ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: Those Who Return: An Evaluation of State Facilitated Extremist Reintegration Programs in Indonesia and Malaysia

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At nine years old, an Indonesian child found herself as the sole survivor of a family suicide bombing that was one of several terrorist attacks involving women and children in Indonesia during 2018. Amongst many conversations, the reality facing this indoctrinated and orphaned child now under state care ignited a discussion around formerly violent extremists returning safely to society. This discussion is complemented by considering how the repatriation of extremists and their affiliates from Syria across the globe forces states to address the returning population with measures specialized to their experience. How extensively have the Indonesian and Malaysian governments incorporated holistic psychological, social, and economic factors that are critical to facilitate reintegration into their post-extremism programming? I argue that Indonesia and Malaysia have narrowly considered some of the underlying factors that facilitate reintegration in their post-extremism programs using a comprehensive country comparison. Though Indonesia and Malaysia remain prime implementers of diverse programming for former extremists, the states are ultimately unable to address key factors that would otherwise maximize successful reintegration and broadly successful programming. Primarily, by focusing their approaches on deradicalization the states undercut their potential. Reintegration is a more effective goal for state-level post-extremism programming and thus, must be a central focus. These considerations and others explored throughout are paramount to the development of comprehensive reintegration programs in Southeast Asia that adequately address the needs, perspectives, and identities of those who return from extremism.
Those Who Return: An Evaluation of State Facilitated Extremist Reintegration Programs in Indonesia and Malaysia

By

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the College of Literature, Science, & Arts at the University of Michigan in partial fulfillment for the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science International Studies with Honors 2020

Thesis Committee:

Professor Allen Hicken
Doctor Anthony Marcum
Dedication

To my late father, with whom I wanted to share my late nights, rough drafts, and celebrations.

To my mother and siblings, with whom I did.

And to those working towards a new future... we learn, we gain, and we succeed only by

listening to and understanding one another.
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Finishing this thesis, though a true dream, felt like a far and unreachable feat until this moment. The journey to this new place was in no small part due to all the support and care from my advisors, mentors, family, and peers. I would not possess the confidence or courage to have begun or sustained this project if not for all the moments we shared.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In 2002, David Rapoport first identified “the four waves of rebel terror” to characterize some of the complicated history around the wars on terror that spanned back to the 19th century (Rapoport, 2002). Modern experts identified a “fifth wave” of terror with a transnational identity that strengthened as globalization stretched across the world (Brown, 2017; Kaplan, 2008; Or and Ido, 2019). This modernized and powerful force of terror targets populations far beyond one country’s borders and often remains resistant to localized attack. Modern responses to transnational terrorism still rely heavily on military force, a short-term solution that does not address the underlying systemic factors that drive individuals to radicalize or join terrorist organizations in the first place. Military might fails to prevent people from radicalizing, and instead, contributes to the narratives utilized by extremists to persuade more towards their cause. Then as the world watched ISIS lose major footing in Iraq and Syria beginning in 2017, states were challenged to respond to a return of extremists who were bred in these transnational networks (Habulan, 2018). Whether through deportation or forced migration, this population is returning from training and fighting in foreign conflicts to communities often unprepared for their arrival. From Australia to the United States, countries are testing approaches that imprison, inform, and integrate radicalized individuals back into society.

Southeast Asia is an important region to study the possibilities of state responses as it is a uniquely diverse microcosm for transnational terrorism and its impacts. In the region, terrorist networks are fluid through state borders especially those of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Borelli, 2017). The countries are also heavily burdened with the return of foreign
terrorist fighters (FTFs) from conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which creates additional challenges for designing specialized approaches to counter foreign extremism (Ryacudu, 2018). As such, efforts to holistically integrate extremists back into society is a critical response to these challenges and they are employed in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, the early variety and success of these state-level programs gained international recognition as examples of the necessity of battling the new era extremism with long-term and forward-thinking approaches. Indonesia and Malaysia, both Muslim majority states, incorporate programs for returning extremists into their counterterrorism agendas as they face a multitude of domestic social and political consequences from transnational terrorism. Therefore, the two countries serve as an important point of analysis to study the reintegration of extremists as a modernized approach to counterterrorism in a globalizing world.

Reintegration is the process of how an extremist transitions from a terrorist or radical environment to civil society while adopting a productive nonviolent identity. The recent emphasis on understanding reintegration reflects an emerging shift away from why individuals radicalize to why individuals quit terrorism (Silke, 2003; Hwang, 2018). Understanding the path of disillusionment from extremism is highly complex and often characterized as a gradual, multifaceted, and personal process similar to joining networks of violent extremism. Thus, more scholars have begun to shift their focus to how, and under what conditions, individuals leave extremism (Horgan, 2009). Within this realm of scholarship, I will study how extensively Indonesian and Malaysian governments incorporated psychological, social, and economic reintegration factors into their post-extremism programming.

Additionally, parallels drawn between studies in criminology and post-war combatants illustrate that a wealth of knowledge is available to understand the path individuals take
following their involvement with gangs, violent crime, combat, and the like. Insights from these seemingly disparate fields can help illuminate why some actors distance or denounce their experiences of crime, trauma, or ideology in an extremist context. The literature can also inform policies designed to prevent backsliding while influencing preemptive interventions for former terrorists (Mullins, 2010). Furthermore, research on paths out of extremism provides policymakers and civil society with tools to curb violent extremism and tactics to trigger disillusionment and voluntary reintegration (Hwang, 2018). This thesis explores current work on post-extremism experiences and argues for the intentional inclusion of reintegration into the counterterrorism landscape in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Southeast Asia more generally.

In this chapter, I introduce my research question and answer and briefly discuss the implications of a reintegration approach within counterterrorism. Next, I will dive into the literature of this field in a discussion of the ambiguity around terminology that impedes progress in studies of counterterrorism strategy, and I clarify definitions for several key terms. Additionally, I will discuss the current limitations of evaluating the success of reintegration programming and the need for measures that extend beyond tracking recidivism rates.1 Towards the end of the chapter, the methodology section describes the various sources analyzed during the construction of my argument including firsthand accounts, news articles, and government sources. The chapter concludes with a roadmap of the remaining four chapters of my thesis.

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1 Recidivism is defined by the National Institute of Justice as a relapse into criminal behavior. Measured by criminal actions causing arrest, conviction, or imprisonment following punishment or intervention for a previous offense (NIJ, 2019). This term will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters.
1.1 Research Question

How extensively have the Indonesian and Malaysian governments incorporated holistic psychological, social, and economic factors that are critical to facilitate reintegration into their post-extremism programming? I answer this question by drawing from the history of reintegration and counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia and Malaysia as well as psychological and policy discussions around reintegration. I argue that Indonesia and Malaysia engage in reintegration style programming to a limited degree by utilizing some but not all key underlying factors of reintegration and by focusing more on deradicalizing rather than reintegrating extremists. Indonesia, as one of the world’s largest democracies, is heralded for its efforts toward a diverse counterterrorism agenda. Similarly, Malaysia is a vocal collaborator on international efforts towards global security. Therefore, the two states’ programs provide important insight towards understanding how to ease extremists out of their terrorist networks.

Through my analysis, I demonstrate that the main factors that facilitate reintegration fall into three categories - psychological, social, and economic. Reintegration programming that addresses these categories must provide and enforce individual and family counseling, community social awareness/de-stigmatization, foster new relationships and personal identity, interfaith and intergroup dialogue, programming specialized to support diverse identities, financial means for former extremists to support themselves plus their families, and paths toward purposeful employment. Once programs adequately integrate these factors, tailoring to domestic needs and societal structure, they are most likely to catalyze and sustain reintegration while preventing recidivism and additional security threats. Furthermore, reintegration programs that are supported at a state level in coordination with community-based groups and
nongovernmental organizations can facilitate the long-term individual support that reintegrating extremists require.

The governments of Indonesia and Malaysia currently provide degrees of primarily psychological and financial support in their counterterrorism programming. The two states attempt major ideological reform in targeted extremists by focusing on efforts to pluralize, 2 counsel religiously and within families, provide limited paths to gain employment, and give some monetary support to extremists and/or their families. However, despite these efforts, there are still an array of psychological, economic, and social factors that are not confronted. This deficit is evident as measures to collaborate with community-based organizations that facilitate effective social reintegration amongst groups are limited, social inclusion efforts are not emphasized, extremist minority populations such as women and children are not adequately addressed, and relationships between state-affiliated mentors and former extremists lack long term maintenance. The intersection of these shortcomings is important to recognize as it indicates a lack of effective enforcement, proper resourcing, and an underwhelming state investment into long term community-based reintegration solutions.

Thus, despite the use of some key factors that facilitate reintegration, post-extremism programs in Indonesia and Malaysia are mainly focused on deradicalization. But, deradicalization without reintegration is doomed to be ineffective. Additionally, while international collaboration on reintegration programming is essential to robust counterterrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia, regional militarization of the programs will adversely impact the current progress made under mainly police and community management. Indonesia and Malaysia

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2 Efforts to pluralize are undertaken in a social context with other former extremists, imprisoned terrorists, major Islamic faith leaders, and other state representatives.
both receive international respect for their efforts towards countering violent extremism (CVE), yet there are several areas of improvement for their reintegration programs. Primarily, further adaptations to programming would better address recent evolutions in women’s and children’s involvement in terrorist activity within Indonesia and Malaysia as well as modern obstacles, including social media, to the process of quitting terrorism.

### 1.2 Literature Review

First, to examine the processes and programs extremists experience in Indonesia and Malaysia, it is paramount to comprehend disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration - the foundational terminology of the field. Gunaratna & Sabariah (2019) claim the concepts of disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration are set within an “intellectual minefield”. Mostly these terms are categorized in a discussion of disengagement and deradicalization with the frequent but secondary examination of rehabilitation and reintegration. Creating consistent definitions is difficult, and thus few scholars dedicate the time to undertake this laborious task. Thus, the interactions between the terms require focused interpretation to frame how states set goals and make productive policy decisions towards countering violent extremism.

*Disengagement and Deradicalization*

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3 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) refers to policy interventions aimed at combating the danger and impact of terrorism. (Schomburg, 2016). The concept can also cover more proactive actions to “counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence” and “should be incorporated into existing programs related to public safety, resilience, inclusion, and violence prevention” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020).
Deradicalization is understood as a definitive, often individualized, shift away from radical ideology. Koehler (2017) defines deradicalization as both an individual and collective process that marks the cognitive change from radical or extremist identity toward a moderate or non-extreme inner ideology. Deradicalization involves inner and interpersonal development to inspire a meaningful ideological change. Hwang (2018) posits that deradicalization, “denotes the delegitimation of the ideology underpinning the use of violence”. Accordingly, Hwang (2018) positions disengagement as a process through which an affiliate of an extremist or terrorist group ends participation with the movement or experiences a role change within the network, both processes being characterized by distancing from (direct) acts of violence.

Disengagement is a change in behavior while deradicalization is a change in beliefs (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2014; Hwang, 2018). Given that beliefs can be harder to modify than actions, disengagement would logically precede deradicalization (El-Said & Harrigan, 2013). For example, Gunaratna and Sabariah (2019) describe the process of leaving an extremist network as beginning with a radical individual disengaging from violence then undergoing rehabilitation, becoming deradicalized, and subsequently being reintegrated into society. However, the literature indicates that deradicalization does not require disengagement and likewise disengagement does not always require deradicalization (Hwang, 2018; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). Furthermore, although discussed as separate concepts, these processes exist along a spectrum and it may not be possible to say, or separate, when exactly an extremist progresses from disengagement to deradicalization, for example.

Koehler (2017) emphasizes the difference between disengagement and deradicalization as disengagement denotes a more behavioral or environmental distancing from radical ideology while deradicalization is characteristically a more deeply cognitive and psychological process.
The distinction between these two terms represents the vast gaps in programming since states face more challenges to forcing individuals to change their ideology than to separate from extremist activity. A far more applicable goal for state programming is to uplift individuals from their situation, whether from a radical group or gang, than facilitate mental dissociation from the logic of extremism. For example, pathways through incarceration and mentorship may facilitate behavioral change but not impact personal truths held by extremists. That step would require a level of willingness in the participant to formulate ideological change.

*Rehabilitation and Reintegration*

Rehabilitation and reintegration represent another facet of the discussion as the two are often utilized almost synonymously. The discussion of rehabilitation as interchangeable with or to achieve disengagement, deradicalization or reintegration, exemplifies a lack of precision and consensus on how rehabilitation is used in the field (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Mullins, 2010; Veldhuis, 2012). The imprecision surrounding the use of rehabilitation as a distinctive stage in post-extremist pathways stands in contrast to the term’s prevalence and utility in other fields such as addiction and criminology. For example, Lynch (2000) defines rehabilitation as any actions or discourse (including psychological, substance abuse treatment, educational, and vocational programming) that works to transform an extremist into a non-criminal citizen. Rehabilitation can thus be considered a mechanism for introducing positive psychological development in radicalized individuals.

Most crucial to the content of my analysis is the term reintegration. Hwang (2018) defines reintegration as a process by which inner competition for identity displaces the extremist mentality with a new social identity. This definition involves new relationships taking the place
of old ones and the ex-combatant finding employment. Furthermore, her definition of reintegration contrasts with more passive definitions of reintegration as a simple and often unavoidable form of physical return by extremists or criminals experiencing incarceration (James, 2016). Variable and passive definitions of reintegration highlight the lack of attention and importance given to the term compared to the larger body of literature around disengagement and deradicalization.

However, reintegration can illuminate the most extensive environmental and psychologically transformative shift for a radicalized individual. The process of an extremist reintegrating into society reflects not only an eventual process in the possible life cycle of an extremist but the process of newly defining self against and within civil society. This conceptualization of reintegration addresses the term’s deficits in current usage, created by scholars using only a passive definition of the term, to better serve counterterrorism strategies.

In summary, given this discussion of how these terms are used loosely and inconsistently defined in the field, I will adopt the following conceptualizations of the terms. I will address disengagement as the process in which a member of an extremist or terrorist network ceases participation, experiences a role change, or distances from direct acts of violence as primarily suggested by Hwang (2018). Combining contributions from both Hwang (2018) and Koehler (2017), I consider deradicalization to be a deliberate and conscious cognitive change from extremist ideology toward a moderate, plural, or non-radical belief system. Additionally, as rehabilitation is arguably the least clarified term in this field, I characterize rehabilitation as a process of intervention to catalyze a transformative psychological change that will reconstitute the extremist’s former mental state.
Finally, I argue that reintegration should be transformed into a stronger focal point in the field. Thus, I define it as the process of an individual undergoing substantial behavioral and cognitive changes towards the construction of a new social identity and personal purpose as they return to a nonviolent and functional role within society. The differences between disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration may appear subtle. Nonetheless, these concepts are necessary to understand and facilitate the long and complex process of moving from terrorist to civilian.

Related Programming

While I will examine specific programmatic efforts to facilitate reintegration and deradicalization and discuss in detail related programming employed in Indonesia and Malaysia in subsequent chapters, the literature on these programs is broad, creating some limitations. Particularly, the role of the state and counterterrorism infrastructure is assessed through studies of terrorism within the criminal system, how communities engage with extremists, and violations of human rights of those accused of terrorist involvement (Koehler 2017; Veldhuis 2012). However, the recent proliferation of studies on deradicalization and reintegration created a body of research aimed at discussing and evaluating the programs that frame individuals’ experience with conceptual beliefs. This type of analysis allows for new understandings of what factors underlie extremism in different regions and the possibility of improvement in approaches to reintegration programming globally. Therefore, by identifying and establishing strong definitions of these terms and maintaining reintegration as the most effective endpoint on a policy level, I will elucidate the factors that facilitate reintegration in the field and within Indonesia and Malaysia society.
Varying programmatic approaches to facilitate individuals’ transitions post extremism are seen around the world. For example, Malaysia’s rehabilitation program is highly revered and although its 95% success rate is self-reported, some observers point to the country’s lack of major terrorist attacks in recent history as an indicator of its success (Koehler 2017). The country makes use of an approach that focuses on religious reeducation, the imposition of the responsibilities of Malaysian citizenship, and vocational training that allows for reintegration (Guay, 2018; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; Koehler 2017).

Indonesia’s programming also gained a level of international praise by making use of religious counseling, social support, and support for employment surrounding former extremists (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). The commitment to these programs differs from that of the Western world, where France recently closed its only deradicalization program and the United States decided to extend sentences for convicted terrorists (Suratman, 2017). These differences suggest the importance of context in studies of reintegration and why terrorists quit. Additionally, the differences illustrate that attempts to generalize findings in the field are limiting and reveal the need for further study of specific CVE programming. To address this need, I will present an intraregional country comparison between Indonesia and Malaysia, whose terror networks are historically interconnected (Hwang, 2018) and who represent two of the main CVE programs in Southeast Asia (Sabariah, 2019).

*The Evaluation of Programming*

Evaluation and critical investigation of reintegration programs are complicated by a lack of reliable data, the necessity of programs to be context-specific, and the absence of a strong metric for success. For example, Mullins (2010) cites a lack of data as a major obstacle to
analysis. Similarly, Silke (2003) points out that the available data for disengagement is often autobiographical and must be used with caution. Studies that are conducted on programs may be informative, but only for the specific setting of the program which can limit the possibility to generalize the findings (Veldhuis, 2012).

One of the biggest limitations is the use of recidivism rates as the singular measure of success for reintegration programs. Recidivism represents a quantitative measure of reintegration that on its own is inherently imperfect as numbers can rarely quantify or measure an individual’s inner experience. Critics argue that a standardized measure of the day-to-day functioning of those reintegrated is needed to supplement basic recidivism rates (Berghuis, 2018). Nevertheless, although measuring recidivism through indicators such as rearrests, reconviction, and reincarceration can be difficult due to problems with data credibility and accuracy, recidivism is a useful partial indicator of the success achieved by reintegration programming (Mullins, 2010). Overall, recidivism must be accompanied by qualitative evaluation and study of both reintegration programming and individuals undergoing reintegration.

Beyond the lack of data and reliable measures of success, a further challenge is identifying the relevant target populations in which to measure success. Today, given the rise in FTFs and repatriated extremists, programming evaluations must address these populations, domestic extremists in detention, and a control population. Such a control population would be former extremists who do not participate in reintegration programming or unmanipulated extremists. Comparison to this type of control group would benefit measuring the progress of reintegration and the reach of programming, however, identifying and testing the control population is nearly impossible (Veldhuis, 2012). Another challenge is the ability to interview and study active extremists in sufficient numbers, which makes it difficult to compare
reintegrated individuals to those who did not succeed or participate in the programs (See, 2018). I will address the further challenges in subsequent chapters.

The evaluation also requires identifying a set of clear objectives to be assessed. A meta-analysis of reentry programs for adult male criminal offenders recently pointed to the need for theoretical grounding in the field of reintegration (Berghuis, 2018). Veldhuis states that a lack of tangible theory limits the success of reintegration programs (Veldhuis, 2012). The development of well-stated objectives and theory in programs for former extremists provides greater accountability, enables the selection of proper methods, and defines whether a program works and why it works (Veldhuis, 2012; Horgan, 2008). Laying out clear objectives is a necessary step to promote proper self-evaluation, which would fill a large deficit in the literature around reintegration programming. At the same time, it would prevent program guidelines from crossing too far into forcing ideology and infringing on basic human rights as these programs are spearheaded by political bodies (Veldhuis, 2012). Monitoring the ethics of manipulating individuals’ ideologies to fit ideals of the state is a lesser developed evaluation piece in the field but remains highly relevant to Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s history of human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Finally, how we think about a concept can affect how we measure it, and consequently, how we measure a concept affects how we think about it (Isbell, 2020). My thesis aims to change how we think about post-extremism programming by emphasizing reintegration and thereby, influencing how reintegration is measured beyond recidivism as a primary measure. With these stated limitations in mind, I will evaluate the current models of reintegration programming in Indonesia and Malaysia to distinguish key factors that influence the reintegration of extremists.
into these two societies. Through a more robust context-specific evaluation, I will compare the two states and define important conclusions regarding reintegration programming.

1.3 Methodology

The primary evidence I use to analyze reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia includes personal accounts from former extremists and those affiliated with reintegration efforts, news and NGO reports of recent violent extremism, and governmental records of incarceration and counterterrorism from both countries. These primary sources characterize the narratives present in a post-extremism path, the current landscape of terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the success of the region’s efforts to prevent violent extremism. Scholarly articles as well as local NGO and human rights organization reports represent the secondary sources I use to interpret and reframe the discussion around reintegration.

Both Indonesia under Suharto and Malaysia with the Internal Security Act experienced largely repressive regimes that had little interest in any post-extremism programming beyond incarceration. Until about the mid-2000s in both Indonesia and Malaysia, extremists were frequently imprisoned indefinitely or without trial (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Human Rights Watch 2004). Over time, Indonesia and Malaysia experienced changes to their tactical approaches to countering violent extremism (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Therefore, I will focus on the condensed evolution of Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration programming between generally the mid-twentieth century and late 2019. Primarily, I will evaluate roughly the last five years (2014-2019) of adaptation since it reflects a period when literature surrounding the study of why terrorists leave proliferated to make reports, interviews, and recidivism rates widely accessible.
First-hand accounts of disengaged extremists by journalists and anthropologists are becoming more common. Anthropological studies, such as Julie Chernov-Hwang’s Why Terrorists Quit, which transcribes interviews she conducted with former Indonesian jihadists, serve as these fundamental narratives. To define the primary factors that facilitate reintegration, I draw from work done by experts in the field of counterterrorism such as Dr. Hwang and Dr. John Horgan, who both theorized about and interviewed former extremists. Others produced conversations with extremists and reintegration programming staff in news sources. News reports, including conversations with public servants, such as Ahmad El-Muhammady who works within the deradicalization program in Malaysia, are additional resources (Guay 2018). Also, I used governmental reports and policies from official state websites which include the Ministry of Defense from Indonesia and the Ministry of Home Affairs from Malaysia. Finally, sources such as the Jakarta Post and other local news entities provide primary accounts of recent terror attacks in Malaysia and Indonesia to allow me to characterize the changing role of women, children, and media in terrorism (Jones, 2018). Using these resources, I discuss the factors that facilitate reintegration, considering the changing face of terrorism and globalization. By assessing how Indonesia and Malaysia address each factor I explore potential areas of improvement.

Sources used in this study come from a variety of motivations as briefly depicted above and with a variety of limitations. I was unable to conduct field research given the timeframe and resources of this project. Limited information is available in the form of robust data or governmental reports. Therefore, I rely on what is available in English through online sources. Sources such as interviews, news reports of recent terror activities, and Dr. Chernov-Hwang’s book represent the most direct accounts of how extremists are functioning within the two
societies regarding reintegration. However, they are subject to the lens of the interviewer and publishers and reflect a particular version of the discussion around integrating former extremists. I attempt to circumvent this issue by utilizing a variety of sources from various perspectives.

Governmental reports provide representations of the programming available and goals of the state which allows me to evaluate the current position on reintegration and what has been implemented. However, the reports are often not available in English and, in Indonesia, are often limited as reports can emphasize the disjointed efforts across the archipelago (Suarda, 2016; Kurlantzick, 2018). Additionally, as Indonesia and Malaysia continue to receive international acclaim for their post-extremism programming, a premium is evident on publishing positively framed reports and this state bias also clouds the field. Similarly, secondary sources including scholarly articles and human rights group reports provide vital perspectives and summaries of the discussion surrounding former extremists. A battery of biases held by these organizations and actors impact certain policies or highlight goals outside of those chosen by the states. With these biases and limitations in mind, I use available evidence to inform and structure a qualitative evaluation and comparison of reintegration programs in Indonesia and Malaysia.

1.4 Chapter Summaries

Chapter 2 entails a more thorough analysis of reintegration beginning with an overview of the current landscape of counter-extremism. I then emphasize how reintegration programming is a separate entity from a deradicalization approach whereas the former is a more holistic and sustainable process and the latter is more difficult for states to achieve and limits potential impact. By discussing both the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches, I make a case for why countries like Indonesia and Malaysia should pursue reintegration instead of
deradicalization. Furthermore, I discuss psychological research that explores why individuals decide to radicalize and how this information can inform programming. I also outline the factors that facilitate a former extremist’s reintegration, namely psychological, social, and economic influences as well as the role of social networks. Within the context of how such factors impact an individual’s return to society, I explain how successful reintegration benefits former extremists and their communities through a restorative justice approach in contrast to punitive philosophies enacted in some other countries. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of how the success of reintegration programming can be measured and the case is made for a comparative analysis of programming in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Chapter 3 provides a concentrated history of terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia. The timeline of events is defined in eras marked by important occurrences such as the repeal of the Internal Security Act in Malaysia and the establishment of a counterterrorism unit in Indonesia. Evolution of the counter-extremism policy in response to the globalization of terrorism, the return of FTFs, and the use of social networking in radicalization are described and evaluated. The influence of allies and international entities like the United Nations on programming is also considered in the context of the defined eras. Chapter 3 concludes by predicting the future directions of reintegration as a component of counter-extremism programming in Indonesia and Malaysia respectively.

Chapter 4 begins by briefly revisiting the factors that facilitate a terrorist’s reintegration into society. Next, using these factors and the consideration of the changing landscapes described in chapter 3, I develop evaluation criteria to define the efficacy of Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration programs. The criteria involve evaluation of 7 different categories: 1. Engagement with non-government actors, 2. Continuity and follow-up, 3. Economic stability, 4. Inclusion of
age and gender support, 5. Psychological care, 6. Educational opportunities, and 7. Social inclusion. I discuss the extent to which Indonesia or Malaysia addresses a particular category and use a rating scale to quantify their success in that area. Chapter 4 also compares and contrasts both the success and strategies of the two countries and lastly discusses future recommendations for the programs.

I will conclude in chapter 5 with a discussion on the regional implications around Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s programming and the role of media in reintegration. To begin, I will summarize the findings from the comparison and program evaluation in chapter 4 that relate to how other states in Southeast Asia could be impacted, especially with movements to militarize counterterrorism in the region. To follow, I will elaborate on the relationship between media and reintegration with a focus on actions taken by the Indonesian and Malaysian governments. While a discussion of regional impacts and media is outside the scope of my thesis, they present important future areas of study as they are closely intertwined with Indonesian and Malaysian reintegration efforts. Finally, I will summarize and reflect on my findings.
Chapter 2: Understanding Reintegration

It’s difficult to start interacting again ... if we meet someone at the market, we try to approach them nicely. ... It was difficult but I got through it because my wife told me to be patient ... finally after one year of seeing our behavior, those who kept their distance started to approach us, and we became active in the community, like participating in gotong royong

Former Indonesian extremist, 2017

Introduction

Given the global and transnational nature of modern terrorism, states face the question of what to do with terrorists returning home from training and extremist operations on foreign soil. The reintegration of these transnational extremists as well as domestic extremists requires development of reintegration programming within a country’s counterterrorism operations. As reintegration is a relatively new and understudied concept, robust research on effective reintegration programming or the factors that specifically influence reintegration is still young. This lack of exploration represents a gap in the field that must be addressed to inform and modify current approaches to preventing and countering extremism. Such growth in programming will positively inform state measures to combat violent extremism and contribute to larger international security initiatives. These findings hold relevance for countries attempting to foster domestic security, state autonomy, and ideologically balanced civil societies when faced with mass return of FTFs. Thus, this chapter clarifies several obstacles impeding analytical progress in the field of reintegration and discusses some of the key factors that facilitate reintegration.

4 The experience was recounted by a former weapons smuggler from Indonesia. Under anti-terrorist legislation, the former extremist was convicted to serve about eight years in prison (Sumpter, 2018).
To begin, I present a brief overview of the roots and current landscape of counterterrorism with a focus on the discussions of countering violent extremism. Following this contextualization will be an analysis of reintegration as a process distinct from deradicalization and a discussion of the specific value of reintegration approaches to preventing violent extremism. Next, the chapter will examine the factors that facilitate reintegration, including the importance of psychology and social networks. I will also discuss how successful reintegration is measured. The chapter will conclude with an argument for the necessity and value of a comparison-based case study between Indonesian and Malaysian reintegration-style programming.

2.1 Background

Trends in Terrorism Research

Traditionally, the focal point of counterterrorism efforts was the entry of individuals into terrorist networks and the process of radicalization. Policymakers, researchers, and intelligence officials alike sought to understand why and how individuals traversed the path to violent extremism in various contexts. While areas of study including social, economic, and cultural factors that facilitated radicalization, research into understanding the psychology and character of radicalized individuals garnered greater emphasis (Berghuis, 2018; Hwang, 2018; James, 2016; Silke, 2003). Thus, much of the work identified individual and collective vulnerabilities to the onset of extremism and analyzed how these individuals may be prevented from undertaking that path. While this approach to preventing violent extremism maintained scholarly attention, not as much work went into researching the back-end process -- why and how terrorists quit.
Recently, global discussions of terrorism are shifting to include the processes of terrorists leaving their networks, changing their roles within radical organizations, and disavowing violent radical ideology altogether (Horgan, 2009). The volume of coverage on radicalization research, according to experts, is overplayed with minimal forward progress from the literature. Thus, new angles must be considered to continue developing solutions and achieve further successful counterterrorism approaches (Silke, 2003; Hwang, 2018). Considering the path away from radicalization creates the potential for counterterrorism efforts to become more dynamic and encompass the entire life cycle of an extremist. Like previous work on radicalization, newer research must elaborate on how economic, social, and psychological factors impact pathways leading from extremism back to civil life. Overall, this repositioning of focus in the study of terrorism depicts a process of return to society that is highly complex, gradual, and personal.

Establishing Key Terminology

To understand the path of returning to society, I delineate the plethora of new terms defined and explored by scholars. Several related terms appear in the literature on criminology, post-combat, and addiction, illustrating key overlaps around the psychological factors that facilitate the reintegration process. The four salient concepts to the discussion in this analysis include disengagement, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (Grip & Kotajoki, 2019). Each of these terms represents a distinct portion of the layered process an extremist undergoes to rejoining a nonviolent civil society. These terms are often used interchangeably or ambiguously, which complicates the understanding of policy, hinders discussion within the field, and complicates evaluation of programming (Horgan, 2009). Thus, further clarity and consistent definitions of these terms are needed to not only improve insight into how and why radicalized
individuals change their roles or leave their organizations but to also understand which concept states should prioritize in their approaches to counter violent extremism. As in previous discussions, I will emphasize the distinctions between the terms as well as the impact of using deradicalization versus reintegration as the primary goal of programming, before narrowing in on how reintegration impacts counterterrorism efforts.

The transition from radical ideology, terrorist networks, or other extremist groups involves two different processes. The first process of change a radicalized individual faces can be considered disengaging and/or deradicalizing. This first process can, and often does, involve no significant environmental change. Extremists may still hold active positions within terrorist networks while only undergoing any change passively. Disengagement represents a change in behavior that is often exemplified by violent extremists taking a more indirect role in the violent activities of their terror network. For example, rather than engaging directly in combat, planning, or the execution of violence, an extremist can disengage from this path to fund or secure supplies for the terrorist cell. Deradicalization, by contrast, involves a change in belief (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009; Hwang, 2018; See, 2018). More specifically, disengagement is primarily characterized by a physical and behavioral distancing from radical ideology while deradicalization is a cognitive shift away from radical ideology and doctrine (Koehler, 2017).

The second process experienced by those transitioning occurs when there is a more drastic voluntary or involuntary environmental shift. The process catalyzes changes in behavior and belief that may (or may not) have begun as part of the first process. At a state level this process can begin when extremists are imprisoned, deported back to their communities, self-
reported, reported by family members, or required to undergo a counter-extremist programs. One step in this process is rehabilitation. Despite a battery of different definitions and uses in literature, in the context of this thesis, rehabilitation denotes a mechanism for introducing positive psychological development and reconstruction in radicalized individuals with the aim of a paramount psychological change like deradicalization.

Finally, and most importantly for the remainder of the chapter, is the concept of reintegration. The significance of reintegration is underappreciated in the current literature where it is often grouped with the terms discussed above (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). In this thesis, I define reintegration as the process whereby an individual undergoes behavioral and cognitive changes to construct a new social identity and return successfully to a nonviolent role in society.

2.2 Reintegration vs. Deradicalization

Reintegration and deradicalization will be the focus of further analysis as they represent two distinct goals following involvement in radical or extremist operations. Both are integral to the development of counterterrorism programs, but reintegration, rather than deradicalization, has the greatest potential impact on counterterrorism through the prevention of recidivism. However, in practice reintegration is often grouped with other terms and concepts. As a result, the distinct importance of reintegration as a definitive step post extremism is underexplored by the field. Another important step is looking at reintegration as an active, instead of passive, process, as it is sometimes described in the literature. If reintegration is ascribed a solely passive

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5 Whether the shift is voluntary or involuntary on the part of the extremist may determine how and to what extent they can achieve success in the steps of the process. If the shift is involuntary, it is also particularly salient how the extremist is cared for by the state. For example, if an extremist experiences torture in state detained and possess no personal interest or inspiration to reintegrate, that individual may never change their radical beliefs or violent behavior and instead refocus it towards the state (Horgan, 2009; Hwang, 2018).
value to be achieved only by the arbitrary relocation of an extremist back to their home with no other psychological or social implications, there will not be active research or programming focused on this step in the post-extremism path (James, 2016). By contrast, viewing reintegration as an active process can improve efforts to curb recidivism directly and strengthen peaceful social networks through the significant personal and communal reconstruction undergone.

Cutting through this ambiguity and creating a consistent definition is thus a major improvement toward a more critical analysis of government facilitated post-extremism programming taking place in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Deradicalization programming is concerned with changing the deeply held beliefs of extremists and thus has remained a popular initiative in counterterrorism agendas. The programs emphasize reeducation and combating indoctrination, aspiring to change how former extremists view religion and justice. Using the term deradicalization in programming implies an ambition for the direct deterrence of violence and further radicalization, sometimes through costly and repressive actions (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Often in current models of state-led deradicalization programming a range of soft and hard approaches target the post-extremist population (Aoláin, 2018).

These soft and hard approaches, which vary across countries, typically aim to deradicalize extremists through measures that do not directly align with solely attempting an ideological change. Soft approaches generally attempt to provide counsel, financial, and social support to those individuals impacted by extremism, assuming in return extremists will accept a “preferred” and nonviolent view of their religion, politics, or identity (Guay, 2018; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Hard approaches can include imprisonment, forced rehabilitation, stripping citizenship, and deprivation of personal rights that expect
deradicalization to follow from physical removal from terror networks and in some cases extreme force (Aoláin, 2018; Mantu, 2018).

However, reframing preventative measures of violent extremism to include the process of reintegration can create more space for actions that practically include a mix of soft and hard approaches. Thus, shifting and adapting these practices towards reintegration instead of deradicalization can more effectively reach the counterterrorism goals held by states. In brief, seeking to reintegrate rather than just deradicalize is a more holistic agenda to achieve the ultimate goal of peaceful integration into society.

A reintegration approach to programming allows for possibilities that are not accessible following a strict deradicalization model. For example, even if an individual can personally undergo deradicalization or experience significant ideological change within the context of state programming, focusing only on deradicalization does not ensure the individual will be exposed to the depth of social and emotional support necessary to participate peacefully in society. Individuals who deradicalize without reintegrating can experience similar senses of social isolation or rejection that pulled them towards radicalization in the first place. Thus, deradicalization aims to change an individual’s values, while reintegration entails a holistic approach to cognition, social interaction, and identity (Hamid & Pretus, 2019). Neither process is easily achieved, but integration into society utilizes distinct factors that can be facilitated by state-level programming to change habits and expand one's thoughts or goals (Vedantam, 2019).

Some advantages to reintegration versus deradicalization-focused programming can also be illustrated through a focus on obstacles in policymaking and enforcement of several counterterrorism measures. For example, passing legislation that defines what an “appropriate” and peaceful interpretation of Islam can be problematic, particularly in a democratic state as it
infringes on the separation of church and state as well as individual freedoms to choose and interpret religion (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Legislation and policy aimed at making definitive statements on faith or belief infringe on basic human rights and civil liberties of choice and personal autonomy (Dickson, 1995). Also, the heavy reliance on religious therapy to cure radicalization can be described as “a kind of broad-spectrum antibiotic [that] may be misplaced and problematic” (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Alternatively, reintegration policy requiring incarcerated extremists’ exposure to pluralism through peer discussions, diverse religious education, and education around social responsibilities utilizes religious perspectives to challenge radicalism but does not require participants to hold views directly in line with the government.

States and officials running counterterrorism programs should not exclusively aim to change the beliefs of those individuals within their programs to a potentially politically influenced interpretation of faith. However, forcing individuals identified as security threats to participate in programs that focus on their peaceful integration and participation in society is a more reasonable goal. Police and some military forces are running these post-extremist programs following prison or as a form of reeducation forced on individuals identified as a threat to the state. Thus, offering an incentive of eventual positive return to society and job training remains advantageous over enforcement of specific interpretations of faith (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; Veldhuis 2012). However, this endeavor should be undertaken with caution; as poorly designed reintegration programs may waste resources as well as increase radicalization whether through rejection of the program or narratives spread by extremists about the programs (Koehler, 2017).

Reintegration tactics are often more effective in both sustaining a heterogeneous active civil society and protecting basic human rights (UN General Assembly, art. 18). Thus, a variety
of different interventions aligned with reintegration produce ideal programming that is similar to successful initiatives seen in criminology (Garfield, 2020). Explicitly, methods of changing social identity, networks, perceptions of self, and habits should be paramount in programs designed to engage a returning extremist population.

2.3 Reintegration in Counterterrorism

Reintegration as opposed to deradicalization is an integral portion of a state’s counterterrorism agenda. Reintegration can be considered to counter violent extremism in two major ways: by countering the grassroots spread of radical ideology and thus fracturing terrorist networks and decreasing the financing of terrorism.

First, individuals who have reintegrated can be an important resource for generating resistance to the spread of radicalized ideology in vulnerable populations and thereby disrupt terror networks (Hwang, 2018; Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Those individuals reintegrating can readdress their former paths of radicalization to provide mentorship and experiential knowledge against the use of violence (Hwang, 2018; See, 2018). Reintegration allows for those with the capacity and social capital to advocate for nonviolence to vulnerable youth or underrepresented populations through avenues traditionally closed to state officials. By providing alternative viewpoints with the credibility of personal knowledge, reintegrated individuals can prevent radicalization of more people and slow the growth of terrorist networks.

Both Indonesia and Malaysia make use of former extremists in their reintegration programs. Former extremists can provide information about terrorist operations as well as work personally with detainees and prisoners to help change their mindset away from that of extremism, which is especially important because detainees are a population at risk of returning
to extremism or spreading their ideology (El-Said, 2012). Talking to someone who was once in their shoes can be a powerful tool to convince an extremist to deradicalize, and if that extremist chooses to reintegrate, they might in turn prevent others from radicalizing. On the other hand, if efforts fail the police or security forces can be aware that the individual who refused to reintegrate is a potential threat, thus hopefully mitigating any future violent action. An added benefit is that reintegration programming increases contact between extremists and police as well as individuals of other backgrounds, which can help break down the walls of anti-pluralist radical ideology.

Education and the promotion of self-investment generated by programs aimed to reintegrate extremists can also curb resourcing of terrorist organizations. As extremists and radicalized youth populations enter into reintegration programs, they find support in securing employment and reprioritizing personal goals around contributing productively to their communities and society. Furthermore, the responsibility that reintegrated individuals feel to finance their former extremist networks is reduced. The financing of terrorist networks, particularly within Indonesia and Malaysia, is a major issue that is more recently gaining international legal support to criminalize (Hwang, 2018; UNODC, 2018). Generally, as reintegration changes one’s personal and social investments, even if that person continues to hold radical ideologies, they will be more likely to end financial support of extremists, progressing state counterterrorism goals.

Finally, aftereffects of vigorous research and support of reintegrated extremists can fundamentally delineate a more full-bodied path for any extremist towards successful and peaceful integration into society. While this may not increase the number of extremists seeking reintegration, it will impact how many individuals are successful if there is a clear and deeply
trialed approach to the process. Long term investment into reintegration can produce a widely traceable journey that yields success for a variety of individuals and thus, bolsters counterterrorism initiatives.

Context and Reintegration

Reintegration and its role in countering violent extremism must be considered in both a domestic and regional context since various aspects of religion and politics can impact the implementation and response to programming. Indonesia and Malaysia are not alone in their prioritization of reintegration initiatives. Generally, Southeast Asia supports programming in-line with reintegration that can supplement traditional counterterrorism efforts. The backbone of such efforts is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967 to promote peace, stability, and strengthen cooperation. A post-9/11 declaration as well as a 2007 convention solidified regional cooperation in counterterrorism efforts (UNODC, 2018). In support of deradicalization, Malaysia hosted the Conference for Deradicalisation and Countering Violent Extremism in January 2016 which was attended by 17 ministers and 500 representatives from the region to share knowledge and practices of countering ideology, community education, media use, as well as counseling and services to detainees (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2016).

The study of reintegration reveals the importance of tailoring programming and benchmarks to the particular society (Koehler, 2017; Veldhuis 2012). Southeast Asia, in particular, is an important region in which to study transnational terrorism, given the fluidity of terror networks through Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Borelli, 2017). Collaboration is a hallmark of international security in this region. Hence, the integration of extremists in Indonesia must work with the dismantling and countering of radicalization in Malaysia to
disenfranchise the various terrorist networks within the region. Radicalization is a pervasive process and can insert itself into any part of society.

In Indonesia and Malaysia, religious schools, community groups, prayer networks, and online forums all serve as spaces where those who are radicalized can spread their ideologies. Extremists often train in one country and commit acts of violence in or send capital to another as most terrorist networks operate transnationally. For example, recent unrest in Marawi Philippines and security threats to Singapore and southern Thailand are linked to terrorists participating in the Jemaah Islamiyah and Daesh related networks present in Indonesia and Malaysia (Tan, 2018). Therefore, as these security threats and networks remain fluid throughout the region, so must measures and collaboration efforts surrounding countering violent extremism. The complexity of transnational terrorism includes foreign incarceration and repatriation of FTFs as these groups must be incorporated into the system of reintegration.

Programming must also be tailored to the demographics of extremists. The conversation around extremist demographics in Indonesia and Malaysia recently reignited as women and children are increasingly involved in terrorist activities in the region. As a result, authorities are faced with a challenge to address populations of varying age and gender identities. Importantly, a one-size-fits-all approach that envisions an extremist to be only an adult male is not adequate to reintegrate extremists into society. Women may become radicalized due to different factors than men (Mahmood, 2019). Additionally, women face different experiences, abuses, responsibilities, and play different roles in extremist groups that require distinct approaches to combat their radicalization and involvement in the network (Santos, 2019).

Age is another consideration, primarily when it comes to children. For example, young children or adolescents may be more susceptible to indoctrination of radical beliefs or beliefs that
violence is an effective tactic to get what you want. Given their vulnerability to growing up into radicalization and be used in terrorist activity even without indoctrination, children may also not fully understand the consequences of their actions (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). Special care must be taken to understand the cognitive and psychological state of children involved in extremist activities and how to best help them reconcile and reintegrate into a nonviolent society they may have never really known. In short, extremists of different gender identities and ages face a diverse set of obstacles to reintegration and successful programming must consider their needs (Nemr et al, 2018).

Moreover, the inclusion of extremists who fight or train transnationally into programs of reintegration provides domestic safeguards against violent tactics and ideologies learned abroad. For example, experts speculate that the release of FTFs from prison increases radicalization and recruitment of more terrorists in their home countries (Schulze, 2018; See, 2018). Reintegration allows for states to further secure their borders and share strong enforcement as the approach works to weaken transnational terrorist organizations by generating more nonviolent paths from extremism. By addressing FTFs directly through reintegration programming, Southeast Asian states engage in protecting their populations and others in the region. But, to reap these counterterrorism and international security advantages achieved through reintegration programming, there must be an understanding of the psychological factors that facilitate extremists’ reintegration into society.
2.4 Psychology of Reintegration

*Shared Trauma*

Experiencing the process of reintegration is not exclusive to extremists, rather it is a form of personal and social development that different populations exposed to significant psychological and physical stresses undergo. In this section, I will explain how the process of reintegration by multiple parties contributes to a community of peace. Examining reintegration as a path through shared traumas provides insight into the hardships faced by extremists both within and beyond terrorist networks. Such insights can then be drawn out of the process to impact the way states think about push and pull factors of radicalization, illustrating how undergoing reintegration can improve counterterrorism efforts more generally. Addicts, incarcerated individuals, soldiers, and victims exposed to trauma, harm, or stress wishing to return to society all face their form of reintegration. These paths of reintegration present a large body of research that addresses complex relationships between individuals and society as well as mind and body (Bazemore, 1998; Belrose et al, 2018; James 2016). Additionally, reinserted individuals in these fields are commonly called on to contribute to the upkeep of these reintegration style programs (Hamidi, 2016; Rucktäschel, 2019). Drawing on these diverse experiences serves as evidence towards promoting the reintegration of extremists, as extremists navigate similar obstacles to others in the community and can also repurpose their experiences positively.

Prisoners, soldiers, victims, and extremists must redefine their identity and undergo cognitive growth to function peacefully in society. Often the path of an extremist and criminal overlaps through similar experiences with legal, social, and financial ramifications from imprisonment plus bodily trauma from detention (Garfield, 2020). Furthermore, the discussion of
whether rights to reform and reintegrate should be offered to terrorists despite the severity of crimes committed is an important conversation to acknowledge due to the scope and intensity of violence around extremism.

Returning extremists and soldiers most commonly carry psychological and neuronal impacts of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other subsequent effects of their actions. There are numerous cases of returning soldiers and civilians exposed to combat diagnosed with PTSD or similar anxiety disorders (Digangi et al, 2018). Impacts on the psychological state of extremists are under-recorded and then under-addressed or unaccounted for in counterterrorism programs. Nurshardrina Khairadhinia (Nur), for example, experienced psychological harm after being tempted towards radical ideology over the internet. Nur convinced her family to follow her to Syria in 2015. She believed in the financial and religious prosperity available under the caliphate depicted by the ISIS fabricated media (Harty, 2017). However, once in Syria, her family was picked apart by death, detention, and the subjugation of women. Nur experienced a deep sense of shame from feeling as though she caused her own family’s peril at the hands of this falsified Islamic haven. The immense guilt and humiliation combined with her forced marriage illustrate the sort of psychological harm those who are exposed to extremism face. Additionally, her story continues as Nur and her family remain in Kurdish controlled territory awaiting ramifications from the Indonesian government. Nur expresses deep regret as her male family members still face the possibility of death by Syrian soldiers or Shiite militias (Harty, 2017).

Lastly, victims of violent crimes may often need to reconstruct their identity and sense of self to function in society, actions that former extremists must undergo to similarly reconcile changes in their beliefs and values (Hwang, 2018; Žukauskienė et al, 2019). Thus, reintegration
is not exclusive to the experience of terrorists, radicals, or any of the aforementioned groups. For many groups, reintegration plays a crucial role in personal well-being as well as the safety of others. For example, successful reintegration can dampen further radicalization, deter re-offense, and protect potentially vulnerable members in the community. By understanding the psychological and physical experiences shared by extremists, prisoners, victims, and soldiers more can be understood and measured about how individuals reintegrate and how programs may succeed. Development of reintegration methods intended to assist soldiers, criminals, and victims produce lessons that will inform extremist reintegration.

Factors That Facilitate Reintegration

The reintegration of extremists is a gradual, multifaceted, and complex process. Some of the factors that facilitate integration into society, including financial, social, and psychological factors, might be similar to those that catalyzed radicalization originally (Jaffer, 2019). While a focus on individual variations and psychological principles have not always been central to reintegration programming, these aspects now dominate studies of extremist populations (Horgan 2009; Veldhuis 2012; Koehler 2017). The inclusion of a behavioral neuroscience perspective denotes a crucial development in the field because the intersectionality of security and psychological concerns crucially influences the process of reintegration (Hwang 2018). Factors commonly associated with reintegration such as social or familial relationships ultimately tie into an individual’s psychology and mental state.

Moreover, disposition directly affects executive processing and the capacity to reintegrate or re-radicalize. For instance, some individuals join extremist groups to gain a sense of belonging and community (Hwang, 2018). The counter to facilitate the reintegration of such individuals
would require fostering a new sense of belonging, community, and connection outside of the extremist network. Thereby addressing a psychological and socially motivated drive that first led to radicalization (Jaffer, 2019). The following factors represent the nuanced components from a broad evaluation of current published cases and narratives that impact reintegration. These conditions are numerous and complex, with most falling under economic, psychological, and social factors (Hwang, 2018; Hamid & Pretus, 2019; Jaffer, 2019; Silke 2003).

Some extremists join terrorist networks due to financial factors, and likewise economic obstacles may encourage them to rejoin after release from prison or return from conflict. For example, former extremists may be blacklisted by banks or places of employment due to legal repercussions of their charges (Guay, 2018). These obstacles during reintegration create financial insecurity that impacts extremists as well as their families and communities. Economic stability is a crucial factor in reintegration as without support, returning to financial security within their terrorist networks is likely (Guay, 2018). Moreover, the sense of purpose and independence that comes from gainful employment and financial security may be key for some individuals who undergo reintegration.

Psychological factors around reintegration are similarly crucial to comprehend. Ibrahim, a former extremist, at seventeen traveled to fight in Syria. In 2013, Ibrahim returned to Denmark and was immediately turned into the police by his father. Through the Aarhus model in Denmark that works with a direct counseling approach, Ibrahim met with a volunteer mentor who gained his trust and exposed him to diverse perspectives (Jeffer, 2019). The psychological aspect of reintegration, while complex and personal, may involve religious and family counseling, rehabilitation, or broad education aimed at expanding restricted and persistent thought patterns held by extremists (Koehler, 2017). Psychological programming may involve meditations on
how one interprets their religion, morals, social justice, or even how to interact with a former radical associate should they run into them (Koehler, 2017; Mullins, 2010).

Within these psychological considerations, it is important to study how various identities held by extremists impact their needs in reintegration programming. For example, individuals of different ages and genders may experience distinct harm within and challenges to their path out of extremism. Women may radicalize for different reasons than men as uncovered by modern gender studies on radicalization (Santos, 2019; Zakuan, 2018). Women are also exposed to particularly harmful performances of gendered roles in radical groups by forced marriage and “grooming their children to become future militants” (Santos, 2019) Thus, women may require different resources and strategies to reintegrate as they face these experiences. Psychological, medical, and social needs all can differ between a male and female detainee and all factors ought to be addressed (International Civil Society Action Network, 2019). Likewise, child extremists vary in their understanding and recognition of their indoctrination, family terrorist activity, and potential for successful reintegration (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). Children in extremist families need more mentorship, educational opportunities, and warrant specific attention as well as resources. In short, it is imperative to keep identities including age and gender in the conversation of factors driving reintegration and evaluation of programming.

Concurrently, researchers have utilized advanced imaging to understand radicalization in the minds of extremists. Recently, Hamid and Pretus recruited young radicals in Barcelona and used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans to study brain activity while they performed tasks. The researchers also sampled their population to gauge extremist values and establish relevant psychological measures. Participants scored normally on scales of personality, IQ, and mental illness when compared to non-radicalized populations. This finding is integral in
its support of previous knowledge that these factors alone are not prevalent in radicalization (Hamid & Pretus, 2019).

Social factors of connection and exclusion were also explored using a virtual passing game. Half of the 538 participants were socially excluded by virtual players. This experiment, though basic, tested the concept of sacred values. Sacred values illustrate the overlap between social and psychological factors that influence one's capacity to shift ideology and identity towards nonviolence during reintegration. Hamid and Pretus define sacred values as non-negotiable values that people will fight for if they feel their value is threatened (Hamid & Pretus, 2019). Their results predicted that individuals who were socially excluded and identified with extremist views treated more of their radical values as sacred. Ultimately, they were more likely to report they would fight or die for their beliefs than those who were included. The study suggests that social exclusion can contribute to hardening of values or willingness to engage in violence to achieve a sense of visibility or personally devised justice. Such an individual may be led to choose a radical path when met with radical indoctrination, financial, and psychological pull factors. Similarly, the research suggests inclusion and reframing of how these individuals advocate for their beliefs or identity can facilitate reintegration by changing their avenues of expression from violence to activism or service.

Another social implication of the study detailed how radical individuals moderated their willingness to fight and die for their values relative to the opinions of their peers (Hamid & Pretus, 2019). Thus, removing individuals from the environment of violent extremists and terrorist networks may encourage disengagement and movement towards a successful return to society. Social support and positive relationships between family and new friends are an important aspect of deradicalization and reintegration. Policies aimed at social inclusion,
purposefulness, and social support of communities that incorporate individuals exiting extremism also prove valuable to countering terrorism (Koehler, 2017; Hamid & Pretus, 2019). However, limiting social exposure to government facilitated reeducation and online messaging that oppose extremism lacks the same social salience (Sumpter, 2018). These factors and others illustrate how reintegration can be achieved through fulfillment of basic human needs.

Other factors that promote and contribute to the process of reintegration underly recent studies of habits and unconscious behavior. Habits are built generally from repeated actions in a given context that are rewarded. These behaviors eventually become automatic and are challenging to alter or reform (Wood, 2019; Neal et al, 2011). These habitual behaviors are not reliant on active decision making. Therefore, we must reintroduce intention and executive processing to the context to change these sorts of autonomous behaviors. Extremists would require a well-structured environment that allows untargeted behaviors to remain automated, so they can concentrate decision processing around target behaviors. Increasing obstacles or friction to complete habits forces individuals to apply attention to the unconscious behaviors that establish a distinct lifestyle and make changes driven by active choice. Conversely, promoting healthy and desired behaviors means decreasing frictions (or obstacles to completing a given behavior) and increasing the ease to reward (Wood, 2019). Reintegration programming must make it easy to perform and be rewarded for these goal behaviors.

Particularly, this facilitation is required because extremists who seek to build a renewed social identity and purpose will need to substantially change their radical behaviors and thoughts, which may be habitual. Thus, well planned and structured programming is necessary to limit the decision making to key behaviors that will best garner successful reintegration, nonviolent problem solving, active critical thinking, and social engagement with nonviolent peers. Other
findings regarding brain plasticity and learning suggest lifelong learning and change in cognition is possible, however, the adult brain does not change as robustly as it does in younger individuals (Pauwels et al, 2018). Following this logic, reintegration programming that strongly targets the treatment of younger radicals and increasingly addresses vulnerable youth populations has greater potential to successfully integrate. Overall, factors that psychologically facilitate reintegration are continually being researched and developed as human behavior and cognitive development interlace over terrorism. This development indicates states must marry policy and the individual to combine neuroscience, psychology of mental health, and social behavior with reintegration.

Media and social networking exposure are an aspect of counterterrorism deserving of more discussion because of their ability to prevent radicalization and return to violent extremism. Strong bonds to family and friends prevent people from joining illegal activities according to social bond theory and many who recidivate are found to maintain no significant outside social network (Berghuis 2018; Hwang, 2018). While social networks may be an important factor for most individuals, that does not mean everyone experiencing reintegration holds the same social needs. Research suggests that humans are driven to group people based on almost exclusively social information and thus, desire membership in groups they identify as ingroups. (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al, 1971). The groupings are designed arbitrarily and almost entirely learned, permitting fluidity in group membership and interest by changes to an individual’s priorities or prior affiliation (Jhangiani & Tarry 2018). An extremist may lose their sense of membership when reintegrating and if these needs are not addressed, a former extremist met with social isolation and rejection can return to the social support of their extremist organization. These organizations on a global scale are persuasive and accessible at all times on the internet, thus...
such a relapse is possible with poor enforcement or resourcing of reintegration programming that addresses the social needs of radicalized individuals (Hwang, 2018).

Finally, the factors that underly reintegration compose the evaluation of Indonesia and Malaysia’s post-extremism programming in chapter 4. The table below indicates how some of the main factors will be drawn on from this discussion to support an exploration of specific state initiatives.

Table 1: Factors That Facilitate Reintegration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor for Evaluation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with Non-Government Actors</td>
<td>Cooperation between government and NGOs or civil society organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity and Follow up</td>
<td>Quality of longitudinal tracking and support after release from prison or state program care</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Stability</td>
<td>Support to find and secure a job/career plus establish financial independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Age and Gender Support</td>
<td>Extent of specialized programming and resources available to address concerns of those with different ages and gender identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Care</td>
<td>Counseling/therapy provided to both extremist and their family to facilitate the development of a new identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational Opportunity</td>
<td>Extent of access to quality education or vocational training for individuals undergoing reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Inclusion</td>
<td>Extent of community outreach to help former extremists return to a society that accepts them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Restorative Nature of Reintegration

The factors underlying reintegration address more than a discussion of the individual and their development, as it embraces a discussion of broader reconciliation. Facing people that we harmed or re-experiencing personal trauma are indisputably immense challenges. However, the
challenge can empower victims and perpetrators toward healing and possibly create a path toward growth. This process depicts the concept of restorative justice and has been put into practice by Common Justice, a New York-based organization led by Danielle Sered. Sered defines restorative justice as a process of accepting accountability and making amends where the individuals most impacted meet to agree on the conditions of reparations and restoration (Garfield, 2020). Restorative justice is a model that challenges systems of classical punishment. Restorative justice, in a similar way to reintegration, evolves and adapts to the needs of the victims, involving many conditions including community service, higher education, restitution, seeking employment, and more. In a recent interview, Sered referred to a criminal system built on poorly enforced deterrence as “trying to solve a thousand different problems with a single tool” rather than using a variety of different interventions specific to each healing and truth (Garfield, 2020).

In terms of extremism, a restorative justice methodology is practical within the framework of reintegration. Reintegration is an essential aspect of the healing process for both extremists and affected communities (Samuel, 2016; Veldhuis 2012). Instead of only treating extremists with prison time, promoting reconciliation through reintegration will allow community members to engage with each other, particularly those with different beliefs, civil, and political identities. Such an approach would also address one of the reasons individuals become radicalized. For example, some people turn to extremism when they feel that they lack a voice. Restorative justice through reintegration gives communities and radicalized youth a process towards truth and understanding that there are other methods to self-advocacy besides violence (Hamid & Pretus, 2019). This path is not available within deradicalization programming which places its focus on changing a terrorist’s internal ideology. Contrastingly, reintegration
provides space for restorative justice to focus on broader healing as extremists and community members reconstruct social bonds.

Structuring a path for extremists back to their home communities is not without difficulty. The process is especially laborious in Southeast Asian countries that have experienced attacks by radicalized individuals within their borders as well as records of ethnic and religious unrest (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). However, with reintegration there can be positive development within communities to accept those active in the reintegration process, preventing rejection of the returning extremist that could spark subsequent re-radicalization (Veldhuis, 2012). While applying restorative justice outside of lower-level criminal offenses is challenging because of possible threats to security or scope of violence, its role in reintegration represents a paramount facet of social inclusion and community restoration.

2.5 Measuring Success

Reception and Commitment

Reintegration is not valued equally across the world, which is evidenced by the program design, resource allocation, and legal framework present in different states. Malaysia and Indonesia serve as examples of countries that highly value approaches to engage former extremists. They institute diverse programming, gain frequent international recognition of their counterterrorism approaches, and invest in collaboration (Koehler, 2017; Holmer & Shtuni, 2017; Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). Malaysia’s former Special Branch director, Datuk Seri

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6 Certain individuals took up their own form of justice at a community level through relationships between families of victims and perpetrators. An example of this personal reconciliation occurred after the 2002 Bali bombings when a unique but positive relationship developed in Indonesia between a widow of a bombing victim and a former bombmaker whose brother actively participated in the attacks (Gelineau, 2019).
Muhammad Fuzi Harun, self-reported a 95% success rate in its deradicalization programming citing only 13 of 240 cases of reoffense, although the lack of major terrorist attacks in the country could also serve as an objective measure of success (Koehler, 2017). The country’s approach includes four objectives: to correct misconstrued Islamic teachings, to identify a detainee’s understanding of Islam, teach awareness of the responsibility of Malaysian citizens, and explain to the detainee that their actions are counter to Islam (Guratna & Sabariah, 2019; Nemr et al, 2018). Indonesia also utilizes a religious counseling approach but provides this service to detainees’ families to create a common understanding of religion in support of detainees’ release which illustrates a model much closer to reintegration (Guratna & Sabariah, 2019). Also, in the last ten years new programming launched that seeks to integrate voices from plural Islamic religious groups, victims of terrorist violence, and universities into the states’ approaches to counter violent extremism (Nemr et al, 2018). Thus, Malaysia and Indonesia represent two states in a key region to the conversation of transnational terrorism that actively seek to counter violent extremism through post-extremist programming.

The approaches utilized by Indonesia and Malaysia contrast with a commonplace philosophy of how extremists are treated in Western countries. In the United Kingdom and France, for example, deprivation of citizenship and punishment of those found guilty of extremism are more common while holistic approaches are scarcer (Mantu, 2018). Furthermore, while Indonesia and Malaysia continue to emphasize and support their deradicalization programming, some of their allies do less. Australia’s programs are criticized as ineffective, the United States has lengthened prison sentences for terrorists and in 2017 France closed its only center for deradicalization of Islamic extremists (Suratman, 2017). Researchers such as Kern (2017) and McAuley (2017) question whether the program failed because of poor execution or
poor prisoner participation. One author raised concerns that so-called deradicalization programs cannot work in the West because the directed target of Jihadist movements is often Western populations (Spencer, 2017). Nevertheless, different parts of the world are tackling counterterrorism in a variety of ways. Indonesia and Malaysia choose to build programs of deradicalization to a greater extent than Western states. Therefore, deeper evaluation of their programs against the process and efficiency of reintegration presents an important study of counterterrorism measures with global implications.

**Tools of Measurement**

An issue that arises alongside this discussion is how to determine and accurately measure the success of reintegration programming. Currently, recidivism rates serve as the primary metric of success for reintegration programs (Mullins, 2010). While recidivism rates can represent an important and useful measure of program success by representing how often those passing through a program experience rearrests, reconviction or reincarceration, accurate data collection is challenging and incomplete (Berghuis, 2018). For example, recidivism rates can exclude extremists reoffending without persecution and individuals who commit criminal offenses outside of terrorist activities. More importantly, recidivism does not measure deradicalization. Recidivism is limited as a quantitative measurement of reintegration that cannot capture the qualitative nature of psychological, economic, or social change undergone by a reintegrated extremist. Additional measurements of active participation in civil society, education, and employment would serve as an effective supplement to recidivism rates to determine the efficacy of reintegration programming (Veldhuis 2012).
However, recidivism is the main metric of success present in the study of reintegration. Therefore, any research on the efficacy of reintegration must incorporate other metrics, especially measures from community groups, to understand over- and underestimating produced by state reported recidivism alone. But the limitations of assessing and understanding recidivism suggest how challenging it is to produce complete measures of success around counterterrorism. This discussion also highlights that the shortcomings of post-extremism programs and success measurements, which lack depth and complete evaluation, must be acknowledged by states to push the field forward in constructing more effective metrics of successful reintegration.

Conclusion

Reintegration programming can play an important role in a country’s counterterrorism operations as it facilitates the transition of radicalized individuals away from terrorist activities and prevents the spread of or a return to extremist ideology and behavior. Reintegration is facilitated in part by psychological, social, and economic factors and thus successful programming needs adequate resources and thoughtful design to address these areas while being cognizant of the individual needs of those in the program.

Due to inconsistencies in definitions and a lack of proven methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of reintegration programming, researchers and states are challenged to make substantial claims about which programs are most successful and why. However, a comparative case study of the Malaysian and Indonesian reintegration programs is a step in the right direction. Analyzing the features of these two countries’ programs gives insight into key factors facilitating reintegration in each country and exposes areas that can be improved domestically and regionally. Additionally, while domestic social structures will still need to be considered, the
evaluation produced by comparing Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration approaches can exemplify why similar reintegration programs should be modeled in Western countries as well to replace current ineffective hard approaches taken by some nations.7

7 Western countries often use citizenship revocation as a deterrent/punishment. This approach does not stop all individuals wishing to return and may push some towards re-radicalization or committing attacks in their home country. Other hard approaches include the U.S. increasing prison sentences for terrorism or attempting to curb radicalization by banning Muslims from entry. Recently, France followed the hard approach trend in Western countries by closing its deradicalization program (Benton & Banulescu, 2019; Suratman, 2017).
Chapter 3: The State and Reintegration

*The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people*

British General Sir Gerard Templer, 1952

Introduction

Indonesia and Malaysia’s reintegration programs develop against an ever-evolving landscape of terrorism that creates various pressures on the countries to constantly rework approaches to counter-extremism and security. The challenges of these dynamic threats influence shifts in domestic politics, regional cooperation, and international partnerships. For example, the developmental trajectory of ISIS, the growing use of social media, and the most recent wave of returning FTFs from Syria to Indonesia and Malaysia pressured the states to reconceptualize their counterterrorism policies. Such adaptations are not limited to military strategy, rather they encompass more diverse efforts to prevent violent extremism like reintegration. Analyzing the progression of terrorism alongside its implications for domestic and international policy provides a crucial context in which to evaluate counterterrorism policy. Specifically, this chapter will give an abridged history of extremism and counterterrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia since the start of the 20th century alongside an exploration of the role reintegration programming plays in countering violent extremism.

The chapter begins by separately dissecting the last several decades of Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s counterterrorism history into eras framed by cornerstone policies or laws.

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8 General Templer was quoted by Sergio Miller in a study on the psychological aspects of the war waged during the Malayan Emergency (Friedman, 2006).
Subsequently, trends in terrorism, as well as the general regional or international responses, will be analyzed for each era. I specifically include changes in counterterrorism programming, variations in extremist demographics, government turnover, and interaction with NGO and community groups over the eras. As the formulation of these eras is central to understanding the development of reintegration approaches in each country, I argue that this history illustrates how different catalysts produce various levels of state commitment to a reintegration approach. Additionally, utilizing this era system I will touch on how colonization impacted future state responses to extremism. Lastly, the chapter concludes by identifying the current state reintegration programming in the counterterrorism landscape of both Indonesia and Malaysia.

3.1 Indonesia

Era 1: Reintegration Under Suharto

The first era I will discuss encapsulates a period of Suharto’s rule over Indonesia, which began in the 1960s and ended with his resignation in 1998. Suharto’s presidency is defined by authoritarianism, censorship, oppression of political opponents, and disregard for civil liberties (McLeod, 2000). The strong-handed military successfully suppressed extremist movements in Indonesia and groups such as Darul Islam were forced to exist underground (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Sumpter, 2018). The political suppression of Indonesian terrorist networks was in part a result of Suharto’s New Order policy in 1982 and 1983. The policy forced Islamic organizations to adopt a single Pancasila ideology. This policy created friction with

9 Pancasila serves as the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. The Sanskrit word translates to five principles: belief in only one God, a just and civilized humanity, Indonesian unity, interaction between representatives producing inner wisdom to guide democracy, and social justice for all Indonesians (Department of Information, 1996). Suharto used Pancasila to punish those who disagreed with him and accusations of being anti-Pancasila could result in loss of employment and imprisonment (Coca, 2018).
fundamentalist and extremist Islamic groups by attempting to secularize the country and forbid political parties to be based on religion (Crossette, 1985). The ideology limited the politically permissive extremist interpretations of Islam for some Islamic organization as the government applied a blanket suppression of most political opposition movements.

Therefore, unable to flourish on a large scale in Indonesia, many extremists went underground or fled elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia to train. A prominent example includes how Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, founders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), leveraged al-Qaeda connections for resources and training in Afghanistan before the terrorist organization was forced to move to the Philippines in the early 1990s (USINDO, 2011). JI extremists who had traveled between Indonesia and South Asia or the Middle East and those who continued to travel between Indonesia and the Philippines illustrate an earlier wave of FTFs in the region. These FTFs would likely have benefitted from opportunities for reintegration but faced mostly indefinite incarceration following persecution causing a history of rippling radicalization and allegiances to international terrorist networks in the region.

Although impactful by countering extremist movements with state repression and incarceration, Suharto’s tactics came with significant costs. For one, his strong-arm military approach was indiscriminate. The government targeted any opposition, regardless of whether they intended violent extremism or advocated for the expansion of civil liberties. The Indonesian government detained, tortured, and even killed pro-independence activists in East Timor and murdered students at the Trisakti University protest in 1998, triggering further deadly riots (Aschenbach, 1992; Yulisman, 2018). Beyond horrendous stories of human rights abuses, the negative impacts of the brutal counterterrorism approach lasted beyond Suharto’s seven-term rule. After his resignation in 1998, extremists from Indonesia were attracted back to their home
country by instability surrounding democratization and proliferated into a variety of militant
groups from earlier terrorist networks. No longer oppressed by Suharto, jihadists emboldened by
Al Qaeda’s prominence and years of pent-up aggression towards the state, unleashed organized
violent extremism on Indonesia (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Sumpter, 2018).

Thus, the period surrounding Suharto’s rule can be analyzed as a distinct time in
Indonesia’s counterterrorism history. The era demonstrates the results of a repressive, military-
driven, and authoritarian approach to suppressing extremism as well as coinciding collateral
damage to human rights and freedoms. At the same time, the government used no notable
programs to holistically integrate former extremists into society. The lack of such programming
or facilitation further illustrates that Suharto’s hardline military approach to counterterrorism was
not robust. Examining this era demonstrates that such a limited approach to countering violent
extremism is not effective, contained no official level of reintegration efforts, and drastically
crippled Indonesia’s long-term domestic security.

Era 2: Reintegration Following Suharto and During Democratization

The second era of Indonesian counterterrorism begins with Suharto’s resignation in 1998
and ends in 2009 following major shifts in terrorist activity in Indonesia. This period marks
Indonesia’s initial steps in democratization. While Suharto’s successor B.J. Habibie pushed
Indonesia toward democracy, the country was plagued by ethnic violence, restriction of
movement, and human rights violations, all of which were problems produced and fertilized
from the Suharto era (Coppel, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Furthermore, Indonesia also
faced the security threat of returning extremists shut out by Suharto. In 1999, these individuals
and networks infused violence and extremism into ongoing conflicts in the Maluku Islands,
which spread to Sulawesi, exacerbating an already volatile situation\textsuperscript{10} (Sumpter, 2018). In 2000, the terrorist group JI launched its first major attack, bombing 28 churches in Jakarta and the islands of Sumatra and Java. The devastating operation, led by Hambali, JI’s military leader affiliated with Al-Qaeda, killed 19 people and injured over 120 (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).

The devastating attack serves as an example of the transition and turmoil marking the period between Suharto’s resignation and the Bali Bombings. Indonesia struggled to find its footing in democracy as those repressed and harmed by authoritarian rule struggled and fought to be a part of the restructuring of Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesia faced economic challenges, protests, government corruption, ethnic violence. For approximately the first time in three decades, the country experienced violent extremism at the hands of JI members and extremists returning from the Philippines and Afghanistan. Challenges such as the rise of extremist factions, mass atrocities, and humanitarian emergencies are common dangers to a democratizing state. Indonesia faced all of these problems (Baker, 2011). Furthermore, the rise of extremists was empowered by the loosening grip of previous military suppression under authoritarian rule. The built-up pressure released when extremists and violent opposition to the state could more openly express desires for political power in Indonesia. The period serves as an example of challenges married to democratization and is an illustration of how military suppression of terrorism can eventually backfire. While the 2000 JI church bombings mark the country’s first major attack,

\textsuperscript{10} Laskar Jihad is an extremist Islamic group that operated in Maluku, Indonesia starting in 2000 and received support from the military during local ethnic tensions between Christians and Muslims. The group attacked Christians and burnt down churches in Maluku, Sulawesi, and eventually as far as Papua and Aceh. President Abdurrahman Wahid declared martial law to curb the violence, but many claim the military and police allowed violence to occur. By the end of the conflict, 9,000 people died, and hundreds of thousands lost their homes (Schulze, 2002).
the 2002 Bali Bombings launched violent extremism into the forefront of Indonesian security policy.

On 12 October 2002, JI terrorists bombed the Sari Club and Paddy’s, two popular nightclubs on the island of Bali, killing over 200 people. The devastating nature of an attack on the country’s largest tourist area and the severity of the death toll elicited a strong reaction from Indonesia. The state was forced to recognize that a counterterrorism strategy was an urgent priority (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019). Terrorist attacks continued to escalate after 2002 and the theme of bombing civilian targets became commonplace. In August 2003, a car bomb outside a Marriott hotel in Jakarta killed 12 people and wounded 150 others (Bradsher, 2003). The police and state officials attributed the attack to JI. Thus, President Megawati Sukarnoputri issued the Anti-Terrorism Law which passed in 2003, providing the government with more power to investigate and convict terrorists (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).

Looking at the major terrorist attacks Indonesia faced in the first decade of the 2000s11, two themes emerge. First, each attack involved utilizing the large-scale tactic of bombing and the targets were almost always highly populated civilian areas like hotels12. The change in tactic illustrates a shift towards unprovoked targeting of civilian and foreign tourist populations rather than extremist violence remaining largely responsive to ethnic tensions across Indonesia. Second, the government suspected JI was behind almost every attack which contributed to speculations that some of the prominent extremist networks were strengthening in Indonesia.

11 In Fall 2004, a bomb outside the Australian embassy killed 10 people ahead of elections in Indonesia and Australia (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Bali suffered more tragedy in 2005 when 20 people died and 100 were injured by suicide bombers at a Four Seasons hotel and a shopping square (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Finally, in July 2009 two hotels in Jakarta’s business district were attacked by suicide bombers, killing 8 people (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). All attacks were attributed to JI and the state’s response marked the beginning of a new era in Indonesian extremism and government antiterrorism policy.

12 Except for the embassy bombing which was not as traditional of a civilian hotspot.
(Vaughn et al., 2005; Owen, 2017). The Indonesian government responded to these key shifts by establishing organizations to combat the rising extremism. After the 2002 Bali bombings, a special anti-terror unit of the police force called Densus 88 was formed in 2003 to pursue suspected terrorists (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019). While the creation of Densus 88 was a successful and a strong initial step to combating terrorism, continued attacks forced the government to further refine its approach. A major positive step occurred with the formation of The National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) in 2009 after the Jakarta hotel bombings. The BNPT represents the first time that police, intelligence services, and military combined for a more coordinated and stronger national counterterrorism strategy. Thus, the era exemplifies low-level efforts towards reaching effective reintegration programming. In this way, it also serves as the end of the second era of Indonesian counter extremism.

Era 3: The BNPT and Reintegration

Established by a 2010 addendum to the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law, the BNPT reports to the president and coordinates all the state’s counterterrorism units including Densus 88, the National Intelligence Agency, the Anti-Terrorism Desk, and the military (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Beyond this integrational agenda, BNPT also implemented reintegration style programming in Indonesia that reflected an official endorsement of crucial anti-extremism strategies. As the government agency in charge of post-extremism programming, BNPT’s allocation of any resources towards the initiative illustrates a major landmark in Indonesian counterterrorism history.

BNPT’s more specific roles involve formulating policies, strategies, and programs, analyzing and evaluating counterterrorism, preventing/fighting radical propaganda, and
coordinating implementation of deradicalization. Part of the BNPT’s deradicalization approach involved developing trust between detainees and officers through incentives like skill training, financial support, and more contact with the prisoner’s family. In one case, the police even paid a detainee’s wife’s hospital bills when she gave birth (Istiqomah, 2011). Furthermore, BNPT utilized former terrorists to play a major role in their attempts to convince extremists to leave radicalism. However, the initial programming overseen by BNPT was hindered by a lack of coordination between agencies, poor training and support for prison guards, and an allocated reintegration budget (Istiqomah, 2011). Now, adequate funding must be pulled from other budgets and departments as BNPT continues to face these obstacles to consistent enforcement and effective resourcing. Problems within the execution of initiatives also arose as the BNPT and police coordinated strongly to reach detainees during the pre-trial process, yet once extremists reach prison the effort is less coordinated and less supported centrally per detention center. Despite these challenges, a 2017 BNPT report claims that at least 1,000 ex-terrorists were successfully “deradicalized” over the previous 3 years (Rohmah, 2017).

Indonesia backed up its efforts of internal support to extremists facing reintegration by increasing its participation in regional and international counterterrorism as well. In 2012, Indonesia ratified the ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism which mandated cooperation on terrorism prevention, law enforcement, information sharing, and terrorist rehabilitation (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Internationally, Indonesia co-sponsored U.N. Security Resolution 2178, a resolution to prevent radicalization and restrict movement of FTFs. At Barack Obama’s Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism in September 2015, vice president Jusul

13 While BNPT sourced former terrorists and extremists to persuade others in the program out of their radical ideology, religious reeducation was not as much a key component of the process as in similar Malaysian efforts.
Kalla stressed improvement of social welfare and rehabilitation as a crucial strategy in fighting extremism. (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Despite the state’s aim to deradicalize and rehabilitate identified extremists and those incarcerated for terrorist activity around the country, initiatives only tactically employed medium level reintegration. Indonesia in this era was growing its counterterrorism agenda to include reintegration strategies a part of post-extremism programming.

Furthermore, the change in policy approach illustrated by forming the BNPT and the new era of counterterrorism was met with even greater challenges. While most major attacks between 2000 and 2010 appeared to be conducted by the Al-Qaeda aligned JI, the group splintered and expanded in 2014 when its former leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, gave allegiance to ISIS (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Similarly, in Southeast Asia broadly, ISIS’s rise divided and energized the transnational jihad movements throughout the region (Sumpter, 2019).

**Era 4: Modern Reintegration: Laws, Policy, and Media**

The fourth and final era in Indonesian extremism and counter-extremism begins around 2016 with the government’s use of online platforms to combat radicalization and continues to December 2019. Consistent with previous eras, the period is marked by changing radical activity. ISIS and pro-ISIS extremists continue to terrorize Indonesia. For example, ISIS-linked violent activity included attacking a shopping district in 2016, killing a two-year-old child outside a church in Borneo, suicide bombing a bus station in May 2017, a prison riot in 2018 involving 156 inmates, and numerous other attacks and thwarted bombings (Schulze, 2018). A new dimension, however, includes the involvement of women, children, and whole families in attacks. On 13 May 2018, a family of six bombed three churches in Surabaya, East Java, killing
twelve people. This attack marks the first attack by a female suicide bomber in Indonesian history (Schulze, 2018). The next day, a family of five riding two motorcycles bombed a police station in Surabaya, East Java with only the eight-year-old daughter surviving (Schulze, 2018).

These events mark an unfortunate and important turn in Indonesian extremism, creating a new obstacle for the BNPT, and society as a whole. With more women and even whole families participating in jihadi movements, the potential population of violent extremists who engage in terrorist activity expanded to groups that may be harder to identify. The immense challenge for states to see into and understand families as terrorist units is compounded by extremists' use of social media in spreading their propaganda, especially to Muslim youth (Suarda, 2016). As access to direct messaging applications such as Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp is extremely prevalent across Indonesia, authorities face a variety of complications to keep track of all flagged individuals and their associates over the internet. Additionally, identifying and monitoring those individuals planning attacks or deemed radical is ethically dubious though it may help determine how and when messages on social media platforms pose a significant threat to domestic security. Despite the complications, since 2016 Indonesia continues to attempt to silence radical activity on social media. For example, the government blocked websites with extremist material and sent messages to social media platforms requesting the removal of jihadi propaganda. The state also blocked Telegram, an encrypted messaging service frequently used by radicals to plan attacks, completely (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).

The measures taken by Indonesia to combat the changing environment of terrorism are controversial and raise questions of whether the country is overstepping rights in pursuit of security. Banning messages that are arbitrarily declared radical risks suppressing freedom of speech. Additionally, these decisions can even backfire and give jihadists oppressive narratives
about the government to use in recruitment. With the threat of terrorists utilizing new technology and more insidious methods of threatening public security, emphasizing strictly punitive counterterrorism measures is an ineffective approach.

High recidivism rates remain a problem for Indonesia in recent years. According to research conducted by the Brookings Institute, the recidivism rate in Indonesia is at least 15% (Ismail & Sim, 2016). To its credit, authorities, primarily the BNPT, are attempting to bolster programming, for example, by supporting families of incarcerated jihadists. On the other hand, over the last several years, many harsh laws concerning the detention of terrorists and free speech have also been proposed (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019, Counter Extremism Project 2019; USINDO 2011). The laws passed by Indonesia may add more challenges to a currently challenged reintegration program. Calls for a stronger risk assessment technique of high-risk detainees and better coordination between the BNPT and other agencies are proposed solutions to Indonesia’s recidivism problem (Counter Extremism Project 2019; Suarda, 2016; Sumpter 2019).

Indonesia also developed other methods of tackling extremism in recent years that are more sustainable and holistic and consistent with medium-high levels of reintegration. In 2018, President Widodo supported a new policy to prevent the radicalization of children (Suzuki, 2018). The BNPT partnered with the Wahid Foundation to implement reintegration programs and developed relationships with several NGOs to facilitate the return of former extremists to their communities (Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019; Sumpter 2018). Relationships between government and community organizations are crucial in Indonesia’s reintegration efforts. The state can empower community-based groups to generate more resources, procedures, and possibilities for sustained long term support for individuals undergoing reintegration. For
example, with reintegrated individuals spread throughout Indonesia, it is easier for local organizations to maintain contact with and support former extremists in their community. NGO and civil organization involvement will be explored further in Chapter 4. Other progressive steps by Indonesian authorities encompass countering extremist propaganda with messages of peaceful perspectives of Islam and the development of economic support for former extremists.

Overall, Indonesia’s modern-day counterterrorism adaptations to changing extremism are marked by both hard and soft approaches of incarceration paired with reintegrative programming, community cooperation, and an emphasis on combating radical ideology. Thus, Indonesia has presented a positive growth model towards achieving reintegration and offering the most promise for sustained success (see Fig. 3.1).

![Fig 3.1: Visualization of Indonesia’s evolution concerning reintegration](image)

### 3.2 Malaysia

*Era 1: Reintegration during The Emergency*

The first era of Malaysian counterterrorism began with the Malayan emergency which occurred from 1948 to 1960. This conflict resulted from attempts of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) to overthrow British colonial rule. The British defeated the communist insurgents
and negotiated Malaysia’s independence in 1957 (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Despite serving as more of a nuisance than a serious threat with occasional violent raids, the CPM leader Chin Peng continued to fight, not for independence, but for the spread of communism within Malaysia (Bakar, 2019). Thus, as an independent state, Malaysia was born combating extremism, as depleted CPM forces continued to present resistance to the State until a peace agreement was reached between CPM and the Malaysian government in 1989.

During the decades after independence, Malaysia took several steps to fight such extremism. The Internal Security Act (ISA), which would serve as a weapon against political dissent for years to come, denied CPM the opportunity to spread their propaganda. Malaysia strengthened its military and developed ASEAN alliances to further bolstering military strength (Nathan, 1990). After the peace accords, CPM members sought battle in politics as some members were reintegrated under the peace accords, such as Chin Peng himself. Although allowing CPM members a place in Malaysia and nonviolent avenues for self-advocacy, this early reintegration created frustration as many ethnic minorities in Malaysian still struggled to gain citizenship (Nathan, 1990). Malaysia’s brushes with terrorism did not end there, however, as several extremist groups also began operating in Malaysia before the late 1990s (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Among the groups were Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), JI, the Philippines’ Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

In contrast to Indonesia, reintegration played a role from the outset of statehood, and even before in the early years of the Malayan Emergency. British forces implemented programs of rehabilitation fitted to the context of this era. These programs aimed to control and engage the population of captured communists to divulge information and turn on their comrades. The state offered captured combatants rewards, negating the economic incentives that recruited them to the
communist cause in the first place. Some detainees were recruited into British platoons and even hours after capture fought against their previous comrades, perhaps because this approach broke the social and personal bonds extremists held to the communist party, they no longer felt any ties to the group (Khor, 2013).

The Surrender for Rewards Program provided detainees with money to start a life away from communism, which provided a strong counterterrorist measure as did the Taiping Rehabilitation Camp which was founded for the rehabilitation of non-insurgents in 1949. This camp in particular was meant to offset harsher treatment of the Chinese in Malayan, an important effort to address the social aspects of reintegration (Khor, 2013). The overwhelming success of this initial deradicalization strategy eventually broke morale and reduced the numbers of the communist combatants around 1990 (Khor, 2013). These concepts developed an early foundation for the continuous implementation of reintegration style programming as a crucial tenant of Malaysian counterterrorism as holistic and long-term approaches to security threats would remain constant (Khor, 2013). Thus, during its fight for independence and in its infancy as a state, Malaysia demonstrated a medium-high level of commitment to reintegration.

Finally, while the period of colonization and fighting for independence is outside the scope of this thesis for Indonesia, there is an interesting variance between the two states as the development of initial counterterrorism strategies were both heavily influenced by colonization. The Dutch did not implement reintegration to the degree executed by the British. Where the British recognized the political roots of the Emergency and were able to combine military efforts with efforts to improve the socioeconomic status of the Malayan Chinese, the Dutch responded to extremism with military might and suppression of nationalist movements. The Indonesian fight for independence was marked by guerilla warfare and excessive violence by Dutch forces
in responses often involving unprosecuted war crimes (Luttikhuis & Moses, 2012). This theme of aggression and violence does appear to parallel Suharto’s rule in Indonesia, which was similarly marked by force rather than holistic approaches like reintegration.

Looking at both Indonesia and Malaysia, it appears that colonization and the battle for independence had lasting effects on counterterrorism approaches. Great Britain maintained a liberal type of colonial rule, keeping a good record of rule of law civil liberties, political participation, economic opportunity, and willingness to encourage independence. Furthermore, the British’s use of a deradicalization strategy to combat the communists during the Malayan Emergency exhibited the value of a varied and reintegrationist counter to violent extremism. Subsequently, a similar approach would be adopted into the Malaysian counterterrorism agenda even as soon as CPM leaders surrendered. Yet, Indonesia experienced an opposite approach as the Dutch enforced a repressive type of colonial government and preferred military force in the battle to maintain control of the islands. These tactics continued into Suharto’s rule where extremist factions were put down by force with no plan for their reintegration. Thus, the early role of reintegration in Malaysia but not Indonesian history may have played a significant part in both countries’ early counterterrorism strategies.

_Era 2: 9/11 & the Internal Security Act_

The second era of Malaysian terrorism begins in January 2000 when Al Qaeda operatives met in Kuala Lumpur for training. The eventual perpetrators of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center attended this training (Sumpter, 2019). The next year, KMM extremists, many of whom had trained in Afghanistan, set fire to a church and Christian Community Center in Sungai Petani, Malaysia. Christians were the target of KMM activities as the group sought to
develop Malaysia into an Islamic state (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). After the 9/11 attacks on New York, Malaysia cracked down on the extremist groups KMM and JI. In 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs founded the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCC) to bolster domestic security and relationships with its allies, (Samuel, 2016). The SEARCC involves countries outside of Southeast Asia, including Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, the U.K., and the U.S. and was designed to enhance counterterrorism enforcement through collaboration with think tanks and international organizations like the U.N. In 2007, Malaysian authorities arrested 19 KMM and 68 JI leaders under rule of the ISA, a controversial 1957 law permitting arrest and detention of individuals without trial or criminal charges. The arrests caused serious damage to both the networks of KMM and JI in Malaysia.

Malaysia also took to other approaches in the battle against new extremist threats. In 2001, Malaysia passed the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001 (AMLATFA) to investigate illegal funding of extremism (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). This act requires institutions to report any suspicious transactions to a financial intelligence unit that can investigate and if necessary, prosecute those funding extremist activities and the extremists themselves (Hamidi, 2016). Capturing financiers also increases the number of individuals that can be reintegrated, further thwarting more covert members of extremist networks. Overall, the passage of this act serves as another example of Malaysia’s commitment to more diverse counterterrorism strategies.

In 2005, the Royal Malaysian Police launched a program aimed at correcting misinterpretations of Islamic discourse and ideology in efforts to deradicalize extremists. Such efforts came from observations that punitive approaches such as imprisonment without trial under the ISA, police abuse, or inhumane treatment were promoting radicalization and revenge,
an unintentional consequence of their counterterrorism approach (Guay, 2018). Ahmad El-Muhammady, a rehabilitation officer for the Malaysian government, describes that the program involves relationships with constant communication between detainees and officers as he tries to rewrite their mental narratives. Despite these efforts, more financial support was needed for the program to allow former extremists their economic independence from extremist networks (Guay, 2018). While in the spirit of reintegration, this early programming still placed greater emphasis on the ideology of an extremist, perhaps limiting its effectiveness. Nevertheless, Malaysia claimed a 95% success rate of its program for extremists arrested between 2001 and 2011 (Ismail, 2016). Some discussion around the validity of this statistic is present in the field, but Malaysia continued its progress towards the effective use of reintegration programming through the early 2000s. From the 9/11 attacks to repeal of the ISA, Malaysia demonstrated a low to a medium level commitment to reintegration as the state focused more on establishing collaborative networks and laws to criminalize existing extremist financing activity.

_Era 3: Modern Reintegration: Laws, Policy, and Media_

The repeal of the Internal Security Act in 2012 delineates what I consider the end of the second and beginning of the third era in Malaysia. This period involves passing new counter-extremism legislation and expanding roles in both regional and international efforts to combat ISIS. Regarding cooperation, in October 2015, Malaysia was selected by the United States as a regional center to counter online propaganda by ISIS and in the same year joined a United States Global coalition against ISIS (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). In 2016, Malaysia adopted a handful of UN resolutions, key among them a resolution to combat the threat of returning FTFs.
Then, in 2017, the country negotiated plans with Indonesia and the Philippines to run joint naval patrols (Counter Extremism Project 2019; Sumpter, 2019).

Internally, the 2015 passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) allowed authorities to detain those suspected of being terrorists for up to two years and restrict their internet access among other things. Malaysia also launched the National Security Council Act and started the National Special Operations Force to strengthen response and prevention of terrorism (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). The National Security Council established by the act held authority to designate an area as a “national security area”, which was subjected to martial law, permitting search and arrest of persons and searching of homes without a warrant. These policies presenting a largely similar style of general oppression under a claim of national security to that under the ISA. Meanwhile, the National Special Operations Force is Malaysia’s first multi-agency counter-extremism force, made up of officers from the Malaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysian Police, and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).

While these hardened measures were implemented, the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs Ahmad Zahid Hamidi emphasized his country’s commitment to reintegration to the UN in 2016 (Hamidi, 2016). Hamidi also hosted a special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism to share ideas and policies regarding reintegration (Sumpter, 2019). A new initiative was added just last year to Malaysia’s reintegration programming when authorities made an offer for 102 Malaysians to return from joining ISIS. Pending certain qualifications, such as security checks, investigations, psychological exams, and counseling to determine an individual's level of radicalization. The extremists could be reintegrated following a month-long program with the potential for no prison time if they did not
participate in militant or criminal activities. Malaysians who were involved must face trial, which was a major development in human rights from the inconsistent trials and lack of proceedings under the ISA. Importantly, women and children are handled on a case-by-case basis, suggesting that adaptations to programming for newer terror threats are underdeveloped (Counter Extremism Project 2019; Sumpter, 2019).

Malaysia, like Indonesia, also adapted a counterterrorism program toward the digitalization of terrorism. A prime example is the establishment of the Counter Messaging Center, which uses social media to monitor extremist propaganda (Hamidi, 2016). Additionally, the Department of Islamic Development of Malaysia constantly monitors social media to detect terrorist activity or what the government considers false information about Islam. Subsequently, the department then has authority to stop that spread of information (Hamidi, 2016). Malaysian law reflects these efforts, as it punishes any “promotion, solicitation, or propagation of extremism using any media constituents” (Hamidi, 2016). Similar to the scenario in Indonesia, shutting down social media or punishing a user more severely highlights a discussion around state-imposed censorship. Despite Malaysia’s increase in policies to strengthen suppression of extremism, the country’s commitment both regionally and internationally to reintegration and inclusion of various psychological and economic factors ranks as medium-high as there are a variety of inconsistencies with its more hardline approaches. Thus, Malaysia presents a comparatively strong but stagnant relationship to reintegration over time compared to Indonesia, suggesting that there must be intentional initiatives taken from now on by the state to move the program along (see Fig. 3.2).
Fig 3.2: Visualization of Malaysia’s evolution concerning reintegration

**Conclusion**

Beginning fundamentally with their respective fights for independence against Dutch and British colonial forces, Indonesia and Malaysia navigated distinctive paths toward their current counter-extremism agendas. Malaysia was born with a sense of the power that reintegration held to win against extremism. However, Indonesia’s violent struggle with the Dutch colonial forces led to a more authoritarian approach to counterinsurgencies marked by generalized suppression of extremism. Despite their different foundations, both countries eventually ended up as leaders of the reintegration movement at regional and international levels. The states equipped themselves with increasingly robust laws and policies paralleling the global efforts to counter violent extremism following 9/11. As Muslim majority countries facing unique threats of transnational terrorism, Indonesia and Malaysia have been forced to work through a variety of approaches faster than other nations. Differences do exist, however. For example, Indonesia expanded its programming beyond ideological change and Malaysia continues to emphasize changing perceptions of Islam and the funding of terrorist activities. Finally, despite increasing their legislation to grant more police and military authority plus set tighter control on social
media, both countries maintain strong deradicalization programs which ultimately limits the efficacy of their programming.

Overall, Indonesia and Malaysia interacted with various factors that facilitate successful reintegration over their experience with constructing counterterrorism methodology. Still, commitment to a deradicalization-based approach, impacts of early colonialism, and regional commitments limit their programs’ potential to affect change on an individual and collective scale. Both states possess important reintegration tactics in their approaches to deradicalize extremists that resulted from histories of colonialism, terrorism, and governmental change. Thus, Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s evolution to their current reintegration programming underscores that the two states are still strengthening much of their approach and may require more deliberate reform to best utilize the factors that facilitate reintegration.
Chapter 4: An Evaluation of Reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia

We spend all this time working with them, but if they go back to where they came from, radicalism can enter their hearts very quickly, (...) It makes me worried

Senior Social Worker Sri Musfiah, 2019

Introduction

Indonesia and Malaysia continue to demonstrate their commitment to reintegration as a counterterrorism strategy over time. However, whether their efforts are effective and relevant today must be assessed to evaluate how these approaches can be utilized beyond the two states. Though these questions are difficult to answer, demonstrating efficacy, or lack thereof, will directly impact national security and international counter-extremism approaches. As previously described, recidivism rates are currently the standard of assessment. Nevertheless, recidivism rates are not always available and often fall short of capturing the whole picture of successful reintegration. Thus, to better comprehend the success of a program, there needs to be an assessment of whether key factors facilitating reintegration are being addressed, reintegrated individuals play an active role in society, and countries are adapting programs to changing radicalization landscapes. This chapter will define evaluation criteria based on the factors that facilitate reintegration identified in chapter 2 and subsequently use those criteria to assess the reintegration programming in Malaysia and Indonesia.

To start, I will describe the factors that facilitate an extremist’s reintegration into society. Next, using these factors I will develop specific criteria for the evaluation of all state-level

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14 As a senior social worker, Sri Musfiah engages with radicalized children in Indonesia to deradicalize and reintegrate them (Beech and Suhartono, 2019).
reintegration programming in Indonesia and Malaysia emphasizing programs that do or do not address the current threats of extremism. The evaluation criteria will then be applied to modern Malaysian and Indonesian reintegration programs with a subsequent discussion of similarities and differences between the two states’ approaches. With consideration of current measures of success, recommendations, and directions for future improvements will be discussed.

4.1 Factors that Fuel Reintegration

The return of an extremist individual to society is a personal journey and likewise should be met with a personalized approach. Furthermore, several common factors that are essential to the success of reintegration, discussed in chapter 2, will be revisited here. The factors that will be discussed in this chapter include 1. engagement with nongovernmental actors, 2. continuity and follow up of programming, 3. economic stability, 4. inclusion of age and gender support, 5. psychological care, 6. educational opportunity, and 7. social inclusion. All seven of these factors were specifically chosen as they fit into the context of Indonesian and Malaysian society as well as the larger path towards successful reintegration. Each factor will be explored in more detail to illustrate their relevance as a measure of successful reintegration. The 7 components will then be scored on a 0-2-point scale and evaluated in reference to each state’s programming later in the chapter.

The first factor that facilitates reintegration is governmental collaboration with NGOs and civil society organizations. The capability of these nongovernmental actors to provide resources to former extremists outside of constraints on the state while fighting stigmatization and facilitating meaningful social engagement cannot be understated. Specifically, these organizations can help mediate between the state and those individuals who do not view the government positively. One example in Indonesia is the Wahid Foundation, an organization that
promotes peace and tolerance through initiatives like interfaith dialogues, education for youth, and working to improve the welfare of the poor (Wahid, 2019). A government program’s willingness to cooperate with valuable civil society organizations and NGOs is important, even though establishing boundaries may be complicated. The amount of confidential information security agencies share with NGOs and how independently organizations operate outside of government interference are important concerns.

Moreover, NGOs and similar groups are often intertwined with the communities that extremists return to. The organizations hold the resources and outreach network to make full reintegration more possible. Overall, including NGOs and civil society organizations in reintegration programming facilitates many of the other factors that contribute to successful reintegration and thus is one of the primary factors.

The second component is the continuation and follow up beyond initial programming or the release of an extremist on the path of reintegration from state care. In addition to examining the content of the various programs, we also want to consider the degree to which continuity and follow-up to the programming exists. This component is a measure of consistency in programming, intel, and the enforcement of important facets of psychological, social, and economic factors of reintegration more broadly. The longevity of the reintegration programs will illustrate how well mentorship, positive relationships, and financial support are provided to individuals during the full path of reintegration across conditions. In many cases, it is not enough to release a former extremist into society and leave them be. Instead, stable long-term relationships, access to resources, and support is necessary (Hwang, 2018; Sumpter, 2019). This continued care can help reintegrating extremists overcome obstacles as they appear and extinguish any factors that may push an individual to re-radicalize after participation with the
initial programming. For example, if a former extremist is approached by old comrades or is facing economic difficulties from a failed business venture, the state or its partners can provide support under these situations. If the worst happens and the person re-radicalizes, the state would know sooner and could work to prevent the individual from causing harm as well.

The third factor is the establishment of economic stability for extremists undergoing reintegration. If a radicalized individual faces poverty, unemployment, or a depleted sense of productivity upon release from jail or state mentorship, they are likely to turn back to extremist networks that supported them in those areas. Therefore, reintegration programs must support financial stability and achievement of gainful employment to counter the economic draw of radicalization and allow former extremists to find purpose while contributing peacefully to society at the same time.

The fourth factor is the inclusion of specialized programming for various ages and genders. This factor is growing in its prevalence to global post-extremism programming yet fits directly into the context of the current landscape of extremism in Indonesia and Malaysia. The increasing participation of women and children in terrorist attacks in Malaysia and Indonesia, as discussed in Chapter 3, creates a need for governments to consider these populations in their reintegration programs. Individuals of different gender identities may face different challenges and have different experiences within extremist networks than men (Nemr et al, 2018). Additionally, how individuals are harmed, recruited, and utilized by extremism will determine their needs as they exit extremism.

Likewise, age is another important identity that requires specific inclusion into reintegration efforts. Children are indoctrinated by extremists and hold active roles in violent extremism just as adults do, however, their recognition and reconciliation with their engagement
in terrorist activity will be different than that of an adult with full executive cognitive function (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). In brief, these two identities represent some of the individual considerations that need to be integrated directly into reintegration programming for it to effectively treat the current populations of extremists in both Indonesia and Malaysia.

The fifth factor I will discuss is psychological care. This factor encompasses several areas including an individual’s personality, mental health, formation of a new identity and sense of self, and their perceived position in society. Addressing the psychological needs of extremists to ensure their security in their identity and beliefs as well as how they identify as a part of civil society influences how much a person peacefully reintegrates. One specific component of this broad factor is the counseling/therapy granted to both extremists and their families to promote mental health and acceptance of a new stable identity.

The sixth factor I will discuss is educational opportunity. This component refers to the extent to which reintegration programming provides individuals with the ability to learn and advance by earning educational degrees, receiving job training, religious education, digital literacy, or other categories of courses. Pursuing an education initiates several positive effects on reintegration, giving former extremists a broader knowledge base from which to consider and support pluralist views that combat radicalization. Individuals with educational opportunities can also maintain greater potential for a dignified career and sustained financial security. Education may also open the door to new social relationships and self-fulfillment, connecting with several factors mentioned previously. An educational plan is particularly important where there are schools that teach ideals with paths to radicalization or schools that are affiliated with radical networks, as in Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus, access to pluralistic or non-religious education
should be made available to individuals attempting to reintegrate. Furthermore, measuring the availability of these opportunities helps in the assessment of reintegration (Vaughn et al, 2005).

Finally, the last factor that will be considered is the level of social inclusion. Social factors include creating a new social network, support mechanism, identity within the community, and redefining one’s social responsibilities. In short, an individual is more likely to be successful on their path to reintegration if they can build new and positive relationships to take the place of old relationships from extremist networks. An individual’s ability to feel their identities reflected in and accepted by their community is constructed by reintegration programs that include community dialogues, training of key actors, and opportunities for extremists to socialize openly and safely with people of different viewpoints (Hwang, 2018). This criterion is closely connected to psychological and economic aspects as well.

In brief, each of these criteria is relevant to the progression of an extremist towards successful and complete reintegration. Additionally, they each represent a component to measure the degree to which a program addresses and engages the factors that facilitate reintegration. The table below summarizes the criterion and illustrates how each component will be measured and analyzed in reference to Indonesia's and Malaysia’s programming on a 0-2 scale. By this scale, 0 represents little to no inclusion in the process, a 1 is assigned if a factor or method is utilized but in a limited way, and a 2 if successful utilization of the factor is achieved to a high degree. The ratings given to programs are based on qualitative judgments supported by relevant literature and evidence. With seven areas of assessment and a 0-2 scale applied to each, the best possible rating is a 14, and the lowest a 0.
Table 2: Criterion for Evaluation of Programming in Indonesia and Malaysia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor for evaluation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with Non-Government Actors</td>
<td>Cooperation between government and NGOs or civil society organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td>No involvement of NGOs or other organizations in State programming</td>
<td>Involvement of few organizations to a limited extent or with poor coordination</td>
<td>Strong involvement of multiple organizations in State programming with consistent coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity and Follow up</td>
<td>Quality of longitudinal tracking and support after release from prison or state program care</td>
<td></td>
<td>No support or contact after release from prison or state program care</td>
<td>Follow up is attempted but inconsistent and limited</td>
<td>Follow up includes consistent outreach and tracking of reintegrated individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stability</td>
<td>Support to find and secure a job/career plus establish financial independence</td>
<td></td>
<td>No economic support with no job training or guidance</td>
<td>The limited distribution of only: a one-time stipend, training, or other support</td>
<td>Robust long-term financial and career-building support and resources to develop financial independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Age and Gender Support</td>
<td>Extent of specialized programming and resources available to address concerns of those with different ages and gender identities</td>
<td></td>
<td>No age or gender-specific programming provided</td>
<td>Few but limited resources or opportunities for individuals of different ages or gender identities</td>
<td>Multiple and consistent resources or opportunities for individuals of different ages and gender identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Care</td>
<td>Counseling/therapy provided to both extremist and their family to facilitate the development of a new identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>No concern given to mental health or beliefs of extremists or their family</td>
<td>One or few resources available to provide counseling or therapy to extremists or their families</td>
<td>Continuous care and multiple resources available for extremists and families to address their mental health and beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Opportunity</td>
<td>Extent of access to quality education or vocational training for individuals undergoing reintegration</td>
<td></td>
<td>No programs or classes available to individuals reintegrating</td>
<td>Few opportunities for education or only courses that teach religious reeducation</td>
<td>Multiple educational opportunities that teach to occupational skills, formal knowledge, and higher-level degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Inclusion</td>
<td>Extent of community outreach to help former extremists return to a society that accepts them</td>
<td></td>
<td>No effort made to prepare community or extremist for return</td>
<td>Limited inclusion of community actors or thoughtful preparation of the community</td>
<td>Extensive and diverse efforts to prepare both the community and former extremist for return</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Evaluation of Indonesia and Malaysia

The following evaluations concern the last era of Indonesian and Malaysian post-extremist programs that are currently employed to achieve reintegration. The assignment of either a 0, 1, or 2 will be made based on evidence of the state programming and resources available to an extremist undergoing reintegration. This analysis will then contribute to the overall scoring of the state. I will provide a concluding analysis based on the total scores and discuss what those scores indicate for the programs. Frequent achievement of a two and a higher total score indicates that state programming is detailed and diverse in the factors used to facilitate reintegration. Additionally, it indicates that the state has systems in place for their programs to remain sustainable and relevant over time. Nevertheless, even with a high total score, programming may still require more depth and consistency, as these measures also need to be considered in their impact across time. Contrastingly, frequent scoring of a one or a more mid-range total score illustrates that the programming is diverse and that there are attempts to address many of the factors that facilitate reintegration. However, some factors are overlooked, and the programs fall short in terms of consistency, longevity, and coordination of these factors across state efforts to reintegrate extremists. Finally, scoring zero or a low total score indicates that many factors that facilitate reintegration are not included in state-level programming and there are likely a variety of obstacles and abuses in the current programming. With this in mind, I will evaluate both states in the same order as they appear in table 2.
Engagement with Non-Government Actors

Firstly, for engagement with non-governmental actors, Indonesia and Malaysia maintain a varied but ultimately growing degree of contact with these actors. In Indonesia, the BNPT seeks the input of NGOs for reintegration practices. The effort included welcoming an offer from an organization called Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE) to assist the Ministry of Social Affairs in raising other NGOs and social workers’ awareness of the situation around returning extremists and define best practices for their reintegration (Sumpter, 2018). The state also permitted Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), a non-governmental organization that runs deradicalization programming, to conduct interventions in prisons and provide entrepreneurial loans to former extremists (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). However, this cooperation is not uniform. While some BNPT departments welcome NGO input, other departments maintain their programming especially around religious and citizenship education (Nemr et al, 2018; Sumpter, 2019). Despite somewhat inconsistent efforts, a memorandum signed by BNPT head Suhardi Alius in 2018 declared an aim for further cooperation in counterterrorism and deradicalization with non-governmental actors, inspiring hope for increased future progress in this area (Sumpter, 2018).

In short, Indonesia is willing to engage with non-governmental actors to the extent that these actors can offer similar programming to the state or provide limited consultation in developing such programming. Furthermore, the state verbally committed to furthering relationships with NGOs and other organizations. Thus, even though there is room for improvement in consistency and cooperation, Indonesia’s current reintegration programming and commitment to involving non-governmental actors is a 2.
Contrastingly, NGO and civil society organization involvement play a more peripheral role in Malaysia’s reintegration program. Currently, more engagement with nongovernmental actors is being suggested to the state as a way to improve the welcoming of reintegrated individuals back into their community (Kamaruddin, 2017; Shahar & Abas 2018). However, the actual implementation or utilization of nongovernmental actors in Malaysia’s official programming is limited and difficult to trace. Some evidence mentions collaboration between Malaysia and NGOs or other organizations as part of a soft approach of counseling and religious reeducation, but details beyond that are neglected (Hamidi, 2016; Star Media Group, 2018). Following this trend, a 2018 report by the Global Center on Cooperative Security mentions Malaysia involved families and NGOs in implementing its reintegration program but fails to name or cite any specific organizations (Nemr et al, 2018).

Based on these findings, it does not appear that Malaysia made significant efforts to work with any specific NGOs or community groups to facilitate reintegration. Yet, the paucity of detail and information regarding the relationship or coordination between the state and such organizations make it difficult to know the actual extent of NGO and civil organization involvement. Without exact evidence of participation with non-governmental actors beyond the possible consultatory nature indicated above, Malaysia receives a 0 on involvement and engagement of non-governmental actors in reintegration programming.

Continuity and Follow Up

Similar to the first criterion, continuity and follow-up is an area Indonesia noticeably improved in the fourth era but must improve. Part of the obstacles around the successful
implementation of this factor is a lack of resources and personnel, which prevents probation services from consistently visiting and engaging with released extremists (Sumpter, 2019). This limits the ability of the state to monitor whether individuals are returning to extremist beliefs or violent behaviors, creating deficiencies in the longevity of the program and detection of possible security threats. Security agencies may not even be able to locate ex-extremists, also reflecting a lack of communication between different levels of government as well as between the government and community accepting a reintegrating individual (Sumpter, 2019). Positively, however, Indonesia attempted implementing supportive visits, including a program to purchase supplies for former extremists to start their businesses after they left state care (Sumpter, 2019). Yet participants reported a lack of follow up and coordination which was in part due to limited ability to repeatedly supply resources to individuals across a wide geographical area (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). Ultimately, it appears that the shortcomings of Indonesia’s follow up is not due to lack of effort but rather a lack of manpower and resources. Overall, Indonesia receives a 1 in the area of follow-up.

Malaysia, likewise, does not possess adequate resources to actively follow up and lacks continuity in the mentorship of their programming (Kamaruddin, 2017; Koehler, 2017). Despite limitations, Malaysia does assign case officers to released detainees in efforts to provide continuous support and ensure those reintegrating can live sustainably away from extremism (Hamidi, 2016). The idea is to foster long-term relationships between rehabilitation officers and former detainees so that help is always available if it’s needed (Guay, 2018). Although it appears Malaysia has taken steps to maintain continuity, reports citing a lack of continuity and engagement with the community depicts limited efficacy (Koehler, 2017; Nemr et al, 2018). For these reasons, Malaysia will also earn a 1 for continuity and follow up.
Economic Stability

Similar to how the states struggle to employ a consistent and efficient follow-up protocol across the country for reintegrated individuals, it can be challenging to manage economic support over time as well. Indonesia provides financial management and vocational training to extremists in detention (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Koehler, 2017). After release, Indonesia issues some small entrepreneurial loans to those individuals that complete programming and even attempts to provide supplies for reintegrating extremists starting their businesses. However, efforts to provide training and distribute loans are somewhat haphazard. For example, one recipient reported a lack of material resources, training, and planning, minimizing possible benefits of the program (Sumpter, 2018). Furthermore, support from visiting parole officers to distribute subsequent monetary support and business resources are reported to be inconsistent or unannounced (Sumpter, 2019; Tomsa, 2016). On a community level, some benefits are available after release from state care. For example, some NGOs hold economic empowerment workshops for female deportees from Syria (Sumpter, 2019). Unfortunately, overall post-release economic support appears inconsistent or nonexistent, leading to a lack of ongoing economic stability to reintegrating extremists, even if they may have received initial monetary support following detention. Thus, the efforts on a state level to ensure the economic stability of reintegrating extremists is minimally effective and earns Indonesia a 1 on the scale.

Malaysia also attempts to employ comparable resources to ensure the economic stability of individuals completing state-level reintegration. While in detention, Malaysia provides extremists with an agenda of vocational training and education on financial management (Hamidi, 2016). Upon release, individuals are provided financial assistance or a monetary stipend (Koehler, 2017). During the reintegration process, assistance in finding a job, some
training after release, and loans for small businesses also play a role in developing economic stability (Kamaruddin, 2017). Despite these efforts, some aspects of programming still fall short. Ahmad El-Muhammady, a Malaysian rehabilitation officer, claims that a lack of entrepreneurship classes, difficulty finding employers to hire reintegrated Malaysians, and blacklisting by banks are serious limitations to the program (Guay, 2018). Thus, while Malaysia, like Indonesia, takes steps to provide economic support, programs still must overcome major obstacles to supporting those reintegrating. For the reasons outlined above, Malaysia scores a 1 on economic stability.

Inclusion of Age and Gender Support

In recent years, the landscape of terrorist activity has begun to see change in the roles played by women and children. With women and even young children participating directly in violent attacks in Southeast Asia, states are challenged to consider this population in programming. Family terrorist attacks heighten the need for states to address a population of survived children, especially girls. In Indonesia a few groups, such as the Wahid Foundation and similar nongovernmental organizations, attempt to engage both populations through education and community outreach. A strong example with collaboration is between the Indonesian government and C-Save to implement treatment and reintegration for women and children (International Civil Society Action Network, 2019). Through these efforts, women can receive job training, community training, and develop relations with village leaders and employers while children are provided with counseling and education. Mothers, who are radicalized and skeptical of government intervention, are educated in matters such as the necessity of vaccinations to public health (International Civil Society Action Network, 2019).
Moreover, programs intended to reintegrate children that receive government funding include a madrasa run by a former extremist, Khairul Ghazali. Ghazali teaches children about peace in Islam while educating them up to a middle school level. Ghazali claims that although thousands of children across Indonesia are indoctrinated by extremist parents, only 100 attend official reintegration programs (Beech & Suhartono, 2019). One such government-facilitated program is held at a Jakarta safe house for children directly involved in terror attacks or who are offspring of suicide bombers. The program works with children such as Mila, who at the age of nine was launched from between her parents on a motorcycle as they committed a family suicide bombing against the Surabaya police station (AFP, 2019). At this safehouse, social workers and psychologists try to establish normal daily routines for the effected children while providing religious reeducation similar to Ghazali. Given the spectrum of resources supported at a state level for women and children, Indonesia earns a 2 on age and gender support. Finally, although Indonesia implemented important initial foundations of inclusive programming, there is still work to be done to make these resources available and consistent to a larger population of those children and women indoctrinated.

Contrastingly, Malaysia’s inclusion of programming aimed at women and children needs greater base level development. In October 2019, Malaysia’s Inspector General of Police stated that women and children in Syria must be allowed to return home to Malaysia and attend government rehabilitation along with other members of Daesh (Tan, 2018). While this public announcement signals state recognition of a place for women and children in reintegration

A madrasa is an Islamic educational institution that can provide a constructive resource in societies with limited access to education. In Southeast Asia, however, madrasas have been implicated in spreading radical ideology and serving as a forum for plotting terrorist activities as well (Ginges, Magouirk, and Atran, 2008).
programming, details of any specific programming or initiatives tailored to these two identities are lacking.

Moreover, Malaysia reports that the state maintains one women’s detention center specifically for extremists that aims to prevent inmate radicalization (Hamidi, 2016). However, there is a paucity of evidence that the reintegration of women is specialized or successfully instituted at this facility or more generally. The lack of detailed programming or practice of truly tailored resources in Malaysia suggests that perhaps such programming is still being developed or is not transparent. Notably, the International Civil Society Action Network recently criticized Malaysia’s approach to reintegration as too focused on religious reeducation, which ignores other factors that may influence radicalization in women (International Civil Society Action Network, 2019). Therefore, the lack of available evidence regarding the already minimal reintegration programming specialized for women and children in Malaysia earns the state a score of 0 in this category.

*Psychological Care*

Psychological care, paramount to the intense ideological and cognitive transformation that occurs during reintegration, is a central tenant in both the Indonesian and Malaysian approach to reintegration. In Indonesia, counseling is available during incarceration for detainees and their families (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). Including their families in psychological care can build long term emotional support for the detainee while in prison as well as after release. Religious counseling is also utilized as a form of psychological rehabilitation (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). Additionally, YPP, C-SAVE, and other organizations affiliated with state
programming provide psychological support for prisoners both before and after release (Nemr et al, 2018; Sumpter, 2018). Support from these groups includes mental health therapy, mentorship, religious counseling, and skill development. While this intervention overlaps with other criteria, efforts to connect a former extremist with new social circles or treat mental health concerns are intimately tied to a person’s psychological well-being and desire to psychologically change habits associated with their extremist life.

Malaysia’s programming focuses on similar areas of self-reflection, spirituality, personality traits, and psychology (Aslam & Bakar, 2020). Psychologists are available to prisoners to discuss personal issues in addition to self-esteem classes to help bolster prisoners’ confidence and mental health (El-Said, 2012). Detainee’s families are also included to foster support and connection outside of the state. Moreover, former extremists play a role in counseling detainees as they can speak to the unique circumstances and challenges facing those reintegrating (Hamidi, 2016). As discussed previously, Malaysia attempts to create lasting relationships between former extremists and their rehabilitation officers in hopes that the officer act as a long-term psychological support entity (Guay, 2018). While those relationships are not always practiced or sustainable, the effort indicates advancement around the psychological care of reintegrating extremists by the state. Therefore, as both Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s programs aim to chiefly deradicalize extremists, their programs are relatively robust in addressing the psychological state of extremists and their families. The various approaches concerned with the psychology of those reintegrating both in detention and after release earn both countries a 2 for psychological support.
While in detention, detainees in Indonesia’s programming are given vocational training to help them obtain jobs after their release (Istiqomah 2011, Koehler, 2017). This aspect of educational opportunity is important for detainees to gain employment upon release as well as to feel confident and self-sufficient. Additionally, religious reeducation is an aspect used in both Indonesia and Malaysia to help former extremists recognize their religion in a way that promotes peace and unity as opposed to violence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). After release, Indonesia provides further educational opportunities primarily in partnership with NGOs and community organizations. This education may be based on developing job skills, collaborative skills, digital literacy, or continued religious reeducation (Nemr et al, 2018). While these opportunities are all important to promote sustained reintegration, there appears to be less mention of earning higher-level degrees or even standard classroom education in Indonesia’s program. Also, as discussed previously in the economic stability section, the job training provided may be limited and ineffective. The limitations of this education may do a disservice to those reintegrating who are still unprepared and under skilled for the job market (Sumpter, 2019). For these reasons, Indonesia earns a 1 in terms of educational opportunity as there are more standardization and variety that is needed for these opportunities to benefit those entering diverse communities from the urban areas that primarily house state-led programming.

Malaysia utilizes several topics of education in programming around reintegration. Detainees participate in educational opportunities for vocational training, social skills, financial management, and psychology (Hamidi, 2016). This multi-faceted approach serves to prepare detainees for a successful life after release back into their community. In parallel, a strong emphasis is still placed on religious reeducation as well as political reeducation. This education
institutes teaching of Islam as a moderate religion to attempt to discount the teachings of Daesh, an Islamic fundamentalist group (Koehler, 2017). Education at this level is provided by a team of religious teachers, former extremists, and community leaders (Hamidi, 2016). Nearing release, reintegrating individuals are provided job training and some versions of social education to facilitate the rest of their journey (Kamaruddin, 2017). Malaysia provides reintegrating extremists with many areas of education while in detention. Therefore, despite possible barriers that face those reintegrating in Malaysia from receiving standard or higher-degree education, Malaysia earns a 2 in educational opportunity for offering an assortment of teachings that increase the likelihood of sustained reintegration.

*Social Inclusion*

Indonesia attempts to make social inclusion a key aspect of its reintegration programming specifically by focusing on the families of extremists. In detention, the program incorporates the detainee’s family into his/her reintegration, beginning the foundations of social support (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019). The program incorporates former extremist support as well, providing individuals with someone relatable to talk to. The most important facet is within NGO involvement because they provide social inclusion both by talking with detainees before release and working to prepare communities for their arrival after release (Sumpter, 2019). Preparing the community is a crucial step for reintegration as it can curb possible alienation and social exclusion that may drive reintegrating extremists back to a former, more accepting, extremist group.
These efforts of outreach and groundwork are designed to create a strong base of support for reintegrating individuals; however, challenges do arise. Many former extremists are not welcomed by their community and face isolation from other residents. One former extremist reported receiving stares from those around him and his children being bullied (Sumpter, 2019). Coordination is another limitation, as sometimes communities and even family members are unaware that their neighbor or loved one is returning home and attempting to reintegrate. Overworked caseworkers, charged with alerting and preparing these groups, are also too burdened in some cases to provide consistent meetings (Sumpter, 2019; Tomsa, 2016). These limitations as well as no available evidence on efforts to facilitate community dialogues around interfaith relations, relationships with police, or ethnic tensions contribute to a score more near a 1 for Indonesia in the realm of social inclusion.

For Malaysia’s program, social inclusion also begins with family support, a major factor in their reintegration programs. In some cases, officers contact a detainee’s family before and after prison to help facilitate their transfer back to the community (Hamidi, 2016). Another important factor that could facilitate social inclusion is the longitudinal relationships with rehabilitation officers. As mentioned previously, officers ideally would meet with reintegrated individuals on a long-term and consistent basis providing a source of social support and integration into the community. Although not as extensive as in Indonesia, Malaysia’s programs also reach out to community members to help them prepare for the return of extremists and incorporate former extremists into the social fabric of their community (Hamidi, 2016; Aslam & Bakar, 2020). This approach is supplemented by teaching social skills and personality training during detention. However, the extent of NGO and community involvement does not appear as broad as in Indonesia. Finally, though Malaysia provides the skills and support to rejoin society
there is minimal work done to engage the actual communities around these reintegration extremists before or during their return. Thus, Malaysia earns a 1 in this category.

Table 3: Evaluation of Indonesia and Malaysia’s Programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with Nongovernment Actors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity and Follow up</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Age and Gender Support</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Care</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Opportunity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Inclusion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

In brief, based on the above evaluation and results, Indonesia’s programming appears to perform better than Malaysia’s in how the state facilitates effective reintegration. The main advantage Indonesia possesses is the state's growing collaboration with NGOs and civil society organizations to implement and sustain a variety of its programming. These relationships are deeply beneficial especially in supporting the social inclusion of reintegrating extremists. Indonesia also illustrated its programs’ adaptability by beginning to provide more specialized support for women and children than available in Malaysia. Contrastingly, Malaysia sustains
advantages in educational opportunity due to the variety of opportunities available to detainees including financial management, social skills, vocational training, and psychology.

Indonesia scored a 1 in 4/7 categories excluding non-governmental actors, inclusion of age and gender support, and psychological care for which they earned a 2 to end with an overall score of 10. This suggests a multi-faceted program that addresses many needs of those reintegrating, albeit with limited development and coordination of many areas across the state’s wide geographical area. Malaysia, while scoring a 2 on education and psychological care, earned a 0 for engagement with nongovernmental actors, inclusion of gender and age support, and social inclusion for a total score of 7. These scores suggest that while Malaysia’s program possesses noticeable strengths the state generally has a less diverse approach to reintegration as much of the focus lies in religious reeducation.

Overall, Indonesia’s score of 10/14 rests in the higher score range while Malaysia’s 7/14 rests more medially, which indicates marked progress in both programs with room for improvement and adaptation. These scores should be interpreted with caution as they too have limitations, but Indonesia’s higher score does reflect an overarching trend of the country bending its approach toward reintegration. As concluded in chapter 3, over the 4 eras Indonesia has shown positive growth towards including reintegration into its counterterrorism agenda. Thereby, the state’s recent experience with family-based terrorist attacks and available networks of community-based groups generated salient concentration on these factors in Indonesia than Malaysia. These sensitivities that Indonesia developed within especially the past five years, indicates a continued desire to bolster the success of their post-extremism programming with reintegration efforts. Therefore, in many ways Indonesia's response to returning extremists
improved beyond its colonial roots of military violence to achieve a diverse agenda of tactics and possess great future potential.

Contrastingly, Malaysia’s approach is still deeply rooted in deradicalization and controlled ideological change. This difference and the deficits in programming illustrate little political will from Malaysia and to some extent Indonesia, in pursuing reintegration fully. Changes in ideology are harder to measure long term and challenging to connect to social or economic reintegration, making Malaysia’s interpretation of reintegration relatively more complicated to visualize. Consequently, Malaysia’s commitment to deradicalization and early successes from their efforts has left the government less inclined to diversify programming significantly beyond the religious reeducation and psychological care they already provide. In this way, Malaysia’s history of using reintegration as an effective approach to address returning extremists has not served to produce exponential growth in the state’s recent history. Instead, the state must reconsider its goals and as in Indonesia, invest more heavily into resourcing and sustaining programs consistent with factors that facilitate effective reintegration.

This assessment is meant to evaluate the efficiency of state-led reintegration programming by measuring the consistent use and consideration of factors that facilitate reintegration. As discussed earlier in the thesis, there is no one complete, robust, and detailed measure for effectiveness that is the standard for the field. Instead, recidivism rates are the current standard measure to quantify reintegration’s effectiveness, though it is an incomplete gauge. Nevertheless, comparing the results of this evaluation to the reported recidivism rates in Indonesia and Malaysia provides an important point of comparison between the measures and critique of the exploration.
Objective and well-supported rates of recidivism are difficult to obtain, although the numbers currently available are worth mentioning. The Brookings Institute estimated Indonesia’s recidivism rate to be 15% in 2016 (Ismail & Sim, 2016). The same year that report was released, Malaysia’s Special Branch director claimed a 95% success rate for his country’s program based on recidivism, although the claim faces some challenges (Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Ismail, 2016). Using the rates given by the Brookings Institute and Malaysia’s government, it would appear that Malaysia’s reintegration programming was more effective in 2016. While this may on its face appear to challenge my findings, the rates are of limited utility as they ultimately only indicate cases of state-reported re-radicalization, reoffence, or reincarceration. This may suggest Malaysia’s self-evaluation is incomplete, underreported, or ineffective as the state may not be aware of how many extremists actually re-radicalize or re-offend.

Additionally, I was not able to find Indonesia’s self-reported figures and some of Malaysia’s published success rates measure how many extremists “successfully completed” programming rather than recidivism (Jani, 2017). In Indonesia, the Brookings Institute reports that “there is no national database tracking arrests, convictions, and releases in a timely manner”, so their rate is a “prediction” based on about 47 identified cases (Ismail & Sim, 2016). In both cases, the evidence that Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s recidivism rates are updated frequently or maintain robust practices of data collection is unavailable. These gaps can indicate that there is a disconnect between my findings and 2016 recidivism rates due to change over time and ineffective reporting mechanisms. Regardless, my findings support, as others have, that better evaluation and assessment of reintegration programming is needed to comprehend recidivism, individual transformation, and societal development (Gunaratna & Sabariah, 2019; Koehler, 2017; Veldhuis 2012). Specifically, recidivism rates exemplify a problematic quantitative
measure of reintegration which must be supplemented by qualitative evaluation of existing programming as done above. The combination of qualitative and quantitative reporting on state reintegration programming must also be completed on a larger scale, regularly, and by various groups.

Finally, by comparing the Indonesian and Malaysian reintegration programs several important lessons arise. Both programs incorporate aspects of economic incentives and psychological care, as well as few consistent or practiced social support measures. Some of these initiatives, like separating extremists’ detainees from other inmates, providing counseling to extremists and their families, providing some job training or monetary aid, and preparing communities for extremists’ return, represent basic building blocks of state reintegration programming. Moreover, shortcomings of both programs in the evaluation were consistently due to lack of resourcing to the programs, training of personnel, inconsistencies across individual cases and geographical areas, and poor translation between programming and practice. Particularly, at a community level the state is deeply disconnected from those on the ground that can provide support in ways to alleviate some of these shortcomings as even in Indonesia community groups are underused.

Overall, these deficiencies do not indicate that these programs are inherently inconsiderate of the primary factors that facilitate reintegration or should not receive international recognition for transforming norms of state responses to returning extremists. Instead, Indonesian and Malaysian state reintegration programming is in practice notably ineffective and inconsistent, indicating the states must refocus the agenda fully towards reintegration to produce change and growth.
Chapter 5: Collaboration, Media, and Further Research

We teach them that Islam is a peaceful religion and that jihad is about building not destroying. I am a model for the children because I understand where they come from. I know what it is like to suffer. Because I was deradicalized, I know it can be done.

Khairul Ghazali, 2019

Introduction

With this thesis, I established that Indonesia and Malaysia utilize varied and multifaceted approaches to integrate extremists back into society that draws on some key factors that facilitate reintegration; however, the states fall short of implementing a fully reintegrationist agenda. I argued that reintegration represents the best and most holistic approach for states to address populations of extremists returning to civil society. Indonesia and Malaysia’s limited efforts to address psychological, social, and financial issues facing extremists demonstrate how they are making some investments in effective reintegration programming at a state level. In Indonesia, the state faced many challenges in developing such infrastructure from the militarized approach left by colonization and subsequent authoritarian rule. Additionally, issues of inconsistent enforcement and access to services across the archipelago plus deficiencies in resourcing remains a major obstacle. In Malaysia, seeds of reintegration style programming were planted early on as the British and a young Malayan government successfully reintegrated communist extremists. However, over time the state’s approach remained largely stagnant and still relies heavily on recidivism measures for success and focuses on religious reeducation as a primary approach.

16 Khairul Ghazali is a former extremist from Indonesia that served five years in prison for his crimes and now runs the madrasa mentioned in chapter 4 (Beech and Suhartono, 2019).
Additionally, both states face mounting issues around balancing the role of the state and protecting human rights as they attempt to address more aspects of individual extremists’ lives and minds. Despite these challenges, the evaluation of Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s state-level reintegration programming and the factors that facilitate reintegration depicts that reintegration is the most effective solution to peacefully integrate former extremists and empower communities.

In this chapter, I will conclude the comparison between the two cases by providing a short analysis of the regional implications of these results and the looming threat of militarization to reintegration in Southeast Asia. I will discuss the role of social media in reintegration and the dangers of states impinging on personal freedoms to address virtual extremism. These topics fall outside of my central question on the use of factors that facilitate reintegration in Indonesian and Malaysia state programming, however, they represent important features of the broader discussion around reintegration and counterterrorism.

5.1 Regional Impacts

As discussed in chapter 4, although Indonesia and Malaysia were considered to have successful programs, there is still much room for improvement of their policies. Neither state possesses an effective method of monitoring long-term programming success or a complete metric of evaluation. Primary steps towards filling these gaps will require a renegotiation of their agenda to prioritize reintegration instead of deradicalization. Such a shift is key to alleviating several of the obstacles mentioned in chapter 4 that prevented both programs from performing better. For example, prioritizing reintegration requires the state to allocate more funding and resources to long-term check-ins, to support the economic stability of reintegrated individuals,
and to expand the diversity of identities served by their programming. Similarly, further regional collaboration between states could help these programs to reach higher degrees of success as international relationships can produce transnational resources and information sharing on how to achieve fuller reintegration. The importance of considering the region around Indonesia and Malaysia is also critical given the fluidity of terrorist networks and activity across Southeast Asia. Thus, there must be further detailed study of the regional implications surrounding the implementation of state-level reintegration programming in Southeast Asia broadly. Importantly, many of these implications relate to the results of this thesis by representing direct paths of improvement and adaptation around promoting reintegration in the global agenda against violent extremism.

Moreover, the regional impacts of these results suggest the necessity for more direct communication and collaboration between Malaysia and Indonesia as the two states maintain different strengths and focus within their respective approaches. Improved regional communication between state-level actors and eventually nongovernmental organizations will resolve some of the deficits in Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s post-extremism programming by challenging them to reflect on existing shortcomings of their initiatives. For example, strengthening the relationship between the state and transnational community-based organizations would present the possibility of holding meaningful dialogues between historically tense groups like those of varying religions and between civilians and police. Other states in the regions can also use the structures and improvements of these programs as a catalyst to start their own. Additionally, looking beyond the state-level approach of one country can broaden the discussion to include a more robust analysis of nongovernmental actors and international groups.
which are also contributing resources and expertise to the formulation of effective reintegration programming.

There can also be an expansion of the discussion around colonial influences on the existing approaches to counterterrorism in other states. Indonesia represents a good model of development from the strict use of military repression of extremism that may assist other states’ progression towards employing more diverse tactics of reintegration. Similarly, Malaysia importantly demonstrates how their colonial experience more positively impacted their counterterrorism institutions following independence. Moreover, psychological, social, and economic factors that facilitate reintegration hold some universally applicable qualities and programs like those in Indonesia and Malaysia demonstrate attention to individuals. Thus, collaboration between countries on how to address these factors remain fruitful despite differences in culture, governmental structure, and civil society. States seeking their success with reintegration programming will be challenged to more holistically invest in long term solutions that empower individuals and the communities.

*Militarization and Reintegration*

While better regional collaboration and coordination offers hope for improvement in the area of reintegration, another recent development pushes in the opposite direction-- namely, the movement to militarize Southeast Asia’s regional approach to counterterrorism. The efficacy of this movement is contested and may detract from efforts to advance reintegration. Though Indonesia and Malaysia invested in their police-run reintegration programming, emphasis on the role of the military has not lagged. Generally, Southeast Asian countries have moved towards
militarization in direct response to terrorist activities in Southern Thailand and the Philippines (Tan, 2018). In this regard, a military response seems logical; however, militarization is a double-edged sword. As militarization can increase regional cooperation and security, it also promotes a hardline and violent approach to counterterrorism that threatens reintegration as states turn away from soft approaches. Military-dominated approaches also raise significant questions about how human rights will fare where the military takes the lead (Tan, 2018). Thus, the installation of more regional collaboration must come with specific focus and investment into primarily police-led reintegration as current efforts of regional counterterrorism are emboldening a more militarized counterterrorism approach.

Furthermore, when military force is utilized individuals can lose trust in the state, a relationship that is crucial to the success of reintegration efforts. Militarization may be especially negative in Malaysia and Indonesia, as both states have a history of human rights abuses under the Internal Security Act and authoritarian rule, respectively (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Coca, 2018). In the last several years, Indonesian President Joko Widodo called for stronger military intervention following a series of bombings in 2018 and the government shutdown of the Telegram application in 2016. The action created concerns surrounding the return of authoritarian rule and elevated role of the military in Indonesia as early on the army sought to seat itself as a guardian of the nation and nationalist cause (Coca, 2018; Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019).

Correspondingly, in Malaysia new policies permit further police crackdown on suspected terrorists, those spreading ISIS ideology, and the financing of terrorist networks with hardline deterrent measures (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Some fear these moves are consistent with possible power-grabbing by military forces, who historically struggle with police and
political groups for power across Southeast Asia (Tan, 2018). Thereby, if Indonesia and Malaysia, through further robust evaluation, prove consistently successful in addressing returning extremists with police-led reintegration, the approach should become a regional standard. Moreover, success for these regional leaders will likely negotiate a prominent role for police in counterterrorism efforts, especially in states with fraught relationships to military rule. Until a more definitive conclusion around the long-term efficacy of Indonesia and Malaysia’s model of police led reintegration can be drawn, regional collaboration must be approached with caution for the effects of militarization on reintegration. Overall, the discussion of regional implications and militarization demonstrates the tumultuous relationship between regional security, militarization, and reintegration.

5.2 The Role of Media and Further Directions

Furthermore, from the study of extremist reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia it is important to also understand the impact of media on reintegration. Though outside the scope of this thesis, media influences on individuals attempting reintegration hold a variety of implications for programming both domestically and regionally. Moreover, engaging with counterterrorism through the media and specifically on social media are major focuses of both Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia, as highlighted in chapter 3, took steps in the third era of their reintegration history to set up the Counter Messaging Center to combat radical messages of Islam on social media (Hamidi, 2016). At the same time, The Malaysian Islamic Development Department set out to identify student leaders at universities to help spread the “true” definition of jihad and promote non-violence (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).
Malaysia also runs public awareness campaigns against violent, hateful, and radical posts on social media. In this effort the state is aided by civil service organizations that possess a similar long-term mission to counter radical narratives online and in communities around the state (Jani, 2017). Similarly, Indonesia also made positive use of the state’s media presence through collaboration with NU Online17 and other civil organizations that, like in Malaysia, promote a pluralistic and non-violent society (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Indonesia also has a history of taking a more direct and hard approach to the spread of extremism on media platforms. In 2016, the Indonesian state banned Telegram, a messaging app, in Indonesia because it was believed to spread violent extremist speeches and helped extremists plan attacks (Counter Extremism Project, 2019).

The government banning media platforms or individual accounts over extremist posts walks a thin line between counterterrorism and the maintenance of freedom of speech. In both the case of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s response, the states confronted issues of extremism in the media by providing opposing and plural views to these posts. However, they both also engage with the hard approach of banning and shutting down accounts whether by a full application ban or state departments focused on extremist media (Hamidi, 2016; Counter Extremism Project, 2019). As the internet has no borders, negative information being produced in one region of the world can seamlessly cause detrimental impacts on another. Moreover, the use of social media to silence beliefs opposite of the state raises concerns of a state-enforced ideological homogeneity that may also be a violation of human rights. This censorship could be interpreted as an attempt

17 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Online, an open civil society organization that promotes a tolerant form of Islam to curb radicalization, extremism, and terrorism virtually. To date, NU online is the most trafficked Islamic website. (NU Online, 2019)
to produce correct or state-sanctioned definitions or interpretations of religion (Coca, 2018; Sumpter, 2019). As both Indonesia and Malaysia as well as countries like Denmark attempt to ideologically reform extremists, they are to some extent defining what is right and wrong beliefs within their borders.

Specifically, media and social networking exposure are aspects of counterterrorism deserving of more discussion because of their ability to prevent radicalization and return to violent extremism. Strong bonds to family and friends prevent people from joining illegal activities on the internet according to social bond theory, and many who re-offend are found to maintain no significant outside social network (Berghuis 2018; Hwang, 2018). If social needs are not addressed, a former extremist or vulnerable individual met with social isolation and rejection can turn to routes of the only social support they feel are welcoming and meaningful – a virtual terrorist organization (Hwang, 2018). Transnational terrorist organizations are increasingly present virtually and accessible at all times. Thus, a relapse into this network or indoctrination by fake and hateful media is possible with poor enforcement or resourcing of programs that teach digital literacy or directly regulate media platforms.

Furthermore, important future research directions align my findings and this discussion on media with the plight of migrant workers in Southeast Asia. For example, as the role of media can broadly be considered a preventative measure to the radicalization of individuals in a society, working to curb issues facing migrant workers abroad that prompt their radicalization can also be preventative (Nuraniyah, 2017). Migrant workers also report using social media to find community and religious support while abroad and are subject to various forms of foreign media that can impact their ability to reintegrate into their domestic society should they be repatriated due to extremist behavior (Mansour-Ille, 2019). However, in both cases, when considering
reintegration, media and issues facing migrant workers are relevant because teaching digital literacy as well as providing financial support and social inclusion to migrant workers will strengthen individuals on the path to reintegration against re-radicalization.

Overall, our increasingly digital world will continue to breed concerns about online social connections. Therefore, social media in particular must be addressed in reintegration programming with similar consideration as for interpersonal social factors discussed in chapter 2. How individuals must reconstruct their virtual presence and identity on social media following their disaffiliation with terrorist organizations and attempted reintegration requires precise focus. Understanding this discussion also relates to the concept that many factors that facilitate successful reintegration can also be initiated in preventative protections against radicalization. This overlap exists because the process of radicalization and reintegration share similar features as they are both reconstructions of an inner self and social awareness. This study of reintegration in Indonesia and Malaysia denotes a complex relationship between online extremism, state intervention, and reintegration. This relationship underscores the need to dedicate further study to these digital networks, particularly as stakeholders consider taking a more transnational approach to reintegrating former extremists.

5.3 Summary of Regional Impacts and The Role of Media

In brief, modern terrorism is not bound by a single border so neither must the approaches to address its root causes and reintegrate former extremists. The regional implications of evaluating state reintegration programs like in Indonesia and Malaysia can produce a healthy wave of collaboration and sharing between states to start and maintain effective reintegration programs. Opening these channels and relationships around counterterrorism can facilitate the
international system’s ability to check human rights abuses in different programs and resource across borders when needed. However, it must be considered that this collaboration can also cause mixed consequences as movements to militarize counterterrorism can also spread if some states or regions see successes from military response to terrorism.

The militarization that may be correlated with transnational collaboration around counterterrorism requires attention because military might could in turn continue to feed the cycle of terrorism. Where hardline tactics of deterrence and force may expand the population that is enrolled in reintegration programming, violence and disconnect between civilians and military personnel can cause programming to be less effective in catalyzing actual psychological or cognitive change. Similarly, military power over counterterrorism can bleed into military monopolization of other state departments and programs that could result in an uneven role and power taken by the military in some states.

Moreover, media also serves as a delicate balancing point in the battle against extremism. On one hand, freedom of speech and expression are universal human rights, fundamentally in the practice of providing a check to governments and advocating for others. Conversely, the practice of this right also plays a role in the planning and execution of violence. Indonesia and Malaysia have both been oppressive in some regard during their fight against extremist messaging. Nevertheless, both states also took steps to combat the spread of extremism on social media with positive and pluralist posts. Stepping on human rights is a risky decision that may drive some individuals to join extremist causes against the state. Thus, Indonesia and Malaysia’s efforts to counter radical propaganda with reinforcing messages of religion and peace is a promising approach that falls in line with their reintegration efforts and requires further investigation.
Conclusion

This thesis established that Indonesia and Malaysia own important histories of achieving some effective reintegration strategies yet fail to possess successful reintegration programs that address all major factors underlying the process. The evaluation of these state programs also warranted an exploration into reintegration as a distinct concept from disengagement, deradicalization, and rehabilitation. A reintegration centered approach was proven the more effective strategy to peacefully integrate extremists back into society against state programs focusing only on the deradicalization of extremist individuals. From these conclusions, a clearer path forward is indicated for the reintegration of extremists into Indonesian and Malaysian societies. This path will push states seeking similar success to focus on the individual and the distinct identities held by those susceptible to radicalization and extremism in their societies. At the state level, this focus can promote the formulation and enforcement of policy that serves vulnerable populations as well as provide vital support to community-based organizations already working to protect and serve these groups. In particular, the path towards improvement and reintegration delineated in this thesis illuminates the value of shifting the global response to terrorism from military might to community and individual empowering solutions that invest in longevity. A “dangerous assumption that must be dismissed”, one expert recognizes, “is that terrorists are somehow no longer ‘relevant’ once their involvement in terrorism has ceased” (Silke, 2003). Undeniably, those who return possess immense potential.
Appendix A: Abridged Timeline of Counterterrorism and Policy in Indonesia and Malaysia

Indonesia

**Era 1: Suharto’s Rule to Resignation (1998)**

1800’s
Padri Rebellion takes place by Muslim clerics attempting to enforce Sharia law.

1980’s
Young Indonesians travel to Pakistan, a base for Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation, and around 200 train with Afghan Mujahidin.

Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar found JI by leveraging their al-Qaeda connections.

1982
Suharto’s New Order government forces Islamic organizations to adopt the philosophy of Pancasila as the sole ideological basis.

1990’s
Sungkar relocates his operation to the southern Philippines under pressure from Pakistani authorities.

1998
JI splinters after Osama Bin Laden’s fatwa.

After Suharto’s fall, Indonesian Muslims who traveled to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan returned to Indonesia and formed various militant groups.


1999
Conflict erupts in Maluku islands amid Suharto’s demise. Eventually fighting spreads west to Sulawesi.

2000
Some JI members train in southern Philippines and marry local women, establishing roots in multiple Southeast Asian countries.

**December**
First major JI attack occurs in Indonesia. The assailants bomb 28 churches in Jakarta, throughout Sumatra, and Java. 120 people are injured and 19 die. JI leader Hambali is suspected as coordinator of attack.

**2000’s**
Indonesia begins “hard” measures against terrorism.

JI begins a period of relative inactivity after a crackdown by the Indonesian government.

*Era 3: Bali Bombings (2002) to Establishment of the BNPT (2010)*

**2002**
Previously JI was led by individuals trained in Afghanistan linked to Al Qaeda and anti-Western ideology. Now, JI’s ranks become depleted due to internal struggles, imprisonment, and death.

**October**
JI-affiliated terrorists set off bombs at two crowded nightclubs on the resort island of Bali, Sari Club and Paddy’s.

After the Bali bombings by JI, creating a strategy to deal with terrorism became one of Indonesia’s most urgent national security priorities.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri issues The Interim Law, to supplement existing criminal law and give the government the ability to efficiently investigate, prosecute, and convict terrorists.

Between 2002 and 2015, Indonesia prosecuted more than 700 suspected terrorists.

Since the Bali Bombing, over 650 people were released after serving sentences for terrorism-related offenses.

**2003**

**June**
The special police anti-terror unit, Densus 88, is established in the wake of the Bali attacks in 2002. In 2005, Densus 88 becomes largely responsible for pursuing terror suspects.

**August**
A car bomb outside of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta kills 12 and wounds 150. Police believe the attack is similar to the Bali bombings and the attack is attributed to JI.

2004

September

A car bomb is detonated by Islamic extremists outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta ahead of elections in both Indonesia and Australia. At least 10 people lose their lives and more than 100 are wounded. JI suspected to be behind the attack.

Constitutional Court rules prosecution of a man charged with playing a role in the Bali bombings was unconstitutional under revised legislation because his case does not meet the extraordinary nature of the perpetrator’s crimes.

2005

October

Authorities believe JI senior leaders Azahari Husin and Noordin Top planned a suicide bombing by three individuals at two sites on Bali resort island. Targets were the Four Seasons hotel and a shopping square popular to tourists, 20 die and more than 100 are injured.

2006

Indonesia’s commitment to interdepartmental cooperation allows police officers and prosecutors to work together to successfully prosecute terrorism cases. Indonesia prosecutes Umar Patek, a Bali bombing suspect extradited from Pakistan.

2009

July

JW Marriott Hotel and Ritz Carlton in Jakarta business district attacked by JI suicide bombers killing 8 people and wounding 50. Attacks inspire physical hardening of potential targets, involving regulation and surveillance of traffic and increased security outside buildings and prominent sites.

2010

Police raid Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid training camp in Aceh, weakening the organization as well as some JI splinter groups. Prosecution and conviction of JI founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and others occurs.
After the hotel bombings BNPT, the national agency for combating terrorism is established, marking the first-time police, military, and intelligence agencies join forces to create a more cohesive counterterrorism strategy.


2010

Addendum to 2003 law was passed, establishing the BNPT, which oversees the coordination for all anti-terrorism units in Indonesia, including Detachment 88, the National Intelligence Agency, the military’s anti-terrorism units, and the Anti-Terrorism Desk.

2012

Indonesia ratifies ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism, mandating cooperation on terrorism prevention, law enforcement, information sharing, and terrorist rehabilitation.

2013

Deradicalisation Blueprint from BNPT stresses the importance of facilitating former extremists’ return to their communities.

2014

September

Indonesia co-sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178, which seeks to prevent radicalization and restrict the movement of foreign fighters.

Southeast Asia’s jihadi movement is energized and divided by the rise of ISIS. Inmates fight in prisons over allegiance to different groups.

2015

September

Indonesian Vice President Jusul Kalla stresses on social welfare improvement and rehabilitation as a strategy to fight extremism at Obama’s Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism.

November

In November 2015, the National Counterterrorism Agency requested that the Indonesian Communications and Informatics Ministry block a propaganda video featuring Santoso’s voice communicating messages of jihad.

2016

Purwakarta Ideology School is formed by Mulyadi in efforts to promote civic education, social justice, and unity.

Operation Tinombala, a joint army-police operation to eliminate the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur terroirs group, launched in Poso, Central Sulawesi. This is an example of increased involvement of the military in counterterrorism.

Concerns of the border patrol’s manpower arise from a DPR member since the country has only 7,000 immigration officers which is less than Malaysia and Singapore.

C-SAVE organization is created to build a national network of civil society organizations to fight radicalism, prevent violence, and promote peace.

**January**

14: 5 ISIS-affiliated terrorists attack a shopping and business district in Jakarta, resulting in 4 deaths and 25 wounded. A Starbucks and a police post are targeted with multiple explosions.

Websites with Jihadist material blocked by the Indonesian government after the January attacks. Social media and messaging platforms asked by the Indonesian government to remove extremist content. Encrypted messaging service Telegram is blocked by the Indonesia’s Ministry of Communication, claiming it had been used to promote radicalism and instructions for attacks.

**February**

New measures to combat extremism in prisons announced by the Indonesian government.

**July**

5: 30-year-old Nur Rohman, who has connections to Bahrun Naim a known extremist, commits a suicide bombing on a motorcycle in front of a Java police station, killing a policeman and injuring another.

23: Police confirm death of Indonesia’s most-wanted pro-ISIS jihadist fugitive, Abu Wardah (aka Santoso).

**August**

Police uncover a plot to launch a rocket attack on Singapore from Batam claiming that Naim provided funds and instructions to the foiled attackers.

Indonesia spearheads the Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit to fight terrorism financing.

Joint naval patrols agreed to by Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean defense ministers.

**November**
13: A group of children outside a church on the Island of Borneo are targeted by an attacker throwing petrol bombs which kills a 2-year-old girl and injures 3 children. Police arrest a 32-year-old former terror convict and four others suspecting connections to ISIS.

December
According to the U.S. Department of State, 241 terrorists are imprisoned in Indonesia with 150 suspects held in detention facilities awaiting trial.

10: Three suspects in Jakarta arrested by police who confiscate a pressure-cooker bomb. The suspects planned to use a female suicide bomber to bomb the presidential palace. The group had connections to Syria-based Indonesian extremist Barun Naim.

21: Three suspected ISIS members are killed in a Jakarta raid after throwing a bomb at them. Another bomb is defused, and suspect arrested before the raid. Police raid a Jakarta neighborhood and kill three suspected ISIS members after one of the suspects throws a bomb at them. Police cordon off the neighborhood and diffuse another bomb.

2017

Over 220 Indonesians deported from Turkey after failing to enter Syria.

Over 200 Indonesians forcibly repatriated and sent back to their communities after one month of state rehabilitation.

President Joko Widodo publicly argues for greater military involvement in counterterrorism leading to more intense calls for reduced military involvement.

A female deportee from Hong Kong, Anggi, arrested while prepping explosives for an attack.

Hizb-ut Tahrir banned by the Indonesian government for representing a potential threat to societal unity. Many become concerned about a return of authoritarian rule to a country that promotes freedoms of speech and assembly.

January
7: JAD, a network formed in 2015 when Indonesian extremist groups together pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an ISIS leader, is designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorist by US Department of State.

February
27: A government building in West Java catches fire when a suspected terrorist blows up a pressure cooker bomb. The bomber is shot and captured by the Indonesian police, who was being monitored by the anti-terror squad for extremist links.

May
President Joko Widodo communicates plans to ban HT and dissolve the group’s charter after evaluation by a government panel.

Police officers guarding a parade route targeted by 2 suicide bombers detonating explosives at a Jakarta bus terminal, killing 3 officers and wounding 12 others including civilians. One of the suspects is connected to ISIS after a raid on his home.

June
25: Police officer is stabbed and killed by 2 attackers with ISIS connections in Medan hours before the end of Ramadan. One attacker is killed and the other injured by police who discover ISIS propaganda in the attacker’s home.

A new law allowing imprisonment of returning FTFs for up to 15 years is announced. The law permits detention of terrorist suspects without trial and includes hate speech, paramilitary training, and membership to banned extremist groups as terrorism activities.

July
Indonesia and Malaysia agree to better military cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.

Reportedly 2,691 individuals with connections to terror groups are under government surveillance.

The rising threat of foreign terrorist fighters is addressed in a meeting co-hosted by Indonesia and Australia with Malaysia, the Philippines, and New Zealand.

19: HT petitions its dissolution after the Indonesian government revokes its legal status and disbands the organization. Jakarta State Administrative Court rejects the petition.

August
15: 5 alleged ISIS supporters arrested in Bandung for allegedly attempting to create chemical bombs to attack the presidential palace.

September
Approximately 84 Indonesians have returned independently from Middle East conflict zones.

2018
There is no allocated budget for reintegration of deportees and money must be obtained from various other areas of government funds.

New laws allow prosecution of Indonesians who joined ISIS abroad and returned to Indonesia as they are considered members of a foreign terrorist organization. Sentences for those involved in any training, foreign conflicts, or terrorist attacks range from 4-1 years with a potential for revocation of passport rights.
Estimates from Indonesia suggest 800 fighters traveled from Indonesia to Syria and Iraq since 2012.

**March**
A memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism and deradicalization cooperation is signed by the Home Affairs Minister and the BNPT head.

**May**
The Indonesian military is granted a stronger role in counterterrorism following a string of bombings by Islamic extremists in Surabaya. Also, passing of the counterterrorism bill grants police greater power to preempt attacks for example by preventive detention of suspects.

500 Indonesians claimed to be fighting in Syria and Iraq while 500 had returned and 103 died in conflict, according to Indonesian Police Chief Tito Karnavian.

8: A prisoner-staged riot occurs at a high-security detention center at the Mobile Brigade Corps headquarters which is Indonesia’s special police unit. In the deadliest incident five police officers are killed. Being the second riot since November 2017, analysts claim the center is not prepared to hold such a large number of high-risk prisoners. All surviving inmates are transported to be held at Indonesia’s maximum-security island of Nusakambangan.

13: Three churches are bombed in Surabaya, East Java by a family of six. The father bombs one while 2 teenage sons the second and a mother and 2 daughters the third, killing 12. This attack is the first attack by a female suicide bomber in Indonesia. Hours after the church attack, a mother and her teenage son die in Sidoarjo, East Java when the bomb their father was making prematurely explodes. The father is killed by police officers.

14: Ten people are injured when a family of 5 launch a suicide bombing against a police station in Surabaya. Only the 8-year-old daughter survives. ISIS claims responsibility.

**June**
More pathways to prosecution of terrorism are created by updated legislation which includes membership of a proscribed terrorist organization.

It is estimated that over 120 Indonesian terrorists lost their lives fighting in Iraq and Syria since 2014. It is also estimated that 500 remain fighting in those areas including 200 women and children of ISIS living at the al-Hawl refugee camp at the border of Syria and Turkey.

22: Influential ISIS supporter and U.S.-designated terrorist Aman Abdurrahman is found guilty of terrorism for charges related to the January 2016 ISIS terrorist attack in Jakarta, he receives the death penalty.

**July**
The government claims only 86 Indonesians who fought in Syria returned home while 539 who traveled to Syria were deported by Turkey.
31: JAD is outlawed by a Jakarta court for allegedly being a terrorist organization with ties to ISIS. According to the Wall Street Journal, JAD is believed to have 1,000 members in Indonesia with several hundred in detention.

November
Indonesian Intelligence Agency announces it conducted a 4-month investigation of about 1,000 mosques.

2019

February
U.S. and U.N. designated Indonesian militant Mohammed Karim Yusop Faiz declared dead by Syrian police.

March
18: JAD leader Abu Umar (aka Syamsul Afirin) sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for involvement in 2018 Surabaya bombings.

June
An Indonesian woman was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for ISIS membership.

29: Leader of Islamist group JI, Para Wijayanto, was arrested at a hotel outside of Jakarta.

Current
The BNPT attempts to use soft approaches to counter extremist in Indonesian society and to deradicalize convicted terrorists within prisons. The Wahid Foundation works to implement deradicalization programs in partnership with BNPT. Despite recent reforms focused on hard short-term actions to counterterrorism, President Widodo agrees to support new policies aimed at preventing radicalization of youth.

Malaysia

Era 1: From Emergency to 9/11

1930’s
While a part of the British colonies, Malaysia begins facing domestic communist insurgency.

1960
The Internal Security Act passes allowing executive action against radicalism. The act played a large role in combating extremism and terrorism until repeal in September 2011.

1963
The independent state of Malaysia established.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) occurs.

1963-1966
Malaysia faces external threats from conflict of the Indonesian Confrontation. The dispute is resolved.

1969
Interregnum- tremendous violence among ethnic and class lines.

1970

1971

1973
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.

1979
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages.

1970’s
Religion becomes a means to spread mistrust and undermine the elected government. Malaysia identifies the threat of Islamic extremists and adopts a policy to address it. The policy includes a deradicalization program for those detained under the ISA.

Violent activities intensified against CPM during the 1970s and 1980s.

1980’s
Militants from Malaysia join the fight in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation. Fighters eventually return home.

1985
The Memali Incident, an armed conflict between police and fringe Islamic radicalists leads to 18 deaths.

1988

1989
Peace treaty between CPM and the Malaysian government signed.

**1991**
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.

**1997**
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.

**1999**
Malaysia joins global move to combat terrorist financing by agreeing to UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

**Late 1990’s**
Domestic Islamic extremist groups: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) made up of Malaysian fighters from Soviet-Afghanistan war, and regional groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group threaten Malaysian society.

**2000**

**January**
Several al-Qaeda operatives, including perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks gather in Kuala Lumpur for training.

**Era 2: 9/11 to the repeal of the Internal Security Act**

**2001**
KMM and JI revolutionary cells uncovered with alleged links to Al Qaeda. After 9/11 attacks, the Malaysian government cracks down on KMM and JI.

Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA) requires institutions to submit suspicious transactions to the financial intelligence unit of Central Bank of Malaysia.

**2003**

**July**
Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs founds the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism.

**Era 3: Movement of Malaysians to join foreign jihad and The institution of POCA and SOSMA to replace ISA to the start of a focus on deradicalization (2015)**

**2012**
Internal Security Act Repealed.

Malaysian extremists start traveling to Syria to fight with Al-Qaeda. Many eventually join ISIS.

Malaysian government enacts the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA), providing procedures for arrest of serious offenses including terrorism and exciting disaffection against the Supreme Ruler. Under the Penal Code terrorism or assisting terrorists carries imprisonment of up to 30 years, life sentences, or death.

2013

February-March
Standoff and defeat of Sulu militants resulting in the death of 56 militants, 6 civilians, and 10 security forces members.

The new challenge since 2013 arises from the Islamic State (IS) militancy or Daesh that has become the fastest-growing threat to Malaysia.

2014

April
Enforcement of the Prevention of Crime (Amendment and Extension) Act (POCA) commenced to expand its application to all the states in Malaysia and to include terrorism offenses.

August
Three Malaysian women are believed to have traveled to Syria to offer themselves as comfort women to ISIS according to Malaysian Intelligence.

Malaysia implements U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178.

September
Global Coalition declares that it is committed to defeating ISIS.

2015

February
2 Malaysians, Mohd Faris Anuar and Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi, are involved in an ISIS beheading video.

April
Malaysian Defense Minister tells parliament that as many as 70 Malaysian military personnel found to have “joined” ISIS.

May
Home Affairs Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi emphasizes that Malaysia sees rehabilitation and deradicalization as integral to combating terrorism.

_Era 4: Further Policy and Legal additions - now POTA and SMATA to Present_

**2015**

Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) are enacted.

Malaysia created an integrated rehabilitation module for those detained under POTA.

**October**

U.S. selects Malaysia to host the regional center to counteract online ISIS propaganda. Malaysia joins the U.S.-led Global Coalition to fight ISIS.

**2016**

Malaysia joins Financial Action Task Force, whose goal is to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and threats to the international financial system.

**January**

Malaysian, Indonesian, and Filipino ISIS fighters in Syria make a video calling for lone-wolf attacks in the 3 countries.

Prime minister orders police to heighten security after deadly ISIS attack in Indonesia and arrest of a suspected suicide bomber in Kuala Lumpur.

A 16-year-old boy attempts ISIS-influenced solo kidnapping at a shopping mall.

Special ASEAN meeting led by Malaysia in response to recent terror attacks in Southeast Asia, namely Jakarta, and Bangkok. 17 ministers or heads of delegation shared policy statements on deradicalization. Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, France, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the People's Republic of China, Singapore, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America and Vietnam were all represented.

**April**

EU and Malaysia enter into PCA to increase political dialogue and cooperation on issues including counterterrorism.

**June**

Grenade attack occurs on a nightclub near Kuala Lumpur.

**July**
15 ISIS-linked individuals arrested including 2 low ranking policemen according to Malaysian Inspector General.

**August**
In New York Malaysia emphasizes deradicalization and rehabilitation as proven methods to change mindsets of radical individuals to reintegrate them and prevent recidivism. Malaysia emphasizes that terrorism cannot only be defeated with force.

Malaysian police warn that ISIS is getting more aggressive in distributing propaganda.

Indonesia and Malaysia agree to share biometric data of suspected and convicted terrorists as well as best practices of deradicalization and counter extremism.

NSCA grants sweeping powers to the new National Security Council.

**October**
National Special Operations Force, Malaysia’s first multi-agency counterterrorism force is launched.

**November**
25-year-old Malaysian national Hasan Zakaria drives car bomb into Kurdish soldiers in Syria killing 15 and injuring many.

Prime minister Najib Razak meets Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte to discuss operations against ASG, a Philippines-based terrorist group.

**2017**

**January**
3 Malaysian ISIS militants reportedly killed in an airstrike in Syria.

**March**
Malaysia has met with Indonesia and the Philippines to address regional security concerns. Beginning in 2016, the three governments met several times to discuss maritime cooperation, culminating in a March 2017 agreement to launch joint patrols of the Sulu Sea to safeguard ships’ crew from piracy and kidnapping.

Malaysian government cracks down on persons suspected of promoting ISIS ideology and recruiting new members.

Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi meet with New Zealand Attorney-General Christopher Finlayson.

Ministry of Home Affairs announces that the government seeks to strictly enforce existing criminal laws to prosecute those suspected of terrorism.
April
Malaysia’s Deputy Home Minister Nur Jazlan Mohamed and visiting U.K. minister discuss closer cooperation on counterterrorism and counter-extremism.

2018
No ISIS-affiliated attacks in Malaysia according to the U.S. Department of State.

May
The first transition of power since independence, new government pledges to review legislation governing arrest, investigation, and detention of terrorist suspects.

July
Malaysia gives a conditional return offer to approximately 102 Malaysians who left the country to join ISIS.

November
Malaysian authorities release Yazid Sufaat from the Simpang Renggam penitentiary sent him to his home.

Sources: Counter Extremism Project, 2019; Hamidi, 2016; Rucktäschel & Schuck, 2019; Sumpter 2019
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