trade mechanisms that are type 2 strategically simple.*

Strategically simple mechanisms are more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment. Hagerty and Rogerson [18] show that in the bilateral trade problem with quasi-linear preferences the only dominant strategy mechanisms that satisfy ex post budget balance and individual rationality are posted price mechanisms. This result extends to our setting with arbitrary risk attitudes.⁸ As discussed in the Introduction, for each posted price mechanism, there exists a corresponding type 1 strategically simple bilateral trade mechanism (the price cap mechanism) that facilitates more efficient trade.

5. VOTING

We now analyze strategically simple mechanisms in settings in which no restrictions are assumed regarding the agents' utilities or beliefs: $\mathbf{U}_i = \mathcal{U}$ and $\mathbf{M}_i = \Delta(\mathcal{U}^{n-1})$ for all $i \in I$. Note that this is the most demanding form of strategic simplicity. We call a mechanism that is strategically simple on this domain a “strategically simple voting mechanism,” because the unrestricted domain is a domain that has been considered in parts of the voting literature. The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [16, 25] shows that in the voting environment, a mechanism has dominant strategies if and only if it is dictatorial. As we shall see, there are many more strategically simple voting mechanisms.

The voting environment satisfies the domain assumptions in Section 3. Thus, Theorems 1 and 2 can be applied. We shall now distinguish type 1 and type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms. In a type 1 strategically simple voting mechanism, some agent i^* chooses a subset of the set A of alternatives and a dominant strategy mechanism for the other agents to pick one alternative from this set. In a second stage, the other agents then play this dominant strategy mechanism. The influence of the first agent on the ultimate outcome may be restricted by limiting the set of subsets of A and dominant strategy mechanisms she can choose from. If she can choose any arbitrary subset, then, of course, we have the classical dictatorship.

Standard results in voting theory provide characterizations of dominant strategy mechanisms that can be played in the second stage. If agent i^* rules out all but two alternatives, then a mechanism has dominant strategies if and only if it is a generalized

⁸This follows from two simple observations. First, there are more types in our setting than in the setting with quasi-linear preferences. Thus, the set of dominant-strategy mechanisms that satisfy ex post budget balance and individual rationality in our setting is a subset of the corresponding set with quasi-linear preferences. Second, posted price mechanisms are still dominant-strategy mechanisms and satisfy ex post budget balance and individual rationality in our setting.

form of majority voting (see Barberà [3, p. 759]). If agent i^* allows the other agents to pick from at least three alternatives, then it follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that only dictatorial mechanisms have dominant strategies. Thus, agent i^* , if she wants to allow at least three alternatives, has to pick one of the other agents, and needs to let this agent make the ultimate decision, where this agent is restricted to the set of alternatives chosen by agent i^* .

Type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms are harder to characterize. Here, we provide a characterization for the voting environment with two agents and three alternatives, but leave as an open question the full characterization for more general voting environments.⁹

Proposition 3. *Let $\#A = 3$ and $n = 2$. A voting mechanism is type 2 strategically simple if and only if it is one of the following two mechanisms (up to relabeling of the agents and the alternatives):*

	a	$b+$	$b-$	$c+$	$c-$
a	a	a	a	a	a
$b+$	a	b	b	a	b
$b-$	a	b	b	c	b
$c+$	a	a	c	c	c
$c-$	a	b	b	c	c

Mechanism A

	a	b	$c+$	$c-$
a	a	a	a	a
$b+$	a	b	a	b
$b-$	a	b	c	b
c	a	b	c	c

Mechanism B

That the mechanisms displayed in the proposition are strategically simple can easily be verified using Theorem 1. For each mechanism it is also straightforward to find a preference profile for which agent 1 is the unique local dictator, and a preference profile for which agent 2 is the unique local dictator, so that these two strategically simple mechanisms are of type 2.¹⁰

The proof that there are no other type 2 strategically simple mechanisms is given in the Supplemental Material (Börger and Li [8]). Here, we provide a brief discussion of this proof. The proof begins with a general observation: Under the conditions of Theorem 1, a strategically simple mechanism is type 2 strategically simple if and only if there are at least two agents each of whom has at least one preference for which

⁹We do not even know whether type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms exist when there are more than two agents or more than three alternatives.

¹⁰See also our discussion of voting incentives in the two mechanisms later in this section.

there are multiple undominated strategies. In the setting of Proposition 3 we show in addition that for any pair of such preferences, \hat{R}_1 and \hat{R}_2 , the set $g(UD_1(\hat{R}_1), UD_2(\hat{R}_2))$ may have one or two elements, but it is not possible that it has three elements.

There are then two cases to distinguish. The first is that for all pairs of such preferences the set $g(UD_1(\hat{R}_1), UD_2(\hat{R}_2))$ has only one element. The second is that for at least one pair of such preferences the set $g(UD_1(\hat{R}_1), UD_2(\hat{R}_2))$ has two elements. The proof in the Supplemental Material shows that in each of the two cases there is a unique type 2 strategically simple voting mechanism, up to relabeling: in the first case it is mechanism A, and in the second case it is mechanism B.

The proof also shows that for each agent, in each of the two cases listed in the previous paragraph, there is just one preference for which there are more than one undominated strategies. Note that this observation already implies that, in the second case, the unique type 2 strategically mechanism must be non-anonymous, i.e., it must give the two agents different roles, whereas it does not imply anything about the anonymity of the unique type 2 strategically mechanism in the first case. The unique strategically simple mechanism in the first case, mechanism A of Proposition 3, turns out to be anonymous, as a sequence of steps that gradually narrow down the set of possible mechanisms shows.

We now provide some discussions of the two mechanisms in Proposition 3.

Interpretation of Mechanism A: This mechanism has the following interpretation (which also motivates the labels that we have given to the strategies). Each agent has five strategies: a vote for a , a “strong vote” for b denoted by $b+$, a “weak vote” for b denoted by $b-$, and similarly a “strong vote” and a “weak vote” for c , denoted by $c+$ and $c-$ respectively. Alternative a is the default alternative. If at least one of the agents votes for the default, then the default is chosen. If both agents vote for b (resp. c), then b (resp. c) is chosen regardless of whether the votes are strong or weak. If one of the agents casts a strong vote for b , but the other agent only casts a weak vote for c , then b is chosen. Similarly, if one agent casts a strong vote for c , but the other agent only casts a weak vote for b , then c is chosen. If the agents cast weak votes for different alternatives, the disagreement is resolved in favor of b . If the agents cast strong votes for different alternatives, the mechanism reverts to the default a .

Voting Incentives in Mechanism A: Let us verify that this mechanism is strategically simple. Agents who rank a top have a dominant strategy to vote for a . Let us say that an agent i has a “weak preference for b over c ” if her preference is: $bR_i cR_i a$.

That is, she ranks the default a below both b and c . For such an agent, a weak vote for b is weakly dominant. Similarly, for an agent who has a “strong preference for b over c ,” i.e., $bR_i aR_i c$, a strong vote for b is weakly dominant.

Weak and strong preferences for c over b are analogously defined, and it is also clear that an agent with a strong preference for c over b has the weakly dominant strategy of voting strongly for c . The final case to consider is an agent who has a weak preference for c over b . Such an agent has two undominated strategies: a weak or a strong vote for c . Informally, such an agent potentially has an incentive to “overstate” the strength of her preference. The reason is as follows. A weak vote for c will inevitably lead to b if the other agent votes for b . If a strong vote for c is cast, then the outcome is a , which is worse than b , if the other agent casts a strong vote for b , and the outcome is c , which is better than b , if the other agent casts a weak vote for b . Which of these two cases is more important depends on the utility difference between c and b , and on the agent’s belief about the relative likelihood of the other agent having a weak or strong preference for b over c .

Notice that in no case higher-order beliefs matter for an agent’s choice. This is obvious if an agent has a weakly dominant choice. For agents with a weak preference for c over b , higher-order beliefs don’t matter because, whether the other agent casts a weak or strong vote for b does not depend on that agent’s first-order beliefs. Thus, the mechanism is strategically simple.

Normative Properties of Mechanism A: Why might a mechanism designer find mechanism A attractive? The most obvious attractive feature of mechanism A is that it is anonymous, that is, it treats the two agents equally. Anonymity is often regarded by itself as a desirable property of a voting mechanism. No type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and in particular no dominant strategy mechanism, is anonymous in the voting setting with 2 agents and 3 alternatives.¹¹

The mechanism may also appeal to a mechanism designer who maximizes expected welfare. To show this, we consider two welfare criteria: the sum of agents’ utilities (“utilitarian welfare”) and the minimum of agents’ utilities (“Rawlsian welfare”), and we consider the comparison between mechanism A and dictatorship. Under mechanism A, when both agents rank a in the middle, but rank different outcomes top, outcome a is chosen, and thus agents “compromise.” This yields higher Rawlsian

¹¹Our definition of a mechanism in Section 2 rules out randomization. If randomization is allowed, then randomization can be used to construct anonymous voting mechanisms.

welfare than dictatorship, and it might also yield higher utilitarian welfare than dictatorship, depending on the agents' vNM utilities of the compromise. When one agent ranks c top, and the other agent ranks c second behind b , then c is chosen, regardless of which agent ranks c top, whereas under dictatorship c is only chosen when the first agent is the dictator. If the second agent is the dictator, then mechanism A yields higher utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare.

On the other hand, mechanism A might also lead to a Pareto inefficiency. Pareto inefficiencies harm both utilitarian welfare and Rawlsian welfare, and they are not possible under dictatorship. A Pareto inefficiency occurs if one agent has a weak preference for c over b and the other agent has a strong preference for b over c . Agents may end up with a , although both prefer b to a . This happens if the agent with a weak preference for c over b exaggerates the strength of her preference and casts a strong vote for c . But she will do so only if the utility from b is close to zero, and therefore the loss from getting a rather than b is “small.”

To compare mechanism A and dictatorship, the designer might adopt an ex ante perspective and calculate the expected welfare if she has a prior over all utility functions and all first-order beliefs. It is clear from the analysis in the previous two paragraphs that depending on which prior the designer uses, she may prefer one mechanism or the other. For concreteness, let us consider the uniform prior over all utility functions and all first-order beliefs.¹² Under the uniform distribution over all utility functions and all first-order beliefs, mechanism A achieves higher expected welfare than the dictatorial mechanism under both welfare criteria, as one can check numerically.

Mechanism B: To save space we keep this discussion shorter than the discussion of mechanism A. Mechanism B is similar to mechanism A, but it is not anonymous. In mechanism B, only agent 1 (the row player) can differentiate between a weak or a strong vote for b , and only agent 2 (the column player) can differentiate between

¹²The uniform distribution over utility functions is constructed by first picking one of the six possible linear orders of three alternatives, where each order has probability $1/6$, and then picking a number x between 0 and 1 from the uniform distribution, assigning utility x to the middle alternative, and utilities 1 (resp. 0) to the top (resp. bottom) alternative. As the discussion of voting incentives in mechanism A has shown, the only aspect of agents' first-order beliefs that matters for their choices is the relative likelihood of the other agent having a weak or strong preference for b over c . We take the “uniform distribution over first-order beliefs” to be the distribution where this likelihood is the ratio of two numbers both independently and uniformly drawn from the interval from 0 to 1. Finally, utilities and beliefs are drawn independently.

a weak or a strong vote for c . The voting rules are then similar to the voting rules in mechanism A. In this mechanism, if an agent ranks a or b highest, then she has weakly dominant strategies. Furthermore, if agent 1 has a weak preference for c over b , i.e., cR_1bR_1a , then a weak vote for c is weakly dominant. If agent 2 has a strong preference for c over b , i.e., cR_2aR_2b , then a strong vote for c is weakly dominant.

Thus, we only have two cases with multiple not weakly dominated strategies. Agent 1 has two undominated strategies when she has a strong preference for c over b , i.e. cR_1aR_1b : voting for a and voting for c . This reflects that she cannot cast a strong vote for c , unlike in mechanism A. Agent 2 has two undominated strategies when she has a weak preference for c over b . As in mechanism A, she might cast a weak or a strong vote for c in this case.

Notice that in no case higher-order beliefs matter for an agent's choice. Agent 1 with a strong preference for c over b only cares about the probability of agent 2 voting for b and the total probability of agent 2 voting for c . In other words, agent 1 does not care about the exact probability of agent 2 casting a weak or strong vote for c . Higher-order beliefs don't matter for agent 2 with a weak preference for c over b , because whether agent 1 casts a weak or strong vote for b does not depend on agent 1's first-order beliefs. Thus, the mechanism is strategically simple.

Remark 4. *So far in the voting problem, we have considered the domain in which there is no restriction regarding the agents' utilities or beliefs: $\mathbf{U}_i = \mathcal{U}$ and $\mathbf{M}_i = \Delta(\mathcal{U}^{n-1})$ for all $i \in I$. A common domain restriction for preferences in the voting literature is the so-called single-peaked domain. In our context, a single-peaked domain would be one for which there is an ordering of the alternatives in A so that for all i all utility functions in \mathbf{U}_i are single-peaked, and the set \mathbf{M}_i is the set of all beliefs that assign probability 1 to single-peaked utility functions. It is easy to see that the first mechanism in Proposition 3 is type 2 strategically simple even in the single-peaked domain when the alternatives are arranged in alphabetical order, whereas the second mechanism is type 1 strategically simple on the single-peaked domain.*

6. RELATED LITERATURE

Li [21] proposes the concept of “obviously strategy-proof mechanisms.” These mechanisms form a subclass of dominant strategy mechanisms in which it is particularly easy for agents to recognize that they have a dominant strategy. While Li's work is, in spirit, related to ours, our purpose is to introduce a class of mechanisms that is larger (rather than smaller) than the class of dominant strategy mechanisms,

yet consists only of “simple” mechanisms. Our motivation for this is that in many applications the set of dominant strategy mechanisms seems “too small.”

Li observes that subjects in experiments often do not recognize dominant strategies, but that they do recognize such strategies if the mechanism is “obviously strategy-proof.” But if subjects in experiments don’t even recognize dominant strategies when they are not obvious, then how can we expect them to engage in the strategic reasoning that we have called “strategically simple” in this paper?

We argue that Li captures a different dimension of “simplicity” than we do. In dominant strategy mechanisms, and arguably also in strategically simple mechanisms, the “logic” that underlies the determination of an optimal strategy is straightforward. By this we mean that the logic can be explained to the agents in a simple and persuasive way. This is presumably a necessary, but not sufficient condition for optimal choices to be “obvious” in the sense that agents can easily find optimal strategies by themselves, without being offered explanations. In practice, it seems common that mechanism designers spend a lot of time explaining to the participants in the mechanism how the mechanism works, and which considerations the participants should base their strategic choices on. Strategic simplicity implies that the mechanism designer can present a simple and persuasive explanation of the relevant strategic considerations to the agents. That does not mean that the optimal choices are “obvious” to the agents.

Several recent papers have analyzed mechanism design when agents’ strategy choices are guided by “level- k thinking.”¹³ Like our paper, the level- k model of strategic choice is motivated by the idea that there is an upper bound on the length of hierarchies of beliefs that agents can form. We assume in this paper that k is equal to 2. The level- k model relies, however, on an exogenous “anchor” that describes the beliefs of an agent who does not analyze the other agents’ incentives at all, but who does maximize expected utility (“level 1 agents”). This amounts to selecting among the not strictly dominated strategies of level 1 agents those that are best responses to a particular belief. We select the not weakly dominated strategies, and thus implicitly assume full support beliefs, but do not fix any specific anchor belief. Thus, our theory of behavior is in most games more permissive than the level- k model of behavior.

Particularly closely related to our work is a paper by de Clippel et al. [15]. They consider an incomplete information environment with a common prior type space. The mechanism designer seeks to implement a social choice function that assigns to

¹³De Clippel et al. [15], Crawford [12], Gorelkina [17], Kneeland [20].

each type vector one outcome. They study a mechanism designer who believes that each agent i is a level $k_i (\geq 1)$ player, but who does not know the levels k_i . Implementation is achieved if for each type vector the desired outcome results whenever each player i is a level k_i player for any combination of k_i 's. This implies that players with a level $k_i \geq 2$ anticipate the same outcome regardless of which level the other players are, and therefore that there is no benefit to a player of thinking beyond level 2, just as in our paper. However, unlike our paper, de Clippel et al.'s postulate an exogenous anchor, work with a common prior, and focus on social choice functions rather than correspondences.

Our work is also related to papers that consider the implementation of social choice functions when agents perform a limited number of rounds of elimination of dominated strategies. Saran's [24] implementation notion includes the requirement that any strategy combination that survives one round of elimination of strictly undominated strategies yields the outcome prescribed by the social choice function. He obtains for many economic environments that a strict subset of the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions can be implemented. By comparison, in our model agents are assumed to be able to perform first-order strategic thinking. Another difference is that we allow for the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.

Jackson et al. [19] and Sjöström [26] show that, in certain economic environments, all social choice functions can be implemented in two rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, with a unique strategy surviving in round two. Thus, the corresponding mechanisms are strategically simple on the restricted domain in which agents have point beliefs about the other agents' preferences. This paper considers strategic simplicity on larger domains.

In complete information models, de Clippel et al. [14] and Van der Linden [27] use the number of rounds of elimination of dominated strategies, or of backward induction, that are required to solve a mechanism as a measure of the strategic complexity of mechanisms for the choice of an arbitrator or of a jury. This idea is closely related to our notion of strategic simplicity. One important difference with our work is that they don't allow uncertainty about other agents' preferences.

Bahel and Sprumont [2] consider dominant strategy mechanisms for the choice among Savage acts. The act that is chosen by the mechanism may depend on each agents' beliefs about the state, but it will not depend on any agent's beliefs about the other agents' beliefs about the state, etc. This is because, for given beliefs and valuations, their mechanisms have dominant strategies. There is thus a parallel between

their work and ours, although in their work beliefs are about Savage-style “states of the world,” whereas in our work beliefs are about other agents’ preferences.

Strategic simplicity can also be interpreted as a form of robustness in the sense of Bergemann and Morris [4]. Whereas Bergemann and Morris study implementation that does not rely on any conditions on agents’ hierarchies of beliefs, we study implementation of outcomes that may depend on agents’ first-order beliefs, but not on higher-order beliefs.

7. DISCUSSION

In this section, we suggest some directions for further research. One objective for further research is to develop a deeper understanding of type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in general and in particular environments. Another interesting research direction on type 2 strategically simple mechanisms would be to seek general conditions on primitives that imply that all strategically simple mechanisms are of type 1. We provided one such environment in this paper, namely, the bilateral trade environment. Our proof in the bilateral trade environment relies heavily on the particular domain structure, and we have not yet found useful ways to generalize the result to other settings. Finally, it might be interesting to define a refinement of strategic simplicity that is satisfied by all mechanisms that we call “type 1 strategically simple,” but not by any mechanism that we call “type 2 strategically simple.”

Strategic simplicity as defined in this paper focuses on mechanisms in which the agents’ optimal choices can be based on first-order beliefs alone. It would be interesting to investigate mechanisms in which there is some integer $k \geq 2$ such that only beliefs up to the k th-order matter for agents’ choices. A characterization of such mechanisms might be particularly difficult to find when considering the analog of what we have called in this paper “type 2” strategically simple mechanisms. However, even the generalization of type 1 strategically mechanisms seems non-trivial. Consider the following example: There are three agents that vote over four alternatives. The three agents in turn remove one alternative from consideration, and the remaining alternative is chosen. This is a simple extension of type 1 strategically simple voting mechanisms, and one might conjecture that the highest order beliefs that matter for optimal choice in this mechanism are the second-order beliefs. Obviously, the agent who moves last does not have to form any beliefs. One might conjecture that the agent who moves second only has to form first-order belief, and that the agent who moves first only has to form second-order belief. However, this conjecture is wrong. The reason is that the second mover needs to form second-order

belief about the correlation between the first mover's belief and the third mover's preference, and therefore, for the first mover, it matters what he believes about the second-order belief of the second mover. We have not yet tackled the complex issues raised by this example, but hope to do so in future research.

A study of strategically simple mechanisms in applications other than the two settings covered in this paper would be interesting. For certain classes of environments with quasi-linear preferences, mechanisms in which agents need to form at most first-order beliefs to determine their expected utility maximizing strategies have been described in Chen and Li [11], Yamashita and Zhu [29], and Crémer and Riordan [13]. The first two papers show that such strategically simple mechanisms dominate the optimal dominant strategy mechanism for a revenue maximizing mechanism designer, and Crémer and Riordan [13] focus on efficiency properties. While strategic simplicity is not the focus of these papers, their results suggest that a further study of strategically simple mechanisms in environments with quasi-linear preferences might be promising.

Future research might also develop criteria which a mechanism designer could use to evaluate strategically simple mechanisms, and then characterize using such criteria the best strategically simple mechanisms. The simplest way of proceeding would be to endow the mechanism designer with a prior over agents' utility functions and their first-order beliefs, and then to maximize the expected value of the designer's objective function. In this paper we have conducted such an exercise when comparing the expected welfare from a type 2 strategically simple voting mechanism and a dictatorial voting mechanism. The comparison is based on a uniform prior. An interesting open research question is whether in the voting context, and in general, results can be obtained that do not rely on the ad-hoc specification of a prior.

Finally, experimental tests of our notion of strategic simplicity would be of interest. We argued in the previous section that in strategically simple mechanisms the "logic" that underlies the determination of an optimal strategy is straightforward, although it might not be obvious. To address the possibility that experimental subjects might not discover by themselves what is not obvious, the experimenter might explain it to them. A comparison between the subjects' understanding and acceptance of the experimenter's explanations in strategically simple mechanisms and in mechanisms that are not strategically simple might serve as a test of our concept of strategic simplicity.

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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1

We first show that mechanisms that satisfy the conditions in the theorem are strategically simple. Fix an agent $i \in I$, any utility function $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$, and any utility belief $\mu_i \in \mathbf{M}_i$. We have to show that agent i has a strategy that is a best response to all compatible strategic beliefs.

Let R_i denote the preference induced by u_i . It suffices to show that there is a strategy in $UD_i(R_i)$ that is among the strategies in $UD_i(R_i)$ a best response to all compatible strategic beliefs. By the definition of weak dominance given R_i , the same strategy will then also be among *all* strategies of agent i a best response to all compatible strategic beliefs.

We can classify the profiles of utility functions u_{-i} of agents other than i into two categories: (1) the ones that induce preference profile R_{-i} such that agent i is a local dictator in the mechanism restricted to the strategy set $UD_i(R_i)$ for agent i and strategy sets $UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ for the other agents; and (2) the ones that induce preference profile R_{-i} such that agent i is not a local dictator in this mechanism. In the first case, the outcome is determined by agent i 's own choice from $UD_i(R_i)$ regardless of which strategies in $UD(R_{-i})$ the other agents choose, and with utility function u_{-i} all undominated strategies of the other agents will be contained in $UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$. In the second case, the outcome is the same regardless of agent i 's own choice from $UD_i(R_i)$ as long as the other agents choose strategies in $UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$, and, again, with

utility function u_{-i} all undominated strategies of the other agents will be contained in $UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$. Thus, agent i 's expected utility maximizing choice from $UD_i(R_i)$ only depends on her utility belief, and is the same for all compatible strategic beliefs, and we can conclude that the mechanism is strategically simple.

Next, we show that mechanisms that are strategically simple with respect to domains described in the theorem must satisfy the conditions in the theorem. We proceed by establishing a sequence of claims.

CLAIM A.1. *Let $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$, $u_{-i} \in \mathbf{U}_{-i}$, and let $\mu_i \in \mathbf{M}_i$ be a utility belief such that $\mu_i(\{u_{-i}\}) > 0$. Suppose $s_i, s'_i \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$. Then for all $s_{-i}, s'_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$:*

$$u_i(g(s_i, s_{-i})) - u_i(g(s'_i, s_{-i})) = u_i(g(s_i, s'_{-i})) - u_i(g(s'_i, s'_{-i})).$$

Proof. Suppose the assertion were not true. Then there are $s_{-i}, s'_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$ such that:

$$u_i(g(s_i, s_{-i})) - u_i(g(s'_i, s_{-i})) > u_i(g(s_i, s'_{-i})) - u_i(g(s'_i, s'_{-i})).$$

Pick any $\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)$ that places strictly positive probability on s_{-i} and s'_{-i} . Because s_i and s'_i are both in $BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$ both strategies must yield the same expected utility under $\hat{\mu}_i$. Now suppose we vary $\hat{\mu}_i$ such that it places ε probability more than $\hat{\mu}_i$ on s_{-i} and ε probability less than $\hat{\mu}_i$ on s'_{-i} , leaving all other probabilities unchanged. If we choose $\varepsilon > 0$ and sufficiently small, we can vary $\hat{\mu}_i$ in this way so that it remains an element of $\mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)$, and so that for the modified belief s_i is a strictly better response than s'_i . This contradicts $s'_i \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$. \square

CLAIM A.2. *Let $u_i \in \mathbf{U}_i$, $u_{-i} \in \mathbf{U}_{-i}$, and let $\mu_i, \mu'_i \in \mathbf{M}_i$ be any two utility beliefs such that $\mu_i(\{u_{-i}\}) > 0$ and $\mu'_i(\{u_{-i}\}) > 0$. Suppose:*

$$s_i \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i);$$

$$\text{and } s'_i \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}'_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu'_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}'_i).$$

Then for all $s_{-i}, s'_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$:

$$u_i(g(s_i, s_{-i})) - u_i(g(s'_i, s_{-i})) = u_i(g(s_i, s'_{-i})) - u_i(g(s'_i, s'_{-i})).$$

Proof. We focus on the non-trivial case: $s_i \neq s'_i$. Claim A.2 follows from repeated applications of Claim A.1 if we can find a sequence of utility beliefs of agent i , μ_i^k ($k = 2, \dots, K$), and strategies of agent i , s_i^k ($k = 1, 2, \dots, K$), where $K \geq 2$, such that $s_i^1 = s_i$, $s_i^K = s'_i$, for every $k \in \{2, \dots, K\}$ the utility belief μ_i^k places positive

probability on u_{-i} , and for every $k \in \{2, \dots, K\}$ both s_i^{k-1} and s_i^k are elements of $\bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i^k \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i^k)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i^k)$. We shall construct such a sequence.

For every $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ we define $\mu_i(\alpha) \equiv (1 - \alpha)\mu_i + \alpha\mu'_i$. We set $s_i^1 = s_i$. Define $\alpha^2 \equiv \sup\{\alpha \in [0, 1] \mid s_i^1 \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)\}$. Observe that the upper hemi-continuity of the best response correspondence implies that $s_i^1 \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha^2))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$. If $\alpha^2 = 1$, then we can set $s_i^2 = s'_i$, $\mu_i^2 = \mu'_i$, $K = 2$, and our sequence has all the required properties.

If $\alpha^2 < 1$, define s_i^2 to be any strategy in S_i that is an element of:

$$\bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha^2 + \varepsilon))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$$

for a sequence of $\varepsilon > 0$ tending to zero. Then, by upper hemi-continuity of the correspondence of best responses, $s_i^2 \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha^2))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$. We define μ_i^2 to be $\mu_i(\alpha^2)$. Note that, because μ_i and μ'_i attach strictly positive probability to u_{-i} , and because μ_i^2 is a convex combination of μ_i and μ'_i , also μ_i^2 places strictly positive probability on u_{-i} . If $s_i^2 = s'_i$, then we set $K = 2$, and the construction is complete.

If $s_i^2 \neq s'_i$, then we repeat the steps just described. In general, let $k \geq 2$, and suppose that, after $k - 1$ steps, we had determined μ_i^k such that $\mu_i^k = \mu_i(\alpha^k)$ for some $\alpha^k < 1$, and s_i^k such that $s_i^k \neq s'_i$. Then repeating the steps described above means that we define $\alpha^{k+1} \equiv \sup\{\alpha \in [\alpha^k, 1] \mid s_i^k \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)\}$. By the upper hemi-continuity of the best response correspondence: $s_i^k \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha^{k+1}))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$. If $\alpha^{k+1} = 1$, then we can define $s_i^{k+1} = s'_i$, $\mu_i^{k+1} = \mu'_i$, $K = k + 1$, and our sequence has the required properties. If $\alpha^{k+1} < 1$, define s_i^{k+1} to be a strategy in S_i that is an element of $\bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha^{k+1} + \varepsilon))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$ for a sequence of $\varepsilon > 0$ tending to zero. By the upper hemi-continuity of the correspondence of best responses, $s_i^{k+1} \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i(\alpha^{k+1}))} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$. We define μ_i^{k+1} to be $\mu_i(\alpha^{k+1})$. Note that μ_i^{k+1} places strictly positive probability on u_{-i} . If $s_i^{k+1} = s'_i$, then we set $K = k + 1$, and the construction is complete. Otherwise, we continue as before.

Note that by construction, in the sequence of strategies no strategy is ever repeated. Because the number of strategies is finite, the construction has to end after a finite number of steps. At that point our sequence will have all the required properties. \square

CLAIM A.3. *For every agent i , for every preference $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$ on A , there exists a utility function u_i^* that represents R_i , such that for every $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ there is a strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$ with support equal to S_{-i} such that:*

$$BR_i(u_i^*, \hat{\mu}_i) = \{s_i\}.$$

Moreover, the utility function u_i^* can be chosen such that $u_i^*(a) - u_i^*(b) \neq u_i^*(c) - u_i^*(d)$ for all $(a, b), (c, d) \in A^2$ with $(a, b) \neq (c, d)$.

Proof. First note that, if we can find a utility function u_i^* with the property in the first sentence of Claim A.3, then we can slightly perturb this utility function so that the property in the first sentence is maintained, but also the condition in the second sentence of Claim A.3 holds. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove only the first sentence of Claim A.3.

By the Lemma, and the remark in the first paragraph of the proof of that Lemma, in Börgers [6], for every strategy $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ there exist a utility function u_{s_i} that represents R_i , and a full support strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$, such that s_i is the unique maximizer of expected utility given that belief. To prove Claim A.3 it therefore only remains to be shown that the utility functions u_{s_i} can be chosen to be the same for all strategies $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$.

We begin with the following observation: Suppose that s_i is the unique maximizer of expected utility in S_i for utility function u_i and full support strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$, and suppose that $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is strictly increasing and concave. We claim that then there is another full support strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$ such that s_i is the unique maximizer of expected utility for the utility function $f \circ u_i$. To see this note first that, because s_i maximizes expected utility for a full support belief if utility is u_i , it is not weakly dominated given utility function u_i . Next, because f is increasing and concave, s_i is not weakly dominated given utility function $f \circ u_i$, either. This follows directly from the argument in the proof of Proposition 1 in Weinstein [28]. We can now use Lemma 4 in Pearce [23] and conclude that there is some full support strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$ of agent i such that s_i maximizes expected utility when the utility function is $f \circ u_i$. It remains to be shown that this belief can be chosen such that s_i is the *unique* maximizer of expected utility. We do this in the next paragraph.

Because s_i is the unique maximizer of expected utility for some full support belief if the utility function is u_i , by Theorem 2.3 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [5], the utility vector $(u_i(s_i, s_{-i}))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \in \mathbb{R}^{|S_{-i}|}$ is an extreme point of the convex hull of the set of all such utility vectors:

$$\text{co} \left(\left\{ (u_i(s'_i, s_{-i}))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \mid s'_i \in S_i \right\} \right).$$

We now claim that the utility vector corresponding to s_i remains an extreme point if we apply an increasing and concave transformation to u_i . That is, we claim that

$(f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \in \mathbb{R}^{|S_{-i}|}$ is an extreme point of:

$$\text{co} \left(\left\{ (f(u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \mid s'_i \in S_i \right\} \right).$$

Suppose it were not. Then $(f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}}$ could be written as a convex combination of the elements of $\left\{ (f(u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \mid s'_i \in S_i, s'_i \neq s_i \right\}$, that is, there would be a mixed strategy $\sigma_i \in \Delta(S_i)$ of agent i that attaches zero probability to s_i , and such that:

$$(f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} = \sum_{s'_i \in S_i} (f(u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \sigma_i(s'_i).$$

Because f is strictly concave, this implies:

$$(u_i(s_i, s_{-i}))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \not\preceq (u_i(\sigma_i, s_{-i}))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}},$$

which contradicts that s_i is not weakly dominated for utility function u_i . We conclude that $(f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i})))_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \in \mathbb{R}^{|S_{-i}|}$ is an extreme point. Using again Theorem 2.3 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [5] this implies that there is some function $\xi : S_{-i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that s_i is the unique maximizer of $\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \xi(s_{-i}) f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i}))$ in S_i . Let us treat ξ as a vector in $\mathbb{R}^{|S_{-i}|}$. One can verify that there must be a small ball around ξ such that for every vector $\tilde{\xi}$ in this ball s_i is the unique maximizer of $\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \tilde{\xi}(s_{-i}) f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i}))$. We can pick from this ball some $\tilde{\xi}$ such that $\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \tilde{\xi}(s_{-i}) \neq 0$. Now consider the vector $\tilde{\mu}_i$ defined by:

$$\tilde{\mu}_i(s_{-i}) \equiv \frac{\hat{\mu}_i + \varepsilon \frac{\tilde{\xi}(s_{-i})}{\sum_{s'_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \tilde{\xi}(s'_{-i})}}{1 + \varepsilon}$$

for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$. For sufficiently small $\varepsilon > 0$ this is a strategic belief. It is a convex combination of $\hat{\mu}_i$, for which s_i is a expected utility maximizer, and of $\tilde{\xi}$, for which s_i is the *unique* maximizer of $\sum_{s_{-i} \in S_{-i}} \tilde{\xi}(s_{-i}) f(u_i(s_i, s_{-i}))$ in S_i . Therefore, s_i is the unique expected utility maximizer for the strategic belief $\tilde{\mu}_i$.

We can now complete the proof by showing that there are a utility function u_i^* and, for every $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$, a concave function $f_{s_i} : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, such that $u_i^* = f_{s_i}(u_{s_i})$ for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$. We first construct u_i^* . Enumerate the elements of A as a_1, a_2, \dots, a_L such that $a_L R_i a_{L-1} R_i a_{L-2} R_i \dots R_i a_1$. We pick u_i^* to satisfy the following, where the first two lines are a normalization:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i^*(a_1) &= 0 \\ u_i^*(a_2) &= 1 \\ &\dots \\ u_i^*(a_{\ell-1}) &< u_i^*(a_\ell) < u_i^*(a_{\ell-1}) + \dots \end{aligned}$$

$$\dots (u_i^*(a_{\ell-1}) - u_i^*(a_{\ell-2})) \min_{s_i \in UD_i(R_i)} \frac{u_{s_i}(a_\ell) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1})}{u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1}) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-2})}.$$

Note that the right most term in the inequality is strictly larger than the left term, so that u_i^* can be constructed, and will be monotonically increasing, and thus compatible with R_i .

We now turn to the construction of the functions f_{s_i} . For every s_i we set $f_{s_i}(u_{s_i}(a_\ell)) = u_i^*(a_\ell)$ for all $\ell = 1, 2, \dots, L$. This defines f_{s_i} for a finite number of elements of \mathbb{R} only. However, it is clear that we can extend f_{s_i} to a concave piecewise linear function on \mathbb{R} if it satisfies the following concavity condition for the points in which it is defined:

$$\frac{f_{s_i}(u_{s_i}(a_\ell)) - f_{s_i}(u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1}))}{u_{s_i}(a_\ell) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1})} \leq \frac{f_{s_i}(u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1})) - f_{s_i}(u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-2}))}{u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1}) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-2})}$$

for all $\ell \geq 2$. By the definition of f_{s_i} , this inequality is equivalent to:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{u_i^*(a_\ell) - u_i^*(a_{\ell-1})}{u_{s_i}(a_\ell) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1})} &\leq \frac{u_i^*(a_{\ell-1}) - u_i^*(a_{\ell-2})}{u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1}) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-2})} \Leftrightarrow \\ u_i^*(a_\ell) &\leq u_i^*(a_{\ell-1}) + \dots \\ \dots (u_i^*(a_{\ell-1}) - u_i^*(a_{\ell-2})) &\frac{u_{s_i}(a_\ell) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1})}{u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-1}) - u_{s_i}(a_{\ell-2})} \end{aligned}$$

which holds by construction. \square

CLAIM A.4. *For every agent i , for every preference $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$ on A , and for every $u_{-i} \in \mathbf{U}_{-i}$ either*

(i) *there is for every strategy $s_i \in UD(R_i)$ an alternative a such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = a$ for all $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$,*

or

(ii) *there is for every strategy combination $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$ an alternative a such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = a$ for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$,*

or both.

Proof. Let us represent R_i by the utility function u_i^* from Claim A.3. Pick any two $s_i, s'_i \in UD_i(R_i)$. By Claim A.3 there are a full support strategic belief $\hat{\mu}_i$ such that: $BR_i(u_i^*, \hat{\mu}_i) = \{s_i\}$, and a full support strategic belief $\hat{\mu}'_i$ such that: $BR_i(u_i^*, \hat{\mu}'_i) = \{s'_i\}$. Because $\hat{\mu}_i$ has full support, and because every strategy is undominated for at least some utility function, there is a utility belief μ_i with $\mu_i(u_{-i}) > 0$ that is compatible with $\hat{\mu}_i$. Similarly, there is a utility belief μ'_i with $\mu'_i(u_{-i}) > 0$ that is compatible with

$\hat{\mu}'_i$. This implies $s_i \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}_i)$ and $s'_i \in \bigcap_{\hat{\mu}'_i \in \mathcal{M}_i(\mu'_i)} BR_i(u_i, \hat{\mu}'_i)$. Therefore, by Claim A.2 for all $s_{-i}, s'_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$:

$$u_i^*(g(s_i, s_{-i})) - u_i^*(g(s'_i, s_{-i})) = u_i^*(g(s_i, s'_{-i})) - u_i^*(g(s'_i, s'_{-i})). \quad (*)$$

This has to hold for any two $s_i, s'_i \in UD_i(R_i)$.

Now let us fix some $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$, and suppose first that for some $a \in A$ we have: $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = a$ for all $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$. Then (*) implies that for every other $s'_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ there must be some $\tilde{a} \in A$ such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = \tilde{a}$ for all $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$. This follows from $u_i^*(a) - u_i^*(b) \neq u_i^*(c) - u_i^*(d)$ for all $(a, b), (c, d) \in A^2$ with $(a, b) \neq (c, d)$. Thus, we have obtained Case (i).

Next suppose that for the s_i that we fixed in the previous paragraph we have: $g(s_i, s_{-i}) \neq g(s_i, s'_{-i})$ for some $s_{-i}, s'_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(u_{-i})$. Then $u_i^*(a) - u_i^*(b) \neq u_i^*(c) - u_i^*(d)$ for all $(a, b), (c, d) \in A^2$ with $(a, b) \neq (c, d)$ implies that (*) can only hold if both sides equal zero, and hence $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = g(s'_i, s_{-i})$ for all $s_i, s'_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ and all $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$. Thus, we have obtained Case (ii). \square

CLAIM A.5. *Suppose for every agent j we have a preference $R_j \in \mathcal{R}_j$ on A . Then, for every agent i , either*

(i) *there is for every strategy $s_i \in UD(R_i)$ an alternative a such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = a$ for all $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$,*

or

(ii) *there is for every strategy combination $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ an alternative a such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = a$ for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$,*

or both.

Proof. Claim A.5 follows from Claim A.4 if we represent for each j with $j \neq i$ the preference R_j by the utility function u_j^* referred to in Claim A.3 because then: $UD_{-i}(u_{-i}^*) = UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$. \square

COMPLETING THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1: The claim is obviously true if there is an alternative a such that $g(s) = a$ for all $s \in UD(R)$. Therefore from now on we restrict attention in this proof to the case that there are two alternatives $a \neq b$ such that $g(s) = a$ for some $s \in UD(R)$ and $g(s') = b$ for some other $s' \in UD(R)$.

We shall say that agent $i \in I$ “has no influence” if for every $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ there is an $a \in A$ such that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = a$ for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$, and we shall say that agent i is a dictator if agent i has the property ascribed to agent i^* in Theorem 1. By Claim A.5 every agent i either has no influence, or is a dictator.

Next note that it cannot be that there is more than one dictator. A dictator can enforce any of the alternatives contained in $\{g(s)|s \in UD(R)\}$. We have assumed that there are at least two such alternatives, say a and b . Having two dictators leads to a contradiction if one of them chooses an action that enforces a , and the other one chooses an action that enforces b .

Finally note that it cannot be that all agents have no influence. Recall that we are considering the case in which there are two alternatives $a \neq b$ such that $g(s) = a$ for some $s \in UD(R)$ and $g(s') = b$ for some other $s' \in UD(R)$. Consider the sequence of n strategy combinations s^k obtained by switching sequentially first agent 1, then agent 2, etc. from strategy s_i to strategy s'_i . Thus, $s^1 = (s'_1, s_2, \dots, s_n)$, $s^2 = (s'_1, s'_2, s_3, \dots, s_n)$, etc. Define $s^0 = s$. Because $g(s^0) \neq g(s^n)$, there must be some k such that $g(s^k) \neq g(s^{k-1})$. But this means that by construction agent k has influence. Hence agent k must be a dictator. \square

APPENDIX B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2

Part (1) of Theorem 2 is obvious. Here, we only provide the proof for part (2). Consider a type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and let:

$$i^* \in \bigcap_{R \in \times_{i \in I} \mathcal{R}_i} I^*(R).$$

We shall show that, for all $i \neq i^*$ and all $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$, the set $UD_i(R_i)$ contains exactly one element. Suppose that, for some i and R_i , the set $UD_i(R_i)$ had two distinct elements, say s_i and s'_i . Consider any $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$. We claim that $g(s_i, s_{-i}) = g(s'_i, s_{-i})$. To see this, first note that $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ for some $R_{-i} \in \times_{j \neq i} \mathcal{R}_j$, because we assume that every strategy is not weakly dominated for some utility function. Now consider the preference profile (R_i, R_{-i}) . Since agent i^* is local dictator for this preference profile, for any $s_{i^*}^* \in UD_{i^*}(R_{i^*})$, there is an $a \in A$ such that: $g(s_{i^*}^*, s_{-i^*}^*) = a$ for all $s_{-i^*}^* \in UD_{-i^*}(R_{-i^*})$. This implies: $g(s_{i^*}^*, s_i, s_{-(i^*, i)}) = g(s_{i^*}^*, s'_i, s_{-(i^*, i)})$ for all $s_{-(i^*, i)} \in UD_{-(i^*, i)}(R_{-(i^*, i)})$. As this holds for all $s_{i^*}^* \in UD_{i^*}$, the assertion follows. But this contradicts our assumption that mechanisms do not have duplicate strategies.

Fix any $s_{i^*}^* \in S_{i^*}$, and consider the mechanism in which we have removed agent i^* from the set of agents, in which all other agents have the same strategy sets as originally, i.e., S_j , and in which the outcome corresponding to any s_{-i^*} is given by $g(s_{i^*}^*, s_{-i^*})$. Let us call this mechanism the “restricted mechanism” corresponding to $s_{i^*}^*$. If all agents $j \neq i$ play the strategies that are uniquely dominant in the overall mechanism, then the restricted mechanism implements an outcome function:

$F_{s_{i^*}} : \mathbf{U}_{-i} \times \mathbf{M}_{-i} \rightarrow A$. Because, in the overall mechanism, agents have dominant strategies, the outcome correspondence is constant with respect to beliefs, and it is also constant if utility functions are changed without changing the order of the elements of A . We can therefore write F as: $F_{s_{i^*}} : \times_{j \neq i^*} \mathcal{R}_j \rightarrow A$. We can treat this outcome function as a direct mechanism. Because agents choose dominant strategies in the overall mechanism, in the direct mechanism it is a dominant strategy for each agent to report their preferences truthfully.

Because in the overall mechanism agents have uniquely dominant strategies, they must have for every preference ordering a strategy that induces in each of the restricted mechanisms a dominant strategy. Agent i^* thus expects, for each of the strategies that he can choose, the same outcome distribution as he would in the sequential mechanism described in Theorem 2, if the second stage mechanisms are the restricted mechanisms described by the outcome function $F_{s_{i^*}}$. Agent i^* will make the same choice as in the sequential mechanism as in the given type 1 strategically simple mechanism. This implies part (ii) of Theorem 2. \square

APPENDIX C. FURTHER PROPERTIES OF STRATEGICALLY SIMPLE MECHANISMS

In this section of the appendix we provide some general properties of strategically simple mechanisms that will be useful for the proofs of our results for the bilateral trade and the voting applications. This section's results rely on the domain assumptions in Theorem 1, but they are not restricted to the applications, and therefore also complement the main text's results on strategically simple mechanisms in general.

Before we turn to our results on strategically simple mechanisms, we record a simple observation that is a direct implication of the notion of weak dominance, and that is unrelated to strategic simplicity.

Lemma 1. *Let $i \in I$, $R_i, R'_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$, and $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$. Then there exists $s'_i \in UD_i(R'_i)$ such that for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$:*

$$g(s'_i, s_{-i}) R'_i g(s_i, s_{-i}).$$

Proof. If $s_i \in UD_i(R'_i)$, the lemma is true if we set $s'_i = s_i$. If $s_i \notin UD_i(R'_i)$, because we are considering finite mechanisms, there is some $s''_i \in UD_i(R'_i)$ that weakly dominates s_i , and the lemma follows if we set $s'_i = s''_i$. \square

For the main results of this section of the appendix, we need some additional notation. For each $i \in I$ and each $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$, let:

$$M_i(s_{-i}) \equiv \{g(s_i, s_{-i}) \mid s_i \in S_i\}, \text{ and}$$

$$b_i(s_{-i}, R_i) \equiv \arg \max_{R_i} M_i(s_{-i}).$$

In words, $M_i(s_{-i})$ is the set of all possible outcomes when agent i 's opponents choose s_{-i} , and $b_i(s_{-i}, R_i)$ is agent i 's most preferred outcome in the set $M_i(s_{-i})$ if agent i 's preference is R_i . In this paper, we say that $M_i(s_{-i})$ is the “menu” offered to agent i if the other agents choose s_{-i} .

Lemma 2. *Consider a strategically simple mechanism under the domain assumptions in Theorem 1. Suppose that for some $R_{-i} \in \mathcal{R}_{-i}$ the set $UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ has at least two elements. Let $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$.*

- (1) *Suppose that for some $s'_{-i}, s''_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ we have $b_i(s'_{-i}, R_i) \neq b_i(s''_{-i}, R_i)$. Then for all $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ and all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$:*

$$g(s_i, s_{-i}) = b_i(s_{-i}, R_i).$$

- (2) *Suppose that for some $s'_{-i}, s''_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ we have $b_i(s'_{-i}, R_i) = b_i(s''_{-i}, R_i) = a$ for some outcome a . Then there exists some strategy $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ such that:*

$$g(s_i, s'_{-i}) = g(s_i, s''_{-i}) = a.$$

Moreover, for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ we have:

$$g(s_i, s'_{-i}) = g(s_i, s''_{-i}).$$

In words, this lemma says the following. Consider any agent i . Consider any preference profile for which at least one agent other than i has more than one undominated strategy. Each of the profiles of undominated strategies of the other agents offers a menu to agent i , and from each of these menus we can determine the outcome that agent i prefers most. In case (1), agent i 's preferred alternative is different for two such menus. In this case, *all* undominated strategies of agent i must yield agent i 's most preferred alternative from the menu offered by the other agents for all undominated strategy profiles of the other agents. In case (2), agent i 's preferred alternative is the same for two such menus. In this case, *some, but not all* undominated strategies of agent i must yield agent i 's most preferred alternative from the menu offered by the other agents. In case (2) every other undominated strategy of agent i must, however, yield the same outcome, regardless of which undominated strategy profile the other agents choose.e.

Proof. (1) Without loss of generality, let $b_i(s'_{-i}, R_i) = a$ and $b_i(s''_{-i}, R_i) = b$. Also without loss of generality, we assume that R_i ranks a above b . Therefore, $a \notin M_i(s''_{-i})$. By Lemma 1, agent i has an undominated strategy s'_i such that $g(s'_i, s'_{-i}) = a$. Because $a \notin M_i(s''_{-i})$, we know that $g(s'_i, s''_{-i}) \neq a$. This means that agent i is not the local dictator, and hence some agent other than agent i must be the local dictator. That is, for every strategy $s_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$, the outcome is independent of agent i 's strategy $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$. Moreover, by Lemma 1, the outcome has to be agent i 's most preferred outcome in the set $M_i(s_{-i})$.

(2) Suppose that there is no strategy $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ such that $g(s_i, s'_{-i}) = g(s_i, s''_{-i}) = a$. Since $b_i(s'_{-i}, R_i) = a$, by Lemma 1, there must be some $s'_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ such that $g(s'_i, s'_{-i}) = a$. Hence, $g(s'_i, s''_{-i}) \neq a$. This means that agent i is not the local dictator, and hence some agent other than agent i must be the local dictator. This implies that $g(s_i, s''_{-i}) \neq a$ for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$. But this contradicts that $b_i(s''_{-i}, R_i) = a$ and Lemma 1. Thus, we can conclude that there exists some strategy $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ such that $g(s_i, s'_{-i}) = g(s_i, s''_{-i}) = a$.

Now either for all $s_i \in UD_i(R_i)$ we also have $g(s_i, s'_{-i}) = g(s_i, s''_{-i}) = a$, in which case the second part of the assertion obviously holds, or there exists some undominated strategy that sometimes yields an outcome other than a if her opponents choose s'_{-i} or s''_{-i} . In the latter case, agent i must be the local dictator, and the second part of the assertion follows. \square

Part (2) of the above lemma has a simple implication. Suppose for some preference profile of the agents other than i at least one agent has two undominated strategies. Then no two profiles of undominated strategies of the agents other than i can offer the same menu to agent i .

Corollary 2. *Consider a strategically simple mechanism under the domain assumptions of Theorem 1. Suppose that for some $R_{-i} \in \mathcal{R}_{-i}$ the set $UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ has at least two elements. If $s'_{-i}, s''_{-i} \in UD_{-i}(R_{-i})$ and $s'_{-i} \neq s''_{-i}$, then:*

$$M_i(s'_{-i}) \neq M_i(s''_{-i}).$$

Proof. The proof is indirect. If $M_i(s'_{-i}) = M_i(s''_{-i})$, then $b_i(s'_{-i}, R_i) = b_i(s''_{-i}, R_i)$ for all $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$. Therefore, case (2) of Lemma 2 applies, and for any strategy of agent i that is undominated for some preference (in other words, for all strategies of agent i), s'_{-i} and s''_{-i} yield the same outcome. They are thus duplicate strategies. But this contradicts our assumption that the mechanism does not contain any duplicate strategies. \square

APPENDIX D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

To simplify the notation, we shall use “ v_i ” not just to refer to agent i 's value of the object, but also to refer to the corresponding ordinal preference. We use $UD_i(v_i)$ to denote the set of strategies of agent i that are not weakly dominated if agent i has ordinal preference v_i . We use $I^*(v_S, v_B)$ to denote the set of local dictators at preference profile (v_S, v_B) . Finally, for any (v_S, v_B) , we denote by $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ the set of outcomes that can arise when both agents play strategies that are not weakly dominated given their valuations. That is, $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B) \equiv \{a \in A \mid a = g(s_S, s_B) \text{ for some } s_S \in UD_S(v_S) \text{ and } s_B \in UD_B(v_B)\}$.

We now prove four claims that will be useful in the proof of the proposition. These claims describe implications of strategic simplicity in the bilateral trade setting, regardless of whether we are referring to type 1 or type 2 strategic simplicity.

CLAIM D.1. *If $I^*(v_S, v_B) = \{S, B\}$, then $|\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)| = 1$.*

Proof. This immediately follows from the definition of local dictatorship: if one agent were able to enforce two different outcomes, then the other agent could not be a local dictator. \square

CLAIM D.2. *If $I^*(v_S, v_B) = \{i^*\}$ for some $i^* \in I$, then $|\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)| \geq 2$, and $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B) \cap T \neq \emptyset$.*

Proof. The first part of the claim follows from the fact that if $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ had just one element, then both agents would be local dictators. The second part of the claim is a direct implication of the first part. \square

CLAIM D.2 implies that the following notations for pairs (v_S, v_B) such that $I^*(v_S, v_B) = \{i^*\}$ for some $i^* \in I$ are well-defined: $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B) \equiv \max \mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B) \cap T$ and $\underline{t}(v_S, v_B) \equiv \min \mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B) \cap T$.

Next, we show that the assumption that each agent has an opting out strategy implies that only ex post individually rational outcomes can occur when agents do not choose weakly dominated strategies.

CLAIM D.3. *For any $(v_S, v_B) \in V_S \times V_B$, for every $i \in \{S, B\}$, agent i with preferences v_i weakly prefers every outcome in $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ to no trade.*

Proof. The claim is straightforward for outcomes when both agents are local dictators. By Lemma 1, each agent weakly prefers at least one outcome in $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ to no trade.

By Claim D.1, if both agents are local dictators, $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ has just one element. Hence, both agents must weakly prefer this outcome to no trade.

In the rest of the proof we focus on the case of a unique local dictator, $I(v_S, v_B) = \{i^*\}$. Consider first the agent who is *not* the local dictator, i.e. agent $i \neq i^*$. Obviously, it is sufficient to consider only outcomes in $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ that correspond to trade at some price $t \in T$. Consider any strategy $s_{i^*} \in UD_{i^*}(v_{i^*})$ of agent i^* that results in trade at price t against any strategy in $UD_i(v_i)$ (see Figure 1). Because i has an opting out strategy, by Lemma 1 one of the strategies in $UD_i(v_i)$ must yield at least as good an outcome as no trade for agent i with preferences v_i . This implies that trade at price t must be at least as good as no trade for agent i with preference v_i .




FIGURE 1. Agent i^* is the unique local dictator at (v_S, v_B) . In this case, trade at price t must not be worse than no trade for agent i with value v_i .

We are left with the task to show that, when there is a unique local dictator i^* , all outcomes are ex post individually rational for the local dictator herself. Without loss of generality we consider the case $i^* = S$. Our proof strategy will be the following. We consider any (v_S, v_B) such that ex post individual rationality for the seller is violated at (v_S, v_B) . We show that then there must be some $v'_S > v_S$ and some v'_B such that $I^*(v'_S, v'_B) = \{S\}$ and ex post individual rationality for the seller is also violated at (v'_S, v'_B) . This implies the claim, because the assumption that there is any value profile at which the seller's ex post individual rationality were violated would imply that there would have to be a largest $v_S \in I_S^*$ for which individual rationality is violated for some v_B , and this would be in contradiction with the assertion that we just made.

Thus, consider any (v_S, v_B) such that $I^*(v_S, v_B) = \{S\}$ and the seller's individual rationality is violated at (v_S, v_B) (see Figure 2). This means that there is a strategy $s_S \in UD_S(v_S)$ for which $g(s_S, s_B) \in T$, and $g(s_S, s_B) < v_S$ for all $s_B \in UD_B(v_B)$. To start, note that there must exist some $v'_B \in V_B$ and $s'_B \in UD_B(v'_B)$ such that v_S ranks $g(s_S, s'_B)$ above no trade. Otherwise, for the seller with preference v_S , the strategy s_S would be weakly dominated by the strategy of opting out. Since v_S ranks $g(s_S, s'_B)$ above no trade, we have $g(s_S, s'_B) \in T$ and $g(s_S, s'_B) > v_S$.

		$UD_B(v_B)$		$UD_B(v'_B)$		
		s_B		s'_B	s''_B	<i>opting out</i>
$UD_S(v_S)$	s_S	$g(s_S, s_B) \cdots g(s_S, s_B)$		$g(s_S, s'_B)$	ϕ	ϕ
				$g(s_S, s'_B)$	ϕ	ϕ
				\vdots	\vdots	
				$g(s_S, s'_B)$	ϕ	
$UD_S(v'_S)$	s'_S	$g(s'_S, s'_B) \cdots g(s'_S, s'_B)$				\vdots
<i>opting out</i>		ϕ	ϕ	\dots		ϕ

FIGURE 2. The seller is the unique local dictator at (v_S, v_B) . Suppose that $g(s_S, s_B) < v_S$. We then find a $v'_S > v_S$ such that $g(s'_S, s'_B) < v'_S$.

Our next objective is to prove the following statements about the behavior of the mechanism at (v_S, v_B) and (v_S, v'_B) . Here, s_B is any arbitrary strategy in $UD_B(v_B)$.

- (i) B is the unique local dictator at (v_S, v'_B) ;
- (ii) $g(s_S, s'_B) > g(s_S, s_B)$;
- (iii) $g(s_S, s_B) > v'_B$;
- (iv) $g(s_S, s'_B) > v'_B$.

Proving (ii) is simple: We have $g(s_S, s_B) < v_S$, and, by construction, $g(s_S, s'_B) > v_S$. Thus, (ii) follows. Now note that $g(s_S, s'_B) > g(s_S, s_B)$ implies that v'_B ranks $g(s_B, s'_B)$ below $g(s_S, s_B)$. By Lemma 1, there must be some strategy $s''_B \in UD_B(v'_B)$ such that v'_B ranks $g(s_S, s''_B)$ above $g(s_S, s_B)$ or $g(s_S, s''_B) = g(s_S, s_B)$. Note that we can conclude $g(s_S, s_B) \neq g(s_S, s''_B)$, and hence that (i) is true.

As an intermediate step we show next that $g(s_S, s''_B) = \phi$. If $g(s_S, s''_B)$ were an element of T , since v'_B ranks $g(s_S, s''_B)$ above $g(s_S, s_B)$ or $g(s_S, s''_B) = g(s_S, s_B)$, it would have to be that $g(s_S, s''_B) \leq g(s_S, s_B)$. Since v_S ranks $g(v_S, v_B)$ below no trade, v_S also ranks $g(s_S, s''_B)$ below no trade. But this contradicts the ex post individual rationality for the agent who is not dictator, which we showed in an earlier step of this proof. We conclude: $g(s_S, s''_B) = \phi$.

By construction, v'_B ranks $g(s_S, s''_B)$ above $g(s_S, s_B)$, hence (iii) follows from the fact that $g(s_S, s''_B)$ is no trade. Finally, (ii) and (iii) imply (iv).

Now note that we have obtained a pair of valuations at which the buyer is the local dictator, and, by (iv), the buyer's ex post individual rationality is violated. We can therefore repeat the argument just presented, reversing the roles of the buyer and the seller. This yields the conclusion that there is some $v'_S \in V_S$, and some $s'_S \in UD(v'_S)$ such that $g(s'_S, s'_B) \in T$ and $g(s'_S, s'_B) < v'_B$, and:

- (v) S is the local dictator at (v'_S, v'_B) ;
- (vi) $g(s'_S, s'_B) < g(s_S, s'_B)$;
- (vii) $g(s_S, s'_B) < v'_S$;
- (viii) $g(s'_S, s'_B) < v'_S$.

The proof can now be concluded. By construction: $v_S < g(s_S, s'_B)$. Result (vii) says: $g(s_S, s'_B) < v'_S$. Hence $v_S < v'_S$. Moreover (viii) shows that ex post individual rationality for the seller is violated at (v'_S, v'_B) . \square

Our next result shows that, if at some valuation profile some agent i is the unique local dictator, this agent remains (not necessarily unique) local dictator even if we change i 's valuation, keeping the other valuation fixed.

CLAIM D.4. *Suppose $I^*(v_i, v_{-i}) = \{i\}$. Then $i \in I^*(v'_i, v_{-i})$ for all $v'_i \in V_i$.*

Proof. Without loss of generality we focus on the case $i = S$. The proof is indirect. Let $I^*(v_S, v_B) = \{S\}$, and suppose $I^*(v'_S, v_B) = \{B\}$ for some $v'_S \in V_S$. Let $s_S \in S_S$ be the strategy in $UD_S(v_S)$ that enforces the outcome $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$ against any strategy in $UD_B(v_B)$. Let $s_B \in S_B$ be the strategy in $UD_B(v_B)$ that enforces the outcome $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B)$ against any strategy in $UD_S(v'_S)$.

Suppose also, first, that: $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B) > \bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. By Lemma D.3, v_S ranks $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$ above no trade. Therefore, v_S must also rank $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B)$ above no trade. By Lemma 1, the seller with value v_S must have a strategy in $UD_S(v_S)$ that guarantees an outcome at least as good as $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B)$ against any strategy in $UD_B(v_B)$. This contradicts the definition of $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$ as the highest price that the seller can guarantee with a strategy in $UD_S(v_S)$.

Now suppose: $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B) < \bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. By Lemma 1, the seller with value v'_S must have at least one strategy in $UD_S(v'_S)$ that yields against s_B an outcome at least as good as $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. This contradicts that s_B yields $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B)$ for all $s_S \in UD_S(v'_S)$.

Finally suppose: $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B) = \bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. Let $s'_B \in UD_B(v_B)$ denote a strategy such that $g(s_S, s'_B) \neq \bar{t}(v'_S, v_B)$ for all $s_S \in UD_S(v'_S)$. By Claim D.2, such an s'_B exists. Since the buyer is the unique local dictator at preference profile (v'_S, v_B) , by Lemma 1, any strategy in $UD_S(v'_S)$ yields against s'_B an outcome at least as good as $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. This outcome cannot be trade at price $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$, because s'_B leads to an outcome other than $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$, and it cannot be trade at a price higher than $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$ because we are considering the case $\bar{t}(v'_S, v_B) = \bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. Therefore, any strategy in $UD_S(v'_S)$ yields against s'_B no trade. But then we have concluded that the seller prefers no trade to trade at $\bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$, which contradicts Claim D.3, i.e. the seller's ex post individual rationality at (v'_S, v_B) . \square

We now turn to an indirect proof of Proposition 2, that is, we postulate that a bilateral trade mechanism is type 2 strategically simple, and then derive a contradiction. The next four claims describe implications of the premises of the indirect proof.

CLAIM D.5. *There are $v_S, \hat{v}_S \in V_S$ with $v_S \neq \hat{v}_S$ and $v_B, \hat{v}_B \in V_B$ with $v_B \neq \hat{v}_B$ such that: $I^*(v_S, v_B) = \{S\}$, $I^*(\hat{v}_S, \hat{v}_B) = \{B\}$, and $I^*(v_S, \hat{v}_B) = I^*(\hat{v}_S, v_B) = \{S, B\}$.*

Proof. By definition of type 2 strategic simplicity, we must have two pairs of values in $V_S \times V_B$, one at which S is the unique local dictator, and another one at which B is the unique local dictator. By Claim D.4 these two pairs must have no component in common. Claim D.4 also implies that if we combine the seller's value in one pair with a buyer's value in the other pair, then both agents must be local dictators. \square

For the remainder of the proof we use the notation (v_S, v_B) and (\hat{v}_S, \hat{v}_B) to refer to the two pairs the existence of which is asserted in Claim D.5.

CLAIM D.6. $\mathcal{O}(v_S, \hat{v}_B) = \{\phi\}$.

Proof. By Claim D.1, $\mathcal{O}(v_S, \hat{v}_B)$ has only one element. Suppose $\mathcal{O}(v_S, \hat{v}_B) = \{t\}$ for some $t \in T$. Using Lemma 1 for the buyer, we can infer $t \leq \underline{t}(v_S, v_B)$. Because at (v_B, v_S) the seller is the only local dictator, Claim D.2 implies that the set $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ must include an outcome a other than $\underline{t}(v_S, v_B)$. If this is trade at a price higher than $\underline{t}(v_S, v_B)$, then clearly the buyer strictly prefers $\underline{t}(v_S, v_B)$ to a . But if a is no trade, then Claim D.3 implies that the buyer strictly prefers $\underline{t}(v_S, v_B)$ to a . Thus, $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ includes an outcome a that the buyer ranks strictly below $\underline{t}(v_S, v_B)$, and hence also strictly below t . The seller has a strategy that locally enforces this outcome at (v_S, v_B) . By Lemma 1 this contradicts the fact that the buyer has a strategy that enforces at (v_S, \hat{v}_B) the price t . \square

CLAIM D.7. $v_S > \hat{v}_S$ and $v_B > \hat{v}_B$.

Proof. The arguments are symmetric for seller and buyer. Consider the seller. Because no trade occurs at (v_S, \hat{v}_B) , by Claim D.6, and trade at some price t is a possible outcome at (\hat{v}_S, \hat{v}_B) , Lemma 1 implies that with value v_S the seller must find no trade preferable to a trade at price t . Claim D.3 says that the seller with value \hat{v}_S prefers trade at price t to no trade. These findings together imply $v_S > \hat{v}_S$. \square

CLAIM D.8. $\mathcal{O}(\hat{v}_S, v_B) = \{t^*\}$ for some $t^* \in T$.

Proof. By Claim D.1, $\mathcal{O}(\hat{v}_S, v_B)$ has only one element. Suppose $\mathcal{O}(\hat{v}_S, v_B) = \{\phi\}$. By Claims D.2 and D.3, trade at some price is contained in $\mathcal{O}(v_S, v_B)$ that the seller with value v_S strictly prefers to no trade. When the seller has value \hat{v}_S , the seller still strictly prefers trade at that price to no trade, because, by Claim D.7, \hat{v}_S is lower than v_S . Hence we would have a contradiction to Lemma 1 if the outcome in $\mathcal{O}(\hat{v}_S, v_B)$ were no trade. \square

We can now complete the proof of Proposition 2. Using Lemma 1 we have: $t^* = \underline{t}(\hat{v}_S, \hat{v}_B)$. By Claim D.3, $t^* \leq \hat{v}_B$. Using Lemma 1 we also have: $t^* = \bar{t}(v_S, v_B)$. But then Lemma 1 and $t^* \leq \hat{v}_B$ implies that among the outcomes in $\mathcal{O}(v_S, \hat{v}_B)$ there must be a trade at a price below \hat{v}_B . This contradicts Claim D.6. \square