The Road to Hell: How Race and Paternalism Shape Political Behavior

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in the University of Michigan
2020

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

About a month after I arrived in Ann Arbor, a fresh faced 22-year-old, with a lot of ideas, Michael Brown was shot and killed by Darren Wilson. I vividly remember watching news coverage of the civil disturbance that followed as the Missouri National Guard rolled tanks into Ferguson and snipers pointed rifles at protestors fighting for their lives. As I put the final pieces of this dissertation together in the early summer of 2020, I felt struck with déjà vu. The public execution of George Floyd and the subsequent nationwide unrest, seemed a fitting backdrop to this work. I began my graduate school career in the Obama era convinced that race was still the central guiding force in American politics, and six years later a record number of Americans agree.

It feels a bit weird to begin an acknowledgments section in this way, but I have to acknowledge that my racial identity, biologically meaningless yet in many ways socially determinant, has played a large role in my growth as a scholar. It has informed my research, and provided me insights on racial attitudes that many in the academy had not considered. It has also pushed me to think seriously about justice, and provided a second gear that has kept me from tiring of my research agenda. Most concretely, my experiences foreground the importance of the research I do.

I also owe a large debt of gratitude to a number of mentors who've been able to sharpen my jumbled and occasionally contradictory convictions into insightful theoretical contributions. At the University of South Carolina, I took my first political science course that treated race and racial attitudes with the seriousness they deserved with Dr. Todd Shaw. The course showed me

just how much political science could look like the kind of work I was interested in doing. Dr. Shaw gave me opportunities to work on research that really interested me and more importantly helped me make one of the best decisions of my life by steering me to his alma mater, the University of Michigan.

I had no clue that Michigan was known for producing Black Ph.D.'s across the social sciences, or that the political science department would be the perfect intellectual fit for me. When the university invited me to present research before applying at the Emerging Scholars Program, I was completely intimidated by the environment and the work it seemed was being done. I believed I could never measure up to this and was not going to apply. But another political scientist who happened to be there, Dr. Melanye Price, gave me advice I'll never forget. She reminded me that Michigan had invited me so they were certainly interested, and that in cases like this I should put the onus on the University to reject me and not eliminate myself from contention out of fear. Dr. Price was obviously correct.

Once I got to Michigan it became clear who would I would seek out as an advisor. Nearly every Black student in the department was under the tutelage of Dr. Vincent Hutchings. After taking a course of his in the end of my first year it became clear why. Dr. Hutchings seemed endlessly brilliant, finding the key weaknesses of works with surgical precision. The class sessions were always interesting and never shied from controversy, but focused on what could be proven. As a mentor Vince has used that same laser focus to trim the fat from my ideas, and uncover something truly meaningful. His weekly meeting helped me stay centered at the most difficult point in my graduate career, after I'd finished coursework and was wed to a dissertation idea that would prove inadequate. Having talked with many fellow graduate students about their

relationships with their faculty advisors, I feel confident in saying I could not have asked for a better chair than Vincent Hutchings.

My other committee members have also been incredibly helpful in pushing my research along. I will never forget what I learned from a summer of working with Rob Mickey on a project; Rob is easily the most well-read human I have ever met. The historical context he's provided for this project has been invaluable. Dr. Mara Ostfeld has been an amazing colleague and mentor. She's listened to my ideas in depth and treated me as an equal partner in our co-authored work and that meant a lot to me. In his brief time at Michigan Dr. Brendan Nyhan was also incredibly helpful and did a lot to shape my thinking on the dissertation project.

A number of other faculty members have had an outsized influence on my development as a scholar. An undergraduate course I took with Dr. Jill Frank at the University of South Carolina did the impossible and made pre-modern political theory incredibly interesting to me. Though not political science, Dr. Qiana Whitted's course on post-blackness in literature was a revelation and has shaped the way I approach teaching. Dr. Iain Osgood and Jason Davis managed to teach me more math than I will ever need as a social scientist. Rocio Titiunik's causal inference course fundamentally changed the way I thought about research design in a very intuitive way. Nicholas Valentino's political psychology course was one of the most intriguing courses I've taken, and managed to somehow keep my attention despite lasting from 4-7 pm. Nick also administered my methods prelim and was instrumental in my dissertation topic switch, which I am very grateful for.

Though faculty and advisors have done so much to shape me as a scholar, I would be remiss here if I did not mention my friends and family who've supported me so much personally during this time. Through Rackham's invaluable Summer Institute for Rackham Merit Fellows I

Kustov, David Wilson, Domingo Morel, Meghan Wilson, Nazita Lejavardi, Bernard Fraga, Jane Junn, Evelyn Simien, Patricia Posey, Efrén Pérez, Omar Wasow, Joe Soss and Chris DeSante.

A special thank you goes to my family. They've had to deal with my unbridled thoughts about politics for quite a long time, so I'm sure they're delighted that I'll find new audiences to lecture in the near future. All jokes aside, they did everything they could to make this stressful experience as smooth as possible for me and I will always be grateful for that. They also helped foster and encourage my education from a young age and without their help there is absolutely no way I would be here today.

A final thank you goes out to my partner in crime, life, and whatever else comes our way, Kayla Steinberg. She has helped keep me sane especially during the endlessly stressful final year of my Ph.D. journey. Through the job market, the pandemic and finishing this manuscript she provided more love and support than I could ever ask for. One of my only graduate school regrets is not getting to know her until the final third of my time in Michigan. I'm so grateful that I've gotten to know her and her family and I don't think I would have made it out without them and so many others cheering me on. This dissertation has been a labor of love and I cannot wait to share it with the world.

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ABSTRACT

Scholars of racial and ethnic politics have largely overlooked an important race-related disposition that strongly impacts salient policy preferences: racialized paternalism. This is a consequential and common disposition; rooted in a desire to improve outcomes for an out-group and a belief that the out-group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Importantly, I argue that this attitude is not motivated by animus. This leads these paternalists to endorse restrictive --- albeit well-intentioned --- policies imposed upon the out-group. These misbegotten efforts are intended to improve conditions for the out-group, but in practice are tantamount to discrimination, and can cause more harm than good. I begin in Chapter 2, by outlining the literature from the social sciences on racial attitudes and highlighting the lack of attention to paternalism. I show that paternalism has been historically wielded against marginalized racial groups, and explore several different ways to measure racialized paternalism against African Americans. In Chapter 3, I find that the first two approaches, based on insights from the stereotype content model, do not consistently predict support for outcomes that are racialized and paternalistic. However, the same is not true for the Black paternalism scale. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that this original measure, derived from the novel theory presented in Chapter 2, strongly predicts support for policies that are racialized and paternalistic. However, I find that this scale also predicts support for some items that are paternalistic and not racialized. This same pattern of results holds for a general and race neutral measure of paternalism. In order to further parse the race specific impact of the Black paternalism scale in Chapter 6, I run a series of experiments. I find that the Black paternalism scale predicts higher support for a takeover of a school board in a largely African American community than an identical school board in a largely White community. This same finding does not hold for the general paternalism measure, suggesting that the Black paternalism scale is capturing some meaningfully different element that is leading to discrimination. Finally, I find evidence that a paternalistic appeal does engender increased support for drug testing welfare recipients, though not among those highest in the Black paternalism scale. I conclude by encouraging scholars of racial attitudes and political behavior to look beyond the simple like-dislike paradigm that has guided much research in this area, and to take seriously the impact of multifaceted dispositions like racialized paternalism.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The right to self-governance is a cornerstone of democratic theory and was one of the key claims that animated the American revolution, leading to the inception of this nation. Despite its foundational place in our national mythology, this right has long been more easily granted to certain members of the polity than others (McConnaughy, 2013; Mickey, 2015; Teele, 2018). Indeed, to this day there remain clear inequities in who is allowed to vote with relative ease and whose votes are more consequential (Malhotra & Raso, 2007; Pettigrew, 2017). Scholars of race and politics have long catalogued these inequities and the attitudes that seem to inform them. Yet much of this work makes a crucial claim about these attitudes that is fundamentally flawed.

To best illustrate this point, it is necessary to briefly delve into the plight of public schools in Detroit, a city widely known for its steep financial decline and majority African American population. In 2009, Jennifer Granholm, the Michigan governor invoked Public Act 72, which took advantage of a law passed in 1990, allowing the state to take control of a local governing entity that was experiencing a financial emergency. This allowed the governor to install an emergency manager, in whom all of the financial powers of the district, stripped from members of the school board, were vested. The city, as a whole, and especially the schools had suffered from consistent budget shortfalls for years, due to a number of factors, but most acutely a rapidly shrinking tax base as White Detroiters fled the city limits for less integrated surrounding suburbs (Kang, 2015). The move to smite the school board was an extreme step, one used only in rare circumstances.

Rarity notwithstanding, evidence suggests that incidences of state takeover are on the rise and there is a troubling pattern behind these interventions (Morel, 2017). To that point, the Detroit school board was not the only Michigan local governing body to find itself suddenly stripped of the power invested in them by the public. Three city governments — Benton Harbor, Highland Park, and Flint — also lost their governing power to the state. These localities share one important demographic feature: they all have a plurality of Black citizens in a majority White state. Prior research on takeovers of elected governing bodies demonstrates that race plays a role in which bodies are targeted, even when accounting for other important factors like the financial situation or performance of these governmental entities (Morel, 2017). However, our understanding of racial attitudes and how they impact political outcomes does not provide a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon.

The literature on race and political behavior often makes an explicit assumption that the main driver of racially biased and discriminatory outcomes is animus toward a particular out-group (Allport, 1978; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears & Henry, 2003), but this need not be the case. The takeover of local governing bodies in largely Black communities in Michigan provides an example where the animus approach might miss some crucial element motivating these actions or support for them. Prior work proposes that these takeovers are targeted towards African Americans disproportionately and are intended to reduce the political power of the group (Morel, 2017). [1] However, this explanation seems less convincing in the case of these Michigan cities (except for Flint), given that the takeovers were set in motion by the state's Democratic governor who benefitted immensely from Black political power in these localities, since Black

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[1] Morel notes that these takeovers can under certain circumstances increase the political power of minorities, as was the case for the Latino community in Central Falls, Rhode Island. But his data on takeovers suggests this is much less likely to be the case for school districts with large Black populations.

voters and politicians were almost exclusively co-partisans. Importantly, these takeover efforts are quite frequently framed and justified as beneficial to the Black community. This is not to say that the elites who trot out this rationale are always being sincere and genuinely want what is best for African Americans; there is clear evidence that many elites do want to reduce the political power of out-groups (Rocha & Matsubyashi, 2013; Hicks, McKee, & Smith, 2016). But this framing may be successful in building a broad coalition of support for these policies in the mass public, including among those who do not harbor ill will towards Black people and are sincere in their desire to improve conditions for the group.

It's important here to pay close attention to the messaging that officials in Michigan used to explain their support for these takeovers. In an interview, shortly after the takeover was announced, Michigan Superintendent of Education Mike Flanagan argued that Robert Bobb, the appointed emergency manager, was a "a man who the community can trust to make the right decisions for the future of Detroit's children."[2] This statement seems to imply the school board duly elected by the city of Detroit for this explicit purpose, could not be trusted. The state of Michigan was, in effect, second guessing the people of Detroit and their votes. These elite actors deemed themselves better arbiters of who could manage the affairs of the school board than local citizens. It is worth taking seriously the possibility that this was not just a scheme to hurt the political power of Black Detroiters, but an attempt to help them, with little regard for the preferences of those in need, that ultimately caused more harm than good.

Detroit's public schools are far from the only example of a well-intentioned racialized social reform project gone awry. In 1961, before she embarked on her career as a civil rights

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[2] https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20090126/FREE/901260263/governor-picks-emergency-financial-manager-for-detroit-public-schools

activist, Fannie Lou Hamer went to a hospital near where she lived in Sunflower County, Mississippi for surgery to remove a uterine tumor. Unbeknownst to her, the White doctors treating Hamer would take this opportunity to, without permission, perform a hysterectomy and completely remove her uterus, leaving her infertile (Kluchin, 2011). This practice was not uncommon. Hamer would later refer to it as a "Mississippi appendectomy", and she estimated that somewhere around 2/3 of the Black women in Sunflower County at the time had been subjected to such a procedure (Kluchin, 2011).

Though the particular doctors who sterilized Hamer may not have been driven by a desire to help her when they took their fateful actions, this behavior certainly fits a common pattern. In 1919 Congress passed a military appropriations bill with a largely forgotten provision, the Chamberlain-Kahn Act, that allowed for the rounding up and detention of "promiscuous" women, in order to stem the spread of venereal disease (Stern, 2018). This plan was used to incarcerate thousands of women in the continental US and territories colonized by the US at the time, such as Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, and there is clear evidence of racial bias in its application (Stern, 2018). This act happened around the same time that ties formed between the burgeoning birth control movement, predicated on increasing access to reproductive freedom to women, and the eugenics movement, which saw social control of reproduction as a means for improving society (Roberts, 1997). Many proponents saw birth control specifically as a way to keep those with inferior genetic inheritance from passing this on, and while some, like Margaret Sanger, still prioritized the choice of individual women in this matter, many of her contemporaries did not (Roberts, 1997).

Many of the women detained under the Chamberlain Kahn Act were, like Hamer, forcibly sterilized, in what those in charge of them believed was in both the women and society's

best interest (Stern, 2018). Several states ran large scale programs of forced sterilization from this time until 1983, when Oregon finally disbanded the final state eugenics agency. Though there is no data on the role of race with regard to the practice in Mississippi, other states like North Carolina kept track of their forced sterilizations. These were clearly targeted toward African American women at a significantly higher rate than Whites especially post-World War II (Price & Darity, 2010). Though forced sterilization has largely been abandoned due to court losses and a near consensus on the danger of eugenics, its specter has occasionally still reared its head in an eerily similar fashion, now targeting pregnant women who suffer from drug addiction (Roberts, 1997).

I argue that a crucial element of support for these takeovers, sterilizations and several other important contemporary race-related policies, is a *racialized paternalism*. This is a group-specific mass attitude, motivated by a desire to improve outcomes for an out-group and a belief that the out-group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Racialized paternalism is not rooted in animus; to the contrary, its adherents feel genuinely positive toward the out-group, but doubt the capacity of the out-group to handle its own affairs. The aftermath of the Flint takeover makes clear that, no matter the impetus behind the move, the loss of local control can lead to disastrous consequences. The city's state appointed emergency manager, who had previously taken a tumultuous turn as emergency manager for Detroit public schools after Robert Bobb, approved a cost-cutting measure that made the Flint River the main source of water for the city. This new water source led to a large increase in the lead content of the city's water supply, poisoning thousands and killing at least 12.[3]

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[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water/michigan-medical-officer-ordered-to-trial-over-flint-water-deaths-idUSKBN1O628F

Extant scholarship on race and politics from across the social sciences has largely failed to account for racialized paternalism. From the definition of prejudice itself, to the large literature on modern racism, symbolic racism, and even on to much of the more recent work on the impact of implicit racial attitudes; all of these efforts examine attitudes borne out of spite. This focus is warranted, given how many Americans still express an unmistakable hostility toward out-groups, and the clear connection between those feelings and discriminatory behavior (Tesler, 2012; Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). However, the story of racial attitudes and how they impact policy preferences certainly does not end with those who express animosity towards other racial groups. But virtually all common approaches to understanding the impact of attitudes about race on public opinion fail to explore the possibility that some of those who endorse discrimination may be not spurred by animus, but instead by their affinity for an out-group.

Scholars of political behavior have ignored paternalism almost entirely. Though there have been attempts to reckon with the construct within political theory, law, and public policy, most of these have focused on when and where paternalism is appropriate. Despite the fact that this attitude, clearly relevant to beliefs about the appropriateness of the role of government in shaping our daily lives, there have been almost no attempts to measure it as an individual level attitude. Scholars have pointed out the connection between race and paternalism, but much of this work is also focused on policy implementation and how this plays out within institutions.

This theoretical construct is valuable for a number of reasons. First, it provides an explanation for why many Whites who express positive feelings toward Black people as a group might still endorse policies that are harmful or discriminatory towards the group. This framework also provides intuition about when a crucial group of "moderates" is likely to side with those whose racial attitudes are more antagonistic (on policy that is racialized and paternalistic).

Finally, this theory underlies the construction of a novel and consequential measure, the Black Paternalism scale. This measure is not easily conflated with partisan or ideological identities, an important critique often leveled against animus-based racial attitudes like racial resentment (Carmines & Sniderman, 1997; Feldman & Huddy, 2005).

This dissertation attempts to assess racialized paternalism and the way that it impacts political attitudes. In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature from across the social sciences on racial attitudes and how they impact political behavior. Specifically, I highlight the lack of attention to conceptions of discriminatory racial attitudes not rooted in animus toward a particular out-group. I highlight the existing literature on race and paternalism and how it points to but does not cleanly identify a mass attitude centered around paternalism and race. I detail a theory of racialized paternalism, a desire to aid a given racial group paired with a belief that the group is incapable of achieving good outcomes on their own. I detail a number of historical instances where this attitude seemed to guide the behavior of dominant group members toward the members of other stigmatized groups throughout American history. I also give detailed expectations of how a measure that tapped this construct should perform with regard to predicting policy attitudes.

In Chapter 3, I explore two strategies for measuring the construct of racialized paternalism based on the stereotype content model. Specifically, these measures capture those who express positive feelings toward a key racialized group but also harbor negative stereotypes about the group relative to their in-group. Across three separate studies, including two original online surveys, and one nationally representative probability sample, I find inconsistent evidence that these measures predict the outcomes a measure of racialized paternalism is expected to strongly impact. This is also true when examining several different racialized groups. These

findings suggest that despite the promise of the relatively straightforward combination of positive affect and negative stereotypes for a given group, racialized paternalism is more complex and a more direct attitudinal assessment is necessary to concretely tap this construct.

In Chapter 4, I detail the creation of exactly such a measure. The Black paternalism scale attempts to directly assess a desire to help African Americans regardless of the consequences, which should align with a belief that the group is incapable of helping themselves. Across several original surveys I find remarkably consistent evidence that this scale strongly predicts support for policies that disproportionately target or impact Black people and are paternalistic. I also explore a nearly identical scale that measures race neutral paternalism, and find that this general paternalism scale also performs as expected and seems to predict support for paternalism regardless of the target of that paternalism. However, these two scales are very highly correlated, and the cross-sectional evidence does not provide clear evidence the two are capturing significantly different attitudes.

In Chapter 5, I use a number of survey experiments to further explore the performance of the measures introduced in the previous two chapters. In order to test the degree to which race can drive differences in the application of paternalism, I run an experiment with a fictional school board in danger of takeover by a state. I alternate the race of the school board and find that even when accounting for animus-based measures like racial resentment, those highest in the Black paternalism scale are more likely to support the takeover when the school board is largely made up of Black members than when the same is true for Whites. This is not true for the general paternalism scale or the measures derived from the stereotype content model, and confirms that the Black paternalism scale can predict meaningful racial discrimination. I run a separate experiment examining the way that paternalistic framing of a policy can increase support for the

policy relative to other frames. I find counterintuitively that though the paternalistic appeal is more popular, and exposure to it significantly increases support for the policy among the full sample, but neither of these effects is true for those highest in the Black paternalism scale.

In Chapter 6, I provide a brief summary of the work presented. I then give some brief concluding thoughts about the work, what it means, and where it goes from here. Despite some outstanding questions about the connection between the general paternalism scale and the Black paternalism scale, the latter very clearly performs in a way that matched the expectations laid out for a measure of racialized paternalism.

Chapter 2: Theorizing Racialized Paternalism

The study of racial attitudes and their impact on public opinion has made an errant assumption that the valence of affect for a group will consistently drive preferences for policy toward that group in a consistent direction. For this reason, scholars interested in understanding the impact of racial attitudes on meaningful political outcomes have prioritized the role of racial animus as the primary impetus behind discriminatory behavior and preferences. Allport, in one of the earliest attempts to reckon with this construct, defines prejudice as "antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization," making a negative affectual charge a necessary component of prejudice (Allport, 1979). Much of the subsequent literature follows Allport's lead and prioritizes the role of negative affect as a necessary condition for prejudice.

The closely interwoven constructs of symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment, have been the hallmark constructs in political science work on how racial attitudes translate into political behavior over the past 40 years. Their creators have described the survey items in these various constructs as tapping into a "subtle hostility" and "a fusion of anti-Black affect and individualism" (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears & Henry 2003). The questions were specifically designed to assess a dislike of African Americans paired with a belief that the group violates traditional norms. To be sure, scholars have offered many potent critiques of the work on racial resentment. But this work has largely questioned whether the construct is picking up on the intended latent dimension (Carney & Enos, nd), whether the construct has an inherent ideological bias (Sniderman & Piazza, 1995; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Huddy & Feldman, 2006), or whether it ignores the role of structural racism (Bonilla-Silva, 1999). Other

scholars have established that anger is the emotional foundation of racial resentment, whereas old fashioned biological racism is motivated by disgust, both extreme negative emotions (Banks & Valentino, 2012).

More recently scholars of race in the quantitative social sciences have taken a keen interest in understanding automatic and implicit attitudes with regard to race. These works have made use of implicit attitude tests that specifically rely on affective charges associated with specific out-groups to measure bias (Kalmoe & Piston, 2013; Kinder & Ryan, 2015; Pérez, 2016). The original IAT and many permutations attempt to assess the immediate emotional charge following exposure to a given out-group and assume that those who have more negative implicit associations with an out-group harbor an implicit bias against them (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003). Though not all implicit measures are affect-based, the ones used most commonly to assess the impact of race bias, like the AMP or go-no go task, are (Payne et. al. 2010; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).

Other scholars have focused on constructs such as ethnocentrism, the propensity of ordinary people to divide the world into an "us" comprised of their in-group, opposed against a "them" comprised of everyone else. Ethnocentrism is driven by a feeling of in-group superiority, and the measurement of the construct reflects this. Notably, strong positive feelings toward one's own group are not necessarily linked to a denigration of other groups (Kinder & Kam, 2009). However, ethnocentrism requires this, as indicated by common measurement strategy. To create a measure of ethnocentrism scholars often use stereotype measures or feeling thermometers to get a sense of the degree to which individuals rate their own group more warmly or more indicative of positive stereotypes than their average for all other groups (Kam & Kinder, 2007; Kinder & Kam, 2010). Though clear negative affect for an out-group is not a necessary condition

for some amount of ethnocentrism to occur (an individual who rates their group as 100 on the feeling thermometer and all other groups as 75 would fall near the middle of the distribution of ethnocentrism), those who feel least positively toward out-groups are very likely to be high in ethnocentrism. Finally, it's worth noting that the stereotype measure has been shown to outperform the feeling thermometer measure, but the two measures are correlated and seem to capture a similar latent dimension (Kinder & Kam, 2010; Valentino, Brader & Jardina; 2012).

A number of other approaches to examining racial attitudes have managed to avoid the dominant animus paradigm. One notable school of thought that falls into this category is the literature on realistic group conflict. Blumer's group conflict theory and variants thereof are largely independent of affect and focus on conflict over claim to material possessions, rights, and resources (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). However, this conception still prioritizes explicit conflict over access to and control over resources, which is likely to co-occur with animosity (Jackman, 1994). Even important critiques of these approaches like that of Bonilla-Silva (1997), which notes the limitations of an understanding of racism rooted in mere interpersonal hostility, pushes scholars towards thinking about race as a structural phenomenon, instead of exploring the connection between neutral or positive affect for a group and racial bias.

Though the lion's share of attention has been paid to negative affect there have been efforts undertaken to explore the way that positive affect for out-groups impacts political behavior. However, this literature makes the same assumption and focuses exclusively on how positive affect and racial sympathy for an out-group in driving attitudes on racialized policy (Katz & Hass, 1988; Chudy, 2017). These authors take the positive affect as a signal of genuine racial liberalism and do not explore the ways this positive affect might be complicated by other attitudes.

Why Animus?

Why have scholars of race been so preoccupied with animus toward out-groups? The most straightforward explanation is the assumption that affective reactions to groups will guide preferences for the group. This assumption is most clearly stated in the literature on implicit attitudes, automatic cognition, and race. Implicit measures are seen as a way to tap the differential emotional activations associated with any given emotional stimulus. Specifically, these tests attempt to get a relative sense of hot cognition, the immediate valence we associate with any given socio-political object (Lodge & Taber, 2013). The difference in this activation is what we consider implicit bias; this is to say that bad feelings targeted towards one group more than another are seen as indicative of bias (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). However, there has been much debate about what exactly the bias demonstrated in implicit tests are actually capturing. The relation of these measures to actual discriminatory outcomes has varied widely (Oswald, Blanton, Mitchell, Jaccard & Tetlock, 2013; Oswald, Blanton, Mitchell, Jaccard & Tetlock, 2015).

But another set of literature has provided a strong challenge to this feelings = outcomes paradigm. The stereotype content model from psychology posits that judgments about social groups fall along two key axes, competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Though most of the work on racial attitudes looks at the congruent pairings, i.e. low competence/warmth and high competence/warmth, there are other possible combinations that can produce unique and consequential emotions toward out-groups. Specifically, groups that are seen as high in warmth and low in competence can engender emotions such as pity or sympathy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Fiske and her colleagues find that several groups like the elderly, the poor, and the disabled meet this criterion and are commonly seen as incompetent but

still viewed positively overall. Though these are the only out-groups viewed by the public in aggregate in this light, it is certainly possible that many individuals feel this way about a variety of groups.

But what does this counterintuitive combination of feelings and beliefs about a given group look like in practice? Research from social psychology on attitudes around gender demonstrates that the pairing of positive affect and negative stereotypes towards women is common and meaningful. These scholars coined the term benevolent sexism to describe a type of sexism that is not driven by negative affect or independent of affect all together, but instead is driven by positive affect (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The concept describes men (and notably many women as well) who feel positively toward women and seek to help them, but still harbor negative stereotypes about the group and desire for them to fill predetermined roles that undercut these efforts. Glick and Fiske note that there are multiple important sources of benevolent sexism but the most relevant for these purposes is protective paternalism (Glick & Fiske, 1996).

Another tempting rationale justifying the preoccupation with animus is that it is easy to find. But a careful examination of the literature shows that this is not as true as one might think. Though the racial resentment battery was created to tap into a clear affective dimension, the questions were also worded such as to capture this element subtly. In the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES) the vast majority of White people do not express a clearly negative view of African Americans, and this has been the case every year the feeling thermometer has appeared on the survey beginning in 1972. This is not to say the group is seen as positively as Whites, they are not and have not been at any point in that span. But it is not the case that some large group of White people is expressing negative views about the group. Positive feelings toward the group are much more common.

With that caveat noted, it must be mentioned that there are still a considerable number of White people who do express negative views about African Americans. These negative views are meaningful and do play a large role in driving political attitudes and behavior. Negative feelings towards a group are the most effective and primary motivator of discriminatory behavior. But they are not the only motivator of discriminatory behavior and positive feelings for a group certainly do not preclude someone from endorsing discrimination against a group. To this point, prior work on benevolent sexism makes this point clearly. A body of literature demonstrates that benevolent sexism, despite its positive tenor, can lead to more negative evaluations of rape victims and lower attributions of blame to the perpetrators of rape (Viki, Abrams & Massey, 2004; Viki, Massey, & Masser, 2005; Masser, Lee, & Mckimmie, 2009).

This makes clear that despite the successes of the animus approach, it can present an incomplete or distorted view of the more complex processes that lead to discrimination. This approach can tell us nothing about what Fiske and colleagues call paternalistic prejudices. This set of attitudes, rooted in affinity for a group, paired with a pitying low perception of competence for that same group, includes benevolent sexism, but also paternalism targeted towards other specific groups. And despite the lack of animus, this paternalism can still lead to the same discriminatory outcomes as animus. In the following section, I give a thorough account of paternalism and how it operates in politics before turning to its specific intersection with racial attitudes.

Paternalism

Paternalism can mean different things in different circumstances but generally refers to the relationship between a parent and child, and specifically circumstances when this dynamic is

applied to other situations. Dworkin (1971) specifically defines paternalism as "the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being coerced." Though this definition has served as a base for scholars thinking about paternalism there is still considerable disagreement about what qualifies as paternalism and how it operates.

Scholars of political theory, philosophy, and law have spilled much ink on the nature and bounds of paternalism. Their works have delineated various ways to categorize paternalism, whether it is intended to restrict voluntary or involuntary behaviors, whether it is intended to reach the ultimate goal of those on the wrong end of paternalism or not. Rich debates have been had about the normative implications of paternalism and when it is appropriate or legal to deny agency to an individual. Even back to the works of John Stuart Mill, political philosophers have explored the degree to which interference with one's personal liberty is appropriate and as such have had to tackle questions of when such paternalism is warranted in governance and when it is not (Mill, 1857; Arneson, 1980; Sanikowski, 1985; New, 1999; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). This important work notwithstanding, other segments of political science have spent less time interrogating paternalism, and this is especially true of the field of American political behavior.

Given the differing conceptions of paternalism, it is necessary to first take some time to explain exactly what I mean by paternalism before addressing how it intersects with racial attitudes. For these purposes, I am only considering what is deemed as "hard" or "coercive" paternalism (Dworkin, 1972). As such, paternalism must include an attempt to limit the choices or access to goods and services, of an individual or group, and a justification of this action as somehow beneficial to the individual or group. Importantly, the restriction here need not be *solely* justified as an attempt to improve conditions for the group, but it does need to be a part of

the motivation. For example, laws that place excess consumption taxes on goods that are detrimental to health outcomes, like sugary drinks or cigarettes, are often also justified as ways to raise revenue for state and local governments, but this does not negate the paternalistic nature of these laws.

I also make an important distinction that paternalism, by this definition, need not go against the will of the target in order to count as paternalism. The mere act of attempting to coerce a specific outcome through restrictions is a sufficient condition for paternalism. To illustrate this point, though many who ride in cars wear seatbelts willingly and would do so even if they would not receive a ticket for noncompliance, laws mandating seatbelts are still a form of paternalism.

Under this definition, a campaign aimed at educating sex workers about potential dangers of their profession would not be paternalistic, because, despite the assumption that sex workers do not understand the job they undertake daily, there is no effort to limit their freedom. However, the SESTA bill passed by Congress in 2018 which effectively shut down websites used by sex workers to sell their services, with the stated goal of ensuring the safety of sex workers, would be paternalistic. This is because concrete steps are taken to limit the access and choice in order to protect these same individuals. Work on subtle paternalism, through choice architecture would not be seen as paternalism unless it specifically restricts access (Sunstein & Thaler, 2008).

Paternalism should be inversely related to dispositions like individualism which venerate the power of the individual to make their own choices. It may be closely related to authoritarianism, in that both of these constructs lead to support for state intrusion into the lives of citizens. Despite this, the motivations behind these constructs are notably distinct; the paternalist does not crave government interference exclusively for order or social control, as

authoritarians do (Altemeyer, 1981). Instead the paternalist desires government interference in order to improve outcomes, driven by their judgments about the inability of their fellow citizens to succeed if left to their own devices.

General paternalism should be more common among liberals than conservatives, in that conservatives should prioritize the ability of the individual to make decisions without government interference. Similarly, since they are motivated by their desire to improve conditions for their fellow citizens, paternalists should be more egalitarian than their counterparts, and should be on average lower than others on constructs like social dominance orientation, a personality trait that captures a natural preference for hierarchy. But again, general paternalism itself is not racialized, and it should be targeted equally towards all groups.

Much of the work cited here makes normative claims about paternalism. I do not attempt to do so here, because of how context specific the impact of paternalism can be. Paternalism in the form of mandated vaccines has helped eradicate disease and saved countless human lives, while other forms such as the denial of agency to disabled individuals has irreparably harmed countless other lives. That said, when coercive paternalism is selectively wielded by the state, and only certain groups or individuals are subject to a denial of agency and intrusion in their personal lives, I argue that this poses a clear problem of discrimination. And indeed, there is considerable evidence that despite the existence of a general and race neutral paternalism, this attitude is often targeted toward particular stigmatized groups.

Race and Paternalism

To this point, despite the inattention of American behaviorists to paternalism, scholars of American politics more generally have found considerable evidence that paternalism is a potent

force and that race is linked to its application. Jackman (1994) explores the possibility that scholars of gender class and race have, in their pursuit of outright conflict in intergroup relations, missed the dominant ideological framework that superordinate groups have attempted to impose on their subordinates. She argues that paternalism is an ideology in the Marxist sense, one used to satiate subaltern groups and convince them that being on the wrong side of unequal relations is not so bad after all (Jackman, 1994). Jackman claims that outright conflict between groups is rare and relations rife with conditional benevolence are a more sustainable strategy, regardless of which side of inequality you fall on. She claims the goal of this paternalism is to reify the status quo and avoid costly and potentially successful challenges to the hierarchy, and that the benevolence often ascribed to the *pater* is an illusion (Jackman, 1994). However, Jackman stops short of conceptualizing and measuring the disposition in the broader public, and assumes its existence from support of paternalist policy (Jackman, 1994).

Soss, Fording, and Schram explore the rise of neoliberalism in the United States specifically with regard to poverty governance and find that race and paternalism are uniquely intertwined in how this has played out (Soss, Fording & Schram, 2012). Mead and others have argued that the late 20th and early 21st centuries in American politics have featured a "new paternalism", referring specifically to efforts to reduce poverty through "directive and supervisory" policy (Mead, 1997). This project led to many reforms of government anti-poverty efforts, such as the end of AFDC and the introduction of work requirements for those receiving TANF. Soss et al. claim this project is intended to remake the poor into ideal citizens, curing pathologies and teaching them to be self-regulating, and that the project is highly racialized (Soss, Fording & Schram, 2012). The relevant stereotypes about the laziness of the poor that these interventions are meant to correct are often targeted towards African Americans, and much

work has shown that poverty itself is racialized (Gilens, 2009). The racial classification model posited by Soss, Fording, and Schram makes clear that the paternalism is an intentional choice by policy makers, and they provide evidence that the race of a particular locality strongly impacts whether paternalism will be evidenced in policy choices (Soss, Fording & Schram, 2008).

To be sure, there is some scholarly work on the way that paternalism plays out among the mass public. Baker (2014) used a survey experiment to demonstrate that support for foreign aid to African countries was highly conditional on whether Western institutions were in place to oversee the use of funds. This work is an important contribution to the connection between race and paternalism, but still fails to measure paternalism as an individual level attitude. More problematically, this work explicitly claims that racialized paternalism does not operate in American domestic politics (Baker, 2014). Baker claims "mass attitudes about race and redistribution still show sentiments of uncharitable resentment, rather than charitable pity, to dominate among American Whites." (p.96)

To the contrary, an examination of the historical record with regard to paternalism makes clear that race (among other identities) has very much played a role in who has been subject to paternalistic intervention at the hands of the state. Paternalism has marred relations between dominant and subordinate groups in the United States almost constantly since the nation's inception. Though chattel slavery in the U.S. stands out for its brutality and dehumanization, slavery proponents rarely noted this aspect of the practice when arguing for its continuance. Indeed, many enslavers and slavery sympathizers made the case that slave owners were engaged in the task of civilizing their human property (Ford, 2009; Genovese, 1976). There is contention around some of these claims, particularly the notion that slavers were motivated by some sort of

genuine benevolence especially given the horrific treatment of many slaves and the constant fear of rebellion that guided thinking of the southern elite at the time (Patterson, 1982). However, consistent with the story told by Jackman and others, there is evidence that even if the benevolence was a post hoc rationalization, it was common and accepted as a rationale.

De Bow's Review, a southern magazine published in the immediate pre-and post-bellum period for Southern elites, would be a place that this paternalism would register if this elite level story were true. And a cursory look at the magazine's archives show this is certainly true. In an 1858 piece in the magazine comparing the experience of newly freed persons in post-revolution Haiti with that of enslaved Black people in the US, Edmund Ruffin, a Virginia aristocrat and ardent secessionist, argued "no unprejudiced mind can now admit… the capacity of the Black race to become or remain industrious, civilized… in any other condition than when held enslaved and directed by white men." [4] In a separate piece in 1856 written by General John Tyler made a similar case, arguing for the "vast social and mental improvement of the Negro slave in the south", claiming "the slave [has] been redeemed from barbarism to civilization and from heathenism to Christianity." [5] It is crucial to note that this paternalism is far from the only racial attitude expressed in these works, indeed in the very next clause Tyler declares that Blacks are naturally a "blood thirsty and predatory animal" engaging in clear dehumanization. These works constantly refer to Blacks in demeaning fashion and proclaim that they lack innate intelligence, but at least as a rhetorical tool, paternalism was a key ingredient in the defenses of slavery.

Yet these arguments did not abate when slavery was abolished. In the postwar period, when similar arguments were made to ward off Black male suffrage. In an 1867 piece for the magazine, William Sykes argued that "if left under the guidance of their true friends, the white

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[4] http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moajrnl/acg1336.1-20.006/674
[5] http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moajrnl/acg1336.1-21.006/610

men of the south, they can become the most valuable laborers." [6] In the post-Reconstruction South similar arguments emerged to explain why giving newly freed persons the ability to vote would be a fate worse than the reign of racial terror instituted in the wake of federal troop withdrawal (Smith, 1993; De Bow's Review, 1867).

Some might dismiss this appearance of paternalism as meaningless rhetorical flourish, especially from conservative and reactionary forces of this time, who had much to gain from the subordination of African Americans. Lest you think this disposition, or at least the facade of such, were limited to these nostalgic Redeemers, I note that the same attitude could be found among ardent abolitionists. Despite close relations in the 1840's, a rift developed between Fredrick Douglass and his White abolitionist counterpart William Lloyd Garrison in the years leading up to the Civil War. Many factors played a role in this, but Garrison's desire to control the image of Douglass seemed to be a big part of their disagreement. Garrison objected to Douglass leaving his auspices and forming his own North Star newspaper, clashed with Douglass on how he, a formerly enslaved person, talked about his time in captivity (Tillery, 1976; Sekora, 1994). Garrison's struggle for control over Douglass mirrored the influence of early funders of the NAACP on the priorities of that organization, leading them away from anti-lynching advocacy to focus on desegregation of schools (Francis, 2019).

Similarly, paternalistic arguments along these same lines were made with regard to indigenous peoples in North America who, well into the 20th century, were forced to attend schools like Carlisle Indian Industrial School, alma mater of famed Sac and Fox Nation member and Olympic gold medalist, Jim Thorpe. These schools were founded by the federal government

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[6] http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moajrnl/acg1336.2-04.005/423n

with the expressed purpose of assimilating indigenous children into American culture which involved forcibly removing all artifacts of these children's own culture even down to their names (Trennert, 1982; Navarro-Rivera, 2006; Dawson, 2012). Even today indigenous Americans in the U.S. are officially designated as "domestic dependent nations", and maintain limited autonomy over their affairs and governance.

As noted in the introduction, countless women, especially Black and Brown women, were targets of forced sterilization at the hands of the state well into the second half of the 20th century. These actions again were justified in the context of eugenics with paternalistic appeals claiming to spare these allegedly morally unsound or incompetent women the hassle of child birth and care (Roberts, 1997; Beal, 2008; Kluchin, 2011). These paternalistic approaches seemed to be targeted with surgical precision towards those at intersections of race, gender, and class. Further, each of these cases involves dominant groups limiting the freedom of out-groups, while claiming to do so in the groups best interest, with little regard for the perspective of group members, who are competent adults capable of articulating their own self-interest. And all of these efforts were incredibly harmful to those on the subordinate side.

A Theory of Racialized Paternalism

These actions were not driven by a general or non-specific paternalism, they singled out particular identities and stripped them of agency afforded to other Americans. I build on the prior work suggesting paternalism among elites is an illusion, and masks strategic motivations (Jackman, 1994; Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording, & Schram 2012). Despite the potential for insincerity from politicians and policymakers, I argue that within the broader mass public these rationales can find sympathetic audiences who harbor no ill will towards these out-groups, and

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genuinely desire to aid the out-group. The illusion of benevolence among elites that Jackman (1994) claims is a facade for those on the subordinate side of inequality, can also serve to convince superordinate group members who subscribe to a *racialized paternalism*. This racialized paternalism has two simple but key components: a desire to improve outcomes for a group and a belief that the group is incapable of improving their own outcomes without interference. Underlying this unique disposition is an affinity for a racialized group, in conjunction with negative stereotypes about the competence and intelligence of the group. Though completely separate from animus, this framework compels support for interventions that strip power and agency from said out-group.

Notably, though judgments about the competence of an out-group are central to this construct, it is not just about the impact of negative stereotypes relevant to an out-group. I argue that the impact of these stereotypes changes when they are paired with a genuine desire to help the stereotyped group. Stereotypes about competence and intelligence should be most likely to motivate racialized paternalism, but other stereotypes such as those concerning commitment to the work ethic or propensity for violence among a group should also contribute to this construct. Given the relevance of stereotypes here, those at the nexus of several stigmatized identities (such as class, gender, sexuality, and disability) are most likely to be targeted by this paternalism. This theory is not specific to any particular identity group or nation, though the majority of the evidence I put forth in this dissertation focuses on how it manifests in Americans who identify as White with regards to Black people.

The construct of racialized paternalism provides several important contributions to the study of intergroup attitudes broadly. First, it expands our understanding of these attitudes by probing beyond a simple like dislike paradigm that has guided much research in this area and

exploring the complex and multifaceted nature of the emotions we feel toward out-groups (Clifford & Piston, 2017). In doing so it provides an explanation for public support of policies that are racially biased or discriminatory among the many majority group members who do not express outwardly negative views of racial out-groups. This framework also clarifies when the adherents of this disposition, who can play a pivotal role in implementing the aforementioned discriminatory policies, will side with those who have more antagonistic attitudes on race. Specifically, racial paternalists will support discriminatory policy that restricts the freedom of the out-group, but only when this policy is seen as accounting for the group's shortcomings and improving the group's outcomes. Finally, the theory elucidated here underpins the logic of a novel measure of racialized paternalism towards Black people, which I explain later in the dissertation.

The construct of racialized paternalism is novel and distinct from some related constructs that have appeared in the social science literature. Obviously, the emotional substrate of affection for members of the key out-group differentiates the construct from the traditional animus-based racial attitudes. Scholars have demonstrated that disgust undergirds more old-fashioned explicit racism and that anger is the base for racial resentment (Banks & Valentino, 2012). Clearly these are aversive and animus laden emotions, and as such these should not be motivating racialized paternalism. The emotions most likely to play a role in motivating racialized paternalism are pity and guilt. Specifically, those who subscribe to this worldview should pity the out-group, and see them as in distress or danger. Those highest in this disposition should be acutely aware of racial inequality, and are less likely than other White people to deny that their group is responsible for this inequality.

Work from psychology has identified the White guilt scale as a powerful motivator of racial attitudes (Swim & Miller, 1999; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). Though it may be likely to co-occur with racialized paternalism, White guilt operates in a substantially different fashion. The scale captures an acknowledgment of the history of racism perpetrated by Whites, and does lead to support for measures that reduce inequality such as supporting affirmative action (Chudy, Piston & Shipper, 2019). But those highest in White guilt need not believe that the out-group is incapable of achieving good outcomes on their own. The same is true for a construct closely related to White guilt, White privilege. This measure captures acknowledgment of the subtle benefits to whiteness, which has been linked to support for inequality reducing measures (Swim & Miller, 1999; Pinterits, Poteat, & Spanierman, 2009). But this is clearly distinct from believing that out-groups are helpless and in need of intervention on their behalf.

The construct is also notably distinct from though likely related to racial sympathy. Though both of these constructs focus on White Americans who recognize and wish to change racial inequality, there is a key distinction. Racial sympathy motivates opposition to policies that harm the key out-group (Chudy, 2019). There is reason to believe that this is not the case for those who subscribe to racialized paternalism. Though there may be considerable overlap between those who express sympathy and paternalism, paternalists are not bothered by causing harm to the group if it is for the greater good.

In a similar manner, this construct is related to respectability politics. Jefferson (2019) builds a scale of respectability and shows that among Black people it leads to support for punitive policies that police other members of the group. Though these dispositions can lead to support for the same outcomes, the source is quite distinct. Jefferson finds that respectability politics is to some degree motivated by shame, which is why it is internalized and wielded

toward in group members. This is quite different from the pity that externally motivates paternalists to subject members of an out-group to similar treatment. I focus on how paternalism shapes attitudes among the dominant group in society, but within group responses to the scale would capture an attitude closer to respectability politics.

Much like paternalism generally, racialized paternalism should be distinct from but related to authoritarianism. Though the measures should lead to support for similar interventions prioritizing social control, racialized paternalists do not endorse these policies just to maintain order, they believe that the policies will help the out-group by forcing them to overcome barriers. In the same manner, this should be inversely related to social dominance orientation (SDO) and particularly it's egalitarian component, because those who are highest in racialized paternalism should be more likely to endorse egalitarianism and do genuinely desire to reduce inequality. However, unlike general paternalism, racialized paternalism should be related to racial attitudes. Those highest in racialized paternalism should be rating Black people high on the feeling thermometer, since they should feel positively towards the group. If this bears out, then racialized paternalism should be inversely related to any measure of racial animus, such as racial resentment or ethnocentrism.

It's less clear how racialized paternalism should relate to socioeconomic and demographic variables. There is some reason to believe that those with higher education and higher incomes should be more paternalistic generally, but it's not clear how this would impact racialized paternalism. Work from psychology shows that those with more domain specific knowledge are more likely to believe they have knowledge in other areas. This could drive those with more education to feel more qualified to weigh in on how others should conduct their lives (Dunning, 2011; Simons, 2013). Similarly, paternalism seems to often be dictated along class

lines and those with higher incomes might similarly feel more qualified to control the lives of others. Those who are more religious might feel more of a compulsion to aid stigmatized groups, a key part of racialized paternalism. They may also be more likely to feel the need to alter the behavior of the out-group in question in order to increase morality or godliness. Historically, the colonialist project was infused with religious zeal and paternalism, and mission trips undertaken by many religious groups today are still rife with this thinking (Bandyopadhyay, 2019). For this reason, I do expect religiosity to be correlated with a measure of racial paternalism.

Paternalism and Policy Support

There is an extensive literature that suggests that when holding certain policies in mind, considerations about the group that the policy is assumed to impact automatically come to mind (Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Pérez, 2016). And there are a number of political issues in the American context that have been demonstrated to be highly racialized, and clearly linked to certain racial groups, such as welfare and crime (Gilens, 2009; Valentino, 1999; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005; Filindra & Kaplan, 2016). When respondents are exposed to a racialized policy that restricts or limits the freedom of the target out-group and does so specifically in order to help that group, racial paternalists will be likely to support this policy. In some cases, this could be policy that is actually harmful and that these respondents might not want for themselves. Regardless, as long as a policy is racialized and it imposes restrictions or limits freedom to overcome deficiencies it should be appealing to racial paternalists.

There are a number of policies that meet this criterion. Given the racialization of welfare, interventions meant to improve the lives of individuals receiving welfare should be popular among racial paternalists (Gilens, 2009; DeSante, 2013). Policies that require drug tests or

employment (e.g. workfare) for welfare recipients should be seen as necessary interventions to ensure that Black recipients that they deem deviant are forced to improve the quality of their own lives. These policies were a large part of the welfare reform push in the US in the 1990's that has been repeatedly linked to paternalism (Wacquant, 2009; Soss, Fording, Schram, 2011). I expect this same process to work out with preferences for subjecting those in public housing to extraordinary scrutiny. In 1996, Congress, at the urging of President Clinton, passed a law that allowed a "One strike you're out" policy for public housing, such that anyone living in public housing who is charged with a crime can be immediately evicted from their homes. This law has withstood a court challenge, and clearly subjects some of the most vulnerable in society to a higher standard than others. This is also clearly racialized since Black people not only make up a disproportionate share of those in public housing, they also comprise a clear plurality of all people in public housing. A measure of racial paternalism towards Black people should be strongly associated with support for these policies.

In a similar manner, several judges throughout the US have offered inmates reduced sentences in exchange for the inmates being sterilized.[7] The rationale offered by the judge in one such case directly points to paternalism as the impetus. "I hope to encourage them to take personal responsibility and give them a chance, when they do get out, to not to be burdened with children," Judge Sam Benningfield said of his decision.[8] A measure of racialized paternalism towards Black people should motivate support for policy initiatives along these lines, especially when the crime is clearly racialized (such as with the use of crack cocaine). Finally, marijuana use is also clearly racialized, African Americans are much more likely to go to prison for

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[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2018/02/08/judge-suggests-drug-addicted-woman-get-sterilized-before-sentencing-and-she-does/
[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/21/judge-to-inmates-get-sterilized-and-ill-shave-off-jail-time/

marijuana related offenses relative to their size of the population, despite the fact that they use drugs at a roughly similar rate as Whites (Wallace, Bachman, O'Malley, Schulenberg, Cooper & Johnston, 2003; McCabe, Morales, Cranford, Delva, McPherson & Boyd, 2007). Because of this racialization, racial paternalists should see marijuana prohibition as necessary to ensure that African American individuals do not excessively use the drug and harm their productivity and cognitive functions with it. Any measure of racialized paternalism should also strongly predict support for these policy outcomes.

In late 2019 COVID-19, a novel coronavirus, began sweeping through China and by early summer had infected more than 2 million Americans and killed more than 100000 Americans. Notably, racial disparities were observed early in the pandemic, and have consistently driven infection and death numbers to be disproportionately high in Black communities (Hooper, Nápoles & Pérez-Staples, 2020). A number of policies were and continue to be discussed in order to stem the spread of the virus, many of which involved paternalism in some form. Given the racialized nature of infection and the potential for paternalistic responses, a measure of racialized paternalism toward Black people should strongly move support for interventions that restrict freedom in order to contain the virus. Particularly the use of police force to ensure that people are social distancing, and those who've been exposed are keeping quarantine should be particularly attractive options to racial paternalists. Similarly, mandatory vaccinations and surveillance of those who may have contracted the virus through mobile phone data should also be seen as good solutions by these racial paternalists. Again, to be clear these interventions could end up saving the lives of Black people disproportionately, but still would fit the definition of discrimination if subjecting this group particularly to more scrutiny than others.

There are number of policy areas that are racialized with regard to groups other than African Americans that a measure of racialized paternalism tailored to the specific group should strongly impact. France instituted a ban on religious headgear in public spaces, as a security measure and an attempt to secularize specifically Muslim women. The rationale was to free these women from their repressive religious customs (Joppke, 2009). This is a fairly straightforward case of racialized paternalism. Though Muslims are not a racial group they have been clearly racialized in American politics and attitudes toward them are quite consistent with attitudes along racial lines. For this reason, a measure of racialized paternalism toward Muslims should predict support for a religious headgear ban. In a similar vein, there has been considerable debate over the appropriateness of non-English instruction in schools in the U.S. Those who feel racialized paternalism towards Latinos should feel strongly that this group should be subject to English only instruction to help prepare them for a largely monolingual culture, even if it hurts outcomes for those students in the short term.

The exact same relationships should exist, though potentially weaker in magnitude, for those highest in general paternalism. They should be supportive of *any* policies that restrict the freedom of individuals in order to help them. However, for these general paternalists the same should be true even if the policy is not racialized. For instance, those highest in general paternalism should be equally likely to support a policy that taxes unhealthy substances like soda, or requires motorcyclists to wear helmets, or to oppose assisted suicide. If these general paternalists are not discriminating, they should support any paternalistic intervention regardless of target.

Similarly, demonstrating that a measure of racialized paternalism is associated with support for racialized and paternalistic policies is not sufficient to prove that the theory

underlying the measurement is correct. We could see that pattern even if the measure of racialized paternalism instead captured some hidden or unexpressed animus. To rule out that possibility I test whether these measures predict support for a policy that is racialized but not paternalistic. For instance, a policy like Obamacare has been demonstrated to be tied to racial attitudes, but only through its association with President Obama (Tesler, 2012). So, unlike racial resentment, a measure of racialized paternalism should be unassociated with opposition to Obamacare. Similarly, support for the death penalty has been shown to be linked to racial attitudes in numerous studies (Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002; Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005). However, given the clear mortal consequences of this policy, it should be seen as too extreme and punitive to be helpful to the out-group. As such, a measure of racialized paternalism should not be linked with such a policy.

Even if the expected behavior is borne out with regard to support for all of those specific policies, it is difficult to completely isolate the role of race by exploring cross-sectional data. In order to conclusively demonstrate that the race is the key driver of racialized paternalism, an experiment is necessary. Returning to the instructive Detroit schools example, takeovers of largely governmental entities largely comprised of Black members have become an important tool used by state and federal authorities (Morel, 2018). From school districts to city administration to even mayors there is evidence that racial bias plays a role in when power is stripped from local governing bodies by their superiors (Morel, 2018). I argue that racialized paternalism plays a role here and stereotypes about even elites of the target out-group lead racial paternalists to believe that the group is not capable of self-governance. For this reason, a measure of racialized paternalism towards Black people should predict increased support for government takeovers of local governing bodies in largely Black communities' relative to support for the

same takeovers in largely White communities. This finding would provide concrete evidence that this disposition motivates racial discrimination. However, this should not be true for the general paternalism measure, which should motivate high levels of support for the takeover with no difference by race.

However, because these paternalists do want to help the out-group, they should also be more supportive of increasing funding to that same school district when the school board is comprised of largely Black members relative to one with White members. If they genuinely see the Black communities' school board as most in need of help they should be more willing to help it. But again, they should see the Black school board as largely unable to help itself without the help of benevolent patrons.

It is also important to test whether paternalism is indeed a useful rhetorical tool that elites can employ to convince the public to support policies that might be harmful to a group. This is a crucial part of the connection between the facade of paternalism that scholars claim is foisted upon the public by elites, and the genuine attitude that I propose exists in the mass public. A paternalistic frame in support of subjecting those who receive welfare to drug tests should convince those who harbor racialized paternalism to be more supportive of the policy. Emphasizing how the policy can help those it impacts should be more popular than emphasizing the punishment aspect or how much money the policy could save a locality. If borne out this finding would provide conclusive evidence that this process is possible, and that paternalism can be used to build support for policies that can be harmful to an out-group even among those who are motivated to aid the group.

In the following chapters, I bring data to bear from the American National Election study, and several original national surveys, in order to test these empirical expectations. The results do

not align perfectly with these contentions, but do provide considerable support for the theory of

racialized paternalism, and demonstrate that the construct does have meaningful impacts on how

Americans think about politics.

Chapter 3: Measuring Racialized Paternalism: Stereotype Content Model

In the previous chapter, I argue that scholars of race and American political behavior have missed a consequential and common attitude that drives political preferences. This racialized paternalism has afflicted domestic politics since the nation's birth, subjecting members of subordinate and stigmatized groups to much harm under the guise of helping improve conditions for them. This attitude is not rooted in animus, though it can also lead to discrimination. Instead it is specifically about a paired desire to help an out-group and the belief that the group is incapable of improving their situation without guidance from a benevolent patron. But this is not the only way to think about racialized paternalism as a construct.

I build from the pioneering work of the stereotype content model, first posited by Fiske et al (2002). This model provides a simple and intuitive understanding of what paternalistic prejudice should look like. Those who are simultaneously high in their expressed affect for a given racial group and low in their expressed estimates of how competent the group in question is should endorse paternalistic prejudice. If the construct of racialized paternalism is really this simple then a measure that captures or approximates these two components and combines them should provide an accurate assessment of levels of racialized paternalism. But this conception is notably different from the theoretical story laid out in the previous chapter. This view sees positive affect and negative stereotypes about the competence of a group as potential precursors that could lead to the development of racialized paternalism, but not the constitutive elements of the construct itself.

Before I test the more detailed theoretical account and attempt to build a measure to tap it, I first explore the simpler model put forth by Fiske and colleagues. In this chapter, I create several measures intended to tap the key components of this conceptualization of racialized paternalism, by combining positive affect and negative competence ratings for an out-group. I discuss the properties and relations of these measures to other key sociopolitical attitudes and policy preferences that should be impacted by a measure of racialized paternalism, or in this case by what I take to be a rough proxy of this measure. I demonstrate that across a number of different specifications, and examining several different racialized groups that these interactive measures have, at best, an inconsistent association with the outcomes racialized paternalism is expected to strongly impact. These findings suggest that the construct of racialized paternalism is a complex attitude that cannot be reduced to the impact of positive affect and negative stereotypes toward a key racial group.

A Stereotype Content Approach

The stereotype content model posits that paternalistic prejudice can be found at the intersection of high warmth and low perceptions of competence for a particular out-group (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Testing this straightforward conception of racialized paternalism should be as simple as measuring positive feelings toward a given racial group and beliefs about the cognitive capacity, and identifying those who are relatively high in the former and relatively low in the latter. I operationalize the key constructs, warmth and competence, in two ways. I first look at the exact warmth and competence questions employed by Fiske et. al (2002) that directly assess perceptions of warmth and competence. Specifically, I ask respondents how friendly and trustworthy they think a group is to assess warmth and how intelligent and competent they think

a group is to assess competence. However, these measures rarely appear on large data sets so I fielded them on original instruments with a non-representative sample.

With the key measures explained, it's worth explaining in detail how to combine them in order to build a composite measure of racialized paternalism as conceptualized in the stereotype content model. For the warmth questions, I assign numeric values to the seven-point response scales, such that rating a group as very trustworthy would represent a six and rating a group not at all trustworthy would correspond to a zero, for both items. I then combine the two items such that every respondent falls somewhere between zero and 12. I then censor this measure at the midpoint such that those whose answers average to indifference and all who view the group negatively are coded as zero. The ordering above the midpoint is preserved, to capture the degree to which one expresses warmth towards the group.

I use a different procedure to assess ratings of competence for the out-group. Instead of attempting to get an absolute sense of competence ratings, I use a comparative measure. To begin I again assign numeric values to the seven-point response scales, such that rating a group as very competent would represent a six and rating a group not at all competent would correspond to a zero, for both items. However, I calculate this for both the key out-group as well as the in-group. I then subtract the scores for the out-group from scores for the in-group. I then censor the resulting composite at zero such that all who rate the in-group and out-group the same as well as the (very few) who rate the out-group as more competent than the in-group are collapsed together. There are a few reasons I take this comparative approach only for the competence questions and not the warmth items. First, there is simply more variance on the competence items and better coverage across the full set of responses. This makes it easier to take the absolute responses on their face. But I also do this because with regard to the

competence items it is important for Whites to believe that Black people *uniquely* lack

competence in order for them to single out that group for interventions. For warmth, an absolute

measure is more appropriate since respondents need not like Black people more than they like

their in-group in order to feel positively toward the group. I then interact the composite high

warmth scores and the negative competence ratings to attain a multiplicative measure intended to

capture the concept of racialized paternalism. The findings are substantively similar when

creating comparative measures for the competence and warmth items or when using absolute

measures for both. Models with these specifications are included in the appendix. I will

henceforth refer to this as the Stereotype Content Model or SCM measure.

2018 M Turk Survey Data

To get a better sense of how these other factors are operating I fielded a pilot study on

Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The study was fielded in two separate waves between

October 26 and November 2, 2018. The solicitation on MTurk asked for only White respondents

and all respondents who indicated they were non-White were not allowed to complete the survey

and were immediately sent to the final screen. To address the high-profile issues with quality of

MTurk samples I implemented protocols to pre-screen suspicious IP addresses within Qualtrics

and not allow respondents with these IP addresses to complete the survey (Burleigh, Kennedy &

Clifford, 2018). 988 respondents completed the survey. The demographics of the MTurk sample

are clearly distinct from that of the nationally representative sample. The MTurk sample was

more male, younger, significantly more liberal, and less educated than the respondents to the

ANES and relative to the demographics of the country as a whole.

The survey took around 10 minutes to complete and participants were paid $1.50 for their

time. I first asked respondents about their demographic information. After this, respondents

answered a battery of questions about their racial and sociopolitical attitudes that included

measures of stereotypes and feeling thermometers, competence and warmth items from Fiske,

Cuddy, Glick and Xu (2002), a shortened SDO battery, the child rearing authoritarianism scale,

and an original measure of paternalism including seven questions.

Finally, respondents are asked a number of policy questions, which are paternalistic or

racialized in some fashion. For the purposes of this analysis I focus on eight questions. The first

four are all racialized policies that should be seen to impact African Americans more than other

groups. These policy support items were drug testing for food stamps/SNAP/EBT recipients,

marijuana legalization, sterilization as a legal punishment for women found to have used crack

cocaine while pregnant, and workfare for recipients of government aid. Any measure of

racialized paternalism should strongly predict support for these policies since they are both

racialized and paternalistic. There are two policy items that are racialized but are not

paternalistic, support for the death penalty and opposition to Obamacare. Racialized paternalism

should be unrelated to these items because, despite being clearly tied to race, these policies are

not paternalistic. The last two policy items were not racialized and are more generally

paternalistic, and measured support for making helmets mandatory for motorcyclists and a soda

tax.

2018 M Turk SCM Results

In order to test the simple model of racialized paternalism that is put forth via the

stereotype content model I begin by looking descriptively at the data. It's important to get a

sense of whether or not respondents who express warmth towards Black people are still willing

to label the group as less competent than Whites. Figure 3.1 does this by plotting the MTurk

respondents uncensored degree of warmth felt towards Black people on the X axis and their

uncensored assessments of the group's competence relative to Whites on the Y axis. The shaded

region captures White respondents who do feel at least somewhat warmly towards Black people

but still rate them as less competent than their own group. About 13% of this sample falls into

that category. While not a particularly large share of the respondents, this provides evidence that

some White people are indeed capable of harboring positive feelings towards Black people as a

group while still viewing them as incompetent.

Figure 3.1: Racial Paternalism (SCM) 2018 MTurk Sample

How does this measure relate to some key political attitudes and dispositions? Table 3.1

sheds some light on this by displaying pairwise correlations with a number of important political

attitude scales. Here SCM represents the interaction of the censored positive warmth ratings for

Black people and the censored negative competence ratings for Black people. The first thing that

stands out is the measure is positively correlated with racial resentment at R=.13. Though this

correlation is not particularly strong, it is significantly different from zero such that the null

hypothesis of no relationship can be rejected. This relationship is in the opposite of the direction

expected, if those high in SCM do feel positively toward African Americans, they should not be

expressing animus toward the group. The SCM interaction is also positively correlated with

authoritarianism at R=.13. This relationship, again significant but not particularly strong, is in the

expected direction. Both ideology and party identification are positively correlated with the SCM

interaction, (R=.1, and R=.08 respectively). These two variables are coded such that higher

values correspond with conservative and Republican identification respectively. This seems to

provide evidence that those on the political right are slightly more likely to identify with this

disposition. The measure is weakly positively correlated with SDO at R=.05, but the magnitude

of the coefficient is not high enough to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship.

Table 3.1: SCM Correlations with Political Attitudes

	SCM	RR	SDO	Auth	Party ID	Ideology
SCM		0.13***	−0.05	0.13***	0.08***	0.10***
Racial Resentment	0.13***		0.23***	0.37***	0.42***	0.61***
SDO	−0.05	0.23***		0.02	0.19***	0.23***
Authoritarianism	0.13***	0.37***	0.02		0.31***	0.40***
Party ID	0.08***	0.42***	0.19***	0.31***		0.69***
Ideology	0.10***	0.61***	0.23***	0.40***	0.69***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

Table 3.2 provides pairwise correlations for the same SCM interaction with a number of

socio-economic variables from the dataset. The first finding that jumps out from this plot is that

the SCM interaction is positively correlated with a standard measure of religiosity, how much

one prays a day, at R=.09. This finding is significant, and allows for rejection of the null

hypothesis of no relationship, but again is not particularly strong. The SCM does not appear to be

significantly related to any of the other outcomes, with R<.06 for the education, age gender and

income variables.

Table 3.2: SCM Correlations with Demographics

	SCM	Pray	Edu	Age	Female	Income
SCM		0.09***	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.05
Pray	0.09***		0.06	0.18***	0.17***	0.03
Education	0.00	0.06		0.01	0.06	0.28***
Age	0.05	0.18***	0.01		0.12***	0.04
Female	0.04	0.17***	0.06	0.12***		0.00
Income	0.05	0.03	0.28***	0.04	0.00	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

These findings are instructive but do not provide much evidence that the SCM interaction

does capture the expected attitude. In order to further understand how this interaction drives

attitudes I turn to policy outcomes. Specifically, I run a series of ordered probit models

examining the degree to which these attitudes predict support for a series of policy items that are

racialized, paternalistic, or both.[9] I again control for key demographic variables, namely income,

education, gender, and age. I also control for important sociopolitical variables, partisan

identification, ideology, religiosity (as measured by a question about how many times a week a

---

[9] Ordered probit models are used here to properly estimate the ordinal responses to the dependent variable, the same models run with OLS can be found in the appendix.

respondent prays), and for sociopolitical dispositions like authoritarianism and racial resentment. All of the independent variables are normalized from zero to one to ensure comparability and the outcomes are coded from one to seven with one corresponding with strong opposition to the policy and seven corresponding with strong support for the policy.

Table 3.3 reports the results for the first four models, each of which predicts support for a different policy outcome that is both racialized and paternalistic. If it actually is tapping racialized paternalism, the SCM measure should predict strong support for each of these policies. In these models the individual components of the SCM approach, indications of warmth toward Black people (Warmth (+)) and relatively lower ratings of competence for Black people (Competence (-)), are included separately then interacted to create the key predictor (Warmth*Comp).

The first column of the table predicts support for drug testing welfare recipients, and the Warmth*Comp interaction, despite a positive coefficient, does not have impact on support for this policy at a magnitude that would allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect. In the second column, when it comes to predicting support for workfare, the same is true, the SCM interaction is in the expected direction but does not reach conventional levels of significance. This is not the case, however, in the third column, predicting support for legal pot. The coefficient for the Warmth*Competence interaction is negative and just shy of conventional significance (p=.07). Finally, in the last column which predicts support for sterilizing a mother who uses crack cocaine while pregnant, the Warmth*Competence interaction does have a positive and significant effect at p=.01. This indicates that those highest in warmth and lowest in competence for Black people are more likely to support the policy even when accounting for a litany of other attitudes. This provides the strongest evidence to this point that the SCM approach

has delivered a measure that does drive attitudes consistent with expectations of a measure that is tapping the construct of racialized paternalism. Despite this and the marginal significance of the interaction in predicting support for legal pot, the evidence here is mixed as with the correlations.

Table 3.3: 2018 MTurk Racialized & Paternalistic Policies with SCM Interaction

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.386***	0.151**	−0.179**	0.006
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Education	0.113	0.389**	−0.567***	0.053
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	1.009***	0.986***	−1.251***	0.360*
	(0.204)	(0.196)	(0.210)	(0.203)
Party ID	−0.078	0.008	0.204*	−0.231**
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.105	−0.098	−0.363***	0.102
	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Income	1.881***	1.826***	−0.733*	0.582
	(0.380)	(0.362)	(0.381)	(0.377)
Age	−0.520***	−0.643***	−0.424**	−0.911***
	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.797***	0.599***	−0.715***	0.770***
	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.158)
Racial Resentment	2.593***	2.031***	−0.393*	1.311***
	(0.218)	(0.205)	(0.218)	(0.211)
Warmth (+)	0.067***	0.038*	0.065***	−0.007
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Competence (-)	−0.022	0.021	0.009	0.034*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Warmth*Competence	0.019	0.011	−0.027*	0.036**
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Those findings cannot not reveal the full picture of how this disposition is guiding political attitudes. Though the measure does seem to be related to some of the key racialized and

paternalistic outcomes, it is difficult to untangle which of these factors is driving the response. If in fact this measure was just capturing some hidden animus, an especially acute concern given the positive correlation of the measure with racial resentment, this could be driving the connection instead of a racialized paternalism. In order to test this, I examine another set of outcomes, particularly racialized policy attitudes that are not paternalistic. If the SCM measure of racialized paternalism is actually capturing something other than animus, it should not lead to support for these racialized policies that do not have an element of paternalism.

Table 3.4 presents another set of models, with the same set of independent variables as those in Table 3.3. Here the outcomes are support for Obamacare and support for the death penalty. In the first column, predicting support for Obamacare, the key Warmth*Competence interaction has a negative coefficient, but one that does not reach conventional levels of significance. This was the expected effect. In the second column, predicting support for the death penalty, the same is true. The coefficient for the Warmth*Competence interaction is positive but does not reach conventional levels of significance. These results do indicate that, despite the positive correlation with racial resentment, the SCM racialized paternalism measure does not predict the same outcomes that animus-based measures do. Racial resentment, the hallmark animus measure is clearly associated with both of the outcomes.

Table 3.4: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies with SCM Interaction

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.069	0.057
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.489***	0.012
	(0.163)	(0.161)
Ideology	−1.840***	1.118***
	(0.202)	(0.198)
Party ID	−0.314***	−0.027
	(0.108)	(0.107)
Pray	0.099	−0.221**
	(0.110)	(0.108)
Income	−0.033	0.841**
	(0.365)	(0.363)
Age	0.134	−0.045
	(0.179)	(0.176)
Authoritarianism	0.277*	0.632***
	(0.155)	(0.153)
RR	−1.647***	1.542***
	(0.206)	(0.203)
Warmth (+)	0.041*	0.006
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Competence (-)	0.012	0.013
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Warmth*Competence	−0.013	0.016
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Affect and Stereotypes Approach

The adapted stereotype content model questions do seem to significantly predict support

at least one of the key racialized and paternalistic policy items that I might expect from a

measure of racialized paternalism. However, it's difficult to make firm conclusions from a single non-representative study. In order to bring further data to bear, I make use of a different strategy to assess the key competence and warmth dimensions. To capture warmth, I use a feeling thermometer for the key out-group and to capture perceptions of competence I use stereotype measures. These are close proxies for the two axes, and have the added benefit of being commonly used on many publicly available nationally representative surveys.

Though not worded in the exact same fashion as the warmth question, feeling thermometers do attempt to directly measure the same underlying construct, how positively one feels toward a group. To be sure, there are a litany of critiques of feeling thermometer measures, including individual heterogeneity in responses due to social factors or survey mode (Wilcox, Siegelman & Cook, 1989; Winter & Berinsky, 1999; Liu & Wang, 2015). However, these critiques are certainly not unique to feeling thermometers, and other work has shown that feeling thermometers are more reliable than some comparable measures (Alwin, 1997; Puhan et. al. 2005). Similarly, standard stereotype measures cannot directly assess perceptions of competence, per se, but they do capture perceptions of intelligence which should be very highly correlated with competence. I make use of the full set of stereotype measures which also assess how hard working and how violent a given out-group is. I include analyses that are restricted to the intelligence measure in the appendix.

I use these items to build a composite measure of racialized paternalism in a very similar manner as for the competence and warmth items. For the feeling thermometer, I preserve the zero to 100 temperature ratings. I then censor this measure at the midpoint such that those whose answers indicate indifference (50 degrees) and all who view the group negatively (below 50) are coded as zero. The ordering above the midpoint is preserved, to capture the degree to which one

expresses warmth towards the group. I again use a comparative rating of competence for the out-group. To begin I again assign numeric values to the seven-point response scales, such that rating a group as very intelligent would represent a six and rating a group not at all intelligent would correspond to a zero, for all stereotype items. However, I calculate this for both the key out-group as well as the in-group. I then subtract the scores for the out-group from scores for the in-group. I then censor the resulting composite at zero such that all who rate the in-group and out-group the same as well as the (very few) who rate the out-group as more competent than the in-group are collapsed together. I then interact the warm feeling thermometer scores and the relatively negative stereotype ratings to attain a multiplicative measure in attempt to effectively capture the concept of racialized paternalism. Again, I also run models with a comparative affect ands stereotype measures and with absolute affect and stereotype measures in the appendix. I will refer to this as the AS (Affect and Stereotypes) approach.

2018 M Turk AS Results

In order to evaluate the AS approach to measuring racialized paternalism I first replicate the results of the SCM approach from the 2018 Amazon Mechanical Turk study detailed earlier in the chapter. First, it is necessary to explore the two approaches to measuring racialized paternalism, their distributions and their relation to other important sociopolitical measures included on the survey. Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of the AS measure with feeling thermometer scores for Black people along the y-axis and the difference between White and Black ratings on stereotype measures along the x-axis. The shaded area in the plot represents those captured by the AS measure, who express positive affect toward Black people but still endorse negative stereotypes about the group relative to White people. Twenty-eight percent of

the sample falls in this category, notably this is more than double the number of respondents who fall into this category when using the SCM approach to measuring racialized paternalism. This measure captures well over a fourth of White respondents.

Figure 3.2: Racial Paternalism (AS) 2018 MTurk Sample

Given that the AS approach captures a considerably bigger slice of the sample than the SCM measure, it's important to understand how much overlap there is between the two. Table 3.5 presents some evidence on this front. It displays the pairwise correlations between both the AS and SCM approaches and the other political attitudes measured in the survey. The AS and SCM approach are positively correlated, and significantly so at R=.34. This correlation coefficient is considerably higher than any other correlation coefficient with the other variables for both the AS and SCM. This is comparable to the relationship between authoritarianism and racial resentment (r=.37) but notably smaller than the connection between party identification and ideology (R=.61). As was true with the SCM measure, the AS measure is positively and significantly correlated with racial resentment at R=.23, though the connection is even stronger

for the AS measure. Yet again this seems to call into question whether this measure is actually capturing some attitude that is separate from animus. Continuing this pattern, the AS measure is also positively and significantly correlated with authoritarianism at R=.18, as expected. The same is true for party identification and ideology, which are significantly and positively associated with the AS measure at R=.1 and R=.13. There is no significant correlation between social dominance orientation and the SCM measure. So, despite the fact that the correlation between the AS measure and SCM measure is not as high as one might expect between two measures tapping the same underlying construct, the two approaches seem to be relating to the other political attitudes in a consistent fashion, if not the one expected for a measure of racialized paternalism.

Table 3.5: AS Correlations with Political Attitudes

	AS	SCM	RR	SDO	Auth	Party ID	Ideology
AS		0.34***	0.23***	0.04	0.18***	0.10***	0.13***
SCM	0.34***		0.13***	−0.05	0.13***	0.08***	0.10***
Racial Resentment	0.23***	0.13***		0.23***	0.37***	0.42***	0.61***
SDO	0.04	−0.05	0.23***		0.19***	0.23***	
Authoritarianism	0.18***	0.13***	0.37***			0.31***	0.40***
Party ID	0.10***	0.08***	0.42***	0.31***			0.69***
Ideology	0.13***	0.10***	0.61***	0.40***	0.69***		

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$.

Table 3.6 presents pairwise correlations between the AS approach to measuring racialized paternalism and the socioeconomic variables included in the survey. The AS measure is

positively and significantly correlated with religiosity as measured by prayer frequency at R=.12, similar to the SCM measure. However, the AS measure is not significantly correlated with education, age, or gender (R<.05 for all). This also follows the pattern of the SCM measure. But when it comes to income, there is a significant and positive but weak (R=.07) correlation. This is the only divergence form the results with the SCM measure which had no correlation with income.

Table 3.6: AS Correlations with Demographics

	AS	Pray	Edu	Age	Female	Income
AS		0.12***	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.07**
Pray	0.12***		0.06	0.18***	0.17***	0.03
Education	0.03	0.06		0.01	0.06	0.28***
Age	0.03	0.18***	0.01		0.12***	0.04
Female	0.01	0.17***	0.06	0.12***		0.00
Income	0.07*	0.03	0.28***	0.04	0.00	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$.

With few exceptions, the correlations between the AS measure and the socio-political variables measured seems to follow the same pattern as the SCM measure. This again provides mixed evidence for whether or not the measures are actually tapping racialized paternalism as expected. To shed additional light on this, I turn to the key policy outcomes that are racialized and paternalistic. I again run a series of ordered probit models, virtually identical to the ones included in Table 3.3, except that instead of the SCM interaction, I include the AS interaction. The constituent elements, positive affect toward African-Americans (Black FT (+)) and

relatively negative stereotypes for the same group (Stereotype Difference (-)), are included

separately and then interacted to get the key variable (BFT*SD).

The full models for the four racialized and paternalistic policies are included in Table 3.7. The first column predicts support for drug tests for recipients of government aid. For this variable, the AS measure of racialized paternalism does not significantly impact support for the policy, despite a coefficient in the expected direction. For the next policy, support for workfare, the same is true. The coefficient for the AS measure is again in the expected direction but it does not reach significance. This pattern continues for the next model, the AS measure of racialized paternalism does not significantly impact support for legal pot, though the coefficient appears to be in the expected direction. In the last model, predicting support for the one outcome that was strongly predicted by the SCM measure, sterilizing those who use crack cocaine while pregnant, there is no significant effect yet again. Unlike the SCM measure which approached significance on half of the outcomes, the AS measure does not do this for any of the key racialized and paternalistic outcomes (p>.25 for all). It's worth noting that when racial resentment is excluded from the model, the AS measure performs considerably better and significantly predicts all but one of the key outcomes. However, if this measure is indeed capturing some element of racialized paternalism it should be exhibiting an impact above and beyond that of animus-based racial attitude measures.

Table 3.7: 2018 MTurk Racialized & Paternalistic Policies with AS Interaction

	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	Dependent variable:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.380***	0.143**	−0.190**	0.001
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Education	0.105	0.378**	−0.541***	0.017
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	1.035***	0.988***	−1.165***	0.342*
	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.202)
Party ID	−0.093	0.002	0.193*	−0.221**
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.069	−0.082	−0.394***	0.138
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Income	1.860***	1.818***	−0.765**	0.670*
	(0.381)	(0.363)	(0.382)	(0.379)
Age	−0.526***	−0.672***	−0.421**	−0.918***
	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.796***	0.593***	−0.758***	0.792***
	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.159)
Racial Resentment	2.443***	1.992***	−0.400*	1.271***
	(0.220)	(0.209)	(0.222)	(0.215)
Black FT (+)	0.124	0.118	0.291**	−0.234**
	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.118)	(0.115)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−0.243	0.249	−0.071	0.301
	(0.250)	(0.237)	(0.245)	(0.239)
BFT*SD	1.020	0.378	−0.823	0.985
	(0.852)	(0.799)	(0.837)	(0.805)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In order to get a sense of whether the AS approach is capturing some other racial concerns rooted in animus, I turn to the racialized outcomes that are not paternalistic. Table 3.8 features the output from a series of ordered probit models virtually identical to those in Table

3.4, except these feature the AS constituent items and interaction instead of that of the SCM measure. If the AS approach is indeed capturing hidden animus, it should impact support for these outcomes. The results demonstrate that this is not the case. The first column shows the AS approach (BFT*SD) has no impact on support for Obamacare. The second column finds the same is true for the AS with regard to support for the death penalty. This finding suggests that these measures are not just capturing some hidden animus.

Table 3.8: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies with AS Interaction

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.062	0.061
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.526***	−0.012
	(0.163)	(0.162)
Ideology	−1.786***	1.090***
	(0.201)	(0.197)
Party ID	−0.318***	−0.026
	(0.108)	(0.107)
Pray	0.056	−0.192*
	(0.110)	(0.108)
Income	−0.105	0.873**
	(0.366)	(0.365)
Age	0.129	−0.042
	(0.179)	(0.176)
Authoritarianism	0.228	0.650***
	(0.155)	(0.154)
Racial Resentment	−1.711***	1.441***
	(0.211)	(0.207)
Black FT (+)	0.321***	−0.076
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.335	0.352
	(0.243)	(0.239)
BFT*SD	−0.537	0.409
	(0.807)	(0.795)
Observations	988	988
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Racialized Paternalism Towards Other Racialized Groups

The data presented thus far from the 2018 M Turk Survey is instructive and promising.

However, it can only tell us about how the different measurement strategies meant to tap

racialized paternalism towards African Americans perform. Fortunately, the survey asked about

two other key racialized groups: Latino and Muslim Americans. Though Muslims in America are clearly a religious group with crosscutting racial identities, there is reason to believe that especially in a post 9/11 world this group has been racialized in a number of ways (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Lajevardi & Michelson, 2019). This group is a heavily and explicitly stigmatized social group, and discrimination against them operates in a similar manner to as it does with racial groups (Kteily, Brunneau, Waytz & Cotteril, 2015; Lajeverdi & Oskoii, 2018; Dana, Lajevardi, Oskoii & Walker, 2019).

The components of both of the racialized paternalism measurement strategies, feeling thermometers, stereotypes, warmth and competence items were collected for each of these groups. I construct the AS and SCM measures for both Latino and Muslim Americans using the exact same protocol as I did to construct these proxy measures for African Americans. The following figures display the distributions of each of these proxy measures. I start with Figures 3.3 and 3.4, featuring the AS measures for Latino people and Muslim people respectively. In Figure 3.3 the plot looks relatively similar to that of African Americans and about 17% of the White sample falls into the shaded region, meaning they indicate positive feeling thermometer scores for Latino people but rate them as higher in negative stereotypes than White people. For Muslim Americans in in Figure 3.4, the same pattern appears but the number on the shaded region is slightly smaller at 12% of the sample. Notably the bottom half of the plot is fuller in Figure 3.4 indicating that Whites are more likely to indicate negative feelings for Muslim people than for Latino people or for Black people.

Figure 3.3: Racial Paternalism Hispanics (AS) MTurk Sample

Figure 3.4: Racial Paternalism (SCM) Muslims MTurk Sample

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 display the distribution of comfort and warmth ratings for Latino and

Muslim Americans respectively. The SCM measure derived from these two variables captured

less of the sample than the AS measure for African Americans and that clearly holds for these groups as well. In Figure 3.5 the shaded region only captures about five percent of respondents, who rate Latino people as warm and also see them as less competent than White people. That is less than a third of the total respondents who fall into the same category for the AS measure for Latinos and just above a third of the total respondents who fall into this category when the same measurement strategy is applied to African Americans. Figure 3.6 demonstrates that an even smaller proportion of the sample is captured with regard to Muslim persons, only about 2% of the sample views that group warmly but also less competent than White people.

Figure 3.5: Racial Paternalism Hispanics (SCM) MTurk Sample

Figure 3.6: Racial Paternalism (AS) Muslims MTurk Sample

How do these measures relate to other racial attitudes? Table 3.9 displays the results of a

series of pairwise correlations between these measures and the AS and SCM approach to

measuring paternalism against African Americans, ethnocentrism, and racial resentment. The

first thing that stands out from the table is the correlation between the two different measurement

strategies for measuring paternalism against Latino and Muslim people. There is no significant

correlation between the AS and SCM approaches for either group (R=.02 for both). This is

notable and was not the case for the two measurement approaches with regard to African

Americans (though the correlation there was still weaker than expected). However, another

unexpected result emerges with regard to these, there is a positive and significant correlation

across groups within measurement strategy. The AS approaches for Muslim and Latino people

are very strongly and positively correlated at R=.47, and the same is true for the SCM

approaches with regard to Muslim and Latino people, though the connection is much less strong

at R=.11. This finding is notable and suggests that some artifact of measurement may be at play here.

The correlations within measurement strategy are also true with regard to the way that attitudes towards Muslim and Latino people correlate with similar measurements of Attitudes toward African Americans. The AS measures for Black people is positively and very strongly correlated with that of Muslim and Latino persons at R=.5 and R=.6 respectively. Notably this measure is also positively correlated with the SCM measure for Latino people at R=.08, but is unrelated to the SCM measure for Muslim Americans. The SCM measure for Black people follows the same pattern and is correlated with the same measure for Latino people at R=.16 but not for the same measure with regard to Muslim persons (R=.01). All of the measures for Latino and Muslim people, with the exception of the SCM measure for Muslim people, is positively and significantly correlated with racial resentment. Though this pattern is not expected it mirrors the findings with regard to the same measures for Black people. Finally, both measures with regard to Latino persons are positively and significantly correlated with ethnocentrism.

Table 3.9: AS/SCM For Muslims/Latinos Racial Attitude Correlations

	MSCM	MAS	LSCM	LAS	SCM	AS	RR	Ethno
Muslim SCM		0.01	0.11***	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01
Muslim AS	0.01		0.00	0.47***	0.12***	0.50***	0.09***	0.02
Latino SCM	0.11***	0.00		0.02	0.16***	0.08**	0.09***	0.13***
Latino AS	0.02	0.47***	0.02		0.60***	0.22**	0.18***	0.15***
SCM	0.01	0.12***	0.16***	0.60***		0.34***	0.14***	0.18***
AS	0.00	0.50***	0.08**	0.22***	0.34***		0.23***	0.13***
Racial Resentment	0.04	0.09***	0.09***	0.18***	0.14***	0.23***		0.57***
Ethnocentrism	0.01	0.02	0.13***	0.15***	0.18***	0.13***	0.57***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

Table 3.10: AS/SCM For Muslims/Latinos Political Attitude Correlations

	MSCM	MAS	LSCM	LAS	Pray	SDO	Ideo	Auth
Muslim SCM		0.01	0.11***	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.07*	0.03
Muslim AS	0.01		0.00	0.47***	0.09***	0.04	0.09***	0.11***
Latino SCM	0.11***	0.00		0.02	0.05	0.03	0.10***	0.06
Latino AS	0.02	0.47***	0.02		0.06	0.01	0.17***	0.16***
Pray	0.01	0.09***	0.05	0.06		0.03	0.34***	0.32***
SDO	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.03		0.23***	0.02
Ideology	0.07*	0.09***	0.10***	0.17***	0.34***	0.23***		0.40***
Authoritarianism	0.03	0.11***	0.06	0.16***	0.32***	0.02	0.40***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

Table 3.10 displays the results of another series of pairwise correlations, this time with socioeconomic indicators. The first result that jumps out is that every measure with regard to Muslim and Latino persons is positively and significantly correlated with ideology. This means that conservatives are more likely to harbor these attitudes across the board, mirroring findings

with regard to African Americans. However, of these measures only the AS measure for Muslim Americans is positively and significantly correlated with religiosity at R=.09, the rest have no discernible relationship. The AS measures for both Muslim and Latino persons are positively and significantly correlated with authoritarianism (R=.11 and R=.16 respectively). None of the key measures are associated with social dominance orientation, which defies expectation but was also the case with the same measures for Black people.

As a final test of these measures of paternalism toward Muslim and Latino people, I included two key survey questions that assessed policy attitudes with regard to these groups that was racialized and paternalistic. For Latino people, the racialized and paternalistic policy was whether schools should be required to provide bilingual education to students. Paternalists should see this as an unnecessary crutch that could keep these students from learning English quickly and fluently and could harm their quality of life, so they should not support this policy. I also asked about whether there should be a public ban on religious headgear. A similar ban was enacted in France and specifically was justified as "freeing" largely Muslim women from their repressive religion and forcing them to secularize (Joppke, 2009). Paternalists should be familiar with the religions implicated by this and should support the policy to free Muslim women from what they see as a backwards religious practice.

In order to determine if the measures created have the expected paternalist impact on support for these models I run another series of ordered probit models. I control, for the same battery of standard demographic variables as the previous section as well as racial resentment and authoritarianism. The results for these models are displayed in Table 3.11. The first two columns report the results for the bilingual education policy and the final two do the same for the religious headgear ban policy. In the first column, the SCM measure for Latino people has no

impact on support for bilingual education in schools. In the second column, featuring the AS

measure for Latino people, the same bears out. Though in the expected direction the coefficient

for the AS measure does not reach significance. In the third column this pattern continues, the

SCM measure for Muslim Americans has no impact on support for a religious headgear ban. The

same is true in the final column, the AS measure for Muslims Americans also has no impact on

support for the headgear ban.

Table 3.11: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies Latinos/Muslims

	Dependent variable:			
	Bilingual Education		Religious Headscarf Ban	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.126*	0.140**	−0.063	−0.064
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Ideology	−0.746***	−0.720***	0.331*	0.276
	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Party ID	0.003	−0.012	−0.088	−0.084
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Pray	0.286***	0.259**	−0.005	0.0002
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Authoritarianism	0.077	0.051	0.134	0.110
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.151)
RR	−1.968***	−1.825***	1.004***	0.803***
	(0.196)	(0.199)	(0.194)	(0.199)
SCM (Latinos)	0.005			
	(0.008)			
AS (Latinos)		0.023		
		(0.018)		
SCM (Muslims)			−0.011	
			(0.009)	
AS (Muslims)				0.341
				(1.183)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2012 and 2016 American National Election Survey Data

Taken as a whole, the 2018 Amazon Mechanical Turk study provides some crucial

evidence on the way that the two stereotype content approaches to measuring racialized

paternalism perform. First, it is clear that White respondents are willing to express positive

sentiment about Black people while at the same time negatively stereotyping the group, though

the number willing to do so is twice as high for the AS measure as the SCM measure. Despite

capturing a smaller portion of the sample, the SCM measure does show some promise and is

associated with support for several racialized and paternalistic policies even when accounting for

the impact of a litany of racial and social attitudes. The same cannot be said for the AS measure.

Both are correlated with racial resentment, which defies expectations, especially since these are

all respondents who express some positive sentiment toward African Americans as a group. But

neither measurement strategy shows much promise when applied to Muslim or Latino

Americans. Though this information is illuminating, it still does not provide a complete picture.

It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about how these measures might work from a single

online convenience sample. In order to get a more complete sense of how these are operating it is

necessary to take a look at another data set.

 To test this set of propositions, I first turn to existing data sets that can provide data that

feature the key outcomes and measures of interest. The 2012 and 2016 ANES meet this criterion.

The ANES provides a high-quality national probability sample, with each year featuring north of

3,000 respondents. I am interested exclusively in how members of the dominant group's attitudes

are shaped by racialized paternalism so I restrict the sample to those who identify as White. I

examine the face-to-face and Internet samples combined in both years. This can induce bias but I

find similar results when these samples are disaggregated. These results are included in the

appendix.

 These data allow me to construct the AS measure meant to tap racialized

paternalism toward African Americans because feeling thermometer ratings and stereotype traits

are included for both White and Black people in 2012 and 2016. In 2012, these stereotype traits

were intelligence and work ethic, in 2016, it was work ethic and violence. Though most of the

racialized and paternalistic policies that appeared on the 2018 Amazon Mechanical Turk survey

are not regularly featured on the ANES, one such policy, marijuana legalization, is measured in

both years. I can also test the other racialized policies that appeared on the 2018 survey, support

for Obamacare and the death penalty are captured in both years.

2012 and 2016 ANES AS Results

The first thing to explore with these data is how much of the sample is captured by the

AS measure meant to tap racialized paternalism. Again, the measure captures anyone who

endorses the counterintuitive pairing of positive affect for Black people and negative stereotypes

for them (relative to Whites). In 2012, 34% of the White sample is captured by the AS measure

and in 2016, 37% of the sample is captured by the AS measure. This represents over a third of

Whites, certainly not a trivial portion of the sample. This is more than the AS measure captured

in the 2018 MTurk sample, and nearly three times as many as captured by the SCM measure in

that survey. This likely due to differences in the sample, and given the representativeness of the

ANES, it's obviously capturing something closer to the general population. Figures 7 and 8

demonstrate this by plotting the difference in stereotype measures for Blacks and Whites (X axis)

and feeling thermometer ratings for Black people (Y axis) in each of these samples. The

highlighted regions in both plots encompass all who are above the mean for the feeling

thermometer but still harbor negative stereotypes about Black people, i.e. those captures by the

AS proxy measure.

Figure 3.7: Racial Paternalism (AS) 2012 ANES

Figure 3.8: Racial Paternalism (AS) 2016 ANES

Notably, of those respondents who rate African Americans above 50 on the feeling thermometer, a majority across both years' data sets also endorses negative stereotypes about the group relative to Whites. So, though the pairing of positive affect and negative stereotypes is counterintuitive, it is certainly not uncommon. Who are the people captured by the AS proxy measure and how do they differ from the rest of the sample? They are younger, more conservative and more religious than the rest of the respondents in both samples. In 2012, they

are also more likely to be female, and in 2016 they are more likely to be Republican though

neither of these patterns is found in the other sample.

Over a third of the Whites in both samples express attitudes consistent with the AS proxy

measure, but does it shift policy attitudes in manner consistent with the expected impact of a

measure of racialized paternalism? To answer that question, I first turn to the models included in

Table 3.12. Again, both models are ordered probit and predict support for marijuana legalization

among Whites. The first column features the model for the 2012 ANES and the second column

features the model for the 2016 ANES. The key independent variables are the censored Black-

White stereotype difference measure (Stereotype Difference (-)) and the censored feeling

thermometer measure for Black people (Black FT (+)). These two are interacted to create the AS

measure (SD*BFT). In the first model the key interaction is negative and significant (p<.01),

indicating that those highest in positive affect for Black people and negative stereotypes for them

relative to Whites are more likely to oppose marijuana legalization as expected. In the second

model, though not reaching conventional levels of significance (p=.08), the coefficient is also in

the expected direction. This is surprising sense there was no effect for the AS measure on

support for legal pot in the 2018 MTurk survey.

Table 3.12: ANES Models for Racialized and Paternalistic Policies

	Dependent variable:	
	Legal Pot	
	ANES 2012	ANES 2016
Age	−0.695***	−1.095***
	(0.104)	(0.094)
Male	0.144***	0.147***
	(0.039)	(0.046)
Education	−0.080	−0.033
	(0.106)	(0.092)
Income	−0.022	−0.158*
	(0.079)	(0.086)
Ideology	1.603***	−1.357***
	(0.109)	(0.116)
Party ID	0.140**	0.122
	(0.061)	(0.187)
Church	−0.537***	−0.738***
	(0.057)	(0.061)
Authoritarianism	−0.441***	−0.407***
	(0.069)	(0.084)
Racial Resentment	0.333***	0.005
	(0.126)	(0.110)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−0.202	0.481***
	(0.126)	(0.143)
Black FT (+)	−0.004	0.279***
	(0.074)	(0.085)
SD*BFT	−0.661*	−0.932***
	(0.387)	(0.357)
Observations	3,548	2,913
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Coefficients from probit models and especially those for interaction terms are difficult to interpret on their own. To put this in context, moving from the midpoint to the maximum value of affect for Black people leads to a 7-percentage point drop in the probability of supporting legalized marijuana in 2012.

Given that the proxy measure seems to move support for marijuana legislation in the expected direction I turn to the merely racialized policy outcomes that are not paternalistic.

Again, if the AS proxy measure is capturing something wholly separate from the animus-based racial attitudes, it should not be related to support for policy items that are racialized but not paternalistic. I test this contention in the models in Table 3.13. Here each of the first two models predicts support for the death penalty and the third and fourth models predict support for Obamacare, all with ordered probit models. The first and third models are derived from the 2012 ANES data while the second and fourth are derived from the 2016 ANES models. Again, the key independent variable is the AS proxy measure (SD*BFT). In the first two columns, there is no significant impact of the AS proxy measure in 2012 or 2016 (p=.71, and p=.86 respectively). In the third and fourth model the same is true for the proxy measure with regard to predicting support for Obamacare. In both samples, the coefficient is not significantly associated with opposition to Obamacare (p=.23 and p=.89, respectively). These findings do seem to match that of the 2018 MTurk survey.

Table 3.13: ANES Models Racialized Policies

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Penalty		Obamacare	
	2012	2016	2012	2016
Age	0.164	0.105	−0.028	0.486***
	(0.103)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.085)
Male	0.021	0.044	−0.024	−0.023
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.042)
Education	−0.078	−0.267***	−0.115	−0.227***
	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.084)
Income	0.102	0.188**	0.220***	0.044
	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Ideology	−0.376***	0.848***	2.110***	−2.430***
	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.102)	(0.111)
Party ID	−0.134**	−0.177	0.845***	−0.195
	(0.062)	(0.203)	(0.056)	(0.171)
Church	−0.382***	−0.343***	−0.049	0.106*
	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.057)
Authoritarianism	0.683***	0.492***	0.004	0.014
	(0.070)	(0.086)	(0.064)	(0.077)
Racial Resentment	1.762***	1.336***	−1.569***	−1.314***
	(0.125)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.101)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.271**	0.606***	0.272**	−0.063
	(0.134)	(0.167)	(0.118)	(0.135)
Black FT (+)	0.002	−0.105	0.187***	0.059
	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.076)
SD*BFT	−0.047	−0.438	−0.483	0.062
	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.349)	(0.332)
Observations	3,845	2,913	3,845	2,913

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Conclusion

Taken all together, the results from this chapter present a comprehensive test of several

procedures for attempting to tap racialized paternalism. Building from the stereotype content

model, I find evidence that over a third of the public holds views that align with the simple conception of racialized paternalism toward Black people, in a representative national sample. However, I also find that these measures have an inconsistent relationship with the key outcomes that should be most strongly driven by racialized paternalism. Though the AS measure predicts opposition to legalized marijuana in the ANES, it has no significant impact on this or any of the other racialized and paternalistic policies in the 2018 MTurk Survey. The SCM measure does surpass this but only has a conventionally significant impact on one of these four policies. When these approaches are used to capture the same construct with regard to Muslim and Latino people, the measures still fail to significantly drive attitudes in response to policies that are paternalistic and racialized for the respective out-groups.

Perhaps most troubling was the positive correlation between these measures and racial resentment. In each survey, it was borne out and it calls into question the measurement strategy. Despite only capturing those who do not express a dislike of the out-group, these measures are still capturing some element that is in common with racial resentment. It's worth noting that these measures also did not predict support for policy outcomes that animus-based measures would be expected to impact. However, this is due at least in part to controlling for the impact of racial resentment in those models.

From this it is difficult to argue that measures rooted in this simplistic notion of racialized paternalism are sufficient to capture the whole of the theorized attitude. In order to better assess this construct, it is necessary to dig deeper than just examining affect and stereotypes. Specifically, more information is needed about the impulses downstream from these initial evaluations. A positive feeling toward an out-group is insufficient, one must seek to help the group and improve their conditions. In the same manner, negative stereotypes cannot do the job

alone, one must feel that the out-group is not competent enough to improve their situation

without interference from a benevolent patron. In the following chapters, I devise a measure that

taps this latent racialized paternalism, rooted in a desire to aid a given racial group paired with a

belief that they cannot help themselves, and put it to the same test.

Appendix

ANES 2012 & 2016 Question Wordings

Feeling Thermometers
Using the same thermometer scale you used earlier in the survey, how would you rate [Blacks/Whites]? 'Please enter the rating number in the number box. 'Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

Stereotype Items
Where would you rate [BLACKS/WHITES] general on this scale?

- Very unintelligent
- Unintelligent
- Somewhat unintelligent
- Neither intelligent nor unitelligent
- Somewhat intelligent
- Intelligent
- Very intelligent

- Very lazy
- Lazy
- Somewhat lazy
- Neither hard working nor lazy
- Somewhat hard working
- Hard working
- Very hard working

- Very violent
- Violent
- Somewhat violent
- Neither violent nor nonviolent
- Somewhat nonviolent
- Nonviolent
- Very nonviolent

Policy Items
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the use of marijuana being legal?

- Favor

- Neither favor nor oppose
- Oppose

Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?

- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Don't know
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the health care reform law passed in 2010? This law requires all Americans to buy health insurance and requires health insurance companies to accept everyone.

- Favor a great deal
- Favor moderately
- Favor a little
- Don't know
- Oppose a little
- Oppose moderately
- Oppose a great deal

2018 MTurk Study Question Wordings

Feeling Thermometers
I'd like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days. For each group listed, I'd like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

	Cool				Neutral				Warm	
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Whites ()	
Blacks ()	
Hispanics ()	
Muslims ()	

Stereotype Items

Q75 How lazy or hardworking is each group? (Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Muslims)
- Very lazy
- Lazy
- Somewhat lazy
- Neither lazy nor hard-working
- Somewhat hard-working
- Hard-working
- Very hard-working

Q77 How violent or nonviolent is each group? (Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Muslims)
- Very violent
- Violent
- Somewhat violent
- Neither violent nor non-violent
- Somewhat non-violent
- Non-violent
- Very non-violent

Q79 How intelligent or unintelligent is each group? (Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Muslims)
- Very intelligent
- Intelligent
- Somewhat Intelligent
- Neither intelligent nor unintelligent
- Somewhat unintelligent
- Unintelligent
- Very unintelligent

Competence Item

Q67 How competent is each group? (Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Muslims)
- Very competent
- Competent
- Somewhat competent
- Neither competent nor incompetent
- Somewhat incompetent

- Incompetent
- Very incompetent

Warmth Items
How friendly is each group? (Blacks, Whites, Hispanics, Muslims)
- Very friendly
- Friendly
- Somewhat friendly
- Neither friendly nor unfriendly
- Somewhat unfriendly
- Unfriendly
- Very unfriendly

Q69 How trustworthy is each group?
- Very trustworthy
- Trustworthy
- Somewhat trustworthy
- Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy
- Somewhat untrustworthy
- Untrustworthy
- Very untrustworthy

Policy Items

Q44 Do you favor or oppose requiring recipients of government aid like EBT/food stamp benefits to work a full time job in order to receive said aid?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q91 Do you favor or oppose the death penalty?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q95 Do you favor or oppose the Affordable Care Act passed in 2010? This law requires all Americans to buy health insurance and requires health insurance companies to accept everyone.
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q116 Do you favor or oppose allowing judges to sentence a woman who is found to have used crack cocaine while pregnant to be sterilized or made infertile as a punishment for her crime?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q106 Do you favor or oppose allowing the legalization of marijuana?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q117 Do you favor or oppose laws requiring schools in the United States to provide bilingual education for students who don't speak English at home?

- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q115 Do favor or oppose banning religious headwear, such as burkas or hijabs, in public schools and universities in the US?

- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q72 Do you favor or oppose requiring recipients of government aid like EBT/food stamps to pass a drug test in order to receive said aid?

- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

OLS Models

Table 3.1A: 2018 MTurk Racialized/Paternalistic Policies AS Interaction

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.527***	0.211**	−0.328***	0.043
	(0.117)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.117)
Education	0.249	0.620***	−0.700***	0.096
	(0.271)	(0.240)	(0.250)	(0.271)
Ideology	1.847***	1.538***	−1.914***	0.470
	(0.331)	(0.292)	(0.305)	(0.330)
Party ID	−0.269	0.002	0.260	−0.361**
	(0.182)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.182)
Pray	−0.166	−0.109	−0.595***	0.180
	(0.180)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.182)
Income	2.608***	2.732***	−0.859	0.999
	(0.613)	(0.543)	(0.567)	(0.613)
Age	−1.026***	−1.026***	−0.637**	−1.576***
	(0.262)	(0.262)	(0.273)	(0.296)
Racial Resentment	3.871***	2.833***	−0.468	1.784***
	(0.344)	(0.305)	(0.319)	(0.344)
Authoritarianism	1.509***	0.988***	−0.946***	1.234***
	(0.257)	(0.228)	(0.238)	(0.257)
Black FT (+)	0.120	0.164	0.273	−0.269
	(0.179)	(0.159)	(0.166)	(0.179)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−0.430	0.434	−0.381	0.865**
	(0.396)	(0.350)	(0.366)	(0.395)
BFT * SD	1.498	0.725	−1.286	1.405
	(1.335)	(1.180)	(1.232)	(1.332)
Constant	1.147***	1.540***	7.668***	1.861***
	(0.204)	(0.197)	(0.205)	(0.222)
Observations	988	988	988	988
R^2	0.403	0.376	0.232	0.186
Adjusted R^2	0.397	0.368	0.223	0.176
Residual Std. Error	1.774	1.568	1.638	1.771
F Statistic	60.030***	48.943***	24.587***	18.592***

Note: ᵖ... *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.2A: 2018 MTurk Racialized/Paternalistic Policies SCM Interaction

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.533***	0.223**	−0.313***	0.056
	(0.117)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.117)
Education	0.269	0.634***	−0.730***	0.152
	(0.269)	(0.239)	(0.249)	(0.269)
Ideology	1.806***	1.530***	−2.032***	0.488
	(0.330)	(0.293)	(0.306)	(0.330)
Party ID	−0.248	0.008	0.269	−0.372**
	(0.181)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.181)
Pray	−0.226	−0.130	−0.562***	0.126
	(0.179)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.182)
Income	2.584***	2.739***	−0.869	0.858
	(0.608)	(0.540)	(0.563)	(0.608)
Age	−0.996***	−0.981***	−0.669**	−1.543***
	(0.293)	(0.262)	(0.272)	(0.294)
Racial Resentment	4.026***	2.893***	−0.466	1.862***
	(0.336)	(0.298)	(0.311)	(0.336)
Authoritarianism	1.487***	0.997***	−0.902***	1.206***
	(0.255)	(0.227)	(0.237)	(0.256)
Competence (-)	−0.035	0.034	−0.001	0.083***
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Warmth (+)	0.087**	0.053*	0.081**	0.006
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Competence*Warmth	0.049*	0.025	−0.034	0.060**
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Constant	0.978***	1.453***	7.618***	1.687***
	(0.205)	(0.200)	(0.208)	(0.225)
Observations	988	988	988	988
R^2	0.410	0.378	0.234	0.189
Adjusted R^2	0.403	0.370	0.224	0.179
Residual Std. Error	1.764	1.565	1.632	1.764
F Statistic	61.689***	49.222***	24.802***	18.959***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.3A: 2018 MTurk Survey Racialized Policies AS and SCM

	Dependent variable:			
	Obamacare	Death Penalty	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.086	0.107	0.079	0.120
	(0.105)	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.113)
Education	0.799***	−0.030	0.844***	−0.050
	(0.242)	(0.260)	(0.242)	(0.260)
Ideology	−2.969***	1.922***	−2.891***	1.900***
	(0.296)	(0.319)	(0.295)	(0.320)
Party ID	−0.509***	−0.051	−0.512***	−0.043
	(0.163)	(0.175)	(0.163)	(0.175)
Pray	0.210	−0.352**	0.162	−0.337*
	(0.163)	(0.175)	(0.163)	(0.176)
Income	−0.087	1.488**	−0.150	1.524***
	(0.546)	(0.588)	(0.548)	(0.589)
Age	−0.004	−0.147	0.002	−0.128
	(0.264)	(0.285)	(0.264)	(0.284)
Racial Resentment	−2.565***	2.427***	−2.662***	2.266***
	(0.302)	(0.325)	(0.308)	(0.333)
Warmth	0.033	0.006		0.048
	(0.031)	(0.034)		(0.038)
Competence (-)	0.006	0.019		
	(0.026)	(0.028)		
Stereotype Difference (-)			0.277	0.525
			(0.354)	(0.386)
Black FT			0.274*	−0.278
			(0.161)	(0.203)
Authoritarianism	0.494**	1.154***	0.441*	1.163***
	(0.229)	(0.247)	(0.230)	(0.248)
Warmth * Competence	−0.005	0.027		
	(0.023)	(0.025)		
BFT * SD			−0.256	1.385
			(1.192)	(1.289)
Constant	5.955***	1.941***	5.915***	1.978***
	(0.202)	(0.218)	(0.199)	(0.219)
Observations	988	988	988	988
R^2	0.444	0.314	0.443	0.317
Adjusted R^2	0.437	0.306	0.437	0.308
Residual Std. Error	1.582	1.705	1.584	1.702
F Statistic	64.829***	37.211***	64.789***	34.761***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models with Absolute Competence/Warmth

Table 3.4A: 2018 MTurk Paternalistic Policies Absolute Competence

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
| | Drug Tests | Workfare | Legal Pot | Sterilization |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.395***	0.156**	−0.192**	−0.010
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.074)
Education	0.111	0.392**	−0.567***	0.053
	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	1.004***	0.985***	−1.224***	0.357*
	(0.204)	(0.197)	(0.210)	(0.203)
Party ID	−0.075	0.008	0.190	−0.231**
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.101	−0.107	−0.358***	0.105
	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Income	1.881***	1.871***	−0.764**	0.666*
	(0.380)	(0.361)	(0.381)	(0.376)
Age	−0.536***	−0.646***	−0.435**	−0.929***
	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.793***	0.619***	−0.766***	0.806***
	(0.159)	(0.154)	(0.164)	(0.159)
Racial Resentment	2.559***	2.034***	−0.354*	1.393***
	(0.213)	(0.201)	(0.213)	(0.207)
Competence (-)	−0.049	0.075	−0.018	0.090*
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Warmth (+)	0.072***	0.037*	0.058***	−0.002
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Competence * Warmth	0.067	0.086	−0.177**	0.020
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.5A: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies Absolute Competence

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.076	0.062
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.505***	−0.002
	(0.164)	(0.162)
Ideology	−1.841***	1.086***
	(0.202)	(0.198)
Party ID	−0.320***	−0.033
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Pray	0.088	−0.212*
	(0.110)	(0.109)
Income	−0.019	0.879**
	(0.364)	(0.364)
Age	0.155	−0.041
	(0.179)	(0.176)
Authoritarianism	0.278*	0.667***
	(0.156)	(0.154)
Racial Resentment	−1.680***	1.515***
	(0.202)	(0.198)
Competence	0.066	0.147***
	(0.053)	(0.053)
Warmth	0.036*	0.019
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Competence * Warmth	0.033	0.044
	(0.070)	(0.068)
Observations	988	988

Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Models with Comparative Warmth/Competence

Table 3.6A: 2018 MTurk Paternalistic Policies Warmth Difference

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.382***	0.154**	−0.184**	0.021
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Education	0.078	0.362**	−0.577***	0.041
	(0.166)	(0.161)	(0.175)	(0.170)
Ideology	1.015***	0.975***	−1.149***	0.326
	(0.202)	(0.195)	(0.208)	(0.202)
Party ID	−0.080	0.011	0.195*	−0.209*
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.049	−0.060	−0.364***	0.108
	(0.112)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.112)
Income	1.940***	1.867***	−0.680*	0.642*
	(0.379)	(0.361)	(0.380)	(0.376)
Age	−0.523***	−0.656***	−0.372**	−0.933***
	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.806***	0.601***	−0.740***	0.773***
	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.159)
Racial Resentment	2.420***	1.915***	−0.502**	1.250***
	(0.217)	(0.206)	(0.219)	(0.213)
Competence (-)	−0.034*	0.012	−0.015	0.031*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Warmth (+)	−0.032	−0.037	0.012	−0.063*
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Competence*Warmth	0.015	0.020	−0.007	0.102***
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 3.7A: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies Warmth Difference

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.066	0.060
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.488***	−0.002
	(0.163)	(0.161)
Ideology	−1.772***	1.084***
	(0.200)	(0.196)
Party ID	−0.315***	−0.023
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Pray	0.100	−0.196*
	(0.109)	(0.108)
Income	−0.005	0.857**
	(0.364)	(0.362)
Age	0.146	−0.066
	(0.179)	(0.176)
Authoritarianism	0.248	0.643***
	(0.155)	(0.153)
Racial Resentment	−1.764***	1.513***
	(0.208)	(0.204)
Competence (-)	−0.005	0.015
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Warmth (+)	−0.023	−0.021
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Competence*Warmth	−0.015	0.011
	(0.027)	(0.028)
Observations	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Models with Intelligence as Only Stereotype

Table 3.8A: 2018 MTurk Paternalistic Policies with Intelligence

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.371***	0.144**	−0.186**	0.001
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.074)
Education	0.098	0.381**	−0.539***	0.020
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	1.031***	1.007***	−1.158***	0.378*
	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.203)
Party ID	−0.092	−0.012	0.195*	−0.254**
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.065	−0.074	−0.399***	0.156
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Income	1.890***	1.809***	−0.779**	0.654*
	(0.381)	(0.363)	(0.383)	(0.379)
Age	−0.540***	−0.652***	−0.422**	−0.887***
	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.798***	0.595***	−0.770***	0.798***
	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.159)
Racial Resentment	2.500***	1.961***	−0.433**	1.210***
	(0.216)	(0.204)	(0.217)	(0.210)
Black FT (+)	0.136	0.127	0.263**	−0.202*
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.113)	(0.111)
Intelligence (-)	−0.056	0.051	−0.011	0.079**
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)
BFT * Intelligence	0.069	0.116	−0.060	0.215*
	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.137)	(0.123)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.9A: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies with Intelligence

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.058	0.057
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.521***	−0.013
	(0.164)	(0.162)
Ideology	−1.792***	1.087***
	(0.201)	(0.197)
Party ID	−0.317***	−0.032
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Pray	0.062	−0.181*
	(0.110)	(0.108)
Income	−0.084	0.885**
	(0.367)	(0.365)
Age	0.127	−0.033
	(0.179)	(0.176)
Authoritarianism	0.241	0.665***
	(0.155)	(0.154)
Racial Resentment −1.664***	1.479***	
	(0.206)	(0.202)
Black FT (+)	0.317***	−0.054
	(0.105)	(0.104)
Intelligence (-)	0.038	0.054
	(0.036)	(0.035)
BFT * Intelligence	−0.143	−0.017
	(0.128)	(0.125)
Observations	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.10A: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies Absolute Stereotypes

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.380***	0.132*	−0.184**	−0.019
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Education	0.107	0.363**	−0.546***	0.009
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	0.982***	0.998***	−1.153***	0.351*
	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.202)
Party ID	−0.082	0.002	0.194*	−0.230**
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.070	−0.080	−0.404***	0.161
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Income	1.871***	1.880***	−0.779**	0.712*
	(0.381)	(0.363)	(0.382)	(0.378)
Age	−0.560***	−0.698***	−0.432**	−0.913***
	(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.188)	(0.189)
Authoritarianism	0.807***	0.607***	−0.769***	0.796***
	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.158)
Racial Resentment 2.517***	2.125***	−0.432**	1.357***	
	(0.212)	(0.201)	(0.214)	(0.207)
Black FT (+)	0.183	0.010	0.149	0.007
	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.154)
Stereotypes (-)	0.062*	0.003	0.005	−0.006
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.032)
BFT * STS	−0.051	0.020	0.025	−0.056
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 3.11A: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies Absolute Stereotypes

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.052	0.051
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.519***	−0.014
	(0.164)	(0.162)
Ideology	−1.784***	1.087***
	(0.201)	(0.197)
Party ID	−0.312***	−0.028
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Pray	0.058	−0.183*
	(0.110)	(0.108)
Income	−0.093	0.917**
	(0.366)	(0.364)
Age	0.094	−0.054
	(0.179)	(0.177)
Authoritarianism	0.217	0.662***
	(0.155)	(0.153)
Racial Resentment	−1.599***	1.575***
	(0.201)	(0.198)
Black FT (+)	0.374**	−0.104
	(0.149)	(0.148)
Stereotypes (-)	0.041	0.007
	(0.030)	(0.031)
BFT * ST	−0.062	−0.004
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Observations	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.12A: 2018 MTurk Racialized/Paternalistic Policies FT Difference

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.392***	0.157**	−0.186**	−0.004
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Education	0.077	0.356**	−0.571***	0.037
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	0.982***	0.943***	−1.111***	0.310
	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.202)
Party ID	−0.076	0.020	0.179	−0.215*
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.037	−0.054	−0.371***	0.121
	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.114)	(0.112)
Income	1.896***	1.838***	−0.645*	0.600
	(0.379)	(0.361)	(0.381)	(0.376)
Age	−0.511***	−0.664***	−0.370**	−0.953***
	(0.180)	(0.176)	(0.186)	(0.187)
Authoritarianism	0.797***	0.576***	−0.712***	0.773***
	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.158)
Racial Resentment 2.323***	1.826***	−0.393*	1.310***	
	(0.221)	(0.209)	(0.223)	(0.217)
Black FT Difference (+)	−0.012**	−0.016***	0.013**	−0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−0.221	0.231	−0.304	0.505**
	(0.228)	(0.216)	(0.222)	(0.217)
FTD * SD (-)	−0.093	−0.724	−0.252	0.267
	(1.173)	(1.127)	(1.179)	(1.147)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.13A: 2018 MTurk Racialized Policies FT Difference

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.067	0.061
	(0.071)	(0.070)
Education	0.483***	−0.001
	(0.163)	(0.161)
Ideology	−1.768***	1.074***
	(0.201)	(0.197)
Party ID	−0.318***	−0.019
	(0.108)	(0.108)
Pray	0.096	−0.198*
	(0.109)	(0.107)
Income	0.012	0.839**
	(0.364)	(0.363)
Age	0.185	−0.062
	(0.178)	(0.175)
Authoritarianism	0.265*	0.636***
	(0.155)	(0.154)
Racial Resentment	−1.805***	1.473***
	(0.212)	(0.208)
Black FT Difference (+)	−0.0001	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.115	0.419*
	(0.221)	(0.217)
FTD * SD	−1.757	1.728
	(1.135)	(1.130)
Observations	988	988

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models ANES Disaggregated by Survey Mode

Table 3.14A: ANES 2012 Internet Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.907***	0.178	−0.166
	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.188)
Male	0.129*	−0.038	0.023
	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Education	−0.074	0.227	−0.085
	(0.196)	(0.178)	(0.201)
Income	0.146	0.368***	0.070
	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.148)
Ideology	1.456***	1.748***	−0.233
	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.199)
Party ID	0.263**	0.916***	−0.335***
	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.116)
Church	−0.533***	−0.056	−0.446***
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.104)
Authoritiarianism	−0.474***	−0.027	0.840***
	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.133)
Racial Resentment	0.770***	−1.183***	1.400***
	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.211)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−1.065***	0.772***	0.461*
	(0.233)	(0.207)	(0.251)
Black FT (+)	−0.027	0.221*	0.023
	(0.128)	(0.115)	(0.123)
SD*BFT	0.739	−1.052	1.332
	(0.748)	(0.664)	(0.810)
Constant	−0.694**	0.421***	0.694***
	(0.344)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Observations	1,178	1,178	1,178

Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.15A: ANES 2012 Face to Face Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.907***	0.178	0.326***
	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.124)
Male	0.129*	−0.038	0.015
	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.047)
Education	−0.074	0.227	−0.054
	(0.196)	(0.178)	(0.128)
Income	0.146	0.368***	0.144
	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.094)
Ideology	1.456***	1.748***	−0.463***
	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.130)
Party ID	0.263**	0.916***	−0.041
	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.073)
Church	−0.533***	−0.056	−0.359***
	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.070)
Authoritarianism	−0.474***	−0.027	0.626***
	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.082)
Racial Resentment	0.770***	−1.183***	1.953***
	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.158)
Stereotype Difference (-)	−1.065***	0.772***	0.140
	(0.233)	(0.207)	(0.160)
Black FT (+)	−0.027	0.221*	−0.049
	(0.128)	(0.115)	(0.090)
SD*BFT	0.739	−1.052	−0.472
	(0.748)	(0.664)	(0.452)
Constant	−1.276**	0.214***	0.595***
	(0.505)	(0.082)	(0.091)
Observations	873	873	873
R^2		0.354	0.185
Adjusted R^2		0.344	0.173
Log Likelihood	−688.795		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,403.589		

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.16A: ANES 2016 Face to Face Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−1.362***	0.112	0.208
	(0.175)	(0.170)	(0.154)
Male	0.324***	0.020	0.026
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.079)
Education	−0.011	−0.005	−0.235
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.155)
Income	−0.242	0.050	0.052
	(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.147)
Ideology	−1.096***	0.660***	−2.473***
	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.203)
Party ID	0.057	−0.276	−0.098
	(0.212)	(0.233)	(0.190)
Church	−0.775***	−0.336***	0.029
	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.105)
Racial Resentment	−0.202	1.504***	−1.210***
	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.191)
Authoritarianism	−0.518***	0.315*	0.104
	(0.170)	(0.168)	(0.152)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.428	0.388	−0.067
	(0.276)	(0.309)	(0.257)
Black FT(+)	0.020	−0.054	0.046
	(0.161)	(0.153)	(0.141)
BFT*SD	−0.539	−0.443	0.826
	(0.705)	(0.727)	(0.627)
Observations	813	813	813

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3.17A: ANES 2016 Internet Sample

	Dependent variable:		
	Legal Pot	Death Penalty	Obamacare
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.979***	0.095	0.612***
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.103)
Male	0.082	0.053	−0.046
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.050)
Education	−0.009	−0.413***	−0.205**
	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.101)
Income	−0.142	0.235**	0.054
	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.093)
Ideology	−1.482***	0.951***	−2.424***
	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.133)
Party ID	0.393	0.182	−0.374
	(0.434)	(0.437)	(0.391)
Church	−0.730***	−0.348***	0.122*
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.069)
Racial Resentment	0.098	1.260***	−1.357***
	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.120)
Authoritarianism	−0.374***	0.555***	−0.027
	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.090)
Stereotype Difference (-)	0.497***	0.672***	−0.035
	(0.168)	(0.199)	(0.160)
Black FT (+)	0.372***	−0.139	0.077
	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.091)
BFT*SD	−1.044**	−0.429	−0.216
	(0.416)	(0.468)	(0.393)
Observations	2,100	2,100	2,100

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 4: Measuring Racialized Paternalism: The Black Paternalism Scale

To most accurately assess the way that racialized paternalism shapes political attitudes and behavior it is necessary to create a scale that can directly assess this construct. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the indirect proxies meant to capture racialized paternalism (the AS and SCM approaches) are not consistently capturing the expected relationships to either policy variables or other political attitudes. A more targeted and direct measure of the key tenets of racialized paternalism: a desire to aid a given group paired with a belief that they are incapable of achieving good outcomes on their own, has the potential to more cleanly and reliably capture this attitude.

In this chapter, I discuss the creation of such a measure. With a number of data sets I examine the way this measure impacts attitudes and behavior, with a specific focus on whether relationships with other socioeconomic attitudes and policy outcomes meet the expectations for a measure of racialized paternalism. After exploring the degree to which the Black paternalism scale shifts attitudes consistent with expectations, I compare the performance of the Black paternalism scale with that of a race neutral measure of paternalism. I find that these two scales are very highly correlated and both seem to perform as expected.

Creating the Black Paternalism Scale

Directly measuring racialized paternalism is difficult for a few key reasons. First, there is reason to believe that with any measures of racial attitudes, which are a particularly taboo subject

in American politics, social desirability can play a large role in shifting responses. A large body of work has found that White Americans responses to survey questions on race, ethnicity, and attitudes therein are sensitive to question mode and wording (An, 2015; Evans, Garcia, Garcia & Barron, 2003; Krysan, 1998; Redlawsk, Tolbert & Franko, 2010; Janus, 2010) This makes it difficult to tap "genuine" or "authentic" attitudes, instead increasing the likelihood of respondents giving what they believe is the answer desired by researchers.

Given the theorizing around racialized paternalism, there is reason to expect this might be a particular problem with those highest in the disposition. Again, those who harbor this attitude do feel positively toward the key racial out-group. These respondents would likely score highly on a measure of egalitarian attitudes, and would certainly not think of themselves as racist. As such they would be highly motivated to avoid the appearance of negative bias toward the key out group. Because of this, though many high in racialized paternalism might, for instance, view African Americans as less intelligent than White Americans as a genuine attitude, thus leading them to see Black people as uniquely in need of aid, many might censor this attitude when asked to self-report, because of its implications.

To get around this problem I worked to create questions that could tap the key attitude but lacked a clear socially desirable answer. In this sense, the questions largely present trade-offs, with both of the response option poles featuring components that could be good for the key out-group in question. The thrust of these trade-off questions revolves around agency, and specifically if it is worth it to try to improve conditions for or help African Americans, if doing so could restrict the group in some way. Those who see their efforts to help Black people as taking precedence over preserving the agency of Black people generally likely do so because they believe that their efforts will work better than what the community could do for themselves.

That belief, that the group is incapable of achieving good outcomes on their own, is key to racialized paternalism, but again because of social desirability is unlikely to be stated plainly by respondents. So, I largely infer agreement based on the endorsement of the idea that efforts to help Black people should take precedence over the personal agency of the group.

The Black paternalism scale was adapted in part from a general paternalism scale, intended to measure a race neutral paternalism. That scale was crafted to capture a belief that the average citizen is often incapable of ensuring good outcomes for themselves and it is the responsibility of the government to correct for these deficiencies through policy. The language was crafted carefully and reference to governmental action was not explicitly stated so as not to trigger ideological concerns about the role of government. This set should have some overlap with but be distinct from those who see Black people in the same light.

I began pretesting a number of items for both scales and settled on six questions that could potentially be used for the Black paternalism scale and five that could be used for the general paternalism scale. I ran a small experiment that gave respondents either the Black paternalism and general paternalism items or just the Black paternalism items. The point of this exercise was to determine if putting both scales on the same instrument would substantially alter responses. I suspected respondents would feel pressure to give consistent answers across groups based on the first battery they saw in order to not express socially undesirable opinions through anchoring.

Both of these scales seem to have good properties, and hang well together. The Black paternalism scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .73 for all items regardless of whether or not respondents also saw the general paternalism items. The Cronbach's alpha for the general paternalism scale came in at .7. Explanatory factor analysis using maximum likelihood revealed

that one factor was sufficient for the Black paternalism scale, however a principal components analysis identified a second potential component that two of the items loaded onto better. A t-test revealed that responses were significantly different for those who saw both the general paternalism and Black paternalism scale relative to those who saw both. Specifically, respondents seemed to be more likely to endorse paternalism against Black people when they had not seen the general paternalism measure. This might be because respondents are generally more paternalistic towards Black people than they are toward the public more generally, but censored some of this to be socially desirable after expressing their preferred level of general paternalism. This finding is consistent with the idea of anchoring responses to the Black paternalism scale based on the general paternalism scale. The correlation between the general and Black paternalism measures was very high at R=.8 meaning that the two are collinear. As such they cannot be included in the same model and for these reasons I choose not to put them on the same instrument for this dissertation. With the key measurement properties of these scales validated, I set out to discern what impact they have on political attitudes.

2019 Turk Prime Panel Study

To get a sense of how the Black paternalism scale performs with regard to key policy and sociopolitical attitudes I fielded a survey through Turk Prime on July 17-18, 2019. The survey was restricted to White identifying respondents who were a part of the Turk Prime panel. 1800 respondents completed the survey, though 44 were dropped for incomplete or implausible responses. The demographics of the MTurk sample are distinct from that of the nationally representative sample. This MTurk sample had more women, was younger, significantly more liberal, and less educated than the respondents to the ANES and relative to the demographics of the country as a whole. Though not representative, a body of research has found that MTurk

samples are still valid and can uncover similar effects as representative samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015). The survey also took around 10 minutes to complete and participants were again paid $1.50 for their time. The survey was preregistered on OSF Framework.10

After examining all six items I dropped two of the questions and combine the remaining four items into a scale. The two dropped questions had heavily skewed distributions, very few respondents answered either of the questions in the affirmative. The dropped questions were "How important is it for black people to have control over their lives, even if it results in them making poor decisions in their lives?" and "How often should Black people be kept from doing risky or harmful things that would have negative consequences for their lives?" Notably these questions were the same items that loaded onto a separate component in the pretest. Principal component analysis here confirms that those two questions load heavily onto a separate component from the other four questions. Factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation still found that one factor was sufficient. Given the mixed results on those two items I opt to drop them and the alpha for the scale improved from .68 to .75 after this.

The survey first asked respondents about their demographic information. After this, respondents answered a battery of questions about their racial and sociopolitical attitudes that included measures of stereotypes, feeling thermometers, the child rearing authoritarianism scale, racial resentment, and the Black paternalism scale.

Finally, respondents are asked a number of policy questions, the majority of which are paternalistic in some fashion. For the purposes of this analysis I focus on six questions. The first four are all racialized policies that should be seen to impact African Americans more than other

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10The preregistration plan can be found here: https://osf.io/uy7gv/

groups. These policy items were drug testing for food stamps/SNAP/EBT recipients, marijuana legalization, sterilization as a legal punishment for women found to have used crack cocaine while pregnant, and workfare for recipients of government aid. The Black paternalism scale should strongly predict support for these policies since they are both racialized and paternalistic. There final two policy items that are racialized but are not paternalistic, support for the death penalty, and opposition to Obamacare. Again, racialized paternalism should be unrelated to these items since, despite being clearly tied to race, these policies are not paternalistic.

Turk Prime Results

I start exploring the data generated in this study with the key independent variable, the Black paternalism scale. Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of that scale. This includes the four remaining questions and has been normalized from zero to one. The distribution is skewed slightly to the left. The average respondent is at .42 out of one on the scale, and about 10% of respondents answered all four questions in a direction that indicated paternalism. Black paternalism is higher among the more religious, less educated, and younger Whites in this sample.

The psychometric properties of the Black paternalism scale indicate that it exhibits internal reliability and is not unpopular. But how does it relate to the other variables included in the study? I examine this in Table 4.1. This table looks at pairwise correlations between the Black paternalism scale and feeling thermometer ratings for African Americans, as well as racial resentment, authoritarianism, partisan identification, and ideology. The correlation between Black paternalism and the Black feeling thermometer is positive and significant at r=.15. This indicates that, as expected, those highest in the Black paternalism scale are also likely to express

higher levels of affect toward African Americans. The correlation between racial resentment and

Black paternalism provides more evidence that the measure is not capturing hidden animus. The

correlation between these two is negative at r=-.20. This suggests this measurement is picking up

some disposition that is clearly not driven by animus.

Figure 4.1: Black Paternalism Distribution Turk Prime Sample

Table 4.1: Black Paternalism Scale Correlations

	BP	BFT	RR	Auth	Party ID	Ideology
Black Paternalism		0.15***	−0.20***	0.09***	−0.10***	−0.03
Black FT	0.15***		0.12***	0.01	0.07**	0.10***
Racial Resentment	−0.20***	0.12***		0.30***	0.44***	0.48***
Authoritarianism	0.09***	0.01	0.30***		0.22***	0.26***
Party ID	−0.10***	0.07**	0.44***	0.22***		0.66***
Ideology	−0.03	0.10***	0.48***	0.26***	0.66***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

The Black paternalism has a positive relationship with authoritarianism at r=.09, as was expected. More notably, the Black paternalism scale is unrelated to ideology, but it is negatively correlated with partisan identification. The ideology and partisan identification variables are coded such that strong conservatives and Republican identifiers are the highest value, so this means that Democrats are somewhat more likely to be high in Black paternalism than Republicans. This is an intriguing result, but the correlation pales in comparison to that of racial resentment and partisan identification (r=.44). This demonstrates that the Black paternalism scale is less easily conflated with partisanship and ideology than animus-based racial attitude measures.

Table 4.2: Turk Prime Racialized and Paternalistic Policies

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.163***	0.006	−0.128**	−0.026
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Education	0.094	0.589***	−0.555***	−0.347**
	(0.165)	(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.160)
Ideology	0.603***	0.512***	−1.051***	0.472***
	(0.139)	(0.131)	(0.138)	(0.134)
Party ID	0.234***	0.267***	−0.125	0.079
	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Pray	0.051	−0.069	−0.177**	−0.001
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.071)
Income	1.857***	1.842***	−0.512	−0.535
	(0.427)	(0.401)	(0.406)	(0.427)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.007***	−0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.304**	0.358***	−0.270**	0.674***
	(0.134)	(0.126)	(0.132)	(0.130)
Racial Resentment	2.103***	1.495***	−0.225	1.111***
	(0.153)	(0.143)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Black Paternalism	0.596***	0.665***	−0.232**	1.218***
	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.105)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

In order to determine whether the Black paternalism scale has the expected impact on policy attitudes, I look at a set of racialized and paternalistic policies. Table 4.2 contains a series of four ordered probit models predicting support for these racialized and paternalistic policies.[11] All of the independent variables are again normalized from zero to one to ensure comparability and the same is true of the outcomes, with zero corresponding to strong opposition to the policy and one corresponding to strong support for the policy. Each model controls for the same

[11] The same models estimated via OLS can be found in the appendix.

demographic variables, for authoritarianism, racial resentment, and Black paternalism. The first model predicts support for drug testing welfare recipients. Here Black paternalism has the expected impact, and is highly significantly associated with support for drug testing welfare recipients (p<.001). In the second model, predicting support for workfare for those on government aid, the same is true. The Black paternalism is again significantly associated with increased support for the policy (p<.001). The next policy is legal marijuana. Yet again, Black paternalism is significantly associated with the policy (p=.03). The final policy included in the table is sterilization for mothers who've been convicted of using crack cocaine while pregnant. And once again the Black paternalism measure is significantly associated with support for the policy (p<.001).

To provide some context about how meaningful these coefficients are, moving from the lowest end of the Black paternalism scale to the highest end would lead to about a 6-percentage point shift in the probability of supporting workfare or drug testing welfare recipients. This same shift would lead to about a 12%-point increase in the probability of supporting sterilizing those who use drugs while pregnant. The association between Black paternalism and these policies is quite strong, and seems to point to this measure tapping the theorized construct with a high level of accuracy. Notably, the Black paternalism scale seems to exhibit impacts at least on par with and occasionally exceeding that of racial resentment and authoritarianism.

To further test the validity of the Black paternalism scale I turn to a second set of ordered probit models in Table 4.3. The two models depicted in this table predict support for the racialized policies that are not traditionally framed in paternalistic language. These feature the same independent variables as the preceding models. Again, the Black paternalism measure should not be associated with support for these variables if it is indeed picking up on an attitude

that is separate from the measures of animus that have long been shown to impact support for these policies. The first column predicts support for the death penalty. Here Black paternalism seems to be unrelated to support for the death penalty (p=.75), as hypothesized. The second model predicts support for Obamacare. Here Black paternalism does have a significant association with support for Obamacare (p<.001), but it is positive, increasing support for the policy. Animus-based measures have been linked to opposition to Obamacare so these findings, though not expected, are consistent with the idea that the Black paternalism scale is not capturing some latent or hidden animus. Considering these results alongside the negative correlation between the Black paternalism scale and racial resentment bolsters this conclusion.

Table 4.3: Turk Prime Racialized Policies

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.052	−0.062
	(0.054)	(0.065)
Education	0.435***	−0.395**
	(0.158)	(0.193)
Ideology	−0.969***	0.813***
	(0.134)	(0.161)
Party ID	−0.578***	0.098
	(0.075)	(0.092)
Pray	0.027	−0.256***
	(0.071)	(0.087)
Income	1.068***	0.358
	(0.399)	(0.500)
Age	0.003	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Authoritarianism	0.226*	0.255*
	(0.127)	(0.153)
Racial Resentment	−1.374***	1.566***
	(0.145)	(0.177)
Black Paternalism	0.846***	0.012
	(0.104)	(0.008)
Observations	1,756	1,756
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

2020 Amazon Mechanical Turk Study

The 2019 Turk Prime study provides promising evidence that the Black Paternalism scale is operating as a valid and reliable measure of racialized paternalism towards Black Americans. However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the way that this scale operates from a single non-representative survey, regardless of the consistency of the results. In order to further test the impact of the Black paternalism scale, and if it performs as a measure of racialized paternalism is expected to, I fielded another survey on June 6, 2020 on Amazon's Mechanical Turk. This study, like the others, was restricted to 594 White identifying American adults. To address the high-profile issues with quality of MTurk samples I again implemented protocols to pre-screen suspicious IP addresses within Qualtrics and not allow respondents with these IP addresses to complete the survey (Burleigh, Kennedy & Clifford, 2018). The demographics of the MTurk sample are clearly distinct from that of the nationally representative sample. The MTurk sample had more women, was more liberal, and less educated than the respondents to the ANES and relative to the demographics of the country as a whole. The survey took around six minutes to complete and participants were paid $1.00 for their time.

It's important to note that at the time this survey was put into the field, protests around police brutality had been ongoing for a week in the wake of a Minneapolis police officer killing George Floyd by kneeling on his neck for over eight minutes while arresting Floyd. The tensions raised by the death and subsequent protests sweeping nearly every city in the nation almost certainly impacted attitudes concerning race, which are crucial to this survey. This does not however render these data useless. To the contrary, these data allow us to examine if the Black paternalism scale still operates in the manner we would expect from racial paternalism as a construct at a time of heightened racial sensitivity.

The survey first asked the respondents for standard demographic and socioeconomic information, including age, gender, income, educational attainment, religiosity (again measured through prayer frequency), partisanship, and ideology. Respondents then were given a battery of racial and political attitude measures, including a shortened racial resentment, authoritarianism, humanitarianism, and White guilt scales and the full four question Black paternalism scale used in the last study. The humanitarianism items were adapted from the scale introduced by Feldman and Steenbergen (2002), and the White guilt items were adapted from Swim and Miller (1999). After this, respondents answered a number of questions about policies that were either racialized and paternalistic, or just paternalistic. This included one question about not allowing those accused of a crime to live in public housing (racialized and paternalistic) and questions about support for a tax on soda and requiring motorcycle riders to wear a helmet (paternalistic).

Respondents were then given a number of questions about COVID-19 and the response to the virus. Specifically, before seeing these questions each respondent was given an introduction that made clear the racial disparity in coronavirus infections that has been uncovered, with Black people making up a significantly larger portion of those contracting the virus than their share of the population. The questions were specifically about the use of paternalism to control the spread of the virus with questions about police enforcing quarantine, the appropriateness of surveillance to track those infected, and mandatory vaccines. Finally, respondents were given a survey experiment that will be discussed further in the next chapter.

2020 MTurk Results

To begin evaluating the performance of the Black paternalism scale as a measure of racialized paternalism, particularly in a moment of reckoning with the role of race in society, I

first plot the distribution of the scale. Figure 4.2 displays this, and the results are notable. The

mean respondent falls at .58 out of one on this scale, considerably higher than the .42 found in

the 2019 Turk Prime survey. It is impossible to say whether this result can be attributed to

changing attitudes, given the differing composition of the two samples. To that point, liberals

were a larger proportion of the sample in the 2020 MTurk Survey than the 2019 Turk Prime

Survey, however the difference between the Black paternalism scores is larger than that gap.

Given this, the possibility that the distribution of this variable in the population has substantively

changed cannot be rejected off hand, either.

Figure 4.2: Black Paternalism Distribution 2020 MTurk Sample

Does the Black paternalism scale have the expected relationship with the new racial and

political attitude measures included in the survey and has the relationship changed with some of

the other racial and political attitude measures? Table 4.4 provides some answers here. It

displays the pairwise correlations between the Black paternalism scale and racial resentment,

authoritarianism, White guilt, and humanitarianism. As was the case in the 2019 Turk Prime

survey, the scale is negatively and significantly correlated with racial resentment at R=-.26, indicating that those who express animus towards Black people are less likely to score highly on the Black paternalism scale than those who are lower on racial resentment. However, unlike the previous survey and defying expectations, the Black paternalism scale is not significantly associated with authoritarianism. The results with regard to White guilt are exactly as expected, the Black paternalism scale is significantly and positively associated with White guilt at R=.28. The same is true for the Black paternalism scale and a measure of humanitarianism, which is positively and significantly correlated with the Black paternalism scale at R=.24.

Table 4.4: Black Paternalism Political Attitude Correlations

	BP	RR	Auth	WG	Hum
Black Paternalism		-0.26^{***}	0.04	0.28^{***}	0.24^{***}
Racial Resentment	-0.26^{***}		0.41^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.39^{***}
Authoritarianism	0.04	0.41^{***}		0.20^{***}	0.09^{***}
White Guilt	0.28^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.20^{***}		0.30^{***}
Humanitarianism	0.24^{***}	0.39^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.30^{***}	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

Table 4.5 looks at the pairwise correlations between the Black paternalism scale and the socioeconomic and demographic measures included in the survey. The Black paternalism scale is significantly and negatively associated with ideology at R=-.21, a finding that did not emerge in the 2019 Turk Prime survey. This is coded such that lower values correspond to liberal identification, so this means liberals are much more likely to be high in the Black paternalism

scale. This correlation is quite strong, and the same is true for partisanship. Democrats are also significantly more likely to score highly on the Black paternalism scale, it is correlated with partisanship at R =- .24 (higher values represent Republican identification). Though this pattern was evident in the 2019 Turk Prime survey, the magnitude doubled from R=.11 in that study. Though not conclusive, the heightened racial tensions are a potential culprit for this increased connection between liberal or Democratic identification and the Black paternalism scale. The scale is uncorrelated with income, as was the case in the 2019 Turk Prime Survey. However, unlike the previous findings there is a significant and positive relationship between higher educational attainment and the Black paternalism scale. Finally, the Black paternalism scale is uncorrelated with religiosity (measured again through prayer frequency) in this sample, unlike in the 2019 Turk Prime survey.

Table 4.5: Black Paternalism Demographic Correlations

	BP	Ideo	PID	Income	Edu	Pray
Black Paternalism		-0.21^{***}	-0.24^{***}	0.02	0.11^{***}	-0.03
Ideology	-0.21^{***}		0.76^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.02	0.39^{***}
Party ID	-0.24^{***}	0.76^{***}		0.15^{***}	0.04	0.35^{***}
Income	0.02	0.10^{***}	0.15^{***}		0.25^{***}	0.00
Education	0.11^{***}	0.02	0.04	0.25^{***}		0.09^{***}
Pray	-0.03	0.39^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.00	0.09^{***}	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. $^{***}p < .001$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{*}p < .05$.

The correlations provide some solid evidence that the Black paternalism is largely operating as expected, even though there is some evidence that its relationships might have changed in our turbulent times. In order to further understand the way the scale is driving

attitudes, and specifically if it is doing so in a way consistent with the expectations for a measure of racialized paternalism, I begin examining the results with regard to policy opinions. I run a series of ordered probit models to estimate support for these policies while preserving the magnitude of the responses.[12] All DV's are Likert-style seven point strongly favor to strongly oppose with higher values indicating favoring the policy. All independent variables are recoded from zero to one to ensure the comparability of the coefficient estimates. I control for the standard demographic and socioeconomic variables as well as racial resentment and authoritarianism.

Table 4.6 displays the results of a series of models predicting support for a racialized and paternalistic policy as well as two merely paternalistic policies. The key variable is the Black paternalism scale, which should predict support for the racialized and paternalistic policy but not the merely paternalistic policies. In the first column predicting support for banning those charged with a crime from public housing, these expectations are met. The Black paternalism scale has a large and highly significant positive effect (p< .001), indicating those highest in Black paternalism are much more likely to support the policy than others, even when controlling for other key attitudinal measures. Defying expectations the same is true for the second column, predicting support for a soda tax. Those highest in Black paternalism are again significantly more likely than others to support a tax on soda (p< .001). This is borne out again in the final model predicting support for requiring those who operate a motorcycle to wear a helmet. The Black paternalism scale significantly predicts support for this policy (p< .001), again defying expectations. These results seem to suggest that the Black paternalism scale is clearly impacting support for paternalistic policies that are not racialized. One could make a case that the soda tax

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[12] The same models estimated via OLS can be found in the appendix.

might be racialized given that it has been implemented most famously in New York City, a particularly diverse metropolis, and assume that the tax might help Black people, who are more likely to suffer from ailments like diabetes that excess soda consumption can contribute to. However, it's hard to make a similar case about the motorcycle helmet policy. But it's also worth noting that the widely used racial resentment scale, ostensibly a direct measure only of racial attitudes that has no theoretical connection a priori to a soda tax or motorcycle helmet law also strongly predicts both of these items.

Table 4.6: 2020 MTurk Racialized and Paternalistic Policies

	Dependent variable:		
	Section 8	Soda Tax	Motorcycle Helmets
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.488**	−0.467**	0.018
	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.213)
Party ID	−0.039	−0.007	−0.185
	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.164)
Ideology	0.607***	−0.362	−0.232
	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.228)
Female	−0.019	0.069	−0.503***
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.094)
Pray	0.161	0.019	−0.053
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.141)
South	−0.161*	−0.071	−0.0004
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.100)
Income	−0.195	0.331	0.011
	(0.557)	(0.558)	(0.568)
Education	0.070	0.334	0.207
	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.217)
Racial Resentment	1.693***	−0.603***	−0.843***
	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.204)
Authoritarianism	0.621***	0.180	0.384*
	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.218)
Black Paternalism	0.891***	1.816***	1.115***
	(0.269)	(0.273)	(0.282)
Observations	594	594	594

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.7 features a series of identical models, this time predicting support for a number

of paternalistic policies to address the novel coronavirus. Given the racial disparities in who has

contracted COVID-19, the Black paternalism scale should strongly predict support for these policies. The first column here predicts support for police enforcement of quarantine of those who contract COVID-19. The Black paternalism scale has a massive and significant impact on support for this policy (p< .00001), even when controlling for racial resentment, authoritarianism and a host of other attitudes, and has by far the largest impact of any explanatory variable. The same is true for the second column predicting support for police enforcing social distancing. The Black paternalism scale again has a massive and significant positive effect (p< .00001) on support for the policy, and again has by far the largest substantive impact of any variable. Continuing this theme, the third column predicts support for using mobile phones to track the movements of those who contract coronavirus. Again, the Black paternalism scale has an enormous and significant impact (p< .00001), those highest in the scale are significantly more likely to support the policy. In the final column, predicting support for making the COVID-19 vaccine mandatory once it is available, the pattern of results continues to hold. The Black paternalism scale, as predicted, has a large and substantive significant effect (p< .00001), increasing support for the policy as Black paternalism scale scores rise. To put a finer point on this, in each of these models, shifting from the lowest end of the Black paternalism scale to the highest end of the scale would lead to a more than 15%-point increase in the probability of supporting the policy, even when accounting for other control variables. This is a massive effect.

The results from this survey are informative and help situate the impact of the Black paternalism scale. The Black paternalism scale has a large and significant impact on support for all of the policies it was expected to impact, and some it was not expected to impact. It seems possible that many who harbor paternalistic attitudes towards Black people as a group might also hold them toward other groups. Despite the clearly racialized nature of the scale and the fact that

it predicts strongly the racialized and paternalistic outcomes, the measure should not be predicting support for the non-racialized paternalistic outcomes if it is capturing a unique desire to help African Americans. These findings underscore the need for a general measure of paternalism to compare with the Black paternalism scale.

Table 4.7: 2020 MTurk Coronavirus Policies

	Dependent variable:			
	Quarantine	Policing	Surveillance	Vaccinations
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	−0.200	−0.200	0.242	−0.171
	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.206)	(0.205)
Party ID	−0.180	−0.236	−0.229	−0.364**
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.161)	(0.159)
Ideology	0.143	−0.018	0.111	−0.437**
	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.224)	(0.222)
Female	−0.067	−0.187**	−0.033	0.091
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Pray	0.083	0.235*	0.012	−0.186
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.136)
South	0.033	0.067	0.018	0.013
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.096)
Racial Resentment	−0.137	0.061	−0.283	−0.209
	(0.194)	(0.195)	(0.200)	(0.197)
Authoritarianism	0.380*	0.330	0.359*	0.038
	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.208)
Income	0.425	−0.042	0.381	−0.355
	(0.555)	(0.560)	(0.561)	(0.558)
Education	−0.052	0.090	0.682***	0.460**
	(0.206)	(0.208)	(0.212)	(0.210)
Black Paternalism	1.757***	2.085***	2.342***	1.785***
	(0.272)	(0.275)	(0.281)	(0.275)
Observations	594	594	594	594

Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

General Paternalism Scale

The first study provides a solid body of evidence that the measure of Black paternalism is valid, the construct displays some of the expected discriminant validity but has a massive impact on political attitudes it is expected to predict. Most importantly, I provide evidence that the disposition which is correlated with positive feeling thermometer scores from African Americans, negatively correlated with racial resentment, and as such seems to clearly be driven by affinity and not animus, still predicts support for real world discrimination. Though this work is very instructive and provides important conclusions, it cannot rule out the possibility that the measure is capturing artifacts of general paternalism not motivated by race. In order to thoroughly test this proposition, I return to the results of the 2018 MTurk Survey, first detailed in the previous chapter to compare the performance of the general and Black paternalism scales on the same items.

For the general paternalism battery, I dropped two of the seven potential questions and compiled a five-item scale. The questions excluded were "How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?" and "How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes in order to learn from them?". Confirmatory factor analysis confirms that all other factors loaded onto a single dimension and these did not. Also, Cronbach's alpha was significantly improved with its removal. Each question gets at the core beliefs around whether people generally need to be told how to behave or act in order to ensure good outcomes (ex. "How important is it to prevent people from making costly mistakes?" or "How important is it to prevent people from making poor personal decisions in their lives?"). The scale has a Cronbach's alpha of .85 indicating a high degree of reliability and a factor analysis of the items

indicates that there is a one factor solution indicating that the scale is capturing one underlying construct.

I look at the outcomes for the racialized and paternalistic policies first explored in the previous chapter. However, the survey also included three policy items were not racialized and are more generally paternalistic, and measured support for making helmets mandatory for motorcyclists, an assisted suicide law, and a soda tax. If it works as predicted, the general paternalism scale should substantially predict support for all of these measures, since it should lead to higher support for paternalism regardless of who the target of the paternalism is.

2018 MTurk Results

I begin examining the results of this study by looking to the general paternalism battery included in the instrument. The distribution of this variable (normalized from zero to one) is displayed below in Figure 4.3. This distribution is skewed to the left, with a mean of around .33, indicating that most of the respondents in this sample fall on the low end of paternalism. Notably, though it's difficult to compare across discordant samples, it appears that mean levels of Black paternalism are higher overall than that for general paternalism.

Figure 4.3: General Paternalism Distribution 2018 MTurk Sample

How do these variables correlate with other important sociopolitical attitudes and each other? Table 4.8 displays the pairwise correlations between the general paternalism measure and authoritarianism, racial resentment, SDO, party identification, and ideology. It's notable that in many ways the general paternalism measure performs similarly to the Black paternalism scale. The general paternalism measure is positively correlated with authoritarianism at r=.18, indicating those highest in paternalism are also likely to be high in authoritarianism. The measure is also negatively correlated with racial resentment at r=.12, again indicating that the measure is not capturing racial animus. As expected, the general paternalism measure has a strong and negative relationship with SDO. This provides support for the idea that those highest in general paternalism are legitimately concerned with inequality and would like to reduce it. Finally, the general paternalism measure is weakly negatively correlated with ideology and partisan identification such that Democrats and liberals respectively are slightly more likely to be paternalistic than the rest of the sample. Additionally, those highest in general paternalism are

older and more religious than their counterparts, similar to the Black paternalism scale. However, there is a stark difference on education, such that those highest in general paternalism are more likely to have higher education; the opposite was true for the Black paternalism measure.

Table 4.8: General Paternalism Scale Correlations

	Pater	SDO	RR	Auth	PID	Ideo
Paternalism		−0.33***	−0.12***	0.18***	−0.09*	−0.09*
SDO	−0.33***		0.23***	0.02	0.19***	0.23***
Racial Resentment	−0.12***	0.23***		0.37***	0.42***	00.61***
Authoritarianism	0.18***	0.02	0.37***		0.31***	0.40***
Party ID	−0.09*	0.19***	0.42***	0.31***		0.69***
Ideology	−0.09*	0.23***	0.61***	0.40***	0.69***	

Note: Correlation table adjusts for multiple tests. ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$.

Table 4.9: 2018 MTurk Survey Racialized and Paternalistic Policies

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.398***	0.141**	−0.195***	0.014
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Education	0.053	0.351*	−0.539***	−0.009
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.176)	(0.170)
Ideology	1.042***	0.998***	−1.230***	0.447**
	(0.203)	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.203)
Party ID	−0.081	0.006	0.180	−0.202*
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.112)
Pray	−0.080	−0.077	−0.281**	−0.010
	(0.113)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Income	1.897***	1.872***	−0.655*	0.621*
	(0.379)	(0.361)	(0.381)	(0.377)
Age	−0.445**	−0.650***	−0.436**	−0.873***
	(0.180)	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.188)
Authoritarianism	0.761***	0.594***	−0.604***	0.597***
	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.166)	(0.162)
Paternalism	0.362*	0.111	−0.743***	1.068***
	(0.189)	(0.183)	(0.194)	(0.191)
Racial Resentment	2.375***	2.050***	−0.684***	1.694***
	(0.201)	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.199)
Observations	988	988	988	988

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

These data are instructive and shed some light on the impact of the general paternalism measure. In order to further understand the way that paternalism shifts policy attitudes I turn to the observational analysis of support for racialized and paternalistic policy items. Again, I use the exact same questions as in the previous survey. In order to model responses, I preserve the Likert style responses and run an ordered probit model predicting support for each policy. Each model controls for the impact of socioeconomic factors and attitudinal measures (age, gender,

education, income, religiosity, party ID, ideology, authoritarianism, and racial resentment all normalized between zero to one). The key independent variable is the general paternalism measure.

Table 4.9 provides the results for this first set of variables. The table contains four models run separately each predicting each of the key outcomes. In the first column, predicting support for drug testing welfare recipients, we see the expected positive effect from the general paternalism measure. Higher scores on that measure significantly predict higher support for drug testing welfare recipients at p=.05. In the second column, predicting support for workfare for welfare recipients, this finding does not hold. The general paternalism measure is unrelated to support for workfare, defying expectations. However, expectations are met again when I turn to the third column, predicting support for legal marijuana. The coefficient for the general paternalism measure is negative and highly significant indicating increased opposition to legal marijuana as general paternalism increases at p<.001. The same is true with regard to the fourth column, modeling support for sterilization of inmates. Here again, the effect of general paternalism is highly significant and positive, such that those who score highest in general paternalism are much likelier to support sterilization of inmates at p<.0001.

Table 4.10: 2018 MTurk Paternalistic Policies

	Dependent variable:		
	Soda Tax	Motorcycle Helmet	Euthanasia
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.178**	0.470***	−0.126*
	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.069)
Education	0.391**	−0.108	−0.326**
	(0.160)	(0.166)	(0.161)
Ideology	−0.396**	−0.828***	−0.811***
	(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.192)
Party ID	−0.217**	−0.011	−0.078
	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.107)
Pray	0.099	0.100	−0.894***
	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.110)
Income	0.370	−0.019	0.010
	(0.359)	(0.375)	(0.360)
Age	−0.473***	0.042	−0.326*
	(0.175)	(0.183)	(0.173)
Authoritarianism	−0.067	0.204	−0.644***
	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.157)
Paternalism	1.372***	1.544***	−0.240
	(0.183)	(0.194)	(0.179)
Racial Resentment	−0.432**	−0.122	−0.388**
	(0.187)	(0.195)	(0.188)
Observations	988	988	988
Note:			*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

The general paternalism measure does predict almost all of the racialized and paternalistic policies with the expected direction and magnitude. But is this true for paternalistic polices that are not racialized? To answer this question, I turn to the three policy items that have some element of paternalism but were not related to race. These questions asked about support

for a soda tax, a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets, and assisted suicide. I again model

responses to these questions with a set of ordered probit models, and control for the exact same

variables as the previous set of models. Table 4.10 displays the results of this analysis. Again, the

three columns represent separate models predicting support for each of the outcomes separately.

In the first column, predicting support for a soda tax, I again find the expected result. The

coefficient for the general paternalism measure is positive and significant such that those highest

in general paternalism are more likely to endorse a soda tax at $p<.001$. The same is true for the

second column, predicting support for a law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. The

coefficient for general paternalism is, once again, highly significant and positive as expected,

indicating that those highest in general paternalism are more likely to support a motorcycle

helmet law. This however, does not hold for the final column, predicting support for euthanasia.

The general paternalism is unrelated to support for euthanasia, defying expectations. This may be

because attitudes on the policy are more likely to be driven by attitudes on the sanctity of life, as

demonstrated by the massive predictive power that religiosity and ideology display in driving

answers to this question.

These results seem to again match with the expectations laid out earlier in the

dissertation. The general paternalism measure exhibits the expected significant impact on five

out of the seven policies, and the majority of both the racialized and non-racialized policies that

are paternalistic. This seems to indicate that the measure is capturing a general preference for

paternalism that does not discriminate on the basis of race.

Conclusion

The data analyzed in this chapter provides substantial evidence that the Black paternalism scale operates in a manner we would expect from a measure consistently and reliably tapping racialized paternalism. Despite the fact that the Black paternalism scale is significantly positively correlated with feeling thermometer ratings for Black people, and negatively correlated with racial resentment, it still predicts support for policies that restrict the freedom of African Americans. This is true even when controlling for attitudes like racial resentment and authoritarianism that are known to significantly impact these types of attitudes. The relationships here are quite strong and almost all meet stringent tests for statistical significance in new discoveries (Benjamin et al., 2018). Across two studies and nine separate racialized and paternalistic policies, the Black paternalism scale has a highly significant and substantively meaningful impact in the expected direction on every single policy. It performs much better than the AS and SCM measures derived from the stereotype content model.

The evidence of the construct validity of the Black paternalism scale is not limited to the outcomes that it predicts. The scale is positively correlated with humanitarianism, White guilt, authoritarianism, liberal ideology, and Democratic identification, all consistent with expectations. It also is unrelated to support for the death penalty and predicts support for Obamacare, which though not expected, is still in the opposite direction of what we would expect from a measure capturing racial animus. That said the scale does also predict support for paternalistic policies that are not racialized, which was unexpected. This is not shocking given the very high correlation between the general paternalism scale and the Black paternalism scale.

The results with regard to the general paternalism scale also seems to map onto expectations. Though the measure does predict support for some of the same racialized and

paternalistic policies as the Black paternalism scale, this measure also predicts support for non-racialized paternalistic items. However, the results for this variable were notably weaker on some of the racialized and paternalistic items, the scale only significantly predicted support for half of these policies. This evidence does suggest there might be some meaningful differences in the effect of the general paternalism scale.

Some key questions remain however. The timing of the final survey including the Black paternalism calls the connection between the Black paternalism scale and partisanship ideology into question. It's not clear if the strong connection found in that survey can be replicated. It's also incredibly difficult to isolate the role of race when attempting to understand why exactly it is that the Black paternalism scale predicts the outcomes it does. Many of these policies target other stigmatized groups (e.g. drug users, women, the poor, etc.), and it is impossible with this data to tease apart these groups in practice. It isn't clear if respondents actually needed the information about racial disparities in coronavirus to support the restrictive policies, again given the overlap between general and Black paternalism, these respondents could just be paternalistic regardless of race. It is still not clear what exactly is leading to the differential response to the Black and general paternalism scales and more work is necessary to tease this out. The high correlation between the two in pre-testing raises a number of questions about how social desirability or anchoring could be adding some noise to the measurement.

Another intriguing finding is the demographic makeup of those who fall into each paternalist category. Both the Black and general paternalism measures seemed to capture more religious and younger Whites. However, more educated Whites are higher than others in general paternalism and much lower than others in Black paternalism. This is quite intriguing and unexpected. The partisan/ideological findings are also quite interesting. Particularly, the change

in the relationship between Democratic identification and the Black paternalism scale in the 2019

and 2020 surveys could be indicative of a substantial attitude shift, but more work is necessary to

make firm conclusions on this.

2018 MTurk Survey Question Wordings

General Paternalism Scale
Q80 How important is it to assist people even if doing so restricts their freedoms?
- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q81 How important is it to prevent people from making poor personal decisions in their lives?
- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q82 How often should people be told what to do with their lives?
- All the time
- Very Often
- Somewhat Often
- Rarely
- Never

Q83 How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them?
- Extremely important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q84 How often should citizens be kept from taking legal actions (i.e. doing something that isn't against the law) that might decrease the quality of their lives?
- All the time
- Very often
- Somewhat often
- Rarely
- Never

Q85 How important is it that people be allowed to make mistakes in order to learn from them?
- Extremely important
- Very important

- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q86 How important is it to prevent people from making costly mistakes?
o   Extremely important
o   Very important
o   Moderately important
o   Slightly important
o   Not at all important

Policy Items

Q105 Do you favor or oppose raising taxes on unhealthy drinks like sodas, in order to discourage people from buying them?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q107 Do you favor or oppose the legalization of euthanasia, also known assisted suicide?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q109 Do you favor or oppose laws requiring anyone operating or riding on a motorcycle to wear a helmet?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Black Paternalism Scale

Q80 How important is it to improve conditions for black people even if doing so restricts their freedoms?
- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q81 How important is it for black people to have control over their lives, even if it results in them making poor decisions in their lives? (DROPPED)
- Extremely Important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q82 How often should black people be allowed to make mistakes without someone stopping them? (DROPPED)
- All the time
- Very Often
- Somewhat Often
- Rarely
- Never

Q84 How often should black people be kept from doing risky or harmful things that would have negative consequences for their lives?
- All the time
- Very often
- Somewhat often
- Rarely
- Never

Q85 How important is it to prevent black people from making costly mistakes?
- Extremely important
- Very important
- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

Q133 How important is it that black people get extra help to make it in today's society?
- Extremely important
- Very important

- Moderately important
- Slightly important
- Not at all important

2020 MTurk Survey Question Wordings

Policy Items

Q106 Do you favor or oppose laws that would force the eviction of anyone charged with a crime that lives in public housing or uses Section 8 vouchers to cover their rent?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q158 I would now like to ask a couple questions about COVID-19, the novel coronavirus that has quickly spread across the globe in 2020. The virus has hit the United States particularly hard; we lead the world in confirmed infections and deaths. Researchers, journalists, and officials have noted stark racial disparities in who is infected. In almost all of the hardest hit cities and states that have released race data, African Americans are more likely than Whites to contract COVID-19.

Q159 Do you favor or oppose allowing police to arrest any person who has been diagnosed with COVID-19 and breaks mandatory quarantine by leaving their home?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q174 Do you favor or oppose allowing police to arrest any person who violates mandated social distancing guidelines (for example: congregating in large groups or not wearing a face mask in a public place)?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose

- Strongly oppose

Q95 Do you favor or oppose mandatory vaccinations for COVID-19 once a vaccine is available, even for those who oppose vaccines for religious or personal reasons?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Q72 Do you favor or oppose allowing state and local government to use cell phone location data to track the movements of people who may have COVID-19?
- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

Table 4.1A: 2018 MTurk Racialized/Paternalistic Policies OLS

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.598***	0.211**	−0.331***	0.065
	(0.117)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.116)
Education	0.174	0.577**	−0.693***	0.041
	(0.269)	(0.240)	(0.250)	(0.267)
Ideology	1.871***	1.563***	−1.993***	0.663**
	(0.329)	(0.293)	(0.305)	(0.326)
Party ID	−0.219	0.012	0.240	−0.318*
	(0.181)	(0.161)	(0.168)	(0.179)
Pray	−0.122	−0.114	−0.474***	−0.053
	(0.182)	(0.162)	(0.169)	(0.181)
Income	2.552***	2.821***	−0.777	0.894
	(0.606)	(0.540)	(0.563)	(0.601)
Age	−0.864***	−0.986***	−0.650**	−1.485***
	(0.294)	(0.262)	(0.272)	(0.291)
Authoritarianism	1.348***	0.968***	−0.781***	0.876***
	(0.260)	(0.232)	(0.242)	(0.258)
paternalism	0.842***	0.288	−0.852***	1.885***
	(0.302)	(0.269)	(0.281)	(0.300)
Racial Resentment	3.839***	2.979***	−0.889***	2.504***
		(0.312)	(0.278)	(0.289)	(0.309)
Constant	2.093***	1.794***	7.228***	2.977***
	(0.290)	(0.258)	(0.269)	(0.287)
Observations	988	988	988	988
R^2	0.411	0.373	0.234	0.208
Adjusted R^2	0.405	0.367	0.226	0.200
Residual Std. Error	1.761	1.569	1.635	1.746
F Statistic	68.110***	58.063***	29.825***	25.651***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.2A: 2018 MTurk Paternalistic Policies OLS

	Dependent variable:		
	Soda Tax	Euthanasia	Motorcycle Helmets
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.065	−0.003	0.713***
	(0.116)	(0.003)	(0.101)
Education	0.041	−0.007	−0.067
	(0.267)	(0.007)	(0.234)
Ideology	0.663**	−0.016*	−1.167***
	(0.326)	(0.009)	(0.286)
Party ID	−0.318*	0.004	−0.022
	(0.179)	(0.005)	(0.157)
Pray	−0.053	0.007	0.130
	(0.181)	(0.005)	(0.158)
Income	0.894	0.032*	−0.041
	(0.601)	(0.016)	(0.527)
Age	−1.485***	0.005	−0.063
	(0.291)	(0.008)	(0.255)
Authoritarianism	0.876***	0.019***	0.407*
	(0.258)	(0.007)	(0.226)
Paternalism	1.885***	0.019**	2.175***
	(0.300)	(0.008)	(0.263)
Racial Resentment	2.504***	0.046***	−0.406
	(0.309)	(0.008)	(0.271)
Constant	2.977***	0.009	7.125***
	(0.287)	(0.008)	(0.252)
Observations	988	988	988
R^2	0.208	0.079	0.182
Adjusted R^2	0.200	0.069	0.174
Residual Std. Error	1.746	0.047	1.531
F Statistic	25.651***	8.333***	21.755***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.3A: Turk Prime Racialized/Paternalistic Policies OLS

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests	Workfare	Legal Pot	Sterilization
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	0.032**	0.001	−0.023*	−0.009
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Education	0.024	0.139***	−0.121***	−0.099**
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Ideology	0.157***	0.124***	−0.250***	0.110***
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Party ID	0.056***	0.067***	−0.039**	0.016
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Pray	0.013	−0.013	−0.043**	−0.0001
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Income	0.390***	0.428***	−0.118	−0.093
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.102)
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Authoritarianism	0.083***	0.087***	−0.064**	0.158***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Black Paternalism	0.146***	0.154***	−0.053**	0.307***
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment	0.460***	0.342***	−0.045	0.267***
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Constant	0.212***	0.170***	1.010***	0.253***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756
R^2	0.271	0.211	0.146	0.184
Adjusted R^2	0.267	0.207	0.141	0.179
Residual Std. Error	0.255	0.247	0.266	0.272
F Statistic	64.823***	46.703***	29.755***	39.311***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4A: Turk Prime Paternalistic Policies OLS

	Dependent variable:	
	Obamacare	Death Penalty
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.011	−0.016
	(0.014)	(0.012)
Education	0.119***	−0.054
	(0.042)	(0.036)
Ideology	−0.253***	0.138***
	(0.036)	(0.030)
Party ID	−0.172***	0.043**
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Pray	0.004	−0.066***
	(0.019)	(0.016)
Income	0.254**	−0.018
	(0.106)	(0.091)
Age	0.0003	0.001
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
Authoritarianism	0.065*	0.098***
	(0.034)	(0.029)
Black Paternalism	0.222***	0.064***
	(0.027)	(0.023)
Racial Resentment	−0.366***	0.374***
	(0.038)	(0.032)
Constant	0.657***	0.363***
	(0.041)	(0.035)
Observations	1,756	1,756
R^2	0.345	0.218
Adjusted R^2	0.342	0.214
Residual Std. Error	0.283	0.241
F Statistic	92.105***	48.716***
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 4.5A: 2020 MTurk Coronavirus Policies OLS

	Dependent variable:			
	Quarantine	Policing	Surveillance	Vaccines
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	−0.304	−0.451	0.374	−0.371
	(0.374)	(0.351)	(0.349)	(0.372)
Party ID	−0.385	−0.504*	−0.424	−0.746**
	(0.292)	(0.275)	(0.273)	(0.291)
Ideology	0.314	0.070	0.201	−0.776*
	(0.404)	(0.380)	(0.378)	(0.403)
Female	−0.064	−0.328**	−0.054	0.195
	(0.162)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.161)
Pray	0.179	0.441*	0.079	−0.324
	(0.245)	(0.231)	(0.229)	(0.245)
south	0.052	0.111	0.065	0.075
	(0.173)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.173)
Racial Resentment	−0.158	0.280	−0.330	−0.255
	(0.355)	(0.334)	(0.332)	(0.354)
Authoritarianism	0.741**	0.503	0.472	0.010
	(0.375)	(0.353)	(0.350)	(0.374)
Income	0.768	0.167	0.682	−0.468
	(1.033)	(0.971)	(0.965)	(1.029)
Education	−0.045	0.004	1.117***	0.824**
	(0.378)	(0.355)	(0.353)	(0.376)
Black Paternalism	0.161***	0.180***	0.190***	0.162***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Constant	0.814	1.287*	−0.634	0.985
	(0.718)	(0.675)	(0.671)	(0.715)
Observations	594	594	594	594
R^2	0.099	0.146	0.170	0.220
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.130	0.154	0.206
Residual Std. Error	1.910	1.796	1.786	1.903
F Statistic	5.820***	9.057***	10.850***	14.950***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.6A: 2020 MTurk Racialized/Paternalistic Policies OLS

	Dependent variable:		
	Section 8	Soda Tax	Motorcycle Helmets
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.126**	−0.835**	0.061
	(0.051)	(0.364)	(0.298)
Party ID	0.004	−0.119	−0.182
	(0.040)	(0.285)	(0.233)
Ideology	0.135**	−0.639	−0.391
	(0.055)	(0.394)	(0.322)
Female	0.0001	0.121	−0.636***
	(0.022)	(0.158)	(0.129)
Pray	0.045	0.026	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.240)	(0.196)
South	−0.040*	−0.168	−0.122
	(0.024)	(0.169)	(0.138)
Racial Resentment	0.435***	−0.878**	−1.133***
	(0.049)	(0.346)	(0.283)
Authoritarianism	0.147***	0.241	0.519*
	(0.051)	(0.366)	(0.299)
Income	−0.045	0.571	−0.358
	(0.142)	(1.008)	(0.823)
Education	0.022	0.562	0.371
	(0.052)	(0.369)	(0.301)
Black Paternalism	0.012***	0.162***	0.088***
	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Constant	0.055	1.192*	6.101***
	(0.099)	(0.701)	(0.572)
Observations	594	594	594
R^2	0.322	0.188	0.190
Adjusted R^2	0.309	0.173	0.175
Residual Std. Error	0.262	1.864	1.523
F Statistic	25.150***	12.249***	12.399***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 5: Experiments on Race and Paternalism

The data explored thus far in the project has provided some clear takeaways. The SCM and AS measures have not consistently performed in the pattern I would expect for a construct tapping racialized paternalism. Despite promising results in the ANES with regard to marijuana legalization, this finding did not replicate in other studies. The same is not true for the Black paternalism scale, which in two studies seems to have a significant and substantive effect in the expected direction on every single policy that was racialized and paternalistic, consistent with the expected behavior of a measure tapping racialized paternalism. However, it also impacted support for policies that are paternalistic and not racialized, defying expectation. Though it does have a more consistent impact on racialized and paternalistic policies than a general measure of paternalism, these two scales appear to be very highly correlated.

Despite this thorough exploration of these conceptualizations of paternalism and how they impact political attitudes, there are still a number of key unexplored questions. The first of these revolves around the unique application of paternalism on issues of race. Though there is considerable evidence that the Black paternalism scale is associated with policies that are racialized and paternalistic, the cross-sectional design of this inquiry does not allow me to uniquely identify race as the sole determinant of the relationships I have uncovered. It is impossible to conclusively determine whether or not the racialized nature of say, sterilizing women who use crack cocaine while pregnant, is prompting paternalism any more than the general stigmatization of those who use illicit drugs. Most of the policies examined in the past chapter target members of a number of heavily stigmatized population that, although

disproportionately African American is not exclusively Black and thus these data cannot say anything about the causal role of race in piquing racialized paternalism.

The relationship between the general paternalism scale and the Black paternalism scale is also still not clear. The constructs are clearly related and seem to overlap in their impacts. But they are also not perfectly collinear, it seems possible that some are more paternalistic in regard to African Americans than others. An experimental design could clarify if there is a difference in what these two constructs are capturing. Specifically, a design that can isolate and manipulate race should shift the impact of the Black paternalism scale, but not the general paternalism scale if the Black paternalism scale is indeed capturing a form of racialized paternalism against Black people and the general paternalism scale is capturing a truly race neutral and evenly applied paternalism.

Finally, the theoretical story outlined in the second chapter of this dissertation makes a key claim that has heretofore gone untested. Specifically, I argue that elites, who may or may not be sincere in their racialized paternalism, use it as a rhetorical strategy to convince those who do genuinely want to help members of the key out-group to support policies that could end up being harmful to that same group. It is difficult to imagine a design that could uncover the "true" motivations of elite actors, especially when they have considerable incentive to be deceptive (and elites certainly would if they were in fact intentionally deceiving or manipulating their constituents). Regardless, it is possible to test the key mechanism here, whether or not framing a policy as paternalistic can shift attitudes toward the policy, especially among those highest in the Black paternalism scale for a policy that is racialized with regard to that group.

In order to answer these outstanding questions, I analyze the results of experiments embedded in each of the original datasets collected for this dissertation, the 2018 MTurk Survey,

the 2019 Turk Prime Survey, and the 2020 MTurk Survey. An experiment manipulating the race of a school board in danger of takeover finds that the Black paternalism scale performs as expected, and predicts higher support for the takeover when the school board is largely Black. In an identical experiment, this finding is not borne out for the general paternalism measure, confirming that the Black paternalism scale can uniquely predict discriminatory behavior, and does seem to capture a construct very closely related to but still substantively distinct from general paternalism. However, a final experiment reveals that paternalistic policy framing is successful and can increase support for drug testing welfare recipients, but defying expectations, this is not true for those highest in Black paternalism.

School Board Experiment

In order to get a sense of how the different proposed paternalism measures drive support for paternalistic treatment of different races I return to the instructive case of Detroit's public schools. Though Morel (2017) demonstrates that race seems to be one of the largest predictors of school takeovers, it is impossible to randomly assign race or takeover campaigns. However, I can manipulate only the race of a fictional school district and assess whether measures of racialized paternalism predict higher support for the takeover when the school district in a largely Black community. I include an identical version of such an experiment on both the 2018 MTurk survey and the 2019 Turk Prime survey. This allows me to evaluate how the AS and SCM measures, and the general paternalism scale perform in the 2018 MTurk survey and to do the same for the Black paternalism scale in the 2019 Turk Prime survey.

In each of these surveys after all of the demographic, socioeconomic, racial and political attitude measures were completed, respondents read a fictional news article they were told was

randomly selected from a list of local news stories. The news articles specifically discussed a local school board that was underperforming. In each article, the Governor of the unnamed state is quoted and advocates for a state takeover of the democratically elected school board. A member of the school board is also quoted in each article and opposes the takeover, arguing that more funding for the school board is necessary to increase student achievement. There are three separate conditions and the only thing that changes in these conditions is the race of the majority of the school board and of the students who attend the schools. In the first condition, the board has a majority of White members and White students are pictured, in the second condition the board has a majority of Black members and Black students are picture and in the final, condition the race is not stated and no students are pictured. After they finish reading the article the respondents are asked what race the majority of the school board was, whether they support increased funding to the school board and whether they support a government takeover of the school.

<h2 style="text-align:center">2019 Turk Prime Survey Experimental Results</h2>

I begin by looking at the data for the most promising of the measures intended to tap the latent construct of racialized paternalism, the Black paternalism scale. To explore the degree to which the Black paternalism scale impacts attitudes towards the school board I run a series of ordered probit regression models. I focus only on the largely Black and largely White communities' school boards here in order to directly estimate the difference between the two. Models run on the full sample are included in the appendix. In these models, the DV is support for the takeover. I run three models, the first only includes an indicator for the Black school board treatment – with the White school board treatment as the omitted category – in order to estimate a main effect of race. The second also includes the Black paternalism scale and an

interaction with the Black treatment to estimate the way that race alters the impact of the Black paternalism scale. The final model takes the independent variables from the second model and also adds both racial resentment and an interaction of racial resentment with the Black school board treatment. This allows for an estimation of the impact of the Black paternalism scale net of a key animus-based racial attitude.

Table 5.1 displays the three ordered probit models estimating support for the takeover. In the first column, the estimate for the main effect of race in the experiment is negative but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.4), failing to provide evidence that support for the takeover in aggregate is driven by the race of the school district. However, the second model tells a much more interesting story. As expected, the interaction between the Black paternalism scale and the Black school board treatment is positive and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.02), indicating that the Black Paternalism scale does predict higher support for a takeover of a school board largely comprised of Black members than one with White members. But does this result stand even when considering the impact of animus-based racial attitudes, long shown to predict discrimination? The final model takes on this question. Yet again, even net of the impact of racial resentment (p=.48), the interaction between Black paternalism and the Black treatment is positive and significant (p=.04), indicating that the Black paternalism scale still predicts higher support for a takeover of a school board in a Black community than a White one. Notably the main effect of Black paternalism in both models and racial resentment in the final model is positive and significant (p>.001 for all), indicating that those highest in Black paternalism are more likely to support the takeover when the school board is comprised of mostly White members, albeit less so than when the school is largely comprised of Black members.

To put this in context, Figure 5.1 presents a set of plots that graphically represents the marginal effect of Black paternalism across the treatments from the final model in Table 5.1 including racial resentment and its interaction with the treatment. In this figure, the red line represents the impact of Black paternalism for those who saw the White school board condition and the blue line represents the impact of Black paternalism for those who saw the Black school board condition, separately for each outcome in the ordered probit model. Those on the highest end of the Black paternalism scale are .1 less likely than those on the lower end of the scale to strongly opposing the takeover when the school board is comprised of White members, but .2 less likely when the school board has Black members. In the same manner moving from the lowest to the highest end of the Black paternalism scale leads to a .15 increase in the probability of strongly favoring the takeover when the school board is comprised of White members, and this gap widens to .25 when the school is largely comprised of Black members. Though the Black paternalism scale was not expected to shift attitudes for a White school board, the stronger findings for the largely Black school board are consistent with the hypothesized effect.

Table 5.1: Turk Prime School Board Takeover

	Dependent variable:		
	Takeover Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	−0.050	−0.281**	−0.198
	(0.061)	(0.116)	(0.188)
Black Paternalism		0.586***	0.713***
		(0.168)	(0.171)
Racial Resentment			0.739***
			(0.193)
Black*Black Paternalism		0.526**	0.495**
		(0.235)	(0.240)
Black*Racial Resentment			−0.184
			(0.282)
Observations	1,173	1,173	1,173
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Figure 5.1: Predicted Probability of Supporting Takeover
2019 Turk Prime Study

These results show that those highest in the Black paternalism scale are driven to discriminate against the very group they claim to want to help. But if given the opportunity to help without paternalism, by providing more resources, are they still willing to single out this group? To test this proposition, I analyze responses to the second question respondents received after the treatment, indicating whether or not they support increasing funding to the school board. If those highest in racialized paternalism do genuinely want to help the out-group in question they should be more likely to allocate resources to a school board in a Black community than in a White one as well. I again run a series of ordered probit models predicting support for increasing funding. The first features the Black school board treatment as the sole coefficient to estimate the main effect of race. The second also features the Black paternalism scale and an interaction with the treatment and the scale to determine if the scale's impact on the outcome changes by

condition. The final model is the same as the second but also includes racial resentment and its interaction with the treatment to estimate the impact of Black paternalism in the Black school board condition net of racial resentment.

Table 5.2 displays these results. First in the initial column there is a significant and positive effect for the Black school board condition indicating that there is a main effect such that respondents are more likely to support increasing funding for the Black school board than an essentially identical White school board. This finding was not expected but does the same hold for those highest in racialized paternalism? The key coefficient in the second column, the interaction between the Black school board treatment and the Black Paternalism scale (Black*BP) is not significant, indicating there is no difference between the impact of the scale in the Black school board condition and the White school board condition. As was the case with support for the takeover, the coefficient for the Black paternalism scale is significant, indicating that it does predict higher support for increased funding in the White school board condition. But unlike for takeover support, this level of support does not significantly vary by condition. In the final column this finding holds, though racial resentment does significantly predict more opposition in the Black school board condition than the White school board condition, there is no difference in the impact of Black paternalism by condition.

Table 5.2: Turk Prime School Board Funding

	Dependent variable:		
	Increased Funding Support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Black Treatment	0.126**	0.030	0.432**
	(0.063)	(0.120)	(0.199)
Black Paternalism		0.917***	0.753***
		(0.175)	(0.179)
Black*BP		0.219	0.131
		(0.244)	(0.251)
Racial Resentment			−1.202***
			(0.203)
Black* Racial Resentment		−0.705**	
			(0.298)
Observations	1,173	1,173	1,173
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Figure 5.2 plots the expected impact of the Black paternalism scale by condition. The blue line represents the predicted probability of opposing or favoring the policy as Black paternalism scores increase in the Black school board condition, and the red line represents the same in the White condition. This seems to suggest ceiling effects might be at play here, those highest in Black paternalism are extremely supportive of increasing funding across the board, so there may not be room for divergence between the two conditions. Regardless this pattern of result seems consistent with the idea that those highest in Black paternalism are willing to discriminate against the group and single them out to lose political power, but are no more willing to provide them unconditional aid than any other group.

Figure 5.2: Predicted Probability of Supporting Increased Funding
TurkPrime Model 3

2018 MTurk Survey Experimental Results

The Black paternalism scale seems to be activated by race, predicting higher support for the takeover when the school board is largely Black as opposed to largely White. But is this also true for the general paternalism scale, given the collinearity between the two? In order to compare, I turn back to the 2018 MTurk survey which featured the general paternalism measure. Again, respondents to this survey were given the exact same experiment as the prior sample. They either read a story about a largely Black or largely White communities school board that was in danger of being taken over by the state government and then answered a question indicating to what degree they supported the takeover. I again use a series of ordered probit models predicting support for the takeover. I first run a model with race as the only variable, estimating the main effect of race, the next model adds the paternalism measure and an

interaction to estimate the specific impact of general paternalism. Since the general paternalism measure is not a specific racial attitude, I do not include racial resentment in this analysis.

Table 5.3 displays these two models. The model presented in the first column regresses Black school board treatment on support for the takeover. These models only include those who saw a treatment in order to directly compare the role of race. Again, models run on the full sample are included in the appendix. The coefficient for the Black school board treatment is positive but does not reach conventional levels of significance (p=.11), which does not allow for rejection of the null hypothesis that treatment is unrelated to support for the takeover. The model in the second column tells a different story. This model includes the paternalism coefficient, which does have the expected positive and significant effect at p<.001. However, since there is an interaction, this coefficient can be understood as the impact of paternalism in the White treatment condition. The interaction of Black school board treatment and the paternalism measure has a negative coefficient that does not reach significance (p=.19), such that the impact of paternalism does not change in the Black condition. This provides strong confirmation of the hypothesized effect, the general paternalism scale drives support for the takeover regardless of condition and does not seem to discriminate on the basis of race in the way that the Black paternalism scale does.

Table 5.3: 2018 MTurk School Board Takeover

	Dependent variable:	
	Takeover Support	
	(1)	(2)
Black Treatment	0.131	0.326*
	(0.082)	(0.167)
Paternalism		2.393***
		(0.306)
Black*Paternalism		−0.567
		(0.435)
Observations	660	660
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

How does the general paternalism scale impact support for funding the school board? Table 5.4 presents yet another series of ordered probit models to provide an answer to that question. As with the previous table the first column features the Black treatment as the sole independent variable, to estimate the main effect of the race treatment on support for increasing funding to the school board. The second also included the general paternalism scale and its interaction with the Black school board treatment to determine if the scale's impact varies by race condition. In the first column, the coefficient for the Black school board treatment is again significant, as was the case in the 2019 Turk Prime survey, indicating that respondents are overall more likely to give money to the Black School district than the White school district. However, this is not the case for those highest in the general paternalism scale. In the second column, matching the results for the Black paternalism scale in the 2019 Turk Prime study, the

key interaction of the Black school board treatment and the general paternalism scale (Black*Paternalism) is not significant, but the coefficient for the general paternalism scale is significant and positive. This means that the paternalism scale predicts support for increasing funding to the school district, with no significant difference by race condition. Yet again there seem to be ceiling effects as very few high in general paternalism are not supportive of increasing funding top the school board, regardless of condition.

Table 5.4: 2018 MTurk School Board Funding

	Dependent variable:	
	Increased Funding Support	
	(1)	(2)
Black Treatment	0.142*	0.050
	(0.085)	(0.169)
Paternalism		0.576*
		(0.301)
Black*Paternalism		0.281
		(0.441)
Observations	660	660
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

These findings are instructive and provide solid evidence that despite the collinearity of the general paternalism scale and the Black paternalism scale, the two are capturing constructs that do meaningfully differ. But the general paternalism scale was not the only paternalism measure that appeared on this survey. The AS and SCM approaches to measuring racialized

paternalism are also included on this survey. Despite the inconsistent performance with regard to the cross-sectional policy attitudes, these measures could still be driving discrimination in a randomized experiment. Especially given the connection between these measures and animus driven racial attitudes, there is reason to believe they might predict discrimination in the same manner as the Black paternalism scale.

To test this contention, I again run a series of ordered probit models. Table 5.5 features these models. Since this is the same data as the general paternalism scale analysis I do not include the main treatment effect. I first include the SCM composite measure (the interaction between warmth for African Americans and lower ratings of competence for Blacks than Whites) and an interaction between this measure and the Black school board treatment. The second column included this and racial resentment plus its interaction with the Black treatment, to estimate the effect of the SCM net of an animus-based racial attitude. The third model includes the AS composite measure (interaction of positive feeling thermometer ratings for Blacks and more negative stereotype ratings for Blacks than Whites) and an interaction between this measure and the Black school board treatment. The final column included this and racial resentment plus its interaction with the Black school board treatment, again to estimate the effect of the AS measure net of an animus-based racial attitude.

In the first column of Table 5.5 the key interaction (SCM*Black) does not reach significance. Unlike with both of the paternalism scales, the main coefficient for the SCM measure also does not reach significance. This points to the measure having no impact on support for the takeover regardless of condition. In the second column, this is borne out again. The SCM interaction with the Black school board treatment again fails to reach significance, but the racial resentment interaction does significantly predict higher support for the takeover in the

Black condition. In column three, the key interaction (AS*Black) does approach conventional significance (p=.06). However, this result disappears in the final model. Net of the impact of racial resentment, which has an interaction with the Black school board treatment that is highly significant (p<.001), there is no longer a remotely close to significant effect for the AS interaction. This suggests that the initial result in the third column may have been driven by the overlap between the AS measure and racial resentment.

Table 5.5: 2018 MTurk School Board Experiment with SCM

	Dependent variable:			
	Takeover Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	0.090	0.053	−0.383**	−0.402***
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.156)	(0.155)
SCM	0.379		0.413	
	(0.580)		(0.583)	
Racial Resentment			−0.121	−0.149
			(0.253)	(0.257)
Black*SCM	0.857		0.543	
	(0.702)		(0.708)	
AS		0.312		0.522
		(1.551)		(1.589)
Black*AS		3.690*		2.268
		(1.925)		(1.967)
Black*RR			1.335***	1.320***
			(0.362)	(0.366)
Observations	653	660	653	660
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

How do these measures predict support for increasing funding to the school district? Table 5.6 presents the results for this item. Again, the first includes the SCM measure and an interaction between this and the Black school board treatment. The second column included this and racial resentment plus its interaction with the Black school board treatment. The third model

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includes the AS composite measure and an interaction between this and the Black

treatment. The final column again features those and racial resentment plus its interaction with

the Black school board treatment. In the first column, the key interaction does not reach

significance, and the coefficient for the SCM measure itself also does not, indicating that the

measure has no impact on support for increasing funding to the school district regardless of race.

In the second column this holds true, regardless of condition the SCM measure has no

discernible impact on the dependent variable. This is not true for the AS measure. In the third

column, the key interaction again approaches conventional levels of significance (p=.09), but

negative, opposite what we would expect from a measure of racialized paternalism. This means

those highest in the AS measure were less likely to support increasing funding to a Black school

board. This pattern seems to match the expectations of an animus-based racial attitude. And sure

enough, in the final column including racial resentment, that effect disappears and the racial

resentment interaction has a highly significant and negative impact on attitudes (p<.001).

Table 5.6: 2018 MTurk School Board Funding with SCM

	Dependent variable:			
	Increased Funding Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	0.192**	0.209**	0.851***	0.822***
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.168)	(0.166)
SCM	0.528		0.794	
	(0.602)		(0.611)	
Racial Resentment			−1.032***	−1.095***
			(0.265)	(0.269)
Black*SCM	−1.153		−0.769	
	(0.722)		(0.737)	
AS		1.319		2.887*
		(1.619)		(1.685)
Black*AS		−3.505*		−2.460
		(1.969)		(2.049)
Black*RR			−1.808***	−1.716***
			(0.382)	(0.385)
Observations	652	659	652	659
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Paternalism Framing Experiment

The school board experiment and its replications provide solid evidence of one key part of the theoretical story laid out in Chapter 2. The most promising measure meant to tap the latent construct of racialized paternalism, the Black paternalism scale, does predict discrimination against the key out-group, above and beyond the impact of racial resentment. This finding is an important contribution to the literature on racial attitudes and how they impact political behavior. However, though that experiment could tell us a lot about how racialized paternalism manifests itself on political attitudes and behavior it cannot tell us about where the attitude comes from and how it is developed.

Considerable work has uncovered evidence of paternalism implemented in policy by political elites throughout history, and much of this paternalism specifically targets stigmatized groups (Ford, 2009; Genovese, 1976; Jackman, 1994; Beal, 2008; Soss, Fording, & Schram 2012). Researchers posit that this paternalism among elites is not "genuine" and is not actually about helping the key out-groups, but instead is used as a cover to accomplish ulterior motives, like expropriating the resources or political power of the group. How can this story be squared with the idea that many in the public do harbor paternalistic attitudes toward the out-group, and do genuinely want to help them but see them as incapable of helping themselves without intervention? I argue that though elites may be insincere in their paternalism, they use it as a rhetorical device to convince those who may be sincerely interested in helping the out-group to support policies that could end up being detrimental to the group.

To test this mechanism, I embedded an original survey experiment into the 2020 MTurk Survey. After respondents had completed all of the demographic, socioeconomic, racial attitude, political attitude, and policy opinion items each was given a similar prompt. It began by explaining that a number of states had passed laws requiring those who receive cash welfare payments to pass a drug test in order to receive benefits. This language was identical across conditions. Respondents were then given one of three potential frames used to highlight why the policy was necessary. The paternalism frame claimed the policy "ensures that recipients of government aid who use illegal drugs are forced to get clean." The punishment frame claimed the policy "guarantees welfare recipients who abuse drugs are punished for their crimes." And finally, the fiscal frame claimed the policy "can save states money by ensuring they don't give benefits to people who don't deserve them."

After reading the frame each respondent rated the effectiveness of the frame they had just read. Then each respondent indicated whether they favor or oppose drug testing recipients of government aid. After this, respondents were given a debriefing message that provided more information about which states drug test welfare recipients and the effect that this has on welfare provision. If the theoretical story is correct, the paternalistic framing should increase support for the policy especially among those highest in the Black paternalism scale.

2020 MTurk Experimental Results

To begin examining the results of this experiment I start by simply plotting the means of support for the policy, drug testing welfare recipients, by treatment condition. This data can be found in Figure 5.4. The first thing that jumps out is that as expected, those in the paternalism condition are more likely to support the drug testing welfare recipients than respondents in either of the other conditions. The mean support level for the policy in the paternalism frame condition is 3.44 out of six, as opposed to means of 3.01 and 3.02 for the punishment and fiscal frame conditions, respectively. But is this due to the effectiveness of the frame? The results from Figure 5.5 suggest that this is the case. This plot features mean ratings of frame effectiveness by treatment frame. Yet again mean levels of frame effectiveness are higher in the paternalism condition than in the other conditions. The mean frame effectiveness rating is 1.39 out of four for those who received the paternalism frame, as opposed to ratings of 1.12 and 1.22 for the punishment and fiscal frame conditions respectively.

Figure 5.4: 2020 M Turk Survey Support for Drug Tests

Figure 5.5: 2020 M Turk Survey Frame Effectiveness

The plots provide part of the story but cannot parse the impact of the Black paternalism scale in driving these attitudes. In order to test the impact of this key measure of racialized paternalism, I run a series of ordered probit models. The first two of these models estimate support for drug testing welfare recipients and the other two estimate effectiveness ratings for each of the frames. I run these models on the full set of data, with the paternalism condition serving as the omitted category and hence the baseline from which the coefficient estimates deviate. In the first and third model, I estimate the main effect of the paternalism treatment by including only indicator variables for the punishment condition and the fiscal condition. In the second and fourth model, I also include the Black paternalism scale, as well as its interaction with each of the other two conditions. This makes the Black paternalism coefficient in these models interpretable as the impact of the Black paternalism scale in the paternalism condition since it is the baseline in these models.

Table 5.7 shows the results of these four models. In the first model the findings from Figure 5.4 are confirmed. The coefficients for the fiscal frame and the punishment frame are negative and approach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.1 for the fiscal frame and p=.06 for the punishment frame). This evidence suggests that there is a potential main effect for the paternalism frame, making it likely that this frame is the most effective of the options at driving support for the policy. But is this effect driven by those subjects who score highest on the Black paternalism scale? The answer from the second column of this table is a resounding no. Again, the Black paternalism coefficient can be understood here as the effect of Black paternalism scale in the paternalism condition, and it is negative but does not reach statistical significance. The interactions between the scale and the other conditions also do not reach

statistical significance, indicating that the Black paternalism scale has no discernible impact on support for the policy in any condition.

Though those highest in the Black paternalism scale seem to not be moved by the paternalistic framing to support the policy more than in the other conditions, they still might have found the frame more effective. To see if this was the case I look to the third column in Table 5.7. First this confirms the findings from Figure 5.5. Those who receive the punishment frame are significantly less likely to the frame as effective than those who received the paternalism frame (p=.03). The same is not true for the fiscal frame, despite the considerable difference between means and the negative coefficient, the effect does not reach significance (p=.22). But the final column shows that yet again the Black paternalism coefficient, understood as the impact of the scale in the paternalism condition, scale fails to reach significance. The scale has no discernible impact on the effectiveness ratings of any of the frames, as was the case with policy support.

As a final test, I run another set of ordered probit models. I estimate support for drug testing those receiving welfare benefits, but separate the paternalism condition and pool the fiscal and punishment conditions. This allows me to better test whether the impact of the Black paternalism scale is consistent across each of these conditions. I start by running a model on those who received the paternalism and the other pooled conditions separately, with the Black paternalism scale as the sole independent variable to estimate the impact of that scale. Since this modeling strategy throws out random assignment, to account for this in the final two models I also control for the full set of demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal measures: age, gender, ideology, party ID, southern residency, religiosity, authoritarianism, and racial

resentment. This allows for estimation of the independent effect of the Black paternalism scale net of all these other variables.

Table 5.7: 2020 MTurk Framing Experiment

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Test Support		Frame Effectiveness	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Punishment Frame	−0.193*	−0.029	−0.240**	−0.500
	(0.105)	(0.363)	(0.111)	(0.379)
Fiscal Frame	−0.172*	−0.162	−0.159	−0.126
	(0.105)	(0.381)	(0.111)	(0.398)
Black Paternalism		−0.440		−0.091
		(0.434)		(0.447)
Punishment*BP		−0.288		0.446
		(0.597)		(0.621)
Fiscal*BP		−0.013		−0.056
		(0.624)		(0.649)
Observations	594	594	594	594
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 5.8: 2020 MTurk Framing Experiement by Condition

| | Dependent variable: | | | |
| | Drug Tests | | | |
	Paternalism	Pooled	Paternalism	Pooled
Black Paternalism	−0.022	−0.579*	0.035	0.270
	(0.022)	(0.304)	(0.024)	(0.333)
Age			−0.538	−0.665***
			(0.358)	(0.257)
Ideology			0.792**	0.991***
			(0.392)	(0.273)
Party ID			−0.111	0.021
			(0.281)	(0.195)
Female			−0.157	−0.216**
			(0.163)	(0.110)
Pray			−0.209	−0.031
			(0.248)	(0.163)
Authoritarianism			0.648*	0.751***
			(0.369)	(0.257)
South			0.037	0.020
			(0.179)	(0.114)
Income			1.431	0.797
			(0.922)	(0.723)
Education			−0.615*	−0.363
			(0.367)	(0.266)
Racial Resentment			1.624***	1.621***
			(0.354)	(0.253)
Observations	197	397	197	397

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 5.8 displays the results of these models. In the first column, predicting support for drug testing welfare recipients only in the paternalism condition, the coefficient for the Black paternalism scale does not reach significance. This is not the case in the second column, the Black paternalism scale actually has a negative impact that approaches conventional levels of significance (p=.056). This means that those highest in the Black paternalism scale are somewhat

less likely to support the policy than their counterparts. Notably, the results from the previous model preclude the conclusion that the effect is significantly different between the treatment conditions, but this does not change the fact that the effect is significantly altering responses in the non -paternalism conditions. This is also notable given the other work presented in this dissertation showing a quite strong positive relationship between the Black paternalism scale and support for this policy. Do these relationships hold when other attitudes are taken into account? In the third column, again restricted to respondents in the paternalism condition, the Black paternalism scale again does not have a significant effect on support for drug testing welfare recipients. Notably net of these other attitudes the sign of the coefficient changes and is now in the expected direction, but not significantly so (p=.14). The same is true for the final column here. Once other variables are taken into account, the negative effect of the Black paternalism scale disappears, and no significant relationship emerges.

Conclusion

The experimental results analyzed in this chapter serve as a fitting buttress to the rest of the work presented in the dissertation. The most notable and important finding is that those highest in the Black paternalism scale, a racial attitude that is clearly not rooted in animus, are more likely to support a takeover of a Black school board than a White one, effectively endorsing discrimination against that group. This finding holds even when accounting for racial resentment. And despite the concerns about collinearity between the general paternalism scale and the Black paternalism scale, these scales seem to clearly diverge in their experimental impacts. Further, when given the opportunity to help the out-group without taking their agency, through increasing funding for the school board, Black paternalists are no more likely to help the Black school board than a White one. Taken together this seems to provide very solid evidence

that the Black paternalism scale is tapping the hypothesized racialized paternalism construct in a meaningful way, is capturing an attitude consequentially distinct from general paternalism, and that it is capturing a unique desire to help Black people by limiting their agency.

On the other hand, the AS and SCM measures continue to unreliably predict the outcomes most associated with the racialized paternalism construct. Though the AS measure did initially appear to have the expected impact on support for the takeover of the Black school board, this finding disappeared once racial resentment was accounted for. This suggests that whatever was driving the result was led by the overlap between racial resentment and the AS measure. Consistent with this interpretation, the AS measure also predicted less support for increasing funding to a Black school board than a White one, a clear-cut case of discrimination that is likely driven by animus.

However, the results with the Black paternalism scale also did not meet expectations in every case. The final experiment produced mostly null effects, the Black paternalism scale certainly did not predict positive responses to the paternalistic framing of the policy. There are a number of reasons this might be the case. The study was underpowered, with about 200 respondents per cell there could have been an effect that was not discernible at this scale. It also seems possible that the experimental manipulation was not strong enough to clearly pique paternalism. In an attempt to make the conditions as comparable as possible the treatment did not emphasize the paternalistic aspect as much as it could have. In this sense, it was a very conservative test, the word help does not appear though presumably "forcing [drug users] to get clean" is likely to be interpreted as helping them.

This study was also potentially plagued by ceiling effects. Again, given the prior established connection between this policy and the Black paternalism scale, those highest in the

scale might be unmoved by the frames. The finding that the paternalistic frame was more effective on the full sample than those who are highest in Black paternalism lends some credibility to this point. Finally, it's worth noting again the circumstances under which respondents were taking this survey. It's possible that some of those highest in Black paternalism deduced what the survey was getting and tried to present a socially desirable response to the policy. Even though race is never mentioned in this experiment, it is all over the questions respondents saw before the treatment and certainly could be playing a role.

Appendix

School Board Experiment Treatments

Black Treatment

Gov considering state takeover of FCPS

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Springdale —State legislators are considering legislation that would disband the locally elected school board in Franklin County and allow the governor to appoint an emergency manager to administer the schools.

Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates. The county and the school board are largely African American.

In a sit-down interview with WLKY, Gov. Matt Simpson said he's interested in getting better results for students and believes a takeover is the only way this is possible. "The students in Franklin County are being underserved by their school board, it's time for the state to step in and right the ship," Simpson told WKLY reporters.

Franklin County school board members pointed out that the county has some of the best performing schools in the state -- and some of the worst -- noting the gap needs to be narrowed. But they believe more resources are necessary to improve performances. "There is certainly room for improvement, but there is no reason to start from scratch here. The real problem is the lack of investment by the state in these students," Paul Brown, an at-large school board member, told WLKY.

Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.

Gov considering state takeover of FCPS

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Control

Gov weighs in on possible state takeover of FCPS

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WLKY | Updated: 8:26 AM EDT May 14, 2018

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Despite being one of the most populous counties in the state, Franklin County Schools have performed worse than the state average in both standardized test scores and graduation rates.

In a sit-down interview with WLKY, Gov. Matt Simpson said he's interested in getting better results for students and believes a takeover is the only way this is possible. "The students in Franklin County are being underserved by their school board, it's time for the state to step in and right the ship," Simpson told WKLY reporters.

Franklin County school board members pointed out that the county has some of the best performing schools in the state -- and some of the worst -- noting the gap needs to be narrowed. But they believe more resources are necessary to improve performances. "There is certainly room for improvement, but there is no reason to start from scratch here. The real problem is the lack of investment by the state in these students," Paul Brown, an at-large school board member, told WLKY.

Legislators plan to vote on the proposal to disband the school board before the end of the current legislative session early next month. Stay tuned to WLKY for more updates on this story.

Post Treatment Items

Q48 In the town described in the article you read earlier in the survey, what race were the majority of the citizens?
- Black
- Hispanic or Latino
- White
- Race not mentioned

Q75 Do you believe the state legislature should increase the amount of funding given to the Franklin County School Board?
- Funding to the school board should be greatly increased
- Funding to the school board should be increased
- Funding to the school board should remain the same

- Funding to the school board should be decreased
- Funding to the school board should be greatly decreased

Q76 Do you support the state disbanding the elected Franklin County School Board, and taking over administration of the schools?
- Strongly support state takeover
- Somewhat support state takeover
- Neither support nor oppose state takeover
- Somewhat oppose state takeover
- Strongly oppose state takeover

Framing Experiment Treatments

Treatments

Q147 A number of state governments have mandated that adults receiving cash welfare payments or EBT/food stamps be required to pass a drug test to receive this aid. Some supporters of this policy have claimed that it can save states money by ensuring they don't give benefits to people who don't deserve them. How convincing do you find this argument?
- Extremely convincing
- Very convincing
- Somewhat convincing
- Not at all convincing
- No opinion

Q161 A number of state governments have mandated that adults receiving cash welfare payments or EBT/food stamps be required to pass a drug test to receive this aid. Some supporters of this policy have claimed that it guarantees welfare recipients who abuse drugs are punished for their crimes. How convincing do you find this argument?
- Extremely convincing
- Very convincing
- Somewhat convincing
- Not at all convincing
- No opinion

Q160 A number of state governments have mandated that adults receiving cash welfare payments or EBT/food stamps be required to pass a drug test to receive this aid. Some supporters of this policy have claimed that it ensures that recipients of government aid who use illegal drugs get are forced to get clean. How convincing do you find this argument?
- Extremely convincing
- Very convincing
- Somewhat convincing
- Not at all convincing
- No opinion

Q146 Do you favor or oppose drug testing those who receive cash benefits from the government?

- Strongly favor
- Favor
- Somewhat favor
- Neither favor nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Oppose
- Strongly oppose

OLS Models

Table 5.1A: Turk Prime School Board Experiment OLS

	Dependent variable:			
	Takeover Support		Funding Support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	0.073**	0.048	0.009	0.076**
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Black Paternalism	−0.155***	−0.188***	0.170***	0.135***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Black * Black Paternalism	−0.134**	−0.123**	0.030	0.014
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Racial Resentment		−0.195***		−0.203***
		(0.050)		(0.036)
Black * RR		0.051		−0.119**
		(0.074)		(0.052)
Constant	0.552***	0.653***	0.628***	0.732***
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.024)
Observations	1,173	1,173	1,173	1,173
R^2	0.047	0.065	0.058	0.135
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.061	0.055	0.131
Residual Std. Error	0.277	0.275 (	0.203	0.195
F Statistic	19.197***	16.164***	23.887***	36.317***

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 5.2A: 2018 MTurk School Board with Paternalism

	Dependent variable:			
	Funding Support		Takeover Support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	0.007	−0.440***	0.351*	−0.288
	(0.122)	(0.151)	(0.182)	(0.237)
Paternalism	−0.395*	−0.300	2.637***	2.656***
	(0.219)	(0.203)	(0.325)	(0.319)
Racial Resentment	0.627***		0.127	
		(0.174)		(0.272)
Black * Paternalism	−0.280	−0.188	−0.582	−0.419
	(0.319)	(0.295)	(0.474)	(0.463)
Black * RR		1.149***		1.603***
		(0.245)		(0.384)
Constant	2.410***	2.145***	1.799***	1.746***
	(0.084)	(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.167)
Observations	658	658	659	659
R^2	0.021	0.171	0.138	0.188
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.165	0.134	0.182
Residual Std. Error	0.788	0.726	1.171	1.137
F Statistic	4.583***	26.918***	34.822***	30.327***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.3A: 2018 MTurk School Takeover AS and SCM

	Dependent variable:			
	Takeover Support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	0.119	−0.437**	0.077	−0.462**
	(0.102)	(0.180)	(0.104)	(0.179)
SCM	0.561	0.596		
	(0.682)	(0.674)		
Racial Resentment		−0.157		−0.193
		(0.293)		(0.298)
Black * SCM	0.881	0.478		
	(0.821)	(0.814)		
Black * RR		1.574***		1.568***
		(0.417)		(0.422)
AS			0.563	0.816
			(1.846)	(1.860)
Black * AS			3.893*	2.213
			(2.248)	(2.271)
Constant	2.639***	2.696***	2.665***	2.733***
	(0.072)	(0.129)	(0.074)	(0.128)
Observations	653	653	660	660
R^2	0.021	0.055	0.022	0.054
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.047	0.018	0.046
Residual Std. Error	1.245	1.225	1.246	1.228
F Statistic	4.590***	7.459***	4.997***	7.395***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.4A: 2018 MTurk School Funding AS and SCM

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
| | Funding Support | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	−0.118*	−0.515***	−0.129*	−0.500***
	(0.065)	(0.107)	(0.066)	(0.106)
SCM	−0.306	−0.456		
	(0.435)	(0.401)		
Racial Resentment	0.681***		0.721***	
		(0.174)		(0.177)
Black * SCM	0.697	0.369		
	(0.524)	(0.485)		
Black * RR		1.158***		1.107***
		(0.248)		(0.250)
AS			−0.844	−1.791
			(1.173)	(1.103)
Black * AS			2.234	1.281
			(1.429)	(1.346)
Constant	2.286***	2.036***	2.291***	2.037***
	(0.046)	(0.077)	(0.047)	(0.076)
Observations	652	652	659	659
R^2	0.007	0.166	0.008	0.165
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.160	0.004	0.159
Residual Std. Error	0.795	0.729	0.792	0.728
F Statistic	1.445	25.738***	1.806	25.854***

Note: $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 5.5A: 2020 MTurk Framing Experiment OLS

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests		Frame Effectivness	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Punishment Frame	−0.412*	−0.068	−0.271*	−0.254
	(0.211)	(0.729)	(0.144)	(0.498)
Fiscal Frame	−0.406*	−0.567	−0.173	0.095
	(0.212)	(0.765)	(0.145)	(0.522)
Black Paternalism		−0.031		0.005
		(0.044)		(0.030)
Pun * Black Paternalism		−0.030		−0.001
		(0.060)		(0.041)
Fisc * Black Paternalism		0.014		−0.023
		(0.063)		(0.043)
Constant	3.437***	3.800***	1.391***	1.335***
	(0.150)	(0.530)	(0.102)	(0.362)
Observations	594	594	594	594
R^2	0.008	0.013	0.006	0.007
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.005	0.003	−0.002
Residual Std. Error	2.107	2.107	1.434	1.437
F Statistic	2.480*	1.561	1.812	0.798

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.6A: 2020 MTurk Framing Experiment Pooled OLS

	Dependent variable:			
	Drug Tests Support			
	Paternalism	Pooled	Paternalism	Pooled
Age			−0.803	−1.096***
			(0.610)	(0.402)
Ideology			1.198*	1.505***
			(0.670)	(0.430)
Party ID			−0.107	0.187
			(0.485)	(0.311)
Female			−0.209	−0.287*
			(0.276)	(0.172)
Pray			−0.130	−0.020
			(0.423)	(0.258)
Authoritarianism			0.988	1.185***
			(0.620)	(0.402)
South			0.015	0.013
			(0.305)	(0.181)
Income			2.636	1.225
			(1.599)	(1.154)
Education			−1.049*	−0.582
			(0.613)	(0.415)
Black Paternalism	−0.031	−0.041	0.071*	0.042
	(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment			2.617***	2.569***
			(0.578)	(0.385)
Constant	3.800***	3.507***	2.155*	2.176***
	(0.538)	(0.368)	(1.216)	(0.765)
Observations	197	397	197	397
R^2	0.003	0.005	0.320	0.387
Adjusted R^2	−0.003	0.002	0.280	0.370
Residual Std. Error	2.137	2.088	1.811	1.660
F Statistic	0.497	1.849	7.916***	22.106***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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School Board Model Full Sample

Table 5.7A: Turk Prime School Board Full Sample

	Dependent variable:			
	Takeover Support		Funding Support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black Treatment	0.140	0.155	0.039	0.579***
	(0.101)	(0.167)	(0.104)	(0.176)
Black Paternalism	−0.799***	−0.893***	0.919***	0.788***
	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.127)
Racial Resentment	−0.508***		−0.875***	
		(0.139)		(0.145)
Black*Black Paternalism	−0.297	−0.294	0.225	0.089
	(0.204)	(0.208)	(0.212)	(0.217)
Black * RR		−0.039		−1.017***
		(0.248)		(0.263)
Observations	1,756	1,756	1,756	1,756

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5.8A: 2018 MTurk School Board Full Sample

| | Dependent variable: | | | |
| | Takeover Support | | Funding Support | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bllack Treatment	0.408	0.067	−0.180	−0.481**
	(0.289)	(0.298)	(0.191)	(0.188)
Paternalism	1.741***	1.843***	−0.504***	−0.370***
	(0.226)	(0.223)	(0.149)	(0.141)
Racial Resentment		0.649***		0.852***
		(0.194)		(0.122)
Black * Paternalism	0.314	0.395	−0.171	−0.118
	(0.416)	(0.408)	(0.275)	(0.257)
Black * RR		1.081***		0.924***
		(0.337)		(0.213)
Constant	3.798***	3.628***	1.920***	1.698***
	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.104)	(0.102)
Observations	988	988	988	988
R^2	0.091	0.135	0.021	0.152
Adjusted R^2	0.089	0.131	0.018	0.148
Residual Std. Error	1.186)	1.158	0.784	0.731
F Statistic	33.283***	31.041***	7.142***	35.447***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The narrative is quite familiar, a White person through some happenstance is given charge of a classroom full of Black and Latino students or a team of inner-city athletes. Despite their extremely different upbringings, the White leader is able to push the student to overcome their character or behavioral deficiencies and achieve something meaningful. I could be describing the 1995 film "Dangerous Minds", or the 2007 film "Freedom Writers", or the 1996 film "Sunset Park", or the 1974 film "Conrack", or even the 1986 film "Wildcats". This White savior narrative has been a consistent theme in film and literature, one that has been catalogued by scholars (De Oca, 2012; Hughey, 2014; Ash, 2015; Aronson, 2017). The key belief underlying this narrative, that the only thing needed to reduce the evident racial inequality in our society is a bit of tough love from a well-meaning White person, is essentially the heart of racialized paternalism.

This dissertation set out to show that this inkling for a White savior is not just a trope restricted to older movies on Netflix, but a key race related disposition that exists and has shaped public policy around race for hundreds of years. I highlight cases since the pre-bellum period where paternalism is wielded with surgical precision towards a number of different subaltern groups historically and I provide examples of a number of policies that this construct should be impacting support for today.

I undertake a number of different strategies to capture this construct. The first two are based on the insights of the stereotype content model and highlight those who express the

counterintuitive positive affect or warmth for the same group they believe negative stereotypes about. I find that this simpler model does not seem to consistently impact support for the policies that should be driven by a measure of racialized paternalism. I test these measures on a number of different racialized groups and across a number of surveys. This measure is also consistently positively correlated with racial resentment, indicating that this measurement strategy may be capturing some expressed animus toward African Americans. The results suggest the reality of racialized paternalism is not easily reducible to the impact of high warmth and low competence ratings for a given group.

The more complex conception of the construct, a desire to aid a given racial group paired with a belief that they are incapable of improving their own condition without interference from a benevolent patron, underlies the construction of a novel measure: the Black paternalism scale. This scale was based on a similar general paternalism scale and attempts to assess a tradeoff, namely if it is worth it to try to help a group if doing so could restrict their freedom or deny them agency. I argue that the responses to this ultimatum should reflect a desire to help regardless of the consequences, which should be driven by a belief that the group is incapable of helping themselves.

The data presented appear highly consistent with this interpretation. Across several different samples the Black paternalism scale has the expected impact on policy support in virtually every single model. Even when accounting for the impact of racial resentment, authoritarianism, and a host of other demographic and socioeconomic variables, the scale predicts remarkably large swings in support for key racialized and paternalistic policies: sterilizing those who use crack cocaine while pregnant, workfare, drug testing welfare recipients, and evicting those charged with a crime from public housing, among others. The only area where

this scale did not meet expectations is with regard to the paternalistic policies that are not racialized. The scale did predict support for these items, which was not anticipated. This is likely related to the very high correlation between this measure and the general paternalism measure. But it's worth considering that racial resentment, a hallmark measure of the literature on race and politics that is supposed to only capture a subtle animosity toward African Americans and not some ideological orientation, also predicts support for these same measures.

The general paternalism scale also appears to perform as expected. It predicts support for most of the paternalistic items included in the one survey that it was featured on. It had a less consistent and smaller effect on the racialized and paternalistic policies than the Black paternalism scale, suggesting that the latter scale may be capturing something unique.

The experimental results largely buttress these findings. The school board experiment demonstrates that those highest in the Black paternalism scale are more likely to support the takeover of a largely Black school board than they are for a White school board under the exact same circumstances. Even in the White school board condition, the Black paternalism scale does predict higher support for the takeover, but it does so significantly more in the Black school board condition. This finding demonstrates that the Black paternalism scale is able to predict discrimination against African Americans as a group, despite the fact that it is positively correlated with the feeling thermometer for African Americans, negatively correlated with racial resentment, and as such is certainly not capturing some hidden animus toward Black people. This conclusively demonstrates that animus, or negative affect, for a given racial group is absolutely not a necessary condition for discrimination against that group to occur. And this finding is not borne out when the same experiment is run with regard to either of the stereotype content measures or the general paternalism scale. While the general paternalism scale also predicts

support for the takeover regardless of condition, no difference emerges across conditions. This is exactly how a race neutral measure of racialized paternalism should perform in this instance. For the AS, or high affect/low stereotypes interactive measure, a significant effect emerges, but is driven by animus and disappears when racial resentment is accounted for.

The results with regard to the funding question from the school board experiment are also interesting. The Black paternalism scale predicts support for increased funding for the school board regardless of the race of the school board, and no significant differences emerge between these conditions. This is not the expected finding but given the very high support across the board from those who are highest in Black paternalism, ceiling effects could be at play here. But regardless, the evidence here shows that those highest in the measure are only singling out the Black school board for the paternalistic solution that takes power from the group. When given the choice to provide unconditional aid these paternalists are relatively supportive, but are not willing to provide more aid to the Black school board.

The final framing experiment results are more mixed and puzzling with regard to the Black paternalism scale. While the paternalistic frame was more popular overall and increased support for drug testing welfare recipients among the full sample, neither of these findings was specifically true for those highest in Black paternalism. This was not the expected finding, and there are a number of potential explanations. The first is simply that the experiment did not do a good enough job of priming paternalism. In order to make the treatments as similar as possible and to be conservative with the test, I intentionally did not try to emphasize paternalism too much, just implied that the policy could be helpful to those it impacts. This could have turned off some of those who are highest in paternalism. This finding could also have been shaped by the heightened tensions around race generally after Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin killed

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George Floyd and renewed attention to police violence against Black people. It's also possible that paternalism was already baked into opinions about the policy and the experiment gave a chance for respondents to reconsider this. Either way, it's important to note that those highest in the Black paternalism scale rejected the other frames, and many still supported the policy.

While this dissertation has provided fairly conclusive answers to some important questions, it leaves many more unanswered. In this sense, the project should be thought of as the starting point of a research agenda, and not the conclusion. It's clear for instance that, of the measures introduced in this dissertation, the Black paternalism scale performs most consistently in the manner expected of a measure of racialized paternalism by far. But it is less clear if this scale could be adapted to other racialized groups and work as well. In the same manner, it is clear that the Black paternalism scale and the general paternalism scale are capturing similar but distinct constructs that have heterogeneous impacts on policy attitudes and political behavior. It is less clear however, what exactly is driving this difference, and who exactly the people high in one scale but not the other are.

Indeed, many questions arise from the possibilities of the general paternalism scale. Are those who harbor this disposition systematically targeting marginalized groups more so for their paternalism? Or does this capture an attitude that is actually targeted towards all other humans at an equal rate? More testing is necessary to determine if this is the case. The connection between partisanship, ideology, and these scales is especially fascinating. Are conservatives who are high in this disposition more likely to target any particular group with their paternalism?

It's also important to get a sense if the shifting landscape of racial attitudes in America have substantially altered the distribution of the Black paternalism scale overall. The baseline certainly seems to be higher in the 2020 sample and some of the relationships, particularly with

political leanings, look different, but more testing is needed to make conclusive claims about this. However, there is a clear literature establishing a rapid liberalization of White's attitudes toward race in the Trump era. Though the evidence from the last survey is consistent with this hypothesis, this project presents a cautionary tale of why that may not have the expects one would expect. One of the key takeaways from the studies detailed in this manuscript should be that Whites developing more positive views of racial minorities does not necessarily mean that they will reduce their discrimination against the group in the same fashion.

Given the emphasis on the differing emotional substrates of the black paternalism scale vis-à-vis the racial resentment scale and other animus-based measures, it is tempting to see this as a less serious or even harmless disposition. It must be noted here that many of the outcomes that the scale predicts are extremely serious and can portend grave maladies for those who are subjected to them. Though the scale leads to support for mandatory coronavirus vaccinations, something that could save the lives of countless African Americans, it does the same for restrictions on welfare and public housing, which both have devastated some of the most vulnerable people in society. There was a considerable amount of support overall sterilizing incarcerated persons and this was especially for those high in Black paternalism. This practice is particularly heinous and has a long history with eugenics. Taking away a groups' reproductive freedom en masse gets dangerously close to some of the more reprehensible actions of the 20th century. Intentions matter for understanding how this arises, but are of little concern to those who bear the brunt of these types of actions.

That said, the serious harm incurred by some of these policies might lead some to believe that this disposition is really about punishing the outgroup and not helping them. Indeed, the sterilization question specifically notes this would serve as a punishment, and some of the other

policies have similar wording. I note here that those who are high in the Black paternalism scale are not motivated to punish, but are fine if punishment is means to an end of improving conditions for a group. Unlike the racially resentful or others motivated by animus, those highest in the black paternalism scale are perfectly fine with a tough love approach, but only if it bestows hardship for the greater good. I argue that this is why the scale is associated with support for sterilizing incarcerated persons, but not the death penalty.

The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that scholars would do well to pay more attention to racial attitudes that are not rooted in animus. Racialized paternalism, despite the inattention from scholars, has a long history in the United States, and this work suggests it will continue to play a role in domestic politics. Martin Luther King Jr. famously wrote in his Letter from Birmingham Jail, "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the White moderate." Racial animus seems ascendant in post-Obama America and presents many normative challenges, including a clear and present threat to the livelihood of racial minorities. But it is well worth remembering that positive feelings and good intentions with regard to subordinate groups are not sufficient to avoid similarly dangerous outcomes.

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