

Principles vs. Profits: Is a Fairness or Business Rationale for Workplace Diversity Most Effective at Promoting Diversity?

by

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Abstract

In today's global world, organizations are increasingly committed to diversity. Yet, diversity in the workplace is a controversial topic that is often met with opposition. As such, organizations regularly attempt to justify why they value diversity by arguing that it contributes to organizational profitability (business rationale) or that it is the right thing to do (fairness rationale). However, little is known about which rationale is most effective at eliciting pro-diversity behavior. This study used experimental methods to investigate whether the type of rationale given for workplace diversity (business, fairness, or no rationale) influenced support for diversity and inclusion (D&I) initiatives and anti-Black hiring discrimination through two mediators: diluted diversity definitions and perceived organizational morality. Additionally, I tested whether colorblindness, egalitarianism, and prejudice moderated these associations across two studies in samples of White people with management experience. In Study 1 (N = 489, 38% women; 61% men, 1% trans/non-binary), I found that exposure to a business rationale made individuals adopt a definition of diversity that was more focused on heterogeneity in skills and expertise than in race and gender (diluted definition of diversity). In addition, a fairness rationale improved perceptions of an organization's morality while a business rationale hurt perceptions of an organization's moral character, especially among those that supported racial colorblindness. In Study 2 (N = 821, 50% women; 49% men; 1% trans/non-binary), diluted diversity definitions did not mediate the association between a business rationale and support for D&I initiatives or anti-Black hiring discrimination - in part because a business rationale did not cause individuals to have a more diluted definition of diversity than a fairness or no rationale for diversity. Though

diluted diversity definitions were associated with reduced support for D&I initiatives among prejudiced, racially colorblind, and anti-egalitarian individuals, diluted diversity definition did not predict anti-Black hiring discrimination. In addition, greater perceptions of organizational morality mediated the association between a fairness rationale and increased support for D&I initiatives, especially among those who endorsed prejudiced, racially colorblind, and anti-egalitarian sentiments. However, greater perceptions of morality also predicted increased anti-Black hiring discrimination among participants low in colorblindness. Taken together, this research provides organizations with initial evidence about the effectiveness of diversity rationales for eliciting pro-diversity behavior from White managers and challenges lay assumptions about the superior persuasive ability of a business rationale over a fairness rationale. This research is important because identifying which rationale is most effective at promoting workplace diversity can help to increase the representation and inclusion of marginalized groups within the workplace and reduce inequality.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Organizations are increasingly prioritizing their commitment to diversity (Carter 2020; Hebl & Avery, 2013; Whye, 2019). A study conducted by Boston Consulting Group found that 96-98% of large companies have diversity programming (Krentz, 2019) and other research shows that organizations spend billions of dollars a year on this programming (Das, 2019; Etsy, 2007; Hansen, 2003). There are several reasons why valuing diversity is especially important in the workplace. Rapid shifts in the demographic make-up of the United States have resulted in greater representation of women and people of color, giving organizations access to a broader and more diverse pool of potential employees and customers (Avery & McKay, 2006; Madera et al., 2018). Additionally, recent public attention to social justice movements such as #MeToo and Black Lives Matter have highlighted the rampant workplace discrimination faced by women and people of color, pushing these issues to the forefront of public consciousness (Fitzgerald & Cortina, 2018; McCluney et al., 2020). These reasons parallel the two different rationales that organizations commonly use to justify why they value diversity. The first rationale, known as the “business case,” uses economic language to argue that diversity is important because it is good for the bottom line (Catalyst, 2004; Cox & Blake, 1991; Herring 2009; Jayne & Dipoye 2004). On the other hand, another rationale called the “fairness case” uses moral language to frame diversity as the “right thing to do” based on principles of equality and fairness (Jones et al., 2013; Mayer et al., 2019; Noon, 2007; Zannoni, et al., 2010).

Many scholars and practitioners believe that of the two rationales for diversity, the business rationale is the most effective at motivating pro-diversity behaviors because it can

assuage majority group concerns about exclusion and “reverse” discrimination (Dover et al., 2016; Plaut et al., 2011) by eschewing value-laden moral rhetoric and instead make profit-maximizing arguments that demonstrate how majority groups contribute to and benefit from diversity (Ashford & Detert, 2015; Hurd & Plaut, 2017). However, there is a dearth of research examining the actual effectiveness of various rationales for diversity in eliciting support for diversity and reducing biased behaviors. Instead, empirical research has documented the prevalence of the business case in organizations and among employees and confirms its overwhelming popularity as a persuasive tactic. For example, in their analysis of diversity statements from Fortune 100 companies, Nurmohamed et al. (2018) found that 58% of companies exclusively used a business rationale to justify their diversity strategies, whereas 4% exclusively used a moral rationale. Similarly, research from the issue selling literature has found that employees most often use a business case when trying to persuade their managers about the importance of a social issue, even if they privately hold moralized attitudes about the issue (Piderit & Ashford, 2003; Sonenshein, 2006). Although this research sheds light on how organizations and individuals attempt to advocate for social issues, documenting the prevalence of the business case only demonstrates that there are lay theories about the superiority of the business case for motivating pro-diversity attitudes and behavior. However popular lay theories may be, they primarily reflect untested assumptions about which rationales make a compelling case for social issues, like diversity. Therefore, more research is needed to empirically test the validity of these assumptions about the persuasive ability of these two rationales for diversity.

The goal of this dissertation is to address the gaps in the literature by examining whether a business or fairness rationale for diversity is the most effective at promoting diversity in the workplace. Across two studies, I used experimental methods to investigate whether the type of

rationale given for workplace diversity (business, fairness, or no rationale) influenced pro-diversity behaviors by changing diversity-related cognitions and perceptions. Additionally, I explored whether diversity attitudes (i.e., colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice) moderated these associations (see Figure 1). This model was tested in a sample of White professionals with management experience because previous research shows that managers' support for diversity is crucial to the success of diversity within organizations (Avery, 2011); since White people are more likely to be managers and resistant to diversity efforts it is imperative to understand how they are influenced by diversity rationales (Dover et al., 2016; Jones, 2017; Lu et al., 2020).

This research makes several contributions to the literature on diversity, prejudice and ethics. First, I advance diversity science by examining whether the rationales that organizations use to justify their commitments to diversity influence pro-diversity attitudes and behavior. In doing so, I question the untested assumption that the business case is the most effective at promoting diversity and provide organizations with empirical evidence about the best way to communicate about diversity to garner employee support for diversity. Second, I further diversity science by exploring whether: a) diversity-related cognitions and perceptions mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and pro-diversity behaviors and b) diversity attitudes moderate these associations. In doing so, I improve our understanding about how diversity rationales affect pro-diversity behaviors and who is most receptive to each type of rationale. Third, I contribute to research on the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM: Crandall & Eshelman, 2003) by testing whether diversity-related cognitions and perceptions interact with prejudice to influence pro-diversity behaviors in a way that facilitates or reduces the expression of prejudice. Fourth, I extend research on business ethics and morality by being one

of the first studies to consider whether rationales for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) efforts (in this case, diversity), rather than the mere presence of CSR efforts, are a source of morality for organizations.

In the following sections, I will first discuss the history of, definitions of, and approaches to diversity and diversity management. Next, I will describe the two diversity rationales, their underlying logic, and the criticisms levied against each rationale. Afterwards, I will detail the role that diversity rationales and colorblindness play in shaping conceptualizations of the term diversity and the subsequent impact diversity definitions and racial prejudice have on support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and hiring evaluations. Then, I will turn to a discussion of how diversity rationales influence perceptions of the organization's morality. Finally, I will describe how perceptions of organizational morality and racial prejudice may interact to have important consequences for support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and hiring evaluations.

From Affirmative Action to Diversity and Diversity Management

The diversity programs and messaging that are common in today's organization evolved from affirmative action and equal opportunity programs developed in the 1960's (Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). In 1961, President John Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 called for government contractors to take "affirmative action" (AA) to ensure that employees and applicants from historically marginalized groups were treated fairly (Hammerman, 1984). Further, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal for organizations to discriminate against applicants or employees based on race, color, religion, nationality, or gender. Subsequent statutes expanded Title VII to include age, ability, pregnancy status, and veteran status as federally protected categories. Importantly, employees from these protected categories could now sue organizations for discrimination and the Equality Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) was established to oversee discrimination claims and ensure compliance with the law.

However, these laws came under attack in the 1980's as the Reagan Administration sought to weaken affirmative action by drastically reducing federal enforcement (Freeman, 1990; Skrentny, 1996). Additionally, organizations faced backlash from White employees, who found these practices unfair, in the form of reverse-discrimination lawsuits (Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). In the face of such uncertainty about the future of affirmative action, EEO/AA specialists attempted to recast affirmative action as "diversity" and "diversity management" (Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). To convince others that diversity was not just a euphemism for affirmative action, EEO/AA specialists further distanced diversity from affirmative action by developing new rationales for diversity that moved away from social justice and equality to organizational efficiency and effectiveness (Kelly & Dobbin, 1998). Whereas affirmative action was a legal measure designed to remedy past discrimination and promote equality, diversity management was described as a set of voluntary human resources practices that helped to give companies a competitive advantage through properly leveraging a diverse workforce.

In their analysis of diversity articles from the 1970's to the 1990's, Edelman et al. (2001) found that diversity management displaced attention from affirmative action. By 1993, the number of articles discussing diversity far surpassed the number of articles discussing affirmative action and equal employment opportunity (Edelman et al. 2001). In addition, 50% of articles cited profit as a reason to support organizational diversity efforts, while only 19% of articles mentioned law and 30% mentioned fairness (Edelman et al., 2001). These findings demonstrate attempts to rationalize the need for diversity management. Furthermore, they show that affirmative action practices were abandoned in favor of diversity management.

Defining Diversity and Inclusion

Though diversity was originally used to talk about marginalized groups protected by law, there are now many ways to define diversity. For example, Harrison and Klein (2007) define diversity as “the distribution of differences among the members of a unit with respect to a common attribute X, such as tenure, ethnicity, conscientiousness, task attitude, or pay” (p.1200) while others define diversity as “the composition of work units (work group, organization, occupation, establishment or firm) in terms of the cultural or demographic characteristics that are salient and symbolically meaningful in the relationships among group members” (DiTomaso, Post, & Parks-Yancy, 2007, p. 474). Alternatively, some scholars exclude demographic differences altogether and instead define diversity as heterogeneity in “personality attributes, personal values, work attitudes, education, and lifestyle” (Liao, Chuang, & Joshi, 2008 p, 112).

Experts have also developed various typologies to categorize diversity for the purpose of understanding how each form of diversity affects group functioning and performance (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Harrison et al., 1998; Jehn et al.,1999). For example, Harrison et al. (1998) distinguished between surface-level diversity (group member differences in easily observable physical attributes, such as race) and deep-level diversity (group member differences in values, beliefs, and attitudes) because they are believed to differently affect group performance. According to the information processing /decision-making theories, groups with deep-level diversity perform better and are more creative because they have a larger pool of task-relevant resources (knowledge, skills, and abilities) to draw from and process information more thoroughly to reconcile conflicting perspectives (Harrison et al., 1998; Mannix & Neale, 2005; van Knippenberg et al, 2007). In contrast, scholars draw from social identity (Tajfel & Turner 1986), social categorization (Turner, 1985), and similarity/attraction (Byrne 1971) theories to

argue that surface-level diversity is negatively related to group performance because it activates categorization processes and negative interpersonal dynamics that subsequently hurt group performance (Jackson et al., 1992; Riordan & Shore, 1997; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). At best, surface-level diversity is believed to merely be a proxy for deep-level diversity (Van de Ven et al., 2008; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Thus, diversity researchers' definitions of diversity have become increasingly focused on deep-level diversity, such as personality, in addition to surface-level diversity.

The focus of this dissertation is not about increasing group performance; rather, it is about how to create more equitable and inclusive organizations. Therefore, I stand with critical diversity scholars (Linnehan & Konrad, 2009; Noon, 2007; Zanoni & Janssens, 2004; Zannoni et al., 2010) and take a social justice approach to diversity by foregrounding surface-level diversity in my definition of diversity. I choose to focus on these dimensions of diversity because, despite their name, they are not surface level. As Shields (2008) notes “identity, such as gender or social class, may be experienced as a feature of individual selves, but it also reflects the operation of power relations among groups” (p. 302). In other words, identities that comprise surface-level forms of diversity are deeply embedded within systems of power and social hierarchy (DiTomaso et al., 2007; Ridgeway, 1991; Ridgeway, 2007). So, to create equitable and inclusive organizations, attention must primarily be paid to the dimensions of diversity that are defined by power differentials (surface-level). Thus, I define diversity as *heterogeneity with respect to characteristics that are legally protected from discrimination (e.g., race, sex, nationality) and/or are associated with historical patterns of status/marginalization (e.g., social economic status, educational attainment, criminal history)*.

In addition to increasing diversity, scholars and practitioners have begun to have conversations about how to make organizations more inclusive. Though these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, it is important to distinguish between diversity and inclusion as experts have demonstrated that these constructs are separate and distinct from one another (Roberson, 2006). Inclusion is the extent to which employees are fully integrated into the organization, have access to information and resources, and are included in both formal and informal decision-making processes (Ferdman & Deane, 2014; Mor Barak, 2015). Drawing on Optimal-Distinctiveness Theory (ODT; Brewer, 1991), Shore and colleagues (2011) posit that inclusion is achieved when an employee's need for both belongingness and uniqueness is satisfied. Employees do not experience true inclusion if: a) belonging is contingent upon giving up their uniqueness and assimilating to the dominant norms and culture of the organization, or b) an employee's unique characteristics are valued, but they are not treated as an esteemed member of the organization (Shore et al., 2011). Inclusion is theorized to be associated with positive relationship dynamics among diverse groups (Li et al., 2015; Nishii, 2013) and positive work outcomes for all employees, but especially those from marginalized groups (Findler et al., 2007; Mor Barak, 2000; Shore et al., 2018).

Though diversity and inclusion programs both benefit members of marginalized groups, they do so in different ways. Diversity efforts are primarily concerned with the representation of marginalized groups in the workplace and, as such, are focused on making hiring and selection processes fairer by establishing practices that remove bias and diversify the applicant pool (Roberson, 2006; Shore et al., 2018). Inclusion practices seek to enable the full participation of marginalized groups once they enter the organization by creating equal access to decision-making, resources, and promotion opportunities (Roberson, 2006; Shore et al., 2018). As

diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) practitioner Vernā Myers put it, “diversity is being invited to the party. Inclusion is being asked to dance” (Cho, 2019). I will be exploring both diversity and inclusion in this dissertation by examining individuals’ support for diversity and inclusion initiatives.

Approaches to Diversity Management

Diversity management can be described as a variety of human resource management practices that attempt to increase diversity with respect to some characteristic (e.g., race, gender, age) and ensure that diversity helps to advance rather than hinder the achievement of organizational goals and objectives (Olsen & Martins, 2012). Diversity management programs typically include various practices to eliminate bias, provide support and opportunities to marginalized workers, and monitor the organization’s diversity goals and outcomes (Leslie, 2019). For example, many organizations hold diversity training where employees are educated about bias and stereotypes with the goal of reducing discriminatory behavior (Alhejji et al., 2016; Bezrukova et al., 2012; Lindsey et al., 2015). Although the literature is mixed regarding successful outcomes, some research has shown that diversity management programs can be effective in increasing representation and decreasing discrimination and exclusion (Bezrukova et al., 2016; Kalev et al., 2006).

Though most diversity management programs include similar policies and practices, scholars have argued that organizations may take different approaches to diversity management. In their qualitative analysis of racially diverse organizations, Ely and Thomas (2001) uncovered that organizations can have at least three different perspectives on workplace diversity: discrimination and fairness, access and legitimacy, and integration and learning. Organizations that hold a discrimination and fairness perspective view diversity as a moral imperative that

helps to ensure fairness and equality and eliminate discrimination between different groups within the organization (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Companies with an access and legitimacy perspective believe that matching the organization's diversity to that of its consumer base helps the organization to gain access to and legitimacy among diverse consumer markets, ultimately leading to a more successful and profitable company (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Finally, the integration and learning perspective is characterized by the belief that diversity is a “potentially valuable resource” that can benefit the organization in a variety of ways by leveraging diverse perspectives, insights, and skills to rethink previously taken for granted business practices, missions, products, market, and culture (Ely & Thomas, 2001, p. 240). Thus, both the access and legitimacy and learning and integration perspectives regard diversity as a business asset. Later work by Podsiadlowski et al. (2009) splits up Ely and Thomas’ (2001) discrimination and fairness perspective into two different perspectives: fairness and colorblind. Though both perspectives emphasize fairness and equal opportunity, a colorblind perspective does so by ignoring differences due to racial background while a fairness perspective attempts to reduce inequality by attending to the specific needs of marginalized groups (Podsiadlowski et al., 2009).

Dwertmann et al. (2016) also draw on the work of Ely and Thomas (2001) in their review of research on diversity climate and distinguish between the fairness and discrimination perspective and synergy perspective. The fairness and discrimination perspective is focused on preventing negative outcomes such as discrimination and social exclusion by ensuring fair treatment through equal employment opportunity practices. This perspective is like the discrimination-and-fairness perspective proposed by Ely and Thomas (2001). Contrastingly, the synergy perspective is focused on promoting positive outcomes such as performance benefits through ensuring that diverse perspectives and information can be exchanged and are integrated.

The synergy perspective is most like Ely and Thomas' (2001) integration and learning perspective.

To sum up, experts have highlighted the myriad ways that organizations may approach diversity management. Underlying these varied perspectives are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about diversity. As evidenced by the fairness and discrimination perspectives discussed previously, some organizations emphasize diversity to ensure fairness and equality between different demographic groups. In contrast, the access and legitimacy, integration and learning, and synergy perspectives all demonstrate that organizations may also view diversity as a business resource to be leveraged for greater profits or increased team and organizational performance. These two ways of thinking about diversity are also reflected in the rationales for diversity that organizations routinely communicate to employees and stakeholders to persuade them to support the organization's diversity and inclusion efforts.

Diversity Rationales

The “business case for diversity” utilizes economic language to justify diversity based on its contribution to the organization’s bottom line. (Catalyst, 2004; Cox & Blake, 1991; Herring 2009; Jayne & Dipoye 2004). Consistent with the diversity management approaches of access and legitimacy and integration and learning, diversity is thought to lead to a competitive advantage for organizations in at least three ways. First, from an information processing/decision-making perspective, demographically diverse teams are more innovative, creative, and outperform homogenous teams because they have access to a broader range of task-relevant knowledge, skills, and perspectives (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Phillips, 2014). Second, employees from marginalized groups can grant organizations access to new and diverse consumer markets by using their cultural expertise to help organizations better relate to

and understand the needs of these new consumers (Bendick et al., 2010; Ely & Thomas, 2001). Third, employing people from diverse backgrounds helps companies attract top talent from a broader pool of applicants (Avery & McKay, 2006; Johnston & Packer, 1987). These three benefits make up the business case for diversity.

Companies that tout the business case hold diversity as an instrumental value or an effective means to a desirable end (Olsen & Martins, 2012). In other words, diversity is viewed as a resource that managers can exploit to achieve higher organizational profits. Similarly, van Dijk et al., (2012) note that the business case is based on utilitarian principles which define the best course of action as that which leads to the most good. According to this doctrine, the consequences of an action rather than the action itself determine what is moral. Following this utilitarian logic, the business case emphasizes the positive consequences that valuing diversity yields for organizations.

On the other hand, organizations may espouse a “fairness case for diversity” wherein moral language is used to argue that diversity is justified because it is the right thing to do (Jones et al., 2013; van Dijk et al., 2012). This rationale is most consistent with the fairness and discrimination approaches to diversity management (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Companies that tout the fairness case hold diversity as a terminal value or believe that increasing diversity is in and of itself a desirable end (Olsen & Martins, 2012). The fairness case for diversity is based on deontology, an ethical theory most closely associated with the philosopher Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1796/2011; O’Leary & Weathington, 2006; van Dijk et al, 2012). The theory posits that actions are moral when they adhere to intuitive and universal moral laws such as “don’t steal, don’t lie, and don’t cheat” (Kant 1796/2011). Increasing diversity is seen as the right thing to do because it can ensure fairness between groups and reduce discrimination, which is a universally

and evolutionarily based moral law (Folger, 2001; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Rupp & Aquino, 2009). Deontology differs from utilitarianism, the basis of moral understanding for the business case, in that moral behavior results from the action that a person takes rather than the consequences of that action (van Dijk et al, 2012). Thus, the fairness case for diversity is based on deontic logic because it emphasizes the intrinsic morality of increasing diversity as the most important reason for organizations to value diversity.

There is disagreement among scholars about which rationale for diversity is most effective at eliciting support for diversity. Proponents of the business rationale for diversity argue that framing diversity in an instrumental manner gives legitimacy to diversity issues by more clearly associating it with business objectives (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Sonenshein 2006). Thus, managers, who are thought to think primarily about maximizing profit for shareholders, will be motivated to take action to support diversity and reduce bias within the company because they can see value in diversity. Furthermore, the business case is believed to appeal to majority group members, who are often resistant to diversity and inclusion initiatives, by demonstrating how they contribute to and benefit from diversity within the organization (Dover et al., 2016; Hurd & Plaut, 2017).

However, proponents of the fairness case note that valuing diversity for instrumental reasons is problematic because it may impede social justice in several ways. First, the business case may undermine efforts to bring about equality by fundamentally altering how people define diversity (Edelman et al., 2001; Trawalter et al., 2016; Unzueta & Knowles, 2014). Rather than solely focusing on characteristics that are defined by status and power differentials (e.g., race), scholars theorize that the business case defines diversity as any dimension of difference that may impact efficiency and profitability. Such a reframing of diversity is harmful because it ignores

the historical context of marginalization and discrimination that some groups have had to endure (Linnehan & Konrad, 1999; Noon, 2007). Further, if everyone contributes equally to diversity then people may be less supportive of organizational diversity and inclusion initiatives that specifically provide support and opportunities to marginalized workers (Akinola, 2020; Unzueta et al., 2012).

Second, the business case could hinder diversity efforts by negatively affecting perceptions of the organization's moral character (Kroger, 2018; Van Zant & Moore, 2015). Researchers have argued that the business case signals an inauthentic commitment to diversity (Jones et al., 2013). Given that some of the defining features of moral character are honesty and sincerity, organizations that espouse a business case may be seen as less moral (Goodwin et al., 2014). Perceptions of organizational morality play an important role in achieving a diverse and inclusive workplace because employees are more likely to support ethical programs, such as diversity and inclusion initiatives, and engage in ethical behavior, such as fair treatment in the hiring process, when they believe a company is moral (Mayer et al., 2010; Van Zant & Moore, 2015).

This research addresses these critiques of the business case by examining how diversity rationales influences support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and hiring evaluations indirectly through diversity definitions and perceptions of an organization's morality. Next, I will discuss how diversity rationales influence diversity definitions and how diluted definitions of diversity may subsequently have negative implications for support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and hiring evaluations.

Diversity Rationales & Diluted Definitions of Diversity

It is often assumed that everyone has a shared understanding of the term “diversity” and that it describes an objective feature of groups. There are, in fact, some consistencies in how individuals define diversity. For example, individuals generally associate diversity with people of color (e.g., Black, Latinx, and Asian people) more than White people (Unzueta & Binning, 2010). Other than this point of consensus, however, there is little agreement about the term diversity. Previous research demonstrates that diversity is highly contested and subjective because it is often influenced by one’s experiences and motivations. For instance, people of color perceive more diversity when a group includes members of their own racial in-group rather than members of other racial minority groups (Bauman et al., 2014). Other work finds that White people construe diversity to entail numerical representation *or* social acceptance of people of color within a group while people of color interpret diversity to include *both* numerical representation and social acceptance (Chen & Hamilton, 2015).

Whereas quantitative studies, such as the ones described above, have focused on what factors contribute to individuals’ perceptions of diversity, qualitative research has focused on how individuals talk about diversity. In their in-depth interviews of people from various metropolitan cities, Bell and Hartmann (2007) found that people responded positively to the concept of diversity, but their understandings of the term were not well developed and full of contradictions. Specifically, people tended to define diversity in broad, abstract, and universal terms that included a wide range of dimensions (e.g., race, religion, parenting style, education, situations, ideas), but the examples they used to talk about diversity most often referenced encounters that they had with individuals from different racial and cultural backgrounds (Bell & Hartmann, 2007). Additionally, respondents were unable to articulate how issues of social

inequality and diversity are related to one another, suggesting that these two concepts are separate issues among laypeople (Bell & Hartmann, 2007).

These studies highlight the ambiguous and subjective nature of diversity among lay people. Whereas some individuals define diversity in broad abstract terms and consider all the ways in which people vary, others prioritize demographic differences in their definitions of diversity. Though it is still unclear why there are differences in how people define diversity, researchers have just begun to uncover some of the individual factors that best predict how people construe diversity, such as race. Building on this work, I propose that people's definitions of diversity may be shaped by contextual cues offered through diversity rationales. Specifically, I expect that compared to a fairness rationale, exposure to a business rationale for diversity will cause people to define diversity less in terms of legally protected categories and demographic characteristics that are marked by power differentials and inequality (equality-focused diversity definition) and more in terms of skills and other individual characteristics (managerial-focused definition). See Figure 2, H1a.

Different beliefs about why diversity is important may lead to different definitions of diversity. Organizations with a fairness rationale for diversity believe that increasing diversity is important because it ensures equality. Thus, definitions of diversity that stem from a fairness rationale are rooted in moral and social justice ideals of equality, focus on power relations between groups, and consider the historical context of discrimination and oppression of certain groups within the workplace (Linnehan & Konrad, 1999; Noon, 2007). Fairness-based understandings of diversity “embrace a moral ideal that groups of citizens who have been subject to past discrimination are now entitled to special protection against any further discrimination and to fair opportunity in employment” (Edelman et al., 2001, p. 1616). Thus, exposure to a

fairness rationale should cause individuals to adopt an equality-focused definition of diversity and define diversity as heterogeneity in demographic characteristics that are protected by law or are marked by power differentials and inequality (e.g., people of color, women, and LGBTQ individuals).

In contrast, organizations with a business rationale believe that increasing diversity is crucial for business success. Thus, conceptualizations of diversity that are rooted in the business case emphasizes a managerial understanding of diversity that focuses on productivity. The underlying logic of the business case is that demographic diversity in terms of race and gender leads to better performance because these teams have access to a wider range of perspectives, skill sets, and knowledge (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Consequently, the profit maximizing benefits of diversity are not only restricted to demographic differences but extend to other dimensions of difference that may increase the diversity of informational resources on a team (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998) That is, diversity on any individual difference that might be task-relevant could produce similar positive effects on team performance. Based on this reasoning, exposure to the business case should cause individuals to adopt a definition of diversity that encapsulates a wide range of dimensions that may impact efficiency and profitability, such as area of expertise or skills, (Unzueta & Knowles, 2014). Borrowing from Linnehan and Konrad (1999), I term the phenomenon of broadening the meaning of diversity to include any individual difference, the *dilution of diversity* and posit that a business rationale for diversity will lead to a more diluted definition of diversity.

In support of this argument, Edelman et al. (2001) coded and analyzed a sample of 286 professional management articles about diversity published between 1975 and 1996 and found that when authors advocated for the business case, they were also more likely to discuss diversity

as heterogeneity in skills and other individual difference (diluted definition of diversity). Specifically, between 10-23% of articles mention diversity based on attitudes, geography, level or function within the organization, training or educational background, or communication style (Edelman et al., 2001). Surprisingly, diversity explicitly included White people and men in over 10% of the articles (Edelman et al., 2001).

Edelman and colleagues' (2001) findings provide correlational data to suggest a linkage between a business rationale and the dilution of diversity. However, virtually no research has empirically demonstrated that presenting individuals with a business rationale causes their own definition of diversity to become diluted. In the only study of its kind, Trawalter et al. (2016) randomly assigned individuals to read a statement that framed diversity as either good, fair, or important. These framings are conceptually like the business rationale, moral rationale, and no rationale in the current study. Participants were asked to list characteristics that they associate with diversity aside from characteristics protected by law. The researchers found that compared to those who read the "diversity is fair" frame, those who read the "diversity is good" frame were significantly more likely to associate other characteristics aside from legally protected groups with diversity (Trawalter et al., 2016). Additionally, when they replicated the study with a control condition that framed diversity as important, they found that participants exposed to the control condition were no more or less likely to list other characteristics of diversity than participants exposed to the "diversity is good" condition (Trawalter et al., 2016). Based on these findings, the authors argue for the idea that people's definitions of diversity tend to naturally include a wide range of characteristics (diluted diversity definition) and the "diversity is fair" frame restricts individuals diversity definition to only include legally protected categories and other characteristics along which people can experience marginalization.

Despite Trawalter and colleagues' (2016) strong evidence that a business rationale for diversity causes individuals to generate diluted diversity definitions compared to a fairness rationale, pressing questions remain about the role that other factors play in determining individuals' definitions of diversity. Thus, my research replicates and extends their study to consider how individual differences interact with diversity rationales to influence individuals' definitions of diversity. As mentioned previously, scholars find that individuals construe diversity according to their motivations. For example, Unzueta et al. (2012) demonstrated that individuals' motivations to enhance or attenuate racial hierarchy determined whether they construed diversity as equality-focused or managerial-focused. In a similar way, the motivation to be colorblind with regards to race may be relevant to how individuals define diversity when presented with different rationales for diversity.

Colorblindness and Diversity Definitions

Colorblindness describes a racial ideology where minimizing or ignoring group differences, particularly race, and instead focusing on the sameness or uniqueness of everyone is believed to be the best way to achieve equality (Apfelbaum et al., 2012; Block, 2014; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Neville et al., 2013; Plaut et al., 2018). These colorblind sentiments are reflected in popular phrases such as "I don't see race; I just see people" or "We all bleed red" (Bonilla-Silva, 2018). White people tend to endorse colorblindness more than people of color because it allows them to maintain an egalitarian self-image (Neville et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2007). Though colorblind individuals believe that they are non-prejudiced and treat people equally, numerous studies have shown that colorblind individuals tend to behave in more biased ways (Offerman et al., 2014; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). White people who held colorblind racial attitudes engaged in more interpersonal discrimination during an interracial interaction, such as increased

social distance and other negative non-verbal behaviors (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). Furthermore, teachers who endorse colorblindness have been shown to engage in unequal treatment towards Black and White students in school settings (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). Though it has yet to be examined, I believe that exposure to a business rationale for diversity may lead to more diluted definitions of diversity among individuals high in colorblindness because it provides them with the opportunity to fulfill their motivations to downplay the importance of race and instead emphasize the uniqueness of everyone (see Figure 2, H2).

Consequences of Diluted Diversity Definitions

Scholars disagree about how diluted diversity definitions influence diversity behaviors, such as support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and fairly evaluating minority candidates. Proponents of the business case assert that this expanded definition of diversity is beneficial for increasing diversity behaviors because it reduces feelings of exclusion among majority group members (Jansen et al., 2015; Stevens et al., 2008). For example, White people who were exposed to an all-inclusive multicultural message, a diversity approach that explicitly includes majority groups, felt more included (Plaut et al., 2011), which in turn, increased their support for organizational diversity initiatives (Jansen et al., 2015). Further, in the context of diversity training, broadening the definition of diversity can give latitude for any personally relevant issues to be discussed and thus make training more palatable to all participants (Roberson et al., 2003) and reduce backlash (Mobley & Payne, 1992).

However, critical diversity scholars have declared that diluted diversity definitions have the potential to undermine diversity efforts by diluting its original intent to remedy inequality and ensure fairness (Akinola et al, 2020; Linnenhan & Konrad; Noon, 2007; Unzueta & Knowles, 2012; Zanoni & Janssens, 2004; Zannoni et al., 2010). Diluted definitions of diversity

trivialize the significance of social identity and the role that it plays in determining employment opportunities and outcomes by equating it with other characteristics (e.g., personality, work style) that are not as consequential or associated with power/status differentials (Linnehan & Konrad, 1999; Noon, 2007). Furthermore, if everyone contributes equally to diversity and the historical context of exclusion and oppression is not considered, it becomes unclear why policies and initiatives that aim to increase the representation of individuals from marginalized groups are needed (McCall et al., 2017; Scarborough et al, 2019). Thus, diluted definitions of diversity may shift diversity discourse away from marginalized groups and deflect attention from policies that help marginalized groups and toward policies that help majority groups (Akinola et al., 2020).

I stand with critical diversity scholars and expect that diluted diversity definitions may make individuals less supportive of identity-conscious organizational diversity and inclusion initiatives because they only focus on improving access and opportunities for marginalized groups like people of color and women (see Figure 3, H4). In support of this claim, one study found that when anti-egalitarian individuals were exposed to a racially homogenous but occupationally heterogenous organization they were less likely to support affirmative action policies because they had construed diversity in a managerial-focused manner to include occupational diversity (Unzueta et al., 2012). Additionally, Akinola et al. (2020) found that organizations with diluted diversity definitions employed fewer women and people of color than organizations with equality-focused definitions of diversity that focused on marginalized groups, suggesting that their diversity and inclusion initiatives were not as effective. More generally, these studies demonstrate that diluted diversity definitions may contribute to the reproduction of inequality in organizations by helping companies create an illusion of diversity while simultaneously remaining disproportionately White and male.

Racial Prejudice and Diversity Definitions

Individuals' diversity definitions may also interact with their levels of racial prejudice to predict their support for organizational diversity and inclusion initiatives. The justification-suppression model (JSM) of prejudice is a theory that attempts to explain the factors that determine when prejudice is expressed (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003). According to the theory, individual's genuine prejudices are rarely expressed and instead are "modified and manipulated to meet social and personal goals" through two processes known as suppression and justification (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003, p. 416). Suppression refers to an "externally or internally motivated attempt to reduce the expression or awareness of prejudice" and it requires sustained attention and effort (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003, p. 420). Inclusive social norms and egalitarian values and beliefs are some reasons why individuals suppress their prejudicial attitudes (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003). The opposing process, justification, is defined as "any psychological or social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice without suffering external or internal sanction" (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003, p. 425). Ambiguous social situations are one of many factors that facilitate the justification of prejudice. For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) found that White participants were equally likely to recommend Black and White candidates for a job position when they were clearly qualified or unqualified for the position. However, they discriminated against Black candidates relative to White candidates when both candidates' qualifications for the position were ambiguous.

Similarly, Akinola and colleagues (2020) suggest that diluted diversity definitions may be ambiguous because it is unclear which type of diversity should be prioritized or is most valued. Following this logic, I argue that diluted diversity definitions may act as a type of justification that allows individuals to express their prejudice. In contrast, equality-focused diversity

definitions leave no room for interpretation because only groups who have suffered from unfair treatment and exclusion are included as a form of diversity. Thus, I predict that among individuals high in prejudice, the more diluted their definitions of diversity become the less supportive they will be of diversity and inclusion initiatives that target marginalized groups. However, I expect that among individuals low in racial prejudice, their support for diversity and inclusion initiatives will not be as influenced by how they define diversity (see Figure 3, H6a).

Diluted definitions of diversity may also justify expressions of prejudice in the context of hiring (see Figure 4, H6b). For example, Ho (2013) demonstrated that individuals' levels of anti-egalitarian sentiment influenced the relationship between a company's diversity definition and hiring evaluations. Specifically, when individuals were exposed to a company's diluted definition of diversity, people high in anti-egalitarianism rated a Black candidate poorly compared to a White candidate. However, when individuals were exposed to a company with an equality-focused definition of diversity, people's anti-egalitarianism sentiment did not influence their ratings of the Black candidate relative to the White candidate. Thus, diluted definitions of diversity may pose a barrier to achieving a diverse and inclusive organization because they allow individuals' racial prejudice to seep into the selection process, affect their decision-making, and unfairly disadvantage candidates from marginalized groups.

In sum, the budding research on diversity rationales has begun to establish that a business rationale for diversity compared to a fairness rationale leads to a more diluted definition of diversity. Importantly, scholars argue that diluted diversity definitions are associated with reduced support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and, in conjunction with anti-egalitarianism, poor hiring evaluations for a Black applicant. I plan to replicate and extend these findings by predicting that diversity rationales are indirectly related to reduced support for

diversity and inclusion initiatives through diluted diversity definitions (see Figure 3, H4). In addition, I expect that this indirect effect will be moderated by both colorblindness and racial prejudice (see Figure 3, H6a). Lastly, I predict that the indirect effect of diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through diversity definitions will be moderated by colorblindness, applicant race, and racial prejudice (see Figure 4, H6b). Next, I will discuss how diversity rationales may influence perceptions of the organization's morality and consequences for pro-diversity behavior.

Diversity Rationales & Perceived Organizational Morality

The way that organizations communicate about diversity is important because it can reflect information about their moral character. Moral character, “being benevolent to people in ways that facilitate correct and principled relations with them” (Brambilla & Leach, 2014, p. 398) is one of three dimensions that form the basis for all our social judgments about individuals and groups (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Fiske et al., 2007). Qualities like friendliness, kindness, trustworthiness, and sincerity are all expressions of one's moral character (Leach et al., 2007; Goodwin et al., 2014). Studies consistently show that perceptions of morality are not only important in the formation of impressions of others, but also best predict evaluations of individuals and groups, including organizations (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Fiske et al., 2007; Goodwin et al. 2014; Leach et al., 2007; Pagliaro et al., 2013; Van Proojen & Ellemers. 2015). For example, when participants were asked to select traits that would help them best form an impression of a stranger, they were more interested in learning about traits that spoke to the stranger's morality, rather than their sociability, or competence (Brambilla, et al., 2012). Additionally, Van Proojen and Ellemers (2015) found that prospective employees rated the morality of a team/organization as more important than its competence. Moreover, prospective

employees were more attracted to teams and organizations that were highly moral but incompetent than those that were immoral but highly competent (Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015). Taken together, these results suggest that people believe that moral character is most diagnostic of individuals and groups, so they are highly motivated to acquire moral information about them. As such, individuals are constantly searching for cues to moral character (Uhlman et al., 2015).

One way that organizations can signal their moral character to outsiders and employees is through the types of activities they engage in. Researchers have theorized that corporate social responsibility (CSR), “the degree to which an organization shows concern with the broader impact of its activities, on its employees as well as on the community and the environment in which these activities take place,” signals the ethical nature of an organization (Ellemers et al., 2011, p. 99; Zerbini, 2015). Indeed, the more employees perceive that an organization engages in CSR, such as diversity and inclusion efforts, the more they believe that the organization is moral (Ellemers et al., 2011). However, organizations may engage in moral actions for non-moral reasons, so additional information about organizational intentions for engaging in CSR efforts may also factor into perceptions of morality (Knobe, 2003; Uhlman et al., 2015). More specifically, Van Zant and Moore (2015) argue that leaders’ rationales for their behaviors leak information about their moral character. Drawing on this reasoning, organizational rationales for diversity could similarly signal information about its moral character. In line with this hypothesis, Jones et al. (2013) posit that a fairness rationale could communicate a genuine, wholehearted, and sincere commitment to diversity, which others have noted is an ideal approach to diversity management (Cox, 1991). In contrast, business rationales that focus on positive outcomes for the company might signal that the organization is self-serving and disingenuous. In

fact, whether an opinion is based on moral or pragmatic concerns has important implications for the speaker's perceived commitment and authenticity. Compared to speakers who ground their opinions in consequentialist arguments, speakers who ground their opinions in deontological arguments are perceived to be more committed to the issue and authentic because their opinions appear to be more based in moral convictions and concerns (Kreps & Monin, 2014). These perceptions correspond to reality. Individuals with strong moral convictions are more deeply committed to maintaining their positions and acting according to their beliefs, even when it is costly (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka et al., 2005; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

Given that honesty, trustworthiness, and sincerity are key characteristics of good moral character, organizations that espouse a fairness rationale for diversity may be perceived to be more moral than those who espouse a business rationale (see Figure 2, H1b) (Goodwin et al., 2014). Indeed, Kroger (2018) demonstrated that organizations that adopt a moral rationale for diversity are perceived to be more moral than organizations that use a business rationale. Similarly, leaders who framed company policies in moral terms versus pragmatic terms were perceived to have greater moral character (Van Zant & Moore, 2015). In contrast, Hafenbradl and Waeger (2019) discovered that CEOs that employed a business frame for CSR activities were judged to be equally moral as CEOs that employed a moral frame. The researchers may have found disparate results because they measured perceived morality differently from the other two studies. While Kroger (2018) and Van Zant and Moore (2015) had participants rate organizations and leaders on traits that indicate morality such as honesty, trustworthiness, and sincerity, Hafenbradl and Waeger (2019) asked participants to rate the extent to which the CEO was "moral" and "ethical." In keeping with the first two studies, I will assess organizational

morality with a list of traits because it is a more precise operationalization that leaves less room for interpretation from participants.

Egalitarianism and Perceived Organizational Morality

In addition to the organization's rationale for diversity, individuals' own attitudes and values about what is morally wrong or right may interact with message frames to influence perceptions of organizational morality. For example, research finds that people have positive evaluations of others who have similar beliefs, moral values, or ideological stances and strong negative evaluations of individuals who do not share their moral convictions (Byrne, 1969; Chambers et al., 2013; Skitka, 2010; Snijders & Keren, 2001). In the context of diversity, attitudes that reflect beliefs about the inappropriateness of inequality, such as egalitarianism, may be especially relevant for determining the extent to which individuals will evaluate organizations with fairness rationales for diversity positively. One common indicator of egalitarian attitudes is social dominance orientation (SDO), defined as an "individual's preference for group-based hierarchy and inequality" (Ho et al., 2012, p. 584; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius et al., 1996). Though SDO was originally thought to reflect one unitary construct, recent work suggests that it is multidimensional consisting of two complementary constructs coined SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E) (Ho et al., 2012). According to Ho and colleagues (2012) whereas SDO-D indicates support for group-based dominance and oppression and predicts aggressive intergroup attitudes, SDO-E indicates opposition to group-based equality and better predicts subtle anti-egalitarian attitudes such as anti-affirmative action sentiments. Given the strong taboos against explicit prejudice and overt oppression that have evolved within the U.S., scholars have argued that the SDO-E subfactor may be a more active and potent dimension of SDO (Ho et al., 2012). Therefore, I expect that individuals who are egalitarian will perceive that

an organization is especially moral when they use a fairness rationale for diversity compared to a business rationale because a fairness rationale indicates that the organization shares similar egalitarian moral values (see Figure 2, H3).

Consequences of Perceived Organizational Morality

As mentioned previously, perceptions of morality are important because they drive the positive evaluations of groups. Further, researchers have suggested that perceptions of morality may also have positive consequences for the speaker's persuasiveness (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Lowe et al., 1996). In particular, Kreps and Monin (2011) contend that highly moral leaders may be perceived as more confident, because moralization of an issue implies a high degree of certainty, and a sense of confidence may increase persuasiveness (Price & Stone, 2004). Recent findings lend some support to this hypothesis; Van Zant and Moore (2015) found that leaders who used moral frames elicited more support for their proposed policies than those who used pragmatic frames across a variety of scenarios. This effect was explained by the perception that leaders who espouse moral rationales possess greater moral character. Similarly, Halevy et al., (2020) found that greater perceptions of leaders and organizations as moral, just, and fair were associated with increased support for their proposed policies. Applying these findings to the context of diversity and inclusion, I argue that the perceived morality of an organization will be positively related to support for proposed diversity policies (see Figure 3, H5a).

In addition to influencing support for organizational diversity policies, perceived organizational morality may also predict hiring evaluations of a Black versus White job applicant. Though no study to my knowledge has directly tested this relationship, findings from the literature on ethical leadership and ethical climate can be used to understand the logic behind this relationship. Studies consistently show that employees who work in an organization where

ethical reasoning and behavior is perceived to be the norm or are supervised by a leader who demonstrates and promotes ethical conduct are less likely to engage in unethical behavior (Mayer et al., 2009; Mayer et al., 2010). The behavioral ethics literature typically draws on social information processing theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) to explain the process by which ethical climates and leaders influence employee behavior (Mayer et al., 2010). The theory states that individuals use social cues in their environment, such as policies, practices, procedures, and leaders' opinions and behaviors, to help them develop expectations about appropriate behavior in that setting (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). In the context of diversity rationales, I argue that like an organization's ethical climate and leadership, perceptions of organizational morality are a powerful cue that will shape expectations about organizational norms for unethical behavior. Specifically, because individuals believe that a moral organization is guided by norms that do not tolerate unethical behavior, and since people typically behave in a manner that is consistent with their norm perceptions (Rousseau, 1990), I expect that people may be less likely to engage in unethical behavior, such as anti-Black hiring discrimination when they perceive their organization to be more moral (see Figure 4, H5b).

Racial Prejudice and Perceived Organizational Morality

Perceptions of organizational morality may also interact with individuals' levels of racial prejudice to predict their support for diversity and hiring evaluations of a Black versus White job applicant. As mentioned previously, the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM: Crandall & Eshelman, 2003) posits that the expression of prejudice is dependent upon justification factors that release prejudice, such as stereotypes, and suppression factors that restrain prejudice, like egalitarian social norms. I argue that perceived organizational morality may act as a suppression factor that inhibits the expression of prejudice because it signals the

extent to which the organization and its employees abide by ethical social norms. Thus, the perceived social norms of an organization should have more of an influence on the diversity behaviors of individuals who are high in prejudice (Crandall et al., 2002). Specifically, I predict that greater perceptions of organizational morality will be related to greater support for diversity and less anti-Black hiring discrimination, especially among individuals who have high levels of racial prejudice. I also expect that among individuals who have low levels of racial prejudice, the relationship between perceived organizational morality and support for diversity and anti-Black hiring discrimination will be weaker because these individuals are already motivated to act in an egalitarian manner and so their diversity behaviors will be less influenced by perceived social norms (see Figure 3, H7a and Figure 4, H7b).

In conclusion, research has established the importance of morality for individuals and organizations. Although many CSR scholars study how organizations signal their moral character, few have examined diversity rationales as a source of morality for organizations. Additionally, none have considered how perceptions of morality may differ based on egalitarian beliefs. Further, both the business ethics literature and the JSM note the importance of social norms for reducing unethical behaviors and prejudicial attitudes, but little research has tested perceived organizational morality as a social norm that might suppress prejudice and reduce unethical behavior (e.g., hiring discrimination). I address these gaps and bridge the disparate literatures on diversity, business ethics, and prejudice by predicting that perceived organizational morality will mediate the relationships between diversity rationales and: a) support for diversity and inclusion initiatives, and b) anti-Black hiring discrimination (see Figure 3, H5a and Figure 4, H5b). Further, I expect that these indirect effects will be moderated by egalitarianism, racial prejudice, and applicant race (see Figure 3, H7a and Figure 4, H7b)

Chapter 2 Overview & Hypotheses

The purpose of this dissertation research is to test how organizational diversity rationales influence support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and anti-Black hiring discrimination through their impact on individuals' cognitions about diversity and perceptions of the organization. Additionally, I investigate whether individual differences in diversity-related attitudes, specifically colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice, affect the magnitude of these relationships (see Figure 1). I explore these associations across two experimental studies. In both studies, the sample consists of White people with management experience, because research indicates that a) White people are most resistant to organizational diversity efforts, b) White people are more likely to be managers, and c) managerial support is crucial to the success of diversity management policies and initiatives (Avery, 2011; Dover et al., 2016; Jones, 2017; Lu et al., 2020). In Study 1, I examine whether diversity rationales influence individuals' diversity definitions and perceptions of an organization's moral character. Additionally, I test colorblindness as a moderator of the diversity rationale and diversity definition relationship and egalitarianism as moderator of the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality (see Figure 2). Study 2 determines whether diversity rationales are indirectly related to support for diversity and inclusion initiatives and anti-Black hiring discrimination through diluted diversity definitions and perceived organizational morality (see Figure 3 & 4). I also examine whether these indirect effects are moderated by colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice.

Hypotheses

Across these two studies, I test seven hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a. Compared to individuals who are exposed to a fairness or control rationale for diversity, individuals exposed to a business rationale for diversity will have a more diluted definition of diversity (i.e., endorse a more managerial-focused diversity definition relative to an equality-focused definition). (Tested in Study 1)

Hypothesis 1b. Compared to individuals who are exposed to a business rationale for diversity, individuals exposed to a fairness or control rationale for diversity will perceive the organization to be more moral. (Tested in Study 1)

Hypothesis 2. Colorblind racial attitudes will moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and diversity definitions. Specifically, compared to individuals who are low in colorblindness, individuals who are high in colorblindness will have a more diluted definition of diversity in the business rationale condition than in the fairness and control rationale conditions. (Tested in Study 1)

Hypothesis 3. Egalitarian attitudes will moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. Specifically, compared to individuals who are low in egalitarianism, individuals who are high in egalitarianism will perceive the organization to be more moral in the fairness and control rationale conditions than in the business rationale condition. (Tested in Study 1)

Hypothesis 4. Individuals' diversity definitions will mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and support for diversity and inclusion initiatives. Specifically, individuals exposed to a business rationale for diversity will have a more diluted definition of diversity than

those exposed to a fairness or control rationale, which will, in turn, be associated with decreased support for diversity and inclusion initiatives. (Tested in Study 2)

Hypothesis 5a. Perceived organizational morality will mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and support for diversity and inclusion initiatives. Specifically, individuals exposed to a fairness or control rationale for diversity will perceive the organization to be more moral than those exposed to a business rationale for diversity, which will, in turn, be associated with increased support for diversity and inclusion initiatives. (Tested in Study 2)

Hypothesis 5b. Applicant race will moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality. Specifically, individuals exposed to a fairness or control rationale for diversity will perceive the organization to be more moral than those exposed to a business rationale for diversity, which will, in turn, be associated with less anti-Black hiring discrimination as indicated by more positive evaluations and pay for the Black applicant but not the White applicant. (Tested in Study 2)

Hypothesis 6a. Colorblindness and racial prejudice will moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on support for diversity and inclusion initiatives through diversity definitions. Specifically, compared to the fairness and control rationale conditions, the business rationale condition will lead to a more diluted definition of diversity especially among individuals who are high in colorblindness. A diluted definition of diversity will, in turn, be associated with reduced support for diversity and inclusion initiatives, especially among individuals who are high in racial prejudice. (Tested in Study 2)

Hypothesis 6b. Colorblindness, applicant race, and racial prejudice will moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through diversity definitions. Specifically, compared to the fairness and control rationale conditions, the business

rationale condition will lead to a more diluted definition of diversity, especially among individuals who are high in colorblindness. A diluted definition of diversity will, in turn, be associated with increased anti-Black hiring discrimination, especially among individuals who are high in racial prejudice. (Tested in Study 2)

Hypothesis 7a. Egalitarianism and racial prejudice will moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on support for diversity and inclusion initiatives through perceived organizational morality. Specifically, compared to the business rationale condition, the fairness and control rationale conditions will lead to increased perceptions of organizational morality, especially among individuals who are high in egalitarianism. Perceived organizational morality will, in turn, be associated with increased support for diversity and inclusion initiatives, especially among individuals who are high in racial prejudice. (Tested in Study 2)

Hypothesis 7b. Egalitarianism, applicant race, and racial prejudice will moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality. Specifically, compared to the business rationale condition, the fairness and control rationale conditions will lead to increased perceptions of organizational morality, especially among individuals who are high in egalitarianism. Perceived organizational morality will, in turn, be associated with less anti-Black hiring discrimination, especially among individuals who are high in racial prejudice. (Tested in Study 2)

Given the conceptual similarities between colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice (Yogeeswaran et al., 2017; Levin et al, 2012; Mazzocco et al., 2012), I also conducted exploratory analyses to determine whether these variables moderate other paths in the models.

Chapter 3 Study 1

Method

Participants

Due to the lack of research on this topic, it was difficult to make an educated guess about expected effect sizes, which are necessary to calculate sample size. So, I calculated power for a small effect size. Using a small effect size for linear regression ($f^2 = .02$), G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that I would need a total sample size of 485 participants to have 80% power to find an effect at $p < .05$.

Participants were 500 White people with management experience recruited from Prolific Academic, an online survey platform created by academics in the UK for the sole purpose of conducting academic research (Peer et al., 2017). Prolific is very similar to Amazon's MTurk in that researchers post studies that participants take in exchange for payment. However, researchers have described Prolific participants as less familiar with research tasks and more honest than MTurk samples, while providing quality data (Peer et al., 2017; Pittman and Sheehan, 2016). To be eligible to complete the survey, participants had to be 18 years old or older, currently reside in the USA, speak English, and be a full-time employee. Since research shows that White people overwhelmingly hold leadership positions and managers' support for diversity is crucial to the success of diversity within organizations (Avery, 2011; Jones, 2017; Lu et al., 2020), participants also had to self-identify as White and have some experience supervising others.

The final sample consisted of 489 participants because 11 people failed the attention check (please select “strongly disagree”). Participants ranged in age from 19 years old to 77 years old with an average age of 37.83 years ($SD = 9.87$). The gender breakdown of the sample was as follows: 38.2% identified as women, 60.5% identified as men, and 1.2% identified as trans, nonbinary, or genderqueer. The sample was mostly straight/heterosexual, with 86.3% identifying as such, 6.7% identified as bisexual, 1.6% identified as gay, 1.4% identified as pansexual, 1.2% identified as lesbian, 1.2% identified as asexual, 1.0% identified as queer, 0.2% identified with another sexual orientation, and 0.2% preferred not to answer. In terms of job characteristics, 27.0% of participants had been working in their current position for 3-4 years and 32.0% had 7 or more years of experience supervising others. Regarding socioeconomic status, 22.0% of participants had a household income between \$100,000-\$149,999 and 44.0% of the sample reported obtaining a bachelor’s degree. See Table 1 for additional sample characteristics.

Procedure

The survey was 10 minutes long and administered via Qualtrics. After participants provided their consent and qualified for the survey, they read a cover story: “SMB International is a marketing firm operating in California that specializes in preparing technology products for the marketplace. They recently redesigned their website and are interested in your opinion of the website and impression of the company based on the website. We have programmed this survey to randomly select one page of their website for you to evaluate.” Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they viewed the organization’s diversity section of the website with its diversity statement, which either provided no rationale, a business rationale, or a fairness rationale for diversity. After reading the organization’s diversity statement, participants completed a manipulation check, measures of their diversity definition,

and rated the organization's morality. Lastly, they completed measures to assess their colorblind and egalitarian attitudes, social desirability tendencies, and demographic information. At the end of the survey, participants were debriefed, thanked, and compensated \$1.60 for their participation.

Measures

Diversity Rationale. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three diversity statements provided by the organization. In the *no rationale (control)* condition, the diversity statement communicated that the organization values diversity, but provided no rationale. In the *business rationale* condition, the diversity statement communicated that the organization values diversity for economic reasons. In the *fairness rationale* condition, the diversity statement communicated that the organization values diversity for moral reasons. Important information for each rationale was bolded as indicated below.

Control - No Rationale for Diversity. “We are passionate about creating an inclusive workplace that promotes and values diversity. Our dedication to diversity is driven by the belief that **diversity is important**. Hiring for diversity **has been one of our top priorities**. We have done a lot to achieve an inclusive and diverse workforce and are firmly committed to making continued progress. Diversity contributes to our organization's mission and commitments.”

Business Rationale for Diversity. “We are passionate about creating an inclusive workplace that promotes and values diversity. Our dedication to diversity is driven by the belief that **diversity simply makes good business sense**. Hiring for diversity **ensures that we employ individuals from different backgrounds to help fuel innovation and**

creative problem-solving. Diversity contributes to our organization’s mission **to be competitive and strengthens our commitment to financial success.**”

Fairness Rationale for Diversity. “We are passionate about creating an inclusive workplace that promotes and values diversity. Our dedication to diversity is driven by the belief that **diversity is simply the right thing to do.** Hiring for diversity **ensures that individuals from different backgrounds get similar opportunities.** Diversity contributes to our organization’s mission **to be fair and strengthens our commitment to equal opportunity.**”

Diversity Definition. Participant’s diversity definitions were measured in two ways, described below.

Diluted Diversity Definition (rated). The extent to which participants' definition of diversity was diluted was measured by creating a difference score from two items. One item assessed endorsement of an equality-focused diversity definition: "My definition of diversity focuses on representation among historically underrepresented groups such as ethnic minorities and women." The other item assessed endorsement of a managerial-focused diversity definition: "My definition of diversity focuses on representation among groups with different skills and abilities, such as individuals with different personalities and occupational backgrounds." Participants responded to both items on a scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The difference score was computed by subtracting participants’ equality-focused rating from their managerial-focused rating. Higher scores indicate greater endorsement of a managerial-focused definition relative to an equality-focused definition. The items were taken from Akinola et al. (2020).

Diluted Diversity Definition (coded). To measure how participants define diversity, they were asked to respond to the following prompt, “What do you think makes an organization

diverse? How might individuals in a diverse organization differ from one another? Please list five to ten ways that individuals might differ from one another in a diverse organization.” A research assistant and I individually coded each response by adding up the number of equality-focused categories (e.g., race, gender, SES) and adding up the number of managerial-focused categories (e.g., personality, expertise, work style). Next, we checked our coding against one another and reconciled any differences in coding with discussion.

To calculate how the extent to which participants’ definition of diversity was diluted, I divided the total number of managerial-focused categories listed by the sum of the total number of diversity categories (equality-focused categories and managerial-focused categories). For example, if a participant defined diversity as heterogeneity in race, gender, and personality, then their diversity definition score would be .33 (as calculated by the following: $1 / (1+2)$). The more managerial-focused categories participants listed relative to equality-focused categories, the greater their score was. This measure was taken from Akinola et al., 2020. For descriptive statistics regarding the diversity categories, refer to Table 2.

Perceived Organizational Morality. Drawing on research by Leach et al. (2007) and Van Zant and Moore (2015) the perceived morality of the organization was measured with six traits: *honest, sincere, trustworthy, caring, compassionate, and helpful*. Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*) how much each trait described the organization whose diversity policy they just read.

Egalitarianism. Participant’s egalitarian attitudes were measured using eight items from the SDO-Egalitarianism (E) subscale of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO₇; Ho et al., 2015). Sample items include statements such as “We should not push for group equality” (reverse-scored) and “We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.”

Participants responded to each item on a Likert scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Items were scored such that higher scores indicate more egalitarian attitudes. See Appendix A for the full scale.

Colorblindness. I assessed colorblindness with eight items, four of which were created by Knowles, Lowery, Chow, and Hogan (2009) and four of which were created for this study. An example item reads, “I wish people in this society would stop obsessing so much about race.” Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement on a Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Items were scored such that higher scores indicate more colorblind attitudes. See Appendix B for this scale.

Social Desirability. To assess social desirability, I used the thirteen-item short-form version (M-C Form C) of the Marlowe and Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) developed by Reynolds (1982). Sample items include “No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener” and “I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.” Participants responded to each statement with true or false. The Social Desirability Total was calculated by summing the number of questions that participants responded to in a socially desirable manner. See Appendix C for full scale.

Political Ideology. Participants' political leanings were assessed with one question, “how would you describe your political outlook?” They responded to this question on a scale of 1 (*very liberal*) to 7 (*very conservative*) with the midpoint being 4 (*moderate*).

Gender Status. To measure gender status, participants were asked “what is your gender?” Individuals who self-identified as “men” were coded as 0 and individuals who self-identified as “women, trans women, trans men, or nonbinary/genderqueer” were coded as 1.

Trans men and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals were included in the same group as women to reflect their marginalized status with regards to gender.

Personality. To help disguise the true purpose of the study, participants completed the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006), which is used to assess the Big Five personality traits. The mini-IPIP consists of 20 items (e.g., “I am the life of the party”) that asks participants to indicate the extent to which each statement generally describes themselves on a scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). These items were interspersed with items that measure colorblindness and egalitarianism. See Appendix D for the full scale.

Likeability. To help disguise the true purpose of the study, participants were asked items to indicate how much they liked the website and the company on a scale of 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*).

Preliminary Analyses

Table 3 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all study variables. See Table 4 for means and standard deviations by diversity rationale condition. All analyses were conducted in SPSS Version 27. Because the colorblindness measure included items that were created for this study in addition to previously validated items, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring and promax rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.894, above the recommended cutoff of 0.60, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, $\chi^2(28) = 1499.87, p < .001$. The eigenvalues and scree plot indicated that colorblindness was indeed one factor that accounted for 50% of the variance. Seven items had factor loadings greater than .60 and one item, “there is more that unites than divides us,” had a factor loading of .22. Given the low loading of the latter item, it was not retained as a part of the final scale.

Results

Hypothesis 1a predicted that individuals would have a more diluted definition of diversity in the business condition relative to the fairness and control conditions. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two univariate ANCOVAs with social desirability, political ideology, and gender status as the covariates. In the first model, diversity rationale condition predicted diluted diversity definition (rated) ($F(2, 483) = 4.87, p = 0.008$). See Table 5 for results. The analysis revealed that participants' diversity definitions were significantly more diluted in the business condition ($M = 0.46, SD = 0.15$) than in the fairness condition ($M = -0.15, SD = 0.16; p = 0.006$). In addition, participants' diversity definitions were significantly more diluted in the business condition than in the control condition ($M = -0.11, SD = 0.15; p = 0.009$). In the second model, diversity rationale condition did not predict diluted diversity definition (coded) ($F(2, 460) = 2.14, p = 0.119$). The results showed that there was no significant difference between the business ($M = 0.29, SD = 0.02$) and fairness ($M = 0.25, SD = 0.02; p = 0.115$) conditions and the business and control ($M = 0.24, SD = .02; p = 0.053$) conditions in regard to how diluted participants' definitions of diversity were¹. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was partially supported.

My second hypothesis, Hypothesis 1b, was that individuals would perceive the organization to be more moral in the fairness and control conditions relative to the business condition. I again ran a univariate ANCOVA with social desirability, political ideology, and gender status as the covariates; diversity rationale condition as the independent variable; and perceived organizational morality as the dependent variable. Diversity rationale condition predicted perceived organizational morality ($F(2, 483) = 3.45, p = 0.032$). The analysis revealed that perceptions of the organization's morality were significantly higher in the fairness condition

¹ When the control variables were not in the model, participant's diversity definitions were more diluted in the business condition than in the control condition (see Table 4).

($M = 3.69$, $SD = 0.07$) than in the business condition ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 0.07$; $p = 0.014$). However, the business condition and the control condition ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 0.07$; $p = 0.670$) did not differ in perceptions of organizational morality. Interestingly, the organization was perceived to be more moral in the fairness condition than in the control condition ($p = 0.042$). Therefore, Hypothesis 1b was partially supported.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that colorblindness would moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and diversity definitions. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two moderated multiple regressions using Model 1 in PROCESS Version 3.4 (Hayes, 2017). In both models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. Because diversity rationale condition is a multicategorical variable with three levels, I created two dummy codes with the business condition as the referent and used indicator coding to compare groups. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control), colorblindness (mean-centered), and their interactions were the independent variables and diluted diversity definition (rated) was the dependent variable. See Table 6 for regression results. The results revealed that although participants' colorblind sentiments predicted holding a more diluted diversity definition ($b = 0.37$, $p = 0.045$), there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on diluted diversity definition (rated) (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.08$, $p = 0.737$; business vs. control: $b = 0.15$, $p = 0.513$). The second model, which predicted diluted diversity definition (coded), also found that there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on diluted diversity definition (coded) (business vs. fairness: $b = 0.00$, $p = 0.963$; business vs. control: $b = 0.05$, $p = 0.106$). Thus, I did not find support for Hypothesis 2.

Given the theoretical and statistical associations between egalitarianism and colorblindness (Levin et al, 2012; Yogeeswaran, Davies, & Sibley, 2017), I conducted exploratory analyses to determine if egalitarianism, rather than colorblindness, moderated the relationship between diversity rationale condition and diversity definition (see Table 6) In the first moderated multiple regression model, social desirability, political ideology, and gender status were the controls; two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control), egalitarianism (mean-centered), and their interactions were the independent variables; and diluted diversity definition (rated) was the dependent variable. The results showed that although participants' egalitarian sentiments predicted holding a less diluted definition of diversity ($b = -0.89, p < 0.01$), there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and egalitarianism on diluted diversity definition (rated) (business vs. fairness: $b = 0.19, p = 0.447$; business vs. control: $b = 0.36, p = 0.131$). The results of the second model, which predicted diluted diversity definition (coded), indicated that there were no significant interactions between egalitarianism and diversity rationale condition on diluted diversity definition (coded) (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.00, p = 0.944$; business vs. control: $b = -0.02, p = 0.604$).

Hypothesis 3 expected that egalitarianism would moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. I again conducted a moderated multiple regression with social desirability, political ideology, and gender status as controls; two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control), egalitarianism (mean-centered), and their interactions were the independent variables; and perceived organizational morality was the dependent variable. See Table 7. The analysis indicated that although participants' egalitarian sentiments predicted greater perceptions of morality ($b = 0.48,$

$p < 0.01$), there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and egalitarianism on perceived organizational morality (business vs. fairness: $b = 0.07$, $p = 0.527$; business vs. control: $b = -0.14$, $p = 0.183$). Therefore, the results did not support Hypothesis 3.

I conducted an exploratory analysis to determine if colorblindness, rather than egalitarianism, moderated the relationship between diversity rationale condition and perceived organizational morality. In the moderated multiple regression model, social desirability, political ideology, and gender status were the controls; two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control), colorblindness (mean-centered), and their interactions were the independent variables; and perceived organizational morality was the dependent variable (see Table 7). The analysis indicated that there was not a significant interaction between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on perceived organizational morality comparing the business and fairness conditions ($b = -0.02$, $p = 0.883$), but there was a significant interaction with colorblindness comparing the business and control conditions ($b = 0.23$, $p = 0.031$). I conducted simple slopes analyses and probed the interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean of colorblindness. See Figure 5 for a graphical representation. The results showed that among people low in colorblindness, there was not a significant difference in perceived organizational morality between the business and control conditions ($b = -0.16$, $p = 0.271$). However, among people high in colorblindness, the organization was perceived to be significantly more moral in the control condition than in the business condition ($b = 0.28$, $p = 0.0458$).

Study 1 Discussion

The purpose of this study was to determine how different rationales for diversity influenced people's definitions of diversity and perceptions of the organization's morality. I also

aimed to test whether these relationships depended on people's levels of egalitarianism and colorblindness. Overall, I found some evidence that diversity rationales affect how individuals construe diversity and their perceptions of organizational morality. Specifically, a business rationale for diversity influenced the extent to which individuals' definition of diversity was diluted (included managerial-focused diversity relative to equality-focused diversity). In addition, when the organization employed a fairness rationale for diversity, it was perceived to be more moral than when it employed a business or no rationale for diversity. Although I did not find support for the hypothesized interactions between diversity rationales, egalitarianism, and colorblindness, exploratory analyses revealed that colorblindness moderated the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. See Figure 6 for an overall model of Study 1 results.

My first hypothesis was that a business rationale for diversity would cause a more diluted diversity definition relative to a fairness or no rationale for diversity. I found partial support for this hypothesis. When diluted diversity definition was measured as a rating, individuals held more diluted definitions of diversity (greater endorsement of a managerial-focused diversity definition relative to an equality-focused definition) when the organization used a business rationale for diversity than when it used a fairness or no rationale. However, above and beyond the controls, when diluted diversity definition was measured as a coded open-ended response, participants' definitions of diversity did not differ based on the type of rationale that the organization adopted. When the controls were not in the model, participants held a more diluted definition of diversity (coded) when they read a business rationale compared to no rationale for diversity. These results suggest that thinking about diversity as a business asset makes individuals more likely to construe diversity to mean heterogeneity in work-related skills and

abilities and other individual differences such as opinion and interests. The fact that diluted diversity definition (coded) was only significant without the controls could indicate that the control variables accounted for more of the variance in the coded measure than the rated measure. Another reason for these divergent results may be that the coded measure captures a broader range of diversity categories than the rated measure. While the rated managerial-focused item only mentions skills, personality, and occupational background, the coded managerial-focused category included diversity in opinion, geography, and interests.

The finding that a business rationale for diversity causes individuals to hold more diluted diversity definitions than a fairness rationale is consistent with the previous research on this topic, which has found correlational and experimental evidence that a business rationale for diversity leads individuals to generate a definition of diversity that is managerial-focused (Edelman et al, 2001; Trawalter et al., 2016). However, the pattern of results in this study comparing people's diversity definition when they viewed a business rationale versus no rationale is different than those reported by Trawalter and colleagues (2016), who found that both a business rationale and no rationale led to broader definitions of diversity than a fairness rationale. In the current study, the means for diluted diversity definition are more similar between the fairness rationale and no rationale conditions than between the business rationale and no rationale condition, suggesting that individuals' diversity definitions are naturally equality-focused and exposure to a business rationale broadens them to include managerial-focused categories. This challenges Trawalter's conclusion that people's definitions are naturally broad and exposure to a fairness rationale for diversity narrows them to solely focus on those categories associated with equality.

My second hypothesis, that the organization would be perceived as more moral when it espoused a fairness or control rationale for diversity than when it espoused a business rationale, was partially supported. Individuals rated the organization as more sincere, honest, trustworthy, caring, compassionate, and helpful when it used a fairness rationale than when it used a business or no rationale for diversity. These findings contradict Hafenbradl and Waeger (2019) who found that leaders who used a business frame for CSR were judged as similarly “moral” and “ethical” as leaders who used a moral frame. However, they bolster other studies which have found that organizations (and leaders) are perceived to be more moral (sincere, honest, trustworthy) when they use a moral rationale than when they use business rationale (Van Zant & Moore, 2015; Kroger, 2018). In addition, these results lend further support to the theory that rationales for a particular stance on an issue signal important information about the organization’s moral character (Van Zant & Moore, 2015; Jones et al., 2013). I also extend research on the perceptions of organizations who engage in CSR by examining how rationales for CSR, rather than the presence or absence of them, affect perceptions of the organization’s morality (Ellemers et al., 2011). The fact that individuals perceived the organization’s morality similarly in the business and control conditions indicates that when organizations do not give a rationale for their commitment to diversity, individuals may assume that the organization is primarily motivated by business reasons, such as protecting their business’ image by appearing unbiased and politically correct. Ironically, these results suggest that this may hurt the organization’s image by negatively affecting perceptions of their moral character.

My third and fourth hypotheses were that colorblindness would moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and diversity definitions and that egalitarianism would moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. Neither of these

hypotheses were supported. One potential reason that the interaction with colorblindness did not emerge could be that colorblindness can be construed in different ways depending on one's preference for hierarchy (Knowles et al., 2009); so, the interaction that I expected may only emerge among people who are anti-egalitarian. The interaction with egalitarianism may not have emerged because people, regardless of their egalitarian sentiment, might believe that a fairness rationale communicates a more sincere and authentic commitment to diversity, and this is reflected in their perceptions of the organization's morality; but this doesn't necessarily mean that they agree with the argument that the organization is making.

Although my predicted interactions were not supported, I did find that colorblindness moderated the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality, specifically comparing the business and control conditions. Regardless of the organization's diversity rationale, individuals who were low in colorblindness perceived the organization to be similarly moral. However, individuals who were high in colorblindness perceived the organization to be more moral when it did not have a rationale for diversity than when it utilized a business rationale for diversity. It is possible that a business rationale for diversity may cause the organization to seem less moral among people who would prefer to ignore group differences and promote sameness because it suggests that the organization not only acknowledges differences, but also believes that they are crucial to business success. So they may exaggerate the importance of differences in the everyday work context, by pigeonholing, or assigning employees to work on projects based on their social identities regardless of their interests or expertise (Bendick, Lou Egan, & Lanier, 2010). Importantly, these findings are not consistent with the popular assumption that a business rationale for diversity persuades skeptics; rather, a

business rationale hurts perceptions of the organization's moral character, even among people who are typically skeptical of diversity, such as those who are high in colorblindness.

Taken together, this study demonstrates that a business rationale for diversity causes people to endorse a diluted definition of diversity that construes diversity as including heterogeneity in work-related skills. Additionally, a fairness rationale improves perceptions of an organization's morality while a business rationale hurts perceptions of an organization's moral character, especially among those that support racial colorblindness. Although this study provides some evidence against the superiority of the business case for diversity, it is crucial to examine how these rationales indirectly affect support for D&I initiatives and hiring discrimination. Study 2 will examine these associations.

Chapter 4 Study 2

Method

Participants

I conducted a power analysis based on the results of Study 1 to determine how many participants were needed for Study 2. G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that I would need a total sample size of 1000 participants to have 80% power to detect a small effect ($f^2 = .01$) at $p < .05$.

Participants were 926 White full-time employees with management experience recruited from Prolific Academic. I was unable to recruit the desired number of participants in a timely manner because participants from Study 1 (and prior pilot testing of materials) were ineligible to participate in Study 2, leaving me with a smaller pool of potential participants that met the study requirements. Nineteen people failed the manipulation check and 23 people dropped out of the study before reaching the manipulation check. Of those who passed the manipulation check, 13 people failed the attention check and 50 dropped out of the study before reaching the attention check, so the final sample consisted of 821 participants.

Participants ranged in age from 19 years old to 75 years old with an average age of 38.13 years ($SD = 9.98$). The gender breakdown of the sample was as follows: 49.5% identified as women, 49% identified as men, and 1.2% identified as trans, nonbinary, or genderqueer. The sample was mostly straight/heterosexual, with 82.6% identifying as such, 8.2% identified as bisexual, 1.8% identified as gay, 1.2% identified as pansexual, 1.7% identified as lesbian, 2.7% identified as asexual, 0.9% identified as queer, 0.1% identified with another sexual orientation,

and 0.5% preferred not to answer. In terms of job characteristics, 25% of participants had been working in their current position for 7 or more years and 33% had 7 or more years of experience supervising others. Regarding socioeconomic status, 20% of participants reported a household income between \$100,000-1499,999 ($M = 8.09$, $SD = 2.88$) and 41% completed a bachelor's degree.

Procedure

The survey was 15 minutes long and administered via Qualtrics. The procedure for Study 2 was identical to Study 1, except that after completing the measure of perceived organizational morality, participants also completed measures of support for D&I initiatives, provided evaluations of a Black or White job applicant's resume, and responded to items that measured their levels of racial prejudice. The D&I initiatives and applicant resume were counterbalanced such that participants were randomly assigned to first see the D&I initiatives and then see the applicant resume or vice versa. Before the participants read the D&I initiatives they were told: "Please imagine that you are a manager at SMB International. They have asked you to help them evaluate several proposed company initiatives. Read about the initiatives below and indicate how much you favor each initiative." Before participants read the job applicant's resume they were told: "Please imagine that you are a manager at SMB International. SMB is in need of a public relations analyst and has asked you to help them make a hiring decision. Please examine the resume and provide your opinion of the applicant." Once they read the instructions for evaluating the resume, participants were randomly assigned to view either a Black or White job applicant's resume.

Measures

In addition to the measures described in Study 1 (diversity rationale, diluted diversity definition [coded], perceived organizational morality, egalitarianism, colorblindness, social desirability, political ideology, and gender status), Study 2 included an updated measure of diluted diversity definition (rated) and measures of participants' support for D&I initiatives, hiring evaluations, and racial prejudice.

Diluted Diversity Definition (rated). The extent to which participants' definition of diversity was diluted was measured by creating a difference score from eight items, updated from two items in Study 1. Four items assessed endorsement of an equality-focused diversity definition: “My definition of diversity focuses on representation among historically underrepresented groups.” The other four items assessed endorsement of a managerial-focused diversity definition: “My definition of diversity focuses on representation among groups with different skills.” Participants responded to all items on a scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Higher scores indicate greater endorsement of a managerial-focused definition relative to an equality-focused definition. The items were inspired by Akinola et al. (2020). See Appendix E for full-scale.

Racial Prejudice. Participants racial prejudice was measured using seven items from the Modern Racism scale (McConahay, 1986). Participants responded to items such as “Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States,” on a Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). See Appendix F for the full scale.

Support for D&I Initiatives. Participants read ten proposed company initiatives (see Appendix G for the full list of initiatives). Five of the initiatives, adapted from Bielby (2014), focused on diversity and inclusion such as “actively recruit racial minorities to apply for job

openings.” The other five initiatives were prosocial but were not diversity focused (e.g., “give local public schools a large discount on newly developed products, such as tablets and computers”). These initiatives were included to reduce demand characteristics and rule out the possibility that the manipulation increases support for all types of prosocial initiatives. I measured support for diversity and inclusion initiatives in two ways based on questions about the initiatives.

Endorsement. Participants indicated how strongly they favored each of the ten proposed initiatives on a scale of 1(*strongly oppose*) to 7 (*strongly favor*). Their mean endorsement of the five D&I initiatives served as a measure of their support.

Monetary. Participants were also told that the company has a total of \$25,000 to spend and they must decide how to allocate the money across these ten initiatives. The sum of the amount of money that they allocated to the five D&I initiatives was also a measure of their support.

Applicant Race. Participants were randomly assigned to view either a White or Black job applicant (see Appendix H and Appendix I). The resumes for both job applicants were identical except for the name and professional affiliation, which were meant to signal the job applicant’s race. In the Black job applicant condition, the applicant was named Lamar Washington and belonged to the Black Professionals Network. In the White job applicant condition, the applicant was named Greg Walsh and belonged to the California Professionals Network. Previous research has found that these first and last names are perceived to belong to Black and White individuals, respectively (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Gaddis, 2017).

Hiring evaluation. I assessed participants’ evaluation of the job applicant with a three-item measure adapted from Rudman and Glick (1999) and Derous et al., (2009). Participants

responded on a Likert scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) to the statements “I would recommend this applicant for hire,” “I would invite this applicant for a job interview,” and “I have a good impression of this applicant.”

Pay. I also measured hiring evaluation by asking participants “if this applicant were hired, how much would you recommend that we pay them?” Participants could respond on a scale from \$50,000 to \$100,000.

Preliminary Analyses

Table 9 depicts the means, standard deviation, correlations, and scale alphas for all study variables. All analyses were conducted in SPSS Version 27. I conducted two exploratory factor analyses. The first analysis was conducted on the eight colorblind items, using the same procedures as described in Study 1. I found similar results; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.90, far exceeding the recommended cutoff of 0.60 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, $\chi^2(28) = 2439.68, p < .001$. Inspection of the eigenvalues and scree plot showed that the colorblind scale had one factor that explained 44% of the variance. All items had loadings over .6 except for item eight (“there is more that unites than divides us”), which had a loading of .33. Given this result, item eight was again dropped from the colorblindness scale.

I conducted a second exploratory factor analysis on the eight diversity definition items since they were newly created for this study. I used principal axis factoring and promax as my extraction and rotation methods. The KMO was 0.81, indicating adequate sampling for factor analysis, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant, $\chi^2(28) = 2910.12, p < .001$. Examination of the eigenvalues and scree plot showed that the diversity definition items consisted of two factors: managerial-focused diversity and equality-focused diversity. The first

factor accounted for 34% of the variance and the second factor accounted for 26% of the variance. Item loadings ranged from .67-.88 and there were no cross-loading items, so all items were retained and used to construct the diluted diversity definition (rated) measure described previously.

Results

Support for D&I Initiatives

Testing Diluted Diversity Definition as a Mediator

Hypothesis 4 projected that diluted diversity definitions would mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives. I conducted four mediation models using Model 4 in PROCESS Version 3.4 (Hayes, 2017) to test this hypothesis. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. Because diversity rationale condition is a multicategorical variable with three levels, I created two dummy codes with the business condition as the referent and used indicator coding to compare groups. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control), were the independent variables, diluted diversity definition (rated) was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. In the second model, monetary support for D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. See Table 10 for mediation results.

In both models, diversity rationale condition did not have a significant effect on how diluted (rated) individuals' diversity definition was (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.07$, $p = 0.539$, business vs. control: $b = -0.05$, $p = 0.678$). In the first model, holding a more diluted diversity definition was associated with lower endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.10$, $p < 0.001$).

There was not a significant indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on endorsement of

D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (business vs. fairness: indirect effect = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03], business vs. control: indirect effect = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03]). In the second model, holding a more diluted diversity definition was associated with lower monetary support for D&I initiatives ($b = -501.14$, $p < .001$). However, there was not a significant indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on monetary support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (business vs. fairness: indirect effect = 36.47, 95% CI [-76.46, 179.94], business vs. control: indirect effect = 24.23, 95% CI [-89.87, 158.74]). So, the type of diversity rationale that participants were exposed to did not influence how diluted their definitions of diversity were but holding a more diluted definition of diversity was related to decreased endorsement of and monetary support for D&I initiatives, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status.

In the third model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control), were the independent variables, diluted diversity definition (coded) was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. In the fourth model, monetary support for D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. See Table 11 for descriptive statistics for the coding categories and Table 12 for mediation results. In both models, diversity rationale condition did not have a significant effect on how diluted individuals' diversity definition was (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.01$, $p = 0.807$, business vs. control: $b = -0.00$, $p = 0.880$). In the third model, there was no association between diluted diversity definition and endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.17$, $p = 0.221$)². Additionally, there was not a significant indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on endorsement of D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (business vs. fairness: indirect effect = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01], business

² When the controls were not in the model, holding a more diluted definition of diversity was associated with decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives.

vs. control: indirect effect = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01]). In the fourth model, there was no association between diluted diversity definition and monetary support for D&I initiatives ($b = -690.58, p = 0.344$)³. Moreover, there was not a significant indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on monetary support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (business vs. fairness: indirect effect = 3.79, 95% CI [-37.08, 58.84], business vs. control: indirect effect = 2.28, 95% CI [-40.48, 60.14]). So, the type of diversity rationale that participants were exposed to did not influence how diluted their definitions of diversity were and their definition of diversity did not influence their endorsement of or monetary support for D&I initiatives, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Testing for Moderated Mediation with Colorblindness and Racial Prejudice

Hypothesis 6a stated that colorblindness and racial prejudice would moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definitions. Since I measured diluted diversity definition and support for D&I initiatives in two ways, I conducted four moderated mediation models, using Model 21 in PROCESS, to test this hypothesis. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, diluted diversity definition (rated) was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Colorblindness moderated the path between the diversity rationales and diluted diversity definition (rated) and racial prejudice moderated the path between diluted diversity definition (rated) and the

³ When the controls were not in the model, holding a more diluted definition of diversity was associated with decreased monetary support for D&I initiatives.

dependent variable. In the second model, monetary support for D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. See Table 13 for results.

In both models, there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on diluted diversity definition (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.08$, $p = 0.473$, business vs. control: $b = -0.10$, $p = 0.395$). In the first model, there was a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and racial prejudice on endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.09$, $p < 0.001$). See Figure 7 for a graphical representation. I followed up this interaction with simple slopes analyses, probing the interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean of racial prejudice. Results showed that among people who were low in prejudice there was not a significant relationship between diluted diversity definition and endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = 0.06$, $p = 0.054$). However, among people who were high in prejudice, holding a more diluted diversity definition was associated with lower endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -.09$, $p = 0.004$). Tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.01]).

In the second model (see Table 13), there was not a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and racial prejudice on monetary support for D&I initiatives ($b = 82.33$, $p = .492$). Additionally, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -.45, 95% CI [-49.15, 63.13], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 11.22, 95% CI [-47.83, 112.46]). So, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, people's endorsement of colorblind ideology did not moderate the relationship between the type

of diversity rationale that they saw and their definition of diversity, but holding a more diluted definition of diversity was related to decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who were high in racial prejudice. Above and beyond the control variables, participants' endorsement of racial prejudice did not moderate the association between holding a diluted definition of diversity and monetary support for D&I initiatives.

In the third model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, diluted diversity definition (coded) was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Colorblindness moderated the path between the diversity rationales and diluted diversity definition (coded) and racial prejudice moderated the path between the diluted diversity definition (coded) and the dependent variable. In the fourth model, monetary support for D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Refer to Table 14 for results. In both models, there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on diluted diversity definition (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.01$, $p = 0.671$, business vs. control: $b = -0.03$, $p = 0.223$). In the third model, there was not a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and prejudice on endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.27$, $p = 0.061$). Further, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.00 , 95% CI $[-0.01, 0.02]$, business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.01 , 95% CI $[-0.01, 0.03]$). In the fourth model, there was not a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and prejudice on monetary support for D&I initiatives ($b = 1418.42$, $p = 0.079$)⁴. Further, tests of the index of moderated moderated

⁴ When the controls were not in the model, there was a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition (coded) and prejudice on monetary support for D&I initiatives. Among people low in racial prejudice, holding a diluted definition of diversity was associated with decreased monetary support for D&I initiatives. Among people high in racial prejudice, holding a diluted diversity definition did not influence monetary support for D&I initiatives.

mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -14.17, 95% CI [-100.25, 60.90], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = -41.83, 95% CI [-145.33, 38.56]). In other words, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, people's endorsement of colorblind ideology did not moderate the relationship between the type of diversity rationale that they saw and their definition of diversity. In addition, participants' endorsement of racial prejudice did not moderate the association between holding a diluted definition of diversity and endorsement of or monetary support for D&I initiatives, above and beyond the control variables. Therefore, Hypothesis 6a was not supported.

Testing Exploratory Moderated Mediations

Given the statistical and theoretical associations between the moderator variables (egalitarianism, colorblindness, and racial prejudice) (Poteat & Spanierman, 2012), I conducted several exploratory analyses to test whether each of these variables moderated the other paths in the mediation model. Due to the large number of tests conducted, I will briefly list which models were not significant, but report the full results for the significant models in the paragraphs below. The following models were not significant. Egalitarianism and racial prejudice did not moderate the paths between diversity rationales and diluted diversity definition (rated) or diversity rationales and diluted diversity definition (coded). Egalitarianism and colorblindness did not moderate the paths between diluted diversity definition (rated) and monetary support for D&I initiatives or diluted diversity definition (coded) and monetary support for D&I initiatives. Egalitarianism also did not moderate the path between diluted diversity definition (coded) and endorsement of D&I initiatives.

I used Model 14 in PROCESS to test a moderated mediation model where two dummy coded diversity rationale variables were the predictors, diluted diversity definition (rated) was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Colorblindness moderated the path from diluted diversity definition (rated) to endorsement of D&I initiatives. Results revealed that although there was not a significant index of moderated mediation (business vs. fairness: index of moderated mediation = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04], business vs. control: index of moderated mediation = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.04]), there was a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and colorblindness on endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.13, p < .001$). See Figure 8 for a graph of this interaction. Simple slopes tests showed that among people low in colorblindness there was no relationship between diluted diversity definition and endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = 0.06, p = 0.091$), but among people high in colorblindness holding a more diluted diversity definition was associated with lower endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.18, p < .001$). Taken together, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, the type of diversity rationale that participants were exposed to did not influence how diluted their definitions of diversity were, but holding a more diluted definition of diversity was related to decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who were high in colorblindness.

I conducted the same analysis described in the paragraph above except in this model egalitarianism moderated the path from diluted diversity definition (rated) to endorsement of D&I initiatives. Tests of the index of moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated mediation = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.01], business vs. control: index of moderated mediation = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.01]) however, there was a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and egalitarianism on endorsement of D&I

initiatives ($b = 0.07, p = <.001$). Refer to Figure 9 for a graph of this interaction. Probing the interaction one standard deviation above and below the mean of egalitarianism, I found that among people low in egalitarianism, holding a more diluted diversity definition was significantly related to lower endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.05, p = 0.042$); however, holding a more diluted diversity definition was significantly associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who were high in egalitarianism ($b = 0.08, p = 0.007$). To paraphrase, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, the type of diversity rationale that participants were exposed to did not influence how diluted their definitions of diversity were, but holding a more diluted definition of diversity was related to decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who were low in egalitarianism and increased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people high in egalitarianism.

I used Model 14 in PROCESS to test a moderated mediation model where two dummy coded diversity rationale variables were the predictors, diluted diversity definition (coded) was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Colorblindness moderated the path from diluted diversity definition (coded) to endorsement of D&I initiatives. Results showed that although the tests of the index of moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness condition: index of moderated mediation = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.02], business vs. control condition: index of moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.02]), there was a significant interaction between diluted diversity definition and colorblindness on endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.38, p = 0.012$). Figure 10 displays a graph of the interaction. I followed up the interaction by conducting simple slopes tests at one standard deviation above and below the mean of colorblindness. Results showed that among people low in colorblindness there was no relationship between holding a diluted diversity definition and

endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = 0.32, p = 0.164$); however, among people high in colorblindness, holding a more diluted diversity definition was significantly associated with lower endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = -0.40, p = 0.023$). To paraphrase, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, the type of diversity rationale that participants were exposed to did not influence how diluted their definitions of diversity were, but holding a more diluted definition of diversity was related to decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who were high in colorblindness.

Testing Organizational Morality as a Mediator

Hypothesis 5a stated that perceived organizational morality would mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two mediation models using Model 4 in PROCESS. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. In the second model, monetary support of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Refer to Table 15 for mediation results.

In both models, perceptions of morality were significantly higher in the fairness condition than in the business condition ($b = 0.18, p = 0.016$), but did not differ between the control and business conditions ($b = 0.07, p = 0.321$). In the first model, greater perceptions of morality were associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = 0.47, p < .001$). Additionally, there was a significant indirect effect comparing the business and fairness conditions (indirect effect = 0.09, 95% CI 0[.02, 0.16]), suggesting that relative to the business condition, assignment to the fairness condition was indirectly associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives, as

mediated by increased perceptions of organizational morality. In other words, compared to participants in the business condition, those in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral, which, in turn, was associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. There was not a significant indirect effect comparing the business and control conditions (indirect effect = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.10]).

In the second model, greater perceptions of morality were associated with increased monetary support of D&I initiatives ($b = 805.32, p < .001$). Additionally, there was a significant indirect effect comparing the business and fairness conditions (indirect effect = 148.72, 95% CI [18.72, 325.19]), suggesting that relative to the business condition, assignment to the fairness condition was indirectly associated with increased monetary support of D&I initiatives, as mediated by increased perceptions of organizational morality. That is, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased monetary support of D&I initiatives. There was not a significant indirect effect comparing the business and control conditions (indirect effect = 60.08, 95% CI [-53.54, 204.87]). Therefore, hypothesis 5a was partially supported.

Testing for Moderated Mediation with Egalitarianism and Racial Prejudice

Hypothesis 7a predicted that egalitarianism and racial prejudice would moderate the indirect effect between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives through perceived organizational morality. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two moderated mediation models using Model 21 in PROCESS. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, perceived organizational

morality was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Egalitarianism moderated the path between the diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality and racial prejudice moderated the path between the perceived organizational morality and the dependent variable. In the second model, monetary support of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. See Table 16 for results.

In both models, there were no significant interactions between the diversity rationale conditions and egalitarianism on perceived organizational morality (business vs. fairness: $b = 0.15$, $p = 0.074$, business vs. control: $b = 0.04$, $p = 0.665$). In the first model, there was a significant interaction between perceived organizational morality and racial prejudice on endorsement of D&I initiatives ($b = 0.20$, $p < .001$). Next, I conducted simple slope analyses probing the interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean of racial prejudice. See Figure 11 for a graphical representation. Analyses revealed greater perceptions of organizational morality were associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who were low in prejudice ($b = 0.22$, $p < .001$) and an even stronger relationship was present among people who were high in racial prejudice ($b = 0.57$, $p < .001$). However, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.08], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.05]).

Given that only one of the two hypothesized interactions turned out to be significant, I followed Hayes' (2017) advice and pruned the model of the non-significant interactions with egalitarianism because I wanted to know whether racial prejudice alone moderated the indirect effect and I could not determine this when egalitarianism when included in the model. I used Model 14 in PROCESS to test a revised moderated mediation model with racial prejudice as the

only moderator. Results of the tests of the index of moderated mediation were significant for the business vs. fairness conditions (index of moderated mediation = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.07]). Specifically, the indirect effect of assignment to the fairness condition (relative to the business condition) on increased endorsement of D&I initiatives through greater perceived organizational morality was stronger at high levels of prejudice (conditional indirect effect = 0.11, 95% CI [0.02, 0.19]) than at low levels of prejudice (conditional indirect effect = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.08]). There was not a significant index of moderated mediation for the business vs. control conditions (index of moderated mediation = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.05]). Stated plainly, regardless of their own egalitarian beliefs, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives, especially among people who more highly endorsed racial prejudice. These results were significant controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status.

In the second model, there was also a significant interaction between perceived organizational morality and racial prejudice on monetary support for D&I initiatives ($b = 706.73$, $p < .001$). I again conducted simple slope analyses probing the interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean of racial prejudice. See Figure 12 for a graphical representation. Analyses revealed that there was not a significant relationship between perceived organizational morality and monetary support for D&I initiatives among people who were low in prejudice ($b = -10.10$, $p = 0.971$), but greater perceptions of organizational morality were significantly related to increased monetary support for D&I initiatives among people who were high in racial prejudice ($b = 1225.69$, $p < .001$). Despite this, there was not a significant index of moderated moderated mediation (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation

= 105.70, 95% CI [-37.99, 273.37], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 25.20, 95% CI [-119.00, 166.44]).

I again pruned the model of the non-significant interactions with egalitarianism and tested a revised model (using Model 14 in PROCESS) with prejudice as the only moderator. Results of the tests of the index of moderated mediation were significant for the business vs. fairness conditions (index of moderated mediation = 130.51, 95% CI [17.48, 294.03]). Specifically, the indirect effect of assignment to the fairness condition (relative to the business condition) on increased monetary support for D&I initiatives through greater perceived organizational morality was significant at high levels of prejudice (conditional indirect effect = 226.35, 95% CI [31.91, 488.17]), but not at low levels of prejudice (conditional indirect effect = -1.87, 95% CI [-110.50, 112.19]). There was not a significant index of moderated mediation for the business vs. control conditions (index of moderated mediation = 52.73, 95% CI [-51.81, 174.21]). To sum up, regardless of their own egalitarian beliefs, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased monetary support for D&I initiatives among people who more highly endorsed racial prejudice. These results were significant controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. Therefore, Hypothesis 7a was partially supported.

Testing Exploratory Moderated Mediations

I conducted several exploratory analyses to determine whether colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice moderated other paths in the mediation model. The only model that did not reveal a significant interaction was the model where racial prejudice moderated the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. All the other models had significant interactions and are reported in the paragraphs below.

I used Model 7 in PROCESS to test a moderated mediation model where two dummy coded diversity rationale variables were the predictors, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Colorblindness moderated the path from diversity rationale condition to perceived organizational morality. Analyses showed that there was a significant interaction between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on perceived organizational morality, specifically comparing the business and fairness condition ($b = -0.19, p = 0.019$). Figure 13 depicts this interaction. I probed the interaction at one standard deviation above and below the mean of colorblindness. The follow-up test showed that people low in colorblindness perceived the organization to be more moral in the fairness condition than in the business condition ($b = 0.35, p < .001$); however, there was no difference in perceived organizational morality between the business and fairness conditions among people high in colorblindness ($b = -0.00, p = 0.984$). Further, tests of the index of moderation mediation were significant for business vs. fairness conditions (index of moderated mediation = $-0.02, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.19, -0.00]$) but not for the business vs. control condition (index of moderated mediation = $0.01, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.08, 0.09]$). Specifically, the indirect effect of assignment to the fairness condition (relative to the business condition) on increased endorsement of D&I initiatives through greater perceived organizational morality was significant among people low in colorblindness (conditional indirect effect = $0.17, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.06, 0.28]$) but not among people high in colorblindness (conditional indirect effect = $-0.00, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.12, 0.12]$). In other words, above and beyond the controls, individuals low in colorblindness perceived the organization to be moral when they read a fairness rationale compared to a business rationale, which in turn, predicted increased endorsement of D&I initiatives. The

analysis revealed the same pattern of results when predicting monetary support for D&I initiatives.

I tested the same model described above except colorblindness moderated the path from perceived organizational morality to endorsement of D&I initiatives. There was a significant interaction between perceived organizational morality and colorblindness ($b = 0.26, p < .001$). Refer to Figure 14 for a graph of the interaction. Simple slopes tests for the interaction revealed that greater perceptions of organizational morality were significantly associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives among people low in colorblindness ($b = 0.26, p < .001$) and this relationship was even stronger among people high in colorblindness ($b = 0.66, p < .001$). Additionally, the index of moderated mediation was significant for the business vs. fairness condition (index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.08]) but not for the business vs. control condition (index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.05]). Specifically, the indirect effect of assignment to the fairness condition (relative to the business condition) on increased endorsement of D&I initiatives through greater perceived organizational morality was stronger among people high in colorblindness (conditional indirect effect = 0.12, 95% CI [0.02, 0.23]) than among people low in colorblindness (conditional indirect effect = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.10]). Said differently, above and beyond the controls, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives, especially among individuals high in colorblindness.

I tested another moderated mediation model, using Model 14 in PROCESS, where two dummy coded diversity rationale variables were the predictors, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and monetary support of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable.

Colorblindness moderated the path from perceived organizational morality to monetary support for D&I initiatives. There was a significant interaction between perceived organizational morality and colorblindness ($b = 845.23, p < .001$). See Figure 15 for a graph of this interaction. Simple slopes tests for the interaction revealed that there was no relationship between perceived organizational morality and monetary support for D&I initiatives among people low in colorblindness ($b = -0.16.59, p = .955$); however, greater perceived organizational morality was significantly related to increased monetary support for D&I initiatives among people high in colorblindness ($b = 1578.85, p < .001$). Additionally, the index of moderated mediation was significant for the business vs. fairness condition (index of moderated mediated mediation = .156.09, 95% CI [24.28, 323.70]) but not for the business vs. control condition (index of moderated mediated mediation = 63.06, 95% CI [-57.99, 213.52]). Specifically, the indirect effect of assignment to the fairness condition (relative to the business condition) on increased monetary support of D&I initiatives through greater perceived organizational morality was significant among people high in colorblindness (conditional indirect effect = 291.57, 95% CI [45.51, 587.72]), but not significant among people low in colorblindness (conditional indirect effect = -3.06, 95% CI [-115.88, 122.76]). Stated differently, above and beyond the controls, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased monetary support for D&I initiatives among individuals high in colorblindness.

I tested another model where two dummy coded diversity rationale variables were the predictors, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and endorsement of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Egalitarianism moderated the path from perceived organizational morality to endorsement of D&I initiatives. There was a significant interaction

between perceived organizational morality and egalitarianism ($b = 0.21, p < .001$). See Figure 16 for a graph of the interaction. Simple slope tests showed that the greater perceived organizational morality was significantly related to increased endorsement of D&I initiatives and this relationship was stronger among people low in egalitarianism ($b = 0.44, p < .001$) than among people high in egalitarianism ($b = 0.17, p < .001$). Further, tests of the index of moderated mediation were significant when comparing the business and fairness conditions (index of moderated moderated mediation = $-0.03, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.06, -0.00]$) but not when comparing the business and control conditions (index of moderated moderated mediation = $-0.01, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.04, 0.01]$). Specifically, the indirect effect of assignment to the fairness condition (relative to the business condition) on increased endorsement of D&I initiatives through greater perceived organizational morality was stronger among people low in egalitarianism (conditional indirect effect = $0.08, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.01, 0.16]$) than among people high in egalitarianism (conditional indirect effect = $0.03, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.00, 0.06]$). That is, above and beyond the controls, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives, especially among individuals low in egalitarianism.

In the next model, two dummy coded diversity rationale variables were the predictors, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and monetary support of D&I initiatives was the dependent variable. Egalitarianism moderated the path from perceived organizational morality to monetary support of D&I initiatives. Results showed that although the tests of the index of moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness condition: index of moderated mediation = $-87.88, 95\% \text{ CI } [-223.24, 7.13]$, business vs. control condition: index of moderated mediation = $-35.50, 95\% \text{ CI } [-136.74, 35.99]$), there was a significant interaction

between perceived organizational morality and egalitarianism ($b = -475.89, p < .001$). Figure 17 depicts this interaction. Simple slopes tests for the interaction revealed that greater perceived organizational morality was significantly associated with increased monetary support of D&I initiatives among people low in egalitarianism ($b = 904.58, p < .001$); however, there was no relationship between perceived organizational morality and monetary support of D&I initiatives among people high in egalitarianism ($b = 48.86, p = .861$). In other words, above and beyond the controls, individuals in the fairness condition perceived the organization to be more moral than individuals in the business condition, which, in turn, was associated with increased monetary support for D&I initiatives among individuals low in egalitarianism.

Anti-Black Hiring Discrimination

Testing for Moderated Mediation with Colorblindness, Applicant Race, and Racial Prejudice

Hypothesis 6b forecasted that the indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on anti-Black hiring discrimination through diluted diversity definition would be moderated by colorblindness, applicant race, and racial prejudice. I conducted four moderated mediation models using Model 20 in PROCESS to test my hypothesis. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, diluted diversity definition (rated) was the mediator, and hiring evaluations was the dependent variable. In the second model, pay was the dependent variable. Given that the previous analyses predicting support for D&I initiatives found that there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and diluted diversity definition, I decided to prune colorblindness from the model and instead run a model with applicant race and racial prejudice moderating the path between diluted diversity definition and hiring evaluations/pay and applicant race moderating the

direct path between diversity rationale condition and hiring evaluations/pay. See Tables 17 for results.

In the first model, there was not a significant three-way interaction between diluted diversity definition, applicant race, and racial prejudice on hiring evaluations ($b = -0.05$, $p = 0.241$) and there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on hiring evaluations (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.17$ $p = 0.277$, business vs. control: $b = -0.01$, $p = 0.960$). Additionally, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.03], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03]). In the second model predicting pay, there was not a significant three-way interaction between diluted diversity definition, applicant race, and racial prejudice on pay ($b = -0.07$, $p = 0.891$) and there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on pay (business vs. fairness: $b = -3.46$ $p = 0.059$, business vs. control: $b = 1.61$, $p = 0.371$). Additionally, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.21], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.18]). That is, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, the race of the job applicant and individual's endorsement of racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definition and hiring evaluations or pay.

In the third model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, diluted diversity definition (coded) was the mediator, and hiring evaluations was the dependent variable. In the fourth model, pay was the dependent variable. See Table 18 for results. In the third model, there was not a significant three-

way interaction between diluted diversity definition, applicant race, and racial prejudice on hiring evaluations ($b = -0.34, p = 0.236$) and there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on hiring evaluations (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.24, p = 0.123$, business vs. control: $b = 0.01, p = 0.954$). Further, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.03], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.02]). In the fourth model predicting pay, there was not a significant three-way interaction between diluted diversity definition, applicant race, and racial prejudice on pay ($b = 0.46, p = 0.890$). However, there was a significant interaction between diversity rationale conditions and applicant race on pay when comparing the business and fairness conditions ($b = -4.11, p = 0.024$), but not when comparing the business and control conditions ($b = 1.94, p = 0.276$). Refer to Figure 18. I then conducted follow-up tests and found that participants who evaluated the Black applicant paid the applicant significantly more when they read a fairness rationale than when they read a business rationale ($b = 2.52, p = 0.049$). Participants who evaluated the White applicant paid the applicant similarly in the fairness and business conditions ($b = -1.58, p = 0.217$). Additionally, tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.17], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.00, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.18]). In other words, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status, the race of the job applicant and individual's endorsement of racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definition and hiring evaluations or pay. However, participants who read a fairness rationale paid the Black applicant more than participants who read a business rationale, whereas the type of rationale that

individuals were exposed to did not influence how much they paid the White applicant. Taken together, these analyses reveal that Hypothesis 6b was not supported.

Testing Exploratory Moderated Mediation

I conducted several exploratory analyses to determine whether colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice moderated other paths in the mediation model. As mentioned previously, egalitarianism and racial prejudice did not moderate the path from diversity rationales to diluted diversity definition (rated) or from diversity rationales to diluted diversity definition (coded). In addition, colorblindness and egalitarianism did not interact with applicant race to moderate the path from diluted diversity definition (rated) to hiring evaluations or pay and it did not moderate the path from diluted diversity definition (coded) to hiring evaluations or pay. In sum, none of the exploratory models with diluted diversity definition as a mediator had significant moderated mediation.

Testing for Moderated Mediation with Egalitarianism, Applicant Race, and Racial Prejudice

Hypothesis 5b forecasted that applicant race would moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality. To test this hypothesis, I conducted two moderated mediation models using Model 15 in PROCESS. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and hiring evaluations was the dependent variable. Applicant race moderated the path between perceived organizational morality and hiring evaluations. In the second model, pay was the dependent variable. Refer to Table 19 for results.

In both models, perceptions of organizational morality were significantly higher in the fairness condition than in the business condition ($b = 0.17, p = 0.023$), but did not differ between the control and business conditions ($b = 0.07, p = 0.374$). In the first model, there was not a significant interaction between perceived organizational morality and applicant race on hiring evaluations ($b = -0.05, p = 0.467$). There was also not a significant interaction between the direct effect of diversity rationale condition and applicant race on hiring evaluations (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.18, p = 0.248$, business vs. control: $b = 0.03, p = 0.843$). Additionally, tests of the index of moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated mediation = -0.01 , 95% CI $[-0.04, 0.02]$, business vs. control: index of moderated mediation = -0.00 , 95% CI $[-0.03, 0.01]$). Stated another way, above and beyond the controls, the race of the job applicant did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and hiring evaluations and it did not moderate the relationship between diversity rationale condition and hiring evaluations.

In the second model, there was not a significant interaction between perceived organizational morality and applicant race on pay ($b = 1.21, p = 0.146$). However, there was a significant interaction between diversity rationale condition and applicant race, specifically comparing the business and fairness conditions ($b = -3.62, p = 0.049$)⁵. Figure 19 depicts this interaction. I decomposed the interaction and found that among participants who evaluated the Black applicant there was no difference in pay between those who saw the fairness rationale and those who saw the business rationale ($b = 2.19, p = 0.090$). Similarly, among participants who evaluated the White applicant there was no difference in pay between those who were in the fairness and those who were in the business condition ($b = -1.43, p = 0.275$). There was not a

⁵ When the controls were not in the model, the interaction was no longer significant.

significant interaction with applicant race comparing the business and control conditions ($b = 1.88, p = 0.295$). Results revealed that tests of the index of moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated mediation = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.69], business vs. control: index of moderated mediation = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.37]). In sum, above and beyond the controls, the race of the job applicant did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and pay. Therefore, Hypothesis 5b was not supported; although the interaction between applicant race and diversity rationale on pay was significant, the predicted difference in pay for the Black applicant by diversity rationale condition was not observed.

Hypothesis 7b expected that egalitarianism, applicant race, and racial prejudice would moderate the indirect effect between diversity rationale condition and anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality. I conducted four moderated mediation models using Model 20 in PROCESS to test my hypothesis. In all models, I controlled for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. In the first model, two dummy coded condition variables (business vs. fairness and business vs. control) were the independent variables, perceived organizational morality was the mediator, and hiring evaluations was the dependent variable. In the second model, pay was the dependent variable. Given that the previous analyses predicting support for D&I initiatives found that there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and egalitarianism on perceived organizational morality, I decided to prune egalitarianism from the model and instead run a model with applicant race and racial prejudice moderating the path between perceived organizational morality and hiring evaluations/pay, and applicant race moderating the direct path between diversity rationale condition and hiring evaluations/pay. Table 20 shows the regression results.

In the first model, there was not a significant three-way interaction between perceived organizational morality, applicant race, and racial prejudice on hiring evaluation ($b = -0.07, p = 0.252$). Additionally, there were no significant interactions between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on hiring evaluation (business vs. fairness: $b = -0.20, p = 0.184$, business vs. control: $b = -0.04, p = 0.788$). Results of the tests of index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.01 , 95% CI $[-0.05, 0.02]$, business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.00 , 95% CI $[-0.03, 0.01]$). To paraphrase, the race of the applicant and individual's endorsement of racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and hiring evaluation.

In the second model, there was not a significant three-way interaction between perceived organizational morality, applicant race, and racial prejudice on pay ($b = -1.52, p = 0.054$). However, the same interaction between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on pay that was discussed in Hypothesis 5b on page 77 was present⁶. The results of the tests of the index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.27 , 95% CI $[-0.75, 0.06]$, business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.10 , 95% CI $[-0.45, 0.13]$). To paraphrase, the race of the applicant and individual's endorsement of racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and pay. Thus, Hypothesis 7b was not supported.

Testing Exploratory Moderated Mediations

I conducted several exploratory analyses to determine whether colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice moderated other paths in the mediation model. As mentioned

⁶ When the controls were not in the model, the interaction was no longer significant.

previously, racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between the diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. In addition, egalitarianism and applicant race did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and hiring evaluations or perceived organizational morality and pay. Colorblindness and applicant race did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and hiring evaluations. Significant results are reported below. Note that the same interaction between the diversity rationales and colorblindness on perceived organizational morality that was discussed on page 69 was present in these models as well.

I tested a moderated moderated mediation model, using Model 20 in PROCESS, that specified two dummy coded diversity rationale variables as the predictors, perceived organizational morality as the mediator, pay as the dependent variable, and colorblindness and applicant race as jointly moderating the path from perceived organizational morality to pay. Although the tests of index of moderated moderated mediation were not significant (business vs. fairness: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.32, 95% CI [-0.83, 0.02], business vs. control: index of moderated moderated mediation = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.52, 0.14]), there was a significant three-way interaction with perceived organizational morality, applicant race, and colorblindness ($b = -1.81, p = 0.025$). See Figure 20. Follow-up tests were conducted to decompose the interaction and showed that there was a significant two-way interaction between perceived organizational morality and applicant race among participants low in colorblindness, $F(1,791) = 6.09, p = 0.014$: perceived organizational morality was negatively associated with pay for the Black applicant ($b = -2.19, p = 0.019$), but not the White applicant ($b = 0.82, p = 0.304$). Among participant high in colorblindness, there was not a significant two-way interaction between perceived organizational morality and applicant race ($F(1,791) = 0.15, p = 0.699$) as

there was no association between perceived organizational morality and pay for the Black applicant ($b = 1.11, p = 0.153$). or White applicant ($b = 0.71, p = 0.305$).

Study 2 Discussion

The purpose of this study was to understand the process by which different rationales for diversity influence pro-diversity behavior. Specifically, I tested whether reading a business rationale, fairness rationale, or no rationale for diversity was indirectly related to support for D&I initiatives and anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceptions of organizational morality and diluted diversity definitions, controlling for social desirability, political ideology, and gender status. Additionally, I was interested in the extent to which these relationships depended on participants' own diversity attitudes, in particular, colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice. In general, I found mixed support for my hypotheses. See Figures 20-28 for overall models of Study 2 results. I did not find any evidence that diluted diversity definitions mediated the relationship between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives or anti-Black hiring discrimination - in part because the type of diversity rationale that participants viewed did not influence their definitions of diversity. Moreover, the indirect effect of diluted diversity definitions did not depend on colorblindness or racial prejudice, though diluted diversity definitions did lead to decreased support for D&I among people high in racial prejudice. In addition, exploratory analyses revealed a similar pattern of interactions between diluted diversity definition, colorblindness, and egalitarianism on support for D&I initiatives.

As expected, perceived organizational morality mediated the relationship between diversity rationale condition and support for D&I initiatives. Further, this indirect effect was stronger among individuals who were high in racial prejudice, high in colorblindness, or low in egalitarianism. Unexpectedly, the relationship between diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring

discrimination through perceived organizational morality was not moderated by applicant race and I did not find support for the hypothesized interactions with racial prejudice and applicant race predicting anti-Black hiring discrimination. However, exploratory analyses revealed an unexpected interaction between perceived organizational morality, colorblindness, and applicant race on anti-Black hiring discrimination. This collection of results sheds much needed light on the benefits and drawbacks of using different rationales for diversity.

Hypothesis 4 (diluted diversity definitions would mediate the relationship between diversity rationale condition and support for D&I initiatives) was not supported. Contrary to expectations, regardless of the way that diversity definition was measured (rated vs. coded), participants' diversity definitions did not differ based on the type of diversity rationale that organization adopted. The results remained non-significant when the control variables were removed from the model. The current findings about the relationship between diversity rationales and diversity definitions are inconsistent with previous research. Other research has found that business rationales for diversity lead to more diluted definitions of diversity (Edelman et al., 2001; Trawalter et al. 2016).

It is possible that these findings diverge from other studies because I operationalized diluted diversity definitions in a different way. In the current study, I created a difference score from ratings of items meant to reflect two different types of diversity. I also allowed participants to self-generate definitions of diversity and created proportion scores based on how many managerial-focused categories they mentioned. Trawalter et al., (2016) also used a combination of participant ratings of predetermined items and open-ended response. However, whereas my measures were continuous, they used binary measure of diluted diversity definition where participants rated how much they associated a list of predetermined "protected" categories (e.g.,

race, gender) with diversity and wrote in other categories that they associated with diversity that were not a part of the original list. Participants who did not write in other categories were coded as 0 and participants who wrote in at least one additional category were coded as 1. Using this measure, they found that compared to participants who were assigned to read a fairness rationale, those who read a business rationale were more likely to list additional categories.

This study also differed from Trawalter et al. (2016) with respect to what categories were counted as evidence of dilution. The authors did not appear to have a clear rationale for why they coded any category that was not race, gender, socioeconomic status, age, religion, sexual orientation, and disability as evidence of dilution, whereas I decided to code any category that was not a legally protected category or defined by power differentials as evidence of dilution because it seemed most in keeping with the original intent of affirmative action law. This difference led to some categories being coded differently between the two papers. For instance, Trawalter et al. (2016) categorized nationality as evidence of diluted diversity definitions whereas in the current study legally protected categories, like nationality, did not count as evidence of dilution. I believe that my method of coding the diversity categories better reflects dilution as I have defined it in this paper and as other scholars have defined it in previous research (Edelman et al., 2001; Linnehan & Konrad, 1999; Unzueta & Knowles, 2014). Taken together, discrepancies in measurement and different conceptualizations of diluted diversity definition between the current study and previous studies may have led to different results.

As expected, more diluted definitions of diversity (rated) were associated with decreased endorsement of and monetary support for D&I initiatives. However, when diluted diversity definition was measured by coding participants' self-generated definitions, it did not predict support for D&I initiatives. The former result is consistent with other studies that have shown

that diluted diversity definitions have negative consequences for support for diversity (Akinola et al., 2020) and counters previous research on all-inclusive multiculturalism which finds that White people are more supportive of diversity efforts when they are included in organizational diversity messages (Jansen et al., 2015). It's possible that the two different measures of diversity produced different results for support for D&I initiatives because the rated diversity definition items can be affected by acquiescence bias, which is participants' tendency to agree with statements in a survey even when they do not reflect their true opinions (Winkler, Kanouse, & Ware, 1982). That is, a participant may have only written about equality-focused diversity categories in their open-ended response but agreed to the statement about diversity being heterogeneity in skills and expertise.

Hypothesis 6a was not supported. I did not find any evidence that the indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition was dependent upon individuals' colorblind or prejudiced attitudes. Specifically, colorblindness did not moderate the relationship between diversity rationale condition and diluted diversity definition for either measure of diversity definition; rather colorblindness was independently related to diluted diversity definition (both rated and coded) such that the more individuals endorsed colorblind attitudes like, "I do not see people in terms of race," the more diluted their definition of diversity was. This finding is consistent with and extends earlier research which finds that individuals' motivations shape their construals of diversity (Unzueta et al., 2012). Although other research has shown that egalitarianism influences how one defines diversity, this study adds that colorblindness, or the motivation to downplay the importance of race, also determines how one defines diversity.

I did find mixed support for the hypothesized interaction between diluted diversity definition and prejudice on support for D&I initiatives. For the rated measure, prejudice did moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definition and endorsement. Specifically, individuals' diversity definition did not influence their endorsement of D&I initiatives if they were low in racial prejudice. However, for individuals who were high in racial prejudice, the more diluted their definitions of diversity were, the less they endorsed D&I initiatives. Further exploratory analyses showed a similar pattern of results for colorblindness and egalitarianism; the extent to which individuals' diversity definition was diluted was associated with decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives only among individuals who were high in colorblindness and, independently, low in egalitarianism. The consistent pattern of results among these three diversity attitudes lends some support to the idea that diluted diversity definitions can act as a justification to express prejudice since diluted diversity definitions were only negatively associated with endorsement of D&I initiatives among people who are motivated to deny the reality of race-based inequality (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003).

In contrast, there was not an interaction between diluted diversity definition (rated) and racial prejudice on monetary support for D&I. One potential reason that the interaction did not emerge when predicting monetary support could be that racially prejudiced individuals are typically very reluctant to give resources to support programs that reduce inequality. In the context of this study, this could mean that individuals who were high in racial prejudice started out with very low monetary support for D&I and so could not give significantly less money to the company's D&I initiatives, even if they held a diluted definition of diversity. Despite the lack of support for my hypothesis, both diluted diversity definition (rated) and prejudice were independently associated with reduced monetary support for D&I. Though these results were

unexpected, they are troublesome because they indicate that regardless of how prejudiced participants were, adopting a diluted diversity definition led to decreased monetary support for D&I initiatives. These findings suggest that organizations should not encourage their employees to construe diversity in a diluted manner if they want to enhance support for D&I.

Similarly, racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definition (coded) and support for D&I initiatives. However, colorblindness moderated the relationship between diluted diversity definition (coded) and endorsement of D&I initiatives such that holding a more diluted definition of diversity was associated with decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives only among individuals who were high in colorblindness. This pattern of results with colorblindness is consistent across the two measures of diluted diversity definition. The interaction with prejudice may have emerged for the rated measure but not the coded measure because of the different diversity categories that are represented in each measure. The coded measure captures a broader range of diversity categories (e.g., geography, opinion, interests) than the rated measure, which only mentions diversity in skills and expertise. It is possible that the diversity categories captured by the rated measure, which are most focused on productivity (e.g., skills and expertise), provide more justification for prejudiced individuals to oppose D&I initiatives than the other diversity categories included in the coded measure.

Hypothesis 5a (that perceived organizational morality would mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives) was partially supported. Contrary to my hypothesis, the organization's morality was perceived similarly whether it espoused no rationale or a business rationale, which could suggest that individuals typically assume that organizations value diversity for business reasons rather than fairness reasons when no rationale is given. These assumptions do reflect the ubiquity of the business case in organizations'

diversity statements (Nurmohamed et al., 2018). In support of my hypothesis, I found that individuals perceived the organization to be more sincere, honest, trustworthy, caring, compassionate, and helpful when it used a fairness rationale than when it used a business rationale, which, in turn, was associated with increased endorsement of and monetary support for D&I initiatives. This result parallels findings from Kroger (2018), who found that organizations are perceived to be more moral when they espouse a fairness rationale than a business rationale for diversity. They are also consistent with research from Van Zant and Moore (2015) who demonstrated that leaders are perceived to be more moral when they espouse a fairness rationale for new initiatives rather than a business rationale. Further, these findings build on and extend the two aforementioned studies by showing that the downstream effects of morality perceptions also matter for organizations, not just leaders, and can be used to bolster support for diversity and inclusion initiatives specifically.

Hypothesis 7a related to egalitarianism and racial prejudice moderating the indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on support for D&I initiatives through perceived organizational morality was partially supported. Contrary to expectations, I did not find any evidence that the type of diversity rationale that the organization used interacted with individuals' egalitarian attitudes to predict perceptions of the organization's morality. Rather, colorblindness moderated the relationship between diversity rationale type and perceived organizational morality. Individuals who were low in colorblindness perceived the organization to be more moral when it used a fairness rationale than when it used a business rationale, but individuals who were high in colorblindness perceived the organization's morality similarly regardless of the type of diversity rationale that it endorsed. Further, adopting a fairness rationale for diversity relative to a business rationale was only indirectly associated with increased endorsement of and monetary support for

D&I initiatives through increased perceptions of organizational morality for individuals who were low in colorblindness. Since individuals typically perceive others with similar opinions as themselves to be more moral than those that have different opinions (Byrne, 1969; Chambers et al., 2013; Skitka, 2010; Snijders & Keren, 2001), individuals who were low in colorblindness might have believed that the organization was more moral when it used a fairness rationale relative to a business rationale because they also see diversity as an issue of fairness, particularly when it comes to race. It is interesting that the same pattern of results was not present for egalitarianism as individuals who are high in egalitarianism likely also view diversity as a fairness issue. It is possible that the interaction did not emerge because individuals' endorsements of egalitarianism were affected by the type of the diversity rationale that the organization embraced, though it was not technically significant ($p = 0.050$). Nevertheless, both findings have important implications because they demonstrate that organizations can only improve their image when they use a fairness rationale because regardless of one's own preference for equality, organizations that use a fairness rationale are perceived to be more moral and this is especially the case among people who are low in colorblindness. In contrast, when organizations use a business rationale, they may be perceived more poorly by individuals who are typically proponents of diversity (e.g., those low in colorblindness).

In support of my hypothesis, I found that the indirect effect of espousing a fairness rationale for diversity relative to a business rationale on increased endorsement of and monetary support for D&I initiatives through greater perceptions of organizational morality was stronger for individuals high in racial prejudice. Specifically, individuals perceived the organization to be more moral when it used a fairness rationale than when it used a business or no rationale, which, in turn, was associated with increased endorsement of and monetary support for D&I initiatives,

especially among individuals high in racial prejudice. Exploratory analyses also showed the same pattern of results when colorblindness and egalitarianism independently moderated the relationship between perceived organizational morality and support for D&I initiatives. Specifically, adopting a fairness rationale for diversity relative to a business rationale was indirectly associated with increased endorsement of D&I initiatives through increased perceptions of organizational morality for individuals who were high in colorblindness and for those low in egalitarianism. Additionally, perceived organizational morality mediated the relationship between the organization espousing a fairness rationale relative to a business rationale and monetary support for D&I initiatives for those who were high in colorblindness. However, this same indirect effect was not conditional upon individuals' levels of egalitarianism, even though the same pattern of interaction between perceived organizational morality and egalitarianism was present when predicting monetary support as when predicting endorsement of D&I initiatives. These results suggest that organizations can increase support for D&I initiatives among people who are typically skeptical of diversity by adopting a fairness rationale. Further, these findings reinforce and extend the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM: Crandall & Eshelman, 2003), by demonstrating that perceptions of organizational morality, an understudied construct within the prejudice literature, can act as a suppression factor that inhibits the expression of prejudice and other related diversity attitudes.

Hypothesis 6b was not supported; I did not find any evidence that the indirect effect of diversity rationale condition on anti-Black hiring discrimination depended on colorblindness, applicant race, or racial prejudice. Specifically, applicant race and racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definition and anti-Black hiring discrimination (hiring evaluation and pay). This is contrary to Ho (2013) who found that

exposure to diluted definitions of diversity resulted in greater anti-Black hiring discrimination among anti-egalitarians. There are several possible reasons why these results did not turn out as expected. First, I may have been underpowered to detect such a complex interaction, given that I was unable to survey as many participants as the power analysis suggested. Second, participants who regularly take online surveys may be aware of these types of experimental designs as they are common, especially with the renewed interest in research on prejudice and discrimination due to the events of the past year. Relatedly, the racially traumatic events of the past year have inspired more awareness of and public discourse about anti-Black racism among White people (Cohn & Quealy, 2020), so participants may have been more likely to positively evaluate the Black job applicant regardless of their definition of diversity.

Hypothesis 5b was not supported; applicant race did not moderate the indirect effect of diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality. Though a fairness rationale elicited greater perceptions of organizational morality than a business rationale, applicant race did not moderate the relationship between perceived organizational morality and anti-Black hiring discrimination. Instead, the more individuals perceived the organization to be moral the more they evaluated the applicant positively, regardless of the applicant's race. So perceived organizational morality did predict less anti-Black hiring discrimination, just not in the way that I predicted. Whereas I assumed that the organization's morality would lead to less anti-Black discrimination by only increasing perceptions of the Black applicant, perceptions of organizational morality benefited both White and Black applicants in that they were evaluated similarly. Surprisingly, perceptions of the organization's morality did not predict the applicant's recommended pay. Regardless of participants' perceptions of the organization, the Black applicant was paid more than the White

applicant. Perceptions of morality may have predicted evaluations but not pay because people's self-reported feelings and attitudes may differ from their actual behavior (Woodzika & LaFrance, 2001). For example, participants may have evaluated the Black applicant somewhat positively but recommended a high salary or vice versa. Additionally, the interaction with applicant race may not have materialized because increased public attention to racial justice over the past year may have caused participants to evaluate the Black applicant positively regardless of their perceptions of the organization so as not to appear prejudiced.

Hypothesis 7b was not supported. As discussed previously, egalitarianism did not moderate the relationship between diversity rationales and perceived organizational morality. Further, applicant race and racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between diluted perceived organizational morality and anti-Black hiring discrimination (hiring evaluation and pay). However, exploratory analyses showed that colorblindness and applicant race moderated the relationship between perceived organizational morality and anti-Black hiring discrimination. Surprisingly, greater perceptions that the organization was moral was associated with decreased pay for the Black applicant but not the White applicant among individuals who were low in colorblindness. In contrast, the relationship between perceived organizational morality and pay did not differ based on the applicant's race for people who were high in colorblindness. This finding is contrary to expectations, given previous research findings that it is typically those who endorse colorblind attitudes who engage in discriminatory behavior towards people of color. However, previous research has not considered the impact of perceptions of organizational morality. It is plausible that people who think that it is important to pay attention to race (those low in colorblindness) and view the organization as moral may inadvertently downrate the Black applicant because they want to abide by the perceived ethical norms of the organization and not

appear biased towards the Black applicant. Further, this three-way interaction may have emerged with colorblindness instead of racial prejudice because people were more comfortable agreeing to colorblind statements than prejudiced statements. Though colorblindness and racial prejudice were highly correlated ($r = .54, p < .001$) the mean for colorblindness is much higher than the mean for racial prejudice. This may be the case because the statements used to measure racial prejudice were taken from the modern racism scale developed in the 1960's and it may no longer be appropriate to express prejudice in the same way in 2021, especially in light of the rising popularity of the Black Lives Matter Movement and increased awareness of racism due to highly publicized racial injustices over the past year (Cohn & Quealy, 2020). However, the items used to measure colorblindness were developed in 2009 and 2020 and so may be a more up to date reflection of how people typically express racially prejudiced sentiments.

At times, I found support for my hypotheses when the control variables were removed from the models. Specifically, holding a more diluted diversity definition (coded) was related to decreased endorsement of and monetary support for D&I initiatives, which is consistent with the results for the rated measure. Table 14 shows that political ideology predicts how participants define diversity and their support for D&I initiatives, so diluted diversity definition may have not been able to explain much variance with political ideology in the model (Avery, 2011; Sidanius et al, 1996). In addition, racial colorblindness did moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definition (coded) and monetary support for D&I initiatives, but not in the expected direction. Individuals who were low in prejudice gave less money to D&I initiatives to the extent that they held a diluted definition of diversity. The difference in findings when the controls are not included in the model suggest that there may be some additional boundary conditions based on participant political ideology, gender status, and social desirability to explore further.

In sum, this study suggests that a fairness rather than business rationale for diversity is most effective at eliciting support for D&I initiatives because it boosts perceptions of an organization's morality. Furthermore, increased perceptions of organizational morality are especially important for eliciting support for D&I initiatives from individuals who are typically skeptical of diversity such as those who are prejudiced, colorblind, and anti-egalitarian. Perceived organizational morality is also important for reducing anti-Black hiring discrimination. However, greater perceptions of morality may also result in anti-Black hiring discrimination among those who are low in colorblindness. Though a business rationale did not cause individuals to have a more diluted definition of diversity than a fairness or no rationale for diversity, diluted diversity definitions were associated with reduced support for D&I initiatives, especially among those who are typically opposed to diversity efforts such as those who are prejudiced, colorblind, and anti-egalitarian.

Chapter 5 General Discussion

The purpose of this dissertation was to understand how different rationales for diversity influence pro-diversity behaviors through people's definitions of diversity and perceptions of the organization. Additionally, I sought to understand how individual differences in diversity attitudes namely colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice would affect the magnitude of these associations. Across two studies I found mixed support for my hypotheses. Though reading about a business rationale for diversity caused participants to hold more diluted definitions of diversity in Study 1, diluted diversity definitions did not mediate the relationship between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives/anti-Black hiring discrimination in Study 2. However, holding a diluted definition of diversity was related to decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives for individuals high in colorblindness, low in egalitarianism, and high in racial prejudice. Additionally, perceived organizational morality mediated the relationship between diversity rationales and support for D&I initiatives and colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice moderated these relationships. Perceived organizational mortality also predicted less anti-Black hiring discrimination except among individuals who were low in colorblindness.

Taken together, these two studies have important implications for how organizations should communicate about diversity to bolster support for diversity efforts, especially from individuals who may be skeptical of such efforts. Moreover, my research makes several contributions to disparate literatures. First, I extend the diversity and inclusion literature by examining the relatively understudied phenomenon of diversity rationales and highlighting the process by which diversity rationales influence pro-diversity behavior. I also advance research

on moral psychology and behavioral ethics by showing that deontological moral arguments (fairness rationale) are seen as more moral than utilitarian moral arguments (business rationale) and that moral perceptions are important for fostering pro-diversity behavior. Lastly, I contribute to the literature on prejudice by demonstrating that diluted diversity definitions facilitate prejudice expression whereas perceptions of organizational morality suppress prejudice (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003).

Across the two studies, there was mixed evidence regarding the effect of diversity rationales on individual's construal of diversity. In Study 1, individuals' diversity definitions were more diluted when the organization used a business rationale for diversity than when they used a fairness or no rationale. However, in Study 2 the type of rationale that the organization espoused did not influence how participants defined diversity, regardless of how it was measured. It is important to note that this discrepancy was not due to the control variables; even when the control variables were removed from the analysis, participants' definitions of diversity were not affected by the diversity rationales in Study 2. Another explanation for the inconsistent findings may be that different measures were used to construct the diluted definition difference score in Study 1 than in Study 2. In particular, I expanded the measure from two items (one managerial-focused and one equality-focused) in Study 1 to eight items (four managerial-focused and four equality-focused) in Study 2. Examining the means across both studies (see Tables 3 and 9), participants' definitions of diversity were more diluted in Study 1 than in Study 2, so it seems that there was something about answering multiple questions about diversity or the wording of the items themselves that might account for this inconsistency. For example, it is possible that seeing several statements about how diversity is defined with some focused on

marginalized groups and others focused on personality and occupational differences could have made them more thoughtful about how they define diversity.

In both studies, I did not find support for the expected interaction between colorblindness and diversity rationales on diluted diversity definition. Regardless of the way the diluted diversity definitions were measured, colorblindness did not moderate the relationship between diversity rationale and diluted definitions of diversity. Importantly, these null results were not because of the controls, as the interaction remained non-significant when social desirability, gender status, and political ideology were not in the model. One potential reason for this could be that colorblindness can be construed in different ways depending on one's egalitarian attitudes. Knowles et al. (2009) describe that colorblindness can refer to the idea that race should not determine an individual's outcomes, or it can mean that individuals should receive equal treatment even if it leads to unequal outcomes. When colorblindness is construed as the former, it can be an egalitarian stance, whereas the latter can reify inequality. It's possible that participants' understandings of the colorblindness items depended on how they construe colorblindness and thus participant's levels of egalitarianism along with their colorblind attitudes might have better predicted how their definitions of diversity were affected by the diversity rationale that they viewed.

Nevertheless, Study 2 demonstrated that individuals' construal of diversity has important implications for support for D&I initiatives. Specifically, the more diluted people's definitions of diversity were the less they supported D&I initiatives. This finding builds on other research within the D&I literature. Previous work has found that holding or being exposed to a definition of diversity that is managerial-focused causes individuals to perceive organizations that lack racial diversity as diverse because they attend to other dimensions of diversity within the

organization (Ho, 2013). Additionally, Akinola and colleagues (2020) showed that organizations with a managerial-focused definition of diversity employed fewer women and people of color than organizations with an equality-focused definition. Taken together previous research and my findings demonstrate that diluted diversity definitions bolster racial inequality. Importantly, my findings suggest that there is a downside to the increasingly popular research on all-inclusive multiculturalism, which seeks to include majority group members in diversity messages (Jansen et al., 2015; Plaut et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2008). Although these messages may make White individuals feel more included in organizations, they may come at a cost to the representation of marginalized groups. Indeed, critical diversity scholars have warned about the dangers of diluted diversity definitions (Linnenhan & Konrad, 1999; Zanoni et al., 2010). Specifically, they argued that including managerial-focused definitions in diversity may end up worsening inequality for marginalized groups because it obscures unequal power relations and makes the purpose of D&I efforts unclear (Akinola, 2020; Noon, 2007). My findings provide much needed empirical support for these arguments.

Study 2 also showed that people vary in the extent to which they are influenced by holding a diluted definition of diversity. In particular, colorblindness, egalitarianism, and racial prejudice moderated the relationship between diluted diversity definition and endorsement of D&I initiatives. Specifically, more diluted definitions of diversity were associated with decreased endorsement of D&I initiatives only among individuals who were either high in colorblindness, low in egalitarianism, or high in racial prejudice. These results are alarming because they suggest that individuals endorsing hierarchy-enhancing ideologies are more susceptible to the hierarchy-enhancing effects of diluted diversity definitions. Yet, these findings are congruent with other research which shows that individuals use diversity definitions in

accordance with their desire for group equality. For example, compared to egalitarians, anti-egalitarians perceived an organization with low racial diversity and high occupational diversity as more diverse which was associated with decreased support for affirmative action policies (Unzueta, Knowles, Ho, 2012). My findings can also be understood in the context of theories of prejudice. The JSM theorizes that ambiguity can be a prejudice-releasing factor, and my findings extend this theory by demonstrating that ambiguity in the meaning of diversity can act as a justification to express prejudice (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003). Lastly, the fact that individuals who are high in colorblindness act similarly to individuals who are prejudiced, and prefer inequality upholds prior theorizing and empirical evidence that despite positive intentions, colorblind approaches are not the best way to achieved equality; rather, colorblindness further perpetuates racial hierarchy (Offerman et al., 2014; Plaut et al., 2018).

Contrary to my predictions, racial prejudice did not moderate the relationship between diluted diversity definitions and anti-Black hiring discrimination. This result is surprising given previous theory on modern racism and prejudice that demonstrates that ambiguity can lead to discrimination among highly prejudice individuals (Crandall & Eshelman, 2003; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). As previously mentioned, this null finding could be due to poor measurement of modern expressions of racial prejudice, since I used a scale that was developed to capture prejudice sentiments 50 years ago (Migetz, 2004). However, since I was able to find other expected interactions with the modern racism scale, participants' awareness of the study design or increased awareness about anti-Black discrimination could also be potential explanations for these results (Cohn & Quealy, 2020).

In addition to assessing how diversity rationales affect individuals' construal of diversity and the downstream effects on pro-diversity behavior, I was also curious about how diversity

rationales influenced perceptions of the organization. Both studies provide strong evidence that a fairness rationale for diversity increases perceptions of the organization's morality relative to a business rationale. Whereas previous research has demonstrated that CSR efforts increase perceived organizational morality (Ellemers et al., 2011), the current study builds on this finding to demonstrate that the rationale behind organizations' CSR activities also determine perceptions of ethicality. Further, the finding that individuals perceived the organization to be more moral (e.g., sincere, honest, and trustworthy) when it used a fairness rationale corroborates research on moral psychology. For example, Kreps and Monin (2014) found that speakers who couch their opinions in utilitarian reasoning appear less committed and authentic than speakers whose opinions are couched in deontological reasoning. This is because lay perceivers have a hard time believing that utilitarian speakers perceive the issue to be a moral one. These findings reveal a gap between scholarly and lay understandings of morality, considering that utilitarian reasoning is a valid moral perspective according to philosophers. In addition, previous research has shown that it is taboo to consider pragmatic trade-offs (i.e., money) for moral values and doing so elicits moral outrage (Tetlock et al., 2000). Therefore, considering the monetary value of diversity might have been perceived as unethical to some participants in the study and resulted in lower morality ratings. Additionally, my results speak to the literature on signaling (Connelly et al. 2011) by demonstrating that using a fairness rationale is an effective way to signal an authentic and sincere commitment to diversity and that a business rationale and no rationale for diversity may be perceived as moral grandstanding or virtue signaling, expressing an opinion solely to look good to others (Tosi & Warmke, 2016). The signals that companies send about D&I are important because engaging in "woke washing," by taking a stand on social issues without

changing company policies and practices, could negatively affect the organization's reputation and image (Sobande, 2019; Vrendenberg et al., 2018; Vrendenberg et al., 2020)

In both studies, I found that colorblindness moderated the relationship between diversity rationale type and perceived organizational morality, however the nature of this interaction differed between the studies. In Study 1, individuals high in colorblindness perceived the organization to be more moral when it did not have a rationale for diversity than when it communicated a business rationale, while individuals low in colorblindness perceived the organization to be similarly moral regardless of the organization's diversity rationale. In contrast, study 2 showed that individuals who were low in colorblindness perceived the organization to be more moral when it espoused a fairness rationale compared to a business rationale, while individuals high in colorblindness did not perceive the organization differently based on the type of diversity rationale that it used. The results may have been different across studies because in Study 1, individuals' levels of colorblindness were affected by the type of diversity rationale that the organization embraced, though it was not technically significant ($p = 0.050$). Specifically, participants endorsed colorblind attitudes marginally more when they read a business rationale compared to no rationale. Though unexpected, these results are somewhat in line with Williams (2017) who found that participants who watched a video with a business rationale for diversity endorsed colorblind statements more than those who watched a video making a legal rationale for diversity. It's possible that the type of diversity rationale did not exert an influence on individuals' colorblind attitudes in Study 2 because the survey was much longer and participants filled out the colorblindness items at the end of the survey, so the effect of the diversity rationales may have worn off by then.

Despite the divergent patterns of interaction across studies, both findings are consistent with previous research from moral psychology, which demonstrates that people's perceptions of others depend on the extent to which their beliefs or moral values align (Byrne, 1969; Chambers et al., 2013; Skitka, 2010; Snijders & Keren, 2001). As mentioned previously, high colorblind individuals who believe that differences should be ignored may have perceived the business rationale more poorly than no rationale because it went beyond a commitment to diversity and emphasized the importance of differences for a productive workplace. Similarly, low colorblind individuals who likely view diversity as an issue of fairness may have perceived the business rationale more poorly because its reasoning for the importance of differences was not equality but profit. These results are also in line with message-matching theory which argues that messages are more persuasive when they are aligned with an individual's characteristics, such as their personalities or ideologies (Lavine & Snyder, 1996; Matz et al., 2017; Petty & Wegener, 1998). For example, Hirsh, Kang, and Bodenhausen (2012) found that individuals evaluated advertisements that matched their personality characteristics more positively than those that did not. Similarly, Feinberg and Willer (2015) showed that political arguments for liberal issues (e.g., nationalized health care) that appeal to the moral values of conservatives were more persuasive because they made conservatives view the issue as more in line with their moral values.

Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that a positive perception of morality mediated the relationship between use of a fairness rationale and increased support for D&I initiatives. This finding contributes to research on diversity and inclusion by identifying moral perceptions of the organization as an antecedent to support for diversity. Additionally, these results build on other research on moral judgement. Prior work has demonstrated that perceptions

of morality are a key driver of positive evaluations and attraction to groups and organizations (Kroger, 2018; Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015). This study adds that another benefit of signaling morality is encouraging pro-diversity behaviors, specifically support for D&I initiatives. More broadly, these findings speak to the consequences of moralizing an issue. Previous research has cautioned against moralizing because it can lead to polarization and make people feel judged if they do hold the same views (Abeywickrama et al., 2020; Kovacheff et al., 2018; Kreps & Monin, 2011). Research from the issue selling literature, suggests that employees frame social issues using economic language rather than moral language because it is perceived to be more legitimate and thus more effective (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Sonenshein, 2006). However, evidence is mounting that moral language can be persuasive. For example, Mayer et al. (2019) demonstrated that using moral language was more effective for selling social issues when the message was also aligned with the organization's mission or values because it elicited a sense of anticipated guilt in listeners. In addition, scholars have found that those who have an economic frame are less compassionate, ethical, and more competitive and self-interested than those who think about an issue through a moral frame (Molinsky et al., 2012; Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999; Vohs et al., 2006). Moreover, organizations are seen as inherently less moral than individuals and are thought to primarily act out of self-interest and reputational concerns which makes people think that they will be less persistent after making ethical decisions (Jago et al., 2019; Tang et al., 2018), so using a fairness rationale for diversity may help to counter these perceptions by making organizations seem less cold, more feeling, and more committed to diversity and inclusion.

Study 2 also showed that people varied in the extent to which they were influenced by perceptions of the organization. Individuals who were high in colorblindness, low in

egalitarianism, or high in racial prejudice were especially likely to support D&I initiatives to the extent that they perceived the organization to be moral. That is, individuals who are typically opposed to diversity were more likely to support diversity when they perceived the organization to be moral. These findings mirror research on CEOs' diversity beliefs and behaviors- when CEOs did not have positive views of diversity having higher moral values were related to increased pro-diversity behaviors (Ng & Sears, 2020). These findings can also be understood in the context of theories about prejudice, particularly the JSM. Previous research on prejudice has shown that highly prejudiced individuals are more attuned to social norms (Crandall et al., 2002) and perceived organizational morality may capture the extent to which individuals believe the organization abides by ethical social norms. Taken together, these findings bridge research on prejudice, moral psychology, and behavioral ethics to demonstrate the positive impact of a fairness rationale on pro-diversity behavior especially among those who are typically opposed to diversity efforts.

Greater perceptions of organizational morality were also associated with more positive evaluations of the job applicant, regardless of the applicant's race. That is, increased perceptions of morality predicted decreased anti-Black hiring discrimination. This is in line with research from the behavioral ethics literature which finds that ethical organizational climate and ethical leadership are associated with reduced employee misconduct (Mayer et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2012). Though I did not find the expected interaction between perceived organizational morality, applicant race, and racial prejudice, I did find that individuals low in colorblindness paid the Black applicant less to the extent that they perceived the organization to be moral. These findings suggest that though ethical perceptions help to decrease anti-Black hiring discrimination, they cannot overcome individuals' unconscious biases. Although people who are low in

colorblindness may not agree with the idea that race should be downplayed or ignored, they may still harbor anti-Black biases that show up in how much they pay Black applicants. Indeed, scholars have found that even individuals who hold egalitarian values have unconscious biases that cause them to act in prejudiced ways (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pearson et al., 2009).

Limitations and Future Directions

Despite the strengths of these studies, there are several limitations that deserve attention. First, there were some limitations with the design of the studies. I was primarily interested in how a business rationale compared to a fairness rationale and no rationale for diversity. However, these rationales are not mutually exclusive, and they are not the only types of rationales that organizations use. For example, in their study of Fortune 100 organizations, Nurmohamed et al. (2018) found that 23% of organizations used a combined business and fairness rationale to justify their commitment to diversity and 15% espoused a legal rationale, citing anti-discrimination law and the need to provide equal opportunity to individuals from legally protected identity groups. Given the ubiquity of these rationales, more research is needed to understand how these rationales are perceived and how they affect individuals' pro-diversity behavior. Preliminary studies have begun to uncover interesting results. For example, a combined rationale caused individuals to adopt a more diluted diversity definition but also increased perceived organizational morality relative to a business rationale (Kroger, 2012; Trawalter et al., 2016). Moreover, compared to a business rationale, a legal rationale lowered people's endorsement of colorblind attitudes, increased beliefs that diversity is important, and increased inclusive behavior (Williams, 2017). These studies suggest that a combined rationale might buffer some of the negative effects of a single rationale that I found in my study like reduced perceptions of morality and lower pay for the Black applicant. These studies provide an

important steppingstone for future researchers to further unpack the independent and joint effects of diversity rationales on perceptions of the organization, diversity attitudes and behavior, feelings of inclusion and belonging, and attraction to the organization.

The current research also has limitations with regards to the measurement of diluted diversity definitions. Although difference scoring the equality-focused and managerial-focused items was a useful way to determine the extent to which individuals' definitions of diversity were diluted, it was flawed in that people who rated both types of diversity equally received the same score whether they rated both types equally high or equally low. This distinction matters because individuals who rated both equality-focused and managerial-focused dimensions of diversity low may have a very different definition of diversity than those who rated them both highly. That is, a difference score may have missed important nuances in how people define diversity. Indeed, difference scores have been heavily criticized for being notoriously hard to interpret in addition to having low reliability and reducing explained variance (Edwards, 2002; Cafri et al., 2010). Future work should consider alternative ways to measure individuals' construal of diversity. In addition, the concept of diluted definitions makes an assumption that everyone's definition of diversity includes at least one characteristic that is equality-focused. Although research suggests that many people equate diversity with people of color and other marginalized groups (Bell & Hartman, 2007; Unzueta & Binning, 2010), it is possible that some people may not consider these characteristics as indicators of diversity and instead only consider heterogeneity in other individual differences as constituting diversity. Future researchers should try to establish descriptive information about people's definitions of diversity such as how common it is for individuals to exclude marginalized groups from their definition of diversity altogether and what predicts holding these kinds of definitions.

Another limitation of this study is the lack of racial and sexual diversity of the sample. This study examined the effect of diversity rationales among White participants. Although trying to understand what motivates this group to engage in pro-diversity behavior is important, because they tend to be the most skeptical of diversity and hold the most power within organizations, doing so presents an incomplete picture of how diversity rationales affect other groups within the workplace. Given that organizations use these rationales in part to convey their commitment to diversity and inclusion, it is important to understand how people of color and other marginalized groups perceive these messages. In other words, which rationale is most effective at signaling a sense of inclusion to marginalized groups?

Preliminary evidence suggests that a business rationale for diversity is not only perceived poorly by marginalized groups but is also associated with greater organizational inequality. For example, reading about a business rationale undermined women and LGBTQ+ individuals' anticipated sense of belonging to a prospective organization which was, in turn, related to lower attraction to the organization (Georgeac & Rattan, 2019). Similarly, Black participants felt more positively toward and expected to fare better in a university with a fairness rationale relative to a business rationale for diversity (Starck et al., 2021). Further, the same study demonstrated that greater use of a business rationale is associated with increased racial disparities in graduation rates between Black and White students, especially when universities are low in fairness rationale use. Together these studies suggest that organizations that use a business rationale could struggle to increase diversity since they repel students and employees from marginalized groups and may inadvertently perpetuate inequality. Future research should continue to investigate the effects of diversity rationales on both majority and minority groups,

so that we can better understand which messaging is broadly appealing and effective at reducing inequality.

Practical Implications and Recommendations

My research answers a crucial question at the core of diversity and inclusion: how can we motivate leaders to engage in pro-diversity behaviors? Both academics and practitioners have assumed that the answer to this question is the business case, if leaders know the benefits of diversity for productivity, creativity, and market appeal they will get on board with diversity and inclusion. Further, this messaging is assumed to be particularly persuasive to skeptics who doubt the necessity of D&I programs and policies. My dissertation tests these assumptions and provides organizations with much needed empirical evidence about how to communicate about diversity. I found little support for the effectiveness of the business case to increase pro-diversity behaviors among White people with management experience. Overall, my findings demonstrate that a business rationale makes individuals construe diversity broadly to include a wide range of individual differences, such as heterogeneity in skills, personality, and expertise. When individuals defined diversity in this way, they were less likely to support diversity initiatives that focused on marginalized groups, especially if they were already skeptical of D&I. In contrast, a fairness rationale led to more support for diversity, especially among skeptics, because it boosts perceptions that the organization is ethical.

My findings suggest several ways for organizations to garner support for diversity within the company. First, my results highlight that espousing a commitment to diversity based on fairness communicates a sincere and genuine commitment to diversity (Jones et al., 2013), which is important for the success of D&I programs and policies (Cox, 1991). If leaders and employees believe that the primary reason that diversity is important is profitability, support for D&I may

become dependent on the company's financial gain, which may delay or completely stall the effectiveness of D&I efforts (Birnbaum et al., 2019). Second, I encourage organizations to adopt and communicate an equality-focused definition of diversity that focuses on groups with unequal power relations and a history of marginalization (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation). Defining diversity in this way makes the necessity for D&I initiatives clear to everyone in the company and allows leaders to accurately assess whether or not the organization has a diversity problem, protecting them from lawsuits and bad press (Akinola et al., 2020; Ho, 2013; Unzueta & Knowles, 2014). Third, my findings demonstrate the need for organizations to cultivate an ethical image as greater perceptions that the organization was moral led to more support for D&I initiatives. In addition to increasing support for diversity, an ethical organization also fosters more prosocial behavior and less misconduct among employees (Mayer et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2012; O'Keefe et al., 2018)

My results also highlight avenues for remedying anti-Black discrimination during the hiring process. Reminding hiring managers of the organization's moral commitment to diversity before the hiring process could help to reduce anti-Black discrimination by prompting them to act more ethically and make fairness and equal opportunity more salient in their minds. Similarly, an ethical organizational climate could also help to rectify anti-Black discrimination. However, individuals' biases could still infect the hiring process in an ethical organization because unconscious biases are pernicious and affect even the most well-meaning people. My results showed that even when people believed that the organization was moral and did not endorse a colorblind approach to race, they paid a Black applicant less. Therefore, it is also important for organizations to have safeguards in place to protect against bias, such as awareness training. Unconscious bias training makes individuals more aware that they have biases which

can affect the decision-making process (King et al., 2012). In addition, blind resume review processes can help reduce bias (Knight, 2017) as research has shown that even when candidates have the exact same qualifications, applicants with White sounding names get more callbacks (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Kang, 2016). Lastly, standardizing all aspects of the hiring process, such as interview questions can help hiring managers stay focused on the applicant's qualifications and give every candidate the same opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge and experience (Knight, 2017; Wright et al., 1989).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the business case is one of the most popular arguments for diversity touted by academics and practitioners. Although studies show that White individuals indeed prefer business rationales and feel more included by this message (Plaut et al., 2011; Starck et al., 2021; Trawalter et al., 2016), little research has tested the extent to which a business rationale for diversity motivates White individuals to champion diversity and inclusion. Overall, the findings from my two studies challenge lay assumptions about the superiority of the business case for eliciting pro-diversity behavior from White individuals.

Though more research is needed on this topic, my results provide initial evidence that viewing a business rationale for diversity caused individuals to prioritize diversity in skills and expertise over diversity in race and gender (e.g., diluted definition of diversity) and conceptualizing diversity in this way led to lower support for D&I initiatives among people who are racially colorblind, anti-egalitarian, and prejudiced. On the other hand, viewing a fairness rationale increased perceptions that the organization was moral which led to increased support for D&I initiatives among individuals who are racially colorblind, anti-egalitarian, and prejudiced. In addition, a fairness rationale reduced anti-Black hiring discrimination-in part

because it boosted perceptions of the organization's morality. These results suggest that, despite its appeal to majority group members, a business rationale for diversity may not be an effective message to elicit pro-diversity behavior. At a time when organizational communication about diversity is more important than ever, my dissertation makes an important contribution to current practical and theoretical conversations about D&I messaging by highlighting how diversity rationales influence White individuals to support diversity and which individuals are influenced the most.

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Tables

Table 1.

Participant demographics for Study 1

Variable	n (% of sample)
Age (in years)	<i>M</i> (37.83), <i>SD</i> (9.87)
Gender	
Women	187 (38.2%)
Men	296 (60.5)
Trans, nonbinary, or genderqueer	6 (1.2%)
Sexual orientation	
Asexual	6 (1.2%)
Bisexual	33 (6.7%)
Gay	8 (1.6%)
Lesbian	6 (1.2%)
Pansexual	7 (1.4%)
Queer	5 (1.0%)
Straight/Heterosexual	422 (86.3%)
Another sexual orientation	1 (0.2%)
Prefer not to answer	1 (0.2%)
Household income	
Less than \$50,000	94 (19.3%)
\$50,000 – \$99,999	206 (42.2%)
\$100,000 - \$149,999	109 (22.3%)
More than \$150,000	79 (16.2%)
Education	
Less than high school	1 (0.2%)
High school graduate	21 (4.3%)
Some college	55 (11.2%)
2-year degree	29 (5.9%)
4-year degree	216 (44.2%)
Masters	129 (26.4%)
Professional degree	21 (4.3%)
Doctorate	17 (3.5%)
Work experience	
Less than 1 year	44 (9.0%)
1-2 years	97 (19.8%)
3-4 years	132 (27.0%)
5-6 years	89 (18.2%)

7+ years	127 (26.0%)
Management experience	
Less than 1 year	29 (5.9%)
1-2 years	104 (21.3%)
3-4 years	115 (23.5%)
5-6 years	83 (17.0%)
7+ years	158 (32.2%)
Rank	
Entry-level (no supervisory responsibilities)	25 (5.1%)
Experienced (no supervisory responsibilities)	124 (25.4%)
Supervisor	119 (24.3%)
Mid-level Manager/Director	169 (34.6%)
Executive	22 (4.5%)
CEO/Owner	15 (3.1%)
Entrepreneur	3 (0.6%)
Other	12 (2.5%)

Table 2.

Frequencies of diversity categories in Study 1

Category	% of responses using each category
Equality-focused	
Race	76.9%
Gender	64.0%
Age	45.0%
Religion	42.1%
Sexual Orientation	37.0%
Socioeconomic Status	29.4%
Education	27.0%
Culture	23.1%
Nationality	22.1%
Disability	15.2%
Language	12.1%
Familial Status	4.5%
Offender Status	1.0%
Veteran Status	0.2%
Mean (SD)	4.53 (2.00)
Managerial-focused	
Background	25.2%
Politics	18.0%
Opinion	17.4%
Geography	13.3%
Experience	13.1%
Personality	8.0%
Skills	7.8%
Physical Traits	7.1%
Style	6.7%
Interests	5.7%
Knowledge	3.1%
Other	3.1%
Rank	1.2%
Mean (SD)	1.57 (1.51)
Codable	95.3%
Irrelevant	18.0%
information	
Total N	489

Table 3.

Descriptive statistics among Study 1 variables

	<i>M (SD)</i>	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Gender Status	-	-							
2. Social Desirability	6.20 (3.34)	.02	.80						
3. Political Ideology	3.22 (1.82)	.15**	.18**	-					
4. Egalitarianism	3.95 (0.88)	-.22**	.02	-.51**	.91				
5. Colorblindness	3.32 (0.94)	.18**	.17**	.47**	-.35**	.87			
6. Diluted Diversity Definition (Rated)	0.07 (2.13)	.14**	.13**	.35**	-.39**	.33**	-		
7. Diluted Diversity Definition (Coded)	0.26 (0.25)	.15**	.17**	.19**	-.17**	.16**	.30**	-	
8. Perceived Organizational Morality	3.54 (0.93)	-.11*	.21**	-.02	.35**	.05	-.16**	-.06	.95

Note. N's = 466-489. Scale reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) are shown in boldface along the diagonal. Gender status was coded such that 0= cisgender men and 1 =cisgender women, trans men, and trans women. *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 4.

Study 1 ANOVA results for diversity rationale condition on study variables

Variable	Business	Fairness	Control	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	η^2
	(n = 164)	(n = 160)	(n = 165)				
	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>				
Social Desirability	5.91 (3.29)	6.63 (3.57)	6.09 (3.13)	2, 486	2.02	0.134	0.008
Political Ideology	3.16 (1.81)	3.41 (1.83)	3.09 (1.82)	2, 486	1.39	0.251	0.006
Egalitarianism	3.97 (.86)	3.91 (0.88)	3.97 (0.91)	2, 486	0.23	0.797	0.001
Colorblindness	3.44 _a (0.86)	3.28 (0.98)	3.23 _b (0.97)	2, 486	2.08	0.126	0.008
Diluted Diversity Definition (Rated)	0.43 _a (2.09)	-0.04 _b (2.08)	-0.18 _b (2.18)	2, 486	3.71	0.025	0.015
Diluted Diversity Definition (Coded)	0.29 _a (0.28)	0.26 (0.24)	0.23 _b (0.24)	2, 463	2.03	0.133	0.009
Perceived Organizational Morality	3.43 _b (0.96)	3.70 _a (0.88)	3.4 _b (0.92)	2,486	3.87	0.021	0.016

Note. Means with different subscripts are significantly different from each other at $p < .05$

Table 5.

Study 1 analysis of covariance results for control variables and diversity rationale condition on diluted diversity definition (rated), diluted diversity definition (coded), and perceived organizational morality

Independent Variable	Adjusted <i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i> ²
Diluted Diversity Definition (Rated)					
Social Desirability		1, 483	3.27	0.071	.01
Political Ideology		1, 483	57.55	< 0.001	.11
Gender Status		1, 483	3.99	0.046	.01
Diversity Rationale Condition		2, 483	4.87	0.008	.02
Business	0.46 _a (0.15)				
Fairness	-0.15 _b (0.16)				
Control	-.011 _b (0.15)				
Diluted Diversity Definition (Coded)					
Social Desirability		1,460	10.20	0.002	.02
Political Ideology		1,460	10.37	0.001	.02
Gender Status		1,460	6.94	0.009	.02
Diversity Rationale Condition		2,460	2.14	0.119	.01
Business	0.29 (0.02)				
Fairness	0.25 (0.02)				
Control	0.24 (0.02)				
Perceived Organizational Morality					
Social Desirability		1, 483	22.47	< 0.001	.04
Political Ideology		1, 483	1.01	0.316	.00
Gender Status		1, 483	6.28	0.013	.01
Diversity Rationale Condition		2, 483	3.45	0.032	.01
Business	3.44 _a (0.07)				
Fairness	3.69 _b (0.07)				
Control	3.49 _a (0.07)				

Note. Means with different subscripts are significantly different from each other at $p < .05$.

Gender status was coded such that 0 = cisgender men and 1 = cisgender women, trans men, and trans women.

Table 6.

Study 1 regression results for diluted diversity definitions (rated and coded) on the control variables, diversity rationales, colorblindness, egalitarianism, diversity rationales X colorblindness, and diversity rationales X egalitarianism

Predictors	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI
Diluted Diversity Definition (Rated)					
Business vs. Fairness	-0.52	0.22	-2.38	0.018	[-0.95, -0.09]
Business vs. Control	-0.49	0.22	-2.26	0.024	[-0.91, -0.06]
Colorblindness	0.37	0.19	2.01	0.045	[0.01, 0.74]
BvF X Colorblindness	-0.08	0.24	-0.34	0.737	[-0.55, 0.39]
BvC X Colorblindness	0.15	0.24	0.65	0.513	[-0.31, 0.62]
Social Desirability	0.04	0.03	1.40	0.161	[-0.02, 0.09]
Political Ideology	0.29	0.06	5.21	< 0.001	[0.18, 0.40]
Gender Status	0.29	0.18	1.55	0.122	[-0.08, 0.65]
Diluted Diversity Definition (Coded)					
Business vs. Fairness	-0.04	0.03	-1.55	0.123	[-0.10, 0.01]
Business vs. Control	-0.05	0.03	-1.83	0.068	[-0.11, 0.00]
Colorblindness	-0.01	0.02	-0.22	0.831	[-0.05, 0.04]
BvF X Colorblindness	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.963	[-0.06, 0.06]
BvC X Colorblindness	0.05	0.03	1.62	0.106	[-0.01, 0.11]
Social Desirability	0.01	0.00	3.12	0.002	[0.00, 0.02]
Political Ideology	0.02	0.01	2.40	0.017	[0.00, 0.03]
Gender Status	0.06	0.02	2.57	0.011	[0.01, 0.11]
Diluted Diversity Definition (Rated)					
Business vs. Fairness	-0.62	0.21	-2.92	0.004	[-1.04, -.20]
Business vs. Control	-0.60	0.21	-2.87	0.004	[-1.02, -.19]
Egalitarianism	-0.89	0.19	-4.77	< 0.001	[-1.26, -.53]
BvF X Egalitarianism	0.19	0.25	0.76	0.447	[-.30, .67]
BvC X Egalitarianism	0.36	0.24	1.51	0.131	[-.11, .83]
Social Desirability	0.07	0.03	2.73	0.007	[.02, .12]
Political Ideology	0.21	0.06	3.75	< 0.001	[.10, .32]
Gender Status	0.16	0.18	0.90	0.369	[-.19, .52]
Diluted Diversity Definition (Coded)					
Business vs. Fairness	-0.04	0.03	-1.59	0.114	[0.10, 0.01]
Business vs. Control	-0.06	0.03	-2.01	0.045	[-0.11, -0.00]
Egalitarianism	-0.02	0.02	-0.99	0.325	[-0.07, 0.02]
BvF X Egalitarianism	-0.00	0.03	-0.07	0.944	[-0.06, 0.06]
BvC X Egalitarianism	-0.02	0.03	-0.52	0.604	[-0.08, 0.05]
Social Desirability	0.01	0.00	3.42	<0.001	[0.01, 0.02]
Political Ideology	0.01	0.01	1.69	0.091	[-0.00, 0.03]
Gender Status	0.05	0.02	2.30	0.022	[0.01, 0.10]

Note. BvF = business vs. fairness, BvC = business vs. control, *b* = unstandardized beta SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval. Gender status was coded such that 0 = cisgender men and 1 = cisgender women, trans men, and trans women.

Table 7.

Study 1 regression results for perceived organizational morality on the control variables, diversity rationales, egalitarianism, colorblindness, diversity rationales X egalitarianism, and diversity rationales X colorblindness

Predictors	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>	95% CI
Perceived Organizational Morality					
Business vs. Fairness	0.26	0.09	2.74	0.006	[0.07, 0.44]
Business vs. Control	0.06	0.09	0.67	0.502	[-0.12, 0.24]
Egalitarianism	0.48	0.08	5.78	<0.001	[0.31, 0.64]
BvF X Egalitarianism	0.07	0.11	0.63	0.527	[-0.14, 0.28]
BvC X Egalitarianism	-0.14	0.10	-1.33	0.183	[-0.35, 0.07]
Social Desirability	0.04	0.01	3.81	<0.001	[0.02, 0.07]
Political Ideology	0.08	0.02	3.40	<0.001	[0.03, 0.13]
Gender Status	-0.09	0.08	-1.14	0.253	[-0.25, 0.07]
Perceived Organizational Morality					
Business vs. Fairness	0.25	0.10	2.52	0.012	[0.06, 0.45]
Business vs. Control	0.06	0.10	0.61	0.543	[-0.13, 0.26]
Colorblindness	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.988	[-0.17, 0.17]
BvF X Colorblindness	-0.02	0.11	-0.15	0.883	[-0.23, 0.20]
BvC X Colorblindness	0.23	0.11	2.16	0.031	[0.02, 0.45]
Social Desirability	-0.06	0.01	4.59	<0.001	[0.03, 0.08]
Political Ideology	-0.04	0.03	-1.68	0.094	[-0.09, 0.01]
Gender Status	-0.22	0.08	-2.66	0.008	[-0.39, -0.06]

Note. BvF = Business vs. Fairness, BvC = Business vs. Control, *b* = unstandardized beta SE = standard error, CI = confidence interval. Gender status was coded such that 0 = cisgender men and 1 = cisgender women, trans men, and trans women.

Table 8.

Participant demographics for Study 2

Variable	n (% of sample)
Age (in years)	<i>M</i> (38.13), <i>SD</i> (9.98)
Gender	
Women	406 (49.5%)
Men	402 (49.0%)
Trans, nonbinary, or genderqueer	10 (1.2%)
Sexual orientation	
Asexual	22 (2.7%)
Bisexual	67 (8.2%)
Gay	15 (1.8%)
Lesbian	14 (1.7%)
Pansexual	10 (1.2%)
Queer	7 (0.9%)
Straight/Heterosexual	678 (82.6%)
Another sexual orientation	1 (0.1%)
Prefer not to answer	4 (0.5%)
Household income	
Less than \$50,000	187 (22.8%)
\$50,000 – \$99,9999	376 (45.8%)
\$100,000 - \$149,999	167 (20.3%)
More than \$150,000	87 (10.6%)
Education	
High school graduate	30 (3.7%)
Some college	132 (16.1%)
2-year degree	69 (8.4%)
4-year degree	338 (41.2%)
Masters	194 (23.6%)
Professional degree	21 (2.6%)
Doctorate	34 (4.1%)
Work experience	
Less than 1 year	88 (10.7%)
1-2 years	206 (25.1%)
3-4 years	194 (23.6%)
5-6 years	124 (15.1%)
7+ years	206 (25.1%)
Management experience	
Less than 1 year	43 (5.2%)
1-2 years	202 (24.6%)
3-4 years	195 (23.8%)
5-6 years	107 (13.0%)
7+ years	271 (33.0%)
Rank	
Entry-level (no supervisory responsibilities)	46 (5.6%)

Experienced (no supervisory responsibilities)	236 (28.7%)
Supervisor	235 (28.6%)
Mid-level Manager/Director	226 (27.5%)
Executive	14 (1.7%)
CEO/Owner	37 (4.5%)
Entrepreneur	14 (1.7%)
Other	10 (1.2%)

Table 9.

Descriptive statistics among study variables in Study 2

	<i>M (SD)</i>	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
1. Gender Status	--	--												
2. Social Desirability	5.88 (3.17)	-.01	.77											
3. Political Ideology	3.26 (1.76)	.15**	.18**	--										
4. Egalitarianism	3.90 (.90)	-.18**	-.04	-.59**	.92									
5. Colorblindness	3.16 (.95)	.21**	.12**	.54**	-.47**	.87								
6. Racial Prejudice	1.87 (.88)	.20**	.11**	.61**	-.74**	.54**	.93							
7. Diluted Diversity Definition (Rated)	-0.60 (1.46)	.19**	.14**	.32**	-.36**	.40**	.39**	--						
8. Diluted Diversity Definition (Coded)	0.26 (.026)	.14**	.06	.22**	-.14**	.19**	.19**	.35**	--					
9. Perceived Organizational Morality	3.42 (0.90)	-.05	.18**	-.04	.25**	.08*	-.10**	-.04	.01	.94				
10. Endorsement of D&I initiatives	5.43 (1.14)	-.17**	.02	-.43**	.67**	-.35**	-.55**	-.25**	-.14**	.39**	.83			
11. Monetary Support for D&I initiatives	10,690.32 (5412.04)	-.11**	.01	-.29**	.33**	-.29**	-.30**	-.21**	-.09**	.15**	.52**	--		
12. Hiring Evaluation	5.54 (0.94)	-.07	.08*	-.04	.15**	.09**	-.07*	-.01	-.02	.30**	.21**	.07	.88	
13. Pay	65.20 (10.74)	-.00	.01	-.09*	.08*	-.01	-.01	-.02	.01	.05	.10**	.06	.35**	--

Note. N's = 783-821. Scale reliabilities (Cronbach's alpha) are shown in boldface along the diagonal. Gender status was coded such that 0= cisgender men and 1 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals. * p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 10.

Study 2 regression results for diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (rated)

Predictors	M (diluted diversity definition [rated])		Y (endorsement of D&I initiatives)		Y (monetary support for D&I initiatives)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.04**	0.02	0.04***	0.01	128.56	58.46
Political Ideology	0.24***	0.03	-0.25***	0.02	-764.27	110.50
Gender Status	0.43***	0.10	-0.20**	0.07	-506.57	370.53
Business vs. Fairness	-0.07	0.12	-0.02	0.09	-237.79	445.97
Business vs. Control	-0.05	0.12	-0.05	0.09	-176.77	437.47
Diluted Diversity Definition (rated)			-0.10***	0.03	-501.14***	132.74
<i>F</i>	24.62***		36.86***		15.85***	
<i>R</i> ²	.13		.22		.11	

Notes. N = 810. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = men women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 11.

Frequencies of diversity categories in Study 2

Category	% of responses using each category
Equality-focused	
Race	76.9%
Gender	66.1%
Age	48.4%
Religion	44.7%
Sexual Orientation	35.8%
Socioeconomic Status	33.1%
Education	28.1%
Culture	25.0%
Nationality	21.8%
Disability	17.3%
Language	12.3%
Familial Status	7.3%
Veteran Status	1.1%
Offender Status	0.5%
Mean (SD)	4.68 (2.19)
Managerial-focused	
Background	27.2%
Opinion	18.2%
Politics	17.6%
Experience	13.8%
Geography	12.6%
Style	7.6%
Personality	7.4%
Skills	7.1%
Physical Traits	5.7%
Interests	5.6%
Knowledge	3.9%
Other	3.9%
Rank	1.2%
Mean (SD)	1.57 (1.55)
Codable	96.3%
Irrelevant information	16.9%
Total N	821

Table 12.

Study 2 regression results for diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (coded)

Predictors	M (diluted diversity definition [coded])		Y (endorsement of D&I initiatives)		Y (monetary support for D&I initiatives)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.00	0.00	0.03**	0.01	89.45	59.70
Political Ideology	0.03***	0.01	-.27***	0.02	-834.16***	111.01
Gender Status	0.06**	0.02	-.25***	0.07	-736.72	376.45
Business vs. Fairness	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.09	-276.27	455.42
Business vs. Control	-0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.09	-329.76	446.21
Diluted Diversity Definition (coded)			-0.17	0.14	-690.58	728.84
<i>F</i>	9.80***		33.75		12.50***	
<i>R</i> ²	.06		.21		.09	

Notes. N = 783. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = men women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 13.

Study 2 moderated mediation results for diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (rated)

Predictors	M (diluted diversity definition [rated])		Y (endorsement of D&I initiatives)		Y (monetary support for D&I initiatives)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.04*	0.01	0.04***	0.01	128.28*	58.01
Political Ideology	0.11***	0.03	-0.11***	0.02	-478.65***	131.78
Gender Status	0.31**	0.10	-0.12	0.07	-338.87	370.04
Business vs. Fairness	-0.08	0.11	-0.00	0.08	-219.75	442.46
Business vs. Control	-0.10	0.11	0.02	0.08	-58.68	434.97
Colorblindness	0.42***	0.10	-	-	-	-
BvF X						
Colorblindness	-0.01	0.12	-	-	-	-
BvC X						
Colorblindness	0.14	0.12	-	-	-	-
Diluted Diversity Definition (rated)			-0.01	0.02	-382.48**	136.88
Racial Prejudice			-0.55***	0.05	-1073.42***	274.67
Diluted Diversity Def. (rated) X Racial Prejudice			-0.09***	0.02	82.33	119.71
<i>F</i>	24.15***		53.15***		14.00***	
<i>R</i> ²	.19		.35		.12	

Notes. N = 810. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 14.

Study 2 moderated mediation results for diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through diluted diversity definition (coded)

Predictors	M (diluted diversity definition [coded])		Y (endorsement of D&I initiatives)		Y (monetary support for D&I initiatives)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.00	0.00	0.03**	0.01	97.80	58.96
Political Ideology	0.02***	0.01	-0.10***	0.02	-455.47***	136.07
Gender Status	0.05**	0.02	-0.13	0.07	-442.05	376.27
Business vs. Fairness	-0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.08	-259.72	449.37
Business vs. Control	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.08	-215.77	440.81
Colorblindness	0.04***	0.02	-	-	-	-
BvF X Colorblindness	-0.01	0.02	-	-	-	-
BvC X Colorblindness	-0.03	0.02	-	-	-	-
Diluted Diversity Definition (coded)			-0.02	0.14	-915.85	752.64
Racial Prejudice			-0.58***	0.05	-1271.37***	273.97
Diluted Diversity Def. (coded) X Racial Prejudice			-0.27	0.15	1418.42	807.05
<i>F</i>	6.90***		48.19		12.58***	
<i>R</i> ²	.07		.33		.12	

Notes. $N = 783$. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 15.

Study 2 regression results for diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through perceived organizational morality

Predictors	M (perceived organizational morality)		Y (endorsement of D&I initiatives)		Y (monetary support for D&I initiatives)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	62.17	59.17
Political Ideology	-0.03	0.02	-0.26***	0.02	-855.64***	106.12
Gender Status	0.06	0.06	-0.22**	0.07	-673.68	366.05
Business vs. Fairness	0.18*	0.08	-0.10	0.08	-350.04	447.16
Business vs. Control	0.07	0.08	-0.08	0.08	-212.62	437.38
Perceived Org. Morality			0.47***	0.04	805.32***	205.23
<i>F</i>	7.56***		67.47***		16.06***	
<i>R</i> ²	.04		.33		.11	

Notes. *N* = 810. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = men women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 16.

Study 2 moderated mediation results for diversity rationales on support for D&I initiatives through perceived organizational morality

Predictors	M (perceived organizational morality)		Y (endorsement of D&I initiatives)		Y (monetary support for D&I initiatives)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.05***	0.01	0.02	0.01	80.21	58.14
Political Ideology	0.07**	0.02	-0.09***	0.02	-470.48***	129.42
Gender Status	-0.01	0.06	-0.08	0.06	-356.13	363.67
Business vs. Fairness	0.19*	0.07	-0.06	0.07	-227.67	439.40
Business vs. Control	0.11	0.07	-0.00	0.07	-15.65	430.47
Egalitarianism	0.27***	0.06	-	-	-	-
BvF X Egalitarianism	0.15	0.08	-	-	-	-
BvC X Egalitarianism	0.04	0.08	-	-	-	-
Perceived Org. Morality			0.40***	0.03	604.39***	204.63
Racial Prejudice			-0.53***	0.04	-1077.99***	259.02
Perceived Org. Morality X Racial Prejudice			0.20***	0.03	706.73***	187.29
<i>F</i>	13.24***		88.97***		16.68***	
<i>R</i> ²	.12		.47		.14	

Notes. *N* = 810. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. * *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001.

Table 17.

Study 2 moderated mediation results for diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through diluted diversity definition (rated)

Predictors	M (diluted diversity definition [rated])		Y (hiring evaluation)		Y (pay)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.05	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.11	0.12
Political Ideology	0.23	0.03	-0.00	0.02	-0.80**	0.27
Gender Status	0.42**	0.10	-0.10	0.07	0.22	0.76
Business vs. Fairness	-0.06***	0.12	0.06	0.11	2.19	1.28
Business vs. Control	-0.04***	0.12	0.03	0.11	-0.34	1.28
Diluted Diversity Definition (rated)			0.00	0.03	-0.17	0.39
Applicant Race			-0.40***	0.11	-2.92*	1.29
BvF X Applicant Race			-0.17	0.16	-3.46	1.83
BvC X Applicant Race			-0.01	0.15	1.61	1.79
Diluted Diversity Def. (rated) X Applicant Race			-0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.56
Racial Prejudice			-0.29***	0.06	-0.68	0.73
Diluted Diversity Def. (rated) X Racial Prejudice			-0.00	0.03	0.15	0.35
Applicant Race X Racial Prejudice			0.43***	0.08	2.93**	0.93
Diluted Diversity Def. (rated) X Applicant Race X Racial Prejudice			-0.05	0.04	-0.07	0.50
<i>F</i>	23.48***		7.80***		3.80***	
<i>R</i> ²	.13		.12		.06	

Notes. *N* = 806-807. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. Applicant race was coded such that 0 = Black applicant and 1 = White applicant. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 18.

Study 2 moderated mediation results for diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through diluted diversity definition (coded)

Predictors	M (diluted diversity definition [coded])		Y (hiring evaluation)		Y (pay)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.00	0.00	0.02*	0.01	0.07	0.12
Political Ideology	0.03***	0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.91***	0.27
Gender Status	0.06**	0.02	-0.11	0.07	-0.00	0.76
Business vs. Fairness	-0.00	0.02	0.10	0.11	2.52*	1.28
Business vs. Control	-0.00	0.02	0.02	0.11	-0.79	1.27
Diluted Diversity Definition (coded)			0.14	0.18	2.99	2.12
Applicant Race			-0.40***	0.11	-2.88*	1.26
BvF X Applicant Race			-0.24	0.16	-4.11*	1.82
BvC X Applicant Race			0.01	0.16	1.90	1.78
Diluted Diversity Def. (coded) X Applicant Race			-0.42	0.26	3.68	3.00
Racial Prejudice			-0.28	0.06	-0.65	0.71
Diluted Diversity Def. (coded) X Racial Prejudice			0.28	0.20	-1.56	2.31
Applicant Race X Racial Prejudice			0.44***	0.08	3.09***	0.87
Diluted Diversity Def. (coded) X Applicant Race X Racial Prejudice			-0.34	0.29	0.46	3.33
<i>F</i>	9.10		7.96***		4.27***	
<i>R</i> ²	.06		.13		.07	

Notes. *N* = 779-780. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. Applicant race was coded such that 0 = Black applicant and 1 = White applicant. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 19.

Study 2 moderated mediation results for diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality

Predictors	M (perceived organizational morality)		Y (hiring evaluation)		Y (pay)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.12
Political Ideology	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.62**	0.22
Gender Status	-0.06	0.06	-0.08	0.06	0.41	0.75
Business vs. Fairness	0.17*	0.08	0.00	0.11	2.19	1.29
Business vs. Control	0.07	0.08	-0.02	0.11	-0.44	1.28
Perceived Org. Morality			0.34***	0.05	-0.26	0.62
Applicant Race			-0.43***	0.11	-3.01*	1.27
BvF X Applicant Race			-0.18	0.15	-3.62*	1.84
BvC X Applicant Race			0.03	0.15	1.88	1.79
Perceived Org. Morality X Applicant Race			-0.05	0.07	1.21	0.83
<i>F</i>	7.13***		15.24***		4.22***	
<i>R</i> ²	.04		.16		.05	

Notes. *N* = 806-807. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. Applicant race was coded such that 0 = Black applicant and 1 = White applicant. * *p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001.

Table 20.

Study 2 moderated mediation results with prejudice for diversity rationales on anti-Black hiring discrimination through perceived organizational morality

Predictors	M (perceived organizational morality)		Y (hiring evaluation)		Y (pay)	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Social Desirability	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.12
Political Ideology	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.84	0.27
Gender Status	-0.06	0.06	-0.09	0.06	0.11	0.76
Business vs. Fairness	0.17*	0.08	0.02	0.11	2.47	1.29
Business vs. Control	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.10	-0.11	1.28
Perceived Org. Morality			0.31***	0.05	-0.51	0.63
Applicant Race			-0.41***	0.10	-2.73*	1.26
BvF X Applicant Race			-0.20	0.15	-3.97*	1.83
BvC X Applicant Race			-0.04	0.15	1.27	1.79
Perceived Org. Morality X Applicant Race			-0.01	0.07	1.73*	0.84
Racial Prejudice			-0.26***	0.06	-5.45	0.69
Perceived Org. Morality X Racial Prejudice			0.05	0.05	0.99	0.60
Applicant Race X Racial Prejudice			0.41***	0.07	2.74***	0.86
Perceived Org. Morality X Applicant Race X Racial Prejudice			-0.07	0.06	-1.52	0.79
<i>F</i>	7.13***		14.20***		4.40***	
<i>R</i> ²	.04		.20		.07	

Notes. *N* = 806-807. Unstandardized coefficients are presented. Gender status was coded such that 0 = women, trans women, trans men, and nonbinary/genderqueer individuals and 1 = cisgender men. Applicant race was coded such that 0 = Black applicant and 1 = White applicant.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figures




Figure 1. Conceptual Model




Figure 2. Study 1 model




Figure 3. Study 2 Model for Support for D&I Initiatives




Figure 4. Study 2 Model for Anti-Black Hiring Discrimination




Figure 5. The interaction between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on perceived organizational morality in Study 1.




Figure 6. Study 1 hypothesized and exploratory model results.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 7. The interaction between diluted diversity definition (rated) and racial prejudice on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 8. The interaction between diluted diversity definition (rated) and colorblindness on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 9. The interaction between diluted diversity definition (rated) and egalitarianism on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 10. The interaction between diluted diversity definition (coded) and colorblindness on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 11. The interaction between perceived organizational morality and racial prejudice on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 12. The interaction between perceived organizational morality and racial prejudice on monetary support for D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 13. The interaction between diversity rationale condition and colorblindness on perceived organizational morality in Study 2.




Figure 14. The interaction between perceived organizational morality and colorblindness on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 15. The interaction between perceived organizational morality and colorblindness on monetary support for D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 16. The interaction between perceived organizational morality and egalitarianism on endorsement of D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 17. The interaction between perceived organizational morality and egalitarianism on monetary support for D&I initiatives in Study 2.




Figure 18. The interaction between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on pay controlling for diluted diversity definitions (coded) in Study 2.




Figure 19. The interaction between diversity rationale condition and applicant race on pay controlling for perceived organizational morality in Study 2.




Figure 20. The interaction between perceived organizational morality, colorblindness, and applicant race on pay in Study 2.




Figure 21. Study 2 hypothesized model results for endorsement of D&I initiatives.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 22. Study 2 hypothesized model results for monetary support for D&I initiatives.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 23. Study 2 exploratory model results for endorsement of D&I initiatives.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 24. Study 2 exploratory model results for monetary support for D&I initiatives.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 25. Study 2 hypothesized model results for hiring evaluations.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 26. Study 2 hypothesized model results for pay.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 27. Study 2 exploratory model results for hiring evaluations.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.




Figure 28. Study 2 exploratory model results for pay.

Note. Grey dashed lines represent non-significant relationships, black dashed lines represent a non-significant two-way interaction but significant three-way interaction, and black bolded lines represent significant relationships. Plus and minus signs indicate the direction of significant relationships.

Appendices

Appendix A

Social Dominance Orientation₇ -Egalitarianism Subscale (Ho et al., 2015)

Instructions:

Show how much you agree or disagree with each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 5 on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best.

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>

1. We should not push for group equality. (R)
2. We shouldn't try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life. (R)
3. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. (R)
4. Group equality should not be our primary goal. (R)
5. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.
6. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
7. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same chance in life.
8. Group equality should be our ideal.

Appendix B

Colorblindness (adapted from Knowles et al., 2009)

1. I wish people in this society would stop obsessing so much about race.
2. People who become preoccupied by race are forgetting that we are all just human.
3. Putting racial labels on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.
4. Race is an artificial label that keeps people from thinking freely as individuals.
5. I do not see people in terms of race.⁷
6. Colorblindness is the best way to achieve an equal society
7. When interacting with others it is best to ignore their race and instead treat them as individuals.
8. There is more that unites us than divides us.⁸

⁷ Items 5-8 were created for this study.

⁸ Item 8 was not included as apart of the final colorblindness scale because it had a low factor loading.

Appendix C

Marlowe - Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960)

Instructions: Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is *true* or *false* as it pertains to you personally.

1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (F)
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (F)
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability. (F)
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right. (F) ,
5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. (T)
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (F)
7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (T)
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (F)
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (T)
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T)
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (F)
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. (F)
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (T)

Appendix D

Mini- IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006)

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>

Instructions: Listed below are a number of statements. Read each item and indicate the extent to which each statement generally describes you by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below. I...

1. Am the life of the party.
2. Sympathize with others' feelings.
3. Get chores done right away.
4. Have frequent mood swings.
5. Have a vivid imagination.
6. Don't talk a lot. (R)
7. Am not interested in other people's problems. (R)
8. Often forget to put things back in their proper place. (R)
9. Am relaxed most of the time. (R)
10. Am not interested in abstract ideas. (R)
11. Talk to a lot of different people at parties.
12. Feel others' emotions.
13. Like order.
14. Get upset easily.
15. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. (R)
16. Keep in the background. (R)
17. Am not really interested in others. (R)
18. Make a mess of things. (R)
19. Seldom feel blue. (R)
20. Do not have a good imagination. (R)

Appendix E

Diluted Diversity Definition (rated) - (adapted from Akinol et al., 2020)

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Somewhat Disagree</i>	<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	<i>Somewhat Agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>

Managerial-Focused Diversity Definition

1. My definition of diversity focuses on representation among groups with different skills.
2. Hiring individuals with different kinds of expertise (e.g., finance, marketing, HR) contributes to the diversity of an organization.
3. My definition of diversity includes individuals with different personalities.
4. My definition of diversity includes individuals with different occupational backgrounds.

Equality-Focused Diversity Definition

5. My definition of diversity focuses on representation among historically underrepresented groups.
6. Hiring individuals with different social identities (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation) contributes to the diversity of an organization.
7. My definition of diversity includes ethnic minorities.
8. My definition of diversity includes women.

Appendix F

Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986)

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>

1. Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.
2. It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America. (R)
3. Blacks have more influence upon school desegregation plans than they ought to have.
4. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
5. Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
6. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
7. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to blacks than they deserve.

Appendix G

Support for D&I Initiatives

<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Somewhat Disagree</i>	<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	<i>Somewhat Agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>

D&I Initiatives⁹

1. An initiative to actively recruit racial minorities to apply for job openings.
2. An initiative to offer voluntary diversity training to their employees.
3. An initiative to provide racial minority employees with mentors who can assist them with job and career challenges.
4. An initiative to try to reduce subjectivity in employment practices by relying on formal criteria for making decisions about hiring and promotion.
5. An initiative to have a special office or committee that identifies barriers to diversity and works to remove those barriers.

Pro-social initiatives¹⁰

1. An initiative to invest in energy efficient technology to reduce our impact on the environment.
2. An initiative to give local public schools a large discount on newly developed products, such as tablets and computers.
3. An initiative to donate to charities and nonprofits that increase technology literacy.
4. An initiative to invest in practices to help our producers achieve sustainable relationships.
5. An initiative to create internship programs that allow students to work with the company and gain experience.

⁹ Items 1-5 were taken from Bielby (2014).

¹⁰ Items 1-3 were adapted from Van Zant and Moore (2015). Items 4 and 5 were created for this study.

Appendix H

White Resume

Greg Walsh

1721 Evans Street Los Angeles, CA
(310) 665-8881 | greg.walsh@gmail.com

EDUCATION

California State University, East Bay <i>Public Relations Certificate</i>	Hayward, CA 2019 – 2020
University of California, Riverside <i>Bachelor of Science, Marketing</i>	Riverside, CA 2014 – 2018

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

Nordstrom <i>Public Relations Assistant</i>	Los Angeles, CA July 2018 – Present
<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Prepared and formatted communications materials including fact sheets, event briefs, press releases, messaging, internal communications, images and/or videos, reports and other documents● Assisted senior management and frontline employees by setting up interviews, providing message points, and organizing PR events● Engaged with marketing and other communications teams to coordinate strategies and efforts	
Undergraduate Academic Affairs <i>Student Administrative Assistant</i>	Riverside, CA September 2015 – May 2018
<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Provided clerical and administrative support to the Executive Vice President and Provost● Addressed sensitive correspondence from central administrative offices to faculty, staff, and students of the University and delegated all administrative duties● Prepared and evaluated the accuracy of files, records, supporting documents, and spreadsheets within the department	

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

- American Marketing Association

ADDITIONAL SKILLS

- Proficient in Microsoft Office
- Experienced with major social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat, LinkedIn
- Content creation expertise using Adobe Photoshop, Canva, Infogram

Appendix I

Black Resume

Lamar Washington

1721 Evans Street Los Angeles, CA
(310) 665-8881 | lamar.washington@gmail.com

EDUCATION

California State University, East Bay <i>Public Relations Certificate</i>	Hayward, CA 2019 – 2020
University of California, Riverside <i>Bachelor of Science, Marketing</i>	Riverside, CA 2014 – 2018

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

Nordstrom <i>Public Relations Assistant</i>	Los Angeles, CA July 2018 – Present
<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Prepared and formatted communications materials including fact sheets, event briefs, press releases, messaging, internal communications, images and/or videos, reports and other documents● Assisted senior management and frontline employees by setting up interviews, providing message points, and organizing PR events● Engaged with marketing and other communications teams to coordinate strategies and efforts	

Undergraduate Academic Affairs <i>Student Administrative Assistant</i>	Riverside, CA September 2015 – May 2018
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PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

- Black Professionals Network, American Marketing Association

ADDITIONAL SKILLS

- Proficient in Microsoft Office
- Experienced with major social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat, LinkedIn
- Content creation expertise using Adobe Photoshop, Canva, Infogram