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JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO JAPANESE PROPAGANDA
1941-1945

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INTRODUCTION

The writer's interest in the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, with special reference to Japanese propaganda, began more than four years ago when she first reported for duty as a research analyst on Philippine Affairs in the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C. Part of the source material handed to her then for study consisted of the daily Japanese broadcasts to and about the Philippines, together with the supplementary bi-weekly analysis of the same broadcasts which were recorded and circulated by the Federal Communications Commission; the enemy radio digest issued daily by the Office of Special Services of the Philippine Government in exile in Washington, D. C., as well as all newspaper articles about the Philippines which appeared during the Japanese occupation of those Islands in all the important newspapers of the United States and which found their way into the clipping bureau of the War Department and, thence, to our office.

To the above mentioned sources, however, other materials were added. There were the sets of questions from the State and War Departments answered sometimes at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and at times in Washington, D. C., by American and Allied internees who succeeded in returning to the United States before the conclusion of the war, aboard the exchange ship, the S. S. Gripsholm; letters of citizens of neutral countries, American civilians and guerrillas from the mountain

fastnesses of the Free Philippines which were received here from neutral countries but which were first intercepted by postal censors and copies of which were sent to our organization for close scrutiny and analysis. There were also the regular reports of Philippine guerrilla commanders, particularly those of Colonel Macario Peralta, addressed to General Douglas MacArthur in Australia. But the most fascinating of all sources were the written reports (often dictated at our office) and interviews of men who escaped Japanese prison camps; American soldiers and civilians who left the Islands at the very fall of Bataan and who dared to cross the turbulent seas on small motorboats to Australia; and such stories as that of Lt. Colonel Emigdio Cruz, Medical Corps, Philippine Army, a Filipino who went back to the Philippines from Washington, D. C., after already experiencing war conditions at Bataan. From Manila, he succeeded in returning again to the American capital in spite of Japanese Kempetai (military police).

With the landing of American forces in Leyte, the writer continued to collect Japanese propaganda materials on her own account. All newspaper articles dealing with the subject were collected. With the gradual arrival of Filipino army officers and civilian students from Manila to the Michigan campus, she interviewed every one of them. Long hours of conversation were held with them so that the author could get the real atmosphere which pervaded occupied Manila and the real feeling of the Filipino people during Japan's regime. Visiting

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Filipino professors, professional men and businessmen were likewise interviewed so that she would reach a cross-section of Philippine society which had witnessed the war.

When the writer was ready to write her thesis, she proceeded to Washington to get the much-needed permission to take detailed notes on the documents she knew so well while in the War Department. She returned to her old office but after requesting access to the files now that the war was over, she was still impressed with security rules and it was emphasized to her that "even newspaper clippings were to be brought out of the huge Pentagon Building (which houses the War Department) only in the form of ashes." However, through the kindness of Brigadier General Harry James Malony and Lt. Colonel John M. Kemper of the Historical Division, War Department, it was arranged that the much needed materials might be declassified for use. This was accomplished early in October, 1946.

To make full use of her stay in Washington, D. C., she also went to the Philippine Embassy, the Library of Congress and the Philippine Affairs Division of the State Department. From the last mentioned office, she heard of the wealth of materials in Ann Arbor, Michigan--of the valuable Joseph Ralston Hayden Collection, the Japanese propaganda collection sent by the University of the Philippines as a gift to the General Library of the University of Michigan, the complete set of Manila Tribune donated to the same University by Mrs. Winnifred O'Connor Pablo, the University of Michigan Publications,

and the collection of war propoganda in the Clements Library in the same University which included official gazettes, posters, pamphlets, other occupation newspapers, and illuminating private letters on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, all contributed by Michigan alumni and others who participated in the war.

The story as to how the source materials were gathered is told here to help anyone interested in a similar subject and to indicate that primary sources were used as much as possible. This thesis is divided into eight chapters, three of which cover the historical basis of Philippine-Japanese relations. The reason for having a number of chapters on the historical background will be found in the discussion of each of these chapters. Chapter I is a brief resume of the development of the Filipino nation with a view to making the reader understand why the Filipinos later reacted the way they did to Japan's call for their return to the Oriental fold. It is the writer's intention to bring out the fact that the Filipino people, even before the arrival of the Western peoples to their shores, were already liberty-loving and had even then favored a democratic form of government. Because of these traits which survived until the present, the Filipinos resented the perversion of democracy and the suppression of individual liberty by the Japanese. Chapter II is a portrayal of the commercial relations between Japan and the Philippines before the advent of the American era and of Japan's attempt, even

then, to spread among the Islanders the gospel of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Chapter III deals with Japan's preparation in the Archipelago of her subsequent military and propaganda invasion under the guise only of an economic penetration. Chapter IV describes the propaganda media and lines utilized by the Japanese in the conquest of the Philippines which culminated in the establishment of the Philippine puppet government. The next two chapters discuss the Japanese propaganda instruments and techniques and the lines which they propagated during the entire Japanese occupation. The seventh chapter is on the guerrilla movement, the proof of the reaction in the Philippines to Japan's gospel. And the last chapter contains the conclusions of the writer.

Throughout the work, there was an attempt on the part of the writer to pose the question: Why did the Filipinos side with the white democracies instead of with their fellow Orientals, the Japanese? The answer comes from Japan's propaganda itself as will be explained in the following chapters--in the spirit behind her propaganda techniques and lines.

Acknowledgments are due to many: to Professor Everett Brown, the adviser of the writer, for his wise guidance and patient understanding; to Professor Harley H. Bartlett, for permitting her to draw freely from his vast knowledge of Philippine affairs, to two friends who cannot now hear these words of appreciation: Professor Joseph Ralston Hayden, who provided the thesis subject and convinced the author of its

importance; and to Professor W. Carl Rufus, Counsellor to Barbour Scholars for many years. Likewise thanks are due to Dr. Frank Huntley, present Secretary of the Barbour Scholarship Committee; to the members of her doctoral committee; to Brigadier General Harry James Malony, Colonel John M. Kemper, and Mr. I. Wise of the Historical Division, War Department; to Colonel Joseph K. Evans, the former head of the Pacific Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department; to Mr. Lloyd Milligan, Mr. Schaeffer, and Mr. George Gray of the State Department; Dr. James B. Childs of the Library of Congress; Mr. W. L. Hebbard of the Treasury Department; to Dr. Clever Bald and Miss Agnes Tysse of the Clements Library and the General Library respectively, University of Michigan; to Miss Belen Guido, Dr. Conrado Dayrit and Mr. Francisco Castro. Lastly and most heartfully, the author expresses her gratitude to Dr. Jesus Llanera Soriano for aid and understanding at every stage of her work.

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CHAPTER I
THE FILIPINO NATION

Geographically, the Philippines lies in the heart of the Far East, and racially, the Filipino people are predominantly Oriental. Historically, politically, culturally and socially, however, the Filipinos are closely bound to the West. For three hundred and sixty-eight years they were in intimate colonial relationship, first with Spain, and later with the United States.

The Philippine Archipelago is situated in the northernmost part of Malaysia, southeast of Asia. It is bounded on the south by the Celebes Sea, and on the west by the China sea.¹

The country has a land area of 115,600 square miles, and is composed of 7,100 islands.² Its population as determined by the Census of 1939 was only 16,000,303, but some economists believe that the Islands can support 60,000,000.³

¹ Map of the Far East from Sumner Welles, An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace (New York: The Dryden Press, 1945), 307; Facts and Figures about the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: Information Division, Office of the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines, 1942), 1.

² "Census Atlas of the Philippines" from the Census of the Philippines (Manila: Government Bureau of Printing, 1940), 11.

³ The Manila Tribune, October 6, 1940, 1.

The Pre-Spanish Philippines

The settlement of the Philippines began thousands of years ago as a part of the great migrations of peoples from the continent of Asia to the Pacific Area.⁴ The three principal racial migrations that reached the Philippines were those of the Negritos, the Indonesians, and the Malays. The Negritos were the first to arrive, and today their still primitive and uncivilized descendants are scattered in some mountain ranges of Luzon and Mindanao.⁵ The Indonesians reached the Philippines during Neolithic times, and with their knowledge of agriculture, pottery and weaving, were much more advanced in culture and civilization than their predecessors.⁶ The Malays, the last to come, reached the Islands in 1500 B.C.⁷ These Malays, who are racially and geographically Indonesians and Mongoloids, should not be confused with the Malay race of Sumatra.⁸ They came to the Philippines in three waves: the first became the ancestors of the Subanons of Mindanao and the Tagbanuas of

⁴ Marcelo Tangco, "Racial and Cultural History of the Philippines," Philippine Social Science Review (Manila), May, 1938, X, 110-111; H. Otley Beyer, Population of the Philippine Islands in 1916 (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1917).

⁵ Marcelo Tangco, op. cit.

⁶ Leandro Fernandez, A Brief History of the Philippines (New York: Glenn and Co., 1932), 115.

⁷ Austin Craig and Conrado Benitez, Philippine Progress Prior to 1898 (Manila: Philippine Education Press, 1920), 6.

⁸ Fernandez, op. cit., 5-6.

Palawan; the second became the progenitors of the pagan tribes of northern Luzon, such as the Ifugaos and the Igorots, who still irrigate the famous rice terraces of their forefathers; the third, who were the most civilized of the Malays, were the ancestors of the Christian Filipinos and their Mohammedan brothers.⁹

It is generally agreed at the present time that the racial make-up of the Filipino nation is 90 percent Malay, which includes Christians, Mohammedans, and some pagan tribes; the remaining ten percent consists of those who show non-Malayan strains, such as Negrito, Chinese, European, and American.¹⁰

Contrary to popular notion, the Filipinos possessed a degree of civilization at the advent of Spanish rule in the sixteenth century. Three cultural influences had already reached the Philippines then. From India, the Filipinos were the recipients of two Oriental religions and their corresponding cultures, Brahmanism and Buddhism. These two cultures were brought directly to the Philippines through the great Madjapahit and the Shri-Visayan empires.¹¹

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Albert Kreiger, Peoples of the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: The Smithsonian Institute, 1942), 2-3.

¹¹ Norberto Romualdez, The Psychology of the Filipino (Baguio: Catholic School Press, 1925), 17-18.

The third cultural influence which found its way into the Archipelago was Mohammedanism. This religion was introduced into the Sulu islands by Makdum, a noted Arabian scholar who also converted the Moluccas to Mohammedanism. Thus began the centuries of Mohammedan culture in the southern Philippines which to this day has successfully withstood the encroachment of Christianity.¹²

When the Spaniards came, there were very few among the Filipinos who could not read or write in either the ancient Malay or the Arabic script.¹³ They had a body of literature all their own in the form of oral and folk traditions. These consisted of epic and lyric poems, folk stories, drama, maxims, proverbs, and ancient myths.¹⁴ The Filipinos were said to be musical even then and they possessed a variety of musical instruments.¹⁵

Neither were the early Filipinos backward in the economic

¹² Jose G. Sanvictores, "The Non-Christian Problem of the Philippines," as quoted by Jose P. Laurel, Local Government in the Philippines (Manila: Pilarica Press, 1926), 6.

¹³ Fernandez, op. cit., 70.

¹⁴ Teofilo del Castillo, A Brief History of Philippine Literature (Manila: The Progressive Press, 1937), 8-9.

¹⁵ Charles Edward Russell, The Outlook for the Philippines (New York: The Century Company, 1927), 26-27.

field. They produced a great number of agricultural products and they had different domesticated animals.¹⁶ A flourishing pearl and fishing industry existed.¹⁷ Fine pineapple cloth, exquisite laces, and unexcelled embroidery were among their handiwork.¹⁸ Their art objects in silver and gold remain even now to excite lovers of beauty.¹⁹ But their most important industry was shipbuilding. They built boats that held as many as one hundred rowers and thirty soldiers on each side.²⁰ The ancient Filipinos were born navigators and engaged early in foreign commerce. They traded with the peoples of China, Japan, India, Siam, Borneo, The Moluccas, Java, and Sumatra.²¹

The form of government practiced by the Filipinos during those pre-Spanish times is a good indication that the Filipinos had leanings towards democracy even before they were subjected

¹⁶ Jose Montero y Vidal, "Historia General de Filipinas, 1887," in The Philippines (1413-1803), eds. Blair and Robertson (Cleveland: The A. H. Clark & Co., 1911), I, 185-191.

¹⁷ Antonio de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas," in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., XVI, 79.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Pedro de Chirino, S. J. Rome 1604, in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., XVI, 29.

²⁰ Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Paris: Libreria de Garnier Hermanos, 1890), 266-267.

²¹ "Resume of Documents between 1521-1569," Blair and Robertson, op. cit., II, 116-117.

to western influences. The unit of government at that time was the "barangay," a word derived from "balangay," a small vessel in which the early Malays came to the Islands. The ruler of the "barangay" had powers which were never absolute because of the presence of a "Council of Elders" composed of former chiefs who because of old age or other infirmities could no longer actually rule. There was also a tendency even then to divide governmental powers into three: executive, judicial, and legislative.²²

There also existed among the early Filipinos a form of "tacit consent" in the election of a ruler. Francisco Colin states that subjects could desert an immoral chief and follow another who because of his industry, courage, or virtue had risen to power. In the southern Philippines, even a slave could say "no" to the ruler.²³

The early legislative procedure in the Islands bore some resemblance to present democratic practice. The most important chief would call all the lesser chiefs of the "barangay" and inform them of the need for some laws to correct certain evils in the community. The lesser chiefs would then authorize him to present a list of regulations for approval, and these, after being acted upon, became laws. A town crier called the

²² Laurel, op. cit., 14-15.

²³ Dapen Liang, The Development of Philippine Political Parties (Hongkong: The South China Morning Post, 1939), 16-17; Francisco Colin, "Labor Evangelica," in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., XL, 84-86.

"umalahocan" then went through the village and announced the new laws.²⁴

The laws of the ancient Filipinos were mostly rooted in customs and traditions which had been handed down from generation to generation, but there were also written laws such as the penal code written in 1433 by Calantiao, chief of Panay.²⁵ Romualdez, a noted Filipino jurist, believes that this ancient code was as wise and as humane as those of Greece and Rome.²⁶

The pre-Spanish states were small and independent. Wars between them were frequent. This state of affairs led Bourne to the conclusion that the greatest defect of the early Filipino state was its lack of unity and cohesion. However, there were some kingdoms which were bigger than others.²⁷ The whole island of Panay, for example, was under just one head, that of Datu Sumakuel who succeeded in consolidating the warring tribes of the island and subjecting them all to his rule.²⁸ Nevertheless, not one of these kingdoms was powerful enough to encompass a whole island as big as Luzon, and it is to Spain's credit that the greater part of the Philippines, with

²⁴ Colin, ibid.

²⁵ Laurel, op. cit., 31.

²⁶ Romualdez, op. cit.

²⁷ Laurel, op. cit., 10.

²⁸ Fernandez, op. cit., 14.

the exception of Mindanao and Sulu, was brought under one rule.

The Philippines Under Spain

The first Occidental country to discover the Philippines was Spain. In 1519, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese, was commissioned by Charles V of Spain to find a westward route to the fabulous Indies and in this expedition, the noted explorer accidentally discovered the Islands. On March 16, 1521, he first sighted the island of Samar and the next morning he landed on the small island of Homonhon.²⁹ However, because of Magellan's untimely death at Mactan, Spain's occupation of the Philippines had to be postponed for forty-five years. It was Miguel de Legaspi, the head of the fifth Spanish expedition, who succeeded in 1571 in occupying the Islands for Spain.³⁰

Legaspi began rebuilding the city of Manila, which he conquered from its Mohammedan Filipino rulers, while two of his able followers, Martin de Goite and Juan de Salcedo, set out to conquer more Philippine lands for Spain.³¹ In the areas occupied by the Spaniards, Legaspi continued the native governmental institutions, an act which places him among the greatest colonizers of all time.³² With this extension of

²⁹ David P. Barrows, History of the Philippines (New York: World Book Co., Revised edition, 1925), 101-102.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Fernandez, op. cit., 45-47.

³² Laurel, op. cit., 10.

Spanish rule into most parts of the Archipelago, Spain succeeded in welding together the separate elements of the country into one political organization, although the Moros of Mindanao never fell under Spain's jurisdiction.

Another unifying factor which was a gift of Spain to the Filipinos was the Spanish language. It is true that the early Filipinos came originally from the same geographical areas, but centuries of isolation splintered their language into numerous diversified dialects. However, by making Spanish the medium of instruction in the schools and by the adoption of the same language as the official means of communication, Spain succeeded in giving, at least to the more educated Filipinos, a common medium of expression which brought them closer to each other.³³

The Spanish missionaries also had their share in the development of the Filipino nation. They brought to the Filipinos the more highly developed culture of Spain. They taught the Islanders how to build better homes and they introduced a great variety of agricultural products from Mexico.³⁴

All throughout the three hundred twenty-five years of Spanish occupation of the Philippines, the music, painting, sculpture, and literature of Spain influenced that of the Filipinos. Today one can notice some Spanish airs in Philippine

³³ Gregorio Zaide, The Philippines: Its History and Culture (Manila: The Oriental Press, 1937), 330-340.

³⁴ Barrows, op. cit., 79.

music, and Filipino literature in Castilian has not, as yet, been excelled in the Islands.³⁵ Even Spanish customs and social standards slowly but definitely permeated into all the Philippine social institutions.³⁶

Above all else, Spain's monumental achievement in the Islands was the introduction of Christianity. Today, the Philippines is the only Christian nation in the Orient. The significance of Christianity to the future democracy as brought by America into the Islands was expressed well by President Taft when he said:

It is evident to me that without this preparation, the plans to convert these peoples into a true democracy and to make them self-governing would have had no foundation. I repeat that if these peoples had not sincerely embraced Christianity, our hopes of preparing them for democratic self-government would have had no foundation.³⁷

Notwithstanding the benefits derived from Spanish rule, Spain's policy in the Islands was not without its flaws. First, although Spanish missionaries did much good in establishing the first schools in the Islands, yet it was a fact that in their zeal to Christianize, they destroyed most of the existing records, writings, and works of art of the pre-Spanish Filipinos.³⁸ Secondly, the early Spanish rule

³⁵ del Castillo, op. cit., 10.

³⁶ Zaide, op. cit., 330-340.

³⁷ Report of the Philippine Commission, January 31, 1900 (Washington, D. C.: Government Bureau of Printing, 1901), I, 24.

³⁸ Francis Burton Harrison, Cornerstone of Philippine Independence (New York: The Century Co., 1922), 20-21.

witnessed many abuses against the natives. Some of these abuses resulted from the "encomienda" system, which was originally a grant consisting of lands and their inhabitants, given by the king of Spain to those who helped in the conquest of the Philippines. The "encomendero" was, in most instances, a Spaniard of little education, with a great ego and a still greater rapacity for wealth. He levied heavy taxes on his tenants, usually assigning to a former "datu" the task of collection; and when he was not satisfied with the amount of tribute, he had the poor datu tied to the pillory and whipped.³⁹

Many abuses were committed by other Spanish officials. It was a common practice in those days to appoint as district magistrates, military commanders or even governors, men from the lowest strata of society in Spain such as hair dressers, lackeys, sailors, or even army deserters. These types of persons, with very little principle and no other guide but their passions, ruled over the nation with despotism and inquisitorial cruelty.⁴⁰ They confiscated the harvests of the natives, or whatever struck their fancy; they forced them to do compulsory labor, such as the cutting of timber for

³⁹ Rizal's note to Morga's "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas," in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., XVI, 101.

⁴⁰ Tomas de Comyn, "State of the Philippines in 1810," (London: 1821), translation of William Walton in Austin Craig's The Philippines through Foreign Eyes (Manila: The Philippine Education Co., 1916), 357-358.

shipbuilding, and serving in public works projects; they likewise inducted them into the army without their consent and made them fight in Spain's wars against the Dutch, the colonial rivals of the Spaniards.⁴¹

All these misfortunes of the early Filipinos made them think that their former gods, whom they had forsaken for the God of their new white masters, were angry at them and were punishing them. This, coupled with their innate love for freedom and liberty, caused them to rebel, time and again, against the Spanish yoke. As early as 1587, they resorted to force with the aid of their Japanese friends.⁴²

At the latter part of the Spanish regime, moreover, the friars wielded too great and unjust influence over the civil affairs of the Islands and they also objected to the rise of the native clergy. The rest of the Spaniards were haughty and overbearing. To them, the native was incapable of intellectual progress and, therefore, was not given enough participation in his own government. Likewise, Spain prohibited the Islanders to trade with countries other than herself.⁴³

During the eighteenth century, however, Spain relaxed her mercantilistic policy in the Islands, and as sudden material

⁴¹ Leandro Fernandez, A Brief History of the Philippines (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1929), 122-131.

⁴² Montero y Vidal, op. cit. For detailed discussion, see Chapter II, below.

⁴³ Barrows, op. cit., 226-230.

prosperity came to the Filipinos, more parents were in a position to send their children to Manila and to Europe for higher education.⁴⁴ The students who went abroad brought back to the Islands the eighteenth century liberalism which was then engulfing Europe. They became the core of the Filipino intellectuals who agitated for reforms in Spain's administration of their country. Slowly they opened the eyes of their countrymen to the many unjust civil and political practices in the Archipelago.⁴⁵ The age-long union of the church and the state in the Philippines became intolerable and they agitated for Filipino representation in the Spanish Cortes.⁴⁶ They also became acutely conscious of their individual liberties such as equality of rights before the law for both Filipinos and Spaniards, freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, the privacy of correspondence, and the removal of hindrances to the promotion of their economic development. These desires of the Filipinos later found expression in their democratic political instrument, the "Malolos Constitution," which they framed in 1898.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Fernandez, op. cit., 211-221.

⁴⁵ Barrows, op. cit., 254-255.

⁴⁶ Fernandez, op. cit., 175.

⁴⁷ Alfredo Morales, "The Influence of American Literature on Filipino Democracy," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, department of English, University of Michigan, 1946), 167.

The Philippine-American Partnership

The result of all these grievances was the revolution of 1896 which the Filipinos plotted with the hope of tangible aid from the Japanese, as we will soon discuss. Unfortunately, however, it was quelled by the Spaniards. While the Filipinos were busy preparing another armed encounter in 1898, the Spanish-American War broke out. The Islanders rejoiced over this turn of events for they had heard of the United States and how, by armed revolt, she had thrown off the British yoke and established her own democratic institutions. They hoped therefore that America would come and liberate them from Spanish misrule, and when Dewey landed to occupy Manila on August 13, 1898, the Filipinos welcomed him with open arms and gave him their whole-hearted support.⁴⁸

In the meantime, the Filipinos had proclaimed their independence and had framed the Malolos Constitution which embodied their national aspirations. They thought that this independence would be recognized by America. But at the Treaty of Paris in December, 1898, Spain ceded the Islands to America. Upon learning of the intention of the United States to retain their country, the Filipinos revolted. America's superiority in arms and equipment was too much for their crude and primitive weapons and the resistance was soon broken.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Barrows, op. cit., 265; Fernandez, op. cit., 258.

⁴⁹ Barrows, op. cit., 265; Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines, Past and Present (New York: The Macmillan Co., New edition in one volume, 1930), 661-668.

Nevertheless, it was not long before America showed her altruism in the occupation of the Islands. In 1899, President McKinley appointed the first Philippine Commission for the purpose of gathering reliable information on the Philippines which might serve as a basis for future legislation.⁵⁰ In March, 1900, the second Philippine Commission was dispatched preparatory to the establishment of a civil government. President McKinley's instructions to the second Philippine Commission is a classic expression of America's best intentions in the Philippines. Among other things, President McKinley enjoined the members of the Commission to bear in mind that the government they were to establish was intended not for the expression of their theoretical views but for the peace and prosperity of the Filipino people and that the Philippines was not for America to exploit but to teach in the art of self-government.⁵¹

By March 4, 1901, a civil government was already established in the Philippines with Governor-General Taft as its first civil administrator.⁵² Autonomy was extended to provincial and local governments in the Islands. The reformation of the judiciary branch was also considered, and an efficient civil service was begun.⁵³

⁵⁰ Barrows, op. cit., 280; Fernandez, op. cit., 279; Worcester, op. cit., 66.

⁵¹ Worcester, op. cit., 792-798.

⁵² Fernandez, op. cit., 270.

⁵³ Ibid.

But America's signal contribution in the Islands was in the field of education. While the first Spaniards landed with Catholic missionaries, American teachers came a month after the military. These teachers went into even the remotest "barrios" of the Archipelago and established schools. It was not easy at first to convince the people, naturally afraid and suspicious of the motives of the Americans, to send their children to school, but by friendliness, sincerity, humor, and generosity, they were gradually won over. As the Filipino school children increased in number, the schoolrooms became the first centers of democratic life in the Islands. The children of both rich and poor received the same treatment. From their books they read about famous Americans who spent their lives making a wilderness into a great democratic country.⁵⁴ While under Spain, the Catholic Church controlled the education in the Archipelago, under America all religions were given the same opportunity to do their share in the education of Filipinos. Of this period, Frank Laubach said:

The public schools are furnishing the intellectual reformation and the churches the spiritual.⁵⁵

With the progress in the primary and secondary education in the Islands, the need of institutions for higher learning

⁵⁴ Paul Monroe, Chairman of the Educational System in the Philippines, a Report to the Board of Educational Survey (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1925), 781.

⁵⁵ Frank Laubach, The Peoples of the Philippines - Their Religious Progress and Preparation for Spiritual Leadership in the Far East (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1925), 8.

became more and more apparent. In 1908, the Philippine Legislature authorized the establishment of the University of the Philippines.⁵⁶ In all these schools, English was made the medium of instruction and because of the great and ever increasing number of students learning English, Filipinos found another medium which linked them more closely--a common tongue. In 1935, with the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, the National Language adopted by the Philippine Legislature was the Tagalog, and this was added to English and Spanish as the official languages of the Philippine government. More than ever, the Filipinos felt that they belonged to the same nation.⁵⁷

By 1939, statistics on education showed that literacy among Filipinos had increased thirty per cent since the Americans founded the Philippine educational system in 1903. This is a record achievement compared to what other western countries have done in their Far Eastern colonies.⁵⁸

Along with American teachers and administrators, the American public health men and engineers deserved the gratitude of the Filipino people. During the latter part of the

⁵⁶ Monroe, op. cit., 781.

⁵⁷ Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), 583-585.

⁵⁸ Ray Hurley, "The Philippine Census, a Preview" in C. P. Romulo, Salvador Lopez, and Donald Ming, editors, The Philippine Yearbook (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940), 121-143.

Spanish regime, famine and disease were rampant in the Islands. One saw a person in the pink of health in the morning only to hear that he succumbed the same afternoon to some dreaded disease like cholera or plague. Smallpox was then a disease which almost every child had to suffer before reaching manhood. But all this changed after the Americans came. When the Philippines suffered an epidemic and a famine shortly after its occupation, the United States Congress voted the sum of six million pesos for the relief of Filipinos. In the Archipelago, the American physicians and other members of the sanitary corps started the system of inoculation and vaccination. Breeding places of germs were cleaned out or destroyed and a competent staff of Filipinos was trained to keep the health situation of the Islands in hand.⁵⁹ Likewise, American engineers built roads and other public improvements which facilitated the transportation of agricultural products from one region to another. The material prosperity resulting from this raised the standard of living, and consequently improved their general state of health.⁶⁰

During the American rule of the Islands, public opinion was given freedom to develop. It is true that during the military period the Americans decreed that political parties which agitated separation of the Philippines from the United

⁵⁹ Fernandez, op. cit., 286.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

States were to be considered agencies of sedition. But with the official declaration of the end of a state of war in the Archipelago, this ban was lifted. Political parties were therefore organized which included in their platforms the issue of immediate independence.⁶¹ But the first opportunity given to political parties to play a part in Philippine politics came in 1907, when the Island's electorate went to the polls to elect the members of the first Philippine Assembly. This legislative body was authorized by the Organic Act of 1902, and it became the lower house of the Philippine Commission, which was an appointive body.⁶² During the 1907 election, a new political party became the majority party in the Islands and it has continued to be so until 1941. This was the "Partido Nacionalista."⁶³

Aside from the legislative branch of the Philippine government, the executive and administrative divisions were also gradually turned over to Filipino officials. This policy of Filipinization found its greatest impetus under the regime of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison. At the beginning, this Filipinization policy lowered the efficiency of the government but the net results proved that it was not harmful at all. In fact, as more Filipinos were given responsible positions, there

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 288.

⁶³ Liang, op. cit., 81.

grew a stronger faith in America's desire really to teach them the "art of self-government."⁶⁴

While the United States was showing its desire to uplift and teach the Filipinos, for a time she did not commit herself in any way to a promise of Philippine independence. Her first declaration of such an intention appeared only in the preamble of the Jones Law of 1916. This law further gave the Filipinos control of the whole legislative branch of the government, and the Philippine Commission was superseded by a popularly elected Senate.⁶⁵

The executive branch of the government was the only one which remained under an American head until 1935, and because of this, there were instances of friction between the Governor-General and the Filipino controlled Philippine Legislature. To smooth out the differences, a "Council of State" was created as an advisory body to the Governor-General. This body was composed of representatives of the Philippine Legislature and members of the cabinet. In this way, better cooperation between the two branches of the government was achieved.⁶⁶

On November 15, 1935, a further step towards Filipino self-government was taken. The Philippine Commonwealth

⁶⁴ Fernandez, op. cit., 286-288.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Government was then inaugurated in accordance with the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934. This government was to serve as a transition government, pending the declaration of complete Philippine independence which was scheduled to be granted by the United States in 1946. A constitutional convention which framed a Philippine constitution was elected preparatory to the inauguration of the Commonwealth. Furthermore, a popularly elected Filipino president and vice-president took over the executive branch of the government. By 1941, when the Japanese invaded the Philippines, all the key judicial, executive, and legislative offices of the Philippine Government were in Filipino hands. Only the American High Commissioner served as a reminder of America's sovereignty in the Islands.⁶⁷

The Filipinos were on their way towards a full realization of their complete independence and towards the establishment of a real western democracy in the Orient. And while they were not bound to America by ties of blood and geographical proximity, they were nevertheless held to her by a firmer bond--a common belief in liberty and democracy.

⁶⁷ Hayden, op. cit., 39-40.

CHAPTER II
PHILIPPINE-JAPANESE RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE
AMERICAN REGIME

Japanese-Philippine Relations before the
Advent of the Spanish Occupation

A certain knowledge of Philippine-Japanese relations before the American period is necessary as a basis for understanding subsequent events and to show that there were actual commercial links between the two nations more than four hundred years ago. Moreover, as early as 1574, three years after Spain successfully occupied the Islands, the Filipinos instigated a revolt against their western conquerors and in their plot to regain their newly lost freedom, they were given Japanese aid and sympathy. The same assistance was again extended to the Filipinos in 1896-1898, in their rebellion first against Spain and later against the United States. By this time, Japan's motive in helping the Filipino revolutionists seemed to further also her own dream of a Greater East Asia, as we will soon discuss.

The first historical accounts of such relations may date as far back as 654 A.D., although dating in early Japanese history is very uncertain. At any rate, some historians claim that the first foreign trade of the Islands with Japan was

established that long ago.¹ Certainly the prevalence of a diversity of Indonesian languages the whole length of Formosa (located north of the Philippines and south of Japan) indicates long continued migration from the southward during an extended period antedating recorded Japanese history. It is highly unlikely that such long continued northward Indonesian migration did not reach Japan itself. In fact, anthropologists recognize distinct somatic characteristics of the people of southern Japan which ally them racially with the Filipinos, and at least one specialist in Indonesian languages has found the affinity of Japanese to be with the Philippine group.² Traffic between nations is never one way only. We may be sure that a long continued drift of migrants northward was not entirely uncompensated by a southward movement from Japan. Trade relations between the Philippines and China are known from archaeological discoveries to reach into Philippine (if not Chinese) prehistory.

Philippine-Japanese Relations During the Early Part
of the Spanish Regime

Certainly there were Japanese visitors and immigrants in Manila in the early years of the Spanish occupation. In their

¹ Much has been made of supposed very early relations between Japan and the Philippines, possibly resulting in some dubious or at any rate not too well authenticated "propaganda history" during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, of which we have an example in Jose P. Santos, "Legacy of the Rising Sun to the New Philippines," Nippon Times (Manila), July 24, 1943, 1.

² Interview with Professor Harley H. Bartlett, dated December 23, 1947, at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

wartime propaganda, the Japanese made much of the blood ties between Japan and the Philippines arising from early migrations and trade relations, urging race relationship as a ground for making common cause against later comers of the white race. The landing points of the Japanese trading vessels then were Calapan, Mindoro; Aparri, Cagayan; and Agoon, La Union. Agoon, because of this, was known as "Puerto de Japon" or Port of Japan. As their medium of exchange, the Filipinos used gold dust. The Japanese were said to have sailed from Nagasaki, bringing with them silk, cotton, and domestic utensils; on their return, they carried back prepared hides and brown earthen jars from Luzon which they particularly treasured.³ The latter may have been from Continental Asia rather than of local Philippine manufacture, for the art of pottery making appears to have been always more advanced in Japan than in the Philippines.

When the Spaniards came to the Philippines, they found some natives of lighter complexion than others. These peoples were reputedly the offspring of Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino marriages. The hospitality of the early Filipinos had charmed Japanese traders so much that many decided to stay and settle in northern and central Luzon. Those who settled in Dilao and

³ Montero y Vidal, "Historia General de Filipinas, 1887," The Philippines (1413-1803), eds. Emma Blair and J. A. Robertson (Cleveland: The A. H. Clark Co., 1911, 55 vols.), XXXIV, 185-191.

San Miguel, Bulacan, intermarried with the natives.⁴ In Mindanao, a group called by Jose P. Santos as the "Tagbalays" are said by him to have descended from the early Japanese traders, and the traits and customs of these people, such as their bravery and industry, are ascribed to their Japanese ancestry.⁵ It appears that this statement came from a reliable source, for Fr. Juan de la Concepcion's Historia General de Filipinas, which was published in Manila in the year 1788, stated in part:

There is another tribe in some parts of Tandag and Bislig [Mindanao] called in Balooy (their native dialect) Tagbaloes of the mountains, who, though infidels, are the most rational among the wild tribes; they trade with peoples of the towns, they are light in complexion and from their features, it can be deduced that they are descendants of the Japanese; it is common to find among them (and the religieuses who have dealt with them and who have converted some of them to Christianity are of this belief) strong and capable ones, trustworthy and reliable in their dealings; brave, yes, but restless.⁶

As early as the beginning of the Spanish period, the Japanese residents in Cagayan are said to have organized themselves into an association known as the "Tayfusa" which aimed to work for the development of home industries in Cagayan. Similar Japanese associations were organized in San Miguel,

⁴ Enrique J. Corpus, "Japan and the Philippine Revolution," Philippine Social Science Review (Manila, 1934), III, 252.

⁵ Santos, loc. cit.

⁶ Fr. Juan de la Concepcion, Historia General de Filipinas (General History of the Philippines) (Manila: San Carlos Printing Press, by Agustin de la Rosa y Balagtas, 1788, 14 vols.), III, 39.

Manila; Taal, Batangas; Pagsanjan, Laguna; and if we accept Santos' statement, even as far south as Mindanao. Even at that time, the Japanese must have been impressed by the vast wealth in natural resources of the Philippines.⁷

At the time when the Spaniards were gaining their foothold in the Archipelago, the Portuguese were then masters of the Far Eastern seas. The Japanese, following the Portuguese example, brought the same goods and visited the same Oriental ports that were touched by the Portuguese. Manila became a flourishing trade center. Annually, Portuguese and Japanese vessels anchored at Manila with cargoes of flour, silk, wooden screens, arms and ammunition, wooden boxes, barrels and horses. The greater part of the Japanese cargo remained in the Philippines for home consumption: the rest was shipped by the Spanish to Mexico and by the Portuguese to India and Europe.⁸ It is hard now to judge how much was Japanese in origin and how much Chinese for the most durable Far Eastern products that remain in Europe as evidence of early trade were ceramic, and Chinese rather than Japanese. Probably tea and silk were the most important Japanese exports of sufficient value to justify the cost of shipment to distant countries.

Morga said that the Christian and non-Christian Japanese in the Philippines at the beginning of the seventeenth century

⁷ Santos, loc. cit.

⁸ A. Craig and C. Benitez, Philippine Progress Prior to 1898 (Manila: The Philippine Education Co., 1916), 46.

were less numerous than the Chinese, and that most of them were in Manila:

They remain after arriving in their ships from Japan and have established their own village or settlement outside the city, between the Parian of the Chinese and the barrio of Laguio, next to the convent of Candelaria, where they are subject to the administration of the discalced friars of the Franciscan orders. . . .

They are people of noble birth and status, notable for their ceremoniousness and courtesy; they set much store by honor and esteem; and were ready for any work. Those who are Christians are very good ones, being devout and observant of the laws of religion. . . . They number about five hundred in Manila; they do not go elsewhere in the country. However, because of their quality, they do not remain in the Philippines but return to Japan so that ordinarily there are only a few in these Islands. . . .⁹

It was not long, however, before the Spaniards changed their minds about putting implicit trust in the Japanese. As early as 1587, just sixteen years after Legaspi's occupation of Manila, some Japanese residents tried to help the Filipinos in an insurrection against Spain. Magat Salamat, son of the famed Lakandula, ruler of Tondo, and other Filipino chiefs, such as Agustin Legaspi, son-in-law of the Bornean sultan; Martin Panga, chief of Tondo, and Pedro Balingit, chief of Pandacan, plotted secretly in Tondo to overthrow Spanish domination.¹⁰

In addition to obtaining support from Cuyo Island and

⁹ Antonio de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas," Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XVI, 10. (The original edition of Morga was published at Paris: Libreria de Garnier Hermanos, 1890.)

¹⁰ Corpus, *op. cit.*, 253; Montero y Vidal in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXIV, 185-191.

Borneo, Magat Salamat looked to Japan for aid. Through a Japanese Christian, Dionisio Fernandez (Japanese as well as Filipinos were given Spanish names), he negotiated with Captain Juan Gayo, a Japanese skipper, to bring arms and ammunition from Japan. In return for their aid, the Tondo leader promised to give the Japanese the Island of Mindoro and one half of the tribute to be collected by him and his fellow rulers in the Philippines. Unfortunately for the Filipino chieftains, Governor Santiago de Vera discovered the plot and Magat Salamat with his accomplices, including the Japanese Dionisio Fernandez, were executed.¹¹

The Japanese corsair by the name of Tay Zufu, was another source of trouble for the Spaniards. Tay Zufu stationed himself at the mouth of the Cagayan River in Luzon with the intention of staying there permanently in 1591. Governor Ronquillo therefore sent Juan Pablo Carrion, who succeeded in driving him away by sinking two of his vessels. It must be noted that Cagayan had even then a Japanese population and there were natives who were more sympathetic to Tay Zufu than to the Spaniards. Carrion next pacified these natives.¹²

¹¹ Ibid.; Fr. Juan de la Concepcion, Historia General de Filipinas (Manila: San Carlos Printing Press, by Agustin de la Rosa y Balagtas, 1788), 91-92.

¹² "Letter from Penalosa to Felipe II," in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., V, 196-198; "Letter from Juan Baptista Roman to the Viceroy," ibid., V, 192-195; Fr. Juan de la Concepcion, op. cit., II, 491-498; Fr. Julian Malumbres, Historia de Cagayan (Manila: Tip. Linotype de Santo Tomas, 1918), 20-21.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, one of the strongest rulers of Japan, became interested in the Philippines during the term of office of Governor Gomez Perez Dasmaringas. He sent an ambassador to Manila demanding that the Spaniards in the Philippines become vassals and that they pay tribute to the Japanese Empire; otherwise, he threatened to overrun the Islands. To appease him, the Spaniards sent emissaries to negotiate trade agreements. The Spanish agents were hospitably received in Japan but on their return trip to the Islands, they were stranded in Formosa and were killed by the natives.¹³

In 1593, Hideyoshi renewed his demands. This time, Franciscan friars were sent to Japan with gifts for the ruler.¹⁴ The early missionary period in Japan culminated in the persecution and wholesale murder or deportation of missionaries and their converts and the exclusion of all foreigners. The wrath of the Japanese rulers was caused by their belief that foreign missionaries were forerunners of western conquerors. So far as there is any record, the exclusion of foreigners from Japan recognized no distinction whatever between Spaniards and Filipinos. Therefore, whatever influence Japan may have gained in the Philippines was lost and forgotten until Japan was

¹³ L. Gonzales Liqueste, "Filipinas y Japon," La Vanguardia (Manila), III, November 25, 1933, 6; Fr. Juan de la Concepcion, op. cit., II, 305.

¹⁴ John Harrington Gibbons, "Hideyoshi and the Satsuma Clan in the Sixteenth Century," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan (Yokohama: Japan Mail Office, 1878), VI, part I, 14; Fr. Juan de la Concepcion, op. cit., II, 223; 356-376; Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, Historia General de Filipinas (Manila: La Pilarica Press, 1916), 59.

reopened to western contact as a result of the visit of the American squadron commanded by Perry in 1853. Hideyoshi's policy of persecution of the Christians had been continued by Iyeyasu and Hidetada and the last 17th century contact between Japan and the Philippines occurred between 1609 and 1616 when about three hundred Christian Japanese were deported to the Philippines. Some of these settled at Taal, Batangas, where they intermarried with the natives. Many people of Taal are said to be descendants of these Japanese.¹⁵

The Spaniards attempted to restore diplomatic contacts in 1624 but Hidetada refused to receive the Spanish ambassador, and commercial ties between the Philippines and Japan ended in that year. Moreover, Hidetada's son, Iyemitsu, decreed the complete isolation of Japan from the world.¹⁶

Period from the Reopening of Japan to the
American Era in the Philippines

When Japan's era of modernization and westernization began in 1853, she again showed signs of interest in the Philippines. In 1875, the Japanese Emperor appointed a commission to visit the Philippines and to investigate conditions there, particularly for purposes of trade.¹⁷

¹⁵ L. Gonzales Lique, Repertorio Historico, Bibliografico y Biografico (Manila: La Vanguardia Press, 1933), 11-18.

¹⁶ Corpus, op. cit., 256.

¹⁷ Ibid.

With Japan's awakening, came the renewed realization of her supposed mission in the Far East. In 1881, the "Genyosha" or the Black Ocean Society was founded by two of the Samurai class, Mitsuru Toyoma and Kotora Kiraoka. Toyoma particularly became instrumental in contacting all centers of native unrest in the colonial areas of East Asia, hoping in this way to unite the East against the West, under Japan's leadership. This was the beginning of Japan's doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics."¹⁸

Three years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and four years before the Philippine Revolution of 1896, a two-way relationship was established between the Black Ocean Society and the Filipino revolutionists. In that year, the Japanese organization sent a representative to the Philippines to establish contact with the revolutionary elements there. Simultaneously, some Filipinos in Hongkong, Tokyo, and Yokohama, working through Japan's secret organizations, sought to enlist the aid of Japan in their struggle against Spain.¹⁹

The Sino-Japanese War of 1895 was the first step in Japan's rise to the rank of a world power. The treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended that war, was greeted by objections of Western powers to Japan's territorial gains. France, Germany, and

¹⁸ Anonymous, "General Artemio Ricarte y Vibora, A Study in Filipino Fifth Column Activity," Military Engineer (November, 1944), 366-372.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Russia presented a note to Tokyo, even before the treaty was negotiated, recommending that territories ceded to Japan on the Chinese mainland should be only temporarily occupied. Because of her weakness at that time, Japan gave in to these demands, but still maintained a position as good as that of the Western powers in their respective "spheres of influence."²⁰

At the time of the peace conference, Spain vigorously protested against Japan's acquisition of Formosa because this island was at the very gates of the Philippines, Spain's only colony in the Far East. Spain's representations were not effective for by the treaty, the Japanese acquired interests and a foothold in China equal to those of any Western nation. Nevertheless, Japan felt affronted, and a common antipathy to Spain became the basis of a heightened prestige of Japan among Filipino intellectuals. The latter, especially in insurrectionary circles, began to look to Japan for aid. To show their goodwill, they patronized Japanese products, to the extent that the undeveloped trade relations were made possible, and a few pioneering Filipino students even went to Japan for their higher education. Japan became known as a country where Filipino political agitators could seek refuge.²¹

²⁰ Corpus, op. cit., 256-257.

²¹ Ibid.

Japan and the Philippine Revolution

The nineteenth century witnessed a Philippine political awakening, brought about mainly by the infiltration of eighteenth century European liberalism, through the efforts of Filipino students abroad, among whom were Jose Rigal and Marcelo H. del Pilar.²² They did not advocate a revolution, but agitated for reforms in Spain's colonial policies. However, their teachings spurred one man, Andres Bonifacio, to organize actual resistance. He was a common laborer but well read on the French Revolution. He founded a secret revolutionary organization called the "Katipunan," the aims of which were the expulsion of the friars and Philippine Independence.²³

By 1895, the Katipunan Society was rapidly gaining in strength. Andres Bonifacio and other leaders were aware of Japan's contempt for Spain and for the West in general. They therefore decided to appoint a committee to negotiate for the purchase of arms and ammunition in Japan.²⁴ However, the arrival of the Japanese cruiser "Kongo" in the Philippines postponed the departure of the Katipunan delegates for Japan. Instead, on February 13, 1896, a delegation was sent aboard the vessel. The following agreement between the Katipuneros and the Japanese officials was concluded:

²² Fernandez, op. cit., 236-241.

²³ Ibid., 244-246.

²⁴ Corpus, op. cit., 258.

On board the Japanese cruiser "Kongo" now anchored at Cavite, this fourteenth day of February, 1896, Duke Ragu, Admiral of the cruiser Hirawa and the Japanese Consul Conorita, the first two bearing with them ample powers from the Katipunan Society, after having had a conference, hereby reduce to writing this hasty contract in terms and conditions as follows:

The Filipinos, after a hasty agreement, agreed to deliver to the Japanese consul at Manila the sum of ₱300,000 as an advance payment for the purchase of 100,000 rifles and 150 cannons of different calibers, with the corresponding ammunition. . . .²⁵

The Spanish authorities in Manila seem to have had some knowledge of these secret negotiations of the Filipino leaders. On September 20, 1896, Governor General Blanco wrote to the Marquis de la Barrera:

I have no doubt that the Japanese government is exerting every effort to show goodwill toward our government, but I note something strange which induces me not to confide absolutely in the promises of Japanese officials, nor to act in accordance therewith. The coming to Manila of a Japanese Viscount and the son of an admiral under the pretext of business, who conferred secretly with the most prominent Filipino agitators makes me presume that even if I am not aware of any agreement which might have been concluded between them, at least an understanding was established which may be dangerous to the future.²⁶

Apparently the Katipuneros, in spite of their zeal, were unable to raise the sum specified in the agreement, for they did not secure the arms. Likewise, the Japanese were possibly unwilling to make any overt move, unless certain that the insurrection would be successful. It is therefore quite positive

²⁵ Teodoro M. Kalaw, Ang Pinagtalunang Akta nang Katipunan (The Controversial Meeting of the Katipunan), Philippine Public Document No. 33 (Manila: Philippine National Library, 1930), 59.

²⁶ Corpus, op. cit., 261.

that during the revolution of 1896-1897, the Filipinos obtained practically nothing from Japan by way of help although there was more or less plotting. The Filipinos in Yokohama and Tokyo did not succeed even in acquainting the Japanese public with the issues involved.²⁷

Before complete preparations for an armed uprising could be made, the "Katipunan" Society was discovered with the result that, earlier than scheduled, hostilities had to be started. The outbreak occurred on August 26, 1896, at Balintawak, Caloocan, Rizal.²⁸ In the meantime, Jose Rizal, the intellectual leader who felt that the Filipinos were not yet ready for an armed revolution, was implicated in the "Katipunan" by his reactionary enemies and after a mock trial was executed by the Spaniards. His death stirred the embers of Philippine nationalism into a glorious flame. More Filipinos joined the Katipunan.²⁹

While the Katipunan was gaining more adherents, however, Bonifacio, its leader, partly due to his failure to get arms from Japan, met his downfall, and Emilio Aguinaldo became the acknowledged leader of the Philippine Revolution.³⁰

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Fernandez, op. cit., 248-250.

²⁹ C. E. Russell and E. B. Rodriguez, The Hero of the Filipinos (New York: The Century Co., 1923), 289-313.

³⁰ Corpus, op. cit., 261.

At this point, the Spaniards decided on a policy of reconciliation. They negotiated with the Filipino rebels the Pact of Biac-na-bato. The Spaniards offered to pay the leaders ₱800,000 (\$400,000) in return for the promise that the latter would go abroad and live in voluntary exile. There is sufficient evidence, however, that neither side agreed to the pact in good faith. Aguinaldo remained in Hongkong hoping that he could make better preparations for the resumption of hostilities against Spain, while the Spaniards refused to pay the whole sum promised by them. All the minor Filipino leaders, who of necessity stayed behind, were persecuted.³¹

While in Hongkong, Aguinaldo met a Mr. Pratt, the American Consul in Singapore, and Admiral Dewey. Aguinaldo maintained that he was assured of the independence of the Philippines by both if he and the Filipinos would join the American forces in the fight against Spain. The weakness of his contention lies in his failure to present documents to substantiate his claims, although even if he had been able to show such evidence, neither Pratt nor Dewey could have had the necessary authority to make such a promise. It is a fact, however, that Aguinaldo returned to Manila aboard an American battleship with Dewey's fleet.³²

When Aguinaldo returned to the Islands, he initiated a

³¹ Fernandez, op. cit., 256.

³² Barrows, David Prescott, History of the Philippines (New York: Yonkers on the Hudson, World Book Co., 1925), 265.

Philippine Revolutionary government which was superseded by the Philippine Republic. The revolutionary leaders at this time saw the need of sending Philippine delegations abroad to present the case of the Filipino people and to gain sympathy for their cause. To achieve this end, the Hongkong Junta, composed of prominent Filipinos then residing in Hongkong, temporarily discharged the duties of a foreign office. By June 17, 1898, Mariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco were dispatched to Japan with instructions to find out whether or not the Mikado would intervene with America in the Philippine independence question and to solicit the armed intervention of Japan if the necessity arose.³³

In the meantime, the Japanese government appointed a commission headed by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura to deal with Philippine Affairs. Two of the members of this commission were sent to Manila to have a talk with General Aguinaldo. They informed him of the availability of 200,000 Japanese rifles which were not used during the Sino-Japanese war, and they offered to recommend to the proper Japanese authorities the advisability of lending them to the Filipino revolutionists. They also agreed to discuss the matter with Vice-Minister Komura himself.³⁴

³³ Letter of Felipe Agoncillo on June 17, 1898, Translations of Official Documents between the Philippine Insurgents (Manila: Division of the U. S. Military Information, January 4, 1901), 14. Now with the Worcester Collection, University of Michigan.

³⁴ Corpus, op. cit.

On June 23, 1898, a department of Foreign Relations was created by the Philippine Republic and on January 2, 1899, with the appointment of Apolinario Mabini as secretary of the department of Foreign Relations, Mariano Ponce, the veteran Filipino propagandist, was officially appointed as the diplomatic agent to Japan.³⁵

The day after the arrival of the Philippine delegates in Tokyo, on June 30, 1898, a new coalition cabinet assumed office in Japan. The Shimpoto (Progressive) party and the Jiyuto (Liberal) party headed by Counts Okuma and Itagaki respectively, assumed control of the new cabinet. This meant a delay in the plans of Ponce and Lichauco although the parties in power were also interested in the Philippines. For instance, Count Okuma was a believer in unification of the Asiatics, and he was also an avowed Filipino sympathizer.³⁶

Ponce and Lichauco were therefore unable to report to the Hongkong Junta until July 30, 1898, after talking with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs at Yokohama. The latter confirmed the availability of 200,000 Japanese rifles and he also assured them of Japan's desire to aid the revolutionary leaders secretly. But these assurances were not given to the Filipino delegates without warning them that the Americans

³⁵ "Cartas Sobre la Revolucion de Mariano Ponce, 1897-98" (Letters Concerning the Revolution of Mariano Ponce, 1897-98) (Manila: Philippine National Library, MSS, 1933).

³⁶ Corpus, op. cit., 278.

were already considering the retention of the Philippines.³⁷ This information and the advice of a Japanese admiral to the members of the Junta in Hongkong to take Manila at all costs before the Americans took that city, were all sent to Aguinaldo's headquarters.³⁸

Even though Ponce was an officially accredited diplomatic agent of the Philippine Republic, he did not negotiate in this capacity but still presented himself as a mere friend of Japan and a private citizen of the Philippines. In fact, Japan had not granted recognition to the Philippine Republic, and under the circumstances, was afraid to do so, being unwilling to risk defeat if she should sponsor the loser. Moreover, Japan never officially or publicly recognized Ponce because she did not feel quite ready to fight another war so soon after the Sino-Japanese war during which she incurred a thirty million yen deficit. Japan's later decision not to lend the 200,000 rifles to the Filipinos can be ascribed to the desire to keep her skirts clear regardless of where her interests and sympathies were. Although Ponce was not officially recognized, he was permitted to remain and negotiate with the Japanese statesmen and militarists. In his contacts with the Japanese officials, he did not fail to point out his belief

³⁷ Letter of Felipe Agoncillo from Hongkong, China, dated July 20, 1898, in Translations . . ., op. cit., 28-29.

³⁸ Letter of Teodoro Sandico to Emilio Aguinaldo from Hongkong (no date), in Translations . . ., ibid., 28-29.

that the Japanese and the Filipinos belonged to the same racial stock in order to gain Japan's aid and friendship.³⁹

Ponce discovered after a short stay in Japan that practically all public officials and important Japanese newspapers favored Philippine independence. Among the influential friends of the Philippine cause were Count Okuma, Marquis Ito, Inagaki Manjeiro, Baron Kato, Messrs. Ariga, Hoshi, Yamagata, and Foujita.⁴⁰ Inagaki Manjeiro was the Japanese Minister to Siam, an authority on Oriental questions and a devotee of the theory of racial homogeneity of Orientals. As already stated, Count Okuma was the leader of the Progressive party in Japan. Marquis Ito, later Prince Ito, was the framer of the Japanese constitution. Ariga, Hoshi, and Baron Kato were diplomats. Mr. Yamagata was a publisher of the Yorodzu Choho, and Colonel Fukushima was a member of the commission on the Philippines, an authority on military questions and a tutor of the Japanese prince.⁴¹

In the summer of 1898, when America had not yet formulated a definite policy regarding the Philippines, Japan would have preferred for her to retain the Archipelago rather than permit it to fall into the hands of the Germans or the Russians. But when the protocol of 1898 was received in Japan, the Japanese

³⁹ Corpus, op. cit., 279.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 280.

⁴¹ Ibid.

officials expressed strong opposition to American annexation of the Philippines. The Shimpoto party, headed by Count Okuma, strongly criticized the proposal of leaving the decision of the Philippine question only to belligerents without consulting Japan. However, the only official Japanese move was the presentation by Mr. Hoshi, Japan's Ambassador to Washington, D. C. then, of a protest against the possible occupation of the Philippines by the United States. Mr. Hoshi also went home to Japan to campaign for the sending of delegates to the Paris Conference.⁴²

Influential Japanese newspapers which were friendly to the Philippine cause included the Fiji Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, China Shimbun, Inodzu Choho, Nichi Nichi, Japan Daily Mail, Japan Daily Advertiser, Hochi Shimbun, Nippon, and Keikwa Nippon. Other lesser newspapers favored Philippine Independence.⁴² The Japan Daily Mail had this to say on November 7, 1898:

The time has come when Japan should form a definite resolution about the Philippines and make her voice heard distinctly. America's procedure is by no means in strict conformity with the dictates of right. The relations of amity that exist between Japan and the United States are not different from those which exist between Japan and Spain. It does not become a great power to take advantage of the state of exhaustion to which another country has been reduced by the long war that the former fomented. America's demands for the cession of the whole Archipelago can not be reconciled with the principles of international morality. From the point of view of material interest also there is much to be said. If the Philippines become an American territory, Japan will have to undertake an extensive campaign of fortification in Formosa. Moreover, her trade with China and America will be injuriously

⁴² Ibid.

affected. In the third place, a formidable competitor will be introduced into the field of maritime enterprise which is sure to be opened between Japan and Russia after the completion of the Siberian railway. Fourthly, points of contact and therefore of possible collision between this country and America will be increased. And lastly, Japan's natural expansion in a southerly direction will be checked. None of these advances would be felt if Spain remained in possession of the Philippines.⁴³

This quotation affords an early example of the unargued assumption on the part of the Japanese that their country had a manifest destiny to expand southward. The mere repetition of such assumptions through the years was propaganda of the strongest sort for establishing Japan's position in the minds of all interested persons, at home and abroad, and it must be admitted that such propaganda became more and more effective the longer it was not actively combatted.

An interesting editorial was also published by Yorodzu Choho, official organ of Marquis Ito on the "Glorious Victory" of Admiral Dewey:

It was divine providence, as Admiral Dewey believed and also every God-fearing people does, that he and his men escaped unhurt. While loss on the side of the Spaniards was so heavy, will not the immortal declaration of their forefathers, that all men are created equal, and contrary to their promise that they do not fight for territorial aggrandizement, they wish to annex the Philippines and make slaves of their inhabitants. The Filipinos are in every way fitted to govern themselves and they crave independence at the risk of their lives, whereas America, turning a deaf ear to all their protests and supplications seeks to establish her rule over them, and when they refuse to obey, slaughters them by the thousands. In fact the Americans

⁴³ Walter Mills, The Martial Spirit, A Study of Our War with Spain (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), 173-193.

are repeating what Spain did towards the poor Filipinos. It is even said that the American rule is worse than that of the Spaniards. Time will surely come, if Americans will not change their behavior, then they will be severely punished by God as Spain was last year.⁴⁴

Civic and scientific organizations and clubs were also at this time in favor of Philippine Independence. We have already discussed the founding of the Black Ocean Society, which was later known as the Black Dragon Society, and why Japan's purpose of uniting the East required the driving away of Western powers from the Philippines. There were also the "Tavokiokay Club" (Oriental Question Discussion Group) which advocated the doctrine of "Asia for the Asiatics." In this organization, Mariano Ponce and Galicano Apacible became members. The "Keisaizashi Kiokai" (Economic Society) also favored Philippine Independence.⁴⁵

In spite of the caution exhibited by Japanese authorities in showing their sympathies for the Filipino insurgents in more concrete terms, the latter still looked to Japan for their source of arms and ammunition. Failing to obtain the 200,000 rifles promised them by the government, they contacted private dealers. The available arms most acceptable to the revolutionists were the light Murata rifles because they could be easily handled by the Filipinos. So Ponce wrote Mabini:

The Murata (kind of Japanese rifle) whose system is not new to our people and with which the Japanese covered

⁴⁴ Yorodzu Choho (Tokyo), December 15, 1899, as quoted by Corpus, op. cit., 284.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 282-285.

themselves with glory in their war with China cost about P10.00 (\$5.00) each. . . .

P.S.--We think that the matter is sure since the man who made arrangements with us secretly is a well known Colonel of the General Staff, Mr. Y. Fukushima, who receives instructions from his government concerning this matter. . . .⁴⁶

This traffic in arms must have had the unofficial approval of the Japanese Minister of War. The Japanese government officials even recommended to the Filipinos the factories from which the Murata rifles could be bought. Moreover, Mr. Suzuki, a businessman of Osaka and a friend of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aoki, offered to charter a vessel for the shipment of the ammunition to the Islands. At this juncture, however, the Philippine-American hostilities broke out openly and to avoid further complications with America, even these negotiations were suspended.⁴⁷

During the recent Japanese occupation of the Philippines the following passage was published in Manila as pro-Japanese propaganda. There is intrinsic evidence that it may be a genuine quotation from some acceptable source contemporary with the Philippine Insurrection, although the writer could not trace it, and can only quote it from the pro-Japanese propagandists, Jose P. Santos.⁴⁸ The following conversation

⁴⁶ Letter of Mariano Ponce to Apolinario Mabini from Yokohama, Japan dated September 16, 1898, Translations . . ., op. cit., 49.

⁴⁷ Letter of Mariano Ponce to Apacible from Yokohama, Japan dated December 1, 1898, Translations . . ., 56.

⁴⁸ Jose P. Santos, "The Japanese Helped the Filipinos in the Revolution," The Sunday Tribune (Manila), March 14, 1943, 5.

between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aoki, and General Kawakami was said to have occurred on the purchase of arms:

Aoki: The United States has filed a strong representation with the Japanese government requiring it to withhold absolutely its support from the Philippine Independence Army. How are you going to supply, though indirectly, the Philippine Army with arms and ammunition? Does the Army General Staff intend to destroy the guiding principle of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States?

General Kawakami: How can we remain idle spectators, when Islands in East Asia are falling preys of "tigers and wolves" in the guise of gentlemen? Japan at present is not strong enough to meet Western powers. . . . We regret that we can not aid the Philippine Independent Army except with arms and ammunition. Japan must have strength so as to meet a combination of two or three western powers in the future. It is extremely regrettable that Japan has not as yet attained such a stage of development.⁴⁸

It is a fact, however, that General Kawakami caused a quantity of arms to be sold to Okkura and Company, who in turn sold the consignment to the German merchant Weinberger.⁴⁹ To transport these arms, it was proposed that the Philippine Revolutionary government buy a vessel engaged in coastwise trade, which would touch Formosa. From this island, the ship could easily make incursions into Philippine waters.⁵⁰

The boat which was chartered by Ponce was the "Nonubiki Maru" which had a capacity of 1441 tons. Since the Hongkong Junta did not favor the purchase of a vessel, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the man destined to be the first President of the Chinese Republic, and a friend of Ponce, convinced one of his countrymen,

⁴⁹ Corpus, op. cit., 290.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

a Mr. Wan Chi, to buy the "Nonubiki Maru" in partnership with Mr. Yaroku Nakamura.⁵¹ Yoshitaro Nagano, a Japanese officer who had served under Aguinaldo, and Manuel Parigonog, a Filipino, supervised the purchase of arms and the fitting out of the expedition.⁵²

The boat was loaded with six million rounds of ammunition, ten thousand Murata rifles, one fixed cannon, ten field guns, seven field glasses, one pressing machine for gunpowder, and one machine for the manufacture of ammunition, and left Moji, Japan on July 19, 1899.⁵³ Between Shanghai and Formosa, a typhoon sank it. The customs authorities at Kobe who investigated the disaster reported that the boat had carried arms and ammunition but the Japanese government took no notice of the incident.⁵⁴

An investigation was also conducted by the Committee of the Revolutionary Government composed of Isidoro de Santos, Francisco Rivero, and Mariano Ponce.⁵⁵

On board the vessel were Yoshitaro Nagano, the Japanese officer who had helped outfit the vessel, Mr. Hayashi, editor and proprietor of the Nippon Times, Captain Kasakichi Mitzumachi,

⁵¹ Ibid., 291.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 291-292.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 292.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Shinobu Matsuda, and five other Japanese who were all on their way to enlist in General Aguinaldo's army.⁵⁶

After this disaster, it was proposed that another shipment of arms be undertaken. General Aguinaldo set aside 200,000 pesos (\$100,000) for the purpose. The vessel sailed from Japan via Formosa in January, 1900, but because of the vigilance of the Americans, the goods had to be unloaded at Formosa. Meanwhile the insurrection had subsided and the arms were "borrowed" by the Chinese revolutionists.⁵⁷

The Japanese government also aided the Philippine Revolutionary Army by permitting its officers to join the latter. In 1898 Captain Tokisawa was sent to observe local conditions in the Philippines. Upon his return to Japan in November, 1898, he reported that although the Filipinos were excellent fighters, they lacked precision and training in the more complex tactical maneuvers. Their discipline was lax and their strategy was unscientific.⁵⁸ High ranking Japanese military officials therefore advised Ponce of the advantage of having Japanese officers help train the Philippine Army. They offered a list of "retired" Japanese officers who would be available to perform these services. Colonel Fukushima indicated that,

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Letter of Mariano Ponce to Mariano Apacible, from Yokohama, Tokyo, dated March 21, 1898, Translations . . ., op. cit., 97-98.

⁵⁸ Corpus, op. cit., 294-295.

upon the request of the Revolutionary government, Colonel Tokisawa would retire to serve on the staff of General Aguinaldo.⁵⁹ Among the Japanese officers who volunteered their services were Captains Nagano and Hara; Lts. Asajiro Inatomi, Shintetsu Nishiuchi, Sakuro Nakamori, and Kesakicho Mitsumachi and Sgts. Keizo Miyao and Shinobu Matsuda. Some of these officers were captured by the Americans.⁵⁹

A publisher, Mr. Yamagata, offered to raise a volunteer force to serve in the Philippines, but this generous proposal was rejected by Aguinaldo for lack of funds.⁶⁰

During the recent Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Japanese controlled Manila newspapers contained magazine articles supposedly based on interviews between General Aguinaldo and certain Japanese officers who came to aid the cause of the Filipinos during the Philippine-American hostilities. The statements are apparently true as General Aguinaldo has never denied them after the Islands' liberation. In an interview with Colonel Hirayama and Captain Harai, he was reported to have said:

I have hitherto regarded the Western men as of a superior race but I have been deceived by the Spanish government and now I am again taken in, this time by Admiral Dewey. . . and his men. I will absolutely never trust Occidentals in the future. On the contrary, I mean to fight against them as our common enemy. . . .⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Manila Tribune, July 24, 1943, 1.

To Captains Hara and Hayashi, who reported to him at Tarlac, General Aguinaldo was supposed to have said:

I can never again have faith in the white race. How many times have they betrayed and deceived us. In the future it must be we, brother Orientals, who should see to the solutions of our own problems.⁶²

To which Captain Hara, who at this early stage was convinced of the justice of the cause of the Asiatics, was said to have answered:

They, the whites, are at present dominating the Asiatics; universal justice is weighed in the balance of might. Under such circumstances, there is no hope for peace in the East and that is why we are here today; to unite and join forces with the Filipinos.⁶³

Thus it is evident that the Japanese sympathized with the Filipinos in their aspirations for independence and were willing during the whole period of the Philippine Revolution to give unofficial but substantial assistance to the Filipinos. It even came to light from papers captured by the Americans from General Aguinaldo's pack train that a Japanese observer accredited to the American Army violated his moral obligations by acting as a contact man between the Filipino insurrectionaries and the Japanese.⁶⁴

The doctrine of Asia for the Asiatics, though just then an ideal, was beginning to be propagandized by the Japanese and was already a serious threat to the Americans and to the

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Translations . . . , op. cit.

white peoples in the Far East at this early date. It is interesting, again, to quote this Pan-Oriental propaganda not from a source contemporary with the events, but from material supplied by the Japanese to the pro-Nipponese Filipino propagandists during the recent Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

CHAPTER III

JAPANESE COMMERCIAL PENETRATION AND PROPAGANDA:

BACKGROUND FOR INVASION AND OCCUPATION

Americans Play Into The Hands of Japanese Propagandists

As the Americans and Filipinos became better adjusted to one another during the early years of the American occupation, the Philippines became increasingly a less fertile field for anti-Western propaganda. The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war, favorable to Japan, and the openly pro-Japanese attitude of the American public, together with the treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan, stilled for a time the open antagonism of reactionary elements in Japan to the Western powers.

Japan's attempted aid to the Philippines during the Revolution had come to light and was well known to American military authorities, but was given no publicity in the United States, since it was ineffective and did not alter the course of events. America decided to retain the Philippines. But there were some Filipino leaders who could not reconcile themselves to a second western power taking charge of the destiny of their country. They had no faith in the West, for the wounds of Spain's recent injustices were still unhealed. And America's colonial altruism was then but an unproved claim, in spite of President McKinley's classical instructions to the second Philippine Commission. The subsequent good points

in America's colonial policy, therefore, were lost to these men; they were only waiting and hoping for the time when Japan would strike and liberate the Islands. Among them was General Artemio V. Ricarte.

It is not definitely known when or how General Ricarte first made his contacts with the Japanese. Perhaps he met some of the Japanese officers who went in a private capacity to fight on the side of the Filipinos during the Revolution. When the Filipino armed resistance to America ended, the conquered leaders were made to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. General Ricarte refused to take it and because of this, was exiled to Guam.¹ In 1903, Ricarte clandestinely made his way back to Manila. Minor uprisings in Ilocos Sur and Zambales followed his return to the Islands, which led to his imprisonment as an instigator of rebellion and to his second exile. The following year found Ricarte in Hongkong. Still his revolutionary efforts continued. He kept sending secret messages and dispatching commissions to his followers in the Archipelago. From Hongkong he transferred his headquarters to Yokohama, Japan. His last efforts at insurrection brought about the short-lived and unimportant 1914 Christmas Eve Revellion in Manila.² Ricarte was, at this time,

¹ Anonymous, "General Artemio Ricarte y Vibora, A Study in Filipino Fifth Column Activity," Military Engineer (November, 1944), 366-372; Artemio Ricarte Vivora, Himagsikan Nang Manga Filipino Laban Sa Kastila (Fierce Struggle of the Filipinos against the Spaniards) (Yokohama, Japan: 1927), XXI-XXXIII.

² Ibid.

determined that he would never again set foot on Philippine soil until the Philippines regained its independence. Poverty was his lot during all his life in exile. But the firmness of his conviction never seems to have wavered. There was little doubt that by 1935, Ricarte had become an intimate associate of the Black Dragon Society. Ricarte and his type of Filipino patriot became the pawns of ambitious Japan.³

We have already discussed America's great contribution to the development of the Filipino nation during her rule of forty-two years in the Islands. But along with the introduction of the American system of education, the betterment of health conditions, the improvement in the standard of living of the masses, universal suffrage, greater Filipino participation in the government and above all, the promise of independence, there was contradictions in her intentions and policies. These became causes of dissatisfaction among some Filipinos. And Japan knew about these (as we will discuss later) and even during the American rule of the Islands, attempted to enlarge on them and to point them out to the Filipinos.

The very acquisition of the Philippines by America is a prime example of such contradiction and conflict of thought and purpose. According to her most upright leaders, it was "manifest destiny" which brought the United States and the Philippines together; and having once liberated the Islands,

³ Ibid.

notwithstanding the fact that colonization was farthest from her mind, the United States deemed it her sacred duty to keep them, for the sole and worthy purpose of educating and uplifting them.⁴ However, how much selfishness actually motivated such seemingly lofty and unselfish intentions, no one can say. Suffice it to note that not a few Americans, notably the then Under-Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, believed that America could find her rightful place among the world powers only by colonizing, as their brothers, the British had done. It was Roosevelt who ordered Dewey to proceed to Manila.⁵

The need for economic expansion of an America just embarking on a career of industrialization was another potent reason why pressure could have been made to bear upon the policymakers of the nation by small but powerful interests. The potentialities of the Islands as an outlet for American products, as well as the vast wealth of the country in raw materials could scarcely have been overlooked by American industrialists and businessmen.⁶ In due course of time,

⁴ Alfredo T. Morales, "The Influence of American Literature on Filipino Democracy," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of English, University of Michigan, 1946), 246-250.

⁵ Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (2nd ed., New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1942), 513-514; Captain J. M. Ellicott, "Under a Gallant Captain at Manila in '98," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1943, 34-35.

⁶ Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times (2d ed., New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1941), 153.

American machinery and manufactured goods started flooding the Archipelago, while large American corporations bought or leased extensive tracts of Philippine public lands for exploitation.⁷ Although this was at first welcomed by the Filipinos, as America's economic grip began to tighten, they started to question the avowed altruistic intentions of the United States.⁸

Another instance of the triumph of American capital on policy questions of the United States was the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which promised independence to the Philippines in 1946, and provided for a period of transition during which American goods could enter the Islands free of duty, while Philippine goods entering the United States would be subjected to a graduated tariff schedule. That the passage of this bill was largely the result of strong lobbying on the part of American labor and American sugar-beet interests cannot be denied.⁹

Even in the field of education, where American contribution to Philippine progress was admittedly the greatest, there was at first the same conflict of ideas and ideals.

⁷ Morales, op. cit., 425-426.

⁸ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Speech of Manuel Quezon on May 1, 1912 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1912), XLVIII, 5701.

⁹ Morales, op. cit.; Compilation of Documents Relating to the Inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, House Document No. 44, 74th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1935); The United States-Philippine Trade--with Special Reference to the Independence Act and Other Recent Legislation (Washington, D. C.: The U. S. Tariff Commission's Report No. 118, second series, 1937).

There were those Americans, colonists and imperialists at heart, who insisted that education in the Philippines take the form of vocational rather than academic training. Their object was to have a source of cheap and efficient labor for the exploitation of the Philippines. Fortunately, there were more of the unselfish and altruistic Americans to over-rule these base materialists.¹⁰

The conflict of ideas invaded all aspects of the American occupation. The question of racism was no exception, and was by no means one of trifling nature. Concerning this, James Leroy had this to say:

. . . only instances for which I can personally vouch will be employed. . . . In general . . . the attitude of the army women in the Islands is typified by that one in Manila, who in discussing affairs in the first call of the wife of a member of the commission, exclaimed in horror: 'why surely you do not propose to visit these people [the Filipinos] and invite them to your own home just the same as you would white people. . . .

An instance of this attitude was the attempt to exclude from the Women's Hospital-at Manila (founded by a donation of Mrs. Whitelaw Reid) all Filipino patients, as well as to keep off the list of patronesses the names of Filipino women. About the same time, the board of ladies to whose energy the American library of Manila was due, asked to have it made a public library, to be helped out by friends from the Philippine Treasury, and made very strenuous protests against having it also thrown open to Filipinos for a share in its management and use. They contend that it had been established as a monument to American soldiers who lost their lives in the Philippines and it was unfitting that Filipinos should have anything to do with it though Philippine taxes might support it.¹¹

¹⁰ Report of the United States Philippine Commission, 1913 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), Part I, 694-791.

¹¹ James A. Leroy, "Race Prejudice in the Philippines," The Atlantic Monthly, XLV (July, 1902), 100-112.

Another example of race prejudice cited by Le Roy was the following incident:

The writer was one of a group of American civilians halted in the street of a Philippine town by an ugly sentinel and ordered in gruff terms at bayonet's point, to salute a minute American flag on top of a fifty feet pole. Not one, of course, had seen it. The pole had purposely been set some hundreds of feet from the barracks almost in the street itself and the order was enforced against everyone who passed. A protest to the officer in command, a grey-haired captain, brought the reply that he was teaching the niggers a lesson. . . .¹²

After citing these examples, Le Roy concludes:

We do not make enemies for ourselves half as much by the occasional administration of the water cure or other forms of torture and barbarity as by the studied attitudes of contempt, an assumption of racial and undivided superiority and the constant disregard of their petty personal rights and of the little amenities which count so much with them.¹³

All throughout the American occupation of the Islands there were some exclusive clubs in Manila, such as the Elks Club, which accepted only white patrons. Some of these clubs really recruited socially and culturally inferior Americans, but how was a Filipino to know that? As late as 1941, Florence Horn reported after a trip to the Philippines that race prejudice was strong in Manila. She states:

Limited in their general knowledge of the people through their houseboy or chauffeur, the American woman's everlasting preoccupation with these Filipino servants builds itself up into a contempt for the people that almost reaches fear.¹⁴

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Florence Horn, Orphans of the Pacific (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), 91.

And the very night before Pearl Harbor, Clark Lee, an American correspondent, witnessed at the Manila Hotel an American drunkenly insulting a policeman whose corpse Lee was to find among the slain Filipinos at Bataan.¹⁵

In the United States, the immigration law classified the Filipinos with other undesirable Orientals, and Filipino laborers could not get into the United States in excess of a certain small quota.¹⁶ They were also the victims of mob violence. From 1928 to 1930, a series of riots against Filipinos occurred in the states of Washington, Oregon, and California. The rioters were lightly punished. Fermin Tobera, a Filipino killed in one of these riots, was called the "Martyr of American Intolerance" and a "National Humiliation Day" was designated in Manila in his memory. A public funeral at the expense of the Philippine government was attended by ten thousand Filipinos.¹⁷ Such incidents laid the Americans open to attack through the pan-Oriental counter-propaganda which was equally based upon race prejudice.

The Philippine Commonwealth period which began in 1935 to prepare the Filipinos for independence by granting them all

¹⁵ Clark Lee, They Call It Pacific (New York: Viking Press, 1943), 50.

¹⁶ Filipinos in the United States, House Document 622, 74th Congress, first session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1935), 5.

¹⁷ Carey McWilliams, Brothers Under the Skin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 224-254.

kinds of governmental autonomy consistent with American sovereignty was also characterized by personal conflicts and jealousies between the elected Filipino President and the American High Commissioner to the Islands over their respective authorities and prerogatives. It was the American High Commissioner's duty to protect the prestige of the United States in the Islands but not to meddle in purely Philippine affairs. The fact that the Philippine President, Mr. Quezon, thought that the Commissioner overstepped his bounds time and again resulted in conflicts. By October, 1941, the Filipino executive and Mr. Sayre could not agree on what to do to solve the problem of preparing the Islands for the impending Japanese invasion.¹⁸ Quezon told one of the advisers of the American Commissioner:

I know that the international situation demands action and I know that if war were to break out today, we would be in one hell of a shape. If I had my way, I would have had air raid shelters all over the city long before this and I would be in a position to tell the Japanese they could damn well attack. When Mr. Sayre brought to me the recommendation which he wanted to put into action, I was all for the grant of power, to put those recommendations into force. What happened? Instead of getting my cooperation and support, I was told that I was trying to be a dictator and letters went to President Roosevelt which suggested, in effect, that my powers should be carefully limited. I did not care if these powers were granted to me by the legislature, by the American Congress, or if I just assumed them. The fact of the matter is, I wanted something done and I started about doing it. I can not understand the mentality of a man who would oppose me in these circumstances. His judgment must be bad and based upon the advice of reactionaries. The trouble with your philosophy

¹⁸ "The Pain of Manuel Quezon," in the National Affairs Section, Time, December 8, 1941, XXXVIII, No. 23, 1.

is that you are guided by the philosophy and personnel which is a hangover from G. G. (Governor-General) days and you are not willing to admit changes which have taken place. . . .

There is no question about the loyalty of me or my government to the United States. We never worry or quibble about the position of the American flag and the Filipino flag and I don't care a thing about my rank as compared with the rank of the High Commissioner. I came from the lowest classes. I was never meant to be a king and I am happiest when I can sit around a poker table talking freely and frankly with men in shirt sleeves. . . . Now, of course, he is the representative of the United States President but that does not mean that he is the government of these Islands. He can not interfere in the government nor can the President of the United States except in accordance with the constitution. The constitution defines my rights and privileges and I am President because the people have elected me. I was born a man and not a slave. . . . Nobody will ever make a rubber stamp out of me. It is a ridiculous theory to believe that a foreigner has our interest at heart more than I have. No matter how much Mr. Sayre or any other High Commissioner tries to understand my people, he can never have the same understanding that I have because I am one of us and my people must take into consideration those who are my own flesh and blood and when I receive a grant of power, you can be sure that I shall use that power in the greater service of my own people.¹⁹

Mr. Sayre's suggestion that a military government be established in the Islands to better prepare the country against Japan's attack brought the following comment from President Quezon:

. . . Sayre dropped a hint when he called to offer me congratulations on my birthday. He said something about a military governor for the Islands and gave me the idea that in the event of war, a military government would be established. . . .

. . . My God, a military government. That's what you give a conquered people or a nation which is fighting

¹⁹ Report of an Adviser to the American High Commissioner, dated October 13, 1941 (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

against you. It's not the way you treat a government which offers you a 100% cooperation and turns over its whole fighting force to America's command. I tell you this much, that if they ever displace my government and set up a military government, on that day, I will resign and with me I will take the five thousand municipal mayors who are my personal men; and by God, there will be chaos here. The idea of a military governor is simply preposterous and I would call the whole business to the attention of President Roosevelt if he did not have enough worries of his own already. . . . America could not possibly run the place unless they put a garrison and a civil officer in every locality in the Philippines, and they would never get cooperation if they treated Filipinos in a ridiculous way. . . . If Japan were to invade the Islands and be at the gates of Manila, that would be one thing and I would see the reason for military intervention or if there should be absolute breakdown of law and order, provision should be made for intervention, but falling short of these two considerations: (1) actual invasion and (2) complete break-up of civil government, it is absolutely not imaginable to set up a military government. . . .²⁰

Even these personal differences between Mr. Quezon and Mr. Sayre were known to Mr. Yoshida, the Japanese consul in Manila. In June, 1940, he informed the late Philippine President that he was ignoring Mr. Sayre's personal opinion on foreign affairs but was seeking the advice and cooperation of the Philippine President. By doing so, Yoshida thought he could gain the confidence and friendship of Mr. Quezon. It was very fortunate that the Philippine President knew the real issues that would be at stake in the approaching Pacific war.²¹

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Report of a Military Intelligence Officer dated June 26, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

Japan Feels for Openings in the Philippines

Now that we have discussed the foci of differences between Americans and Filipinos during the rule of the United States in the Archipelago, we shall next turn to Japan's systematic plan to attract the Filipinos to her side, with the hope of turning them against America. This plan was executed by first gaining a foothold in the Islands through economic penetration. Incessant propaganda campaigns were carried on and the Japanese engaged constantly in subversive activities.

In the early days of Japanese economic penetration, it was quite easy for the Japanese to make headway by pointing out the fact that they were not taking retail business away from Filipinos, who in the main, were not shopkeepers, but, on the contrary were competing with the Chinese, who to a large extent controlled retail business. Success of the Japanese in retailing did not, however, enable them to undertake compact colonization. The latter started at Davao and was in 1941 beginning to spread beyond it.

In 1903, one thousand five hundred Japanese coolies were employed in the construction of the highway leading to the mountain resort of Baguio in northern Luzon. When their work was finished in 1904, these Japanese became unemployed and some of them returned to Japan, but one hundred and fifty, under Kyosaburo S. Ohta, a foreman, went to Davao after hearing of the desperate need for capable laborers on American

hemp and coconut plantations. These men found the volcanic soil of Davao very fertile and the climate agreeable. They therefore took up public landholdings and combined their savings to form agricultural corporations.²² The first important corporation, the Ohta Development Company, was founded in 1907. This corporation made use of artificial irrigation and also established an agricultural experimental station.²³ Other Japanese corporations followed such as the Catalunan Agricultural Company, the South Mindanao Development Company, Mintal Plantation, Furukawa Plantation, Bato Plantation, and the Riverside Plantation.²⁴

World War I gave the Manila hemp (abaca) industry its greatest prosperity. By 1915, the hemp prices were skyrocketing and boom days came to Davao, where the finest abaca fiber was most cheaply produced. Ohta died in 1917 at the early age of forty-two, after some forty companies had already been formed under his leadership.²⁵ It was, however, in the period between 1917-1919 that Japanese capital poured into Davao like

²² Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), 712; "Japan and the South Seas," Japanese Geography (Tokyo: 1931), IV, 156.

²³ Karl Maussner, "Economic Advance of the Japanese in the Philippines as seen in Germany," Strausburger Neueste Nachrichten, June 26, 1942, sent to the War Department, Washington, D. C., by the Consul General of Basel, Switzerland.

²⁴ Report of an American Military Intelligence Agent, October 30, 1939 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

²⁵ Hayden, op. cit., 717.

water. Americans sold their landholdings to the Japanese. By 1919, the sixty Japanese companies were employing ten thousand laborers.²⁶

The crash in the abaca market, however, came in 1923 with the result that only 2,700 Japanese remained in Davao and their corporations decreased from sixty to forty-one. It was during this crash that the Bank of Formosa and other Japanese governmental agencies were called upon to save Japanese investments in Davao. These years, moreover, saw the beginning of the systematic campaign to Japanize Davao. For the first time, American intelligence men also came across Japanese spies in the garb of laborers.²⁷

By 1935, 80 percent of the abaca production of Davao was in the hands of the Japanese. This was 48 percent of the total production of the Philippines. In that year, the total hemp investment of the Japanese was valued at ₱8,840,000 (\$4,420,000) and this figure must have quadrupled by 1941.²⁸

Some justified Japan's control of the Davao hemp by stating that if the Japanese had given up hope and abandoned the hemp plantations as some people wished they had, there would have been no hemp industry in Davao by 1941, because the American and Filipino planters turned to coconuts and

²⁶ Op. cit.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Atsuhiko Kimura, Taiheiyo (Pacific) (Tokyo), November, 1941, an extract (Washington, D. C.: War Department files).

other crops. To prove that the Filipinos and Americans had no initiative, the pro-Japanese propagandists pointed out that the best land in Mindanao, lying on the Gulf of Davao and on the boundary line of Agusan, was still waiting to be cultivated.²⁹

Aside from hemp, the Japanese in Davao raised copra, roselle, and kapok.³⁰ Their plantations formed a compact industrial colony which became the scene of Japanese military preparations prior to their military conquest of the Islands. For example, the Furukawa Plantation Company installed an electrical plant near the seashore at Dalian, Davao, with a concrete wharf and rails from the wharf to the plantation. This was later converted for war purposes.³¹

Aside from Davao there was only one other beginning of compact agricultural colonization by the Japanese.

In Baguio, about seventy Japanese families were engaged in truck farming and they supplied about 50 percent of the vegetable demand of Manila by 1941.³² At the same place, the Japanese had begun to organize the production and sale of such

²⁹ The Japanese in Davao (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

³⁰ P. J. Pelzer, "How Japan Obtained Philippine Foothold," Baltimore Sun, December 14, 1941, 4.

³¹ Letter to a Major General of the U. S. Army dated September 7, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

³² Kimura, op. cit.

tourist curios as wood carvings.

Another industry to which the Japanese devoted themselves in the Philippines was fishing. This activity was first started in 1905 by a few Japanese whose original intentions apparently were to engage in agriculture. However, they soon turned to fishing upon discovering that it was more lucrative and that there was no competition in the field of deep-sea fishing. Starting with sailboats and junks, they soon expanded their business by the use of motorboats. By 1930, there were sixty-four Japanese-owned fishing boats operating around Manila Bay and thirty-six in the Gulf of Davao. Some four hundred known Japanese participated in the industry, in which about ₱500,000 (\$250,000) was invested.³³ The Japanese thus attained a monopoly of deep-sea fishing in Philippine waters, for Filipinos, in the main, continued to confine their fishing to shallower waters and relied more on the in-shore traps, nets, and lines of their ancestors.³⁴

The Japanese control of Philippine fishing led to the passage of an act by the Philippine legislature of 1930 requiring that no fishing boat would be licensed the ownership of which was not at least 60 percent Filipino or American, and further requiring that all but a small proportion of the crew of such vessels be Philippine citizens.³⁵

³³ Hayden, op. cit., 156.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

This law was circumvented by the Japanese by the use of dummy Filipino stockholders. It was said that although the "Philippine Sea Foods Corporation" and the "South Sea Marine Products Association" had Filipino stockholders to make them legal, these corporations were really financed by the Ohta Development Company of Manila, Zamboanga, and Davao.³⁶ Japanese businessmen, especially those in the fishing industry, became so influential that they succeeded in recruiting dummy stockholders even among the society matrons of Manila.³⁷ Government officials were bribed; assemblymen and prominent lawyers were "persuaded" to use their influence for the granting of fishing licenses to Japanese. This state of affairs brought about the promulgation of Commonwealth Act number 471, often referred to as the Anti-Dummy Law.³⁸

The determination of the Filipinos gradually to supersede the Japanese in the fishing industry brought about repeated incidents in which fishermen from Japan and Taiwan tried to defy Philippine authorities whenever they were apprehended for illegal fishing. In the Batanes Islands, north of Luzon and near Formosa, Japanese fishermen in 1940 razed native

³⁶ Japanese Fisheries in the Philippines, dated February 24, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

³⁷ Japanese Expansion in the Philippines, A Report of the American Consulate in Saigon, French Indo-China dated May 24, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

³⁸ S. P. Vak, "Third Conquest of the Philippines," Pacific Affairs, September, 1941 (Washington, D. C.: War Department extract).

villages to the ground. The Filipino natives protested to their distant government in Manila but without result.³⁹

A more serious incident was that of the "Haiun Maru." In 1934, this vessel was operating piratically off the southern tip of Palawan for about a week and in her incursions, the crew frequently came ashore to rob isolated Filipino settlers. Finally, a patrol of Philippine Constabulary men boarded the craft, but were disarmed by the Japanese and thrown overboard. The "Haiun Maru" then sailed away, leaving the Filipino officers to sink or swim some three or four miles from the shore. Efforts to catch the offending vessel were in vain but the boat was traced to Takao, in the south of Formosa. Japan, in spite of the existence of an extradition treaty with the United States, refused to extradite the crew of the "Haiun Maru." The American State Department obtained no redress for this serious assault on American authority.⁴⁰ It was well known that such craft as the "Haiun Maru" were auxiliary vessels of the Japanese navy and that the Japanese Government itself could not be absolved from complicity in its acts of piracy. The American policy at the time, however, was one of appeasement, and clearly drawn issues were merely dropped.

In the meantime the Commonwealth regulations on fishing brought public protests from prominent Japanese in the Islands. They referred to these laws as "fatal blows against the Japanese

³⁹ Japanese Expansion in the Philippines, op. cit.

⁴⁰ Hayden, op. cit., 716.

fishing industry." They claimed that the reason why the Philippine government subjected the Japanese to these exclusion laws was because the Filipinos were jealous of the prosperity enjoyed by Japanese fishermen and were now trying to oppress them by all conceivable means.⁴¹

The truth about the matter was that Filipino authorities were starting to realize that competing with Japanese fishermen meant competing with the Japanese government. T. Noma, a sub-manager of the Bank of Japan branch in Manila before the war, was the source of the information that the Japanese fishermen had been borrowing from the "Japanese Mutual Loan Association" which was managed by a certain Genichi Amano. The secret service found out, however, that Amano was in a state of bankruptcy but was backed by the Bank of Taiwan, a Japanese governmental financing agency.⁴²

In 1938, the first reports were received that navy officers were actually in charge of Japanese fishing vessels plying in Philippine waters. Also it was known that the manager of the "Pearling Fleet" in the southern part of the Philippines was a Mr. M. Koshiwagan, an ex-naval fleet officer of high rank. It thus became well known that the Japanese had a potential navy in the southern part of the Philippines, which needed only to be supplied with arms and ammunition for

⁴¹ Kimura, op. cit., 3.

⁴² Japanese Fisheries in Philippine Waters, dated February 24, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

conversion into a striking force.⁴³

Many suspicious vessels were frequenting the Islands by 1939. There was the "Mishima Maru" which entered Port Lamón on December 14, 1939, ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining crude oil and fresh water. The crew stated that they had cleared from Port Dodo, New Guinea, and had passed through Palau Island with Davao as their destination. But the map showed that Davao was closer than Port Lamón. They then declared that they were engaged in shell fishing and showed a box of six hundred shells in the hold. They had too small a catch to make their claim believable. Their marine map bore the title "Sea Approaches to the Philippines." The ship had, moreover, no fishing equipment except for a diving device and equipment for soundings.⁴⁴

Suspicion of Japan's motives led to an extensive campaign of law enforcement waged by the Filipino Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which resulted in the apprehension of about five hundred unlicensed Japanese fishermen.⁴⁵

In 1940, illegal Japanese fishing boats were still being apprehended. The "Ryozin Maru" was fined by the Philippine Cutter "Apo" off Tabbataha Reef, Mindanao, for entering

⁴³ Letter on the Japanese in the Philippine sent by an American citizen to the War Department dated January 15, 1938 (Washington, D. C.).

⁴⁴ Activities of Japanese Boats in the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁴⁵ Japanese Fisheries in Philippine Waters, op. cit.

Philippine waters illegally. At almost the same time the "Sun Keh" was fined ₱1,000 (\$500) by the Collector of Customs of Iloilo for fishing in Philippine waters and for entering the closed port of Anini-y, Antique. The "Showa Maru," with a crew of ten Japanese was also caught in this period on charges of illegal fishing off Carnassa, on Gato island.⁴⁶

However, in spite of all efforts of the Commonwealth government to limit Japanese fishing activities in Philippine waters, by March, 1940, the number of Japanese fishermen had increased to 1,250, operating 120 fishing boats. This meant that 75 percent of fishing in the Archipelago was in Japanese hands and even this was a conservative estimate, for on further investigation of the number of Japanese fishing boats registered under Filipino "dummies," the total was brought to more than 90 percent of the fishing boats in Philippine waters.⁴⁷

Another Commonwealth law, Act number 4003, was therefore promulgated. This act prohibited the use of the Moro-Ami method of fishing because it was found that it involved the employment of a greater number of crew members, and would therefore make places for more Japanese on each boat. The same act provided further that an alien would be granted a fisherman's license only if he arrived in the Philippines

⁴⁶ Activities of Japanese Fishermen, Report dated March 1, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁴⁷ Hayden, op. cit., 713; Complete List of Japanese Fishing Boats in the Philippines, dated February 24, 1940 (Washington, D. C., War Department).

before December 31, 1933. It was hoped that this provision would eliminate the spies and subversive agents who came later.⁴⁸

As late as September, 1941, an operative of the Philippine Constabulary checked on fishing boats in the waters of Mindanao and found seventy Japanese boats without licenses. Although many of the crew looked like fishermen, others did not and it seemed likely that they were spies or engaged in subversive activities. Some of them were found hiding in secret compartments of the boats. In one instance when a group of them were jailed in the municipality of Paluan, twenty-eight of them broke out of prison and escaped in frail bancas.⁴⁹

In the lumber industry, the Americans held the first place and the Filipinos the second. But the Japanese had not overlooked the economic and subversive potentialities of this field. With their five million peso (\$2,500,000) investment, they ranked third.

By 1939, the Philippine authorities were already disinclined to renew the existing Japanese timber leases because it was known that the purpose of the Japanese was to exhaust the timber supply in the Philippines while they restored their own. Moreover, the apprehension of the Filipinos was aroused

⁴⁸ Complete List of Japanese Fishing Boats in the Philippines, dated February 24, 1940, op. cit.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

by the disproportionately rapid expansion of the Japanese lumber interests in spite of their late start in this field. For example, in Mindanao they had the biggest lumber concession, that of the Tagum Lumber Company, located thirty miles north of Davao, within an area of 65,000 hectares, which they received through the Davao Penal Colony. A big concern in Japan, the famous Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, owned this lumber company at Tagum. The same Mitsuis also had holdings in Zamboanga, Cotabato, and Agusan. Another Japanese lumber concession was the Gulf Lumber Company at Tibungko which was capitalized at half a million pesos (one-fourth of a million dollars). This corporation consisted of the owner of the Furukawa plantation and four other Japanese, three of whom lived in Japan. Big corporations in Japan controlled most of the Japanese lumber interests in the Philippines.⁵⁰

The Gulf Lumber Company had a 100,000 hectare concession and in normal years, this company alone shipped 20,000 cubic meters of lumber to Japan. About 350,000 board feet were shipped to the United States annually. Filipino representatives were stationed at the manager's office to be sure that no more than the permitted amount of lumber was exported to Japan; but the effectiveness of this method of control was very doubtful, for these Filipino agents, with a meager salary of P150 (\$75) a month, were naturally not immune to bribery.

⁵⁰ Some Notes on a Trip to Mindanao Via Cebu, June 8-24, 1938 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

The lease of this company was to have expired on December 31, 1938, but it had not been taken away up to the outbreak of the war.⁵¹

As in other trades and professions, the Japanese in the lumber industry were not above suspicion. Activities of questionable character were soon traced to their doorsteps. On March 22, 1939, a report to the Philippine military authorities stated that the "Philippine Lumber Company," located on the east coast of Luzon, at the Casiguran Bay, north of Baler, Tayabas, was being secretly prepared to serve as a rendezvous for Japanese submarines in the event of an emergency.⁵²

The Japanese also used Filipino dummies in securing many of their lumber concessions. In Tayabas, the Dingalen Lumber Company, was ostensibly owned by a well-known politician from Nueva Ecija but was managed actively by the Japanese. It was believed that Japanese capital ran this concern and that the Filipino politician was getting a share of the profits for serving as a "legal blind."⁵³

That these Japanese lumber companies, like the other Japanese industries in the Philippines, served as fronts for

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² A Visit to Baler and Dingalen Bays, Tayabas (Washington, D. C.: War Department, March 22, 1939).

⁵³ During the Japanese occupation, Chick Parsons reported that this Dingalen lumber concession was the site of a Japanese airstrip, Report of Chick Parsons to President Manuel L. Quezon, dated September 27, 1943, in the files of the Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department; S. P. Vak, op. cit.

subversive activities, one hardly needs to point out. The people around the Dingalen Lumber Company, for instance, reported that heavy barges plied to and from the Japanese ships anchored in the Dingalen Bay, supposedly transporting nothing else but lumber, but that arms were being stored in the company's compounds which were heavily guarded.⁵⁴

Japanese activities were not limited to the smuggling of arms and spies, however. The far-sighted planning of Japan envisioned the Philippines as one of the prime sources of raw materials, so that attempts were continually being carried out to grow cotton and other important textiles. A Japanese foreman at the Bituloc Sawmill in the Dingalen region, experimenting with cotton growing, succeeded in producing a stalk about four and one-half feet high, which unfortunately did not give a good yield. These experiments were expanded during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, when an effort was made to convert sugar plantations into cotton fields, with equally poor results.⁵⁵

The rapid progress of Japan's lumber industry suffered a serious setback, however, when in 1941, President Roosevelt ordered the freezing of all Japanese assets in American territories and the restricting of Japanese shipping in American-controlled ports. From this time on until the outbreak of the

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

war, the supply of Philippine lumber to Japan was reduced to a mere trickle.⁵⁶

The Japanese devoted much effort and money to the mining industry. During the Philippine mining boom of 1937, Japan had already several companies of her own, such as the Mitsubishi Mining Company, the Pacific Mining Company, and the Toho Metal Refining Company. These, as usual, were financed and managed by giant industrial corporations in Japan, such as the Ishihara Company of Kobe, the Mitsubishi, and the Nippon Mining Company. They exported chrome, manganese, iron, and other minerals to Japan, minerals which the Island Empire needed badly for the prosecution of her war with China.⁵⁷

As in other industries, Filipino stockholders were included in the Japanese mining corporations to evade the Commonwealth law which prohibited the formation of corporations unless 60 percent of the stock was owned either by Americans or by Filipinos. Another evasion practiced by the Japanese mining men for the same purpose was the leasing of Filipino mining concessions.⁵⁸

Some prominent Filipinos knowingly or unknowingly became the instruments of Japanese mining interests in the Islands. They were given important positions in the corporations and

⁵⁶ Kimura, op. cit.

⁵⁷ Ibid.; S. P. Vak, op. cit.

⁵⁸ Japanese Activity in the Philippines, dated March 1, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

their social and political influence was utilized for the gaining of Japanese objectives. For example, in 1938 the Japanese-owned "Insular Mine Operators, Incorporated" at Paracale, Camarines Norte, dynamited the mouth of the Malaguit River so as to permit the passage of lighters which loaded Japanese ships anchored at the Malaguit Bay. These ships took iron ore directly to Japan. A former Philippine Supreme Court Justice and a poet laureate of note was the nominal president of this company. The officials of this company did not even ask the Commonwealth government for permission to widen the channel but merely served notice that they were having this done on September 30, 1938. The titular President was the one who advised the chief of the Philippine Constabulary about the fact.⁵⁹

Americans, too, did business with the Japanese. In March, 1940, the Luzon Stevedoring Company consummated a deal with a large Japanese interest, possibly acting for the Japanese government, whereby its entire iron ore output at Sibul Springs, Bulacan, would be taken by the Japanese. It was reported that a large sum was deposited by the Japanese in several banks of Manila as a bond for the contract. The Luzon Stevedoring Company even promised to construct a standard gauge railroad from the iron mine area near Sibul Springs to Dingalen Bay or to roads connected directly thereto, so as to enable the Japanese

⁵⁹ Military Intelligence Report dated November 14, 1938
(Washington, D. C.: War Department).

to transport the ore to Japanese ships enroute to Japan.⁶⁰

The Japanese mining activities, however, were cut short due to the enforcement of the metal export control by the Philippine government in November, 1941, but not until after the Japanese had succeeded in stock-piling much material for her war with the United States.⁶¹

In addition to industries such as fishing, agriculture, lumbering, and mining, the Japanese turned also, during the past fourteen or fifteen years, to the manufacturing enterprises of the Philippines, some of which had made remarkable progress. Among them were the making of rubber shoes, hoisery, beer and soft drinks, dairy products, home furnishings, pottery, bicycles, dessicated coconut, confestionary, cake, paper, dried fuel, and cotton and rayon products. In all of these industries the Japanese invested. The textiles of the Ilocos and Visayan regions were imitated on Japanese looms in the Philippines and sold for less than similar native-made products. The Japanese claimed that the almost prohibitive tariff rates levied by the Filipino government upon the importation of manufactures from their homeland led them to invest heavily in these industries of the Archipelago. The Balintawak Beer Brewery, the National Rubber Goods Manufacturing Company, the Oriental Industrial Company, the O'Racca

⁶⁰ Japanese Activities in the Philippines dated June 26, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁶¹ Ibid.

Confectionary and the Mori Bicycle Company were examples of Japanese Corporations in which the huge Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo interests were heavily represented. Even the Imperial family was said to have made investments in the Islands.⁶² Moreover, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, the former being a Japanese government controlled institution, had local branches in Manila to finance adequately the Japanese industries of the Philippines.⁶³

Because of their sufficient supply of capital, the Japanese also began to buy valuable real estate property in most of the cities of the Philippines. Many residential areas in the districts of Quiapo and San Miguel, Manila, were owned by them. The Japanese were preparing amply for their eventual domination of the Islands.⁶⁴

The Japanese also established "bazaars" in the Philippines. Following the "Manchurian Incident" of 1931, the Chinese middlemen, who up to then still largely controlled retail trade in the Islands, refused to handle Japanese merchandise. Thereupon, the Japanese proceeded to build a new system of retail distribution which was entirely their own. In Manila, the following streets became Japanese trading centers: Rizal Avenue, Echague, Tabora, Herran and Bustillos. Hundreds of Japanese

⁶² S. P. Vak, op. cit., 4; Kimura, op. cit., 3.

⁶³ Hayden, op. cit., 713.

⁶⁴ S. P. Vak, op. cit.

"bazaars" or stores were also established in the other cities and towns of the Islands.⁶⁵

The Japanese bazaar keepers engaged in espionage work. From Batangas, Batangas, came the report in March, 1940, that a number of Japanese in that town were following the movements of American forces who were on maneuvers there. In one instance, six Japanese in a Bazaar were found to be following, on a map, the route of the American forces.⁶⁶

The Japanese-Philippine trade relations were meagre compared to that of the United States and her Philippine territory. Between the years 1930 and 1940, the former trade averaged thirty-two million pesos a year. The imports into the Archipelago from Japan were only twenty-three million pesos annually. In the two years (1936 and 1937), the exports of Japan to the Islands were about 2 percent of her total exports. But she saw some hope of future improvement in her trade with the Philippines when in 1937, in spite of high tariff barriers against her, she supplied the Islands with one and a half million pesos worth of cotton and silk goods.⁶⁷ She also looked forward to the political control of the Philippines

⁶⁵ Ibid.; Hayden, op. cit., 713-714.

⁶⁶ Activities of the Japanese during the American Maneuvers, January, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁶⁷ M. Epstein, ed., The Statesman's Yearbook (London: Eighty-third annual publication, Macmillan and Company, 1946), 677-679.

after the United States granted the Filipinos their independence in 1946. Then she would monopolize Philippine trade. For this reason, Japan publicly favored Philippine Independence and outspokenly opposed the re-examination of the "freedom" issue.⁶⁸

Prominent Japanese in the Philippines began to speak glowingly of the economic aid they were planning to give the Filipinos after independence. They started to flatter the people by saying that they hoped to see the Philippines become a first class power with what they termed "Japan's unselfish aid," and they compared their altruistic motives to America's "economic imperialism and exploitation" of the Islands' natural resources.⁶⁹ Some Filipino businessmen must have been undoubtedly taken in by their condescending patronage. In 1939, as a result of Japanese attempts to dislodge American capital in the Archipelago, there grew a tendency among some members of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce to gain favorable trade concessions in Japan through Japanese commercial agencies in the Islands. Orders had already been placed, far in advance, for a large amount of heavy machinery for mines, roads, factories, and shipbuilding, delivery to be made after the cessation of hostilities in China and after Philippine

⁶⁸ Hayden, op. cit., 714.

⁶⁹ Kimura, op. cit., 4.

Independence.⁷⁰

It was in Davao that the Japanese, however, enjoyed the greatest freedom for expansion in the period before 1941. Here, not only their economic but also their social and political activities bordered on outright defiance. It was more as if Japanese rather than American sovereignty existed then in Davao. Spying, smuggling, and military operations were carried on openly and brazenly. Here were found the strongest indications of the war preparations that Japan was busily making.

In 1939, out of the 29,262 Japanese who resided in the Philippines, 17,888 lived in Davao. There were ten Japanese for every Filipino or American settler in the province. This is possibly one of the important reasons why Davao was easily controlled by the Japanese. No wonder it was referred to, before 1941, as "little Japan."⁷¹

A great part of Davao's public lands became, by 1935, Japanese property. About one-half (28,098 hectares) was acquired legally, through actual purchase or lease. But the other 29,252 hectares were acquired illegally, with the connivance of Americans and Filipinos, for the Philippine Commonwealth government, after its inauguration in 1935, prohibited

⁷⁰ Japanese Activities in the Philippines during the Month of October, 1939 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁷¹ Studies Based on the 1939 Census of the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: War Department, March 19, 1942).

the sale of public lands to aliens.⁷²

The Japanese succeeded in circumventing this law by means of the "Paquino system," which was a sort of a crop sharing system.⁷³ One instance of the working of the "Paquino system" is the following: An Okinawan took a Bogobo woman for a common law wife and cultivated her land which she acquired by squatter's right. For this, the Okinawan gave his wife 15 percent of the harvest at the end of the year.⁷⁴

The other squatters in Davao were the Mandayans and they also became victims of the Japanese who, together with unscrupulous Filipino government surveyors, practically stole the lands of these ignorant owners. Around 1938, it was noted that most of these people had been driven from their lands or cheated out of them. Filipino surveyors paid the Mandayans a peso or less for their thumbprints which they affixed to documents purporting to show that they had received several hundred pesos for their fifty or one hundred hectare landholdings. Since it was illegal for Filipino government surveyors to purchase lands, the transactions were therefore made through their relatives. The land thus obtained was subsequently leased to the Japanese. And a ruse was further made by which the Japanese ostensibly worked as laborers for the new owners when in reality they were the actual managers of

⁷² The Davao Land Problem (Washington, D. C.: War Department, November 11, 1938); Hayden, op. cit., 716.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

the property.⁷⁵

There is little doubt that the Japanese acquired a great part of their land in Davao through Filipino dummies as well as through Filipino lawyers and government officials who had access to records of the Bureau of Lands.⁷⁶ Some of their land was also bought from American plantation owners who after a period of time decided to return to the United States and enjoy their savings. Like the Filipino dummies, the American planters who sold their lands to the Japanese did not seem to realize the economic and political impact of their individual transactions.⁷⁷

Aside from Filipino surveyors and dummies, some members of the Philippine Constabulary in Davao aided to entrench further the Japanese there. Although they were strict and hard with their own countrymen in such matters as the acquisition of firearms, yet money and gifts made them deal with the Japanese with pleasant liberality. Corrupt attitudes and acts of Filipino public officials and officers could not fail to win the disrespect and scorn of the very people who were favored. A high official of the Furukawa Plantation Company, a Mr. Chutaya, who later returned to Japan, said of these officials:

⁷⁵ Japanese Activity in the Philippines, March 1, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ The Japanese in Davao (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

They are just like small children for they eat whatever kind of candy is given them.⁷⁸

Disrespect on the part of the Japanese for Philippine officials in Davao was soon extended to disregard for all Philippine authority, and resulted in abusive and high-handed acts. Instances like the following were reported as early as 1920: a newly baptized Bogobo used as a dummy was advised by a lawyer not to follow the unreasonable wishes of the Japanese. Soon after this, he died under very suspicious circumstances.⁷⁹

A striking instance of the Japanese tendency to act independently of Davao authorities happened in 1929. Matsuzo Kian had to sell his abaca plantation for one half of its real value to escape Davao. His sin: he failed to pay his dues to the Davao Japanese Association to which he belonged. Within twenty-four hours, there was a general alarm for his capture, dead or alive. He was captured by the police and was released to the custody of his attorney. During the night, the attorney's place was surrounded by a group of Japanese. It thus appeared that the Japanese Association was the real power in Davao.⁸⁰

These occurrences made not only the Filipinos but also the Americans in Davao very cautious. By 1938, an American

⁷⁸ Letter to a Major-General, United States Army, dated September 7, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁷⁹ Incidents to be Reckoned with, dated October 30, 1939 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

operative reported to the War Department that he found it difficult to secure the services of Americans to accompany him on visits to Japanese plantations in Davao. They would have liked to do so but were fearful of the interpretation that would be attached to such acts. When an American, in American territory, had to curb his freedom out of consideration for aliens in the place, conditions must certainly have deteriorated alarmingly.⁸¹

By 1939, the Japanese in Davao were becoming more and more arrogant, overbearing, and even actually rebellious. There was the case of the "Takao Maru" which arrived in Davao in the morning of December 29, 1939, to load lumber. Three days later, on New Year's Day, the crew tried to bring ashore two bottles of "saki" (a Japanese rice wine). The customs guard refused the entrance of the "saki" and he was attacked by the ship's crew and thrown on deck. When other customs guards attempted to interfere, three other crew members, including the third officer, joined in. One Japanese, said to be the third officer, snatched a customs guard's automatic pistol from his holster, jammed it against the guard's stomach and pulled the trigger. Fortunately for the guard, the pistol did not discharge. This was another indication of the Japanese attitude towards all constituted authority in Davao.⁸²

⁸¹ Some Notes on a Trip to Mindanao via Cebu, June 8 to 24, 1938 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁸² Activities of Japanese Boats in the Philippines, January 6, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

The Japanese also controlled about three hundred kilometers of private roads in Davao. These were built and maintained by Japanese corporations and were opened to the public only at the convenience of their owners. Two or three of these roads, where traffic was said to be particularly heavy and the cost of maintenance correspondingly high, were later completely closed to public use. The reason for the unduly high cost of maintenance, apart from the wear and tear of the heavy traffic was quite evident. The roads were built in the towns of Guianga and Upper Santa Cruz, Davao, on the slopes of Mount Apo, which were too steep for ordinary trucks and automobiles. Rumors, at first conflicting, but later recurrent, were to the effect that Japanese arms and ammunition which were smuggled into Davao were stored somewhere at the foot of Mount Apo, near a hot spring which the Japanese used for bathing purposes. Bogobos who were used as "cargadores" claimed that they carried heavy boxes and that they were never permitted to go beyond a demarcated line near the foot of Mount Apo. It was even said then that planes and war tanks could be assembled at a minute's notice.⁸³

The Japanese constructed "exclusive" club houses all over Davao, equipped with hospitals and wide grounds where radio masts were erected. During the Japanese occupation, aeroplanes landed safely on these wide grounds and Japanese soldiers

⁸³ Intelligence Report of May 12, 1933 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

were housed in the big buildings.⁸⁴

Pre-Invasion Japanese Propaganda

Along with their economic penetration of the Philippines, the Japanese indulged not only in subversive activities but also in insidious Japanese propaganda. And Davao became naturally one of the most important centers of their pre-invasion propaganda campaign. In this province, the education of children of Japanese and Filipino parentage was supervised by the agents of the Ministry of Education in Tokyo. By 1940, there were two thousand such students who were taught Japanese, Bogobo, and last of all English. After their high school education, they were sent to Osaka, Kobe, Tokyo or to schools in Palao, never to Philippine colleges and universities. The worst part of this set-up was the fact that these children, while eligible for Philippine citizenship or actually Philippine citizens, because of their Bogobo mothers and the fact that they were born on Philippine soil, became emotionally and doctrinally Japanese.⁸⁵

In this same province under the American flag, the Japanese built their own monuments to honor their Japanese leaders such as Ohta and Mikami whom they worshipped as the "Builders of Davao." This kind of propaganda technique is a Japanese favorite and was often used by them in other parts

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Some Notes on a Trip to Mindanao via Cebu, op. cit.

of the Philippines and in other Oriental countries they occupied during the war period of 1941-1945.⁸⁶ It was initiated by erection of shrines in Formosa to Japanese war dead, to which school children were taken to worship. Similar shrines in Manchuria and Korea provided the models to be copied in the lands occupied by the Japanese during the Greater East Asia War.

Two Japanese agencies were founded to help Japan's war and propaganda schemes in Davao. The "Nanyokai" (The South Seas Association) under Prince Fuminaro Konoye in Tokyo, and the "Kirippin Kyokai" (Philippine Association) under Marquis Tokugawa, were both extended to Davao by the establishment of local branches there. These two associations tried to disseminate Japanese culture and taught the Japanese language to Filipinos in this province. It was in Davao that the Japanese studied the propaganda lines that would be most effective to attract Filipinos.⁸⁷

Newspapers were also used for propaganda in that period by the Japanese and various Japanese corporations financed their publication in Davao. In 1941, the "Davao Nichi Nichi" was founded, with a capital of ₱55,000 (\$27,500). This newspaper was published by the Nichi Shimbun Sha, Incorporated.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Lowry Sinclair, "Japanese in Davao," Baltimore Sun, September 14, 1941, 3.

⁸⁷ "Japanese in the South Seas," Japanese Geography (Tokyo: 1931), IV, 156.

⁸⁸ Japanese Publishing Concern (Washington, D. C.: War Department, April 16, 1940).

The Japanese government in Tokyo kept in constant touch with its subjects in Davao. It often sent there high ranking civil and military officials. For example, in the summer of 1940 there was much excitement created in the Philippines by Admiral Nomura's announcement, while on his way home from an inspection tour of Japanese mandates, that he would visit Davao and investigate the health conditions of his countrymen there--quite a flimsy excuse for an admiral's visit. On July twenty-third, the two large passenger steamers, sides painted with enormous flags, steamed up the Gulf and anchored off Davao city. The first brought five members of the Japanese Diet and the second brought Admiral Nomura.⁸⁹

In other Philippine cities, especially in Manila, many ruses were employed by the Japanese for their subversive and propaganda tactics. Not only Japanese firms, as the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, and the Daido Boeki Kaisa of Manila,⁹⁰ but also apparently innocent Japanese associations, organized during the period of 1934 to 1941, became centers of these activities. Examples of these associations were the "Society for International Cultural Relations," the "Japanese Association of Manila," the "Nippon Young Men's Organization," the "Quiapo District Residents' Association,"

⁸⁹ P. J. Palzer, "How Japan Obtained Philippine Foothold," Baltimore Sun, December 14, 1941, 2.

⁹⁰ A Military Intelligence Report from Manila dated June 26, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

the "Nanyokai" (South Seas Association), the "Philippine Association" and the "Asia Club," all organized in Manila with the hope of strengthening Japan's cultural influence among the Filipinos.⁹¹

Outstanding propagandists and spies were made heads of these Japanese associations. There was Otagaro Mochozuki, the President in 1940 of the "Asia Club" in Arlegui and Quiapo streets in Manila. This club was formed to unite Oriental peoples and to expel the white man from the East. Applications for membership were carefully scrutinized before they were accepted. To attract people, the club maintained rooms where billiards, card and Japanese games could be played. All conversation was in Japanese. Young, attractive Filipino girls were selected by Mochozuki to serve as waitresses at the club. This club was located in a building whose rental cost about ₱250 (\$125) per month while the club's income was only about ₱100 (\$50).

Mochozuki was also the President of the Japanese Fishermen's Association in Manila and was a part owner of the "BBC Bar" located at 403 Carriedo, Quiapo, Manila. This bar was a favorite gathering place of both American and Filipino soldiers and sailors. During the course of the evening, he was often observed to mix with patrons of the bar, engaging particularly with American service men in frequent conversations. There is

⁹¹ Japanese Activity in the Philippines over March 1, 1940, op. cit.

no doubt that he kept an ear tuned in on talks regarding fleet and troop movements.⁹²

It must be remembered, however, that outside of Davao, the Japanese propaganda proceeded with caution and subtlety. Newspapers and magazines were used to put across their ideas. There was, for instance, the "Pictorial News" published by the "Union of South Seas Miscellaneous Goods Export Association." This publication contained the usual story of Japan's benevolence in China and Manchuria, undoubtedly with the intention of belittling or actually belying the stories of the massacres and atrocities they committed. It also had beautiful photographs of Japanese progress in their own country.⁹³ Another journal which was made into a Japanese propaganda instrument was the "National Outlook" founded in January, 1940. Ninety percent of the advertising in this journal was contributed by Japanese commercial firms. This magazine glorified the lives of Philippine heroes, and having incited the Filipinos to greater nationalism, the Japanese hoped that they would more easily be swayed to discard their western ties and their sympathy for the white man, particularly the American.⁹⁴ The third Japanese publication

⁹² Ibid.; "Japanese Spies Were Active in the Philippines before the War Broke Out in 1941," Ann Arbor News, November 16, 1945, 1.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ "Japanese Chamber in Manila Pushes Tri-Party Trade Plan," Christian Science Monitor, October 9, 1937, 3; Japanese Activities in the Philippines on March 1, 1940, op. cit.

which appeared in 1940 was "Oriental Art and Culture." Like the two journals mentioned above, it was mostly devoted to Japan and things Japanese: it called the attention of Filipinos to the great advantages which could be theirs if they would only choose a more intimate and friendly association with Japan. It also published a Japanese-Tagalog-English vocabulary for those who wanted to study the Japanese language. The dissemination of the Japanese language was thus begun considerably before the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The Japanese thought that they could incorporate the Filipinos more easily into their proposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere if the two peoples were bound together by a common Oriental language, Japanese.⁹⁵

Mention must also be made of the use of Filipino tools in Japanese propaganda. For example, General Ricarte, who was given asylum in Yokohama, Japan, was encouraged to write books and pamphlets on his version of the Philippine Revolution of 1896-98 and of his persecution by the Americans after his first refusal to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. A book printed in Tokyo and written by Pio Duran, on the other hand, capitalized on America's imperialistic policy and the race prejudice of some of her people in the Philippines.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Oriental Art and Culture, a report dated April 19, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁹⁶ Artemio Ricarte Vivora, op. cit. The book by Duran is nowhere to be found in the libraries of the University of Michigan and the Library of Congress, but the writer had seen copies of it in the Philippines before the war.

Another pre-war propaganda medium adopted by the Japanese was the radio. A radio program called "Land of Cherry Blossoms" was sponsored by the Philippine-Japanese Association in Manila. Anyone who listened to it for the first time would take it for an innocent, wholesome program, without political or, for that matter, wide international implications. One would think it was intended merely to encourage greater Philippine-Japanese friendship. This program included lectures on Japanese culture, home life and religion but in some of its programs it branched out to include a general discussion of the problems of peoples in the Far East, with the dominant theme, of course, of the white man's suppression of colonials there. The Philippine Immigration law which was passed by the Philippine legislature in 1940 providing for the entrance of Orientals into the Islands under a quota system was also vigorously objected to by the Japanese over this program.⁹⁷

Around 1940, Japanese operatives took every opportunity to speak before Filipino groups on the theme that the Japanese and Filipinos were blood brothers and should therefore unite, and that they should help each other drive away the white man from the East. Caution was used, however, and they spoke on this theme only before private gatherings.⁹⁸

High Japanese representatives in the Islands especially

⁹⁷ A Military Intelligence Report dated June 26, 1940
(Washington, D. C.: War Department).

⁹⁸ Ibid.

used the medium of heart-felt farewell speeches in handing out to the Filipinos glib Japanese propaganda. In June, 1940, at a farewell party given in honor of Colonel M. Kikagawa of the Imperial Japanese Army, it was reliably reported that the Japanese Consul General Yoshida, let slip in his speech that Philippine newspapers greatly exaggerated the true conditions when they expressed apprehension over the invasion of the Islands by Japan. He pointed out that Japan could not attack its neighbors without any good reason, unless war broke out between America and Japan. And he did not stop at this. He boldly belittled the Filipino and American armies for lack of proper defense preparations in the Philippines. He said further that Japan marvelled at the lack of cooperation between the American Army authorities and the Philippine public. Yoshida was taking full advantage of his knowledge that there existed friction between Filipinos and American officials concerning defense preparations.⁹⁹

Japanese university professors and imperial messengers were sent to tour Philippine cities and towns to lecture to Japanese groups and by inspiring the latter with patriotic fervor, eventually to reach the Filipinos for whom their ideas were intended. Professor Kano of the Kyoto Imperial University and Mr. Saburo Kawano were in this group of Japanese propagandists. Kawano arrived in Manila in May, 1940, equipped with

⁹⁹ Japanese Attitudes Toward the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: War Department, November 4, 1938).

sixteen millimeter newsreels which were exhibited at the Japanese temple at Lepanto, Manila. These newsreels depicted scenes favorable to Japan and her cause.¹⁰⁰

And lastly, Filipino delegations were invited for sight-seeing or inspection trips, while Filipino student groups visited Japan annually in March or April. Almost without exception, these Filipinos returned friends of Japan and distributed reports of their impressions to their Filipino friends in the form of pamphlets. Members of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce, newspapermen and legislators fraternized with members of their respective professions in Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kyoto,¹⁰¹ and were often thoroughly infected by Japanese pan-Asiatic propaganda.

The Japanese arguments in this Pan-Asiatic movement, whereby they hoped to entice all the Asiatic nations, including the Philippines, to unite under Japan's leadership, were the same old arguments they had used as early as 1892, but reinforced and brought out with much more vigor by the use of psychological subtleties, aided by the modern instrumentalities we have just referred to.

The Japanese pointed out the geographical proximity of the Islands to Japan. They explained how this proximity could be used to good advantage economically and socially.¹⁰² They

¹⁰⁰ John Edgar Hoover, On the Japanese (Washington, D. C.: War Department, March 7, 1940).

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Hayden, op. cit., 713.

also stressed, especially in the decade between 1930 and 1940, the racial affinity of the Japanese and the Filipinos. The Japanese took it upon themselves to remind the Filipinos repeatedly of this common origin from an Oriental parental stock. A visiting Japanese scholar, for example, speaking before a University audience in Manila, told how he felt he had not left his own homeland when he arrived in Manila, because he saw the same type of faces as in his own country.¹⁰³ This same line of talk would not have been encouraged in Tokyo, where the renaissance of Shinto as the nationally approved religion could not countenance an idea of Japanese racial origin other than the grotesque origin myths of the ancient books of Japan, which set the Japanese apart from all other races.

Western imperialism, exploitation, and economic strangulation, as we have already seen, were amply enlarged upon. At the same time, the Japanese gave assurances of their own truly altruistic purposes, and the co-prosperity in store for all the nations of Greater East Asia under the unifying and guiding influence of Japan.¹⁰⁴

Not an insignificant part of the campaign was the effort on the part of Japan to sell to the Filipinos her unique culture and civilization, presenting it as the main fount from

¹⁰³ Kimura, op. cit., 3.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

which sprang her superiority and invincibility. This, she emphasized, was the secret of her power, in contrast to the decadence of nations clinging to effete Western civilization.¹⁰⁵

By way of summary we note that Japanese disguised as commercial agents, plantation owners, laborers and merchant seamen cooperated for espionage and propaganda activities with Japanese students, tourists, newspapermen, photographers, and members of the consular staff who entered the Islands as Trojan horses.¹⁰⁶ How many of the Filipinos participated actively for such purposes and how many were really convinced by Japanese propaganda, cannot be definitely stated. However, it is true that some Filipinos and Americans perhaps unknowingly helped Japan's cause in the Islands. It is also a fact that the Japanese interested for subversive purposes, unimportant labor leaders, politicians, editors, dancers, businessmen, army officers, lawyers and second rate writers, who for financial considerations agreed to give their services to Japan's espionage work. Only these needy Filipinos and the few opportunists--a class found in every nation, readily consented to the schemes of the Japanese. But few as they were, they were enough to get and accumulate the necessary information which Japan needed for her future invasion of the Islands.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Oriental Art and Culture, op. cit.

¹⁰⁶ S. P. Vak, op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

Aside from these classes of people we have just mentioned, there were a number of Filipinos who really gave their sympathies to the Japanese and made no effort to hide it. We have already traced the activities of General Ricarte, and to his class belonged Benigno Ramos. Ramos was the head of the "Sakdal Society," a pro-Japanese organization with a radical land program designed to win the bulk of the poor Filipino peasants. In 1935, the Sakdalistas staged an uprising. Unsuccessful, Ramos fled to Japan but was soon returned to Manila and jailed. Later, he became an active Japanese agent.¹⁰⁸ Another avowed admirer of the Japanese before 1941 was a Filipino assemblyman from the province of Albay. In 1940, he was reported to have spent ₱10,000 (\$5,000) for campaign purposes, a sum considered unusually high for such election purposes. This man served as the legal adviser of most of the large Japanese firms in the Islands and this fact might have had something to do with his pro-Japanese sentiments then.¹⁰⁹

Two members of the Philippine cabinet were suspected of Japanese leanings during the Commonwealth period. Both were said to have offered bribes to acquire for the Japanese more favorable consideration in connection with the Philippine Immigration Law of 1940. One was said to have made the remark

¹⁰⁸ Sumner Welles, An Intelligent American's Guide to Peace (New York: the Dryden Press, 1945), 309.

¹⁰⁹ Japanese Activities in the Philippines over March 1, 1940, op. cit.

that the Immigration Law should be modified quietly later on to give the Japanese special privileges. The other offered a money bribe to the author of the same Immigration Law so that the latter would use his influence to raise the Japanese quota of five hundred to one thousand or at least to seven hundred and fifty. These two officials might have been more interested in the monetary returns than in Japan's aims, which would have been even more to their discredit than dereliction of duty, while officers of the Commonwealth.¹¹⁰

The isolated cases of Filipino collaboration should be judged, however, in the light of other events. The contradictions in America's policy towards the Filipinos during her rule of forty-two years, as well as the economic imperialism and race prejudice on the part of some of her people, must have contributed their share in attracting Filipinos to Japan's side.

On the other hand, Japan's economic penetration of the Philippines proved even more aggressive than that of the Americans whom Japan denounced. The disrespect and disregard of the Japanese for American and Filipino authorities in the Archipelago made the bulk of the Filipino people skeptical about the claims of Japan. Moreover, the realization by the Filipinos of what American sovereignty, at its best, stood for: freedom of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, a genuine

¹¹⁰ Japanese Activities in the Philippines on June 26, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

desire on the side of her scholars, scientists, economists and educators to improve the lot of the common Filipino. These were active factors in Philippine-Japanese-American relations before Japan struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in 1941.

The late President Manuel Quezon must have realized at this early date which side of the balance he favored when he said:

I am not worried that the Filipinos will take up with Japan--The Japanese can never offer us anything like the Americans have offered us, and no amount of mistrust on the part of the High Commissioner or double crossing on the part of a few congressmen will make me lose faith in fundamental Americansim. I think that its code is the code which holds out the most for us and I choose it deliberately. I think that it can be said that there is more merit in my loyalty than there is in that of Americans who are born to their creed.¹¹¹

During a decade before the event, Japan was feverishly preparing for her final attack on the Islands. Spratly Island was tactically seized early in 1941, to complete Japanese encirclement of the Philippines. This island is barely two hundred miles west of Palawan. In 1937 Elpidio Quirino, the Secretary of the Interior during the Commonwealth period, had called attention to its strategic value by sending a memorandum to the State Department requesting that a formal declaration of claims to Spratly Island be made by the Philippines for national defense purposes. The State Department did not see fit to act on the question although at that time Spratly Island was apparently without official owners. Geographically,

¹¹¹ Report to the American High Commissioner on October 13, 1941, op. cit.

moreover, the Philippines would seem to have been the logical claimant of this Island.¹¹²

In June, 1940, Japanese destroyers were reported by American agents to be stationed in the Carolines and the Marshalls.¹¹³ But long before this, rumors about the coming Japanese invasion had already been spreading widely among the Filipinos. In 1933, a Filipino chauffeur who spoke Japanese told his friends that he heard the Japanese Consul in Davao make a patriotic address at a Japanese Club calling upon the Japanese to stick to their post in the event of war.¹¹⁴

In Manila, the first rumors of Japan's invasion came directly from Vice-Consul Kawaminami of Japan. He asked his countrymen there not to be perturbed about becoming prisoners of war if hostilities should break between the United States and Japan. He assured them that Japanese vessels would immediately come to take them back to Japan.¹¹⁵

In Davao, the signs of war were more ominous. In 1940, the Japanese Consul was reported selling "bootleg insurance" in the expectation that when Japan took over the Islands, these insurance policies would be legalized.¹¹⁶ The Collector

¹¹² S. P. Vak, op. cit.

¹¹³ Japanese Activities in the Philippines on June 26, 1940, op. cit.

¹¹⁴ Military Intelligence Report dated May 12, 1933 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

¹¹⁵ Op. cit.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

of Customs in the same province reported in March, 1940, that there had been a steady departure of Japanese males from Davao, possibly for military training in Japan. The Japanese Consul there was likewise reported as canvassing all able-bodied Japanese for the same purpose.¹¹⁷

Looking back on the period immediately before 1941, it is impossible to believe that the American and Philippine Commonwealth governments did not have sufficient and repeated warnings of Japan's hostile intentions. These facts stand out: Japanese propaganda lines were already perfected, and Japan's smuggling of arms and propaganda work had been going on under the very noses of American and Filipino officials throughout the Commonwealth period. A few Filipinos collaborated even then to make Japanese propaganda effective but this fact should be considered in the light of the subsequent acts of Filipino soldiers and civilians when the Japanese invasion began. The stage had been set, and the curtain was raised with the bombing of Manila and Clark Field in Pampanga.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PUPPET PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

The Philippine Campaign

Major Raymond Herrick, Signal Corps, AUS, was handed an urgent message to be decoded at his office in Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga, on December 8, 1941. A .50 caliber bullet recocheted from the wall, hit him and knocked him unconscious. When he came to in a few minutes, he found a bump on his head about the size of an egg and still in his hand was the message. Lying flat on his stomach, he read it thus:

A state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial Japanese government.¹

This incident describes quite well the total surprise with which the Japanese started their attack on the Philippines. Their plan was to cripple the defending air force so that their troop landings would be made easier. Moreover, by taking the Filipinos and Americans by surprise, they hoped to create confusion. This latter purpose they also achieved. Immediately, communication on Luzon became chaotic. Panic calls clogged the wires and vehicles jammed the highways.²

The Japanese offensive was carefully planned and based on accurate information, the fruits of long and persistent espionage

¹ "Bataan into Darkness," Triumph in the Philippines, 1941-1946 (Australia: The Combat History Division, G-1, Section Headquarters, AFWESPAC, 1946), 1, 36.

² Ibid., 40.

work. Private Michael J. Amrich, who was at Clark Field when the war broke out, relates that the American planes had been up all morning on reconnaissance that day. While the pilots were taking their luncheon, the Japanese planes came. Dummy planes which had been erected to confuse the enemy were ignored. They knew exactly where the real planes were. What seemed more strange was that even the newly arrived planes which were not yet unpacked were hit. Moreover, the Japanese also knew the exact time when to strike their targets. Whenever the Fil-American planes came down for refueling, the Japanese appeared at once to hit them on the ground.³

Japan's military preparations for the invasion of the Philippines began very much earlier than December, 1941. By November 1941, the Watari force was already secretly concentrated in Formosa, two hundred miles from Lingayen Gulf in northwestern Luzon where it was to land, while the Morioka group was readying itself at Palau Island, eight hundred miles south of Guam and almost directly opposite the scheduled landing places at Legaspi and Lamon Bay in southern Luzon.⁴

The Japanese strategists were determined that the Islands be overwhelmed in thirteen days by making their pincers snap shut with hairline precision around Manila. This would avert

³ Report of Michael J. Amrich, AC Headquarters Squadron, 19th Bomb Group (Washington: War Department, 1944).

⁴ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 25.

a long struggle at Bataan. With total surprise, air superiority, more numerous ground force equipment and supplies, but above all, crack troops to oppose the amateur and civilian defenders of the Philippines, the Japanese thought that their plan could not fail.⁵

America, on the other hand, was not adequately prepared to defend the Philippines. Before December, 1941, there was widespread indifference to a military program of preparedness. Some of her treaties prevented the modernization of fortifications in her insular possession and there was a hindering plan of economy, partially caused by the current wave of pacifism then existing.⁶

The Philippines made military preparations on her own initiative, but only after her commonwealth government was inaugurated. The Philippine Army was created by an act of the Philippine Legislature on December 21, 1935. General Douglas MacArthur, who outlined the military program for the Philippine Government, hoped to train 125,000 men. With this, he was sure that any attacking nation would find the taking of the Philippines so wasteful in men and materials that it would not be worth occupying. But the enemy struck too early.⁷

⁵ Ibid., 32.

⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁷ Ibid., 6-8; Clare Boothe Luce, "MacArthur of the Far East," Life, II, No. 23 (1941), 123-127; Basilio Valdes, "The Filipinos Prepare to Defend Themselves," Philippines (Washington, D. C.: Department of Information), I, No. 5, 4-5.

The Japanese landings were made successively at different points in Luzon: at Gonzaga in the north, Vigan and Lingayen in the northwest, Legaspi in the south, and Antimonan and Mauban in the east.⁸ The great pincer movement was planned to close in on Manila.

General MacArthur's defense plan consisted in the division of his troops into a North and South Luzon Force and a Visayan and Mindanao Force. The vastness of the territory covered so dispersed the small defending army that at first glance, it seemed that it would easily be overwhelmed. That it was not so was due mainly to two factors: the masterful retreat of both the north and south forces to Bataan, and the stiffness of the Fil-American resistance. Even the "barrio" people put up whatever defense they could with borrowed rifles.⁹

Meanwhile, Manila was being bombed night and day by the Japanese, even on Christmas day. To protect it from further destruction, General MacArthur declared it an open city on December 26. This, however, went unheeded and the bombings continued, resulting in the death of civilians and in the unnecessary destruction of historical and religious relics.¹⁰

⁸ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 25.

⁹ Ibid., 54.

¹⁰ Ibid., 64; War Department Communique No. 35, dated December 30, 1941 (Washington, D. C.).

a. The Battle of Bataan. The battle of Bataan was the story of bravery and heroism pitted against overwhelming odds: against overwhelming numbers (several hundred thousand Japanese against 70,000 Filipinos and Americans), against overwhelming superiority in materials and equipment, against hunger and disease.¹¹ The first Congressional Medal of Honor awarded to an enlisted man in World War II was won in this battle by a Filipino, Sgt. Pedro Calugas. On January 16th, he visited the artillery position to see how the battle was progressing. A quarter of a mile from where he watched, another Philippine Scout battery was knocked out of action and its gun crew either killed or seriously wounded. Despite the fact that it was not his responsibility, he being a cook, he dashed from his sheltered position across the shell-raked battlefield to the silenced battery. He arrived unscathed and from near-by foxholes he recruited enough men to put the gun back into action, and he personally directed the fire.¹²

The Igorot soldiers of the 11th Infantry also won undying fame in Bataan, in the battle of Cotar River (which General MacArthur called the bloodiest battle of the Luzon campaign). They mounted American tanks and led them fearlessly through

¹¹ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 89; Mercury Herald (San Jose, California), April 12, 1944, 1; The New York Times, February 16, 1942, 4.

¹² "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 98; The New York Times, February 18, 1942, 3.

the jungle against the enemy. As a result of their bravery, General Jonathan Wainwright was able to report on February 12th to General MacArthur that his men had recovered all the ground lost during the Japanese penetration, and that his lines were again intact.¹³

Amidst all the hardship, sufferings and privations, the beleaguered Bataan defenders still managed to retain their sense of humor, as we can see from their song:

We are the battling bastards of Bataan;
 No mammy, no pappy, no Uncle Sam,
 No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces,
 No rifles, no guns, no artillery pieces,
 And nobody gives a damn.¹⁴

The Japanese propaganda corps, which plastered areas of resistance with propaganda leaflets from the very first day of the Japanese offensive in the Islands, was likewise most active in Bataan. Propaganda leaflets addressed to American and Filipino soldiers were dropped by planes.

To the Americans, the leaflets painted a picture of the uselessness of continuing the hopeless struggle and urged them to surrender. All their discomforts, difficulties, and hardships in Bataan were enlarged upon, while at the same time, they were constantly reminded of their life of comfort and abundance in the States. A leaflet, printed on glossy paper, carried the picture of a beautiful movie actress representing

¹³ "Bataan into Darkness," *op. cit.*, 140; The New York Times, February 23, 1942, 1; April 2, 1942, 1.

¹⁴ "Bataan into Darkness," *op. cit.*, 100.

the Japanese conception of the ideal American wife or sweetheart, to whom it was suggested that they could return. A leaflet entitled: "Ticket to Armistice" was also provided and it purported to guarantee a safe conduct to any American soldier who wanted to surrender.¹⁵

The leaflets addressed to the Filipinos were often printed on pulp paper in Tagalog and Spanish with semi-literate English translations. They exaggerated the discriminations against the Filipinos which the latter had heard of and which doubtless existed in a few instances at Bataan. They pointed out that the food served to them was poorer in quality and lesser in quantity than that served to the Americans. A sample leaflet had on the upper part a picture of Filipino soldiers manning a cannon while an American had his pistol pointed at their backs. Below this was the caption:

Ask yourself this question: why should Filipinos be hungry while Americans are not?¹⁶

The Japanese also capitalized on the report that the Filipinos were out front while the Americans fought in the rear. For example, a leaflet contained the picture of Japanese soldiers furiously attacking Filipinos while the American soldiers were running away in disorder. With this picture was

¹⁵ Sample leaflet dated April 4, 1942 (From the Philippine Section collection, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.).

¹⁶ Sample leaflet dated April 8, 1942 (Military Intelligence collection); Manila Tribune, April 14, 1942, 1.

published the letter of a Filipino soldier captured by them.

It began thus:

Dear brothers-in-arms:

As you very well know, the Americans are furnished with plenty of very good food and they never go out to the positions which are exposed to Japanese gunfire. On the other hand, how about the Filipinos? This is over, Comrades! Will the Americans change positions with the Filipinos? . . .

Sgt. Allado Abraham
Co. G 3rd Infantry Regiment,
1st Division¹⁷

The Japanese also made use of their war successes in the different war theaters during those early days of the war in their propaganda. By doing so, they were able to insinuate subtly to the loyal Filipinos that they were on the losing side. One such leaflet told them the news of the fall of Singapore to the Japanese at 7:50 p.m. on February 15, 1942. Below the news item were these words:

It is the best time for you to surrender. Life or Death!¹⁸

Another leaflet charged the Americans with willful lying and concealing of true facts to the Filipinos. It was entitled: "Don't be misled by American absurd Propaganda." It said:

It is extremely ridiculous that General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces, intending to patch up the real situation of the USAFFE which is now entirely isolated in the southwest Pacific and to buttress the fighting spirit of troops under his command, is desperately

¹⁷ Sample leaflet dated April 4, 1942 (Military Intelligence Collection).

¹⁸ Sample leaflet dated February 22, 1942 (Military Intelligence Collection); Manila Tribune, February 16, 1942, 1; The New York Times, February 19, 1942, 1.

spreading through every possible [sic: means] of communication, various false and entirely absurd propaganda such as [sic] recapture of seven important forts in the Philippines by the Pacific Fleet or the sinking of a number of Japanese transports or the downing of more than 100 Japanese planes.

We cannot help feeling deep sympathy for [sic] ill fate of MacArthur and other officers under his command who are obliged to command troops, who have no food to eat, nor amusement to comfort them, bitten by mosquitoes, completely exhausted by tropical life, demoralized and wanting of fighting spirit. . . .¹⁹

In a leaflet with the title: "Say farewell to your American General," the Japanese urged the Filipinos not to have too much faith in the ability of America to pay their salaries for she could not even afford food for her fighting soldiers. The Tagalog words were translated thus:

No salaries paid
 No food remains
 No confidence should be given
 to the American Army.²⁰

After inciting the Filipinos to hatred for and distrust of their American superiors, the Japanese tried to induce them to shoot their masters and free themselves from their bondage. They also invited the Filipinos to join them, their blood brothers, in the creation of a new and independent Philippine Republic and in the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Japan's leadership. Those who refused to listen to the call of Japan, the Nipponese ridiculed by asking why they wanted to fight with white peoples against

¹⁹ Leaflet dated February 22, 1942.

²⁰ Leaflet dated April 4, 1942.

their own kind and why they would rather pretend to be more Americans than the Americans themselves?

To further undermine the morale of the long suffering but courageous and loyal Filipinos, pamphlets and leaflets were distributed with letters from their families and homes with the intention of making the home loving Filipinos quit fighting and go home. It is possible that these letters came as a result of a Japanese notice published in the Manila Tribune (the most widely read newspaper before the war) that mail for Bataan soldiers would be delivered as a sign of the benevolence of the Japanese Imperial Army.²¹ Many of these "letters from home" reached the soldiers at Bataan. One of them said:

March 5, 1942

My dearest husband,

This is just to inform you, wherever you are, that Manding and I are getting along fine and so with Lucia. God is taking care of all of us! The other baby (girl) has gone. Dr. Llanas took care of me then in the hospital. So don't worry about me. We are perfectly alright. Dona Isidra and the rest of the neighbors are taking care of us financially.

Manding is getting bigger day by day and more mischievous; but he is very obedient to me though.

Lots of love and kisses from us two.

Your loving wife,
Loleng²²

²¹ Manila Tribune, March 5, 1942, 1; Ibid., March 11, 1942, 1.

²² Leaflet dated March 27, 1942 (Military Intelligence Collection).

The friendliness and "brotherly love" of the Japanese for the Filipinos was well emphasized in the following letter which they must have required Lt. Jose Nievera, M.C. (who was captured by the Japanese on Trail 17 on January 29, 1942) to write. It said:

I am addressing myself to my comrades in Bataan. I cannot stop myself from talking to you from the bottom of my heart. Your day has come. I have returned to Manila under the wholehearted protection of the Japanese soldiers. And what joy met me when I found myself in the midst of my family! I saw my beloved wife and children of whom I was thinking constantly and who even appeared in my dreams. I also met my old friends who are now constantly talking to me in the midst of our happiness.

Now I am eating the best of foods as adobo, michado, sinigang, etc. Courses which I have been longing for in foxholes. I am smoking the best cigarettes, I walk the streets unhampered by anybody and my heart is leaping with joy. It seems to me that I have just awakened from a bad nightmare.

The Japanese Army is not our enemy; our real enemy is the American Army that is always behind us in the battlefield, that is fooling us, and scaring us and wresting away from us our happiness. . . .²³

Surrender tickets were distributed in the hope that many would make use of them. However, the flaw of the Japanese propaganda in Bataan came to light when a small group of soldiers who had used their "surrender tickets" were found dead. They had been bound hand and foot, forced to kneel and then bayoneted many times. One of them with eighteen bayonet wounds lived long enough to cross the lines and tell the story. Evidently, they were questioned about the Fil-American positions,

²³ Leaflet - no date attached to it (Military Intelligence Collection); Manila Tribune, February 8, 1942, 3.

but to no avail.²⁴

In spite of Japanese propaganda, the Fil-Americans continued to fight fiercely and with great determination. In the meantime, hunger and disease became more enervating. Gastroenteritis followed the eating of poisonous roots known as "nomia" which look like potatoes. Efforts were made for a while to supplement their diet with fish from near-by Mariveles where Filipino soldiers were sent on "bancas" with loads of dynamite. For a while this alleviated the food situation but in March 1942, the flour from the Quartermaster bakery gave out.²⁵

Diseases at Bataan multiplied while medicine became practically non-existent. Dysentery, malaria, jaundice, beriberi--all took a great toll among the Fil-Americans. The only quinine supply, for example, was in powdered form and it was impossible to take it orally without vomiting due to its bitterness. Nor was there any way to disinfect equipment in the hospitals.²⁶

Amidst all these privations and hardships, the Japanese-controlled station KZRH in Manila broadcasted a special radio program each night at 9:45 for the soldiers at Bataan. It consisted of popular American recordings with the theme song:

²⁴ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 110.

²⁵ Ibid., 145.

²⁶ Ibid., 146.

"The Ships that Never Came In."²⁷

On the same station Filipino leaders were made to appeal to the remaining troops of Bataan so that the latter would give up the fight. One of these men was General Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine Revolution in 1896. He urged General MacArthur to surrender at once to the Japanese in the name of humanity. However, the War Department in Washington stated that this act of General Aguinaldo apparently became only a joke among the Fil-American soldiers at Bataan.²⁸

At the same time the Japanese planes dropped leaflets and bombs with lavish abandon. The military victories of Japan were repeated and stressed to the beleaguered men. But acts of bravery in the line of duty never failed to inspire them. The Igorot warriors who made a magnificent showing in the battle of the Cotar River were now doing reconnaissance patrol, deep behind the Japanese lines. As the Japanese prepared to crush the Bataan defenders, the tough non-Christian warriors killed many of them by their sniping and clever ambushes.²⁹

A great blow to the morale of the Fil-Americans was the news of the departure of General MacArthur and the American Commissioner to the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre. This was

²⁷ Ibid., 147-149.

²⁸ The New York Times, February 7, 1942, 1.

²⁹ Ibid.

capitalized on by the Japanese in their insidious propaganda. A leaflet was issued for the occasion. It had the picture of a man on top of a plain waving good-bye to a few soldiers who were left on Bataan and who were hopelessly surrounded by the Japanese. After terming this departure an "escape," it urged the Filipinos to prepare the muzzles of their guns and shoot the Americans.³⁰ Loudspeakers also started their own barrage. The Filipinos were urged to retreat now that they were left without a leader.

At this time, more letters came from "home." One of them was supposed to have come from a soldier's son. It said:

I had dreamed about you last night, papa. My mother was telling me that you are surely coming back from the front tomorrow morning. Is that true, papa?³¹

The starved and sick Fil-Americans heard the rumble of Japanese tanks but they were too weak even to lift projectiles to the breaches of guns to sustain counter battery fire. Their lines were reduced to but a fraction of their original strength. A major summarized the situation by saying:

It will have to be a surrender, or else the worst massacre in history. Do you know we have over 7,000 patients now? There are no front lines; we have not anything to fight with.³²

³⁰ Sample leaflet, no date attached (Military Intelligence Collection); The New York Times, March 18, 1942, 1.

³¹ Sample leaflet dated April 8, 1942 (Military Intelligence Collection); The Manila Tribune, March 20, 1942, 1.

³² "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 164-194.

When General King realized that surrender was inevitable, he ordered the destruction of supplies and ammunition to keep them from falling into the hands of the Japanese. Amidst flame, explosions, earthquakes, and chaos, Bataan fell.³³

The Japanese propaganda at Bataan was not as naive and as devoid of value as some writers would lead us to believe. It was subtle, psychologically sound, and it revealed a complete knowledge of the hopeless conditions obtaining there. The Japanese also magnified and exaggerated whatever grudge some Filipinos felt against the discriminatory treatment given them, and they succeeded in convincing a few.

But the effectiveness of the Japanese propaganda was to a great extent nullified by the Fil-Americans with the aid of the Japanese themselves. While they professed kindness and nobility in dealing with the vanquished, their actions belied their words. Moreover, as the days of fighting passed, the Filipinos and Americans jointly realized that they shed the same red blood in battle and that the white and brown soldiers met the same dangers and faced the same deaths in the foxholes.

b. The Surrender of Bataan. Meanwhile, the surrender of the Fil-Americans started. It had two phases: the maniacal massacre which took place all over Bataan when the maddened Japanese fell upon their hapless victims and the murderous

³³ Ibid.; The New York Times, April 10, 1942, 1; The Manila Tribune, April 10, 1942, 1.

trek of the prisoners to San Fernando, Pampanga, on their way to Camp O'Donnell in Capas, Tarlac. The second phase is known to the world as the "Death March."³⁴

A few samples of what happened to the Filipino and American prisoners of war at the Bataan massacre will prove that the first phase of the surrender was really the culmination of Japanese cruelty. At Mariveles, more than twenty-five Filipino soldiers became human bayonet targets to be stabbed and stabbed until life was no longer in them. Along the jungle trails, captives were tied to trees to be hit, spat upon or stabbed as any passing Japanese might see fit. The entire officer personnel of one division were either beheaded or bayoneted to death and many men were buried alive.³⁵

The massacre of the officers of the 91st Division, Philippine Army, was perhaps the most shocking of all, however. All officers were separated from the soldiers and ordered to stand fast while the soldiers resumed their march. There were about four hundred officers and some non-commissioned officers left behind. These were then tied in long files, with field telegraph wires. The wrists of each victim were securely bound, and then each officer was connected with those to the front and rear with strands of the same wire. They were then

³⁴ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 213; Report of Major William Dyess, Air Corps, August 21, 1943; "Death March" from Dyess, Mellnick and McCoy (War Department, Bureau of Public Relations, Press Bureau Release at Midnight, January 27-28, 1944).

³⁵ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 213.

marched into a near-by ravine in columns, arranged in long lines up and down the length of the ravines. The Japanese soldiers started from one end of the lines while their officers started from the other end, the soldiers bayonetting their victims to death and the officers slashing off their heads with sabers. If officers did not cry out, they received only three thrusts. If they screamed, the thrusting went on and on until they made no more sound.³⁶

These uncalled for atrocities after the surrender served to form the nucleus of the guerrilla movement. Hundreds of officers and men, upon seeing what was going on, took off through the jungles to chance an escape rather than face certain destruction in the hands of the Japanese and many of them assumed leadership in the guerrilla movement.³⁷ However, the loyalty of the Filipinos to America did not result only from Japanese atrocities.

The "Death March" is too well known to need recounting. Suffice it to say that the Japanese probably instituted it partly in resentment of Filipino resistance against their fellow Orientals in favor of the American nation, partly as a show of Japanese might and invincibility and to demonstrate that the white race was by no means superior. But from the

³⁶ Ibid., 215.

³⁷ Ibid., 215; Reports of Various American escapees and guerrilla leaders on file (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Department, War Department).

propaganda standpoint it was an unwise move. It succeeded only in alienating the Filipinos whom the Japanese were so anxious to attract.

c. Corregidor Awaits Its Doom. When Bataan surrendered, Corregidor, the rocky fort close to it, continued fighting. But like Bataan, the defenders of Corregidor had a losing war on their hands from the beginning. The great batteries it held were, in effect, relics of a bygone age and drinking water was almost non-existent on the island. However, under General Wainwright (who proceeded to Corregidor to assume the command of the USAFFE upon MacArthur's departure), the men stood by their guns and succeeded in accomplishing their mission of delay.³⁸

At Corregidor, the Filipino soldiers demonstrated the same devotion and faithfulness to the Americans. In spite of the fact that as early as March 15, 1942, General Wainwright gave them the heartbreaking news that the starvation quota of half a Filipino ration per man per day would have to be cut by still another third to make existing supplies last until April 10, 1942, there persisted every desire to continue fighting.

The Japanese tortured the defenders by beginning, on April 10th, the twenty-seven days bombing siege of Corregidor

³⁸ "Corregidor, of Eternal Memory," Triumph in the Philippines (Australia: Combat History Division, G-1, Section Headquarters), II, 1-7; The New York Times, February 2, 1942, 3; ibid., March 28 and 29, 1942, 2.

from Mariveles. And no sooner had the siege started than the Japanese propaganda machine resumed with vigor its work of demoralization. It played up Bataan's fall and the futility of further defense. But the Japanese, who had not anticipated any stand of consequence on the island once Bataan had fallen, were again disappointed.

However, the odds against the valiant soldiers grew each day and on May 4th, the Japanese succeeded in making a landing between the Infantry and Cavalry Points. By this time, only a few mouthfuls of water were left in the fort and this fact contributed its great share in the fall of Corregidor on May 6, 1942.³⁹

The significance of Bataan and Corregidor were best expressed by General MacArthur when he said:

Bataan with Corregidor, citadel of its integral defense, made possible all that has happened since. History I am sure, will record it as one of the decisive battles of the world. Its long protracted struggle enabled the United Nations to gather strength to resist in the Pacific. Had it not held out, Australia would have fallen with incalculable disastrous results. Our triumphs of today belong equally to that dead army. Its heroism and sacrifices have been fully acclaimed but the great strategic results of that mighty defense are only now being fully apparent.⁴⁰

The defence of Bataan and Corregidor was made possible by the 12,000 Americans and 70,000 Filipinos who had to withstand a constant propaganda bombardment under conditions calculated to break down morale.

³⁹ "Corregidor, of Eternal Memory," op. cit., 14; Manila Tribune, March 26, 1942, 1; ibid., May 7, 1942, 1.

⁴⁰ "Corregidor, of Eternal Memory," op. cit., 14.

The First Period of Japan's Occupation of the Philippines

Manila, on the other hand, had already experienced Japanese rule three months before Bataan surrendered. The Nipponese forces actually occupied the Philippine capital on January 2, 1942, although it had been declared an open city a few days earlier.⁴¹

The inhabitants of the city expected the worst before the Japanese forces came in. Some feared that the Japanese soldiers would go from house to house and loot whatever valuables took their fancy. Others remembered with fear and anxiety the rape of Nanking.⁴²

Amidst all these uncertainties, the high Commonwealth officials had to leave Manila and join General MacArthur at Bataan. But to assure the Filipinos that their leaders were not really escaping the sad fate of those who were to be left behind, President Manuel L. Quezon appointed Jorge B. Vargas, his executive secretary, as Mayor of Greater Manila. Vargas was left behind to encourage them in this dark hour, and to maintain peace and order while waiting for the Japanese to occupy the city.⁴³

On the day of the arrival of the Japanese forces, Mayor Vargas ordered the Metropolitan police to put a big banner across the facade facing west of the Manila City Hall with the

⁴¹ The Detroit Free Press, January 3, 1942, 1.

⁴² Interview with Drs. Augusto Camara and Conrado Dayrit, September 6, 1946 (Both doctors were in Manila on January 2, 1942).

⁴³ The New York Times, December 28, 1941, 2.

words: "Open city, be calm, stay at home, no shooting."⁴⁴

The Japanese Army, from previous bitter experiences in conquered Chinese cities, planned an orderly occupation of Manila.⁴⁵ To prepare the minds of the Filipinos for the proper reception of the army of occupation, the propaganda corps had begun to drop from planes leaflets professing friendship to the Filipinos. These further stated that the Japanese were at war with the Americans, not with the Filipinos. They also assured them that life and property would be safeguarded and that the status of the open city under international law would be respected. One leaflet said: "Filipinos, stay at home. Save your beautiful city."⁴⁶

The entry into Manila began at six o'clock in the evening on January second when a small advance detachment of Japanese troops entered with the plan of cooperating with the local police in the maintenance of peace and order. This was followed by soldiers in trucks and staff cars which came from the north and south of Manila. Some of the trucks distributed more leaflets carrying a message from the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army urging the people to be calm and to trust in the genuine concern for their welfare of the army of occupation.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Manila Tribune, January 1, 1943, 6.

⁴⁵ "Bataan into Darkness," op. cit., 6.

⁴⁶ Manila Tribune, op. cit.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

In spite of the kind words of the propaganda corps, martial law was proclaimed in Manila and the Commander-in-Chief ordered the issuance of posters enumerating acts which the Japanese forces considered untoward and hence punishable by death. The system of making the lowest type of Filipinos spy on their countrymen also began with this proclamation. Those were promised rewards who reported any violators of the following hostile acts:

1. The jeopardizing of the political and economic set-ups to be instituted by the Japanese and the disturbance of industries, transportation, and communication facilities.

2. The fomenting of ideas that would disturb the minds of public officials and the people.⁴⁸

On the same day, Jorge Vargas was appointed head of the central administrative organization, which the Japanese called the "Executive Commission." Vargas was ordered to proceed at once and organize the following six departments: Interior, Finance, Justice, Agriculture, Education, Health and Public Welfare, Public Works and Communications. He was also instructed to have each department headed by a minister. Japanese advisers and assistant advisers were to be assigned to each one of them. These Japanese advisers were to pull the strings behind the curtain and make their marionettes act.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ "The Commander-in-Chief's order on January 2, 1942 for Peace in the Philippines," The Journal of the Philippines (Manila: Japanese Imperial Forces Publication, 1942), I, 1.

⁴⁹ "Organization of the Central Military Administration," ibid., 7.

Vargas was subsequently called by the Japanese Imperial Army representatives for an interview that day. He was given more duties to perform: to maintain peace and order, to control the movement of goods into the city for the purpose of securing an abundant supply for the Japanese Army and the residents of Manila, and to provide the invaders with Filipino labor and materials. He was also made to give his consent to the use of various installations and facilities in the Islands for military purposes. From the beginning of the Japanese occupation of the Archipelago, it was apparent that the welfare of the conquering army took precedence over that of the Filipinos.⁵⁰

At the same time, the Japanese found more ways to tighten their control on the daily life of the people. The newspapers,⁵¹ the radio stations,⁵² the mails and all the other means of communications and transportation were rigidly regulated and censored.⁵³

Moreover, every Filipino was required to pay a head tax and to acquire a residence certificate as a token of his subjection to Japan. This certificate was used for purposes of identifying people who went in and out of Manila and in this

⁵⁰ "Interview between Representatives of the Imperial Japanese Forces and Mr. Vargas," ibid., 9.

⁵¹ "Regulation of Philippine Newspapers," ibid., 9.

⁵² "Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief, January 2, 1942," ibid., 17.

⁵³ "Censorship," ibid., 21; The Manila Tribune, February 13, 1942, 1.

way, the Japanese were able to detect those of suspicious character and indirectly to prevent the infiltration of ideas inimical to the purposes of Japan in the Islands.⁵⁴

Hardly had the Japanese established themselves when their economic grip on the Archipelago began to be felt. By the middle of March, 1942, the Japanese Army took over the management of the National Rice and Corn Corporation, the government agency during the Commonwealth period which took charge of the purchase and consumption of two main Philippine staples: rice and corn. Likewise, the Department of Agriculture was ordered by the Japanese militarists to report on the possibility of growing cotton and on methods of diverting Philippine agricultural industry into producing products for home consumption instead of export crops such as sugar, coconut, and abaca.

To make it easier for them to accomplish this economic exploitation, the Japanese did not revive at once the popularly elected pre-war Philippine Assembly. Instead, they gave Vargas, whom they had chosen to head their Executive Commission, all the legislative powers in addition to his executive powers. Thus, they dealt only with one man instead of with many.⁵⁶

They also created an advisory body, the Council of State,

⁵⁴ The Manila Tribune, March 16, 1942, 1; "Notification Concerning Residence Certificates," February 17, 1942, The Journal of the Philippines, op. cit., 62.

⁵⁵ The Manila Tribune, April 22, 1942, 4.

⁵⁶ Ibid., February 22, 1942, 1.

to help Chairman Vargas in the performance of his duties. This body was composed of thirty-four of the best known and most influential Filipino leaders. By their inclusion in the newly established government, the Japanese intended to make Vargas' orders less objectionable to at least their followers.⁵⁷

To those who refused to join the Japanese puppet government, death was the penalty. Jose Abad Santos, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and a man of great ability and moral integrity had been chosen by President Quezon to head the Commonwealth government in the unoccupied areas in the President's absence. Unfortunately, the Japanese captured him in Cebu Island and attempted to force him to collaborate with them in the establishment of a new government. He refused and was executed. To his son who was with him just before his death, he said: "This is a rare chance . . . not everyone is given the opportunity to die for his country."⁵⁸

Other officials of the Philippine Commonwealth were also subjected to humiliating punishments. Judges Arsenio Locsin and Gregorio Narvasa were among the Filipinos who were tied to telephone poles along the boulevards of Manila for three

⁵⁷ "The Council of State Organized," Journal, op. cit., 67-68.

⁵⁸ Report of Chick Parsons to President Quezon (Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.); ernando Abaya, Betrayal in the Philippines (New York: A. A. Wyn Inc., 1946), 29.

days and nights.⁵⁹

In contrast to the life of ease and security during the American era, life under the Japanese was one of constant fear. The Kempe-tai started its activities as soon as the Japanese came. This organization was the Japanese version of the Nazi "Gestapo." Japanese sentries, partly because of ignorance on their part of Filipino customs and traditions, partly because of a desire to show off their authority to the conquered people and perhaps also partly because of their own feeling of insecurity, began their own reign of terror. Whenever a Filipino passed one of them, he was required to stop, take off his hat, and make a low bow. If the obeisance did not suit the Japanese,⁶⁰ or if a Filipino cast a look which the sentry thought insulting, he was slapped, punched and kicked. Women and children were not spared a similar treatment.⁶¹

Charles Foster Hancock reported that a small boy had the tendons of his ankles bayoneted by a soldier who demanded the eggs he was carrying. A fisherman was seriously wounded because he was not bright enough to produce his permit upon entering Manila while still others were wounded because they

⁵⁹ Report of Clark Lee (Military Intelligence . . .).

⁶⁰ Report of Lucy Brown to Richard Ely on Cebu (Military Intelligence . . .); Report of Albert Klestadt dated December 29, 1942 (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence . . .).

⁶¹ Report of Vice Consul William Fraleigh, June 20, 1942 (In answer to a Gripsholm Questionnaire, Military Intelligence, War Department, Washington, D. C.).

were unable to answer questions.⁶²

Another spectator to these initial atrocities in Manila was Dr. Dolores Lopez Vda. de Vera, a physician of the Mexican Consulate in Tokyo who was caught by the war in Manila enroute to Mexico. She said:

While passing a bridge in the middle of the city by the Pasig River, we saw two men submerged in water up to their necks, with their faces to the sun. Some Japanese soldiers on the banks were watching them. When the men dropped their heads towards the water, the Japanese struck them in the head with their rifles to make them hold their heads back with their faces toward the sun. When we returned from the movie, we were told by a Philippine guard that the men had become submerged and were now under the water dead.

Another case witnessed by me concerns a youth fifteen or sixteen years old who passed riding a bicycle across a street and entered a cross street. He did this in front of two Japanese approaching on a motorcycle. One of them, the stronger, made the youth dismount and kneel on the pavement and struck him so hard in the face that his nose bled. Not being satisfied, one of the soldiers pierced the boy with a bayonet amidst the great laughter from the other. When asked why they treated the youth so badly, they answered that it was done so that at another time he would not pass in streets before the Japanese.

I also saw with my own eyes a man picking some empty cans from a pile in the street, probably to carry to his house. The Japanese came from a nearby house and asked what he was doing. The man said: "I am picking up these cans to carry to my house to use them." The Japanese caught him by the front of his coat and said: "You are a thief because these cans are not yours," notwithstanding the fact that the cans were in the street and the Japanese in the house. Then among four Japanese that came from the house they took a rope, tied him to a post and began to beat him, as of custom. . . . The following day . . . I saw the man and he had a can in front of him at his chest full of water. The man was crying for water and the Japanese guard nearby kept saying: "Drink, you have it,"

⁶² Report of Charles Hancock Foster, *ibid.*

but the man's neck was tied up so tight he could not drink it.⁶³

Gaston Willoquet, the French Consul at Manila before the war, was the source of this story which proves that in some cases the poorly informed sentry contributed more to alienating the Filipinos than even their better informed superiors. He said:

On January 12, 1941, two men accused of looting were apprehended by the Japanese MPs and taken to Rizal stadium in Manila, tied up to posts, beaten and tortured by lighted cigarettes and sabre thrusts. A crowd gathered while this was going on. A Japanese officer passing by in a car noticed the crowd, stopped and alighted. He argued with the MPs and stated to the crowd that through his intercession, the two men would be released. However, after the officer left, one of the MPs ran one of the men through with his sword and chopped off the head of the other. Then the two MPs kicked the head of the decapitated man about.⁶⁴

There were hardly any occupied provinces without incidents of Japanese atrocity. Private property was confiscated, even pregnant women were abused. These instances were gleaned from documents found on the persons of Japanese prisoners caught in later battle engagements.⁶⁵

The Japanese propaganda corps, which named itself the Hodobu, tried to explain some of these unexpected acts of the Japanese Army men. For example, they advised the civilians to cooperate with the sentries and to approach them with a

⁶³ Report of Dolores Lopez Vda. de Vera (Washington, D. C., Military Intelligence . . .).

⁶⁴ Gaston Willoquet, "See You in Manila, Colonel Ohta," (Philippine Section, Military Intelligence, War Department, Washington, D. C., Mss, 1943).

⁶⁵ Translations of Prisoners of War Documents from the Watari Group (Washington, D. C., Military Intelligence . . .).

friendly but "respectful attitude." They reasoned out that some Filipinos abused the sentries and the result was that the soldiers were compelled to use force on them. Another Rodobu man said that slapping in Japan was a very minor punishment although in the Philippines it was an insult of the first magnitude.⁶⁶ These explanations did not seem to bear out the Japanese contention that they "love Filipinos" and that they came as friends with every desire to respect and consider their customs and traditions.

Gradually the Filipinos began to realize that other dangers faced them. Hunger and exposure which were so unusual in such a rich and sparsely populated country were now beginning to affect those who had never been indigents. The Filipinos, therefore, began to compare their life of abundance under the United States with that under Japan.⁶⁷

Hence, civilian resistance against the Japanese grew in intensity. The Filipinos took every opportunity to show their contempt for their conquerors. Many Japanese informers mysteriously disappeared. A secret society known as the "Fighters for Freedom" (FFF) was formed to foster civilian resistance.⁶⁸

One day in February, 1942, the Japanese Military authorities

⁶⁶ The Manila Tribune, February 16, 1942, 4.

⁶⁷ Ibid., March 3, 1942, 1; ibid., March 6, 1942, 1.

⁶⁸ The New York Times, February 22, 1942, 2.

woke up to find that copies of their proclamation, which they had plastered throughout Manila and the countryside, had all been strangely altered. This proclamation enumerated a number of offenses against the Japanese which were punishable by death and which threatened that for every Japanese killed, ten Filipinos would be shot. The alteration made the proclamation read thus: "For every Filipino killed, ten Japanese soldiers will lose their lives."⁶⁹

The classic example of Filipino resistance in the provinces during this early period of Japanese rule was the Cuerva Case. In the province of Batangas, the enemy sought the services of one familiar with the roads to drive a truck which would convey twenty-four Japanese soldiers to a garrison. A local Filipino chauffeur named Cuerva volunteered for the job. But instead of driving the Japanese where they wished to go, he swerved the truck over a cliff, killing himself and eleven of the enemy soldiers.⁷⁰

In the meantime, propaganda in the local newspapers was being continued to the effect that the Americans were interested only in exploiting the Philippines and that they had no real affection for the Filipinos, whom they supposedly treated with contempt and disregard. They published many accounts of American discriminations against their Filipino allies in

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., February 16, 1942, 41.

Bataan which they professed to be true.⁷¹ To the Filipinos, at this early phase of the Japanese occupation, however, such propaganda by a nation whom they knew had just been doing the very things she decried, exploiting the Philippines' resources, and maltreating her civilians, could hardly be expected to produce great effect and usually such accounts were then either ignored or derided.

⁷¹ The Manila Tribune, March 20, 1942, 1; ibid., April 14, 1942, 1; ibid., April 16, 1942, 1; ibid., April 17, 1942, 1; ibid., April 21, 1942, 4.

CHAPTER V

JAPANESE PROPAGANDA MEDIA AND TECHNIQUES

The military conquest of the Philippines was only the first step in the ambitious plan of the Island Empire to enfold the Philippines within its "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The rest of the plan depended on the proper indoctrination of the Filipinos to the realization and acceptance of this "New Order" and the Philippines' place in it. To achieve this, the Japanese resorted to many and varied propaganda instruments, media, and techniques,¹ reminiscent in many ways of those of Nazi Germany.

Japan Isolates the Philippines from Outside Influence

The process of ideological and cultural reformation necessitated first, the complete insulation of the Islands from all western contact and influence, and second, the regulation or abolition of such existing institutions and practices as would interfere with or hinder the taking root of Japanese ideas. Both of these the Japanese promptly undertook, even before the last shot at Bataan was fired. Foreign mail was banned, and

¹ Propaganda may be defined as a "systematic attempt by an interested individual or individuals to control the attitudes of groups of individuals through their use of suggestions and consequently to control their actions," by Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935), 89. For our purposes, we will differentiate propaganda media, techniques, and lines thus: media are the agencies of transmission and communication; techniques involve the pre-planned and often expert use of propaganda media. Propaganda lines, on the other hand, are the doctrines and ideas disseminated through the use of media and techniques.

local correspondence was subjected to a strict censorship by the Japanese Military Police.² All wireless telegraph and telephone communications, except those given express permission by the Japanese authorities, were absolutely prohibited.³ The distribution of printed matter such as newspapers, magazines, books, and even Japanese-English dictionaries was strictly supervised.⁴ Typewriters,⁵ mimeograph machines and other printing machines had to be registered.⁶ Listening to foreign radio broadcasts was absolutely forbidden.⁷

Japan's Propaganda Organization in the Philippines

In contrast to the foregoing stern regulations, Japanese propaganda itself followed a policy of outward benevolence and attraction. The spreading of Japan's gospel was first entrusted to the Propaganda Corps of the Japanese Army. The word "propaganda" having acquired a disreputable connotation, this office,

² "Order No. 4 to Chairman Vargas from the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces," Journal of the Philippines (Manila: Japanese Imperial Forces Publication, 1942), I, 23-24.

³ "Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief dated January 31, 1942," ibid., I, 19.

⁴ Manila Tribune, February 8, 1942, 1.

⁵ Ibid., July 2, 1942, 1.

⁶ Ibid., May 27, 1942, 1.

⁷ Ibid., July 25, 1942, 1; Federal Communications Commission's Daily Broadcasts, henceforth to be known as FCC (Washington, D. C.), July 18, 1942, 1.

referred to as the Hodobu,⁸ was reorganized in October of 1942 as the Department of Information of the Imperial Japanese Forces, under Colonel Jiro Saito, a well known propaganda and public relations man.⁹ The Japanese established also in Manila a Liaison and Public Assistance Service, which had the avowed purpose of securing jobs for the unemployed.¹⁰ On July 14, 1943, another agency, the Bureau of Information and Public Security, was added to their propaganda department; this was created to help promote peace and order in the Islands.¹¹ All these agencies operated under the Japanese Army and remained active until the creation of the Board of Information of the puppet Philippine Republic.¹²

Propaganda Media

a. Printed Matter. That the Japanese knew the effectiveness of printed matter as a propaganda instrument can be seen by the liberal way they made use of posters, pamphlets, postage stamps, official journals, and newspapers.

⁸ George Abbott, Japanese Propaganda in the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: State Department, 1943).

⁹ Ibid.; Manila Tribune, October 11, 1942, 1; Radio Report of the Far East, henceforth to be known as RRFE, a bi-weekly analysis of Enemy Radio Digest (Washington, D. C.: Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission), March 30, 1944, No. 42, E 1.

¹⁰ Manila Tribune, October 11, 1942, 1.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "Why the Board of Information," Philippine Review (Manila: March 7, 1944), LXXI, No. 1, 3.

Posters. Posters occupied an important place in their propaganda. These were widely distributed throughout the Islands and it is probable that these, of all the propaganda media used, reached the greatest number of people.

There were five objectives discernible among the posters available to the writer: (1) The inciting of hatred against America. Posters depicted America's scorch-the-earth policy with pictures of burning churches and devastated areas. Other posters harped on the supposed American discrimination and race prejudice towards the Filipinos at Bataan. American soldiers were shown maltreating and abusing their Filipino comrades in arms. Race discrimination in the United States was likewise denounced. One poster labeled "The True Picture of America," portrayed a supposed lynching in a typical American town where lynching was said to be an ordinary occurrence. (The only flaw in this picture was that the victim was a white, blonde-haired man.) (2) The awakening in the Filipinos of a greater sense of nationalism and pride in their native culture and traditions. One poster glorified the flag of the Philippine Republic, the same that was adopted by the short-lived Philippine Republic in 1898. By playing on their pride and patriotism, the Japanese hoped to arouse in the Filipinos a dislike for what they called, "the decadent western culture and civilization." (3) They attempted to emphasize the contrast between the degenerate and soft living of the occidental peoples and the healthy mode of life of the Japanese with

posters of healthy looking children doing the "radio taiso" (calisthenics). (4) Other posters glorified Japan's military might. A poster with a picture of a Japanese plane, a warship and soldiers was captioned: "The Liberators of Oriental Peoples." Another showed an American warship receiving a hit from a Japanese plane. (5) The propagation of the doctrines of "Asia for the Asiatics" and of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." In these sets of posters, the invincibility of a united Asia under Japan's leadership was stressed. With all the Far Eastern nations pooling their resources together and working for the common good, prosperity for all was promised and the dream of "Asia for the Asiatics" was to become a reality.¹³ These and similar posters attempted to give the impression that it was a great folly on the part of the Americans to have dared to fight Japan.

Pamphlets. The pamphlets issued by the Japanese propaganda units embraced many diverse subjects. "The Burning Faith of Calvary" was one of the pamphlets which tried to convince the Filipinos, who were mostly Christians, that Japan too, although predominantly non-Christian, had a not insignificant Christian population.¹⁴ "Aguinaldo's Independent Army" was a

¹³ From the Winifred O'Connor Pablo and the Gifford Kibbee Collection of Japanese Posters in the Philippines, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

¹⁴ Lt. S. Mochizuki, The Burning Faith of Calvary, An Address to the Christian Leaders in the Philippines, October 18, 1942 (Manila: The Department of Information, 1942).

narration of the patriotism and courage of the Filipino revolutionary leaders. This pamphlet did not fail to call attention to the support (insignificant though it was) that Japan gave Aguinaldo and his forces in their struggle first against Spain, and later against the United States.¹⁵ The speeches of the different Commanders-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines were also published in pamphlet form.¹⁶ Hisasi Enosawa, who spent many years of his life in the Philippines and thus understood Filipino psychology, had many pamphlets to his name, among which may be mentioned: "Rasshiki¹⁷ is the Way," "History and Spirit of Japan's Education," "Significance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," and "The Co-Prosperity Sphere is the Right of Asiatics to Live."¹⁸ Other pamphlets discussed the Japanese-sponsored organizations, such as the Kalibapi and the Neighborhood Associations, in an effort to explain to the people the aims and purposes of such organizations.¹⁹ "The Voice of the New Philippines" was a

¹⁵ Ki Kimura, Aguinaldo's Independent Army (Tokyo: Daitao Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1942).

¹⁶ Address to the Filipino People of the Commander-in-Chief of Japan's Expeditionary Forces in the Philippines (Manila: Propaganda Corps, Imperial Japanese Forces, 1942).

¹⁷ "Rasshiki" means the spirit of order.

¹⁸ Hisasi Enosawa, Significance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Manila: Japanese Propaganda Corps, 1942).

¹⁹ "Ano Ang Kalibapi"? (What is the Kalibapi?) (Manila: Department of Information, 1943); The Kalibapi Workers' Handbook (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943).

collection of lectures on current topics, and included Marquis Tokugawa's "Cultural Movement"; Chairman Vargas' "Why the Filipinos Should Cooperate with Japan"; Benigno Aguino's speech at Naga, Camarines Sur; and that of Pio Duran, a pro-Japanese even before the war. All of these urged collaboration with the Japanese.²⁰

Among the Filipinos who contributed most to Japan's pamphlet drive was Jose P. Laurel, the man chosen to head the puppet Philippine Republic. There is no doubt that the widespread publication of his writings could be ascribed in no small measure to the importance of his position. And, with his smooth and fluent style, his works must have been widely read. The "Filipino Credo" was his invitation to his countrymen for a spiritual return to the Oriental fold by following and imitating Japanese ways.²¹ The booklet which he entitled "Forces Which Make a Nation Great" was a series of anecdotes emphasizing the different Filipino virtues (as exemplified in the lives of Philippine heroes) which he considered, demonstrated the Filipino nation to be definitely of the East.²² In his inaugural address as President of the Republic, he proposed the creation of a government based on force, so that:

²⁰ Voice of the New Philippines (Manila: Department of Information, November, 1942).

²¹ Jose P. Laurel, The Filipino Credo (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944).

²² Jose P. Laurel, Forces that Make a Nation Great (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944).

. . . the Philippine Republic need not undergo the humiliation of outside intervention in purely internal disturbances.²³

He also urged the dissolution of political parties to prevent the division of the Filipino people in times of stress, as during the infancy of the Republic.²⁴

The Philatelic Medium. The philatelic medium, with its well known economic and educational value, provided the Japanese with a ready and effective instrument for a subtle invasion of every home which carries on any sort of correspondence; and this they proceeded to exploit with all due promptness. On March 4, 1942, just two months after the occupation of Manila, and with the issue at Bataan still undecided, the mail service was resumed, but only stamps authorized by the Japanese Military Administration were accepted.²⁵ These first stamps issued were the old "Rizal" stamps, and the "Magellan Landing" stamps, with the words, "Commonwealth" and "United States of America" blacked out.²⁶

The Japanese commemorated with stamps almost every event of significance; and they used stamps also for popularizing slogans and obtaining support for their pet projects. On

²³ Jose P. Laurel, Inaugural Address (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Manila Tribune, March 25, 1942, 1.

²⁶ James B. Hatcher, "Stamps," The New York Sunday American, January 23, 1944, 4.

May 18, 1942, the "Woman and Carabao" stamp of the Commonwealth government, with a two-centavo surcharge, and the words, "Congratulations Fall of Bataan and Corregidor, 1942" was used to commemorate Japan's victory in the Philippines.²⁷ To celebrate the first anniversary of the Great Asiatic War, these same stamps were over-printed with Japanese characters and the date "12-8-42."²⁸ When the Japanese wanted the people to increase their food production, they issued on November 12, 1942, their "Food Production" stamps. These were inscribed as follows: "Philippine Postage-Produce and Preserve Food for New Philippines."²⁹ One year after the members of the Philippine Executive Commission took their oath of office, they were honored with special stamps. These were issued on January 23, 1943, and consisted of the 1941 Moro Vinta and Clipper air-mail sets, surcharged two centavos on eight centavos, and five centavos on one peso, and dated "1-23-43."³⁰ A two-day commemorative set, with inscriptions in Japanese and English, appeared on May 17, 1943 to mark the first anniversary of the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. These stamps showed on the left side a Japanese soldier, and on the right, the Japanese flag, a plane and warship, flanking a map of Manila Bay spotting

²⁷ Manila Tribune, May 16, 1942, 1; Hatcher, op. cit.

²⁸ Hatcher, ibid.

²⁹ Manila Tribune, December 6, 1942, 6; Hatcher, op. cit.

³⁰ Hatcher, ibid.; Manila Tribune, January 17, 1943, 1.

"Manila," "Bataan," "Corregidor." They also had Japanese inscriptions which when translated read as follows: "Filipino Post-Bataan, Corregidor Fall One Full Year Anniversary--Showa Eighteenth Year, Fifth Month."³¹ The proclamation and inauguration of the Japanese puppet Philippine Republic was of course an event of transcendental importance, and for this occasion, three sets of stamps were issued on October 14, 1943. The design on these stamps portrayed a Filipino woman dressed in native costume, representing the Philippines. At her right was the monument of the Filipino patriot and martyr, Dr. Jose Rizal, and at her left was the flag of the puppet Philippine Republic. Symbolic of her liberty were two broken chains hanging by her sides. Written on the upper part of the stamp (in both Roman alphabet and Philippine script) was the phrase "Kalayaan Nang Filipinas" (Philippine Independence).³² For the first anniversary of the Republic, the commemorative stamps (Special Laurel Stamps) were not issued until January 12, 1945, when the American forces were almost at the gates of Manila. These were of five, seven and ten-centavo denominations.³³

One honors the country when one honors her heroes; so the Japanese issued the heroes series, honoring Jose Rizal, Jose Burgos and Apolinario Mabini³⁴ stamps.

³¹ Manila Tribune, April 11, 1943, 1; Hatcher, op. cit.

³² Manila Tribune, October 10, 1943, 2.

³³ Ibid., January 4, 1945, 1.

³⁴ Ibid., February 8, 1944, 1.

The sale of these stamps was rapidly enhanced by the prompt re-establishment of regular mail service in all the occupied areas of the Philippines. In places without postal facilities, Laurel's Ordinance No. 21 ordered the designation of barrio lieutenants as postal agents with a ten percent commission on the sale of stamps and postage stock.³⁵

Newspapers, Magazines, and Official Journals. The great influence of newspapers, journals, and magazines on the thoughts and views of a nation hardly needs emphasizing. It is to be expected, therefore, that the Japanese used these means as one of their chief channels of disseminating their propaganda. The day following the occupation of Manila by the Japanese forces, the Manila Tribune, one of the most widely read English dailies, resumed publication under the censorship of Mr. Isogai, a civilian member of the Japanese Propaganda Corps. Three weeks later, the Propaganda Corps itself took over completely the job of censorship.³⁶ In due time, La Vanguardia (a Spanish daily) and the Taliba (a Tagalog daily), both sister publications of the Tribune, also resumed publication.³⁷ The DMHM Newspapers, those of the other big newspaper chain in Manila, were not revived, for the plant was burned during the 1941

³⁵ Ibid., June 6, 1944, 2.

³⁶ Ibid., January 5, 1942, 1.

³⁷ "Regulation of Newspapers," Journal of the Philippines, 9; "Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army on Newspapers," ibid., February 2, 1942, 1.

Japanese bombings of the city.

The magazines which were in circulation during the Japanese occupation included the Shinseiki (New Era), an illustrated magazine devoted purely to propaganda, whose early issues contained interesting photographs of the bombings of Pearl Harbor and the fighting in Bataan, Corregidor and other areas;³⁸ the Liwayway, a Tagalog weekly; and the Philippine Review, a well written monthly, edited by Albano Pacis, the former editor of the Philippines Herald, one of the DMHM Newspapers.³⁹

Besides these magazines, there were the official journals, namely, the Journal of the Philippines, first published on March 21, 1942, by the Japanese Military Administration, and the City Gazette.⁴⁰ Both of these journals were written in English and Japanese and contained the proclamations, notifications, orders, and speeches of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, and of the Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration, as well as the executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission.⁴¹

On October 12, 1942, all the Philippine newspapers and magazines which were under private management, were taken over by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi and the Japanese Osaka Mainichi.

³⁸ Abbott, op. cit.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ The Manila Tribune, October 2, 1942, 1.

⁴¹ Abbott, op. cit.; Manila Tribune, March 25, 1942, 3; ibid., April 4, 1942, 4.

These combines established a subsidiary in the city, the Manila Sinbun-sya, under the Presidency of Masao Matsuka, the former editor of the Keijonippo in Chosen. In addition, the Manila Sinbun-sya took over the management of a number of regional newspapers, such as the Davao Nichi Nichi, and the Bicol Herald. It also published the Manila Sinbun, a Japanese paper. According to the Japanese Army authorities, the new publishing company was established for the purpose of:

. . . further clarifying the invulnerable position of the Nippon Empire, now in the midst of the creation of the New Order in Greater East Asia, of making more thoroughly understood the purport of the military administration in the Philippines, and of propelling with greater force the materialization of the New Philippines.⁴²

With the amalgamation of all the Philippine newspapers under the Manila Sinbun-sya, the volume of "pure propaganda" materials printed in them increased. A specially edited Japanese Language section (Kana) was made a regular daily feature of the Tribune, Taliba, and La Vanguardia.⁴³

Of all the newspapers published during the period of Japanese occupation, the Tribune continued to be the most widely read. This was published daily except Mondays, with a special Sunday issue. The latter included a four- or six-page supplement, made up almost entirely of pure, undisguised propaganda articles, such as: "Japan Has Yet to Show Full

⁴² Manila Tribune, November 1, 1942, 1; RRFE, November 10, 1942, I, 5.

⁴³ Abbott, op. cit.

force of Her Navy."⁴⁴ "The Nipponese Wife" (a glorification of the docile, uncomplaining Japanese wife);⁴⁵ "Kill Everything Over Ten" (an article relating the supposed atrocities of the Americans when they first came to the Islands).⁴⁶ The article, "Eight Nipponese Soldiers Learn to Speak and Write Tagalog,"⁴⁷ was clearly intended to show the desire of the Japanese to befriend and understand the Filipinos. A regular Sunday feature was the column "From My Nipa Hut," by Mang Kiko, who was believed by some to be the author of a pro-Japanese column in the daily Tribune.⁴⁸

The daily issue of the Tribune usually consisted of four or six tabloid-sized pages. Here was printed all the news that the Japanese thought fit for the Filipinos to read. Crisp slogans were printed in large letters at the bottom of each front page: "Work every day the true independent way," "Sampaguita is the flower, Nippon the friend," "The Rising Sun of Japan is the shining sun of Asia," "Freedom this year is freedom forever," "Today's collaboration builds tomorrow's Philippines," "The ABC of the New Order is Act, Build, Collaborate." ⁴⁹

⁴⁴ The Sunday Tribune, June 29, 1942, 1.

⁴⁵ Hisasi Enosawa, Sunday Tribune, April 12, 1942, 3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., January 17, 1943, 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid., May 3, 1942, 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁹ Mona Gardner, "Memo to an AMG Editor," Collier's, April 29, 1944, 2.

The Tribune had its share of regular columns too: there was "Short Talk," by Juan de la Cruz or "Commentator" as he called himself; "Off and On," by Maharajah,⁵⁰ "Our Today" and its variation, "Our Tomorrow," by E. M.⁵¹ It goes without saying that these had favorable things to say about the Japanese or they would not have maintained their regularity. The last page was devoted to the "Kana."⁵²

The typical issue of the Tribune almost invariably carried glowing reports of Japanese victories, of enormous losses inflicted on the enemy, of how the enemy was put to rout. One item would mention so many planes downed, another the number of ships damaged or sunk. The figures given were always so overwhelmingly in favor of the Japanese that it was not long until the Filipino public started to doubt the veracity of these reports. For example, there was the report of the Solomons Battle in which the Americans were said to have lost 125 ships and 850 planes, while the Japanese lost only 41 ships and 206 planes.⁵³ Every other battle, according to the Tribune was just a repetition of this, with the figures varying more or less, but always in Japan's favor. There was not

⁵⁰ Manila Tribune, November 24, 1942, 4.

⁵¹ Ibid., December 5, 1942, 10.

⁵² Samples of Manila Tribune from the Clements Library, University of Michigan; Abbott, op. cit.

⁵³ Manila Tribune, December 5, 1942, 1.

a single instance, whether advancing or retreating, where the Japanese were admitted to have lost a battle. Because of this, several anecdotes started circulating among the people. There was one popularized by two daring Filipino comedians, Togo and Pugo. Their conversation went as follows: "Who sank the American Navy?" "The Japanese?" "No." "The Germans?" "No." "The Italians?" "No." "Then who?" "Why, the Tribune, of course."⁵⁴

Another anecdote was the following: St. Peter heard a knock at the door of Heaven. Opening it, he asked, "Who are you, and what do you want?" The strangers answered, "We are the souls of the ten Japanese aviators who were killed in the last raid over the Marshall Islands, and we would like to gain admittance." St. Peter scanned his list carefully, and shaking his head, said, "I'm sorry boys, but I cannot take you in. The Tribune says that no Japanese aviators died in that raid."⁵⁵

As the Tribune kept on giving obviously garbled accounts of the war, the Domei, the Japanese official news agency, became synonymous with lies and falsehood, and "Domei" became known as the "Department of the Most Erroneous Information."⁵⁶

When the tide of war started going against Japan, the Tribune devoted less and less space to war news. During the

⁵⁴ Anecdote related by Dr. Conrado Dayrit.

⁵⁵ Anecdote related by Drs. Genaro Felizardo and Augusto Camara.

⁵⁶ As told by Dr. Augusto Camara.

latter months of the war, days at a time would pass without any mention of the fighting fronts, while the pages were filled by news of the pacification campaign, prisoner of war releases, the Kalibapi doings, Neighborhood Association activities, Governors' Conventions, various speeches of Japanese and Filipino officials, announcements that food prices would shortly drop, and similar news about the home front. The articles of "Commentator" took on a distinctly apologetic tone in some instances and began to be filled with such phrases as "shortening of lines, regrouping of troops, masterly strategic evacuation, tremendous enemy losses to gain an important objective, brave defense against overwhelming odds," etc.⁵⁷ The astute Filipino reading public could easily tell the progress of the war by reading between the lines of the war news. For example, the Tribune would publish news about an American raid on a certain Japanese held island, and tell how the Americans retreated in confusion in the face of fierce Japanese counter-attacks. A few days after, a small item would tell about the heavy damage inflicted by Japanese bombers on the same island. This was enough to indicate that in spite of the Tribune, that island had been taken by the Americans, or the Japanese would not be bombing it at all.⁵⁸

Another paradox that the Tribune could not explain satisfactorily was that the Americans kept advancing despite the

⁵⁷ Abbott, op. cit.

⁵⁸ Interview with Dr. Conrado Dayrit and Francisco Castro.

fact that they never won a battle. The Filipinos reasoned thus: either the Americans did not know when they were licked, or Domei was trying to pull the wool over their eyes. The conclusion was obvious. The news-reporting phase of the Japanese propaganda was not too successful.

However, the war news, as we have already seen, formed only a small part of the Japanese newspaper propaganda. There were the letters published in the Tribune and other Japanese controlled newspapers. Some of these were obtained from Filipino war prisoners, and among the things mentioned was that the American soldiers, although physically superior to the Filipinos and Japanese, showed much less courage and fighting ability.⁵⁹ Other published letters came from prominent Filipinos. One that was ascribed to Emilio Aguinaldo dated July 11, 1944, urged the guerrillas to surrender now that "they need not be slaves of Americans for the Japanese would grant the Filipinos their independence." He also personally guaranteed their safety.⁶⁰

A more pernicious and insidious type of propaganda was the publication of statements supposedly voluntarily uttered during interviews by American and Filipino prisoners of war. The following was supposed to be a straight-forward account of one such interview:

⁵⁹ Manila Tribune, June 4, 1942, 1.

⁶⁰ Ibid., July 11, 1944, 1.

Predicting the total collapse of guerrilla resistance within a short time, Lt. Col. Hugh Straughn, self-appointed American chief of guerrillas in the Philippines, admitted in an interview last Thursday, soon after his capture by units of the Imperial Japanese Army, that his followers had been deserting him in ever increasing numbers in the weeks immediately preceding his capture.

Asked to explain the reason for these desertions, Straughn said that his followers had been steadily losing faith in the possibility of the Americans returning to the Philippines. At the same time they were fast being convinced of Japan's generous intentions towards the Philippines.⁶¹

Although not quite so convincing as the foregoing, interviews of Japanese officials and dignitaries added their bit in wearing down Filipino resistance. General Homma had this to say in his interview with Domei:

A comprehensive study of Filipino manners and customs and the development of such points as are fitting for Asiatic culture is essential for the moral and spiritual reconstruction of the Philippines, as one of the nations in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. . . . The Philippines does not have an ancient culture and the present day culture is a conglomeration of recent American influence and the vestige of many centuries of Spanish rule.⁶²

Another account along a similar vein went as follows:

Convinced that the best arrangement for the Filipino people is to do their part as members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Ki Kimura, one of the foremost novelists of Japan, on the eve of his departure for Japan, pleaded with the Filipinos for a more active and intelligent cooperation on their part in the Asia-for-the-Asiatics movement being undertaken by Japan.

The more he observed the Filipinos and the longer he stayed with them and had a chance to learn their ways and their customs, the more he was convinced that the Filipinos can never be happy as a race unless they rid themselves of

⁶¹ Ibid., August 7, 1943, 1.

⁶² Ibid., August 2, 1942, 1.

the western influences and live and think like orientals, according to him.⁶³

Other activities sponsored by the Manila Sinbun-sya were the different contests: musical and literary. There were Japanese language contests, Independence Day Speech contests, song-writing and play-writing contests. The purpose of these is not too difficult to imagine. The judges always managed to pick as winner the one which most highly extolled the virtues of Oriental culture and civilization.⁶⁴

And to further cultivate the friendship of the people, the Manila Sinbun-sya sponsored relief drives for the destitute of Manila, whose members have increased tremendously since the Japanese occupation.⁶⁵

b. Photographs. Just like the bulk of the news, the pictures and photographs that appeared in the different newspapers and magazines were rich in propaganda value. These were mostly taken by the photographic section of the Propaganda Corps of the Imperial Japanese Army. To describe but a few: there was one showing the prisoners at Corregidor, recuperating from their injuries under the "excellent" care given by their captors;⁶⁶ there were the photographs of the

⁶³ Ibid., May 1, 1942, 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid., December 8, 1942, 9; ibid., December 12, 1942, 1; ibid., January 2, 1943, 1; ibid., June 10, 1943, 1; ibid., October 7, 1943, 1.

⁶⁵ Ibid., November 21, 1943, 1.

⁶⁶ Ibid., May 24, 1942, 1.

landings in Cebu City with the caption stating that the Japanese found the city in flames, which they condemned as "inhuman and unnecessary";⁶⁷ pictures of Filipinos reading Japanese posters could hardly fail to cause wonder as to why they were so interested in what the Japanese had to offer until one noticed on closer scrutiny that only a few were actually reading the posters.⁶⁸ In the Philippines Journal, pictures of the different victory and anniversary parades were published. A picture of the victory parade at the Escolta had this caption:

The Tribune, in its editorial news said as follows: "Literally, the fall of Corregidor is music to the Filipinos, or so it seems to city residents who have been enjoying popular band concerts ever since that historic day. . . . Everywhere the victory music caravan stops to play, a large crowd of intent listeners may always be seen gathering."⁶⁹

Another interesting photograph, which showed some Filipino laborers at the pier hauling sacks of rice, had the following description:

"This is made possible by the fact that more rice is being imported from Thailand and French Indo-China and to the fact that the rice crop in the Islands this year is far better than in previous years. Five provinces in Central Luzon alone, despite the ravages of war, are expected to exceed their annual yield this year, so that there is no fear of a rice shortage."⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Ibid., April 20, 1942, 1.

⁶⁸ Ibid., August 2, 1942, 1.

⁶⁹ "Picture of Victory Parade at Escolta," Philippine Journal, op. cit., IV, 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 5.

This picture appeared when the shortage of rice was beginning to be felt acutely. Japan wanted the Filipinos to think that Japan had their interests at heart and that she was bringing food into the islands to alleviate the food shortage. This, however, did not fool anybody, for the Filipino knew that those sacks of rice were being loaded on ships to supply Japan's troops elsewhere, and that it was wholesale requisition of Philippine rice which was the prime cause of the rice shortage in the country.⁷¹

c. Exhibits. Different kinds of exhibits were also held by the Japanese to put across their message to the Filipinos. A miniature replica of Pearl Harbor as it appeared prior to its destruction by Japanese airmen was exhibited at the Korakuen Stadium in Manila to commemorate the first anniversary of the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War on December 8, 1942.⁷²

There were two exhibits of news and war pictures in Manila. One, called the Philippine Reconstruction Photographic Exposition, was held in the Heacock Building, and was supposed to commemorate the Fall of Bataan.⁷³ The other, sponsored by the Japanese Department of Information together with the Nippon Bunka Kaikan, showed the progress in the development of the New Philippines, and also pictured the "United States in Agony."⁷⁴

⁷¹ Interview with Dr. Augusto Camara.

⁷² Manila Tribune, December 5, 1942, 1.

⁷³ Ibid., April 11, 1943, 8.

⁷⁴ Ibid., March 31, 1944, 4.

Other prominent displays in the same Heacock Building were the war bulletins. These were usually written in fairly large letters and gave the latest news about the battle fronts.⁷⁵

d. Movies. The great popularity of American movies among the Filipinos furnished the Japanese with another excellent opportunity for disseminating their ideas. During the war years, the movies were one of the few recreational escapes of the people from a life of uncertainty, and even if the same pictures were shown over and over again, the movie houses still could hardly accommodate the droves of people wanting to see the shows. It was a simple matter for the Japanese to include propaganda "shorts" in between the main screenings. One of these showed the bombing of Pearl Harbor;⁷⁶ another, the "Toyo No Gaika" (Victory Song of the Orient), recorded the Philippine campaign culminating in the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor.⁷⁷ There were periodic news flashes showing Japan's "everlasting military victories,"⁷⁸ as well as documentary films depicting the progress of the "rehabilitation" and "rejuvenation" work in the Philippines.⁷⁹ To give the

⁷⁵ Abbott, op. cit.

⁷⁶ Manila Tribune, May 1, 1942, 1; Enemy Radio Digest, henceforth to be known as ERD (Washington, D. C.: Office of Special Services, Philippine Commonwealth Government), June 1, 1943, 2.

⁷⁷ Carlos P. Romulo, "How We Can Win but Still Lose in the Orient," Liberty, April 29, 1944, 10; Manila Tribune, December 11, 1942, 6.

⁷⁸ Manila Tribune, June 17, 1943, 1.

⁷⁹ Ibid., June 2, 1942, 1.

lie to the widespread rumor that General Homma had committed hari-kiri for his failure to take Bataan according to schedule, one newsreel pictured him boarding a plane from Manila bound for Japan.⁸⁰ Laurel's election as President of the "Republic of the Philippines" on September 25, 1943, his subsequent visit to Japan, and the conferment of decorations on him and his companions (Vargas and Aquino) by Emperor Hirohito, were all faithfully filmed and shown in the cinema houses in the Philippines.⁸¹

Besides these movie "shorts," there were a few Japanese full length features released for their propaganda value. The "New Snow," for instance, depicted Japanese community and family life, Japanese Neighborhood Associations in action, a feminine slant on the proper up-bringing of children in Japan, and, incidentally, it vividly portrayed the low position of women in Japan.⁸² Certainly, to the westernized Filipino woman, such propaganda could not have elicited anything but repulsion. "On to Singapore" was a war picture glorifying the Japanese victory at Singapore. And "Tear Down the Stars and Stripes" was a supposed account of atrocities in Bataan when the Americans used the Filipinos as human barricades. This picture was filmed in the Philippines, and made use of

⁸⁰ Ibid., August 20, 1942, 1.

⁸¹ Ibid., October 10, 1943, 1.

⁸² Ibid.

prisoners of war to enact certain scenes. One interesting sidelight happened during the making of the picture; several high society girls started giving out cigarettes to the American prisoners and for this they were herded by the Japanese into Fort Santiago where they presumably must have had to listen to some lectures on "proper behavior."⁸³

e. Radio. We have already seen in the first part of this chapter how control of radio transmission and reception was one of the very first steps taken by the Japanese. As soon as the army entered Manila, it issued an order prohibiting the further operation of amateur radio stations.⁸⁴ A month later, on February 3, 1942, outside antennas were ordered removed from all houses, and a ban was placed on all foreign broadcasts.⁸⁵ Another order a few months afterwards, required that all radios be registered and "reconditioned" which meant the removal of their short wave coils. Three months after this order was put into effect, only about one half of the radios in Manila had been submitted for reconditioning.⁸⁶

The Japanese attempted to justify their control of the radio by saying:

⁸³ Ibid., March 12, 1943, 1; C. Porter Kuykendall, Report on Life in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation (Washington, D. C.: State Department, 1943).

⁸⁴ Proclamation of January 9, 1942 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, "Journal, I, 17.

⁸⁵ Manila Tribune, January 7, 1943, 1.

⁸⁶ Abbott, op. cit.

The necessity of this new ruling is absolute. It saves the Filipinos, now in the heat of reconstruction work, from the radio, one of modern warfare's deadliest weapons - a weapon with which the enemy may assail fighting forces and non-combatants alike. Of course the enemy's boasts, lies, and promises over the air waves mean nothing to the intelligent radio listeners. It is the pernicious influence this hostile propaganda may work on the unfortunate gullible that the new order seeks to prevent.⁸⁷

And again:

A hostile broadcast is just as much a weapon as a hostile plane; the enemy propaganda is sometimes even more deadly than enemy bombs . . . any government has a right and more than a right - a duty to protect itself, to protect the community and to protect the members of the community from radio raiders. . . .

We are all engaged in a modern war - a total war and individual rights must of necessity be subordinated to the common welfare. The reconditioning of radio sets in the Philippines is a necessary war measure which we might say is a laudable precaution designed to protect the community from mental sabotage.⁸⁸

Judging from the programs aired over the Japanese controlled radio stations, KZRH and PIAM, one can readily see that much thought and planning went into the selection of what was and what was not suitable for Filipino consumption. News reports figured prominently in these broadcasts; there were news periods three times a day, with the news each time being given in English and repeated in Japanese and Tagalog. An hour every afternoon was devoted to propaganda talks in Tagalog.⁸⁹ Lessons in Japanese were also given over the air daily except Sundays

⁸⁷ Manila Tribune, January 17, 1943, 6.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Abbott, op. cit.; FBIS, May 11, 1944, No. 45, F 21.

by K. Okazaki.⁹⁰

Important features of the radio propaganda were talks by leading personages. General Ricarte, just returned from his self-imposed exile in Japan, urged the Filipinos to cooperate with the Japanese, and advised the soldiers fighting in Bataan and Corregidor to give up their struggle and return to their homes.⁹¹

Other talks on the same subject highlighted many radio programs such as appeals to the guerrillas to surrender,⁹² speeches lauding Japanese benevolence and magnanimity,⁹³ pleas for closer trade relationship between the two countries,⁹⁴ and diverse propaganda topics. Prominent ladies, too, were invited to talk over the radio on a variety of subjects from pointers in cooking to broad appeals to the Filipino womanhood to help in the building of the New Philippines.⁹⁵ Mrs. Kihara, the

⁹⁰ Manila Tribune, June 2, 1942, 2; Abbott, op. cit.; RRFE, November 24, 1942, I, 4.

⁹¹ Manila Tribune, March 8, 1942, 1.

⁹² "Collaboration with the Japanese Government," Sixth Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines to the President and Congress of the United States Covering Fiscal Year, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (Washington, D. C.: October 20, 1942), 79-84; ERD, June 3, 1943, 1.

⁹³ Manila Tribune, September 1, 1942, 1; ibid., September 14, 1947, 1.

⁹⁴ Ibid., May 11, 1942, 1.

⁹⁵ Ibid., October 10, 1942, 2; RRFE, October 27, 1942, I, 7.

wife of the former Japanese consul in Manila, in one such talk, extolled the virtues of Japanese women, and enjoined Filipino women to emulate their example.⁹⁶

Every morning daily at seven o'clock, a high-pitched, screeching voice speaking in Japanese was heard, signaling the start of the radio taiso, which is the Japanese version of the "daily dozen." The Japanese were great exponents of "a sound mind in a sound body" and tried to carry this out by making everybody do the radio taiso. Government officials, employees, personnel, students, all had to go through these exercises, if not early in the morning, some time later or even in the afternoon.⁹⁷ This became a ritual, and a much disliked one at that.

Speeches. Let us next consider the important public addresses. There were innumerable speeches delivered by one official or another during the tenure of the Japanese in the Islands, and to discuss all of these would fill another book. For our purpose, it is sufficient to touch on just a few representative ones and point out their propaganda value. The speech of Premier Tojo in which he promised the Philippines her independence,⁹⁸ and Foreign Minister Togo's indictment of "Britain's and America's encroachment on East Asia which caused the present war"⁹⁹ need no further comment. These of course

⁹⁶ Ibid., October 10, 1942, 3.

⁹⁷ Ibid., September 4, 1942, 4; RRFE, September 14, 1942, G 6.

⁹⁸ Manila Tribune, January 29, 1942, 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid., May 13, 1942, 1.

occupied the headlines and front pages of all the newspapers for days. The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army and the Director of the Japanese Military Administration in the Islands were great at making speeches, and did so at every opportunity. They addressed official gatherings, and their "messages" were often read by high-ranking officers and officials before other gatherings of a humbler nature; for example, released war prisoners, graduates of the numerous "rehabilitation and rejuvenation institutes," constabulary training schools, and so forth.¹⁰⁰ The general tone of such speeches was the same:

The Filipinos . . . should return to the original features of an Oriental people, shaking vanity and their dependent mentality . . . return native life to one of simplicity and reorganize industries which make possible the cooperation of this country with its neighbors . . . a nation which indulges in pretty dresses, nice foods, physical enjoyment, and expensive fashion can never succeed in establishing a strong nation.¹⁰¹

Japanese propagandists, as exemplified by Marquis Tokugawa and his group, worked tirelessly. Tokugawa, who was the President of the Philippine Society of Japan, was active even before the war. After the occupation of the Philippines, a series of "Cultural Lectures" was organized for him under the auspices of the Japanese Propaganda Corps, with a view of impressing on the people the advantages of pure Oriental culture over that

¹⁰⁰ Abbott, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ Manila Tribune, February 8, 1942, 1.

of the West.¹⁰² The following was one of his speeches at Manila:

Is it necessary to mention that the Filipinos are by nature an Oriental people, racially, geographically, and culturally? Let the existence of Japan, which is today defeating Great Britain and the United States on all fronts, leading in the establishment of a new order in East Asia, serve as a protection of your people . . . rise and be proud of being members of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

It is natural for peoples whose ideas have been westernized to incline towards the frivolous and materialistic eye . . . but now is the time to awake in you a pride that would spur and inspire you to the realization and rejoice in the discovery of the inherent cultural traditions of the Orient.¹⁰³

How many people the Japanese succeeded in actually convincing is difficult to say. But judging from their outright criticism of the Filipino nation, their preaching tone in exhorting the Filipinos to return to their Oriental culture and from the fact that the Japanese themselves obviously did not believe in what they preached and took to western comforts and conveniences more avidly than the people they were supposed to reform, it is safe to conclude that these speeches were largely ineffective.

The effect produced by the speeches of the Filipino officials, on the contrary, is somewhat more difficult to evaluate. Psychologically, they had the advantage of better understanding their own countrymen, and hence their utterances should have carried more weight than those of aliens. However,

¹⁰² Ibid., September 12, 1942, 1; RRFE, October 27, 1942, I 7.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

the ultimate effect depended on how many of these statements were known to be spontaneous and how many were known to be Japanese-inspired. It was a matter of common knowledge that government officials were "encouraged" to exercise their vocal chords at every opportunity. When Bataan and Corregidor fell, for example, Chairman Vargas of the Philippine Executive Commission had to "thank" General Homma for "liberating his people from American oppressors."¹⁰⁴

The Philippine National Assembly, the citadel of democracy before the war, became, during the Japanese occupation, the scene of many apparently pro-Japanese speeches. It was here that Jose P. Laurel, as President of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic, delivered his first message to the puppet Philippine Assembly, in which he spoke glowingly of the Asian Federation. He asserted that, regardless of the outcome of the war,

Western civilization can not come back because in the midst of the destruction of the war, the spirit of Asia has risen like Athens with redoubled strength.¹⁰⁵

On previous occasion, while still Secretary of Interior, he showed the force of his convictions in an extemporaneous speech in which he asked the Filipinos to cooperate with the Japanese and to give up fighting since America could not be expected to return; or if she did return, he assured his listeners:

¹⁰⁴ Manila Tribune, August 4, 1942, 2.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., November 26, 1943, 1.

You would not be the ones to suffer by cooperating with Japan. We would be the ones to suffer, we, the members of the Executive Commission and other outstanding leaders. They would pick us out and line us before a firing squad, perhaps in a public plaza, and kill us. But we are ready for the sacrifice. We are ready to be traitors to America, if by doing so, we will be of service to you, the Filipino people. . . .106

One needs very little imagination to realize the impact this self-effacing attitude on the part of Filipino leaders had on their countrymen. If they were not actually convinced, there and then, at least they were placed in a more receptive frame of mind to be convinced later. This speech showed a deep insight into Filipino psychology, something that the Japanese, in their repetitious, often arrogant way, utterly lacked.

f. Philippine Social Institutions. Two other institutions in the Philippines, recognized as important social forces since the Spanish times, were taken over by the Japanese early in 1942 to serve as centers for their propaganda. These were the churches and the schools.

Philippine Churches. We have seen that the legacy of Spain to the Philippines, the one factor which more than any other had succeeded in bringing about the unification of the Islands, was Catholicism. Up to the present, the Catholic Church had wielded a strong influence on the predominantly Catholic Filipinos. Statistically, as shown by the 1939 census, the last taken before the war, Catholics numbered 77.31 percent of the total population. There is even greater solidarity

106 Ibid., January 20, 1943, 1.

than the figure indicates, however, as the other religious groups are so comparatively small and diverse.¹⁰⁷ The predominantly non-Christian Japanese, therefore, aimed their religious propaganda primarily at the Catholics, although they did not neglect the other Christian sects (the Protestants and Aglipayans), nor the Mohammedans (the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu).¹⁰⁸

On January 14, 1942, Colonel Narusawa, the head of the Religious Section of the Japanese Army, issued the "Declaration to Christians in the Philippines." In this declaration he stated that it was the desire of the Japanese Army to foster freedom of religion; but then he went on to say:

We have seen how Great Britain and America have dominated Asia, depriving us of our rights in many ways, and making existence difficult and oppressive . . . Unless these destructive forces are eliminated, we shall have no future; the races of Greater East Asia with thousands of years of glorious history will be doomed to complete subjugation.¹⁰⁹

With this, the control of the Philippine churches was launched. The Catholic Church, of course, received first attention. Colonel Narusawa called on the Archbishop of Manila, Michael J. O'Doherty with whom he discussed the subject of closer collaboratio

¹⁰⁷ Other vital statistics on Philippine religions were: Catholics: 12,603,428; Aglipayans: 1,573,572; Mohammedans: 677,903; Pagans: 528,421; Protestants: 392,626; Buddhists: 47,565; Shintoists: 13,681; Others: 77,234; Facts and Figures about the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: Information Division, Office of the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines), 13-14.

¹⁰⁸ Manila Tribune, January 14, 1942, 1.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., January 14, 1942, 1.

between the Catholic Church and the Japanese. The Army spokesman said that "he received a favorable reply."¹¹⁰ Reliable sources, however, revealed that after this interview Archbishop O'Doherty was confined to his residence for several weeks undergoing a "severe cross-examination."¹¹¹

The first "Friendship Mass" was celebrated on January 15, 1942, at the Sta. Cruz Church in Manila, when a Japanese army priest who officiated made use of the occasion to spread propaganda from the pulpit.¹¹² Two days later, a conference between the representatives of the Religious Section of the Japanese Army and the heads of the Catholic religious orders was held. In this conference, Colonel Narusawa promised his help and that of the Japanese Army to those who followed his orders, and threatened to deal accordingly with those who refused to cooperate. Archbishop O'Doherty's answer to this was as follows:

The members of the Catholic Church in the Philippines intend to cooperate in the establishment of world peace.¹¹³

Two months after this conference, the Religious Section of the Japanese Army tendered a banquet at the Manila Hotel in honor of Catholic dignitaries.¹¹⁴ This apparent state of

¹¹⁰ Ibid., January 11, 1942, 1.

¹¹¹ Horatio Mooers, Attitude of the Japanese Military Authorities Towards Religious Groups in the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: State Department, 1943).

¹¹² Ibid., January 15, 1942, 1.

¹¹³ Manila Tribune, January 17, 1942, 1.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., March 17, 1942, 1.

mutual good-will, however, was soon followed by a number of stern announcements. For example, in May, all priests and ministers were required to obtain permits from the newly organized Bureau of Religious Affairs before they could solemnize marriages.¹¹⁵ Early in June, Chairman Vargas issued a regulation requiring all religious orders and organizations to register with the Bureau of Religious Affairs.¹¹⁶ This was followed more than a year later by another circular providing for the rigid supervision by the puppet government of the administration of the Catholics' trust funds, properties, and expenditures.¹¹⁷ In the meantime, the Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration had ordered the abolition of all religious instruction in the schools of the Islands. The Manila newspapers stated that educational circles were "favorably impressed" by this order,¹¹⁸ but it is impossible to believe that the Catholic Church, which had outrightly opposed, during the American occupation, the secularization of Philippine schools, would now favor the complete abolition of religious teaching.

Throughout the summer of 1942, the Church pulpits were being transformed, more and more, into propaganda centers for

¹¹⁵ Ibid., May 3, 1942, 1.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., June 5, 1942, 1.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., July 23, 1943, 1.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., June 7, 1942, 1.

the spread of Japan's wordly gospel. Colonel Katsuya, the first head of the Propaganda Corps of the Japanese Army in the Islands, spoke during a mass celebrated at the sumptuous San Marcelino Church in Manila. His words were in honor of a Japanese Catholic feudal lord, Justo Ukon Takayama, who in the seventeenth century left Japan, where the Christians like himself were then being persecuted, and took refuge in the Philippines until his death.¹¹⁹ By the next spring, the Catholic priests themselves were required to preach to their congregation the futility of resisting the Japanese.¹²⁰ And when Premier Tojo promised Philippine independence pending the complete pacification of the Archipelago, the parish priests were again urged to redouble their efforts towards peace and security in the Islands.¹²¹

Other ways were found by the Japanese to attract the Catholic population. When the Archbishop's Palace in Manila was mistakenly bombed by American planes in 1944, the Japanese made a loud protest against the "action of the barbaric Americans who did not consider the sacredness of the houses of God." At the same time, they gave wide publicity to the Army trucks which they placed at the Archbishop's disposal so that he could carry into safety the valuable historical documents and relics

¹¹⁹ Ibid., September 21, 1942, 1.

¹²⁰ Ibid., February 21, 1943, 1; ibid., March 21, 1943, 1.

¹²¹ Ibid., March 21, 1943, 1.

which the palace housed.¹²²

This seeming collaboration of the Catholic Church resulted in bitter criticisms against her from various quarters. Some pointed out that the Church's sympathy for axis powers like Japan was traceable to a tendency to be absolute and totalitarian in her organization; others, as an example of her axis associations, recalled the strong support and friendship of the Catholic Church to General Francisco Franco in Falangist Spain.¹²³

It is possible, however, that the Catholic Church did not actively resist the Japanese in the Philippines for other reasons. First, there were the threats of armed chastisement by Colonel Narusawa and the Japanese Army in case the prelates failed to cooperate in Japan's plan.¹²⁴ Secondly, it is possible that the Church acted as she did to protect her many landholdings and priceless historical relics in the Philippines.¹²⁵ And most important of all, although the point must be assumed rather than proved, the prelates probably acted as they did

¹²² Ibid., November 18, 1944, 1.

¹²³ Allan Chase, Falange, the Axis Secret Army in the Americas (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943), 42-43.

¹²⁴ Horatio Mooers, Attitude of the Japanese Military Authorities Towards Religious Groups in the Philippines, op. cit.

¹²⁵ Joseph Ralston Hayden and Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines, Past and Present (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), 590-594.

in order to insure the survival of the Church institution itself. They may be assumed to have felt that without the Church's survival there would be less chance of counteracting eventually the conqueror's attempt to convert the Philippines to the Japanese belief, a mixture of Shintoism and Buddhism.¹²⁶

Before leaving the account of the Catholic Church during the occupation, two additional facts may be mentioned as significant. First, the Japanese were never satisfied with Archbishop O'Doherty, leader of the Catholic oligarchy in the Islands, and at one time tried to replace him with Bishop Taguchi from Japan. However, Archbishop O'Doherty remained in his position.¹²⁷ Secondly, there were many Catholic priests, who, in one way or another, aided the guerrilla movement in the Islands, while some even acted as spies for the Americans.¹²⁸

The next most important religion in the Islands was

¹²⁶ Martin G. Scott, Japan's Relations with the Catholic Church (Washington, D. C.: Treasury Department, August 28, 1942).

¹²⁷ Charles Parsons to Carl Crow and Dennis McEnvoy, "Master Plan for the Philippines," a magazine excerpt dated September 25, 1942 (Washington, D. C., Military Intelligence Collection).

¹²⁸ Report of Father James E. Haggerty, S.J. (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department, February 25, 1945); Report of Father Patrick A. Magnier of Panay Island (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 1943); Albert Klestadt, Report on Matters in the Philippines (Australia: Allies Intelligence Bureau, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, December 29, 1942); Charlotte Martin, "Two Jumps Ahead of the Japs" (Washington, D. C.: MSS, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, 1943); Report of Chick Parsons to President Manuel Quezon (San Francisco, California: September 27, 1943).

Mohammedanism. The Japanese did not curtail the activities of the leaders of this group and even courted their favor. According to the report of the State Department official, the Japanese adopted this policy because they wanted the "Moros," as the Mohammedans in the Philippines were called, to act as a link with the other Mohammedans of East Asia.¹²⁹

The different Protestant denominations were the ones which fared worst of all among the churches of the Philippines during Japan's occupation there. The reason for this could be found in the fact that before the war, ministers in key positions in Protestant churches in the Philippines were either Americans or citizens of alien countries (from Japan's standpoint). When Manila was occupied by the Japanese, many of these key men found themselves at the Santo Tomas Internment Camp. (The group interned did not include every Protestant minister, for there were also native Filipino Protestant ministers in the Islands.) On January 15, 1942, the members of the religious section of the Japanese Army in Manila went to the Santo Tomas Camp and offered to release missionaries who would continue to engage in religious services outside. After the release of these missionaries, between thirty and forty representatives of the various Protestant groups were called together and Colonel Narusawa of the Religious Section of the Japanese Army presented to them for signature a declaration in Japanese which

¹²⁹ C. Porter Kuykendall, Religious Affairs in the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: State Department, 1943).

stated among other things that "the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was divinely ordained and it was proper to abide by the Will of God." Some of the ministers refused to sign the declaration and so the wording of the translation was changed to read thus: "the purpose of Japan in coming to the Philippines was to establish universal peace."¹³⁰

By May 20, 1942, the leaders of the religious section of the Japanese Army were ready to form a "Federation of Evangelical Churches" and called for a conference of some of the leading Protestant ministers. At this meeting, T. Aiura, Chief of the Japanese Army's Protestant unit, presided.¹³¹ The Federation was easily organized, apparently because the ministers present had no choice and was patterned after the "Church of Christ" in Japan. According to Kuykendall, the real purpose of the Japanese in establishing a united Protestant organization in the Islands was to rid the Protestant churches there of their foreign domination and supervision so that the Japanese could slowly bend the Protestant Filipinos toward a spiritual re-orientation that would exclude Western influences.¹³²

However, in spite of the Federation, the privilege granted to Protestant missionaries of living outside the internment camps was rescinded a little more than two years later, after

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Manila Tribune, May 21, 1942, 1.

¹³² Op. cit.

some of them were caught spying. The spies were executed, while the rest of the ministers were re-interned to prevent further hostile acts against Japan.¹³³

Schools and Universities. Schools, which were the source and fountain of civic consciousness and democratic ways in the Philippines before the war, were converted, during the Japanese occupation, into agencies for the eradication of what the invaders termed "Western influence and materialism."

Exactly a month and a half after the Japanese came to Manila, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces inaugurated the "cultural recovery" of the Filipinos by outlining the following educational imperatives: (1) Eradicate the reliance of Filipinos upon Western nations which are well known for their love of materialism. As examples of the undesirable Anglo-American characteristics of the Filipinos, the Commander-in-Chief cited "government by the masses, self-centered lack of restraint, craving for material things, and easy living."¹³⁴ (2) Make the Filipinos understand the position of the Philippines as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (3) Spread Japanese or Nippongo and Tagalog in the Philippine schools and terminate the use of the English language as soon as possible. (4) Encourage vocational education above everything else, and emphasize to the Filipino students the love

¹³³ Manila Tribune, July 9, 1944, 1; Report of Captain Danon J. Cause (Washington, D. C.: October 30, 1942).

¹³⁴ Manila Tribune, September 1, 1942, 1.

of manual labor.¹³⁵

In carrying out these Japanese educational objectives, the puppet Filipino officials soon met difficulties. For instance, there were no textbooks available which were wholly acceptable to the Japanese. Those which the schools had used during the Commonwealth period did not contain the message that Japan wanted to convey to her conquered peoples in East Asia, and conversely presented the ideologies of the West in a good light. There was also a shortage of qualified teachers. The Filipinos, never having spoken Nippongo before, could not provide teachers of the new language. Only a few civilian Japanese attached to their army of occupation in the Islands were capable of teaching it. On the other hand, the transporting of Japanese teachers from their homeland was an expensive proposition. And finally, the pacification of the whole country was proving rather a slow process and this was not conducive to the opening and smooth operation of schools.¹³⁶

The Japanese did their utmost to meet these problems. The best solution found for the scarcity of Filipino teachers in Japanese was the opening of special normal schools that taught Nippongo to the Filipino teachers. This program was to make certain that Philippine schools could be opened in the

¹³⁵ "Order Number Two of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces Concerning the Principles of Education," dated February 12, 1942, Journal of the Philippines, I, 13.

¹³⁶ Abbott, op. cit.

earliest possible time and that public instruction need not be completely in the English language.¹³⁷ Next, a textbook committee, headed by the Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines, was appointed, composed of seven Japanese and three Filipino members. The following were instructions for changing textbooks: "abolish everything which deals with western democracy and liberalism; likewise, get rid of pictures, poems, symbols, sentences and phrases which express anti-Japanese or anti-Asiatic sentiment."¹³⁸

Probably realizing that the youngest Filipino children had been least exposed to western ideologies, the Japanese gave the most attention to their education. The Director General ordered that the public elementary schools be opened first.¹³⁹ This was accomplished on June 1, 1942, when the first one hundred elementary schools were made available to about eighty thousand elementary pupils.¹⁴⁰ Broken down into comprehensive terms, this meant an average of approximately 114 pupils for each teacher, as only one class of each grade was provided. The value of such education may be questioned, inasmuch as it is

¹³⁷ Manila Tribune, September 5, 1943, 5.

¹³⁸ Ibid., February 22, 1942, 1.

¹³⁹ Ibid., February 20, 1942, 1; "Instruction Number Twenty-six of the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration" dated May 16, 1942, Journal of the Philippines, I, 6.

¹⁴⁰ Manila Tribune, May 30, 1942, 1.

doubtful if much individual progress in school could be made by the pupils in such crowded conditions with instruction given by over-worked teachers forced to teach in a language new to them.

Furthermore, on the basis of the last pre-war Philippine census, the number of students provided for in this way was less than 7 percent of those who had been in elementary schools previously, or 80,000 out of 1,201,674. On August 4, 1942, another group of 117 elementary schools were reopened,¹⁴¹ but again this meant only minimum improvement, percentagewise. By June, 1943, Manila newspapers claimed that seven hundred elementary schools were in full swing throughout the Archipelago.¹⁴² Still this was less than 31 percent of the number which had been open in 1939. Until the latter part of the Japanese regime, thousands of Filipino children were not provided with schooling.

The curriculum of the elementary schools was revamped by the Japanese to exclude western influences, in accordance with their educational program for the Islands. Elementary Japanese became one of the prominent subjects required; for textbooks, the Japanese army prepared special Japanese primers.¹⁴³ Books with simple Japanese songs were also provided, so that the

¹⁴¹ Manila Tribune, August 4, 1942, 1.

¹⁴² Ibid., June 11, 1943, 1; FCC, June 11, 1943, G 2.

¹⁴³ Ibid., May 30, 1942, 1; ibid., June 2, 1942, 1; Report of Engineer Russel L. Forsythe (Washington, D. C., 1944).

school children might enjoy learning Nippongo.¹⁴⁴ The Japanese classes from the outset were handled by the hurriedly trained Filipino teachers, under Japanese supervision.¹⁴⁵

The Japanese next reopened the public high schools. Here vocational training was given the emphasis, literature and social studies being neglected. Academic subjects included languages, science, mathematics, physical and health education, none of which centered around ideologies and hence were "safe" from western influence. The boys and girls were segregated in these high schools and the former were given heavier vocational subjects: automotive engineering, metal work, woodworking, agronomy, horticulture, poultry, ceramics, chemistry, weaving, electricity, and fishing. The girls were offered art and home economics subjects, in line with the plan of relegating the Filipino women to an inferior position like that of her Japanese sisters.¹⁴⁶ This over-emphasis on vocational training in the secondary schools made many Filipinos doubt Japan's true intentions in the Philippines. For, in spite of Japan's claim that it was the American who made the Filipinos "hewers of wood and carriers of water," the Filipino school children had been given the liberty to choose academic or vocational courses during the American regime. Of the six hundred students per

¹⁴⁴ Manila Tribune, November 11, 1942, 1.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., May 1, 1943, 1.

school whom the Japanese expected when they reopened the secondary schools, only one-half returned.¹⁴⁷

Private elementary and secondary schools were reopened much later than the government schools. The private school teacher was also subjected to a "rehabilitation" program. Likewise the curriculum of the private institutions was revamped and as a result, their enrollment never reached pre-war numbers.¹⁴⁸ (In 1939, private elementary and high school enrollment had been 1,876,055, or 54 percent of the total school population.)

We have already touched on the inclusion of Nippongo in the curriculum of private and public schools. It is probably reasonable for us to assume that the Japanese had hopes that by teaching the Filipinos Nippongo, the latter could be fed more propaganda materials and thereby rendered "true Orientals" and "worthy members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The Japanese apparently feared that if they permitted the English language to be taught, the influence of America would persist. At any rate, the country would remain more accessible to American counter-propaganda.

But how far did the Japanese succeed in educating the Filipinos in Nippongo? Let us first consider their centers for propagating knowledge of the language. The largest and

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., May 1, 1943, 1.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., February 24 and 28, 1943, 1; ibid., March 14, 1943, 1.

most important, of course, were the schools. But as we have seen, not all the schools were reopened during the Japanese era. Nippongo clubs, Kalibapi and Neighborhood Associations became diffusion centers too for the Japanese language at this time.¹⁴⁹ But not all the municipalities boasted of Nippongo Clubs, nor were there Neighborhood Associations in all the occupied areas of the Islands. Efforts were made by the Japanese to spread Kalibapi branches in every nook and corner of the Archipelago, but as we will discuss later, they succeeded in planting these Nippongo agencies only in some provinces of Luzon, especially around Manila.¹⁵⁰ Japanese language lessons were given every night over radio stations in Manila, based on texts printed daily in the newspapers.¹⁵¹ Anyone who had cared to tune in on the radio could have learned Nippongo, but few Filipinos owned radios at this time.

Francisco Lavidés, who was the Counsellor to the "Philippine Embassy" in Tokyo during the days of the puppet republic, discussed in a magazine article dated May 16, 1943, what he termed the "pressing problem" of teaching Nippongo to the Filipino people. He said that after excluding three million, four hundred thousand Filipino school children who were to be taken care of eventually by the schools, there were still the

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., January 11, 1943, 1.

¹⁵⁰ Abbott, op. cit.

¹⁵¹ Manila Tribune, January 21, 1943, 1.

adult Filipinos from the age of nineteen to fifty years to be taught Japanese. The latter numbered about five million. How were these to be reached? One might take as a basis the estimate that the average Filipino could learn the language in from two to four years. As there were then forty-six Philippine provinces (two having been abolished by the Japanese for economic reasons) and eight cities, or a total of fifty-four provinces and cities, each would have had to teach 100,000 students.¹⁵² This figure was never approximated, however, in any area, even Manila itself.

As for adult education on the university level, only a few universities were reopened in the beginning and these were all technical colleges, such as engineering, agriculture, medicine and pharmacy.¹⁵³ Before the war there had been 744 private colleges ("colegios") in the Islands, giving instruction on various levels from the kindergarten up, 60 of them being in Manila. One private college, the Far Eastern University, had boasted an enrollment almost equalling that of the government-supported University of the Philippines, and had ranked high in scholarship. Neither the Far Eastern University nor the National Teachers' College held classes during the occupation; Japanese occupation forces used their buildings.

¹⁵² Francisco Lavidés, "A Pressing Problem is Teaching Nippongo," Manila Sunday Tribune, May 16, 1943, 2.

¹⁵³ Manila Tribune, June 17, 1942, 1; FCC, June 12, 1943, G 2; RRFE, March 30, 1943, F 6.

When the Japanese soldiers took the buildings of the University of the Philippines for their barracks, the Filipinos were shocked to see chairs being used as firewood, the statue of Venus before the entrance of the School of Fine Arts hung with underwear, and worst of all, precious library books gone up in smoke.¹⁵⁴

After the puppet Philippine Republic was inaugurated, the Japanese offered some liberal arts courses at the University of the Philippines. From their titles there seems no doubt that the Japanese were adopting Nazi Germany's geopolitical interpretation of history. The following were the courses offered in June, 1944: Political History of Japan, Geopolitics of Greater East Asia, Politico-Economic History of the Philippines, Oriental Ethics and Philippine-Nippon Relations. To induce students to enroll, a minimum fee of five pesos (\$2.50) was charged to new students. The old students were not even charged for enrolling.¹⁵⁵

With Laurel's ascension as President of the Puppet Philippine Republic, other educational reforms were instituted. He created a new educational board which was to establish a new educational set-up that would develop more personal and collective responsibility in its students. Philippine

¹⁵⁴ Augusto A. Camara, Japanese Occupation of Manila, MSS of a speech delivered before the Ann Arbor Junior Chamber of Commerce, June, 1947.

¹⁵⁵ Manila Tribune, April 15, 1944, 1.

history was to be taught not by foreigners but by Filipinos alone. This would encourage, he explained, the youths of the land to love their country and to make greater sacrifices to her. The training of all teachers was to be controlled directly by the state.¹⁵⁶

Laurel also created a committee to draft a Filipino civic code, which was to be used as a textbook to instill Philippine nationalism among students.¹⁵⁷ A legal code committee was likewise appointed by him and to its members, he advocated a philosophy of law based on the tenets of the New Order, strengthening the family as a vital unit of the state and at the same time subordinating the individual rights of the citizens for the welfare of the state.¹⁵⁸

Other kinds of schools founded by the Japanese in the Islands were: government employees' training institutes, cultural institutes, preparatory institutes for government scholars to Japan, boys' camps, prisoner of war rejuvenation schools, Philippine Constabulary training schools, schools for aviation mechanics, ship officer's and seamen's institutes and even a school for jockeys.¹⁵⁹ A brief explanation of each

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., February 18, 1944, 4; ibid., April 4, 1944, 1.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., February 16, 1944, 1; Hisasi Enosawa, Significance of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, op. cit.

¹⁵⁸ Manila Tribune, April 20, 1944, 1.

¹⁵⁹ Abbott, op. cit.; RRFE, March 16, 1944, No. 41 E 11.

of these will be given in the following paragraphs, except for the special schools, whose titles are self-explanatory, and the prisoner of war schools, which will be discussed later in connection with the pacification campaign of the Islands.

The government institutes were founded to train selected minor executives and ranking employees of the various executive departments of the central government as well as those of provincial, city, and municipal governments in the Islands.¹⁶⁰ The following were the purposes for which these institutes were intended, according to the Japanese: "to rejuvenate all government employees spiritually, morally, and physically; to develop their spirit of cooperation in the program of building a New Philippines; to teach them a high sense of honesty, frugal living and greater endurance and capacity for hard work."¹⁶¹ In addition, Nippongo was taught in these government training institutes.¹⁶²

Another school established during the Japanese occupation was the Philippine Cultural Institute which was operated under the joint auspices of the Department of Information, Japanese Army; the Philippine Executive Commission, and the "Kanmin Renraku Sko" (Office of Public Liaison and Assistance, Japanese Army). This institute was located at picturesque Tagaytay city.

¹⁶⁰ Manila Tribune, November 1, 1942, 1; ERD, June 1, 1943, 1.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., November 29, 1942, 1.

¹⁶² Ibid., April 22 and May 26, 1942, 1.

It was to train selected Filipino college graduates between the ages of twenty to thirty-five years for positions of leadership in the New Philippines. To be sure that many would apply for entrance into the institute, the Japanese Army offered free board and lodging, clothing, other daily necessities (in those days of great scarcity) and a monthly allowance of forty-five pesos (\$22.50).¹⁶³ The subjects in this school centered around propaganda warfare and the meaning of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese and Filipino authorities as well as professors from the University of the Philippines, were hired as teachers.¹⁶⁴ The course lasted for three months in the beginning but the period of training was extended to five months in April, 1944. Some of the graduates of the Cultural Institute found employment in the Information Ministry in Tokyo, others were stationed in the Information Section, Japanese Military Administration in Manila, and still others were sent to different provinces of the Philippines to act as high powered Japanese propagandists.¹⁶⁵

The Preparatory School for Government Scholars to Japan, which was housed at the Malacanan Palace in Manila, was another educational innovation of the occupation. Each year, this school was opened for forty-five days, a period of intensive

¹⁶³ Ibid., April 18, 1944, 1; RRFE, May 25, 1943, F 9.

¹⁶⁴ Manila Tribune, May 22, 1943, 1; ibid., August 7, 1943, 1.

¹⁶⁵ C. Porter Kuykendall, op. cit.

study of the Japanese language.¹⁶⁶ After this training was completed, the students, who numbered twenty annually, were sent to the Keio University in Tokyo, where they took advanced technical courses, along with students from other conquered nations of East Asia. In addition to their technical subjects, these scholars to Japan were indoctrinated with Japanese "culture, way of life, ideals, and aspirations."¹⁶⁷

A Boy's Camp was also opened at Balara, Rizal, where regular ten-day periods of camp life, systematically regimented, were offered. Each session included fifty Filipino and ten Japanese boys. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that the Filipino boys invited to this camp were the sons of the most prominent Filipino leaders. This camp was called the "Pahingahang Bagong Buhay Ukol Sa Mga Batang Filipino at Japones" (New Life Camps for Filipino and Japanese Youths). Ten Japanese boys were always mixed with the Filipino youths because, according to the Japanese Army, they had much to teach their Filipino brothers of the "spirit of comradeship, brotherhood, simple and frugal living."¹⁶⁸

In the effort of the Japanese to train every class of Filipinos, a most unusual school was established by them in the Islands. This was the school for jockeys where the latter

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.; RRFE, May 25, 1943, F 9.

¹⁶⁷ Manila Tribune, February 26, 1944, 1.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., April 17, 1943, 1; RRFE, April 27, 1943, F 7.

were supposedly trained to play fairly and squarely in the sport world.¹⁶⁹

Throughout the Japanese occupation, the Japanese government sent to the Philippines a steady stream of missions-educators, medical men, professors, scientists, agriculturists, industrialists, musicians, painters, authors, newspapermen, and stage actors. Some of these cultural delegates lectured before students, others before their corresponding professional groups, still others attended scientific conventions and Japanese-sponsored meetings.¹⁷⁰ Their activities were often over-publicized, as shown in the following news item:

Dr. Osima Performs Delicate Operation

A delicate caesarian operation that further cemented Nippon-Philippine friendship was performed yesterday by Dr. Yosizuki Osima, 34, a noted Japanese physician at the Philippine General Hospital, on Mrs. Vicente Villanueva, 23, of 1883 Juan Luna, Manila. Osima is one of the party of Nipponese physicians who arrived here recently to work and teach in the leading medical colleges and hospitals here.¹⁷¹

A member of one of the good will missions to the Philippines who seemed to have achieved unusual popularity in the Islands was Kosak Yamada, the head of the Japanese Musical Mission to the Philippines. Besides speaking before fellow musicians in the Archipelago on the relation of music to

¹⁶⁹ Abbott, op. cit.

¹⁷⁰ Carlos P. Romulo, "How We Can Win the War and Still Lose in the Orient," Liberty, April 29, 1944, 1; RREE, March 2, 1943, P 9.

¹⁷¹ Manila Tribune, November 3, 1943, 3.

Philippine nationalism and the New Order, Yamada's good will activities included the encouragement of Filipino composers to create purely native music, which was presented by the Japanese Army under his baton. His impressions, however, of Filipino musicians were expressed in an article written by Fusai Hayashi, a delegate of the Japanese Writers' Association in Manila. This was quite a surprise to many Filipinos. The article said:

. . . According to Kosak Yamada, the Filipino musicians as they are today can easily earn a living in Japan. One year of good training under competent musicians in Japan would place them amongst the second rate musicians of Japan.¹⁷²

g. Japanese Sponsored Associations. The Japanese founded two new civic associations in the Islands with the intention of using them there as propaganda instruments. These were the Neighborhood Associations and the "Kapisan sa Paglilinhod sa Bagong Filipinas" (The Society for Service to the New Philippines), which was known for short as the Kalibapi.

Neighborhood Associations. Of these two associations we have just mentioned, the first that was founded was the Neighborhood Association. This was patterned after the "ko-koo" or the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Japan.¹⁷³ Chairman Vargas defined a Neighborhood Association and differentiated it from a district association in his executive order

¹⁷² Ibid., November 21, 1943, 1.

¹⁷³ Ibid., September 1, 1942, 6.

dated August 17, 1942. He said that a group of ten families who lived in a contiguous area composed a Neighborhood Association. On the other hand, ten Neighborhood Associations made up a district Association. The same executive order enumerated the purposes of these Neighborhood Associations and the following were the most important: (1) the maintenance of peace and order by a system of self-protection under the joint responsibility of all the male residents of a given area. (For this purpose, all the men in the area were assigned to nightly patrols in rotation.) (2) The reporting to local authorities of bandits and suspicious characters that might be found in the neighborhood. (3) The preparation of a census of all the members of every family residing in each district. (4) The encouragement of good social habits among the people so that the welfare of the state would take precedence over that of the individual citizen. To achieve these purposes from all the heads of families in the given area, a money contribution was exacted based upon an apportionment, made by the Mayor of the locality, which took into consideration the financial circumstances of each family.¹⁷⁴

At first, only a few Filipinos joined the Neighborhood Associations. However, with the scarcity of rice, chief staple of the people's diet, came a new "method of persuasion"

¹⁷⁴ Executive Order Number Seventy-seven, "Journal of the Philippines, I, 45; RRFE, November 24, 1942, I 4.

on the part of the Japanese, who had early taken over the "Naric" or National Rice and Corn Corporation; rice became available for purchase through the Neighborhood Associations. Naturally, membership was boosted.¹⁷⁵

In February, 1943, the Primco (Prime Commodities Corporation) delegated to the Neighborhood Associations the rationing of the soap, lard, and other edible oils.¹⁷⁶ Later, sugar, matches, and clothing were added to the list of daily necessities which were distributed by the Neighborhood Associations.¹⁷⁷ Small wonder that in February, 1944, there were organized, mostly in Manila and in the neighboring provinces, 164,000 Neighborhood Associations which embraced 1,483,837 families.¹⁷⁸

To acquire the privileges which membership in the Neighborhood Associations entailed, the individual members had assumed obligations. First, they had to take an oath of allegiance to the Japanese Military Administration.¹⁷⁹ Second, when Philippine independence was inaugurated, coincident with the proclamation of the Kalibapi as the party of the people,

¹⁷⁵ Manila Tribune, June 19, 1942, 1.

¹⁷⁶ C. Porter Kuykendall, op. cit.

¹⁷⁷ Manila Tribune, May 19, 1943, 1.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., February 9, 1944, 1.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., April 18, 1943, 1.

the Neighborhood Associations became its lower administrative subdivisions.¹⁸⁰ Third, with the issuance of the presidential order for compulsory labor for all male citizens in the Islands from the age of sixteen to sixty years, the men were drafted from the Neighborhood and District Associations.¹⁸¹ Fourth, for parades, rallies, and other celebrations organized by the Japanese, the Neighborhood Associations supplied participants.¹⁸² Finally, when the danger of American offensive was getting nearer, the same Neighborhood Associations were made the basis for the home guard units of Manila.¹⁸³

Kalibapi. The other new civic association formed by the Japanese was the Kalibapi. Organized for the purpose of indoctrinating the Filipinos, young and old, with the idea of building a New Philippines, it can be safely considered as the counterpart of the National Socialist Party of Germany (Hitler's Nazi Party) and the National Service Order of Japan. At the beginning of its existence, the Japanese assured the Filipinos that it was not a political party but a public service organization. A pamphlet issued by the Department of Information of the Japanese Army describes it thus:

An ordinary association managed under the customary

¹⁸⁰ C. Porter Kuykendall, op. cit.

¹⁸¹ Manila Tribune, May 14, 1944, 1.

¹⁸² Ibid., December 8, 1944, 1.

¹⁸³ Ibid., November 4, 1944, 2.

rules and regulations of all social organizations. It is not a political party. . . .¹⁸⁴

It was not long, however, before its totalitarian principles were known. The first act of the Japanese prior to the creation of the Kalibapi had been to liquidate the existing political parties in the Islands, such as the "Nationalista," "The Young Philippines," "Democrata," "Ganap," and the "Popular Front." Then a Japanese spokesman issued the following press statement:

Unquestionably, the paramount problem facing the people of the Philippines today is the extirpation of the American brand of politics and misgovernment. . . .

A brief study of the political history of the Philippines reveals that there has always been a strong tendency to believe that a democracy and a representative form of government are impossible, unless political parties exist. On the other hand, it has been the common experience of all countries in the past that political parties invariably place first importance on party interests and party gains.¹⁸⁵

To make the dissolution of political parties seem voluntary, the Japanese propagandists staged a sort of rally at which Jorge Vargas, Chairman of the Executive Commission, and various party leaders were invited to speak. Among these speakers was Jose Yulo, then the Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court and the recognized head of the majority party in the Islands, the "Nacionalista." He said:

While there was unanimity of opinion among the leading members of the party in favor of dissolution, it became

¹⁸⁴ Ano Ang Kalibapi? (What Is the Kalibapi?), op. cit.; ERD, June 11, 1943, 1.

¹⁸⁵ Manila Tribune, December 5, 1942, 1.

unnecessary to do so, because by virtue of the rules of the party, it had virtually ceased to exist since last January first.¹⁸⁶

This abolition of political parties was followed by the dissolution of all civic organizations in the Archipelago, among which were the National Federation of Women's Clubs, Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, the Philippine Association of Women Writers, and the Filipino Nurses Association.¹⁸⁷ The Young Women's Christian Association was nevertheless reported later for its work of giving aid and comfort to the Fil-American prisoners of war.¹⁸⁸

The Kalibapi was formally launched on December 30, 1942, on the anniversary of the death of Dr. Jose Rizal, the foremost Filipino hero and martyr.¹⁸⁹ Membership was supposedly open to all Filipino citizens not less than 18 years of age, of good standing in the community, who identified themselves with the aims of the Association.¹⁹⁰ Before admittance into the Kalibapi a prospective member was made to take the following pledge:

On my honor I solemnly pledge to be loyal to the Japanese military administration and to the Philippine

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., December 5, 1942, 1.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., December 22, 1942, 1.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Miss Pilar Garces, Social Worker of the YWCA during the war.

¹⁸⁹ Manila Tribune, December 30, 1942, 1.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., December 7, 1942, 1.

Executive Commission, never to disgrace the Philippines by my deeds, to place the interests of the nation above those of the individual; to discard selfish considerations and past dissensions; to develop the native virtues that will give strength and happiness to the Filipino people; to unite my mind, my heart and my efforts with those of my countrymen in the establishment of a "Bagong Filipinas" [New Philippines] as a useful unit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and to respect and obey the orders of the Kalibapi and to uphold the ideals for which it stands.¹⁹¹

The requirement of this pledge made the membership of the Kalibapi more select than that of the Neighborhood Associations. Unlike the latter, however, the Kalibapi collected no membership fee.¹⁹² There was also a Kalibapi salute in the best Nazi style--the right hand was placed over the heart while the person bowed deeply.¹⁹³

The following purposes were ascribed to the Kalibapi by its first charter: (1) To help eradicate Occidental influences so that the Filipinos would think as Orientals. (For example, family ties were to be strengthened so that the father would be in authority and the formerly highly respected Filipino wife relegated to a position of subservience.) (2) To unify the Filipinos of all classes through a deeper and more widespread sense of organic community. (No example can be cited to clarify this vague statement.) (3) To coordinate all fields of endeavor. (For example, "cultural coordination" led to

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Abbott, op. cit.

¹⁹³ A. T. Steele, "New Order," Chicago Daily News, December 7, 1943, 4.

organizations such as the "Katipunan Nang Manunulat sa Pilipinas" (Association of Filipino Writers). Even Filipino laborers were organized, under a general program similar to the Nazi's Labor Front, all groups being regimented and organized. (4) To vitalize agriculture, commerce, industry, and to create a useful program for the development of the Islands' natural resources. (The aim apparently was to cloak the need for material help from the Philippines as soon as possible for Japan's war effort.) (5) To persuade guerrillas to surrender. (6) To propagandize the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the Philippines' place in it.¹⁹⁴

The charter provided for a president and an advisory board, which was composed of a vice-president; director general; members of the Philippine Executive Commission serving ex-officio; three directors at large for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao¹⁹⁵ and the heads of four bureaus, namely, research and planning, provincial and municipal branches, publicity and general affairs. The latter was to attend to all matters relating to moral, physical, cultural and economic rehabilitation,

¹⁹⁴ Manila Tribune, December 7, 1942, 1; December 18, 1942, 8; Ano Ang Kalibapi (What Is the Kalibapi?), op. cit.; Edward Mill, The Government of the New Philippines (Washington, D. C.: Office of Strategic Services, May 15, 1944); The Kalibapi and the Filipinos--Association for Service to the New Philippines (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943); The Kalibapi and the Co-Prosperity Sphere (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944); The Kalibapi Workers' Handbook (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944).

¹⁹⁵ Manila Tribune, December 7, 1942, 1.

as well as employment and liaison services.¹⁹⁶

Kalibapi campaigns for membership were then organized. The first provincial capitals visited were those of Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlac. At San Fernando, Pampanga, the first director-general of the Kalibapi and head of the membership campaign in Central Luzon, Benigno S. Aquino, delivered his most important collaboration speech. In it he tried to explain why he was determined to cooperate with the Japanese, and urged the Pampango guerrilla group to surrender. He said:

During the first days of our administration, I received countless threatening letters. I cannot deny that these letters made me think and ponder on my fate, but the more I examined my conscience, the deeper grew the conviction that I was not a traitor. How could I be a traitor to America, because we were offering our service in those areas already occupied and from whom the American flag had totally disappeared? To Japan? Impossible, because our cooperation was precisely with Japan. To our country? I could not be a traitor to our country because if we had accepted positions offered us at the risk of our lives, it was because of a sincere desire to serve our country at the time when our country needed us most.

I would not hesitate to say that I do not care if I were called a traitor to America, first because I am not an American, and second, because, if by treachery to America I could serve my country and my people, if by showing treachery to America, peace and tranquility could be restored to the Philippines so that the people might live again their normal lives; if by treachery to America all our institutions might return to their state of normality, and thus restore to the hearts of the people the aspirations for a happy future, then I would say once again that I would rather be one thousand times a traitor to America, if by being so I show my complete loyalty to my country.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Ano Ang Kalibapi? (What Is the Kalibapi), op. cit.

¹⁹⁷ Manila Tribune, January 19, 1943, 1.

Great crowds attended these Kalibapi campaign meetings in Manila and the provinces, partly because of the fame of the Filipino speakers imported for the occasions, partly because of musical numbers provided by the Japanese,¹⁹⁸ but mostly because minor civil employees, school children and members of the Neighborhood Associations were compelled to attend.

In spite of the rallies, on July 28, 1943, three months before the inauguration of the puppet Philippine Republic, the Kalibapi reported its total membership to be 353,647, or only 1/49th of the total population of the Philippines (which was then 17,576,800). Manila had the greatest membership, 45,681, or 1/21 of her total population. The 25 provinces and three cities in Luzon netted a membership of 303,128, while the 11 provinces and three cities of the Visayas reported only 4,437 members. Mindanao, with its 401 members, reported the lowest membership record.¹⁹⁹

A "Leaders' Institute for the Training of Kalibapi Workers" was formally opened on August 30, 1943 in Manila. This institute trained speakers on such subjects as physical education, Japanese and Filipino culture, public administration, Tagalog and Nippongo, and the philosophy of the Kalibapi.²⁰⁰

A Junior Kalibapi was also set up, on the occasion of Dr.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., February 4, 1943, 1.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., August 3, 1943, 1; Abbott, op. cit.

²⁰⁰ A. T. Steele, op. cit.; Manila Tribune, July 31, 1943, 1.

Jose Rizal's eighty-second birthday on June 19, 1943. This organization enlisted Filipinos under eighteen years of age who "showed promise of usefulness and service to the New Philippines."²⁰¹

All of these attempts to swell the party membership were surpassed when General Hideki Tojo announced on June 16, 1943, that the Philippines would be granted its independence within the year.²⁰² Rallies were held "to express the gratitude of the Filipino people." One of these rallies, held at Plaza Moriones in Manila, was said to have had an attendance of 50,000. At this rally, Director General Aquino again stood up to say:

We are ready to fight side by side with Japan because of her solemn pledge of independence in the shortest possible time.²⁰³

Two days later, another rally was held in Manila, at the New Luneta, supposedly to "manifest the country's profound gratitude for the definite assurance of the grant of Philippine Independence." Here Pio Duran, another Kalibapi official, said:

It is very significant that Philippine Independence will be granted not by an Occidental power but by a sister Oriental nation, not as a result of a prior petition but by the spontaneous, voluntary interpretation by Nippon of the feelings of her younger sister nation. . . .

The promise given by America on the other hand was

²⁰¹ Manila Tribune, July 31, 1943, 1.

²⁰² Ibid., June 18, 1943, 1.

²⁰³ Ibid., February 22, 1943, 1.

a result of political bargaining and not for a feeling of brotherhood and comradery among nations. . . . Economically, the United States was not liberating the Philippines from the American market--they were always linking Philippine economy with their own economic plans and sacrificed our economy for the benefit of American manufacturers and industrialists . . . that is why she did not want cotton to be grown in the Philippines.²⁰⁴

The Kalibapi further played a role when the puppet Philippine constitution was in preparation. At the first national convention of the Kalibapi, on June 19, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in Manila ordered that this body should be given the "honor and responsibility" of nominating the members of the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence.²⁰⁵ In compliance with another mandate from the same authority, Kalibapi leaders convened in Manila and ratified the puppet Philippine constitution when it was finished.²⁰⁶ Also, officers of the provincial and municipal Kalibapi chapters were responsible for electing, on September 15, 1943, all non-appointed members of the New National Assembly. These assembly members in turn elected the puppet president.²⁰⁷

Once the puppet Republic was established, on October 14, 1943, the Kalibapi became its propaganda arm.²⁰⁸ As soon as

²⁰⁴ Ibid., June 18, 1943, 1.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., June 17, 1943, 1.

²⁰⁶ Abbott, op. cit.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.; Manila Tribune, March 29, 1944, 1.

²⁰⁸ Manila Tribune, March 29, 1944, 1.

Laurel was sworn into office as the president of the Japanese-sponsored Republic, he reiterated the "party line" about the evils connected with political parties and announced that only one organization, the Kalibapi, would function politically.

The puppet president declared:

I shall stand for no political party while I hold the rudder of the state. We must have only one party, a party that stands for peace and reconstruction, sound national economy, social refinement and the creation of a new order.²⁰⁹

The political nature of the Kalibapi was thus for the first time openly acknowledged, and accepted. Executive order number 17, dated May 8, 1943, not only technically transferred the Kalibapi from a Japanese to a puppet instrument (though this was in effect a change in name only) but also legally converted the Kalibapi from a "non-political to a non-partisan political organization." The word party was avoided because of the evils they associated with the party system before; puppet officials declared that since there existed no political parties, the Kalibapi was to be the legitimate agency representing the people and linking the government to the people.²¹⁰ Just how it represented the people was not clearly stated; perhaps it was understood without being expressed that it would carry to the people the will of the Japanese conquerors, and not vice versa.

With the transformation of the Kalibapi into a political

²⁰⁹ Edward Mill, loc. cit.

²¹⁰ Manila Tribune, May 6, 1944, 1.

organization, its membership was limited to those entitled to vote according to the constitution, namely, persons over twenty-one years of age. Filipino women over twenty-one were included in the "Melchora Aquino Sisterhood," named in honor of a Filipino heroine. Filipino youths were incorporated into the "Kabataang Pangarap ni Rizal" (Rizal's dream youth), the purpose of which was to "insure a stable foundation for the Republic by inculcating in them the virtues exemplified and preached by Rizal." Laurel also created, as an auxiliary unit of the Kapariz, the Maria Clara Sisterhood, named in honor of Rizal's heroine described in his novels as the exemplification of everything noble and sacred in womanhood. These executive orders automatically abolished the pre-puppet Junior Kalibapi.²¹¹

The influence of the Kalibapi was felt in almost every social institution. Even the Catholic Church, whose power and wealth were factors to be reckoned with, had pressure brought upon it. On August 17, 1944, the Archbishop was urged to Filipinize the clergy. (The two highest positions in the Catholic Church in the Islands were still held by foreigners.) Kalibapi officials explained that the move would prove that the church was universal, and would dignify the Filipino race.²¹² Underlying reasons for the move were probably chagrin on the

²¹¹ Ibid., May 6, 1944, 1.

²¹² Ibid., August 17, 1944, 1.

part of the Japanese for their failure to secure wholehearted cooperation from the clergy, and also their hope that such a major change in the church would pave the way for further changes later and perhaps lead eventually to the introduction of the Japanese religion. However, according to Kuykendall, the clergy of the church were not Filipinized.²¹³

Although for purposes of description we have sorted out the propaganda media into such divisions as printed matter, exhibits, motion pictures, radio, speeches, church, schools, Neighborhood Associations and Kalibapi, it will be seen that by the fall of 1943, in less than two years, the entire social fabric was interwoven with the conqueror's ideologies. Religious and educational institutions were linked, as shown in the fact that the Kapariz and the Maria Clara sisterhood (and before them, the Junior Kalibapi) were affiliated with both public and private schools. The most detailed phases of Philippine cultural, political and religious life were enmeshed in the Kalibapi movement, which had, in fact, become the most pervasive medium of all. Given as many years of life as the Nazi party had in Germany, it well might have, in spite of a slow beginning, developed an increasing group of fiercely pro-Japanese and pro-Oriental adherents.

²¹³ C. Porter Kuykendall, op. cit.

General Propaganda Techniques

What techniques were employed to utilize the media we have discussed? In other words, what large-scale projects were undertaken to bring into fullest play the propaganda media the Japanese had developed? Three major undertakings emerge when we study the three years' occupation from this vantage point three years later--the Pacification and Independence movements.

Before discussing them, however, we shall consider some less ambitious projects which were also of importance. These were the changing of American-named streets and bridges, the consecration of Japanese tombstones, the return of government corporations to the puppet republic, granting of gifts, conventions and conferences, and compulsory celebrations.

a. Street Names Changed. Among the Manila streets and bridges whose names were changed by the Japanese were the Dewey Boulevard to Heiwa (Peace) Boulevard, Taft Avenue to Daitoa (Greater East Asia) Avenue.²¹⁴ Even the name of former President Quezon, who was then in Washington, D. C., was changed by executive order when it appeared on bridges and boulevards in the Islands. Quezon Boulevard became Mulawen Bridge; Quezon Park in Lucena, Tayabas, was made into Kamagon Park.²¹⁵

b. Honoring of the Dead in Imitation of the Shinto Ritual. A favorite Japanese practice to propagandize the good which

²¹⁴ Manila Tribune, May 19, 1942, 1.

²¹⁵ Ibid., December 10, 1943, 1.

some of their people had achieved in conquered areas was the honoring of the dead by commemoration of monuments and tombstones. We have already mentioned elsewhere that even during the American regime, there had been a memorial tower erected atop a hill on the outskirts of Davao, Mindanao, to Kyosaburo Ohta, whom they dubbed the "father of Davao."²¹⁶ Another monument had been erected on the spot where died Justo Ukon Takayama, a Japanese feudal lord and Catholic who had once taken refuge in the Islands following the persecution of those of his religion in Japan. The Japanese further urged the Catholic clergy of the Philippines to work for his beatification as a Catholic saint.²¹⁷ The Yahagi tombstone was also unveiled on May 28, 1942, as a feature of the observance of the first Navy Day. This tombstone was said to be erected on the exact spot where forty-eight members of the crew of the Japanese cruiser Yahagi were buried in 1918 when they died of an influenza epidemic in Manila.²¹⁸

c. Seized Property Returned. One of the most effective gestures of the Japanese was the return to the Filipino puppet government of property which had previously been seized by the Japanese army, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations. This policy began a few months before independence

²¹⁶ Ibid., November 1, 1943, 1.

²¹⁷ Ibid., November 14, 1942, 6.

²¹⁸ Ibid., May 28, 1942, 1.

was granted, after the Japanese Board of Information announced that it was never the desire of the Japanese army to exploit or monopolize the Philippine national economy. By July 11, 1944, fifteen government-owned corporations, two government enterprises and seven central agencies as the Philippine Sugar Association were transferred to the puppet republic.²¹⁹

d. Granting of Gifts, Honors and Distinctions. Gifts from the Japanese Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in the Philippines were donated time and again, either to indigent Filipinos or to a branch of the puppet government. Special ceremonies were held, and newspapers carried stories of these "friendly gestures." Besides money, truckloads of medicine and surgical supplies, yards of cloth,²²⁰ toys for children (given mostly during the Christmas season),²²¹ and sacks of supposedly imported rice were among the donations.²²² On one occasion, a million pesos were "donated" by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army for the reconstruction of vital Philippine highways, but of course, these roads were really required for Japan's military purposes.²²³ Likewise, on March 12, 1944, the Commander-in-Chief decided to cancel the supposed Philippine Government debt amounting to 23,979,000 pesos.

²¹⁹ Ibid., November 24, 1943, 1; July 12, 1944, 1; Romulo, op. cit.

²²⁰ Manila Tribune, January 11, 1943, 1.

²²¹ Ibid., December 24, 1943, 1.

²²² Ibid., September 19, 1944, 1.

²²³ Ibid., January 6, 1943, 1.

Without, of course, informing the people how they acquired this obligation. And finally, top Filipino collaborators like Jose P. Laurel, President of the puppet Philippine Republic, were awarded the highest honor that could be granted to foreigners by the Emperor of Japan.²²⁴

e. Conventions and Conferences. Conventions and conferences of provincial and local leaders served a propaganda as well as an administrative purpose. All in all, there were about four important conventions of governors and municipal and city mayors. On one occasion, the senior constabulary officers were likewise invited to a convention. The first convention was called for May 18, 1942 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army for the purpose of instructing the local leaders in such matters as preservation of peace, greater production of foodstuffs, and proper regard for their official positions. General Hayasi admonished the group thus:

In the present Philippine administration, it is imperative that the sense of duties of the government officials should be renovated as promptly as possible. The eradication of old evils, the enforcement of official discipline, and the cultivation and encouragement of a strong sense of responsibility are the fundamental elements of all the renovation to be undertaken.²²⁵

The second convention was held between August 12 and 16, 1942. This meeting followed the first release of prisoners of war and innumerable speeches were made by its delegates in praise of the Japanese for the latter's benevolence. As in the first convention, the preservation of peace was a primary

²²⁴ Ibid., March 12, 1944, 1; ibid., October 1, 1943, 1.

²²⁵ Ibid., May 18, 1942, 1.

subject for discussion. The renovation of education, the solution of the food problem, and the creation of Neighborhood Associations were also taken up.²²⁶

Three months later, another meeting of governors and mayors was held. Again the problem of peace and order was considered, as well as the development of industry in the local areas, for by the end of September, news had come through that the people in the provinces were ceasing to plant crops.²²⁷

For the final provincial convention, the senior constabulary inspector of each area met with the governors and mayors. This convention opened on February 22, 1943, a few weeks after Tojo promised Independence in the near future as soon as peace prevailed. This convention was called to step up the pacification campaigns in the Archipelago; hence the presence of the peace officers.²²⁸

Another type of convention organized by the Japanese was for the local newsmen in Manila. This was held on August 28, 1942, under the joint auspices of the Japanese Correspondents Association of Manila, and the Ho-do-bu. The reporters were expressly invited to be taught the Japanese policy concerning news releases and articles acceptable for print.²²⁹

²²⁶ Ibid., August 11-17, 1943, 1.

²²⁷ Ibid., September 30, 1942, 1.

²²⁸ Ibid., February 21 to 24, 1943, 1.

²²⁹ Ibid., August 28, 1942, 1.

Greater East Asia Conferences were likewise held in Tokyo to which delegates from all the occupied nations of the Far East were invited. A Greater East Asia Press Meeting was opened on November 18, 1943, at which the most important Philippine journalists were represented. Some returned home greater sympathizers of Japan.²³⁰ The most important Greater East Asia Conference, however, was that held on November 5, 1943, in Tokyo. To this, political leaders and high ranking officers of the occupied nations in East Asia were invited. President Laurel himself attended the conference, and his party included Foreign Minister, Claro Recto, and Minister of Public Works, Quintin Paredes. Out of this convention came the "Declaration of the Greater East Asia Nations."²³¹

f. Parades, Ceremonies and Rallies. Another propaganda technique used by the Japanese was public celebrations for their victories in the war as well as other significant events in their history, by means of parades, ceremonies and rallies. Parades were one picturesque method of celebrating. In their three years of occupation, the Japanese sponsored six mammoth parades. The first was staged by the Japanese themselves, on February 1, 1942. It took the form of a military parade which featured the motorized units of the Japanese Army with the intention of impressing the Filipinos with Japan's military

²³⁰ Ibid., November 18, 1943, 1.

²³¹ Ibid., November 5, 1943, 1.

might.²³² The second parade was held on May 18, 1942, to celebrate the Fall of Bataan and Corregidor and to provide the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army with a triumphal entry into Manila.

Previous to this parade, as on later occasions, Mayor Guinto asked the Manilans to decorate their houses and to display Japanese flags.²³³ All government employees were required to attend, headed by the chairman and members of the Philippine Executive Commission, with the members of the council of state and other high-ranking public officials. To insure that all government employees actually attended, each government office sent a checker who was assigned to see that everyone answered a roll call before the parade began. Likewise, employees of private firms and members of different organizations were urged to attend. Free transportation on street cars was provided.²³⁴

Detailed instructions as to behavior were published in the newspapers prior to the appointed date. One set of instructions read as follows:

Proper manner in paying respect to high officials:

1. Correct way of hailing "Banzai" [Hurrah!]

²³² Ibid., February 11, 1942, 1.

²³³ Ibid., May 8, 1942, 1.

²³⁴ Interview with Drs. Genaro Felizardo and Augusto Camara, December 9, 1942.

Raise and lower flag three times.

2. Correct position in marching: during the parade and on passing before the reviewing high officials walk straightly with eyes turned toward the reviewing stand.
3. During the ceremonies, the hoisting of the National Japanese flag and the playing of the Japanese anthem, hold your flag in your right hand, your left hand as illustrated thus. [A diagram followed.]²³⁵

The night before the parade, the Japanese Association in Manila held a symbolic lantern parade as a prelude to the victory celebration on the following day.²³⁶

The victory parade program included a salute to the Commander-in-Chief by Chairman Vargas and the other officials, hoisting of the Japanese flag by the Secretary of the Philippine Commission while the Constabulary Band played the national anthem, opening remarks by Chairman Vargas on the significance of the celebration, and a reply by Commander-in-Chief Hayasi. The program ended with Vargas leading the public in three cheers of "Banzai."²³⁷

Thousands of people attended the parade and the newspapers were full of accounts of it, stressing the cooperation given by the Filipinos. The papers further stated that a unit which was particularly attractive to the crowd was the Constabulary Battalion band, at the head of the parade, which made its formal appearance under Captain Alfonso Fresnido. Band members

²³⁵ Manila Tribune, May 11, 1942, 1.

²³⁶ Ibid., May 17, 1942, 1.

²³⁷ Ibid., May 11, 1942, 1.

appeared in their new all white uniforms.²³⁸ It was reported that Japanese officials on the reviewing stand were impressed by the immaculately uniformed, straight-marching and serious-looking participants of the parade. But a Japanese who had spent much of his life in the Philippines said of the marchers, "The Filipinos are such good actors."²³⁹

Interviews with those who survived the Japanese occupation reveal some interesting personal reactions to these parades. Reports have been made to the author that the Japanese did not trust the Filipinos, especially in such large groups, and stationed tanks and machine guns on the parade grounds to be sure that everyone behaved. Before flags were waved, either Vargas, Aquino or the Chairman of the parade committee announced over the microphone: "Iwasibas ninyo ang mga bandila." (Wave your flags.) The people waved them slightly and then all was quiet again. Not satisfied with this, the announcer asked the people to wave their flags again. Then the waving started and did not stop until the man said: "Justo na." (That's enough.) This seems to indicate lack of spontaneity on the part of the crowd.²⁴⁰

The Japanese Army held its own celebration observing the victory at Bataan and Corregidor on June 4, 1942. To be sure

²³⁸ Ibid., May 19, 1942, 1.

²³⁹ From a Gripsholm report (Washington, D. C.: War Department, 1943).

²⁴⁰ Camara and Felizardo, op. cit.

of no untoward incidents, it was ordered that houses facing the parade route have their windows closed from the second floor up. A feature attraction of this parade was an exhibition of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Corps as wave after wave of Japanese planes flew over the parade grounds. Before the parade ended, three pursuit planes executed several intricate maneuvers in the air, including a power dive, and newspaper reports stressed the modern equipment and skill possessed by the Japanese.²⁴¹

Calling the day a "blessing to the people," Chairman Vargas announced plans for a colorful parade and program for December 8, 1942, the first anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Clark Field. This was the day the Japanese called the Anniversary of the Greater East Asia War. The usual Filipino government officials from the highest to the lowest walked in this parade with the employees of industrial firms. And to make the parade noisier, fifteen bands participated. Placards were required for every delegation, their sizes having been specified in advance.²⁴² There were also parades in the provinces.

As on other occasions, the instructions for the "Kokumin Girei" were observed--Japan's national etiquette of bowing toward the Imperial palace for a minute or so of silence and

²⁴¹ Manila Tribune, June 1 and 4, 1942, 1.

²⁴² Ibid., December 5, 1942, 1.

prayers. Instructions for the proper performance of this practice had filled the air and the newspapers. The people assembled were asked to execute an about face, with backs to the grandstand and face the city hall which was due north from the Luneta. At a given signal, all were to bow. Then the assembly was to face the grandstand and again observe a minute of prayer for the war dead and the success of the Japanese.²⁴³ It was said that the prayer many Filipinos whispered during the "Kokumin Gerei" was not the expected one, however, but this: "Dios Ko, mamatay sana ang lahat na Japones," meaning "God, I pray that all the Japanese will drop dead."²⁴⁴

We have already discussed Tojo's speech on Philippine Independence in January, 1943. This inspired another parade and rally in which the puppet officials read the resolution of gratitude for the proclamation of independence. The Manila Tribune described the ceremonies as follows:

For more than an hour, thousands upon thousands of persons, representing all elements of the city, passed before General Tanaka in the reviewing stand, in orderly groups to express their joy to the Imperial Japanese Forces for driving American domination permanently away from the Philippines in order to make possible the realization of their ambition to be a free nation . . . when the parade was on, both the old and the new Luneta were a sea of faces beaming with joy.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Interview with Felizardo and Camara.

²⁴⁵ Manila Tribune, February 9, 1943, 1.

Other Japanese national holidays were imposed upon the Filipinos for celebration. One was the Kigen-setu or Japanese Empire Foundation Day on February 11 of each year. In 1942 it was marked by a message from the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army who said:

Today we are celebrating Foundation day of the Great Japanese Empire with you, our Filipino brothers. . . .

We remember on this day that you our brothers have long suffered without realizing your yearnings for independence, your natural aspirations to be free from oppression and the tyranny of the white people. . . . The American influence which has been thoroughly saturating the entire Philippines will now be completely removed, so that you may freely return to the natural life of an Oriental people. . . .

You should find in this event the best opportunity for a new life. Let us be thankful to our ancestors. . . .²⁴⁶

The following year, the same holiday was celebrated by all giving homage to the Imperial palace and the usual prayer for Japanese war dead and her victory. This was also the occasion when the Director General of the Japanese Army informed the people of Tojo's first speech on independence. About 50 Filipino military offenders were released on this day, mostly chosen from among those who bribed Japanese officials.²⁴⁷

Proper emperor worship was also required of the Filipinos by their new masters. Emperor Hirohito's birthday on April 29 was always observed during the Japanese occupation of the Islands. Mammoth parades, proclamations to the effect that

²⁴⁶ Ibid., February 11, 1942, 1.

²⁴⁷ Report of Major Charles Folsom (Washington, D. C.: War Department, 1943).

the Emperor should be thanked for their "liberation," and the release of another group of 79 military offenders were among the forms the celebrations took.²⁴⁸

In their wish to Japanize the culture of the Filipinos, the Nii Name-sai, the second harvest festival was announced through Vargas, chairman of the Executive Committee. Ceremonies for the occasion were held in schools and government offices, but the chief rites took place at the National Rice and Corn Corporation, where a rice offering ceremony was held at a shrine built inside the compound. It was not a Catholic priest, but a Shinto priest who presided at these ceremonies.²⁴⁹

At the end of the first month of the new government a three-day festival was held, featuring the display of the National colors of the "Republic," decorations on houses and buildings, civic programs, athletic games, music festivals and fireworks.²⁵⁰ The Japanese must have felt that since the Filipinos were a lighthearted people, these celebrations would convince them of Japan's good intentions.

There was even a mass demonstration of able bodied residents at the time that compulsory labor service was ushered in.²⁵¹

The glorification of Philippine heroes became part of the

²⁴⁸ Manila Tribune, April 22, 29, 1943, 1.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., November 22, 1942, 1.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., November 10, 1943, 1.

²⁵¹ Ibid., May 11, 1944, 1.

propaganda program when it was considered useful. For example, the Kalibapi was formally launched on December 30, 1942, on the anniversary of the death of Jose Rizal, his name being exploited as an example of "Oriental virtues."²⁵² The order of Tirad Pass was bestowed by the puppet Philippine Republic in honor of General Gregorio del Pilar, the young and valiant defender of Aguinaldo's Philippine lines in 1899 against the invading American forces.²⁵³ There was some mention of national heroes day (November 30) in the papers in 1942, and in the next year, Rizal's birthday was chosen as the date for organizing the Filipino youth into the Kapariz, when a band parade and youth pilgrimage were held. A statement was made by the puppet government on the anniversary of the death of the three martyred Filipino priests, Gomez, Burgos and Zamora to the effect that the three priests were champions of racial vindication and therefore were worthy of tribute.²⁵⁴ When conditions became so bad that Filipinos began to die of hunger in the Manila streets, Laurel issued another statement in observance of Apolinario Mabini's anniversary:

Apolinario Mabini, the sublime paralytic, is both a rebuke and an encouragement today--a rebuke to the situation which calls for more abnegation, discipline, work, loyalty, determination and sacrifice; and an encouragement because, as a Filipino, he had demonstrated the capabilities of the Filipino people who today have great opportunities and advantages to do what they had done and more.²⁵⁵

²⁵² Ibid., December 30, 1942, 1.

²⁵³ Ibid., May 5, 1944, 1.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., February 17, 1944, 1.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., March 15, 1944, 4.

Pacification

All the propaganda media and techniques we have discussed so far were utilized by the Japanese in their attempt to pacify the resisting Filipinos. The pacification movement had, in fact, begun as soon as the Japanese won the first battle engagements in the Philippines. Pacification and good-will missions had been sent immediately to different parts of the Archipelago. A twenty-day tour of the Bicol region in the southern tip of Luzon was made as early as March, 1942, by representatives of the Japanese propaganda corps, the religious section of the army, the military police, the newly organized civil and military administrations of Manila, and the National Rice and Corn Corporation.²⁵⁶ Later in the summer, while the battle of Bataan was still raging, there was already noticeable a contradiction in policies within the Japanese army. While the Japanese soldiers, especially those of the lower ranks, wanted to get what they could from the Filipinos immediately for the Japanese war effort, the propagandists believed in first winning and befriending them. So at Bataan, while some Japanese soldiers "requisitioned" watches and other property, others struck up friendships with natives in the near-by towns by playing games with them, organizing musical and literary programs in their public plazas or small parks, and by supplying the needy with food and medicines.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Ibid., March 15, 1942, 4.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., April 11, 1942, 1.

Within a week after Wainwright surrendered the whole USAFFE in the Philippines, the Japanese propagandists were already on a trek through narrow trails to mountainous Bontoc in Northern Luzon. Here the population was predominantly non-Christian. The Japanese distributed candy to the children and by means of lectures tried to indoctrinate the women of Bontoc in the way of living that would be approved by the new conquerors.²⁵⁸ Ho-do-bu men went in different directions, even to the remotest "barrios," and, with their music, songs and movies, usually succeeded in gathering a crowd. Then they began speaking. Often, they brought local political figures to deliver speeches urging the futility of resistance. They distributed leaflets, posters and newspapers telling of the latest war developments (at this stage in the war the Japanese were continuously winning), accounts of the rehabilitation and reconstruction work, and bulletins from the Philippine Executive Commission.²⁵⁹

In more important towns, larger meetings were held and more prominent Filipinos spoke. One of these speakers was General Artemio Ricarte, who had once won the respect of the Filipinos for his steadfast agitation in favor of independence. He was brought by the Japanese from Yokohama, where he had lived for decades in poverty as a voluntary exile.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ Ibid., June 7, 1942, 4.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., August 16, 1942.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., July 7, 1943, 1.

In the southern regions, the Japanese propagandists and soldiers took to their sailboats and landed even in the smallest and most inaccessible islands. Fully equipped with propaganda material, they made speeches aboard their boats which they amplified so that the curious people who gathered on the wharves could hear. Then they distributed the usual printed materials.²⁶¹

A year after the surrender of Bataan, the Japanese had begun to make use of their prisoners of war for pacification purposes. The major prison camp, at O'Donell, was converted into an educational camp. Likewise, Camp Dau in Pampanga province became the "General Gregorio del Pilar's Educational Camp."²⁶² One of the Filipino commanding officers at Bataan, General Guillermo Francisco, was appointed head of the Dau School.

The period of training for prisoners was completed in from twenty days to six weeks. The day started with a flag-raising ceremony early in the morning, followed by classroom instruction. The prisoners were taught Nippongo and subjects bearing on the Japanese war-time ideologies, such as the meaning of "Greater East Asia," Japan's military discipline, and history. Prisoners were exposed to magazines and pamphlets published under the supervision of the Japanese covering such

²⁶¹ Ibid., July 7, 1943, 4.

²⁶² Ibid., April 20, 1943, 1.

subjects as "Ideals of the New Philippines," "Significance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," "Future of the New Philippines," "Japan Today," and "Japanese Home Life." To facilitate the learning of Nippongo, the prisoners were taught to sing patriotic Japanese songs. The physical rejuvenation of the emaciated prisoners was likewise undertaken by daily exercises, mostly administered in the afternoon.²⁶³

Captured guerrillas or ex-USAFPE men who voluntarily surrendered were treated in much the same way as the prisoners of war and underwent almost the same training. Most of them were trained in a school established in Manila for the purpose.²⁶⁴

Simultaneous with the completion of the first period of the rejuvenation of prisoners, the first announcement was made of the release of prisoners-of-war. The Japanese gave widespread publicity to the release of each batch of prisoners. Between June 23, 1942, the date of the first release, and August 30, 1942, there were twenty days when the newspaper headlines announced new releases; the accompanying articles cited them as examples of the generosity of the Japanese authorities and their good will towards the Filipinos.

A ceremony was held for each group released, the chief features of which were a mass oath-taking (a deep bowing of

²⁶³ Ibid., August 10, 1942, 1.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.; Abbott, op. cit.

the prisoners of war and the audience in the direction of the Emperor's palace) and a speech by a ranking Japanese officer. Usually the particular Filipino official who was to become responsible for the behavior of the prisoners made a speech in response.²⁶⁵ As "rejuvenated" prisoners returned to their own districts and villages, the Japanese hoped they would spread the ideas with which they had been indoctrinated.²⁶⁶

Some of the released prisoners did not return home, however, but joined propaganda groups; others were too sick to return home and were placed in public welfare establishments or foster homes where they received medical aid. Those who were crippled were given occupational training so that they could return to civilian life properly adjusted in spite of their handicaps. In this connection, mention must be made of the unselfish service given by Filipino women, particularly those of Manila, who worked to restore hope to these released soldiers.²⁶⁷

Captured guerrillas, many of whom were destined to die at the hands of the Japanese, were forced to speak in the pacification tours. One particularly pitiful case was that of Colonel Claude A. Thorpe, the former commander of a Luzon guerrilla unit. After he had been made to sign a newspaper article which stated that the guerrillas were "common thieves

²⁶⁵ Manila Tribune between June 23, 1942 to August 30, 1942, 1.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Abbott, op. cit.

preying on peaceful inhabitants of the country," he was taken from one public meeting to another to tell the people that he "gave guerrilla warfare a fair trial" and was convinced that it was unwise to continue. He was also forced to criticize his own people by stating that "the Americans maliciously spread the fact that the benevolent Japanese soldiers were barbarous, and that "apparently these moves were intended to make the colored races of the Philippines fight against the Japanese who belonged to the same Asiatic race." When his usefulness to the campaigns ended, he was killed. Other American guerrillas met the same fate.²⁶⁸ Captured Filipino guerrillas were also used to make speeches, among them being Angelo Hermitano, the head of the "Brown Eagle" guerrillas of Cavite province.²⁶⁹ Since it was common knowledge what furious resistance these guerrilla leaders had made up to the very moment of their capture, one wonders how effective their speeches were.

About January 1, 1943, the Public Order Division was created in the Department of Interior, and from that date the pacification campaign was directed by the puppet government.²⁷⁰ In March of the same year, Laurel, then the Secretary of

²⁶⁸ Manila Tribune, January 21, 1943, 1; January 31, 1943, 1.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., January 23, 1944, 12.

²⁷⁰ Radio Broadcast of the Far East, henceforth to be known as RRFE, a bi-weekly analysis (Washington, D. C.: Federal Communications Division), January 6, 1943, F 4-5.

Interior of the Philippine Executive Commission, called about two hundred Filipino leaders together and appealed for their cooperation in the preservation of peace. Included were the members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Philippine Assembly, merchants, bankers, industrialists and labor leaders.²⁷¹ In June, the Philippine Executive Commission and the Kalibapi jointly created a Central Peace Preservation Committee, with Laurel at its head. A more vigorous campaign to end disturbances began, in an attempt to meet Premier Tojo's condition that peace be restored before independence was granted.²⁷² The Philippines were then divided into seven districts, each with a commissioner who toured his district and spoke at public meetings, along with Kalibapi officials, provincial governors, town mayors, vigilance officers and a member of the office of military administration.²⁷³

Later, when the puppet Republic was set up, in October, 1943, "President" Jose Laurel issued a General Amnesty Proclamation, which promised full pardon to any guerrilla who would surrender within the next 30 days, and this was later extended to January 25, 1944.²⁷⁴ January 19-25 was named "General

²⁷¹ Ibid., June 8, 1943, P 2.

²⁷² Manila Tribune, June 4, 1943, 1.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., January 24, 1944, 1.

Amnesty Week." He appointed an Amnesty Board, headed by General Jose de los Reyes, a veteran commander of the Fil-American Forces at Bataan. Under de los Reyes, a nation-wide campaign was inaugurated. Different localities in the islands were visited.²⁷⁵ A corps of public speakers from the newly organized Bureau of Information and Public Order cooperated with the Amnesty Board in urging the Filipinos to give up resistance against the Japanese.²⁷⁶

However, as we will see later, there were Filipino guerrillas up to the very end of the Japanese regime.

Independence Movement

The granting of Philippine Independence, even in name only, was an astute move, no doubt calculated to win the support of the liberty-loving Filipino and to cajole the guerrilla hiding in the mountain fastness. The first mention of Independence was made nineteen days after the Japanese occupation forces reached Manila. On January 21, 1942, Premier Hideki Tojo of Japan, in addressing the seventy-ninth session of the Imperial Japanese Diet, said:

Japan will gladly grant the Philippines its independence as long as it cooperates and recognizes Japan's program of establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ Ibid., January 23, 1944, 1.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., August 22, 1943, 1.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., October 16, 1943, 2.

A year later, on January 28, 1943, Premier Tojo reiterated his Philippine Independence pledge before the Japanese House of Peers when he said:

Substantial progress is being made in the degree of cooperation rendered to the Japanese Empire by the people of the Philippines as well as in the restoration of internal peace and security. Under these circumstances and on condition that further tangible evidence of cooperation is actively demonstrated, it is contemplated to put into effect the statement made previously on the question of Philippine Independence in the shortest time possible.²⁷⁸

This speech of Premier Tojo was immediately elaborated on by the Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration in the Islands when he said that independence was to be earned by fulfilling the following conditions: (1) Eradication of all entanglements and connections with the past regime, (2) Economic rehabilitation of the Philippines in close cooperation with the Japanese military administration by the initiation of effective ways to bring about economic self-sufficiency, (3) Reorientation of people both spiritually and intellectually.²⁷⁹

Thus began the use by the Japanese of the Independence theme for pacification purposes. In hailing Tojo's speech, a Japanese Army spokesman said he hoped that "the Filipinos will not fall short of the expectations of the Japanese people." The head of the Japanese Military Police warned the guerrillas that "Punitive drives will be launched if outlaws will not

²⁷⁸ Ibid., January 29, 1943, 1; RRFE, February 2, 1943, F 1.

²⁷⁹ Abbott, op. cit.

surrender."²⁸⁰

The puppet Philippine officials, perhaps prompted by their masters, likewise organized a huge public demonstration of gratitude for Tojo's pledge of Independence. Tojo, after this occasion, said:

I have been further strengthened in my convictions which I expressed in my previous declaration that if the Philippines continues to substantially cooperate with Japan, Japan will enable the Philippines to obtain independence as soon as possible.²⁸¹

To further propagandize Japan's promise of independence, a manifesto, written in the style of America's Declaration of Independence, was issued by the members of the Council of State over the signature of Jorge Vargas, Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission. It said in part:

Independence is finally within our reach: Japan is waging a sacred war for the purpose of liberating the Orient from Occidental domination. In pursuance of that noble cause, now happily on the point of attainment, and as a result of her brilliant success on air, land, and sea, she offers us the honor of independence and the blessings that it implies.

This generous and unparalleled offer Japan solemnly made to the Philippines with the sincerity of a friend and protector. Her friendship for us is traditional. As far back as the sixteenth century, her samurai warriors offered to join our ranks to smash the Spanish yoke. . . . Nor was that all. Long before the outbreak of the current Greater East Asia War, her Imperial government freely and unreservedly declared that she had no territorial ambition in the Philippines. This declaration, the Imperial Japanese Forces reaffirmed when they occupied Manila early last year. They had come here, they announced, merely to fulfill Japan's sacred mission, the establishment of Asia for the Asians, the Philippines for the Filipinos.

²⁸⁰ Manila Tribune, January 31, 1943, 1.

²⁸¹ RRFE, April 27, 1943, F 3.

. . .
 Finally, resolved as we are and have always been to attain our independence, we would be unworthy indeed of our race and that liberty which our martyrs have sanctified with their blood if we did not exert our utmost to surmount every obstacle placed in our path to freedom and nationhood. But first of all, let us be united. . . . Let the misguided remnants of the USAFFE who are still hiding in the mountains abandon any futile resistance which at best can only mean unnecessary suffering and sacrifice to our people.

She [Japan] freed our imprisoned soldiers and with her own hands repaired the ravages of war. She went beyond that. She taught the value of discipline, increased our national consciousness and showed us by precept and example the real meaning of social dignity. By cooperating with the Japanese actively, and in full measure, we emancipated ourselves from political domination and economic exploitation and win for ourselves the honor and glory of independence.

We therefore appeal most earnestly to all our countrymen to join and help us in the titanic task of reconstructing our own country and in complete reestablishment of peace and order throughout the land. Let us avoid further suffering, bloodshed and destruction.²⁸²

While Japan's interest in this proposed Philippine independence was at its height, the exiled President Manuel L. Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth government spoke from his sick-bed in Washington and warned his people:

The Philippines are possessed of the attributes of full nationhood. . . . The only thing lacking is the establishment of the Philippine Republic. That will be forthcoming, as soon as the Japanese are driven out of the Islands.

Do not despair for your liberty is certain. Do not let the Japanese fool you. Use your wits and beat him at his own game. Above all, you must continue to have faith in America.²⁸³

²⁸² Manila Tribune, February 27, 1943, 1; RRFE, March 2, 1943, F 1.

²⁸³ Washington Post, February 25, 1943, 1.

Premier Tojo's answer to President Quezon's message was a flying visit to Manila. Newspapers gave great play to the story of his arrival. They described his visit as a signal honor to the Filipino people, and as a symbol of his high regard for them. His arrival coincided with the second anniversary celebration of the fall of Corregidor and Bataan, for which a huge parade and rally were prepared long in advance. News items of the rally at first estimated the attendance at 100,000 but later upped it to 400,000. In his speech, Tojo declared:

Upon my arrival in this country, I see everywhere tangible evidences of your growing desire to cooperate more closely with the Imperial Japanese government. I note with great pleasure that you are actively forging ahead in your tasks of creating the New Philippines and under these circumstances, I am convinced more than ever of the propriety of early independence.²⁸⁴

Indeed, Premier Tojo's first visit became an imposing propaganda tool in the hands of the Ho-do-bu men, who publicized pictures of him taking a morning stroll at the Luneta and talking to a woman vendor, smiling as he watched a boy climb a coconut tree, etc. Also given newspaper prominence were the gifts he brought, including a 100,000 peso donation for Philippine relief.²⁸⁵ To be sure that sufficient publicity was given to the 4,000,000 quinine tablets he brought, the Japanese organized a ceremony for their reception by the

²⁸⁴ Manila Tribune, May 7, 1943, 3.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., May 8, 1943, 1.

Filipino officials.²⁸⁶ Mayor Leon Guinto received from Tojo a cloisonne vase in the name of the city of Manila and exploited the occasion thus: "I expect the city of Manila to exert even greater efforts for the fulfillment of the Premier's expectations."²⁸⁷

In the meantime, the former Filipino leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, was used to throw the spotlight upon the past sufferings of his countrymen at the hands of the Spaniards and Americans in a speech made to the Annual Convention of the Veterans of the Philippine Revolution, on June 12, 1942. By June 16, he was ready to petition the Japanese to "grant independence to the Philippines within this year." On the same day, Filipino youths were organized in Manila and paraded with banners containing the inscription: "Dawn of Filipino liberation has come."²⁸⁸

At about this time, a delegation of Filipino officials was invited to tour Japan and to listen to another "historic" pronouncement to follow. In a banquet given in honor of the delegation's arrival, Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu said:

The time has arrived when all countries of East Asia must stand up and save East Asia from foreign yoke. Japan wants active participation.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ Ibid., May 13, 1943, 1.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., May 11, 1943, 1.

²⁸⁸ RRFE, June 22, 1942, H 1.

²⁸⁹ RRFE, April 27, 1944, No. 44, F 1.

The stage was set for the climactic pronouncement of Premier Tojo. The Filipino delegation was properly seated in the Diet's gallery. Before the eighty-second extraordinary session of the Japanese Imperial Diet, Premier Tojo said on June 18, 1943:

The attitude of Nippon toward Philippine Independence had been repeatedly clarified in the past but at this time, Nippon would go a step further and declare to the world that Japan will grant the honor of independence to the Filipinos in the course of the present year.²⁹⁰

The delegates from the Philippines were afterwards interviewed by the Japanese newsmen concerning Tojo's address. Mayor Quinto, head of the delegation, expressed appreciation for the promise, and Pio Duran exclaimed that he was "electrified" by it.²⁹¹

A new barrage of propaganda was begun in the Islands. Japan's sincerity and generosity were repeatedly cited, and the failure of the United States to have accorded Independence was deplored. Loyalty to the puppet republic which was about to be established was solicited by attempts to arouse a spirit of nationalism.²⁹²

Immediately, the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration in Manila invited approximately one hundred

²⁹⁰ Manila Tribune, June 17, 1943, 1.

²⁹¹ Ibid., June 17, 1943, 2; "Independence Is Proclaimed," Ang Kapit Bay (The Neighbor) (Manila), June, 1943, 1-4.

²⁹² Edward Mill, loc. cit.; Abbott, loc. cit.

Filipino leaders to a banquet at the Manila hotel and offered a toast to Independence. Vargas, then the head of the puppet government, rose to ". . . pledge the entire collaboration of the Filipino people to Japan in the current sacred war of liberation for the freedom of Greater East Asia."²⁹³

On June 18, 1943, the Kalibapi, which was holding a convention of one thousand delegates, received an order from the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration to name a committee of five which in turn would nominate twenty members of a Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence. The five were "unanimously chosen" that day, and carrying out in incredible speed this imitation of democracy, on the following day, the same convention approved the twenty names they presented. On the third day, at the great Luneta Rally which was organized supposedly to manifest the Filipino people's gratitude to Tojo, Benigno S. Aquino announced these twenty names. Newspapers carried the story that the people ratified by acclamation the names of the members of the preparatory commission and called this the people's "approval" of the proceedings.²⁹⁴

The twenty members of the commission were formally appointed by Shigenori Kuroda, Director General of the Japanese Military Administration, on June 20, 1943, and Jose P. Laurel,

²⁹³ "Independence Is Proclaimed," loc. cit.

²⁹⁴ Manila Tribune, June 20, 1943, 1; RRFE, June 22, 1943, H 1; Mill, loc. cit.

the Minister of Interior of the Philippine Executive Commission, was chosen as chairman, while Ramon Avancena, the former chief justice of the Supreme Court was made first vice-president. Benigno S. Aquino, the Director General of the Kalibapi, became second vice-president, while Vargas received no office. Other members were: Teofilo R. Sison, Antonio de las Alas, Rafael Alunan, Claro Recto, Quintin Paredes, Jose Yulo, Emilio Aguinaldo, Miguel Unson, Canilo Osias, Vicente Madrigal, Manuel Briones, Emiliano Tirona, Pedro Sabido, Sultan Alaoya Alonto Sa Ramain, Melencio Arranz and, surprisingly, Manuel Roxas, a man whose resistance to the Japanese had gained the respect of the people. These twenty men represented all the important linguistic and regional divisions of the Philippines and three among the twenty--Laurel, Recto, and Roxas--had also participated in the drafting of the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935, a fact which the Japanese utilized by saying that their political experience would be drawn upon.²⁹⁵

The first meeting of the Preparatory Commission was held on June 23, 1943, under the chairmanship of vice-president Avancena, President Laurel being in the hospital for wounds he had received when guerrillas made an attempt on his life.²⁹⁶ The members were said to have "unanimously" voted for the organization of six sub-committees and agreed to leave the

²⁹⁵ RRFE, June 22, 1943, H 1.

²⁹⁶ Manila Tribune, October 16, 1943, 2.

selection of their chairmen and their members to the discretion of Commissioner Laurel. The six committees were: (1) Administrative, (2) Legislative, (3) Judicial, (4) Miscellaneous Affairs, (5) Planning and Investigation, (6) Constitution Drafting. The constitution drafting committee was the most important; this group of four men, including Laurel himself, were responsible for the provisions of the puppet constitution.²⁹⁷

Meanwhile, the Filipino leaders who had been in Japan when Tojo made his speech of June 16 toured the towns and cities of the Philippines to inform the masses of the new republic about to be established. Rallies and gratitude meetings were held.²⁹⁸ Laurel, as Minister of Interior, ordered the creation of special provincial, municipal and barrio committees to gain popular support for the "Republic" and to be responsible later for Independence celebrations in all localities.²⁹⁹

Premier Tojo, on his way back to Japan from Thailand and Singapore, reappeared in Manila on July 10. He conferred with the members of the Preparatory Committee for 45 minutes. Japanese propagandists claimed that this visit from the "illustrious statesman" increased the committee's prestige.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ Mill, loc. cit.

²⁹⁸ Manila Tribune, July 7, 1943, 6; September 3 and 4, 1943, 1.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., September 10, 1943, 1; RRFE, September 27, 1943, H 1.

³⁰⁰ Manila Tribune, July 11, 1943, 1.

By August 31, 1943, after having supposedly spent days in study, consultation and discussion, the handful of members of the Constitution Drafting Committee presented their completed draft to the plenary session of the Preparatory Committee. Speaking before the session, Laurel said that the constitution they were submitting reflected the ideals of the Filipino people and hence was the best organic law which the human mind could conceive. And appealing to his countrymen, he said:

It is equally important that the Filipino people be prepared to do their part unselfishly and unreservedly.³⁰¹

The final deliberations of the plenary session of the preparatory committee were made into a theatrical stunt. On September 4, 1943, at the Metropolitan Waterworks building where the members met, loud speakers were installed so that the proceedings in Tagalog would be heard by the thousands of Filipinos gathered there. After the meeting, the preparatory committee members were ushered to the gaily decorated balcony, there to sign the document one after another and to receive the "thunderous applause" of the crowd. When the constitution was duly signed by all, the Philippine Constabulary Band struck up the "Song for the Creation of the New Republic," composed for the occasion.³⁰²

³⁰¹ Ibid., September 8, 1943, 1; RRFE, September 15, 1943, F 2; Mill, loc. cit.

³⁰² Manila Tribune, September 5, 1943, 3; RRFE, September 15, 1943, E 1-2.

A Kalibapi convention was called for September 6th and 7th and the new constitution summarily ratified. The Manila Tribune stated that Chairman Vargas authorized the ratification of the Constitution by the Filipino people, but due to the lack of time and material necessary to submit the organic law to a direct vote, and to the fact that the Kalibapi was the "people's association," it was decided to have the Kalibapi Convention ratify it instead.³⁰³ This Kalibapi convention which was referred to as a general popular assembly, consisted of two delegates from each province and city where the Kalibapi chapters had been formed.³⁰⁴ Benigno S. Aquino, chosen as chairman of the Assembly, appointed Camilo Osias and five others, including Mayor Leon Guinto of Manila, as a committee to draw up the resolution ratifying the constitution. On September 7, all the 108 delegates, together with the members of the Independence committee, were said to have attended church services individually to seek "spiritual encouragement to carry out the great task still before them." In accordance with "this inspiration and in obedience to the mandate of their respective constituencies," the 108, after listening to the stirring address of Laurel, "unanimously and devoutly" approved by a roll call vote the resolutions submitted to them.³⁰⁵

³⁰³ Manila Tribune, September 5, 1943, 1.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ RRFE, September 15, 1943, E 1-2.

The ratification ceremonies were continued with the usual mass rally attended by 100,000 Manilans who were said to have greeted the Independence Committee members with "thunderous cheers." While the bands blared lively tunes and leaflets dropped from the sky, a parade a mile long marched past the reviewing stand. The last event was the dedication of the constitution, fittingly concluded the next day when all the members of the Independence Commission, the Kalibapi delegates, members of the Executive Commission and the Council of State made a special floral offering at the monument of Jose Rizal. Thus, with pomp and ceremony, the new constitution setting up the puppet Republic was adopted, with virtually no endorsement by the Filipino people.³⁰⁶

Were the Japanese afraid to submit the new constitution to the people for approval? It is true that many provisions seemed almost to have been directly lifted from the Commonwealth Constitution. There was the same general allocation of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; the old titles such as National Assembly and Supreme Court were retained. But the following advantages of the new constitution over that of the Commonwealth period were pointed out by the Manila Tribune: First, it left no doubt that the government soon to be established would be republican in form. Second, it incorporated "a lesson from contemporary history,"

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

in that it talked not only of rights but also of the duties of every citizen. Third, it settled the conscription question by providing expressly that the armed forces of the Philippines could not be called to the service of a foreign nation. Similarly, no foreign nation could maintain military or naval bases in the Philippines without the latter's consent. [In the light of later events, they claimed that this was actually a greater degree of autonomy than the Philippines have since received from America by provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law.] Fourth, there was no High Commissioner, nor were the rights of the Philippines to control her own currency, transportation, export and tax systems to be ultimately dependent on foreign tribunals. And fifth, the document prevented exploitation of natural resources by any foreign power by providing that Filipino concerns alone could obtain franchise for public utilities or could dispose, exploit and otherwise develop agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain.³⁰⁷

If the constitution was superior in these ways, why then was it necessary to circumvent the Filipino people in ratifying it? Perhaps because at closer scrutiny, the following differences appear:³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Manila Tribune, September 5, 1943, 1; RRFE, November 10, 1943, E 5.

³⁰⁸ Edward Will, loc. cit; copy of the Puppet Philippine Constitution from Sunday Manila Tribune, September 5, 1943.

PUPPET CONSTITUTION

COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION

A. Executive Power

1. Mode of Election

The President was to be elected by the National Assembly.

2. Power of Appointment

The President was to appoint ministers, ambassadors, provincial governors, city mayors and other personnel, unhampered by any right of the legislature to consent to his appointments.

3. Control of National Resources and Public Utilities

The President was empowered to enter into agreements with foreign nations for the utilization of natural resources and the operation of public utilities without seeking the consent of the legislature.

4. Veto Power

The President was given what amounted to an absolute veto. He could veto a bill passed by the legislature twice. Following the second veto, the Assembly might not during the same session reconsider the measure.

5. Vice President

None provided for.

1. Mode of Election

The President was to be elected by direct vote of the people.

2. Power of Appointment

The President was to appoint all important governmental officials but his appointments were subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.

3. Control of National Resources and Public Utilities

The President was given no such power to bargain away the country's natural resources.

4. Veto Power

The President's veto could be over-ridden by a 2/3 vote of members of the National Assembly.

5. Vice President

The Vice-President was elected by direct vote of the people for the same term as the President.

B. Legislative Branch - National Assembly

1. Composition

The National Assembly was to be composed of provincial Governors and city mayors acting ex-officio and one elected representative from each province.

2. Mode of Election

Only one half of the Assembly was to be elected. The other half automatically served because of their positions as provincial Governors or city mayors. This half were presidential appointees who in practice controlled elections in their own districts as heads of the local Kalibapi units. The President was thus in a position to determine who the elective as well as the appointive members of the Assembly would be.

3. Term of Office

Three years for the elective portion of the membership.

1. Composition

The National Assembly was to be composed of representatives apportioned among the several provinces according to the number of inhabitants, the total number not to exceed 120. In 1940, by amendment, two houses were provided, a senate and house of representatives, the former to be elected at large and the latter by provinces.

2. Mode of Election

Elected by the eligible voters.

3. Term of Office

Six years for senators and four years for representatives.

Judicial Branch

1. Supreme Court

Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and six associate justices, appointed by the President with advice of the Cabinet.

1. Supreme Court

Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and ten associate justices, appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.

2. Inferior Courts

Inferior Court judges were to be appointed by the President with the advice of the Supreme Court.

2. Inferior Courts

Inferior Court judges were to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.

It can be seen from the foregoing that the most striking characteristic of the new constitution was the power concentrated in the hands of the President at the expense of the assembly.

On September 13, 1943, Vargas issued an executive order providing for the selection of delegates to the unicameral National Assembly to be set up.³⁰⁹ Since there were 46 provinces and eight cities, the Assembly was to have a total membership of 108, made up of 54 ex-officio members serving by virtue of having been appointed provincial governors or mayors of chartered cities, and 54 members to be elected by the provincial municipal and municipal district committees of the Kalibapi.³¹⁰ On September 20, 1943, the 54 elective solons were thus chosen by the Kalibapi.³¹¹

The new National Assembly convened for the first time on September 25, 1943.³¹² Two of the duties which confronted the members at the opening sessions were the election of the

³⁰⁹ RRFE, September 15, 1943, E 1-2.

³¹⁰ Manila Tribune, September 14 and 19, 1943, 1.

³¹¹ Ibid., September 24, 1943, 1.

³¹² Ibid.

President and the appointment of a group to take charge of his inauguration. The name of the man to be nominated was not heard first, however, within the walls of the National Assembly. As prearranged, Chairman Vargas had previously urged the Filipino people to "forsake personal considerations and unite for the welfare of the nation by electing Jose P. Laurel, the only Filipino under the present circumstances who could make a success of the Philippine Republic. . . ." Benigno S. Aquino, the newly elected speaker of the National Assembly, personally nominated Laurel and appealed to that body to vote for him after securing approval for his proposal that everyone vote by roll call. Laurel was elected to the Presidency by the "unanimous" vote of all the members present in the Assembly.³¹³

The Assembly then proceeded to other business. Two resolutions were passed, the first expressing gratitude to Japan for fulfilling her promise of independence and the other expressing gratitude to Vargas for his "most unselfish leadership and dynamic nationalism in piloting the ship of state during one of the most critical periods of Philippine history and guiding the people to realize their long cherished dream of independence." At every possible point, the new independence was utilized as pro-Japanese propaganda.

On September 30, 1943, Laurel, Aquino, and Vargas arrived in Tokyo to consult Japanese government officials concerning

³¹³ Ibid., September 14, 19, 21, 24, 26, 1943, 1.

the independence of their country.³¹⁴ They were sumptuously feted and granted decorations by the Emperor.³¹⁵

On October 8, 1943, Laurel was back with his party in Manila and announced that the "independence of the Philippines, promised by Japan in less than two years after the outbreak of the Greater East Asia war, will be proclaimed on October 14, 1943."³¹⁶ This announcement was countered by the allies with a message from President Roosevelt that the "United States will grant the Philippines her independence the moment America achieves victory." The Japanese in Manila, however, quickly retorted that President Roosevelt's message was a sign that the American Congress wanted to wash its hands of the Philippines and that the United States would never return. Hence it would be folly to wait for the Americans.³¹⁷

Preparations for the Independence celebration were under way. The inauguration committee chosen by the Assembly and the local independence committees created earlier by Laurel as Commissioner of the Interior now began to mobilize. The poster section of the Department of Information of the Imperial Japanese Army began work on posters depicting historical and

³¹⁴ Ibid., October 1, 1943, 1.

³¹⁵ Ibid., October 2, 1943, 1.

³¹⁶ Ibid., October 8, 1943, 3.

³¹⁷ RRFE, October 12, 1943, F 1.

allegorical scenes concerning Philippine Independence.³¹⁸ Japan's representatives began arriving. "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Philippines," Syozo Murata with three members of his suite arrived on October 13.³¹⁹ Speaker Okada of the Japanese house of representatives, and Marquis Sasaki, of the house of Peers, were on hand.³²⁰ The Department of Information in Tokyo sent Kosaki Yamada and a group of Japanese musicians with a "Philippine Independence March" as a gift for the new republic.³²¹

The day before the celebration was to be held, newspapers carried the announcement that contrary to a previous plan, the Japanese would not offer free food to the Filipinos after the Independence ceremonies. No reason was given for this change of plan.³²²

In Manila, long before eight o'clock on the morning of the ceremonies, the street in front of the Philippine Legislative building was teeming with people and swaying flags.³²³ Properly seated on the official dais were: the high Japanese

³¹⁸ Manila Tribune, October 9, 1943, 1.

³¹⁹ Ibid., October 9 and 13, 1943, 1.

³²⁰ Ibid., October 10, 1943, 1.

³²¹ Ibid., October 19, 1943, 5.

³²² Ibid., October 13, 1943, 1.

³²³ Ibid., October 15, 1943, 1.

dignitaries in full regalia; Lieutenant General Sigenori Kuroda, highest commander of the Japanese Army in the Philippines; the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy in the Philippines, Ambassador Syozo Murata; President Laurel, Speaker Aquino, and former Chairman Vargas (the latter three resplendent with their newly acquired Imperial decorations); the members of the National Assembly; the Council of State; the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence; the Philippine Executive Commission; and the Philippine Supreme Court.³²⁴

In preparing for the "solemn ceremonies," the most minute instructions had been issued. The time and place for assembling, entrances to be used, number of representatives to take part in the parade from various organizations, kind of placards permitted, correct mode of attire, when to stand at attention and numerous other details had been broadcast to the people several times on the eve of the event.³²⁵ Outside of Manila, at 8 o'clock in the morning of October 14, the Japanese flag was lowered with "appropriate respect and veneration" in all the cities and towns.

In Manila, the ceremony was opened with a proclamation from the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces which was read by Vargas, announcing the withdrawal of the

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ RRFE, October 27, 1943, G 1-12.

Japanese Military Administration. Laurel then pronounced the following declaration of Independence:

Love of freedom has always been the dominant impulse which has given the historical evolution of the Filipino race a meaning and a purpose. The Filipinos ceaselessly have fought and labored for their freedom ever since they were brought under a foreign yoke, first under Spain for three hundred years and later under America for the last forty years. . . .

It went on to proclaim that the Filipino people valued their new "unbounded privileges" to govern themselves, and develop their natural potentialities uninhibited by political subjugation or racial prejudice. The familiar strains were struck again that this freedom would allow rehabilitation of mind and spirit through inclusion in the Oriental fold, restoration of forgotten ways, and contribution to the New World order as an integral part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.³²⁶

After the declaration of independence was pronounced, Bishop Mario Guerrero gave the invocation, followed by one minute of silent meditation in honor of the heroes and martyrs of Philippine freedom and for the success of the New Republic, and another minute of prayer for Japan's war dead and her victory. Even the manner of praying had been prescribed in detail: "Everybody will keep silent, stand at attention with head uncovered and slightly bowed from the neck."³²⁷

³²⁶ The Declaration of Independence (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943).

³²⁷ Manila Tribune, October 15, 1943, 1; RRFE, October 27, 1943, G 1-12.

Generals Emilio Aguinaldo and Artemio Ricarte, two men who symbolized the Philippine Republic of 1898, hoisted the flag to the tune of the National Anthem and the ringing of church bells. Then Laurel took his oath of office. The Japanese forces gave him a gun salute and he began his inaugural address.³²⁸

He thanked the Emperor of Japan "for ordering this holy war and hastening the day of our national deliverance." Then he outlined his governmental program: (1) To cope with any untoward situation which might arise, (2) to establish self-sufficiency and export raw materials to other members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, (3) to carry on welfare activities under the slogan of "lives help live," (4) to further the evolution of a new type of citizenship ready and willing to subordinate itself to the state, (5) to renovate the educational system with emphasis on character formation, (6) to conscript military and civil personnel for service and necessary training period, (7) to strengthen the family and stimulate group consciousness of the young, (8) to take measures for health and to encourage scientific research, and (9) to establish a single party system.³²⁹

Following Laurel's address, Lieutenant General Shigenori Kuroda offered his congratulations to the puppet republic.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ President Laurel's Inaugural Address (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943); RRFE, October 27, 1943, G 1-12.

The ceremony was concluded with a thirty-minute parade, with the representatives of various organizations strictly limited to one hundred each.³³⁰

There followed a four-day holiday marked by every conceivable form of festivity. Manila was said to be a huge sea of flags which waved from every building, from street cars, automobiles, "carretelas," tricycles, even from barges and junks crossing up and down the Pasig River. Bands on government trucks played the national anthem, Filipino marches and Japanese martial music. Placards, posters, banners and streamers dotted the city while Japanese planes flew the Philippine flag overhead. Plays, lectures, contests, musical and sport events, exhibits and even jazz bands provided entertainment. Floral offerings were made to Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio and to others.³³¹

The emphasis in speeches was that the new government was a reincarnation of the first Philippine Republic. It was pointed out that this "Second Republic" drew heavily upon its ill-fated predecessor, taking its flag, its national anthem, and some features of its constitution.³³²

One article written by a delegate of the Japanese writers' Association concerning the Independence celebration indicates

³³⁰ Manila Tribune, October 16, 1943; RRFE, October 27, 1943, G 1-12.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.

the sentimental and theatrical note that was struck:

When the Filipino national flags were unfurled and hoisted solemnly at the top of the twin flagmasts of the Legislative Building on that day of the Inauguration of the Philippine Republic, every Japanese present was crying. No one wept aloud, and nobody made wild gestures but true to their character they remained immobile and with sheer will power held back the tears that had filled up in their eyes. Controlling their emotions as best they could, they waited for the sparkling dew to dry.

Those tears the Japanese wept were the purest symbols of love for the Filipinos and the Philippines. Only those who wept have the right to speak of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.³³³

The first Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the new government was Claro Recto, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth government. His first official act was to receive Syozu Murata, Japan's ambassador and to negotiate with him as early as October 19, 1943 the Philippine-Nippon Alliance Pact. This pact virtually relegated the Philippines again to her original state of subjugation to Japan in spite of her new independence. According to the constitution, the President could negotiate with the heads of other nations for the utilization of the Islands' natural resources without seeking the consent of the National Assembly. President Laurel was therefore legally within his rights in agreeing to cooperate with Japan on political, economic and military matters. Through the pact, the Philippines promised to provide all kinds of facilities for the military actions of Japan.³³⁴

³³³ Manila Tribune, November 18, 1943, 2.

³³⁴ Ibid., October 20, 1943, 1.

The new government soon set itself the task of gaining recognition by other governments. Somewhat naively, an appeal was made to the United States for recognition, even though that country was still at war with Japan. Camilo Osias, a former Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States, expressed the hope that:

. . . true lovers of freedom and independence everywhere, especially those in the United States, are with the Filipino people in their rejoicing and exultation over the independence for which they have long sacrificed and which is now a reality.³³⁵

Laurel made a similar statement:

. . . As America has repeatedly avowed not only friendship but solicitude and love for the Philippines, we now ask America to recognize and respect our independence and forbear to bring greater suffering and destruction into our midst among our people. I, and with me, the Filipino people, I am sure, ask America to prove to the entire world the sincerity of her protestations of friendship towards us by not placing obstacles on the path of the New Republic. . . . All that we ask is to be allowed to work out our salvation our own way.³³⁶

Messages were sent to the heads of various independent states but only Axis powers and their satellites answered by recognizing the new republic. Among the well-wishers were Germany, Italy, Croatia, Burma, the "Government of Free India," Sumatra, Malaya, Johore and Thailand.³³⁷ Two neutral states acknowledged Laurel's message, the Vatican and Franco's Spain.

³³⁵ Ibid., October 20, 1943, 2.

³³⁶ Ibid., October 15, 1943, 1.

³³⁷ Ibid., October 20-28, 1943, 1; RRFE, January 13, 1944, C 4.

Pope Pius XII gave an answer that was a study in carefulness. Almost three months after the inauguration of the puppet regime, Monsenieur Guglielmo Piani, Apostolic Delegate to the Philippines, informed Laurel that the Holy Father received Laurel's message thus:

Sir: I have the honor and the pleasure of presenting your Excellency with a message from the Vatican: His Eminence Cardinal Luigi Maglioni, Secretary of State of His Holiness, through the apostolic delegate of Japan, has instructed me to assure your Excellency that the Holy See has received your obliging telegram announcing your installation as President of the Philippines and to convey to your Excellency the most sincere thanks for your courtesy.³³⁸

Spain sent this message to the puppet republic:

. . . We greet the Philippines on the attainment of her independence and express the hope that the relations between this country and Spain shall always be on a plane of perfect comprehension and mutual understanding.³³⁹

When the United States sent an official diplomatic protest to Spain with a demand for reconsideration of her message to the Philippine republic, the Manila Tribune reported another instance of the "beastly intimidation and coercion of the Anglo-Saxons."³⁴⁰

The Independence Movement was now being exploited on an international scale, the fledgling republic being talked up in loud tones to cover its weaknesses.

For courage was needed by Laurel and the other leaders.

³³⁸ RRFE, January 13, 1944, C 4.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Manila Tribune, November 2, 1943, 1.

On October 15, the National Assembly convened in a special session to consider urgent legislation.³⁴¹ The following basic actions were recommended by Laurel: (1) Appropriation of funds for the general relief of the masses suffering the effects of stringent wartime living; (2) action to insure a living wage for workers, especially for public employees, to raise their minimum income to at least sixty pesos monthly; (3) grant of general amnesty to all political offenders, including the "misguided elements" still in the mountains.³⁴²

A step taken to create public confidence was the establishing of suggestion boxes as a means of getting advice from the people. A Bureau of Public Liaison was created to analyze these grievances and to advise the President accordingly.³⁴³

Another step taken to popularize the new government was a "purge" of undesirable and corrupt officials and employees. An investigation bureau was formed, under General Ramos.³⁴⁴

A Board of Information was created under Arsenio N. Luz, a veteran Filipino advertiser and propagandist. Luz was given the rank and emoluments of a Minister and was given the duty

³⁴¹ Ibid., October 22, 1943, 1.

³⁴² Ibid., October 15, 17 and 22, 1943, 1.

³⁴³ Ibid., January 19, 1944, 1; Philippine Review (Manila), March, 1944, II, No. 1.

³⁴⁴ Manila Tribune, June 15, 1944, 1.

of selling the Japanese sponsored republic to the people.³⁴⁵

Still there seemed little improvement in the condition of the Islands. In the last analysis, a government can be successful only when its people are adequately nourished and properly clothed and sheltered.

a. The Economic Collapse. Indeed, the puppet officials of the new Republic were faced from the outset with unsurmountable problems inherited from the previous twenty-two months of Japanese occupation. The impending economic collapse of the country was obvious before Tojo's promise in June, 1943 of Independence within the year. By that time, and in spite of Chairman Vargas' early campaign for the cultivation of farm lands abandoned during the recent battle;³⁴⁶ the Japanese Army's five-year food production plan;³⁴⁷ and the complicated point system in the distribution of prime commodities in the Islands, the prices of necessities continued to soar and the stocks to diminish.³⁴⁸ For example, by 1943, the increasing shortage of meat was very apparent and it was accompanied by a great need of livestock on farms, especially of water buffaloes, many of which were slaughtered for food purposes,³⁴⁹

³⁴⁵ Edward Mill, loc. cit.

³⁴⁶ Manila Tribune, May 16, 1942, 1; "Executive Order No. 40," Journal of the Philippines, op. cit., II, 31-32.

³⁴⁷ Manila Tribune, March 14, 1943, 1.

³⁴⁸ Abbott, op. cit.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.; Manila Tribune, September 10, 1943, 4.

Following Laurel's recommendation, the National Assembly created the Office of Food Administration and charged it with the solution of the food shortage. Likewise, an economic planning board headed by the foremost Philippine economist, Manuel Roxas, was established to find ways and means of averting a state of economic collapse. Many food agencies, designed to carry out the policies of the two above-mentioned bodies were organized to take care of the accumulation and proper distribution of prime commodities after the "Naric" (National Rice and Corn Corporation), the "Biba" ("Bigasang Bayan" or Public Rice Center),³⁵⁰ the "Ricoa" (Rice and Corn Corporation), and the "Rural Reconstruction Administration"³⁵¹ were set up in succession to solve the grain problem. The "Primco" (Prime Commodities Corporation) and the "Nadisco" (National Distribution Corporation) were intended, on the other hand, to look into the question of getting more of the prime necessities for the Filipinos. But all these agencies failed.

Prices were now beyond control. Second class meat was costing then eleven dollars a kilo (2.2 pounds).³⁵² A cup of coffee cost twenty dollars.³⁵³ Price fluctuations were mercurial. Maharajah, in his "Off and On" in the Manila Tribune

³⁵⁰ Manila Tribune, January 6, 1941, 1.

³⁵¹ Ibid., December 26, 1944, 1.

³⁵² Ibid., June 22, 1944, 1.

³⁵³ Ibid., November 16, 1944, 3.

describes one business transaction:

In a recent raid a man had been caught by the air raid alarm on the point of paying P150 for a kilo of "panocha" (caked sugar) in the Mandaluyong market. The panocha had been weighed and was being wrapped but the wailing siren and the actual bombing drove the people to the shelter before the sale could be terminated.

After the raid . . . the purchaser went to fetch his "panocha." To his surprise, he was told brazenly by the vendor of the commodity that he could no longer give it at the "old price"--that is, at the price of half an hour before.³⁵⁴

The cry of the people was now "Feed the Hungry." A letter published in the "Public Pulse" corner of the Manila Tribune said:

Rationing of rice to the indigent members of the neighborhood association has not benefited men, women and children who, like hungry animals, search garbage cans for wasted limes, carcasses, fruits, and vegetables. The situation is horrible, if not downright deleterious to public health.³⁵⁵

Another letter said:

No less than fifty persons a day succumb in Manila streets to the ravages of hunger and disease. . . . Lack of food is bad enough but want of medicine is worse. . . .³⁵⁶

A third description of the hunger in Manila states:

We here in Intramuras [Walled City] are full of garbage overgrown with young plants and infested with vermin and flies. Starving derelicts, cats, and dogs rake the waste before the public view.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ Ibid., November 11, 1944, 3.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., October 24, 1944, 1.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., December 12, 1944, 2.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., November 2, 1944, 4.

And lastly, of the lack of food and medicine an observer reports:

in crowded places . . . one can not escape the horrible sight of dirty, hungry, and scantily clothed ugly men limping or crawling on the ground, suffering from pestiferous ulcers. . . . From the putrifying, decaying flesh of these unfortunates emanates an odor so offensive and so annoying that one can not just help wondering why our city health center or some of our private charitable health institutions seem to shrug their shoulders with the cool implication that it is none of their business to do something for these ailing men when medicine is not only costly but scarce and to look after this needy is a sacrifice.³⁵⁸

Indeed, the demands on the country's resources had been too great; anyone versed in economics could have foretold disaster. It is therefore possible that the entire Independence scheme was thought out by the Japanese as a means of saving their own faces and placing on the shoulders of the puppet leaders the blame and responsibility of the total collapse that followed.

And while the Filipino officials bore the blame for the crisis, the Japanese Army and Navy, their technical experts and propagandists remained in the Islands.³⁵⁹ They were still there behind the puppets, ready to make greater demands on the Filipinos so that the latter would contribute more to the war effort of Japan.

Looking back on our discussion in the present chapter, one can safely conclude that Japanese propaganda in the

³⁵⁸ Ibid., August 24, 1944, 4.

³⁵⁹ Manila Tribune, November 16, 1944, 1.

Philippines was intended to appeal directly to the emotions of the Filipinos. It was rhetorical, repetitious, and sentimental.

Japan's media and techniques were not without their potentialities. The Nipponese, it appeared, knew all the modern vehicles and techniques and they adapted them to each class of Filipinos they intended to convince. They used a particular type for the residents of Manila and another for those of the outlying villages. Aside from their handbills,³⁶⁰ posters, stamps, newspapers, and public addresses which reached the greatest number of people, it is not amiss to say that the schools and the Kalibapi were the most potentially dangerous media utilized by them. In a period of ten to fifteen years, the entire social fabric of the Philippines could have been permeated with the conquerors' ideologies through these social organs.

On the other hand, the Japanese carried the seeds of their own destruction in the Archipelago. From the time of their occupation of Manila on, a two-sided policy was discernible. One was friendly and enticing--the other was harsh, ruthless and cruel. While the Japanese propagandists were professing unselfish aims and genuine friendship for the Filipinos, the Japanese soldiers were committing atrocities and trespassing on the property rights of the conquered. Even the propagandists,

³⁶⁰ These were discussed in connection with Japanese propaganda at Bataan.

however, made great blunders which could be ascribed to a superficial knowledge of the psychology of the Filipino. They preached, scolded, shouted and threatened instead of subtly suggesting and guiding the Islanders in a return to the Oriental fold. Likewise, they thought that by loud festivities and theatrical stunts, the Filipinos would be made to forget what they were losing. Their biggest theatrical effort was the independence celebration. However, amidst the playing of bands, the chiming of bells and the stupendous fireworks displays, it was too much to believe that the Filipinos would forget that there was no popular consent behind the Japanese-inspired Republic or the simple fact that they were hungry and oppressed.

CHAPTER VI

JAPAN'S PROPAGANDA LINES

Japan's new gospel, which she hoped would be whole-heartedly accepted by the Filipinos was propagandized along five general lines, namely: (1) Propaganda directed against the Anglo-American countries, but particularly against the United States, considered by Japan to be her real enemy in the Far East. (2) Japan's build-up line, adopted in an attempt to make the Filipinos believe that her Oriental culture was really superior to that of her enemies from the West, and more suited to all Orientals, and that Japan should be accepted as the spiritual leader. (3) The presentation of the Puppet Philippine Republic in the best light. (4) An endeavor to make the Islanders sincerely embrace the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere--the Oriental Utopia in which Japan dreamed of uniting all the countries of East Asia. Their populations, comprising one-fourth of that of the whole world, would be developed into a super state under her leadership. (5) An effort to convince the Filipinos that America would not return to liberate the Philippines, and that, therefore, it would be wiser for the Filipinos to give up resisting Japan's occupation of the Archipelago, and cooperate with her. This last propaganda line, and the selling of the puppet Republic to the Filipinos, have already been explained in detail in the preceding chapter in connection with Japan's pacification movement and the granting of Philippine independence. We shall therefore devote more

time to the three other propaganda lines which were not so far completely discussed elsewhere.

Propaganda Against the West

a. Anglo-Americans Responsible for the Greater East Asia War--To gain the sympathy of the Filipinos and thus align them on her side, Japanese propagandists tried to convince them that the Anglo-Americans had continuously subjected the Philippines to injustices and unfair treatment. Not Japan but these white intruders, said the propagandists, were responsible for the Greater East Asia War. To impress upon the Filipinos the guilt of the Anglo-Americans, the Japanese published on the eighth day of every month, in every important Philippine newspaper throughout the Japanese occupied Islands, a copy of the rescript which the Japanese emperor issued when he declared war on the United States and Great Britain. The following were the highlights of the rescript:

We, by the grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the Chungking regime, have aggravated the disturbance in East Asia. . . .

Moreover, these two powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased their military preparation on all sides of our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce and finally resorted to a direct severance of our economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of our Empire. . . .

This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not

only nullify our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of the stability of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of our nation. The situation being such as it is, our Empire for its existence and self-defence has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.¹

The real origin of the Greater East Asia War, according to the Japanese, could be found in the Sino-Japanese War which broke out on July 7, 1937. Japan and China, they said, became enemies not because they had any cause for enmity against each other or because of a divergence of interests between them, but because of:

. . . Anglo-Saxon intrigues, aimed at bringing about a war between China and Japan for the purpose of reducing the national strength as well as the military power of Japan at the expense of the Chinese so that they, the Anglo-Americans, could make their influence and domination over China more extensive and complete.²

Aside from the deliberate instigation of a quarrel between two fellow Orientals, Japanese military leaders professed themselves as disgusted with the haughty attitude of Anglo-Saxons in Asia. This attitude resulted from a mistaken belief that Western civilization is superior to that of the East. In his address to the Filipino people, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief said:

. . . The Anglo-Americans, heedless of high principle and choosing to abandon themselves to the haughty concept of the superiority of material civilization, dared to tyrannize East Asia with permanent oppression. . . . it was to drive their malignant influence far from East Asia that Japan participated in this war.³

¹ Manila Tribune, December 8, 1942; March 8, 1943, 1.

² Ibid., July 7, 1943, 1.

³ "Address to the Filipino People," Journal of the Philippines (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1942), I, 10.

In another speech of his, at a banquet held in honor of Filipino puppets on February 2, 1942, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief pinned the blame for the war on the Anglo-Saxon desire to conquer the whole world, a desire masked by insincerity and deceit:

The Greater East Asia War was, as you know, the result of our failure in the pacification settlement with the United States, which we patiently pursued for a dozen weeks, because of the lack of sincerity on the other side, and this was meant to be a final blow directed against us by the shameless nations who desired to conquer the whole world with threats, cheating, bargaining, and with mammon--the power of money, and for us it is indeed a war of life or death, waged with the whole of our resources for the establishment of international justice.⁴

Of the two Anglo-Saxon countries, however, the Japanese ascribed the greater amount of war guilt to the United States. A Japanese militarist said at Manila:

The actual cause of the Greater East Asia War is attributable, in essence, to Anglo-American foreign policies, particularly to the foreign policy of the United States. Hence the responsibility for the devastation and the chaos it engendered lies squarely with the instigator of the war, the United States.⁵

The international policy of the United States was reviewed by the Japanese from the earliest times so that the latter could pick out instances which they considered examples of American threats and coercion of other countries. They recalled the acquisition of Louisiana, Texas, Upper California, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, parts of Wyoming, Colorado,

⁴ "Speech of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines," Journal of the Philippines, II, 10.

⁵ "Address to the Filipino People," op. cit.

Oregon, and Alaska and in all the annexations within the American continent they claimed that America resorted to violence and conquest, when money failed. Likewise, the annexation of American territories as Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines was said to have been an example of the "hypocritical work of the cynical, rapacious, and selfish American imperialists." This line was introduced preparatory to Japan's avowal that she struck at Clark Field and Pearl Harbor only after America provided her with no alternative but war.⁶

Questionable episodes mentioned by the Japanese to the Filipinos included, to start with, the story of the first Indian Chief who was cheated out of his land, the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine, the Haiti and Caribbean episodes, the story of the dollar diplomacy, World War I, the failure of the League of Nations because of America's indifference to it, and the policy of Franklin Roosevelt toward the Germans.⁷

The Japanese likewise gave wide publicity to the supposed bombings by American planes of Japanese hospital ships as instances of America's habit of breaking international laws, so that the Filipinos would believe Japan's version of the history of the outbreak of the war.⁸

⁶ Manila Tribune, January 19, 1943, 4.

⁷ George Abbott, Japanese Propaganda in the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: 1942).

⁸ Manila Tribune, March 14, 1943, 8; ibid., April 28, 1943, 1; ibid., December 21, 1943, 1.

The background now having been prepared, Ambassador Saburo Kurusu, the Japanese special envoy who had been sent to the United States ostensibly to avert war with America, began the counter attack on the American State Department's contention that Japan was the attacker nation, asserting that "these documents are full of perversions, prevarications, studied omissions, and deliberate misrepresentations."⁹

Saburu Kurusu further accused America of trying to crush Japan, her competitor and the defender of East Asia, of attempting to convert the entire region into a colony of her own.¹⁰ He said that "America abrogated the Nippon-American treaty, blockaded Nippon economically and even froze Japanese assets in the United States."¹¹

In spite of these American economic threats, the Japanese leaders even at the expense of their personal prestige, according to Japanese propaganda, made further peace overtures to the United States. They said:

Japan sent Kichisaburo Nomura to Washington with a letter from Prime Minister Prince Konoye to President Roosevelt wherein he spoke of the "cancer that was being enfolded in the Pacific and of the mutual need of localizing and exterminating it for the purpose of preserving peace;" and ultimately Japan had sent Ambassador extraordinary Saburu Kurusu, who by reason of his previous achievements and family ties should have deserved at least better attention at the White House.¹²

⁹ Ibid., December 5, 1943, 1.

¹⁰ Ibid., November 29, 1944, 1.

¹¹ Ibid., November 27, 1942, 1.

¹² Ibid., August 9, 1942, 2.

The Japanese further contended that these peace efforts bore no good results and so:

On November 26, 1942, the United States took a step which made peace in Asia untenable. Washington leaders communicated to Japan the demands for the wholesale withdrawal of the army, navy, air and police forces of Japan from China and French Indo-China and demanded that Japan should not give military, political and economic aid to any local regime excepting Chungking.¹³

This note of Secretary of State Cordell Hull was interpreted by Viscount Isii in the Tokyo Diplomatic Review as:

America's desire to see to it that Japan renounce her alliance with the European Axis powers and recognize the regime of Chiang Kai-Shek in China. The note therefore was America's ultimatum to Japan.¹⁴

These American terms were furthermore called by the Japanese as "inconceivable." The Japanese propagandists wrote the following in the Manila Tribune concerning these demands:

The tripartite pact was signed by Japan more than a year before; and about two years previously Japan had recognized the government established in Nanking by Wang Ching Wei as the only national government in China. It would, in effect, make his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, the government and the people of Japan disregard their international obligations and show a lack of proper decorum in her commitments. And knowing, as everybody knows, that she would prefer her complete annihilation in a war rather than accept such humiliating imposition merely to avoid a bloody conflict in her intense desire to preserve peace, she rightfully took them as a challenge and at the same time as an open declaration of war.¹⁵

The situation created by the demands of the United States on Japan, according to Nipponese propagandists, confronted

¹³ Ibid., November 22, 1942, 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., August 9, 1942, 2; ibid., November 28, 1944, 4.

¹⁵ Ibid., August 9, 1942, 2.

Japan with the threat of national extinction and forced her to rise against the Anglo-Saxon threat.¹⁶

The Japanese did not fail, likewise, to answer America's accusation that she was attacked unawares; that she was stabbed in the back. A Japanese controlled newspaper recalled Hallet Abend's article in the New York Times as early as July, 1941, which envisioned the effective defense of Pearl Harbor and the cities of the American west coast.

The propagandists for Japan also quoted time and again a passage from the report of the Roberts Commission which stated that on November 27, 1941, the day after the filing of the United States' ultimatum, the Chief of Staff of the American Army informed the Commanding General at Hawaii that negotiations with Japan seemed ended with little likelihood of resumption.¹⁷

Likewise, the Nipponese stated that between November 28 and December 7, 1941, for a period of almost two weeks, Japan politely continued to appeal to American reason. In those two weeks, even the United States Canal defenses would have had every opportunity to prepare against surprise attacks.¹⁸ In fact, the war broke out, according to the Japanese, because the Anglo-American countries were confident of their own military preparations.¹⁹

¹⁶ Ibid., November 27, 1942, 1.

¹⁷ Ibid., April 4, 1944, 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., February 12, 1942, 1.

b. Anglo-American Exploitation of East Asia--Another propaganda line which Japan disseminated in the Philippines to berate the Anglo-Americans, was her outspoken accusation that these nations have ruthlessly and selfishly exploited the natives and the economic resources of East Asia.

The fall of Singapore offered the Japanese one of their earliest opportunities to inform the Filipinos of England's decadent colonial policy and of her unsavory economic activities in the Orient. An article in the Manila Tribune stated:

The Singapore base had cost the British a capital outlay of roughly eighty million dollars to serve as the concentration point for a gigantic fighting fleet obviously composed of the combined Anglo-American Asiatic fleets and other reinforcements against only one potential enemy in the minds of British parliamentarians who passed the Singapore bill in 1923--Japan.

England, however, furnished only a minute fraction of the cost of the base itself, contributions having come from Hongkong, New Zealand, Strait Settlements, Federated Malay States, and other places.²⁰

Speaking of the economic significance of the fall of Singapore to the British and the Americans, the Japanese said:

Singapore's fall definitely means the end of British aggressive designs in East Asia. . . .

How much the Netherlands East Indies means to Britain and the United States is indicated in the following comment by the Anti-Japanese writer, Ernesto Hauser who said:

"Britain's economic stake in the Archipelago is considerable. Through the partly British owned Royal Dutch Shell Combine, Britain has a hand in the exploitation of the Island's oil resources, British investments amount to

²⁰ Manila Tribune, February 12, 1942, 1.

over \$130,000,000,000. Britain's statesmen say that they can not afford to have the Empire's communications with Australia severed at will and face muzzles of enemy guns from across the Straits of Singapore."

. . . Today, Britain's interest in defending the Dutch East Indies is even greater.

Concerning the United States, Hauser said:

"America depends heavily on the Islands for rubber. Along with the tin produced in nearby British Malaya, the United States needs it for the smooth execution of her armament program."²¹

The Japanese also noticed the great lack of native factories in the Oriental colonies of both Great Britain and the United States and they harped incessantly on this failure of the two mother countries. The following is a sample:

Anglo-Saxon imperialism has prevented the rise of factories in India, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere in Asia--In fact, wherever they have chosen to plant colonies--so that at the present time there is not a single industrial country in the Orient aside from the Japanese Empire. They have seen to it through the centuries that Asia shall always remain in a colonial position, whatever the political status they may choose to give to any special section. Under them, the Orientals would forever remain cutters of wood and drawers of water.

To take a very close example, the Philippines has rich undeveloped water resources. Why? Simply because the Americans wanted the Filipinos to consume their excess of oil and coal. The result has been the unbelievably high cost of power in this country. Under such conditions, industries could not possibly flourish, well suiting the purposes of the Americans. The Americans were interested in the Philippines for its gold, sugar, hemp, and coconuts, and even these were juggled to suit her own economy, without even a semblance of thought for the welfare of the Filipino workers.

The Americans are fond of speaking of the great rights they have given to you. Indeed, they have given you the

²¹ Ibid., February 3, 1942, 1.

rights to argue, to emulate American customs and to hold popular assemblies, but what do such rights amount to when fundamental rights such as the means to livelihood, and national development are denied you, not of course in expressed legislation, but through the financial grip they have on you?²²

Japan told the Filipinos that the democratic processes which they imitated from America were really gestures devoid of substance, since their country, in the last analysis, was entirely dependent economically upon the United States--over ten thousand miles away from Manila. The Japanese further emphasized to the Islanders that America was not as altruistic as she appeared to be in her colonial policy in the Philippines. Major General Hayashi said in this connection:

The United States has ostensibly declared that her help in the Philippines was her sacred duty, based on humanitarian impulses. However, in practice, what has the United States done for the sake of the Filipinos? It is true that the United States has purchased some of your products at high prices, but in return, you have been forced to accept those expensive American luxury goods which were harmful to the development of the real strength of the Filipino people. Furthermore, the United States has established schools in this country, but purposely neglected to establish the vocational schools absolutely necessary for the cultivation of the national strength of the Philippines. In the spiritual aspect, too, little importance has been attached to the sense of duty which requires endurance and sacrifice; instead, the Filipinos have learned self-indulgence and physical pleasure through the encouragement of individual rights. . . .

Therefore, in spite of the superficial elevation of the standard of living among a limited number of Filipinos belonging to an upper class, there has been no material progress or development in the past decades. I am given to believe that was the reason why some enlightened Filipinos were inclined to advocate bitterly the postponement of independence upon the approach of the "glorious" 1946.

²² Ibid., March 10, 1942, 4.

You ought to have grasped the fact that the United States made the Philippines a stepping stone for her Oriental expansion, despite the beautiful pretext of humanitarianism she has made her reason for possession of this country.²³

Another Japanese propoganda article tried to prove that in spite of America's apparent unfavorable balance of trade with the Islands often used as a proof that America had only the most altruistic intentions in the Philippines, "Uncle Sam's profits were derived from non-visible items such as insurance premiums, freight charges, interests on bonds and debentures, and remittances, all of which were more than enough to offset his losses in the visible items."²⁴ The Japanese also attacked America's agricultural policy in the Islands.²⁵

General Douglas MacArthur's departure to Australia from the Bataan battleground became another occasion for the Japanese to hurl invectives against the white man's mercenary interest in East Asia. The Japanese said:

The flight of MacArthur once again shows that the white man's interest in East Asia is mercenary and imperialistic. He comes to exploit the people and the natural resources, fill his pockets with as much wealth as can be obtained, irrespective of the means, and later returns to his own native land to spend the declining years of his life in comfortable indolence. He cares not for the defense of any of the colonies he may have acquired. At the first sign of danger, he packs his bag and baggage and runs away, leaving the native inhabitants to whatever fate awaits them. . . . it seems incredible that for forty years we have been so subtly betrayed without our knowledge. Let

²³ "Speech of Major General Hayashi of May 18, 1942," Journal of the Philippines, I, V-VIII.

²⁴ Ito, "American Altruism in the Philippines," Philippine Review, March, 1944, 10.

²⁵ Ibid.

us hope that the flight of MacArthur will once and for all convince every Filipino that the white man will not fight for the cause of the colored races and that the so called "white man's burden" is nothing but a myth.²⁶

c. Race Prejudice--Perhaps the most resounding battle cry of the Japanese in the Philippines was the alleged rabid race prejudice of the Anglo-Americans in the Orient. However, for the benefit of the other white nations in Asia who belonged on Japan's side, some of her spokesmen professed that the Greater East Asia War was not a racial war. Lieutenant Colonel Tsukaso Kato, Chief of the Japanese Military Affairs Bureau in Tokyo, said that, "A friendly attitude will be adapted towards Axis nationals, thus shattering allied propoganda to the effect that the present conflict is a racial war."²⁷

Japan's Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, in an address before the seventy-ninth Japanese Diet, also asserted that the war was waged solely to crush Anglo-American misrule. He further added that, "Japan has never dreamed of the racial war of which she is accused by enemy countries nor is there any necessity for Japan to undertake such warfare."²⁸

However, in spite of the foregoing Japanese denials that the Asiatic war was not a racial war, Japan kept on inculcating in the minds of Orientals, especially in the minds of the Filipinos, that race prejudice existed in their midst. Moreover,

²⁶ Manila Tribune, April 19, 1942, 4.

²⁷ Ibid., May 13, 1942, 3.

²⁸ Ibid., January 22, 1942, 1.

the Japanese did not fail to pose as the Orient's champion of the colored races. Pio Duran, one of the Japanese sympathizers in the Philippines, recalled that:

The records of history bear out the fact that the only staying power in the Far East compelling Great Britain, the United States, and the Dutch East Indies to treat the colored races as human beings, was the military might of Japan shown in 1905 when she decisively defeated Russia.²⁹

The Japanese propagandists also reviewed Count Nobuaki Makino's bill on racial equality which defined the rights of all races regardless of color or creed at the peace conference in 1918. But, they lamented, this demand was then rejected by the western "democratic" nations.³⁰

Race prejudice in some parts of the Far East were cited by the Japanese:

In the occupied cities of China, it was a common thing to see signs of "no dogs and Chinese allowed" hoisted in public places, hotels, stores, and restaurants. Without the strength of the Japanese Army and Navy in the Far East, I dare say that the political concessions heretofore granted to the Filipinos during the last era would be definitely withheld.³¹

The Japanese likewise gathered all the isolated cases of race prejudice in the Philippines during America's regime of forty-three years there, enlarged upon them, and repeated them over and over again to the Filipinos in the fervent hope that the Islanders would break down and really hate their former American masters.

²⁹ Ibid., May 6, 1942, 1.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

To make the Filipinos more race conscious, Benigno Aquino, one of the Islanders chosen by Japan to speak on the racial question, urged his countrymen to develop a strong sense of racial dignity:

We want the steady growth in our country of a deep sense of Malayan dignity. We want the Filipinos to efface their inferiority complex, we want the Filipinos to feel that the Malayan race is as worthy and as honest and as dignified as the white race.³²

One attack against American race prejudice was written by a certain Mr. A. Perico who said:

Let us take the case of America. Abraham Lincoln, America's greatest President and a true emancipator, so loved the freedom and equal rights of his people that he permitted his country to be thrown into a civil war. . . . But even Abraham Lincoln, when he said: "All men are born equal", did not realize that his white brothers would later automatically disprove his statement by discriminating against all those who were not white because of their color or creed.³³

The actions of the American veterans of the Spanish American War of 1898, who married Filipino women were likewise subjected to an examination by the Japanese, who said:

Right here in the Philippines, the Americans have drawn the color line. Of the many Americans who have married our women here, how many have taken their wives and offsprings back to America and placed them on equal basis with those of their own native Americans?³⁴

Likewise, the establishment of exclusive clubs by the Americans in the Archipelago was pointed out for the Filipinos to behold

³² Ibid., March 19, 1943, 1.

³³ Ibid., December 20, 1942, 1.

³⁴ Ibid.

and ponder about.

We have already discussed Japan's constantly reiterated propaganda line concerning American racial discrimination to the beleaguered Filipino soldiers at Bataan. To the civilians who anxiously waited for the return of their loved ones from that war, the same propaganda line was fed: American racial discrimination at Bataan. One of the outstanding articles published in Manila asserted:

Since time immemorial, the Americans have done nothing but inject in the minds of the Oriental people the superiority of the Anglo-American race. They have ridiculed the Japanese, humiliated the Filipinos, enslaved the Asiatics and disseminated creeds and teachings tending to support the inferiority of the people who happened to be under their yoke. Even in the midst of terrific war, the Filipinos were treated worse than dogs.

More Filipinos were killed by these Americans than by the Japanese, through starvation, malaria, and diarrhea combined. To know how their loved ones were killed, the Filipinos should turn their questions to these Americans instead of anybody else. . . .³⁵

To arouse Filipino indignation further at America's race prejudice, the Japanese cited all the possible discriminations which the Americans perpetrated against the Filipinos, other Orientals, and the different colored groups in the United States itself.

Discriminations against Filipinos in the United States, particularly on the West Coast before the war, were published by the Japanese in Manila newspapers. One of them was the notorious Watsonville incident. The following is Japan's

³⁵ Ibid., June 21, 1942, 1.

version of that riot:

"Brown brothers" they had been called. But since white and brown in a discriminating country like the United States are as distant as the poles, the word brother becomes a euphemistic term for "hewers of wood and drawers of water," which on their painful nakedness, the browns would surely resent. Like the Negroes, the Filipinos had never been looked upon as the equals of the Euro-Americans. Their "spheres of influence" were the kitchens and orchards, for, as a rule, they have never been given better jobs than as fruit pickers, dish washers, laborers and servants. Prosperity was alien to them; so was dignity.

Fortune and fame with them had always been construed by the Westerners as unnatural and dangerous--unnatural because they had always been known as impermanent job seekers and dangerous because of their superiority in winning their own American women from them.

And so this happened at Watsonville, California. . . . Finding this time most propitious to explode the pent-up feeling against the "little niggers", 200 California gangsters surrounded the Filipino Club at Watsonville and would have attempted to rush the building had not the owners of the structure confronted them with guns.

The following night, 200 white understrappers were completely equipped with arms. Shots were fired. The helpless Filipinos were dragged along the streets, clubbed on the head, kicked and stepped upon and wounded. Stripped of their clothes and given a more bloody and smokey medieval background, the helpless Filipinos could have afforded a modern Luna the inspiration for a second "Spoliarium" arrested in paint.

One Fermin Tobera was shot dead while helplessly unconscious in a bunk house. Another, Martin Barrera testified to this cold murder, distant though he was, as he saw flashes of fire.³⁶

In connection with Filipino-American marriages before 1941, another article which appeared in the Manila Tribune reported that, "There was still the case of the Filipino physician who was nearly lynched by an outraged mob in Virginia because of

³⁶ Ibid., July 11, 1943, 5.

his marriage to an American girl."³⁷

Discrimination against the Filipinos in the United States during the second world war was likewise noted by Japanese propagandists from American newspaper articles that came into their possession from neutral countries. These reports as usual, seemed to have been exploited, as this article will show:

Filipinos in the United States Subject of Race Discrimination. Lisbon, August 21, 1944: Many Filipinos from the Pacific coast of the United States are moving northward to Alaska to live and work there, apparently due to pressure arising from racial discrimination, according to an AP [Associated Press] report.

A virtually unexplored region, Alaska with its severe climate, will prove fatal to many of them, it is believed.³⁸

Instances of American discriminations against Filipinos in the United States who were then actually in the service of Uncle Sam in order to help in the preservation of American democratic traditions and ideals were likewise cited, supposedly from Buenos Aires, Argentina:

Shrill cries of protest against American discrimination against Filipino soldiers in the United States was raised by Manuel Bergen in a signed article entitled "Life in the Army" published in a recent number of the New Republic, an American magazine.

"However, one of my acquaintances who is a sergeant and several of his friends were refused service at all the restaurants of Marysville, California, where the camp of the Filipino Army in the United States is located. They all wore their American uniforms proudly.

But just because their complexion was brown, they were either refused admission to motion picture theatres or were isolated in the worst sections of the theatre if they were admitted at all.

³⁷ Ibid., December 20, 1942, 1.

³⁸ Ibid., August 24, 1944, 1.

In San Francisco, we can not find even a single barbershop where we can have haircuts and shave even if we are willing to pay special prices.

As an American citizen, I have the right to marry the American girl with whom I have been going for five years, but even this has been refused me under one pretext or another. On the question of marriage, and in most other things, we are still "an inferior race."³⁹

Another article spoke of race discrimination in buses, street cars, other public conveyances and residential districts, particularly in Washington, D. C., the heart and capital of the United States.⁴⁰

Of the Negroes in the United States, the Japanese had this to say:

"Colored Americans Denied Equal Chances, Refuse to Believe U. S. Fighting for Preservation of Democracy in the World."

We reproduce here extracts from the book "American Unity and Asia" written by Pearl S. Buck, American author familiar with the problems of Asia, and published by the John Day Company, New York in 1942, believing that they make clear the United States' aim in this war and her attitude to the colored people. . . . "As a result of the effects of race prejudice, a very serious conviction is gradually becoming settled in the minds of colored Americans all over the country. They are coming to see that what they have been taught and have believed, is not true, namely, that if the colored people can be patient and good and show themselves obedient and humble, they will inevitably prove themselves worthy citizens and will therefore receive the awards of full citizenship. They are beginning to believe, and this in very large numbers, that the individual or even collectively, consideration as human beings gain them nothing so long as they are Negroes."⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid., December 24, 1943, 1.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., August 26, 1944, 4.

The outbreak of the notorious race riots in Detroit during World War II gave the Japanese in the Philippines the glorious opportunity to play up America's race prejudice. For days, Manila newspapers repeated the news and assigned articles about it to the most conspicuous spaces; for example,

"Race Riots Break Out Anew in the United States"

The Detroit riots were but a prelude to wholesale war between Negroes and Americans throughout the United States. It was reported from New York that five persons were killed and more than five hundred injured when hundreds of shops were wrecked during a "short" series of disturbances in the Negro section of Detroit on Sunday. Damage to property was estimated as high as \$5,000,000.

The report from Lisbon avoided the race question, declaring that the disturbances were caused by "Hooligana Hookigans."⁴²

The American Indians were likewise remembered by the Japanese as another group who were made the object of unfair treatment by the white man:

"Navajo Indians Face Eviction"

Buenos Aires, June 17--In a characteristically cruel and inhuman fashion the United States government has decided to evict fifteen thousand Navajo Indians from their reservation in the Rio Grande District near the Mexican frontier.

The excuse given is that the government has decided to construct a reservoir in that area.

Angered by the eviction order of the United States government, this peaceful Indian tribe, which has lived in the region for the past five hundred years is reported to have assumed a threatening attitude.⁴³

⁴² Ibid., August 7, 1943, 1.

⁴³ Ibid., June 19, 1943, 6.

Admiral William F. Halsey's courage and dry humor could not be appreciated by his Japanese opponents, and their ire was the more aroused when they heard certain remarks ascribed to him. The article published on Admiral Halsey's statements was captioned "Race Prejudice Still Sways" and "Dementia Praecox America." It stated:

William Frederick Halsey used to be the Commander-in-Chief of the ill fated United States Pacific fleet, nearly the entire bulk of which was quickly destroyed by the Japanese Navy in a series of sea and aerial battles in the Solomon Sea last November. For public enlightenment, we should like to quote him as reported by a Reuther's dispatch as follows:

"One of the greatest lessons I have learned thus far is that the Japanese, instead of being a superman, is still a monkeyman--Let us grab his tail and pull him down from the tree--and he may screech as do all other monkeys."

Even coming from an innocent child, this is still too nasty. We are proud to entertain such dirty insult as really coming from an American Commander.

Dishonorable remark: Halsey's statement is typical of American race prejudice. If Americans regard the people of so great an empire as Japan as "monkeymen," it is a wonder if they can take Chungkingers as human beings. The Filipinos know, too, that to the Americans, they are no better than tamed monkeys who blabber in an uncomprehensible bamboo English.⁴⁴

Even when the Americans were already knocking hard at Leyte, the race prejudice line was not abandoned by the Japanese. They still hoped that it would change the minds of the Filipinos and make them rally to the banner of Nippon. They said:

American contempt for the Filipino was revealed by

⁴⁴ Ibid., May 4, 1944, 4.

an informer who has returned from the battlefield on Leyte where a few hundred guerrillas who awaited the return of the United States Forces to the Philippines were sadly disappointed to know they were only fit for the United States labor battalion, dispatches disclosed.⁴⁵

At the fighting in Baguio City, Luzon Island, the Japanese scattered the news that Americans found the Filipinos only fit as baggage carriers.⁴⁶

d. Atrocities--After harping continuously on the race prejudice of the Anglo-Americans in the Philippines and in the other parts of the Orient, the Japanese proceeded to present in the most systematic and effective way they could muster all the atrocities committed by Anglo-Americans in the places where they once held sway.

In the Philippines, the Japanese emphasized how the Americans had made use of the brave Filipino revolutionists to drive Spain out of the Islands and then ruthlessly disavowed all their promises and, later, deprived the Philippines of her independence. Of the behavior of the Americans in Manila in that war (1898-1899), the following atrocities were recounted:

. . . These were recently recalled from the startling disclosures contained in authoritative and authentic documents, which have been found buried deep in the official archives of the Philippine government and are now brought to light for the first time.

A few excerpts from these documents, show how reprehensible the deportment of the American troops had been

⁴⁵ Ibid., November 1, 1944, 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid., January 20, 1945, 1.

in these days, how the American occupation of Manila was characterized by acts of unparalleled savagery and brutality; how they plundered public buildings and looted private homes; how they robbed and desecrated even the churches and graves; how they attacked innocent civilians and abused helpless women.

Furthermore, during the last three days, American troops acted brutally and arbitrarily. All private carriages running in the streets were stopped by American soldiers. Pistols in hand, they forced the owners or passengers to get off, and then they ran off with horse and carriage.

In the Church of Sta. Ana, the American soldiers, not content with stealing the jewels adorning the sacred images of the venerated saints, desecrated the church graves, opening and scattering the bones of the dead. In Paco and in Calocan, similar profanities were committed.⁴⁷

The "scorched-earth policy" which the Americans supposedly pursued on their retreat before the arrival of the Japanese in the different parts of the Archipelago was likewise cited by the new conquerors as a sample of American atrocities. After condemning this incendiarism as purposeless, the Japanese published the news of the burning of the oldest Philippine city, Cebu. The Fil-Americans, on the other hand, blamed this vandalism on the "Nipponese hordes."⁴⁸

Atrocities said to be committed by the Americans at Bataan were the most numerous and the most widely dispersed of the brutal and savage incidents of the Asiatic war which the Japanese ascribed to the white man in the Philippines.

⁴⁷ Ibid., January 10, 1943, 1.

⁴⁸ Ibid., April 15, 1942, 1; ibid., August 9, 1942, 1; "Address to the Filipino People," Journal of the Philippines, I, 1-8.

One Nipponese article stated that the Filipinos did not voluntarily fight at Bataan.⁴⁹ Moreover, the Japanese contended that the Americans forced the native soldiers to fight for them in the front lines.⁵⁰ Another article on the same subject stated:

The Americans placed the Filipinos on the front lines and stayed in the rear compelling Filipino soldiers to fight. The Filipinos were inclined to disobey the orders, or they surrendered to the Japanese forces as they hated the cruel behavior of the Americans.⁵¹

The Japanese likewise scattered accounts of the starvation and lack of medical care of Filipino soldiers, omitting what Americans there also underwent:

General Francisco said that for one thing the food allowance of the American in the USAFFE was different from that of the Filipinos. Also he recounted how during the last days of Bataan, some American soldiers held up food convoys belonging to Filipino soldiers on the front lines.⁵²

Another article on the starvation of Filipino soldiers at Bataan related that, whereas the American soldiers looked healthy and vigorous, the Filipino soldiers looked very hungry and some of them were almost dying of starvation.⁵³

A third article reported:

⁴⁹ Manila Tribune, April 15, 1942, 1.

⁵⁰ Ibid., June 16, 1943, 1.

⁵¹ Ibid., May 13, 1942, 1.

⁵² Op. cit.

⁵³ Manila Tribune, April 14, 1942, 1.

Nearly all of these Filipinos lining up were suffering from malaria. They did not receive even a bit of medicine or a portion of food from the Americans who once boasted that they would never forsake the inhabitants of these Islands. Had these proud Americans only desisted from fighting the Japanese, these poor people should not have suffered as they are suffering now.⁵⁴

Another atrocity ascribed to the Americans at Bataan was the supposed massacre of Filipinos who insisted on following them to Corregidor when Bataan's impending fall was near at hand.⁵⁵ Another account said:

All troops who have been successfully evacuated to Corregidor, according to these reports are Americans, no Filipino soldiers being allowed to board the boats plying between the southern tip of the Bataan peninsula and the island fortress. Filipino soldiers attempting to get on these boats were mercilessly killed by Americans. . . .⁵⁶

It is true to fact, however, that there were some Filipino soldiers at Corregidor.⁵⁷

Perhaps to offset future American accusation against Japan of incidents described in the "Death March" and in the "Mariveles Massacre," the Japanese disseminated as early as possible among the Filipinos the story that Americans machine gunned their allies at Bataan.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Ibid., April 15, 1942, 1.

⁵⁵ Op. cit.

⁵⁶ Manila Tribune, May 13, 1942, 1.

⁵⁷ "Corregidor: of Eternal Memory"; Triumph in the Philippines, 1941-1946 (Australia: The Combat History Division, G-1, Section Headquarters, AFWESPAC, 1946), II, 6.

⁵⁸ Op. cit.

Other types of atrocity stories told by the Japanese dealt with the indiscriminate bombings of innocent Filipinos by American planes before and after Bataan.⁵⁹ The resumption of the bombing by the Allies of the Japanese occupied Philippines occurred in August, 1944. At this time the Japanese tried to warn the Filipinos by saying:

There can be nothing more criminally foolish than to engage in romantic notions about Americans having a special spot in their hearts for our people which will prevent them from bombing or killing us. The anti-Axis bombings and strafings of hospital ships, churches, schools and other objectives specified under international law as "open objectives" prove only too well that it is best not to trust any spot in anybody's heart; least of all, a desperate anti-Axis heart.⁶⁰

The bombing of a Misamis hospital was likewise publicized by the Japanese.⁶¹ Moreover, we have previously referred to the bombing of the Archbishop's Palace in Manila, which was reported by the Japanese controlled newspapers together with the burning of the exclusive Ermita district of Manila:

United States planes raiding Manila on Tuesday, indiscriminately dropped bombs on the historic palace of the Catholic archbishop of Manila in Intramuros, which received a direct hit . . . and on the residential neighborhood in Ermita where the Guerrero family⁶² suffered from the latest enemy terror. . . .

Archbishop O'Doherty particularly deplored the incident because the "archives was a veritable Filipiniana

⁵⁹ Manila Tribune, May 13, 1942, 1.

⁶⁰ Ibid., August 24, 1944, 1.

⁶¹ Ibid., November 1, 1944, 1.

⁶² Intellectually famous Filipino family.

treasure accumulated over a period of more than four hundred years." They were public property, he added.⁶³

An editorial on this latest bombing is worth repeating:

When the Americans announced their intention to reconquer the Philippines and set the Filipinos under their heel once again, they did not say, in the true fashion of gallant gentlemen, or of sincere enemies: "We are coming back to crush you. You will suffer enormous losses of lives and property, and many of you will be hurt beyond helping. Your economic livelihood will be impaired without any prospect of repair. But you must be patient, because that is the way of conquest. Our material superiority has no patience in treating inferior races in a gentle and polite manner." . . . Instead, the American said: "We shall rescue you from the Japanese. You just wait for us to destroy them and then you shall be free and you shall have a grand time--dance halls, cigarettes, apples, flour, biscuits, and automobiles--everything "genuwine." We shall hit their military objects, and you shall want to welcome us with open arms."⁶⁴

Another Japanese inspired editorial on the bombing of a group of sixteen Filipinos en route allegedly from Mindanao to Samar employed an emotional appeal:

. . . one woman on board suddenly held up her baby for mercy, hoping perhaps that the frequent propaganda avowals of friendship professed by the enemy would be substantiated by the saving of her baby and other innocent and helpless persons on the banca.⁶⁵

Just as the Americans accused the Japanese of bombing Manila on Christmas day in 1941, the Nipponese charged the Americans for "saying it with bombs" on the same day, three years later.⁶⁶ Also, the famous Intramuros or Walled City

⁶³ Manila Tribune, November 15, 1944, 1.

⁶⁴ Ibid., November 15, 1944, 1.

⁶⁵ Ibid., December 15, 1944, 1.

⁶⁶ Ibid., December 26, 1944, 1.

of Manila was said to be bombed by American planes on January 10, 1945. The Japanese asserted:

One bomb scored a direct hit on the residence of Gabino Pobre, former councillor on Solano Street, near Cabildo. Practically the entire Pobre family was reported wiped out. . . . One bomb fell in front of the San Francisco church, century old Catholic temple in Manila.⁶⁷

But a more serious offense allegedly committed by Americans in the Islands was that there was a strong indication that the American invasion forces in Pangasinau⁶⁸ were utilizing smoke screens containing poison gas.⁶⁹

The arrival of Japanese internees from American prison camps en route to Japan was also followed by a series of articles in the Manila newspapers describing the mistreatment of Japanese civilians who were interned there. At the same time, American internees were made to write letters and interviews praising the kind treatment accorded them by the Japanese Forces. The following is a sample of an article on Japanese internees, which is again reminiscent of the American version of the "death march" and the complaint of American internees at Santo Tomas:

Even the Americans would shudder in disgust if they knew of the barbaric and bestial treatment to which Japanese nationals were subjected in gross violation of all rules of humanitarianism and international law by the United States authorities at the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia, Ken Nakasawa, formerly professor of Japanese

⁶⁷ Manila Tribune, January 11, 1945, 1.

⁶⁸ Province in Northern Luzon.

⁶⁹ Manila Tribune, January 21, 1945, 1.

history and culture at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, declared in an interview.

. . . Dr. Honda's relative, Nakano, testified that Honda's death was not due to suicide and that his wife was unable to recognize her husband at the time of the funeral owing to the brutal treatment he had received. Mrs. Honda was mentally deranged at the pitiful sight of the remains of her husband, who was President of the Society of Japan Veterans in Los Angeles.

. . . Secondly, Nakamura was held in the Los Angeles police station and beaten by three policemen. He lost three front teeth but was forced to sign an affidavit when he was transferred to the detention camp in Missouri saying that he had been chastised because of resistance.

. . . Japanese detainees in the Southeastern part of Los Angeles were herded into the underground coolers of the police stations, thirteen to each cell which barely could accommodate two. Access to the water closet was denied. . . .

The detainees were also obliged to wear prisoners' garb and when outside they were not allowed to wear a coat or a raincoat.⁷⁰

e. Criticism of Anglo-Saxon Political Ideology and

Institutions--Another propaganda line attempted by Japan to discredit the Anglo-Americans in the eyes of the Filipino people was the criticism of the political ideology and institutions of the former. At the same time, the Japanese boasted of their excellent Oriental political philosophy, which was in reality totalitarian in nature and which subordinated the rights of the individual citizen to that of the impersonal state.⁷¹ Benigno Aquino said:

The Greater East Asia War is a war of two opposing

⁷⁰ Ibid., September 9, 1942, 3.

⁷¹ Ibid., July 23, 1943, 1.

political ideologies, namely, the Occidental political philosophy and the Oriental political philosophy. For an indication of the Occidental philosophy, there is the British colonial policy particularly in India. . . .⁷²

Aside from the fact that the Japanese propagandists confused Western democracy with Great Britain's colonial policy in the Orient, particularly in India, the Japanese disparaged America's republican government by making it synonymous with the rule of unscrupulous political bosses and unprincipled big businessmen and capitalists:

Taking up the American brand of democracy in particular, the flagrant claim which is made--that it is the only form of government which is compatible with the so called human nature may appear individualistic but by the same generalized inference, we can also say that it is gregarious and cooperative. . . .

The Presidency seems to be nothing but a nominal creation of a vicious political machine which the wily and the shrewd contrived for hood-winking the public who are never in a position to know a man except through campaign ballyhoo around election time. . . .

Likewise, the big capitalists control public opinion in the United States and while they become richer and richer, the masses become poorer and poorer. . . . This is what is called by the modern definition, a capitalist democracy--freedom for money but not for man. . . .

On the other hand, there is a sinister discrimination which divides the society vertically. That is their race prejudice. The maldistribution of economic rewards and the lack of refinement among the people as a whole have made this discrimination one of the most shameful humiliations of Christendom.⁷³

Specific attacks on President Roosevelt and his administration were made because of Japan's desire to make the Filipinos

⁷² Ibid., May 20, 1944, 1.

⁷³ Ibid., November 1, 1942, 5.

believe that the set-up of the enemy government was ready to collapse and hence Japanese victory would certainly come soon. One of them accused President Roosevelt of trying to be an American dictator but acknowledged too the power of Congress.⁷⁴

After stating that Roosevelt's proposal for a National Service Act smacked of dictatorship, the Japanese controlled newspapers began again to write of his increasing unpopularity in Congress:

Returning to America from a tour abroad of five weeks, President Roosevelt was confronted with the unprecedented enmity of Congress and the people, contrary to his expectation that he would be welcomed home by the whole nation.

Roosevelt advocates the open door for Negro laborers to secure increased labor supply. This step is disapproved by labor organizations and the people of the southern states which deny racial equality to Negroes. Bloodshed has already occurred over the matter.⁷⁵

The statement from ex-President Herbert Hoover that the United States government is disclosing inefficiency in the execution of the war against Axis powers was interpreted by the Japanese as a criticism of Roosevelt's administration.⁷⁶

The Japanese seemed to have sensed even earlier than most of the American people that Franklin Roosevelt was a sick and tired man. The same article repeated the contention that some Americans did not regard Roosevelt as indispensable:

Senator Ralph O. Brewster, Republican from Maine

⁷⁴ Ibid., September 9, 1942, 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid., December 11, 1942, 1; ibid., January 8, 1942, 1.

⁷⁶ Ibid., December 14, 1942, 1.

declared in a speech at Norfolk, Virginia that "there are at least fifty men in the country who could do a better job of running the country than President Roosevelt. . . . I quote one of the best informed democrats in Washington as saying: Roosevelt is one of the greatest politicians and one of the worst administrators the world has ever seen."⁷⁷

Roosevelt's sponsorship of a bill authorizing GI's to vote in absentia at the presidential elections was thus interpreted by the Japanese:

President Roosevelt revealed he is seeking definitely a fourth term when he sent a special message to Congress demanding in strong language a simplified method of voting to permit the 9,000,000 members of the United States armed forces to vote in the elections next fall, according to a Washington dispatch.⁷⁸

The Japanese campaigned in the Philippines against the fourth term for Roosevelt:

By starting this great war, Franklin Roosevelt increased the financial deficit of the United States to the huge sum of \$220,000,000,000. Authorities predict a tremendous economic crisis and millions of unemployed persons in the United States after the current war.

Although Roosevelt in all probability will be elected in his fourth attempt, the pendulum is about to swing in favor of the Republican Party. The administration is likely to lose a majority in the house of representatives. It seems possible that Congress will obstruct the domestic and foreign policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt as in the case of Wilson. The chief reason for this is the fact that Roosevelt has broadened [sic] numerous promises made to the world through the Atlantic Charter.⁷⁹

The Leyte offensive was, according to the Japanese, timed to sway the Americans so that they would re-elect Roosevelt to

⁷⁷ Ibid., May 4, 1944, 1.

⁷⁸ Ibid., January 28, 1944, 1.

⁷⁹ The Nippon Times (Tokyo), September 24, 1944, 1.

the Presidency.⁸⁰ The Japanese also tried to smear Roosevelt's personality by ascribing the cause of Secretary of State Cordell Hull's resignation to the President's selfish and dominating personality.⁸¹

Propaganda Against President Quezon and the Philippine Government-in-Exile--President Manuel Luis Quezon, who died in August, 1944, in Washington, D. C., was said by the Japanese controlled newspapers of Manila to have died as early as March 17, 1942.⁸²

Perhaps because the Japanese realized Quezon's popularity in the Philippines, however, they did not attack him as openly as they did Roosevelt. Only four articles about him appeared in the Manila Tribune during the war. Two concerned his "deaths." And the rest were Shingoro Takaishi's article-- which claimed that if Quezon were not forced by the Americans to flee to the United States, he would undoubtedly be on Japan's side, and Vargas' confirmation of Takaishi's contentions. Part of Takaishi's article follows:

. . . he has Oriental blood in his veins, which has manifested itself time and again. What he aspired to do was to govern his country in the Oriental way instead of blindly following American institutions.

Quezon, on one occasion said: "When the occasion demands, individual rights have to be sacrificed for the legitimate good of the State. The state is absolute and

⁸⁰ Manila Tribune, November 11, 1944, 1.

⁸¹ Ibid., November 30, 1944, 1.

⁸² Ibid., March 23, 1942, 1.

may ignore individual rights when necessary."

A thorough believer in the collaboration with Japan in view of geographical proximity and economy and cultural relations, Quezon is known to have opened his heart on the subject to his close lieutenants.

When the Philippine policy with regard to the Davao land question angered the Japanese, I cabled him, calling his attention to the matter. He replied, assuring me that Nippon need have no uneasiness regarding the question.

I learned later that he told his agricultural adviser then: "Give me more time. America's power is too great for us to do anything at present. If you will wait, I shall make a real settlement."⁸³

Jorge Vargas, one of Quezon's lieutenants, collaborated with Takaishi in his claims:

President Quezon may have mentioned to you, Mr. Takaishi, the basic plan drafted by our most able economists for the cultivation of new markets to take the place of the American market, which was distant and soon to be closed by high tariffs.

Significant features of this plan were the diversification of agricultural products and the consumation of trade agreements tending to unite the Philippines economically with our natural markets in the Orient, especially with Japan. . . .

Refuting the alarmist propoganda that pictured a far-fetched "yellow menace" in the rich province of Davao, Quezon declared: There is no Davao problem.⁸⁴

If these remarks ascribed to Quezon were true, they were either the product of an unsuspecting nature or they were subterfuges of the late President who did not want to anger the Japanese, and was biding his time.

When news dispatches from Washington reported Quezon's

⁸³ Ibid., December 13, 1942, 2.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

death at Saranac Lake, the Japanese still did not judge him harshly, in spite of the biting words he had used in speaking of the "Japanese hordes who overran his country and his people." It is possible that they wanted to continue giving the Filipinos the impression that he was sympathetic to Japan's ideals at heart. They said:

It is a great tragedy that Quezon was finally spirited away by the Americans into exile so that he died without experiencing the independence which his country has finally succeeded in attaining. If he had been allowed to stay in the Philippines, he would have been remembered as one of the greatest leaders of the New Philippines. If he had been a citizen of a first rate power, his unquestionable political genius would have placed him among the four or five greatest statesmen of contemporary history.⁸⁵

The pre-war Philippine government which Quezon headed was not spared abuse. The following article had revealed the existence of an unfair social order in the Islands with the idea of making the Filipino masses disillusioned with their Commonwealth government:

Many people are prone to look back to the days before the war as the high tide of our fortunes as individuals and as a nation. A privileged, limited group were receiving fabulous salaries, if we were in the government, or receiving still more princely incomes if we were doing business of one kind or another. It was convenient then to overlook the lot of the toiling millions to whom changes in political party regimes, in technological developments, in social ideas, hardly meant anything except more systematic mass exploitation, more deprivation of mass and individual dignity, more wanton wastage of human resources.

Then we had freedom. We had the freedom to get rich as quickly as we could, to be blind as we would, and to impose

⁸⁵ Nippon Times (Tokyo), August 5, 1944, 4; Federal Communications Commission's Daily News Broadcast (Washington, D. C.), August 7, 1944, G 1.

the consequences of our blindness on our less privileged neighbors. We hated regulation. We hated regimentation. We hated dictatorship. We hated those things because our God was individualism. Our so called liberty meant nothing but extreme individualism. We thought that to be an individual was freely to exercise the right to walk over other people who were less aggressive, less enlightened, and less unscrupulous than we were.⁸⁶

The government of Quezon's successor was likewise lashed by Japanese accusations:

It is utterly preposterous on the part of MacArthur to think of liberating the Philippines, which to all intents and purposes is an independent nation with its duly formed government in conformity with the United will of the Filipino people.

Whatever Osmena's government may do, will be done at the bidding of the American general, and no self-respecting Filipino, and, for that matter, no people in the world, would pay serious attention to the existence of such an American puppet.⁸⁷

f. Shallowness and Materialism of Western Culture--The last important propaganda line spread by the Japanese in the Islands against their enemies, the Americans and British, was the supposed shallowness, materialism, and epicureanism of Western culture. The idea behind this Japanese move was to make the Filipino, the most westernized Oriental, discard particularly his American and Spanish ways and return to the original culture of his forefathers. In this way, the Filipinos would be more susceptible to Japanese indoctrination.

Benigno Aquino in delivering one of the propaganda speeches belittling Anglo-American culture, said:

⁸⁶ Ibid., November 1, 1942, 6.

⁸⁷ Ibid., October 27, 1944, 2.

Both (Anglo-American) nations were suffering from "spiritual anaemia," and their military and moral resources are rotten to the core. . . . Hence, the enemy can not win this war and their military operations are an impossible enterprise.⁸⁸

Another Japanese propaganda line made American civilization only synonymous with Negro lynchings. Below a picture of the winning painting at the Carnegie Exhibit in Pittsburgh which was called "America Pieta," a picture depicting the body of a Negro after a lynching, the following caption appeared: "An American institution that denies all pretenses of a so called United States civilization."⁸⁹

The Japanese, after professing that American civilization was rotten, made the Filipinos believe that they needed a new spiritual foundation. Their Commander-in-Chief in the Islands said:

The Filipinos lost their racial character and they became bold imitators of the American way of life which is devoid of introspection. . . .

The corruptive custom of showing expressive esteem toward the weaker sex which was produced by the American influence, led to the breakdown of the time honored principles of the East to respect the head of the family.⁹⁰

The Japanese pointed out to the Filipinos the defects of a society which recognized the equality of the sexes, and which unduly stressed the importance of physical comfort, bad features taken over from the Americans. General Hayashi

⁸⁸ Manila Tribune, April 25, 1944, 1.

⁸⁹ Ibid., August 13, 1944, 3.

⁹⁰ "Address to the Filipino People," op. cit.

enumerated other specific objectionable aspects of American influence in the Philippines:

It is true that the Americans forced you to accept those expensive American luxury goods which were harmful to the elevation of the real strength of the Filipinos. Furthermore, the United States established schools in this country but purposely neglected to establish vocational schools which were absolutely necessary for the cultivation of national strength in the Philippines.

In the spiritual aspect, too little importance has been attached to the sense of duty which requires endurance and sacrifice; instead, the Filipinos have learned self-indulgence and physical pleasure through the encouragement of individual rights. Therefore, in spite of the superficial elevation of the standard of living among a limited number of Filipinos belonging to the upper class, there has been no material progress or development in the national strength of this country during the past two decades.⁹¹

The Japanese wanted to instill into the Filipino civil servants a sense of duty and responsibility to the puppet Philippine government. At the first meeting of provincial governors, General Hayashi said on this matter:

It is regrettable that there exist rumors to the effect that, in varying circumstances, some government officials have enriched themselves by committing abuses in the performance of their duties, have given discriminatory treatments to the public in accordance with the dictates of their personal desire and sentiments, or have aspired for higher honors or possibly through the unjustifiable use of political powers or parties, have defiled and degraded the more lofty and dignified duties of government officials and employees.⁹²

The fact that the Philippines was the only Christian country in the Orient did not impress either the Japanese or

⁹¹ Manila Tribune, May 24, 1942, 4.

⁹² "Speech by General Hayashi to the First Meeting of Provincial Governors, City Mayors and Treasurers," Journal of the Philippines, I, XIII-XVII.

their puppets. In the words of President Laurel:

We, the Christian Filipinos, are wont to say without a great deal of pride that the Philippines is the only Christian country in East Asia. I happened to have repeated this statement in a conversation with one of my Japanese friends. He pointedly remarked: "That may be true; but is there much to it?"

One wonders, likewise, why, after centuries of Christian civilization, our people now stand in need of being reminded and encouraged by a non-Christian nation to strengthen her moral fiber and to cultivate those virtues which, by reason of Christianity's early adoption here, should have been long theirs. Faith, honor and integrity, three basically Christian principles of conduct, are at present being impressed upon the Filipinos by the Japanese who, notwithstanding their non-Christian code of morals, have possessed these virtues throughout their long history.

The truth is, in our case, while there may be many Christians, there is little or no Christianity in the practice of daily life.⁹³

According to Laurel, another defect of the Christian Filipinos was:

. . . their complete passivity. As a result, their spiritual life is based on an inculcated fear of God and not on moral consciousness and scientific knowledge. They have acquired what I might call the "friar complex," by which I mean a profound religious deference to men of religion regardless of their absolute and unscientific teachings. I hear that the Darwinian theory was never taught in Catholic schools of this country. To me, and to every emancipated man, there is no contradiction between religion, morality and science. But not here in the Philippines.⁹⁴

⁹³ Jose P. Laurel, "Influence of Buddhism," Manila Tribune Sunday Magazine, August 8, 1943, 1.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

Japan's Build-Up Line

a. Japan's Superior Culture and Technology--One of Japan's build-up lines was her attempt to convince the Filipinos of the superiority of her culture, compared to that of the Occident. This she tried to prove by selling her literature, music, painting and other arts through cultural missions, by speaking glowingly of her efficient political philosophy, and by ascribing to the Japanese people many virtues. Japan's different achievements in the field of the physical sciences were also praised. All these were the results of her spiritual strength. As examples of the professed excellence of Japanese science, it was claimed that Army medical authorities had two modern miracle medicines, equal to or superior to Fleming's miracle penicillin.⁹⁵

Japan also ascribed her engineering and industrial might to: (1) her electrical machinery and heat generation, (2) her enormous water power, (3) her huge modern aeronautical factories, (4) her self-sufficient automobile factories, (5) her arctic and antarctic whaling and fishing industry, (6) her synthetic fibers which she developed from wood, fish scrap, slaughterhouse waste, soybean and other surprising sources.⁹⁶

b. Japan's Religious Tolerance--The Japanese also claimed that they respected all the religions adhered to by the Filipinos.

⁹⁵ Manila Tribune, November 19, 1944, 1.

⁹⁶ The New Order (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943).

When the Japanese Forces occupied some Catholic churches, they excused themselves by saying that these churches were only temporarily occupied and had now been vacated. The commanders in charge explained that the Japanese know the deep religious feelings of the Filipino people which they respected.⁹⁷

c. Japan's Avowal of Friendship for the Filipinos--Japan also professed that her soldiers came as friends and brothers who took extra precautions to guarantee the safety and well-being of the Filipinos. For example, she contended that she defeated the enemy at Bataan at once so that she could save the Islanders from too much suffering.⁹⁸ The isolated cases of Japanese who were punished by being sent home to Japan because of misconduct in the Philippines were, moreover, widely publicized.⁹⁹

d. Japan's Economic Self-Sufficiency Line--One more build-up line was Japan's insistence upon her economic self-sufficiency in East Asia. As a result of her initial victories, she contended that she became heir to all the natural resources left by the defeated Anglo-Americans. One such news item stated:

Japan is no longer a "have not" but a "have" nation and is sure to win the ultimate victory in the Greater East Asia War. . . . Japan has become far richer than

⁹⁷ Manila Tribune, October 31, 1944, 1.

⁹⁸ "Speech of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army on February 2, 1942," Journal of the Philippines, II, 19.

⁹⁹ Manila Tribune, January 13, 1943, 1.

the United States and Great Britain, owing to the natural resources acquired in the southern regions. . . .¹⁰⁰

While taking extra precautions to keep the Filipinos from knowing that their foodstuffs were being sent out of the country to feed Japanese troops, the Japanese Military Administration made great efforts to spread the news that Japan was indeed capable of a huge scale development of the Island's natural resources. It therefore publicized the arrival of Japanese technical experts even before the end of the fighting.¹⁰¹

Aside from mining, Japan took over the manufacture of arms and ammunition, alcohol, sugar, ice, textiles and other household products.¹⁰² She also controlled the following industries: fishing, agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry.¹⁰³ All the public utilities in the Islands were placed under a Japanese corporation, The Taiwan Electric Power Company.¹⁰⁴ To finance these different economic ventures, the Bank of Taiwan was authorized by the Japanese government to operate in the Philippines.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ FCC, June 2, 1943, No. 2, 2.

¹⁰¹ Manila Tribune, April 21, 1942, 1.

¹⁰² Notification of the Commander-in-Chief, January 5, 1942, Journal of the Philippines, I, 10.

¹⁰³ RRF, February 24, 1943, No. 34, F 11, 1; Manila Tribune, January 6, 1943, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Manila Tribune, April 21, 1942, 1.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., January 6, 1943, 3.

George Abbott (a state department official caught by the war in the Philippines) stated that in all their economic ventures, the Japanese claimed (without benefit of statistics) that production had doubled and redoubled as a result of Japan's scientific progress and mechanical ingenuity.¹⁰⁶

But while she claimed extraordinary progress in the exploitation of the Islands' natural resources, she showed by the way she appropriated for herself the machinery, automobiles, auto spare parts,¹⁰⁷ luxury articles such as frigidaires, watches and pianos, and other articles manufactured either in the United States or England,¹⁰⁸ that she was in dire need of war materials to prolong the war. Also, as early as January 14, 1942, the Japanese Army had already required that owners of these articles should report them or else: "Any person violating this notice will be regarded as having committed a hostile act and will be severely punished by the Imperial Japanese Army."¹⁰⁹ By the end of January, 1942, even the owners of five gallons of crude oil, lubricating oil or mobile oil had to surrender them.¹¹⁰ The Filipinos began wondering

¹⁰⁶ Abbott, op. cit.

¹⁰⁷ "Proclamation: January 14, 1942, of the Commander-in-Chief," Journal of the Philippines, I, 18.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Misses Consuelo Tan and Esperanza Siochi, November 6, 1946, at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

¹⁰⁹ "Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief, January 14, 1942," Journal of the Philippines, I, 16.

¹¹⁰ "Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief, January 30, 1942," ibid.

why such a rich country should bother with the little they had.

e. Japan's Military Strength--Because of her economic self-sufficiency and the wealth of her newly acquired territories, the Japanese made the constant claim that their military might was invincible. Constantly boasting of the Japanese soldier and his discipline, they made such statements as this:

General Percival said that the Japanese troops were doing very well and added, "I would like to commend especially the brilliant results which the Imperial Japanese Navy achieved in a series of battles off the Solomon Sea and in the Southwest Pacific."

The Japanese Army has undoubtedly benefited from its five years of war in China. Especially regarding landing operations, the Japanese Army has had very much practice. Its equipment for this type of war is very modern and very efficient, while it is skillfully trained to function boldly and adroitly.

The Japanese troops are hardy and their power of endurance is considerable. This confers on them a great advantage over European troops. . . .

Another asset of the Japanese Army is its discipline. This discipline is securely based on Japan's "family system" and other factors to make the Japanese soldier a strong fighter and enables him to face danger with fortitude and courage.¹¹¹

The crusading spirit of the Japanese people which grew out of their desire to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is another cause of Japan's military might. Duran, a Filipino sympathizer of Japan asserted:

Japan can not be defeated in this war.

With the Japanese spirit moving 100,000,000 people of Japan who are solidly behind the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War to a successful end, the great

¹¹¹ Manila Tribune, November 24, 1942, 1.

empire of Japan can not be beaten in the current war.112

Another stated:

General Tominaga said that no matter how superior the enemy may be in material successes, in the face of Nippon's terrifying assaults, the enemy will surely be defeated. It is most gratifying, he said, that this spirit of sacrifice permeates all of the Japanese forces, bluntly adding that the Japanese are fiercely crashing into the enemy gun emplacements carrying bombs.113

The Japanese also described their navy's torpedo technique, especially at night, as "excellent." After reporting the sinking of an Allied cruiser off Lunga, they added that "According to these observers, the sinking at the battle of Lunga, of a battleship by an unassisted torpedo attack flotilla is the first in world naval history."114

American planes were always pictured as fleeing at the sight of Japanese "Wild Eagles" and the following are examples of this kind of propaganda line:

Foe's Aircraft Carriers Severely Damaged East of the
Philippines

Nippon air units, detecting a group of enemy carriers operating in waters east of the Philippines early yesterday morning, carried out a heavy assault upon them.

Entrapping several large carriers, the units dealt severe damage on them by furious bombing and machine gunning, setting afire the flying decks.115

112 Ibid., July 7, 1943, 1.

113 Ibid., December 2, 1944, 1.

114 Ibid., December 5, 1942, 1.

115 Ibid., September 24, 1944, 1; Abbot, op. cit.

A total of thirty-five enemy war craft, including thirteen aircraft carriers, have been either sunk or heavily damaged by Japanese forces off Taiwan, the Imperial General Headquarters announced at 3 P.M. today. The text of the Communique follows: "Our forces continue their pursuit of the fleeing enemy forces."¹¹⁶

Likewise, they presented in the most favorable light the damage done by their anti-aircraft batteries by claiming that, "American planes shot down by Japanese air and land units on the occasion of the raid in the Manila area last Sunday morning totalled 28 including 12 probables."¹¹⁷ Another reported:

Giving a hot reception to the enemy raiders Monday, the Japanese ground artillery in Manila shot down a total of 35 enemy planes, including ten probables, according to reports reaching the Air Defense Headquarters yesterday afternoon.¹¹⁸

The Allied offensive, beginning with the Solomons campaign, was treated by the Japanese as a "desperate sacrifice of men and ships" and enemy losses were always said to be several times greater than those of Japan. Moreover, the missing Japanese planes were said to have usually "dived into an enemy objective." The news item below illustrates these points:

The results of the night battle off Lunga in Guadalcanal Island brings the total number of enemy warships and transports sunk and heavily damaged in the Solomons area from August 4th to December 30th to 125 and more than 850 planes shot down or destroyed. Warships and vessels sunk, total 87 and those heavily damaged, 36. Japanese losses and damages included 41 warships and

¹¹⁶ Ibid., October 17, 1944, 1.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., November 14, 1944, 1.

transports sunk, 206 planes which dived into enemy objectives or which have not returned and 31 planes damaged.¹¹⁹

Without explaining how the Americans gained footholds in the Southwest Pacific area, the Japanese reported that the Imperial Japanese Navy carried out a devastating raid on the American base on Tunafute Island in the Ellice group on November 18, 1943.¹²⁰

When the Americans landed in Leyte, the Japanese claimed that this was a manoeuver designed to draw the Allies into a trap where they could be annihilated at the proper time.¹²¹ Even at the final phase of the Philippine campaign, when the Americans had begun the reconquest on Luzon Island (where Manila is located), the Japanese threatened the Americans with annihilation. Rear Admiral Sosa was reported to have said that "this reckless operation will afford the Japanese troops a God-sent opportunity to accelerate their bleeding tactics against the enemy."¹²²

f. Allied Friction--In a different line of propaganda the Japanese pictured the Allies as disorganized and with much friction developing in inter-Allied relationships. They particularly emphasized supposed Anglo-American feuds but even then neglected differences between the Anglo-Americans and

¹¹⁹ Ibid., December 5, 1942, 1; Abbott, op. cit.

¹²⁰ Manila Tribune, November 21, 1943, 1.

¹²¹ Ibid., October 24, 1944, 4.

¹²² Ibid., January 17, 1945, 2.

their Russian allies. The following were the alleged causes of Anglo-American difficulties: first, a speech said to have been made by the British Minister of Production, Oliver Lyttleton, to the effect that America provoked Japan to the extent that the latter was forced to bomb Pearl Harbor;¹²³ second, the disposition of British bases leased to America during the war; and third, the imperialistic rivalry between the two Anglo-Saxon countries. Of the latter, the Manila Tribune remarked:

The greatly increased influence of the United States military power in India, treasure house of Britain, will unfailingly augment the already stringent friction existing between Great Britain and the United States.

As regards such essential munition plants manufacturing steel, projectiles, and other war implements, the United States controls nine to Britain's ten, thus practically maintaining the same level with Britain in this field. Only with regard to naval facilities is Britain able to hold her own as mistress of India, controlling seven to the United States' one. . . .

The United States has already brought Australia under its influence. . . .¹²⁴

g. America's Growing Weakness--Japan took every opportunity to pick out news items concerning the privations, scarcities, labor strikes and even the calamities which the American people suffered during the war and by giving these misfortunes great prominence in the newspapers she controlled in the Islands, she hoped to convince the Filipinos of America's ever growing weakness and suggested in many ways the great

¹²³ Ibid., June 23, 1944, 1.

¹²⁴ Ibid., December 21, 1944, 4.

probability that the United States would never retake the Philippines. The first of this series of newspaper articles dealt with a coal mine strike:

U. S. Home Front Shaken

The American home front is now confronted with extraordinary confusion arising from the skyrocketing of the cost of living due to the national character of the Americans. . . . They themselves had premonitions that their solidarity would waver in the face of the protracted war of attrition. However, it is surprising that America has soon revealed to the world its internal instability.

The beginning of the domestic breakdown was the recent coal miner's strike. It had two serious repercussions, namely the 23,000 ton decrease in coal output and the passage of the anti-strike law. Yet, neither was the strike situation solved nor were the causes thereof removed. The factors behind the strike have emerged as national issues and Congress and President Roosevelt are in direct confrontation. Herein lies the gravity of the American crisis.¹²⁵

The Japanese also claimed that America's war effort was greatly hampered as a result of her lack of war materials.¹²⁶ Moreover, food was said to be a most serious problem for the Americans, especially because its distribution had fallen into the hands of notorious gangsters.¹²⁷ Floods, earthquakes, and draughts in America were never missed by Japanese propagandists.¹²⁸

Aside from emphasizing the weaknesses of the Allies, the Japanese stated that there was a serious plot in the United States, as a result of American losses in the various world

¹²⁵ Ibid., July 13, 1943, 3.

¹²⁶ Ibid., August 3, 1942, 4.

¹²⁷ Ibid., November 9, 1943, 6.

¹²⁸ Ibid., January 16, 1944, 1.

wide fronts. The news item reported:

Riot Plot in the United States

Indicative of the serious political unrest in the United States, as a result of serious American losses in the various world wide fronts, was an abortive socialistic riot timely unearthed by the Washington political authorities. The discovery came in the wake of an investigation conducted in an attempt to assassinate President Roosevelt, in which thirty persons were involved. A dispatch from Tokyo revealed that these would-be rioters will shortly be put to trial.¹²⁹

n. Signs of America's Impending Defeat--Another unusual propaganda statement made by the Japanese was that General Douglas MacArthur was tired of war and wanted to be President, as related in the following news article: ¶

MacArthur Tired of War; Wants to be President

Buenos Aires, December 22 (Domei)--There were indications today that General Douglas MacArthur had grown tired of leading his forces in the South Pacific, following so many recent defeats, as he touched on the subject of the United States politics in an off the record conference with visiting Canadian newspapermen, according to a Washington report.

Earlier, reports said supporters of MacArthur as a potential candidate were taking his silence as a golden assurance that he would accept if drafted.¹³⁰

The Japanese even suggested in their newspapers that because of America's losses in the war, a peace move was already started in the United States.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹³⁰ Ibid., December 26, 1943, 3.

¹³¹ Ibid., January 14, 1944, 1; January 16, 1944, 1.

1. Japan's Plans for the Losers--The Japanese also did not forget to inform the Filipinos of the colossal and grandiose schemes of their military leaders. The following are examples:

(1) Invasion of U. S. Aim of Japanese in the Present War

The Japanese armed forces will not stop in the present war until they have landed on U. S. soil, Lieutenant Colonel Yosio Nakosima, chief of the Department of Information of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines told the gathering of Japanese and Filipino newspapermen at the Manila Hotel yesterday afternoon.¹³²

(2) Yamashita to Demand U. S. "Unconditional Surrender"

General Tomoyuki Yamashita, new Japanese Army Commander in the Philippines, is going to demand "unconditional surrender" from the United States. He told President Jose P. Laurel that the only words he spoke to the British Commander during the negotiations for the surrender of Singapore were "All I want to hear from you is 'Yes' or 'No.'" He added: "I expect to put the same question to MacArthur."¹³³

Japanese writers even had their own plan as to how Japan would deal with Great Britain and the United States politically, financially and militarily after the termination of hostilities. The military part of this plan was said to be based on Rear Admiral Tanetugu Sosa's conditions for the disposal of the "remnants" of the American fleet and military facilities. The following was the worked-out plan, according to the Manila Tribune:

(1) In case of the scuttling or deliberate damaging of any vessel, the United States should pay indemnity at construction cost and those responsible for the action should be punished.

¹³² Ibid., November 28, 1942, 1.

¹³³ Ibid., November 9, 1944, 1.

(2) American naval facilities, including naval stations, navy yards, arsenals, naval schools and other training organs should be completely done away with.

(3) Private shipyard facilities should be destroyed with the exception of shipbuilding facilities for coastal and river craft.

(4) American steel and oil products should be allowed only with restrictions.

(5) In order to insure the adherence of the United States to the foregoing conditions, the United States should be kept under strict surveillance for at least ten years after the war and perhaps indefinitely.

(6) Private banking organs should be abolished.

(7) Monopolistic trusts and cartels should be prohibited.

(8) All stock market speculations should be given up.

(9) All labor unions should be disbanded and workers should be given a definite social status.¹³⁴

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Since Japan's occupation of the Philippines, she had consistently invited the Filipinos to join her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Just what was Japan's conception? The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was Japan's vision of what Southeast Asia should be--a family system of Oriental nations,¹³⁵ an organization which would take the place of the status quo existing there before the war broke out, when the "Western imperialists," according to Japan, took advantage of and exploited the weaker peoples of Southeast Asia. Japan blamed

¹³⁴ Ibid., May 24, 1944, 1.

¹³⁵ Report on Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as Pictured by Domei, dated October 12, 1943 (Washington, D. C.: War Department).

this "state of exploitation" on the absence of a powerful nation among them which might have protected the smaller nations against each other and against outside interference. As an alternative, she therefore offered the "Co-Prosperity" relationship based on a "common consciousness of their similarity of race, ideals, and institutions and a common hatred of the Anglo-Americans,"¹³⁶ whereby a powerful nation (which she claimed she was) would guide and protect her weaker sister nations, and the latter, abounding in their natural resources, would collaborate with her.¹³⁷

Which nations were to have been encompassed by Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere after its final completion? They were the countries geographically near her in East Asia, namely, Manchukuo, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Malay States, the Philippines, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Portuguese Timor, Celebes, New Guinea, and other oceanic islands of the Pacific.¹³⁸ In citing the names of these countries, one is reminded of the fact that many of them, at one time or another, were members of the two far-flung empires which the Malay peoples built in antiquity:

¹³⁶ FBIS, July 2, 1943, E 2.

¹³⁷ Professor Sakaeda, "A Positive Living Independence in the Co Prosperity Sphere," Manila Sunday Tribune, August 5, 1943, 5.

¹³⁸ "Prosperity of the Philippines and the Efforts Required of Every Filipino," The New Order (Manila: The Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1943).

the Shri-Visayan¹³⁹ and the Madjapahit empires.¹⁴⁰

In our attempt to define the "co-prosperity" relationship in Greater East Asia, we have pointed out Japan's supreme position as its leader, and protector. An article on this subject, published in the Manila Tribune, reiterated this fact, but to appease the Filipinos, it also added:

Being the acknowledged leader nation in the sphere, Nippon is bound to be the fountain head of the political, military, economic and cultural system that will knit the East Asia nations into one, but the Philippines, being one of the most advanced of the Oriental family of nations, will play an equally important role. If Japan were the engine that would make the Co-Prosperity automobile go, the Philippines would, together with Manchukuo, Burma, India, China, and Thailand, be one of the wheels without which the automobile would not go forward.¹⁴¹

Japan, moreover, made the Filipinos understand that she deserved to lead the countries of East Asia because she had made enormous sacrifices in men and materials and because she had even gone to the extent of staking her national existence on the attempt to "liberate the peoples of East Asia from Anglo-American domination."¹⁴¹

What are the basic principles that governed the Greater

¹³⁹ Norberto Romualdez, The Psychology of the Filipino (Baguio: Catholic School Press, 1925), 17-18.

¹⁴⁰ Emma Blair and J. A. Robertson, eds., The Philippines, 1413-1803 (Cleveland: The A. H. Clark Co., 1911), XL, 82.

¹⁴¹ P. C. Santos, "The Co-Prosperity Sphere in Action," Manila Sunday Tribune, November 21, 1943, 5.

¹⁴² Abbott, op. cit.; Jose P. Laurel, "United Asia Asset to the World," Manila Sunday Magazine, November 8, 1944, 1.

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Premier Tojo, in appointing the Greater East Asia Construction Council which he created to formulate the concrete steps for the establishment of a new order in East Asia, charged that body with the express duty of deliberating upon these principles:

1. development of the total economic power of Greater East Asia for the benefit of all.

2. creation of a sentiment of firm understanding in such a way that all inhabitants within the co-prosperity sphere will naturally be inclined to share equally both grief and happiness.¹⁴³

The principles enunciated by Tojo were further elaborated by the Greater East Asia Congress called in November, 1944, and made up of representatives of Japan, China, Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines, Burma, and the provisional government of Azad Hind, the latter having an observer.¹⁴⁴ One achievement of the Greater East Asia Congress was a joint declaration, part of which states:

The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the war of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, ensuring their self-existence and self-defense and constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:

1. The countries of Greater East Asia, through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well being based upon justice.

2. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the

¹⁴³ Manila Tribune, May 29, 1942, 1.

¹⁴⁴ Laurel, op. cit.; Manila Tribune, November 5, 1944, 1.

fraternity of nations in their regions by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

3. The countries of Greater East Asia, by respecting one another's traditions and developing the faculties of each race will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia. . . .¹⁴⁵

Claro Recto, then foreign minister of the puppet Republic, interpreted the declaration thus:

The joint declaration is intended to operate on three distinct levels: the level of national existence, the level of regional cooperation, and the level of universal intercourse.

Concerning the first phase, the joint declaration guarantees the right of every nation to develop politically, economically and culturally within the orbit of its own territory and sovereignty, its own natural resources, and its own traditions and idiosyncrasies.

With respect to regional cooperation, it provides a means whereby the nations of East Asia may work in fruitful cooperation with one another and thus ensure the prosperity of their region.

Finally, it is intended to operate internationally, for by sanctioning a policy of cultural intercourse with all nations and the opening of resources throughout the world, the Joint Declaration gives due recognition to every just demand of universal progress and international peace.¹⁴⁶

The principles of the Joint Declaration can also be summarized: (1) to inculcate respect for the sovereignty and independence of each nation in Greater East Asia; (2) to help each other in enhancing their individual cultures and civilizations; (3) to construct a new order of common prosperity and well being based on justice; (4) to cultivate friendly relations

¹⁴⁵ Manila Tribune, November 7, 1943, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., November 12, 1944, 1.

with all countries of the world and work for the abolition of racial discrimination; (5) to espouse the scientific and cultural advancement as well as the utilization of the resources of the world.¹⁴⁷

Of these five principles, we shall treat in detail only the economic. The others are self-explanatory, in the light of what we have already discussed. Moreover, the economic principle concerned the Japanese the most during their occupation of the Philippines because of their great need of war materials.

Before proceeding to our explanation of the economic principle, it is necessary to define what is meant by regional economy and how it was supposed to improve the conditions in Greater East Asia. Laurel defined regional economy as "the system of economically organizing blocs of countries possessing certain affinities and adjacent to one another." Speaking further of regional economy in East Asia, Laurel said:

Where there is absence of economic affinity, the conflicting interests come out in bolder relief. To do away with this perennial source of friction among nations trading individually with each other, and at the same time to save economically weak peoples from exploitation by the strong, the leaders of the new economic reorientation would organize groups of countries possessing racial, cultural and economic affinity, and geographical propinquity into blocs each of which would take care of the economic interests of members of the bloc or sphere.

In Instead of each country having to deal individually

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., November 5, 8 and 9, 1944, 1; F. B. Icasiano, "The Greater East Asia Joint Declaration," Philippine Review, March, 1944, II, No. 1, 10-13.

with other countries, the bloc as a whole will trade with the other blocs. Under this system of bloc trading, substantial mutual concessions would be possible and benefits derivable therefrom would be adequate to assure the prosperity of the individual members of a bloc.

. . . Moreover, wasteful competition among member countries of the bloc, for one thing, will be completely eliminated, since the planning of production will naturally be in the hands of a central body that shall have authority to apportion, after conducting a scientific survey, the production of the commodities that shall be needed by the bloc, whether for internal consumption or for export to other blocs. . . .

The present economic advantages of the Asiatic bloc are impressive. It produces 96% of the world's rice output, 90% of rubber, 98% of quinine, 96% of tea and 90% of silk; these are virtual monopolies; some countries in the bloc are heavy exporters of hemp, cordage, copra, coconut oil, mineral oils, tobacco, lumber, tin and tin ores, sugar and coffee. Many of the raw materials which are strategic from the point of view of the United States are found in the sphere.

The Western hemisphere bloc will depend on the Asiatic sphere for these strategic materials. This factor alone should constitute a powerful weapon of the Asiatic sphere in bargaining when bloc trading shall have become the prevailing rule of world commerce.¹⁴⁸

But who would serve as the central authority which would determine the export commodities to be produced by each nation? The logical answer is by implication Japan, who had time and again emphasized her great sacrifices for the liberation of the Eastern peoples.

The exponents of the Greater East Asia line then proceeded to locate the Philippines in the regional sphere. One pointed out that the Islands should trade with her neighbors, instead

¹⁴⁸ Jose P. Laurel, Prospects of Regional Economy in Greater East Asia (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944).

of with the United States.¹⁴⁹

For the Filipinos to participate in Oriental trade, they were urged first of all to change their products for those needed by Japan and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Farmers were urged to change over from sugar, coconut and abaca to ramie, jute, and particularly cotton. The Japanese tried to persuade the Filipinos to correct the previously unhealthy specialization of crops, which was the result, according to them, of American greed and selfishness.¹⁵⁰ They argued:

The success of the Philippine sugar industry in the past is not to be attributed to more favorable natural conditions and higher technical standards than those of other remarkable sugar producing countries of the world, enabling this country to be a dominant factor in the world sugar market, but to the policy adopted by the United States of encouraging the sugar industry in the Philippines for the sole purpose of supplying the needs of the United States. Upon finding, however, that the Philippine sugar industry was proving to be prejudicial to the interests of American capital, they selfishly maneuvered to close the American market, the only outlet for the Philippine sugar whose production America had once vigorously encouraged, using the ruse of an offer of independence to the Philippines. Thus the Philippine sugar industry was brought face to face with complete ruination.¹⁵¹

These agricultural products, which the Japanese wanted to discard, were the most important sources of income of the Filipino farmer during the Commonwealth period. Sugar was, for instance, the most important pre-war export of the Philippines.

¹⁴⁹ The Geopolitical Ideology of Hemispherical Homogeneity (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1944).

¹⁵⁰ Manila Tribune, April 22, 1942, 4.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., August 11, 1942, 3.

In 1940, the sugar export of the Philippines amounted to 923,542 tons of centrifugal sugar and 52,931 tons of refined sugar.¹⁵² In the same year, the production of copra and coconut oil placed the Philippines among the foremost coconut producing countries in the world with annual exports amounting to 341,930 metric tons of copra, 105,428 tons of copra cake, 185,920 tons of coconut oil, and 40,518 tons of dessicated coconut.¹⁵³ Manila hemp was equally significant in the economy of the Islands. In 1940, the Philippines produced 134,224 metric tons.¹⁵⁴

Another product to be affected by Japan's agricultural policy in the Philippines was rice. In her desire to make the Islands a cotton producing country, she ordered the planting of cotton on former rice fields.¹⁵⁵ Rice, however, is the chief staple of the Filipinos and their annual produce was not ordinarily exported but was consumed locally. In the years before the war, when draught or locusts came, and the Islands could not produce its average yearly yield of 52,510,570 cavan¹⁵⁶ (127 pounds is equal to one cavan) of "palay" (unhusked rice), the Filipinos averted famine by importing Saigon

¹⁵² M. Epstein, The Statesman's Yearbook (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), 676.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Manila Tribune, May 22, 1942, 1.

¹⁵⁶ M. Epstein, Statesman's Yearbook, 1942, op. cit.

rice.¹⁵⁷

The Japanese began to campaign for the cultivation of ramie, jute plants, and particularly of cotton by the Filipinos. They outlined a comprehensive plan for the development of cotton cultivation in the Islands. The main object of this was the production of 1,500,000 piculs of ginned cotton through the cultivation of an area of 450,000 hectares for a five-year period, beginning in 1942 and continuing up to 1946.¹⁵⁸ Experts and representatives of cotton companies were then imported into the Philippines. Experimental stations were established, one of which was located at the infamous Camp O'Donnell in Capas, Tarlac, after the last prisoner-of-war had gone.¹⁵⁹ Other experimental sites were in Lubao and Florida Blanca, Pampanga.¹⁶⁰ Negros province too, the most important producer of sugar in the Philippines before the war, was planted with cotton.¹⁶¹

To stimulate added interest in cotton cultivation, the Japanese promised that the entire crop of the Philippines would be retained in the Archipelago, to relieve the shortage of

¹⁵⁷ Mary A. Pugh, Preliminary Economic Survey of the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: Division of Economic Studies, Commerce Department, 1943), 5.

¹⁵⁸ Manila Tribune, August 11, 1942, 1.

¹⁵⁹ Abbott, op. cit.; Manila Tribune, November 21, 1943, 1.

¹⁶⁰ Manila Tribune, May 22, 1943, 1.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., December 7, 1942, 2.

cotton textiles which had become acute by April, 1943.¹⁶² A few months later, the farmers who suffered loss through cotton growing were pledged some compensation. It was explained that because of the late planting, the extraordinary draught at the end of the year, the presence of insect pests and the unfamiliarity of the people with proper cultivation methods, some areas planted to cotton had not produced the expected yield. But in September, 1943, it was announced that the area to be devoted to cotton in the new season would be tripled to complete the cultivation of the 47,000 hectares quota, and this plan was carried out.¹⁶³ The results of cotton cultivation in the Islands on the whole, however, were found to be disastrous. Japan's expectations were never fulfilled as far as the volume of production was concerned, and the once fertile lands were left idle and unkept.

A few months before the Philippines was granted its independence, Shozo Murata, the highest adviser to the Japanese Military Administration in the Islands, after an extensive tour of East Asia, made the following statement concerning the economic contribution of the Filipinos to the cause of Greater East Asia:

With the exception of copper, almost everything produced in the Philippines is obtained in other regions. Abaca, for which the Philippines is well known, is now produced in Sumatra. Sugar is produced in Djawa in larger quantities and with lower production cost than before. Other products such as rice, copra, and tobacco

¹⁶² Ibid., April 26, 1943, 1.

¹⁶³ Abbott, op. cit.

are also obtained in other regions in good quantity as well as in quality. . . .

However, this backward situation can not be placed at the door of the Philippine Administration alone. Plans and programs in the Philippines are being obstructed by guerrilla activities. Herein lies the reason why the unpatriotic non-collaborationist of the Philippines is a traitor to his country.¹⁶⁴

How true were these statements of Murata? Mr. W. L. Hubbard, a Treasury Department official, who spent the war years in an internment camp in Manila, said that at the first part of the Japanese occupation, there were some Filipino farmers who had a tendency to deal with Japanese buyers. But when they realized that these products were being exported elsewhere, they either planted only what they needed or hid their produce for local consumption.

By May 18, 1944, the vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Abello, made his own interpretation of "Co-Prosperity":

As co-prosperity implies, we can not really begin to participate in the economic life of the sphere unless we are able to produce enough for our own needs and something to spare for our neighbors. The concept of co-prosperity implies not dependence on the neighbor but inter-dependence. Nothing better guarantees the success of the Asiatic countries than the mastery by each of the component elements of its own fate because it can live on its own efforts alone.¹⁶⁵

This indifference of the Filipinos in cooperating economically with Japan may be ascribed to Japan's own propaganda lines. We have discussed elsewhere (in Japan's economic self-

¹⁶⁴ Manila Tribune, September 12, 1943, 1.

¹⁶⁵ FCC, May 18, 1944, G 1.

sufficiency line) that she had tried to give the Islanders the impression that victory was surely on her side because she had taken advantage, as early as possible, of exploiting the resources of the Islands as well as those of other nations in East Asia. Likewise, in the economic phase of her Greater East Asia line, Japan dictated what the Filipinos should produce for her war effort, without considering either the needs of the Filipinos for their own livelihood or the production of goods most adapted to their climate and their soil. The Filipinos must have been forced on the defensive. Thoughts must have filled their minds about preserving their natural resources for themselves and their posterity. Hence, they decided by the middle of 1943 to plant only what they needed for their food or not to plant at all. Mr. Hebbard tells how the Japanese, at the latter part of their occupation, could not even get the Filipinos to harvest the coconuts from the trees. As a result, the economic collapse came to the Philippines. This, we have also already explained in connection with the puppet Philippine Independence.

In spite of the failure of the economic phase of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere, it is the writer's opinion that it was the one propaganda line that could have appealed to the practical side of Filipino thinking, and for that matter, to that of all nations of East Asia. For there is no doubt that East Asia's population and vast territory are something to reckon with. Also, these countries are among

the richest in natural resources.¹⁶⁶ Given favorable conditions for unity and proper understanding among them and a higher technology, the peoples of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere could be economically self-sufficient and would never have to be afraid of economic exploitation by other peoples. Japan's idea could have been meritorious, except for her desire to use the wealth of these peoples to further her own selfish aims. Here was why Japan failed.

Peter Constan, one of the thirteen American government officials who were stranded in Manila during the war and who returned to the United States on the exchange ship, the S.S. Gripsholm in the summer of 1944, said, of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity line and the effect it had on the Filipino:

Filipinos have become thoroughly adapted to the American way of life and living and enjoy it. Any propaganda line which aims at converting them to a different way of living obviously has a very hard row to hoe, unless it offers them something really better than the American way, and to the Filipinos, what the Co-Prosperity sphere offers, is unmistakably inferior.¹⁶⁷

Effects of Japan's Propaganda Lines on the Filipinos

What were the effects of the other Japanese propaganda lines on the Filipinos? George Abbott said of Japan's

¹⁶⁶ See M. Epstein, editor, The Statesman's Yearbook, 1945 on the population, area, and natural resources of countries as China, Manchukuo, the Philippines, Thailand, French Indo-China, Burma, Borneo, Java and Sumatra for a confirmation of this statement, or Sumner Wells, An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace (New York: The Dryden Press, 1945) on the same countries.

¹⁶⁷ Peter Constan's answer to a State Department Questionnaire for Gripsholm passengers (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, 1944).

pacification line:

. . . it had little effect on the morale and loyalty of the Filipino troops during the period of organized resistance.

In spite of the apparent success in inducing large numbers of guerrillas to surrender [the Manila Tribune had continuously published news items on guerrilla surrenders], extensive areas are still under guerrilla control and areas considered as pacified are still harboring large bands of armed Filipinos. No evidence, on the other hand, appeared from the press or private sources that the general public is cooperating to any considerable or increasing extent with Japanese troops or gendarmie engaged in hunting down guerrillas.¹⁶⁸

On the Independence line, Abbott claimed:

There was not much popular enthusiasm aroused for it. . . . This is indicated by attacks in newspapers of "fence sitters" and the attitude of "few Filipinos" to whom it was possible to talk.¹⁶⁹

On Japan's build-up line, Abbott observed:

Developments in recent months have helped to dispel the myth of Japan's invincibility. Their accounts of results of air and naval battles are being received with increasing skepticism.

Information campaign regarding Japan's culture, history, resources, and economy has resulted in a great increase of knowledge on Japan. But not in liking or respect due to contact with Japanese troops, police, and civilians. Policy of leniency and comparative humanity toward the Filipino has operated less to engender a feeling of gratitude and liking for them than to dispel fear and submissiveness which was first evident.

Japanese propaganda regarding origins of war aims and intentions has been too complicated and involved to be understood by the average Filipino.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ George Abbott, op. cit.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

On the anti-Anglo-American line, he continues:

. . . this is the most difficult to evaluate. The prestige of the United States suffered from our military defeats at the beginning of the war. Also, appeals to race hatred always strike a response among certain types of persons. In the Philippines, there was a certain background of anti-American feeling dating from difficulty with Aguinaldo and this was followed and kept alive by independence agitation. . . .¹⁷¹

The most effective phase of the anti Anglo-American line seems to have been that of race prejudice. Charles Hancock Foster, the head of the American Red Cross in the Philippines for twenty years and a Gripsholm passenger said:

Major emphasis should be placed on our attitude toward the native populations of the Philippines. I have talked to professors, members of my staff who have been working under me. Some of them for almost twenty years. Their loyalty to the United States and to American institutions is solid and sincere. But they feel very deeply the patronizing attitude of many Americans who have resided in the Islands for many years and the critical attitude of these Americans regarding the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves. While these Filipinos do not express resentment, they feel that the honor and integrity of their leaders have been questioned and discussed too openly. They feel hurt at a certain undercurrent of opinion on part of Americans that Islands will go from bad to worse unless American direction continues to be maintained. They feel keenly the discrimination which deprives them of entrance into American clubs and social life. From twenty years of my life and work among them in developing the Philippine Red Cross and welfare activities, I have found that they welcome wholeheartedly America's interest and cooperation but this must be carried out with a sense of equality, entirely forgetting racial differences. I state, without hesitation whatever, that there must be a complete change of attitude after the war. . . .¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Charles Hancock Foster, in answer to a State Department questionnaire for Gripsholm passengers (Washington, D. C.: War Department, 1944).

Karl Lott Rankin, another American internee from the Philippines, added:

One of the most effective types of propoganda put out by the Japanese is that which plays up the "color line" formerly drawn so sharply by the Americans and British in the Orient.¹⁷³

The effect, however, of Japan's race prejudice line did not seem to be great. An analysis of the reports of 158 American escapees from prisoner-of-war camps, guerrillas, and civilians, who succeeded in returning to the United States before the liberation of the Islands, reveals that 95 percent of the Filipinos were loyal to America even in the darkest hour of the Japanese misrule. Among the 5 percent who were sympathetic to Japan, were included those who suffered in one way or another from race prejudice, the Filipino puppet officials who collaborated with the Japanese whole-heartedly, the pro-Japanese Filipinos who found in Japan, even before the war, the salvation of their country as General Ricarte, Benigno Ramos and his Sakdal Group,¹⁷⁴ the "Makapili" who spied on their countrymen to please the Japanese, and worst of all, the rich men who, because of a streak of King Midas in them, sold scrap iron, coconuts and other war materials to enable Japan to prolong her war effort.¹⁷⁵ The last two groups, particularly, seem to deserve the greatest condemnation because

¹⁷³ Karl Lott Rankin, ibid.

¹⁷⁴ We have discussed the group of Japanese sympathizers in Chapter II.

¹⁷⁵ Manila Tribune, January 30, 1945.

they were directly stained with the blood of their countrymen.

Why then did Japan's propaganda in the Philippines fail? Because of the contradictions in her own propaganda lines, the lack of the right psychological insight into the nature of the Filipino, the Japanese own sense of superiority over the Islanders as seen in actions of cruelty and abuse attributed to the Japanese soldier in the Philippines. Likewise because America once gave the Filipinos a better way of life, and a political ideology more in harmony with the innate love of freedom of the Filipino people. Thirdly, because the Filipinos were convinced that in the long run, the Allies would win. And last, because of the large following of President Manuel L. Quezon among the Filipinos. As we will find out later, these same reasons brought about the spontaneous origin of the Philippine Guerrilla Movement.

The Japanese propagandists were aware of the ineffectiveness of their efforts among the Islanders. And so was the Japanese high command in Tokyo. To revenge themselves against these brother Orientals who defied their power and sided with a white nation, they ordered Manila's massacre on February 14, 1945. This massacre was Japan's last desperate move against the Filipinos. Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo reported Manila's massacre to the American Congress thus:

Here are confidential orders from the bodies of dead Japanese officers, excerpts from the diaries of Japanese soldiers, and the sworn testimony of American military medical officers, of priests, and civilians who escaped the Japanese massacre, and official photographs taken by members of the United States Army Signal Corps, all captioned with names, locales, dates, and

explanatory data. . . .

. . . Orders such as these, emanating from the high command in Tokyo said in effect to the Filipinos:

"We the Japanese will make of you an example to horrify the rest of the Far East because you, as Orientals, have dared to rally to the side of the white democracies. We are trapped, but you are trapped with us, and we are not yet through with you. Before liberation comes to you, we will have made of the Filipinos an example that will serve as a vengeance and a warning to the other inhabitants of Asia."

. . .

Read from the testimony of Father Cosgrave, Superior of the Redemptorist fathers, who miraculously survived the February 12th massacre at the La Salle College--a massacre like none other in history. Those who tried to escape, he says, were pursued by soldiers with bayonets. In his own words:

"Some of the children were only 2 and 3 years old, a few were even younger. These were given the same treatment as their elders. When the Japanese had finished bayoneting us, they pulled and dragged the bodies out and threw them in a heap at the foot of the stairs, the dead being thrown with the living. . . ."

Where else in all history has there been such a scene of terror as was uncovered behind the locked double doors of Fort Santiago--by comparison, the Black hole of Calcutta was a place of light. In one room in that place 50 bodies were found, hands bound, bullet-riddled, 30 in another stone dungeon; between 250 and 300 in still another, putrid bodies piled together, and these men and women had been pushed in there while still alive and left to die. The emaciated, dehydrated bodies give testimony too terrible to put into words, for they tell of hideous devices used on humans trapped between stone walls and iron grills and abandoned. Such things, too gruesome to describe, you will find in this printed indictment against Japan, in the sworn testimony of honorable men.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Speech of Carlos P. Romulo on Orders from Tokyo--the Destruction of Manila--Price of Filipino Loyalty to America, April 17, 1945 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1945).

We will now turn to the Filipino reaction against Japanese propaganda in the Philippines in the mass movement which was the real cause of the massacre of Manila, the Philippine Guerilla movement.

CHAPTER VII

THE PHILIPPINE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Along with the incessant activities of Japan's propagandists to disseminate her new gospel during her short occupation of the Philippines was a contradictory strain of thought--a nullifying influence to the Japanese avowal of friendship and goodwill in the Islands which, as we have discussed elsewhere, goaded the invaders to desperation and caused them to massacre innocent Filipino men, women, and children in their last stand in Manila. The sources of this neutralizing factor were the Filipino guerrillas, together with their American comrades.

Origin of the Guerrilla Movement

In order to fully comprehend the importance of this guerrilla movement, and to determine the degree of participation by the Filipino people as a whole, we shall indicate the close underground cooperation between the guerrilleros and the Philippine citizenry in general, a cooperation so close in spirit that there was indeed very little sympathy with Japanese propaganda except on the part of a small minority of top crust collaborationists. The Japanese sensed the hollowness of the apparent subservience and politeness to them, and were constantly on the alert to break down the guard of the Filipinos. Met with a technical compliance with their wishes, so far as outer appearances indicated, they were still uneasy and uncertain of their status, and their attitude of suspicion (justified though

it was) introduced a false note into their relations with the Filipinos. Only in rare instances did close personal friendship develop between Filipinos and Japanese, for the basis of real understanding was absent. On the one hand, the loyalty of the Filipinos was elsewhere, in spite of their seeming acceptance of the Japanese overtures, for their hearts were with the guerrilleros. On the other hand, the Japanese also knew that the Islanders offered a shallow pretense of friendship and were obsessed by the idea that the Filipinos had not accepted their overtures in complete illusionment and simple faith. Under the circumstances, there could hardly be anything better than mutual distrust, quite justified on both sides. So long as their brothers and sons were fighting in the hills, and so long as there was the least glimpse of hope for their success, the Filipino heart and mind would hold out against any propaganda, no matter how plausible it was.

On account of the disjointed insularity of the Philippines, the guerrilla movement could not at all times be unified, nor could parts of the movement in all places be in touch with other units. Nevertheless, there was general knowledge that resistance was almost everywhere and such knowledge could quickly spread even though the Japanese were ever on the alert to detect communications. In view of the incompletely unified administration of the guerrilla movement at first, it has seemed best to treat it from a geographical standpoint although it became almost completely unified toward the end of the war,

and its effect on citizen morale and resistance to propaganda was the same everywhere. For our purpose, therefore, we will divide the Philippine guerrilla organization into five main groups: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

a. Northern Luzon. The guerrillas of Northern Luzon sprang up spontaneously from the Fil-American divisions previously cut off from the main body of soldiers who retreated to Bataan.¹ Moreover, at least two leaders of the North Luzon guerrillas escaped from Bataan after the surrender and found their way northward where they led not only professional soldiers but sympathetic Filipino civilians.² Consequently, the oft repeated statement that "the Philippines never surrendered" was true here as in other parts of the Archipelago.³

One of the leaders who was contacted by the USAFFE headquarters in Corregidor before the surrender was Major Everett L. Warner who had assembled Fil-American remnants cut off after the Japanese landings at the Lingayen Gulf. After the capture of Corregidor, Warner surrendered in compliance with General

¹ Information Bulletin dated November 16, 1944, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in Northern Luzon (Australia: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, MIS, General Staff), 1.

² "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," Triumph in the Philippines (Australia: The Combat History Division, G-1, Section Headquarters, AFWESPAC, 1946), III, 29-30.

³ Edward M. Kuder and Pete Martin, "The Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post, March 10, 1945.

Wainwright's order, though Guillermo Z. Nakar, a Lieutenant Colonel, and one of his battalion commanders, took part of the force to Nueva Vizcaya. There Nakar contacted Australia by radio and was authorized by General MacArthur to form the 14th Infantry Regiment. However, Nakar's headquarters near Cabanatuan was captured and he was executed in November, 1942. The remainder of his forces were taken over by Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Enriquez.⁴

Enriquez, a Philippine Army officer, appeared in the area of Baguio at the head of a guerrilla intelligence group in August, 1943. His headquarters was located in a "Nacoco" store (National Coconut Corporation, a Philippine government corporation taken over by the Japanese during the occupation) in Baguio City, which was established with the permission of the Japanese, ostensibly as a trading organization. Agents posing as salesmen came and went from all parts of Northern Luzon to Baguio, bringing intelligence reports. Later, the Japanese suspected Enriquez and put him in a concentration camp but he was released on one of the Japanese holidays celebrated in the Islands. He reassembled his group and the reorganized unit which resulted covered the mountain provinces, Pangasinan and Isabela.⁵ His men were divided into two groups: combat units and sabotage units. Former armed members of the constabulary

⁴ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," op. cit., 30.

⁵ Ibid., 3.

and civilians with arms composed the nucleus of his combat units which were mainly located in the Mountain Province. The unarmed ex-servicemen formed a sabotage unit. In December, 1943, a transmitter was brought from Manila and placed in Baguio under Captain Ali Al-Raschid, Chief of Police of Baguio. This organization led by Enriquez seems to have folded up, however,--at least temporarily--with the arrest of many of its members in February, 1944.⁶

In February, 1942, Colonel John P. Horan, who had been the Commander of Camp John Hay at Baguio before the war, also started reorganizing his infantry battalion from his former men and some Philippine constabulary units from the sub-provinces of Bontoc and Ifugao. He likewise included in his organization the guerrillas of Walter Cushing, whose unit covered the provinces of Abra, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur. When the surrender came, Colonel Horan, like other American commanders, surrendered to the Japanese in obedience to General Wainwright's order and turned over much of his newly organized 121st infantry to them. However, a number of his men, including the units of Walter Cushing, disappeared into the hills. Cushing declined the command of the remaining forces and so Captain George Parnett took over.⁷

Another guerrilla band in the vicinity east of Baguio

⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁷ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 31-33.

before the capture of Corregidor was led by Captain Parker Calvert, who rounded up a number of Philippine Scouts and army soldiers, enrolled a number of civilian volunteers and called his force the 43rd Infantry Detachment. Like Horan, however, he surrendered later to the Japanese and for a time his units were without a leader. In June, 1942, Lieutenant Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur Noble, who had escaped the "Mariveles Massacre" and the "Death March," arrived in Benguet and discovered that Captain Calvert's detachment was not included in Colonel Horan's surrender. Hence, they took over its leadership.⁸

Moses and Noble were able to destroy large numbers of Japanese men and quantities of ammunition, so much so that the Japanese became alarmed. They therefore massed two full regiments in Benguet and launched a strong attack on Noble and Moses. The pressure was so intense that the guerrilla forces went into hiding by mid-November, 1942. The two commanders were forced to flee to Ifugao where they were met by Major Ralph Praeger's officers, carrying word that they should continue north to Praeger's headquarters at Apayao and establish radio contact with Australia. In February, 1943, General MacArthur authorized them to take command of all forces north of the line through Lingayen, Pangasinan, and San Jose in Nueva Ecija, and to concentrate their efforts on the establishment of a stable organization as well as on the collection of

⁸ Ibid.

military intelligence information. But shortly after the two colonels returned home, they were caught by the Japanese. This was on June 1, 1943. Lt. Colonel Russell W. Volckmann inherited command in February, 1944, and this unit became known as the USAFIP (United States Armed Forces in the Philippines), North Luzon.⁹

Volckmann launched his guerrilla forces on an intensive training program. Previously the troops had been allowed to live in "barrios" (country villages) and to impersonate civilians when the enemy was in the neighborhood. This set-up did not please Volckmann. He put his soldiers into hidden platoon and company camps. One of these training camps succeeded in staying open through the occupation, blowing bugle calls and holding reveille and retreat ceremonies each morning and evening.¹⁰

Other North Luzon units existed, mostly headed by Filipinos. There were Roque Alban's forces in the Ilocos provinces and Abra; Lt. Colonel Gregorio Manalo in Cagayan and Isabela; Major Ganlan in the Ilocos, and the "Maharlicas" under Lt. Col. Ferdinand Marcos, a 31-year-old law graduate of the University of the Philippines.¹¹

⁹ Ibid., 34; The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in North Luzon, 5.

¹⁰ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 38.

¹¹ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in Northern Luzon, 5.

From the foregoing account of the North Luzon guerrilla units it is clear why the presence of strong Japanese garrisons and a network of good roads, as well as the presence of numerous Japanese patrols, limited the North Luzon guerrilla movement during the occupation to an "underground force." Yet, the attempts of the leaders and their loyal Filipino followers constantly kept the conquered people in a state of hopeful anticipation.

b. Central Luzon Guerrillas. In both Central and Southern Luzon, the closeness of the Japanese likewise impaired the organization of a more effective guerrilla force. Yet the guerrilla units, in spite of fear of Japanese retaliation, contributed greatly to the successful Allied liberation of the Islands. Like the guerrillas of Northern Luzon, the Central Luzon guerrillas were organized even before the fall of Bataan. General MacArthur had sent for Major Claude A. Thorpe (in January, 1942), whom he ordered to organize guerrilla activity behind the Japanese lines. Thorpe made his way northward from Bataan into the Zambales Mountains on the west coast of Central Luzon, and established his headquarters near Mount Pinatubo. When Bataan fell, he had already divided Central Luzon into several commands under his over-all direction. But in October, 1942, Colonel Thorpe was captured by the Japanese and executed.¹² In the absence of orders from General MacArthur, Major Anderson

¹² "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 40-41.

took over the command of the East Central Forces, and Lieutenant Colonel Gyles Merrill took over the command of Western Central Luzon forces after the death of its previous commander, Captain Ralph McGuire.¹³

Merrill's command claimed the control of a force of 8,000 men although only 500 of these were armed. His headquarters was in the Zambales Mountains. Captain John Boone organized a force in Bataan and southern Zambales and cooperated with Merrill's forces.¹⁴

Captain Anderson's East Central Forces included the provinces of Bulacan, Tayabas, Batangas, Laguna and Nueva Ecija. A number of his intelligence men operated in Manila under Lt. Antonio Barros.¹⁵ Major Robert Lapham, also cooperated with Anderson. His guerrilla unit covered North Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Nueva Vizcaya.¹⁶ The ROTC guerrillas, composed largely of former Manila students, and Marking's Guerrillas, were eventually subjected to Anderson's jurisdiction.¹⁷ Marking's guerrillas were said to have transmitted a considerable number of intelligence reports to Australia. This unit was organized in April, 1942, under the leadership of Marcos Villa Agustin and Yay Panlilio. In 1944, Marking's had united with the Fil-

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 43.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Report of Major Charles W. Folsom (in the files of the Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

American Irregular Troops in Manila and his forces spread out through Rizal, Laguna, Batangas, Tayabas, Bulacan, Cavite, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Manila.¹⁸ Charles W. Folsom claimed that Marking's guerrillas were composed of 5,000 armed men and many thousands of sympathizers. Its headquarters was located in Tanay, Rizal.¹⁹

Anderson's unit began harassing the enemy, destroying roads, blowing bridges, cutting communications and demolishing Japanese supply dumps five days before the American forces landed at the Lingayen Gulf. Their efforts were aided by bombing and strafing of Japanese positions by American planes, acting on information provided by the guerrilla intelligence agents. They confused the Japanese in Central and Southern Luzon. Soon some Japanese were fleeing the mountains and the guerrillas took over many towns before the American forces were even near.²⁰

Other independent guerrilla units likewise existed. There were Ramsay's guerrillas, which eventually controlled elements in Manila, Western Nueva Ecija, Eastern Bulacan, and Cavite;²¹

¹⁸ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 43; Report of Jesus Villamor, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

¹⁹ Report of Major Charles W. Folsom and Report of Cpl. Gottlieb G. Neigum dated January 18, 1945, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D.C.

²⁰ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 46.

²¹ Ibid., 41.

the "Hukbalahaps," whose political economic movement, organized against the powerful landowners and whoever were sympathetic to the latter in the central plains of Luzon, began years before the war. By late 1944, they had 5,000 men under arms, with their main stronghold at Mt. Arayat.²² Other guerrilla units were TERRY'S and President Quezon's Own Guerrillas.²³

The fact that there were active guerrillas in the provinces around Manila and in Manila itself indicates the strength of anti-Japanese feeling among the natives. The chief contribution of the Guerrillas in Central Luzon was along intelligence lines and by way of preparing the different areas for subsequent allied invasion.

c. Guerrillas of Southern Luzon. In the Southern part of Luzon, most of the loyal Filipino public officials and constabulary men took to the hills after their ineffectual resistance against the Japanese. The wandering remnants of escaped and unsurrendered USAFFE soldiers and loyal civilians began to organize guerrilla units, each dominating certain areas within the provinces. The larger units particularly were typically committed at the beginning to the preservation of law and order in their areas. For a time, active guerrilla resistance caused the Japanese considerable trouble.²⁴ For

²² Ibid., 43; letter of Luis Taruc to Rafaelita H. Soriano from San Fernando, Pampanga, May 18, 1946.

²³ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," op. cit., 41.

²⁴ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Bicol Area (Australia: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, MIS, General Staff, G-2, dated November 7, 1942), 1.

example, in Camarines Sur, the Filipino guerrillas succeeded in recapturing the town of Naga.²⁵ However, the increasing lack of funds and supplies hampered their activities, and smaller units had to dissolve or merge with more powerful groups.²⁶ The following were the better known guerrilla units: Major Boayes' "Vinson's Travelling Guerrillas" in Camarines Norte; Camarines Sur--Major Miranda's, Major Padua's, Major Dianela's, Major Sandico's and Major Zabat's guerrilla units. In Northeast Albay, a Mr. Flor led about 50 men, while in South Albay, there were the "Bagong Katipunan" guerrillas under a "General" Orobia. Burias Island was under a Captain Tacerua. Sorsogon province was controlled by Major Liserio Lapus and former Governor Escudero.²⁷

d. Visayan Guerrillas. Another guerrilla group which we will consider is that of the Visayan Islands. In order to simplify the discussion of these units, we will make use of the military districts into which even the smallest inhabited Visayan Island was classified by the Southwest Pacific headquarters. The Visayas was composed of four military districts: 6th district included Panay, Masbate, Marinduque, Mindoro, Palawan, and Romblon; 7th district: Negros and Siquijor Islands;

²⁵ Report of Peter Constan in the files of the State Department, Washington, D. C.

²⁶ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Bicol Area, op. cit., I.

²⁷ Ibid., 2-3.

8th district: Bohol and Cebu; and the 9th district, the Islands of Samar and Leyte.

Sixth Military District. Six months after the surrender of Corregidor, a little group of loyal Filipinos from Panay worked in relays pedaling furiously on a jacked-up bicycle to spin a generator stolen from the Japanese invaders. All the hopes and faith of these Filipinos were poured into its set of storage batteries which soon thereafter were to power a makeshift shortwave radio set whose weak and wavering signals were beamed to America in an effort to arrange a rendezvous. It took three hours' pumping without pause (except to change pedalers) before the broadcast started and after fifteen minutes, the batteries were already exhausted. But a War Department monitor picked up the signals before they faded and these were relayed to General MacArthur in Australia who sent a submarine to get in touch with these patriots.²⁸

The history of the guerrillas on Panay is unique among the Islands' units in the early and complete establishment of its command and in the continuation of its authority without question afterward. In both military and civil matters, it is probably the most extensive and the best example of a completely Filipino patriotic effort of all the Philippine guerrilla organizations.

The Panay guerrillas dated back to when General Christie

²⁸ Carlos P. Romulo, "Eerie, Deadly War Waged by Filipinos," New York Times, February 3, 1945, 1.

of the 61st Philippine Army Division in that Island told the Filipino officers under him before his surrender that Wainwright's orders did not apply to them. As a result, many Filipinos took to the hills with most of the division weapons, supplies, and equipment. Only a few American officers and men surrendered.²⁹

The guerrilla organization was actually started in August, 1942, ten weeks after the surrender of General Christie. Macario Peralta was chosen leader, or assumed command with the tacit approval of all concerned, and was acknowledged commander of the Island almost immediately.³⁰ Throughout the next four months, former army personnel were reassembled, new recruits were taken in and the units of the 61st Philippine Army Division were reactivated. By November, 1942, the reorganization was complete, the Japanese were contained in garrisons in a few towns at San Jose, Antique; Capiz, Capiz; and Iloilo city. The morale of the army and the civilians in the Island was high. As a reward for Peralta's efforts, General MacArthur made him commander of the sixth military district in February, 1943.³¹

One of the chief contributions of the Panay guerrillas to the Southwest Pacific headquarters was their carefully worded,

²⁹ Information Bulletin dated February 3, 1945, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay (Australia: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, MIS, General Staff, G-2), 1; "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 52.

³⁰ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," ibid.

³¹ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay, 1.

detailed and voluminous intelligence reports. We have already touched upon their efforts to contact Washington, D. C. in 1942. From this humble beginning, Peralta was able to report every twenty-four hours the enemy's strength, movements of even individual Japanese, enemy installations, supply areas and communications.³² This was achieved by means of Peralta's contacts with many other guerrilla areas so that his intelligence system gave him a complete detailed coverage.³³ Pedro Serran, a 26-year-old graduate of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, was his Intelligence Officer. By April, 1944, Peralta was sending agents to the Mountain Province, Abra, La Union, Cagayan, Ilocos Provinces, Isabela, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Pampanga, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Tayabas, Zambales, Bataan, Manila, Cavite, Rizal, Laguna, Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, Albay, Sorsogon and even to the tiny island of Corregidor,--in fact all over Japanese-infested Luzon.³⁴ How did the Panay guerrillas achieve this? By the establishment of a two-way intelligence channel to Luzon, duplicating and cross-checking each other. One of these channels was through southwest Luzon and the other through southeast Luzon. The first team (through southwest Luzon) was headed by Captain Alejandro P. Hontiveros, a 25-year-old graduate of the Ateneo

³² Ibid., 4.

³³ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 52.

³⁴ Ibid.

de Manila, while the other was under Major Enrique Jurado, a graduate of the Annapolis Naval Academy.³⁵ The educational background of Peralta's key men is significant when one considers that all of them were products of the American school system established in the Islands. Peralta himself was then a 30-year-old graduate of the College of Law, University of the Philippines.³⁶

The civil government of Panay was headed by Tomas T. Confesor, the former governor of Iloilo. When the Japanese overran the Island, he assumed the leadership of the two other provinces in Panay and went to the hills with the guerrillas. From his mountain hide-out, he tried to administer the Islands and in 1943, he was officially recognized as the governor of Panay and Romblon. Fermin Caram, the puppet governor of Iloilo, wrote to Confesor in January, 1943 a letter in which he pointed out that resistance and hardship were foolish and needless. The following was Confesor's classic answer, reproduced here in part:

. . . I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders, in their darkest hour, to teach our people to avoid suffering and hardship at the sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life. On the contrary, it is their bounden duty and responsibility to inspire our people to willingly undergo any kind of difficulties and sacrifices for the sake of noble principles that they nourish deep in their hearts. Instead of depressing their patriotic ardor, the

³⁵ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay, 4.

³⁶ Interview with Brigadier General Macario Peralta on August 26, 1945, at Ann Arbor, Michigan.

people should be inspired to be brave and courageous under all kinds of hardships and difficulties in defense of what they consider righteous and just. We shall never win or deserve the esteem and respect of other nations if we lack principles, and if we do, we do not possess the courage and the valor to defend those principles at any cost. . . .³⁷

An island under Panay's 6th military district was Masbate. According to official war department reports said to have been supplied by Peralta, there were during the occupation three guerrilla groups originally, led by Rosel, Captain Donato and Captain Villaojada. Donato was a Lieutenant in the USAFFE and founded his organization in October, 1942. The three leaders met in January, 1943, and chose Donato as their leader. However, Villaojada seemed to have become powerful later and overthrew Donato's control. Peralta therefore sent Tansiongco in July, 1943, to install himself as the Island Commander.³⁸

Another island under the Panay guerrillas was Marinduque. When the Japanese landed on July 7, 1942, Lt. Sofronio T. Untalan, a Philippine constabulary commander at Baoc, went to the hills with his men to organize resistance units against the Japanese. He was captured later and Sergeant Charles H. Hickock, who was then on the island, organized a guerrilla band of about 30 loyal Filipinos in September, 1942. By November, 1942, contact was made with Peralta who sent Captain A. Cudilla to take over the Island command. When the two

³⁷ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Panay, 12; Peter Constan, Japanese Military Activities in the Philippines (Washington, D. C., State Department).

³⁸ Ibid., 14.

intelligence teams for central Luzon were set up, however, Major Jurado decided to send Hickock back to Marinduque in order to make it an important intelligence base for agents coming to and from Luzon and Panay.³⁹

In the Island of Mindoro, there was no USAFFE garrison at the outbreak of the war. With the first Japanese landings on the Island, most of the small Philippine Constabulary garrison personnel fled to the mountains with what arms they could muster and carried on guerrilla resistance there. Some informal guerrilla bands also arose, and an influx of civilian volunteers with additional bands strengthened the pre-war constabulary units. Weaker organizations merged with powerful ones and by the latter part of 1942, several moderately strong bands had emerged. Most guerrillas acted here chiefly as police forces to keep order in the countryside. Jose Garcia, Romerius, Sotelo, Jose M. Ruffy and Beloncio were the chief guerrilla leaders of Mindoro. Later, Major Philipps was sent from MacArthur's headquarters to be the commanding officer. He had had long Philippine experience in Mindanao.⁴⁰

Palawan, another island under the 6th Military District, was occupied by the Japanese early in 1942. At Puerto Princesa, the only town of importance in the province, they constructed an airfield, using American navy and marine prisoners of war

³⁹ Ibid., 16.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 18.

whom they brought down from Manila. Patriots proceeded on foot and by launch to the north and south parts of the Island, and at harvest time, resisted occasional forays which were made by the Japanese to seize the rice crops. In general, the Japanese had not attempted to control areas except near Puerto Princesa. Guerrilla activities were limited to occasional ambushes of Japanese patrols, and, more importantly, to the maintenance of peace and order, the support of their civil government, and the procurement of intelligence.⁴¹

Guerrilla groups of importance gradually developed in the vicinity of Brookes Point, around Danlig, and, at the northern end of the island chain stretching from Palawan to Mindoro, in the Busuanga-Coron area.

In the Busuanga-Coron area, the Japanese tried to operate the manganese mines as early as 1942. Carlos Amores, a policeman at the mines, secretly organized a resistance force of over 400 men, largely workers at the mines. In September, 1942, it became evident that the Japanese had discovered the existence of the organization and Amores gave the signal for an uprising. Armed with clubs and rocks and a few pistols, the guerrillas killed all the Japanese at the mines and many in the town. The mine entrance was blown up with dynamite and considerable stocks of ore were destroyed before the guerrillas retreated. Amores went to Danlig in a captured Japanese

⁴¹ Ibid., 23.

launch to confer with the Cobb brothers, Americans who had established themselves in Palawan, concerning the unification of their forces.⁴²

The Cobb brothers visited Cuyo Island in September, 1942, and invited a number of American soldiers who had taken refuge there to join them. Some of these men returned to Palawan with the Cobbs and helped the guerrillas organize. In the meantime, Alfred Cobb also found Gaudencio Abordo, Governor of Palawan, in his evacuation place on the west coast of the Island and persuaded him to re-establish a free civil government for the province. By December, 1942, Abordo had reconvened his provincial government at Caramay with most of his officials active. He had been confirmed by the Philippine government in Washington, D. C.

The last guerrilla group in Palawan Island was located at Brooke's point. In August, 1942, three American navy men and three marines escaped from a Japanese prison camp at Puerto Princesa and appeared at Brooke's point, where they joined Americans living in a small settlement. The Japanese attempted a landing there in October, but were beaten off by a small guerrilla force organized by these men. A local government was also established here while a bolo (a native blade) battalion was organized in villages of the district to give warning

⁴² Ibid.; Peter Constan, The Japanese Military Activities in the Philippines (Washington, D. C.: State Department).

of approaching Japanese patrols.⁴³

Romblon, the last island under Panay, was important for the establishment of an intelligence base into Luzon. The first guerrilla leader was Captain Constantino Raval, formerly of the Philippine merchant marine. Major Enrique Jurado replaced him in February, 1943.⁴⁴

Seventh Military District. The 7th military district, composed of Negros and Siquijor islands, was as outstanding as that of Panay. It had a well knit and well controlled military organization and it was headed by Salvador Abcede, a young man of 31 who, like Peralta of Panay, graduated from the state university in Manila. American officers who had met him described Abcede as "capable, conscientious, and free from politics."⁴⁵ One guerrilla unit in Negros Oriental, moreover, centered around an institution of higher learning, the Silliman University at Dumaguete, a school operated by the Presbyterian American missions. The Negros guerrillas likewise had a civil government headed by Alfredo Montelibano.⁴⁶

The following were the guerrilla unit commanders on Negros Island: Abcede, Ernesto S. Mata, Hermenegildo Mercado, Major Placido A. Ausejo, and Lt. Col. Gabriel Gador. To this could

⁴³ Ibid., 23.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁵ Report of Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁶ Report of Arthur Carson, President of Silliman University, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

be added the leaders of "Puring Guerrillas," who operated west of Vallehermoso in Oriental Negros. The latter were considered a "lawless band in the hills who had attacked Japanese."⁴⁷

Abcede's unit was located in central and south Negros Occidental and it was organized in July, 1942, under Abcede himself, who had been a battalion commander in the area under Colonel Hilsman at the time of the surrender. This battalion formed the nucleus of the guerrilla unit which centered in the town of Kabankalan. Major Enrique Torres, one of the best fighting commanders on Negros, organized another unit in the vicinity of Binalbagan under Abcede. Much USAFFE equipment was saved, and the unit, with 600 rifles, was the best armed of the original guerrilla groups, and the largest. Many of the officers and men came from the plantations in the vicinity and the unit was never in want of food supplies. When the guerrillas were forced back into the hills, many of the families in the region evacuated with them but maintained contact with supply sources in the lowlands. The first engagement of the unit with the Japanese took place at Buenavista in early August, 1942.⁴⁸

Ernesto S. Mata's guerrillas was organized in mid-1942 in North Negros. Mata was then about 29 years old, a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy in 1937. Due to tenuous

⁴⁷ Information Bulletin dated December 10, 1944, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Negros (Australia: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, MIS, General Staff, G-2), 3.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1.

communications with south Negros from Mata's area during the occupation, little had been known of its activities except that it did inflict much damage on Japanese installations in Bacolod and near Fabrica and was a large factor in the failure of Japan's plans to grow food and cotton in North Negros.⁴⁹

Another man from the Philippine Military School, an instructor before the war, was Hermenegildo Mercado. Thirty years of age, he led the guerrillas from Guihulngan northwards, in Negros Oriental.⁵⁰

Gabriel Gador led the area between Concepcion and Libertad, Negros Oriental. His organization had a tendency to operate independently of the 7th military district command.⁵¹ In this connection, it is important to state that the man who achieved the unification of the Negros command was Major Jesus Villamor, a 30-year-old American-trained ace pilot who achieved fame at Bataan and who was sent by General MacArthur to coordinate the guerrillas of Negros.⁵²

Speaking of the origin of the guerrillas in South Negros Oriental, Arthur Carson, President of the Silliman University, moved out the University press at the request of the governor, who then talked of retreating to the hills and carrying on a

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 2.

⁵¹ Ibid., 3.

⁵² Ibid., 7.

free government with the support of the army which was confidently expected to continue resistance.⁵³

The staff members of Silliman University retreated to the mountains near the town of Malabo. The Japanese landed too late in this part of Negros, on May 26, 1942.⁵⁴ By this time the natives near-by had begun reporting to Mr. Henry Roy Bell, an American Professor from Silliman. Of these days, Dr. Carson said:

On July 27, 1942, two Filipino soldiers who had escaped from a prison camp at Fabrica, came to Bell. They had one rifle, wrapped in coconut leaves. Next Monday, three boys from town appeared with eleven pistols which they had taken from a Japanese arsenal under the very noses of sentries there. Unsurrendered soldiers continued to find their way to both camps. They told us that posters had appeared in town ordering them to report immediately to Bell in the mountains. . . . On August 18, 1942, a truckload of corn appeared at a Chinese store in the valley below us, consigned to Bell as a contribution from the Chinese merchants for the support of the soldiers. With this aid, Bell established refuge centers for soldiers.
 . . .⁵⁵

About August, 1942, word was received over the radio that General MacArthur had seized Guadalcanal from the Japanese. This had an electrifying effect on the Filipinos and they felt that it would only be a matter of months before the Americans would push their way back to the Islands. Japanese patrols were fired upon. By December, 1942, the movement became quite extensive and the guerrillas succeeded in confining the Japanese

⁵³ Report of Arthur Carson, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Op. cit., 5.

⁵⁵ Report of Arthur Carson, op. cit.

garrisons within two towns of Negros Oriental: Bais and Dumaguete. The guerrillas had the situation so well in hand that the schools were opened in Southern Negros without interruptions. The Japanese, however, later reoccupied the coastal towns and found flag staffs still flying the American and Filipino flags, where in June, 1942, they had flown Japanese flags.⁵⁶

Bell was a civilian, and thought of getting a military man to head the organization. He offered the position to Major Placido Ausejo. The choice was a wise one and four independent guerrilla groups in that province, namely, those led by Lt. B. Vilorio, who had come from Mindanao, Ridad and Jornales' guerrillas, whose leaders were both Silliman students, and that of Sgt. David Cirillo of the Philippine Constabulary, all united under him.⁵⁷

Eighth Military District. The eighth military district consisted of the islands of Bohol and Cebu. When the Japanese occupied Tagbilaran, the capital of Bohol island, in May, 1942, the loyal officials and patriots went to the hills, and a number of informal guerrilla bands arose throughout unoccupied areas of the island. The largest and most active of these groups was the "Behind the Clouds" unit organized in June, 1942,

⁵⁶ Report of Robert Benton Silliman and Metta Silliman in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

⁵⁷ Report of Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

in northern Bohol under the command of 3rd Lt. Ismael P. Ingeniero. Another unit, the "East Bohol Battalion," was active in eastern and southern Bohol during mid-1942. These two guerrilla groups and that of 1st Lt. Jose Maneja, who had gone to western Leyte to organize his men, later met in concord and agreed on Ingeniero as commander of a unified Bohol guerrilla force.⁵⁸

The organization was run in a military manner with some formality, and guards and sentry posts were frequent on the highways. Discipline was reported good among the Bohol guerrillas and the former Volunteer Guard organized by the late President Quezon before the war was converted into a Bolo Battalion whose duties included messenger work and transportation of supplies. A "Woman's Auxilliary Service" was created as a female counterpart to the Bolo Battalions. Their duties were largely the production of clothing and equipment for soldiers and the raising of funds by entertainments. An official organ, "Bolos and Bullets," edited by A. G. Lavilles, a lawyer, regularly circulated news and guerrilla propaganda.⁵⁹

In Cebu, deluded by the ease with which they had occupied all the east, central, and west coast cities, the Japanese left only small garrisons behind to keep the peace, in spite

⁵⁸ G-2 Information Bulletin dated December 15, 1944, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Bohol (Australia: General Headquarters, SWPA, MIS, General Staff), 1.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

of the fact that Cebu, with a population of 150,000 was the second largest Philippine city. The retreat of the USAFFE forces, which permitted the Japanese to occupy Cebu without much resistance, enabled the former to escape to the hills with a large quantity of arms, ammunition and supplies. Guerrilla units were quickly reformed in the hills and soon their power made itself felt in the cities. Most of the puppet officials became secret collaborators with the guerrillas and those who did not collaborate were either eliminated or educated into a state of neutrality.⁶⁰

The accomplishments of the Cebu area command were considerable: they organized about 9,000 men, one-third of whom were civilian volunteers, and one-half of whom were armed. Ammunition was manufactured in limited amounts in various towns and enemy terror attacks were retaliated. The two leaders of the Cebu guerrillas were Americans: Harry Fenton, who emerged in 1942 as the leader of north and south Cebu, and Lt. Col. James Cushing, who led guerrillas in the south and central part of Cebu.⁶¹

Ninth Military District. The 9th military command included Samar and Leyte. Samar, due to its strategic insignificance, was occupied lightly by the Japanese throughout

⁶⁰ G-2 Information Bulletin dated December 15, 1944, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Bohol (Australia: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, MIS, General Staff), 1.

⁶¹ Ibid., 6.

the war and consequently a large part of the island was dominated by guerrilla forces, the leading ones being those led by Merritt and Causing. In September, 1944, Charles M. Smith was sent from the southwest Pacific to Samar and succeeded in unifying the command under Colonel Pedro V. Merritt. Samar had 8,000 to 9,000 men, two-thirds of whom had pre-war military training, under his command. A civil administration was likewise set up under Governor Gregorio V. Abogado, an ex-member of the Philippine legislature.⁶²

Leyte, later the historic scene of the first American landing, had many guerrilla groups "half of which were organized for patriotic reasons and the other half for the more personal reasons of banditry and looting."⁶³ These guerrilla units sprang up early in 1942. Lt. Alejandro Balderian organized the unit in Northern Leyte while Major Ciriaco Centeno and his son Isabelo, organized northeast Leyte. East Leyte was under a former USAFFE soldier, Antonio Sinco, while the southern area guerrillas were led by Gordon A. Long. Northwest Leyte belonged to Lt. Blas Miranda and 1st Sgt. Filemon Pabilona, controlled 3 towns of Leyte: San Miguel, Babatugon, and Alangalang. On two small islands near Leyte (Panaon and Biliran) Captain C. Capin, Sgt. Felix Pamanian, Major Porfirio E.

⁶² "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 53.

⁶³ Ibid., 58.

Jain and Lt. Jose Nazareno took charge of the guerrillas.⁶⁴

The most important guerrilla groups in Leyte, however, were led by Blas Miranda and Colonel Ruperto Kangleon, the latter being chosen later to head all the unified guerrillas on Leyte. By the time the Americans were ready to land on Leyte in October, 1944, his guerrilla force had a strength of 3,200 men.⁶⁵

e. Mindanao Guerrillas. The guerrillas on the important island of Mindanao were the only group we have not described. Before going any further, we should first mention the fact that in General MacArthur's defense plan prior to the war, he had already envisioned the continuance of resistance in the ideal set-up which Mindanao's jungles and unexplored regions provided.⁶⁶ In fact, even after General Wainwright had already issued the surrender order, General William Sharp Jr., who was in charge of the USAFFE forces in Mindanao and the Visayas, still persisted in continuing the fight. General MacArthur agreed with him and nullified Wainwright's order of capitulation in a cablegram he sent Sharp in May, 1942.⁶⁷ After a

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ "Bataan into Darkness," Triumph in the Philippines (Australia: The Combat History Division, G-1, Section Headquarters, AFWESPAC, 1946), I, 54.

⁶⁷ Wainwright letter to Sharp from Fort Mills, dated May 7, 1942, caused Sharp's protest to MacArthur in Australia and the latter's cablegram to Sharp.

conference with Wainwright's messenger, however, Sharp gave himself up because the message he received stated that further delay in his surrender would mean the sacrifice of more Fil-American prisoners' lives. However, not all of Sharp's men surrendered with him. Many fled into the hills, taking with them their arms and supplies.⁶⁸

The Japanese, on the other hand, did not occupy all of Mindanao. Instead they garrisoned only the cities which were located on the coast, such as Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Cagayan, and Surigao, and only patrolled road nets and highways. This was the reason why, from the beginning of the Japanese occupation, and throughout the war, 95 percent of the Island was part of the Free Philippines.⁶⁹

One of the earliest guerrilla units in Mindanao was organized by Captain Luis P. Morgan, a Philippine Constabulary commander at Kolambugan, Lanao, before the war, out of his 200 armed and unsurrendered men. From July to September 15, 1942,⁷⁰ Morgan continued organizing because of the great need for preserving law and order in his area. The confusion was caused by the Japanese mistreatment of civilians, which stunned and demoralized them. Their feelings being aroused against the

⁶⁸ G-2 Information Bulletin dated January 31, 1945, The Guerrilla Resistance Movement on Mindanao and Sulu (Australia: General Headquarters, SWPA, MIS, General Staff), 1.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 1-2.

⁷⁰ Report of Lt. Robert E. Gentry in the Military Intelligence files, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Japanese, guerrilla units sprang up spontaneously throughout the province. Aside from Morgan, Manalo Mindalano, a Moro, and Captain Pedro Andres in the Illigan area, were the principal leaders in the guerrilla movement in this vicinity.⁷¹

In the meantime, William Tate began organizing in Misamis Occidental. While Morgan subdued the Kolambugan area and Tate in Misamis Occidental, the two joined bands and together pushed the Japanese entirely out of Misamis Occidental in September, 1942.⁷²

With two provinces under him, Morgan contacted Wendell Fertig, a civilian mining engineer in the Islands called to active duty during the war, who was at Kolambugan, Lanao, at this time. He suggested that while Morgan would travel throughout the Islands unifying the various guerrilla forces, Fertig would take command of the guerrilla headquarters.⁷³ This was the origin of the 108th Division and in February, 1943, when radio contact was established with Australia, Misamis Oriental became the heart of the whole Mindanao movement because Wendell Fertig was made the commanding officer of the 10th Military District.⁷⁴ Other leaders of the 108th

⁷¹ Guerrilla Resistance Movement in Mindanao and Sulu, op. cit., 7.

⁷² Ibid., 2.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.; Report of Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, loc. cit.

division aside from Morgan and Fertig were Lt. Col. Charles Hedges and Lt. Col. Robert V. Bowler.⁷⁵

Cotabato Area. In Cotabato area, a bolo battalion of Moros was organized by American officers before the war with the intention that these Moros would hold defensive positions along the Digos-Kabacan road, and harass the Japanese advance from Davao. The force disintegrated when the surrender came but one Moro leader, Salipada Pendatun, a law graduate of the University of the Philippines, became a prominent Cotabato guerrilla leader.⁷⁶ When the Japanese began a reign of terror in the Cotabato Valley, the populace were antagonized and Pendatun organized the first guerrilla group. They attacked the first Japanese garrison at Pikit, Cotabato in August, 1942. Pendatun likewise attacked Kabacan and regained the Digos-Kabacan Road in September of the same year.⁷⁷

Because of the good reputation he had established in Cotabato, two Filipino political leaders, Manuel Fortich and Vicente Leuterio persuaded Pendatun to go to Bukidnon and drive away the Japanese there. This he did, in the towns of Kibawe, Maramag, Valencia and Mailag in the latter part of 1942.⁷⁸

Speaking of Salipada Pendatun, an American who served

⁷⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 16.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 16-17.

under him, Sgt. Leo A. O'Connor, stated in a report to the War Department that after receiving a note from Datu Pendatun early in December, 1942, he and two other Americans present at the meeting signed up with him. A short while later they forced the Japanese north, back of the road to Malaybalay. The movement gained momentum every day and Filipino and American soldiers, hiding in various places in the district, came out and joined Pendatun's outfit. By March, 1943, Pendatun had several thousand men, of whom more than 2,000 were armed. They had 20 cars and trucks as part of their transport and confined the Japanese to Malaybalay. Salipada's area covered the region south of Malaybalay, deep in southern Cotabato.⁷⁹

Another outstanding leader in Cotabato was Gumbay Piang, the commander of the 119th regiment. When the Japanese occupied Cotabato, he was taken prisoner by the Japanese and released later to appease the Moros. Upon his return to his home, he set a sign over his door saying: "Gumbay Piang, Prisoner-of-war." He stayed in the house benevolently neutral to the guerrillas in the area and stood his ground when the Japanese came to find out what he was doing. He always pointed to the sign over his door and insisted on his rights as a prisoner. When the Japanese had fairly good proof of his pro-guerrilla activities, they sent their most diplomatic agent

⁷⁹ Sgt. Leo A. O'Connor's report to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.

to visit Piang. He maintained his position but left his own home afterwards to join the guerrillas.⁸⁰

Cotabato province belonged to the 106th Division, led by Lt. Col. Frank McGee. Other guerrilla leaders other than Piang and Pendatun in this division were Major Herbert Page, Fred Johnson, Villamor and Captain Guballa, who led groups in the southern and southwestern part of Cotabato.⁸¹

Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental. The 105th division included the area between Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental. Here, with the exception of eight officers and about 100 enlisted men, the USAFFE garrison surrendered in Zamboanga city on May 15, 1942. The unsurrendered personnel, together with loyal civilians and refugees from surrendered forces of the Island, gathered in various sections of Zamboanga and Occidental Misamis. Later they were unified under Lt. Col. Hipolito Garma.⁸²

South Agusan to Davao. From South Agusan to Davao, the 107th division under Lt. Col. Clyde C. Childress held sway. This division originated from small guerrilla organizations formed shortly after the surrender. The most important regiments were the 130th, the 111th and 112th provisional battalions. The 130th regiment comprised the area in the province of Davao

⁸⁰ The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in Mandanao and Sulu,
17.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., 5-6.

north from Davao city and east to the dividing range along the coast. The guerrillas northwest of Davao, on the other hand, were organized in June, 1942, by Lt. Col. Claro B. Laureta who went to the hills with about 30 members of his unit. There he found a large number of civilian evacuees (3,000 to 5,000) from Davao city settled along the Libuganon river. He used his small unit to enforce law in this jungle community. The evacuees provided food and recruits, and he established farms so that his guerrilla unit became self-supporting. A system of passes was in force, and all visitors were considered spies unless prompt proof to the contrary was produced. Ammunition was scarce but occasional Japanese patrols, easily ambushed along jungle trails, furnished his men with arms, ammunition and clothing. His headquarters at Maniki was near enough to the Davao Penal Colony for the guerrillas to give assistance to many escaping prisoners of war and to smuggle supplies into the colony.⁸³

Cagayan de Misamis and Bukidnon. The provinces of Cagayan de Misamis and Bukidnon, on the other hand, comprised the 109th Division. The guerrilla movement in this area started in two sections, one in the area about Cagayan de Misamis and the other in the southern Bukidnon-Cotabato border area. In the Cagayan area between Talakag and Sumilao, several American enlisted men of the air corps started semi-renegade guerrilla

⁸³ Ibid., 18.

groups. Lt. Col. Bowler contacted these men and other guerilla leaders in late 1942 and began to coordinate and regularize the units. Arms and equipment were salvaged from USAFFE supplies. Two other units, the 117th regiment and the 109th were included in this division. Pendatun's expedition to south Bukidnon was what gave impetus to the activation of the 117th regiment, while the 109th was started by Major Jaldon in Alubijid, Misamis Oriental in 1942.⁸⁴

East Misamis Oriental, North Agusan, and Surigao. The last division in Mindanao was the 110th, headed by Lt. Col. Ernest E. McClish and it was composed of the area between East Misamis Oriental, North Agusan and Surigao. The guerrillas here were a mixture of civilians, ex-USAFFE soldiers, constabulary men, army and navy personnel. Small unconquered groups organized themselves in "hometown" barrios (villages) and were led by natural leaders who assumed their responsibility for various reasons, as the desire to fight the Japanese, to establish law and order, for personal aggrandizement, or even for banditry. Motives in various instances were mixed. Under this division were the 110th regiment, from the Tagaloan River in Misamis Oriental to East Misamis Oriental; the 113th regiment in North Agusan and the 114th regiment from North Surigao to Lianga.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Ibid., 11-12.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 12-13.

The command of the Sulu Archipelago was separated from that of Mindanao and the nuclei of the guerrillas here were the dispersed Philippine Constabulary forces.⁸⁶

What was the importance of the Mindanao guerrillas to the return of the Allies into the Philippines? As local security and banca contact with the other islands were excellent, Mindanao was developed as a supply base for other guerrilla units, particularly of Bohol, Leyte, and Luzon. In January, 1945, approximately 70 radios were in operation, covering all the roads, important enemy areas and coastal positions commanding shipping channels. Flash reports on aircraft and ship movements had been regularly received for some time. Guerrillas also held airfields at Dipolog, Labo, Lala and Barobo which were frequently used by distressed airplanes. These fields were also used to speed up the flow of supplies into the Islands.

And side by side with the Mindanao guerrilla organization, civil government was gradually established. Provincial governors were appointed and local governments were established. Likewise, in the matter of food and other supplies, Mindanao was fortunate in having many comparatively untouched food growing areas. Pineapples were available in quantities from the del Monte plantations near Cagayan de Misamis; potatoes and temperate vegetables grew well in the Bukidnon hills near Talakag and

⁸⁶ Ibid., 21-23.

near Claveria, Misamis Oriental; coffee was available, and sufficient rice was grown in the Panguil Bay area and on the east coast of Surigao to feed people in other areas of Mindanao. The main difficulty was distribution. Trails and water transportation were developed and the 10th Military District planned and coordinated exchange between areas as much as local transportation facilities permitted.⁸⁷

f. Conclusion on the Origin and Organization of the Philippine Guerrilla Movement. From the foregoing description of the Philippine resistance movement, it is important to note that all the different islands of the Philippines had their own guerrilla units, varying in size according to the population and distance of each island from Central Luzon, the center of the Japanese occupation forces. Likewise, it should be pointed out that in north and central Luzon, and in Mindanao, most guerrilla units had their beginnings before the Filipinians surrendered at Bataan. Of course, as in the case of Cotabato, the original bolo battalions disintegrated in the confusion caused by the surrender, but faithful men like Pendatun kept alive the enthusiasm of people in that region. In northern Luzon some of the leaders were sent by MacArthur himself to organize guerrillas when the defeat of his forces at Bataan and Corregidor was impending. Other leaders were men who escaped from the "Death March." Many independent units

⁸⁷ Ibid., 3-4.

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⁸⁷ Ibid., 3-4.

sprang up spontaneously as continuations of pre-war provincial governments. Others had for their nuclei unsundered Philippine Army or Philippine Constabulary groups.

The history of the guerrilla movement shows that in most areas it had a continuous existence, and that it existed practically everywhere. Unconsolidated and perhaps bewildered by the events following the surrender of Bataan and Corregidor, it nevertheless held the loyalty of the civilian populace. So far as Japanese propaganda was concerned, the mere continuance of the guerrillas gave the people hope, and a point of attachment for their loyalty. American propaganda was disseminated by the guerrillas through dark days when it was hard to have continued faith in MacArthur's promise to return. Later, when the Japanese hold became weaker and the approach of the battle front indicated that the Philippines would soon be reached, the guerrilla districts were all in constant communication with each other. They constantly received the latest news of the war which they constantly transmitted to the civilian population in spite of the most rigorous control that the Japanese could exercise.

The continued existence of resistance conditioned the people, psychologically, to reject Japanese propaganda. The wide-spread distribution of guerrilla warfare to the most remote and small islands kept the people almost completely unified, and the eventual radio contact of the unified guerrilla movement with U. S. Army headquarters provided the factual

information on the progress of the war which was essential to controverting Japanese propoganda.

Who Participated in the Guerrilla Movement?

Aside from the American leaders, there were many Filipino leaders in the guerrilla organization, most of whom were regular army men, but some were provincial officials, and others just plain civilians before the war, such as policeman Carlos Amores who played so important a part in the Coron-Busuanga area. It is also worthy of note that many of the Filipino guerrilla leaders were in their early thirties, most of them products of the school system organized by the Americans in the Archipelago.

In Chapter VI, we already asked but only briefly answered the question: what was the percentage of Filipino loyalty to the Allied cause in the Philippines? Our answer was 95 percent,⁸⁸ most of them, of course, civilians. What part of those loyal Filipinos were either directly or indirectly participants in the guerrilla movement? We could perhaps make a fairly dependable estimate of their number from the statistics preserved in the records of the War Department. But many of those whose names were not registered in any guerrilla organization contributed

⁸⁸ See reports of Pfc. Kenneth Bayley, Henry Roy Bell, Pvt. Julian Benac, Sgt. Carl E. Comeaux, Lt. Col. Emigdio Cruz, Lt. Col. William Dyess, Capt. Damon Gause, Sgt. Irving V. Joseph, Captain R. S. Kramer, Homer Mann, Col. John H. McGee, Sgt. Franklin J. Trammell, Major Jesus Villamor in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

directly or indirectly to Philippine resistance. In some instances aid was given by mere boys to American prisoners who had escaped Japanese camps. Pvt. Patrick J. Mellody, after recounting his escape, describes his first days of freedom in a town south of Manila,--Balayan, Batangas:

We were now about eight kilometers from a warehouse which was the Japanese prison camp when we met a Filipino boy of ten who said: "Hello, Joe, where are you going?" He then told us to wait for he would bring us some food. Later on, he brought us some bananas.⁸⁹

Another American who was travelling over Japanese infested territory was likewise aided by a Filipino boy. Capt. Damon J. Gause, upon landing at Cavite, met a boy on the trail who informed him:

"The Japanese are coming."

Then he grabbed me and hid me, and three Japanese came by. When they had gone, he hid me out in the woods in the back of his house. He gave me food and water, and some tennis shoes he stole from the Japanese. He also gave me some native clothes.⁹⁰

Another escaped prisoner of war said of the help he got from a civilian Filipino:

He brought some iodine and painted me. Then I laid out in the sun for a week, and he moved me back and forth. Everyone out there is related to everybody else. One night I would stay with his uncle, and the next night with his uncle's father, and then with his grandfather,

⁸⁹ Report of Pvt. Patrick J. Mellody to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁰ Report of Capt. Damon J. Gause dated October 30, 1942 (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

etc. Everyone knows each other and they are all patriotic.⁹¹

The following is another report of the hospitality of civilians to Americans in the Islands during the occupation:

At Taal where I was a prisoner, I escaped with a private. A Filipino met both of us and went to his house about 25 yards away and returned with steamed rice, fried eggs, a few pieces of fried chicken, and a piece of bully beef. After breakfast he guided us to within five kilometers of the main highway. He hid us in the woods and told us to remain there till he returned.⁹²

In Mindanao, simple civilians likewise gave help to American soldiers, who later joined guerrilla units. In Anakan, Oriental Misamis, George Wesley Winget had the following experience:

I wish to say a thing for the native Filipino. If they have half a slice of bread it is for the American. What few eggs they could get, they gave to us and ate native vines and things themselves. One man, Lorenzo Canonigo, had a family of 7 small children, had very little to eat and also had many enemies due to a former land trouble in peace time who were too ready to report that he was keeping Americans. In spite of this fact, he demanded that we did not go very far so that he might be able to extend a little help.⁹³

Even the Filipino puppet mayor did his share of saving the life of an American. Private Aldo P. Maccagli gave this information:

⁹¹ Report of Sgt. John L. Hawken (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

⁹² Report of Earl E. Steele (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

⁹³ Report of George Wesley Winget (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

I was sick at the time so I was taken by Snyder and Simbahon to Tandag [Surigao] by boat in early June. Dr. Serra helped me while I stayed in the house of the Treasurer of Tandag. The Filipinos were very kind to me. Mayor Jaime Serra, Sampson and others came and visited me. On June 13, the Japanese arrived in a launch with three Filipino officers, one of whom was Major Garcia, stationed at Surigao with the [puppet] Filipino constabulary. City officials who had aided Americans to hide received the Japanese who spotted me. They levelled rifles on me. But the mayor told the Japanese that I was not an American but his own brother, half Spanish and half Filipino. The ruse succeeded and Samson's niece, who nursed me, took me with her a few miles up the Tandag river to her family's home.

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The Mangyan, unsophisticated Philippine tribesmen who live a very primitive existence and whose understanding of politics and economy is practically nil, gave their support to the Americans in San Jose, Mindoro. William Hammons, erroneously calling them Negritos, whom some of them do indeed somewhat resemble, wrote that when he and other Americans heard of Bataan's surrender,

A group of six Americans asked Negritos to help them. They were given food, shot wild chickens and green fruit. But there was no rice. . . . Three of these Americans became sick and were gradually nursed back to health. They arranged to get a guide to take Americans down to a valley to the home of a Filipino by the name of Romera.⁹⁵

These accounts are a few of many, too numerous to mention individually, indicating that most Filipinos, not merely those registered as guerrillas, actually participated in the Island's guerrilla movement.

⁹⁴ Report of Pfc. Aldo P. Maccagli (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

⁹⁵ Report of William Hammons (Washington, D. C.: War Department, Military Intelligence Division).

What part of Philippine society was most active in the guerrilla movement? There is no doubt that people in all walks of life joined in and that the educated Filipinos furnished in most cases the leadership; but if we consider the accounts of an American civilian and soldiers who helped build the guerrilla organizations in the different parts of the Archipelago, we see that they indicate definitely that the common man was the one most responsible for patriotic deeds during the war. This is but natural since they represent the bulk and substance of the Filipino community as would be true of other countries of the Far East. Mrs. Charlotte Martin, in her manuscript entitled "Two Jumps Ahead of the Japanese," said, with reference to the result of Japanese inquiries about Americans who had just left a Filipino community as the Japanese entered:

No one saw them [Americans] leave the town. That is how the majority of the Filipinos were with us those days and I believe they will always be with us. The Japanese have not a chance to get those people on their side. The common Filipino has a strong sense of right and wrong and they like the Americans and our straightforward way of doing things. . . .⁹⁶

One other account confirmed the fidelity of the Filipino common "tao":

With the lower classes and particularly those who have been befriended by guerrillas [American], there is more loyalty. For example, when an American was trying to contact Fertig in Misamis [Oriental], he was misdirected by every Filipino he questioned and contacted him only by letter. The Filipinos questioned were all

⁹⁶ Charlotte Martin, "Two Jumps Ahead of the Japanese" (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, MSS, War Department).

of the lower class and were loyal to Fertig, the acknowledged guerrilla leader in the area.⁹⁷

Lt. Joseph F. St. John had an explanation, other than his numerical dominance, for the outstanding contribution of the common man to the guerrilla movement. He stated:

The poorer the Filipino the more intense was his devotion to America and his rage against the Japanese. Some of the more prosperous were a little too anxious to preserve their property by not offending the Japanese.⁹⁸

What Gave Impetus to the Resistance Movement?

What gave the Philippine resistance movement its great impetus? There were many causes. There was primarily the sympathy for the Americans which resulted from their presence for more than four decades in the Islands. The Americans, because of their sense of justice and fair dealing, had succeeded in making friends among all classes. Robert and Metta Silliman said of their friends in Negros Oriental:

Most of the people are very, very loyal to America and have been wonderful to us; one dear old Filipino who wears only a "G" string most of the time says that Bob is his "blood brother."⁹⁹

A second reason for the fondness of Filipinos for the Americans

⁹⁷ Report of Glover, D. L. Napolilio, F. A. Offret, E. H. Owens (Washington, D. C.: Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

⁹⁸ Lt. Joseph St. John, as told to Howard Handleman, Leyte Calling (New York: Vanguard Press, 1945).

⁹⁹ Letter of Robert and Metta Silliman to Mr. Jacobs from Negros Oriental, dated April 14, 1943, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

must be attributed to the sound public school system which they had established in the Islands and which paid dividends in the form of loyalty for America and what she stood for. Salipada Pendatun, the Mohammedan datu from Mindanao whose guerrilla activities have been recounted, expressed this clearly at a conference he had with some American soldiers in the process of organizing his guerrilla unit. He said that he had "a debt to the Americans" who had provided him with an education.¹⁰⁰ The now famous incident of Buenaventura J. Bello, a Filipino schoolmaster at Vigan on the far northwestern coast of Luzon, dramatically presents the sense of civic responsibility of a Filipino brought up in the democratic tradition with which Filipino school teachers and children were imbued before the war. This is the story of his heroism:

. . . Downstairs there was a sudden disturbance-- someone tramping pompously up the stairs. Others were following. Six Japanese soldiers suddenly marched in through the office door. War had come to Buenaventura J. Bello. . . .

He sat frozen to his seat. Yes, these were the enemy. He noted that one wore a samurai sabre. . . . The one with the samurai sword was telling him something--Japanese. Then he made a gesture which Bello understood. The Japanese pointed to the two flags on the wall, almost directly behind Bello's back, and jerked his clenched fists down toward the floor.

So! the Japanese wanted him to tear down the American and Philippine flags. He sat bolt upright in his chair. He would tell this creature off in good American English.

"If you want the flags taken down you will do it

¹⁰⁰ Report of Sgt. Leo O'Connor dated January 21, 1944, loc. cit.

yourself," he said. "But not me."

He sat back and folded his hands over his chest in defiance. Now the Japanese knew where he stood.

The Japanese officer pulled out his revolver. Quick but orderly thoughts were marching through Bello's mind. "There are moments in the lives of men when they are impelled to certify with their actions what they believe and what they teach. Such a moment has now arrived in my life. I shall so certify.

"I have taught my school children to defend the flag of their nation and of their mother country. That I will do."

He raised his fists in a defiant gesture, and shook them under the very nose of the glaring invader.

"These hands," he shouted, "are made to defend those flags, and not to pull them down."

"The Japanese reaction was instantaneous. He pulled the trigger and the slug tore into Bello's body."¹⁰¹

Bello survived and the account of the matter is quoted from an interview with him in the official files of the War Department.

Other reasons why the Filipinos sided with the white Americans have been discussed in connection with the failure of Japan's propaganda in the Islands: the traditional tendency of the Filipino to lean towards a democratic government as against the totalitarian state which the Japanese wanted to impose on them; America's promise of independence; and the fact that life under the Americans, in spite of the claim that the natives had become too dependent in their national economy on the Americans, had constantly become more comfortable

¹⁰¹ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 1-2.

and pleasant. Life during the American regime was indeed different from that under the puppet republic! The Japanese ceaselessly reiterated in their propaganda that the Filipinos had grown away from the stern virtues of the simple life, and were greatly in need of the self-discipline which would fit them to assume a proper place in the life of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

This sympathy for the Americans must have been latent but perhaps undeveloped in the average Filipino mind until the actual occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese began. Then this dormant feeling awakened and began to assert itself ever more clearly. The Japanese from the outset did not seem to have understood the Filipino mind. For example, Ohta, Chief of the Japanese Kempei-tai, told the Filipino Chief of Police Torres of Manila that the latter should run the police department in Manila "but we will be in charge." Then he proceeded to place a Japanese staff sergeant in command of Chief Torres, who was himself a Colonel, and appointed a Captain Horikawa as a sort of liaison officer between the Kempei-tai and the unarmed city police.¹⁰²

A high official of the puppet Philippine Republic noticed these discrepancies. In his letter to General T. Wati, head of the Japanese Military Administration in the Islands, dated June 16, 1944, Claro Recto complained:

¹⁰² Ibid., 9.

Most of the towns in the provinces are still actually governed by the commanders of the local Japanese garrisons who are in the majority of cases with only the rank of sergeant and who treat the municipal mayors as their subordinates even to the extent of beating them publicly.

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Moreover, the Japanese required too much homage from their conquered peoples. One guerrilla report claimed:

When the Japanese boarded our boat, they made us kneel on the outrigger while they carried out their inspection. Every now and then a soldier would ask a question of us, and every time one of us raised his head to answer, the soldier struck us with his hand. However, after offering them some of our chickens they permitted us to proceed on our way to Lucena.¹⁰⁴

The Japanese, however, though desirous of impressing upon the Filipinos their superiority, made the latter laugh many a time, in spite of the hardships prevailing in the Islands then. The following is one of the many incidents:

The Japanese soldiers were directed to repetitiously use the English phrase, "Japanese love Filipinos." Unable to handle the "l" in speech (it became an "r") and having great difficulty with "v", it turned out that the Japanese soldiers were going around saying, "Japanese rob Filipinos." The Filipinos would smile and reply, "Soldier, you are telling the truth," and the Japanese felt their idea was a great success.¹⁰⁵

The Filipino's assertion did not seem very far from the

¹⁰³ Copy of the letter of Claro Recto to Lt. Gen. T. Wati dated June 15, 1944, from Manila in the Winifred Pablo O'Connor collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

¹⁰⁴ Report of Lt. Col. Emigdio Cruz to the War Department (Washington, D. C.: Philippine Division, Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

¹⁰⁵ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 14-15.

truth when we consider what the Japanese did when they occupied Iloilo and Cebu, which infinitely overbalanced all the parrot-like jabbering of "Japanese love Filipinos." There is a large amount of such evidence as the following:

. . . They [the Japanese troops] were accompanied by Japanese civilians with their families. The civilians accompanying the troops endeavored to commandeer the business establishments in Iloilo and Cebu and then move in with their families and continue the business as a Japanese enterprise. These tactics were successful in only a few instances.¹⁰⁶

But the greatest incentive to the Philippine guerrilla movement and therefore the most powerful force operating against the success of Japanese propaganda was the atrocities committed by the Japanese, not only at the beginning of their occupation (which they attempted to excuse because of the confusion in the early months already discussed in Chapter IV) but throughout the Japanese occupation and in practically all places in the Archipelago where there were Japanese. A brutal practice of the Japanese particularly in harassing civilians whom they considered the "non-combatant guerrillas" was "zoning." Peter Constan, an American who was interned in the Philippines during the occupation, described it thus:

Suddenly, a cordon of police is thrown around a certain district or barrio and all male adults found within that zone are herded to a place of segregation: a school, a church, or any sort of enclosure. There, they are told that a number of them are known to be guerrillas and that all of them will be held prisoners unless the guerrillas give themselves up. If there were signs of delay, the

¹⁰⁶ Report of Lt. Comdr. Knoll, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

police would proceed to apply various measures of torture until confessions were made. Prisoners were held incommunicado, but sometimes their women folk were permitted to bring them food; while at other times, they were given neither food nor drink. Finally a number of men succumb. As soon as they give themselves up the police subject them to a severe and not altogether humane examination in order to obtain names of other guerrillas or the location of arms. Guerrillas thus obtained were held. The "zone" moves on to the next barrio [village] or district.

In one "zoning" session at Los Banos, which included students and faculty members of the agricultural school, 40 persons confessed, and a quantity of arms and ammunition was found buried in the college grounds. Result: torture of Dean Uichangco and the Assistant Dean of the College. The former had his shoulder dislocated.

In September, 1943, the Emmanuel Hospital in Manila was visited by several military men and a Filipino whose head was covered with a sack, with places cut out for the eyes. The employees at that hospital were made to line up while the masked man identified those connected with the guerrilla activities and USAFFE. Nurses were subjected to rough treatment and several hours' questioning of the hospital authorities demoralized them.¹⁰⁷

Tiaong, Tayabas, was one of the places that suffered from zoning.¹⁰⁸ But the worst "zoning" committed by the Japanese (unless we consider as zoning the systematic wholesale massacres at Manila, Lipa, and other places) was the burning of Guimaras Island near Panay. There, a "bandit zone" was declared and properties of civilians were confiscated. The people themselves were killed by fire--all of them--1,300 men, women and children. The cordon of terror was made and fire left nothing.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Peter Constan, Japanese Activities in the Philippines.

¹⁰⁸ Letter of Claro Recto to Lt. General T. Wati dated June 15, 1944 from Manila.

¹⁰⁹ Report of Lt. Col. Enigdio Cruz, Lt. Comdr. F. L. Worcester, Sgt. Bill Dean, all in the files of the Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

It is not the writer's object to perpetuate stories of atrocities which are not necessarily characteristic of Japanese, but are a blot on our common human nature, but it is necessary to insist that incidents of the most shocking nature occurred, which are well attested, not made up, and not to be waved aside as just "more atrocity stories." The atrocities were genuine, and not only the persons directly touched by them but also everyone who heard of them were shocked into disbelief of Japanese propaganda, whether true or false. It must likewise be realized that in time of crisis personal knowledge of one atrocity makes it easy to believe a hundred or a thousand, and the effect of such belief, as an antidote to favorable propaganda, is quite as great as though the whole were true. It cannot be overemphasized that the actual atrocities committed by the Japanese fanned the fire of resistance, aligned the Filipinos with the Americans, and forced a decision favorable to the Americans in many who had probably never had anti-Japanese prejudice at all. So, disagreeable as they may be, here follows a small selection of atrocity stories, not only true, but essential to the argument.

In Manila, Krumbhaar Herndorn reported:

A Filipino girl, an eye witness, was assaulted and was saved by a friend and the timely arrival of a high Japanese officer. She stated that the Japanese entered their house when her sister had just given birth to a baby four hours previously. They attacked her sister in bed, who screamed, and jumped out of a window, breaking both of her legs. The Japanese, not satisfied with this crime, went down after her, dragged the wounded woman

into the house and raped her there.¹¹⁰

-In Negros Occidental an unusual punishment reminiscent of Mussolini's fascist regime was meted out:

Torres, son of a guerrilla leader, was forced into the service of the Japanese constabulary and brought to Kabankalan. During a routine inspection of another Filipino by the Japanese, a letter addressed to his father by the son [young Torres], wherein he said he was about to make an attempt to join his father's guerrilla forces, was confiscated. Young Torres was given more than a gallon of enema and the entire proceedings were open to the public. . . . Torres received numerous small bayonet jabs, his nose was split and his ears cut. People of the town sang [sic] a mass at the time and pleaded with the Japanese to spare his life, whereupon the Japanese administered first aid treatment and then transferred him to Bacolod.¹¹¹

The following incident would classify the perpetrators among the most barbarous people on earth:

On December 19, 1943, the Japanese struck Camp Tapaz, killing . . . [sixteen Americans]. All except Lt. King and Clardy were protestant missionaries. Clardy's wife was pregnant. The Filipinos informed Clardy of his wife's capture. He and Rounds, who had been securing supplies for the camp turned themselves in to the Japanese. The Japanese ran a bayonet into Clardy's wives' [sic] stomach. Then they first cut the soles and feet off Lt. King before he died. They made a "lechon" roast [roasted pig] out of Dr. Meyer by tying him on a bamboo spit and turning him over a fire and roasting him alive. All the others were killed either by bayonetting or being burned to death.¹¹²

Mindanao was not exempted from Japanese cruelty in spite of the fact that 95 percent of its territory was free from the Japanese forces. Edward Kuder, a former superintendent

¹¹⁰ Report of Krumbhaar Herndorn to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence Division. . . .

¹¹¹ Report of Major Edward F. McLenahan to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence.

¹¹² Report of Pfc. Clarence Beardon and Pvt. Holly Hendrickson to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence Division.

of schools there before the war, and Peter Martin told the story of Fidel:

. . . He was bound to a concrete fence post in front of the school building which was the main Japanese barrack. One strand of barbed wire was placed around his neck and another around his body under the armpits. His captors pulled his arms down over that strand so that the barb wire could cut into his flesh, and tightened another strand around his waist. Still other barbed wires were dug into him at his knees and ankles. . . . He was left there in the sun, and lingered for three days before he died.¹¹³

The natural result of all these widespread Japanese atrocities was fierce hatred for them. Robert Benton Silliman, who was in Negros Oriental during the war, gave the following picture of the native's animosity against the Japanese:

A boat sank close off the coast of Malaconang, southwest Negros, during May, 1943. Survivors all struck out swimming toward Negros' shore. When the natives became aware of what was happening, the fishermen jumped into the boats and paddled out to where the Japanese were swimming. They attacked them with bolos, killing many of them in the water. The Filipino women stood on the beach and acted as a cheering section for their husbands.¹¹⁴

Of the fate of the Japanese who survived this unexpected warfare, Dr. Arthur Carson, president of Silliman University, who stayed in that island (Negros) during the war, continued:

One of the guerrillas told Bell that one of the survivors had been confined in his custody. People approached his guards, begging them to turn the survivor loose. One woman who had lost a son on Bataan was carrying a dagger. She pleaded with the guard to let her get at the prisoner, promising that she would make only one small hole in him.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Edward Kuder and Pete Martin, The Philippines Never Surrendered, loc. cit.

¹¹⁴ Report of Robert Benton Silliman, loc. cit.

¹¹⁵ Report of Dr. Arthur Carson, loc. cit.

Animosity because of atrocities committed against their people must have been the reason for spectacular heroic deeds by some Filipinos. One story of bravery and ingenuity is related of a Filipino woman, Maria Fernandez, who managed to get food and money to the 500 Americans on the isolated island of Corregidor where the prisoners were being used to haul guns and scrap iron to the docks for shipment to Tokyo. The prisoners called her the "pipe line to Corregidor" and wondered how she got boats to make the secret rendezvous on the island.¹¹⁶

From Mindanao, Kuder recounted the following valiant exploit of a Filipino:

The Japanese were fond of the native markets, for in them they could buy fresh fruit and spot likely girls. As a precaution, they stuck together in a group, and every other man carried his gun. The people seemed afraid of them. The vendors pretended not to understand them, and the Japanese found it hard to make purchases. A young Filipino, dressed like a common farmer, struck up an acquaintance with them and acted as their Cicerone. After that, they seemed to get things more easily. He made signs to them that he could get them native drinks, laughed and looked at them inquiringly. The Japanese looked eager. He made them show him how much money they had, and appeared satisfied with the amount. They followed him, grinning in anticipation.

Just outside of the market, where a dirt road passed some clumps of bamboo, he stopped as if in doubt and looked once more at the money. As he handed back the last purse, they were stupefied to see him running away at top speed. Some roundish objects plopped at their feet behind the bamboo. As they looked down, grenades lying in the dust killed eleven of them.¹¹⁷

Another heroic feat was achieved by Lt. Col. Emigdio Cruz,

¹¹⁶ "Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," 24.

¹¹⁷ Edward Kuder and Pete Martin, loc. cit.

a veteran of Bataan who came to the United States with the presidential party of Manuel Quezon. In order to get first hand information about conditions in the Islands, and to collect other intelligence data, he offered to go by submarine and enter Japanese occupied Philippines. From Washington, D. C., where he started the trip, he sailed for Australia; arrived by submarine on Negros Island and proceeded to Southern Luzon by boat. In this last trip of his, he posed as a merchant. He succeeded in reaching Manila and even talked there with Manuel Roxas and other Filipino leaders, then returned to Washington, D. C., unscathed. This is the only instance known to the writer of anyone from the outside world who reached Manila and got out of it safe and whole.¹¹⁸ The heartening effect on the loyal leaders of such an exploit cannot fail to have been great, and in view of slurs that have been cast at President Roxas on the ground of collaboration with the enemy, it is reassuring to have such incontrovertible evidence of where his sympathies lay.

Unfavorable Propaganda Resulted from Guerrilla Abuses

In order to evaluate properly the resistance movement in the Islands from the standpoint of its neutralization of Japanese propaganda, we must determine what were its bad features as well

¹¹⁸ Interview with Lt. Col. Emigdio Cruz, in the Pacific Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.; likewise, his written report to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence Division.

as its good. The bad aspects mitigated the good, and they were so obvious in some few localities as to strengthen the Japanese position. There is no doubt that there were lawless units which called themselves guerrillas, as well as lawless individuals in some guerrilla units which were dominantly well disciplined, law-abiding, and patriotic. Bad elements, seeking personal gain or mere adventure, get into the best organizations, and the guerrilla companies were no exception. Residents of certain Philippine towns alleged that they would have been better off with the Japanese alone than with the brigands who glorified themselves as guerrillas. This was true in a province in the eastern part of the island of Luzon.¹¹⁹ An American guerrilla said:

Every relative he [the leader] had was made an officer and he made himself a General. . . . He used to round up young girls in the town, taking them into the mountains, raping them, and sending them home; forcing the people to give him money, and robbing municipalities.¹²⁰

In Negros Oriental, another reporter had this to say of a small guerrilla set-up:

A constabulary clerk . . . who was stationed at Dumaguete before the war organized a group of bandits who preyed on the people. . . . [He] executed 17 Filipinos, one of whom he burned at stake for refusing to turn over his fighting rooster to him.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Report of Cpl. Gottlieb G. Neigum to the War Department in the files of the Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Report of William Leland Archer to the War Department in the files of the Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division.

In Leyte, a semi-lawless unit headed by a couple who called themselves "Joan of Arc" and "Major X" existed. Of this couple, Mrs. Charlotte Martin said:

She once ordered a dance given and issued a proclamation that all young girls and matrons had to attend. One young woman did not attend--the next day she sent for this woman and had her strung up by her heels and let her hang that way with her head down for twelve hours. . . . One day "Major X" shot a man in the market place, but before the man died he shot him and got "Major X" through the hip.¹²²

Mindanao had unruly guerrillas too. An American mestizo was said to have required people in what he called "his territory" to pay him a certain amount every month, either in money or in produce in return for protection against other guerrilla bands and from the Japanese. He issued long written proclamations, announcing that he would settle all disputes in the future on the coast.¹²³

Aside from guerrilla abuses, extending to actual banditry, there was a concentration camp in the Island of Negros where the guerrilla leader's enemies and some "desirable" women were imprisoned. One guerrilla reported that a particular leader showed his genial hospitality to his fellow guerrilla leaders by offering them a particularly unattractive blonde from his camp.¹²⁴ At least three guerrilla unit leaders had criminal

¹²² Charlotte Martin, *op. cit.*, 173.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Interview with Captain Augusto Gutierrez, Chief of Staff of Lt. Col. Liserio Lopus, who went back and forth to Negros and Panay during the occupation.

records before the war.

Some possibly mitigating circumstances should, however, be considered in judging the guerrilla units implicated in these abuses. Existence was precarious and most of the guerrilleros led unnatural lives in the mountains. Likewise, it was only natural that guerrilla organizations would attract men with criminal records, as well as the daring and the reckless. Furthermore, brave leaders with the most honorable motives, who lacked that experience in commanding men which regular officers have, did not necessarily prove to be good disciplinarians. In some instances essentially good guerrilla leaders had insufficient control over their men. Even the wild and undisciplined bands, however, had something to their credit in common with the regularly organized and properly disciplined guerrilla units--like them, they harassed the common enemy wherever they could.

Within the recognized guerrilla organizations themselves there was a certain amount of internecine warfare. Filipino leaders fought against each other, just as Americans in the different units were equally guilty of the same fault. To top it all, there were instances of friction between Filipino and American guerrillas.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ See the reports of Cpl. Michael Amrich, William Leland Archer, Pfc. Clarence Beardon and Pvt. Holly Henderson, Alfred Y. Brasher, Fr. James Haggerty, Charles W. Hickock, Robert T. Johnston, Pfc. Aldo P. Maccagli, Edward McLenahan, Col. John H. McGee, Major Jesus Villamor and Major A. Whitehead, in the files of the Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

But to dwell disproportionately on these abuses, which were the exception rather than the rule in the Philippine guerrilla movement, is to lose proper perspective in viewing the whole. After considering a large number of reports on guerrilla activities, the writer was left with the conviction that the favorable effect of guerrilla activities was very far greater as a neutralizer of Japanese propaganda than contrary, and that only exceptionally was the balance unfavorable. The exceptional instances grew out of the fact that naturally lawless, undisciplined and criminal elements such as exist at all times in all countries, took refuge under the cloak of the guerrillas. They lacked proper motivation, and a few of them to this day continue the career of banditry and insubordination which they entered as false patriots.

Now let us look more in detail at the good side of the guerrilla movement.

Favorable Propaganda Grew Out of Well Administered
Guerrilla Activities

One of the best achievements was the restoration of law and order by setting up of civil governments so that life for the civilians in guerrilla areas could be as normal as possible. Speaking of Panay Island, Father Patrick A. Magnier said:

After the Japanese invasion, armed Filipinos outside the occupied territories did much looting and shooting. At that time, guerrilla resistance was not organized, and there was no restraint on bandits. Within about six

months, however, the guerrillas gained enough strength to maintain order and since that time, there has been better law and order in unoccupied areas than in Japanese occupied areas of Panay.¹²⁶

On the establishment of civil governments after law and order was maintained by guerrillas, George Wesley Winget offered the following information about Misamis Oriental:

I swore in mayors and other municipal officials, told them what was wanted [of them] and how they were to run their government--as near as possible as that in peace time. . . .¹²⁷

The civil governments established by the guerrillas had specific functions to perform. Some mayors in Misamis Oriental put back into effect their "pahina" (compulsory labor for public works) system to fix the roads and build bridges. To solve transportation difficulties in Misamis Oriental, particularly in the town of Gingoog, the mayors called all banca (small native boats) owners to register their bancas with the municipal government. The civilians also paid a small tax, as was customary in peace time and this provided a fund for the indispensable expenses in moving troops.¹²⁸

Likewise, some of these areas were made self-sustaining in every respect. Food production was greatly encouraged, especially in areas unoccupied by the Japanese. Farm projects

¹²⁶ Report of Fr. Patrick A. Magnier, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division. . . .

¹²⁷ Report of George Wesley Winget, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹²⁸ Report of George Wesley Winget, loc. cit.

were organized¹²⁹ and irrigation was put in for particular rice fields.¹³⁰ The civilian natives carried their valuable food contributions on their backs to the armed forces in Misamis Oriental and they were given a receipt for every item brought.¹³¹ In Surigao province, the civilians sold army food for the guerrillas and as a result, some monetary system was necessary.¹³² It was provided, in the form of guerrilla currency. Medicine was collected as in Davao and Cagayan, where Chinchona bark (from Bukidnon) was pulverized to substitute for quinine.¹³³

Clothing was also manufactured from hemp and ramie in Surigao¹³⁴ and in the Agusan province.¹³⁵ Other necessities which were manufactured were shoes,¹³⁶ soap, sugar,¹³⁷ and

¹²⁹ Report of Lt. Edward McIntyre, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹³⁰ Report of Major Mihiel Doverbich, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹³¹ George Wesley Winget, loc. cit.

¹³² Report of William Dyess, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹³³ Report of Major Mihiel Doverbich, loc. cit.; T/Sgt. Tracy S. Tucker's report in the Military Intelligence files, War Department.

¹³⁴ Op. cit.

¹³⁵ Report of Lt. Edward McIntyre, loc. cit.

¹³⁶ Report of Mihiel Doverbich, loc. cit.

¹³⁷ George Wesley Winget, loc. cit.

salt.¹³⁸

Aside from providing these necessities, local products were substituted for imported war materials. In the province of Surigao, alcohol was obtained from "tuba" (fermented coconut sap), fuel was produced from coconut oil for the running of diesel motors, trucks, generators and launches.¹³⁹ In Cagayan de Misamis, home-made weapons such as dynamite packed in a pineapple can become a grenade. A home-made mortar from a three-inch galvanized pipe with a home-made breech and three home-made shells were also used to fight the enemy. Bamboo traps from the people of Bukidnon stopped Japanese patrols from entering deep into the hills.¹⁴⁰ Ingenuity was an indispensable asset in the production of these substitutes which the guerrilleros effectively used in their struggle against the enemy who had modern implements.

With these crude implements at the beginning, some guerrilla units learned how to ambush and to kill many Japanese with little loss to themselves.¹⁴¹ These successes raised the morale of the people in their areas. In the towns of

¹³⁸ Report of Mihiel Doverbich, loc. cit.

¹³⁹ Report of William Dyess, loc. cit.

¹⁴⁰ Report of Maj. Halbert E. Woodruff, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹⁴¹ Report of Chick Parsons, Jesus Villamor, and Howard Tom Chrisco in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

Tagloan and Sta. Ana, Mindanao, Alfred Fernandez told of one such encounter:

In June, 1943, we fought on the river and killed about 50. From then until May, 1944, we killed about 1,000. On May 1, 1944, we killed ten. . . . Then we received an order from the regimental commander to invade Tagloan while the Japanese were attacking the division and district. On the 12th we went in. We killed many and lost no men. . . .¹⁴²

Another guerrilla contribution to the return of Americans to the Philippines was the building of new airports. Lt. Col. William Dyess, himself an ace pilot, described this activity in Mindanao:

Some of the best work the guerrillas are doing is building new airports under the disguise of camote patches, rice fields, etc. for the use of the Americans when they are needed. Maramag and Valencia fields are still in the hands of the guerrillas and ready to receive our airplanes with[in] a 24 hour notice. . . . In addition to this, two new fields are being built near Lala, Lanao.¹⁴³

The voluminous intelligence reports from the Panay guerrillas are by now sufficiently cited and need no repetition. Other places in the Islands sent their own G-2 reports. An interesting spy system was described by Major Charles Folsom thus: "We had spies in every government office [in Manila], including Fort Santiago, the Japanese military headquarters...."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Report of Alfred Fernandez dated February 17, 1945, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹⁴³ Report of William Dyess, loc. cit.

¹⁴⁴ Major Charles Folsom, loc. cit.

The help given by the guerrillas to American prisoners of war, civilians, and fliers shot down in the different areas has already been mentioned. The miserable fate of the prisoners in the Iwahig Penal Colony was often alleviated by supplies from near-by guerrillas who brought cigarettes, foods, and other necessities.¹⁴⁵ One of these prisoners who later escaped was Lt. Col. William Dyess, who first informed the world of the "Death March" (in which he also participated). Dyess described the help given to him and his companions by the Palawan guerrillas when they escaped:

. . . Eighty-three Japanese were sent in pursuit. A guerrilla unit intercepted them and a fierce fight resulted. We heard the fight and travelled in that direction to get out of the swamp.¹⁴⁶

Many American prisoners en route to another camp in Japan whose ship was torpedoed near Zamboanga also owe their lives to Philippine guerrillas. Lt. Col. Harry O. Fischer said about the aid extended to them:

Escapees from the torpedoed ship reached shore singly and in small groups, some of them remaining in the water until dark and others hiding behind corral formations to avoid Japanese fire. Fischer, Captain Morrell and Master Sergeant Robinett met shortly after reaching the shore and hid together in the foliage. They had no idea where they were but were soon contacted by Filipino civilians carrying American carbines. These Filipinos were members of the Volunteer Guard who carried on coast watching activities for Filipino guerrillas. They were told they were near the town of Liloy, about 100 kilometers from Zamboanga. . . . Several survivors from the boat were brought in,

¹⁴⁵ Report of Alfred Cobb, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹⁴⁶ Report of Lt. Col. William Dyess, loc. cit.

some badly wounded. The Filipinos showered them with food and even took off their own clothes to clothe naked escapees.¹⁴⁷

American fliers who were shot down during the preparatory bombing of the Islands were likewise given all sorts of assistance by the guerrillas. Earle Steele was one of those who found himself in such a predicament on Luzon on September 21, 1944. He landed on Lake Taal and was brought by the guerrillas to Alaminos, Laguna, where he met Lt. Lamb and Pvt. House. According to him, both these men were escorted by Vicente Umali who travelled with them for a month, always moving on horseback to avoid detection and to reach Major Smith's headquarters, which had communication facilities with Australia.¹⁴⁸

America's offensive on Leyte on October 20, 1944, marked the beginning of the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese invaders.¹⁴⁹ Within a few hours after the landings, General MacArthur stepped ashore at Red Beach, Leyte, and using a portable radio station on an amphibious landing vehicle, made this broadcast to the Filipino people: "I have returned-- rally to me. Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the line of battle rolls forward to bring you within the zone of operation, rise and strike."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Report of Lt. Col. Harry O. Fischer, in the files of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

¹⁴⁸ Report of Earle E. Steele, loc. cit.

¹⁴⁹ "The Return: Total Victory," in Triumph in the Philippines, IV, 12.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 12.

General MacArthur's headquarters had of course alerted the guerrilla units scattered throughout the Islands that the invasion was on. Demolition work had been done a few days earlier, intelligence data had been provided concerning the enemies' most recent movements and new recruits were alerted to join the fight or to finish it, as the case might be.¹⁵¹

While guerrilla units were joining the fight in the zone of operation, the intrepid rescue of American prisoners of war at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, Sto. Tomas and Los Banos Internment camps were brought about with the aid and close cooperation of other Filipino guerrillas.¹⁵²

The activities of the disciplined and patriotic guerrillas which we have just referred to were not the only ones which served as a source of favorable propaganda for America in the Archipelago. The Philippine guerrillas themselves disseminated propaganda on their own account. Part of this was American propaganda, received by radio and submarine, and relayed largely by word of mouth, but the other part of it, and an important part, was their own reply to the Japanese propaganda.

Guerrilla Propaganda

In answer to Japan's propaganda concerning American economic abuses in the Philippines, one guerrilla article pointed out Japan's own:

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 78-84.

¹⁵² Ibid., 54; Washington Post, February 25, 1945, 1.

Every cereal, every edible fruit, vegetable, or animal we grew had first to satisfy the Japanese military requirements . . . and in the Philippines where yesterday none died of starvation, thousands dropped dead daily, their only illness being lack of food.¹⁵³

On the other hand, to Japan's claim of her economic wealth and her love for the Filipinos, the same article retorted:

. . . [Japan] has plundered us of our wealth. She has monopolized and exploited our major industries. She has looted our gold, our copper, our manganese, and other mines. She had taken over our shipyards, our machine manufacturing and repair factories--our "Butanol" factories, our sugar mills and public utilities. She has confiscated our ships and our railroads, both steam and electric. She controls our harbors and our ports. And she has requisitioned even our trucks, our autos, our carretelas [horse drawn vehicles], our dokars, our carts and brought about disastrous inflation.¹⁵⁴

Likewise, while the Japanese praised the efficiency of their totalitarian form of government, the guerrillas bewailed the loss of individual liberty which the Filipinos greatly cherished:

Nor was Japan content with robbing us of our wealth: no, she must also strip us of our rights and our liberties. . . . today, no one can rest in his own house without a gnawing fear that for no reason at all the military police would invade it in the dead of the night, beat him and his family, rummage through his private effects, and then whisk him away to Fort Santiago [known for the inhuman punishments meted out there] . . . without a warrant, without even telling him why, . . . Today none of us can call our homes our own; if its appearance catches the eye of an officer, we find ourselves in the streets. We had the right to privacy of communication and correspondence; today . . . our every letter is opened and carefully scrutinized by censors. We had the right to form political

¹⁵³ Freedom (Panay), January 24, 1945, 2. From Winifred O'Connor Pablo Collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 25-26.

association . . . ; today we must belong either to the Kalibapi or to the Makapili [an association of the most rabid pro-Japanese Filipinos who spied on their own countrymen]. We had the complete separation of church and state--today, the state tells our preachers what to preach and the Japanese Army converts our churches into barracks. . . . We had freedom of speech and of the press--today, even in private conversation, we can not speak of what interests us most--the war--without fear of being held for "spreading false rumors." We had the right peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances--today, we can not even gather into groups of four without special permission, we can parade only when the government organizes the parade and we can only air the grievances we have against Filipinos--not against the Empire of Japan. We had the right to freedom from involuntary servitude--today we must work, whether we like it or not, on Japanese military installations. We had the right to be assumed innocent of every crime, until the contrary was proven; to be heard, to be informed of the accusations against us, and to have a speedy trial, to meet witnesses face to face, and to compel attendance of witnesses. Today, we are presumed guilty until we prove our innocence, there is even no pretense of a hearing. . . . We had the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments--today, we have the water cure, the plucking of finger nails, the burning of armpits and of private parts. We had the right to the equal protection of the laws; today, the Japanese citizens are immune from our judicial processes.¹⁵⁵

To Japan's demand that the Filipinos should emulate her superior culture by completely returning to the Oriental fold, the guerrillas countercharged that:

Before the Japanese came to "purify" our culture, we Filipinos were an honest, God-fearing, law-abiding people; and our women were the purest in the East. After the Japanese had rejuvenated us, we learned by her example to steal, to lie, to rob, and to cheat, and more and more our women walk the streets.¹⁵⁶

And while the Japanese were imposing their superior airs and customs on the Islanders, the guerrillas made a joke of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 25-27.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 31.

it thus:

Sirs: I always bow before any dog I see in the street. Why? Well, because I am democratic. I believe in the equality of all animals, whether four legged or just plain bow-legged.¹⁵⁷

To impress upon the people the fact that the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic was a farce, the guerrilla leaders questioned the collaborators on the subject openly. In an interview between Paulino Santos, the Commissioner of Mindanao under the puppet Republic and Salipada Pendatun, which was published (unfortunately for the invaders) in the Japanese-controlled Manila Tribune, Pendatun questioned:

"Why did the Japanese forces not leave the Philippines after the grant of independence as they promised?" . . .

"Why do the Japanese forces put the Filipino people under forced labor?"

"Why are the Filipinos required by the Japanese to volunteer for the Constabulary [a national police force which the Japanese tried to expand after the establishment of the puppet republic] although it's none of their business after they granted us independence?"¹⁵⁸

Another guerrilla writer ridiculed the agencies which the puppet Republic created one after the other to solve the growing complete economic collapse of the Islands and ascribed the cause of the peoples' suffering to the Japanese when he stated:

and so the "Biba" and the "Gunkanri Beikoku" were amalgamated into the RICCOA, ostensibly to feed the starving Filipino people, but actually to supply the Japanese Army.

The "RICCOA" today is actually the Quartermaster

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 41.

¹⁵⁸ Manila Tribune, April 22, 1944, 1.

Division of the Japanese Army. The fiction of an amalgamation is only being maintained to deceive farmers of Central Luzon. . . . Farmers believe that the rice bought by the "RICCOA" would go to the starving populace of Manila and other provinces.¹⁵⁹

While the Japanese painted a beautiful picture of what Asia and the Philippines would be like under their Utopia, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Filipino resistance pointed out the miseries which had existed since the arrival of the Japanese. A guerrilla columnist who signed himself as Tomas Juvenal said in his column, "Casual Entries":

Hunger: I saw a skeletal figure steadying himself at the iron gates of a rich Japanese merchant while begging for food. . . . More and more dead bodies found on the Manila sidewalks. . . . An ever increasing number of boys and girls dressed in rags walk the streets with outstretched palms begging for "rice, please, rice!"¹⁶⁰

To Japan's contention that resistance was futile for it only meant more suffering and the loss of more Filipino lives, we have already cited Tomas Confesor's classic answer. And to the claim that the Americans would never return to redeem the Philippines, the guerrillas issued leaflets and newspapers which contained optimistic predictions based upon radio broadcasts from San Francisco. The latter told about the Pacific war and MacArthur's progress in his island-to-island hopping. Pendatun also posed this question to dispel the doubt in the people's mind about America's return:

Why are the Japanese forces strengthening the defenses

¹⁵⁹ Freedom (Panay), January 24, 1945, 34-39.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 8.

of Mindanao if they are not expecting anti-Axis forces soon to invade the islands?¹⁶¹

What propaganda media were used by the Philippine guerrillas in their battle of words with the enemy? We have already referred to leaflets, magazines, and newspapers. The Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, Philippine Research and Information Section in the Southwest Pacific Area, noted down 37 such news organs issued by the Philippine resistance members during the occupation. Manila guerrillas led with seven such organs, followed closely by six from Panay. Leyte ranked third with four and Negros Island had two publications. The following provinces had at least one each according to the same research office: Bohol, Cebu, North Luzon Provinces, Samar and Tayabas. Twelve other organs did not indicate a place of origin. Of these printed materials, the Philippine Research and Information Section had this to day:

Guerrilla newspapers listed below have [The list is here omitted.] a limited historical value in terms of content. Many were unable to do more than publish radio news from Allied sources although a few give some details of the local guerrilla activities and the history of their organizations. Most of the publications reflect the acute shortage of paper during the period, being published on the reverse side of copies of government notices and stationary. It will be noted that these publications vary from sporadic, spontaneous ventures, usually anonymous, to official organs of established and recognized groups, which published the names of their responsible officials. The latter were usually mimeographed (a few even printed) but among the former were typewritten news sheets and some pen and ink offerings, passed from hand to hand. Only a few issues of each paper are available.

¹⁶¹ Manila Tribune, April 22, 1944, 1.

In addition to newspapers, a continuous flow of guerilla counter-propaganda in leaflet form supplemented the more regular publications. These consisted of typewritten and mimeographed flyers of pro-Allied interpretations of the war, condemnations of "traitorous collaborators" and appeals for faith in an American return.¹⁶²

The Philippine guerrillas acquired their war news by listening to broadcasting stations from the United States, the most popular of which was KGEI station in San Francisco.¹⁶³ Broadcasts from the States often reached the Islands at about five o'clock in the afternoon.¹⁶⁴ How the guerrillas gathered news from American news broadcasts was told by Fred Warner:

All stenographers were unemployed, so, whenever a radio was operated, news was accurately taken down, typed and sent to all parts of the Island. Stenographers often worked in relays.

I wish I had a picture of groups listening to the news. Sometimes we sat in comfortable salas [living rooms]; sometimes we crept through cornfields; other times we listened in little grass huts with part of the audience crowding around outside. And we were a motley bunch--barefooted (even Americans had no shoes), ragged, some wearing clothes made of rice sacks, others with short pants and no shirts--educated, half-educated, uneducated. The announcer would close with "Mabuhay ang Filipinas" [Long live the Philippines] and we answered "Mabuhay."¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² An annotated list of the literature published in or about the Philippines during the Japanese occupation (Australia: Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, Philippine Research and Information Section, GHQ, AIPAC, APO 500, October 15, 1945), 29.

¹⁶³ Report of Homer Mann, loc. cit.

¹⁶⁴ Report of Sgt. Floyd Reynolds and Pvt. Joseph Jensen on Negros Guerrillas (Washington, D. C.: Philippine Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department).

¹⁶⁵ Report of Fred Warner to the War Department in the files of the Military Intelligence Division.

Aside from the printed matter we have just discussed, the guerrillas had broadcasted words of encouragement to their fellow Filipinos as early as May, 1942, and even answered speeches of Japanese officials in Manila. One such broadcaster called himself "Juan de la Cruz." Filipinos who came to the United States from the Islands after the liberation told the writer that these broadcasts were made in the vicinity of Manila by two young high school students who were later caught and executed by the Japanese. The following is an excerpt of such a broadcast which must have been intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission. It said:

To You Hayashi--you referred in your victory speech last May 18, 1942 about the "utterly futile resistance" of the Fil-American Forces. We do not think our resistance is futile, for this is significant in our history. We do not believe in giving up anything in war without a fight even if we know we are foredoomed. The Fil-American resistance may have caused us tremendous sacrifices Hayashi, but we know we have to sacrifice; it is our duty to sacrifice. We have our burden to carry with the Americans--that burden is the defense of our fundamental institutions of freedom, democracy and independence which you Japanese savages are out to destroy. We will fight for America because America is Democracy itself--and the Filipino way is the democratic way. . . . "The Voice of Juan de la Cruz."¹⁶⁶

One more guerrilla vehicle was public speeches. Charlotte Martin described one of them in a free area:

After the play the mayor got up to make a speech. He told the people first that they could believe the rumors about the arrival of a submarine--that MacArthur had not forgotten us--that he was now sending us ammunition, guns,

¹⁶⁶ Copy of this broadcast is in the files of the Philippine Division, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

and medicine. He told them that they must not lose faith in the mother country--the great country that loved liberty and freedom--America.¹⁶⁷

Other propaganda media used by the guerrillas were letters, imported American goods, and schools. The most important letter which was circulated practically in all parts of the Islands during this period under consideration was that of Tomas Confesor, to which we have already referred.¹⁶⁸ At least two areas in the Philippines, moreover, continued their schools. These were Negros Oriental, in the guerrilla area headed by Major Abcede and Henry Roy Bell. Here, 100 schools were reopened.¹⁶⁹ The other area was under Salipada Pendatun. Of the opening of schools there, Sgt. Leo A. O'Connor stated:

Salipada has a great appreciation for education and one and one-half months after he organized, he had all the schools in his area opened. They are still open and the teachers still teaching. . . .¹⁷⁰

But the most exciting and tangible propaganda media within the grasp of guerrillas at the time were the American supplies which reached them by submarine. William Leland Archer recounted Delegate Pardisis' propaganda stunt in the Japanese sponsored constitutional convention in Manila:

Pardisis was sent to Manila to attend the constitutional convention. Prior to his departure, he informed

¹⁶⁷ Charlotte Martin, op. cit.

¹⁶⁸ Peter Constan, loc. cit.

¹⁶⁹ Henry Roy Bell's report, loc. cit.

¹⁷⁰ Report of Sgt. Leo A. O'Connor, loc. cit.

guerrillas [about it] and asked them to furnish him with evidence in the way of magazines or any other article carrying recent dates which he could use when the opportunity came to convince Filipino legislators in Manila that Americans were not forgetting Filipinos. Archer supplied Pardisis with an Esquire Magazine dated April 1, 1943. Others furnished him with adhesive tape reels dated July 1, 1943. During the convention, when the Japanese were not present, Pardisis exhibited the magazine and the reels, explaining the situation with [to] other legislators. He told Archer on his return that they were all very excited when he exhibited the items.¹⁷¹

There is little doubt that the Philippine guerrilla movement did not only nullify Japan's propaganda during the latter's occupation there, but it achieved more than this--it awakened the latent fondness of the Filipinos for their former mother country and for the democratic way of life she represented. When the Americans reached Manila, the people's joy was boundless. An American reporter who saw this welcome could not help but call it a pathetic entry:

Filipinos came out of their unpainted and run-down houses with pitchers of cold water. Others offered us Japanese cigarettes. Many called, "How are you? Are you all right?" Imagine them asking us! These people have had to face overwhelming prices--they have been starving and they show it.¹⁷²

General MacArthur, on the other hand, tried as soon as possible to give assurances to the loyal Filipinos. On February 27, 1945, he declared at a ceremony which celebrated his entrance to Manila:

¹⁷¹ Report of William Leland Archer in the files of the Military Intelligence Division. . . .

¹⁷² New York Times, February 5, 1945, 1.

On behalf of my government, I solemnly declare, Mr. President, the full powers and responsibilities under the constitution restored to the Commonwealth, whose seat is here re-established as provided by law.

Your country thus is again at liberty to pursue its destiny to an honored position in a family of free nations.¹⁷³

By way of a summary of the Philippine guerrilla resistance movement, ex-President Sergio Osmena's analysis of it seems to the writer the most appropriate:

It would be an error . . . to believe that the struggle was limited to the sphere of action of the guerrilleros. The fountain springs were wider and deeper. They were in reality the people's army. For this reason, the enemy, inherently despotic and cruel, laid violent hands on the people. But in spite of his repressive measures, resistance persisted all over the country--on the plains as in the mountains, in the popular centers as in the remote barrios, in the northernmost island, in the southernmost tip of the country. It was the common will of the people; it was the entire nation, resolved to oppose at any cost, domination by the invader.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Official Gazette (Manila: Bureau of Printing), March, 1945, 86-87.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 92-98.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The background for Japanese occupation of the Philippines was created, as we have seen, by economic penetration and actual beginning of colonization, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by propaganda that was at first more or less unorganized, but which grew during the decade preceding the occupation into a persistent and sedulously intensified effort. The effect of the economic penetration was in the main adverse to the propaganda, and the effectiveness of the latter was to be determined only in the light of now historic events toward which Japan had bent her course. Japan had doubtless given up hope that the Philippines would prove to be a push-over, but hoped for a great effectiveness of her propaganda when active resistance had broken down. As a matter of fact, the continuation of guerrilla effort throughout the occupation period never gave the subjugated Filipinos a chance to favor Japan against the United States without disloyalty to their own brothers who were still maintaining resistance in the mountains.

Nevertheless, the degree of effectiveness of Japanese propaganda in the Philippines after the invasion has to be considered separately from the actual invasion period, especially the propaganda applied to the battlefield of Bataan.

At Bataan, Japan's propaganda was not completely ineffective, especially at the outset. Leaflets and radio broadcasts

were the most widely used propaganda media then. The principal propaganda lines disseminated at Bataan were: (1) Appeal for the individual or group surrender of both American and Filipino soldiers. This, the Japanese hoped to achieve by pretending to give the Americans their sympathy because the latter had to fight on foreign soil, far away from the comfort of home, and by constantly reminding the Filipinos of their unnecessary separation from their families to which they were closely attached. (2) Futility of further resistance since the Fil-Americans were unprepared and had no supplies to fight a long drawn out war against the well provisioned and powerful Japanese Army. (3) America's materialistic policy in the Archipelago was pointed out, in the hope that the Filipinos would come to hate their American comrades. (4) Instances of American racial discrimination at Bataan were always publicized and expanded, with the plea that the Filipinos, their brother Orientals, should kill their white officers and cross the line to join the Japanese side.

An analysis reveals the fact that Japan's propaganda at Bataan was not as naive and as devoid of value as some writers would have us believe. It was subtle, psychologically sound, and it revealed a complete knowledge of the hopeless conditions obtaining there. The effectiveness of these Japanese claims, though limited, was proved by the surrender of some soldiers who crossed the lines with their surrender tickets, which were constantly dropped over the defenders' positions. But herein

lay the weakness of Japan's claims: many of those who capitulated to the enemy were found perfidiously slain and those who saw what happened to their unfortunate comrades decided to fight to the bitter end. Likewise, most of the Filipinos and Americans became true and loyal comrades through gradual realization that both shed the same red blood and met the same fate in battle.

Japan's propaganda during her more than three years' occupation of the Archipelago was part of the comprehensive scheme and a direct continuation of the pre-war program. Among the media utilized were posters, handbills, pamphlets, postage stamps, official journals, newspapers, magazines and photographs. There were also war bulletins, movies, radios and public speeches. Even social institutions such as the churches and schools were employed for propaganda purposes. Lastly, two Japanese sponsored associations, the Kalibapi and the Neighborhood Associations, were organized to indoctrinate the Islanders in the gospel of Japan.

The Japanese made use of a variety of techniques: they changed American named streets and bridges, consecrated tombstones of their heroes, returned government corporations to the puppet Philippine Republic, granted gifts to the people, organized conventions and conferences as an evidence of their recognition of democratic procedures, and finally, they instituted among the Filipinos compulsory celebrations such as parades, ceremonies and rallies. The latter were to convince

the Filipinos that they were actually participating in a mass movement favorable to Japan. The Japanese hoped that group participation in such affairs would get the Filipinos trained to behave like sheep. The two grandiose examples of Japanese propaganda wherein all sorts of media and techniques were used were the pacification and the Japanese sponsored independence movements.

Japanese media and techniques during the occupation were not without potentialities. Aside from handbills, posters, stamps, newspapers, and public addresses which must have reached the greatest number of Filipinos, it is not amiss to say that the schools and the Kalibapi were the most potentially dangerous media utilized. In a period of ten to fifteen years, the entire social fabric of the Philippines could have been permeated with the conquerors' ideologies through these social institutions.

The Japanese also revealed a knowledge of some pre-existing attitudes and prejudices in the Philippines which they tried to exploit to the fullest to make the natives side with them. They never failed to appeal directly to the emotions of the Filipinos and for this reason, the Japanese were rhetorical, repetitious, dramatic, and sentimental in their approach. And on top of everything, they saw to it that their media and techniques were adapted to and aimed at each class of Filipinos whom they intended to convince. They used a particular type of propaganda for residents of Manila and another for those of

the outlying districts.

What were Japan's propaganda lines during the occupation? Her new gospel, which she hoped would be whole-heartedly accepted by the Filipinos, was propagandized along five general lines, namely: (1) Creation or intensification of prejudice against the Anglo-American countries, particularly the United States, considered by Japan to be her chief enemy in the Far East. (2) Glorification of something vaguely referred to as Oriental culture, which Japan said, was really superior to that of her enemies from the West, and more suited to all Orientals. Subtle or not-so-subtle intimation that Japan should be accepted as the spiritual leader of all Asia. (3) The presentation of the puppet Philippine Republic in the best light. (4) The endeavor to make the Islanders sincerely embrace the idea of a Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere--the Oriental Utopia in which Japan dreamed of uniting all the countries of East Asia. Their populations, comprising one-fourth of the people of the whole world, would be developed into a super state under her leadership. (5) An effort to convince the Filipinos that America could not return to liberate the Philippines, and that, since the American cause was lost, it would therefore be easier and wiser for the Filipinos to give up resisting Japan and to cooperate with her.

Of these propagand^a lines, it is the writer's belief that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity line, if it had been sincere, might have appealed to every right-thinking Filipino and

for that matter, to any realistic Asiatic. This Utopia which Japan proposed could have resulted in the mutual advantage of all countries of East Asia. But Japan's Greater East Asia conception failed to attract Filipinos because of the essentially dishonest motive, insufficiently hidden behind its conception: because Japan was trying to enslave the Filipinos and to exploit the natural resources of the Philippines for the realization of an audacious scheme of world conquest.

A loose confederation of Far Eastern nations, along the lines perhaps of the Pan-American Union, could have been organized for the benefit of its member nations. Such a structure would indeed have a logical basis. All countries of East Asia are inhabited by peoples largely of similar racial stocks. The joint solution of economic and social problems would result in the economic prosperity of the whole sphere. These countries occupy one of the most fertile and richest areas in the world. Each country could really supplement the others by exchange of products, and, with proper stimulus, some areas could logically have their manufacturing potentialities developed to serve all. The sphere, no doubt, could be nearly self-sufficient and free of external exploitation and domination provided no one member nation were to usurp authority or take selfish advantage of the rest. The co-prosperity propaganda failed because the Filipinos had good and constantly increasing evidence that it was not sincere. Japan was a wolf in sheep's clothing.

The most effective of the Japanese propaganda lines in the Philippines, however, was the anti-Anglo-American line. Appeals to race hatred always strike a response among at least those who have been subjected to it and in the Philippines, there was a certain background of anti-American feeling dating back to the Philippine insurrection.

The effect, however, of Japan's race-prejudice line did not seem to be great. An analysis of the reports of 158 American escapees from Japanese prisoner-of-war camps in the Islands, guerrilleros, and civilians who succeeded in returning to the United States before the liberation of the Philippines, reveals that 95 percent of the Filipinos were still loyal to America in the darkest hour. Who then comprised the 5 percent who were sympathetic to Japan? Perhaps there were those who suffered in one way or other from race prejudice, the Filipino puppet officials who collaborated with the Japanese wholeheartedly, such pro-Japanese Filipinos as General Artemio V. Ricarte, who sought in Japan even before the war the salvation of their country, the "Makapilis," a small group of Filipinos who spied on their countrymen partly because to them Japan represented the pure Orientalism which they hoped would be imitated by their countrymen and partly for personal gains, and worst of all, a few rich Filipinos who, because they had a streak of King Midas in them, sold scrap iron, coconut and other war materials to Japan to enable her to prolong the war. The last two groups, particularly, deserve the condemnation

of every patriotic Filipino because they were directly responsible for the death of many of their own people.

Why then did Japan's propaganda fail in the Philippines? Was it not plausible that Philippine-Japanese relationships were older than the contact between Filipinos and the first Westerner? The more naive Filipino, unversed in history, might believe this, not knowing that ancient contact had been culturally trivial in the first place, that it had long since been forgotten, and that the persecution of Catholicism in Japan which soon followed early contacts caused a revulsion of any friendship the Christian Filipinos could have felt for Japan, and finally, that down to the end of the Spanish period including the centuries when Japan was closed to foreigners, Japanese influence in the Philippines had been minimal, except for its cultivation by a numerically small number of top Filipino revolutionaries. The line of propaganda based upon exaggerated ideas of ancient friendship and cultural interchange between Japan and the Philippines involved the tacit assumption that the Filipinos could and would immediately forget all the good they had received from the West, good which was a part of the life experience of everyone. Actually, only the more naive would disregard the omnipresent and deeply felt Western influences for the unsubstantial values which the Japanese would have the Filipinos believe, had come in ancient times from themselves. Were the Filipinos to forget assistance which Japan gave them in their attempt to

regain their lost freedom first against Spain and later against the United States? The Japanese were to have the Filipinos forget that Japan played a skulking and underhanded game at that time. They played safely and dishonorably, the total amount of their aid being negligible and likewise all of it ineffective. Japan risked nothing, and apparently lost few if any yen. Are not the Japanese and the Filipinos of the same racial stock? For the purposes of Japanese propaganda in the Philippines, yes, but not in Japan, where caste and family distinctions were all important and where anthropology could not be taught if it gave any true indication that the Japanese race arose except as taught by Shinto in accordance with the Kojiki. Are the Japanese and the Filipinos not both Orientals? The Filipinos could not help remembering that many of them were part Spanish, and still more, part Chinese. Yet the Japanese had persecuted the Chinese for years.

Aside from any direct, rational reply to the questions raised by Japan's propoganda, the latter was overbalanced by other considerations. Let us briefly refer first to the Philippine guerrilla resistance movement which was indeed the fountain spring of a strain of thought that successfully counteracted Japan's propoganda lines. The guerrilleros all had relatives and friends among non-combatant Filipinos. By means of letters, leaflets, magazines, speeches, radio broadcasts and American supplies which arrived in the Islands by submarine, they were able to nullify Japan's propoganda claims

and to accentuate the growing animosity of the Filipinos against their Nipponese conquerors. The guerrilleros also distributed war news which they gathered by listening to American broadcasting stations and thus kept their people well posted in the actual progress of the war in the Pacific. The mere fact that their relatives continued to wage war against the Japanese was a vastly important factor in creating resistance to Japanese propaganda, for loyalty to friends and relatives is the basic feature of Filipino mores.

The services rendered by the guerrilleros to their countrymen and to the allied cause constituted the strongest possible counter-propaganda. They established civil governments; preserved law and order; maintained the existing public works for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of food and war supplies. They encouraged food production and the manufacture of clothing, shoes, soap, sugar, and salt in the guerrilla areas. They also built airports, helped prisoners-of-war to escape, offered asylum to shot-down American fliers, and supplied General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia with intelligence data to help plan the allied counter-offensive. Thus the guerrillas not only made life under the Japanese as bearable as they could, so that the Filipinos did not sink into the darkest of despair, which would have made them susceptible to Japanese propaganda, but they actually shortened the time of waiting for the liberation of their country.

A second reason for the ineffectiveness of Japan's

propaganda lay in Filipino awareness of events in the years before the war, events which certainly helped to cause Japan's dismal propaganda failure. As early as 1923, Philippine-Japanese relations began to be more and more strained because of Japan's economic aggressiveness in the Philippines. The Filipinos also became aware of Japanese boldness in threatening Filipinos and Americans alike with corporal punishment if either of the two peoples ever crossed their plans in areas under Nipponese control, as in Davao and Shanghai. The incident of the American gunboat "Panay" caused fierce resentment in the Philippines. When the Japanese showed utter disregard for Philippine and American authorities before 1941, as exemplified by the piratical adventures of Japanese fishing boats in Philippine waters, the Filipinos were aroused to intense indignation. To these happenings in their midst, were added news from the outer world: from Korea and China whence Japanese atrocities were reported to have been committed. Filipinos who heard of events in Shanghai, Nanking, and elsewhere were conditioned to discredit Japanese propaganda even before 1941.

On the contrary, how was America regarded in the Islands after her more than four decades of close colonial relationship with the Filipinos? In that span of years, she had established an educational system which successfully taught the Filipinos the principles of Anglo-Saxon democracy. This form of government was in consonance with the Filipinos' natural leanings towards a democratic form of government, which they had had

in pre-Spanish times. It accorded with their innate love of freedom and liberty, which was shown by their revolts against Spain. In the realm of government, the Americans transplanted bodily their bill of rights to guarantee the individual liberties of the Filipinos; they gradually introduced popular suffrage; authorized the popular election of the peoples' representatives. A policy of Filipinization in the different executive and judicial offices followed, and, in 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth government was organized, headed by a popularly elected Filipino President and Vice-President. Only the American High Commissioner reminded the Filipinos of America's sovereignty in the Islands. America had also improved the health conditions of the Archipelago, so that mortality rates there were the lowest in the Far East. She had also aided in the building of a good transportation system all over the country which in turn improved the agriculture and commerce of the Filipinos and had the important political effect of welding the several linguistic groups of separate islands into an effective nationality. With these blessings came the rise of the Filipinos' standard of living so that by 1941, the Philippines had the highest standard in the Orient. And most important of all, America definitely committed herself to the Islands' complete independence in 1946. It is true that in her colonial policy in the Philippines, Americans had shown some discrepancies in treatment of Filipinos and Americans and waverings about abandoning a remnant of economic imperialism.

Likewise, there was race prejudice among some Americans there but these contradictions were too light in consideration of what weighed on the other side of the balance. In general, Filipinos were willing to go more than half way in affirming Philippine-American friendship.

Much as the Americans had the advantage over their Japanese rivals for the trust and sympathy of the Filipinos at the outset of the Greater East Asia War, the Japanese could still have neutralized this Filipino predisposition toward their white masters if Japan herself had treated the people fairly and unselfishly during her occupation of the Islands. But while she loudly bemoaned and exaggerated America's economic exploitation and insisted that her Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would give the Filipinos a better way of life, the shipment of great quantities of food and other Philippine produce for the Japanese fighting army led to the death of many Filipinos from starvation, disease, and exposure; while she wailed over America's race prejudice, she too showed her own sense of superiority over her conquered subjects by imposing upon them her own customs and traditions; while she professed to have an invincible army and navy, the Filipino guerrillas were supplying their countrymen with the actual news of the war, which demonstrated Japanese untruthfulness; and, lastly, while she professed deep love for the Filipinos, her soldiers were committing the worst imaginable atrocities in the Philippines. In other words, the Filipinos could not

help but realize the disparity between Japan's sweet words and the reality of her regime.

Even if they had not been discredited by the mistakes perpetrated by the Japanese military and civil officials in the Philippines, the Japanese propagandists themselves carried the seeds of their own destruction. Some of the great blunders they committed could be ascribed to their superficial knowledge of the psychology of the Filipinos. They preached, scolded, shouted and threatened instead of subtly suggesting new attitudes and quietly guiding the Islanders in a turn to the Oriental fold. They also thought that by loud festivities, parades, and theatrical stunts, the Filipinos would be beguiled into forgetting what they were losing. Their biggest theatrical stunt was the independence celebration on the occasion of the inauguration of the puppet republic. However, amidst the playing of bands, the chiming of bells and the stupendous displays of fireworks, it was incredible that they should believe that the Filipinos would overlook the fact that there was no popular consent behind the Japanese inspired Republic or the obvious fact that the Filipinos had so far lost their individual liberties, that they had had no part in choosing their new puppet government and therefore had no representation in it.

The Japanese propagandists were aware of the ineffectiveness of their efforts in the Philippines. And so was the Japanese High Command in Tokyo. To revenge themselves against

these brother Orientals who defied their power and sided with a white nation, they ordered the massacre of Manila on February 14, 1945. This massacre was Japan's last desperate move against the Filipinos and it was so ordered on the ground that all Filipinos, even the innocent men, women, and children, were guerrilleros and therefore should be doomed to die.

Were the Filipinos traitors to the Orient for siding with a white nation against fellow Orientals? To the fanatical Filipino nationalist who sees nothing good in what a distant country has to offer, his countrymen definitely committed an unforgivable blunder. Or to those who believe that "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet," the Filipinos just wasted so many human lives for nothing. But to those who believe that the world is now ready for internationalism and mutual understanding, the Philippine-American solidarity, based on liberty, freedom and democracy as against regimentation and totalitarianism, is the best example so far of what future world relationships should be. It is highly significant that the Filipinos should have repudiated propaganda based largely upon race prejudice and calculated to set up an Oriental block of nations regardless of deeper considerations than skin color and geographical proximity.

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