

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE NATURE OF PRESENCE

AND

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION

by

Archie J. Bahm

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FOREWORD

A philosophical system is a persistent attempt to satisfactorily, systematically and truthfully interpret experience, completely, though generally.¹ Interpretation is of two sorts: "internal description" or "analysis" and "external description" or "explanation". Internal description is interpretation of experience in terms of concepts which are intended to represent something given in experience. External description is interpretation of experience in terms of concepts which are intended to represent something not given in experience.

It is the main purpose of this paper to give an internal description of experience, and to indicate implications of such a description. Supplementary to the internal description there will be given such external description as is deemed necessary for a clear understanding of the import of internal description.

Theses with which this paper will be concerned are:

1. Presence (experience as given) has no essential characteristics discoverable by an analysis of the given.
2. All arguments for transcending presence are unsound. That is, all attempts to prove the being of something not given by means of logical deduction fail.

1. For a fairly complete discussion of the nature of a philosophical system, see Appendix.I, p. 38.

3. All philosophy which is not concerned merely with an analysis of the given must be uncertain and get to its subject-matter by alogical means. Since no logical argument for establishing the certainty of the being of anything not-given can be derived from an analysis of what is given, any attempt to establish belief in the being of anything not-given must resort to means other than logical implication.

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Section A. INTRODUCTION

Philosophy attempts to interpret experience. What, then, is experience? We cannot begin our interpretation of experience by defining it, for by so doing we predetermine to some extent what its nature must be found to be. Rather our interpretation should be of something undefined, something ultimate, something given for interpretation. We assume that experience is something ultimate and something with which everyone is acquainted.

Interpretation is of two sorts: "internal description" and "external description." By "internal description" we mean interpretation of experience in terms of concepts which are intended to represent something given in experience. By "external description" we mean interpretation of experience in terms of concepts which are intended to represent something not given in experience. We shall use the term "analysis" as a synonym for the term "internal description" and the term "explanation" as a synonym for the term "external description."

Although our chief purpose is to make an internal description, which is concerned with an analysis of the nature of the given, we shall accompany this internal description with external description, which is concerned with explanation of the not-given conditions of the given. We shall be concerned with external description only incidentally and only to the extent deemed necessary for a clear understanding of the internal description.

However, there are two points of external description which it is advisable to make clear at the outset. They may be stated in the following generalizations: (1) All experience is present experience. (2) All the experience given for interpretation is "my" experience.

(1) All experience is present experience; Assuming the distinction between past, present and future, it follows that whatever is is present, for whatever is said to be past is not, but was, and whatever is said to be future is not, but will be. Thus also, all the experience that is, is present experience, for whatever is said to be past experience is not, but was, and whatever is said to be future experience is not, but will be.¹

(2) All the experience given for interpretation is "my" experience; Assuming that all experience is present experience, it does not follow that all the experience that is is "my" experience. Yet all the experience that is given for interpretation may be said to be "my" experience. We have put "my" in quotation marks to emphasize that this discussion is intended to be external description which must not be taken as a basis upon which to prejudge the results of internal description. That a "my" is essential to experience as given, we shall question. But we make this statement here by way of

1. Since all the experience that is, or is actual, is present experience, all the experience that there is to interpret is present experience. If the task of philosophy is to interpret experience, its whole task consists in interpreting present experience. To make such an assertion is, however, not to belittle the task of philosophy, for interpretation, being of two sorts, may involve a past and a future to explain experience.

external description in order to indicate that our general viewpoint is "subjective." That is, we wish to avoid the Kantian mistake of attempting to interpret a phenomenon common to all who experience. We shall not assert that the results of our interpretation of the given must apply universally and necessarily to all experience. We shall believe that anyone who interprets experience as given shall discover what we discover, but we shall not assert that he must discover it because we discover it.

Experience as given for interpretation is both present and presented. Such a statement is made, not by way of definition, but by way of external description. In order to avoid misleading connotations, we shall adopt the term "presence" to represent that which is given for interpretation. And in order to be completely free from misleading connotations, we shall define the term as being entirely nonconnotative. That is, it is purely denotative. It denotes something which is ultimate and undefined, yet something with which, we assume, everyone is directly acquainted. The term "presence" means neither what is present nor what is presented, insofar as the term "present" connotes a reference to past and future and insofar as the term "presented" connotes a person to whom something is presented. Yet the term "presence" is intended to denote something which, by external description, may be described as present in time and presented to a person. But such external description does not form a part of the meaning of the term.

In setting out to make an interpretation of experience, we seek to avoid all terminology which predetermines what our interpretation shall be. If it be asserted, for example, that presence is present, by definition, then an interpretation of presence must reveal that it is related to a past and a future. Thus such a definition would determine beforehand what the result would be. We seek a term which will denote that which we seek to analyze without at the same time involving connotations which predetermine the results. And the term "presence" will, we intend, serve for this purpose.

In what follows we shall attempt to accomplish the following:

Section B is devoted to a Critique of Terminology, with purpose of pointing out wherein certain terms, which tend to denote what the term "presence" is intended to denote, so connote results that their employment would be vicious.

Section C is devoted to a Critique of Method, wherein we attempt to recognize the fundamental elements in our method which do predetermine our results. We shall point out what methodological predeterminations are inescapable conditions of our interpretation.

Section D is devoted to an Interpretation of the Nature of Presence. It is concerned chiefly with internal description, or analysis, of the nature of the given. Ten characteristics which are often considered essential to the nature of presence are shown to be

not essential so far as internal description is concerned. The intent of this section is to show that there are no essential characteristics of presence discoverable by analysis.

Section E is devoted to Implications of the Interpretation. Ten proposed arguments for transcendence are considered and shown to be unsound. The intent of this section is to show that there are no sound arguments for transcendence.

Section F is devoted to the Conclusion that since there are no sound arguments for transcending presence, i.e., since there are no logical ways of getting from what is given to what is not given, any ways, if there be any ways, of getting from what is given to what is not given must be alogical.

Section B. CRITIQUE OF TERMINOLOGY

The term which we use to denote that which we seek to analyze is "presence." The term "presence" is intended to denote what others denote by such terms as "specious present," "moment of experience," "appearance," "consciousness," "awareness," and other terms which we shall discuss in the sequel. Each of these terms, we shall point out, involves a connotation which makes it unsuited to represent something about to be analyzed. We agree that "one of the first and most important steps to take in an epistemological discussion of experience is to free one's terms, experience, knowledge and the like, from metaphysical implications which solve in advance problems which might be later proposed."¹

In considering the following terms we shall indicate objectionable connotations or "metaphysical implications."

1. Specious present: "This term, the 'specious' (or apparent) present, is due to a Mr. E. R. Clay who is quoted by William James as saying: 'The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past -- a recent past -- delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future.... Time, then, considered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz., the obvious past, the specious present, the real present and the future. Omitting the specious present, it consists of three ... nonentities --

1. Wendel T. Bush, Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience, p. 6.

the past, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, and their coterminous, the present, the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present."¹

"This present actual moment of experience has been called a specious present to distinguish it from a mathematical present."²

"Thus the 'specious present' is not present at all, but includes within it distinctions of past and present. We may add of the future as well."³

We object that to denote by the term "specious present" what we intend to denote by the term "presence" is to connote that what is denoted is not genuine or actual. But, on the contrary, there is nothing specious about that which we seek to analyze. It is genuine. It is actual. There is nothing more actual than presence. The so-called "mathematical present" is, rather, the fictitious present. For what is given in experience is actual. But the mathematical present is not something given in presence but is a hypothetical non-existent coterminous of two non-entities. The term "presence" denotes something actual, without connoting the being of anything fictitious or non-actual.

1. John Laird, Knowledge, Belief and Opinion, p. 274. Cf. E. R. Clay The Alternative, p. 167, and William James, Principles of Psychology, I, p. 609.

2. Herbert Wildon Carr, "The Moment of Experience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1915-1916, p. 10.

3. Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, I, p. 122.

2. Present: In rejecting the term "specious present," the term "real present" suggest itself. But it has been pointed out¹ that "the word 'present' has at least three meanings: (a) present to me in space -- 'here'; (b) present in time, and not past or future -- 'now'; (c) present to the mind, or 'given'" The term is thus highly ambiguous in that it has many meanings.

We may outline our objections to this term thus:

(a) By "present" is often understood a mathematical time-point or an instant in an abstract frame of reference. But the term "presence" neither denotes nor connotes a mathematical time-point or abstract instant.

(b) The term "present" is a variable, ambiguously denoting the present moment, the present hour, the present day, the present year, age, aeon, etc., depending upon the context. But the term "presence" is intended to be free from such ambiguity.

(c) The term "present" is usually understood to imply a time-frame of reference. The term "present" derives its meaning by being distinguished from past and future. But the term "presence" is intended to be without connotation of past and future, before and after, or any temporal relations whatsoever.

(d) The term "present" is often intended to denote all that is, whereas the term "presence" is not intended to denote all that is.

1. C. A. Strong, Essays in Critical Realism, p. 238.

3. The Given: The terms "given," "presentation," and "datum" are, in many respects, synonymous in meaning. What we here say about the meaning of "given" holds also for the meaning of "presentation" and "datum."

The term "given" is often intended to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence." But usually, at the same time, the term "given" connotes (a) a giver and (b) a receiver.

(a) The giver: If something is given, it must be given by something. If something is given, there must be a cause of the given.

(b) The receiver: If something is given, it must be given to someone. There can be no given that is not received. Notions like these are usually taken to be involved in the meaning of the term "given."

Insofar as these and other meanings are connoted by the term "given," it is useless for our purposes, for it prejudices, by implication, that a giver and a receiver are essential to the nature of the given. However, insofar as the term "given" may be taken only in its denotative significance, we can use it as a synonym for "presence." We shall find it convenient to use the term "given" in this latter sense.¹

4. The Datum: The term "datum" is sometimes used to denote

1. A relevant discussion of the meanings of the term "given" is to be found in John Laird's Knowledge, Belief and Opinion, pp. 271-273.

what we intend to denote by the term "presence." Sometimes, however, it is used to denote something not to be identified with presence; for example:

(a) The term "datum" is used to represent the starting-point of any inquiry or analysis, or the premises of any chain of reasoning.¹ "In science, a datum signifies whatever inaugurates and prompts investigation."²

(b) The term "datum" is used to represent the result of any inquiry or analysis, or the conclusion of any chain of reasoning. "Are we to understand by a datum that with which analysis begins, or are we to understand by it that with which analysis terminates."³

(c) The term "datum" is used to represent the evidences in support of an hypothesis.

Thus, an investigating scientist begins with certain data, finds certain data in support of his hypothesis, and gets certain data as the result of his investigation.

The term "datum", in its more peculiarly philosophical uses, is still a highly ambiguous term: "Six different views as to this have succeeded each other in the course of modern philosophy: (1) that the datum is the real thing; (2) that it is an ideal represen-

1. Cf. Mathew Thompson McClure, An Introduction to the Logic of Reflection, Ch. 5, entitled "Data."

2. J. Loewenberg, "Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data," Journal of Philosophy, 1927, p. 5.

3. Ibid.

tative of the real thing; (3) that it is an ideal thing, psychological in its nature; (4) that it is an ideal thing, logical in its nature; (5) that it is a thing of psychological nature, but real; (6) that it is a thing of logical nature, but real -- naive realism, representationism, psychological subjectivism, logical subjectivism, psychological objectivism, logical objectivism. The view I shall try to recommend in this article is distinct from any of these, is (7) that the datum is the logical essence of the real thing."¹ We are seeking a still different meaning of the term when we seek a non-implicative meaning.

Three other philosophical uses of the term "datum" with objectionable connotations are:

(a) The term "datum", like the term "given," implies a donor and a donee.

(b) The term "datum" represents a notion made famous by Immanuel Kant and recently re-presented by Mr. C. I. Lewis. Mr. Lewis distinguished between "the datum given to the mind" and the "construction which the mind itself imposes."² Or he distinguishes between the "given in experience" and the "a priori in experience." In Kant's terminology, the distinction is between the "sense-manifold" and the "categories." The term "datum," according to this notion,

1. C. A. Strong, Essays in Critical Realism, p. 223.

2. C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order, p. 39.

represents one of "two elements"¹ of which experience is composed, and represents something which, in order to be, involves the being of the other element.

(c) The term "datum" is used as the genus term of which the terms "sense-datum," "conceptual datum," and "feeling-datum" are species. The term, as thus used, tends to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence." But this use of the term involves a danger, because, for example, "sense-datum may connote particular sense-organs."²

Since "the term 'datum' is burdened with grave ambiguity,"³ we shall, for the most part, avoid it. Insofar as it can be taken as a synonym for presence and as purely denotative in meaning, however, we have no objection to the term.

5. Experience: "There is perhaps no word more frequently employed in the philosophical literature of the present day than 'experience.'⁴ "Experience is a treacherously ambiguous word."⁵ What are some of the objectionable features of the term?

1. C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World-Order, pp. 37, 38, 48, etc.

2. Ibid., p. 57.

3. J. Loewenberg, "Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data," Journal of Philosophy, 1927, p. 5.

4. J. E. Creighton, "The Standpoint of Experience," Philosophical Review, 1903, p. 593.

5. C. M. Bakewell, "The Issue Between Idealism and Immediate Empiricism," Journal of Philosophy, 1905, p. 688.

(a) The term is used rather indiscriminately, both in and out of philosophy, to represent experiences of various sorts, such as an atom's experience, a nation's experience, experience over a lifetime, past experience, unconscious experience, and Universal or Absolute Experience. We seek a term which, when properly used, can imply none of these.¹

(b) The term "experience," in being associated with the term "empirical," connotes a plurality of past experiences. For example, when one "learns from experience," the experience referred to is never "present experience," and it is usually more than one "experience." The term "presence" connotes neither past experience nor a plurality of past experiences. So far as a description of the meaning of the term is concerned, we do not wish to beg the question as to whether "learning from experience" can be discovered by an analysis of experience.

(c) The term "experience" is sometimes understood to connote an "experiencer" and an "experienced." Insofar as the term connotes these it predetermines the results of questions raised concerning experience.

However, the term "experience" may be taken in a purely denotative sense, and insofar as it may, we can use it as a term to

1. In seeking a term which does not have implications, the term must not only not imply that there is unconscious or past experience, but must also not imply that there is not unconscious or past experience.

denote that which we seek to analyse.

6. The Moment of Experience: The term "the moment of Experience," a term used by Shadworth Hodgson¹ and H. Wildon Carr², is intended to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence." We cannot use this term, however, because it, like the term "specious present," implies a temporal context or a time-frame of reference. We do not wish to deny that presence is in time in some sense, but we seek a term which is free from such a connotation.

7. Immediate Experience: Two salient objections to the use of this term for our purposes are: (a) the term implies that there is also a "mediate experience;" (b) there are several special meanings of the term which have found a definite place in philosophical terminology.³

1. Metaphysic of Experience, I, ch. 2, entitled "The Moment of Experience."

2. "The Moment of Experience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1915-16, pp. 1 ff.

3. A discussion of these meanings of "immediate experience" would involve too much for our purposes at this time. However, we may cite a bibliography of articles which treat of meanings of immediate experience:

Bouwama, O. K., On Difference in the Criterion of F. H. Bradley, pp. 71 ff.

Bode, B. H., "The Concept of Immediacy," Journal of Philosophy, 1912, pp. 141 ff.

Bradley, F. H., "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," Mind, 1909, pp. 40 ff. Also in Essays in Truth and Reality, ch. 6.

Dewey, J., "Immediate Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 1905, pp. 597 ff.

Fite, W., "The Priority of Inner Experience," Philosophical Review, 1895, pp. 129 ff.

(note continued on next page)

8. Pure Experience: "The term 'Pure Experience' is intended to translate the German 'reine Erfahrung,' but the German word 'rein' suggests 'mere,' 'nothing else than,' which the English word 'pure' less readily connotes. The English term at once suggests the question: What is an unpure experience? Experience conceived not as pure is conceived not as experience simply, experience as such, but as interpreted in the light of some metaphysic. Pure experience is experience taken in an absolutely empirical way, and conceived without metaphysical presupposition ... without metaphysical implications."¹

If the term were conceived "without metaphysical implications," we might be able to use the term. But,

(a) As Bush notes, it suggests "unpure experience."

(b) As Avenarius and James use the term, "pure experience" comes to mean "common experience," or at least experience some of which is common to different persons. James discusses the intersection of

3 (continued).

Joachim, H. J., Immediate Experience and Mediation, An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford, 20, November, 1919. In Oxford Lectures in Philosophy, 1910-1923.

Leighton, J. A., "Cognitive Thought and Immediate Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 1906, p. 174.

Reid, L. A., "Immediate Experience; Its Nature and Content," Mind, 1930, pp. 154 ff.

Schiller, F. C. S., "Thought and Immediacy," Journal of Philosophy, 1906, pp. 234 ff.

Platt, D. A., "Immediate Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 1928, pp. 477 ff.

l. W. T. Bush, Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience, p. 33, note.

two streams of pure experience. Avenarius pictures the whole of history as an evolution of pure experience.

(c) As Professor Drake points out, "a philosophy of 'pure experience'" is "a philosophy which refuses to believe in anything outside of experience."¹

9. Mind: While the term "mind" is sometimes employed to denote what we wish to denote by the term "presence,"² we have two objections to its employment:

(a) It has numerous other meanings which are more common, and explication of the difference between the particular meaning we choose and these others would be too difficult at the outset and too difficult to maintain throughout the discussion.

(b) We favor another meaning of the term as its "proper" meaning.

10. State of Mind: "We get 'states' of mind in this sense, if, by a fiction, we arrest the stream of consciousness at a given moment and take a cross section."³ Those who speak of "a state of mind" undoubtedly intend to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence." But obviously, as critics have so often pointed out, the term "mental state" connotes staticness and the use of it involves a consequent need for relating static states by means of some external principle of motion which is itself not static. "Presence"

1. Durant Drake, Mind and Its Place in Nature, p. 35.

2. Warner Fite speaks of the usage of "experience," "consciousness," and "mind" as synonyms or "equivalents." Cf. Philosophical Review, 1895, p. 130.

3. R. F. A. Hoernlé, "Symposium--Can There Be Anything Obscure or Implicit in a Mental State?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1912-13, p. 302.

is a term which connotes neither the static nor the flowing.

11. Before the Mind: The phrase "before the mind" is sometimes used to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence." But this phrase implies (a) a mind and (b) a relation of "beforeness" between the mind and this which is before it. We seek to describe the meaning of the term "presence" in such a way as to be free from implicative relations.

12. Phenomenon: The term "phenomenon" is objectionable because it implies a non-phenomenal, or noumenal, kind of being. In this respect, our objection is similar to that of Mach: "What do we understand by the 'given?' Mach answers that the 'given' consists of appearances, phenomena. One must not, however, include in the notion of phenomena any reference to something behind the phenomena, as Kant does."¹ And, we would add, we must not exclude from the notion phenomenon the possibility of there being something conditioning the phenomenon, as Mach does. The notion of phenomenon, insofar as it can be taken as a synonym for the notion of presence, implies neither the necessity of, nor the impossibility of, being which is not phenomenon.

13. Appearance: The term "appearance" is used to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence," but we hesitate to employ the term because it is ordinarily understood that a non-

1. Erich Becher, "The Philosophical View of Ernst Mach," Philosophical Review, 1906, p. 535.

apparent reality which appears is implied by it.

14. Consciousness: The term "consciousness" is one of the terms which most clearly denotes that which we intend to denote by the term "presence." But it is a term which is so popular and so thoroughly abused that it bears with it an abundance of unwanted suggestions.

"It has been suggested¹ that were 'the use of the term consciousness to be forbidden for a season, contemporary thought would be set the wholesome task of discovering more definite terms with which to replace it, and a very considerable amount of convenient mystery would be dissipated.'² We are, obviously, engaged in this "wholesome task."

Among our objections to this term are the following:

(a) It tends to imply unconsciousness or non-consciousness.

"The term consciousness in its widest sense implicitly contains above the threshold as part of its meaning. And the mere addition, above the threshold, does no more of itself, than explicitly distinguish it from non-consciousness."³

(b) It has certain special usages which are objectionable:

1. R. B. Perry, "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," Psychological Review, 1904, p. 282.

2. E. B. McGilvary, "Experience and its Inner Duplicity," Mind, 1909, p. 225.

3. S. H. Hodgson, Metaphysic of Experience, I, p. 56.

(1) William James and the Neo-Realists hold that it connotes external relations. "Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation."¹

"William James and Professor Woodbridge propose ... the view that consciousness is not the subject-term of a subject-object relation, but is itself a relation between terms, and that this relation is an external relation which does not in any way change the character of the terms which it relates. These two thinkers differ, however, in the identification they make of the relation which is properly called consciousness.

"The former treats consciousness and the relation which obtains between two experiences when one passes into the other in the continuum of personal biography. The later experience, as appropriating the earlier, stands to it in the relation of consciousness. Consciousness is nothing but the felt continuity of the later experience with one that has preceded it. No experience taken by itself is conscious; it is just pure experience, without any inner duplicity; it is a mere that, whose nature is all told when you have enumerated the sensible qualia and relations which are in 'the instant field of the present.' When consciousness arises, it comes as a new relation tying two successive experiences to each other in such a way that they now both belong to the same self.

"For Professor Woodbridge, on the contrary, consciousness arises when, in addition to the multifarious relations that obtain in the world, a relation of meaning arises between the objects. Under the guidance of common sense and of science, 'we are wont to think of a world without consciousness in it as a world devoid of meaning. Add consciousness to that world and then meaning is added, but nothing else.'^{2,3}

1. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 25.

2. Quoted from "The Problem of Consciousness" in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology by Former Students of Charles Edward Garman, p. 160.

3. E. B. McGilvary, "Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning," Journal of Philosophy, 1911, p. 511.

(2) F. H. Bradley holds that "consciousness is not co-extensive with experience"¹ but rather that it is only one part of experience. He distinguishes between "feeling" or "immediate experience," on the one hand, and "thought" or "mediate experience," on the other. It is this latter that is called consciousness.²

1. Essays in Truth and Reality, p. 192.

2. Further investigation into the many meanings of "consciousness" is hardly warranted here. Discussions of them are to be found in the following articles and books:

- Bode, B. H., "Definition of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, 1913, p. 232 ff.
- Bode, B. H., "Realistic Conceptions of Consciousness," Philosophical Review, 1911, pp. 256 ff.
- Boodin, J. E., "Consciousness and Reality," Journal of Philosophy, 1908, pp. 169 ff and 561 ff.
- Bush, W. T., "An Empirical Definition of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, 1905, pp. 561 ff.
- Davidson, W. L., "Definition of Consciousness," Mind, Vol. 6, pp. 406 ff.
- Dewey, J., "The terms 'Conscious' and 'Consciousness,'" Journal of Philosophy, 1906, pp. 39 ff.
- Gore, G., "A Scientific View of Consciousness," Monist, Vol. 15, pp. 227 ff.
- Lewis, G. H., "Consciousness and Unconsciousness," Mind, Vol. 2, pp. 156 ff.
- Miller, D. S., "Is Consciousness 'A Type of Behavior'?" Journal of Philosophy, 1911, pp. 322 ff.
- Norris, O. O., "A Behaviorist Account of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, 1929, pp. 29 ff and 56 ff.
- Perry, R. B., "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," Psychological Review, 1904, pp. 282 ff.
- Rehmke, Johannes, "Fundamental Conceptions Regarding the nature of Consciousness," Philosophical Review, 1897, pp. 449 ff.
- Sellars, R. W., "Is Consciousness Physical?" Journal of Philosophy, 1922, pp. 690 ff.
- Shand, A. F., "The Nature of Consciousness," Mind, 1891, pp. 206 ff.
- Singer, E. A., Jr., "On the Conscious Mind," Journal of Philosophy, 1929, pp. 561 ff.
- Strong, C. A., "The Nature of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, 1912, pp. 533 ff, 561 ff, 585 ff.

(note continued on next page)

15. Awareness: The term "awareness" is used to denote that which we intend to denote by the term "presence." However, the term "awareness" tends to suggest someone who is aware and something which this one is aware of. The term "presence," let us emphasize again, is intended to be free from such suggestions. We shall, however, find it convenient to use the term "awareness," but we shall do so without intending that the term connote what we here object to.

16. Attention-span: The term "attention-span" may be taken as denoting what we intend to denote by the term "presence." But insofar as the meaning of the term "attention-span" connotes an attendant or duration in time or extension in space, it connotes what we cannot permit the term "presence" to connote.

17. Other terms which are intended to denote what we intend to denote by the term "presence," yet which involve connotations undesirable for our purposes, are: "the total field of my present consciousness,"¹ "presentation continuum,"² "private world,"³

2 (continued).

Woodbridge, F. J. E., "The Nature of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, 1905, pp. 119 ff.

Holt, E. B., The Concept of Consciousness.

Marshall, H. R., Consciousness.

Strong, C. A., The Origin of Consciousness, especially Chapter IV, on "Modern Theories of Consciousness."

1. C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, p. 49.

2. Helen Wodehouse, "Knowledge as Presentation," Mind, 1909, p. 391. Cf. also N. K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, Ch. 6.

3. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 2, p. 166. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, p. 92.

"compresence,"¹ "knowledge by acquaintance."² We shall not take time to criticize them.

18. Presence: Although we have adopted the term "presence" for our purposes, we do so advisedly, for we have adopted a term which is not without some established meaning. Meanings of the term which we do not adopt, in adopting the term "presence", are as follows:

(a) Consulting a dictionary³ we find several recognized meanings of the term "presence":

1. Act, facto, or state of being present, or of being in a certain place and not elsewhere, or of being within sight or call, at hand, or in some place that is being thought of; -- opposed to absence; as the presence of troops saved the city.

2. The part of space within one's ken, call, influence; immediate nearness or vicinity of one.

3. An assembly, esp. of persons of rank or nobility.

4. The whole of the personal qualities of an individual person. Personality.

5. Port, bearing, carriage, mein, air, personal appearance.

6. An apparition, specter.

(b) Mr. Bertrand Russell employs the term "presence" in a

1. S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, I, p. 13. C. D. Broad, "Prof. Alexander's Gifford Lectures," Mind, 1921, p. 27.

2. B. Russell, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, p. 108. B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, ch. 5. "Symposium: Is there Knowledge by Acquaintance," Proc. of Arist. Soc., Supp. Vol. 2, pp. 159 ff.

3. Webster's New International Dictionary, 1929.

special way which he describes for his purposes.¹

(c) The term "presence" is also likely to be taken as connoting "absence." But, since we are using the term "presence" in a purely denotative way, it does not even connote "absence."

We have now finished our critique of terminology. In it we have been concerned with making clear what it is that we wish to analyze, and with determining the meaning of a term to denote this which we wish to analyze without predetermining the results of the analysis by admitting connotations.

We have chosen the term "presence" to represent that which we wish to denote. We have assigned to it a purely denotative meaning. There is involved, in our employment of a term with a purely denotative meaning, the difficulty of conveying to readers that which we wish to denote when that which we wish to denote cannot be pointed out. We have attempted to overcome this difficulty of denotative non-communicability by identifying the meaning of the term "presence" with the meanings of other terms which, it is assumed, are understood by our readers. The identification, we have taken great pains to make clear, is identification only with regard to denotation and not identification with regard to connotations.

1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Acquaintance," Monist, 1914, p. 443.

In the sequel, we shall find it convenient to use such terms as "given," "appears," "awareness," "experience," and "consciousness" as synonyms for the term "presence." In so using them, of course, we intend their meaning to be purely denotative. We shall use them because we wish to connect our interpretations with those of others and because our readers will probably find our arguments more clear and convincing if they are cast in a terminology with which they are more familiar.

Section C. CRITIQUE OF METHOD

Even as, in a Critique of Terminology, we sought to avoid predetermination of the results of our proposed analysis by the use of connotative terms, so now, in a Critique of Method, we seek to avoid predetermination of the results of our proposed analysis by the method we employ.

In this second Critique we shall, however, be less successful than in the first. We must employ some method. And the results of our analysis will be conditioned by our method. And defects in our method will result in defects in our analysis. But "we must make the effort to beg as few questions as possible at the outset. If we are rigorous enough we shall discover just what questions we have to beg and why we beg them."¹

In this Critique, then, we shall be concerned with determining some of the assumptions involved in our attempt to analyze presence and to recognize the bearing they will have upon our results.

Three important assumptions involved in our attempt to analyze presence are: (1) the "three laws of thought," (2) a "theory of types," and (3) the interpretability of presence.

1. The "three laws of thought": The so-called "three laws of thought," assumed in traditional Aristotelian logic and involved

1. Wendel T. Bush, Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience, p. 1.

in some way or other in every system of abstract logic, are "the law of identity," "the law of non-contradiction," and "the law of excluded middle." We assume these laws as methodological postulates. It is important that we explicitly recognize this assumption because it has an important bearing upon our results.

For, even though our analysis is intended to be purely empirical -- that is, we seek to analyze simply what is given without allowing connotative terms to influence our results -- yet we shall be able to assert concerning the nature of presence that certain things must be so and that certain things cannot be so simply because we postulate these laws of thought. Thus our analysis is not a purely empirical analysis, but an empirical analysis conditioned by these laws of thought.

The three laws of thought, when applied to our problem, involve the three following postulates concerning the nature of presence. Whatever is in presence is in presence, and whatever is not in presence is not in presence. Whatever is in presence is not out of presence and whatever is out of presence is not in presence. Whatever is, is either in presence or not in presence. Our interpretation of presence, no matter what its nature actually is, will conform to these three postulates.

2. A "theory of types:" We find it necessary to invoke a theory of types to get us out of a predicament, which we shall call the "presenco-centric predicament." Logic by its very nature

involves a "logico-centric predicament" such that there are some propositions about all propositions which cannot be about themselves without contradiction. When logic is used as a part of a method of interpretation, this predicament is to be found also in the interpretation. And so, in attempting to interpret presence, we find ourselves in a predicament, which we call the "presence-centric predicament," and which is due to the nature of the logic we employ.

The "solution" to this predicament in logic is to postulate a "theory of types." This theory may be stated thus: No proposition can be about itself. That is, the proposition seeming to be about all propositions is really a proposition of a higher type than the propositions which it is about.

The "solution" to the presence-centric predicament is likewise to postulate a "theory of types." This theory may be stated thus: The interpretation of presence, being an interpretation of all presence, is not itself interpreted in the interpretation of presence. That is, the interpretation of presence is in some sense other than presence, and the interpretation of presence does not apply to the interpretation itself. The interpretation is an experience of a "higher type" than that which is interpreted. This doctrine has been expressed in the words of William James thus: "The standpoint of the psychologist is external to that of the consciousness he is studying. Both itself and its own object are

objects for him."¹

We invoke this "theory of types" to forestall the criticism that our interpretation is itself experience, and that since all the experience that there is is present experience and since all the experience that is given for analysis is in presence, therefore our interpretation must be in present experience and in presence. But obviously we do not intend that our theory is entirely within presence nor that presence is such that our theory could be contained within it.

We assume, then, as a part of our method, that our interpretation of presence is not an interpretation of itself. Our interpretation is of such a nature that it does not apply to itself. The results of our interpretation are again, thus conditioned by our method.

3. The interpretability of presence: (a) In order to make an interpretation² of presence, we must assume that presence is interpretable. The interpretation^{ab} of presence is in some sense

1. Mind, Vol. 9, p. 20.

2. After this section was written it was discovered that the term "interpretation" as used bore with it a serious ambiguity. Since revision would unduly expand the treatment and make the reading unnaturally cumbersome, a device has been adopted for clarification of meaning. The term "interpretation" has three meanings: (a) it represents the act or process of interpreting, (b) it represents the results of the completed process, and (c) it represents both of these together. Symbols appended to this term, representing each of these meanings respectively, are, a, b, ab.

other than presence. Does the interpretation^{ab}, then, have to be like that which is interpreted^{ab}? Whether it must or not, we must assume that interpretation^{ab} is possible.

But in assuming that interpretation^{ab} of presence is possible, we should make as explicit as possible what is involved in this assumption concerning the nature of interpretation.^{ab} The results of our interpretation^a will be conditioned by the nature of interpretation^{ab}, so recognition of its nature is advisable at the outset. What, then, is the nature of interpretation?^{ab}

By "interpretation"^{ab} we mean the representing in a theory by concepts that which is interpreted. The results of an interpretation^a are stated in terms of concepts or universals. Even though that which we denote by the term "presence" is a particular, the interpretation^b of it must be in terms of universals. And any non-conceptual elements in presence represented in the interpretation^b must be represented in the results by concepts.

Whether this representation of a particular by universals and of non-conceptual by concepts is to be considered falsification, we do not need to determine so far as this interpretation^{ab} is concerned. But we must recognize that interpretation^b involves the representation of presence by something which is both other than and in some respects unlike presence. And we must recognize that the results of a process of interpretation^a are thus conditioned by the nature of interpretation.^{ab}

(b) In considering the question of the interpretability of presence, we must recognize, further, that the process of interpretation^a has lasted over a period of years, while presence itself has, by external description, a duration of but a few seconds. The question then arises: Can there be an interpretation^a of presence, when presence is one particular? Is the interpretation^{ab} an interpretation^{ab} of one particular which had its being when the process of interpretation^a began, or is the interpretation^{ab} an interpretation^{ab} of a number of particulars, or is the interpretation^{ab} an interpretation^{ab} of a type of which the particulars are instances?

The term "presence" is intended to denote one particular. It is not intended to denote two or more particulars. The term "presences" may be used to denote more particulars than one. The term "interpretation"^{ab} means "representation of essential characteristics." In asking what shall be our interpretation^b of presence we are asking what is the nature of presence or what are the essential characteristics of presence. An interpretation^b of the nature of presence is, of course, an interpretation^b of the nature of a particular. But the interpretation^b may apply to several particulars. We do not intend to be interpreting the nature of a type of which particulars are instances. We intend to be interpreting the nature of a particular, which interpretation^b may or may not apply to more particulars than one.

The term "presence" is not a "proper name." It is a

"common name" used at different times to denote different particulars. Yet each particular denoted by the term "presence" may be supposed to have a nature which is represented in the interpretation^b by concepts, if interpretation^b is possible. And we must assume that interpretation^b is possible.

The process of interpretation^a is a process whereby we abstract elements from different presences, rather than by holding one presence up before us for investigation. We do not take apart one presence, but, by observing several presences, produce an hypothesis concerning the nature and essential characteristics of presence. We are not intending to suppose that there is a typical presence, but we must suppose, if interpretation^b is possible and true, that there is a nature typical to all presences. We do not wish to hypostatize a presence, but to hypothesize concerning its supposed nature.

We intend our interpretation^b to be such that, whenever anything is denoted by the term "presence," our interpretation^b will be an interpretation^b of it. The interpretation^b is a universal in that it may apply to several particulars, but it is always an interpretation^b of a particular. That is, it is always a particular presence, not a typical presence, that is represented by the interpretation^b. Yet the possibility of true interpretation^b presupposes that there is a typical nature -- a set of essential characteristics -- which is somehow involved in the being of whatever is represented

by the term "presence."

In asking what shall be our interpretation^b of presence, we are asking what are the essential characteristics of presence. If interpretation^b is possible, and we are assuming that it is, presence has certain essential characteristics. Interpretation,^b again, is of two sorts: internal description, or analysis, and external description, or explanation. In asking what shall be our internal description of presence, we are asking what characteristics must be discovered by an empirical analysis of presence. In asking what shall be our external description of presence, we are asking what characteristics must be invoked to give a satisfactory explanation of what takes place in presence.

A word further about internal description of, or analysis of, presence: Our analysis is intended to be empirical. Yet, by analysis we mean an attempt to discover what are the essential characteristics of presence discoverable by an examination of what is given. We do not wish to presuppose that the attempt must be successful, that is, that presence must be found, by analysis, to have essential characteristics. We wish simply to investigate whether or not it has. In the process of our analysis we shall ask, concerning various characteristics which are commonly considered as essential to presence, whether or not they are essential.

So much, then, for a Critique of Method. In it we have sought to point out that our interpretation^{ab} of presence is conditioned (1) by the nature of the logical methodology employed, (2) by the impossibility of our interpretation^b applying to itself, and (3) by the nature of interpretation itself,^b which involves: (a) representation of a particular by universals and of non-conceptual elements by concepts and (b) applicability of interpretation^b to more presences than one and supposition of a typical nature for a particular presence.

These conditions predetermine, to some extent, the results of our interpretation. How to avoid such predetermination, we do not know. We might substitute other similar conditions, but how to avoid methodological conditions of this kind, we do not know. We have not made an attempt to make explicit all of the assumptions involved, but only those which we thought to be of fundamental importance.

Section D. INTERPRETATION OF THE NATURE OF PRESENCE

Introduction

What has been written so far has been introductory, or by way of preparation for the actual interpretation of the nature of presence. We come now to the interpretation itself. Our general problem is: What is the nature of, or essential characteristics of, presence discoverable by analysis? We shall deal with this general problem by treating a number of specific problems.

1. We shall state these specific problems in the form:

Must X be given? We state the problems in this way because ~~there are~~ some theorizers ~~who~~ assert that certain characteristics must be given. We seek, by an analysis of the given, to discover what, if any, characteristics must be given. We shall find, further, that certain characteristics cannot be given. And we shall note certain characteristics which may or may not be given, i. e., which are not essential to the nature of presence.

2. Our treatment of each of these specific problems will conform to no set outline, though in addition to (a) the argument or arguments employed to prove our contention concerning the non-essentiality or impossibility of certain characteristics belonging to presence, there will be (b) an attempt to relate, where convenient, our treatment of the specific problem to treatments by others, (c) some suggestion, where convenient, of the bearing of our conclusion on arguments for transcendence, and (d) an emphasis, where advisable, on the relation of internal description to external description,

(It is vitally important to bear in mind that the chief aim in making this interpretation is to make an internal description of presence, and that the external description resorted to is only incidental and included in order to make clear the precise import of the internal description. We are not seeking to make a complete interpretation of experience, but only that sort of interpretation which we call internal description. The external description is added in order to make clear the exact meaning of the internal description -- and this is advisable because the attempts to deal with experience merely as it is actually given have been so infrequent that it is with difficulty that the reader will follow if some comment upon external conditions of presence is not conjoined.)

3. The general form of the argument to be employed in treating each of these specific problems is as follows: Problem: Must X be given? First, what is meant by X? If X means something that is given, X can be given. If X means something that is not given, X cannot be given. For whatever is in experience is in experience, and whatever is not in experience is not in experience, and everything that is is either in experience or not in experience. But next, if X can be given, is it an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis? That is, must X be given? How prove that X is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis? By showing that there are some presences which do not contain the characteristic. If there are some presences

which do not contain the characteristic, it is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis.

4. An outline of the problems to be treated is: (1) Must implicitness be given? (2) Must boundaries of presence be given? (3) Must a margin of presence be given? (4) Must unity be given? (5) Must duration be given? (6) Must change be given? (7) Must the self be given? (8) Must purpose be given? (9) Must knowledge be given? (10) Must truth be given?

5. Reasons for selecting these problems for treatment are:

(a) They are generally considered important, if we may judge by the consideration they have received from others.

(b) They bear directly upon arguments for transcending presence which we shall discuss in Section E. This analysis is intended to be a preparation for wholesale refutation of arguments for transcending presence. Discussion of the precise import of our analysis, or the implications of our interpretation of the nature of presence, is reserved for Section E.

(c) We have selected only ten problems for consideration and we consider our treatment of them sufficient to establish our contentions, for: (1) If our reader be convinced that our argument has been successful concerning these ten problems, he will probably be convinced that it will hold for all problems concerning other possible characteristics of presence; (2) We are probably not acquainted with all possible characteristics of the nature of presence, so no matter to what lengths we might go in treating problems concerning possible characteristics of presence we would still not have treated all of them, and so must stop some place; (3) The

treatment of these ten problems should make the force of our argument sufficiently clear, so that further application of it would be monotonously superfluous.

1. Must Implicitness be Given?

Implicitness is of three sorts, psychological, logical and physiological. We take our cue for this distinction from Mr. Henry Barker¹ who describes implicitness as follows:

"When we speak of a component of a mental state as being psychologically implicit, we may agree to mean, (a) that, on the one hand, the component is really present in, and gives some sort of coloring to, the mental state, so that the mental state with the component is different from -- and might be known to be different from -- a mental state otherwise the same but without the component, (b) that, on the other hand, the subject is not aware of the component itself as a distinct or distinguishable component; he cannot, or at any rate, for the time being, does not, distinguish it at all from the other components with which it is blended. The first of these two marks serves to distinguish psychological implicitness from logical or again physiological implication; and it is all important to keep these things entirely distinct."²

Let us give our interpretation of these three kinds of implicitness:

(a) By psychological implicitness is meant that whenever something is supposedly given and yet not explicitly distinguished, that something is said to be implicitly given.

(b) By logical implicitness is meant that when one logical

1. Mr. Barker, together with Mr. G. F. Stout and Mr. R. F. A. Hoernlé, contributes a Symposium to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1912-1913, pp. 257 ff., entitled "Can there be anything obscure or implicit in a mental State?" Mr. Barker presents his view first and is attacked in turn by Mr. Stout and Mr. Hoernlé. It is our conviction that Mr. Barker's arguments do not suffer from these attacks.

2. Op. cit., p. 263.

concept implies another, the second is implicit in the first.

(c) By physiological implicitness is meant that whenever one existent is dependent upon another existent for its being, the second is implicit in the dependent existent.

Our problem, Must implicitness be given? thus become three problems: (a) Must psychological implicitness be given (b) Must logical implicitness be given? (c) Must physiological implicitness be given?

(a) Must Psychological Implicitness be Given? Psychological implicitness not only need not, but cannot, be given. In Mr. Barker's words, "psychological implicitness is a sheer fiction, and the distinction between the explicit and the implicit has no psychological application whatever."¹

In arguing for this view we find it convenient to quote at length from Barker's convincing discussion. In what follows, he first distinguishes implicit presence from potential presence and from inferred presence, and then presents some arguments for the view.

"The implicit must therefore be distinguished from the simply potential. If I have forgotten a name which I afterwards remember, the name was not implicit during the period of forgetfulness, because it had no conscious existence at all. Implicit elements, on the contrary, are actually present in the mental state; they are potential not for consciousness, but only for discrimination. As I do not believe in the existence of such implicit elements, it is impossible for me to give an example which seems to myself satisfactory.

1. Op. Cit., p. 264.

"It is most important not to mix up with the distinction between explicit and the implicit another distinction which has often been drawn in psychological and philosophical discussion, the distinction between conscious apprehension of an object of perception or thought, on the one hand, and a reflective statement about what is perceived, an abstract formulation of what is thought, on the other. This second distinction I regard as entirely sound and necessary, but it also seems to me to be essentially different from the distinction between the explicit and the implicit.

"Examples will make this plain.... Suppose I meet in a room ten persons of whom I know all but one; I am asked afterwards who were there and how many; I give the names of those I know, and add that there was another person whom I did not know, and that there must therefore have been ten persons in all. Here the naming is an instance of reflective statement. It does not alter the perceived content in any way, or add anything to it, but simply communicates in a definite way what was perceived. An exact description of the unknown person as remembered would be another instance. For, although I had not separately enumerated the characteristics of his appearance to myself before, I am now merely reading them off from my memory image. I am not making the image more definite than before, but am merely stating in a definite and successive way what was already definitely but simultaneously apprehended in it. The counting, on the other hand, may be a piece of new knowledge based upon the data supplied by memory. I did not know exactly how many were there until after I had counted, and am therefore adding to my previous awareness something which was logically (or arithmetically) involved in it, but of which I was, strictly, not aware in any sense at all until the counting had been done.

"Now we must distinguish from both of these processes -- both from the reflective statement and from the subsequent operation upon the mental data -- the relation of the explicit to the implicit.

"Suppose I had been asked if the unknown person was dark or fair. I may be unable to say. Now, if we suppose that it is not the case that I knew at the time and have simply forgotten, there still remain two possibilities: on the one hand, it may be said that although I perceived the person sufficiently well to know that I did not know him, I did not perceive him as either dark or fair -- of course we may assume that he could not have been either in a very marked degree -- on the other hand, it may be maintained, that,

if the person was, say fair, and I perceived the person, I must also have perceived, or been aware of, his fairness, although my perception or awareness of it remained implicit.

"Now this latter contention is plausible, but it seems to me to depend wholly on one of the fallacies referred to.¹ The argument, stated in general form, is really this, that, because the object was there before me and because it had certain features, I must have been somehow aware of them. My answer is that, in the first place, no amount of indirect argument from the presence of the stimulus will prove that I have a sensation or perception when I myself am not aware of having it, or that I have had it if my memory truly records no awareness of having it. And if it is objected that I am here playing on the ambiguity of the term awareness, I answer, in the second place, that implicit awareness -- awareness of two in one without awareness that the one contains the two -- is a conception which is to me simply self-contradictory.

"And on this view, of course, the question really ceases to be one of fact, for it becomes the question whether the hypothesis of implicit elements is really thinkable at all as applied to consciousness. For my own particular part I am bound to say that I am unable to make intelligible to myself the sense in which two items can be said to be present in consciousness, when there is no consciousness of the difference between them, or how any item can be said to be present when I have no awareness if its being there among the other items. I simply do not see what such presence can mean. Hence no indirect arguments even from conscious data themselves seem to me to be in the least adequate to prove the supposed implicit awareness."²

The argument, in sum, is this: To be psychologically implicit means to be in presence without being explicitly in awareness. But presence consists of awareness. Thus it follows that to be psychologically implicit a thing must both be in presence and

1. In an unquoted discussion.

2. Op. cit., pp. 276-279.

not in presence, But this is impossible since it violates our necessary methodological postulates (laws of thought).¹ Again in Mr. Barker's words, a thing "must either be there in consciousness or not, and, if there, then there in some definite way. It cannot, as it were, be half there and half not, or there only to half the degree it might otherwise be."²

Hoernlé supports this view when he makes the following statements: "Psychologically speaking, the object, the what-I-am-conscious-of at any given moment, is always explicitly just what we experience it as."³ And in an analysis, "we must take every experience of an object in the first instance on its merits, as it were. We must ask simply: What is it just as it stands? And this analysis of the experience as we have it or find it must precede, and must not be confused with, any interpretation of it by comparison with other experiences such as might lead us to say, it is implicitly the same as this, or it is implicitly the same as that."⁴

But then Hoernlé raises an objection: "But there is a source

1. We hold that it is not merely a matter of logical impossibility that there could be no psychological implicitness, but that if it were possible to analyze a particular presence, nothing psychologically implicit would ever be found.

2. Op. cit., 274.

3. Ibid., p. 302.

4. Ibid., p. 306.

of trouble in that there are regions of experience for which this distinction will not work. Take, e.g., a strong emotion like anger or fear. It will certainly make me attend to the object which arouses the emotion, but the emotion itself, though the dominant fact in my consciousness, can certainly not be said to be in the focus of attention if that means that it is made an object."¹

We reply to Hoernle that this objection does not at all affect the argument, but that it simply serves to make an additional clarification of our view. Insofar as an emotion is in presence it is in presence completely. If to be in presence means to be an object, then if an emotion is in presence it is an object. An emotion of which there is no awareness simply isn't in presence, for presence is nothing more than awareness. If an emotion is given at all, it must be given explicitly. It cannot be given implicitly because to be ~~given~~ psychologically implicit means to be both given and not given.

We have, in the above discussion, been concerned with "internal description." If one will analyze presence he will find only what is given explicitly because that is all that is actually in presence to be discovered. If one is to maintain that there can be something psychologically implicit in presence, that is, that something both is and is not in presence, he must resort to "external description," that is, he must resort to a description of something

1. Ibid., p. 304.

that is not actually in presence. To be psychologically implicit is to be something that is admittedly not in presence and yet which is, somehow, still in presence. Insofar as this something is not in experience, interpretation of it belongs to "external description." Insofar as this something is, somehow, still in presence, interpretation of it belongs to "internal description." But, this something, if there, then there, but not both there and not there. That is, this something, if there, then there explicitly, but not implicitly.

(b) Must Logical Implicitness be Given? Logical implicitness (a) can or (b) cannot be given, depending upon precisely what is meant by logical implicitness. We have given as a general definition of logical implicitness the following: By logical implicitness is meant that when one logical concept implies another the second is implicit in the first. If both of the concepts are in presence, then the implicitness can be given, but if one of the concepts is in presence and the other not in presence, the implicitness cannot be given.

(a) Logical implicitness can be given if the two concepts are both given in presence, and a logical implication is given if it is apparent that the one concept is implied by the other. To illustrate: Being red implies being colored. This implication can be given if both concepts, "being red" and "being colored," are given. This implication is given if both concepts are given and there is also an awareness that the one implies the other. But if

there is no awareness of the implication, the implication cannot be said to be given.

(b) Logical implicitness cannot be given if the concept which is said to imply, or be implied by, a given concept is not in presence, and if the givenness of an implication involves the givenness of both of its terms. For if a concept is not in presence it is not given, and if the givenness of an implication involves the givenness of both of its terms, it cannot be given when one of its terms is not given.¹

If it is maintained that, for example, the concept "being red" implies the concept "being colored," and that therefore the givenness of the concept "being red" involves the givenness of the concept "being colored," we protest that such a contention is made without sufficient consideration of the facts. There are two theories of the being^{of} logical implications of the kind about which we are speaking; namely, nominalism and realism. As we understand them, neither of these theories give warrant to the above contention.

1. This doctrine that a concept which is logically implied by a concept in presence, which is nevertheless not itself in presence, may be illustrated from the writings of Kant: "But if we look more closely we find that the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought is taken as to what the single number may be which combines both. The concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 5;... This is still more evident if we take larger numbers." (Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by N. K. Smith, p. 53.)

The nominalist holds that concepts have no being apart from presence and that implications have no being apart from presence. Then, if there is awareness of the concept "being red" without there being awareness of the concept "being colored," the concept "being colored" has no being and therefore cannot possibly be involved in the concept "being red." For the nominalist, then, there cannot even be an implication between a given concept "being red" and a not given concept "being colored" so certainly such an implication cannot be given.

The realist holds that concepts do have a being apart from presence, and that there are implications between concepts whether or not they are in presence. He holds further that since the being of such implications are not dependent upon their being in presence, any concept in presence can imply a concept not in presence. But, we point out, even though a given concept does imply a not given concept, it does not follow that therefore the not given concept is given. Rather, a not given concept cannot be given, and therefore logical implicitness, where implicitness is supposed to involve a not given concept, cannot be given.

(c) Must Physiological Implicitness be Given? If we mean by "physiological implicitness" that a dependent existent has implicit in it the existent upon which it is dependent, then it may be argued that, for example, a physical organism is implicit in consciousness. Since there can be no consciousness without a physical

organism, a physical organism is involved in the being of consciousness, it may be argued. All this may be granted without affecting our contention that if the physical organism is not actually given in awareness it is not given at all. For it is either given or not given, and if it is not given explicitly, or in awareness, it is not given at all. At this point our distinction between internal and external description comes into sharp relief. In an internal description of presence, we deny that physiological implicitness is possible; that is, we deny that what is not given is nevertheless given. Yet, in an external description we may, at the same time, contend that presence is dependent for its being upon physiological or other physical conditions. The point we are trying to emphasize is that such dependence is not discoverable by an analysis of what is given.

In conclusion: Our problem has been: Must implicitness be given? Our answer has been: (a) Psychological implicitness cannot be given, for psychological implicitness means something is both given and not given. (b) Logical implicitness cannot be given where a not given concept is supposed to be implied by a ~~not~~ given concept. (A logical implication can, however, be given when there is an awareness of both of the terms and the implication.) (c) Physiological implicitness cannot be given unless there is awareness of dependence.

2. Must Boundaries of Presence be Given?

Presence is a particular, and therefore must have limits; and yet there is no awareness of the limits of presence. Here we are confronted with a dilemma which gives rise to this problem: If presence is finite and limited, must its boundaries or limits be given.

Upon the solution of this problem hinge the grounds for an argument for transcendence. The argument is that if presence has boundaries, and if boundaries are relations between things, then there must be things other than presence. But we wish to show that such an argument has no cogency because it assumes a question-begging assumption. An argument for transcendence must, presumably, get the grounds for the argument from within presence. These grounds must be discovered by an analysis of what is given, and accounted for in "internal description."

We grant that, by way of external description, "the moment of experience is limited in duration,"¹ and that we "actually do measure this moment of experience by a purely objective standard."² An external description must admit that there is a "boundary between consciousness and non-consciousness."³ There are, probably, both

1. H. W. Carr, "The Moment of Experience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1915-1916, p. 9.

2. Ibid., p. 14.

3. S. H. Hodgson, Metaphysic of Experience, I, p. 55.

spatial and temporal limits of presence. But the important question is: Are these discoverable by an analysis of what is given?

An analysis of what is given can never reveal boundaries of presence. In support of this contention we offer two items of evidence, one "empirical" and one "dialectical."

(a) First, we appeal to everyone's experience. There never actually is an awareness of the boundaries of presence. And if there is no awareness of boundaries, there are no boundaries given, for to be given means to be in awareness. Further, the habit of psychologists of speaking of the "stream of consciousness"¹ and of the "presentation continuum"² indicate the lack of awareness of boundaries of presence. The very notion of presence itself is difficult to understand, upon first explanation, because it involves, by external description, a notion of limits of which there is no awareness. It is only by argument that one is convinced that experience has limits, for the normal supposition is that one's consciousness is continuous from waking to sleeping and that the only boundaries that it can have are those at waking and those at falling to sleep.

(b) Secondly, we argue from the meanings of the terms "boundaries" and "given." If boundaries are given they must fall within presence. If they fall within presence, they cannot be

1. William James, Principles of Psychology.

2. Helen Wodehouse, "Knowledge as Presentation," Mind, 1909, p. 391.

boundaries, for what is in presence must be inside of the boundaries of presence.

An analysis of presence, then, fails to reveal boundaries of presence. Boundaries of presence cannot be given. Arguments for transcendence based upon the grounds that boundaries of presence imply some non-presence get these grounds by assuming that presence has boundaries when no boundaries are actually discoverable by analysis.

3. Must a Margin of Presence be Given?

A boundary is a limit. A margin is something inside a limit which indicates a proximate limit. The problem: Must a margin of presence be given? has been much discussed and an affirmative answer to it has supposedly furnished grounds for an argument for transcendence. We shall attempt to show that a margin of presence cannot be given, and that therefore such an argument is groundless.

The problem has been stated in various sorts of terminology. It is spoken of as the problem as to whether presence has a foreground and a background, a focus and a fringe, a center and a margin. The distinction between "the focal and marginal content of consciousness ... is, of course, a commonplace."¹ It is usually held that "all experiences have their focus and margin."² Laird asserts that "it is most certainly true that every event perceived has a present setting and fringe, part of which wanes while part waxes."³ Piatt agrees that "experience ... has its margin as well as its focus."⁴

The doctrine that a margin must be given, that a fringe is an essential characteristic of presence, is not only widely held

1. Henry Barker, op. cit., p. 268.

2. B. H. Bode, "The Definition of Consciousness," Journal of Philosophy, 1913, p. 235.

3. John Laird, A Study in Realism, p. 49.

4. D. A. Piatt, "Immediate Experience," Journal of Philosophy, 1928, p. 477.

but it is also used to serve different purposes in the hands of different writers. Let us note some of these:

1. For William James and his doctrine of Pure Empiricism, the fringe is essentially relational in character, in that it is that which connects different bits of pure experience together. He speaks of it as a "halo of obscurely felt relation to masses of other imagery about to come, but not yet distinctly in the focus."¹ "This fringe may be an experienced relation of any sort whatever, provided only the relation be not experienced as terminating in some then experienced content other than the (present content) -- it must be terminated in a definitely discriminated 'gap.' This fringe may itself be complex in that there may be several different relations experienced together as pointing, each in its own way, to the same gap, to the missing term or object."²

2. For F. H. Bradley, and L. A. Reid and their doctrine of "Immediate Experience," the fringe is essentially non-relational in character. The fringe is constituted of "feeling" or non-relational experience as contrasted with "thought" or relational experience. The fringe is a "felt background against which the object comes."³

1. William James, Principles of Psychology, I, p. 478.

2. E. B. McGilvary, "The 'Fringe' of William James' Psychology the Basis of Logic," Philosophical Review, 1911, p. 145.

3. F. H. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 176. The full details of this doctrine of the fringe are to be found in Bradley's Essays in Truth and Reality, ch. 6, and in L. A. Reid's "Immediate Experience; Its Nature and Content," Mind, 1930, pp. 154 ff.

3. For John Laird, the emphasis is upon the "nebulousness of the margin." The margin is a "misty border" of experience. His account is rather clear, and we shall quote at length:

"The margin, to be sure, is usually neglected in perception, but is perceived none the less, and it is quite absurd to describe the field of vision as if it were a mosaic of sense data which appear the same whether they are focussed or not. We do not, indeed, perceive a world all at once, but we certainly do perceive an extensive pattern, clean in the centre and nebulous towards its misty border. Moreover, when we alter our attention within this perceived expanse, we perceive a difference of outline and emphasis within the same field and not two different sense data (as the sensory atomists aver). Again, the very nebulousness of the margin is rich in consequences. If, for example, we turn our eyes from the candlestick on the mantelpiece to the tiles of the fire-place, something more has happened than a mere change of emphasis within the same field; for the passage of our eyes continuously annexes a new field only partially coincident with the old one. What was formerly central is now marginal, and what was formerly part of the margin is now in the center, and the new margin has come to include something that was previously not perceived at all."¹

No matter what its nature is specified as, insofar as a fringe is intended to be a definite margin of semi-presence between presence and non-presence it is a conception based upon ~~a~~ part of presence and then, without due warrant, applied to the whole of presence. We do have experiences of clear and obscure perceptions, but when we "say that the object is obscure, the mental state as such is clear and not obscure."² We do distinguish between the background and foreground of a picture, for example, but the back-

1. A Study in Realism, p. 23.

2. Barker, op. cit., p. 256.

ground of the picture, just as much as the foreground of the picture, is in the "foreground" of presence. We do have experiences which warrant a distinction between a focus and a fringe, a center and a margin, but it does not follow that this distinction applies to presence itself. This doctrine is well-presented in a discussion by Mr. B. H. Bode.¹ In what follows he first presents the viewpoint of the "psychologists" and then criticizes it.

"What, then, is meant by the focus and margin? If we turn to our psychologies, we seem to be confronted once more with something that everybody knows and nobody can define. But since we have to do with the distinction, the obligation to differentiate cannot be wholly ignored. Consciousness is sometimes likened to a visual field and sometimes to the waves of the sea. Like the visual field it has a foreground and a background, a near and a remote, a center and a margin or periphery. The contents of consciousness are vivid or clear in the center of this field and fade away into vagueness or obscureness in proportion to their approach to the periphery.

"Or, to take the other comparison, the focus may be represented by the crest of the wave and the margin by what we call its base. This illustration has the advantage that it indicates the difference between higher and lower degrees of concentration. As concentration increases, the crest of the wave rises higher, and its width decreases, while the reverse is true where the concentration of attention is less intense.

"All consciousness possess^{ed} the distinction of focus and margin in some degree; however much we may be absorbed in an object or topic, there is always an indirect mental vision that informs us of other facts, which for the time being are in the background of consciousness.³

1. "The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin," Philosophical Review, 1914, pp. 389 ff. The following quotations are from pp. 393-396:

2. So far, Mr. Bode has been discussing the viewpoint of the "psychologists." Henceforth he turns to criticize them.

"I am forced to think that the visual field in particular is a thoroughly vicious metaphor when employed to body forth the distinction of focus and margin. Whatever this distinction may in the end turn out to be, it is not such as this comparison would lead one to suppose. Objects seen in indirect vision appear obscure and blurred precisely because they are in the focus of consciousness. We get pretty much the same sort of obscureness or blur on a printed page when we look at it in indirect vision as we do when we look at it from a distance that is just too great to make out the words or characters. What the illustration shows is that things look different according as the circumstances under which we see them are different, but what bearing this has on marginal consciousness is not at all obvious to an unsophisticated intelligence.

"When we speak of a focus and margin in consciousness, we are presumably¹ dealing with conscious fact. Now this illustration of the visual field does not represent conscious fact. Ordinary perception carries with it no sense of obscureness at all, and when it does we have exactly the same kind of situation as when the object is too distant or in some other way inaccessible to satisfactory perception. That is, the object perceived is in the 'focus,' and not in the margin. The obscureness of objects when seen with the margin of the retina has no more to do with the margin of consciousness than the obscureness caused by an attack of dizziness or by a morning fog.

"It will be said, perhaps, that consciousness may be unclear even though there be no sense of unclearness, that there is such a thing as intrinsic clearness, quite apart from obstacles and problems. In other words, the same sensation is capable of realizing various different degrees of clearness. It is not at all obvious, however, why the different experiences that are concerned in such a comparison should be called the same sensation. As long as we abstract from objective reference, each sensation is just what it is and there is no opportunity to make comparisons on the basis of clearness.

"A sensation as such -- if we are bound to speak of sensations -- can by no possibility be an obscure sensation, for the trait that we call obscureness or vagueness constitutes the intrinsic being of that sensation. If we permit ourselves

1. According to the "psychologists."

to speak of clearness at all we should rather say that it possesses a maximum of clearness, since it has managed to express or present its whole nature with not a trait or feature lacking. What more could be demanded, in the way of clearness, of any conscious fact than that it should body forth every detail that it possesses?"

"... this distinction of focus and margin cannot be drawn on the basis of the experienced contrast between clearness and obscureness. The very fact that anything is experienced as obscure means that it is an object of attention, or, in other words, that it is in the focus of consciousness and not in the margin. The comparison of focus and margin with direct and indirect vision is misleading, because it suggests that experiences are marginal in proportion as they are felt as obscure."

"... if we undertake to distinguish between focus and margin on the basis of a difference in clearness or vividness of which no note is taken at the time, we encounter the difficulty that experience or consciousness, taken abstractly, does not admit of such variations in degrees, and so this criterion likewise goes by the board."

We agree with Mr. Bode that if a margin is experienced at all it is experienced clearly. If there is a margin in presence there must be an awareness of it, for presence consists of awareness. And if anything is in awareness, the awareness of it is clear and complete, for "what more could be demanded, in the way of clearness, of any conscious fact than that it should body forth every detail that it possesses?"

If by margin of presence is meant an unclear portion of presence, we conclude that a margin cannot be given, for everything that is in presence is there to just the fullest possible extent that it can be. Every unclear experience is a clearly unclear experience. If a margin is supposed to be unclear, and yet given, it must be

clearly unclear, and thus, being clear, it is not a margin of presence.

We may turn from dialectic to appeal to experience. The common notion of consciousness as continuous from waking to sleeping does not include within it an awareness of a fading and approaching margins of presence. There may be a feeling of drowsiness at bedtime, but the actual act of falling asleep, itself, even, is never given. For if it were given, one would have to be awake in order to experience the falling asleep. Even as we fall asleep without experiencing the fact, so objects cease to be in presence without our experiencing their disappearance when we are awake. There is no need for a supposed "margin" of experience to account for their "fading." They do not "fade from experience." They are in experience and then not in experience. Only their being in experience is experienced. They cannot fade from experience, for, if so, their fading must be experienced, but if their fading is experienced, they are still in experience so long as they are experienced as fading. In order for fading to be experienced there must be an experience of their being experienced and their not being experienced, for fading from experience means first being in experience and then being not in experience, but experience of what is not in experience is clearly impossible. Empirically, again, it is not only impossible for a fading from presence to be in presence, but we never actually do

experience such a fading from experience, even though we often infer that a disappearance has taken place.

What causes things to be and not to be in presence is not a matter for internal description. What hypotheses concerning the nature of the cerebral mechanisms conditioning presence are necessary to satisfactorily explain why experience is such as it is, is a matter for external description -- a matter far too complicated for consideration in connection with our present purposes. We are concerned, at present, only with the fact that the hypothesis of a margin of presence is not needed to account for the nature of presence, and that there is actually no ground in experience for maintaining that presence has a margin. And if we have made our point, those who argue for transcendence upon the ground that presence has a margin can no longer argue from such a ground.¹

1. Before leaving this problem, two further points are of interest:

First: We should note that although we often hear of the subjective background and of the objective background, we seldom hear of the distinction between subjective and objective background. If there were a subject distinct from an object, each might well have its own background. But we are certainly never aware of two backgrounds. Bradley solves this difficulty by making the self, or subjective element, the background or margin for the objective element. We find no background in experience, but we wish to point out that those who discover both subjective and objective elements in experience, if they also discover a margin in experience, face this difficulty of determining whether the margin is subjective or objective, or, if both, how the two are related.

Second: Our criticism of the following statement (an interpretation by Bode, op. cit., p. 392) will bring our view out in bold relief.

(note continued on next page)

4. Must Unity be Given

It is usually held that unity is an essential characteristic of experience. And it is usually held that plurality is an essential characteristic of experience. And it is usually held that experience is essentially a many in one. Further, it is argued that

1 (continued). "'However deeply we may suppose the attention to be engaged by any thought, any considerable alteration of the surrounding phenomena would still be perceived; the most abstruse demonstration in this room would not prevent a listener, however absorbed, from noticing the sudden extinction of the lights.' Even so the ticking of the clock may pass unnoticed in the sense that it is an undiscriminated element in the background of our consciousness; but if the ticking comes to a sudden stop, the feeling of a void in our consciousness proclaims the fact that something has gone out of it."

We contend, on the other hand, that the awareness of the extinction of the lights or of the stopping of the clock does not prove that there was awareness of the lights or of the ticking. One may be in a lighted room and reading a book lighted by a lamp directly above the book, and yet be unaware that the book is lighted by the lamp. And he may be aware of the extinction of the light without having been aware of the light.

This may at first seem an absurdity, that something should go out of presence which was not in it. But we contend that the "extinction of the light" is not a "something going out of presence," but simply a "given in presence." If no attention was paid the lighted lamp, it was not in presence. When there is awareness of the "extinction of the light" there is something given, but how it is given need not necessarily be discoverable by an analysis of what is given. How the extinction could take place with the previous awareness of the light is just as much a mystery as how it could take place without previous awareness, so far as an internal description of presence is concerned.

The experience of extinction is usually accompanied by an inference that a light had been on and by an inference that there had been an awareness of the light having been on, but while the first inference may be true yet the second may be false, without making any actual difference to practical experience.

if there are, for example, two things in experience the two are somehow united in the experience, and that, regardless of whether there is an awareness of this unity, it is an essential characteristic of experience.

We intend to show, without denying that unity is an essential characteristic of experience, that it is not an essential characteristic of experience discoverable by an analysis of what is given. The proof is simple: Anything that is an essential characteristic of experience discoverable by an analysis of what is given must be given in order to be discoverable. And anything that is given must be in awareness, for anything of which there is no awareness cannot be given. So if there is ever an awareness which is not an awareness of unity, unity is not given. And if there is one case of awareness in which unity is not given, unity is not an essential characteristic of experience discoverable by an analysis of what is given. That there are experiences in which no unity is given is probably obvious to the reader. Yet, to illustrate: when the whole of attention is absorbed in noting the difference between two things, there is no attention given to their unity and thus their unity is not given.

That there is a unity involved whenever two things are given together, we have no wish to doubt. But that there is a unity given whenever two things are given together, without there being given as together, we do deny. Explanation that a not given unity of experience is an essential condition of experience belongs to

external description. We are concerned here only to point out that unity is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis.

(Nor can the demand for unity of two givens be used in support of an argument for transcendence, for such a demand is an external demand. If two are given, they are given, and without a demand for unity. The only kind of demand for unity that could be used in argument for transcendence is a given demand; but a given demand for unity is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by an analysis of the given, for there are some experiences (all but the few containing the speculations of philosophers arguing for transcendence on the basis of demand for unity) which do not have a given demand for unity as a part of them.)

5. Must Duration be Given

It is usually held that duration is an essential characteristic of presence.¹ We intend here to show that duration need not be given, or that duration is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis.

Presence is often spoken of as a momentary affair, a specious present, a moment of experience. These and other terms intend to indicate that presence is durational in nature. We have no objection to describing presence as durational in nature, provided it is clearly understood that such description is external description. That is, that it is an attempt to explain what is probably the nature of the conditions of presence, rather than an assertion of what must be found by an analysis of what is given.

Why cannot an analysis of what is given reveal that the nature of presence is necessarily durational? Because it is possible to be completely unaware of duration. If there is no awareness of duration, no duration is given. And if no duration is given, duration is not an essential characteristic of presence.

The complete absence of duration is clearly illustrated by an experience in which the attention is completely absorbed in

1. E.g., "The passage of time is not, it would seem, absent from the field of consciousness for a single moment. It may not be specially attended to; it is at least 'enjoyed' or 'endured.'" N. K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, p. 80.

the contemplation of a geometrical pattern. Most of our experiences are durationless in the sense that there is no explicit awareness of duration. But theory concerning the nature of presence is so imbued with "the undeniable fact that we are able to and actually do measure this moment of experience by a purely objective standard"¹ that it is thereby supposed that any analysis of presence must reveal its nature as durational. Thus internal description is contaminated by external description. The ^{solution of the} difficulty of consistently explaining how there can be non-durational experiences in a supposedly durational presence is to keep clear the distinction between internal and external description. A pure internal description of presence need not reveal duration, as is evidenced by complete absorption of attention in contemplation of a geometrical pattern.²

1. H. W. Carr, op. cit., p. 9.

2. Discussions relevant to the problem of the givenness of duration may be found as follows:

S. H. Hodgson, Metaphysic of Experience, I pp. 35-37.

H. W. Carr, "The Moment of Experience," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1915-16, pp. 1 ff.

E. B. McGilvary, "Time and the Experience of Time", Philosophical Review, 1914, pp. 124-143.

N. K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, pp. 80-83.

Bertrand Russell, "On the Experience of Time," Monist, 1915, pp. 212 ff.

L. E. Akeley, "The Problem of the Specious Present and Physical Time", Journal of Philosophy, 1925, pp. 561 ff.

V. J. McGill, "An Analysis of the Experience of Time," Journal of Philosophy, 1930, pp. 533 ff.

John Laird, Knowledge, Belief and Opinion, pp. 270-278, 297-299.

John Laird, A Study in Realism, p. 47.

G. F. Stout, Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, pp. 169-170.

6. Must Change be Given?

not.

Change need/be given. The general argument we are using should now be clear: If there are some experiences in which there is no awareness of change, change is not an essential characteristic of experience discoverable by analysis. And that there are experiences in which there is no awareness of change is undoubtedly obvious to the reader. To illustrate: When attention is completely absorbed in contemplation of a still life scene, or, again, a geometrical pattern, there is no awareness of change.

But in connection with this problem there is another argument pertinent to a clarification of our view and supporting our contentions. We may make a distinction between change in presence and change of presence, where by change of presence we mean that presence changes from something that it is to something that it is not. Change in presence is obviously a possibility, for there can be an awareness of change. But that change of presence is an impossibility, we shall proceed to show.

Change of presence, by which is meant that presence changes from what it is to what it is not, is impossible because, since presence consists of what is given, both a given and a not given would have to be given. But a change of the given into some not given is clearly impossible, for (a) if we suppose there to be a given change, the not given must be given together with the given,

and then the supposed not given is given and not not given, or (b) if we suppose the change to be from the given to the not given, observation of the change must involve more than the given, and thus the observation is not a given observation, or the observed change is not given as observed.

In different terminology, we deny that there can be given "an experience of new events and a loss from experience of old events."¹ For if there is an experience of "loss" from experience, what is lost must be experienced as no longer present. And there is a difference between "being experienced as no longer presence" and "no longer being experienced." If what is lost is "being experienced as no longer present," it is still being experienced, and thus is not a "loss."

Concerning change, then, we say that it need not be given, for there are experiences in which there is no awareness of change. And if change is given, it is change in presence, for it cannot be change of presence. An external description of presence might explain that change is an essential condition of presence, even though there is no awareness of change, and that there is change of the essential conditions of presence even though there is no awareness of them. But an internal description -- an analysis of the given -- does not furnish grounds for argument for transcendence, at least not the ground that change is an essential characteristic of presence.

1. E. B. McGilvary, "Time and the Experience of Time," Philosophical Review, 1914, p. 143.

7. Must the Self be Given?

"That there is some real and permanent Subject or agent, some of whose functions, psychologically speaking, support and condition consciousness, is as a common-sense idea undeniable,... But this explanation cannot be given, nor can the substantial truth of the common-sense idea be vindicated, without having recourse ultimately to the analysis of the present moments of consciousness, taken each for itself, without the assumption of the continuity of consciousness as an existent stream, from the beginning to the end of a Subject's conscious life."¹ Such an analysis "will specify only states or process-contents of consciousness, together with the inseparable elements of which they are composed, and the relations of combinations in which they stand, or into which they enter, with one another; and will, as an analysis, contain no statement that these or any of them are perceived by a Subject."²

The above quotations from Hodgson express rather well the position we take with regard to the problem: Must the self be given? Without attempting to deny that there is something which so conditions presence that something like the common-sense notion of an enduring self is necessary to give a satisfactory explanation of the nature

1. S. H. Hodgson, Metaphysic of Experience, I, p. 43.

2. Ibid., p. 42.

of experience, we do at the same time attempt to show that we cannot, by analysis of presence, discover that the self is an essential characteristic of presence. We agree that a completely critical system of philosophy will "have recourse ultimately to the analysis of present moments of consciousness, taken each for itself." That is, it will recognize that presence is all that is given for analysis, and that all arguments claiming certainty in a metaphysics will find their grounds ultimately in presence. And, with regard to the self, we argue that it is not an essential characteristic of presence, for there are presences without any awareness of a self. To illustrate: If presence is constituted of a judgement such as: Two plus two equals four, or There are white swans, there is no awareness of a self involved.

We consider this a refutation of the doctrine of Calkins and other Idealists who assert that "every idea is experienced as an idea-of-a-conscious-possessor-of-ideas."¹ It is, likewise, a refutation of Kant's assertion that there is a necessary "... 'I am', which accompanies all my judgments and acts of understanding..."² There may be, and probably is, something like a Transcendental Ego which accompanies as a necessary condition of presence, but that

1. M. W. Calkins, "Psychology as Science of the Self," Journal of Philosophy, 1908, p. 13. For a criticism of the 'axiom' that "for the known there must be a knower," see W. E. Pillsbury, "The Ego and Empirical Psychology," Philosophical Review, 1907, pp. 387 ff.

2. Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by N. K. Smith, p. 35, note.

there is an explicit "I am" necessarily given in presence is not warranted by an analysis of presence, as evidenced by any experience in which there is no explicit awareness of a self, or in which the attention is obviously completely absorbed in some object.

Another point: while, on the one hand, there may be no self in presence, yet, on the other, there may be several selves in presence. This is illustrated by a comparison of a childhood self with a mature self. If there is to be an experienced comparison of a childhood self and a mature self, both selves must be given in the experience. If one does not hold that there are two real selves accompanying the two given selves, what reason should there be that there must be one real self accompanying one given self? We cite this in support of the contention that, an analysis of the given gives no necessary ground for the doctrine that a real self is a necessary condition of presence. That a completely satisfactory explanation of the nature of experience involves a real self, we do not wish to question. But that an analysis of what is given necessitates a real self, we deny.

8. Must Purpose be Given?

Some hold that purpose or will or desire is the fundamental principle constituting being. And they may argue that since everything is essentially purposive in nature, presence is essentially purposive in nature. Such a conclusion follows from the premises. But it does not follow that purpose must be given; that is, that an analysis of presence must reveal purpose. To assert that the world is purposive is one way of explaining presence, that is, to assert that presence is a part of a purpose is one way of explaining presence. But to assert that therefore purpose must be given is to predetermine analysis.

Let us state and consider three conclusions concerning the givenness of purpose:

1. If by "purpose" is meant an ontological principle either constituting or necessarily conditioning presence, and if purpose is in any sense something more than presence, insofar as it is something more than presence it cannot be given, for anything that is more than, i.e., not, presence cannot be given. Again, in other words, if presence is a part of a purpose, that part of the purpose which is not in presence cannot be given, for what is not in presence is ipso facto not given.

2. If by "purpose" we mean something that is in presence (e.g., one's desire for the anticipated enjoyment of a play), purpose can, of course, be given. But insofar as "purpose" also means

something that is not in presence, it cannot be given. For example, if it be asserted that purpose has its realization outside of presence and that realization is a part of purpose, then there is a part of purpose which is not in presence. The realization of an unrealized purpose cannot, thus, be given.

3. If by "purpose" we mean something that is in presence, it does not follow that purpose is an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis. We assert that purpose is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by analysis, for there are some experiences in which there is no awareness of purpose. And where there is no awareness of purpose, purpose is not given. Experience without awareness of purpose may be illustrated by any experience wherein awareness is wholly constituted of (a) a feeling of drowsiness, (b) an attitude of surprise, or (c) retrospective contemplation.

9. Must Knowledge be Given?

In order to answer the question: Must knowledge be given? we must first determine what is to be meant by the terms "knowledge" and "objects." The term "objects" refers to what is known, and objects, according to epistemological tradition, may be of two kinds, given and not given. The term "knowledge" may be defined to mean different things depending upon whether the act of knowing and the objects known are both given or whether the act of knowing alone is given. Let us discuss three possibilities:

(a) If knowledge involves a given act of knowing and a given object, knowledge can be given.

(b) If knowledge involves a given act of knowing and a not given object, knowledge cannot be given.

(c) If knowledge is said to be about a not given object and yet involves only the given act of knowing, knowledge may be said to be given.

Let us first discuss (b), the case where knowledge cannot be given; then (c), where knowledge of not given objects may be given; and then (c) and (a) together, where knowledge can be given, and their bearing upon the problem: Must knowledge be given?

(b) If knowledge involves a given act of knowing and a not given object, knowledge cannot be given, because part of knowledge, the not given object, is not given. It may be objected that, since a part of knowledge is given, knowledge is given. But, if knowledge

be taken as being made up of two parts, the knowing and the object, the givenness of the knowing is not equivalent to the givenness of knowledge unless the part is equivalent to the whole. We assert, then, that if knowledge involves a given knowing and a not given object, knowledge cannot be given.

(c) If knowledge is said to be about a not given ^{object} knowledge and yet involves only the given act of knowing, ^{like} knowing may be said to be given. The being of knowledge, on such a definition, does not involve the being of objects;¹ and the givenness of knowledge, so defined, does not give grounds for arguments for transcendence. A quotation from Wendel T. Bush² clearly presents this position:

"I therefore define knowledge, provisionally, at least, as experience with the cognitive character. ... One is perhaps inclined at this point to protest against a misuse of words. We do not normally use the word knowledge to mean an experience which has a cognitive feeling. By knowledge we knowledge and not perhaps error that feels like knowledge. Truth and error, it is held, are two radically different things, and knowledge means the possession of truth and it cannot mean the possession of error. This is the traditional attitude. I admit that the point of view which I here defend uses the word knowledge in a novel way, which may be a little confusing. But the habit of declaring that knowledge must be knowledge of outer fact, and then to say that epistemology investigates knowledge, is to declare an important problem solved by a mere fiat before beginning. Or put differently, there must be a transsubjective object of knowledge, otherwise there would be no knowledge for epistemology to investigate; but we have epistemology, therefore we have knowledge. Perhaps we have, but it is to beg the

1. "Knowledge consists of a content and a claim." Sellars, Essays in Critical Realism, p. 214.

2. Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience, pp. 14, 15.

most fundamental of questions to assume the transsubjective objects in our definition of knowledge. We have cases of experience which we say are cases of knowledge. As types of experience, they must be distinguished by experience qualities. These experience marks are precisely what they are, whether there is any knowledge of transsubjective things or not."

(a) & (c) If by knowledge we mean something that can be given, we may still ask: Must knowledge be given? The answer is this: Knowledge need not be given. For there are some experiences which do not have a "cognitive character." To illustrate: A proposition may be entertained without being affirmed or denied. There may be presented a sense-datum which is not interpreted. One may feel good without knowing why.

Concerning the givenness of knowledge, then, we say: Givenness of knowledge is not an essential characteristic of presence discoverable by an analysis of what is given. And further, if and when knowledge is given, it does not follow deductively that there is anything which is not given, for (a) knowledge which involves a not given object cannot be given, and (b) knowledge which does not involve a not given object implies nothing concerning what is not given.

10. Must Truth be Given?

In order to consider the problem: Must truth be given? we must first determine what is to be meant by the term "truth." We accept as the most satisfactory, and most completely generalized, theory of the meaning of truth that of Aristotle. He asks "what the true and false are." "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true."¹ We may state this theory in a form which seems to us preferable: Truth is a property of a belief when what is believed to be, is; or when what is believed to be so, is so; or when what is believed to be not, is not; or when what is believed to be not so, is not so. And falsity is a property of a belief when what is believed to be, is not; or when what is believed to be so, is not so; or when what is believed to be not, is; or when what is believed to be not so, is so.

We contend that such a theory is a "most completely generalized theory of the meaning of truth" because it is not, as some of our critics have supposed,² merely a correspondence theory of the meaning of truth, because the truth of a belief does not always depend upon correspondence between an idea and a real thing, for example, but may sometimes depend upon consistency or workability or some other function. That is, the truth of a belief that an idea is consistent with other ideas depends upon the consistency of that

1. Metaphysics, 1011a 25, W. D. Ross translation.

2. This theory of the meaning of truth was presented in a paper read before the Acolytes in January, 1932.

idea with other ideas. Or, the truth of a belief that an idea will work successfully depends upon the successful working of that idea. All of these and other kinds of beliefs are capable of being true under Aristotle's definition of the meaning of truth. That is why we prefer to call it the "Generic Theory" of the meaning of truth.

But regardless of the preferences for methods of stating the meaning of truth, all theories agree that that which makes a belief (judgement, proposition or idea) true is in some sense other than the belief itself. And a belief, being in presence, is made true by something other than itself, whether this other be in or not in presence. If this other be not in presence, and if the givenness of truth involves the givenness of this other, truth cannot be given. For example: If an idea is made true by the being of a corresponding not-given existent, and if truth involves the corresponding existent (i.e., if the givenness of truth involves the givenness of the corresponding existent), then the truth of the idea cannot be given. But where this other is in presence, truth can be given. That is, if there is a belief about something else within the same presence, and if there is awareness of the belief as being about something else in presence and as true, truth can be given.

The problem: Must truth be given? is answered, then, by saying that (a) if truth involves some not given, truth cannot be given, and (b) although it is possible for truth to be given, where the givenness of truth does not involve the givenness of anything

not given, such givenness is not essential to presence for there are some experiences in which there is no awareness of truth. To illustrate: An experience in which the awareness is completely filled with a feeling of intense pain or, again, with a feeling of drowsiness.

Conclusion

Presence, as we interpret its nature, has no essential characteristics discoverable by analysis. This is our contention. Whether or not our contention be taken as established depends upon (a) whether or not we have successfully argued concerning the non-essentiality of the ten proposed characteristics, and upon (b) whether or not the success of the argument in these ten cases convinces the reader that the argument will be successful in all possible cases.

Section E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION

Introduction

In this section we shall seek to point out what bearing our interpretation of the nature of presence has upon "arguments for transcendence." There is implied by our analysis of what is given, nothing that is not given. It follows, then, that nothing can be logically deduced from what is given, and that thus all "arguments for transcendence" are "unsound."

1. An "argument for transcendence," as we are using the term in this paper, is an attempt to get, by logical means, from what is given to what is not given. It is an attempt to prove the being of something not given from given premises.

An argument for transcendence is "sound" when it is valid and based upon warranted premises. (a) An argument is valid when the conclusions follow from the premises logically, i.e., without violating the "three laws of thought" which we postulated in our Critique of Method. (b) Warranted premises are those which are discoverable by an analysis of presence. Only those premises which can be found by such an analysis are warranted, for to use not given premises as a basis for such an argument would be to beg the question. To assume a not given premise in attempting to prove that something not given is, is to beg the question and to make the argument unsound.

2. We have selected ten proposed arguments for transcendence, related to the ten proposed characteristics of presence considered

in Section D. We consider our treatment of them sufficient to establish our concluding contentions, for: (a) If our reader be convinced that our argument against these ten proposed arguments has been successful, he will probably be convinced that the same sort of argument may be used successfully in refuting all possible arguments for transcendence. (b) We are probably not acquainted with all possible arguments for transcendence and thus probably cannot explicitly refute every possible argument in this paper, so we must set a limit somewhere. (c) In treating these ten arguments, our general argument shall have become sufficiently clear, and the use of it so monotonously repetitious, that further instances of its application would be superfluous for our purposes.

3. The general form which we have adopted for stating the proposed arguments is this: Can X imply some not given? The X in each case is a characteristic considered in Section D.

4. An outline of the proposed arguments to be considered is: (1) Can implicitness imply some not given? (2) Can boundaries of presence imply some not given? (3) Can a margin of presence imply some not given? (4) Can a demand for unity of presence imply some not given? (5) Can givenness of duration imply some not given? (6) Can givenness of change imply some not given? (7) Can givenness of self imply some not given? (8) Can givenness of purpose imply some not given? (9) Can givenness of knowledge imply some not given? (10) Can givenness of **truth** imply some not given?

5. The general form of the argument which we shall use in refuting all arguments for transcendence is this: Problem: Can X imply some not given? That is, can X be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not given? It may be argued that, since X is given and since it follows from X and Y (where Y is some assumed axiom), some not given being is. But a proposed argument for transcendence such as this may be shown to be unsound because: (a) X cannot be given, and thus the givenness of X is not a warranted premise for argument; (b) Y is an assumed axiom which is not discoverable by an analysis of presence, and thus is not a warranted premise for argument; (c) If X is given, but can be shown to not imply some not given, an argument which attempts to deduce a not given from a given X is invalid because it has something more in its conclusion than was given in its premises.

6. The purpose of Section E is to prove the conclusion that there are no sound arguments for transcendence. And from this conclusion there follows a further conclusion, to be considered in Section F, namely, that since there are no sound arguments for transcendence, i.e., since there is no logical means of getting from what is given to what is not given, if there is a means of getting from what is given to what is not given, it is not a logical means.

1. Can Implicitness Imply Some Not-Given? Implicitness, as we have pointed out (pp. 38,39),¹ is of three kinds; psychological, logical and physiological. Although our answer with regard to each of the three is the same, we may profitably deal with them separately.

(a) Can psychological implicitness imply some not-given?

That is, can psychological implicitness be used as a basis for an argument for transcendence? We shall show that it cannot.

It may be proposed as an argument for transcendence that since a thing may be given implicitly, i. e., we may be "unaware of it in the sense that (we have) no distinct awareness of it as a part of the total object distinct from the other parts,"² it follows that there is something in experience of which we are not aware. Or, as we prefer to state the argument: Since implicitness is given, whereby "implicitness" is meant that something which is not in presence is yet in presence, it follows that some not given is implied by some given.

When so stated, the error in the argument is obvious. We present two counter arguments by way of disproof of the proposed argument:

a. Implicitness, as we have shown (pp. 39-44), cannot be given, and thus cannot be used as a basis for such an argument.

1. Throughout Section E, references to pages in the preceding Section will be inserted in the text in parentheses, instead of being designated by footnotes.

2. Barker, op. cit., p. 264.

d. The maxim that "implicitness involves something which is not explicitly given" is itself not given in presence, and thus cannot be used as a basis for such an argument.

(b) Can logical implicitness imply some not-given? We have no wish to doubt that some concepts logically imply others or that some propositions imply others. But we do deny that logical implications can be used as a bases for an argument for transcendence. That is, we are not here objecting to those who, by way of external description, assert that, for example, "being red implies being colored." But we do object to the assertion that "being perceived as red implies being perceived as colored." For this latter assertion, though it is intended to be a description of what is actually given, is arrived at not by an analysis of what is actually given, but by deducing from a not given premise that it must be so. That is, given the premise, "being red implies being colored," it follows that if "being red" is given, "being colored" is implied by it, and thus something not given is implied by something given.

But we object that logical implicitness cannot be used as a basis for argument for transcendence for two reasons.

a. Logical implicitness cannot be given, as we have shown (pp. 45-46). Even though a given concept does logically imply a not given concept, if the implication is not given, it cannot be used as a basis for argument for transcendence.

b. The maxim that, for example, "being red implies being colored," is not itself in presence, and thus it cannot be used as

a basis for such an argument.

(c) Can physiological implicitness imply some not-given?

That is, can the assertion that "something in presence is dependent for its being upon something that is not in presence" be used as a basis for an argument for transcendence? It cannot, for two reasons:

a. Not given conditions of presence are, ipso facto, not given, and thus cannot be found by an analysis of the given. The relation of physiological implicitness thus cannot be given, and thus cannot be used as a basis for an argument for transcendence.

b. The assertion that "something in presence is dependent for its being upon something that is not in presence" is itself a premise which is not given, and which thus cannot be used as a basis for a sound argument for transcendence.

2. Can Boundaries of Presence Imply Some Not-Given? Can

the givenness of boundaries of presence be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not given? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued that since presence is finite, it is limited or has boundaries, and since boundaries are relations between things, there must be things other than presence. But, if such an argument is intended to be an argument for transcendence, it can be refuted on two grounds:

a. Boundaries of presence cannot be given, as we have shown (pp. 48-50). That is, the contention that presence has

boundaries is a premise which cannot be discovered by an analysis of the given, and it is thus not a premise that can be used in an argument for transcendence.

b. The premise that "boundaries are relations between things" is itself not something that is discoverable by an analysis of presence and so cannot be used as a premise in a sound argument for transcendence.

3. Can a Margin of Presence Imply Some Not-Given? Can the givenness of a margin of presence be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not given? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued, for example, as William James does, that there is a margin of experience which is given as a relation to something that is not in experience. "This fringe may be an experienced relation of any sort whatever, provided only the relation be not experienced as terminating in some then experienced content other than the (present content)." But such an argument cannot be a sound argument for transcendence, for two reasons:

a. A margin of presence cannot be given, as we have shown (pp. 51-58). And if a margin cannot be given, givenness of a margin cannot be used as a basis for an argument for transcendence.

b. The asserting that "a given margin is given as a relation to something not in experience" is an assertion which obviously cannot be a premise discoverable in presence, for it involves something

not in presence. And anything that is not in presence cannot be discovered in presence by an analysis of it.

4. Can a Demand for Unity of Presence Imply Some Not-Given?

Can a demand for the unity of presence be used as a basis for a sound argument for transcendence? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued, as Kant does, that experience involves a unity, and that if there is no given principle of unification there must be a transcendental principle of unification. But such an argument, insofar as it is intended to be a sound argument for transcending presence, i. e., an argument for the necessitation of the being of something that is not given by something that is given, is not a sound argument for transcendence, for:

a. The demand for unity is not a given demand. If there are two things in presence, without there being any awareness of their unity, and without there being any awareness of a demand for their unity, there is no given demand for their unity. And if there is no given demand for unity, the supposed givenness of such a demand cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence.

b. The dictum that "if there is no given principle of unification, there must be a transcendental principle of unification" is a dictum which is not warranted by an analysis of presence, for the dictum concerns something transcendental, or not-given, and thus is of such a nature that it cannot be found in presence. Thus this dictum cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence.

5. Can Givenness of Duration Imply Some Not-Given? Can givenness of duration be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not given? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued that duration has significance only in reference to some time-frame, and that thus givenness of duration involves a time-frame of reference. But such an argument is not a sound argument for transcendence, for:

a. There may be an awareness of duration without there being an awareness of a time-frame, and the duration may have just the significance that it has as given, without there being an awareness of a not-given time-frame. To say that a given duration has no significance apart from a time-frame is clearly a mistake, for the given duration has just the significance that it has as given, regardless of whether there is an awareness of the reference of it to a time-frame. The significance that the given duration has is a significance, or meaning, that is limited to presence. And it is not a definitional, or logical, significance. But it is, nevertheless, significance, and is all the significance that anything needs in order to be given. The proposed argument, then, is not sound because it presupposes a not-given sort of significance as essential to the being of any duration (given or not given), whereas (a) such a sort of duration is not essential to the givenness of duration, and (b) such a sort of significance would not possibly be discovered by an analysis of the given because it is a not-given significance.

b. The assertion that "a given duration can have significance only in reference to a time-frame" is itself an assertion that is not warranted by what is discoverable by an analysis of presence. For if it were, the time-frame itself would have to be given. And if the time-frame itself were given, the argument would not be an argument for transcendence.

6. Can Givenness of Change Imply Some Not-Given? Such a question may mean either of two more specific questions: (a) Can change in presence imply some not-given? and (b) Can change of presence imply some not-given?

(a) Can change in presence imply some not-given? That is, can change in presence be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not in presence? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued that givenness of change implies that there is something which changes, for every change involves something which changes. That is, a change in presence is either a change of presence, or of something in presence, or of something not in presence. That change of presence cannot imply some not given, we shall show shortly. That change of something in presence is involved does not give warrant for an argument for transcendence is obvious, so need not be considered. That change of something not in presence is involved cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence, we shall proceed to show.

a. If the something which changes is not in presence, it cannot be discovered by analysis, for analysis can reveal only what is in presence. And what analysis fails to reveal cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence.

b. The dictum that "every change involves something that changes" is itself not something that is warranted by an analysis of the given, for "every change" is obviously not in presence. And if this dictum is not in presence, it cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence.

(b) Can change of presence imply some not-given? That is, can change of presence be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not in presence? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued that change of presence involves something that is not presence for presence to change into. But such an argument is not a sound argument for transcendence, for:

a. Change of presence cannot be given, as we have shown (pp. 64-65). And what cannot be given cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence.

b. The dictum that "change of presence involves something that is not presence for presence to change into" is itself a dictum that is not warranted by what is discoverable by an analysis of what is given. Thus it cannot be used as a basis for a sound argument for transcendence.

7. Can Givenness of Self Imply Some Not-Given? Can the

givenness of a self be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not in presence? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued that, knowingly or unwittingly, that the givenness of a self implies the being of a not given self, or that a self as given is not all of a self. "Cogito, ergo sum." But such an argument is not a sound argument for transcendence, for:

a. The being of a real self which thinks and has presentations is not implied by the being of an apparent self in presence. For insofar as the real self is not given, it cannot be discovered by an analysis of presence, and thus it cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence. In the argument, "Cogito, ergo sum," if "sum" means the being of a self which is not merely given, it involves more than what is warranted by an analysis of the given, and thus cannot be used as a premise in a sound argument for transcendence. If, however, "sum" means only the being of a self which is wholly given, the argument, "Cogito, ergo sum," is sound, but it is not an argument for transcendence.

b. The dictum, "Cogito, ergo sum," where "sum" means the being of a not given self, is itself a dictum that is not warranted by an analysis of the given, since it involves a not given element. Thus it cannot be used as a premise for a sound argument for transcendence.

8. Can Givenness of Purpose Imply Some Not-Given? Can the givenness of purpose be used as a basis for arguing for the being of

something that is not given? We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued, as Professor Parker does, that there is purpose, that purpose has its realization, and that thus we can get outside of present experience. But such an argument is not a sound argument for transcendence, because:

a. Granted that a purpose is given, i. e., that there is an awareness of purpose, it does not follow that there is (or will be) a not-given goal or realization. To illustrate: some purposes are frustrated and some forgotten. Some purposes, even, are impossible of realization; suppose, for example, I live virtuously with the purpose of going to heaven; but if there be no heaven there is no not-given goal, no realization. Thus goals and realizations are not essential to purposes. If it be replied that the goal is something given along with the purpose, that is, if the virtuous liver sees the goal at which he is aiming, such an argument cannot pretend to be an argument for transcendence, for the goal is then a given goal, and not a not-given goal. Our arguments have proved, then, that (a) if a purpose is given, a not-given goal or realization is not implied by it, and thus givenness of purpose cannot be used as a basis for an argument for transcendence, and (b) if it be asserted that a purpose involves a goal (because every purpose is a purpose to achieve something), the goal itself, as the goal which the purpose purposes to achieve, is given, and thus the involvement of a goal involves no not-given.

b. If it be asserted that some purposes are realized and that they have their realization outside of presence, it still does not follow that an analysis of the given must reveal that a not-given realization is involved in some cases. Rather, the dictum that "some purposes are realized and that they have their realization outside of presence" is itself a premise, used in the proposed argument, which does not find its warrant in presence. Thus the proposed argument is not a sound argument for transcendence. (That this premise does not find its warrant in presence should be obvious from the fact that it cannot find its warrant in presence, for it involves something which is not given, and anything not given cannot be found by an analysis of presence.)

9. Can Givenness of Knowledge Imply Some Not-Given? Can the givenness of knowledge be used as a basis for an argument for the being of something that is not given. We contend that it cannot.

It is often argued that knowledge implies something known. But such an argument cannot be used to prove the being of anything not given, for:

(a) If the argument intends to prove only that given objects are necessary to knowledge, it clearly intends to prove nothing concerning the nature of the not given.

(b) If the argument intends to prove the being of a not given, it fails, for, as we have shown (pp. 71,72), knowledge of not given objects cannot be given.

(c) If the argument intends to prove the being of a not given object, when the givenness of knowledge does not involve the givenness of the object, and, further, does not involve the being of an object, the argument clearly oversteps its grounds.

10. Can the Givenness of Truth Imply Some Not-Given?

Can the givenness of truth be used as a basis for arguing for the being of something that is not given. We contend that it cannot.

It may be argued that truth is something which involves some not-given and there is truth, and that, therefore, the givenness of truth implies some not given. But such an argument is not a sound argument for transcendence, for:

a. The assertion that "by truth is meant something which involves some not-given" in itself does not follow from an analysis of presence, for we cannot discover by analysis of presence anything that is not given. This assertion thus cannot be used as a premise in a sound argument for transcendence.

b. The assertion that "there is truth" may mean either of two things: (a) There is truth, where truth involves something not given. In this case, there can be no warrant for the statement discoverable by an analysis of presence because there is nothing in presence that is not given. (b) There is truth, where truth involves only what is given. In this case, if truth involves nothing not given, there are no grounds in the premises for arguing for transcendence, In any case, the givenness of truth does not imply

the being of something that is not given.

General Note: Having first proved that Implicitness cannot be used as a basis for a sound argument for transcendence, we might have appealed to this proof as a further means of refuting every other argument for transcendence stated in the form "The givenness of X implies the being of some not-given." But we have omitted discussion of such a means of disproof because we believe it to be obvious to the reader and because we have sought to show that our general method of argument can be used successfully in all cases and independently of our proof that implicitness cannot be used as a basis for a sound argument for transcendence.

Conclusion

There are no sound arguments for transcendence. That is, given presence, there can by no logical process be deduced something which is not presence. This is our contention. Whether or not our contention be taken as established depends upon (a) whether or not we have successfully argued concerning the unsoundness of the ten proposed arguments, and upon (b) whether or not the success of our method of argument convinces the reader that this method of argument-

tion will be successful in regard to all other proposed arguments for transcendence.

Note: It should be born in mind by the reader that the term "argument for transcendence" is not always used in the same sense in which we are using it, and thus that in refuting every argument for transcendence we are not refuting every argument which is named an "argument for transcendence" in literature. We have stated that we mean by "argument for transcendence" an attempt to get from what is given to what is not given. Some arguments for transcendence are attempts to transcend experience, where by "experience" is meant something vastly more inclusive than what we mean by the term "presence." Thus, since they propose to start with less limited premises, our refutations are not refutations of them.

Section F. CONCLUSION

Since there are no sound arguments for transcendence, that is, since there is no logical way of getting from what is given to what is not given, any successful attempt to get from the given to the not given must be not logical, or alogical. What ways there are, or even whether there are ways, of getting from the given to the not given, it is no part of our purpose to suggest. Only this we assert: if there be true judgements, where the truth of the judgements necessitates the being of something not given, there must be something that is not given. But we do not assert that there are true judgements. Our judgements appear to be true, but there is nothing given which necessitates their being true. This is the limit to which we are able to go and yet remain within the bounds of certainty.¹

Before proceeding further, let us introduce two new terms which will aid us in stating our conclusion more significantly. The terms are (a) certainty and (b) speculation.

(a) Certainty: That which is "certain" cannot be doubted, theoretically. Now by being "certain" we do not mean simply being convinced or believing. For one may believe or be convinced without

1. Despite Mr. Dewey, philosophy is, by intention, a quest for certainty. We may agree with him that certainty is never actually achieved, apart from what is actually given, and that philosophy is forever pursuing an unattainable goal, but, nevertheless, certainty is one of the goals at which philosophical efforts aim.

being certain, in the sense of the term which we are using. By "being certain" we do not mean that one does not doubt, but that one cannot doubt, theoretically. We say "theoretically" because some may actually doubt what is logically impossible to doubt, simply because logical considerations have been omitted in the formation of the belief or doubt. That which is "certain" is simply that which cannot be doubted without violating logical laws. Given premises and that which is necessitated by them are "certain."

(Note: Certainty is not truth, nor is it knowledge.

Certainty is not truth, for it is possible to entertain a true proposition which is both actually doubted and theoretically doubt-able. Certainty is not knowledge, where knowledge involves some not given, for it is possible to have knowledge which is both actu-ally doubted and theoretically doubtable.)

(Note: We are using the term "certainty" in an absolute sense. By the term "certainty" as we are using it here we mean absolute certainty, recognizing that the term "certainty" has other meanings such as partial certainty and practical certainty. In our disproof of certainty concerning the being of anything not given, we are not disproving the probability of ^{the} being of anything not given. But the question of probability hardly enters our discussion, for presence is something unique and particular whereas probability involves a number of instances. So the appeal to inductive methods of proof for the being of some not given must likewise fail before

our method of argument, as well as the deductive methods which we have been considering.)

(b) Speculation: Any belief that is not certain is "speculative". Any belief that it is possible to doubt is speculative.

We may now state our conclusion to this paper in a different terminology. Since there is no logical way of proving the being of anything that is not given, beliefs concerning the being and nature of what is not given are speculative or uncertain. All external description of experience is speculative. All explanation of the nature and conditions of experience which are not given is speculative. All science whatsoever, insofar as it purports to deal with what is not given, is speculative. And all philosophy, which is not a mere analysis of what is given, is speculative, in the sense of the term which we are using.

We have not been arguing for "solipsism of the moment." For by "solipsism of the moment" we understand "belief that I at the present moment am all that exists." But we have been arguing for the belief that all that is certain is presence. Presence is what is given, and there can be no doubt about what is given. And there can be no doubt about what necessarily follows from what is given. But nothing necessarily follows from what is given, so presence and presence alone is certain.

Our conclusion is that of a scepticism more complete, even, than the scepticism of Hume. For Hume hesitated to doubt a not

given being of mathematical and logical facts, whereas we have contended (Cf. pp. 44-46) that even logical facts cannot be known to be, that is, there is nothing in the nature of what is given which necessitates the not given being of logical facts.

Final Summary

In this paper we have contended for the following theses:

1. Presence has no essential characteristics discoverable by analysis.

2. All arguments for transcending presence are unsound. That is, all attempts to prove the being of something not given by means of logical deduction fail.

3. All philosophy which is not concerned merely with an analysis of the given must be uncertain and get to its subject-matter by alogical means. Since no logical argument for the establishing of certainty of the being of anything not-given can be derived from an analysis of what is given, any attempt to establish belief in the being of anything not-given must resort to means other than logical implication.

Appendix I. Definition of a Philosophical System

A philosophical system is a persistent attempt to satisfactorily, systematically and truthfully interpret experience, completely though generally.

The precise meaning of this description may be made more definite by discussing each of the important terms involved. These terms will be considered in the following order: (1) experience, (2) interpret, (3) completely, (4) generally, (5) satisfactorily, (6) systematically, (7) truthfully, (8) attempt, (9) persistent.

(1) Experience: That which philosophy undertakes to interpret is best represented by the term "experience." For experience is taken to be something ultimate and yet something which is interpretable. Whatever is not experience is of significance only because and insofar as it is a condition of experience.

(2) Interpret: The term "interpret" is used because experience, whatever it may be, is intended to be represented in the system by concepts, which concepts are in some sense other than the experience which they represent. I say "in some sense other" because (a) the logical methodology employed necessarily involves the logico-centric predicament, whereby a theory cannot apply to, and is therefore in some sense other than, itself; and (b) the logical methodology probably presupposes that the theory, or system, is intended to be in some sense subsistent.

The term "interpretation" as used in this particular system,

represents activities of two sorts, which may be called "analysis" and "explanation." Analysis is interpretation of experience in terms of concepts which are intended to represent something given in experience. Explanation is interpretation of experience in terms of concepts which are intended to represent something not given in experience. We shall find it convenient to use also the terms "internal description" and "external description" to represent these two sorts of activities. Internal description is interpretation of experience from the inside; it is description of what is given in experience. External description is interpretation of experience from the outside; it is speculation concerning conditions of experience which are not given in experience.

(3) Completely: A philosophical system is intended to be complete interpretation of experience.

(4) Generally: A philosophical system is not intended to be an interpretation of every detail, but only of the generic, fundamental or typical characteristics and conditions of experience. It is intended to be only generally complete.

(5) Satisfactorily: A philosophical system is intended to be a satisfactory interpretation of experience. What is satisfactory to no one can hardly be regarded as a philosophical system.

(6) Systematically: A philosophical system is intended to be systematic; that is, it is intended to be ordered in accordance with the rules of a logical methodology.

(7) Truthfully: A philosophical system is intended to be a true interpretation of experience, insofar as it is possible for any interpretation to be true. An interpretation may be satisfactory without being systematic or true; it may be systematic without being satisfactory or true; it may be true without being satisfactory or systematic. But a philosophical system is intended to be satisfactory, systematic and true.

(8) Attempt: A philosophical system is spoken of as an attempt because the philosophical ideal, a completely satisfactory, systematic and true interpretation of experience, is unachievable. Unachievability does not, however, make the goal unworth the pursuing, for degrees of perfection are attainable. One may attain a system that is satisfactory without being completely systematic or true. One may attain a system that is satisfactory and systematic without being true. One may attain a system that is partially true, or true in some sense or other. At any rate, the value of the quest lies at least partly in the questing.

(9) Persistent: A philosophical system is not a momentary affair but involves a persistent endeavor to achieve the goal of satisfaction, systematization and truth.

Appendix II. Suggestions Concerning External Description

We have entitled our paper "An Interpretation of the Nature of Presence and Some Implications of the Interpretation." Perhaps it would have been better if we had entitled it "An Analysis of the Nature of Presence and Some Implications of the Analysis," for, as we have explicitly stated, our purpose was to make an internal description, and such external description as was to be included was to be incidental and included only for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of the internal description. We have considered this problem of analyzing presence a problem sufficient unto itself; that is, although very definitely limited, it is of sufficient complexity and comprehension to be treated significantly by itself. However, our examiners have urged that the external description has been insufficient and that this topic is one which "cannot be left in the half." So we comply, with these appended remarks.

Again in other words: We have been duly warned that a paper of this kind should not be an attempt to present a system of philosophy. So we have limited our study in a very definite way. Yet an examination of the "first edition" has produced the criticism that the topic has been too limited. We interpret this criticism as a demand for a clearer picture of the significance of the conclusions of this study for a system as a whole. We shall, therefore, proceed to sketch an outline of the system of interpretation that we have had in mind, and for which this study has been a prelude, a prolegomenon,

a propaedeutic.

This analysis of the nature of presence is intended as a prelude to a system of Tentative Realism. By "realism" is meant theory that there is something that is not given. By "tentative" is meant that no belief in the being of something that is not given can be absolutely certain. We choose to be "realists" because belief in the being of some not-given is practically necessary. We are realists by a natural necessity. But we are forced to be "tentative" realists because we can discover many arguments for the "break-down" of natural realism, but we cannot, or at least so far have not, discovered any sound argument for transcendence -- any sound argument which necessitates the being of some not given. Thus we find it theoretically necessary to be "tentative" realists.

It is important to note that we are not tentatively holding to a system of Realism. But we are holding to a system of Tentative Realism. The principle of tentativity is an essential part of the system. Critics are wont to raise the criticism that a Tentative Realism must be held to absolutely, and thus that there is at least one thing that is held to absolutely and not tentatively. But there are three replies to such critics, each of which is sufficient to annul the effects of the criticism: (1) Appealing to a theory of types, we may grant that we hold to the system of Tentative Realism absolutely, but that the "holding absolutely" is of a higher type than the "holding tentatively," because theories are not intended to

apply to themselves. (2) We may choose to hold to our system tentatively. Then, without appealing to a theory of types, we may assert, without contradiction, that our theory does apply to itself. Critics may point out that such a position involves us, logically, in an infinite regress: we must not only hold tentatively to Tentative Realism, but must also tentatively hold tentatively to Tentative Realism, etc. The criticism is granted, but so long as it involves no contradiction it is a logically possible position. (3) We may choose to hold our system tentatively. But assert that the "holding" of our system is an act -- something that is in a particular presence -- and that it is not a logical affair, thus does not come under the rubric of logical necessitation. If critics assert that holding tentatively to a Tentative Realism involves, where no appeal is made to a theory of types, an infinite regress, we admit that there is a logically possible infinite number of holdable positions in such a logical infinite regress. But that all of them must be held, because they are logically possible, we deny. If one holds tentatively to Tentative Realism, then, if he take another position with regard to "holding tentatively to Tentative Realism," he must do so tentatively. But that he must take this other position is not necessitated by logic.

A.

The problem of knowledge, as we conceive it, divides conveniently into three sub-problems: theory of truth, theory of certainty and theory of cognition. (Or, if you will, veriology, certology, and cognoscology.) A word about each of these may be of profit.

(a) Theory of truth is concerning with the meaning of truth. The formulation which we prefer has already been stated in the body of this paper (p. 74). Since the number of cases in which beliefs are about something in presence is minute, we ignore them for the present. A belief is true, then, when what is believed to be is; or, when a belief is true, there is something not given which is as it is believed. It follows from this position that if there is truth, then there is reality. (Permit us to define "the real" in this way: To be real is to be not given.) Thus, if we assert that there is truth, we assert that there is reality, and we can no longer be "tentative" realists. But we do not assert that there is truth, at least truth as we have defined it. We are led to the position that there may be no truth, so defined. And such a position is a possible position, so long as we can further explain how it is possible for presence to be as it is and yet there be no truth. This we think we can do, provided our readers have plenty of patience.

Suppose that what is given is related to what is not given as a shop's signals are to its activities. Two bells is the signal for full speed ahead, three to stop, and five to reverse, let us say. Now the bells are not like the speeding ahead. Yet they mean the

speeding ahead. So, what is given in a supposedly true belief may be entirely unlike that which makes it true, and yet it may, for all purposes, mean it. Suppose we visit a pilothouse for the first time, and inquire of the skipper what the bells mean. He will tell us that two bells mean full speed ahead. But we do not know what is meant by full speed ahead. Then he may point out the rate of movement of the ship relative to its surroundings. But full speed ahead does not mean the rate of movement of the ship relative to its surroundings. That is simply an effect. It really means a certain activity on the part of the engineer, the movement of certain levers, the shovelling of coal, the vaporization of water, the churning of propellers. All this is what makes "two bells" true. But we never know it, on our first trip. So knowledge of real objects does not need literal givenness of the real object, nor does it need revelation of the characteristics of the real object. All that is needed is something that is a suitable sign. So long as the not-given can never be penetrated anyway, it does not matter whether the not-given be like the given or not. And it does not matter whether there be any truth, in the strict sense, or not.

The drawing of a distinction between three meanings of the term "truth" may aid in clarifying our position. Let us distinguish between (1) strict truth, (2) practical truth and (3) formal truth. (1) By strict truth we may mean that truth is a property of a belief when what is believed to be, is. And, as we have said,

strict truth is not necessary to explain experience, and is impossible if Tentative Realism is accepted. (2) By practical truth we may mean that truth is a property of beliefs as long as they are believed, or as long as they "work." Two bells means full speed ahead, i. e., the movement of the ship relative to its surroundings. For all practical purposes, the apparent movement of the ship is what is meant by the two bells. We have no wish to deny there being truth in this sense. (3) By formal truth we may mean a property of an abstract proposition. And that which makes a proposition true is neither our believing it to be true (as in practical truth) nor the "is as it is believed to be" (as in strict truth), but by a supposed subsistent kind of being called a "fact." Now whether facts have a being independent of presence, or whether they are mere fictions, matters not for practice. We may be tentative realists with regard to the real subsistent being of facts, or we may deny that they have any real being at all. This is one of those questions which, since its solution makes no difference for practice, need not be settled in outlining a system. Whichever solution is adopted, it must be held tentatively, and its adoption or preference shall rest upon specific items of evidence which point in its favor.

Such a theory of the meaning of truth leads one to be not merely a Tentative Realist, but also a Tentative Rationalist. We believe that we correctly calculate the pathways of the stars. But even though in all of our practice we can never detect a mistake,

it does not follow that what is, is like what we believe and have calculated it to be. We cannot even assert that the "laws of thought" are also necessarily "laws of being." We are forced to admit the possibility of irrationalism. But this force, or logical necessitation, is accepted without pain, for we willingly believe that being is in some sense irrational. We bear being no grudge because we fail to think it.

(b) Theory of certainty is next to be considered. We have already concluded in the body of this paper (p. 92) that all arguments for transcendence are unsound and that all beliefs concerning the being and nature of the not-given are uncertain. That is, all that is certain is what is given or what is in presence. In such statements we have been using the term "certainty" in an absolute sense. But we recognize that the term also has other meanings. We may call these practical meanings, and speak of their kind of certainty, as practical certainty. Three distinguishable types of practical certainty are: (1) intuitional certainty, (2) empirical certainty, and (3) logical certainty. (1) By intuitional certainty we mean conviction that something is grasped as it is. For example, I believe that the object before me is what I understand to be a watch and that I cannot be mistaken about my belief. An actual grasping of an object as it is, is not essential to this conviction. (2) By empirical certainty we mean conviction that something which has been experienced as occurring in a certain set of circumstances

will be experienced again as occurring in another set of circumstances of the same kind. For example, I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow. Problems of empirical certainty include problems of induction and probability. (3) By logical certainty, or, perhaps better, deductive certainty, we mean conviction that what is deduced from a belief accepted as true is itself true. Logical certainty entails a rationalism which can be only empirically certain.

(c) Theory of cognition involves metaphysical presuppositions concerning the nature of conditions of the given, so any account of it will be complex -- too complex to be expounded here. We favor an account which explains the nature of knowing in terms of a physical organism immersed in a physical environment, in accordance with the accounts of contemporary scientific theories. Any philosophical account of the nature of knowing must take into consideration the evidences presented by the various special sciences relevant to the problem of the nature of knowing. What our stand concerning the details of theory of cognition will be, is as yet undetermined. Determination of it will involve further study, for which present study has been a preparation.

B.

In metaphysics, we shall not take sides in the battle between Idealists and Realists, or rather between Mentalists and Materialists. We choose rather to be Neutral Monists -- not Neutral

Monists of either the Neo-Realistic or the Spinozistic type, but rather of the type of those who style themselves Naturalists. We do this because, when this problem of nature of the most ultimate is considered, we are confronted at the very outset by the fact that we can never be certain concerning the nature of anything that is not given. So far as practice is concerned, all that is required of the ultimate nature of being is that it be such that it can produce presence. And further, that, if our scientific theories are true, it must be such that it can produce those things which are required to make our scientific (religious, etc.) theories true. This is all that is required of ultimate being for practice, so this is all that a theory of the nature of ultimate being is required to account for. What its ultimate nature is, we need never know. And to suppose that it is like anything given in mere presence is to express human conceit. Even as the religious are wont to create gods in their own image, so metaphysicians are wont to create the ultimate nature of being in the image of their own experience or of their experienced objects. Dogmatism in ontology we consider the greatest of follies.

Metaphysical speculations concerning the nature of what is not given must, it seems to us, tentatively maintain the need of two kinds of reality of completely account for experience. The two kinds, which we call existence and subsistence, may be discussed briefly. Postulation of existence is needed to account for those items of experience which may be characterized as spatial and temporal.

If we believe, for example, that there is a real motor conditioning an apparent automobile, then, if our belief is true, there must be an existent motor. Postulation of subsistence is apparently needed to account for those items of experience which may be characterized as non-spatial and non-temporal. If we believe, for example, that the proposition "two plus two equals four" is true independently of its being given, then, if our belief is true, there must be a subsistent fact which makes this subsistent proposition true. The demands for these two kinds of being as necessary to explain experience are apparently equal. But we believe that it is quite possible to give a complete interpretation of experience without postulating subsistence, if we are willing to hold that all beliefs concerning the being of subsistents are false. This we do, postulating rather a nominalistic explanation of the nature of universals and a "philosophy of as if" explanation of apparent subsistents.

So far we have spoken only of the most general metaphysical questions. We have not proposed speculations concerning the metaphysical nature of such specific conditions as time, change, purpose, physical organism, etc. What is the relation of a given duration to a not-given duration? What is the relation of given change to not-given change? What is the relation of given purpose to not-given purpose? What is the relation of presence to its conditioning physical organism? Proper answers to such questions would involve more than we are prepared to give. We have purposely eliminated discussion of

them, because we wish to reserve the right to be influenced by future study with regard to them. So we have deliberately made our statements, in the body of the paper, such that various conclusions concerning the nature of the not-given may be arrived at without viciating our internal description. We have not yet arrived at convictions concerning the not-given nature of these things. But our conclusions concerning them as given are intended as final, even though no final conclusions concerning them as not given have been arrived at. Thus our conclusions concerning the not-given will have to be fashioned to conform to our conclusions concerning the given. The prelude is a beginning with which the sequel must conform.

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