The Feminist Paradox:
How Labels Keep Women Candidates from Equal Representation

by

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For Angelo and Dina

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Abstract

Although theories of descriptive representation often posit that citizens are drawn to individuals from groups with which they identify, and despite the fact that women remain largely politically underrepresented in the United States, female voters do not favor ingroup – female – candidates. Why is shared gender between voters and candidates such a weak attractive force compared to other group attachments? I argue that the female electorate is divided into two gender subgroup identities: feminists and non-feminists. Feminists are a homogeneous group and share a feminist gender ideology that focuses on fostering gender equality. In contrast, non-feminists are a very diverse group that includes three distinct types characterized by differing gender ideologies: 1) non-labelers, who endorse core egalitarian values and principles of feminism (i.e., feminist gender ideology) yet eschew the feminist label, because they are wary of the social stigma attached to it, 2) gender individualists, who acknowledge gender inequality but support individualism and self-determination rather than collectivism and public policies to promote gender equality and combat discrimination, and 3) gender inegalitarians, who deny the existence of gender inequality and discrimination and/or oppose both individual and collective efforts to address them. I test my hypotheses on the role played by gender subgroups by relying on both quantitative and qualitative

evidence from two surveys – the 2016 American National Election Study and a survey fielded on YouGov in 2018 – and two experiments – one conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk in 2017 and the other conducted on CloudResearch/TurkPrime in 2019.

My results demonstrate that support for gender equality, which both feminists and non-labelers share, is much more widespread than acceptance of the feminist label. The choice to self-label as a feminist vs. a non-feminist has important political implications. Among both men and women, feminist identity is largely and significantly associated with considering the election of more women to political office as important. In contrast, non-feminist identity strongly undermines support for women in political office, all else equal. In the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a mayoral election, and a legislative primary, I show that feminist voters in both the Democratic and the Republican Party largely favor ingroup – feminist – candidates over outgroup – non-feminist – candidates of both genders, but they also favor non-labeler over individualist candidates. Despite their group heterogeneity, non-feminists of both parties display highly coherent preferences: they favor individualist candidates over non-labeler and, particularly, feminist candidates, regardless of candidate gender.

In sum, labels related to gender subgroups divide the U.S. public much more than the actual idea of gender equality, particularly the female electorate. The divides among feminists, non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians are distinct from and cut across those based on gender group membership, gender identification, and political ideology. They influence how individual voters perceive and evaluate candidates, interpret the political spectrum, and decide to cast their ballot. Explicit association with the feminist label on the campaign trail thus puts feminist candidates at a severe electoral disadvantage and is likely to be riskier and costlier than touting a gender egalitarian policy agenda. The label appeals to one rather small gender subgroup – feminists

– but alienates a larger and more diverse one – non-feminist voters. It is the aversive reaction to the label, rather than a rejection of the substance of their politics, that drives many women away from candidates of their own gender group.

Chapter 1

A Theory of Gender-Based Political Subgroups

1.1 Introduction

"I don't think that any woman should be asked to vote for someone because she's a woman."

– Nancy Pelosi, 2016.[1]

"To the women I see marching in D.C. — I am a woman. I am strong. I am not a victim. I am not afraid. Just thought you should know."

– Van Duyne, Mayor of Irving, Texas, 2017.[2]

In July 2016, Hillary Clinton was the first woman in U.S. history to become a major party's nominee for president. She directly appealed to women as a voting block and competed against a candidate whose statements and actions appeared hostile to women. Nonetheless, according to exit polls, only 54 percent of female voters supported her on Election Day – a proportion quite similar

[1] Moscatello, Caitlin. August 22, 2019. "Vote for the Woman Because She's a Woman," Pennsylvania Center for Women & Politics. https://www.chatham.edu/pcwp/blog/index.php/2019/08/vote-for-the-woman-because-shes-a-woman?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=vote-for-the-woman-because-shes-a-woman (Accessed December 20, 2019).

[2] Van Duyne, Beth. February 24, 2017. "Enough with the Name-Calling, Single-Issue, Fear-Based Feminism," *OZY*. http://www.ozy.com/pov/enough-with-the-name-calling-single-issue-fear-based-feminism/75953 (Accessed December 20, 2019).

to the performance of Democratic candidates in previous presidential contests between two men.[3] Indeed, a similar percentage of women – 55 percent – supported the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, in 2012.[4] Clinton's tally was particularly modest – 43 percent – among White women. These percentages indicate that gender group membership per se could not have been driving much of Clinton's support. Why did Clinton fail to elicit more support from the female electorate, especially the White female electorate?

More broadly, in terms of women's representation in government, the United States has fallen from 46th to 81st in the world over the last two decades.[5] Despite a record-breaking number of female candidates elected in the 2018 midterms – 102 in the House (one resigned in November 2019), 14 in the Senate, and 9 in gubernatorial races – the U.S. trails many democracies in the descriptive representation of women. In fact, in the current Congress (2019-2021), women hold only 23 percent of the seats in the House and 26 percent of the seats in the Senate.[6] Many other underrepresented political groups demonstrate political solidarity at the voting booth. Why not women?

Theories of descriptive representation often posit that citizens are drawn to candidates from groups with which they identify. However, previous studies present mixed results when it comes to gender. On the one hand, Rosenthal's (1995) findings suggest that women are indeed more

[3] CNN, Election 2016, Exit Polls, National President. November 23, 2016. https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls/national/president (Accessed August 23, 2019).
[4] CNN, America's Choice 2012, Election Center, President: Full Results. December 10, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/president/ (Accessed August 23, 2019).
[5] Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Percentage of women in national parliaments." https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=3&year=2020 (Accessed March 15, 2020).
[6] Center for American Women and Politics, Rutgers Eagleton Institute of Politics, "Women in the U.S. Congress 2020." https://cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2020 (Accessed March 20, 2020).

likely to prefer representatives of the same sex, all else equal. Sanbonmatsu (2002) argues that voters have a "baseline gender preference" for either female or male candidates, which stems from gender stereotypes. Preferences for female candidates depend on positive stereotypes about women's stance on and competence about stereotypically feminine issues as well as voter gender. In contrast, preferences for male candidates in races against women are a function of negative stereotypes about women's traits and positive stereotypes about men's competence in relation to stereotypically masculine policy issues. Overall, Sanbonmatsu finds that the gender affinity effect leading women to prefer same-gender candidates is asymmetric: women are more likely than men to take gender into account and have an underlying predisposition to vote for and be represented by female candidates. Similarly, based on Gallup poll results, Dolan (2014, p. 55) shows that men are more likely than women to view sharing the sex of a representative as unimportant, 58 percent to 38 percent. In the context of fourteen races in which women sought statewide office on the tickets of a major party in 1992, Plutzer and Zipp (1996) find that voter sex (i.e., being female) was significantly associated with voting for female candidates in 8 out of 13 states across voter partisan affiliations.

On the other hand, several studies find that gender affinity is weak at best, and inconsistent over time (e.g., Dolan 2004). One of the most comprehensive discussions of the sources of political disunity among women is offered by Sears and Huddy (1992). They find women do not support female candidates at significantly higher rates than men do, all else equal. Moreover, they do not differ from men in relation to policy issues that affect women's tangible group interests: how much discrimination there is against women, affirmative action hiring and promotion policies, legalized abortion, access to affordable childcare, and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Additionally, women appear not to assign more weight than men to women's issues when facing partisan choices

or voting decisions. Sears and Huddy (1992) find that symbolic predispositions – namely, sociopolitical egalitarian values, partisanship, political ideology, and religiosity – have far more predictive power than individual or group interests in predicting support for government aid to women, abortion rights, Geraldine Ferraro (the first woman on a major-party presidential ticket), gender equality, and feminism.

Gender also tends to be a weak predictor of voter behavior when accounted for in isolation from other group attachments such as race and partisanship. In regard to race and intersectionality, Gay and Tate (1998) indeed find that Black women identify as strongly based on their gender as their race, and that gender identity may detract from the impact of racial identity on Black women's opinions of controversial Black public figures. Sigelman and Welch's (1984) results suggest that White women are about as likely as White men to support female candidates, while Black women are more likely than Black men to support them. Similarly, Philpot and Walton (2007) argue that the effect of gender and race has to be examined simultaneously, and show that Black women are the strongest supporters of Black female candidates. These studies seem to indicate that while gender may represent a unifying factor and a source of solidarity among women of color, it tends to be a particularly weak force among White women.

In regard to partisanship, King and Matland (2003) conduct an experiment that varies the gender (i.e., sex) of a Republican candidate to Congress. They find no gender affinity effect. However, their results show that the female Republican candidate receives more electoral support than the male Republican candidate among Democratic and Independent participants. In contrast, the male candidate is preferred to the female candidate among Republican respondents of both genders.

Why does a citizen's gender matter sometimes but not others in politics? The lack of gender

gaps under many circumstances is especially puzzling when the impact of gender is compared to that of other group identities. Numerous scholars have shown that party identification is a social identity (e.g., Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Importantly, partisan labels cause bias in the evaluation of candidates with identical issue stances (e.g., Munro et al. 2003) and out-party labels produce opinion polarization on policy issues among partisans (e.g., Nicholson 2012). Analogously, ideological social identities and the corresponding liberal and conservative labels have been found to predict preferences for the ideological ingroup over the outgroup, independently of issue preferences (e.g., Mason 2018).

Why is shared gender between voters and candidates such a weak attractive force compared to other group attachments? The answer I propose looks beyond the outcome of the 2016 presidential election and cuts across the impact of group identities that have received a great deal of attention in American politics, such as partisanship and political ideology. I argue that shared gender is a weak predictor of support for women candidates because of the underestimated impact of identities at the gender subgroup level, which shape the different ways individuals process political information about candidates, campaigns, and elections and form political judgments about them. I specifically identify two strong but countervailing subgroup identities that divide the female electorate most strongly: "feminism" and "non-feminism."

The terms "feminism" and "feminist" are closely connected to and directly derive from the feminist movement, which can be historically divided into three main waves in the United States (Aronson 2003; Kroløkke and Sørensen 2006). The first wave began in the nineteenth century and concluded with the ratification of the 19th Amendment in 1920. It was indeed primarily concerned with the issue of women's suffrage. The second wave lasted from the 1960s through the 1980s and promoted laws protecting women's rights – the ERA, Title IX, and the Roe vs. Wade case. The

third wave began in the 1990s and has focused its efforts on including women with multiple marginalized identities within the mainstream movement. Across its three waves and despite its heterogeneity, the common theme of the feminist movement can be identified with the issue of gender equality and advocacy for the rights of women to be equal to those of men. The efforts of the movement have been mainly focused on mobilizing American women as a political force toward those goals. In other words, feminism can be viewed as the political arm of the concern for gender equality (Sears and Huddy 1992, p. 272).

Rather than merely representing either the opposite of feminism or the absence of feminism, "non-feminism" includes three ideologically distinct gender types, all bound together politically by their shared rejection of the feminist group label. It is thus important to keep in mind that these three types positively identify as "non-feminists." The first type consists of individuals who refuse the feminist label – and thus identify as non-feminist – but support core feminist tenets such as gender equality and endorse government efforts aimed at achieving such equality (i.e., "non-labelers"). The second type also self-identifies as non-feminists who believe men and women are equally capable, but do not support political solutions to guarantee equal treatment. I will refer to these as "gender individualists." This lack of support for the feminist political movement stems, therefore, from the belief that addressing gender inequality is not the role of government, but instead should be achieved by individual women addressing and overcoming the obstacles they face in the public sphere. The third type includes non-feminist individuals who dislike feminists as a group and hold explicitly inegalitarian, or discriminatory, gender attitudes. I will refer to this type as "gender inegalitarian" or "anti-feminist."

As a result, rather than failing to have a positive attachment to their gender group, many non-labeler and gender individualist women will vote against a female candidate if she explicitly

associates herself with what they perceive to be an outgroup – feminists. It is this *aversive* reaction to the label, rather than the actual substance of their politics, that drives many non-feminists away from women candidates. In this dissertation, I explore how these gender subgroups, and in particular the non-feminist group identity, explain why women have been and continue to be so politically divided. I argue that what lies behind this heterogeneity are primarily two factors: the adoption of a gender subgroup – feminist or non-feminist – label and the adoption or rejection of different gender ideologies.

The idea that labels used by elites and pundits may have a powerful impact in American politics is not new. It is, however, worth discussing and reflecting on where the adoption versus the rejection of politically salient labels comes from and what it depends on. Most of all, political elites can strategically deploy certain labels against their opponents in order to lead the electorate to perceive those labels increasingly negatively over time, thus reducing the popular adoption of the group label. The political impact of adopting some labels versus others, either independently of or in conjunction with the actual policy content they imply, is the central theme of this dissertation. I employ the tug of war between feminism and non-feminism as my case study. The key insight is that non-feminism is a positive identity in and of itself rather than the absence of feminism. In other words, individuals can positively identify as non-feminists, and self-labeled non-feminists are not only distinct from self-labeled feminists but also far more ideologically diverse (spanning non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians).

1.2 Labels in American Society and Politics

The relevance of publicly salient labels in U.S. politics has been studied in regard to both partisanship and political ideology. As for party ID, more than 40 percent of the public reported that they were Independents, according to a survey conducted in July 2015 by the Pew Research

Center (Klar and Krupnikov 2016, p. 152). This constitutes a large proportion both in absolute terms and in relation to the recent past. Klar and Krupnikov (2016) argue that only a minority of those self-reported Independents are actually removed from both parties. Indeed, many of them are unlikely to endorse a bipartisan compromise if that compromise involves their preferred party giving something up. Why do these voters then intentionally misrepresent their partisanship and call themselves "Independents" if they are partisan in their political attitudes? People are motivated by the desire to make the most positive impression they can on others. Identification as an Independent satisfies this self-monitoring need, as Independents are generally perceived as free thinkers, open to the truth, and competent (2016, p. 8). In contrast, partisans on either side tend to be viewed as negative, angry, personally unlikable, and untrustworthy (2016, p. 81). The label of Independent thus enables self-identifiers to go undercover and avoid the social undesirability conveyed by partisan labels. Similarly, the need to be viewed positively by men and other women may also be at the root of many self-identified non-feminist women's reluctance to embrace the feminist label due to its perceived negative connotations.

As for political ideology in terms of the liberal-conservative dimension, Converse (1964) was one of the first scholars to propose that the mass public holds unconstrained issue positions and, accordingly, does not organize their policy views coherently on the left-right spectrum. In other words, political ideology does not constitute an integrated "belief system" and Americans are largely "innocent" of ideology in terms of policy preferences (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). However, another approach argues that issue positions are insufficient and inadequate to understand ideology. Instead, ideological "labels" imply a sense of psychological and emotional attachment to a group that is unrelated to any set of issue positions and a rejection of outgroups (e.g., Conover and Feldman 1981; Devine 2015; Malka and Lelkes 2010).

Ellis and Stimson (2012) analyze this same paradox in contemporary American public opinion. They distinguish between the traditional view of political ideology as issue-based (i.e., operational) and the more recent view of political ideology as identity-based (i.e., symbolic). Specifically, on the one hand, the concept of operational ideology refers to what citizens believe the government should or should not do with respect to issues of public policy. On the other hand, symbolic ideology captures how citizens think about themselves ideologically: whether they consider themselves liberal, conservative, moderate, or something else. Ellis and Stimson demonstrate that the public is operationally liberal but symbolically conservative. This means that on average, the mass public holds liberal preferences in regard to economic, social, and cultural issues. They tend to support more government intervention, more public spending, and a more tolerant agenda in the social sphere. At the same time, however, Americans support a conservative approach to public policy and express a disdain for the liberal label, while preferring the conservative one.

The number of ideological mismatchers (people who identify as conservatives but have liberal policy preferences) is much greater than the number of ideological conservatives (2012, pp. 96-97). These "conflicted conservatives" choose a label that does not reflect their policy views due to the now-pejorative connotation of the label "liberal" as compared to the popularity and esteem associated with the label "conservative" among the mass public (e.g., Jennings 1992). The term liberal has indeed become increasingly correlated with support for the "undeserving poor" and those who seek to attack mainstream institutions and values (Ellis and Stimson 2012). The repellent power of the liberal label is exemplified by the fact that conflicted conservatives have far more in common with self-identified liberals than self-identified conservatives, although they share an ideological label with the latter rather than the former. Moreover, liberals have

increasingly turned to other labels, such as "progressive," in order to distance themselves from a negatively perceived label (Ellis and Stimson 2012, pp. 175-76). This behavior is analogous to non-labelers' decision to adopt the non-feminist label although they endorse core feminist principles in order to distance themselves from the negatively charged label of feminists.

From a partisan-ideological perspective, the popular stigmatization of the liberal label and the favor in which the conservative label is instead held in elite discourse have led to the emergence of the group of self-identified "conservative Democrats" (Schiffer 2000). Their proportion within the electorate has stayed fairly consistent – about 9 percent – since 1972 in spite of the expected countervailing impact of the Southern realignment (e.g., Black and Black 1987; Miller and Shanks 1996) and recent ideological polarization (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Analogously to Ellis and Stimson (2012), Schiffer (2000) finds that the persistence of these discordant self-identifiers is due to symbolic ideology rather than being reflective of actual issue-based ideology. Indeed, on conservative issues such as guaranteed jobs and spending for government services, conservative Democrats are strongly and significantly distinct from conservative Republicans. At the same time, the issue distance between conservative and moderate Democrats is small. Further, conservative Democrats are on average more liberal than moderate Republicans. It seems conservative Democrats are ideologically unconstrained Democrats who choose an ideological label that garners positive rather than negative social regard.

1.3 Gender Group Identification: Meanings and Implications

Group identification is politically consequential because it links an individual to the social world. When identifying with others, a person takes on "both shared meanings, as to what that categorical label implies, as well as elements of a common agenda for behavior and action" (Deaux et al. 1997, p. 91). Drawing on Tajfel, I define gender identity as residing in "that *part* of an

individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a [gender] group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1978, p. 63). The underlying assumption is that no matter how complex an individual's view of herself or himself is, some aspects of identity stem from being a member of certain groups as opposed to others. In other words, social identity acquires meaning only by comparing our own group to others. We look at the surrounding social environment in a way that enables us not only to distinguish between our group and other groups, but also to make our group compare favorably. It is the perception of positive distinctiveness from relevant outgroups that props up our self-esteem. This became, of course, the central insight of one of the foundational theories in the study of intergroup relations, Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

However, the relational underpinnings of gender identity are markedly different from those of other social identities in every society. For instance, despite the fact that the U.S. society remains stratified along both racial and gender lines, and that both racism and sexism are well-documented in many aspects of social and political life, the situation of women as a group has peculiarities that are dissimilar to those experienced by other disadvantaged groups. When it comes to women, the relevant outgroup is men. Favorable group comparisons and distinctiveness between men and women are complicated by a number of factors.

As with other politically underrepresented groups, all women have some interests in common – a monopoly on childbearing and a near monopoly on family caregiving in most human societies, a subordinate economic position to men, and so on. Nonetheless, Gurin (1985) found that women were not as group conscious as African Americans, older people, or blue-collar workers. In particular, the proportion of Blacks who closely identify with other Blacks was three times larger than the proportion of women identifying with other women. Why is that the case?

The most profound obstacle to the development of gender consciousness and solidarity among women lies in the structure of their relations with both men and other women. Indeed, group solidarity as well as the acknowledgement of group deprivation and discrimination are developed when members interact more with each other than with the outgroup, when intimate interactions are limited to the ingroup, and when interactions with the outgroup are characterized by competition rather than intimacy (Williams 1975). However, women's interactions and relations with other women are sometimes competitive, while they usually experience close family and emotional ties to men during their lifetime. Furthermore, they may derive social status, protection, and powerful material rewards from their roles as homemakers, wives, and/or mothers. In other words, many women have a vested interest in maintaining social structures that simultaneously reinforce gender inequality. Therefore, the meaning of gender identification is likely to vary according to a woman's gender role norms (Cook 1989).

When faced with an unfavorable comparison with men, women have two choices, as leaving the group is practically impossible for objective (i.e., physical) reasons. They can: 1) "change [their] interpretations of the attributes of the group so that its unwelcome features (e.g. low status) are either justified or made acceptable;" or 2) "accept the situation for what it is and engage in social action which would lead to desirable changes in the situation" (Tajfel 1978, p. 64). In the first case, women strive to achieve positively valued gender identity by individual means, namely by comparing themselves with other women – rather than with men. For instance, this applies to women who accept their domestic role and derive satisfaction and self-esteem from it, while comparing themselves to other women who do not share their values and standards. In the second case, women have an awareness that their gender status position is illegitimate and subject to change. Thus, they are willing to address and redefine the intergroup situation by

collective action as a strategy to improve women's position and reduce gender-based power inequities. For example, this applies to women who refuse to accept the traditional definition of themselves shaped by the outgroup – men – and associate themselves with the feminist movement and its goals to various extents.

In sum, among women, gender identity may have different implications as a result of competing interpretations about what 'identifying as a woman' means. Does it mean identifying as a non-feminist who sees herself primarily as a caregiver, wife, and/or mother, or identifying as a feminist who prioritizes gender equality and advocacy for women's rights? Women can indeed identify with other women without holding feminist beliefs or values. In other words, the importance of being a woman itself is likely to have very different consequences for some women compared to others. This heterogeneity can be effectively studied through the lens of feminism and non-feminism.

1.4 Feminism and Non-Feminism

Gender is only one of the identities individuals – both voters and policy-makers – may feel an attachment to. Each individual is likely to identify with multiple, often crosscutting social groups at once (e.g., Brewer and Pierce 2005; Roccas and Brewer 2002). Thus, my theoretical framework encompasses multiple ingroup-outgroup categories by including both group-level – gender and partisanship – and subgroup-level – feminism and non-feminism – identities at the same time. Specifically, accounting for gender identification as well as for feminist or non-feminist identification is important because the former is distinct from the latter both conceptually and empirically. In other words, identification with a gender group is compatible with and can translate into either identification as a feminist or as a non-feminist. Furthermore, distinguishing between feminism and non-feminism as identities is crucial, as both labels are actively chosen by a large

number of Americans to define themselves. But how popular are these labels within the American public? To what extent are these subgroup labels actually embraced in the United States?

Overall support for the women's movement appears to have either increased or remained stable since the mid-1970s through the 1990s (Hall and Rodriguez 2003). In particular, according to data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), average support for the women's movement increased from 32 percent in 1970 to 52 percent in 1974 and remained relatively stable in the low 60s% from the mid-1980s. However, Hall and Rodriguez (2003) also find that a significant share of women believe that the women's movement has made family life more difficult. Moreover, while two-thirds to three-quarters of both men and women reported "very" or "mostly favorable" opinions of the women's movement in the late 1980s and 1990s, feminists as a group often receive quite negative evaluations (Huddy, Neely, and Lafay 2000, pp. 320-21). Indeed, feminists as a group receive more mixed and negative evaluations than the movement itself. Average warmth toward feminists ranges from 53 percent in 1988 to 56 percent in 2016, according to ANES data.

Importantly, to date, the proportion of women who self-identify as feminists is highly variable. Between 1989 and 1999, only a quarter to a third of American women responded affirmatively when asked if they considered themselves to be a feminist or not (Huddy et al. 2000, pp. 325-26). By 2016, that number had increased to about 51 percent (12 percent said they were a strong feminist, and 39 percent said they were a feminist) according to survey data from the ANES. An even larger share, 60 percent, of women identified as feminists (17 percent as strong feminists and 43 percent as feminists) according a national survey of 1,600 adults conducted by The

Washington Post/Kaiser family Foundation from May-June 2015 over the phone.[7] However, results from a Huffington Post/YouGov poll of 1,000 adults conducted in April 2013 show that when asked if they consider themselves a feminist, an anti-feminist, or neither, the proportion of self-identified feminist women may be much smaller: about 23 percent.[8] The differences between these percentages are large and significant, but we do not know what they stem from. One of the goals of the studies I present in the following chapters is to address the uncertainty regarding the relative proportion of gender subgroups by relying on both large, diverse, and representative samples of the U.S. adult population and more comprehensive and nuanced measures of strength of feminist and non-feminist identification.

Furthermore, key differences between White and Black women have historically emerged regarding their support for the feminist movement in the United States (Simien 2004). Huddy, Neely, and Lafay (2000, p. 347) show that two-thirds of African Americans agree that Black feminist groups have been helping the Black community by advancing the cause of Black women. Mansbridge and Tate (1992, p. 48) argue that African American women have been more supportive of feminism and the women's movement than White women. Similarly, Hall and Rodriguez (2003, p. 889) find that more African Americans support the women's movement than Whites and Hispanics. This divide is particularly large for the most supportive attitudes: more African Americans have "very favorable" opinions of the women's movement than do Hispanics and Whites. In other words, support for feminism and feminists appears to be a more divisive issue

[7] Hamel, Liz, Jamie Firth, Scott Clement, and Mollyann Brodie. January 28, 2016. "Washington Post/ Kaiser Family Foundation Feminism Survey." https://www.kff.org/other/poll-finding/washington-post-kaiser-family-foundation-feminism-survey/ (Accessed October 25, 2019).

[8] Swanson, Emily. April 16, 2013. "Poll: Few Identify as Feminists, But Most Believe in Equality of Sexes." https://www.huffpost.com/entry/feminism-poll_n_3094917 (Accessed October 25, 2019).

among White than Black women. Views about feminism and adoption of the feminist label can therefore be interpreted as major sources of disunity among women, particularly among White women, and key tools enabling us to interpret those divides.

Although the feminist label ensues from the legacy of the feminist movement and although the feminist movement has been mainly concerned with gender inequality, there is more to the feminist label than support for feminist principles. Evidence from existing work highlights that support for feminists and support for gender equality are not equivalent. In fact, the divide both among women and between men and women appears much less pronounced with regard to gender equality as compared to views about feminists and acceptance of the feminist label. Support for gender equality is overwhelming: when asked if they believe that "men and women should be social, political, and economic equals," 82 percent of both female and male respondents responded affirmatively in a Huffington Post/YouGov poll conducted in 2013 (Swanson 2013). Nonetheless, from a socio-demographic perspective, some groups tend to advocate for gender equality more than others. For instance, women who are employed, high-income, younger, and well-educated tend to be more supportive of gender equality than those who are nonworking, low-income, older, and less well-educated (Sears and Huddy 1992, p. 275).

The combination of the fact that a large proportion of women – between 40 and 75 percent – reject the feminist label while a substantial share of those women are supportive of gender equality suggests non-feminism has become a potent identity in America. Rather than merely representing either the opposite of feminist gender ideology or the absence of feminist identity, non-feminism is a positive umbrella identity that includes three distinct types of citizens: non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians. These groups will be discussed in more detail below, but the central point is that non-feminist identifiers hold a much wider range of beliefs

about gender than do feminists.

In the remaining of this chapter, I will present a theory of gender identities at the subgroup level that enables us to explain the main sources and effects of political heterogeneity within gender groups, namely among men and women. First, I will distinguish between feminist gender ideology and feminist identification. I will then discuss the main factors predicting individuals' willingness to adopt either the feminist or the non-feminist label. Next, I will describe how these gender subgroup identifications are associated with several other gender attitudes, such as sexism, and political behaviors, such as political activism and support of women candidates. Finally, I will outline the differences between feminists and the three types of non-feminists – non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians. I conclude the chapter by presenting five hypotheses that will be tested in the following empirical chapters.

1.5 A Theory of Gender-Based Political Subgroups and Types

Antecedents and Predictors of Feminist vs. Non-Feminist Self-Labeling

Feminist identification is marked by an individual's willingness to embrace the feminist label, while non-feminist identification ensues from an individual's choice to eschew the feminist label and adopt the alternative label of "non-feminist." In this section, I discuss what we know about predictors of feminist and non-feminist self-labeling. Indeed, when it comes to feminism and non-feminism, measuring the antecedents and sources of self-identification is not clear-cut. This process is complicated by the complex relationship between feminist gender ideology and feminist self-labeling. By feminist gender ideology, I mean the core ideas underlying the feminist movement, namely support for gender equality, women's rights, and women's empowerment. A large literature has demonstrated that many women hold those pro-feminist attitudes and beliefs but still reject the feminist "label" (Burn, Aboud, and Moyles 2000; Cowan, Mestlin, and Masek

1992; Duncan 2010; Liss et al. 2000; Myaskovsky and Wittig 1997; Renzetti 1987; Williams and Wittig 1997). In other words, feminist gender ideology and feminist identity are correlated but distinct constructs. Ideology per se cannot explain why women do not favor female over male candidates, since many women who endorse basic feminist ideas still vote against candidates who call themselves feminists.

Nevertheless, some research on the socio-political consequences of feminism conflates feminist gender ideology with feminist identity. In fact, two of the most common survey instruments employed to measure feminism are often misrepresented as measures of feminist identity, although they actually constitute measures of feminist gender ideology. The first instrument is Downing and Roush's (1985) Feminist Identity Development Model. This model is based on a developmental trajectory consisting of five stages. Women begin in a stage of Passive Acceptance of traditional gender roles and sexist discrimination. They then move on to the Revelation stage, in which they become aware of gendered oppression as well as its consequences. The third period is called Embeddedness-Emanation, when women immerse themselves in woman-oriented intellectual contexts, connect and develop supportive relationships with other women, and gradually open themselves toward interacting with men. The fourth stage, Synthesis, is characterized by the development of an authentic and positive feminist identity. In the final stage, Active Commitment, women are actively committed to working on behalf of women's rights. Although the word "identity" is used to define this model, the scale represents a measure assessing the adherence to different degrees of feminist gender ideology, rather than different degrees of adoption of the feminist label.

The second instrument is the Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS; Henley et al. 1998). The idea behind this measure is that feminism is not a monolithic perspective. Thus, the authors

develop six theoretically motivated perspectives or approaches to feminism. Liberal feminism is characterized by a belief that men and women are equal, that equality of opportunity should be assured by law, and that the government should be limited to a public sphere. Radical feminism views gender oppression as the oldest, most widespread, and most deep-rooted form of human oppression. Women are considered a politically oppressed group and, therefore, they have a bond with other women that is stronger than any bond they may have with men based on shared class or race. Socialist feminism sees all forms of oppression, whether based on gender, class, or race, as equally abhorrent. It further considers sexism, class oppression, and racism as fundamentally inseparable evils that are mutually reinforcing. Cultural feminism focuses on "masculine" values (e.g., force, aggressiveness, emotional inexpressiveness) that are held by both men and women. It regards them as destructive of humane relations. Women of color feminism or Womanism addresses racism and the exclusion of women of color from the women's movement. Accordingly, it recognizes poverty, racial discrimination, and ethnocentrism as equally important and intertwined with sexism. Additionally, Henley et al. (1998) describe conservativism as a political theory with implications for feminist issues. It reflects traditional (i.e., non-feminist) attitudes about gender roles and relationships. It mainly aims to keep men dominant and in public roles, and women subordinate and in private realms. As the Feminist Identity Development Model, the FPS scale is a measure of types of feminist gender ideology rather than types of identity. This distinction is crucial because it enables us to more accurately account for individuals who are supportive of feminist beliefs without necessarily being willing to embrace the feminist label.

The main takeaway from the previous discussion is that feminist gender ideology does not necessarily map onto identities in any direct way. Among others, Williams and Wittig (1997) compare predictors of pro-feminist orientation (i.e., feminist gender ideology) and feminist self-

identification. In regard to feminist gender ideology, support of feminist goals and positive evaluations of feminists are the only statistically significant predictors. In contrast, several variables significantly contribute to predicting feminist identification: respondents' gender, support of feminist goals, positive evaluations of feminists, previous exposure to feminist thought, and belief in collective action, although only positive evaluations of feminists and exposure to feminism provide a unique contribution. In sum, although positive evaluations of feminists predict both feminist gender ideology and feminist identification, others only predict one but not the other, thus demonstrating that ideology and identification are not equivalent. Moreover, the power of evaluations of feminists in predicting one's willingness to identify as a feminist is larger among female than male student participants.

Eisele and Stake (2008) also make the distinction between ideology and identification. Specifically, they study the differential relationships of feminist attitudes or, in other words, ideology (i.e., beliefs in the feminist goal of gender equality that do not require either public or private identification with any group) and feminist identity (i.e., a social identity that requires explicit self-identification as a feminist) to self-efficacy. They survey college students prior to and after taking women's and gender studies classes. Their results indicate that feminist identity partially mediates the positive impact of feminist attitudes to personal efficacy and feminist activism before enrolling in those courses, and to class-related feelings of empowerment and feminist activism after completing those courses. This suggests that feminist attitudes and beliefs are indirectly related to feminist activism through the adoption of the feminist label. This further means that feminist beliefs are a precondition for accepting the feminist label, and the label adds something to those beliefs.

In terms of socio-demographic predictors, women are on average significantly more

willing than men to self-identify as feminists (e.g., Anderson 2009; Burn et al. 2000; McCabe 2005; Williams and Wittig 1997). This is not particularly surprising since the feminist movement has focused on addressing women's unequal position and promoting equal rights and empowerment for women. Moreover, self-labeled feminists tend to have a higher level of education, have higher income, and be more likely to work outside the home as compared to non-feminists (e.g., Cook 1993). Huddy and Willmann (2017) also find that feminists are more likely to display lower levels of religiosity across both genders as well as single marital status and higher education levels among women. Similarly, McCabe's (2005) results based on data from the 1996 General Social Survey indicate that years of education are positively associated with the predicted probability of feminist self-labeling. In contrast, living in rural areas or medium-sized communities is negatively associated with feminist self-identification. Race, age, income, marital status, and employment status are not statistically significant predictors. Further, both Republican and conservative respondents are less likely to identify as feminists. Based on ideal types, a single, White, urban woman who is liberal and Democratic has a .62 probability of self-identifying as a feminist compared to .37 for a similar man, ceteris paribus. In contrast, a single, White, rural woman who is conservative and Republican merely has a .08 probability of self-identifying as a feminist, while that probability is .03 for a similar man (McCabe 2005, p. 490).

When investigating predictors of gender subgroup self-labeling rather than ideology, it is important to understand how different labels are perceived and interpreted by the public, as those perceptions can help us explain individuals' (un)willingness to adopt those labels. A large proportion of the U.S. electorate interpret the label "feminist" as negative: overall, 37 percent perceive the feminist label as negative, 29 percent view it as neutral, and only 26 percent see it as positive (Swanson 2013). Across genders, 32 percent of women and 42 percent of men consider

"feminist" a "completely negative" or "mostly negative" term. Accordingly, a number of studies have examined attitudes toward and stereotypes about feminism and feminists that contribute to explain individuals' reluctance to embrace the corresponding label.

Haddock and Zanna (1994) compare attitudes toward housewives and feminists. Their results show that feminists are evaluated significantly less favorably than housewives among both female and male student respondents, although men hold more negative attitudes toward feminists than women do. Similarly, Twenge and Zucker (1999) compare the evaluations and stereotypes of feminists and of the "typical/average woman." Their undergraduate respondents consider the following attributes as typical of a feminist: serious, intelligent, knowledgeable, productive, and of the present, on the one hand, but also stubborn, angry, nontraditional, anti-male, and radical, on the other hand. Overall, left-leaning political beliefs and assertive/career-oriented behavior are the two categories that are considered most typical of feminists, followed by gender (i.e., being female). Furthermore, when compared to the average woman, feminists receive significantly more negative evaluations overall and are viewed as less likely to be heterosexual, more assertive/career oriented, and more politically liberal. Overall, both Haddock and Zanna's (1994) and Twenge and Zucker's (1999) findings help us understand why many women may be reluctant to either call themselves or be called feminists as opposed to housewives or simply women.

Stereotypes about feminists as a group are clearly a part of their stigmatization in American politics. Anderson (2009) studies how those stereotypes vary across gender: feminist women as compared to feminist men. Her sample consists of college students who are asked to rate four terms – "man," "woman," "feminist man," or "feminist woman" – on semantic differential scales. Regression results indicate that both women and men evaluate "feminist man" more positively than "feminist woman." However, "feminist woman" is rated significantly higher on the potency

dimension than “feminist man” among respondents of both genders, although she is still rated lower in potency than “man.” In terms of sexual/physical attractiveness, women rate “man” as more attractive than “feminist man,” and men similarly rate “woman” as more attractive than “feminist woman.” On the confidence dimension, women rate “feminist woman” as the most confident, while men rate “feminist man” as equally confident as “feminist woman.” Finally, “feminist man” is viewed as the least heterosexual among the four stimulus terms. In sum, Anderson’s (2009) results reinforce the idea that feminist women may be punished more harshly than men and be considered as less attractive than non-feminist women due to their association with the group.

In a female student sample, Leaper and Arias (2011) examine if and to what extent feminist self-labeling is predicted by background factors (parent education and ethnic minority status), gender-related experiences (sexual harassment and exposure to feminism), gender-related cognitions (gender identity, egalitarian beliefs, and sexism awareness), and feminist stereotyping. The two largest and statistically significant independent variables are having learned about feminism and holding less stereotyped views of feminists. In particular, three stereotypes negatively influence women’s willingness to call themselves feminists: “undesirable” (vs. “desirable”), “plain” (vs. “sexy”), and “gay” (vs. “straight”). These specific stereotypes suggest that feminist self-labeling may negatively impact how women are perceived by men and may make feminist women less appealing than non-feminist ones.

Negative and/or stereotypical perceptions of the feminist label can also help us explain why Alexander and Ryan (1997) find that the majority – 61 percent – of undergraduate women in their sample are at least somewhat reluctant to identify with the group. The main positive qualifications chosen by their respondents include statements as the following: “I’m a feminist, but I come from

a traditional background/family;" "I'm a feminist as long as no men are around;" "I'm a feminist, but not a radical;" and "I'm a feminist, but I don't want to be grouped with all those other feminists." Among the self-identified non-feminist respondents, negative qualifications include "I'm not a feminist because I come from a traditional family/background;" "I'm not a feminist because men don't like it;" "I'm not a feminist because I'm not radical;" and "I'm not a feminist, but I believe in what they stand for." In other words, many women are concerned about being considered radical or being judged negatively by men if they were to embrace the label of feminist.

The risk of experiencing prejudice and discrimination as a result of feminist self-labeling applies to a variety of public settings. Anastasopoulos and Desmarais (2015) explore the consequences of unfavorable stereotypes of feminists in the context of both a workplace setting and a social setting – specifically, a first impression study – within an undergraduate sample. Their results show that the feminist label leads to prejudicial evaluations of a job candidate, although it does not preclude her from being hired. Furthermore, feminist self-identification predicts discrimination in student peers' willingness to both befriend and date a female confederate. A woman who publicly refers to herself as a feminist is thus likely to face social ostracism from others.

Other studies specifically show how views about feminism and feminists are correlated with feminist self-identification. Cowan, Mestlin, and Masek (1992) test predictors of feminist identity, measured as the degree of agreement with the statement "I consider myself a feminist." According to their findings, only opinion of the feminist movement and pro-feminist beliefs regarding women's role (measured through a subset of items from the Attitudes Toward Women Scale, or AWS) significantly contribute to self-labeling as a feminist.[9] Myaskovsky and Wittig

[9] The AWS scale was created and first presented by Spence and Helmreich (1972).

(1997) also examine factors explaining identification as a feminist in a sample of undergraduate women. Support of feminist goals, positive opinion of the feminist movement, and exposure to feminism are significant and unique predictors of feminist identity. Liss et al. (2001) analyze predictors of feminist and non-feminist identity by measuring them both as dichotomous and as continuous variables, within a sample of female college students. They find that the adoption of the feminist label and degree of feminist self-identification are positively and significantly predicted by having positive general evaluations of feminists and not having conservative beliefs about gender. In sum, while negative stereotypes about feminists may lead some women away from feminist self-labeling, positive views may conversely encourage women to adopt the label.

The causal impact of negative vs. positive stereotypes about feminists on women's willingness to self-identify as a feminist has been studied by Roy, Weibust, and Miller (2007). Female college participants were randomly assigned to read one of three paragraphs: one including positive stereotypes about feminists (i.e., strong, independent, intelligent, knowledgeable, active, confident, and assertive), one including negative stereotypes about feminists (i.e., overbearing, stubborn, angry, opinionated, anti-male, demanding, and aggressive), and one that was unrelated to feminists in the control condition. Women who were told that feminists are viewed negatively were not less likely to identify as feminists compared to women in the control condition. It is noteworthy that both women reading about negative feminist stereotypes and women reading the control paragraph were equally unlikely to adopt the feminist label, thus suggesting that the perception of the label "feminist" as socially stigmatizing tends to be the norm. However, female subjects became almost twice as likely to identify as feminists in the positive feminist stereotype condition. Roy, Weibust, and Miller's (2007) findings raise the question of where those positive views and stereotypes come from and of whether and how they can be fostered.

Extant research demonstrates that exposure to positive depictions of feminism and feminists plays a significant and positive role in counteracting the impact of negative stereotypes and ultimately explaining individuals' acceptance of the feminist label. In this regard, Reid and Purcell (2004) study mediators of the relationship between life experiences that expose an individual to feminists and/or feminist gender ideology and self-identification as a feminist in a sample of female college students. Through a mediation model, they show that previous exposure to feminism is significantly associated with heightened common fate with other women and less negative evaluations of "the average feminist," which, in turn, predict strength of feminist identification. In particular, stereotypes about feminists are measured by relying on a number of dimensions: attractiveness (undesirable-desirable, ugly-beautiful, plain-sexy, not concerned with appearance-very concerned with appearance), gender and sexuality (masculine-feminine, frigid-sexual, gay-straight), attitudes toward men (hate men-like men), and ideology (radical-traditional). Furthermore, when gender common fate and negative evaluations of feminists are accounted for, the exposure-identification relationship goes to zero, thus indicating that it is indeed mediated by these two variables.

In sum, there appear to be multiple barriers to women's adoption of a feminist identity. Self-identified non-feminist women may actively seek to distance themselves from feminism because of the social stigma attached to the label, negative evaluations and stereotypes about feminists, and a lack of exposure to positive depictions of feminism and feminists through formal education, reading feminist texts, or having personal relationships with feminists (e.g., Cowan, Mestlin, and Masek 1992; Leaper and Arias 2011; Liss et al. 2001; Myaskovsky and Wittig 1997; Reid and Purcell 2004; Roy, Weibust, and Miller 2007; Zucker 2004). However, there are relatively fewer obstacles preventing women from embracing basic feminist principles such as

gender equity in the public sphere. The pervasiveness of individuals' disdain for certain politically salient labels has been shown in regard to political ideology (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Schiffer 2000) and partisanship (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), but not in relation to gender. What we know is that a large majority of the U.S. electorate support gender equality, but only a minority self-identify as feminists (e.g., Huddy et al. 2000; McCabe 2005; Zucker and Bay-Cheng 2010).

Feminist and Non-Feminist Self-Labeling: Correlates, Implications, and Consequences

I have proposed that the inconsistent findings related to the impact of gender group membership and identity on electoral behavior stem from the neglect of two highly publicly salient identifications and labels at the subgroup level that play a role above and beyond gender itself: feminism and non-feminism. In the previous section, I discussed some of the most important factors predicting the adoption of the feminist vs. non-feminist label. But what can these labels help us explain? In this section, I will turn to describing the socially and politically relevant attitudes and behaviors impacted by gender subgroup identities.

Exploring the distinction between gender identification and attachments to specific subgroups is crucial because identifying as a woman is less politically consequential than is identifying as a feminist (e.g., hooks 2000a, 2000b). In terms of electoral behavior, Cook and Wilcox (1991) find that the divide in voting is not between men and women, but between feminist men and women, on the one side, and non-feminist men and women, on the other side. Female feminists share an emotional bond with other women that stems not only from their gender identity as women but also from their political identity as feminists (Conover and Sapiro 1993). This may help us further explain why the impact of evaluations of feminists is stronger among women, and why women are more likely than men to adopt the feminist label. Additionally, in regard to candidate preference and vote choice, Cook (1993) finds that feminists felt warmer and were more

likely to vote for the Democratic candidate in presidential elections in which candidates took clearly divergent positions on women's issues from 1972-1988. The significant impact of feminist identity remains after controlling for socio-demographics (i.e., education and income), partisanship, political ideology, and specific policy positions. However, feminist women are willing to defect from Democratic candidates when those candidates do not support feminist positions and another candidate does. This is what happened in 1980 when feminists were more likely to vote for Carter than for Reagan, but they felt warmer toward John Anderson than Jimmy Carter and were much more likely than non-feminists to vote for Anderson, as he took liberal positions on feminist issues.

Feminist identification, but not gender identification, is also powerfully associated with awareness of sexism and willingness or ability to address it. Henderson-King and Stewart (1994) find that feminist identification is more strongly and positively correlated than gender identification with a sense of discontent regarding the social power and influence of feminists, sensitivity to sexism, and a sense of common fate with other women within an undergraduate sample of women.

In contrast to non-feminist identity, feminist identity also contributes to shield individuals from the negative impact of sexist experiences. Landrine and Klonoff (1997) study the consequences of and remedies for sexist discrimination, which contributes to physical and psychiatric symptoms among women regardless of how those women appraise sexist acts. Their results strongly suggest that feminist identification mediates the negative impact of sexist events on women by providing them with a cognitive framework for interpreting sexist experiences as an aspect of the reality of gender, thereby decreasing internal (i.e., self-blame) attributions and increasing active coping. In particular, Landrine and Klonoff find that sexist discrimination has a

greater negative impact on the health of non-feminists than that of feminists, although feminists report sexist experiences more frequently and assess them as more distressing. This result may depend on the fact that non-feminists, lacking a feminist schema, misunderstand sexism as a response to them as individuals and blame themselves for it. In contrast, feminists find sexist events stressful because they view them as inherently unfair societally although not directed at them personally. Feminist identification may therefore represent a resource for women and girls that can insulate them to some extent from the damaging effects of the sexist discrimination they experience. This is one general benefit of the basic strategy of the feminist movement to calling attention to the existence, injustice, and dangers of "sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression" (hooks 2000a, p. 1).

Moreover, feminist self-labeling may help identifiers to address sexual harassment. Leaper and Arias (2011) investigate women's self-identification with feminism in relation to their cognitive appraisals of coping responses to sexual harassment in a sample of college women. Confronting the perpetrator (i.e., "[telling] someone to stop behaving in a harassing way") appears to be strongly and significantly predicted by identifying publicly as feminists, in addition to holding fewer stereotypes about feminists.

In addition to responses to gender-based discrimination, a number of scholars have analyzed the relationship between feminist or non-feminist self-labeling and political activism. Among others, Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) conduct a two-stage survey to study social psychological predictors of several different forms of participation in favor of women's rights: involvement in women's groups or organizations, collective protest, informal participation (i.e., discussing women's issues with friends or colleagues, and reading publications or watching films about women's issues), and individual protest (i.e., contacting elected representatives, contacting

the media, and signing a petition). Among the explanatory variables, gender identification is measured by aggregating identification both as a woman and as a feminist. Within their sample of female activists and students, Kelly's and Breinlinger's analyses show that gender identity (i.e., combined with feminist identity, by design) has the strongest significant impact on all types of action. Moreover, it moderates relationships between other predictors (women's relative deprivation, efficacy, and collectivist orientation) and self-reported participation. This constitutes preliminary evidence that identifying as a feminist may lead women to become more politically involved and active in regard to women's rights.

Similarly, Liss, Crawford, and Popp (2004) examine predictors of collective action in a sample of female undergraduates. Specifically, they measure collective action as the number of behaviors respondents participated in over the previous two years among: attending a rally for women's rights, signing on a petition on a women's issue, contributing to a fundraiser for a women's cause, participating in a prochoice rally or march, petitioning for women's acceptance in an exclusively male club or activity, participating in a rape victims' vigil, and attending events at a women's center. The variables that are most strongly and positively correlated with these collective activities are feminist self-labeling, a belief in gender collectivism, and life experiences (i.e., having taken classes that focus on gender and women's issues, having a mother who considers herself a feminist, and having experienced gender-based discrimination). Holding conservative beliefs is also significantly negatively related to activism on behalf of women. These results further points to the positive relationship between feminist identity and collective action.

In a sample of lesbian and bisexual women, Szymanski (2004) also studies the relationship between self-identification as a feminist and involvement in feminist activities. The activities range from conducting research, reading, writing, teaching, and speaking about feminist/women's issues,

organizing feminist events or activities, and participating in feminist demonstrations, marches, or rallies, to contacting public officials regarding women's issues, donating money to feminist groups or causes, and voting for candidates who support feminist issues. Szymanski's results show that feminist activism is uniquely predicted by feminist identification. In sum, willingness to self-identify as a feminist plays an important role in actual involvement in collective political action among women of different sexual orientations.

Moreover, Duncan (1999) shows that feminist consciousness is not only directly related to higher levels of participation in collective action for women's rights, but it also mediates the relationship between personality and life experience variables – moral traditionalism, political salience, experiences with gendered oppression (experiencing sexual harassment and/or identifying as lesbian or bisexual), education level, and education specifically about women's position in society – on the one side, and women's rights activism, on the other side. In other words, developing group consciousness as a feminist (of which feminist identification is a component) is a necessary step in individuals' dedication to women's rights activism.

Political activism is strongly linked not only to feminist identity, but also to feminist gender ideology. Indeed, drawing on Downing and Roush's (1985) Feminist Identity Development Model, Fischer et al. (2000) conducts a factor analysis whose results indeed suggest that the largest factor and a necessary component in the development of feminist gender ideology is active commitment, namely deep commitment to social change, which involves working toward gender equality, being involved in activism to improve women's status, and one's broader motivation and commitment to an egalitarian world.[10]

[10] Active Commitment is the final (i.e., fifth) stage of feminist identity development (Downing and Roush 1985).

In sum, there is a great deal of evidence that women who strongly identify with women as a group but do not label themselves as feminists, are substantially less likely to endorse collective efforts to eliminate gender inequality, or even to perceive such inequality in the first place. In particular, feminists are more likely than non-feminists to report sharing a sense of common fate with other women, perceiving gender-based discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexism as relevant or problematic, believing in the efficacy and appropriateness of collective action and activism in the struggle for women's rights and gender equality, and supporting political candidates who are associated with feminism (e.g., Cook and Wilcox 1991; Duncan 1999; Henderson-King and Stewart 1994; Kelly and Breinlinger 1995; Landrine and Klonoff 1997; Leaper and Arias 2011; Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004; Swim and Hyers 1999; Szymanski 2004). In contrast, self-labeled non-feminists are more likely to accept traditional gender roles as compared to feminists (e.g., Cowan, Mestlin, and Masek 1992; Liss et al. 2001).

However, the electorate is divided not only according to gender subgroup identities (feminist or non-feminist) but also according to gender ideologies or belief systems. I will discuss these important concepts and resulting divides in the next section.

Gender Subgroup Identities and Gender Ideologies in U.S. Politics

I operationalize two gender subgroup identities or labels: feminists and non-feminists. On the one side, feminists share a feminist gender ideology that focuses on fostering gender equality, women's rights, and women's empowerment. On the other side, non-feminists are a very diverse group that includes three distinct types characterized by differing gender ideologies or belief systems: 1) non-labelers, who endorse the core egalitarian values and principles of feminism (i.e., feminist gender ideology) yet eschew the feminist label, because they are wary of the negative connotations and social stigma attached to it; 2) gender individualists, who acknowledge gender

inequality but support individualism and self-determination rather than collectivism and public policies to promote gender equality and combat discrimination; 3) gender inegalitarians, who reject the premise of gender inequality in the first place: they deny the existence of inequality and discrimination and/or oppose any individual or collective effort to address them. Social psychology has identified the feminist and non-feminist subgroups but has not mapped their contours and size, nor has it examined the political distinctions across gender types and the political implications of such distinctions (e.g., Bay-Cheng and Zucker 2007; Zucker 2004; Zucker and Bay-Cheng 2010). Investigating these divides and the consequences ensuing from them is the main objective of this dissertation.

Table 1.1: Concepts: Identities vs. Gender Belief Systems

Identity/Subgroup/Label	Gender Ideology/Belief System/Type
Feminist	Feminist
Non-Feminist	Non-Labeler
	Gender Individualist
	Gender Inegalitarian

Two aspects are particularly important to highlight based on the conceptual framework presented in Table 1.1. First, I argue that non-feminism is an identity rather than a group attitude. In other words, non-feminists are not simply individuals who dislike feminists as a group. They are those members of the public who positively self-identify as non-feminists and hold a gender ideology or belief system that accompanies and backs the adoption of the non-feminist label. Accordingly, in my empirical chapters, I measure non-feminist identity as a scale including not only individuals' choice to consider themselves a non-feminist, but also the intensity of such self-

identification through two questions: “How well does the term ‘not a feminist/non-feminist’ describe you;” and “How important is it to you not to be a feminist.” Similar to feminist ID, strength of non-feminist ID widely varies across individuals who define themselves as non-feminists.

Second, while feminist identifiers hold a highly coherent gender belief system (i.e., feminist gender ideology) that is centered around gender equality, non-feminist identifiers are a conglomerate of gender ideological types – non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians. Non-feminists are therefore a much more diverse identity group than feminists. This could lead to the expectation that non-feminists will be more divided electorally since they encompass a wider set of beliefs about gender relations and equality for women. However, contrary to this expectation, all my studies point to the fact that non-feminist types share a large amount of preferences in relation to candidate evaluation and public policy. In particular, they not only oppose feminist candidates, but also support non-feminist candidates. The fact that non-feminists strongly and significantly support other ingroup members rather than merely opposing outgroup members further suggests that non-feminism is a positive identity rather than a merely negative attitude toward feminists.

Why non-feminists are able to maintain a high degree of unity and consistency of preferences despite their diversity in belief system is a central question underlying this dissertation. A conjecture that I propose and will come back to in my final chapter is that feminist identification appears to require adherence to a much larger set of beliefs ranging from women’s rights and gender roles to the role the government should play in promoting and/or ensuring those rights and opportunities. If an individual disagrees with any tenets, the person is likely to feel rejected by that group. This rejection becomes the root of an identity, shared by all the other individuals who

disagree with feminist gender ideology for some reason, and politicized by elites. In other words, non-feminism may benefit from the diverse set of reasons for which people tend to defect from feminist gender ideology and the corresponding identity. Disagreeing on any of a wide range of beliefs is more likely to be the case than agreeing on that large set.

The previous discussion about feminist stereotypes raises some additional questions about negative stereotypes of feminists as a group, which are important because they may drive individuals who believe in gender equality away from feminist identification. To what extent do individuals personally hold certain negative stereotypical views of feminists and to what extent do they believe that many other people hold negative evaluations of feminists? Further, how do assumptions or perceptions about other people's stereotypes impact an individual's willingness to identify as a non-feminist as opposed to a feminist, for example among non-labelers and gender individualists? In fact, the way women personally evaluate feminists may not matter as much as the way they perceive feminists are viewed by others – either men or other women. In this regard, Liss, Hoffner, and Crawford (2000) explore feminist and non-feminist women's views of a typical feminist. Whether they self-identify as feminists or not, female students perceive the typical feminist to be more of a radical feminist, more of a socialist feminist, and more of a cultural feminist than themselves. The difference between women respondents' own beliefs and the beliefs attributed to a typical feminist is considerably larger among non-feminists. Nonetheless, self-identified feminist women are not exempt from the stereotype of feminists as radical.

Similarly, Ramsey et al. (2007) compare the views women themselves hold of feminists to the views they believe others hold of feminists. They divide their female undergraduate sample among self-identified feminists, self-identified non-feminists (i.e., either gender individualists or inegalitarians according to my conceptual framework), and non-labelers, who are operationalized

as non-feminists who support feminist goals. According to their analysis, all three give feminists a more positive general evaluation than they think others do. In particular, feminists give them the most positive evaluation, non-labelers give them a neutral evaluation, and non-feminists give them a slightly negative evaluation. However, feminists are as likely as non-feminists and non-labelers to believe that others view feminists negatively. This gap between 'self-view' and 'other-view' shows that respondents recognize an anti-feminist bias in other people, but they themselves deny having any biases against feminists. Additionally, all participants are less likely than others to assume that a feminist is a lesbian. Across the three types, feminists are the least likely to think feminists are lesbians, but they are as likely as non-feminists and non-labelers to believe that others do. In sum, whether and to what extent an individual believes feminists are stigmatized is likely to have an impact on that individual's willingness to choose the feminist vs. the non-feminist label. The spread of negative stereotypes about feminists as well as the perception of such spread may contribute to explaining why non-labelers eschew the feminist label despite their endorsement of key feminist egalitarian principles.

The recognition of non-labelers as a separate gender type is relatively recent, as psychologists started identifying and studying them about fifteen years ago. Initially, non-labelers were simply operationalized as weak feminists. For instance, Duncan (2010) studies the similarities and differences in attitudes and behaviors by self-reported feminist/non-feminist labeling – strong feminists vs. weak feminists vs. non-feminists – across two generations – Generation X (born between 1961 and 1975) and Baby Boomers (born between 1943 and 1960). When asked to describe their identity as feminists, respondents selecting "not so strong feminist" have been classified as "weak feminists." The sample includes politically active women riding buses to a 1992 March on Washington for Reproductive Rights. The results show no generational

differences except for the fact that Baby Boomers are more likely than Generation Xers to self-identify as strong feminists. In terms of self-labeling, strong feminists significantly differ from non-feminists. Weak feminists hold some of the same attitudes and outlooks as strong feminists, but they are not as committed to the label or the feminist cause. In several respects, although they adopt the feminist label, weak feminists appear as a middle group between strong feminists and non-feminists. Indeed, their scores are in the middle on gender common fate, power discontent on behalf of feminists, system blame, cognitive centrality of gender (i.e., sense of pride in the accomplishments of other women and sense of anger about how other women are treated in society), and women's rights activism. In other words, weak feminists display some similarities with non-labelers, as they are between feminists and other types of non-feminists on a number of measures of gender and feminist consciousness. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that weak feminists are not the same as non-labelers. Although Duncan (2010) distinguishes between strong feminists, weak feminists, and non-feminists, in her account weak feminists are still feminists whose strength of gender subgroup identification is simply rather low.

The investigation of non-labelers as distinct from weakly identified feminists represents a conceptual step forward that began with Zucker's work. She defines non-labelers as including individuals who "hold feminist beliefs but reject or hold mixed feelings toward the label 'feminist'" (2004, p. 427). Specifically, her framework contrasts non-labelers to feminists and non-feminists – those who "reject at least one cardinal belief of feminists" (2004, p. 427). The three cardinal beliefs she focuses on all pertain to the issue of gender inequality but disregard any political or governmental intervention to address it: "Women and girls have not been treated as well as boys and men in our society;" "Women and men should be paid equally for the same work;" and "Women's unpaid work should be more socially valued." In other words, Zucker's (2004)

framework conflates non-labelers and gender individualists, while it simply defines gender inegalitarians as non-feminists. Relying on a sample of female college graduates, her analyses highlight that non-labelers and gender individualists are distinct from both feminists and gender inegalitarians. Specifically, non-labelers' and individualists' mean scores are both significantly lower than feminists and significantly higher than inegalitarians on several measures of feminist consciousness: power discontent (i.e., a sense of grievance over feminists' relative position in society), rejection of sex discrimination (i.e., rejection of legitimacy of gender-based disparities), a feeling thermometer toward feminists, and attitudes toward feminism and the women's movement. Additionally, feminists' scores are significantly higher than the scores of any non-feminist type on having feminists in one's family of origin, being exposed to feminism in higher education, having personal relationships with feminists, acknowledging suffering due to sexism, and being involved in feminist activism. As non-labelers and individualists are statistically indistinguishable from inegalitarians with regard to exposure to feminism, this suggests that having ties to feminist individuals and learning about feminism represent crucial elements in dispelling negative myths about the group. Thus, such ties and learning can ultimately tip some non-feminist women from the endorsement of the underlying egalitarian gender ideology, to the adoption of the corresponding label. Moreover, non-labelers' and individualists' level of feminist activism is also statistically indistinguishable from inegalitarians', suggesting that non-feminist self-labeling is highly consequential in predicting public behaviors and, particularly, non-feminists' overall lower participation on behalf of women's rights.

Zucker and Bay-Cheng (2010) further investigate the nature of the divide between those who identify as feminists, those who believe in gender equality but identify as non-feminists (i.e., non-labelers and gender individualists), and those who do not believe in gender equality (i.e.,

gender inegalitarians). Relying on survey responses from college women and drawing on Schwartz's (1992) value theory, they assess respondents' scores on seven values (universalism, self-direction, achievement, power, conformity, tradition, and security), social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al. 1994), belief in the existence of a meritocratic system, hostile and benevolent sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996), and modern sexism (Swim et al. 1995). Non-labelers' and gender individualists' ratings on universalism, conformity, and tradition are equivalent to those of gender inegalitarians, but they are significantly different from those of feminists. Furthermore, feminists have the lowest score on the SDO scale and have the least faith in the existence of meritocracy, whereas non-labelers and individualists do not statistically differ from inegalitarians on these two measures. With regard to hostile sexist predispositions, feminists have the lowest scores, while non-labelers' and individualists' scores are statistically equivalent to inegalitarians' ones. Non-labelers and individualists display the highest level of benevolent sexism. In terms of modern sexist attitudes, non-labelers' and individualists' score is higher than feminists but lower than inegalitarians. These results about the relationship between various forms of sexism and feminist vs. non-feminist self-labeling are consistent with Landrine and Klonoff's (1997) and Leaper and Arias' (2011) studies. In contrast to non-feminist ID, feminist ID can help women recognize, oppose, and cope with sexist discrimination, particularly the most blatant, antagonistic, and derogatory expressions of sexism.

Among non-feminists, the distinction between non-labelers and gender individualists is important, since these two gender types fundamentally disagree about how to address gender inequality. In particular, they disagree about whether government should play a role in achieving equality. In this regard, Rich's (2005) work sheds light on how gender individualists perceive the feminist label and how those perceptions lead them to reject that label. Rich draws on a life history

study focusing on a cohort of female student teachers of physical education. In their interviews, participants report not considering themselves feminists, although they privately accept feminist values of gender equality and equal opportunities. Instead, they embrace a neoliberal or "gender individualist" stance based on individual choice, self-determination, and independence, without accounting for gendered constraints. They express disdain for feminist collective identity and action and they dislike the group. They view feminism as a movement for victims, women who "only have themselves to blame for not seizing their opportunity" (2005, p. 502), or "pathetic female[s]" (p. 504). At the same time, they are concerned about feminist women being perceived as aggressive and unfeminine. In this view, feminism is not only unnecessary and irrelevant, but also associated with disadvantage and disempowering. In other words, neoliberalism prompts women to dissociate their individual well-being from the collective well-being of other women. This neoliberal view is therefore at the root of the divide between non-labelers and gender individualists: the former support public policies to promote gender equality, whereas the latter are opposed to them and prefer to achieve success through individual effort without the government's help.

Although my theoretical framework partially relies on existing work in social psychology, it is important to point out that most of the social psychology studies in this research area rely on college student samples. However, the relative size of gender subgroups (feminists and non-feminists) and gender ideological types may be very different within the broader U.S. population. Indeed, female undergraduates are likely to be less diverse and therefore more systematically biased than the general U.S. population in a number of relevant respects, such as race and ethnicity, income, and education level, of course. The analyses I have conducted and discuss in the following chapters enable us to address these biases, as they rely on larger samples of U.S. adults who are

registered voters, and two of my four samples are nationally representative. Therefore, my studies help us identify the relative proportion of feminists, non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians within the U.S. electorate and the political impact of these divides.

Ingroup Positivity vs. Outgroup Negativity

A shortcoming of one of the foundational theories in the study of intergroup relations, Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979), pertains to the relationship between attitudes toward the ingroup and attitudes toward outgroups. SIT posits that individuals develop and maintain a positive self-concept in order to preserve or enhance their self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1975). The evaluation of one's own group stems from the favorable comparison of the ingroup relative to relevant outgroups: "a striving for positively valued distinctiveness for one's own group" (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979, 190). However, SIT predicts a reciprocal relationship between ingroup favoritism and outgroup animus. Nonetheless, several studies in both social psychology and political science have found that ingroup positivity does not always accompany outgroup hostility (e.g., Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999; Lowery et al. 2006). In fact, favoritism toward the ingroup is fully compatible with increases in ingroup ratings, decreases in outgroup ratings, or both (Brewer 1979, 2007). With regard to both feminist and non-feminist self-labeling, it remains largely unclear when and under what circumstances ingroup attachment and positivity are likely to be more salient and consequential than attitudes toward outgroups and vice versa. Both SIT and its offshoot, known as social categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al. 1987), have indeed failed to address this question due to their neglect of variation in the strength and relevance of group identification at the individual level (Huddy 2001, 2004). The studies I present in the following chapters enable us to explain and predict when gender subgroup identification is going to mainly hinge on ingroup favoritism as opposed to outgroup

animosity. Understanding the relationship between ingroup and outgroup attitudes is particularly important for non-feminist identity as I argue that non-feminism does not merely consist in disliking feminists, but it also rests on holding a positive sense of belonging to the non-feminist group.

1.6 Hypotheses

I propose to test five main hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 (Gender Subgroup IDs): Feminism and non-feminism are meaningful and distinct subgroup identities that affect evaluations of and support for political candidates, particularly among female voters.

Hypothesis 1a (Feminist Voter): Feminist self-identification leads feminist voters to favor feminist candidates.

Hypothesis 1b (Non-Feminist Voter): Non-feminist self-identification drives non-feminist voters away from feminist candidates.

Both of these hypotheses – H1a and H1b – are consistent with results from Sigelman and Sigelman (1982). The more similar a candidate is to a voter, the more likely the voter is to be favorable toward that candidate. As ingroup identification strengthens, individuals become more likely to support ingroup than outgroup candidates. Thus, citizens who identify as feminists will be more favorable toward feminist candidates, whereas citizens who identity as non-feminists (non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians) will be more favorable toward non-feminist candidates.

Hypothesis 2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender): Identification with either feminism or non-feminism and acceptance of the corresponding label play a larger role than either gender group

membership or gender group identity in predicting evaluations of female candidates, especially among women.

This expectation is supported by several results suggesting that identifying as a feminist has far larger socio-political implications than identifying as a woman (e.g., Cook and Wilcox 1991; Duncan 1999; Landrine and Klonoff 1997; Leaper and Arias 2011; Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004).

Hypothesis 3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology): The impact of feminist/non-feminist self-labeling on support for women candidates is distinct from the impact of liberal/conservative political ideology.

This third hypothesis stems from numerous findings in social psychology pointing to the fact that feminist gender ideology and feminist identity are distinct (e.g., Eisele and Stake 2008; Renzetti 1987; Williams and Wittig 1997). However, it is important to acknowledge that feminist gender ideology and political ideology refer to different configurations of beliefs: the former encompasses pro-feminist beliefs about gender equality and women's rights, whereas the latter consists in psychological attachment to either political liberalism or conservatism (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017, pp. 11-13, 48).

Hypothesis 4 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender Ideology): The endorsement of basic feminist principles is far more widespread than willingness to adopt the feminist label among both women and men.

Although this fourth theoretical expectation is supported by results showing that popular support for feminist principles (i.e., feminist gender ideology) is larger than willingness to explicitly identify with the feminist movement and feminists as a group (e.g., Burn et al. 2000;

Fitz and Zucker 2014; Fitz, Zucker, and Bay-Cheng 2012; Ramsey et al. 2007; Zucker and Bay-Cheng 2010), most existing studies rely on small and non-representative samples of the U.S. adult population. Thus, it is a valuable endeavor to test what proportion of American women is represented by non-labelers and/or gender individualists.

Finally, I will test two hypotheses about the relative impact of ingroup vs. outgroup attitudes among feminists and non-feminists.

Hypothesis 5a (Feminist Ingroup Positivity): Preference for feminist ingroup candidates will be driven more by **ingroup positivity** than outgroup negativity.

Hypothesis 5b (Non-Feminist Outgroup Negativity): Preference for non-feminist ingroup candidates will be driven more by **outgroup negativity** than ingroup positivity.

Based on SIT, women face two options. If they choose to address gender-based discrimination by collective means, they can be expected to focus on strategies in the public sphere, such as engaging in women's rights activism. Existing results tell us that this is likely to be the case for self-identified feminists. Accordingly, these women are likely to be strongly supportive of ingroup – feminist – candidates, because they explicitly aim to advance feminist goals (i.e., reducing gender inequities and discrimination by relying on government policies) for all women. In contrast, if women choose to deal with gender inequality by comparing themselves with other women (rather than with men) at the individual level, they will strive to maintain and enhance their self-esteem by differentiating themselves from those women. That is likely to be the case for self-identified non-feminists (i.e., non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians), as they tend to have lower commitment to collective action strategies (e.g., Rich 2005; Zucker 2004). Thus, these non-feminist women will punish candidates who do not share their gender subgroup identification to a larger extent than they will reward candidates who do.

1.7 Roadmap of the Empirical Chapters

The goal of this first chapter has been to present a novel theory to address the broad question of why women voters are politically heterogeneous and provide inconsistent support for women political candidates, despite their enduring political underrepresentation in the United States. I have proposed a theoretical framework that enables us to look above and beyond other group attachments, such as gender group membership and political ideology. According to my theory, both women and men are divided into two identity groups: feminists and non-feminists. While feminist identifiers are ideologically coherent, with egalitarian gender values and a belief that women need to stick together to produce collective goods for their group, non-feminist identifiers are highly heterogeneous. They include non-labelers, who agree with egalitarian values but are worried that they will be rejected by their communities if they take on the feminist label, gender individualists who believe that while inequality exists it is the responsibility of individuals to fix that problem for themselves without a collective movement, and gender inegalitarians who reject the principle of gender equality in the first place. In American politics, the power of the non-feminist identity to shape voting behavior lies in keeping these three ideologically distinct groups within the same coalition. In the first chapter, I have also explored what we know about what lies behind individuals' adoption of the politicized feminist label or rejection of it in favor of the non-feminist label, independently of gender ideology. The feminist label is widely perceived as radical and stigmatized by both men and women. My empirical analyses draw on the existing literature to further understand why individuals of both genders choose one label versus the other, who those individuals are, and how their acceptance of the feminist vs. the non-feminist label in addition to a certain gender ideology or independently of it affects their candidate evaluations and voting behavior. Importantly, in contrast to extant work, the analyses I present in the following chapters

rely on representative samples of U.S. voters, thereby enabling me to provide some estimates about the actual size of these gender subgroups. Understanding their relative size in the population is important because a larger group has greater potential electoral impact.

Chapter 2 encompasses analyses and results from two studies: the 2016 American National Election Study and a survey-based experiment conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk from April-May 2017. Both of these studies can be interpreted as a proof of concept. They are meant to show that both feminist and non-feminist identities matter in U.S. politics and to measure their relative size. Although the American public does not hold homogenous views about the feminist movement or feminists, it does have some deep-seated understanding about what identifying as a feminist or as a non-feminist means. Whether an individual chooses to explicitly associate herself/himself with the feminist label or with the non-feminist label impacts that individual's political attitudes and decision-making. Importantly, these labels' impact on voting behavior is independent of the beliefs people hold about gender equality, namely their gender ideology.

Study 1 relies on survey data from the 2016 ANES to demonstrate what role feminist and non-feminist identities played in relation to vote choice in the context of the 2016 presidential election. It represents a necessary first step to illustrate the fact that the gender subgroup level matters in real politics and may meaningfully impact the outcome of electoral races featuring a female candidate who directly appeals to women and runs against a candidate whose views are explicitly hostile toward women. The results demonstrate that non-feminist identity has been overlooked in political science as an important force. We need to better understand this group if we intend to explain why women voters do not unite and still vote against women candidates in the face of their group's persistent political underrepresentation and unequal treatment in government and other spheres of public life.

Study 2 aims to isolate and causally identify the impact of both feminist and non-feminist identities on a smaller scale in the context of a less politically salient race. Although controls are included for partisanship and political ideology, the experiment does not manipulate candidate gender or party ID, and the sample is exclusively female. The main objective is to abstract from the peculiar circumstances of the 2016 presidential election in order to test whether gender subgroup labels matter when considering fictitious female candidates whom voters have no priors about. The choice to have only four experimental conditions and to describe the candidates as moderate women running in a non-partisan election serves the purpose of potentially replicating the results from the first study while addressing an additional key question: Do feminist and non-feminist ID matter independently of each other, even in a local, low-stake election where all candidates are women and partisan loyalties are not part of voters' calculation?

Chapter 3 sheds light on the bigger and deeper picture of gender subgroup labels. In this chapter, I take a step back. I look at my theory at a more fine-grained level and explore as well as test its implications through a survey on a nationally representative sample conducted using the YouGov platform in May 2018. The survey measures feminist and non-feminist identification as both dependent variables and explanatory variables. As dependent variables, I explore how and to what extent the choice to identify as a feminist or as a non-feminist is associated with individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, beliefs about obstacles to the achievement of gender equality, views about what roles women should prioritize, and evaluations of and beliefs about the feminist movement and feminists as a group. As independent variables, I focus on how feminist and non-feminist ID impact support for female candidates (specifically, a woman President in the next twenty years and more women elected to political office), women's rights activism, and policy preferences about gender issues (gender equal pay, preferential hiring for women, paid parental

leave, and abortion). Furthermore, I analyze the associations between gender subgroup identities, on the one hand, and gender-related predispositions (i.e., gender linked fate, traditional beliefs about women's role, modern sexism, and collective orientation) and experiences (i.e., individual gender discrimination and division of household chores between spouses or partners), on the other hand.

Chapter 4 builds and expands on the previous empirical chapters in significant ways. It includes a survey-based experiment I ran online using the CloudResearch/TurkPrime platform in June 2019. The experimental design manipulates political candidates' gender type (feminist, non-labeler, or gender individualist), gender group membership (female or male), and partisan identification (Democratic or Republican). Thus, this design enables me to disentangle the effect of feminist and non-feminist ID – combined with either non-labeler or individualist gender ideology – from those of sex and partisanship on various forms of support for candidates. I further compare the impact of the two subgroup identities with political ideology and find that neither can be subsumed under the divides on the liberal-conservative continuum. Finally, I return to the question I only partially addressed in Chapter 1 about the relationship between ingroup and outgroup attitudes and their relative impact on candidate evaluation and electoral support. Overall, most of my theoretical expectations receive strong support across the four studies.

Chapter 5 includes a review of the takeaways from my empirical results and a reflection about the broader electoral and political implications of my theory and findings looking at the future. Addressing women's political underrepresentation in the United States is an important goal in order to increase various forms of political engagement within the female electorate. Gender subgroups and gender types offer us a novel lens to interpret U.S. public opinion, particularly, the obstacles and challenges women's candidates are likely to face. However, understanding the

impact and relative size of feminists, non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians also provides candidates, policy-makers, and scholars with new opportunities and enables them to envision ways to partially overcome gender subgroup divides. Accordingly, in the final chapter I further discuss the next steps in this line of research that consist in focusing on more deeply analyzing the range of sources of diversity as well as of unity among non-feminist identifiers. Better understanding what enables non-feminists to electorally behave as a unified block despite their internal differences in terms of gender beliefs can help feminist-minded candidates and representatives to more effectively engage with some of those non-feminists and, most importantly, to design strategies to rebrand the feminist label in a more appealing and inclusive way.

Chapter 2

Explaining the 2016 Presidential Election and Beyond

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present results from two studies: the 2016 American National Election Study and a survey-based experiment conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) between April and May 2017. In both samples, strength of feminist identification and strength of non-feminist identification are identically measured and used as the main explanatory variables predicting vote choice in the 2016 ANES and support for a female candidate in my MTurk experiment. In both studies, participants indicate their strength of non-feminist identification after self-identifying as non-feminists. In other words, strength of non-feminist identity is measured among non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians without distinguishing among these types. Therefore, the corresponding analyses and results enable us to have a first look at what impact the acceptance of the feminist label as compared to the non-feminist label had on voter behavior and candidate evaluations both in the context of the 2016 presidential election and of a fictitious mayoral election.

Specifically, the analyses I present in this chapter are targeted to assess the argument that feminist identification and gender ideology are distinct as well as to test three of my hypotheses. First, the two studies show that feminist and non-feminist labels matter both in the case of a highly

salient presidential election and in the case of a local, low stakes, and non-partisan election, after accounting for a number of other politically relevant factors (H1 - Gender Subgroup IDs). In particular, voters who identify as feminists were much more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and support feminist candidates in my 2017 experiment (H1a – Feminist Voter). At the same time, voters who identify as non-feminists were significantly less likely to turn out for Clinton according to ANES survey data or endorse feminist candidates according to MTurk experimental data (H1b – Non-feminist Voter). Second, my findings strongly suggest that the adoption of the feminist label has a statistically larger impact than gender group membership (ANES Study) and strength of gender identification (MTurk Study), according to H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). Third, analyses based on both studies point to the fact that the predictive power of feminist as well as non-feminist self-labeling is different and needs to be distinguished from that of political ideology (H3 – Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology).

2.2 Study 1: 2016 ANES Time Series

The 2016 presidential election offers a unique and particularly suitable case to test my theoretical expectations not only because of the presence of the first female presidential nominee in U.S. history on a major party's ticket, but also because that candidate was a self-proclaimed feminist. The comment Hillary Clinton made in 1992 when asked about her decision to continue practicing law while her husband was governor of Arkansas became famous as a symbol of feminism: "I could have stayed home and baked cookies and had teas, but what I decided to do was fulfill my profession, which I entered before my husband was in public life" (Reilly 2016).[11]

[11] Reilly, Katie. November 5, 2016. "Beyoncé Reclaims Hillary Clinton's 'Baked Cookies' Comment at Rally." *Time*. https://time.com/4559565/hillary-clinton-beyonce-cookies-teas-comment/ (Accessed November 7, 2019).

She then explicitly labeled herself a feminist before the 2016 presidential campaign, while defining feminism as "supporting equal rights for women" and adding that she did not "see anything controversial about that at all" (Gibson 2014).[12] She further responded to women who view feminism as outdated, saying "I don't think you've lived long enough."

The ANES sample I employ includes both respondents interviewed face-to-face (n = 1,181) and respondents interviewed on the Internet (n = 3,090). Post-stratification weights have been applied.

Measures

In terms of gender subgroups, respondents are asked whether they consider themselves a strong feminist, a feminist, or not a feminist. It is not important to keep in mind that while feminists hold a coherent feminist gender ideology centered around gender equality, non-feminist identifiers represent a large and highly diverse group, including non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians, who all adopt the non-feminist label despite differing gender belief systems. Non-labelers reject the feminist label for personal or relational reasons – they fear being stigmatized, but they hold egalitarian gender beliefs as feminists do. Individualists believe in the goal of gender equality but also believe it rests on individual women to overcome gender discrimination and bias. Inegalitarians reject gender equality and are actively opposed to any individual or collective effort to address it.

The pie charts below (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) show the proportion of each subgroup disaggregated by party and gender group membership.

[12] Gibson, Megan. June 12, 2014. "Hillary Clinton wants you to call her a feminist." *Time*. https://time.com/2864425/hillary-clinton-hard-choices-feminist/ (Accessed November 7, 2019).

Figure 2.1: Gender Subgroups among Democratic Voters



Source: 2016 American National Election Study

Figure 2.2: Gender Subgroups among Republican Voters



Source: 2016 American National Election Study

Democratic women are the most likely to embrace the feminist label: about 66 percent of them identify as either feminists or strong feminists. Democratic men and Republican women include the second and third largest group of feminists: roughly 43 percent and 33 percent, respectively. Furthermore, being a strong feminist is much more popular among Democratic than Republican participants. Nonetheless, one third of Democratic women and more than half of Democratic men identify as non-feminists, thus rejecting the feminist label. The relative percentage of non-feminists is even larger among Republicans of both genders. Specifically, the highest proportion of non-feminists is among Republican men (87 percent), followed by Republican women (67 percent), Democratic men (57 percent), and Democratic women (34 percent). Overall, male respondents within both parties are significantly more likely to identify as non-feminists, while female respondents in both parties are significantly more likely to label themselves as feminists. Finally, being a strong feminist is much more popular among Democrats of both genders than among Republicans.

The main dependent variable is the respondent's post-election self-reported vote for Hillary Clinton. As explanatory variables, I focus on two gender subgroup identities – identification with feminism and with non-feminism – and on two gender attitudes – modern sexism and traditional beliefs about women's role. In order to measure feminist identity, I combine four items into an additive scale. The first is a 0-100 feeling thermometer toward feminists that is present in several previous ANES studies. The other three items were added in 2016. Respondents are asked: 1) "Do you consider yourself a strong feminist, a feminist, or are you not a feminist?" 2) "How well does the term 'feminist' describe you?" (Extremely well, Very well, Somewhat well, Not very well, Not at all); and 2) "How important is it to you to be a feminist?" (Extremely important, Very important,

Somewhat important, A little important, Not at all important). The resulting four-item scale has strong reliability ($\alpha = .87$).

Although the 2016 ANES does not include any specific item about non-feminism, respondents are asked two questions about anti-feminism, which I use as a proxy for non-feminism: 1) "How well does the term 'anti-feminist' describe you?" and 2) "How important is it to you to be an anti-feminist?" I therefore measure non-feminist identity by combining answers to these two questions, in addition to the feeling thermometer toward feminists (reverse coded) and the item asking respondents if they consider themselves a strong feminist, a feminist, or not a feminist (reverse coded). Due to the fact that all the respondents who self-identify as non-feminists are asked the two above-mentioned questions about anti-feminism, strength of non-feminist identification is measured among all non-feminists, including non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians. The resulting non-feminist ID four-item scale has acceptable internal consistency ($\alpha = .62$). The reliability of this scale is likely lower than the feminist ID scale because it conflates all the three non-feminist types.

I include two additional gender-related variables in my analysis: modern sexism and attitudes about women's role. Both of these variables signal opposition to feminist gender ideology. The term 'modern' sexism refers to attitudes about the 'modern' women's movement and encompasses hostility toward the goals and demands of the feminist movement and feminists as a group (Swim et al. 1995). Attitudes about women's role denote old-fashioned beliefs that women belong in the home and their primary role consists in being wives and mothers (Kalmuss et al. 1981). As argued by Sharrow and others (2016) in the context of the candidacies of Hillary Clinton and Sarah Palin in 2008, there is indeed some substantive overlap between support for liberal feminism and opposition to sexism. Low scores on the modern sexism and beliefs about

women's role scales can thus be interpreted as recognition of ongoing discrimination against women and implicit support for both policies and candidates favoring gender equality. In other words, individuals with low scores on these two variables can be viewed as having a more egalitarian gender ideology, whether they also accept the feminist label or not. While the ANES does not include any item capturing respondents' endorsement of feminist principles, the modern sexism and women's role measures can therefore be interpreted as proxies for non-feminist gender ideology in this dataset. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these measures do not enable us to distinguish among the three gender ideologies or types held by non-feminist identifiers: non-labeler, gender individualist, and gender inegalitarian. In other words, although modern sexist attitudes and traditional beliefs about women's role tend to be positively associated with non-feminist ID and negatively associated with feminist ID, they remain imperfect proxies for gender ideology among non-feminists in general rather than actual measures of the different gender belief systems of non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians.

In regard to sexism, the ANES uses the Modern Sexism Index (MSI) to measure gender attitudes that are similar to hostile sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996, 2001, 2011). The MSI includes three questions in 2016: 1) "Should the news media pay more attention to discrimination against women, less attention, or the same amount of attention they have been paying lately?" 2) "When women demand equality these days, how often are they actually seeking special favors?" and 3) "When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more problems than they solve?" Higher scores denote more highly sexist attitudes. An additive scale shows acceptable reliability (α = .68).

To measure traditional beliefs about women's role, I employ a battery that includes two items in 2016. Respondents are asked: 1) "Do you think it is easier, harder, or neither easier nor

harder for mothers who work outside the home to establish a warm and secure relationship with their children than it is for mothers who stay at home?" and 2) "Do you think it is better, worse, or makes no difference for the family as a whole if the man works outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family?" High values on this scale indicate support for women's traditional role.

The following analyses also control for gender (i.e. female), race (i.e. White), racial resentment, authoritarianism, partisanship, political ideology. To measure racial resentment, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed with the following four statements: 1) "Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors;" 2) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class" (reverse coded); 3) "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve" (reverse coded); and 4) "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." Authoritarianism is measured with a four-item childrearing preferences scale developed and validated by Feldman and Stenner (1997). I also include socio-demographic controls for age, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 18, born-again Christianity, education, and relative household income. These controls are important in order to rule out the possibility that gender identity and gender attitude predictors may be merely substitutes for other predispositions – racial attitudes, authoritarianism, party ID, or political ideology.

Survey Results

First, I conducted some preliminary analyses to empirically explore the theoretical distinction between feminist and non-feminist ID, on the one side, and non-feminist gender

ideology measured through modern sexism and traditional women's roles, on the other side. There are moderate correlations between gender subgroup identifications and modern sexism: *r*=-42 and r=.46 for feminist ID and non-feminist ID, respectively. This suggests that even if gender subgroup identity – feminist/non-feminist ID – and gender ideology are distinct, there is some overlap between the two. Although it is impossible to causally identify the path connecting identification to ideology, it is reasonable to speculate that feminist gender ideology represents a necessary but not sufficient step in the trajectory toward feminist identification. The correlations between gender subgroup identities and attitudes about women's role are much weaker: *r*=-15 and r=.16 for feminist ID and non-feminist ID, respectively. These results further point to the idea that choosing a label corresponding to a gender subgroup identity is correlated with but different from embracing a belief system corresponding to that gender subgroup.

I then estimated six logit regression models with respondents' post-election self-reported vote for the Democratic candidate as the dependent variable in order to test H1, H1a, and H1b (Table 2.1). The first three models include feminist ID, modern sexism, and women's role, whereas the other three models include non-feminist ID, modern sexism, and women's role as main predictors. The first and fourth models also include gender as a predictor (since a measure of gender ID is not available in the 2016 ANES), while the other models are broken down by respondent's gender.

The results from Table 2.1 below shows women were not more likely than men to support the Democratic candidate. In fact, the coefficient on gender is statistically significant at a .05 level but negative. The relatively small size of the gender coefficient is not surprising, of course, since studies have long shown quite small gender effects on political preferences of all sorts (Sears and Huddy 1992). However, it is interesting that the gender gap reverses. The reason that may have

been the case is key to my theory. We know that women are not a politically homogenous group. The existence of gender subgroups with which citizens identify and through which they interpret the political spectrum tells us why the female electorate is heterogeneous. As was the case in 2016 for the first time in U.S. history, the presence of a female candidate on the ballot can be expected to have made those divides even more salient among women. Hillary Clinton's candidacy and campaign appeals are likely to have prompted women to ask themselves whether they could identify with her. The answer was a resounding no among self-labeled non-feminists, who represent the majority of female voters among Republicans (67%) and Independents (52%), according to the 2016 ANES data. This can help us explain why the gender gap may reverse in elections including female candidates who explicitly associate with the feminist label, as in the case of Clinton in 2016.

In contrast to gender group membership, identifying as a feminist had a powerful, positive, and statistically significant impact on support for Clinton ($p<.001$), thus providing support for H1 (Gender Subgroup IDs) and H1a (Feminist Voter). The substantive association of feminist identification and vote choice in the sample as a whole was large, with an increase of 45 percent points in the likelihood of endorsing Clinton when moving from low to high on the feminist ID measure.

Non-feminist identification had the opposite impact: it was significantly ($p<.001$) associated with a much lower likelihood to turn out for the Democratic candidate, namely a 55 percent point decrease. Overall, the negative impact of non-feminist ID on support for Clinton is larger than the positive impact of feminist ID. These results are predicted by and provide some support for H1b (Non-Feminist Voter).

Table 2.1: Impact of Feminist and Non-Feminist ID on Clinton Vote Choice across Gender

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Gender (Female)	-0.50*			-0.46*		
	(0.22)			(0.21)		
Feminist ID	1.99***	2.54***	0.89			
	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.93)			
Non-Feminist ID				-2.83***	-3.65***	-1.46
				(0.67)	(0.80)	(1.17)
Modern Sexism	-2.23***	-2.25**	-2.78**	-2.07***	-1.95**	-2.66**
	(0.58)	(0.70)	(1.02)	(0.59)	(0.71)	(1.02)
Women's Role	-2.14***	-2.38**	-1.99*	-2.08***	-2.27**	-1.95*
	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.96)	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.96)
Authoritarianism	-0.44	-0.13	-0.81	-0.41	-0.10	-0.78
	(0.38)	(0.49)	(0.56)	(0.39)	(0.50)	(0.58)
Racial Resentment	-3.20***	-3.06***	-3.58***	-3.19***	-3.10***	-3.55***
	(0.47)	(0.64)	(0.69)	(0.47)	(0.63)	(0.70)
Race (White)	-1.22***	-1.27***	-1.23**	-1.30***	-1.37***	-1.27***
	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.38)
Age	-0.03	0.09	-0.51	-0.11	0.11	-0.60
	(0.82)	(1.00)	(1.42)	(0.84)	(0.98)	(1.41)
Region (South)	-0.36	-0.39	-0.44	-0.37	-0.39	-0.44
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.32)
Employed	-0.43	0.04	-1.07*	-0.43	0.02	-1.07*
	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.45)
Married	-0.37	-0.99**	0.43	-0.40	-0.99**	0.40
	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.37)
Kids under 18	-0.40	0.90	-1.92	-0.44	0.88	-1.93
	(1.09)	(1.52)	(1.31)	(1.10)	(1.51)	(1.33)
Born-again	-0.25	-0.17	-0.32	-0.18	-0.13	-0.26
	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Education	-0.15	0.41	-0.86	-0.15	0.49	-0.88
	(0.74)	(0.98)	(1.08)	(0.72)	(0.96)	(1.07)
Income	0.48	0.93	0.24	0.47	0.84	0.27
	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.64)	(0.41)	(0.53)	(0.65)
Party ID (Rep.)	-5.35***	-5.31***	-5.66***	-5.37***	-5.29***	-5.66***
	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.54)
Constant	7.57***	6.05***	9.44***	9.41***	8.38***	10.34***
	(1.01)	(1.22)	(1.50)	(1.03)	(1.14)	(1.63)
Observations	2,390	1,300	1,080	2,390	1,300	1,080

Data: 2016 ANES.

Note: The dependent variable is self-reported vote for Hillary Clinton. Entries are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All variables recoded 0 to 1.

However, the association between either feminist ID or non-feminist ID and vote choice is mostly driven by female voters. Specifically, there is a 56 percent point probability shift among women when moving from low to high on the feminist ID scale, compared with a non-significant shift of 19 percent points among men. Conversely, the likelihood of voting for Clinton when moving from low to high on the non-feminist ID scale decreases by 68 percent points among women, while it decreases by 27 percent points among men. Such a gender difference in the effect of feminist ID is not surprising based on theoretical expectations from Social Identity Theory. In contrast to men, women have two options while facing the unfavorable comparison with the male outgroup. Women who choose collective means and a feminist identity to achieve positive self-esteem from their gender identity can be expected to support ingroup (i.e., feminist) candidates. On the contrary, women who choose to enhance their self-esteem by comparing themselves with other women adopt a non-feminist identity and are likely to achieve positively valued gender identity by opposing outgroup (i.e., feminist) candidates. In other words, these gender subgroup divides are more consequential for women than for men.

Moreover, both modern sexism and old-fashioned beliefs about gender roles strongly predicted opposition to Clinton in the sample as a whole, all else equal. The impact of modern sexism on vote choice and of attitudes about women's role is roughly equal across gender. In particular, moving from low to high on the modern sexism scale produced a decrease of 42 percent points in the probability of voting for Clinton. Similarly, traditional beliefs about women's role reduced support for Clinton by a substantial amount – 45 percent points. These findings reinforce the conclusion that identification with feminism was linked to a higher probability of turning out for Clinton, while identification with non-feminism as well as non-feminist gender ideology (i.e., modern sexism and traditional beliefs about gender roles) were linked to a lower probability of

doing so. Furthermore, these results suggest the association with the feminist or the non-feminist label is more consequential than support for the corresponding ideology among women, as the size of the coefficients on feminist ID and non-feminist ID is larger than the coefficients on modern sexism and women's role among female respondents. Using Wald tests, the differences between feminist ID and non-feminist gender ideology – modern sexism and women's role – are statistically significant at a .001 level among women, while the differences between non-feminist ID and modern sexism or women's role do not reach standard levels of statistical significance.

Next, I examine whether there are differences in the association of the feminist label and non-feminist label with Clinton vote across both gender and party. Table 2.2 includes Democratic respondents, while Table 2.3 includes Republican respondents. The results from both tables suggest that the positive impact of feminist ID was large and significant ($p<0.05$) across party – among Democratic and particularly Republican women, although not across gender, ceteris paribus. The negative impact of non-feminist ID was even stronger and statistically significant among women in both parties – especially Republican women, but not among men in either party. These findings further reinforce the conclusion that gender subgroup labels represent important lenses used by female voters in both parties to make sense of candidates across the political spectrum. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 also show that modern sexism had a statistically significant and negative impact among all Democrats as well as Republican women. Women's role was related to a significant decrease in support for Clinton only among Republicans, particularly Republican men. In other words, holding a non-feminist gender ideology drove voters away from Clinton. This is not surprising. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the impact of non-feminist gender ideology manifested itself in different forms across parties. Ideological opposition to Clinton was

predominantly a function of modern sexist attitudes among Democrats and of traditional views about women's role among Republicans.

Table 2.2: Impact of Feminist and Non-Feminist ID on Clinton Vote Choice across Gender within the Democratic Party

VARIABLES	(1) Dem Women	(2) Dem Men	(3) Dem Women	(4) Dem Men
Feminist ID	1.58*	0.76		
	(0.79)	(1.17)		
Non-Feminist ID			-2.65*	-1.10
			(1.09)	(1.69)
Modern Sexism	-2.23**	-4.39*	-2.07*	-4.25*
	(0.86)	(1.78)	(0.87)	(1.76)
Women's Role	-1.78	-0.33	-1.74	-0.33
	(0.95)	(1.41)	(0.94)	(1.42)
Race (White)	-2.28***	-1.60**	-2.33***	-1.65**
	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.50)	(0.60)
Racial Resentment	-3.01***	-2.76**	-3.04***	-2.74**
	(0.75)	(1.03)	(0.76)	(1.04)
Authoritarianism	-0.40	-1.28	-0.34	-1.27
	(0.62)	(1.07)	(0.63)	(1.10)
Constant	5.88***	9.03***	7.54***	9.72***
	(1.57)	(2.22)	(1.47)	(2.41)
Observations	606	403	606	403

Note: The dependent variable is self-reported vote for Hillary Clinton. Entries are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All variables recoded 0 to 1. Drawn from logit regressions that also control for age, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status (i.e., married), children under 18, born-again, Christianity, education, and household income.

Table 2.3: Impact of Feminist and Non-Feminist ID on Clinton Vote Choice across Gender within the Republican Party

VARIABLES	(1) Rep Women	(2) Rep Men	(3) Rep Women	(4) Rep Men
Feminist ID	2.77*	2.20		
	(1.14)	(1.34)		
Non-Feminist ID			-4.36**	-2.73
			(1.57)	(1.84)
Modern Sexism	-3.18*	-2.47	-2.63	-2.49
	(1.33)	(1.37)	(1.35)	(1.38)
Women's Role	-3.34*	-6.60***	-3.08	-6.56***
	(1.55)	(1.84)	(1.61)	(1.87)
Race (White)	-0.59	-1.21*	-0.76	-1.22*
	(0.70)	(0.59)	(0.72)	(0.59)
Racial Resentment	-3.56**	-4.00**	-3.50**	-3.92**
	(1.19)	(1.38)	(1.16)	(1.35)
Authoritarianism	-0.95	-0.63	-0.92	-0.63
	(1.09)	(0.91)	(1.11)	(0.92)
Constant	0.20	8.46**	2.52	10.47**
	(2.45)	(3.06)	(2.41)	(3.20)
Observations	556	577	556	577

Note: The dependent variable is self-reported vote for Hillary Clinton. Entries are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All variables recoded 0 to 1. Drawn from logit regressions that also control for age, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status (i.e., married), children under 18, born-again, Christianity, education, and household income.

Furthermore, I have conducted Wald tests on the equality of the regression coefficients on feminist ID/non-feminist ID and gender (Table 2.1) in order to test hypothesis 2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). Feminist ID is not only larger, but also statistically different from gender at .001 significance level using Wald tests, as predicted by H2. After adding political ideology to the models in Table 2.1 in order to test hypothesis 3, Wald tests show that feminist ID and political ideology are also statistically different at a .001 level among both women and men, as predicted by H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology). Additionally, the coefficient on non-

feminist ID is statistically different from gender and from political ideology among men using Wald tests, thereby providing some further support for H2 and H3.

As a robustness check, I have estimated the same models using the pre-election intention to vote for Clinton as the dependent variable (Table 2.7). Interestingly, in the pre-election survey wave, feminist ID is a statically significant and positive predictor among not only women, but also men. The size of the feminist ID coefficient is also larger among men than women. Similarly, non-feminist ID becomes a statistically significant and negative predictor among men as well, and the size of that impact is larger among men than women. This suggests that the estimates relying on the post-election vote for Clinton as the dependent variable (Table 2.1) may be conservative for male voters. Gender subgroup – feminist and non-feminist – self-labeling is a powerful driving factor of candidate evaluations across voters of both genders.

As an additional robustness check, I have examined self-reported vote for Trump as the dependent variable (Table 2.8). Feminist identification and non-feminist identification remain strong predictors among female voters: the former leading to significantly lower support and the latter to significantly higher support for the Republican candidate. The size of the coefficients on both feminist and non-feminist ID is roughly similar to the size of those coefficients predicting Clinton post-election vote choice.

2.3 Study 2: Amazon's Mechanical Turk Survey Experiment

A sample of 551 U.S. adult women and 541 usable observations was gathered on the Internet using MTurk from April 29-May 8, 2017. While this sample is not representative of the U.S. population, Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012) show that MTurk samples are more representative of the U.S. population than local convenience samples and comparable to Internet-based opt-in samples. Furthermore, when replicating survey experiments originally conducted on

nationally representative samples with MTurk subjects, Coppock (2019) finds that the overall replication rate is pretty high: 72.5 percent. My study consisted of a survey-based experiment aimed to examine how the combination of female candidates' association with feminism or non-feminism and women voters' feminist or non-feminist self-labeling affect evaluations of and support for those candidates. The experiment manipulates two factors: a female candidate's gender subgroup identity (either feminist or non-feminist) and her race (White or Black), thus resulting in a 2 x 2 factorial design with four conditions. The choice to manipulate race stems from the numerous findings in the intersectionality literature showing that gender and race are mutually reinforcing and, consequently, should be accounted for simultaneously (e.g., Gay and Tate 1998; Philpot and Walton 2007; Sigelman and Welch 1984). Moreover, in its aims and tactics, the feminist movement has been historically biased toward representing White women's perspectives and interests, thus failing to fully include Black women (e.g., Simien 2004). This legacy may thus influence the relative impact of the intersection of race and feminist/non-feminist identity.

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four paragraphs from a news article about a fictitious, non-partisan mayoral election featuring a female candidate in Davenport, Iowa. The candidate is described as a moderate without explicitly mentioning any partisan affiliation. The choice to focus on a non-partisan electoral contest derives from the objective to replicate the results of the 2016 ANES study and isolate the impact of gender subgroup identities by excluding partisan loyalties from voters' calculations. Moreover, the race being described is local and lower-stakes than a presidential election, thus making it highly unlikely that voters may have priors about the candidates. These design choices therefore enable us to assess whether gender subgroups matter beyond the case of a highly partisan, nationwide, salient, and historically unprecedented election featuring candidates with a well-established reputation. Furthermore, Iowa can be viewed

as a politically middle-of-the-road state: Bush won Iowa in 2004 by a small margin, Obama won a majority in 2008 and 2012, and Trump won a majority in 2016. Table 2.4 below summarizes the four experimental conditions.

Table 2.4: Summary of Experimental Conditions

EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS		**RACE**	
		White	Black
GENDER SUBGROUP ID	Feminist	White feminist candidate	Black feminist candidate
	Non-Feminist	White non-feminist candidate	Black non-feminist candidate

The candidate's race is conveyed explicitly by describing her as either "White" or "African American." In contrast, the candidate's identification with either the feminist or non-feminist subgroup is conveyed implicitly through two types of cues: her background (via a short biography) and her policy agenda. Specifically, the short biography includes the candidate's educational and professional history in all conditions as well as marital and parental status in the non-feminist conditions. In the short policy agenda being provided, both feminist and non-feminist candidates focus on the economy. However, feminist candidates prioritize reducing the gender wage gap and supporting female entrepreneurship, whereas non-feminist candidates signal commitment to gender-neutral economic policies that do not address gender inequality or women's rights. The exact wording of the four vignettes is shown below.

Feminist Conditions: White/Black Feminist Candidate

A recent poll indicates that the frontrunner in this year's nonpartisan mayoral race is Amy Krueger/Lakeisha Jefferson. She is a moderate and relative newcomer to politics. Krueger, a 45-year-old White/African American businesswoman, has spent her career as a manager in consulting firms after organizing women's activist groups in college while earning a

Bachelor's degree in Finance. She has indicated that tackling the city's economic problems is her number one priority. Krueger's/Jefferson's plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Non-Feminist Conditions: White/Black Non-Feminist Candidate

A recent poll indicates that the frontrunner in this year's nonpartisan mayoral race is Amy Krueger/Lakeisha Jefferson. She is a moderate and relative newcomer to politics. Krueger/Jefferson, a 45-year-old White/African American mother of three, is married to businessman Jake Krueger/DeShawn Jefferson and has stayed home to take care of her family since leaving college early to support her husband's career. She has indicated that tackling the city's economic problems is her number one priority. Krueger's/Jefferson's plan includes providing tax incentives to business owners interested in relocating downtown and creating job training programs to help workers meet the needs of today's economy.

In order to assess the manipulations' effectiveness, I conducted a pretest on MTurk from April 10-15, 2017. Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with a statement defining the candidate as a feminist. There was indeed a statistically significant (p<.001) difference of 33-34 percent points in mean ratings between the feminist and non-feminist conditions (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Checks of Experimental Stimuli (pretest sample N=253, U.S. adults)

			Difference in Means (p-value)
Feminism rating	White Feminist	White Non-Feminist	.33 (p<0.000)
	.81	.48	
Feminism rating	White Feminist	Black Non-Feminist	.33 (p<0.000)
	.81	.48	
Feminism rating	Black Feminist	White Non-Feminist	.34 (p<0.000)
	.82	.48	
Feminism rating	Black Feminist	Black Non-Feminist	.34 (p<0.000)
	.82	.48	

Note: Results based on a pretest conducted on a separate experimental sample on MTurk. The values reported are the mean ratings on feminism for each candidate, where feminism ratings range from 0-1.

Measures

Following the exclusion of incomplete surveys, the final sample includes responses from 541 U.S. female registered voters. As in the 2016 ANES, participants are asked whether they consider themselves a strong feminist, a feminist, or not a feminist. Responses to this question display a pattern that is similar to the one from the ANES study among Democratic (including Democratic-leaning Independents) vs. Republican (including Republican-leaning Independents) women (Figure 2.3). It is important to keep in mind that subjects selecting the 'not a feminist' option may be non-labelers, gender individualists, or gender inegalitarians. In other words, large variance in gender belief systems can be expected among non-feminist identifiers shown in the figure below.

Figure 2.3: Gender Subgroups among Women Voters Across Party



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

These results suggest that non-feminist identification is far more widespread among

women in the Republican Party. Indeed, the vast majority – almost 79 percent – of them view themselves as non-feminists. Among Democratic women, non-feminism is present among about a quarter (22 percent) of participants. In contrast, Democratic women are more likely than Republican women to adopt the feminist label. Almost 78 percent of female Democrats identify as either feminists or strong feminists, whereas only roughly 21 percent of female Republicans identify as such. Additionally, the proportion of strong feminists is much higher among Democratic participants: 25 percent of Democratic feminists consider themselves strong feminists, but merely 3 percent of Republican feminists consider themselves as such. In sum, the majority of female voters within the Democratic Party label themselves as feminists, while the majority of female voters within the Republican Party identify as non-feminists.

In terms of gender subgroups by race and ethnicity, self-labeled feminists represent more than half of White, Black, and Latino women (Table 2.6). Still, this means that between 31 and 45 percent of women across these racial/ethnic groups reject the feminist label and self-identify as a non-feminist.

Table 2.6: Gender Subgroups by Race and Ethnicity

Gender Subgroup	White	Black	Hispanic/ Latino	Asian	American-Indian	Arab	Other
Feminist	238 (55%)	38 (69%)	12 (67%)	11 (50%)	3 (50%)	2 (67%)	5 (71%)
Non-Feminist	192 (45%)	17 (31%)	6 (33%)	11 (50%)	3 (50%)	1 (33%)	2 (29%)
Total	430	55	18	22	6	3	7

Note: Percentages represent proportions by column.

The outcome variables are subjects' various forms of support for the candidate, which are measured through four dependent variables. In particular, participants are asked how likely they would be to vote for the candidate, how favorable they feel toward her, how they rate her on a 0-100 feeling thermometer, and how likely they would be to contribute money to support her campaign. As main explanatory variables, I focus on the same two gender subgroup identities as in the ANES study – identification with feminism and with non-feminism, in addition to strength of gender group identification and traditional beliefs about women's role as a measure of non-feminist gender ideology.

Specifically, in order to measure feminist ID, I combine three items into an additive scale. Relying on the 2016 ANES question wording, participants are asked: 1) "Do you consider yourself a strong feminist, a feminist, or are you not a feminist?" 2) "How well does the term 'feminist' describe you?" (Extremely well, Very well, Somewhat well, Not very well, Not at all); and 2) "How important is it to you to be a feminist?" (Extremely important, Very important, Somewhat important, A little important, Not at all important). The resulting three-item scale has strong reliability ($\alpha = .91$). Furthermore, as in the 2016 ANES, subjects are asked two questions to measure non-feminist ID: 1) "How well does the term 'anti-feminist' describe you?" and 2) "How important is it to you to be an anti-feminist?" I measure non-feminist identity among self-identified non-feminists by combining answers to these two questions, in addition to the item asking respondents if they consider themselves a strong feminist, a feminist, or not a feminist (reverse coded). The resulting non-feminist ID additive scale has acceptable internal consistency ($\alpha = .65$).

Strength of identification with subjects' gender ingroup is measured by employing a six-item scale that combines the identity subscale of the collective self-esteem scale (Luhtanen and Crocker 1992) and the identification with a psychological group scale (Mael and Tetrick 1992).

Specifically, the six items that participants rate their level of agreement with are: "I feel that being a woman is an important reflection of who I am;" "I don't act like the typical woman" (reverse-scored); "I have a number of qualities typical of women;" "Being a woman is an important part of my self-image;" "If someone praises women, it would feel like a personal compliment;" and "If someone criticizes women, it would feel like a personal insult." The resulting scale has moderate reliability ($\alpha = .74$).

As a measure old-fashioned beliefs about women's role, I employ a battery of two items, which is identical to the one included in the 2016 ANES. Subjects are asked: 1) "Do you think it is easier, harder, or neither easier nor harder for mothers who work outside the home to establish a warm and secure relationship with their children than it is for mothers who stay at home?" and 2) "Do you think it is better, worse, or makes no difference for the family as a whole if the man works outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family?" High values on this scale indicate support for women's traditional role.

Experimental Results

First, I ran some analyses to further assess the distinction between gender subgroup identity – feminist/non-feminist ID – and non-feminist gender ideology, which is operationalized through the traditional women's role scale in this study. There are moderate correlations between gender subgroup identification and attitudes about women's role: r=-40 and r=.38 for feminist ID and non-feminist ID, respectively. As in the ANES study, these correlations highlight that, although partially overlapping, gender subgroup identities and gender ideology are not equivalent and need to be distinguished.

Next, I focused on the relative impact of feminist ID and non-feminist ID on the four dependent variables across experimental conditions through interactive linear regression models.

Specifically, I examined how the interaction between candidates' and voters' gender subgroup identities impacts different types of support for those candidates. Although my intention was to run these analyses separately among White and Black female subjects, the number of Black women within my sample and across conditions is too small to detect any pattern of results. Indeed, the sample includes 56 Black women in total: 15 randomly assigned to the White feminist condition, 17 in the Black feminist condition, 16 in the White non-feminist condition, and 8 in the Black non-feminist condition. Thus, all the following analyses rely on the full sample that consists of all the racial and ethnic groups displayed in Table 2.6.

Figure 2.4 (below) illustrates interaction coefficients from OLS regressions predicting feminist subjects' likelihood to vote for the candidate, favorability toward her, a 0-100 feeling thermometer, and likelihood to make a donation in favor of her campaign. Although not shown, controls are included for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children under 18, Christianity, evangelic, education, household income, partisanship, and political ideology. As suggested by H1 (Gender Subgroup IDs), gender subgroup identities – both feminist ID and non-feminist ID – constitute a powerful force driving evaluations of female candidates. In particular, feminist voters display a strong and statistically significant preference for feminist candidates, whether those candidates are White or Black, thereby providing support for H1a (Feminist Voter). This is the case in relation to all four outcome variables. In contrast, a candidate's race appears to not significantly influence feminist participants' overall support for the candidate. In other words, whether a feminist candidate is White or Black or whether a non-feminist candidate is White or Black does not matter either substantively or at a statistical significant level in terms of voter endorsement.

Figure 2.4: Predicting Voter Support by Candidate's Subgroup Identity among Feminist Voters



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

Furthermore, across the four dependent variables, the impact of traditional attitudes about women's place remains generally non-statistically significant in the interactive models both with feminist ID and with non-feminist ID. This constitutes further evidence not only that feminist/non-feminist identification is distinct from feminist/non-feminist gender ideology, but also that gender subgroup labels influence voter behavior to a much larger extent than gender belief systems.

Figure 2.5 (below) displays the results of the same regression analyses conducted among non-feminist voters. These interaction coefficients suggest not only that non-feminism is a meaningful identity impacting support for women candidates, but also that non-feminist ID is significantly (except in regard to making campaign contributions for the White feminist rather than the White non-feminist) and largely associated with opposition to both White and Black feminist

candidates, as predicted by H1b (Non-Feminist Voter). Non-feminist subjects discriminate on the basis of both candidates' gender subgroup identification and theirs. However, as among feminist voters, a candidate's race – White or Black – does not significantly affect the degree of support received by that candidate, regardless of whether she is a feminist or a non-feminist.

Figure 2.5: Predicting Voter Support by Candidate's Subgroup Identity among Non-Feminist Voters



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

Furthermore, I have assessed the impact of feminist and non-feminist identities as compared to strength of gender identity and political ideology in order to test hypotheses 2 and 3 (Figures 2.6-2.9 below). Specifically, I analyze the relative impact of these predictors in the two feminist conditions (vs. the two non-feminist conditions) on the likelihood to vote for the candidate

(Figure 2.6), favorability toward the candidate (Figure 2.7), the 0-100 feeling thermometer toward the candidate (Figure 2.8), and the likelihood to donate money for the candidate's campaign (Figure 2.9). Controls are included for traditional views of women's role, race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children under 18, Christianity, evangelic, education, and household income.

Across the four dependent variables, feminist ID has a larger impact on candidate support than gender ID, in accordance with H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). The only exception is that gender ID impacts the feeling thermometer slightly more than feminist identification. However, the difference between feminist ID and gender ID is not statistically significant using Wald tests. Feminist ID also has a larger impact than political ideology. Wald tests on the equality of the regression coefficients on feminist ID and political ideology support the hypothesis that the two variables are statistically different at a .95 level of significance, as expected from H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology). Similarly, although in the opposite direction, non-feminist ID has a stronger association with all the four outcomes than both gender ID and political ideology. Results from Wald tests suggest that the coefficients on non-feminist ID and gender ID are statistically different between the feminist and non-feminist conditions in relation to all dependent variables. Non-feminist ID and political ideology are also different at a .95 significance level. The only exception is represented by the coefficient on non-feminist ID that is not statistically different from the one on political ideology with regard to the propensity to donate money to the candidate.

Additionally, Figures 2.6-2.9 overall show that the size of the negative impact of non-feminist ID is far larger than the positive impact of feminist ID on candidate support, thereby suggesting that candidate evaluations may be asymmetrically impacted by hostility toward

feminists rather than sympathy toward them. This is important, as it underscores that feminist candidates may face greater opposition from non-feminist voters than support from feminist ones. In electoral terms, they may end up losing more than they gain from being associated with the feminist label.

Figure 2.6: Feminist ID, Non-Feminist ID, Gender ID, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Likelihood to Vote for the Candidate



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

Figure 2.7: Feminist ID, Non-Feminist ID, Gender ID, and Political Ideology as Predictors of Favorability Toward the Candidate



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

Figure 2.8: Feminist ID, Non-Feminist ID, Gender ID, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Feeling Thermometer Toward the Candidate



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

Figure 2.9: Feminist ID, Non-Feminist ID, Gender ID, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Likelihood to Donate to the Candidate's Campaign



Source: MTurk Survey Experiment, April 29-May 8, 2017

Qualitative Responses

This study also included two open-ended questions intended to shed light on what role women think they play and should play in U.S. society and politics. The majority of respondents who identify as feminists chose one or the combination of three types of responses: "whatever women want," "women should be equal to men," and "women should support and encourage other women." In other words, feminist women do not appear to display negative attitudes toward non-feminists. In fact, they tend to advocate for greater tolerance of diversity of choices among women and broader inclusiveness within the feminist movement. As one feminist writes, "In this day and age, a woman's role and contribution should be whatever she wants it to be. If a woman wants to be a homemaker and support her husband's career while raising the children and maintaining the home, that's great. If she wants a career, with or without a husband and children, that's great also."

Similarly, another feminist respondent points out that "if a woman wishes to stay home to care for her family, that is fine, even if it is not my personal choice. If a woman wants to work outside the home or not have kids at all, those choices should not be looked down upon either." Similarly, other feminists argue that "Men and women can... both be great parents and both be the bread winners of the family," and that women's role should be "whatever we want to do. Homemaker is fine. President is fine. Sex worker is fine." Moreover, several feminists specifically favor increasing women's political representation. These are some of their responses: "We should have more [female] representation at all levels of government and more influence regarding issues that primarily impact women;" "Given the percentage of women in the population, the percentage of women in political positions should be significantly higher;" and "Women should be more involved in politics... to help women in society."

In contrast, respondents who identify as non-feminists are split into two camps: a significant proportion of them wrote responses similar to "whatever women want," but about a third emphasized that women's primary role should be as wives and mothers. These non-feminists appear to perceive a clear trade-off between professional and domestic responsibilities and be biased against women who decide to focus on their career rather than their home and family. Responses of this type include: "Women in society should mostly care for their families and support the interests of their husbands;" "I do believe that a woman's family should come first and that politics should wait until after the children are grown;" and "if [women] don't have kids and don't choose to start a family then they can be just as qualified as a man." Moreover, several non-feminists appear to discriminate against feminist women. For instance, a non-feminist participant writes that "feminists do our cause much harm because they come across as man-hating, tinfoil hat wearing extremists," and another similarly argues that "if a woman is fully educated and can be

seen as non-biased or as a non-feminist, then she should pursue politics just like every other man." Another adds, "I don't understand what these young women are pushing for now. We've gotten so much that is important to us, why ask for more?" It is noteworthy that several participants emphasize that they refuse the feminist label while endorsing gender equality. Some of the most representative responses from these non-labelers are: "I don't consider myself a feminist but I do believe in equality," and "While I am not a feminist, I do feel that women as a group should definitely have a 'voice.' I admire those women who speak out in the political arena."

Sample characteristics

In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, the mean age is 38 years old. More than half of the sample (54 percent) resides in a suburban area. About 48 percent of participants have either a 4-year college or a post-graduate degree. The median household income ranges between $40,000 and $50,000. In terms of racial and ethnic identification, 82 of subjects describe themselves as White or Caucasian, 10 percent as African American, 4 percent as Hispanic or Latino, and 4 percent as Asian American. About 47 percent and 19 percent of the sample reports being employed full-time and part-time, respectively. About 47 percent of participants are married, while 43 percent have children under the age of 18. With regard to religion, 45 percent of respondents identify as Christian and 10 percent as evangelical. In terms of partisan identification, 59 percent of the sample identifies as Democratic (including Democratic-leaning Independents), 12 percent as Independent, and 29 percent as Republican (including Republican-leaning Independents). Ideologically, about 52 percent of respondents describe themselves as liberal and 28 percent as conservative.

2.4 Conclusions

Data from the 2016 ANES and the survey experiment I conducted on MTurk in 2017 demonstrate that feminist and non-feminist identities matter in U.S. politics. They divide the U.S. electorate and influence how voters look at female candidates and decide to cast their ballot. In the context of the 2016 presidential election, feminists were much more likely to support Hillary Clinton, while non-feminists were much more likely to oppose her and to vote for Donald Trump. The association between feminist/non-feminist ID and vote choice was significantly larger among women within both parties. In the context of a fictitious mayoral election in Iowa, feminist female candidates were preferred to non-feminist ones by feminist women, whereas they were punished by non-feminist women, regardless of the candidate's race (White or Black). Furthermore, although there are moderate correlations between gender subgroup identification – feminist/non-feminist ID – and non-feminist gender ideology – operationalized as modern sexism and traditional beliefs about gender roles, the two appear to be distinct.

In both studies, the impact of both feminist and non-feminist ID is also distinct and larger than gender group membership and strength of gender group identification. Moreover, their association with candidate support outweighs political ideology, as measured on the liberal-conservative continuum. Interestingly, results of the MTurk experiment further suggest that the impact of feminist ID and non-feminist ID tend to be asymmetric: explicitly adopting the feminist label may trigger more hostility from non-feminist voters than it engenders support from feminist ones. In other words, the electoral costs of running as a feminist candidate are likely to exceed its benefits.

In the next chapter, I will focus on analyzing what beliefs, values, and attitudes underlie and are associated with an individual's choice to adopt the feminist vs. the non-feminist label. How

do gender subgroups differ in terms of their beliefs, values, and attitudes? Understanding those beliefs enables us to shed light on why feminists and non-feminists view female candidates and vote so differently. Rather than simply holding negative views of the outgroup, both feminists and non-feminists have contrasting positive beliefs about what role women play and ought to play in American families, society, and politics. Importantly, the design of the survey I discuss in Chapter 3 also makes it possible to distinguish between non-labelers and gender individualists, on the one side, and gender inegalitarians, on the other side.

APPENDICES

Table 2.7: Impact of Feminist and Non-Feminist ID on Clinton Vote Intent across Gender

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Gender (Female)	-0.41			-0.34		
	(0.22)			(0.21)		
Feminist ID	1.62***	1.37**	2.33**			
	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.86)			
Non-Feminist ID				-2.16***	-1.95*	-2.65**
				(0.58)	(0.77)	(0.87)
Modern Sexism	-2.18***	-1.98*	-2.50**	-2.09***	-1.86*	-2.50**
	(0.61)	(0.83)	(0.91)	(0.60)	(0.83)	(0.92)
Women's Role	-1.25*	-1.13	-1.47	-1.26*	-1.19	-1.42
	(0.52)	(0.69)	(0.82)	(0.52)	(0.69)	(0.84)
Racial Resentment	-2.27***	-2.12***	-2.42***	-2.26***	-2.13***	-2.42***
	(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.64)	(0.42)	(0.57)	(0.65)
Authoritarianism	0.00	-0.04	0.14	0.02	-0.03	0.15
	(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.49)
White	-1.59***	-1.70***	-1.55***	-1.67***	-1.78***	-1.62***
	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.37)
Age	0.04	0.48	-0.38	-0.07	0.33	-0.33
	(0.71)	(0.86)	(1.21)	(0.72)	(0.86)	(1.21)
Region (South)	-0.12	0.14	-0.38	-0.12	0.17	-0.42
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Employed	-0.46*	-0.22	-0.80*	-0.47*	-0.25	-0.79*
	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.37)
Married	-0.08	-0.20	0.08	-0.08	-0.19	0.04
	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Children	-0.10	1.09	-1.20	-0.18	1.00	-1.27
	(0.88)	(1.19)	(1.17)	(0.88)	(1.19)	(1.20)
Born-again	-0.23	-0.34	-0.07	-0.18	-0.30	-0.03
	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.29)
Education	-0.92	-0.17	-1.72	-0.95	-0.29	-1.55
	(0.66)	(0.90)	(0.94)	(0.66)	(0.90)	(0.96)
Income	0.88*	0.91	1.08	0.82*	0.82	1.03
	(0.41)	(0.62)	(0.59)	(0.42)	(0.64)	(0.59)
Party ID (Rep.)	-4.83***	-4.36***	-5.51***	-4.85***	-4.34***	-5.56***
	(0.36)	(0.48)	(0.50)	(0.36)	(0.47)	(0.51)
Constant	6.23***	4.65***	7.44***	7.78***	6.22***	9.22***
	(0.88)	(1.05)	(1.35)	(0.95)	(1.10)	(1.42)
Observations	2,423	1,294	1,119	2,423	1,294	1,119

Data: 2016 ANES.

Note: The dependent variable is the pre-election intention to vote for Hillary Clinton. Entries

are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All variables recoded 0 to 1.

Table 2.8: Impact of Feminist and Non-Feminist ID on Trump Vote Choice across Gender

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Gender (Female)	0.48*			0.44*		
	(0.20)			(0.20)		
Feminist ID	-1.78***	-2.40***	-0.92			
	(0.48)	(0.58)	(0.85)			
Non-Feminist ID				2.57***	3.80***	1.17
				(0.64)	(0.77)	(1.04)
Modern Sexism	2.87***	2.62***	4.03***	2.72***	2.30***	3.98***
	(0.55)	(0.65)	(0.96)	(0.56)	(0.66)	(0.96)
Women's Role	1.54*	2.41**	0.54	1.49*	2.28**	0.54
	(0.61)	(0.76)	(0.90)	(0.61)	(0.76)	(0.90)
Racial Resentment	3.76***	4.25***	3.61***	3.76***	4.35***	3.62***
	(0.51)	(0.65)	(0.70)	(0.51)	(0.67)	(0.71)
Authoritarianism	0.79*	0.69	0.97	0.77	0.65	0.96
	(0.39)	(0.48)	(0.58)	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.59)
White	1.10***	1.18***	1.22***	1.17***	1.29***	1.25***
	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.36)
Age	1.30	0.04	3.25**	1.38	0.04	3.30**
	(0.76)	(0.90)	(1.18)	(0.78)	(0.90)	(1.19)
Region (South)	0.36	0.47	0.25	0.36	0.48	0.26
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.30)
Employed	0.25	-0.33	1.10**	0.26	-0.32	1.10**
	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.40)
Married	0.40	0.84**	-0.29	0.43	0.86**	-0.27
	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Children	-0.65	-2.90*	2.05	-0.64	-2.97*	2.05
	(1.00)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.01)	(1.29)	(1.32)
Born-again	0.12	-0.12	0.25	0.08	-0.16	0.22
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Education	0.04	-0.80	0.61	0.05	-0.88	0.64
	(0.74)	(0.98)	(1.14)	(0.76)	(1.00)	(1.14)
Income	-0.45	-0.50	-0.65	-0.45	-0.42	-0.68
	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.58)	(0.39)	(0.49)	(0.58)
Party ID (Rep.)	4.95***	5.03***	5.18***	4.97***	5.06***	5.17***
	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.51)	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.52)
Constant	-8.83***	-7.43***	-10.55***	-10.52***	-9.80***	-11.37***
	(1.02)	(1.15)	(1.61)	(1.02)	(1.16)	(1.55)
Observations	2,390	1,300	1,080	2,390	1,300	1,080

Data: 2016 ANES.

Note: The dependent variable is self-reported vote for Donald Trump. Entries are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All variables recoded 0 to 1.

Table 2.9: Difference in Means of Each Dependent Variable Across Conditions

DV	White Feminist	White Non-Feminist	P-value of difference in means
Likelihood to vote for candidate	.70	.57	**p=.000**
Favorability	.67	.59	**p=.008**
Candidate feeling therm.	.69	.60	**p=.000**
Likelihood to donate to candidate	.40	.35	p=NS
	Black Feminist	**Black Non-Feminist**	
Likelihood to vote for candidate	.72	.64	**p=.012**
Favorability	.71	.65	p=NS
Candidate feeling therm.	.74	.67	**p=.009**
Likelihood to donate to candidate	.47	.42	p=NS
	White Feminist	**Black Feminist**	
Likelihood to vote for candidate	.70	.72	p=NS
Favorability	.67	.71	p=NS
Candidate feeling therm.	.69	.74	p=NS
Likelihood to donate to candidate	.40	.47	p=NS
	White Non-Feminist	**Black Non-Feminist**	
Likelihood to vote for candidate	.57	.64	**p=.026**
Favorability	.59	.65	**p=.035**
Candidate feeling therm.	.60	.67	**p=.001**
Likelihood to donate to candidate	.35	.42	**p=.047**

Data: MTurk Survey Experiment, 2017.
Note: P-values that are statistically significant at a .95 level are in bold.

Based on Wald tests, there are statistically significant differences stemming from the candidate's race only among non-feminist candidates – between White non-feminist and Black non-feminist candidates. The Black non-feminist candidate is significantly more likely to receive the participants' vote, be viewed favorably, be evaluated positively on the feeling thermometer, and receive campaign contributions than the White non-feminist candidate. Additionally, a pattern

is present in regard to feminist as compared to non-feminist conditions. Subjects are significantly more likely to vote for and feel warmer toward both White and Black feminist as opposed to non-feminist candidates. Moreover, they significantly ($p<.01$) view the White feminist candidate more favorably than the White non-feminist one. Further, they are more likely to donate money to the campaigns of feminist candidates of either race as opposed to non-feminist candidates, although these differences do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. The pattern in favor of feminist candidates probably depends on the fact that the sample is biased in a pro-feminist direction: about 57 percent of the sample self-identifies as either a feminist or a strong feminist.

Chapter 3

Feminist and Non-Feminist Identities:

Predictors, Correlates, and Implications

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 includes the analysis of a survey I conducted in May 2018 by employing the YouGov platform. The survey relies on revised and enhanced measures for feminist and non-feminist identification, which enable us to distinguish between non-labelers and gender individualists, on the one side, and gender inegalitarians, on the other side. Importantly, the sample is nationally representative and therefore makes it possible to estimate the relative size of these gender subgroups and types within the population of U.S. registered voters.

The study has both exploratory and confirmatory objectives. In the first section of the survey and the chapter, I explore the main sources of feminist and non-feminist identification Specifically, I examine whether and to what extent respondents' beliefs about barriers to the achievement of gender equality, roles and tasks that women should prioritize, the feminist movement, and feminists as a group predict strength of feminist and non-feminist ID. In the second section, I study the question of what gender-related attitudes and experiences are associated with feminist and non-feminist self-labeling. As for attitudes, I analyze the relationships between gender linked fate, modern sexism, traditional views of women's role, and collective orientation,

on the one hand, and gender subgroup identities, on the other hand. As for experiences, I focus on how respondents' experiences of gender discrimination and division of household chores with their spouse or partner are related to their identification with feminism or non-feminism. Finally, in the third section of the chapter, I employ strength of feminist and non-feminist ID as explanatory variables in order to explore their impact on voters' support for female candidates (a woman President in the next twenty years and more women elected to political office), women's rights activism, and gender policies (gender equal pay, preferential hiring for women, paid parental leave, and abortion). I further conduct deductive tests of hypotheses 2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender) and 3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology) by comparing the impact of feminist/non-feminist ID to the impact of gender group membership and political ideology on support for women candidates and women's rights activism.

3.2 Study 3: Survey on YouGov

This study focuses on the socio-political correlates of feminist and non-feminist self-identification and their impact on female candidate evaluations and political behavior, more broadly. A nationally representative sample of 1,000 U.S. registered voters was gathered between May 17-24, 2018 on the YouGov platform.

YouGov interviewed 1,228 registered voters who were then matched down to a sample of 1,000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements. The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender,

race/ethnicity, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles. The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight.

The survey covers three key thematic areas. First, it is aimed at better understanding how the terms "feminist" and "non-feminist" are perceived and conceptualized by the American public. There is indeed considerable ambiguity about the meaning of feminism (Aronson 2003). Among others, Huddy, Neely, and Lafay (2000) find that there is more support for the women's movement than for feminism, thus indicating that they are perceived as distinct cognitive constructs with differing connotations. There is also extensive evidence that young women tend to be unwilling to identify as a feminist even though they are overall supportive of feminist goals (e.g., Abowitz 2008; Rich 2005; Schnittker et al. 2003). In other words, interpretations and perceptions of what feminism and non-feminism mean and stand for are likely to affect one's willingness to accept the feminist label (Zucker 2004). But failure to self-identify as a feminist cannot be necessarily viewed as a rejection of the values and goals underlying the feminist movement or as unwillingness to endorse feminist political candidates. Thus, it is necessary to explore the types of beliefs underpinning feminist vs. non-feminist self-labeling.

Second, the survey addressed the question of where those conceptualizations and beliefs come from, namely how they develop according to the social and political context individuals grow up and live in. In particular, experiences of sexism and perceptions of collective as well as individual gender discrimination can be expected to make feminist identity more relevant, while a relative lack of negative experiences based on sex and gender, conservative views about gender

roles, and feelings of gender resentment may make non-feminism more salient.

Finally, feminism and non-feminism are interpretative tools employed by individuals to navigate the socio-political world. Consequently, a set of survey questions focus on the relationships between feminist/non-feminist identity as the explanatory variable and political involvement, support for female candidates, and attitudes about specific policies regarding women's rights and opportunities as dependent variables.

Measurement of Feminist and Non-Feminist Self-Identification

The sample includes 1,000 U.S. registered voters of both genders: 535 women and 465 men. The pie chart below (Figure 3.1) shows the proportion of strong feminists, feminists, non-labelers and gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians, broken down by respondent's gender. The displayed percentages derive from respondents' answers to the question of whether they consider themselves a strong feminist, a feminist, not a feminist/a non-feminist, or an anti-feminist. As anti-feminists are operationalized as gender inegalitarians, non-feminist identifiers may be either non-labelers or gender individualists.

These percentages indicate that the majority of voters across genders identify as non-feminists, and are either non-labelers or individualists. Male respondents are significantly more likely to be non-labelers or individualists – 67 percent as compared to 53 percent among women. However, women are much more likely than men to adopt the feminist label: about 43 percent of women define themselves as either a feminist or a strong feminist, while only 25 percent of men consider themselves a feminist. In particular, being a strong feminist is more popular among women than men: about 14 percent as compared to 8 percent, respectively. Finally, inegalitarians are a small proportion of the electorate, particularly among women: they represent about 7 percent of men and 4 percent of women.

Figure 3.1: Gender Subgroups and Types by Respondent's Gender



Source: YouGov Survey, May 17-24, 2018

I measure strength of feminist identity for respondents who identify as either a strong feminist or a feminist. I constructed a scale by combining answers to a battery of six closed-ended questions: 1) "Do you consider yourself a strong feminist, a feminist, not a feminist/a non-feminist, or an anti-feminist;" 2) "How would you rate feminists on a 0-100 feeling thermometer;" 3) "How would you rate non-feminists on a 0-100 feeling thermometer;" (reverse-coded) 4) "How would you rate anti-feminists on a 0-100 feeling thermometer;" (reverse-coded) 5) "How well does the term 'feminist' describe you;" and 6) "How important is it to you to be a feminist." This additive scale displays good reliability ($\alpha = .80$). On a range from 0-1, the mean of feminist ID is .72 among women and .70 among men.

Strength of non-feminist identity is measured among respondents who consider themselves a non-feminist or an anti-feminist. I created the non-feminist ID scale by combining answers to the following two items in addition to the first four items used for feminist ID: 1) "How well does

the term ‘not a feminist/non-feminist’ describe you;”; and 2) “How important is it to you not to be a feminist.” The resulting 6-item scale has good internal consistency (α = .74). On a range from 0-1, the mean of non-feminist ID is .56 among both women and men.

Social, economic, and political correlates of feminist vs. non-feminist self-labeling

I have examined what socio-demographic factors are associated with an individual’s likelihood to accept the feminist vs. the non-feminist label through logit regression models (Table 3.1). The dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the respondent indicated considering herself a strong feminist or a feminist and equal to 0 if she reported considering herself a non-feminist or an anti-feminist. The first model includes gender (i.e. being female) as an explanatory variable, whereas the other two models are run among women and men separately.

The variable that is most strongly and significantly (p<0.001) correlated with the propensity to embrace the feminist vs. the non-feminist label across genders is political ideology. Conservative respondents are much more likely to identity as non-feminists, whereas liberals are more likely to identify as feminists. That association is stronger among men than women. Another largely significant factor appears to be age: older individuals are less likely to consider themselves a feminist. This result runs counter to the finding that younger women are less likely to identify as a feminist, although a majority of them are supportive of gender egalitarian goals (e.g., Abowitz 2008; Rich 2005). These differences may stem from sample representativeness: while my sample is representative of the broader U.S. electorate, most of those results in social psychology rely on unrepresentative samples of college students. Being a Christian is also negatively associated with choosing the feminist as compared to the non-feminist label, especially among men. Additionally, women living in rural areas are significantly less likely to define themselves a feminist.

Among the positive predictors, higher levels of household income and education among

men are correlated with a higher probability of identifying as a feminist. Gender (i.e. being female) is also positively and significantly (p<0.001) associated with feminist self-identification. Women are indeed 25 percent more likely to adopt the feminist label than men are.

Table 3.1: Socio-Demographic Predictors of Feminist vs. Non-Feminist Self-Labeling

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men
Gender (Female)	1.35***		
	(0.22)		
White	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.48)
Age	-1.71*	-1.30	-2.54
	(0.75)	(0.95)	(1.39)
Rural Residence	-0.37	-0.85*	0.64
	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.53)
Region (South)	-0.21	0.13	-0.66
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.35)
Employed	-0.02	0.43	-0.41
	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Married	-0.11	-0.19	-0.05
	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.44)
Kids under 5	-0.41	0.26	-1.98
	(0.81)	(1.17)	(1.74)
Christianity	-0.94***	-0.61	-1.54***
	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.46)
Born-again	0.40	0.27	0.79
	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.64)
Church Attendance	0.63	0.38	1.11
	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.76)
Education	0.75	0.15	1.87**
	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.62)
Income	1.60**	0.61	3.07***
	(0.58)	(0.80)	(0.86)
Political Ideology (Cons.)	-5.64***	-5.35***	-6.48***
	(0.53)	(0.74)	(0.83)
Constant	1.52**	3.01***	0.93
	(0.52)	(0.69)	(0.93)
Observations	804	414	390

Note: Entries are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is a feminist. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

I have further analyzed whether there are differences by generation rather than age in respondents' likelihood to identify as a feminist as opposed to a non-feminist (Table 3.2). Specifically, I divided my sample into five generations: Silent Generation (birth years 1931-1945), Baby Boomer (birth years 1946-1964), Generation X (birth years 1965-1980), Generation Y or Millennials (birth years 1981-1996), and Generation Z or Centennials (birth years 1997-). These results are consistent with the previous analysis that controls for age (Table 3.1). Both women and men of the two youngest generations – Millennials and Centennials – are significantly more likely to adopt the feminist rather than the non-feminist label. Previous studies found that individuals who were young adults during the second wave of the feminist movement were the most likely to identify as feminists (Schnittker et al. 2003). However, based on my sample, those who became adults during the third wave may be much more inclined to adopt the feminist label. Importantly, members of Gen Z are the most likely to call themselves feminists, thus indicating that the relative proportion of feminists in the electorate is going to increase in the future.

Table 3.2: Predicting Feminist vs. Non-Feminist Self-Labeling by Generation

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men
Boomer	0.06	0.33	-0.31
	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.44)
Gen X	0.44	0.46	0.45
	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.44)
Gen Y	0.88***	0.79*	1.09*
	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.43)
Gen Z	1.76***	2.67***	1.37*
	(0.45)	(0.72)	(0.68)
Constant	-1.09***	-0.82**	-1.53***
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.38)
Observations	996	535	461

Note: Entries are logit regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. "Silent Generation" is the omitted category. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Perceptions and conceptualizations of feminism and non-feminism

In this first section, I examine a variety of questions that shed light on what beliefs underlie feminist vs. non-feminist identification and what connotations voters attach to the corresponding labels. Investigating those beliefs and connotations helps us better understand what drives voters to choose one label over the other.

To begin, respondents were asked to rank a list of six roles they believe women should prioritize: "being a wife and/or mother;" "having a successful career outside of the home;" "taking care of the home and/or family;" "being an advocate for women's rights;" "being compassionate;" or "having an equal say within the household." Results of linear regressions of strength of feminist self-identification on the above-mentioned six priorities for women are displayed in Table 3.3. "Being compassionate" is the omitted category in this analysis.

Table 3.3: Priorities for Women as Predictors of Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Being a wife and/or mother	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Having a career outside of the home	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Taking care of the home and/or family	-0.07	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Being an advocate for women's rights	0.14**	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Having an equal say within the household	0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Constant	0.66***	0.59***
	(0.08)	(0.10)
Observations	229	117
R-squared	0.171	0.279

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is feminist ID. "Being compassionate" is the omitted category/priority for women. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Among both women and men, advocating for women's rights is largely, positively, and significantly (p<0.001) associated with feminist self-identification. Indeed, advocacy for women's rights is not only the largest, but also the only statistically significant predictor in both genders. This result is consistent with the findings in the social psychology literature pointing to the strong correlation between feminist identity and women's rights activism (e.g., Duncan 1999; Eisele and Stake 2008; Kelly and Breinlinger 1995; Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004; Szymanski 2004). Of course, it remains hard to discern whether the causal arrow runs from activism to feminist ID or vice versa. However, it is clear that an important part of being a feminist consists in being committed to promoting women's rights and opportunities. Interestingly, having an equal say within the household is not significantly related to feminist identity.

Table 3.4 displays the same linear regression models including strength of non-feminist self-identification as the dependent variable. This non-feminist subsample includes non-labelers and gender individualists. Gender inegalitarian respondents – those who described themselves as anti-feminists – have been excluded from this and all the following regression analyses because of their small proportion in the sample (n=33 among men, n=21 among women). Due to the exclusion of inegalitarians and for ease of presentation, I will refer to the combination of non-labelers and gender individualists as "non-feminists" in the remaining of this chapter.

As opposed to feminists, non-feminist women (but not men) significantly rank both advocating for women's rights and having a career outside of the home as low priorities. On the contrary, taking care of the home and family and being a wife and/or a mother are highly ranked among men (but not women) and are positively and significantly (p<0.05) associated with non-feminist ID. In sum, non-feminist identification appears to be partially rooted in downplaying women's contributions to the workplace and in the public sphere among women, while it stems

from positively endorsing women's role as wives, mothers, and caregivers inside the home among men. In other words, non-feminist women place a high value on women not having to play a role beyond their household, whereas non-feminist men place a high value on women focusing on their household.

Table 3.4: Priorities for Women as Predictors of Non-Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Being a wife and/or mother	-0.01	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Having a career outside of the home	-0.06*	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Taking care of the home and/or family	0.01	0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Being an advocate for women's rights	-0.15***	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Having an equal say within the household	-0.06	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.64***	0.48***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	284	305
R-squared	0.107	0.136

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is non-feminist ID. "Being compassionate" is the omitted category/priority for women. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Moreover, respondents were asked whether they believe the following three statements about the feminist movement to be true: "It accurately reflects the views of most women;" "It looks down on women who do not have jobs;" and "It unfairly blames men for women's challenges." Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below display the results of linear regressions including those descriptions of feminism as predictors of strength of feminist and non-feminist identification, respectively. Self-labeled feminists of both genders believe feminism portrays the views of the majority of women and does not blame men unfairly for women's challenges (Table 3.5). Additionally, feminist

women believe that feminism does not disdain women without a career outside the home. This suggests that feminists reject negative stereotypes that are usually associated with feminism and contribute to the social stigma attached to the feminist label. They do not view feminism as a movement that alienates men or excludes women who choose to stay home.

Table 3.5: Descriptions of Feminism as Predictors of Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Accurately reflects the views of most women	0.09***	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Looks down on women who do not have jobs	-0.05*	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Unfairly blames men for women's challenges	-0.07**	-0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.67***	0.65***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	226	116
R-squared	0.141	0.202

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is feminist ID. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Overall, opposite beliefs are held by non-feminists (Table 3.6). The largest predictor of strength of non-feminist identity in both genders is the belief that the feminist movement is hostile to men and places unjust blame on them. The belief that feminism looks down on unemployed women is significantly related to non-feminist ID only among men, while the view that feminism reflects what most women think is a statistically significant and negative predictor of non-feminist ID only among women. What this tells us is that the view that feminism is directed against men plays a big role in individuals' decision to identity as non-feminists. Furthermore, similarly to feminist women, non-feminist women tend to think they are a majority of all women.

Table 3.6: Descriptions of Feminism as Predictors of Non-Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Accurately reflects the views of most women	-0.07***	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Looks down on women who do not have jobs	0.03	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Unfairly blames men for women's challenges	0.09***	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.49***	0.48***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	281	308
R-squared	0.217	0.115

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is non-feminist ID. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Next, I examine if and to what extent phrases describing feminists as a group (rather than the feminist movement) are associated with strength of feminist and non-feminist identity (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Women who agree that "They [Feminists] support abortion rights" tend to have a stronger feminist identity (Table 3.7). This points to the positive correlation between feminism and support for women's reproductive rights. Further, among women, the more strongly an individual disagrees with the statement that "They [Feminists] don't respect married women who stay home and take care of families," the more strongly that individual identifies as a feminist. This finding is consistent with the results from Table 3.5: feminist women do not view their choice to adopt the feminist label as implying a negative judgement toward women who choose to be homemakers. Among men, different descriptions of feminists are consequential. Specifically, the belief that feminists work against sexual harassment is positively associated with feminist ID, while the beliefs that feminists work in favor of equal pay for women and that they are overly concerned with sex are negatively associated with feminist ID among male participants. Although it makes

sense that feminist men value feminists' efforts to combat sexual harassment, it is surprising that they view efforts to achieve equal pay negatively. A possible interpretation is that men who think feminists mostly work to ensure equal pay for women are likely to identify less strongly as feminists, because they perceive this goal as threatening to their relative standing in the workplace.

Table 3.7: Descriptions of Feminists as Predictors of Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Work for equal rights	-0.09	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Work for equal pay for women	-0.00	-0.14*
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Work against sexual harassment	0.04	0.14**
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Support abortion rights	0.08*	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Work for affordable daycare	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Don't respect married women who stay home	-0.10***	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.05)
Don't like most men	-0.05	-0.10
	(0.03)	(0.06)
Are too preoccupied with sex	-0.07	-0.17*
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Are often lesbians	0.04	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Constant	0.70***	0.59***
	(0.07)	(0.04)
Observations	224	113
R-squared	0.160	0.211

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is feminist ID. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Strength of non-feminist identification across both genders is significantly associated with holding negative stereotypes about feminists, namely that feminists dislike most men and that they are too preoccupied with sex (Table 3.8). Moreover, the belief that feminists tend to be lesbians is

positively correlated with non-feminist ID among female respondents, whereas the belief that feminists do not respect married women who are homemakers is positively correlated with non-feminist ID among male respondents. In sum, there is a clear and strong relationship between non-feminist ID and several stereotypical views of feminists as women who hate men and mostly care about sex. It also interesting that men seem to identity as non-feminists as a way to implicitly defend their wives' role as homemakers and, therefore, their role as breadwinners.

Table 3.8: Descriptions of Feminists as Predictors of Non-Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Work for equal rights	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Work for equal pay for women	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Work against sexual harassment	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Support abortion rights	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Work for affordable daycare	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Don't respect married women who stay home	0.01	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Don't like most men	0.08***	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Are too preoccupied with sex	0.06**	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Are often lesbians	0.06***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.48***	0.49***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	275	302
R-squared	0.301	0.288

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is non-feminist ID. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Participants were further asked to rank six possible goals of feminism in order of

importance: “equal pay for equal work;” “reducing sexual harassment;” “access to quality, affordable childcare;” “paid time off from work to care for family members;” “improving women’s health care;” and “getting more women elected to political office.” Linear regression results based on respondents’ rankings as predictors of feminist and non-feminist ID are displayed in Tables 3.9 and 3.10, respectively.

Table 3.9: Goals of Feminism as Predictors of Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Equal pay for equal work	0.09*	0.13
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Reducing sexual harassment	0.11**	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Access to childcare	0.05	0.19*
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Improving women’s health care	0.11*	0.12
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Getting more women elected to political office	0.18***	0.15*
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Constant	0.43***	0.35*
	(0.09)	(0.16)
Observations	228	117
R-squared	0.109	0.101

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is feminist ID. “Paid time off from work to care for family members” is the omitted category/goal of feminism. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Both female and male feminists rank electing more women very highly, thereby suggesting that feminism is a highly politicized identity with important implications for voter behavior (Table 3.9). Feminists aim to elect more female candidates. Additional positive and statistically significant predictors of strength of feminist ID are improving women’s health care, reducing sexual harassment, and achieving gender equal pay among female respondents, and providing access to affordable, quality childcare among male respondents. It is reasonable that women

prioritize goals that benefit their gender group: they want not to be victims of sexual harassment, to have good health care, and to be paid equally. However, it is surprising that childcare is a main concern among feminist men, but not among feminist mothers who work outside the home.

Table 3.10: Goals of Feminism as Predictors of Non-Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Equal pay for equal work	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Reducing sexual harassment	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Access to childcare	0.05	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Improving women's health care	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Getting more women elected to political office	-0.10**	-0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.58***	0.64***
	(0.07)	(0.06)
Observations	284	308
R-squared	0.089	0.029

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is non-feminist ID. "Paid time off from work to care for family members" is the omitted category/goal of feminism. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

In contrast, among non-feminist respondents, only one feminist goal significantly and negatively predicts strength of non-feminist identity among both women and men: getting more female candidates elected to political office (Table 3.10). This result demonstrates that non-feminism is also a highly politicized identity. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on electoral support for women candidates crucially separates feminists from non-feminists: the former subgroup prioritizes it, while the latter subgroup does not think it should be pursued as a goal. There may be multiple reasons behind non-feminists' dismissal of equal representation. Gender individualists are likely to be hostile to the idea of actively preferring female over male candidates

because they believe candidates should be evaluated only based on their merits and qualifications rather than their gender or their contribution to diversity.

Finally, respondents were asked to indicate what they think is a bigger factor keeping women from achieving full equality with men among the following: "the choices women make themselves," "discrimination against women," "both (women's choices and discrimination) equally," or "women have achieved full equality with men." This question powerfully highlights another key source of the divide between feminists and non-feminists (Figure 3.2 below).

Figure 3.2: Bigger Barrier to Gender Equality: Discrimination vs. Women's Choices



Source: YouGov Survey, May 17-24, 2018

On the one hand, the vast majority of self-identified feminists view discrimination as the main cause of gender inequality. On the other hand, the majority of non-feminists – non-labelers and gender individualists – believe the lack of gender equality to be a function of both discrimination and women's choices equally. Gender inegalitarians are mostly split between

viewing women's choices as the cause of gender inequality, particularly among female participants, and stating that women have already achieved full equality with men, particularly among male participants. The fact that feminists identify discrimination, while non-feminists tend to identity women's choices as the main source of gender inequality is in line with studies showing that non-feminist women take sexism personally and blame themselves for it, while feminist women interpret it as a systemic problem of injustice (Landrine and Klonoff 1997).

In sum, there is a strong relationship between feminist and non-feminist identification, on the one side, and beliefs about women's priorities, the feminist movement, and feminists, on the other side. Strongly identified feminists prioritize advocating for women's rights and view electing more women to political office as a major goal to be pursued. Moreover, they reject negative stereotypes about feminism and feminists. In contrast, strongly identified non-feminists believe that feminism places unfair blame on men and that feminists do not like men, do not respect married women without a job outside the home, and are overly concerned with sex. Additionally, feminists and non-feminists disagree on what gender inequality stems from – whether it is mainly a structural issue or a result of women's choices. This difference in attribution is important because disagreement over the sources of such inequality implies disagreement over how to address it.

Relationships between gender subgroup identities and gender-related attitudes and experiences

In this second section, I investigate how feminist and non-feminist identities are correlated with gender-related attitudes and experiences. As for attitudes, I focus on gender linked fate, traditional beliefs about women's proper role, modern sexism, and collective orientation. As for experiences, I focus on individual experiences of gender discrimination and division of household chores between spouses and domestic partners. My conjecture is that these gender-related attitudes and experiences are more likely to temporally precede rather than follow the adoption of the

feminist/non-feminist label. However, the survey data at my disposal and my empirical strategy do not allow me to identify any causal relationship. In other words, it may be the case that identifying as a feminist or as a non-feminist influences an individual's gender-based beliefs as well as perception of gender-based experiences and sensitivity to discrimination. Thus, the results I present in this section should be interpreted as pointing to an association between gender background characteristics and feminist/non-feminist ID or a lack thereof rather than to a causal impact of the former on the latter.

Tables 3.11 and 3.12 below show linear regression results for models including gender attitudes as explanatory variables and strength of feminist or non-feminist identification as the dependent variable, respectively. Specifically, in order to measure common fate with one's own gender group, respondents were asked whether they think that what happens generally to women/men in this country will have something to do with what happens in their life and if yes, how much that will affect them. With regard to old-fashioned beliefs about women's place, participants were asked the same battery of questions drawing on the 2016 ANES. In particular, the women's role scale includes two items: 1) "Do you think it is easier, harder, or neither easier nor harder for mothers who work outside the home to establish a warm and secure relationship with their children than it is for mothers who stay at home;" and 2) "Do you think it is better, worse, or makes no difference for the family as a whole if the man works outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family." The modern sexism scale combines the following three items: 1) "Should the news media pay more attention to discrimination against women, less attention, or the same amount of attention they have been paying lately;" 2) "When women demand equality these days, how often are they actually seeking special favors;" and 3) "When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more problems than they solve."

Furthermore, participants responded to four items to measure collective orientation as compared to individualistic attitudes to address gender disparities and inequities (Gurin 1985). The four statements they indicated their degree of agreement with are: 1) "It is not enough for a woman to be successful herself; women must work together to change laws and customs that are unfair to all women;" 2) "Women can best overcome discrimination by pursuing their individual career goals in as feminine a way as possible" (reverse coded); 3) "Only if women organize and work together can anything really be done about discrimination;" and 4) "The best way to handle problems of discrimination is for each woman to make sure she gets the best training possible for what she wants to do" (reverse coded). Higher values on this scale indicate stronger collective orientation, namely willingness and motivation to work with other women to promote women's rights and combat discrimination against women.

Table 3.11: Gender Attitudes as Predictors of Feminist ID

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	Women	Men
Linked Fate with women	0.11***	
	(0.02)	
Linked Fate with men		0.03
		(0.04)
Women's Role	-0.18***	-0.25*
	(0.05)	(0.10)
Modern Sexism	-0.18***	-0.20*
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Collective Orientation	0.21***	0.23*
	(0.06)	(0.10)
Constant	0.64***	0.71***
	(0.06)	(0.10)
Observations	223	114
R-squared	0.329	0.280

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is feminist ID. All variables are coded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Among both women and men, the strongest correlates of feminist ID are collective orientation, modern sexism, and women's role (Table 3.11). An individual who has collectivist attitudes about women's rights is likely to identify much more strongly as a feminist, while an individual holding sexist attitudes and/or old-fashioned beliefs about women's role is much less likely to identify as such. This is not surprising as feminists are characterized by a commitment to collective action (e.g., Duncan 1999; Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004; Williams and Wittig 1997). Moreover, holding sexist and traditional attitudes about gender roles signals opposition to feminist gender ideology or, in other words, gender egalitarianism, as I argued in Chapter 2. However, it is noteworthy that gender common fate is a statistically significant predictor only among women, thus suggesting that there is a positive correlation between women's gender consciousness and feminist ID. This makes sense since the feminist movement has been primarily concerned with addressing women's unequal position in the private and public spheres and fostering their rights and opportunities.

Relationships in the opposite directions are present among non-feminists (Table 3.12). Across gender, modern sexism is significantly and positively associated with non-feminist ID, while collective orientation is significantly and negatively associated with it. But there are a few important differences as compared to feminist ID. Traditional views about women's role are a statistically significant predictor of strength of non-feminist identification only among male respondents. Additionally, gender linked fate is not significantly associated with non-feminist identity among either women or men, thereby indicating that non-feminism is to some extent "gender-neutral" or, in other words, is neither a primarily male or a primarily female subgroup identity. This further suggests that non-feminism may be perceived as more inclusive than feminism by both men and women. In other words, although feminism is aimed at broadening

rights and opportunities for women, it may end up being less successful than non-feminism in attracting a large and diverse coalition.

Table 3.12: Gender Attitudes as Predictors of Non-Feminist ID

VARIABLES	(1) Women	(2) Men
Linked Fate with women	0.02	
	(0.02)	
Linked Fate with men		0.02
		(0.02)
Women's Role	0.09	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Modern Sexism	0.26***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Collective Orientation	-0.19**	-0.16**
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Constant	0.46***	0.47***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Observations	274	302
R-squared	0.321	0.208

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. The dependent variable is non-feminist ID. All variables are coded 0 to 1.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

In order to measure personal experiences of discrimination, respondents were asked if they have ever been discriminated against due to your gender. Table 3.13 below shows the percentage of those who responded affirmatively by gender group (i.e., sex) and type – strong feminists and feminists, non-labelers and gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians. Among men, individual experiences of gender-based discrimination do not appear to be related to any gender subgroup identity. Moreover, a relatively low proportion of men – between 26 and 34 percent – report having experienced gender discrimination. However, a clear pattern emerges among women. About three in four strong feminists and three in five feminists acknowledge having felt discriminated based on their gender. In contrast, only about three in ten non-feminists (non-labelers

and individualists or inegalitarians) report similar experiences. This pattern is consistent with findings in social psychology indicating that feminist identification is correlated with heightened sensitivity to sexism and sexual harassment as well as enhanced willingness and capacity to tackle them (e.g., Henderson-King and Stewart 1994; Landrine and Klonoff 1997; Leaper and Arias 2011). Furthermore, experiences of sexism have been found to indirectly predict feminist self-identification (Nelson et al. 2008).

Table 3.13: Percentage of Respondents Who Experienced Gender Discrimination by Sex and Gender Type

	Strong Feminists	**Feminists**	**Non-labelers and Individualists**	**Inegalitarians**
Female	75.22%	60.24%	31.52%	26.9%
Male	25.54%	32.57%	28.57%	34.46%

An additional question respondents were asked about their personal experiences pertains to the division of household chores and responsibilities with their spouse or partner: "Do you do more than your (spouse/partner), does your (spouse/partner) do more than you, or do you share this about equally." As shown in Table 3.14 (below), whether a woman or a man does more than their spouse/partner does not appear to be correlated with gender subgroup identification. In fact, among women, similar proportions of feminists and non-feminists state they do more than their spouse/partner at home or share chores equally. The only outlier is represented by inegalitarian women, who report doing more to a larger extent (71 percent). Overall, it is important to highlight that regardless of individual partners' subgroup identification, more than half of women report doing the heavy lifting at home, while the majority of men report sharing chores and responsibilities equally with their spouse/partner.

Table 3.14: Division of Household Chores by Respondent's Gender and Gender Type

	Strong Feminists	Feminists	Non-labelers and Individualists	Inegalitarians
Women who do more	56.68%	55.73%	51.09%	71.35%
Women who share equally	41.15%	33.06%	45.21%	21.43%
Men who do more	27.28%	13.86%	17.23%	16.57%
Men who share equally	52.18%	48.27%	63.85%	41.97%

Note: These percentages represent proportions by column among women and men, separately.

The impact of feminist and non-feminist identities

In this third section, I examine the impact of feminist and non-feminist identification on support for women in politics, activism in favor of women's rights, and gender-related policies. In order to do so, I account for strength of feminist and non-feminist ID as independent variables. This enables me to evaluate hypotheses 1 (Gender Subgroup IDs), 2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender), and 3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology).

With regard to female candidates, respondents were asked if and to what extent they view having a woman President in the next twenty years positively ("Would it be good, bad, or neither good nor bad if the United States has a woman President in the next 20 years") and whether it is important to have more women elected to political office ("How important is it that more women be elected to political office"). Table 3.15 below includes linear regression models predicting support for a woman President. Although not displayed, controls are included for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau), employment status (employed either full- or part-time), marital status (i.e., married), children under the age of 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income.

Table 3.15: Predicting Support for a Woman President in the Next Twenty Years

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Feminist ID	0.41***	0.39***	0.46***			
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.29***	-0.21*	-0.33**
				(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Gender (Female)	-0.00			0.03		
	(0.02)			(0.02)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.04	-0.05	-0.03	-0.19**	-0.17*	-0.14
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Party ID (Rep.)	-0.09	-0.10	-0.03	-0.08	-0.04	-0.14
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Constant	0.56***	0.56***	0.57***	0.98***	0.97***	1.00***
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Observations	291	187	104	464	209	255
R-squared	0.273	0.273	0.341	0.218	0.271	0.254

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Among both men and women, feminist ID powerfully and significantly (p<0.001) predicts considering the election of a woman President in the next 20 years as positive. This is consistent with my finding that feminist identifiers view electing more female candidates as the main goal of feminism (Table 3.9). Furthermore, the impact of feminist ID far outweighs the impact of both gender (i.e. being female) and political ideology. Indeed, Wald tests on the equality of the regression coefficients on feminist ID and gender support the hypothesis that they are statistically different, as predicted by H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). The difference between feminist ID and political ideology is also statistically significant among both men and women based on Wald tests, in accordance with H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology).

Non-feminist ID has the opposite impact: it predicts viewing the election of a woman

President in the next two decades as negative, particularly among men. This is also consistent with my earlier finding that non-feminists tend to oppose candidate preferences that are based on considerations of gender group membership (Table 3.10). Furthermore, the size of such a negative association is much larger than gender group membership in predicting support for a woman President at a .95 level of significance using Wald tests, thereby providing additional support for H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). However, the difference between the non-feminist ID and political ideology coefficients does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, although the size of the coefficient on non-feminist ID is larger than the one on political ideology, especially among male participants.

Table 3.16 below includes the same regression models in relation to the dependent variable of getting more women elected to political office. Feminist ID is powerfully associated with considering the election of more women as important, especially among men. Moreover, as in the previous table, Wald tests at a .95 significance level demonstrate that the coefficient on feminist ID is not only larger, but statistically different from both gender as predicted by H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender) and political ideology as predicted by H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology), among both men and women.

In contrast, non-feminist ID is largely and significantly associated with viewing the election of more female candidates as unimportant among female voters, but not among male ones. This is a meaningful result, because it shows that female candidates may encounter greater and more active opposition from non-feminist women than men. Additionally, non-feminist ID has a larger impact that gender, and the difference in the size of the coefficients on non-feminist ID and gender is statistically significant (H2 – Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). When comparing non-feminist ID and political ideology, the difference between the two coefficients is significant

only among women voters using Wald tests, thereby providing some partial support for H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology). Among men, conservative political ideology is a stronger predictor of opposition to female candidates than non-feminist identity.

Table 3.16: Predicting Support for More Women Elected to Political Office

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Feminist ID	0.39***	0.30**	0.48***			
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.12)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.33**	-0.72***	-0.04
				(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Gender (Female)	0.06**			0.06*		
	(0.02)			(0.03)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.10	-0.19*	-0.03	-0.38***	-0.28**	-0.42***
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Party ID (Rep.)	-0.04	0.02	-0.15	-0.08	0.01	-0.14
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Constant	0.56***	0.75***	0.45***	0.84***	1.05***	0.70***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Observations	291	187	104	463	209	254
R-squared	0.240	0.202	0.377	0.193	0.277	0.205

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Overall, the results in Tables 3.15 and Table 3.16 provide clear support for H1 (Gender Subgroup IDs), as they indicate that feminist and non-feminist identities are largely politicized and consequential among U.S. voters in predicting support for electing a woman President in the near future as well as more female candidates at various levels of government.

In terms of political engagement, respondents were asked a battery of three questions about women's rights activism: 1) "Have you ever voted for a candidate because of her or his support

for women's rights;" 2) "Have you ever phoned, written, or sent an email to a public official expressing your views on women's rights;" and 3) "Have you ever expressed your views about women's rights on a social media site like Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram." I created an additive scale, which has acceptable internal consistency (α = .70), by combining responses to these three items, where higher values correspond to more activism in support of women's rights. Linear regression results are displayed in Table 3.17.

Table 3.17: Predicting Women's Rights Activism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	All	Women	Men	All	Women	Men
Feminist ID	0.89***	0.80***	1.16***			
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.22)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.15	-0.03	-0.26
				(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Gender (female)	0.02			-0.01		
	(0.04)			(0.02)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.37**	-0.58***	0.12	-0.09	-0.11	-0.09
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Party ID (Rep.)	0.20*	0.29**	0.04	-0.05	-0.10	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.36**	-0.21	-0.48*	0.35***	0.19	0.46***
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Observations	288	185	103	460	208	252
R-squared	0.305	0.393	0.324	0.092	0.124	0.136

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Feminist identity is significantly (p<0.001) associated with higher levels of activism across gender. In contrast, the association between non-feminist identity and women's rights activism is small and not statically significant. The positive relationship between feminist identification and

political activism is highly consistent with findings from social psychology (e.g., Duncan 1999; Kelly and Breinlinger 1995; Fischer et al. 2000; Liss, Crawford, and Popp 2004; Szymanski 2004). Moreover, this pattern echoes my previous finding that considering advocacy for women's rights as a priority for women predicts strength of feminist identification (Table 3.3). Further, the impact of feminist ID far outweighs the impact of both gender and political ideology. Results from Wald tests show that the differences between feminist ID and gender, on the one side, and feminist ID and political ideology, on the other side, are both statistically significant, as expected according to H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender) and H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology), respectively.

Finally, participants were asked to indicate their views about a number policies pertaining to gender issues: the gender wage gap, preferential hiring for women, paid parental leave, and abortion. Specifically, in regard to the gender wage gap, respondents were asked the following question: "Do you think the federal government should take a more active role to ensure equal pay for men and women who are doing the same job, or do you think the government is already doing enough?" Results of linear regressions of support for a more active role of the government in ensuring gender equal pay on feminist and non-feminist ID are displayed in Table 3.18 below. Feminist identity is strongly, positively, and significantly associated with support for gender equal pay, especially among male respondents. In contrast, non-feminist identity is significantly related to lower support for equal pay for equal work. Comparatively, the size of the negative impact of non-feminist ID is much larger than the positive impact of feminist ID. It is also noteworthy that both feminist ID and non-feminist ID have a significantly larger impact than political ideology, thus suggesting that gender subgroup identities are partially overlapping with but cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of either liberal or conservative ideology.

Table 3.18: Predicting Support for Government Ensuring Gender Equal Pay

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Feminist ID	0.29**	0.24*	0.41*			
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.16)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.72***	-0.69***	-0.81***
				(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Gender (female)	0.05			0.14***		
	(0.03)			(0.03)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.10	-0.02	-0.28*	-0.35***	-0.10	-0.49***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Party ID (Rep.)	-0.02	0.03	-0.21	-0.07	-0.14	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	0.77***	0.80***	0.80***	1.35***	1.31***	1.47***
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Observations	291	188	103	463	208	255
R-squared	0.153	0.143	0.307	0.281	0.186	0.347

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

With regard to preferential hiring for women, participants were asked: "Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose preferential hiring for women, that is hiring a woman rather than a man when they are both equally qualified?" Linear regression results are included in Table 3.19 below. Feminist ID is largely, positively, and significantly associated with support for affirmative action in favor of women in hiring, particularly among men. Non-feminist ID is not, however, a statistically significant predictor among either female or male respondents. This suggests that while feminists are actively supportive of women's affirmative action and gender diversity in the workplace, non-feminists overall tend to be against it but not to the point of holding hostile attitudes toward it. This result may depend on the fact that non-feminists include both non-labelers and gender individualists in this sample. While non-labelers can be expected to support

preferential hiring for women, individualists are likely to oppose it since they believe the responsibility of combating discrimination and pushing for equality rests on individual women.

Table 3.19: Predicting Support for Preferential Hiring for Women

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Feminist ID	0.56***	0.44**	0.68***			
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.19)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.21*	-0.25	-0.18
				(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Gender (female)	-0.03			0.09***		
	(0.03)			(0.02)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.26*	-0.28*	-0.25	-0.13	-0.07	-0.17*
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Party ID (Rep.)	0.05	0.19*	-0.28*	-0.10*	-0.15*	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Constant	0.30**	0.34*	0.32	0.68***	0.75***	0.69***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Observations	291	188	103	463	208	255
R-squared	0.199	0.230	0.433	0.167	0.206	0.172

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Drawing on wording from the 2016 ANES, participants were asked this question about parental leave: "Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose requiring employers to offer paid leave to parents of new children?" The resulting regression results are shown in Table 3.20 below. Feminist identity is not significantly related to favoring paid parental leave. However, non-feminist identity is significantly associated with lower support for requiring employers to offer paid leave to parents of new children among male respondents. This significant result among non-feminist men is not surprising, as they are likely to believe in traditional roles for women and may

therefore view parental leave as posing a threat to these roles they support.

Table 3.20: Predicting Support for Paid Parental Leave

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Feminist ID	-0.11	-0.15	-0.02			
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.17)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.32**	-0.23	-0.40*
				(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Gender (female)	0.03			0.13***		
	(0.03)			(0.03)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.15*	-0.16	-0.12	-0.25**	-0.06	-0.38**
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Party ID (Rep.)	-0.07	-0.12	0.07	-0.05	-0.03	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Constant	1.07***	1.22***	0.87***	1.07***	1.01***	1.21***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Observations	290	186	104	464	209	255
R-squared	0.118	0.156	0.175	0.178	0.150	0.246

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Finally, respondents' views about abortion were captured through the following question borrowed from the 2016 ANES: "There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which of these opinions best agrees with your view? [By law, abortion should never be permitted. / The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. / The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. / By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice]." As shown in Table 3.21 below, feminist ID is strongly and significantly associated with higher support for women's right to get an abortion as a matter of personal choice among female respondents.

Conversely, non-feminist ID is largely and significantly associated with opposition to abortion rights. These results suggest that attitudes toward abortion represent an important divisive factor among women: between feminist and non-feminist ones. This result is consistent with my previous finding that feminist women view working for reproductive rights as one of feminists' main tasks (Table 3.7). The fact that subgroup identities are significantly associated with attitudes toward abortion only among women is reasonable, since women's health is directly affected by policies and laws regarding access to abortion.

Table 3.21: Predicting Support for the Right to Abortion

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) Women	(3) Men	(4) All	(5) Women	(6) Men
Feminist ID	0.29**	0.36**	0.20			
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)			
Non-feminist ID				-0.21	-0.39*	-0.01
				(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Gender (female)	-0.00			-0.04		
	(0.03)			(0.03)		
Ideology (Cons.)	-0.01	0.17	-0.15	-0.35***	-0.40**	-0.30**
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Party ID (Rep.)	-0.37***	-0.45***	-0.22*	-0.10	-0.10	-0.09
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Constant	0.59***	0.45**	0.61**	1.03***	1.03***	0.96***
	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Observations	282	185	97	443	200	243
R-squared	0.425	0.497	0.438	0.415	0.456	0.403

Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients; standard errors are listed in parentheses. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, region (i.e. South), employment status, marital status, children under 5, Christianity, born-again, church attendance, education, and household income. All variables recoded 0 to 1. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Sample characteristics

The mean age is 50 years old. Half of the sample resides in a suburban area and about 64

percent lives a non-Southern state. Almost 40 percent of participants have either a 4-year college or a post-graduate degree. The median household income ranges between $50,000-60,000. In terms of racial and ethnic identification, 75 of respondents describe themselves as White, 12 percent as African American, 9 percent as Hispanic or Latino, and 2 percent as Asian American. About 39 percent and 10 percent of the sample reports being employed full-time and part-time, respectively. About half of participants (49 percent) are married, while 22 percent have children under 18. With regard to religion, 56 percent of respondents identify as Christian and 26 percent as born-again. Almost 60 percent of them view religion as either "very important" or "somewhat important," and about 26 percent attend religious services at least once a week. In terms of partisanship, 41 percent of the sample identifies as Democratic, 31 percent as Independent, and 28 percent as Republican. Ideologically, about 39 percent of respondents describe themselves as liberal and 38 percent as conservative. In regard to political interest, 56 percent of the sample follows the news "most of the time." In the 2016 presidential election, 48 percent of participants report having voted for Clinton, whereas 43 percent report having voted for Trump.

3.3 Conclusions

Analyses from my YouGov survey shed light on three questions. First, who is a feminist and who is a non-feminist within the U.S. electorate? Women are more likely than men to identity as feminists, and younger individuals – Millennials and Centennials – are more likely to be feminists than older ones. However, the majority of American voters are non-feminists – and the largest share of both men and women are non-labelers and gender individualists. Moreover, feminists hold stronger collectivist attitudes about gender equality, while non-feminists display higher levels of modern sexism. Feminist women are also more likely than non-feminist women to report having experienced gender discrimination. This may depend on feminists' greater

awareness of sexism as a systemic issue.

Second, why do individuals decide to identify as a feminist vs. a non-feminist? Negative connotations and the social stigma attached to the feminist label may explain why some voters adopt the non-feminist label. Indeed, non-feminists believe that feminists dislike men and unfairly fault them for women's problems. Furthermore, non-feminist men view feminist women as judgmental and discriminatory toward female homemakers. Importantly, in addition to negative views of feminists, non-feminists are also characterized by positive beliefs about women's role: non-feminists believe women should place a high value on their role within the household as wives and mothers and not feel pressured to pursue a career. In contrast, feminist women appear to prioritize advocating for *all* women's rights and opportunities and reject the criticism of alienating women who do not have a job outside the home. In sum, non-feminists and feminists hold opposite views about whom the feminist movement welcomes and whom it excludes. Importantly, feminists identify discrimination as the main obstacle to gender equality, whereas non-feminists believe women's choices are equally to blame for gender disparities.

Third, how do feminist and non-feminist identification impact political behaviors and policy attitudes? Feminist identifiers support the election of a woman President in the next twenty years and of more women candidates. On the contrary, non-feminist identifiers view having a woman President as negative and more women in political office as unimportant. Additionally, feminists are in favor of women's rights activism, the government's taking a more active role in ensuring gender equal pay, preferential hiring for women, and the right to abortion (among women). Non-feminists are opposed to government intervention to guarantee equal pay, requiring employers to offer paid leave to parents of new children, and abortion rights (among women).

In the next chapter, I will return to studying the implications of gender subgroup identities

and gender ideologies in regard to voting behavior. Importantly, the design of the survey experiment I present in Chapter 4 makes it possible not only to identify gender inegalitarians (as in this chapter) but also to distinguish between non-labelers and gender individualists. To what extent do these gender types behave similarly? Crucially, how do these gender types compare in terms of their candidate preferences – do their ingroup preferences depend more on positive evaluations of the ingroup (non-feminists) or on negative evaluations of the outgroup (feminists)?

Chapter 4

The Contest Between Feminist, Non-Labeler, and Gender Individualist Candidates

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze the data I collected in June 2019 by using the CloudResearch (formerly known as TurkPrime) platform. This experimental study builds on the YouGov survey I presented and discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 3). As the YouGov survey, it includes revised and refined measures for feminist and non-feminist identity, which enable me to distinguish between gender inegalitarians and the other two non-feminist types – non-labelers and gender individualists. Furthermore, this study includes a measure of gender ideology, namely support for government policies to promote gender equality in society and in the workplace, thereby making it possible to distinguish between non-labelers and gender individualists. Indeed, the former are characterized by support for this type of policies, while the latter tend to oppose them on the grounds that women should help themselves. Thanks to these measurement improvements, the analyses presented in this chapter therefore differentiate among all gender subgroups and types: feminists, non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians. Specifically, the experiment is aimed to identify the impact of shared vs. differing gender subgroup identities between political candidates and voters holding different gender belief systems.

Accordingly, the experiment encompasses separate conditions for feminist, non-labeler, and gender individualist candidates. Furthermore, candidates' gender group membership (i.e., sex) and partisanship vary across conditions. This makes it possible to assess if and to what extent the impact of gender subgroup identification differs between female and male candidates as well as between Democratic and Republican candidates.

I employ this study to test the full set of hypotheses. I consider whether gender subgroup identities significantly and largely impact support for political candidates across gender and party ID, even after controlling for a range of socio-demographic factors (H1 – Gender Subgroup IDs). In particular, I test whether feminist voters favor ingroup – feminist – candidates over outgroup ones – non-feminists (H1a – Feminist Voter), and whether non-feminist voters favor ingroup – non-labeler and gender individualist – candidates over the outgroup – feminists (H1b – Non-Feminist Voter). I also evaluate the relative impact of gender subgroup identities as compared to gender group membership (H2 – Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender) and political ideology (H3 – Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology). Further, the large size of the sample I collected and the measures I included make it possible to assess if the proportion of the U.S. electorate that supports gender equality is larger than the proportion of those who self-label as feminists (H4 – Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender Ideology). Finally, I test whether preference for ingroup candidates ensues more from positivity toward one's own gender subgroup or from negativity toward the outgroup. I predict that positive attitudes toward the ingroup will mainly drive feminist voters' preferences (H5a – Feminist Ingroup Positivity), whereas negative attitudes toward the feminist outgroup will mainly drive non-labeler and gender individualist voters' preferences (H5b – Non-Feminist Outgroup Negativity).

4.2 Study 4: Survey-Based Experiment on CloudResearch/TurkPrime

This study consists in a survey-based experiment aimed to examine how and to what extent both voters' gender types and candidates' choice of the feminist/non-feminist label as well as cues about their own gender ideology impact electoral support across genders and parties. Specifically, the goal is to understand whether and to what extent voters punish candidates for adopting the feminist ID label and/or feminist gender ideology. Thus, the experiment manipulates three factors: a political candidate's gender type (feminist, non-labeler, or gender individualist), gender (female or male), and party ID (Democratic or Republican), thus resulting in a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design with twelve conditions – six for each major party. All featured candidates are White, and their race is signaled using racially distinctive names (see Appendices). After indicating their partisan identification, participants have been randomly assigned to one of the six conditions corresponding to their party. This design enables me to disentangle the effect of feminist and non-feminist ID – combined with either non-labeler or individualist gender ideology – from those of gender group membership and partisanship on various forms of support for candidates. The two tables below show the six Democratic and the six Republican conditions, respectively (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

Table 4.1: Democratic Experimental Conditions

DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS		**GENDER**	
		Female	Male
FEMINIST ID		White, Democratic, feminist female candidate	White, Democratic, feminist male candidate
NON-FEMINIST ID	Non-Labeler	White, Democratic, non-labeler female candidate	White, Democratic, non-labeler male candidate
	Gender Individualist	White, Democratic, gender individualist female candidate	White, Democratic, gender individualist male candidate

Table 4.2: Republican Experimental Conditions

REPUBLICAN EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS		**GENDER**	
		Female	Male
FEMINIST ID		White, Republican, feminist female candidate	White, Republican, feminist male candidate
NON-FEMINIST ID	Non-Labeler	White, Republican, non-labeler female candidate	White, Republican, non-labeler male candidate
	Gender Individualist	White, Republican, gender individualist female candidate	White, Republican, gender individualist male candidate

As part of the manipulation, subjects have been randomly assigned to read one of twelve paragraphs from a news article about a fictitious White candidate belonging to their own party and running in a top-two primary for the House of Representatives in the State of Washington. A **t**op-two primary is a type of primary election in which all candidates are listed on the same primary ballot. The top two vote-getters, regardless of their partisan affiliations, advance to the general election. Consequently, it is possible for two candidates belonging to the same party to win in a top-two primary. Each candidate may state a political party that he/she prefers. Washington voters identifying with either of the two major parties or as an Independent may vote for any candidate listed on the ballot.

Across all experimental conditions, participants have been provided with a summary of the candidate's policy agenda that focuses on improving the state's economy. In the feminist condition, the candidate explicitly identifies as a feminist and signals commitment to a feminist policy agenda: he/she prioritizes promoting equal pay in order to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship. In the non-labeler condition, the candidate rejects the feminist label but

prioritizes the same policy agenda as the feminist candidate. In the gender individualist condition, the candidate rejects the feminist label and signals commitment to economic policies that do not focus on women or address gender equality: providing tax incentives to business owners, offering professional development programs to entrepreneurs, and creating job training programs to help workers meet the needs of today's economy (see Appendices for the exact wording of all conditions).

The final sample includes 3,831 U.S. registered voters. It was gathered between June 6-13, 2019 on the CloudResearch/TurkPrime platform. It was obtained after excluding subjects who did not meet one or more of the following eligibility criteria: agreeing to participate, being 18 or older, being registered to vote, and residing in a U.S. state other than Washington. Additionally, non-leaning Independents have been excluded from all the following analyses, as the goal of this study consists in identifying the impact of gender subgroup identification and gender ideology within and across the two major parties. In terms of gender, about 62 percent of the sample is female, and 38 percent is male. With regard to partisan identification, 51 percent of the sample identifies as Democratic (including Democratic-leaning Independents), 12 percent as Independent, and 37 percent as Republican (including Republican-leaning Independents). Ideologically, about 37 percent of participants describe themselves as liberal and 36 percent as conservative.

Measurement of Feminist and Non-feminist ID

The interaction between candidates' gender type and subjects' strength of identification with feminism or non-feminism constitutes the main explanatory variable. I measure strength of feminist identity by combining subjects' answers to a battery of six closed-ended questions: 1) "Do you consider yourself a strong feminist, a feminist, not a feminist/a non-feminist, or an anti-feminist;" 2) "How would you rate feminists on a 0-100 feeling thermometer;" 3) "How would

you rate non-feminists on a 0-100 feeling thermometer;" (reverse-coded) 4) "How would you rate anti-feminists on a 0-100 feeling thermometer;" (reverse-coded) 5) "How well does the term 'feminist' describe you;" and 6) "How important is it to you to be a feminist." This additive scale displays moderate reliability (α = .74). Strength of non-feminist identity is measured by combining answers to the following two items in addition to the first four items used for feminist ID: 1) "How well does the term 'not a feminist/non-feminist' describe you;"; and 2) How important is it to you not to be a feminist." The resulting 6-item scale has acceptable internal consistency (α = .70). In sum, feminist and non-feminist identifications are measured identically as in my YouGov survey study discussed in Chapter 3.

In order to distinguish across gender types, I employ the question about whether subjects consider themselves strong feminists, feminists, non-feminists, or anti-feminists. Moreover, I measure endorsement of feminist/egalitarian gender ideology through the following two questions: "In general, how strongly do you support or oppose government policies that are aimed at increasing gender equality in society;" and "In general, how strongly do you support or oppose government policies to reduce gender discrimination in the workplace." An additive scale with good reliability (α = .80) has been constructed by combining the two items. Thus, I operationalize "non-labelers" as subjects who self-identify as non-feminists and whose score on the gender equality scale is above the median (.875 out of a 0-1 scale). In contrast, "gender individualists" are those who also identify as non-feminists but score below the median on gender equality. Finally, "gender inegalitarians" are those who report considering themselves anti-feminists. The pie charts below (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) show the proportion of each gender type disaggregated by subjects' gender group membership (i.e., sex) and party ID.

Figure 4.1: Gender Subgroups and Types among Democratic Voters by Voter Gender



Source: TurkPrime Survey Experiment, June 6-13, 2019

Figure 4.2: Gender Subgroups and Types among Republican Voters by Voter Gender



Source: TurkPrime Survey Experiment, June 6-13, 2019

These percentages indicate that Democratic women are the most likely to embrace both the feminist label and feminist gender ideology: about 70 percent of them identify as either feminists or strong feminists. Democratic men and Republican women include the second and third largest group of feminists, respectively: 41 percent and 26 percent. Additionally, being a strong feminist is much more popular among Democratic than Republican participants. In contrast, the vast majority of Republican women refrain from the feminist label, but a large proportion of those self-identified non-feminists are supportive of policies to advance gender equality.

Among self-identified non-feminists, non-labelers represent the largest proportion of Republicans, whereas gender individualists represent the largest proportion of Democrats. In particular, 44 percent of Republican men and 35 percent of Republican women are non-labelers. In contrast, 30 percent of Democratic men and 17 percent of Democratic women are gender individualists. The highest proportion of gender inegalitarians is among Republican men – about 9 percent, while the proportion is lower and roughly similar between Republican women and Democratic men (about 3 percent).

This descriptive analysis enables us to evaluate H4, namely the hypothesis that support for the feminist principle of gender equality is more widespread than acceptance of the feminist label. Indeed, both feminists and non-labelers support policies promoting gender equality. However, only feminists adopt the feminist label. As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show, the percentage of voters who endorse gender equality is much higher than the percentage of those who identify as feminists or strong feminists across both gender and party. Thus, H4 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender Ideology) receives clear support.

I have also examined whether there are generational differences across gender types. I have divided my sample into five generations: Silent (older than 74), Baby Boomer (55-73 years old),

Generation X (39-54 years old), Generation Y or Millennials (23-38 years old), and Generation Z or Centennials (18-22 years old). The table below (Table 4.3) displays the cross-tabulation of gender types by birth generation. A much larger proportion of younger individuals – Millennials and Centennials – are feminists. In contrast, Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, Generation X are roughly equally split across gender types: feminists, non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians. This is consistent with results from my YouGov study presented in Chapter 3. It overall suggests the relative proportion of feminists within the U.S. electorate is destined to increase in the next few decades.

Table 4.3: Cross-Tabulation of Gender Types by Generation

		GENERATION				
		Silent	**Baby Boomers**	**X**	**Y**	**Z**
GENDER TYPE	**Feminist**	37.61%	38.11%	39.04%	50.89%	59.86%
	Non-Labeler	30.28%	29.89%	27.34%	23.18%	19.48%
	Gender Individualist	30.28%	29.37%	28.33%	22.35%	18.31%
	Gender Inegalitarian	1.83%	2.63%	5.30%	3.58%	2.35%

Note: These percentages represent proportions by column.

The Impact of Candidates' and Voters' Feminist/Non-Feminist Identities and Gender Ideology

I analyze how the interaction of candidates' and voters' gender type impacts support for the candidate through linear regression models. Specifically, I focus on three gender types: feminist, non-labeler, and gender individualist. Heterogeneous effects among gender inegalitarian voters are not presented due to the small size of this gender type within my sample, particularly among Democrats: n=34 among Democrats, and n=92 among Republicans. Support for the

featured candidate is measured through six questions: how participants rate the candidate on a 0-100 feeling thermometer, how favorable they feel toward her/him, how likely they would be to contribute money to support her/his campaign, how likely they would be to vote for her/him, how well the candidate represents someone like the respondent, and to what extent the candidate is a good representative of voter opinions. Figures 4.3-4.6 show the interaction coefficients for the likelihood to vote for the candidate (measured on a five-point scale from "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely") as the outcome variable. Since each subject has been randomly assigned to one of the six conditions corresponding to the party she/he has indicated belonging to, this analysis captures the effect of feminist/non-feminist ID within each party. Similar results are present for the other five dependent variables (see Appendices). Although not displayed, controls are included for participants' gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status (employed either full- or part-time), marital status (i.e., married), children, evangelical Christianity, education, and household income. In particular, Figures 4.3-4.5 show effects disaggregated by the candidate's party among feminist, non-labeler, and gender individualist voters, respectively.

Figure 4.3: Predicting Vote for the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Feminist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to vote for the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for subjects' gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Within both the Democratic and the Republican Party, self-identified feminist voters largely favor feminist over gender individualist candidates and non-labeler over gender individualist candidates, although more strongly among Republican subjects (Figure 4.3). The preference for feminists over non-labelers is also statistically significant across parties, but it is larger among Democrats. These results provide strong support for H1 (Gender Subgroup IDs) and H1a (Feminist Voter). Indeed, both feminist and non-feminist identities are highly relevant to feminists in the public. Feminist voters place a high value on the feminist label and, in its absence, prefer a feminist policy agenda to a gender individualist one. In sum, they clearly and strongly prefer ingroup (i.e., feminist) candidates to any outgroup – either individualist or non-labeler –

candidates. These findings remain largely consistent for the other outcomes (Figures 4.8-4.12).

Figure 4.4: Predicting Vote for the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Non-Labeler Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to vote for the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for subjects' gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

The preferences of non-labeler voters are in the opposite direction of feminist voters, although they share the same egalitarian gender ideology (Figure 4.4). Indeed, within both parties, non-labelers prefer gender individualist candidates to non-labeler and, particularly, to feminist candidates. Furthermore, Democratic subjects significantly favor non-labeler over feminist candidates. These findings show that a candidate's feminist label can strongly disadvantage that candidate as compared to an individualist candidate among non-labeler voters of both parties and as compared to a non-labeler candidate among Democratic non-labelers. These results also offer

support for H1 (Gender Subgroup IDs) and H1b (Non-Feminist Voter), since non-labelers identify as non-feminists and appear to strongly oppose outgroup candidates or, in other words, candidates explicitly associated with the feminist label. Interestingly, non-labeler voters favor individualist candidates, who have a gender-neutral policy agenda, over non-labeler candidates, who have a feminist policy agenda. This suggests that non-labelers tend to be hostile primarily toward the feminist label and secondarily toward feminist gender ideology, although they themselves espouse pro-feminist beliefs about promoting gender equality in society and in the workplace. Figures 4.13-4.17 show very similar results for the other five dependent variables.

Figure 4.5: Predicting Vote for the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Gender Individualist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to vote for the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for subjects' gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Gender individualist voters display preferences that are very similar to non-labelers' (Figure 4.5). In particular, both Democratic and Republican individualist participants strongly prefer gender individualist to feminist candidates, thereby demonstrating that candidates' feminist label can be electorally costly among these voters as well. In other words, in accordance with H1b (Non-Feminist Voter), individualists are clearly opposed to candidates associated with the outgroup label. Moreover, they largely favor gender individualist over non-labeler candidates, particularly among Republicans. The preference for non-labeler as compared to feminist candidates is not statistically significant in either party, thus reflecting individualists' opposition to government intervention to foster gender egalitarian goals regardless of a candidate's feminist/non-feminist label. In sum, among individualists, both Democratic and Republican subjects have a strict preference in favor of individualist candidates. These results stay consistent across the other outcome variables for the most part (Figures 4.18-4.22). There are, however, a few noteworthy differences. When predicting favorability and the likelihood to donate to the candidate among Democrats, individualist voters' preference for individualist over non-labeler candidates is not statistically significant. However, when predicting favorability and the feeling thermometer toward the candidate among Democrats, the preference for non-labeler over feminist candidates becomes statistically significant. This reinforces the conclusion that Democratic individualists strongly discriminate against feminist-labeled candidates.

The main difference between non-labelers and individualists is across parties when it comes to vote choice (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). Indeed, Democratic non-labelers punish feminist candidates much more than Democratic individualists do, whereas Republican individualists tend to discriminate against feminist candidates more than Republican non-labelers do. Considering the relative size of the non-labeler and individualist types within my sample as well as the broader

U.S. electorate, it is therefore hard to understate the electoral cost that may ensue from a candidate's explicit association with the feminist label. I now turn to analyzing whether and to what extent such a cost is faced more by female than male candidates.

Figure 4.6: Predicting Likelihood to Vote for the Candidate by Candidate's Gender and Voter's Gender Type



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to vote for the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unlikely" to "extremely likely" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for subjects' gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.6 (above) displays effects by the candidate's gender. Among feminist voters, both female and male feminist candidates are strongly preferred to individualist candidates and, to a smaller extent, to non-labeler candidates. Moreover, feminist participants largely favor non-labeler over individualist candidates of both genders. Non-labeler subjects hold preferences that are in the opposite direction of feminist subjects, but most interaction coefficients are larger among feminist than non-labeler subjects. Among individualist participants, individualist candidates of both genders are largely preferred to feminist ones. Furthermore, individualists are favored over non-labeler candidates, and female non-labelers are favored over female feminist candidates. In other words, feminist candidates are severely punished by both individualist and non-labeler voters.

Importantly, feminist women are punished more than feminist men by individualist voters, whereas feminist men are punished more than feminist women by non-labeler voters. However, there are noteworthy differences in intensity between female and male feminist candidates. Indeed, feminist women candidates are discriminated against by individualist and non-labeler voters to a similarly large extent. In contrast, feminist men candidates are discriminated against much more strongly by non-labeler than individualist voters. Results relative to the other five dependent variables remain fairly consistent (Figures 4.23-4.27). Across all outcomes, the largest interaction coefficients refer to the comparison between feminist and individualist candidates. This is not surprising as the difference between those candidates is based on both labeling and gender ideology, thus making it easier for voters to notice.

As in Figures 4.3-4.5, the regression results displayed in Figure 4.6 provide additional support for H1a (Feminist Voter) and H1b (Non-Feminist Voter). Indeed, they show that feminist voters in both parties favor candidates of their own gender subgroup over the outgroup – individualist and non-labeler – candidates of either gender, in accordance with H1a. Conversely,

individualist voters favor their own non-feminist ingroup – individualist and female non-labeler candidates – over the feminist outgroup, in accordance with H1b. Similarly, non-labeler subjects oppose outgroup – feminist – candidates, as expected according to H1b. They further prefer individualist to non-labeler candidates of both genders, thus suggesting that dissociation from feminism in terms of both the label and gender ideology is effective among individualist as well as non-labeler voters.

Next, I evaluate the impact of feminist/non-feminist ID as compared to gender group membership (i.e., being female) and political ideology on the likelihood to vote for the candidate across conditions (Figure 4.7). Overall, the effect of gender is either much smaller than either gender subgroup identity or not statistically significant, in accordance with H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender). Indeed, Wald tests at a .95 significance level on the equality of the coefficients on feminist ID and gender as well as the coefficients on non-feminist ID and gender among non-labelers support the hypothesis that they are statistically different in all experimental conditions. Among individualists, the difference between non-feminist ID and gender is also statistically significant in the feminist and individualist conditions using Wald tests.

When compared to political ideology, Wald tests on the equality of regression coefficients show that the effect of feminist ID is distinct and significantly stronger across all conditions. Among individualist voters, the difference between non-feminist ID and political ideology is statistically significant in the individualist condition. Finally, among non-labelers, non-feminist ID has a significantly larger impact than political ideology in the non-labeler and individualist conditions. These results thus provide some support for H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology).

Figure 4.7: Gender Subgroups, Gender Group Membership, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Likelihood to Vote for the Candidate



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to vote for the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unlikely oppose" to "extremely likely" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for subjects' race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Across the other five dependent variables measuring support for the featured candidate, the coefficients on feminist ID and non-feminist ID remain larger and statistically distinct from gender in the conditions including feminist and individualist candidates, based on Wald tests (Figures

4.28-4.32). Moreover, across the other five outcomes, the impact of feminist ID is generally stronger and statistically different from political ideology across all conditions, whereas the impact of non-feminist ID is larger and different from political ideology in the individualist condition among non-labeler voters and in the feminist condition among individualist voters (Figures 4.28-4.32). In sum, the impact of both gender subgroup identities tends to be distinct from and larger than both gender and political ideology in all conditions except for the ones including non-labeler candidates. This can be partially explained by the fact that non-labelers can be viewed as an intermediate typology between feminists and gender individualists. Indeed, they differ from feminists based on self-labeling and differ from gender individualists based on their egalitarian gender ideology and corresponding pro-feminist and pro-women policy agenda. In other words, a policy agenda focused on gender egalitarianism marks the commonality between non-labelers and feminists, but it also drives the divide between non-labelers and gender individualists. Accordingly, non-labeler candidates are likely to make considerations about ideology and gender group membership more salient among voters.

These findings across the six dependent variables measuring support for the candidate also speak to the question of whether preferences based on these gender subgroup identities mainly hinge on ingroup positivity or outgroup negativity (Figures 4.7, 4.28-4.32). They provide strong support for H5a for feminist ID among feminists and partial support for H5b for non-feminist ID among gender individualists, but not among non-labelers. On the one side, candidate assessments stemming from feminist ID asymmetrically rely on favoritism toward the ingroup – feminists. They are also accompanied by hostility toward some outgroup candidates – gender individualists, but to a lesser extent. Moreover, feminist voters are slightly supportive of other outgroup candidates – non-labelers. On the other side, among gender individualists, higher levels of non-

feminist ID are associated with stronger opposition to outgroup – feminist – candidates than favoritism toward individualist candidates in relation to four out of six outcome variables. Strength of non-feminist ID is also negatively related to electoral support for non-labeler candidates among individualist voters. However, such opposition is much milder toward non-labeler than feminist candidates, thus indicating that the feminist label is likely to be riskier and costlier than a feminist policy agenda among individualist voters. In contrast to individualists, non-feminist ID among non-labelers is associated more with favoritism toward non-labeler and, especially, individualist candidates than with negativity toward the feminist outgroup. In other words, non-labelers interestingly mirror the pattern present among feminists: ingroup positivity outweighs outgroup negativity among both non-labelers and feminists. This reflects the fact that non-labelers are similar to feminists with respect to their gender belief system. Furthermore, this result reinforces the idea that the difference between non-labelers and individualists is not merely a matter of degree but also of substance. Although they share the same non-feminist label, non-labelers' preference for non-feminist candidates is primarily a result of positivity toward those candidates, while individualists' ingroup preference is more a result of hostility toward the feminist label and, to a smaller extent, feminist policy goals.

Sample characteristics

The mean age is 43 years old. Half of the sample resides in a suburban area. About 43 percent of participants have either a 4-year college or a post-graduate degree. The median household income ranges between $50,000 and $75,000. In terms of racial and ethnic identification, 73 of subjects describe themselves as White or Caucasian, 13 percent as African American, 4 percent as Hispanic or Latino, and 2 percent as Asian American. About 44 percent and 12 percent of the sample reports being employed full-time and part-time, respectively. About

40 percent of participants are married, while 37 percent have children under the age of 18 living with them. With regard to religion, 61 percent of subjects identify as Christian and 15 percent as evangelical. About 29 percent attend religious services almost every week.

4.3 Conclusions

This experimental study has enabled me to assess the relative proportions of all gender types within a large sample of the American electorate. Those proportions differ by party ID, sex, and generation. Democrats, women, and younger generations identify as feminists to a larger extent than Republicans, men, and older generations do. Among non-feminist identifiers, non-labelers constitute the largest proportion of Republicans, while gender individualists represent the largest proportion of Democrats. Overall, the proportion of those who both support policies aimed at promoting gender equality and adopt the feminist label is much smaller than those who support gender equality without identifying as a feminist.

In regard to candidate evaluations and support, feminist voters powerfully favor ingroup – feminist – candidates over the non-feminist outgroup. However, they do differentiate between non-labeler and gender individualist candidates: they prefer non-labelers to individualists. This reflects the idea that feminist identifiers not only adopt the feminist label, but also hold a feminist gender ideology that they share with non-labelers. These voter preferences remain fairly consistent across parties – toward Democratic and Republican candidates – as well as across genders – toward both female and male candidates.

Despite their differences in terms of gender belief systems, both non-labeler and gender individualist voters hold preferences that are in the opposite direction of feminist voters. In other words, the impact of non-feminist identification trumps the impact of gender ideology. Indeed, in both parties, both non-labelers and individualists prefer individualist candidates to non-labeler and,

particularly, feminist candidates. However, some noteworthy differences between non-labelers and gender individualists emerge between parties: Democratic (but not Republican) non-labelers significantly favor non-labeler over feminist candidates. Furthermore, non-labelers punish feminist candidates more than individualists do among Democrats, whereas individualists punish feminist candidates more than non-labelers do among Republicans.

When considering whether candidate gender matters, non-feminist voters appear to hold the same preference ranking regardless of whether a candidate is male or female. Both non-labelers and individualists have a strict preference for individualist candidates, followed by non-labeler candidates. In other words, feminist candidates receive strong opposition from both non-labeler and individualist voters. However, it is important to point out that feminist women candidates are discriminated against by individualist and non-labeler voters to a similarly large extent. In contrast, feminist men candidates are discriminated against much more strongly by non-labeler than individualist voters.

My results further show that the impact of feminist and non-feminist ID is distinct from and tends to be larger than the impact of both gender group membership (i.e., sex) and political ideology across all outcomes measuring candidate support and across all conditions with the exception of the ones with non-labeler candidates. Finally, I found that preference for feminist candidates among feminist identifiers primarily relies on positivity toward the ingroup – feminists – rather than negativity toward the outgroup – gender individualists. In contrast, preference for ingroup candidates among gender individualists is more a function of negativity toward the outgroup – feminists – than positivity toward individualists. Interestingly and contrary to my expectations, preference for ingroup candidates among non-labelers is the result more of ingroup positivity – toward non-labelers and, particularly, individualists – than negativity toward the

feminist outgroup. Thus, non-labelers resemble feminists in regard to ingroup vs. outgroup attitudes. This result further highlights the idea that non-feminists are a diverse group. They differ in terms of their gender belief system and, even if they all tend to favor ingroup over outgroup candidates, they do so as a result of opposite dynamics: non-labelers' choices ensue more from ingroup favoritism, whereas individualists' choices ensue more from outgroup hostility.

APPENDICES

Wording of the Experimental Manipulations

Now we would like you to read the following paragraph from an article on The Seattle Times regarding the future primary for the House of Representatives in the State of Washington.

Condition 1 (Democratic Feminist Woman):

Democratic Candidate Says Feminism is More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Democratic frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Amy Miller. A long-time member of the Democratic Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is her number one priority. She is a self-proclaimed feminist, and her policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 2 (Democratic Feminist Man):

Democratic Candidate Says Feminism is More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Democratic frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Jake Miller. A long-time member of the Democratic Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is his number one priority. He is a self-proclaimed feminist, and his policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 3 (Democratic Non-Labeler Woman):

Democratic Candidate Rejects Being Labeled a Feminist

A recent poll shows that the Democratic frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Amy Miller. A long-time member of the Democratic Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is her number one priority. While she rejects the label of feminist, her policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 4 (Democratic Non-Labeler Man):

Democratic Candidate Rejects Being Labeled a Feminist

A recent poll shows that the Democratic frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Jake Miller. A long-time member of the Democratic Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is his number one priority. While he rejects the label of feminist, his policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 5 (Democratic Gender Individualist Woman):

Democratic Candidate Says Improving the Economy More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Democratic frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Amy Miller. A long-time member of the Democratic Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is her number one priority. She does not view gender issues to be as important, and does not consider herself a feminist. Her policy plan includes providing tax incentives to business owners, offering professional development programs to entrepreneurs, and creating job

training programs to help workers meet the needs of today's economy.

Condition 6 (Democratic Gender Individualist Man):

Democratic Candidate Says Improving the Economy More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Democratic frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Jake Miller. A long-time member of the Democratic Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is his number one priority. He does not view gender issues to be as important, and does not consider himself a feminist. His policy plan includes providing tax incentives to business owners, offering professional development programs to entrepreneurs, and creating job training programs to help workers meet the needs of today's economy.

Condition 7 (Republican Feminist Woman):

Republican Candidate Says Feminism is More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Republican frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Amy Miller. A long-time member of the Republican Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is her number one priority. She is a self-proclaimed feminist, and her policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 8 (Republican Feminist Man):

Republican Candidate Says Feminism is More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Republican frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Jake Miller. A long-time member of the Republican Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is his number one priority. He is a self-proclaimed feminist, and his policy

plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 9 (Republican Non-Labeler Woman):

Republican Candidate Rejects Being Labeled a Feminist

A recent poll shows that the Republican frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Amy Miller. A long-time member of the Republican Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is her number one priority. While she rejects the label of feminist, her policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 10 (Republican Non-Labeler Man):

Republican Candidate Rejects Being Labeled a Feminist

A recent poll shows that the Republican frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Jake Miller. A long-time member of the Republican Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is his number one priority. While he rejects the label of feminist, his policy plan includes promoting equal pay for equal work to reduce the gender wage gap, supporting paid family leave for new parents, and creating job training programs to support female entrepreneurship.

Condition 11 (Republican Gender Individualist Woman):

Republican Candidate Says Improving the Economy More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Republican frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Amy

Miller. A long-time member of the Republican Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is her number one priority. She does not view gender issues to be as important, and does not consider herself a feminist. Her policy plan includes providing tax incentives to business owners, offering professional development programs to entrepreneurs, and creating job training programs to help workers meet the needs of today's economy.

Condition 12 (Republican Gender Individualist Man):

Republican Candidate Says Improving the Economy More Important than Ever

A recent poll shows that the Republican frontrunner in the next state legislative primary is Jake Miller. A long-time member of the Republican Party, Miller has indicated that tackling the state's economic problems is his number one priority. He does not view gender issues to be as important, and does not consider himself a feminist. His policy plan includes providing tax incentives to business owners, offering professional development programs to entrepreneurs, and creating job training programs to help workers meet the needs of today's economy.

Figure 4.8: Predicting Favorability Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Feminist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in favorability toward the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unfavorable" to "extremely favorable" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.9: Predicting the Feeling Thermometer Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Feminist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the feeling thermometer toward the candidate from 0-100 when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.10: Predicting the Likelihood to Donate to the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Feminist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to donate to the candidate (on a five-point "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" scale about the statement "It is likely that I would contribute money to support this candidate") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.11: Predicting How Well the Candidate Represents Someone like "You" (the Respondent) by Candidate's Party among Feminist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents someone like "you" (on a five-point "very poorly" to "very well" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.12: Predicting the Extent to Which the Candidate Is a Good Representative of Voter Opinions by Candidate's Party among Feminist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents voter opinions (on a five-point "Describes very poorly" to "Describes very well" scale about the statement "This candidate is a good representative of voter opinions") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.13: Predicting Favorability Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Non-Labeler Voters



Note: Points represent the change in favorability toward the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unfavorable" to "extremely favorable" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.14: Predicting the Feeling Thermometer Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Non-Labeler Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the feeling thermometer toward the candidate from 0-100 when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.15: Predicting the Likelihood to Donate to the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Non-Labeler Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to donate to the candidate (on a five-point "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" scale about the statement "It is likely that I would contribute money to support this candidate") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.16: Predicting How Well the Candidate Represents Someone like "You" (the Respondent) by Candidate's Party among Non-Labeler Voters



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents someone like "you" (on a five-point "very poorly" to "very well" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.17: Predicting the Extent to Which the Candidate Is a Good Representative of Voter Opinions by Candidate's Party among Non-Labeler Voters



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents voter opinions (on a five-point "Describes very poorly" to "Describes very well" scale about the statement "This candidate is a good representative of voter opinions") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.18: Predicting Favorability Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Gender Individualist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in favorability toward the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unfavorable" to "extremely favorable" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.19: Predicting the Feeling Thermometer Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Gender Individualist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the feeling thermometer toward the candidate from 0-100 when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.20: Predicting the Likelihood to Donate to the Candidate by Candidate's Party among Gender Individualist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to donate to the candidate (on a five-point "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" scale about the statement "It is likely that I would contribute money to support this candidate") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.21: Predicting How Well the Candidate Represents Someone like "You" (the Respondent) by Candidate's Party among Gender Individualist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents someone like "you" (on a five-point "very poorly" to "very well" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.22: Predicting the Extent to Which the Candidate Is a Good Representative of Voter Opinions by Candidate's Party among Gender Individualist Voters



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents voter opinions (on a five-point "Describes very poorly" to "Describes very well" scale about the statement "This candidate is a good representative of voter opinions") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.23: Predicting Favorability Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Gender and Voter's Gender Type



Note: Points represent the change in favorability toward the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unfavorable" to "extremely favorable" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.24: Predicting the Feeling Thermometer Toward the Candidate by Candidate's Gender and Voter's Gender Type



Note: Points represent the change in the feeling thermometer toward the candidate from 0-100 when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.25: Predicting the Likelihood to Donate to the Candidate by Candidate's Gender and Voter's Gender Type



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to donate to the candidate (on a five-point "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" scale about the statement "It is likely that I would contribute money to support this candidate") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.26: Predicting How Well the Candidate Represents Someone like "You" (the Respondent) by Candidate's Gender and Voter's Gender Type



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents someone like "you" (on a five-point "very poorly" to "very well" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.27: Predicting the Extent to Which the Candidate Is a Good Representative of Voter Opinions by Candidate's Gender and Voter's Gender Type



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents voter opinions (on a five-point "Describes very poorly" to "Describes very well" scale about the statement "This candidate is a good representative of voter opinions") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for gender (i.e., female), race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.28: Gender Subgroups, Gender Group Membership, and Political Ideology as Predictors of Favorability Toward the Candidate



Note: Points represent the change in favorability toward the candidate (on a five-point "extremely unfavorable" to "extremely favorable" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.29: Gender Subgroups, Gender Group Membership, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Feeling Thermometer Toward the Candidate



Note: Points represent the change in the feeling thermometer toward the candidate from 0-100 when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.30: Gender Subgroups, Gender Group Membership, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Likelihood to Donate to the Candidate



Note: Points represent the change in the likelihood to donate to the candidate (on a five-point "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" scale about the statement "It is likely that I would contribute money to support this candidate") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.31: Gender Subgroups, Gender Group Membership, and Political Ideology as Predictors of How Well the Candidate Represents Someone like "You" (the Respondent)



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents someone like "you" (on a five-point "very poorly" to "very well" scale) when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Figure 4.32: Gender Subgroups, Gender Group Membership, and Political Ideology as Predictors of the Extent to Which the Candidate Is a Good Representative of Voter Opinions



Note: Points represent the change in how well the candidate represents voter opinions (on a five-point "Describes very poorly" to "Describes very well" scale about the statement "This candidate is a good representative of voter opinions") when moving from lowest to highest value on each predictor. Error bars display the 95 percent confidence interval. All variables recoded 0–1. Drawn from OLS regressions that also control for race (i.e., White), age, rural residence, employment status, marital status, children, evangelic, education, and household income.

Chapter 5

Broader Implications and Conclusions

The first woman to serve in the United States Congress, Jeanette Rankin (Republican from Montana), was elected in 1916. As she prophetically commented upon her election, "I may be the first woman member of Congress, but I won't be the last" (Mallon 1917, p. 8). The number of female elected representatives increased at a very slow rate until the 1970s. Indeed, by 1970, only 10 women had served in Congress and nearly half of those congresswomen had won seats left open by their husbands' death (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Since then, the number of women elected to Congress has significantly risen. In total, 365 women have been elected or appointed to Congress: 309 women elected only in the House of Representatives, 40 women elected or appointed only in the Senate, and 16 women elected or appointed in both houses (Manning and Brudnick 2019). The 116th Congress (2019-2021) currently includes 130 women: 26 in the Senate (17 Democrats and 9 Republicans), 101 Representatives in the House (88 Democrats and 13 Republicans), and 4 women in the House who serve as non-voting Delegates or Resident Commissioner, representing American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.

Virgin Islands (2 Democrats and 2 Republicans).[13] Despite this progress, the fact remains that men hold over 66 percent of the voting seats in Congress, and the United States ranks 81st worldwide in terms of the percentage of women in the national legislature.[14]

Why should we care as citizens and scholars to understand the sources of and propose remedies to women's political underrepresentation in the United States and other democracies around the world? Beyond the normative perspective, numerous studies have shown that being represented by other women enhances women's interest and involvement in public life. When female candidates run and win electoral races, women in the public become more likely to discuss politics and influence others' vote (e.g., Atkeson 2003; Hansen 1997), express interest in politics (e.g., Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Reingold and Harrell 2010), have strong senses of political efficacy and competence (e.g., High-Pippert and Comer 1998), participate (e.g., Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), and become more informed of representatives' policy record (e.g., Jones 2014). In sum, as Atkenson argues, "Viable women candidates lead women to feel more connected to and a part of the political system in a way that they do not when they look around and see only men" (2003, p. 1043).

Furthermore, the election of female candidates may motivate more women to enter politics, thereby leading to the emergence of more female candidates. Ladam, Harden, and Windett (2018) examined the impact of women in major offices – governors and U.S. senators – on women's running for state legislature between 1978 and 2012. They found that the presence of a prominent female politician was associated with an increase in the proportion of female candidates – on

[13] Center for American Women and Politics, Rutgers Eagleton Institute of Politics, "Women in the U.S. Congress 2020." https://cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2020 (Accessed March 20, 2020).
[14] Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Percentage of women in national parliaments." https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=3&year=2020 (Accessed March 15, 2020).

average, seven additional women on state legislative ballots. This increase appears to be linked to a symbolic causal mechanism: high-profile female officeholders are likely to mobilize women candidates by inspiring them and acting as role models.

Thus, women's descriptive representation is valuable not only in and of itself, but also because it indirectly leads to female empowerment. The question is then why women have not reached parity in political office. This remains a million-dollar puzzle in the face of women's rising levels of education and participation in the workforce. Two main lines of scholarship have addressed this question. One focuses on the behavioral and institutional factors explaining women's willingness and chances to emerge and run as political candidates. The other examines the factors that make women candidates more or less likely to get elected. My dissertation offers a contribution to the latter stream of research.

Most of the recent findings seem to indicate that there is no systematic bias or discrimination against female candidates, once partisanship and incumbency status are accounted for (e.g., King and Matland 2003; Lawless and Pearson 2008; Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth 2018). In fact, opposition to a female President appears to have decreased by a significant amount – from 26 percent in 2006 (Streb et al. 2008) to 13 percent in 2016 (Burden, Ono, and Yamada 2017). Does this mean that women candidates are not at a disadvantage compared to male candidates? My theory and the empirical evidence I bring to bear in my four studies point to a resounding no. This disadvantage goes beyond partisan affiliation and ideological affinity. Importantly, it goes even beyond gender group membership (i.e., sex) itself and gender identity. The key problem for female candidates does not simply consist in being and running as a woman. Instead, it consists in running as a candidate who has self-labeled or has been labeled by others as a feminist. Labels related to gender subgroups crucially divide the U.S. public, particularly the female electorate.

Specifically, I have identified four main gender types – feminists, non-labelers, gender individualists, and gender inegalitarians – that differ according to two dimensions. On the subgroup identity or labeling dimension, feminists adopt the feminist label, whereas non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians adopt the non-feminist label. On the gender ideology or belief system dimension, feminists and non-labelers hold an egalitarian gender ideology, while individualists believe in gender equality but also in individual solutions to inequality, and inegalitarians reject the existence of gender inequality or the need to address it either individually or collectively.

Social psychologists have identified the divides between feminists and non-feminists, but they have not examined the political distinctions between them and the political implications and impact of such distinctions. Furthermore, the relative proportion of these gender subgroups and types within the U.S. electorate was largely unknown. My dissertation has addressed this uncertainty with both large and diverse samples of U.S. registered voters (two of which are nationally representative) and more encompassing and nuanced measures of strength of feminist and non-feminist identification. This is an important contribution, since the relative size of these gender subgroups and types as well as the sources and political implications of subgroup self-labeling may be very different within the broader U.S. population as compared to college student samples, on which most of the social psychology studies in this research area rely. Estimating their relative size is important because a larger group is likely to have a larger impact on electoral and, more broadly, political outcomes. Based on the results of my four studies, support for the feminist principle of gender equality, which both feminists and non-labelers share, is more widespread than acceptance of the feminist label, which is the case only among feminists. This is consistent with my theoretical expectations (H4 – Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender Ideology).

But why are the labels of feminist and non-feminist so powerful and divisive within American society and politics? What lies behind them? What leads individuals to adopt one versus the other? By relying on a nationally representative sample of registered voters interviewed on the YouGov platform, I have shown that individuals' choice to identify as a feminist as opposed to a non-feminist is strictly linked to contrasting views of the feminist movement and feminists as well as beliefs about what women's priorities ought to be. On the one hand, feminists reject negative stereotypes about feminism and feminists. They view gender discrimination as the main obstacle to the achievement of gender equality. Consequently, they prioritize advocating for women's rights and electing more women to political office as goals.

On the other hand, non-feminists (non-labelers and gender individualists) believe that feminism unfairly blames men for women's problems, and stigmatize feminists as women who dislike men and are too preoccupied with sex. Non-feminist men also view feminist women as judgmental and discriminatory toward female homemakers, while they believe women's priority should be to be a wife and/or mother and to take care of the home and/or family. In other words, all non-feminists want to protect men from what they see as unfair attacks from feminists. Additionally, non-feminist men appear to explain their adoption of the non-feminist label as a way to defend the non-feminist women in their life. Overall, non-feminists view both discrimination and women's behavior as causes of gender inequity. Accordingly, they do not value advocating for women's rights and do not consider the election of women candidates a priority.

Furthermore, feminist and non-feminist self-labeling are correlated with a number of gender attitudes. Among them, two appear to drive the divide between the two subgroups: feminists tend to display higher levels of collective orientation but lower levels of modern sexism, whereas non-feminists are likely to hold stronger modern sexist attitudes but be less collectively

oriented. Moreover, feminist women are more likely than non-feminist women to report having been discriminated against due to their gender identity. This may be a function of feminists' greater awareness of sexism as a systemic issue.

Importantly, in relation to politics, feminist and non-feminist identification are strictly linked to attitudes toward female candidates. Among both men and women, feminist identity is largely and significantly associated with considering the election of a woman President in the next twenty years as positive and of more women candidates as important. In contrast, non-feminist identity strongly predicts viewing a woman President in the next two decades as negative and more women in political office as unimportant. With regard to political activism and policy attitudes, feminists strongly support women's rights activism, ensuring gender equal pay, preferential hiring for women, and abortion rights (among women). Conversely, non-feminists do not care about activism in favor of women's rights, and are opposed to any government intervention to guarantee equal pay, requiring employers to offer paid parental leave, and the right to abortion (among women).

The 2016 presidential race and Hillary Clinton's historical candidacy represent a prominent example of the risks and costs associated with explicitly associating with the feminist label. During the last presidential election, the gender gap not only disappeared but reversed, all else equal, according to ANES data. This may appear surprising, as the gender gap in voting across political parties has been a strong feature of American elections since the 1980s, with women consistently more likely than men to vote for Democratic candidates in both presidential and congressional elections. Why did so many women voters decide not to support Clinton despite her direct appeals to the female electorate as a voting block? My theory helps us answer this question. Those female voters label themselves non-feminists and, therefore, could not support a candidate who is a

member of the feminist outgroup. On the one side, self-identified feminists were the strongest supporters of Clinton, but on the other side, self-identified non-feminists (non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians) were her strongest opponents. In other words, her explicit association with the label of feminist made her gain one gender subgroup but lose the other, which is larger at present. The relative size of these subgroups indeed contributes to explaining why Clinton's feminist identity clashed with widespread opposition from the female electorate. Specifically, 35 percent of female Democrats, 52 percent of female Independents, and 67 percent of female Republicans consider themselves non-feminists, according to data from the 2016 ANES. Paradoxically, rather than representing the base of Clinton's electoral support, women thus turned out to be her strongest critics because many of them could not identify with her "typology of woman." The impact of both feminist and non-feminist self-labeling is powerful among both Republican and Democratic women, thus indicating that the divides stemming from gender subgroup identification cut across partisanship.

The importance of gender subgroup identities goes far above and beyond the case of the 2016 presidential contest. The survey experiment I conducted in 2017 on Amazon's Mechanical Turk refers to a local, non-salient, and low-stake race, namely a fictitious, non-partisan mayoral election in Davenport, Iowa. Furthermore, the featured female candidate's feminist vs. non-feminist identity is conveyed implicitly though her biography and policy agenda, thereby providing a subtle and conservative test of the relative impact of shared gender subgroup identification between candidates and voters. Analogously to what happened with Hillary Clinton, I found that feminist female candidates are likely to be strongly preferred to non-feminist ones by feminist female voters, after controlling for party ID, political ideology, race, and other relevant socio-demographics, as predicted by H1a (Feminist Voter). Conversely, non-feminist women prefer non-

feminist to feminist women candidates, as predicted by H1b (Non-Feminist Voter). These results hold regardless of a candidate's race: there are no statistically significant differences between White and Black feminist candidates or between White and Black non-feminist ones. In other words, the role played by gender subgroup labels cuts across race, in addition to partisanship.

Most importantly, the impact of feminist and non-feminist ID is opposite but *asymmetric*: feminist candidates tend to encounter more hostility from non-feminist voters than sympathy from feminist ones. In other words, the costs associated with the feminist label are likely to outweigh its benefits. My qualitative responses further point to the existence of the "double bind" identified by Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth (2018). Non-feminist respondents appear to simultaneously discriminate against women who are labeled feminist and who do not prioritize their role at home as wives and/or mothers. This non-feminist expectation toward women candidates translates into a gender-unequal burden (i.e., double bind). Single and/or childless women are discriminated against and may therefore feel discouraged from running, whereas married mothers are favored but may not have the time to actually run and embark on a political career because of their more demanding family role. Where my theory differs from Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth's (2018) argument is that I identify the source of this voter disapproval in non-feminist identification rather than merely sex or gender identity.

However, non-feminist identifiers are not a homogenous group. As the findings from the 2016 ANES and MTurk studies indicate, non-feminist ID and non-feminist gender ideology – operationalized as modern sexism and traditional beliefs about gender roles – are moderately correlated but remain distinct. Thus, the non-feminist subgroup is comprised of three types that differ according to their gender belief system: 1) non-labelers, who endorse feminist (i.e., egalitarian) gender ideology (i.e., gender equality, women's rights, and women's empowerment)

yet eschew the feminist label in order to avoid the social stigma attached to it; 2) gender individualists, who reject collectivist solutions to gender inequality; and 3) gender inegalitarians, who reject both collective and individual means to address gender inequality.

Drawing on this conceptualization, the experiment I conducted on CloudResearch/TurkPrime in 2019 examines how the combination of gender subgroup identities and gender belief systems affects electoral support for candidates across genders and the two major parties in a fictitious top-two primary for the House of Representatives in the State of Washington. As compared to the experiment on MTurk, each candidate's association with the feminist or non-feminist label was provided explicitly. In terms of voting behavior, feminist voters in both the Democratic and the Republican Party largely favor ingroup – feminist – candidates over outgroup – non-labeler or individualist – candidates, but they also favor non-labeler over individualist candidates. These preferences remain regardless of whether the candidate is a man or a woman. This tells us that feminist voters highly value the feminist label and, in its absence, prefer non-labelers' feminist policy agenda to individualists' gender-neutral one. Indeed, feminists have more in common with non-labelers, with whom they share a feminist (i.e., egalitarian) gender ideology, than with individualists.

Within both parties, non-labelers hold opposite preferences from feminists, although they share similar egalitarian beliefs and values with them. Importantly, non-labelers' preferences closely resemble those of individualists, with whom they share the non-feminist label. In other words, non-labelers' behavior is more affected by their gender subgroup identity than their gender ideology. Both Democratic and Republican non-labelers and individualists favor individualist candidates over non-labeler and, particularly, feminist candidates. However, there are a few notable partisan differences. Democratic (but not Republican) non-labelers significantly favor non-

labeler over feminist candidates. Additionally, Democratic non-labelers punish feminist candidates more than Democratic individualists do, whereas Republican individualists punish feminist candidates more than Republican non-labelers do.

Importantly, non-labelers and individualists hold the same preference ranking regardless of candidate gender. They strictly prefer individualist candidates of both genders. Both gender types also favor non-labeler over feminist candidates. Nonetheless, being labeled a feminist is likely to be riskier and costlier for women than men candidates among some subsets of the electorate. In particular, feminist women are punished more than feminist men by individualist voters, whereas feminist men are punished more than feminist women by non-labeler voters. Moreover, there are noteworthy differences in intensity between female and male feminist candidates. Indeed, feminist women candidates are discriminated against by individualist and non-labeler voters to a similarly large extent. In contrast, feminist men candidates are discriminated against much more strongly by non-labeler than individualist voters.

Furthermore, the preference for feminist candidates among feminist voters primarily relies on positivity toward the ingroup – feminists – rather than negativity toward the outgroup – gender individualists, as predicted by H5a (Feminist Ingroup Positivity). In contrast, preference for ingroup candidates among gender individualists is more a function of negativity toward the outgroup – feminists – than positivity toward individualists, as expected (H5b – Non-Feminist Outgroup Negativity). However, contrary to my expectations (H5b), preference for ingroup candidates among non-labelers results more from ingroup positivity – toward non-labelers and, especially, individualists – than negativity toward the feminist outgroup. Thus, non-labelers resemble feminists in regard to ingroup vs. outgroup attitudes. This result provides further support to the theoretical insight that non-feminists are a highly diverse group. They are divided according

to their gender belief system and, even if they all tend to favor ingroup over outgroup candidates, they do so as a result of opposite dynamics. While non-labelers' candidate preferences depend on ingroup positivity, individualists' preferences stem from outgroup hostility.

Both my YouGov survey and TurkPrime survey experiment also help us understand who is a feminist and who is a non-feminist within the U.S. electorate. This is an important contribution, as most prior studies do not rely on representative samples of U.S. adults. I found that women and Democrats are more likely than men and Republicans, respectively, to identity as feminists. Moreover, among non-feminist identifiers, non-labelers constitute the largest proportion of Republicans, while gender individualists represent the largest proportion of Democrats. Overall, at present, the majority of American voters across gender and party is constituted by non-feminists – particularly, non-labelers and gender individualists.

However, interestingly, these proportions are likely to reverse in the near future. Indeed, my results show that younger individuals – Millennials and Centennials – are more likely to consider themselves feminists than older ones. It is to some extent surprising that younger women are less concerned and feel less constrained by the social stigma attached to the feminist label, since existing work shows that individuals who were young adults during the second wave of the feminist movement were the most likely to identify as feminists, while younger women were more likely to identify as non-feminists (e.g., Abowitz 2008; Rich 2005; Schnittker et al. 2003). I interpret this difference in results as partially stemming from how the feminist movement has evolved in the last twenty years. The recent emergence of the #MeToo movement, Women's Marches across the country and the world, and possibly a fourth wave of the feminist movement may have changed how younger women perceive the feminist label and improved the connotations

they attach to it.[15] If this is indeed the case, the political weight of feminist voters as well as the relative proportion and influence of feminist candidates and politicians is likely to increase in the future.

It is also important to underline that the impact of feminist and non-feminist identities cannot be subsumed under variables that have received far more attention in political science and public policy. Results from all my four studies clearly demonstrate that the divides between gender types – feminists, non-labelers, individualists, and inegalitarians – are distinct from and tend to be larger than those based on gender group membership (i.e., sex) or strength of gender identification, as predicted by H2 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Gender) and on political ideology, as predicted by H3 (Feminist/Non-Feminist ID vs. Political Ideology). They influence how individual voters perceive and evaluate candidates, interpret the political spectrum, and decide to cast their ballot. Consequently, they should also enter into female candidates' calculations of how to run their campaigns and present themselves to the electorate. Indeed, this investigation has key implications for explaining and predicting political attitudes and decision-making among not only voters, but also political candidates and policy-makers.

My results seem to point to the conclusion that an explicit association with the feminist label should be avoided. In other words, the best short-term strategy may be for feminist-minded women candidates to support a pro-feminist policy agenda while distancing themselves from the label. However, two of my results qualifies this strategy. First, the existence and relative size of non-labelers open up a number of opportunities looking forward. In particular, better

[15] Grady, Constance. July 20, 2018. "The waves of feminism, and why people keep fighting over them, explained." *Vox.* https://www.vox.com/2018/3/20/16955588/feminism-waves-explained-first-second-third-fourth (Accessed January 28, 2020).

understanding what non-labelers' rejection of the feminist label is rooted in can help us design ways to make non-labelers less unfavorable toward candidates who are labeled as feminists and more willing to engage with feminist policy-makers. In my dissertation, I have shed light on the fact that the stigmatization of feminism as a movement that is allegedly hostile to men and female homemakers significantly contributes to many individuals' refusal to embrace the label. To the extent this perception is indeed the case, exposure to positive depictions of feminism and of feminists as a diverse and inclusive group could help non-labelers become more supportive of feminist candidates and causes that reflect the goal of gender equality. Second, the majority of the two youngest generations, namely generations Y and Z, identify as feminists. This means that as the proportion of these two generations increases within the U.S. voting-eligible population in the next few decades, candidates who are associated with the feminist label are likely to face lower costs and receive increasing electoral support. In other words, the prospects of feminist candidates can be expected to improve thanks to the support of younger voters, who grew up with a concept of feminism that was shaped by the third (and possibly fourth) wave of feminism and the #MeToo movement.

A crucial question underlying this whole dissertation has been why non-feminists succeed in attracting and unifying individuals with extremely different gender belief systems, whereas feminists fail to appeal to a larger and more diverse subset of the public despite their highly coherent gender ideology. The answer likely rests in the perception of the feminist movement and feminists as unwelcoming and exclusionary. As my YouGov survey results show, non-feminists view feminists as being not only intolerant of men, but also judgmental and disparaging toward women who prioritize taking care of their home and family over pursuing a career outside the home. Thus, many men and women feel looked down upon or rejected by feminists. Jessica Valenti

(2018), a feminist writer, argues that "Feminism isn't about blind support for any woman who rises to power;" that "while feminism need not be complicated – it's a movement for social, economic and political justice – it is not for everyone;" and that "Now we have a different task: protecting the movement against conservative appropriation."[16]

Although statements like these may be motivated by the desire to reaffirm many feminists' commitment to a broad range of rights and opportunities for women and other underrepresented groups, it is easy to understand how they may be interpreted as excluding women and men who identify as conservative and/or Republican. Indeed, Charlotte Hays (2018) from the Independent Women's Forum reads Valenti's words as meaning that "feminism is an exclusive club, something that not any woman can claim."[17] Hays then adds that "Ms. Valenti is not very welcoming. By contrast, we conservative women are," and "Valenti and people who agree with her are gatekeepers. You must agree with them. And you must agree with them on *everything.*" The point Hays makes is crucial: feminist thinkers and supporters are often perceived as uncompromising 'purists,' and this hurts the breadth of their appeal. Rather than a movement advocating for *all* women, many non-feminists see feminism as a movement only for a selected type of women who agree on all aspects of feminist gender ideology. Paradoxically, then, non-feminism has become

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[16] Valenti, Jessica. May 19, 2018. "The Myth of Conservative Feminism." *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/opinion/sunday/conservative-feminism.html?rref=collection%2Fissuecollection%2Ftodays-new-york-times (Accessed January 28, 2020).

[17] Hays, Charlotte. May 24, 2018. "Another Take on Claim that Conservative Women Can't Be Feminists." Independent Women's Forum. https://www.iwf.org/2018/05/24/another-take-on-claim-that-conservative-women-cant-be-feminists/ (Accessed March 15, 2020).
Hays, Charlotte. May 21, 2018. ""Sex Object" Author Jessica Valenti Says Conservative Women Can't Be Feminists." Independent Women's Forum. https://www.iwf.org/2018/05/21/sex-object-author-jessica-valenti-says-conservative-women-cant-be-feminists/ (Accessed March 15, 2020).

synonymous of gender ideological diversity and inclusivity among a large number of voters, while feminism is being perceived as alienating for everybody who fails to meet any of the criteria that feminist elites deem as important.

An interesting aspect of how feminists are perceived is that feminist identifiers appear to not only reject the above-mentioned criticisms, but also to be to some extent unaware of them. Feminists participants in my YouGov survey strongly refused the claim that feminists may be overly critical of men and/or women who are not career-oriented. Furthermore, a large proportion of feminist women in my MTurk survey experiment argued that women should support and encourage other women regardless of their family or career choices. In other words, feminist identifiers in my samples do not appear to hold negative or discriminatory attitudes toward non-feminists. In sum, it is clear that feminists and non-feminists hold opposite views about whom the feminist movement welcomes and whom it excludes.

Accordingly, the next step in this line of research consists in further developing my theory by focusing on non-feminists, who remain largely understudied in American politics, although they represent the majority of the electorate. In my dissertation, I have identified non-feminism as a political identity, and showed how each non-feminist type resembles and differs from each other and from feminists in terms of their voting behavior and policy attitudes. The next step in this project consists in investigating the relative size of each non-feminist type within a nationally representative sample of U.S. voters.

In order to effectively do so, it will be crucial to further improve the quality of the scale I have employed to capture individuals' non-feminist identification. In particular, the measure should be aimed to more clearly disentangle to what extent non-feminism consists in negative affect toward feminists as a group rather than a positive sense of belonging and solidarity with

non-feminists as a group. To this end, I propose to integrate three items into the non-feminist ID scale, with which participants will be asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement: "Not being a feminist is important to my identity;" "The fact that I am not a feminist is a major part of how I see myself;" and "Identifying as a non-feminist is crucial to my self-image." These items can also be adapted and included in the feminist ID scale. The scale I employed in my four studies already includes an item measuring how important it is to an individual to be a non-feminist ("How important is it to you not to be a feminist" in my 2018 YouGov survey and 2019 CloudResearch/TurkPrime experiment; "How important is it to you to be an anti-feminist" in the 2016 ANES and my 2017 MTurk experiment). However, the three items I propose to add are likely to enhance both the reliability and the validity of the non-feminist ID scale as a positive subgroup identity rather than as a mere reflection of negative attitudes toward feminists.

More broadly, I intend to better understand the range of perceptions and connotations associated with the non-feminist as compared to the feminist label. Indeed, while the feminist label alienates all the non-feminist gender types, the non-feminist label successfully attracts and unifies individuals with a highly heterogeneous set of gender beliefs. It is reasonable to expect elites on the right to capitalize on the widespread prejudice against feminists by working to justify the stigmatization of feminism and to create the non-feminist identity as a positive attachment. Elites on the right side of the political spectrum indeed have a strategic incentive to do so in order to both weaken popular support for liberal and progressive candidates and enhance the appeal and approval of politicians with gender conservative platforms and agendas. This raises the question of what positive connotations and stereotypes actually succeed in making the non-feminist label significantly more appealing than the feminist one. Capturing those connotations can enable both female candidates and policy-makers to design campaign platforms and policy agendas whose

frames more effectively resonate with and mobilize larger segments of the public by better responding to their beliefs and values. Importantly, based on my current results, such connotations are likely to vary by age or generation. The non-feminist label can be expected to evoke more positive emotions among individuals from the Silent Generation, Baby Boomers, and Generation Xers rather than Millennials and Centennials.

Understanding how non-feminists perceive their group, and how much they value the non-feminist label, is important, particularly in regard to non-labeler voters. These voters have the highest potential to become allies of feminists and help them in the pursuit of common goals, such as gender equity in wages. The key for this partnership to form is for feminist candidates and policy-makers to engage on a dual-track strategy of focusing more on shared goals rather than divisive labels and, at the same time, progressively "rebranding" feminism as a movement for all women and anybody who is supportive of equal opportunities across the board, regardless of their gender, marital or parental status, or race/ethnicity. Such a partnership will likely be crucial for women candidates to be increasingly successful and women's political representation to rise in the United States.

The impact of gender subgroup divides is also unlikely to be confined to campaigns and elections. Since non-feminist identified voters tend to be more critical of feminist as compared to non-feminist candidates, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they will assess and evaluate feminist policy-makers' performance more harshly than they would in the case of non-feminist ones. Future work should therefore study how hostility toward feminism may translate into perception and approval of an elected representative's job. Specifically, does non-feminist bias against feminists lead to placing excessive weight on a representative's negative performance and/or dismiss her/his

successful policy outcomes? Can non-labelers become more supportive over time of a feminist policy-maker who succeeds in delivering on the issues they care about?

Whether a larger number of highly qualified women candidates will be able to win electoral contests against male candidates in the future will depend on their ability to create partnerships and coalitions across gender subgroup divides. What my results highlight is that labels can matter more than policy agendas. They have the potential to unify groups believing in different goals, such as gender individualists and non-labelers, but also to disaffect like-minded groups from common goals and candidates, such as feminists and non-labelers. The ultimate lesson seems to be that in order to be successful, female candidates need to become more aware and strategic about the labels they use themselves and the ones attached to them by political opponents and pundits. In an era of information and misinformation overcrowding, gender subgroup labels are likely to tell voters a disproportionate amount about what they are willing or able to pay attention to.

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