The Liabilities of Foreign Institutional Ownership: Managing Political Dependence Through Corporate Political Spending

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**Research Summary:** The benefits of foreign institutional ownership (FIO) have been amply researched, but there are also potential downsides to such ownership. High FIO can subject a firm to heightened regulatory scrutiny and compliance, increasing its political dependence. Drawing on resource dependence theory, we argue that firms can manage the political dependence that arises from FIO by engaging in corporate political spending (CPS). We derive two moderating conditions from our theoretical argument, positing that the strength of the positive relationship between FIO and CPS hinges on the intensity of a firm’s government contracting and on the political sensitivity of the industry. Our study advances strategic ownership research by highlighting that U.S. firms may need to manage the potential liabilities associated with FIO through nonmarket strategy.

**Managerial Summary:** Research suggests that firms can reap many benefits from equity investments made by foreign institutional investors. However, such investments may also have potential downsides. We posit that high levels of foreign institutional ownership may subject a firm to increased political and regulatory scrutiny, and that firms can manage this increased exposure to government by engaging in corporate political activities that allow them to monitor and influence the political landscape. To explore this question, we analyzed a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms and find empirical support for our arguments. Our study highlights an unintended “liability” of foreign institutional ownership that firm executives should be aware of and has practical implications for how firms manage their investors and allocate resources between market and nonmarket strategies.
Institutional investors—mutual funds, pension funds, and other entities that invest on behalf of clients—have become key players in the global capital market. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these professional investors jointly manage $76 trillion financial assets (equivalent to nearly 100 percent of annual global GDP and 40 percent of global financial assets) (IMF, 2015). The internationalization of these investments has generated a stream of research on how foreign institutional ownership can affect domestic firms’ decisions. Foreign institutional investors not only provide significant capital to domestic firms, which can drive up their stock prices, but also have been shown to promote effective corporate governance (Aggarwal et al., 2011), improve disclosure quality (Aguilera et al., 2017), enhance corporate social performance (Dyck et al., 2019), and encourage long-term oriented investments (David et al., 2006).

Prior research has identified numerous benefits of foreign institutional ownership; yet, foreign institutional ownership can also subject domestic firms to undesirable governmental scrutiny, leading to potential liabilities associated with such ownership. However, we know little about how firms cope with these liabilities. Exploration of this question is critical to developing balanced insights into the repercussions of foreign institutional ownership. Thus, to advance research on foreign institutional ownership, we investigate how foreign institutional ownership shapes the nonmarket strategy that U.S. firms deploy to manage such potential liabilities, i.e., corporate political spending (CPS). Foreign institutional ownership in publicly traded U.S. firms roughly tripled between 2000 and 2013; during roughly the same period, the U.S. political environment also became increasingly sensitive to foreign investments. We theorize that foreign institutional ownership can increase U.S. firms’ political dependence. By political dependence, we mean reliance on the government...
for resources or legitimacy. Politicians and regulators can take direct regulatory actions against firms with foreign institutional ownership. For example, firms with foreign institutional ownership can be subject to enhanced regulatory scrutiny, such as review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a federal interagency committee with broad authority to investigate controlling and non-controlling foreign investment stakes in U.S. companies and to intervene as necessary (e.g., by forcing divestments). Indirectly, to gain public support from the electorate, politicians and regulators may publicly scrutinize and criticize U.S. firms with considerable or visible foreign institutional ownership, adversely affecting these firms’ legitimacy or reputation.

Resource dependence theory suggests that political actions, such as lobbying and political contributions, enable firms to alleviate political dependence and reduce external uncertainty via access to information and influence (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). We thus argue that U.S. firms with high foreign institutional ownership are likely to increase their CPS to manage political dependence and assuage political uncertainty. Following directly from this theoretical argument, we derive two moderating conditions pertinent to the degree of U.S. firms’ political dependence. The first is the intensity of firms’ contracts with the federal government. When a firm engages in substantial contracting with the government, its dependence on government increases. The second moderating condition is industry specific. Because firms operating in national-security-related industries face more stringent governmental scrutiny, these firms should exhibit stronger political dependence than those in other industries. Thus, we posit that the positive relationship between foreign institutional ownership and CPS will be stronger when firms have more intensive government contracting or belong to national-security-related industries.
We test our arguments using a sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms between 2000 to 2013. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, our empirical strategy utilizes fixed-effects regressions and instrumental variable regressions. Furthermore, we implement a battery of supplementary analyses to deepen our insights into the relationship between foreign institutional ownership and CPS. Finally, to better understand our context and the mechanisms underlying our phenomenon, we conducted multiple supplemental interviews with senior corporate executives and lobbyists.\footnote{We conducted 10 supplemental interviews to more deeply understand our phenomenon (see Appendix A for details).}

This study attempts to make three contributions. First, strategy scholars have devoted considerable attention to investigating how firms’ strategic decisions can be shaped by institutional investors (Connelly \textit{et al.}, 2010a). This literature has largely uncovered favorable influences on the part of foreign institutional investors, such as promotion of effective governance practices and improved decision quality (Aggarwal \textit{et al.}, 2011; Bena \textit{et al.}, 2017; David \textit{et al.}, 2006); little research has examined possible \textit{liabilities} associated with foreign institutional ownership. We theorize that foreign institutional ownership can increase firms’ political dependence and lead these firms to invest in CPS to manage such dependence.

Second, we contribute to nonmarket strategy research by unpacking how foreign institutional investors can trigger U.S. political activity. Strategy scholars have examined antecedents of corporate political activity such as firm size, slack, types of customers, age, and diversification level (for a review, see Hillman, Keim, \& Schuler, 2004 and Dorobantu, Kaul, \& Zelner, 2017), but research is scant on how foreign investors with non-controlling stakes can indirectly affect a firm’s
CPS. By linking ownership research with nonmarket strategy, we shed light on an understudied yet increasingly prominent antecedent of CPS: foreign institutional investors.

Third, scholars of international strategy have looked closely at how firm behaviors change in response to receiving foreign direct investment (FDI) (e.g., Meyer & Sinani, 2009). By contrast, little attention has been paid to foreign portfolio investors, despite their status as major players in the global capital market. Portfolio investors differ from direct investors in that the former typically hold non-controlling equity stakes in multiple firms and do not participate in those firms’ day-to-day operating decisions. Thus, our focus on foreign institutional investors advances global strategy research by shedding light on an increasingly prominent class of global economic actors.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Foreign institutional investors’ influence on firms

The association between institutional investors and firms’ decisions has elicited considerable attention in strategy research (Connelly et al., 2010a; Westphal & Bednar, 2008). This line of inquiry finds associations between institutional ownership and a host of strategic decisions, including investments in research and development (David, O'Brien, & Yoshikawa, 2008; Hoskisson et al., 2002), corporate strategies (Connelly et al., 2019; Goranova et al., 2017; Shi et al., in press), competitive tactics (Connelly et al., 2010b), financial misconduct (Shi, Connelly, & Hoskisson, 2017), and investment in corporate social responsibility (Johnson & Greening, 1999).

More recent research has begun to investigate the influence of foreign institutional investors on their portfolio firms. One stream of research examines how foreign institutional ownership can facilitate the adoption of effective governance practices (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Research also
suggests that foreign institutional investors promote adoption of standard financial reporting practices (Fang, Maffett, & Zhang, 2015). Another stream of research investigates how foreign institutional ownership can influence strategic decisions, such as making strategic investments (David et al., 2006), expanding into foreign markets via cross-border M&As (Ferreira, Massa, & Matos, 2010), and increasing their long-term investment in tangible and intangible assets (Bena et al., 2017) and in corporate social responsibility (Dyck et al., 2019).

Existing research has largely focused on how institutional investors from North America and Western Europe—and from the United States in particular—have improved the corporate-governance and strategic decisions of non-U.S. portfolio firms. By contrast, the influence of foreign institutional investors on U.S. firms remains largely unexplored, though foreign investors’ participation in U.S. equity markets has been steadily rising and is industry-spanning in scope. A survey by The Pensions and Investments indicates that investments in U.S. real estate by foreign institutional investors increased 33 percent, to $62.1 billion, between 2013 and 2014 (Jacobius, 2014). Clearly, foreign institutional investment in the United States is far from trivial.

**Resource dependence theory and political uncertainty**

Resource dependence theory addresses how organizations manage their relationships with external environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory postulates that external environments provide support and resources that organizations depend on; those that depend more on such support and resources will be more highly motivated to manage their relationships with relevant external environmental actors and to reduce the uncertainty associated with them. Studies that draw on resource dependence theory have identified an array of co-optation strategies that organizations can
deploy to absorb, defuse, or co-opt external actors (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013), including mergers and diversifications, bridging ties via strategic alliances, membership in associations and business groups, and director appointments (Harris & Helfat, 2007; Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976).

In particular, government policy, regulation, and enforcement “are major forces in the external environment of business” and have “enormous impact on the operations of firms” (Hillman, 2005: 465). Because government policies can create uncertainty and constrain firms (Hiatt, Carlos, & Sine, 2018), firms engage in corporate political activity to create linkages with the government in order to manage their dependence on government policies and regulations by absorbing, diffusing, or co-opting political constraints. For instance, firms can potentially leverage political influence to respond to policy shifts arising from electoral cycles (Siegel, 2007), to promote favorable policies (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999), and even to shape the payoff structures that govern their business environment (Gavetti, Helfat, & Marengo, 2017). Anecdotal evidence points to the importance of political spending in mitigating unfavorable policies and regulations in the United States. When Congress was considering a soda tax in 2009, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, bottlers, and the American Beverage Association spent more than $40 million in lobbying; the bill was subsequently abandoned (Wilson & Roberts, 2012).

**Political dependence.** Resource dependence theory suggests that governmental and regulatory policies are critical sources of firms’ external uncertainty (Marquis & Qian, 2014). Because government regulation shapes almost every aspect of business, governmental interventions or shifts in policies and regulations can significantly alter a firm’s opportunity sets (Li & Csaszar, 2019; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). Thus, managing political dependence—a firm’s dependence on
the government for resources or legitimacy—becomes particularly salient when firms face high political uncertainty (Gao, et al., 2017). For example, in democratic states, competition among interest groups or a change in party ascendancy can trigger severe policy disruptions (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990). In developed countries, including the United States, in fact, political uncertainty has been on the rise in the twenty-first century. As The Economist (2016) observes, managers in both emerging and developed markets need to be alert to political uncertainty:

For the past 30 years multinationals in developed markets have mostly operated in a benign environment. . .. Shocks were few. No longer. . .. Unprecedented shocks are almost routine. In 2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded America’s sovereign-debt rating for the first time. Greece’s default in 2015 to the International Monetary Fund was the first by a rich-world country.

Political uncertainty is a key concern for leaders of publicly traded U.S. corporations; accordingly, company executives typically devote a portion of their quarterly-earnings conference calls to discussing the political uncertainty facing their firms (Hassan et al., 2017). In fact, regulatory uncertainty ranked second in a recent large-scale survey of board members about the biggest strategic challenges their companies face (Cheng & Groysberg, 2018). To alleviate political uncertainty, firms need to actively manage their dependency relationships with government.

**Direct influences on firms’ political dependence.** Though foreign institutional investors can provide important financial resources and valuable information to U.S. firms (Rishe, 1990), they can also increase those firms’ political dependence both directly and indirectly. For instance, a U.S. firm could be considered to be operating under foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) “whenever a foreign interest has the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and whether or not exercisable through the ownership of the U.S. company’s securities, by contractual
arrangements or other means, to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of that company” (NISPOM, paragraph 2-300a). In this sense, U.S. firms with foreign institutional ownership could be deemed to be operating under FOCI and therefore subject to close government scrutiny and stringent regulatory compliance. Relatedly, regulatory oversight of foreign investments with national-security implications (broadly and ambiguously defined), such as by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), can increase U.S. firms’ political dependence. As a federal interagency committee, CFIUS has broad authority to investigate foreign investment stakes in U.S. companies, controlling and non-controlling, and to intervene by imposing civil penalties or fines, blocking deals, or forcing divestments. CFIUS’s jurisdiction has been growing over time, strengthened by the 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act and also more recently when its oversight authority was extended to “a far wider array of foreign transactions that are deemed a threat to national security” (Rappeport, 2018).

A key characteristic of CFIUS—and a challenge for firms—is that its jurisdictional scope is intentionally ambiguous. Guidance suggests that a given institutional investor can typically purchase an ownership stake in a U.S. firm on the open market without intervention from CFIUS as long as the stake is low and the investments are held “solely for the purpose of passive investment” (Latham & Watkins, 2017). However, as CFIUS legal experts note, what is considered “passive” is actually

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3 In other words, CFIUS’s jurisdictional reach is not just limited to a few specialized industries. As the New York Times reported, CFIUS “would apply its new authority very broadly and would review any foreign transaction involving a business that designs or produces technology related to 27 industries” (Rappeport, 2018).

4 A “low” ownership stake in terms of providing “safe harbor” from potential CFIUS scrutiny or intervention typically means an ownership level at least under 10% (Latham and Watkins, 2017), or 6% depending on the source of guidance.
not straightforward and can be “called into question in light of ‘other’ facts deemed relevant by CFIUS” (Latham & Watkins, 2017). This ambiguity affords CFIUS considerable jurisdictional power and scope (Jackson, 2019) especially given that CFIUS “determines the scope of its own jurisdiction…and is afforded significant deference by the courts” (Latham & Watkins, 2017). For example, CFIUS recently forced the transfer of a minority investment stake in the U.S. cybersecurity company Cofense from a Russia-linked private-equity firm to a fund managed by BlackRock, an American investment-management company (Louch & Lim, 2019) and threatened hefty fines for Cofense’s failure to report to CFIUS the minority ownership stake held by a foreign investor.

Another example of direct governmental intervention is a 2018 notice on the U.S. Treasury Department’s website, in which CFIUS imposed a $1 million penalty on an undisclosed party for “failure to establish requisite security policies and failure to provide adequate reports to CFIUS.”

As resource dependency theory would suggest, this ambiguity in CFIUS’s jurisdictional scope thus incentivizes firms to manage their political dependence by creating linkages with their source of external dependency—government in this case—in order to reduce uncertainty and buffer against potential political interventions (Hillman et al., 1999; Pfeffer, 1972). This may be particularly salient given that likely investigation by CFIUS can impose high costs on firms. It is also important to note that CFIUS’s investigations are not limited only to “rival” countries, such as China; foreign

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A CFIUS expert we interviewed suggested that even at foreign ownership levels under 6%, CFIUS scrutiny is still a risk due to its broad jurisdiction: “I think it’s a 6% threshold…[but] I think CFIUS would care even if it’s under the threshold, if its significant, [e.g.] if its [somehow] related to critical infrastructure…because remember, you don’t have to file for CFIUS, but that doesn’t mean CFIUS won’t come and find you…there’s an office in Treasury that is monitoring it, even though DOD [Department of Defense] has a heavy hand in it, they’re monitoring it… [corporate executives] view it as a huge black box and they don’t understand it.”

5 The notice can be found at home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Penalties-Imposed-and-Unilateral-Reviews-Initiated-2018.pdf
investors from advanced western democracies/OECD countries are also subject to the same type of scrutiny. This was echoed by a CFIUS strategist from a leading consulting firm that we interviewed, who stressed that even non-controlling minority investment stakes from Western European or Canadian companies “can still raise issues [in terms of CFIUS scrutiny] …it’s not just China, no, you can think even Canada or [Western European countries].” For instance, “what if you’re a Canadian company that buys like 5 percent [equity stake in a U.S. company]—and that Canadian company is also 5 percent owned by a Chinese SOE. Now you’re getting dangerously close to like ‘yeah, it’s a Canadian company, but it’s almost meeting the threshold’…and not all other countries have [national security oversight mechanisms like] CFIUS.” In sum, the political dependence of U.S. firms with foreign institutional ownership is a reality given the direct intervention mechanisms that the U.S. government has in place.

**Indirect influences on firms’ political dependence.** Foreign institutional ownership can also indirectly increase a U.S. firm’s political dependence: to appease public criticism or to gain public support, e.g., to signal alignment with broader socio-political expectations such as nationalism or toughness on national security. Politicians may rhetorically attack or increase scrutiny on firms with considerable or visible foreign institutional ownership, potentially harming such firms’ legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders (McDonnell & Werner, 2016). As an illustration, in 2017, *Business Insider* published a list of eleven formerly American companies, and editorialized that “some of America’s most famous brands have fallen into foreign hands” (Hanbury, 2017). Domestic banks that

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6 As a matter of fact, CFIUS’s annual reports to Congress reveal that the top three countries of origin of CFIUS-covered foreign-investment transactions in 2005-2007 were the United Kingdom (79), Canada (35), and France (25). In 2015, the top country of origin of CFIUS-covered foreign-investment transaction was China (29), but the next highest countries of origin were: Canada (22), United Kingdom (19), Japan (12), and France (8).
benefited from foreign capital bailouts in the 2007–2008 financial crisis also elicited heated public
criticism (Niepmann & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). Politicians may publicly disparage (e.g., and
rhetorically attack) firms with foreign ownership to advance their own political agendas (Shirky,
2011), which would increase political uncertainty for firms—particularly those that have high
dependence on government. This public sentiment was echoed by a head legal executive at a
Fortune-50 firm we interviewed, who noted that “there could be optics issues with foreign
institutional ownership, where you get into a realm where [it could be perceived that] a foreign entity
is using a corporation as a tool…even [as far back as] the 1980s [where] there was an anti-Japanese
sentiment because Japanese companies were coming in [and investing in U.S. assets]—if it appears,
even without factual basis, that something is not right…it’s a concern…that’s your optics…and
sometimes politicians will use that as a threat…a lot of this is politicized for sure.”7 These
arguments support that indirect government influence is also a real potential trigger of U.S. firms
political dependence.

Firm strategic actions in response to political dependence

We have posited that foreign institutional ownership can increase a firm’s political dependence both
directly and indirectly. Next, we draw on resource dependence theory to theorize that firms will
pursue corporate political activity to manage their increased political dependence. Specifically, we

7This executive further noted that these optics issues applied not just to rival nations but also allies: “and certainly I think
it cuts across the board too with friendly allies, though yes there may be a heightened level of concern with countries like
Russia etc…” and that such situations need to be actively managed: “if you know there’s a concentration like that [in
terms of foreign institutional ownership], that’s when you have to be sensitive and tie in your investor relations,
government relations, and communications departments.”
argue that two types of corporate political spending are particularly relevant for managing political dependence: lobbying and contributions to political action committees (PACs).

*Lobbying* consists of dialogue—or “transfer of information in private meetings and venues”—between interest groups (such as a corporation) and political actors (such as policymakers and regulators) (De Figueiredo & Richter, 2014). Corporations hire lobbyists to petition political actors on their behalf using “statistics, facts, arguments, messages, forecasts, threats, commitments, signals, or some combination thereof” (De Figueiredo & Richter, 2014: 164). Lobbying is a significant component of the influence industry: total spending on federal lobbying has surpassed $3 billion per year in every year from 2008 to 2019 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2020). Furthermore, some of the top reasons why companies engage in lobbying is to mitigate political dependence, including direct (e.g., “protect against changes in government policies [or] actions that could be harmful”) and indirect (e.g., “respond to critics and counter negative publicity”) sources of political dependence, according to an academic survey of corporate lobbyists (Drutman, 2015: 73).

Lobbying helps corporations reduce their political dependence through two primary mechanisms: *monitoring* and *influencing*. Monitoring political developments to gather information and stay constantly informed is a key component of lobbying, since “when things do happen, they often happen very quickly, placing a premium on preexisting networks and information” (Drutman, 2015: 83). Lobbyists are well suited for monitoring political developments and uncertainty given their access to key political actors in Washington (Byun, Frake, & Agarwal, 2018). The monitoring mechanism is particularly important for mitigating sources of increased political dependence, such as CFIUS, since such regulatory bodies have broad and ambiguous jurisdictional scope, span multiple
government agencies, and feature constantly evolving policies and regulations. Thus, more monitoring allows firms to better anticipate and more proactively prepare for potential interventions from complex regulatory bodies such as CFIUS, which reduces uncertainty and thus attenuates political dependence.

The influence mechanism of lobbying consists of petitioning government officials in order to sway their views through information exchange (Jia, 2018; Ridge, Ingram, & Hill, 2017). This can occur via different channels of persuasion (i.e., micro-mechanisms). For example, repeated lobbying interactions (i.e., transfer of information) with political or regulatory decisionmakers can shape their thinking by “saturating” the intellectual environment. As Drutman (2017: 36) notes, political and regulatory decisionmakers “may listen to the same arguments over and over again…[and] through constant repetition, they achieve a top-of-mind status…so that when the time comes to make a decision, certain arguments and frames will come to mind quicker than others,” thereby shaping the “causal stories” that underlie policymaking. Thus, the influence mechanism allows firms to directly reduce their political dependence by framing the views of political decisionmakers. In other words, such “petitions are designed to influence the opinions, policies, and votes of legislators and other government officials” (De Figueiredo and Richter, 2014: 164), which can help facilitate favorable firm outcomes (Kim, 2019; Macher & Mayo, 2015).

PAC contributions, like lobbying, provides access to political actors so that firms can engage in monitoring and influencing to reduce their political dependence (Hadani & Schuler, 2013). “[A] system has developed over the years where if you have money to contribute to campaigns, you will also get access and influence in legislative and regulatory processes” notes Edwin Davis of the non-
partisan campaign-finance watchdog organization Common Cause (Oberholzer-Gee, Cantrill, & Wu, 2007: 9). Studies have shown that firms making PAC contributions have better-quality and more frequent access to politicians (Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010). Qualitative evidence suggests that this access grants expedient opportunities to monitor political developments, as political fundraisers are events where one can “get to see members of Congress and get a sense of what they are thinking about issues of interest” (Drutman, 2015: 94). Additionally, this access also offers leverage and opportunities for influence. For example, a lobbyist noted in an interview that “when you can hold up a card that says you’re with [company omitted], that carries a lot of weight. When people know you have a $2 million PAC, it makes a lot more impact than if they know you have a $100,000 PAC. PACs are important. They’re great ways to create relationships, a great way for us to carry the weight we need to get some of things we get done, done” (Drutman, 2015: 95). Similarly, another noted that “it’s a lot easier working on an agenda with someone you helped get into office than someone you opposed” (Drutman, 2015: 94). Given this, firms generally contribute to both Republicans and Democrats to preserve access and have a voice on both sides of the aisle (Hillman et al., 2004).

In tandem, lobbying and PAC contributions grant corporations a channel by which to ease political uncertainty and manage political dependence. We thus synthesize our reasoning in the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** A U.S. firm’s level of foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with its level of corporate political spending.
We have argued that foreign institutional ownership can increase U.S. firms’ political
dependence, which in turn leads these firms to invest in CPS to manage such dependence and
reduce political uncertainty. Building on this, we derive two moderating conditions that follow
directly from our argument for Hypothesis 1. Our first moderating condition pertains to the
intensity of a firm’s contracting with government entities. We argue that foreign institutional
ownership can play a more salient role in shaping U.S. firms’ political dependence when the firms
have more intensive government contracting. Firms with high government contract intensity are
more dependent on the government since their financial performance is more significantly driven by
the magnitude and renewal rate of their government contracts. Additionally, government contracts
could provide access to state-of-the-art technological experience or knowledge (Rishe, 1990), which
can affect long-term firm competitiveness.

However, firms that seek government contracts must submit to close government scrutiny.
The U.S. government treats classified information as a national-security asset, and an array of laws
and regulations ensure that such information is not released to any organization subject to “foreign
ownership, control, or influence” (FOCI) (Rishe, 1990: 145). This implies that firms with more
intensive government contracting will face greater scrutiny due to the transparency requirements
(e.g., competitive bidding or compliance documentation requirements) that government agencies are
subject to as well as media scrutiny of government activities. An example of this was echoed by a
director of a public U.S. electronics company we interviewed, who noted that the company had a
partial owner who was Chinese, and because of that, the “amount of scrutiny they have to go
through was huge,” including enacting mitigation measures to prevent foreign influence or control.
This entails a costly process, for instance, “you got to go down the whole path of filing with the government and meeting all the requirements, which just adds costs. I mean, the amount of reporting and special restrictions and requirements and so forth, that we had to follow is unbelievable. And we have an [foreign] owner, [whose stake] it’s [single-digit percentage under six] percent, so technically, we’re not [even] at the level where [it should draw enhanced scrutiny].”

Firms with low (or zero) levels of government-contract intensity are less dependent on the government for revenues in the first place. More importantly, FOCI regulations are less relevant to these firms; as a result, increasing foreign institutional ownership may not draw as much regulatory and governmental scrutiny compared to firms that are more intensive in government contracts. In other words, foreign institutional ownership should exert a weaker positive influence on U.S. firms’ political dependence when the firms have less intensive government contracting. Consequently, these firms may not need to manage political dependence through CPS. We thus summarize our reasoning in the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** The positive relationship between foreign institutional ownership and corporate political spending is stronger in U.S. firms with high government-contract intensity than in those with low government-contract intensity.

Our second moderating condition pertains to the type of industry in which the U.S. firm operates. Governmental regulators are not able to monitor and scrutinize foreign ownership’s control and influence in all U.S. firms, given their resource constraints (Yu & Yu, 2011). With the objective of safeguarding U.S. national security, regulators focus their attention and resources on monitoring and scrutinizing firms operating in national-security related industries and therefore tend

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8 In fact, this respondent mentioned that given the company’s exposure to Asia-related political risk, the board was pushing the company executives to engage in more political activity: “We’re pushing to have some lobbying…”
to be more sensitive to foreign institutional ownership in firms operating in national-security related industries relative to firms operating in other industries (Nossal, 2001). This prioritization was echoed by an asset management portfolio manager we interviewed, who noted that there could be negative optics issues associated with having foreign institutional ownership, “especially when these companies that have some foreign ownership are still engaging in…sensitive industries such as those in the national security related industries, and we see from even common press examples…some [industries] are not even that ‘too sensitive’ and ‘too related’ to national security, but are related to privacy concerns that the U. S. Government does not feel comfortable with.” Consequently, for firms operating in national-security related industries such as telecommunications and information technology, increasing foreign institutional ownership would more significantly intensify their political dependence and motivate these firms to manage political dependence through higher CPS.

In contrast, firms operating in non-national-security related industries such as apparel manufacturing and footwear manufacturing may not draw as much close scrutiny from the government. Thus, increasing foreign institutional ownership would less significantly augment their political dependence, and accordingly, their need to manage political dependence through CPS will be less strong relative to firms operating in national-security industries. Collectively, we posit that the impact of foreign institutional ownership will have a more pronounced effect on CPS for firms operating in national-security industries than firms operating in other (non-national-security related) industries. We thus hypothesize:

**Hypothesis 3:** The positive relationship between foreign institutional ownership and corporate political spending is stronger for U.S. firms operating in national-security related industries than those operating in non-national-security related industries.
METHODS

Sample

Our sample selection begins with the universe of firms headquartered in the United States and covered by BoardEx, during the period 2000–2013 (N=7,657). We were able to match financial data from Compustat for 5,827 firms using their 8-digit CUSIP numbers. We also merged data on foreign institutional ownership from FactSet LionShares using their 8-digit CUSIP numbers. Our data on firms’ lobbying expenditures and PAC contributions come from the Center for Responsive Politics, an independent nonpartisan research group that tracks the impact of lobbying and campaign contributions on U.S. federal elections, politics, and public policy. Because the Center for Responsive Politics does not track CUSIP information for firms, we manually collected such information on firms that have engaged in lobbying and made PAC contributions. After merging with all the control variables, our final sample consists of 5,674 U.S. firms.

Dependent variable

Our dependent variable is corporate political spending (CPS), which has two components. The first component is a firm’s total annual lobbying expenditure. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives to compile, verify, and disclose lobbying-related information. The second component is firms’ contributions to political action committees (PACs). To calculate a firm’s total corporate political spending in a year, we combine the dollar amounts of its lobbying expenditures and PAC contributions; we take the natural logarithm of the summated value to mitigate skewness. Because foreign institutional investors may also be related
to how firms allocate CPS, we examine *lobbying dispersion* across government agencies and *PAC contribution dispersion* between Democratic and Republican candidates in supplementary analyses.

**Independent variable**

*Foreign institutional ownership* is the percentage of a U.S. firm’s equity that is owned by foreign (non-U.S.) institutional investors. It is measured as the sum of the holdings of all institutional investors domiciled outside the United States, divided by the number of shares outstanding. FactSet collects ownership information directly from fund reports, regulatory authorities, fund associations in different countries, and fund management companies. FactSet’s ownership data have been extensively used in studies on foreign institutional investors (Aggarwal *et al.*, 2011; Ferreira *et al.*, 2010; Ferreira & Matos, 2008). The average level of foreign institutional ownership in our sample of U.S. firms is three percent, slightly less than the average level of foreign institutional ownership of non-U.S. firms (four percent) (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Luong *et al.*, 2017).

**Moderators**

The first moderator is *government-contract intensity.* We obtain data on firms’ government-contract intensity from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). In the first step, the authors attain data on federal contracts from USAspending.gov, a website mandated by the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006. They then match information about each contract recipient and its parent company with Compustat firms. This match generates the amount of the parent firm’s revenue derived from federal contracts, allocated to its three-digit SIC industry using industry codes and line-of-business data in Compustat Segment. Baker *et al.* (2016) then aggregate revenues and

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9 We obtain data on government-contract intensity from the website of Stanford economist Nicholas Bloom: [https://nbloom.people.stanford.edu/research](https://nbloom.people.stanford.edu/research).
contract awards to obtain the ratio of federal purchase payments to total revenues in each three-digit SIC by year. To mitigate potential bias from high-frequency variation due to lumpy contract awards, they calculate average ratios for the period 2000–2013 to attain an exposure measure for each three-digit SIC code. In the second step, they calculate each firm’s exposure to government purchases as its revenue-weighted mean of the industry-level exposure measure. They choose this two-step approach because it reduces the scope for reverse causality and because “industry-level measures may better proxy for the firm’s ex ante exposure to uncertainty about government purchases” (Baker et al., 2016: 1618).

Our second moderator is national-security industry. The Defense Production Act of 1950 permits the U.S. President to reject foreign investments that threaten U.S. national-security interests. Based on this Act, CFIUS was established in 1975 to review foreign acquisitions. After several high-profile foreign takeovers (e.g., Dubai Ports World’s acquisition of P&O Steam Navigation in 2006) resulted in congressional inquiries, CFIUS’s scope and power was strengthened in 2007 with enactment of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act. The 2008 CFIUS Annual Report to Congress provided a list of four-digit SIC industries (see Appendix B) critical to national security (CFIUS, 2008). We construct a dummy variable where if a firm’s main four-digit SIC industry is on this list of national-security industries, the firm will receive a value of 1 for national-security industry, and 0 otherwise.

Control variables
Because firms with more abundant resources are more inclined to invest in CPS (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), we control for several firm characteristics proxying the level of a firm’s resources. First, we
control for firm size using the natural logarithm of firm revenues. Our results are robust to using the natural logarithm of a firm’s market value to proxy firm size. Second, we control for firm performance, using return on equity (ROE) measured as the ratio of operating income after depreciation to total shareholders’ equity. Our results are robust to adding Tobin’s q as an additional control for firm performance. Third, we control for a company’s debt ratio (measured as the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets) and cash-holding ratio (measured as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets).

We control for government sales ratio\(^{10}\)—the ratio of revenues from all sales to government entities to total sales revenues—because firms with a higher government sales ratio are more likely to engage in CPS (Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994). We obtain sales information from Compustat Customer Segment; the Segment database provides information on a firm’s sales to government. We control for product diversification level because highly diversified firms tend to enjoy lower levels of external dependence and thus to invest less in CPS. We use the widely adopted entropy measure to capture product diversification (Hoskisson et al., 1993); pertinent data are also obtained from Compustat Customer Segment. Because firms with high international diversification may be subject to low political dependence at home and thus may refrain from intensive CPS, we control for international diversification using the ratio of international sales revenues to total sales revenues (Sambharya, 1996). Data used to measure international diversification are obtained from the WorldScope database.

\(^{10}\) Government sales ratio captures sales to both the federal government and local governments; by contrast, our measure of government-contract intensity captures only a firm’s government contracts with the federal government. Our results are similar if we do not control for government sales ratio.
We control for *domestic market uncertainty* because firms will invest intensively in CPS to mitigate external resource dependence when faced with highly uncertain domestic markets (Li & Tang, 2010; Tang *et al.*, 2015). Dess and Beard (1984) define market uncertainty along three dimensions: munificence, dynamism, and complexity: high munificence reduces market uncertainty, whereas high dynamism and high complexity increase market uncertainty. To create a comprehensive index, we rely on these three dimensions of domestic market uncertainty. To measure dynamism and munificence, we follow prior studies (Boyd, 1990) by first regressing time against the value of total industry revenues (based on four-digit SIC codes). To calculate total industry revenues, we aggregate the revenues of all Compustat firms headquartered in the United States that belong to the same four-digit SIC code. The estimate for any given year is based on the five preceding years (e.g., the dynamism estimates for 2005 is based on data from 2000–2004). To measure dynamism, we use the standard error of regression slope coefficient divided by the mean value of five years of revenues; to measure munificence, we use the regression slope coefficient divided by the mean value of five years of revenues. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to capture complexity. Each industry’s total revenue is obtained by aggregating the revenues of all the Compustat firms headquartered in the United States that belong to the same four-digit SIC code. Because a higher level of concentration implies a lower level of complexity, we use 1 minus our measure of industry concentration to measure complexity. We then standardize these three dimensions and combine them to measure domestic market uncertainty. Because high munificence is negatively associated with market uncertainty, we reversely code munificence prior to adding it to complexity and dynamism.
We control for domestic institutional ownership because close monitoring by domestic institutional investors may lead firms to reduce CPS (Hadani, 2012). Domestic institutional ownership is measured as the ratio of all shares owned by institutional investors headquartered in the United States to total shares outstanding. Because investment in CPS may be affected by firms’ governance characteristics, we also control for three variables related to governance quality. The first is CEO duality, which takes a value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board and 0 otherwise (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). The second is board independence, measured as the ratio of the number of outside directors to board size. We control for CEO duality and board independence because investors have called for separation of the CEO and board chair positions and for greater board independence to promote good corporate governance (Dalton et al., 2007). Data on CEO duality and board independence are obtained from BoardEx. The third governance variable is whether a firm has a “poison pill” in effect in a particular year. A poison pill is among the most widely used defenses against hostile takeover; it can dramatically increase the price that a hostile buyer must pay to acquire a firm (Davis, 1991). Thus, the presence of a poison pill can lead to managerial entrenchment and affect a firm’s governance quality. This variable takes a value of 1 if a firm has a poison-pill provision in a year and 0 otherwise. Data on poison pills are obtained from the Security Data Corporation Corporate Governance dataset. Lastly, we control for year fixed effects. The dependent variable is measured at Year \( t+1 \); all other variables are measured at Year \( t \).

**Estimation**

Our dependent variable is CPS, which is non-negative and right-censored. Tobit analysis, a maximum likelihood technique, is often used to accommodate censored data; it provides a
nonparametric alternative to OLS. However, there is no statistical software that can implement firm fixed-effects Tobit regressions. Thus, we choose to use firm fixed-effects OLS regressions to test our hypotheses. Firm fixed-effects control for bias arising from time-invariant firm heterogeneity, and significantly alleviate potential endogeneity associated with omitted variable bias. Firm fixed-effects also control for industry fixed-effects, given that firms’ industry classification is relatively stable over time. We implement firm fixed-effects regressions by using the Stata procedure of “xtreg” with the “fe, vce(cluster)” option. Although firm fixed-effects regressions can mitigate bias associated with time-invariant firm heterogeneity, it is possible that foreign institutional investors choose to invest in firms with high CPS or that unobservable time-variant heterogeneity affects both the level of foreign institutional ownership and CPS. We thus also test our hypotheses using instrumental variable regressions.

The two instruments we utilize for our study are a firm’s time-varying membership in (1) the Morgan Stanley Capital International All Country World Index (MSCI ACWI) and (2) the Russell 2000 index. Valid instrumental variables need to satisfy conditions of relevance and exogeneity (Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014). Results from F-tests (described in the results section) indicate that our two instruments can be considered relevant. In terms of exogeneity, we make theoretical arguments for the exogeneity of each of the instruments directly below. Additionally, because our model is overidentified—i.e. two instruments for one endogenous regressor (foreign institutional ownership)—we are able to perform the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions to assess the endogeneity of our instruments (again described in the results section) (Semadeni et al., 2014).

11 Our results hold if we use random-effects regressions (controlling for two-digit SIC industry fixed-effects).
Our first instrument is a firm’s membership in MSCI ACWI.\textsuperscript{12} We construct a dummy variable (MSCI), which takes a value of 1 if a firm is a member of the MSCI ACWI in year $t$ and 0 if not. The MSCI ACWI is a global equity index designed to represent the “performance of the full opportunity set of large- and mid-cap stocks across 23 developed and 26 emerging markets.”\textsuperscript{13} In essence, the index covers 85% of the global investable equity opportunity set and is constructed by adding stocks based on their market capitalization (in descending order of size) until the cumulative share of firms reaches 85% of the market capitalization in each country.\textsuperscript{14} A key fact about MSCI indexes is that they are the most followed by mutual funds around the world—thus foreign institutional investors are more likely to invest in MSCI indexes’ stocks since “international portfolios are typically benchmarked against these indexes”—while in contrast, domestic institutional ownership does not increase significantly after a firm’s stock gets added to the MSCI ACWI (Bena \textit{et al.}, 2017). Importantly, how the MSCI ACWI is constructed (i.e. via a \textit{mechanical} logic) provides for arguably exogenous variation in foreign institutional ownership. As Bena \textit{et al.} (2017: 129-130) point out: “because index membership is determined by the mechanical rule that firms are included depending on their market capitalization ranking, the variation in foreign institutional ownership

\textsuperscript{12}This instrument has been extensively used in recent finance and accounting research on foreign institutional ownership (Aggarwal \textit{et al.}, 2011; Aguilera \textit{et al.}, 2017; Bena \textit{et al.}, 2017; Dyck \textit{et al.}, 2019).

\textsuperscript{13}Source: Official MSCI ACWI website: https://www.msci.com/acwi.

\textsuperscript{14}Details about how the MSCI ACWI is constructed can be found here: https://www.msci.com/acwi. A short excerpt: “The MSCI ACWI Index, MSCI’s flagship global equity index, is designed to represent performance of the full opportunity set of large- and mid-cap stocks across 23 developed and 26 emerging markets. As of December 2018, it covers more than 2,700 constituents across 11 sectors and approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each market. The index is built using MSCI’s Global Investable Market Index (GIMI) methodology, which is designed to take into account variations reflecting conditions across regions, marketcap sizes, sectors, style segments and combinations…MSCI ACWI Indexes offer a building block approach with a rules-based, consistent and transparent methodology”
included by this rule is plausibly exogenous.” Hence, stock additions to the MSCI AWCI index would be plausibly exogenous to firms’ investment decisions including CPS.

Our second instrument is firm membership in the Russell 2000 index. We construct a dummy variable (Russell 2000), which takes a value of 1 if a firm is a member of the Russell 2000 index in year t and 0 if not. The Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index are widely used market benchmarks: the Russell 1000 consists of the largest 1,000 U.S. stocks, in terms of market capitalization; the Russell 2000 consists of the next largest 2,000 stocks (not including the first 1,000). Because the portfolio weight assigned to each stock in these indexes is value-weighted, and the Russell 2000 index is a more popular benchmark for index funds, the assignment of a stock to one or the other index can have a profound impact on the extent of ownership by index funds (Appel, Gormley, & Keim, 2016). Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2018) find that ownership by passively managed mutual funds and exchange-traded funds is about 40 percent higher for stocks in the Russell 2000 index than for otherwise similar stocks in the Russell 1000 index. Therefore, a firm’s membership in the Russell 2000 index can increase passive domestic investors’ demand for its shares, which can crowd out ownership by foreign institutional investors. Meanwhile, the Russell 2000 index is reconstituted once a year based on stocks’ end-of-May market capitalization. At this time, all eligible securities are ranked by their current market capitalization. This implies that inclusion in the Russell 2000 index is determined by a firm’s market-capitalization ranking and is therefore plausibly exogenous to firm decisions (Appel et al., 2016).

After constructing these two instruments, we implement firm fixed-effects instrumental variable regressions using the Stata procedure of “xtivreg2” with the “fe, cluster” option.
RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the variables used in this study. Before conducting regression analyses, we perform multicollinearity diagnostics. Specifically, we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect multicollinearity issues. Untabulated results show that the average VIF is 2.3 and that none of the values for VIF are greater than 10, the threshold beyond which multicollinearity may be a concern (Hair et al., 1998).

Firm fixed-effects regressions

Table 2 presents the firm fixed-effects OLS regressions used to test our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 asserts that foreign institutional ownership (FIO) is positively associated with CPS. Model 1 includes all the control variables; Model 2 introduces FIO, and the coefficient estimate of \( FIO \) is positive (\( \beta = 5.565, p < .01 \)), consistent with Hypothesis 1. One standard deviation increase in FIO will be associated with a 23 percent increase in CPS.

Hypothesis 2 posits that the positive relationship between FIO and CPS is stronger when firms have high government-contract intensity. We test the moderating effect of government-contract intensity by conducting subgroup analyses, for two reasons. First, the measure of government-contract intensity is time-invariant for each firm, and it cannot be included in firm fixed-effects regressions. Second, recent research (Shaver, 2019) suggests that using interaction terms to test moderating effects in fixed-effects regressions may not fully control for bias from time-invariant firm heterogeneity. The median value of government-contract intensity across our sample is zero, and we divide our sample into two groups: low contract intensity (equal to 0) and high
contract intensity (greater than 0). In Model 3 (low contract intensity), the coefficient estimate of FIO is positive ($\beta = 3.408$, $p = 0.015$). In Model 4 (high contract intensity), the coefficient estimate of FIO is also positive ($\beta = 7.242$, $p < .01$). Although Chow-tests are often applied to compare the statistical difference of two coefficient estimates across models, such tests are not applicable to panel regressions with firm fixed-effects. Nevertheless, in terms of magnitude, for firms with low government-contract intensity, a one-standard-deviation increase in FIO is associated with a 13 percent increase in CPS; however, for firms with high government-contract intensity, a one-standard-deviation increase in FIO is associated with a 31 percent increase in CPS.

Hypothesis 3 argues that the positive relationship between FIO and CPS is stronger for firms in national-security industries than in other industries. To test this moderating hypothesis, we again conduct subgroup analyses. Model 5 presents results from non-national-security industries; the coefficient of FIO is positive ($\beta = 5.098$, $p < .01$). Model 6 presents results from national-security industries; the coefficient of FIO is also positive ($\beta = 6.433$, $p = 0.001$). In terms of magnitude, for firms in non-national-security industries, a one-standard-deviation increase in FIO is associated with a 20 percent increase in CPS; however, for firms in national-security industries, a one-standard-deviation increase in FIO is associated with a 27 percent increase in CPS.

**Instrumental variable regressions**

As noted, FIO may suffer from endogeneity because of reverse causality or omitted variable bias and can be mitigated by instrumental variable regressions. The instruments that we use (as described in the previous section) are a firm’s membership in the MSCI index and in the Russell 2000 index. Table 3 reports results from instrumental variable regressions.
Model 1 presents the first-stage regression results. The coefficient estimate of the MSCI is positive ($\beta = 0.024, p < .01$); that of the Russell 2000 is negative ($\beta = -0.003, p < .01$). This indicates that firms belonging to the MSCI index have a higher level of foreign institutional ownership while those belonging to the Russell 2000 index have a lower level, consistent with our arguments. We also conduct tests to assess the relevance and endogeneity of our instruments. Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are weak. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 709, much higher than the 19.93 suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005), which indicates that our instruments can be considered relevant. We conduct the Sargan-Hansen test to examine the endogeneity of our instruments. The Hansen J statistic has a p-value of 0.523 in Model 2, suggesting that we cannot reject the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms and are correctly excluded from the second-stage regressions. It is important to note that the Sargan-Hansen test rests on the assumption that at least one of the two instruments is truly exogenous. As argued, given that a firm’s inclusion into the MSCI index and Russell 2000 index is to a large degree random to its strategic decisions, we believe that these two instruments may not be endogenous.

Model 2 presents the second-stage of firm fixed-effects instrumental variable regression. The coefficient estimate of FIO is positive ($\beta = 36.087, p < .01$), supporting Hypothesis 1. Models 3 and 4 report instrumental variable regression results for the low-contract-intensity and high-contract-intensity subgroups. The coefficient estimate for FIO is larger in the latter subgroup ($\beta = 46.245, p < .01$) than in the former ($\beta = 30.777, p = .01$). Models 5 and 6 report instrumental variable regression results for non-national-security industries and for national-security industries. The
Supplementary analyses

*Lobbying dispersion and PAC contribution dispersion.* Our analyses focus on the influence of foreign institutional ownership on the magnitude of CPS. We argue that firms engage in intensive CPS to reduce political uncertainty brought about by foreign institutional ownership. They manage their political dependence by monitoring and influencing political and regulatory decision-makers. Thus, firms may earmark their lobbying expenditures for overtures to an array of government agencies (Ridge *et al.*, 2017), especially since inter-agency committees like CFIUS span multiple Cabinet departments and federal agencies (Latham & Watkins, 2017). We assign agencies lobbied by our sample firms to three classifications: executive branch (e.g., Department of the Treasury), legislative branch (e.g., Medicare Payment Advisory Commission), and independent agency (e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission). We then calculate lobbying dispersion using the entropy measure, defined as

\[
\text{Lobbying dispersion} = \sum_i [P_i \times \ln(1/P_i)],
\]

where \(P_i\) is the lobbying expenditure attributed to one of the government agencies and \(\ln(1/P)\) is the weight given to each type, or the natural logarithm of the inverse of lobbying expenditure on each type. This measure considers both the number of government agencies that lobbyists approach and the proportion of total expenditures that each type represents. Results with lobbying dispersion as the dependent variable are presented in Model 1 of Table 4. The coefficient estimate of coefficient estimate for FIO is larger in the latter (\(\beta = 49.114, p < .01\)) than in the former (\(\beta = 30.884, p = .001\)).
FIO is positive ($\beta = 0.188, p = 0.004$), suggesting that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with the degree of lobbying dispersion.

[Insert Table 4 here]

We also create an alternative dependent variable that captures PAC-contribution dispersion. Specifically, we calculate a firm’s total PAC contribution to Democratic candidates and Republican candidates and then use the entropy measure to calculate PAC-contribution distribution. Results appear in Table 4, Model 2. The coefficient estimate of FIO is positive ($\beta = 0.197, p < .01$), implying that firms increase the degree of their PAC-contribution dispersion as foreign institutional ownership increases.

**Foreign institutional ownership and disclosed political risk.** We have argued that a high level of foreign institutional ownership (FIO) can increase a firm’s political dependence, which may in turn spur it to raise its CPS. Although we cannot directly measure political dependence, we can capture the degree of political risk that firms have disclosed. When a firm’s top executives disclose substantial political risk in public communications, it is presumably safe to assume that the firm is subject to high political uncertainty and dependence. We obtain a measure of political risk, based on executives’ disclosures in earnings conference calls, from Hassan et al. (2017). Specifically, the authors construct a firm-level measure of the political risk faced by U.S. firms by means of textual analysis of quarterly-earnings conference-call transcripts: the political risk faced by a given firm at a given point in time is quantified as the share of the conversation that centers on risk associated with politics. Using the quarter-year political-risk measure from Hassan et al. (2017), we then calculate an average annual measure. Our goal is to investigate whether foreign institutional ownership can
predict political risk. Results from such analyses appear in Table 5. Political risk is measured at Year $t$; FIO and control variables are measured at Year $t-1$. We control for two-digit SIC industry fixed-effects instead of firm fixed-effects as we are attempting to show the mediating role of political risk between FIO and CPS and a cross-sectional analysis is more intuitive than a within-firm analysis.

[Insert Table 5 here]

The coefficient estimate of FIO is positive ($\beta = 0.478$, $p = 0.047$), indicating that FIO is positively associated with political risk. In Model 2, with CPS as the dependent variable, we find that the coefficient estimate of political risk is positive ($\beta = 0.325$, $p < .01$). In Model 3, after we introduce both CPS and political risk, we find that the coefficient estimate of political risk decreases from 0.325 in Model 2 to 0.317 in Model 3. We conduct the Sobel test to evaluate whether political risk partially mediates the relationship between FIO and CPS. We find that Sobel test $= 1.87$ ($p = 0.06$). These findings provide some evidence that a firm’s disclosed political risk partially mediates the relationship between its FIO and CPS.

**Foreign institutional investors’ country of origin.** We classify foreign institutional investors into two types based on whether their country of origin is a democratic country following Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2011). We then create two FIO variables: FIO from democratic countries and FIO from non-democratic countries. The level of FIO from non-democratic countries accounts for less than 1 percent of total FIO. In other words, foreign institutional ownership in the U.S. firms mainly arises from foreign investors from democratic countries. The top five countries where foreign institutional investors are from: United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and
Spain. As such, it is not surprising that our results are mainly driven by foreign institutional investors from democratic countries rather than from non-democratic countries.

**Heterogeneity among foreign institutional investors’ strategies.** The investment strategies of foreign institutional investors differ. Among the most important such differences is their investment time horizons (Yan & Zhang, 2009): foreign institutional investors with long-term investment horizons tend to concentrate their shareholdings in a small number of firms for an extended period of time and to maintain lower turnover rates; in contrast, their counterparts with short-term investment horizons tend to hold stakes in a wide and diverse range of firms and to move in and out of individual stocks frequently. Hence, firms with a higher level of ownership by long-term foreign institutional investors are more likely to become targets of political scrutiny given such investors’ concentrated ownership (as opposed to the dispersed ownership characteristic of short-term institutional investors).

The FactSet database assigns institutional investors to five classifications based on their investment horizons: very low, low, medium, high, and very high. We designate foreign institutional investors with very low/low turnover rates as long-term and those with very high/high turnover rates as short-term; those with medium turnover rates are designated medium-term. In unreported results, we find that the coefficient estimate of Short-term FIO is negative ($\beta = -0.018, p = 0.348$); the coefficient estimates of Long-term FIO and Medium-term FIO are positive ($\beta = 0.170, p < .01$ for Long-term FIO and $\beta = 0.093, p = 0.003$ for Medium-term FIO). The coefficient estimate of Long-term FIO is greater than those of Medium-term FIO or Short-term FIO. The F-test shows that the coefficient estimates differ from each other. These findings indicate that long-term FIO bears a stronger
association with CPS than medium-term FIO, whereas short-term FIO does not seem to be associated with CPS.

DISCUSSION

This study examines how U.S. firms’ institutional ownership affects their corporate political spending. We find that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with the level of U.S. firms’ CPS, and that this relationship between foreign institutional ownership and U.S. firms’ CPS is stronger for firms with higher government-contract intensity and for firms that operate in national-security related industries. We believe that our findings contribute to several streams of research.

First, prior research (Aggarwal et al., 2011; David et al., 2006; Fang et al., 2015) has documented many potential benefits of foreign institutional ownership. Through investigating the relationship between foreign institutional ownership and CPS, our study highlights the potential liabilities of foreign institutional ownership for U.S. firms. Although foreign investors can infuse substantial capital to U.S. public firms and drive up their stock prices, high foreign institutional ownership could also increase the degree of regulatory scrutiny placed on firms as well as firms’ compliance costs (e.g., filing reports to government agencies and adjusting their practices to align with compliance requirements). This can heighten firms’ political dependence on government actions. We argue that to mitigate political dependence, firms allocate resources to CPS in order to monitor and influence political actors, which does not come without cost as such expenditures can crowd out resources that could otherwise be used for attaining market aims (i.e., R&D or business expansion). In addition, existing research has examined U.S. institutional investors’ influence on domestic firms’ decisions (Bermiss et al., 2017; Bushee, 1998) and on non-U.S. firms’ strategic
decisions (David et al., 2006). Our study expands this research by investigating the relationship between foreign institutional ownership and U.S. portfolio firms’ decisions.

Second, our study extends prior research on the domestic antecedents of non-market strategy by examining foreign influences on U.S. firms’ CPS. This question has become increasingly pertinent given the drastic escalation in CPS following the 2010 Citizens United ruling and rising public interest in the impact of foreign influences on firm strategy. Research has examined the role of foreign direct investors in shaping non-market strategy by comparing the corporate political spending of foreign subsidiaries in the United States with that of U.S.-headquartered firms (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000). Departing from existing research, our study points out that non-controlling ownership stakes by foreign institutional investors may indirectly shape firms’ CPS through intensifying these firms’ political dependence.

Lastly, at a broader level, our study contributes to a growing call for better understanding of how firms shape their environments (Ahuja et al., 2018). Prior research has focused on the actions of shaping (Gavetti et al., 2017); our study helps unpack some of its antecedents. We believe that our examination of how foreign entities are related to firms’ CPS is particularly timely given immense policy and public interest in the role of foreign influence in U.S. corporate political activity. We hope that this study will motivate future research on other antecedents of shaping strategies, including such key firm characteristics as political capabilities and cognition (Schilke, Hu, & Helfat, 2018).

Policy and managerial implications

Our study has important policy implications. A significant increase in CPS following the 2010 Citizens United ruling has generated growing public and political interest in understanding the impact
of foreign entities on U.S. political activities. This is particularly relevant given recent legislative
developments, such as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, which
reflects the increased interest and jurisdiction that U.S. regulatory bodies such as CFIUS have over
foreign investments in U.S. companies. Our study yields important insights into the antecedents of
corporate political strategy amidst heightened regulatory uncertainty, arguing that higher levels of
aggregate foreign institutional ownership can subject U.S. firms to high political dependence and
thus spur them to increase CPS. The managerial implications of our findings suggest that firm
managers and stakeholders should be aware of the potential “costs” of foreign institutional
ownership and think carefully about how to best allocate resources to their market and nonmarket
strategies.

Limitations and future research

We cannot observe directly how foreign institutional ownership can increase portfolio firms’
political dependence. Building on nonmarket strategy research, we infer that high foreign
institutional ownership subjects U.S. firms to higher political dependence than is experienced by
firms with no or low foreign institutional ownership. However, through our supplemental analysis,
we do find empirical evidence that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with the
political risk disclosed by top executives. To systematically unpack the pertinent mechanisms,
processes, and moderating conditions, it may be useful to employ survey methodologies to identify
how foreign institutional ownership affects U.S. firms’ political dependence.

Our two moderating conditions attempt to capture a firm’s political dependence. However,
these two moderators pertain more to the direct influence of foreign institutional ownership on a
firms’ political dependence than the indirect influence through shaping public opinions. More research is needed to investigate the indirect mechanism. For instance, are firms with high foreign institutional ownership more likely to become targets of public criticism when economic nationalism is on the rise? Additionally, we have tested our arguments using a sample of U.S. firms, and this may constrain the generalization of our findings. Given that some country governments (e.g., China and Russia) have more direct power over resource control and allocation, are firms from these countries more motivated to pursue nonmarket strategies to alleviate political dependence arising from foreign ownership? Additionally, further research can incorporate types of CPS beyond lobbying and PAC donations (Jeong & Siegel, 2018; Luo et al., 2018; Westphal & Park, 2020) and examine whether our results differ for non-public firm types, such as private companies and new ventures operating in nascent rather than mature industries (Armanios et al., 2017; McDonald & Gao, 2019). There is also broad scope for future research to examine how other corporate stakeholders—e.g., communities, employees, suppliers, and customers—(differentially) influence CPS (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Gatignon & Capron, 2020), and in particular, how managers engage with and balance the preferences of different stakeholder groups. Lastly, to help alleviate endogeneity concerns, we have utilized instrumental variable regressions. Yet, such regressions cannot fully rule out endogeneity concerns since no statistical tests are available to verify the exogeneity of instruments. Therefore, future research can try to find natural experiments as an identification strategy to further investigate the causal relationship between foreign institutional ownership and CPS.

Conclusion

Foreign institutional investors have become increasingly important players in the global capital
markets. In a departure from prior research that emphasizes the positive benefits of foreign institutional investors, our findings imply that foreign institutional ownership could also increase firms’ political dependence, and thus spur firms to allocate resources to CPS. Our findings help contribute to a more balanced view regarding the implications of foreign institutional investors. We hope that our study will motivate further strategy research on the potential liabilities or costs of foreign institutional ownership and thus advance cumulative knowledge on the strategic implications of firm ownership, foreign investors, and corporate political activity.
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| Variable                          | Mean  | S.D.  | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 9    | 10   | 11   | 12   | 13   | 14   | 15   | 16   | 17   | 18   |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Corporate political spending     | 2.93  | 5.30  | 1.00 |     |     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Foreign institutional ownership  | 0.03  | 0.04  | 0.34 | 1.00 |     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Government-contract intensity    | 0.01  | 0.05  | 0.10 | -0.02| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| National-security industry       | 0.28  | 0.45  | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| MSCI                             | 0.12  | 0.33  | 0.46 | 0.48 | -0.01| -0.01| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Russell 2000                     | 0.45  | 0.50  | -0.14| -0.10| 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.33| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Firm size                        | 5.86  | 2.18  | 0.47 | 0.42 | -0.02| -0.22| 0.52 | -0.04| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Firm performance                 | 0.11  | 0.57  | 0.10 | 0.08 | -0.01| -0.18| 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.31 | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Debt ratio                       | 0.20  | 0.21  | 0.13 | 0.10 | -0.04| -0.14| 0.06 | -0.04| 0.23 | 0.10 | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Cash-holding ratio               | 0.19  | 0.22  | -0.08| 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.45 | -0.09| 0.07 | -0.40| -0.23| -0.33| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Government sales ratio           | 0.03  | 0.16  | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.41 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Product diversification          | 0.41  | 0.53  | 0.28 | 0.19 | 0.02 | -0.07| 0.24 | -0.07| 0.44 | 0.10 | 0.14 | -0.21| 0.05 | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| International diversification    | 0.16  | 0.25  | 0.07 | 0.18 | -0.03| 0.27 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.01 | -0.08| 0.15 | -0.06| 0.17 | 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Domestic-market uncertainty      | -0.01 | 1.64  | -0.04| -0.06| -0.02| -0.03| -0.02| -0.01| -0.07| -0.01| -0.01| -0.09| -0.06| -0.14| -0.12| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Domestic institutional ownership | 0.54  | 0.30  | 0.26 | 0.38 | -0.03| 0.03 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.57 | 0.16 | 0.08 | -0.04| 0.03 | 0.25 | 0.22 | -0.10| 1.00 |      |      |      |      |      |
| CEO duality                      | 0.51  | 0.50  | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.01 | -0.06| 0.10 | -0.03| 0.15 | 0.07 | 0.07 | -0.08| 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.00 | -0.03| 0.08 | 1.00 |      |      |      |
| Board independence               | 0.72  | 0.14  | -0.11| -0.11| 0.02 | -0.04| -0.19| 0.02 | -0.26| -0.07| -0.04| 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.13| -0.12| 0.09 | -0.19| -0.19| 1.00 |      |      |
| Poison pill                      | 0.25  | 0.43  | 0.09 | 0.05 | -0.01| 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.08 | -0.01| 0.02 | 0.04 | -0.01| 0.06 | 0.10 | -0.07| 0.20 | 0.04 | -0.11| 1.00 |      |

Note: N = 44,380.
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Note: FIO = Foreign institutional ownership. Standard errors are clustered by firms. P-values are reported in brackets. Two-tailed tests.
Table 3. Instrumental Variable Regression Results

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<th>Variables</th>
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<th>Model 4 High contract intensity</th>
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Note: FIO = Foreign institutional ownership. Standard errors are clustered by firms. P-values are reported in brackets. Two-tailed tests.
<table>
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<td>[0.047]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political risk</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm size</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>1.746</td>
<td>1.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.925]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm performance</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.038]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.003]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt ratio</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.318]</td>
<td>[0.986]</td>
<td>[0.704]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-holding ratio</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>3.692</td>
<td>3.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.134]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government sales ratio</td>
<td>0.919</td>
<td>4.147</td>
<td>4.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product diversification</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.025]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
<td>[0.000]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: FIO = Foreign institutional ownership. Standard errors are clustered by firms. P-values are reported in brackets. Two-tailed tests.
International diversification  -0.005  -1.661  -1.757  
[0.958]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Domestic-market uncertainty  -0.012  0.037  0.042  
[0.095]  [0.425]  [0.361]  
Domestic institutional ownership  -0.132  -1.326  -1.555  
[0.018]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
CEO duality  0.018  0.368  0.363  
[0.383]  [0.003]  [0.003]  
Board independence  0.018  0.338  0.794  
[0.843]  [0.482]  [0.094]  
Poison pill  -0.013  0.574  0.547  
[0.492]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Constant  -0.075  -7.125  -6.264  
[0.630]  [0.000]  [0.000]  

Observations  24,719  26,583  26,583  
R-squared  0.095  0.353  0.364  
Industry FE  YES  YES  YES  
Year FE  YES  YES  YES  
Adjusted R-squared  0.0919  0.351  0.361  

Note: FIO = Foreign institutional ownership. Standard errors are clustered by firms. P-values are reported in brackets. Two-tailed tests.

Appendix A. List of supplemental exploratory interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview respondent</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General counsel and government affairs director, Middle East and North Africa (former)</td>
<td>U.S. publicly-traded company (Fortune 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior U.S. executive (former)</td>
<td>U.S. publicly-traded company (Fortune 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group vice-president and head of governmental affairs (former)</td>
<td>U.S. publicly-traded company (Fortune 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFIUS strategist (former)</td>
<td>Leading political advisory consulting firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio manager (former)</td>
<td>Leading investment management firm with over $30 billion assets under management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-founder</strong></td>
<td><strong>Boutique political risk consulting firm</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investor-relations executive</strong></td>
<td><strong>U.S. publicly-traded company</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive vice president</strong></td>
<td><strong>U.S. lobbying firm specializing in relations with Capitol Hill</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public policy executive</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leading investment management firm with over $1 trillion assets under management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managing director</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leading government affairs consulting firm</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Email back-and-forth
### Appendix B. List of national-security industries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SIC codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Materials and Processing</td>
<td>3313, 2899, 3299, 2821, 3341, 3087, 2892, 8731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>3829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing</td>
<td>3823, 3559, 3827, 3559, 3544, 3549, 3829, 3844, 3542, 3549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>3571, 3575, 7372, 7375, 7374, 7371, 8243, 7373, 3577, 3572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>4813, 3661, 3663, 3812, 4812, 4899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microelectronics</td>
<td>3674, 3672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment</td>
<td>3559, 3674, 3825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics: Military-Related</td>
<td>3699, 3812, 3663, 3571, 3812, 3679, 3571, 3569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biotechnology</td>
<td>2836, 8733, 2835, 2833, 2834, 2836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Scientific Instruments</td>
<td>3845, 3826, 3844, 3841, 3842, 3843, 3851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace and Surface Transportation</td>
<td>3721, 3724, 3711, 7371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>4911, 1381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Systems</td>
<td>3663, 3571, 3761, 3229, 3822, 3764, 3812, 8711, 3663, 3845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Systems</td>
<td>4499, 3699, 8711, 3731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Liabilities of Foreign Institutional Ownership: Managing Political Dependence Through Corporate Political Spending

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