

The Concrete Universal As a Logical Principle

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Introduction

As I see it my subject calls for two things. It calls for a discussion of the concrete universal and, secondly, it must be shown that the concrete universal is inevitable if we accept idealistic logic. I shall not attempt to work out the application of the concrete universal in the different fields of value. That, it seems to me, is an entirely different problem.

In so far as I shall defend the principle of the concrete universal the thesis will be a constructive criticism of Bosanquet's philosophy. Had I chosen to work out the metaphysical applications of the concrete universal I could have limited myself to a discussion of Bosanquet. No one has worked it out so completely as he. A discussion of the logical principle, on the other hand, cannot be confined to a system. I think we may truly say that this principle has guided the whole development of philosophy. We find it in Plato, in Aristotle, in the Scholastics, in Spinoza, in Kant, in Hegel, in Green, in Bradley. It is emphasized in Hegel and in the Hegelians of the 19th century, but it would not be true to say that Hegel introduced the principle. He formulated it systematically but the significance of the concrete universal as a logical principle dates back to Plato's theory of

knowledge, to the fact that he realised that this world was a coherent world which was to be interpreted in terms of value and not in terms of mere existence.

I said above that to show how the principle of the concrete universal is applicable in the different fields of value, is a problem separate from ours. Had I chosen to write on it, I should have been able to deal with the concrete universal more directly. Much that I have to say now will seem irrelevant. My contention throughout will be that idealistic logic is grounded in experience and that it will ultimately resolve itself into the concrete universal. Rather than accept the logical principle of the concrete universal without argument, I thought it better to discuss the basis of idealistic logic and then, secondly, show that the concrete universal is the logical result of such a logic. There is as much truth in the one as there is in the other.

In the second part of my paper I shall discuss the concrete universal along the lines indicated by Professor Norman Kemp Smith and Mr. M. B. Foster. Instead of agreeing with Professor Smith that all universals are abstract I shall hold that all universals are concrete. Universals differ as to the degree of concreteness. It will be difficult, and at times impossible, to show empirically that this is the case. But I do not care

for empirical verification in all instances. Two roads are open. We can start with an a priori principle and let go of it when we meet an instance in which it is impossible to verify our a priori principle empirically, or we can hold fast to our a priori principle and say that the impossibility of empirical verification is due to the imperfection of our knowledge. I wish to take the latter alternative.

Many philosophers let go of the principle that the real is the rational because there are apparent irrationalities in the universe. But my question is: Is it not more logical to hold fast to the principle which comes to us as a logical ought, than to let go of it because we do not see how the principle is verified empirically in all instances? Give up the principle and I do not see on what basis you can continue to philosophise.

I shall argue for the concreteness of all universals on the following grounds:

(1) The immediate and the mediate are phases, not levels of experience.

(2) The individual is the true type of universality and is explicable in terms of universals.

(3) The whole nature of the individual is covered by the universal and therefore the universal is capable of determining its individual embodiment.

We shall devote a chapter to each point.

Chapter I.

Why is idealism or speculative philosophy so often called abstract and artificial? The answer is, no doubt, because it speaks of the Absolute, of Ultimate Reality, of Truth being the Whole. The opponents of idealism say that we never do experience the Absolute and that this is all the world we have and by this they refer to particular instances and situations. Now I always feel that these criticisms are due to misunderstanding. The Absolute and Ultimate Reality are not outside, or external to our experience. An understanding of Bosanquet would do away with such superficial criticism as we find in E. B. Bax's The Real, the Rational and the Alogical. Bax says, "I look in vain in Bosanquet's work for any suggestion of the problem as to the pointe d'attache between the individual consciousness here and now and the absolute as the perfection of all consciousness. If Mr. Bosanquet's Absolute is not connected with the bare fact of my personal consciousness, of my empirical conscious focus, for me its intellectual, aesthetic, or moral value is nil."¹ If there is anything in Bosanquet's works which is repeated time and time again it is the fact that the Absolute is not separated from, but is an immanent principle in every

1 - Pages 246-247.

man's experience. Bosanquet is as emphatic in his denunciation of an Absolute without a pointe d'attache as his most severe critic. Philosophy has nothing to do with realities that are always in a world beyond. Philosophy always deals with the concrete, with that which is in the highest sense present and when Bosanquet speaks of the Absolute he is referring to something which in principle can be found in the daily experience of a typical human being.

The criticism that idealistic logic in general and Bosanquet's logic in particular, is abstract and detached from reality is so common that I think we do well to consider it in more detail. I challenge anyone to find a philosophy rooted so deeply in actual life as Bosanquet's. His philosophy was fed by many and deep sources of practical life, love of nature, familiarity with and enjoyment of great works of art and literature. He had first-hand acquaintance with the world. One need not agree with Bosanquet but to say that his speculations are without reality is wholly unfair. A sympathetic study of his works will, I think, convince us that his conclusions are the result of reflections on his own experience.

Many object to the doctrine that Reality is the Whole on the basis of modesty. They say that we can make no assertion about the whole because this is all the world

we have. We know nothing beyond what we experience every day, so let us take account of our concrete human experience and pay no attention to Ultimate Reality. But is not this a bit of false modesty? When we argue thus are we not making our own limitation a limitation of the coherent nature of thought? Are we not stopping the logical process at some arbitrary point?¹ I have no objection to calling on our concrete human experience as data for the interpretation of reality but I do not wish to limit that experience to a bare existential this. So to limit that experience is to lose sight of an element that gives truth its human interest; is to lose sight of the coherent nature of our world.

To maintain that our experience cannot be limited to the existential is to admit the self-transcendent power of thought. The denial of the self-transcendent power of thought has always been the chief criticism of reasoning. The answer to this criticism is simply to point out that without self-transcendence genuine thinking would be impossible. It is the logical ought of all thought. Thought must transcend itself and in transcending itself it establishes the Absolute. Now it may seem pretentious to say "This or nothing" but it is not nearly so pretentious as saying that our own limitations are the limitations of

1 - It is like saying, "I am tired, and I won't play any more; therefore you must please stop the game."

the coherent nature of thought.

I think Mr. Stedman is justified in criticising Bosanquet's doctrine of self-transcendence.¹ If the doctrine of self-transcendence is to mean that every fact is defective and falls into contradiction then I do not wish to subscribe to it. (I hope to say more about this later in connection with the doctrine of degrees of truth.) A fact, although conditioned, may be absolutely true. So by the self-transcendent power of thought I do not wish to maintain that we are always dealing with truth which is never quite true. By self-transcendence I mean that thought is of such a nature that it is incapable of satisfaction in a world which it merely recognizes, in a world independent of, and without any affinity for thought's own nature. Thought does not consist of a combination of sensations through which we are supposed to get the concrete facts. If this were the case the function of thought would be to recognise, to identify, to classify and, consequently, it would be wholly abstract. On the contrary, thinking is a process which moves from the less to the more determined. Thought must transcend itself in so far as the first determination of a thing by thought cannot be identified with its complete determination. The more complete is the "larger truth" more true, because within

1 - Mind, Vol. XL, P. 163.

it the identity is more and more determined by its differences.

There are various logical theories. We hear of idealistic logic, instrumental or pragmatic logic, symbolic logic, etc. These logics rest on different assumptions or as Professor Urban says, "Each reproduces the ontological prejudices of his own particular attitude as the postulate of logic Uberhaupt."¹

I agree with Professor Urban that idealistic logic claims that its particular attitude is the postulate of logic Uberhaupt. No logic is without assumptions, although pragmatic logic claims that it is neutral and guided by no prejudices or presuppositions. The strength of a philosophic system does not lie in the fact that it does not make any presuppositions. The task of metaphysics is to lay bare the underlying assumptions, to investigate the necessary beliefs and assumptions. By denying "presuppositions" pragmatism denies metaphysics its task.

It goes without saying that the field of philosophy, if we divide philosophy into Epistemology, Logic and Metaphysics, is logic. And of the different types of logical theory mathematical or symbolic logic is the fashion today. Instrumental logic is also much alive. Idealism is

1 - The Intelligible World, P. 84.

dead¹ - at least so its critics say. Nor is it strange that idealism should be pronounced dead in an age when all emphasis is on mathematical logic. The two are direct opposites and, obviously, both cannot be true. Mr. Russell defines his system as "logical atomism or absolute pluralism because, while maintaining that there are many things, it denies that there is a whole composed of these things."² On this basis the pursuit of abstractness and generality is the ideal for logic. Idealistic logic, on the other hand, maintains that the "Truth is the Whole." The total truth is nothing less than the whole of experience. There is nothing we are as certain of as of the existence of the whole. This makes for concreteness and individuality.

Every logic has a right to its presuppositions. The important question is, Are its presuppositions necessary. Symbolic logic has certain a priori principles but it seems to me that these a priori principles are entirely arbitrary. The symbolic logician, just as the mathematician, is engaged in an ideal realm. Thought is supposed to be able to abstract from all contact with the world of sense perception and to move in an ideal realm "where it creates and discovers a priori, its own objects,...."³

1 - Professor Blanshard, in reviewing the proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, remarks that not a single champion of Hegelianism spoke in its behalf. To the cynic this means that idealism is dead. But Professor Blanshard maintains that idealism is by no means dead. It is "in a state of heart-searching preliminary to voicing itself anew." (Journal of Philosophy)

2 - Mysticism and Logic, P. 113.

3 - H. R. Smart, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Mathematical Logic, P. 54.

Professor Hoernle, in reviewing Bosanquet's Implication and Linear Inference remarks that the Principia Mathematica, notwithstanding its volume, has not yet begun to touch the bulk of the empirical sciences, and some competent mathematical logicians admit that it (mathematical logic) must ultimately fail on intrinsic grounds.¹ Its failure to touch the bulk of the empirical sciences is not surprising if we consider its a priori principles. Conclusions deduced from such ideal premises will naturally be abstract and general. What we would expect to find, however, is agreement as to the validity of the conclusion. The opposite is the case. In speaking of the premise from which the theory of knowledge starts Russell says, "When you are talking of the premises for the theory of knowledge, you are not talking of anything objective, but of something that will vary from man to man, because the premise of one man's theory of knowledge will not be the same as those of another man's."² This results in not one but many logics, a different logic for every set of subjectively asserted premises. Russell is here speaking of epistemology and not of logic and, therefore, his contention that the premises vary from man to man seems obvious. One man's ideas differ from the ideas

1 - Cf. Philosophical Review, Vol.30, P. 90.

2 - Monist, Vol. 29, p. 499.

of another. But it seems to me that Russell forgets that although the premises are different for each man they are also the same. I hope to show later on that epistemology as conceived of by Mr. Russell is a false doctrine since it does not recognise identity within differences.

Symbolic logic and idealistic logic are so entirely different that a criticism of one in terms of the other is useless. They diverge at the very beginning. They speak different languages. The respective logicians approach the problem with different expectations. The idealist expects reality to be responsive to thought; the symbolist does not. The idealist comes to philosophy steeped in literature, in the history of civilization, in the experience of politics and social reforms. The symbolist comes to philosophy with a mind steeped in mathematics and mathematical logic, and failing to find the precision he is accustomed to find in the mathematical world he becomes sceptical of this world of ours. Because of these differences I shall not further criticise the one on the basis of the other. After we have developed idealistic logic a fairer estimate of their respective values can be made.

The essential point of difference between

instrumental logic and idealistic logic is that, according to the former all thinking takes place in the face of a particular problem, according to the latter thinking is determined by thought at large. A whole Weltanschauung is involved. Each has an entirely different notion of the judgment and inference. For the pragmatist "judgment always starts from a vital problem, and is an operation on a real and urgent situation, we predicate only when involved in a predicament."¹ For the idealist a conclusion drawn from anything about anything, demands and challenges contradictions from anything relevant that the universe may anywhere contain.

Pragmatism fails to grasp thought in its totality. It fails to grasp the synthetic nature of judgment. The occasions, instead of the totality of thought, set the problem for thinking. The whole of reality is not involved in any judgment we make. Our attention, says Professor Dewey, is always taken up with particular questions and specific answers. We must always ask the question, What validates and confirms this thought? We are not confronted with the question of thought at large. Thus the function of thought is instrumental to the task of resolving particular conflicts in experience - how shall I think right

1 - F. C. S. Schiller, Logic for Use, p. 226.

here and now.

Thought is an instrument of action and it does appear to solve practical problems. But thought is more than an instrument of action. Pragmatism considers truth on a psychological level - truth is effective coping with environment. If pragmatism would take a wider view of thought, it would find that we cannot rest until we have considered the fuller nature of truth. Truth is metaphysical, not psychological. Thinking is a continuous and progressive function, attempting to solve related problems. There is always an implicit reference to a more comprehensive problem than that upon which the mind momentarily directs its attention and it is this fact that constitutes any inquiry philosophical. We are not engaged in solving a series of disconnected problems. I agree with Professor Hoernle that in the study of Art, Religion, and Philosophy we have left the categories of the biological and psychological far behind. Thinking may begin "under the stimulus of baffled action," but "it comes to its own only when it is exercised for the satisfaction of the disinterested curiosity of science and philosophy".¹

The argument of the pragmatist that we must stop the logical process somewhere, that we cannot go on ad infinitum, seems obvious and plausible. It is one of these

1 - Hoernle's Review of Dewey's Essays in Experiential Logic, Phil. Review, Vol. 26, p. 429.

dangerous half-truths. The question involved is a question of relevance. What is relevant and what is irrelevant to the question at hand? So far the idealist and the pragmatist agree. As soon as we ask What shall be the criterion of relevance? they diverge. Pragmatism says workability; idealism says stability. Since workability is not a metaphysical category I do not see that pragmatism really has a criterion. Only truth can criticise truth, i.e., the greater can criticise the lesser. Truth must ultimately be its own criterion.

I do not intend to subscribe to everything that has been written under the name of idealism, nor to everything that has been put forth in its defense. But in so far as the idealistic point of view is concerned, I think it is fundamentally correct. Idealism has its ontological prejudices, its presuppositions, its ultimates - just as any other logic. Idealism differs because its presuppositions are necessary. Experience entails the idealistic point of view.

It has been said that the different logics are the result of the way each of us "feels the pull" of the universe. Training and interest are very important, but still I think it possible to establish on logical grounds

a kind of logic which is truer than any other.¹ To this we must now turn.

From Descartes to the present the problem of method played an important role in the history of philosophy. Descartes introduced the mathematical method. "I was especially delighted with mathematics, on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasoning, but I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; and thinking that they contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts, I was astonished that foundations, so strong and solid, should have no loftier superstructure reared on them." (Discourse on Method) Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason" writes as follows: "Why is it that, in metaphysics, the sure path of science has not been found? Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of our weightiest concerns?..... Or if the path has hitherto been missed, what indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and to enable us to hope for greater

1 - Professor Urban believes that value must ultimately replace logic. "The postulate of a coherent whole of reality as the ultimate postulate of logic presupposes a whole which must itself have value and validity on some other ground than logical, if the facts of the whole are to have value through logical relation to the whole." (Intelligible World, p. 94) I think Professor Urban is here criticising Naturalism in so far as Naturalism denies the self-transcendence of reason. Naturalism assumes that man's mind is a part of the world of nature. If so, then "the whole must have value and validity on some other ground than logical". But if we are willing to accept the self-transcendence of reasoning we need no other ground than logical. Then value and logic have the same meaning.

success than has fallen to the lot of our predecessors."

Following Kant is Hegel. Hegel, like Descartes and Kant, is anxious about the question of philosophic method. He was dissatisfied with the previous attempts. Descartes introduced the geometrical method into philosophy in order to dispense with the haphazard reasonings of Common Sense. In geometry everything, given the premises, is necessitated. Now philosophy in adopting this method for its own, would, so thought the Cartesians, abolish opinions and enter upon the sure path of science. Their optimism, however, was unwarranted. "That these methods," says Hegel, "however indispensable and brilliantly successful in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophic cognition, is self-evident. They have presuppositions; and their style of cognition is that of understanding proceeding under the canon of formal identity."¹

Hegel, then, criticises the Cartesian method for two reasons. It has presuppositions and uses the canon of formal identity. The first is clear. Geometry begins with axioms, propositions, and definitions. These are assumed without ground. No reason is assigned for them and so they remain an ultimate unexplained fact. They may be "self-evident" as Descartes' Cogito ergo sum, but they

1 - The Logic of Hegel, 2nd edition, p. 369 (Wallace's translation).

are not necessitated. It may be a fact that I am, but why am I? This is not explained. And even though the rest of the system follows from this assumption with the strictest logical necessity, it remains true that the chain is no stronger than its weakest link.

The second criticism is not so easily understood. What can Hegel mean by a "canon of formal identity"? The law of identity is formal when it is tautologous. A is A. But this is a violation of the law, says Hegel, for it vitiates thinking. To think is to judge and to judge is to say something. A is A, says nothing. Mere or formal identity is no identity, for identity implies difference. Judgment is never a question of either or, but both and neither. Descartes in using this canon of judgment claimed that a thing is either A or not A, Thought or Extension. Deduction is therefore impossible, and Descartes remains a subjectivist.

But Hegel was also dissatisfied with Kant's work. For one thing, "Kant did not put himself to much trouble in discovering the categories."¹ To the philosophy of Fichte belongs the merit of giving a genuine deduction of the categories and calling attention to their necessity. The first objection is that Kant's method has no guiding

1 - Hegel's Logic, p. 87.

principle, so that there can be no deduction and without it no necessity. And further, since there is no necessity and deduction, and therefore no transcendence or mediation, and since Kant's philosophy begins with the manifold of sensations, the categories are incapable of giving a knowledge of things-in-themselves. Kant therefore keeps the great gulf fixed between the world of Understanding and Reason.

The basic distinction underlying the dialectic is Hegel's double use of the word thought. It is the distinction between "Thought in general and the reflective thought of philosophy,"¹ Hegel assumes, although not wholly without ground, that the world is through and through rational. To this rational world corresponds reflective thought in man. Now the object of knowledge is to make thought, reflective thought, equal to thought as the sum of All Being (Reality). When this identity obtains we have truth. There are other ways of coming in touch with reality, but, since the form is not reflective, it is not philosophic. It is the aim of philosophic knowledge to be in "harmony with actuality and experience," or again "the highest and final aim of philosophic science is to bring about,..... a reconciliation of the self-conscious reason with that reason which is in the world."²

1- Hegel's Logic, p. 5.

2- Ibid., p. 10.

Hegel's purpose in the logic was to give a necessary connection of the categories in order of their worth for metaphysical interpretation. He is not satisfied to accept a certain number of categories obtained from hither and yon and not woven out of one tissue, but only with a complete necessary deduction of all the categories of thought from one principle. We cannot have a complete science of logic unless we can show that everything is necessary and dependent, and nothing is assumed. Such a logic, says Hegel, is generated by the dialectic. To make the principle work it is, however, necessary that we make a beginning. But a beginning is an assumption, and an assumption is arbitrary. What then, are we to fail at the outset? No, not at all. We can make an assumption that is a demand of thought. The real beginning for thinking is where thinking must begin. Being, Pure Being, is such a beginning. No one can evade the fact that there is something, and that whatever else a thing may be, to be something, it must be. Being according to Hegel is the most general of all the categories. It is absolutely pervasive and forms a solid foundation for the deduction of the other more concrete and definite categories.

In Hegel we find Bosanquet's background. Bosanquet accepts the Hegelian dialectic and agrees with Hegel that the dialectic is a constructive principle and brings into evidence the nexus of experience, the Concrete Universal.

Thought begins in the abstract and by means of the dialectic proceeds to the concrete and the universal. "The normal working of intelligence, then, is creative and constructive, tending toward the concrete and to continuity within differences. The universality which is its mainspring is in itself a nisus to the concrete." Bosanquet, like Hegel, purports a philosophy which is thoroughly concrete, necessitated throughout, without ending in dualism with its consequent agnosticism. Bosanquet criticises Descartes on the basis of his axioms; he criticises Kant for making the laws of thought merely regulative instead of constructive.

Some maintain that Bosanquet never got beyond Hegel. This I question. It cannot be denied that they have much in common - much more than, say, Hegel and Bradley. The movement of Bradley and Bosanquet may be designated as the movement away from Kant. Bradley is merely critical; Bosanquet is constructive¹ also. In a letter to Hoernle,¹ Bosanquet once wrote that he was very much interested in the way the younger generation would study Hegel. To Bosanquet himself Hegel never had the foreignness and

1- "I am interested in the way Hegel strikes the younger generation. To me he has not, and never did have from the first, that foreignness and difficulty. Not that I can 'explain' him, anymore than others can, but when I do seem to understand, he speaks to me as the only writer I can understand. What he says, seems to come straight out of one's own heart and experience." Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, pp. 511-512.

difficulty which so many seem to have with him. Thus Bosanquet is entirely in sympathy with the Hegelian point of view but does not accept the system of Hegel unconditionally.

Difficulties will always remain but as Professor Muirhead suggests¹ these difficulties are not to be solved by going back on the main principle of idealism. If the difficulties are to be solved we must follow the clue Bosanquet gives us. These involve nothing new or startling but they are principles which everybody believes and few accept.²

There is a fundamental difference between Bradley's and Bosanquet's conception of the "immediate". For Bradley the immediate is below the relational. Experience and consciousness are not coextensive. Feeling is a unity without distinctions and relations.³ And so Bradley makes a clear line between the mediate and the immediate. The former is discursive and relational, the latter is either below or above the relational. "In mere feeling or immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole. This whole contains diversity, and, on the other hand, is not parted by relations."⁴ In the immediacy of sense

1 - Cf. Mind, Vol. N. S., 22, p.399.

2 - Cf. Preface to Individuality and Value, p. V.

3 - Essays, p. 194.

4 - Appearance and Reality, p. 159.

perception we touch Reality, but as thought begins its work on this immediate content, we are led away from Reality. Thought is discursive, relational, appearance.

Bosanquet also believes in the immediate. But for him "immediacy is a form which any content can take, and which is peculiar to none."¹ And again, "Immediacy is a character that may be assumed by any mental complex or object, however logically articulate or external and independent of mind it may appear under certain conditions. And no complex or object is altogether beyond it. Everyone has its immediate mental aspect."² It is not true that mental events are at first merely there, wholly indeterminate, and are afterwards, i.e., when the dialectic begins its work, clothed with determinateness. Every item of experience has quality and relation. Experience and consciousness are coextensive.

The status of the immediate is very important, for it is here that we find the roots of the concrete universal. Experience must be continuous. It may be more or less mediate or immediate, but it is never wholly the one without the other. It is never wholly either-or, but always both "within limits". The immediate is always more abstract, less stable, and the process of thought is always toward the

1 - Prin. of Ind. and Value, p. 297.

2 - Logic, Vol. II, p. 296.

concrete and more stable.

For a doctrine of immediacy which is directly opposed to the doctrine advocated by Bosanquet, we must turn to F. H. Jacobi. Like Descartes, Jacobi found the first foothold of certainty in the individual. Sensible evidence is superior to rational conclusion. Thought is to be identified with bare cognition. It is the work of the intellect and proceeds by means of abstraction. Contact with reality is found in the immediate but so soon as mediation sets in this contact is lost.¹

I say that this is a type of immediacy not to be looked for in Bosanquet. Bosanquet here follows Hegel. The immediate is found in every experience and as a result of thought the immediacy is increased, not decreased. It is not true that feeling and sense are to be identified with the immediate, and that thought is always mediated and abstracted. There is no dividing line between feeling and sense, on the one hand, and thought on the other. And so there is no dividing line between the immediate and the mediate. Every experience contains both. Let us see how Bosanquet argues the point. To do this we must go back to Hegel.

1 - Note. Jacobi argues effectively against the reflective understanding, but the whole argument becomes ineffective when applied to thought as a whole. Jacobi failed to recognize the genuine nature of thought. In following thought we are not leaving reality behind.

All knowledge, according to Hegel, begins with images, intuitions, or as we should say, perceptions. These are, however, only the lower limits of knowledge. But knowledge pure and unalloyed seeks for the permanent characteristics in these images and intuitions; for the universals. These are the product of cognition. Philosophy is therefore the science which seeks "to know and comprehend thinkingly." "But with the rise of this thinking study of things, it soon becomes evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance is thus discovered to be inadequate."¹ But there is more. Not only is our original acquaintance with reality inadequate, it is also contradictory. Otherwise, why speak of reconciliation? In the thinking study of things, thought, says Hegel, "entangles itself in contradictions, i.e., loses itself in the hard and fast non-identity of its thought and so, instead of teaching itself is caught and held in its counterpart."² Thought falls into contradiction - the negation of itself.

The ultimate nature of thought is, however, not contradictory. The complete, full reality, for Hegel Die Idee

1 - Hegel's Logic, pp. 3 ff.

2 - Ibid., p. 18.

is a self-existent system where all contradiction and all unrest is removed. But how are we to get from contradiction to self-consistence? Knowledge is a movement from a necessitated beginning (A) to an end which is somehow apprehended (B). But the process could not be motivated, unless (A) in the light of (B) were not recognized as incomplete and inadequate. Pure Being ultimately leads to Die Idee.

This general statement is not fully satisfactory and complete. To bring out in detail Hegel's actual procedure, I shall try to produce one of his trials. I take the first. Pure Being equals immediate existence over against us. It is the most abstract of all categories. It is the emptiest form of all affirmation. It is pure "isness". But mere "isness" is nothing. A that without a what is less than a ghost. Being if pressed produces the category of nothing. But how? Well, being is a category of irreflective thought, the category a child might apply to what is over against it. But so soon as we begin to reflect upon our experience or the object out there as over against us, we recognize that the category of being is nothing. To say that something is stripped of all negation is to negate it. Hence to say something significant we must predicate that a thing is and is not. But to be and not to be is to become. Therefore thinking cannot rest in an undetermined something but passes on to a more definite and determined predication of the object of thinking.

Bosanquet is in full accord with Hegel on the status of the immediate. I paraphrase from Principle of Individuality and Value. What is, is by determinate self-maintenance. To say that a thing is without saying "what it is" is meaningless. Now Plato explained in what sense "is" and "is not" can be united in the determination of the same content. But in so far as "is" and "is not" affirm different self-maintenances it is alleged that in its self-maintenance it fails to maintain itself. This destroys the character of being, for it posits and annuls in the same act. That is, an experience which "is" and "is not" without distinction, falls short of the character of being. It undoes itself. In as far, on the other hand, as hostility to self is removed by transforming the content of experience into what is relatively a system, in which this and the other are co-operative and no longer conflicting members, the experience "is" in a higher degree; it includes more of reality in its self-maintenance. Every experience tumbles backwards and forwards between "is" and "is not",¹

Thinking is advancing. To understand this is to keep clearly before us the relation between that with which the mind begins and which is within it forming its ideal

1 - pp. 44 and 45.

content, and that with which the mind seeks to end.¹ Knowledge is about the real but cannot, at least at first, be equated with it; for all knowledge works under the limitations of time, space, the form and substance of the knower. All judgment is conditional. But if conditional then not wholly true, for the condition always falls outside the judgment. On the other hand, it is just as true that in knowledge the conditions are implicitly before the mind, so that judgment takes that which is before it as its ideal toward which it moves.

This movement could not take place if our present ideal content were not recognized as an inadequate expression of the ideal toward which thought moves. That is, as soon as a man begins to inquire into the truth or falsity of his judgments he brings to bear upon his judgments a

1 - The following passages will bring this out clearly:

"But it is a mistake, so far as I can see, to treat this apparently immediate certainty, which is at bottom equivalent to the abstraction 'something is' as superior in logical value to the certainty of any well established world of concrete experience, although in a purely formal sense the latter may seem at a disadvantage, i.e., to be incapable of being formulated as a content of a priori truth." Principle of Individuality and Value, p.48.

"The whole question is really that of the connection between the mediate and immediate experiences, and the assertion that no argument is possible about ultimate ends rests on a confusion and a mistake. The confusion is between the immediate and the ultimate; and the mistake is in holding the immediate to be below or above critical discussion, an idea already false of the immediate, and moreover transferred by confusion to the ultimate, of which it is much more false." Ibid., p. 295.

standard or criterion which is obtained not in the judgment but outside, although it is true that only he who makes the judgment obtains the insight. For a fuller understanding of the nature of transcendence and modification which set in as a result of recognizing the inadequacy of the judgment, we must turn to Bosanquet's theory of judgment and inference.

A judgment may be defined in more than one way. In text-books a judgment is generally spoken of as a proposition, i.e., "an assertion made in language". The judgment as a proposition has a definite or limited subject and predicate. We may speak of "judgment" in this sense, says Bosanquet, if we bear in mind that this is merely a translation of the judgment and not the judgment itself. Judgment in the real sense is "co-extensive with waking consciousness."¹

As stated above, the starting point of Bosanquet's logic rests on an assumption. We must assume that the real is the rational and that somehow or other we are in possession of it. If we were not in possession of reality at the beginning we certainly would not be in possession of it at the end. Now most critics will grant that we are in possession of reality in sense perception, but they

1 - Essentials of Logic, p. 33.

deny that the real is the rational. But judgment, says Bosanquet, teaches us just this. In sense perception I am in contact with reality. "Reality is given for me in present sensuous perception, and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it. The real world, as a definite organized system, is for me an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension."¹ Now if judgment is the extension of present sensuous perception the given and its extension cannot differ absolutely. The one is merely more of the other and it is impossible to lay down exact boundaries between the two.

The movement of thought is not purely analytic, for then thought would forever be confined within the limits of the immediate. On the contrary, the dialectic method purports to be a real inferential process going from lower to higher. It means to be a synthetic process adding to the knowledge with which we begin. But what makes this synthesis possible? The answer lies, as indicated by Hegel, in the relation between thought and reality. Reasoning is a process of seeing logical implications. It is

1 - Logic, p. 72.

not creative but essentially recreative and reconstructive. Recreative and reconstructive but not in the sense of repetition or approximation to an original.¹ Approximation to an original implies the theory of correspondence and the acceptance of it would mean a denial of our immanent standard. But recreative in the sense of playing our part, "which as we are finite, has a beginning and an ending, in its self-maintenance."² By means of the principle of non-contradiction thought moves forward to predicate something other than it has given to it in the present judgment. All knowledge is at once analytic and synthetic.

There are many minor differences between Bradley and Bosanquet, but on the nature of thought they differ quite radically.³ For Bradley all judgment involves abstraction. It consists in applying an abstract universal to a logical subject. Yet this abstract universal does not exist except in someone's head. Thought requires separation from existence and content because thought is ideal. "Without an idea there is no thinking, and an idea implies separation of content from existence."⁴ Bosanquet admits that thought

1 - Even in the judgment $7 + 5 = 12$ we have an eternal novelty "It is the expression of something which, parting from itself remains within itself, and which being always old, is yet perennially new." Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 144.

2 - Logic, Vol. II, p. 249.

3 - Cf. This is especially true of Bradley in his Appearance and Reality. In the Essays he is closer to Hegel and Bosanquet.

4 - Appearance and Reality, p. 163.

is abstract in so far as it omits and selects, "Yet all thought need not be abstraction as a special process."¹ Thought has an abstract character but this does not mean that thought leads us away from reality. It may be possible that thought will never be one with the real. But this much is certain - thought will at least point the way to what lies beyond, and introduce us to the nature of this beyond if necessary.² Thus Bosanquet is not led to Bradley's ultimate doubts. Bosanquet sees the principle of concreteness in all thought, and by means of it we are capable of reaching the highest truth or reality.³

Judgment must be in actual touch with the real. An interesting discussion of this point is found in L. J. Russell's article in Mind on "The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic."⁴ Russell here denies Bosanquet's contention that supposal always rests on actual system. No matter how complex a system we may imagine, says Bosanquet, we shall find that it is insufficient of itself to enable us to deduce its consequences. A deduction of consequences will always transcend the supposed and be grounded in the actual. If we were able to cut ourselves off from reality, judgment would go overboard.

1 - Logic, Vol. II, p. 20.

2 Cf. Principle of Ind. and Value, p. 39.

3 Cf. Ibid., p. 56.

4 - Vol. N. S. 27, pp. 432-436.

Russell argues "that every judgment is relative to some system, whether real or supposed, which is sufficiently complete to render the judgment necessary for we hold that it is possible to construct various systems of this kind without finding it necessary to draw on any unspecified portions of reality. If we specify the precise portions of reality on which we are drawing, then not reality, but the system we have specified, is the ultimate subject of our judgment."¹ Prima facie, Russell's arguments seem convincing. It is a pragmatic argument and pragmatism always appeals. Truth is not the whole but it is the whole of some human endeavor or that which answers some purpose.

Fortunately Bosanquet answered Russell and he answered him in these four words. "Judgment always transcends supposition." We cannot specify, not even suppose, the precise portion of reality on which we are drawing. The whole is always involved. Mr. Russell argues that we can draw conclusions from contents which have no basis in reality. Premises may be posited, pure and simply, and from these we draw conclusions. If we suppose enough in each case, we shall find that our conclusions are drawn without implying the real or reality as a whole.

The difference between these two views is the old

1 - Mind, N. S. 43, p. 448.

question whether the laws of thought are a priori in the sense of being merely regulative or whether they are also constitutive of reality. If they are constitutive of reality, and it seems to me that we must admit it, then idealistic logic is based on a necessary assumption. Then idealistic logic is superior to the logic advanced by L. J. Russell, by B. Russell and by McTaggart - to mention no others. If induction is to be valid it must rest on a priori principles. So far all agree. The latter, however, differ from Bosanquet when they say that the a priori principle can be taken in isolation. Bosanquet maintains that every inference involves a judgment based on the whole. To illustrate: Imagine anything you please. Specify it sufficiently to enable you to draw conclusions from it. So long as you have suppositions without drawing consequences, you have a very complex antecedent of a hypothetical judgment but you have no affirmation. Your suppositions lie in isolation. But now draw consequences and immediately "you infuse the life of reality into your suppositions. You are drawing on the whole of what is in reality, of what may prove to be relevant anywhere in the universe, to sustain your conclusions, and you are challenging it to contradict them. Your supposition when it has been allowed for can draw no magic circle by which anything

further in the universe can be barred out."¹ You cannot draw a conclusion from a mere and pure supposition. Every inference involves, though it need not refer to, the whole of reality.²

The whole question can be reduced to this: "Can I really transform the function of supposition into the function of judgment?" L. J. Russell thinks that Bosanquet does not suppose enough and if he would suppose enough the function of supposition would pass over into the function of judgment. But can it? The attempt to suppose enough always ends in an "ab-normal supposition."³ The laws of thought are such ab-normal suppositions. No matter how complex your supposition, you will find that you are never able to deduce consequences from them. Apart from judgment the suppositions are out of relation with reality. Judgment binds suppositions together and because judgment introduces this unity, every judgment is ultimately absolute. This does not mean that one cannot draw conclusions which refer to a mere supposition and nothing more. It may refer to a mere supposition but it always involves or entails more.

We now see what Bosanquet means when he says that every judgment is both hypothetical and categorical.

1 - Mind, Vol. N. S., 28, p. 205.

2 - We shall come back to this when we discuss the ontological argument.

3 - Mind, N. S., 28, p. 208.

Knowledge is hypothetical in so far as it is partial or determined by an abstraction. It is categorical in so far as it refers to reality as a whole, in so far as it always involves the laws of thought.

In concluding the second article on "The Nature of Universals" N. Kemp Smith raises some objections to idealistic logic. He says, "Does it not assume the ultimate self-contradictoriness of all relational thinking; and is not this an assumption that neither Bradley nor Bosanquet has succeeded in substantiating?"¹ Smith criticises the concrete universal for different reasons. Since this is one of them we shall have to answer his objections.

I think we must, in the first place, distinguish between contradiction, on the one hand, and negation or transcendence on the other. Anyone will admit that it is inadmissible to affirm and to deny the self-same judgment without distinction. "Contradiction consists in 'differents' being ascribed to the same term, while no distinction is alleged within that term such as to make it capable of receiving them."² The last part of the sentence is significant. Do we really ever predicate without distinction? To argue that on the basis of Bosanquet's logic we must

1 - Mind N. S. 36, p. 279.

2 - Prin. of Ind. and Value, p. 223.

be able to say that "A is not-A" and "A is A", and that this is a contradiction if anywhere there is contradiction, is a bit hasty.¹ Is not the doctrine involved another instance of what Bosanquet calls "a truism which everybody believes and few accept"?

As I see it negation or transcendence is not formal contradiction. Transcendence merely means that there is always more implied in any judgment than what is explicitly stated. Thought always goes beyond. "Nothing is so impossible, for instance, as this, that I am; for 'I' is at the time a simple connexion with self, and as undoubtedly connexion with something else," says Hegel. Therefore "I am" and "I am not". Both judgments are true within limits. Or take another judgment, e.g., "The boy becomes a man." At no age is the "boy" mere "boy" and at no age is he mere "man". He is always boy and man. Now more of the one. Now more of the other. But always both.

Smith raises another objection in the following question. He says, "Does it (referring to idealistic logic and especially to the systems of Bradley and Bosanquet) not also rest on their equally sceptical account of the nature of all judgment, as asserting, not what is articulated in the terms of its content, but only instead a

1 - Cf. Thought, Existence and Reality, by Gemertsfelder.

non-relational, transformed, and so far unknown Reality?" And his conclusion is that "Bosanquet can hope to make good his position only by showing that system originates in, and is the expression of, what is Individual;....."¹ I shall attempt to show that system originates in, and is the expression of, what is Individual, in the second part of my paper. Now I merely wish to examine the statement that judgment asserts a non-relational, transformed and so far unknown Reality.

Smith's criticism contains nothing new. It is the old objection voiced anew. If the nature of judgment is such that we must always use the formula: "Reality is such that S is P", then we shall always be left with an unknown Reality. That is the contention.

The whole difficulty rests on a misunderstanding of the transcendent. The absolute is never cut loose from our daily experience. Although we can never hope to experience the whole as such, nevertheless it is true that the Absolute is in every experience. There is no characteristic of the nature of the whole which cannot be demonstrated in our experience. Bosanquet says, "There is no fusion or union which we can conceive ourselves bound to ascribe to the Absolute which has not something to represent it in the world of time and space."² We never have

1 - Mind N. S. 36, p. 279-80.

2 - Prin. of Ind. and Value, p. 384.

an experience which is entirely either-or, but every experience is always both immanent and transcendent, i.e., incomplete in itself, and still it partakes of the nature of the Absolute and in so far the Absolute is immanent in every experience. And here the critics see a contradiction. If every experience is both transcendent and immanent "the members of every world are worlds and therefore the series of worlds within worlds is endless."¹ We are confronted with an infinite regress and therefore have an unknown Reality.

But does the above conclusion follow from the premise that every experience is both immanent and transcendent? I think not. In his first major work Knowledge and Reality Bosanquet already answered this criticism. ".....reality appears to us in a series of phenomena. I did not think that we were to look for it as completed in that series, I say that I am not looking for it there, because I think that in looking for it rightly, in the organic relation of knowledge, we escape from the series." The critics identify the series with what Bosanquet alleges to be outside the series.

Reality cannot be compared to an algebraic series.

1 - Our doctrine would, I suppose, involve that a class can be a member of itself. "And if this is a contradiction at any rate it is one shared apparently with every term that covers both an individual and a type." Swabey. The Monist, Vol. 39, p. 259.

An algebraic series moves onward, not outward. Since there is always a term beyond the last term, the series is never complete. But this is not what we mean by transcendence or negation. To understand it we must go back to Aristotle's doctrine of end. Aristotle, as we all know, had two meanings for the word "end". On the one hand, it meant completion or cessation. The end of the series, in this sense, will never be obtained for there is always another term. The other meaning of "end" is "the completion of a positive whole which is developing through a process."¹ This is a far more significant meaning of the term because it takes account of the organic relations of knowledge. And it is this meaning that the critics of Bosanquet lose sight of when they criticise his doctrine of judgment and inference.

Knowledge is organic, and because it is organic it is circular. It is from immediacy to mediation and back to immediacy. Bradley held that the ultimate premise of proof itself cannot be proved, i.e., all mediate certainty must stand on immediate knowledge. Bosanquet denies this for two reasons. In the first place we cannot draw a line between mediate and immediate knowledge. Every experience partakes of both. Knowledge cannot be compared to a house

1 - Prin. of Ind. and Value, p. 124.

where the mediated knowledge is the superstructure and the unmediated the foundation. The one falls with the other. The immediate rests on the mediate and the mediate on the immediate. And secondly, because all reasoning is circular. One cannot speak of precision without introducing quantity; quantity presupposes a unit, a unit a standard, and where we have a standard, we are dependent upon a system of knowledge. And only through this system of knowledge is this standard endowed with all that constitutes its precision.¹ It is impossible to get away from the organic nature of knowledge. One thing always involves another. Take such a simple thing as the measurement of an actual base line for a trigometric survey. Supposedly it is immediate, i.e., it need not be referred to a system of knowledge. But even here a standard is involved. It is impossible to rest in the immediate.

1 - Knowledge and Reality, p. 332.

Chapter II.

The problem of universals is of perennial interest in philosophy. From Plato to the present, philosophers have argued the question. For some universals are ante rem, for others in rem and for a third group they are post rem. The different theories extend in scope through delicate shades from the insistence that universals are the only real things to the insistence that they have no existence at all. That so fundamental a problem in respect to one of the most fundamental sciences of life should show such diversity, certainly must strike the critical observer both as pathetic and ludicrous.

Since there is so much controversy as to the nature of universals in general one can hardly expect a favorable reception for the Concrete Universal. Most philosophers discard it at once and say that it is a concept as contradictory as a square circle. It is the nature of a universal to be abstract, then how can it be concrete? The concrete is always the particular. Therefore we can speak of abstract universals and of concrete particulars but to speak of concrete universals is plainly contradictory. The search for them is as futile as the search for a priori synthetic judgments.

The Concrete Universal would be contradictory if

we should take "Concrete" on the one hand, and "Universal" on the other, and then by putting them together speak of the Concrete Universal. Such a concept would be as contradictory as the idea of a square circle. But the nature of a concrete universal cannot be expressed separately in the words for the concrete universal is a unity "which is manifested in just those parts in just those relations." Once more we must think two seemingly contradictories together. In this respect the concrete universal resembles the judgment. In the judgment there are differences within the identity and still the judgment is a unity, a totality. The proposition consists of parts - Subject, Predicate and Copula. For this reason the analysis of a proposition can never control the interpretation of a judgment. In the judgment Subject and Predicate are really distinct, as a real identity from or in its differences, but they are never isolated parts of speech which can be treated as separable contents or separate psychical existences. The judgment is not a relation between two ideas, a transition from one idea to another. And so the concrete universal does not consist of two concepts put together externally. Whatever else it may be it must be a unity.¹

1 - Note. Dr. Carr defines the concrete universal as the "self-sufficiency of mind and the inclusion within its activity of the object of knowledge; for the term universal can only apply to concepts, not to intuitions, and the term concrete can only be descriptive of that which possesses within itself the ground of its existence." (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919-1920, page 141) I do not think that we can define the concrete universal in this way.

The Concrete Universal is an identity within differences. It is a cosmos or world and "a cosmos or world is a system of members, such that every member, being ex hypothesi distinct, nevertheless contributes to the unity of the whole in virtue of the peculiarities which constitute its distinctness."¹ The best example of it, says Bosanquet, is a proper name, e.g., Caesar. Here we have an identity extended through space and time and in every judgment we make concerning Caesar we exhibit this identity in some act or moment through which it persisted.

The self is a universal. Many deny this in toto, whereas others would allow the individual self to be a universal of a peculiar kind. In the self we have an example of a universal as a continuant. The self retains its identity in spite of (or by means of) its differences. The self then becomes a universal with reference to time but not identical with different positions in space. Therefore the self is a unique universal.

Professor Smith holds that all universals are abstract and therefore the term universal can never be applied to a recurrent type of identity. By a universal, he says, we never mean a continuant. "The problem of universals bears only on the latter (recurrent) and not on the former (continuant) type of identity."² For this reason he denies

1 - Principle of Ind. and Value, p. 37.

2 - Mind N. S. 36, p. 280. (1927)

the existence of the concrete universal. It does not distinguish between an identity as a recurrent and an identity as a continuant. To define the universal as a continuant means that we look upon the universal as a meeting-point of differences, or in short, as an identity within difference. Since Smith holds that all universals are abstract he cannot define them as identities within differences but speaks of "relatedness within a system" as the ultimate category.

My thesis will be that all universals are concrete. The distinction between abstract and concrete universal is one of usage and not of theory. Everything that is real is more or less a concrete universal. The abstract universal is an abstraction and although Bosanquet sometimes spoke of the abstract universal he certainly did not mean by it what Smith means by an abstract universal. What Bosanquet means by an abstract universal is an experience where the domination of the differences by the identity is at a minimum, where it approaches zero. In an abstract universal the domination of the differences by the identity would be zero. That we cannot grant.

It will be my business to show that the recurrent and continuant type of identity do not differ in kind. This then is the thesis: essentially the difference between myself and another self is no more ultimate than

the difference between myself of today and myself of tomorrow. Both types of identity rest on the inclusive type of individuality and it is only because we think more readily of individuality in terms of "undividedness," in terms of peculiar existential states, that we deem the difference between one self and another self more ultimate than the difference between the same self at different intervals of time. But it seems to me that it is just as impossible, on the basis of an existential individuality, to account for the identity of a self through time, as it is to account for the identity of different selves. Is the relation between the continuant (Caesar) and the occurrents (crossing the Rubicon, rival of Pompey, conqueror of Gaul, etc.) a unique relation or is it essentially the same as the relation of the universal "blue" to its various instances (blue book, blue house, blue sky, etc.) Caesar is a continuant (temporal) universal, blue is a recurrent (spatial) universal, but when we say that Caesar is the same through time and "blue" is the same through space, we are speaking of a single type of continuity. What is true about temporal continuity must be true of spatial continuity. I do not mean to say that there is no distinction between two men in the same place or time and two periods of a man's one life. Or between two periods of a man's one life and the recurrence of a universal in two instances. One is a temporal

universal and the other is a spatial universal and the distinction can never be wiped out. "Any one can of course perceive that the sameness of a thing with itself at different times differs from its possession with another thing of one and the same character."¹ But in so far as we can speak of sameness in each case this sameness is an identity in difference.

I do not think it necessary to take up the question of nominalism. We shall assume that there are universals. It will be necessary, however, to argue against the self or individual as being a peculiar type of universal. If we can establish that the self is not a peculiar type of universal but merely one amongst others, then the difference in kind between a universal as a continuant and recurrent will fall away.

Before we consider the nature of the concrete universal as such it will be necessary to define the terms particular and universal. Is the distinction between particular and universal ultimate? Are the objects with which metaphysics is concerned divided into two ultimate classes, universals and particulars? My opinion is that the dualism is ultimate only in so far as both are necessary to constitute what is individual. Existence is individual

1 - Bradley, "Appearance and Reality" p. 585.

and the individual is a unity of particularity and universality. The objects with which metaphysics is concerned are not, therefore, divided into two ultimate classes, universals and particulars. The duality is resolved in the unity of the individual.

The particular then is non-existent. If it were existent the objective world would be resolvable into certain ultimate, simple elements called "pure sensa". These "pure sensa" would then be bare "impressions" of sense out of which develop, and upon which rests the whole structure of experience. Now it seems to me clear that if these are the ultimate data of knowledge, then to explain the genesis of knowledge becomes fairly impossible. To begin with, it is extremely doubtful that we are ever aware of such entities; we cannot so much as form an image of one. In the second place, a pure sensum would be a mere "that", for any determinable "what" would imply some degree of recognition, some activity on the part of the subject. Any attempt to set up a mere "that" is an attempt to set up existence itself apart from character, or to set up a finite something which is not a "somewhat". In short, the simplest discoverable experience is always perceptual and the minimum of experience reveals this perceptual character. In it we find three irreducible activities of mind: retention, complication, and indiscrimination. An

instantaneous experience is impossible and if it were possible it could not give rise to knowledge. Knowledge requires at the very least the element of recognition. And without some degree of retention there can be no recognition.

It is impossible to define the particular. At best it can be designated. Only that which is individual can be defined. Definition always implies characterisation, determination, and the particular is supposed to be absolutely undetermined. If existent the particular (as we have defined it) would be as useless as Locke's substratum. When we attempt to think away the properties or relations of an object of knowledge, the object of knowledge ceases to exist.

By "universal" we mean that which exists in its sameness in more than one object. A universal is a quality which may be common to many objects. If A is red, B is red, and C is red, then "red" is a quality which is common to A, B, and C, and, therefore, "red" is a universal. So defined our universal does not differ from the abstract universal - the abstract universal is the common quality of many objects. We wish to distinguish our universal from the abstract universal by insisting on the nature of this sameness. Sameness is the important word in the definition of a universal. There can be no universals without sameness.

but the difference between an abstract and a concrete universal rests on the meaning we give to this sameness. Although universal means that the same quality can appear in different objects it is equally true that this identity must admit of diversity within itself. The concrete universal is always an identity-in-difference such that the identity is determined by the differences.

I must now show how the idea of a particulars in the sense of "pure sensa", "wholly indeterminates", and universals in the sense of identity without diversity, arose. The belief that there are such entities is generally far from clear and usually quite uncritically assumed, and one might find it difficult to discover any very great uniformity with respect to common beliefs about them. Yet these conceptions are with us and their presence must be explained. They arose somehow, somewhere, sometime or other out of reflection upon experience, and it is to experience that we must go for whatever grounds there may be for them.

It is more or less the persistent claim of the majority of mankind that there are many objects or things which we might call particulars. Thus I am a particular, you are a particular, yonder oak tree is a particular, and so on. Each object is thought of as standing entirely alone. That is, my existence does not depend on your

existence and the existence of either of us does not depend on the existence of yonder oak tree. Each particular has its existence independently of the other. There are many self-existent things in our common world. Reality is composed of a great number of particulars, in their own nature unrelated, though connected with one another in an external fashion as sticks might be bound together with a tie. Things exist in their own right and upon existence they enter into relations.

Things are particular but they have common qualities. Two roses may have the qualities red and sweet-smelling in common. These qualities can belong, and in fact do belong, to all particular roses and these common qualities are universals. Thus things are particular, qualities are universal.

We are thus presented with exclusive alternatives, particulars and universals. Idealism, in attempting to bring these alternatives together, is said to obscure the distinction. But philosophy, it seems to me, cannot be satisfied with the easy method of solving problems by making distinctions. It must seek a unity within the differences. It must be remembered that the task of philosophy begins with the attempt to bring together again as manifestations of a "single principle" the elements which are distinguishable. Even such a pluralist as C. A. Richardson admits that "when pluralism has done its utmost, we are

left to search for the nature of that concrete universal principle or entity, whereby subject is linked to subject, and the many made one."¹

Reality does not consist of a series of exclusive alternatives such as the "given" and thought, perception and conception, particular and universal. As Hegel did, we must take our stand behind these alternatives, see the truth which is in both of them and then seek for the unity which alone is adequate to the differences that it carries within it. Because idealism always insists on this unity-in-differences discussions in idealistic terms are said to be extremely vague. Idealism never calls a spade a spade - a spade is always more or less of a spade. Realists, on the other hand, make numerous distinctions. A thing either is or is not of such and such a character. It is either particular or universal, identical or different, one or many. For idealism everything partakes of both.

Some forms of idealism have been guilty of vagueness. To say that a thing always partakes of oppositions without indicating what the exact relation of that opposition is, is not satisfactory. Analysis is absolutely necessary. Thought must abstract and to speak of the abstract in depreciatory terms is not to understand the

1 - Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy, p. XXI.

nature of thought. But thought cannot rest in the abstract. Throughout the process of abstraction we must realize that there is a concrete universal principle which makes the abstraction valid. We must abstract because we cannot think all things at once. We must tear up the unity of the real and deal with aspects only. But if by abstraction you mean that you proceed from a datum (the given) regarded as real which excludes the principle of the whole (thought) then abstraction is impossible. Abstraction is fruitful in so far as it shows that reality has two sides, the real and the ideal. It is always both. And to say that such a doctrine is disturbing¹ merely bears out the fact that thinking is a highly complex process.²

I maintain that the distinction between particular and universal is not ultimate; it is ultimate only in so far as both are necessary to constitute the individual. They are distinguishable but not separable. It will therefore be necessary to define what we mean by the individual, by individuality. What are the essential properties of the individual considered as a type of the real? Following

1 - See N. K. Smith, Arist. Society, 1927-1928)

2 - Bradley's question whether "one must so believe in the power of analysis as to hold that what it cannot bring out naked is therefore nothing at all" is a very relevant question. (Appearance and Reality, p. 594)

Bosanquet we can maintain that individuality has two extremes. An "atom" may be said to be individual because it is simple, indivisible, the least possible, and if anything is taken away from it, it will cease to exist. This is one view of individuality. Then there is the other view which conceives of individuality "as the character which our fullest experience tends to approach." The first definition is in terms of distinction, the second in terms of content. It is in the second sense that we wish to speak of the individual as Real.

The first definition takes the individual as indivisible. I suppose the etymology of the word suggests this "undividedness". Experience must be analysed and broken up into the greatest possible number of simple parts and so in the end each part differs quantitatively from every other part. Intelligibility is supposed possible only when the object is made as small as possible, void of all quality. This method continues until the individual can be distinguished only by taking different places in the numerical series. It is either number one, or number two, or number three, etc. As such the individuals are not different, they are interchangeable and each counts for one. At the end of this analysis there is no difference between the elements or individuals; the difference consists in the abstract symbols by which the elements are

represented. The real elements have disappeared and the attempt to find individuality by means of dividing phenomena into the greatest number of simple parts ends in abstraction. The individual cannot be interpreted in terms of not-this, not-that, etc. This method of difference destroys the qualitative nature of the real and therefore distinctness (otherness) cannot be the principle of individuality. Instead of being a type of the true individuality it really is the extreme opposite of the true individual.

The only truth there can be in insisting on the exclusive relation is that individuals must be distinct. It can give no clue to the content of individuality. Its usefulness lies in the fact that it enables us to avoid absolute identity or abstract universality, but if it is looked upon as the essence of individuality it soon becomes dangerous. At best it is a pragmatic entity which draws artificial boundaries within the actual and as such it is useful for practical purposes. It has no power to constitute the real but it merely tells us where, within the real, boundaries may be drawn in order to facilitate the relative distribution of values.

Then there is the other view of individuality which interprets it in terms of "comprehensive content." It defines individuality not in terms of "not one being someone else" but as "being oneself". I am not, in the first place,

an individual because I am distinct from others but I am an individual only in so far as I can include others within me, in so far as I can make their ideals my ideals, their plans my plans, The individual is the harmonious, the self-contained, the concrete universal relieved of its extensional and negative implications. I then am an individual not because I am an element in the series and thus distinguished from everybody else, but I am an individual because I have harmonized the ideals of others with my own ideals and the uniqueness of my individuality is determined by the extent to which I can do this. Individuality now becomes a principle, not a thing. In dealing with the individual we must leave the plane of things and strive for the plane of principles. The true individual is the spiritual, not a supernatural entity or substance, but spiritual in the sense that there is meaning and organization in whatever is.

The individual defined as principle is not extensional but intensional, i.e., in order to understand what is truly individual we must go behind the categories of space and time and externality, to categories which are more expressive and intimate with the life of experience. Space and time and the external are of course not unreal. When we are concerned with the existent they are real and necessary. But the real as constituted by a spiritual

principle cannot be explained in terms of space and time or space-time. Mackenzie in an article on "Universals and Orders" maintains that space-time is the individualising function of existence. A thing may occupy a position in space which is occupied by an infinite number of other objects. The same holds true with respect to time. But, he says, "its position in space-time would seem to be a characteristic that belongs only to itself as individual."¹ By holding to space-time as the principle of individuation Mackenzie believes that he avoids the pure singularism of Bradley and Bosanquet, and the pure pluralism of Stout. Now it seems to me that Mackenzie's Cosmism (for so he calls his system) emphasizes the "existential" view of individuality. No one will deny that man as a member of the biological series is a part of nature, is in space and time. To say that the individual is not in space or time is ridiculous if you mean by the individual the psychic individual who was born on a certain day and after three score and ten years dies. With such facts we are not concerned when we speak of the true individual.² What we mean is that there are other facts, beside the fact that a

1 - Mind, Vol. N, S. 31, p. 193.

2 - "That our self, or will, or mind at its best, is not the self or will or mind of a unique individual, bounded, so to speak, by our normal circumference, is the one definite point on which spiritual experience seems unambiguous." (Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. II, p. 255.

thing is "given" in space and time, to be considered before we can pronounce a thing individual. Any attempt to define individuality in terms of space and time ends in formalism.¹

Here then we have two types of individuality. One in terms of existence, the other in terms of meaning. The former is accepted by atomic realism, and existential idealism of the Berkeleyian type which interprets the world in terms of mind and reduces reality to conscious states. The latter is the view of speculative philosophy and interprets mind and reality in terms of the concrete universal. The former arrives at its conclusions by going back on experience, i.e., by asking the question: How is experience possible? The latter looks forward for the significance of reality. Reality lies ahead, it can never be interpreted by retracing the various states of experience. It must be interpreted by more of itself. The question is not, How is experience possible? but, What does it mean?

These two types of individuality are two approaches to philosophy. The acceptance of the individual as the "existential" leads to abstract universals and external relations. Individuality as inclusiveness leads to concrete

1 - I think this is in agreement with Mr. Johnson's definition of a continuant. "A continuant is not a combination of occurrents unless they are related in some unique relation which cannot be reduced to causal, spatio-temporal, qualitative likeness or to any combination of these."

universals and internal relations.

Speculative idealism has never separated the mind from the external order of nature. It never recognizes an ego standing apart from the order of nature and from a society of other minds. Consequently, it dismisses as unmeaning those problems which are called epistemological, as to how the mind as such can know reality as such. It begins to philosophise by assuming that the mind by its very nature is already in touch with reality. Instead of assuming that there is one entity called mind and another entity called nature, we assume on the basis of experience that the entities mind and nature are complementary, not opposed. The system of relations which holds between mind and nature is not something external or accidental. If it were, then each could be real outside of this system. We can think of mind apart from the objective order of nature only by means of an abstraction. Mind to be mind means to be in contact with a world which is more than an order of ideas.

Insoluble epistemological problems arise so long as our thought is tied down to the category of existence. Experience cannot be validated by constructing it in terms of particular existences for thus conceived the mind and its objects become modes of existence, and the relation

between them must be conceived as external and mechanical. The reduction of experience to a particular form of psychological existence raises such insoluble questions as, is my idea of an object numerically one with the object which it knows? Do two people looking at the same thing have the same idea? There is always the question of the relation of the idea to the thing and no answer can be given on the assumption that experience and reality are nothing but bare existences. To existence we must add meaning and as meaning reality transcends the particularity and exclusiveness of particular existences. Things in their concreteness must always be taken as belonging to some system and as belonging to a system or as members of a system they take on a meaning which is not confined to a "here" and "now".

With this background we can turn to a more direct discussion of our problem. We have stated what we mean and what we do not mean by "particular," "universal," "individual."

Following Smith, the first question for discussion is the similarity or dissimilarity of the recurrent and continued types of identity. Is the difference between the two types ^{one} of kind or of degree? It is evident

that a "recurrent" does not convey the same meaning as a "continuant." Different words have different meanings. We must hold to distinction, otherwise we shall have the "altogetherness of everything." What I wish to show is that the identity in each case is an identity-within-differences. The two types are not similar, they are fundamentally the same. That the continuant type is not a unique identity will be the thrust of my argument.

The self is not a peculiar kind of universal except in so far as there is only one example of any given self.¹ Apart from this I see no uniqueness in the self - no more than in any other universal. If the individual were a peculiar kind of universal, I do not see how we could ever extend this universal to anything outside of self. We have direct knowledge of this individual universal and the logical hypothesis is to extend the knowledge of this universal to the universals in nature. The same situation seems to hold in the judgment. We defined judgment as the extension of the reality that is given to me in present sensuous perception, and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence.² Thus the given

1 - This is what Bradley means when he says that "nothing that is real is universal."

2 - Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, p. 72.

and its extension differ but relatively. And so with respect to the individual universal and other universals. If we want to put any meaning into the hypothesis that we can infer what is the nature of universals in the external world because we know the nature of the individual universal, then we must assume that the individual universal is not peculiar in kind. Otherwise knowledge of it could not be extended to the external world. The only universal we could know under that condition would be the individual universal. We would be shut up within ourselves.

The universal as continuant is exemplified in Caesar. Caesar is a temporal universal. He is an individual but his individuality is not antagonistic to his universality. If we take the singular judgment "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" we are not confining Caesar to the one act of crossing the Rubicon. "If we thus refused to refer the predicated content to the whole extended identity of Caesar the significance of the judgment would be destroyed, and an eristic error committed by reducing an assertion to a tautology." ¹ If the whole of Caesar were exhausted in fording the river what significance

1 - Bosanquet, Logic, Vol.I, p. 198.

would it have to affirm that he was the founder of the Roman monarchy, the rival of Pompey, the conqueror of Gaul?

By way of contrast I wish to discuss Lotze's analysis of the above judgment. Lotze says, "Caesar crossed the Rubicon but not the Caesar who lay in the cradle, or was asleep, or was undecided what to do, but the Caesar who came out of Gaul, who was awake, conscious of the situation, and had made up his mind; in a word, the Caesar whom the subject of our judgment means is that Caesar who is crossing the Rubicon, and in no previous moment of his life was he the subject to whom this predicate could have been attached." ¹ Bosanquet answers the above analysis as follows: "In order to give this (Caesar crossed the Rubicon) its full meaning we must not try to cut it down as Lotze in one place does, reducing Caesar to mean merely a creature that crossed the Rubicon; this would be A is A again. Precisely the point of the judgment is that the same man united in himself or persisted through the different relations; say, of being conqueror of Gaul and of marching into Italy. The identity is the individual, or the concrete universal, that persists through those relations. And if you ask

1 - System of Philosophy, p. 63.

what the particular this is, and try to whittle away the difference and leave the identity, you will find that when the differences are all gone the identity is all gone too." ¹

Lotze takes the predicate "crossing the Rubicon" as not applicable to Caesar before or after the event. If, he says, we let A stand for the black man, B for the drinking dog, and C for Caesar crossing the Rubicon, then A exists as a fact continually, B sometimes and C occurred once in history. It is of course obvious to everyone that Caesar could not go on crossing the river. But this does not mean, it seems to me, what Lotze implies, namely, that in no subsequent moment of his life can Caesar be the subject of this judgment. A temporal universal means that one can be the same at different moments. Experience can be transmitted. Lotze makes the initial mistake when he divides the universal into two classes. The universals of thought are the abstract universals and the universals of sense are the concrete ones. By so doing he compromises between Scepticism and Idealism. ² He retains the view

1 - Science and Philosophy, p. 37.

2 - Lotze compromises between Scepticism which condemns knowledge and Idealism which "deifies" it. "Conscious of the fact that the abstract universals of thought cannot be applied to an entirely foreign material so as to make it coherent; that it does not go out, to use his phrase, to meet the manifold which flows in, with a series of empty forms in its hand; and that, if it did the former could never be applied to the data; and conscious, on the other hand, that to find these forms present in the material from the first, as concrete and constitutive universals would involve the interpretation of the world in terms of thought, he strikes a middle path. (Jones, The Philosophy of Lotze, p. 227.

that all thought is formal and its universals are abstract in the sense that they do not produce their content. But a difficulty crops out. If the universals of thought are abstract, how are they to have objective validity? If the universals which thought produces are to make the phenomena of experience inwardly coherent, they must have been present in the phenomena from the beginning. Otherwise I do not see how you are ever to give your universals objective validity. You cannot put anything into thought which was not there from the beginning. All you can hope to do is to make the implicit explicit. Thought must express the universal by bringing out differences in it and at the same time it must throw new light upon the differences by showing that they are necessarily related under the universal.

I say that Lotze made the initial mistake when he divided universals into universals of thought and universals of sense. When you have so separated them, you have at once ruled out every attempt for a successful union between the two. Then the distinction between the abstract and the concrete is unbridgeable. This is the truth in Bosanquet's doctrine that the immediate is only a phase, not a level of experience. The immediate and the mediate are continuous. "The real is the rational, and

the reflection is its consciousness of itself."¹

This has been an aside from the immediate thread of the argument but pertinent in so far as it shows what the relation between the abstract and concrete universals should not be. We do not need to show, in the first place, what is meant by a continuant. The main problem is to show that a continuant and a recurrent exemplify the same kind of identity. We shall first discuss the recurrent type of identity and later make a comparison.

Let us take three objects, say a blue book, a blue house, and the blue sky. Blueness is here the recurrent character. Now the question is whether we ought to call these and other instances where we find blueness in nature, one and the same blueness? Two other alternatives are possible. We may say that they are similar, i.e., attributes of the same type or class. This is Professor Smith's view in his article on "The Nature of Universals." Or we may say with Professor Stout that the blueness in each case is as particular as the object which they characterise. Now I wish to maintain that blueness in different objects is one-and-the-same blueness. I reject Smith's view because it makes all universals abstract and Stout's view because it is based on a

1 - Jones, The Philosophy of Lotze, p. 226.

metaphysical presupposition. I shall discuss these objections later.

We may begin our consideration of universals by citing a paragraph from Professor Smith's article. He states the problem clearly.

"The position ordinarily adopted by those who believe in universals is that universals are either qualities characterising a number of distinct particulars or relations recurring in a number of different situations. Thus if it is asserted that A is red and that B is red, what, on this view, is meant is that though the things A and B are distinct and spatially separate, one and the same identical character is found in both. It is as against this fundamental thesis that the outstanding difficulty in regard to the nature of universals - the difficulty which has given rise to such an endless amount of discussion - at once presents itself. By what right are things and characters thus differentially treated? The red that is seen in A is spatially separate from the red that is seen in B. If spatial separation justifies us in regarding A and B as numerically distinct, why not also in the case of the characters? What justifies us in saying that though A and B are numerically distinct, the red thus seen in two places is none the less identical in both?"¹

I shall have to justify the view that though two things are numerically distinct, a quality seen in two places is none the less identical, one-and-the-same. The identity here is just what it is when I say that I am one-and-the-same individual from birth till death. The identity in each case is an identity-in-difference.

Identity is often analysed as follows: "A thing is either simple or composite and if composite it can be

1 - Mind N. S.36, (1927) p.137.

divided into two parts, identity and difference. Composite objects are thus constituted of two things, their absolute identity in certain respects plus their absolute non-identity in others. Or if we have two objects we can say that they are identical with respect to the characters a and b but are different with respect to x, y, and z. It is always possible to set the identities over against the differences." Such an analysis is altogether impossible. If you take identity and difference apart you forfeit the character of each. You cannot take identity as remaining itself when the differences are excluded. You may attend to the one or the other but you cannot hold them apart. The one if not qualified by the other is a vicious abstraction. An opposition can be made but it must be remembered that any opposition presupposes an underlying identity.

Bradley was one of the first English philosopher to emphasize the doctrine of Identity-in-difference. "What he in principle refuses to accept I understand to be bare conjunction, that is, the bringing together of different, without mediation by any analysis of their conditions satisfactory to thought." ¹ But Bradley contradicts this principle in the following passage: "You may take by abstraction a quality A, B, or C, and that abstract

1 - Bosanquet, Mind and its Objects, p. 59.

quality may throughout remain unchanged."¹ It seems to me that this passage suggests a process of analysis which we do not want. It certainly is contrary to Bradley's previous statement that if you take identity and difference apart you forfeit the character of each. The qualities must remain the same for otherwise there can be no universals. But the same does not mean unchanged.

Before we continue our argument we shall have to determine whether or not the argument of the infinite regress invalidates our view. The argument may be put as follows: "If all identity is an identity-in-difference you can never get at the bare identity and identity will break up into an identity-in-difference ad infinitum." Now such an infinite regress will not arise if we insist on the distinction between the individual and the universal. I think we can use the same argument here that is used against Bradley's relations. Bradley tries to relate relations to relations and consequently falls into an infinite regress. But since relations hold only among individuals, characters have no relations among themselves. Certainly not in the same sense as the relation between a character and an individual. Therefore the infinite regress never gets started. The relation of a character as an identity-in-difference to the individual which it characterises, is

1 - Appearance and Reality, p. 579.

not the same as the relation of an identity-in-difference to an identity-in-difference, i.e., granting that there is a relation of the latter kind.

The infinite regress may be said to arise on another count. "If you have two blue objects A and B you can abstract their common quality X (blueness). But here is a third object C and by comparing it with A and B we get X_1 , etc. There will be an infinite number of X, X_1 , X_2 , X_3 , etc." This situation never occurs because X ceases to exist when X_1 appears. X_1 is not a mere repetition of X for that would mean that the object C had nothing to contribute, that the identity did not determine the differences. Every experience of blue changes my idea of "blueness" and still there is but one "blueness." It is always an identity-in-difference. (I shall explain this more fully when I take up the ontological argument.)

The "same" does not mean unchanged. It is often thought that only the absolutely unchanging can be identical with itself and therefore the absolutely simple, homogeneous, unrelated, can satisfy this demand of "sameness". "But when we try to apply this concept to empirical objects, there appears nothing in the whole 'choir of heaven and furniture of the earth' from our 'selves' down to the grains of sand on the shore, which is thus simple, homogeneous unrelated, unchanging."¹

1 - Hoernle, "Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics" P. 282.

An unrelated, unchanging entity is inconceivable. But why look for the unchanging? "Sameness" can only be explained in terms of the changing and to look for the unchanging¹ is the fallacy of apprehending everything on the level of existence, to eliminate meaning and to give up the principle of identity-in-difference.

I do not wish to discuss nominalism. I assume that there are universals. But I do think that the denial of the principle of identity-in-difference inevitably leads to nominalism. We explain likeness by identity, whereas the Nominalists explain likeness by similarity. One object is, they say, like another because it has similar qualities. They even speak of "exactly alike", whatever that may mean. Let me quote Mr. Ainscough, a refined nominalist, as to what is meant by "likeness." "The admitted facts in this problem may be exemplified by two bits of single-coloured ribbon, one light blue, the other dark blue. Take up the light blue piece first and cut it in two, then if the dyer has done his work properly each half will, as regards colour, be exactly like the

1 - Bolland speaks of the onveranderlyke veranderlyke (unchanging changing) in discussing Hegel's theory of identity. Some such concept is necessary for a true conception of identity-in-difference. (Collegium Logicum,

other; this is an example of exact likeness. Now compare a piece of light blue with the dark blue; they are not exactly alike in the way that the two pieces of light blue were exactly alike in colour, yet they are alike one another in a way that neither is like a piece of red ribbon; both, we say, are blue though of different shades; let us call this kind of likeness - approximate likeness."¹

If the above quotation is to be intelligible it must mean that the two pieces of light blue ribbon are partially the same, that the two bits of single-coloured ribbon are partially the same, and that the blue ribbon and the red ribbon are partially the same. If likeness and similarity are to convey meaning, that meaning must be based on identity. Likeness and similarity are always based on partial identity. In so far as they are similar or alike they are identical. To say that they are alike or similar but not identical is merely evading the issue. The two pieces of light blue ribbon are partially the same. If they were not the same my inference that they are exactly alike would be without a ground. I can judge that they are alike because they are the same. In the same way with respect to the two bits of light and dark blue. I judge that they are approximately alike because

1 - Relations and Universals, Mind N. S. 38, 1929, p.145.

both are blue. And by "blue" I mean blue, not something which is similar without being identical. You cannot base likeness on similarity, or similarity on likeness. Both must be based on identity.

The nominalistic argument may be presented from another angle. Is the sweetness of the orange I ate this morning the same as the sweetness of the apple I ate yesterday? I think we must say that it is although the nominalists would agree with Richardson "that we should distinguish between different attributes of the same type in accordance with their occurrence even though they be perfectly similar."¹ The nominalistic position seems reasonable but it is based on a false epistemological theory. It seeks to relate a world of ideas to a world of reality. In the above instance it would argue as follows: "How is the idea of sweetness in the orange related to the idea of sweetness in the apple? Since an idea about different objects at different times can never be identically the same, we can only say that they are similar." Now I admit that you can never have the same idea of different objects at different times. This possibility would destroy the concrete universal. But identity can and does not exist in the idea. The identity,

1 - The Theory of Universals, Monist, Vol. 39, 1929, p.554.

the permanent identity, exists on the side of the subject and on the side of the object thought of. There is no world of ideas to be related to a world of reality. Every idea modifies the subject but it does not continue to exist as an idea.

The recurrent or spatial universal is an identity-in-difference. The fact that two objects are spatially separated does not make them "other". That is, if A is a blue book and B is another blue book, then A and B are the same in respect to blueness. They may be of different shades but in so far as they are blue they are the same and identical. To say that they are alike or similar is to admit that they are partially identical.

It may be objected that we are now treating identity-in-difference as bare identity. But the sameness of A and B is not a sameness of repetition. Nothing is ever repeated and still, I think, we must say that objects have common qualities. I shall return to this presently.

The best example of the continuant type of universal is a human being. An individual is an identity-in-difference - a meeting point of universals. Not of abstract universals for then it would always be possible to have a duplicate. But an individual is a meeting point of concrete universals. Every universal has diversity within.

it and therefore every identity is dominated by the differences. If this were not the case individuality would go over-board on our view, for then it would be possible to have many individuals made up of the same universals. Then John would be Henry. Obviously this is not the case. John and Henry are qualitatively different. My point is that they are different because they are the meeting point of universals. They are not different because each has a core of identity which cannot be made universal.

I see no objection to the view that the individual is the meeting point of universals. And since the view that the individual has a core of identity cannot but lead to an abstract theory of universals, I think we must reject it. To look for a core of identity in the individual is to give up the principle of identity-in-difference. The answer to the question, What is the principle of individuation? is the concrete universal. And if we insist on another answer it is because we do not take identity-in-difference seriously. Instead of taking identity-in-difference seriously we insist on identity and difference, and so viewed a core of identity is necessary to account for individuality. But rightly viewed we need no other principle.

The view that individuality is unique is a gratuitous hypothesis. This core of identity must be one of two things. It is either outside the series and if so it does not explain anything, or it is within the series and then the relation between the self and the uniqueness of the self must be determined. Either alternative fails to account for individuality. So instead of holding that the activities of the individual are more unique than the universal, we hold that the universal is more unique than the activities and consequently a core of identity to account for individuality is unnecessary.

The core-of-identity doctrine is another instance of the view that everything can be apprehended on the level of existence, that there are simple and unrelated elements. It is an attempt to explain the individual in terms of the existential type of individuality. We argued¹ that this type of individuality is impossible and suggested the inclusive type in its stead. I now wish to show that this inclusive type is compatible with our doctrine of universals. We may begin by quoting from Bradley's Ethical Studies.

"Let us take a man, an Englishman as he is now, and try to point out that, apart from what he has in common with others, apart from his sameness with others,

1 - See page 58.

he is not an Englishman - nor a man at all; that is if you take him as something by himself, he is not what he is. Of course we do not mean to say that he can go out of England without disappearing, nor, even if all the rest of the nation perished, that he would not survive. What we mean to say is, that he is what he is because he is born and educated a social being, and a member of a single social organism; that if you make abstraction of all this, which is the same in him and in others, what you have left is not an Englishman, nor a man, but some I know not what residuum, which never has existed by itself, and does not so exist. If we suppose the world of relations, in which he was born and bred, never to have been, then we suppose the very essence of him not to be; if we take that away, we have taken him away; and hence he now is not an individual, in the sense of owing nothing to the sphere of relations in which he finds himself, but does contain those relations within himself as belonging to his very being; he is what he is, in brief, so far as he is what others are also." (p. 166)

Bradley here argues in favor of the concrete universal on ethical grounds. He continues: "The universal to be realised is no abstraction, but an organic whole; a system where many spheres are subordinated to one sphere, and particular actions to spheres. This system is real in the details of its functions, not out of them, and lives in its vital processes, not away from them. And I am one of the organs. The universal then which I am to realize is the system which penetrates and subordinates to itself the particulars of all lives, and here and now in my life has this and that function in this and that case, in exercising which through my will it realizes itself as a whole, and me in it." (Page 176)

What has all this to do with the problem of showing

how the inclusive type is compatible with our view of universals? Everything, for it proves that two men can have the same thing in common. The principle of individuation cannot be found by reducing man to something which belongs to him and him only; you cannot get at the individual by taking away the qualities which he has in common with others. The qualities of others are his qualities and there is no residuum which is his in a unique sense. Abstracting qualities in this manner would destroy the individual just as "paring off the coats of an onion only gives us less onion, and in the end no onion at all."¹

Here it is well to consider the argument for the identity of indiscernibles. It may be stated as follows: "If the individual is a meeting point of universals it will be possible to have duplicates. But individuals are individual and not duplicates. Therefore it is impossible to construct the individual out of the universal and the principle of identity of indiscernibles is not true." Now it is of course impossible to have duplicates, repeats. Duplication is meaningless and what is more, it contradicts the principle that the real is the rational. But I think it possible to deny duplication and still hold to the principle that the individual is the meeting point of universals. This, I should say, is the distinctive feature of the concrete universal.

¹ - Stapledon, The Problem of Universals, in Monist, 1924, p. 577.

A class is to be distinguished from a universal for "a class is essentially of one sort only." "Individuals taken per se as members of a class in virtue of identical properties are ex hypothesi parts or members of a whole of repetition, and, so far, of no other kind of whole whatever. And each individual of those so taken can be considered only in respect of the properties in virtue of which it is a member of the class. The difference within that property itself, and those which constitute the whole remaining content of the individual nature, are ruled out ab initio by the method."¹ Thus classes can be repeated because in constructing a class we attend merely to qualities which are repeated and forget that its members are members of a concrete system. It is a bare conjunction, an abstract universal. It consists in its sameness in different members and this sameness is a sameness without diversity. But the sameness of our universal is a sameness in diversity. There is always diversity within the universal and this diversity accounts for individuality without duplication.

The notion that the individual cannot be a meeting-point of universals because it would then be possible to have duplicates, finds its truth in the abstract universal.

1 - Bosanquet, Prin. of Ind. and Value, p. 35.

If universals were abstract this notion would be true. But a universal is always an identity-in-difference such that "the identity shows itself in the different elements which make it up, not as a repeated quality, but as a quality contributing, each part in a distinctive way, to the nature of the whole."¹ It is as Aristotle said, "For that of which the presence or absence makes no difference is no true part of the whole." Now various wholes (individuals) can have the same characteristic, but it is manifested differently in the different wholes and it is impossible to transfer a characteristic as exhibited in one whole to another without adaptation to that whole. This is the same as saying that a universal cannot be given once for all.²

In denying repetition it seems as if we are driven to accept Professor Stout's view that a "character characterising a concrete thing or individual is as particular as the thing or individual which it characterises."³ Professor Stout argues that qualities must be as particular as the concrete thing because things are particular

1 - Bosanquet, Essentials of Logic, p.55.

2 - Cf. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, p. 90.

3 - The Nature of Universals and Propositions, p. 4.

and things are nothing apart from their qualities. Substances cannot be distinguished from each other without discerning a distinction in their qualities. "It follows also that if the distinction of the substances is not preconditioned by any discerned dissimilarity between their qualities, the qualities must be primarily known as separate particulars, not as universals."¹

My opinion is that we cannot find any justification for this view in our experience because it rests on a metaphysical presupposition. Although substance is nothing apart from its qualities it does not necessarily follow that the same quality may not be common to many distinct things. Substance is qualities in thought relations. If it is admitted, as it is by Professor Stout, that a character or quality is abstract then we must accept one of two views. Then the individual either consists of common qualities plus some unique core of identity, or there are no common qualities and each quality is as particular as the thing it characterises. Both views are fundamentally alike in so far as they hold to the abstract universal. The difference is this: the first view emphasizes the identities, the second the difference. The first is left with identities without

1 - Ibid., p. 9.

diversities, the second with diversities without identities. In the above view identity and difference are assumed to exclude one another, and therefore, according to the first view, since sameness of characters is a fact the diversity must be supplied in some unique way; according to the second view it is assumed that since diversity is a fact, it follows that there is no identity.

The concrete universal is an identity-in-difference. That is, "Every part of a quantitative whole is distinguished by a peculiar quality as well as united with the rest by an identity of quality. Every whole of red, besides being a degree of red in general, is also a particular hue and produces a distinct impression."¹ The individual is therefore particular and universal, or rather particular in being universal. Because he is particular he is universal and vice versa. The only way to escape scepticism is to recognize the true nature of the individual, as an organic union of the particular and the universal. Experience is not a process from the particular to the universal, but from the less determined to the more determined, i.e., from individuality to individuality. Only when we recognize degrees of individuality can we understand the principle of identity-in-difference.

1 - Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, p. 124.

It is very difficult to explain what is meant by the principle of identity-in-difference. According to Miss Stebbing neither Bradley, nor Bosanquet, nor any of the Idealistic school, has ever succeeded in making clear what is meant by the principle.¹ Probably it is an ultimate which cannot be explained. But I agree with Bradley when he says, "For my part, since in experience identity and difference seem indissoluble and since otherwise the entire world of our knowledge seems dissipated, I will take them in this union through certainly I cannot explain it."² Any other principle vitiates our whole system of knowledge.

I have not attempted to explain how identity-in-diversity is possible. My problem was to show that the recurrent and continuant type of universal are fundamentally one and the same. I do not say that there is no distinction between a spatial and a temporal universal. "Certainly the diversity of space, and again of time, has a character of its own."³ This distinction is not questioned. What I do wish to maintain is that this character is an instance of the one principle of identity-in-difference. Spatial and temporal difference are not

1 - Cf. A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. VIII.

2 - Mind, N. S. Vol. 2, 1892, p. 368.

3 - Bradley, App. and Reality, p. 588.

ultimates but both are instances of an ultimate principle. That Bradley did not wish to erase the distinction between the spatial and temporal universals is evident from the following quotations:

"Certainly I saw no advantage in cataloguing everyday distinctions, such as those between two men of the same sort, and two men in the same place or time, and again two periods of a man's one life. It did not occur to me that such distinctions could fail to be familiar or that any one could desire to be informed on them. I presupposed as a matter of course a knowledge of them, and, if I myself anywhere confused them, I have not found the place."¹

"Any one can of course perceive that the sameness of a thing with itself at different times differs from its possession with another thing of one and the same character."²

"There is a disposition on the ground of such facts as space and time to deny the existence of any one fundamental principle of identity. And this disposition is hard to combat since it usually fails to find itself upon any distinct principle."³

That he conceived of the spatial and temporal universal as exemplifying one principle is evident from the following:

"And mutatis mutandis what is true here about temporal continuity is true also about spatial, and not to perceive this would be an error."⁴

"These objections (to the fundamental sameness of all identity), to repeat, seem to me to rest on the superstition that, because there are diverse identities, these cannot have one underlying character, and the

1 - App. and Reality, p. 585.

2 - Ibid.

3 - Ibid., p. 587.

4 - Ibid., p. 589.

superstition again that there is a foreign existence outside character and with a chasm between the two. Such crude familiar divisions of common sense are surely in philosophy mere superstitions."¹

Note - One of the main reasons for refusing to admit that the continuant and recurrent universal ultimately stand for the same kind of identity is the "indifference of space." In a recent issue of the Hibbert Journal Professor J. E. Boodin suggests that it is difficult to conceive of the cosmos as an organic whole because of the indifference of space. (By indifference of space he means separateness.) He continues: "But if we place ourselves at the level of an electron, we will find that to such an organism the wholeness of an organism like a human organism must be as unimaginable as the whole cosmic whole is to us. It is impossible for an electron to imagine how the human organism could be a whole, but we, who are familiar with the function, take them as a matter of course."²

1 - Ibid., p. 590.

2 - Vol. 28, p. 590, 1930.

Chapter III

In this chapter I wish to show why our universal is said to be concrete. The concrete universal is a unity and therefore its nature cannot be expressed separately in the words. Still it will be necessary to point out the significance of the word "concrete". In the preceding chapter I attempted to show that there is one type of unity underlying the recurrent and continuant universal. The unity in each case is an identity-in-difference. It is a unity in which the identity dominates the differences. Now we must show that the universal determines its own particularization. This is what makes it concrete in the true sense of the word.

In the January issue of Mind appears an article by M. B. Foster on the "Concrete Universal". In this article the views of Cook Wilson and Bosanquet are discussed. "My purpose in this article," says Foster, "is simply to show that the attempt to conceive the universal as concrete in the sense which I have described,¹ has been the driving force behind the doctrines of two philosophers very different from one another in other ways, - Wilson

1 - Note. In this article the concrete universal was described "as the universal which determines its own particularization."

and Bosanquet - and to explain in what respects, as it seems to me, both fail."¹ I shall maintain that the concrete universal does determine its own particularization and that the whole nature of the individual is covered by it. If the whole nature of the individual is not covered by the universal, then the universal cannot be concrete. To a determination of this we must now turn.

I might have headed this chapter "The Ontological Argument Generalized" for we must establish a relation between essence and existence, between the ideal and the real, between thought and reality. If our doctrine that every identity determines its differences is true, then each individual determines in some way or other not only existence but also essence. Every individual is necessary and a change in existence will necessarily produce a change in essence. Bosanquet brings this out clearly in the following passage: "If we say we know what a sovereign is, and do not know how many there are in the world, then we do not really know what a sovereign is. Its production is necessarily relative to its nature, to the need for a thing of that particular nature, to the condition of its supply, and to the degree of its wear and tear."²

1 - January 1931,

2 - Meeting of Extremes in Philosophy, p. 89.

Idealism is said to mistake a theory of knowledge for a theory of reality. That is, it does not distinguish between the psychological occurrence and the consciousness of that occurrence. But it seems to me that the critics of idealism assume that idealism is a theory of the subjective in pursuit of the objective. They deem it necessary to give a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality plus a theory of their relation. But idealism is not a theory of the subjective in pursuit of the objective and therefore all criticism which is based on the above assumption may apply to some other system, but it is irrelevant so far as idealism is concerned. If epistemology is the science which seeks the relation between knowledge and reality, then idealism can very well do without epistemology. According to idealism there is no world of ideas and therefore it is unnecessary to relate it to a world of realities.

Hegel needed no epistemology because his theory was a theory of the real. "Everything we know both of outward and inward nature, in one word the objective world, is in its own self the same as it is in thought and that to think is to bring out the truth of our object, be it what it may."¹ For Kant thought never quite got over to things

1 - Hegel's Logic, Para. 22, Wallace's Trans.

and things never revealed their inmost nature to thought. Hence Kant remained sceptical. Hegel (and Bosanquet) takes his stand behind the alternatives of thought and reality and seeks for the unity of reality which alone is adequate to the differences which it contains within it. Thus Hegel starts from a reality which is all-inclusive, from a world which consists of thinkers and things thought about. There are no existential realities called "ideas."

Critics of idealism have taken the theory of thinking to be a theory of thought and therefore they have thought it necessary to relate the theory of ideas to the theory of reality. How are thoughts related to things? But the question is unnecessary because the laws of thought are the laws of things. All judgment is a definition of real reality, for if thought does not characterise reality what do we mean by thought? "Thought, as I understand the matter, is always an affirmation about reality through the process of particular minds.....Thought which deals with no given, and constructs no order is res nihili."¹ Thought thinks truly of reality. In detail, judgments may be mistaken but the judgment function cannot be mistaken, for we can never get outside of it. All criticism of the judgment must be in terms of judgment and unless

1 - Bosanquet, Contemporary British Philosophy, p. 60.

you are willing to admit that reality merely circles around your ideas, you cannot deny that it is the nature of mind to think truly of reality. I am in touch with the real. This much we must accept.

If it is the nature of mind to think truly of reality what becomes of the distinction between the ideal and the real, my idea of an object and its actual existence? There is a difference between the idea of toothache and the actual toothache. Once grant that the idea of something is sufficient to establish its existence, you will have to admit the objective reality of all fancies. Then there will be no difference between fact and fancy. Obviously, we can and do not wish to wipe out the distinction. To wipe it out would be to introduce a contradiction. To say that thought is the thing thought of contradicts the very condition of thinking. The fact is the fact, the event is the event, the thought is the thought. So far I have no objection for it merely means that there are thinkers and things thought about. But the critics of idealism doubt the genuineness of the objective reference which is characteristic of every idea.¹

1 - Note. Bradley, and Bosanquet to some extent, sometimes doubt the genuineness of thought and in so far deny the concrete universal. I shall return to this presently.

They look upon ideas as existential realities which can be divided into psychological phenomena which perish and objective references which have permanent existence. Instead of looking upon ideas as perishing in the process of knowing, they create a world of ideas and this world of ideas is substantial enough to be opposed to the world of facts. Naturally the question of their relation arises. And here is where epistemology goes wrong. The question of the relation between knowledge and reality never arises.

Since thought thinks truly of reality ontological validity must be present in human experience. All experience must appeal to a criterion not only more ultimate than experience itself but itself wholly removed from the mere limitations of our experience. By means of this presupposition of thought is man enabled to envisage true universals. The reference in thought is not to some empirical item in experience but to a determinant, to an absolute affirmer which we bring to experience.

So much for a general introduction. We must now show how this is related to our specific problem - the determination by the universal of its own particularization.

We are seeking for a relation between existence and essence. A relation can be established if we can show, says Professor Laird, "that all universals logically

require particular instances which actually exist."¹

On page 117 he continues, "We must conclude, therefore, that some general facts are logically independent of existence although existence itself cannot be independent of general facts. In other words, the ultimate difference between existence and subsistence remains." It seems to me that these two statements are contradictory. The first one accepts the principle of the concrete universal, the latter denies it. Professor Laird denies the principle of the concrete universal by retaining an ultimate difference between existence and subsistence. He argues his point as follows: "Logic is satisfied if there are some existing instances of these (redness and sentientness) universals; it cannot deduce all the particular instances which happen to exist. Kulpe says, for example, that there are about 150 discriminable colours. I do not know whether that is the right number, but I can be quite certain that the right number, whatever it may be, cannot be deduced from the universal 'colour'. Granting then that 'colour' logically requires to have some variety in the world, it does not logically require to have any determinate number of varieties. The universal 'man' may logically require mankind, but this circumstance does not relieve the census officials."²

1 - A Study in Realism, p. 115.

2 - Ibid., p. 116.

This is a flat denial of the concrete universal, for if the principle of the concrete universal is true ^{then} universals not only require instances but they require just the determinate number of instances that are. If it is granted, as Laird does (and most philosophers do), that it is necessary for universals to have some instances then we must admit the necessity of just those instances that are. There is no vacuous actuality of the universal. This is generally admitted. But by what logic can it be admitted that a universal must be exemplified and denied that it must be exemplified in just those instances that are? If we admit the one we must admit the other. This or nothing - i.e., either admit that none are necessary or admit that all are necessary.

If every single instance of a universal were not significant, we would never be able to get out of Hume's difficulty. "It follows, that, if we are to get out of Hume's difficulty, we must find something in each single instance, which would justify the belief. The key to the mystery is not to be found in the accumulation of instances, but in the intrinsic character of each instance."¹ This means that a single instance is enough to establish the universal. In other words, the individual is the real.

1 - A. N. Whitehead, "Uniformity and Contingency" in Arist. Pro. Vol. N. S. 23, 1922-23.

Let us turn for a moment to Foster's criticism of Bosanquet's Concrete Universal.

According to Foster, Bosanquet uses the term concrete universal in three different ways. There is first of all Smith's definition where the concrete universal is taken to determine its own difference. The concrete universal is here equated with the individual. Secondly, it is used to distinguish between the unity of particulars belonging to a class and the unity of elements within a system. And finally, it is used to point to a content which gains in concreteness as its extension increases. "Individual as opposed to what is commonly understood by universal; system as opposed to class; generic concept as opposed to accidental predicate - all these are included by Bosanquet in the common designation 'the concrete universal'." Foster here attempts to show that the phrases used by Bosanquet in indicating the concrete universal are applicable to the distinction "between the generic concept as differentiated in its species and the universal quality as predicable of its instances." The generic concept determines the kind of individuals in which it is to be actualised, the specific character in which it is to be realised. But specific determination is not individual particularization and individual particularization is an essential requirement of the concrete universal. Since

knowledge of the generic character alone is operative in determining what the further characteristics of a subject are to be, "knowledge of this character and knowledge of no other character is capable of serving as necessary ground for predication."

But this may be questioned. Bosanquet, I think, would question it and we must question it on more general grounds. Bosanquet questions it when he says, "We must not confuse analogy in that secondary sense, as a mere anticipation of nature with the true generic or analogical judgment which is compatible with complete analytic perception of mechanical cause and effect within the subject considered."¹ Mr. Foster forgets that the main function of the generic judgment is interpretation, not prediction. The most important character is the complete perception of mechanical cause and effect within the subject considered and such an analysis will show that the universal determines its own individual particularization. Thus it is not true, as Foster would have us believe, that Bosanquet cries, in reaction against the physicists, that "Form is operative." He accepts that a thing is determined by the infinite causal relation in which it stands.

We must question it on more general grounds, Mr.

1 - Logic, Vol. 1, p. 221.

Foster maintains that it is grotesque to say that the universal is capable of determining the time and place of the temporal existence of its instances. His argument for this is that the whole nature of the individual is not covered by the universal but that there is some substantive existence, which lies outside of the universal in virtue of which individuals are individuals. Now it is precisely this to which we objected in the second chapter. To be an individual does not mean that there is some substantival existence which is unique. There is no core of identity apart from the universal characters. The individual is the meeting-point of universals and, therefore, its whole nature is covered by the universal.

The real is the individual. "Rose in the abstract does not exist. But it is a concrete universal which has power, in the context of the real world to which we refer it, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment."¹ The individual is formed matter, not form without matter. The form determines the matter and a complete knowledge of the form would determine the number and nature of all existence. Matter is never emancipated from form nor form from matter. Indeterminism attempts to emancipate matter from form and to give to

1 - Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, p. 227.

matter the freedom of indeterminism. The principle of the concrete universal admits no indeterminism and for this reason it is enabled to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment.¹

The search for a relation between existence and essence led us to conclude that the concrete universal is able to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment. We had to admit that a universal must have some instances; it cannot exist vacuously. But if some instances are necessary we cannot rest short of the doctrine that just those instances that are, are necessary. Against this view the following objection is likely to be raised. "If a universal must be exemplified in just those instances that are, how about the instances which might have existed? That is, we might very well

1 - "The isolated concrete universal 'man', on the other hand, will determine infinite individual embodiments differing from each other within the range of subordinate variations admitted by the universal. But within the system of nature the concrete universal 'man' meets resistant material; man can only appear in nature where the conditions permit. And the matter resists because it is otherwise 'formed' with nature as a whole. It is in this sense that the concrete universal 'has power, in the context of the real world, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment.'" (Hallett, Aeternitas, p. 163.)

conceive laws according to which there might be centaurs. But of this universal there is no instance. Yet it is conceivable that there would be instances of this universal. And instances of this (and other universals like it) invalidate the argument for a necessary relation between existence and essence." Mr. Moore presents the same objection in his doctrine of external relations. He says, "Though Edward VII was father of George V he might have existed without being the father of George V. Therefore it is not true that a person who was not father of George V would necessarily have been other than Edward. Yet it is, in fact, the case, that any person who was not the father of George V must have been other than Edward.¹

I think we must say that Edward VII could not have existed without being the father of George V. Our world is so interrelated that to suppose that Edward VII might have been the father of George V forces us to suppose the elements of the actual world changed in other respects. The world is strictly systematic and any change in a part involves change throughout the whole. We must therefore insist that, since Edward VII was father of George V, the character of an entity which would be Edward VII without being father of George V is incompatible with the nature of the universe. In our actual world no such entity could

1 - Proceedings Arist. Society. V. 20, p. 40.

have been produced. And if this seems grotesque, it is only because we cannot see the material contradictions implied in these "might be" laws. We must maintain that all so-called 'universals' which have no instances are self-contradictory and although the self-contradiction is not evident in the present state of our knowledge, since we know merely the barest outline of any universal, a full knowledge of the universal would reveal the contradictory character of all pseudo-universals.

We are now facing a serious problem. If we know merely the barest outline of any universal and if every universal is modified, as it necessarily must be, by many unknown factors, are not all the forms we know unreal and deceptive abstractions? If, as Bradley says, "a red-haired man who knew himself utterly would and must, starting from within, go on to know everyone else who has red hair, and he would not know himself until he knew them,"¹ does not knowledge become impossible? If the unknown factors qualify our universals so that they are something different in reality from what we know them, then all our knowledge seems vitiated. Are not all universals, and not only those which have no instances, vicious abstractions from the only coherent universal which is the Absolute?

1 - App. and Reality, p. 581.

To this we must reply that, although the whole is involved in every judgment we make, we can and do know some things without knowing everything. To deny that we know somethings without knowing everything is to take universals abstractly. But the principle of the concrete universal distinguishes between full and adequate knowledge. Knowledge is adequate but never complete because we must always focus our attention on a small field, and neglect the existence of the rest of the world except as a background. When Bosanquet says, "I quite understand that on the doctrine offered us Identity-in-Difference must go. And I quite see for myself that it must go 'in the end' that is to say, in any experience for which objects are self-contained, and cease to transcend themselves,"¹ he denies, I think, the concrete universal. If we can only arrive at true knowledge 'in the end' then the concrete universal is a fancy for the following reason:

The concrete universal is based on Identity-in-Difference, not on Identity and Difference. Now Identity-in-Difference means that a thing can change and still remain the same. There are identities-in-difference in such a manner that the difference changes the identities and still the identities remain the same. But now, what

1 - Logic, II, p. 279.

does Bosanquet do when he says that 'in the end' the Identity-in-Difference must go? He criticises knowledge in the light of the abstract universal. The abstract universal proceeds on the assumption that everything is just a bit false because it is not self-contained. But if the principle of the concrete universal is true, we need not wait for truth until we reach the end. We have it here and now. Not the complete truth - that can only be attained when all the differences are determined by the identities. But in so far as the differences are determined by the identities, in so far we have truth. Degrees of truth must not mean that everything is just a bit false. Such a doctrine of degrees of truth is not consistent with the principle of the concrete universal. On the basis of the abstract universal plus internal relations, truth can be attained only 'in the end'. But unless we have truth here and now we are reduced to utter scepticism.

According to Bradley and Bosanquet¹ we really cannot understand any one thing unless we understand everything. But I am inclined to agree with Russell that this rests on a confusion. We can know something apart from the fact that there are still a great many propositions

1 - Note: This is true especially of Bosanquet's earlier writings. It is hardly applicable to his Gifford lectures.

to be made about any particular. I need not know how many red things there are before I can know what red is. But from this it does not follow that from the proposition "This is red" one cannot deduce the existence of any other entities. For Russell the knowledge of red does not imply the existence of red things. This I question for it implies that universals can exist vacuously. Notwithstanding, Russell's objection to the theory that you cannot know anything unless you know everything, is valid.

Knowledge is unexhaustive, i.e., "nature as perceived always has a ragged edge."¹ And again, "The true purpose of an intellectual explanation in the sphere of natural philosophy is to exhibit the interconnections of nature, and to show that one set of ingredients in nature requires for the exhibition of its character the presence of the other set of ingredients." "Nothing in nature is accidental," nothing in nature could be what it is except as an ingredient in nature as it is."² Knowledge is unexhaustive but this does not mean that what we have is false, as Bradley and Bosanquet would have us believe. I quite agree with Bradley that thought is compelled to take the road of indefinite expansion because

1 - Whitehead, "Concept of Nature" p. 50.

2 - Ibid., pages 141 and 142.

the given reality is never consistent. Truth is partial. There are degrees of truth. But the point I wish to make is that partial truth does not mean that knowledge is not genuine knowledge. If the knowledge we have were not genuine we would never mean what we do mean.

Individuality possesses two characteristics. It must be all-inclusiveness and it must have internal harmony. Or as A. E. Taylor puts it, "The more a thing includes of existence and the more harmoniously it includes it, the more individual it is."¹ Bradley is unable to fix the place of any appearance in the scale of reality and this is fatal to his philosophy. Bradley insists on identity-in-difference and points out that difference without identity is less than nothing. By the same logic he ought to say that appearance without reality is less than nothing. What we have is not Appearance and Reality but Appearance-in-Reality. Appearance and Reality is an abstraction and on this basis no appearance can be fixed in the scale of reality.²

1 - Elements of Metaphysics, p. 110.

2 - Note: I wish to quote a few passages from Bradley which would seem to prove the opposite. But I do not see how these are consistent with Bradley's main conclusions.

"The Absolute is its appearances, it really is all and every one of them."

"But on the other hand, taken for itself and measured by its own ideas, every level has truth. It meets, we may say, its own claims, and it proves false only when tried by that which is already beyond it."

"We can find no province of the world so low but the Absolute inhabits it. Nowhere is there even a single fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does not matter." (App. and Reality, pp. 486, 487.)

The thrust of Bradley's philosophy is that it is impossible to bridge the gap between thought and reality. For Kant thought never quite got over to things. For Bradley thought never quite got over to reality. Consequently both landed in scepticism. Now it may be true that thought never gets over to reality. But this does not make thought inadequate. We must begin with the assumption that any given element of it is true; that our universals are identical with characters of the real. Unless we begin with this assumption we shall never get over to the real. Not even 'in the end'.

We seem to be bringing contradictory doctrines together. We insist that there are degrees of truth, i.e., everything is what it is only in relation to the whole. Therefore every truth is always partially false since the whole can never be known by finite man. This seems to be the general idealistic conclusion. Realism has always objected to such a notion of truth. And rightly, I think. Whatever is present here and now has a finality independent of any connection it may have with other things. Idealism must, it seems to me, admit this. It may retain its axiom of system but it must admit that abstraction does not invalidate. The principle of the concrete universal consistently admits the following axioms:

- (1) Everything in the last analysis depends on

everything else.

(2) Whatever is here and now has a finality independent of the knowledge of everything else.

Both may be accepted. The former gives us a larger, but no truer result. To say that (1) and (2) are incompatible is to confuse quantity of information with the quality of truthfulness.

Conclusion

In the first chapter of the thesis I attempted to do away with some of the misconceptions of Absolutism. I do not think that it utterly fails to give a reasonable account of experience. Absolutism, rightly interpreted, does not posit the existence of a Reality beyond the reach of human experience. It seemed necessary therefore to trace the development of thought from Pure Being to the Absolute. Thought is continuous; and once admit that there is a "given", you are led to affirm the Absolute. Every experience in principle contains it. Thought is not necessarily abstract, for there is no ultimate difference between the mediate and the immediate.

The next chapter contains the argument for identity-in-difference. To understand this doctrine we must know what we mean by the individual. We saw that the individual had to be defined in terms of universals. There is no unique core of identity. Now if the individual can be defined in terms of universals, then it follows that there is identity-in-difference. We thus argued the question, How is identity-in-difference to be understood? by showing that it is logically necessary and that it involves no contradiction.

In the last chapter we argued for the concreteness of the universal by showing that it determines its own individual embodiment. The universal must have instances, and it must have just those instances that are. If it must have just those instances that are, then there is no separate realm of subsistence. Then essence and existence are related in such a way that a complete knowledge of essence involves the existence of all particulars. But, on the other hand, we can know truthfully without knowing completely.

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