Three Essays on Race and Trust in the United States

by

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DEDICATION

For Jordan.

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ABSTRACT

Social science research has found that the benefits of social trust and related concepts like social capital and collective efficacy accrue to individuals, communities, and nations. Studies have linked social trust to economic growth, democratic governance, lower rates of community violence, positive health outcomes, and trustworthy behavior. Because social trust is thought to be beneficial to society, social scientists have expressed concern about two disconcerting patterns. First, Black Americans report relatively low levels of social trust. Second, social trust is on the decline in the United States, particularly among white Americans. These two patterns of distrust could exacerbate existing racial inequalities while making it more difficult to solve challenging collective action problems related to racial and economic inequality, police reform, and immigration. Across three empirical studies, I investigate how individual experience and social context have contributed to racial differences in trust and declining trust.

The first study focuses specifically on how discrimination in interpersonal interactions and institutional settings contributes to racial differences in trust. Findings reveal that personal experience with discrimination contributes modestly to racial differences in trust. In fact, the negative association between discrimination and generalized trust appears strongest for white adults. These findings suggest that understanding distrust requires a richer conceptual framework that moves beyond personal experience. I argue that the theory of systemic racism provides a framework for understanding distrust as a consequence of countervailing efforts to uphold and contest the racial hierarchy.

Using survey data for Chicago, the second study seeks to understand how three contextual factors—neighborhood disadvantage, income inequality, and racial diversity—relate to trust in other people, neighbors, and the police. These three social factors figure prominently in debates over declining trust in the United States. What is often left unsaid, particularly in the context of inequality and diversity, is that the real motivating interest is in understanding social change. For example, it is not diversity but rather the process of diversification, brought on by

immigration and population dynamics, fueling concern over social cohesion. In this study, I show that past levels of and changes in neighborhood social context are in many cases stronger predictors of trust than are contemporaneous conditions emphasized in earlier work. However, the relationship between social context and trust is structured by race where disadvantage and inequality are more powerful predictors of distrust for Black and Hispanic adults, while outgroup share is more strongly associated with distrust for white adults.

The final study specifically focuses on the controversial claim that increasing national diversity has contributed to declining social trust. I study this relationship by linking repeated cross-sectional survey responses with three decades of data on county racial diversity. In this study, I seek to distinguish true diversity effects from out-group threat. I find evidence of a modest negative association with trust for both diversity and, in the case of white respondents, segregation. There is little support for group threat theory and even suggestive evidence that trust increases with a rising share of the Black population for white people reporting low levels of prejudice.

Collectively, these studies show that the problem of distrust defies straightforward explanations. Because distrust appears to run deeper than individual experience or commonly cited structural conditions, I argue that future work should consider explicit challenges to the racial hierarchy as a potential source of distrust in society.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The Loss of Trust in People and Institutions

Sociologist Bernard Barber once observed, "Today nearly everyone seems to be talking about trust" (Barber 1983, 1). This remark perhaps resonates more today than it did when Barber penned his monograph *The Logics and Limits of Trust* nearly four decades ago. From Covid to the U.S. Capitol insurrection and police brutality against people of color, the events of the previous two years have conspired to propel trust back into the public spotlight. David Brooks—public intellectual and founder of the Aspen Institute's Weave community-building project—recently compared the nation's Covid response to World War II, lamenting, "That victory [in World War II] required national cohesion, voluntary sacrifice for the common good and trust in institutions and each other. America's response to Covid suggests that we no longer have sufficient quantities of any of those things" (2021). Brooks uses this timely comparison to underscore his point, but he and others are troubled by long-term declines in social cohesion that extend beyond the here and now.

The loss of trust in institutions and other people so concerning to Brooks is reflected in the General Social Survey (GSS)—one of the longest-running and widely cited barometers of national sentiment. Since 1972 our trust in other people and major social institutions like Congress, big business, the press, medicine, and organized religion has plummeted (Figure 1.1). Some trends vary by race, for example, trust in the executive branch of government appears to have increased among Black people who also generally express greater trust than white people in educational institutions, organized labor, television, and the press.[1] Black people may perceive institutions like the federal government to be relatively impartial or to afford a degree of

[1] The smoothed series only runs through 2018 making it too early to tell if the Trump presidency altered the trajectory for trust in the executive branch for Black and white respondents.

protection in a discriminatory society (Nunnally 2012). This trust does not extend to people in general. Today, less than one out of five Black GSS respondents agree most people in society can be trusted (Figure 1.1). Trust in most people or what is known as generalized trust is about twice as high for white respondents but has been on the decline in recent decades. Broadly speaking, Figure 1.1 provides empirical support for the claim that trust in institutions and people is lower than it was in previous decades.

Against the backdrop of a broad-based decline in trust, this dissertation focuses primarily on the decline and racial differences in generalized trust, that is, trust in most people. As I will discuss, generalized trust is thought by some to form the basis of cooperation and tolerance in society (Uslaner 2002, Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). Specifically, I am interested in how personal experience and social context shape patterns of distrust in the United States. In the following three empirical studies, I supplement analyses of generalized trust with complimentary assessments of trust in neighbors and trust in the police where racial differences in trust, particularly in the context of policing, also persist. In the next section, I offer a working definition of trust and describe the different types of trust identified in social science research. The remainder of the introduction, attempts to answer the question, why study trust? In the process of answering this question, I outline the contours of contemporary debates over social cohesion and trust.

Defining Trust

Before discussing why we should care about trust, it is helpful to describe what we mean by trust. Despite numerous monographs on the subject, there is no agreed-upon definition of trust. Drawing on previous scholarship, I simply define trust as the expectation that others will act toward us with goodwill and benign intent (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, Glanville and Paxton 2007, Barber 1983). This definition is usually applied to the most general form of trust. Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine how it could relate to many different types of trust relationships, from trust in family members to trust in strangers or institutions like the police. In this regard, theoretical and empirical work has identified four different types of trust: generalized trust, particularized trust, political or institutional trust, and knowledge-based trust. I will provide a brief overview of these different types of trust as they surface later in the introduction and empirical chapters.

Generalized trust is trust in strangers or people with whom we have little or no prior knowledge. This form of trust is thought to be the most important form of trust, forming the basis for cooperation and social order in society (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011, Uslaner 2002). Uslaner (2002, 18) defines it as "the belief that others share your fundamental moral values and therefore should be treated as you wish to be treated by them." Generalized trust is measured by the General Social Survey and World Values Survey with the question, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Uslaner argues people have a moral obligation to trust. However, my preference is to think of generalized trust as an indicator of the overall level of trustworthiness in society (see Hardin 2006).

In contrast, **particularized trust** is trust in specific groups such as family members, coworkers, acquaintances, or neighbors. In this case, trustors have varying degrees of prior knowledge of and experience with the trustee. Putnam (2000) refers to this form of trust as "bonding" because it joins people who are alike in contrast to "bridging" (i.e., generalized trust) which helps to form connections with out-group members.[2] Sociologists will also recognize the parallels with Granovetter's "weak" and "strong" ties (1973). Like strong ties are less useful for helping individuals to get ahead, particularized trust is thought to be less beneficial to society and possibly harmful if strong in-group bonds come at the expense of generalized trust (Banfield 1958, Newton and Zmerli 2011).

What I refer to as **institutional trust** is also described as political trust or, more often in sociology, systems trust (see Giddens 1990, Luhmann 1979). Although this form of trust may also apply to expert knowledge (e.g., medical professionals, pilots, lawyers), I am primarily concerned with government entities. Within this realm, it is important to distinguish political bodies from institutions like the judiciary and police that are responsible for upholding order (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Whereas evidence suggests that trust in Congress and the executive branches of government is highly contingent upon party control and short-term performance (Wilkes 2015, Rothstein and Stolle 2008), trust in entities like the police is grounded in perceived impartiality and fairness (Tyler 2001). Empirically, factor analyses distinguish trust in

[2] Others distinguish this form of trust from identity-based trust, for example, trust in people of the same racial, ethnic, or religious group. I use the two concepts interchangeably since both connote some degree of familiarity or knowledge.

impartial institutions like the police from trust in political entities (Rothstein and Stolle 2008).[3] An ongoing controversy in the trust literature is over the direction of the causal arrow (if one exists) between generalized and institutional trust. Rothstein and Stolle argue that institutional trust is the basis for generalized trust in society, but it is only impartial institutions like the police and courts that truly matter. Chapters 2 and 3 focus specifically on the Chicago police, an institution in which trust is highly conditioned by race.

As the term suggests, **knowledge-based trust** is based on knowledge of the trustee. This strategic conceptualization of trust is grounded in a rational choice or game-theoretic perspective. As Coleman (1990, p. 99) explains, "the elements confronting the potential trustor are nothing more or less than the considerations a rational actor applies in deciding whether to place a bet." Similarly, Hardin's (2006, p. 17) "encapsulated interest" formulation is "grounded in an assumption that the potentially trusted person has an interest in maintaining a relationship with the trustor, an interest that gives the potentially trusted person an incentive to be trustworthy." As Uslaner (2002, 17) argues, knowledge-based trust is of little interest to anyone outside of game theorists; therefore, I do not engage with this form of trust. Even Cook, Hardin, and Levi (2005, 1) admit that "the actual role of trusting relations as declined relatively. On this view, trust is no longer a central pillar of social order, and it may not even be very important in most of our cooperative exchanges, which we manage quite effectively without interpersonal trust."

One of the most important debates in the trust literature is over the relationship between generalized, particularized, and institutional trust. Specifically, some scholars argue that generalized trust is the basis for democratic governance (Putnam 2000, Uslaner 2002), while others contend that well-functioning institutions like the police are the basis for generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008) or there is a reciprocal relationship between trust and democracy (Paxton 2002). Similarly, there is a parallel debate on the relationship between generalized trust and particularized trust. Some argue that particularized trust crowds out generalized trust (Uslaner 2002) while others contend that trust in localized relationships forms the basis of generalized trust (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009, Glanville and Paxton 2007, Newton and Zmerli 2011).

[3] Using the World Values Survey, Newton and Zmerli (2011) find that trust in the police loads on the same component as trust in parliament, government, and political parties, but it also has the lowest factor loading.

These debates are nestled within a larger controversy over whether generalized trust is a stable personality disposition or a malleable quality that changes with experience (for a review see Dinesen and Bekkers 2017). If trust were strictly a personality disposition, we may expect this quality to be evenly distributed throughout the global population, making it of little interest to sociologists. However, that generalized trust varies dramatically across countries (and even regions within countries) strongly suggests a social basis for this quality. A weaker form of the dispositional perspective claims that generalized trust is based on social learning during early childhood. This perspective allows for a sociological understanding of generalized trust as a property of societies (Lewis and Weigert 1985) because early childhood learning will be influenced by social context. Still, the social learning perspective suggests that generalized trust will be relatively stable within individuals and in the aggregate as early childhood socialization practices are likely to change slowly with the larger social context. Ultimately, the socialization perspective is a pessimistic one as it suggests public policy and changes in social context will do little to stem the gradual decline in trust or to narrow racial disparities in trust.

On the other hand, the experiential perspective argues that generalized trust is malleable and subject to change with life experience (Glanville and Paxton 2007, Paxton and Glanville 2015). This perspective suggests a role for both individual experience and changes in social context to influence generalized trust. The purpose of the following dissertation chapters is not to take a definitive stance on these debates. Rather I seek to understand how personal experience and changes in social context in the form of income inequality, racial diversity, and disadvantage influence trust. Implicit in this goal is the assumption that to some degree the different forms of trust are malleable. Otherwise, there would be no point in undertaking these analyses. In contrast to previous work, I also seek to understand if the racial identity of trustors conditions the association between individual experience and social context and trust. To preview the results, generalized trust appears to be less sensitive but not completely immune to experience and context than the other forms of trust. Moreover, race does appear to play a moderating role in some contexts.

The Importance of Trust

I begin with perhaps the most essential question: should, as people like David Brooks and Robert Putnam argue, society be worried about declining trust and racial disparities in trust, or

are these concerns overwrought? The sheer volume of ink spilled in monographs on the subject (e.g., Misztal 1996, Luhmann 1979, Seligman 1997, Barber 1983, Hardin 2006, 2002, Cook 2001, Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005, Cook, Levi, and Hardin 2009, Fukuyama 1995) suggests trust is if nothing else the lifeblood of social theorists. Trust is also a central theme in contemporary writing on social capital (Coleman 1990), collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997), social interaction (Garfinkel 1963), and modernity (Giddens 1990), not to mention foundational texts concerned with the problem of social order (Durkheim 2014, Simmel 1950, 2004, Parsons 1967). Peter Blau (1964, 99) described trust as being "essential for stable social relations," while philosopher Sissela Bok (1999, 27) warned that "when it is destroyed, societies will falter and collapse." In similarly apocalyptic language, Georg Simmel (2004, 177-178) claimed, "without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate." With so much scholarly interest devoted to this topic, should the United States be worried about an imminent social collapse in the face of failing trust in institutions and each other?

Cross-national comparisons provide some solace in that most of the world's countries persist despite rampant distrust. In a recent iteration of the World Values Survey (WVS), distrusters outnumbered trustors three to one in a plurality of countries (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). France, for instance, soldiers on with trustors accounting for less than one-fifth of the population, while Brazil manages one of the world's largest economies despite distrusters outnumbering trustors nine to one. Trust, at least as measured by the WVS, is not a prerequisite for national continuity. Still, across the world, trust goes hand-in-hand with low levels of corruption, high per capita wealth, and greater income equality (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009, Delhey and Newton 2005, Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011, Rothstein and Stolle 2008).[4] Trust is also correlated with qualities many people in the United States value like "reciprocity, social connectedness, peaceful collective action, inclusiveness, tolerance, gender equality, confidence in institutions, and democracy itself" (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011, 787). Not to mention, trusting people tend to be more trustworthy (Glaeser et al. 2000).

[4] National religion is an example of a historical contingency. Cross-national comparisons find generalized trust is comparatively low in Confucian countries where strong familial ties and in-group cohesion inhibit the formation of general social trust (Fukuyama 1995, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). Likewise, trust is low in the former countries of the Soviet Union (Knack and Keefer 1997, Bjørnskov 2006).

Nonetheless, trust may be correlated with these social goods without being the primary cause (Portes and Vickstrom 2011). To quote Robert Putnam, trust and its supposed consequences are "as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti" (2000, 137). Yet, we would be remiss to ignore powerful associations with qualities like tolerance and equality that many of us value but that are more difficult to come by in low-trust countries. Even if there are other correlated social forces behind these associations, trust may be a harbinger—the proverbial canary in the coal mine—of greater social problems lying ahead.

Lastly, there is another reason to worry about distrust and, more specifically, racial disparities in distrust that is seldom if ever mentioned in the literature. This observation is based on my two-year experience living in Ukraine as a Peace Corps volunteer. Cross-national comparisons show that Ukraine has typical levels of generalized trust. However, consistent with my experience, Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011, 791) found in their analysis of the WVS that two-thirds of Ukrainians failed to complete the full battery of trust questions. Questions about people of other religions and nationalities presented the most problems, leading Delhey and colleagues to conclude that "Ukrainians have a restricted notion of 'most people.'" During my time there, many of my fellow volunteers were harassed by the police, stared at on public transportation, robbed, and assaulted. Volunteers of color were disproportionately targeted; although, I too was detained by police while entering the subway, cheated by shop keepers, burglarized, and generally viewed with suspicion by my Ukrainian coworkers. Reflecting the understanding of trust as a cognitive process (Lewis and Weigert 1985), I found the perpetual state of not being trusted or able to trust others to be psychologically exhausting. This essence is eloquently stated by Anthony Giddens (1990, 100) who cautioned, "In its most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus a state of mind which could best be summed up as existential angst and dread."

Implicit in Giddens' observation is the possibility for asymmetry in that trust does not have to be particularly helpful for distrust to be harmful. Living in Ukraine taught me to appreciate trust as a taken-for-granted privilege. More importantly, the experience taught me to fear distrust. If trust is indeed a privilege, then it is troubling that less than 20 percent of Black people feel they can trust "most people." Others have pointed to the practical implications of distrust for employment outcomes and neighborhood violence (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, Smith 2007, 2005), but what is the underappreciated psychological toll of being in a

perpetual state of distrust, constantly wondering if strangers on the street, coworkers, classmates, the police, health care providers, corporations, and the government will treat you with goodwill and benign intent. There are unexplored parallels with the established literature on racism-related vigilance (Lewis, Cogburn, and Williams 2015, Williams and Mohammed 2009) as well as research on the health benefits of trust (Kawachi et al. 1997, Subramanian, Kim, and Kawachi 2002). I will not delve into these issues here. Suffice to say, scholarship cheerleading the benefits of trust too often ignores the psychological implications of distrust. If distrust continues to mount in the United States, a larger share of the population will experience the existential angst and dread that concerned Giddens.

In this respect, static cross-national comparisons between high and low trust countries only tell part of the story and are of limited utility for trying to understand the contemporary problems in the United States that are more about social change and racial inequality. The questions we should be asking are, what happens when a high-trust country morphs into a low-trust country and what are the consequences of living in a perpetual state of distrust? Although these issues motivate my dissertation, they are not questions I seek to answer directly. I am unaware of any historical case studies examining the transition from high to low trust, while modern surveys do not allow us to follow the long arc of historical change. In Chapters 3 and 4, I return to this issue of change but in the context of trying to understand how changes in social context contribute to distrust.

Dissenting Voices on the Decline in Trust

It is also important to acknowledge that not all social scientists are concerned about declining trust. Political scientist Russell Hardin (2006), for example, argues that distrust is only a problem in so much that it reflects a decline of actual trustworthiness in society. Although I refer to "trust" throughout this dissertation, I agree with Hardin that the central issue is trustworthiness rather than trust.[5] I return to this point in Chapter 2 in the context of narrowing racial differences in trust where I argue white people and institutions have an obligation to demonstrate trustworthiness, particularly when it comes to racial inequality. I would add one caveat to Hardin's observation that in addition to actual trustworthiness, we should also be

[5] On the other hand, Uslaner (2002) argues that we have a moral imperative to trust others and that generalized trust is not a measure of perceived trustworthiness.

concerned with *perceived* trustworthiness. People may miss out on opportunities for collaboration if they mistakenly perceive others to be untrustworthy. For example, Sandra Smith (2007, 2005) illustrates how pervasive distrust of family and friends in low-income communities leads to higher unemployment because job seekers are reluctant to ask for assistance and job holders are equally resistant to offering help. Indeed, this atomistic behavior is what we may expect in societies with pervasive distrust (Barber 1983, Lewis and Weigert 1985).

Hardin downplays rising distrust, arguing as a consequence of modernization, we come in contact with far more people today through formal and informal associations than did our ancestors who more often lived in small communities where they had intimate knowledge of acquaintances and a higher degree of social closure (i.e., mechanisms for enforcing social norms like trustworthy behavior).[6] From this perspective, distrust is on the rise simply because our social networks bring us into contact with more untrustworthy people than in the past. However, much of the decline in trust in the United States happened in recent decades, well after the dramatic social changes Hardin describes. One may also wonder how Scandinavian countries managed to maintain high levels of trust while also undergoing similar social change or why substantial racial differences in trust persist in the United States. Excusing distrust as a natural consequence of modernization is not a convincing argument for why it is unproblematic for solving collective action problems or racial inequality.

Sociologists Portes and Vickstrom (2011) make perhaps the most forceful argument for why declining trust is not a problem as part of a broader critique of Putnam's work on social capital popularized in his book *Bowling Alone*. In a nutshell, Putnam argues social capital, which he defines as "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them," is on the decline in the United States to the detriment of social goods, including educational attainment, health and safety, and overall happiness (2000, 19). Putnam argues that the solution to social decline in the United States is a return to community embodied by greater participation in organizations like bowling leagues and civic organizations like the Moose Order. Portes and Vickstrom characterize Putnam's communitarian perspective as a reactionary call to return to an idealized past, one that appeals to the emotions of white, Christian American men, but does not reflect the way the world is or will be in the future, not to mention the historical social exclusion of marginalized groups (on the latter point see Arneil 2006).

[6] See Coleman (1988) for an in-depth discussion of social closure.

I find much to agree with in this critique of Putnam's theory of civic participation. There is little evidence for a long-term decline in participation in formal and informal organizations (Paxton 1999, Schwadel and Stout 2012, Clark 2015, Costa and Kahn 2003b, Ladd 1996, Arneil 2006). Likewise, empirical studies consistently fail to establish a strong causal connection between civic participation and generalized trust (Nannestad 2008, Delhey and Newton 2003, 2005, Newton 1999, Paxton 2002, Uslaner 2002, but see Brehm and Rahn 1997). Yet, it is important to recognize Putnam's theory of civic participation is distinct from concern over a loss of trust in people and institutions. Portes and Vickstrom argue social trust is unnecessary because organic solidarity, defined as heterogeneity, the division of labor, and strong coordinating institutions, is sufficient for ensuring social order but also for solving collective action problems (see also Abascal and Baldassarri 2015).

Portes and Vickstrom illustrate this point with the example of train conductors and passengers seamlessly coordinating the daily workday commute simply by following prescribed roles. In this case, overarching institutions and rule-bound roles coordinate a complex process with no need for shared community. Their theoretical articulation is worth quoting at length:

> Organic solidarity, not communitarianism, coordinates the daily lives of millions in modern society and makes possible the achievement of both individual expectations and collective goals…As Durkheim (1984 [1893]) recognized more than a century ago, organic solidarity does not lead to disaffection and anomie, but to their opposite. The emotional identification that the individual feels with her nation or her metropolis does not depend on mutual acquaintance with all their members, but rather *on shared values and the recognition of a common normative order* [emphasis added] required for the fulfillment of individual goals. This is the type of cohesion that leads people to identify as citizens of a nation, fulfill their obligation toward it, and support it in times of need (2011, 473).

One could interpret this argument as a critique of Putnam's theory of civic society but also an endorsement of the importance of generalized trust. Part of the issue is definitional. It is important to distinguish generalized trust from the particularized variant of trust that is most likely to emerge from associating with like-minded people in bowling leagues. What Portes and Vickstrom refer to as "shared values and the recognition of a common normative order" is what many trust scholars would call generalized trust or social trust. For example, Fukuyama (1995, 26) defines social trust as, "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that

community." Similarly, Uslaner (2002, 79) argues generalized trustors "believe that most people share the same fundamental values, though not necessarily the same ideology." Whether intended or not, Portes and Vickstrom appear to endorse generalized trust as a vital social force in society.

However, they provide little justification for the novel theory that organic solidarity is the source of generalized trust in society. Take for instance the example of people boarding commuter trains. The invisible hand of organic solidarity may coordinate this activity, but what about the distinct collective action problem associated with funding public transportation? Quite the opposite of what Portes and Vickstrom's theory would predict, the share of municipal budgets devoted to public goods is inversely related to local racial and ethnic diversity (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). More recently, the division of labor and strong coordinating institutions enabled multiple U.S. companies to bring to market an effective Covid vaccine under unprecedented conditions. Yet, despite this achievement, herd immunity remains elusive because too few people are willing to take the vaccine. The United States also incurred a disproportionate number of Covid deaths precisely because many people resisted mask and social distancing mandates, placing individual liberty and personal freedom ahead of the collective good (Guzman-Cottrill et al. 2021).

Ideological differences are a permanent feature of any cosmopolitan society, but between the response to Covid, the U.S. Capitol insurrection, and clashes over-policing, there is ample evidence that people no longer see each other as belonging to the same moral community governed by unifying values and norms. Although the decline in social trust and racial differences in trust are not new, recent events have made it impossible to ignore the problem of distrust and the loss of social cohesion in our society. While a lack of bowling leagues and moose lodges is an unlikely cause for our loss of social cohesion, Hardin's dismissal of distrust along with Portes and Vickstrom's appeal to organic solidarity should offer little comfort.

Social Transformation and Trust

What is lost in the misplaced emphasis on organic solidarity, is that Durkheim (2014) also warned how rapid social change could lead to anomie or normlessness (see Zhao and Cao 2010). The emergence of the knowledge economy has contributed to massive income inequality as wage growth has favored highly educated elites over people performing manual labor or working in service sector jobs that require less formal education (Powell and Snellman 2004).

Meanwhile, technological advances like the internet and social media promised to bring us together by democratizing knowledge and influence. Instead, this technology may have bolstered in-group affinities and possibly contributed to generalized distrust by fueling partisan echo chambers, misinformation, and conspiratorial thinking. As mentioned earlier, there is considerable debate in the trust literature over the extent to which particularized trust in in-group members crowds out generalized trust and the degree to which trust in people relates to trust in institutions (Uslaner 2002, Freitag and Traunmüller 2009, Glanville and Paxton 2007, Newton and Zmerli 2011, Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Contrary to what the crowding out perspective predicts, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that trust in local settings forms the basis for generalized trust (Glanville and Paxton 2007, Freitag and Traunmüller 2009, Newton and Zmerli 2011). In other words, trust in in-group members does not come at the expense of trust "most people" or institutions. However, these findings could be historically contingent and less applicable for understanding distrust during periods of rapid social change brought on by disruptive technological advances like social media.

Conclusion

I started by asking if we should be concerned about declining trust and racial differences in trust in the United States. That many countries persist with far lower levels of social trust than found in the United States would suggest that society will not "falter and collapse" because of a lack of trust alone. Still, because of the powerful correlation between trust and economic prosperity, tolerance, and democratic governance, it is reasonable to ask if these social goods will flourish in a low-trust society. The argument that organic solidarity provides sufficient social cohesion for solving serious collective action problems lacks face validity and is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile with the facts on the ground. Moreover, this perspective assumes strong coordinating institutions without specifying how these mechanisms come into existence or are maintained.[7] The apparent loss of credibility in the eyes of many Americans on the part of the Centers for Disease Control, the media, and our electoral system indicate that our coordinating institutions may not be as strong as supposed. Lastly, if for no other reason, we should care about trust because nobody wants to live with the existential angst and dread associated with distrust.

[7] Robert Putnam would argue it is trust that makes strong coordinating institutions possible.

I devoted the lion's share of the introduction to the question: why trust? The reason for this approach is the following empirical studies assume trust is a valuable social commodity and a meaningful sociological concept. If trust were unimportant, there would be no point in asking how personal experience and a changing social context shape racial differences in trust and changes in trust over time.

Chapter 2 begins with an empirical investigation of racial differences in generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in the police using the 2001-2003 Chicago Community Adult Health Study (CCAHS). Historically, scholars have attributed these well-known differences in trust to historical and contemporary forms of discrimination. Yet until recently, there has been little attempt to quantify the extent to which racial disparities in trust are attributable to experiences with discrimination. This study investigates how everyday discrimination and unfair treatment in institutional settings (e.g., employment, policing, and housing) contribute to racial differences in trust. In addition, I also explore the possibility that the strength of the association between discrimination and trust varies across racial groups and depends on the nature of the trust relationship.

Chapters 3 and 4 shift emphasis from individual experience to changes in social context. One of the most controversial topics in the trust literature is the extent to which racial diversity has contributed to declining trust. From a theoretical perspective, diversity could erode trust through group threat or what I refer to as a pure diversity effect, where coordination problems and uncertainty about group norms lead to a retreat from social life. Others contend that poverty and income inequality are far more important sources of distrust in society. Evidence for the relevance of these factors varies across studies, depending on the geographic unit of analysis and the measurement of trust. Because most studies on this issue rely on static cross-sectional data, missing from this debate is the importance of social change. For example, the process of *diversification* might more relevant than static levels of diversity to debates over immigration. Likewise, from a policy perspective, we might anticipate trust to be lower in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but the more interesting question is if a reduction in neighborhood disadvantage will result in greater trust. Chapters 3 and 4 leverage move us beyond simple static comparisons to help us understand the connection between changing social context and trust.

In Chapter 3, I merge three decades of census and homicide data for the city of Chicago with the CCAHS to investigate how change and lagged values of neighborhood disadvantage,

income inequality, and diversity relate to contemporary levels of generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in the police. Lastly, Chapter 4 merges data from the 1993-2018 General Social Survey with county and state measures of racial diversity, income inequality, and poverty to study how these social factors relate to generalized trust. In contrast to the other two empirical chapters, the goal of this study is to produce causal estimates by leveraging within-county and within-state changes in the social context variables. In both Chapters 3 and 4, I stratify the results by race to determine if the association between social contract and trust varies across racial groups.

These three empirical studies illustrate that experience with discrimination and changing social context do matter for trust. However, the association with trust is highly contingent, both on the race of the trustor but also geographic context and the nature of the trust relationship. In Chapter 5, I conclude by discussing the implications of the findings for the desirability of and potential to increase trust in society as well as the future of solving collective action problems.

Fig 1.1 Population-weighted proportion of Black and white General Social Survey respondents expressing confidence in U.S. institutions and people, 1972-2018



Note. Population-weighted proportion of Black and white General Social Survey respondents expressing “a great deal” of confidence in major U.S. social institutions or who agree “most people” can be trusted, 1972-2018. Survey responses smoothed using locally weighted polynomial regression. The police outcome is based on a 100-point feeling thermometer from the American National Election Study that has been rescaled to run from zero to one.

CHAPTER II

Narrowing Racial Differences in Trust

Introduction

On a Friday night in October of 2018, D'Arreion Toles was attempting to enter his St. Louis apartment building when a white woman blocked his path and demanded proof that he—a Black man—was a resident. The woman followed Toles to his unit, where he proved he lived there by opening the door with his keys. Despite this good-faith performance, the police showed up at Toles's door thirty minutes later, after the woman called to complain that he had made her feel uncomfortable (Gomez 2018). This is just one of a series of incidents that have gained national attention in which white people have called the police to question members of racial minorities engaged in routine activities such as taking a college campus tour, napping, or playing golf (Victor 2018). Such cases have shone a national spotlight on what sociologists have long known: Black people and other people of color face regular discrimination. Yet, whereas public interest has gravitated toward the shocking nature of these accounts and the public shaming of white perpetrators, few scholars have considered whether such experiences fundamentally alter a victim's outlook on humanity. This study explores this issue by asking whether the experience of discrimination leads victims to have less trust in people and institutions.

Survey research and qualitative studies reveal members of racial and ethnic minority groups report substantially less trust than do white people (Smith 2010). Distrust seems to pervade a range of social contexts from interpersonal relationships with friends, family, and neighbors (Smith 2005, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) to interactions with the health care and criminal justice systems (Doescher et al. 2000, Tyler 2005) to the political sphere (Avery 2006). Racial differences in generalized trust have narrowed in recent decades, but because trust has declined among white people (Wilkes 2011). To the extent that pervasive distrust impedes cooperation, it could exacerbate racial inequalities in the economic, social, and political spheres.

Previous scholarship has attributed distrust among people of color to historical and contemporary forms of discrimination (Smith 2010). Indeed, recent studies have found that the disproportionate experience of discrimination among people of color contributes to racial differences in trust (Douds and Wu 2017, Wilkes and Wu 2019). However, these studies did not distinguish discrimination in routine social interactions from mistreatment in institutional settings. More importantly, the theoretical relationship between discrimination and trust remains underdeveloped, particularly in the literature on generalized trust. This study draws on the social learning perspective on trust and concepts from the systemic conceptualization of racism to inform our understanding of distrust. By showing that distrust is deeply embedded in the racialized structure of society, this work challenges the communitarian approach to social capital which advocates for civic participation as a solution to the problem of distrust in the United States (e.g., Putnam 2000).

Using multidimensional measures of discrimination and trust from the Chicago Community Adult Health Study, I investigate when and for whom discriminatory experiences are most salient to trust. I find that experience with discrimination contributed only modestly to Black-white and Hispanic-white differences in trust. Furthermore, even though white people are least likely to experience discrimination, perceived unfair treatment proved to be most detrimental to generalized trust for this group. These findings imply that social scientists must look beyond individual experience with discrimination to consider how more complex problems related to systemic racism contribute to distrust among people of color. Moreover, this study provides evidence for an emergent theory that challenges to race-based privilege have contributed to a long-term decline in generalized trust among white people (Wilkes 2011, Arneil 2010).

Background

Racial Disparities in Trust

Drawing on previous scholarship, I conceptualize trust as the expectation that others will act with goodwill and benign intent (Barber 1983, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013). Trust may occur in interpersonal relationships with strangers or people we know, as well as in interactions with faceless institutions (Glanville and Paxton 2007). For this reason, scholars distinguish *generalized trust*, that is, abstract trust in strangers from

particularized trust, trust in people we know or specific groups, and *trust in institutions* such as the political and criminal justice systems (Newton and Zmerli 2011). One of the most persistent findings in the trust literature is that Black and Hispanic people report substantially lower levels of trust than do white people across these different domains (Smith 2010).

According to the 2018 General Social Survey (GSS), 36 percent of white, 25 percent of Hispanic, and 17 percent of Black respondents agreed that "most people" could be trusted.[8] This commonly used measure of generalized trust shows that racial differences in trust have narrowed in recent decades as a result of declining trust among the white population, but the general pattern has held over time and across related measures such as the perceived helpfulness and fairness of others (Wilkes 2011). Moreover, Black-white differences in generalized trust persist after controlling for individual and community socioeconomic characteristics (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Abascal and Baldassarri 2015). A more limited number of studies have found that Hispanic people report higher levels of trust than Black people, but Hispanic-white differences also remain after controlling for community characteristics (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015, Rahn et al. 2009).

Some have argued that the GSS trust question overstates racial differences in trust because survey respondents may interpret "most people" relative to the majority white population, making the question an in-group measure of trust for white people and an out-group measure of trust for people of color (Simpson, McGrimmon, and Irwin 2007). While this may be true, the criticism does not invalidate the question, as the benefits of trust are not limited to intra-racial social interactions. Distrust may lead to forgone opportunities, regardless of the race of the trustee. We may not expect people of color and white people to trust "most people" to the same extent but that does not mean that very low levels of trust among people of color are not problematic for individuals and society.

Moreover, racial differences also prevail in the context of particularized trust—trust in specific people or groups. For example, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) found that after controlling for sociodemographic and community characteristics, Black and Hispanic respondents reported lower levels of trust in neighbors as well as specific racial groups, including toward in- and out-group members. Similar patterns of distrust are also found in institutional settings, particularly in the context of policing. Given the history of racially biased

[8] Author's tabulation.

policing in the United States, it is perhaps unsurprising that recent national surveys find that about 83 percent of white respondents have confidence in community police compared to 52 percent of Black and 63 percent of Hispanic respondents (Krogstad 2014).

Narrowing Racial Differences in Trust

In light of pervasive racial differences in trust, it is understandable that researchers would focus on explaining why people of color report a high degree of distrust relative to white people. As the title of this study suggests, my concern extends beyond explaining distrust to thinking critically about how racial differences in trust may narrow in the future. To this end, it is important to understand that racial differences in trust could close because trust increases among people of color or trust declines among white people. In a departure from previous work, the present study draws on the social learning perspective on trust and concepts from the systemic conceptualization of racism to investigate the implications of discrimination for narrowing the racial differences in trust.

The Social Learning Perspective on Trust

The idea that discriminatory experiences influence trust in people and institutions is consistent with the social learning perspective on the roots of trust. This perspective holds that trust is a malleable quality, subject to continual updating based on life experience (Paxton and Glanville 2015, Glanville and Paxton 2007, Freitag and Traunmüller 2009, Hardin 2002). As Hardin (2002, 113) explains, "experience molds my expectations of trustworthiness….even my capacities for assessing trustworthiness will reflect a commonsense learning process." The salience of life experience to trust is evident from empirical studies finding that generalized trust correlates with negative experiences such as divorce, unemployment, and crime victimization, as well as positive experiences related to social relationships and well-functioning institutions (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Laurence 2015, Rothstein and Stolle 2008, Paxton and Glanville 2015, Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013). In this respect, discrimination is a particularly pernicious type of experience, one that provides valuable information about the potential trustworthiness of people and institutions.

In the following sections, I discuss the implication of the social learning perspective for three facets of the discrimination-trust relationship. The first relates to the salience of discrimination to different forms of trust. The second deals with the possibility that discriminatory experiences account for less of observed racial differences in trust than previously

believed. Lastly, I will discuss the possibility that because of racial socialization the effects of discriminatory experiences on trust may differ across racial groups.

Trust and Discrimination as Multidimensional Concepts

Previous studies have either focused on a single type of trust or did not distinguish discrimination in routine social interactions from unfair treatment in institutional settings like policing or the labor and housing markets. This has limited our understanding of how efforts to reduce discrimination through education and legislation may affect different trust relationships. The first insight from the social learning perspective is that discrimination and trust should correlate when embedded in the same social context because trust in particular people and institutions derives from localized experiences (Glanville and Paxton 2007). Perhaps the most straightforward example of this relationship is that trust in the police is largely determined by how the police interact with community members (Tyler and Huo 2002). Similarly, discrimination in everyday social interactions should affect trust in particular people like coworkers or neighbors. While this one-to-one correspondence between discrimination and trust is intuitive, the social learning perspective leaves open the possibility for more interesting cross-over effects. Because the perspective holds that individuals assess the trustworthiness of others by generalizing from previous experiences, discrimination in one setting should affect trust in other settings.

For example, Tyler and Huo (2002) argue that because the police represent community norms and values, police interactions shape trust in community members at large. The present study extends this work by investigating if police treatment is associated with generalized trust more broadly. Conversely, there is also evidence from Belgium that discrimination in other social contexts erodes trust in the police (Van Craen 2013). Yet, this study did not distinguish unfair treatment in institutional settings from discrimination in routine social interactions. The ability to distinguish between different forms of discrimination in the present study will reveal if the police represent the values and norms of social institutions or individuals in society.

Crucially, the social learning perspective also predicts that generalized trust is formed from the summation of past experiences in other trust relationships, for example, with coworkers and store workers (Glanville and Paxton 2007, 232). Therefore, discriminatory experiences in routine social interactions and intuitional settings should undermine generalized trust. Specifically, political scientists argue that “impartial institutions” like the police undergird

generalized trust because they symbolize the moral standards of society (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). To my knowledge, the present study is the first to investigate if discrimination in other supposedly impartial settings like the labor and housing market or routine social interactions also undermines generalized trust. It is also important to acknowledge a competing alternative to the social learning perspective that regards trust as a personality characteristic or the product of early childhood socialization (Uslaner 2002). In contrast to the social learning perspective, this dispositional perspective predicts that generalized trust will be immune to experiences like discrimination. Consistent with the view that the two perspectives are not entirely incompatible (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009), I will discuss the possibility that the salience of discriminatory experiences to racial differences in trust is determined by the racial structure of society.

Discrimination, Systemic Racism, and Racial Differences in Trust

Discrimination is defined as unequal treatment based on a characteristic such as race or gender (Pager and Shepherd 2008). Members of the Black and Hispanic communities are more likely than white people to experience discrimination, both in institutional settings such as employment, housing, and policing and in daily social interactions (Weitzer and Tuch 2005, Pager and Shepherd 2008, Feagin 1991). Because the social learning perspective predicts that negative experience with discrimination will be associated with distrust, disproportionate exposure to unfair treatment in these different contexts could explain why members of the Black and Hispanic communities consistently report lower levels of trust than do white people. Indeed, previous scholarship has attributed racial differences in trust to historical and contemporary forms of discrimination (Smith 2010). Few studies on trust fail to mention differences between Black and white people or to attribute these differences to discrimination (Uslaner 2002, Thomas and Hughes 1986, Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). As Brehm and Rahn explain, "Being a member of a minority increases one's chances of being a victim of prejudice or discrimination [and] may lead to heightened self-consciousness, which may contribute to a suspiciousness of one's surroundings and the motives of others" (1997, 1009). Consistent with the social learning perspective, recent efforts to study the empirical relationship between discrimination and trust have likewise emphasized direct experience with unfair treatment.

In a study of Houston-area residents, Douds and Wu (2017) found that discrimination partially explained the relationship between race and generalized trust in that controlling for this factor narrowed the Black-white and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic-white differences. The results

indicate that discrimination accounted for nearly half of the Black-white difference but only 12 percent of the Hispanic-white difference in trust. Likewise, Wilkes and Wu (2019) found that in Canada, the experience of discrimination explained approximately 20 to 50 percent of the difference in generalized and particularized trust between the native-born white population and people of color, including those who were native-born, foreign-born, and indigenous. However, for theoretical and empirical reasons, these studies may have overstated the importance of discriminatory experiences to racial differences in trust.

Although previous studies found that discrimination contributed to distrust, much of the difference with white people remained unexplained, suggesting that distrust runs deeper than individual experience. Relatedly, contemporary race scholars have challenged social scientists to consider the systemic aspects of racism (Feagin 2006, Bonilla-Silva 2001, 1997). From this perspective, direct experience with discrimination is one aspect of a larger system of racial oppression or what Bonilla-Silva succinctly refers to as the "totality of social relations and practices that enforce white privilege" (2018, 9). In addition to discrimination, this system encompasses racist framing, ideologies, stereotypes, and institutions developed by white people to enforce white privilege (Feagin 2006). Together, these factors reproduce inequality in material outcomes like wealth and employment but may also contribute to inequality in attitudes like the perceived trustworthiness of other people and institutions. Discrimination is just one manifestation of systemic racism, but as a consequence of individual prejudice, it is perhaps most amenable to efforts to "cure" racism through anti-discrimination education and legal efforts to discourage discrimination in institutional contexts. On the other hand, finding that discriminatory experiences contribute little to distrust would suggest that racial inequality in trust is more deeply embedded in the racialized structure of society.

An important limitation of earlier studies is that they used ad hoc measures of discrimination that could have overstated the contribution of discrimination to distrust. For example, Douds and Wu (2017) relied on a question asking specifically about discrimination based on ethnicity. Single-item questions such as these have poor reliability and low correlation with validated, multi-item measures like those used in the present study (Krieger et al. 2005). Also problematic, previous studies explicitly asked about racial or ethnic discrimination. Some scholars have argued that questions making race explicit may lead to over-reporting of discrimination because of a desire to please interviewers or the misattribution of past negative

experiences to discrimination (Lewis, Cogburn, and Williams 2015, Williams and Mohammed 2009, Gomez and Trierweiler 2001). As Lewis and colleagues (2015) have emphasized, a focus on racial discrimination also ignores the reality that people often occupy more than one socially disadvantaged identity while neglecting experiences like gender discrimination and discrimination based on sexual orientation that could affect trust among white people. Even among people of color, Krieger and colleagues (2005) found a nontrivial 30 percent of Black and 60 percent of Hispanic respondents attributed everyday discrimination to some attribute other than race. Previous studies have paid less attention to white people, but as I discuss in the next section, the relationship between discrimination and trust is also of substantive interest for this group.

Racial Socialization and the Varying Effects of Discrimination on Trust across Racial Groups

At the same time that the social learning perspective suggests that the experience of discrimination will be negatively associated with trust, it leaves open the possibility that discrimination will not affect all people or groups in the same way. One important caveat to the social learning perspective is that the salience of experience to trust depends in part on prior expectations. As Paxton and Glanville explain, "If social encounters influence trust, then experiences that are inconsistent with prior expectations should be more likely to change assessments of trust than experiences that are consistent with prior expectations" (2015:200). In a racialized society, expectations for future treatment and the trustworthiness of others are formed through the process of racial socialization.

Nearly all Black parents and a majority of Hispanic parents prepare their children to anticipate discrimination from a young age (Hughes 2003, Nunnally 2012). This form of socialization is particularly common in the context of policing where Black and Hispanic parents teach their children how to handle police interactions (Brunson and Weitzer 2011). Furthermore, highly publicized race-related events like instances of police brutality also reinforce tacit knowledge of discrimination, independent of individual experience with discrimination (Williams and Mohammed 2009, 2013). The advent of social media and cellphone cameras has made it easier to record and disseminate video recordings of mistreatment, making knowledge of discrimination available to a wider audience. Because of socialization and indirect experience, knowledge of racial oppression is likely to be factored into assessments of trustworthiness. This

is not to discount the harm of discrimination but rather to point out that direct experience is just one factor shaping trust.

White people also experience racial socialization or what Bonilla-Silva (2018, 121) refers to as white habitus, which he defines as "a racialized, uninterrupted socialization process that conditions and creates whites' racial taste, perceptions, feelings, and emotions and their views on racial matters." Through socialization, white children acquire negative views of people of color, while also developing a positive sense of white identity and privilege (Feagin 2006). Because whiteness is normalized and mainstream, white identity often goes unnoticed (Bonilla-Silva, Goar, and Embrick 2006, Doane 2003). However, recent structural changes to the economic, political, and social landscape have challenged white privilege, making white people more aware of their racial identities (Doane 2003). Indeed, perceptions of white victimization and reverse discrimination are central to contemporary color-blind frames that simultaneously deny the importance of racism to racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva 2018). The experience of discrimination runs counter to expectations for fair or even deferential treatment that are synonymous with white privilege (Feagin 2006). The social learning perspective suggests that the disruption to the status quo will undermine white people's faith in the trustworthiness of people and institutions.

Consistent with the framework developed here, earlier studies show that the effects of discrimination vary across racial and ethnic groups. For instance, a study of European Union member states found a negative association between discrimination and generalized trust among native-born individuals, but not among first- and second-generation immigrants (Dinesen 2010, Dinesen and Hooghe 2010). Even though immigrants are likely to be victims of discrimination, this experience appeared to have little influence on generalized trust among this group. Similarly, the anticipation of discrimination was not associated with trust in neighbors, store clerks, congregants, and coworkers in a study of Black adults in the United States (Nunnally 2012). In the context of policing, there is also evidence that vicarious knowledge of police behavior shapes attitudes toward the police among members of the Black and Hispanic communities (Weitzer 2002) but that direct experience is most salient for white people's attitudes (Rosenbaum et al. 2005, Tyler and Huo 2002). However, others have found that the consequences of police interactions on perceptions of the police do not vary by race or in some cases are stronger for racial and ethnic minorities (Weitzer and Tuch 2005, Tyler 2005). Overall, there is suggestive

but inconclusive evidence that dominant groups may react more negatively to direct experience with discrimination but that this relationship may vary across different types of trust.

Present Study

The present study uses a comprehensive set of discrimination measures that distinguish isolated incidents of unfair treatment in institutional contexts from discrimination in routine social interactions. I use the analytic concepts of mediation and moderation to investigate the implications of discrimination for narrowing racial differences in trust. Importantly, these approaches answer two distinct questions. Mediation asks if the disproportionate experience of discrimination among people of color explains racial differences in trust. Meanwhile, moderation asks if the effects of discrimination on trust vary across racial groups. Together, these analyses contribute to our understanding of if racial differences in trust are more likely to narrow because of increasing trust among people of color or decreasing trust among white people. The study addresses the following research questions in relation to specific examples of generalized, particularized, and institutional trust.

1. Does the association between race, discrimination, and trust vary depending on the context in which discrimination takes place and on the nature of the trust relationship?
2. Does disproportionate experience with discrimination explain why people of color report lower levels of trust than do white people?
3. Does the strength of the association between the different types of discrimination and trust vary across racial and ethnic groups?

Methods

Data

This study draws on data from the Chicago Community Adult Health Study (CCAHS), a multistage probability sample of 3,105 adults ages 18 and older living in Chicago. Survey responses were collected during interviews conducted from May 2001 to March 2003 with a 71.8 percent response rate. All descriptive statistics and models incorporated post-stratification survey weights to account for complex survey design, such that the weighted sample matches the 2000 Census Chicago population for race and ethnicity, gender, and age (Morenoff et al. 2007). I used listwise deletion to handle missing data as all predictors were missing values on less than 1.1 percent of observations. Because of missing data on the dependent variables, the analytic sample

depended on the outcome of interest: trust in most people (n=2990), trust in neighbors (n=2854), and trust in community police (n=2893).

Analytic Strategy

I began by exploring the general relationship between discrimination and trust by estimating logistic regression models using the -svy- commands in Stata 15.1 to account for the CCAHS's complex sampling design and clustering at the neighborhood level. Results are reported on a probability scale as average marginal effects to ease interpretation. These initial models identify which forms of discrimination are associated with the three outcomes: trust in most people, trust in neighbors, and trust in police. Although several covariates were highly correlated, a check for multicollinearity showed that the maximum variance inflation factor was 5.0 for perceptions of neighborhood safety but less than 2.6 for all remaining variables, indicating that multicollinearity was not a significant problem.

I then performed a formal mediation analysis using the Karlson, Holm, and Breen (KHB) decomposition method to estimate the unique contribution of each form of discrimination to racial differences in trust while controlling for a comprehensive set of confounders. The KHB method overcomes problems with comparing coefficients across nested non-linear probability models by re-parametrizing the models so they have identical scale factors and error distributions (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013, Kohler, Karlson, and Holm 2011). Re-parameterization allows for a comparison of coefficients across models that control and do not control for discrimination. The reduction in the coefficients for Black and Hispanic signifies the extent to which discrimination accounts for (or mediates) racial differences in trust after controlling for other confounders. I conclude with a moderation analysis to investigate if the association between discrimination and trust varies across racial groups by adding race-by-discrimination interactions to the base models. I report the results from the moderation analysis by plotting the average marginal effect for each form of discrimination by race and by comparing the magnitudes across racial groups.

Dependent variables. The study measured trust with three binary indicators that represent the theoretical constructs of generalized trust, particularized trust, and trust in institutions. Consistent with previous work, I operationalized generalized trust with a question asking, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Possible responses were "Most can be trusted" or "You can't be

too careful in dealing with people." Measures capturing particularized trust and trust in institutions, respectively, asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the statements "People in this neighborhood can be trusted" and "The police in your local community can be trusted." For trust in neighbors and trust in community police, I dichotomize responses into the categories "trusting" and "not trusting" by grouping the responses "agree" with "strongly agree" and "disagree" with "strongly disagree." Note that trust in neighbors and the police are specific examples of particularized and institutional trust rather than validated measures of these constructs.

Types of discrimination. The study also integrated an extensive set of discrimination measures to capture major incidences of unfair treatment in institutional settings, everyday discrimination in routine social interactions, and vigilance or the anticipation of discrimination in social interactions. These individual items and validated scales are widely used by health scholars but have yet to be adopted in studies of trust where ad hoc measures of discrimination have prevailed. The CCAHS used a two-part formulation to measure major incidents and everyday discrimination, first asking respondents if they experienced unfair treatment in a given context and then asking about the reason for unfair treatment in a follow-up question (Williams et al. 1997, Kessler, Mickelson, and Williams 1999). Consistent with several earlier studies, I used only the first question asking about unfair treatment (Hicken et al. 2014).

Major discrimination events were assessed with three binary variables indicating if respondents had ever experienced unfair treatment in hiring, been unfairly fired, or been denied a promotion; been unfairly stopped, searched, questioned, physically threatened, or abused by the police; and been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood. I did not combine the indicators on a single scale as they were not intended to be indicators of an underlying construct (Williams, Neighbors, and Jackson 2003).

The everyday discrimination scale—the most widely used measure of discrimination—assessed the frequency with which respondents experience relatively minor but chronic forms of mistreatment in social interactions (Williams and Mohammed 2009). The five-item Likert scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.75$) asked respondents how frequently (1) they are treated with less courtesy or respect than others; (2) they receive poorer service than others at restaurants or stores; (3) people act as if they think they are not smart; (4) people act as if they are afraid of them; and (5) they are threatened or harassed. I generated the everyday discrimination index by averaging the

five possible responses (*never, less than once a year, a few times a year, a few times a month,* and *at least once a week*) across all items. Scale values ranged from zero (*never experienced discrimination*) to four (*experienced discrimination at least once a week on average*).

The anticipation of discrimination was measured using the heightened vigilance index assessing how often respondents anticipate and prepare for discrimination in daily social interactions (Hicken et al. 2014). The four-item Likert scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.74$) asked respondents to assess how often they (1) prepare for possible insults from other people before leaving home; (2) feel that they always have to be very careful about their appearance; (3) carefully watch what they say and how they say it; and (4) try to avoid certain social situations and places. In addition to being of substantive interest, controlling for the anticipation of discrimination may mitigate the problem of reverse causation in that less trusting people could be more likely to view mistreatment as discriminatory. The process for generating the heightened vigilance index was the same as for the everyday discrimination scale.

Other covariates. I also controlled for socioeconomic circumstances, life experiences, and personality characteristics that previous studies have found to predict trust. These variables include race and ethnicity, categorized in this study as non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and other (Native American, Asian, and Pacific Islander). I include the category "other" in the analysis but do not discuss the results because of the small number of respondents and the category's multiracial composition. Basic sociodemographic controls included sex, age, educational attainment, homeownership, years in current residence, nativity, language spoken at home (Spanish or other), and status as a parent of a non-adult child. I categorized education into four groups (less than 12 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, and 16 or more years). Finally, I accounted for negative life experiences, neighborhood conditions, and personality characteristics that previous studies have found to be associated with trust (Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013, Uslaner 2002, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Smith 1997, Laurence 2015, Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh 2001). Specifically, I included three controls measuring perceptions of neighborhood safety, friendship diversity (number of diverse types of friends a person had), and if the respondent was an active participant in at least one civic organization. Likewise, I included a count of negative life events experienced in the past five years. I also controlled for early childhood socialization with a two-item parental affection scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.81$) and for personality with an optimism scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.65$).

Results

Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for all covariates for observations with no missing data. Black respondents reported lower levels of trust across all three outcomes but were also more likely than white and Hispanic respondents to experience each form of discrimination. Black-white differences were particularly stark for employment and policing, where approximately 40 percent of Black respondents reported unfair treatment. Black respondents were also most likely to report everyday discrimination in routine social interactions and the anticipation of discrimination. In comparison, Hispanic-white differences were considerably smaller and negligible in the case of employment and everyday discrimination. The attribution-free measures of discrimination adopted in this study indicate that the experience of discrimination among Hispanic respondents more closely mirrors that of white respondents. The remainder of the table shows that there were also differences across races in the distribution of the other covariates.

Relationship between Discrimination and Trust

Table 2.2 summarizes the racial differences in trust while also identifying which forms of discrimination are most salient to different trust relationships. The table reports average marginal effects for logistic regression models that predict each of the three trust outcomes. The first set of models for each trust outcome reports unadjusted racial differences in trust on a probability scale, while the second model under each heading adjusts for discrimination and all covariates previously described. The unadjusted results in Model 1 indicate that Black respondents were 40.3 percentage points less likely than white respondents to report trust in most people whereas the Hispanic-white trust difference was 33.2 percentage points. The addition of the discrimination measures and other covariates in Model 2 narrowed these differences considerably but to a greater extent for Hispanic than Black respondents. The remaining models indicate that large Black-white differences persisted for trust in neighbors and trust in police. Moreover, the addition of an extensive set of covariates left between 47 and 64 percent of the Black-white trust difference unexplained across the three trust outcomes. On the other hand, the unadjusted Hispanic-white difference for trust in neighbors and trust in police was relatively modest and, in the case of trust in neighbors, almost entirely accounted for by the controls.

This preliminary analysis also shows that the association between discrimination and trust depends on the nature of unfair treatment and the trust context. Although all forms of

discrimination were negatively associated with trust in most people in Model 2, only heightened vigilance was statistically significant, indicating that trust declined by 3.3 percentage points for a one-point increase in this five-point scale. On the other hand, everyday discrimination was the only discrimination measure to predict trust in neighbors, where a one-point increase in the scale was associated with a 3.6 percentage point decline in trust in neighbors. Experience mattered most in the context of policing, where unfair treatment in employment and in policing was negatively associated with trust in the police, as was everyday discrimination. The next two parts of the analysis build on these findings by distinguishing the extent to which each form of discrimination contributes to distrust and investigating if the strength of the association between the different types of discrimination and trust varies across racial groups.

Contribution of Discrimination to Racial Differences in Trust

Table 2.3 displays the results of the KHB decomposition showing the extent to which each form of discrimination contributed to racial differences in trust. The estimate at the top left of the table corresponds to a reduced model indicating that the probability of trusting most people was 29.4 percentage points lower for Black than for white respondents after controlling for all confounders except for discrimination. The addition of the discrimination variables in the full model reduced the Black-white trust difference to 25.9 percentage points (a 3.4 percentage point reduction). The table shows that combined, the discrimination variables explained only 11.6 percent of the Black-white difference in trust in most people that remained after controlling for the other confounders. Heightened vigilance alone explained 5.7 percent of the trust difference, accounting for about half of the total explained by all discrimination variables. Overall, similar results prevailed for Hispanic respondents in the bottom portion of the table, where discrimination accounted for 22.2 percent of the Hispanic-white difference in generalized trust, of which heightened vigilance was the primary contributor.

Model 2 indicates that discrimination accounted for a relatively modest 10.4 percent and 18.7 percent of the Black-white and Hispanic-white difference, respectively, for trust in neighbors. However, in this instance, everyday discrimination and unfair treatment by police were the most important explanatory factors, further underscoring the relevance of direct experience to particularized trust. Finally, Model 3 indicates that discriminatory experiences were most salient in the context of trust in the police, accounting for 18.2 percent of the Black-

white difference and 27.5 percent of the Hispanic-white difference. Not surprisingly, unfair treatment by police was the largest contributor, but everyday discrimination was also relevant.

Overall, discrimination never explained more than 10 to 28 percent of the racial trust difference across the three trust outcomes. Moreover, in the case of generalized trust, it was the anticipation of discrimination rather than direct experience with unfair treatment that proved to be most salient for trust. Across all three trust outcomes, the discrimination variables explained a larger percentage of the trust difference with white adults for Hispanic than for Black adults. This finding is consistent with the social learning perspective because it suggests that experience factors into assessments of trustworthiness to a greater extent for Hispanic people, who are less likely than Black people to be socialized to anticipate discrimination.

Association between Discrimination and Trust Varies Across Racial Groups

The final analytic step investigated whether the relationship between discrimination and trust varied across racial groups. Figure 2.1 plots the average marginal effect for each form of discrimination by race. The figure is based on the results of logistic regression models reported in Appendix Tables A.1-A.3. In these models, I interacted race with each form of discrimination while controlling for all discrimination variables and covariates used in earlier models. I introduced the interaction terms one at a time to limit the number of interactions in any one model. In Figure 2.1, average marginal effects that were significantly different from zero ($p<0.05$) are shaded black. The first panel shows that for white respondents, three out of the five discrimination measures were associated with lower levels of trust in most people. In contrast, none of the discrimination measures were significant for Black and Hispanic respondents for this outcome. For example, white respondents who experienced unfair treatment in policing were 12.7 percentage points less likely to trust most people relative to those who never experienced unfair treatment. Similarly, for a one-unit increase in the everyday discrimination and heightened vigilance scales trust in most people declined 5.5 and 6.6 points, respectively, for white respondents.

The dashed lines in the first panel indicate where the average marginal effect was smaller for Black and Hispanic adults than for white adults ($p<0.10$). Black-white differences in the average marginal effects were significant for four out of five discrimination measures, including in employment, policing, and heightened vigilance ($p<0.05$) and in everyday discrimination ($p<0.10$). Overall, the average marginal effects were similar for Hispanic and white people

except for unfair treatment in policing, which was negatively associated with trust in most people for white but not Hispanic respondents.

In contrast, the middle panel indicates that only everyday discrimination was associated with lower trust in neighbors. This association was significant for Black and Hispanic people, but of similar magnitude for white people. The unanticipated positive association between unfair treatment in moving to a neighborhood and trust in neighbors for Hispanic and Black respondents could reflect positive feelings about current neighbors that contrast with unfair treatment during previous moves.

The third panel examined trust in community police. Although the absence of dashed lines indicates that none of the racial differences in average marginal effects reached statistical significance, white respondents were the only group to have significant negative associations for unfair treatment in employment and everyday discrimination. Unfair treatment in policing was related to lower trust among all racial groups, but the negative effect was approximately 7 percentage points higher for white relative to Black people. Overall, Figure 2.1 shows that discrimination was more salient for white respondents than for Black and Hispanic respondents in the context of generalized trust and, to a lesser extent, trust in police.

Discussion

A persistent finding in the trust literature is that white people in the United States report substantially higher levels of trust relative to people of color and Black people in particular. Previous scholarship has attributed racial differences in trust to historical and contemporary forms of discrimination. Several empirical studies have found support for this theory, but these studies relied on one-dimensional measures of discrimination that may have overstated the importance of discrimination to racial differences in trust. Moreover, these studies did not consider that the association between discrimination and trust may depend on context or vary across racial groups. The present study advances our understanding of the relationship between race, discrimination, and trust by illustrating when and for whom discriminatory experiences are most salient.

First, the results presented here challenge the hypothesis that the experience of discrimination explains contemporary distrust among people of color. Previous work found that discrimination explained upwards of 50 percent of the difference in generalized trust in Houston

and a national sample of Canadians (Douds and Wu 2017, Wilkes and Wu 2019). In the present study, the combined discrimination measures never accounted for more than 18 and 28 percent of the Black-white and Hispanic-white difference, respectively, across all three trust outcomes. This discrepancy is not explained by the more comprehensive set of controls used here, as similar results prevailed after excluding all confounders from the mediation analysis and when assessing the discrimination measures one at a time. Furthermore, a supplemental analysis (available upon request) using follow-up questions asking about the main reason for unfair treatment found that discrimination attributed to race or ethnicity did not account for distrust any more than the general discrimination measure used in the main analysis. The most likely explanation for why the results of the present study diverged from earlier findings is that this study measured the prevalence of discrimination with questions asking about unfair treatment in general, whereas earlier studies used single-item questions asking specifically about racial or ethnic discrimination. Although there is no agreed-upon framework for measuring discrimination, the present study provides an important counterpoint to previous work by taking advantage of the most commonly used measures of discrimination.

Whereas the results of earlier studies imply that the problem of distrust could be solved largely by eliminating discrimination in social interactions, as I will discuss, the present study shows that distrust runs deeper than discriminatory experiences. This view is supported by long-term trends in generalized trust, where levels of trust among Black people have held relatively stable over the previous four decades (Wilkes 2011) despite a dramatic decline in overt racial prejudice among white people over the same period (Bobo et al. 2012).

Secondly, the results illustrate that the debate over if trust is socially learned or a personality disposition is an oversimplification of reality. At first glance, the initial descriptive results in Table 2.2 appear to support the dispositional perspective in that generalized trust was associated with the anticipation of discrimination but not experience with discrimination. However, the moderation analysis revealed a strong association between discriminatory experiences and generalized trust but only for white respondents. This finding is consistent with the caveat to the social learning perspective that experience is most salient when it runs counter to expectations (Paxton and Glanville 2015). A major implication of these findings is that the social learning perspective must be understood in the broader context of racial oppression, where

racial socialization has conditioned people of color and white people to have divergent expectations about the trustworthiness of others.

Unfair treatment in policing, everyday discrimination, and heightened vigilance were all negatively associated with generalized trust for white people but not for Black or Hispanic people. The finding that unfair treatment by police was associated with substantially lower levels of generalized trust among white people is consistent with the view that people see the police as being responsible for upholding the racial hierarchy (Weitzer 2017). As Sunshine and Tyler (2003, 154) explain, the police reflect "a community's moral values and therefore are regarded as prototypical group authorities, who are defending group norms." Perceived mistreatment by the police undermines white racial privilege in a way that causes white people to question fundamental values like the trustworthiness of others. More work is needed to understand if the police are a special kind of institution or if perceived unfairness in other institutional contexts where white people have historically been privileged, such as higher education, government, and the media also undermines generalized trust for the white population.

Similarly, the negative association between discrimination and trust in the police was generally strongest for white people, even if the differences between races were not significant. The fact that unfair treatment in employment and everyday social interactions was associated with distrust in the police for white people reinforces the idea that the police are an institution responsible for upholding white privilege. It appears that the inability of the police to protect against unfair treatment in other institutional and social contexts undermines trust in this institution. On the contrary, the salience of discrimination to trust in neighbors was similar across racial groups. The effects of everyday discrimination were somewhat stronger for Black and Hispanic respondents, indicating that experience plays a direct role in shaping trust in specific people. Future work may consider ways in which microaggressions affect trust in more familiar settings like the workplace and classrooms. The present study provides evidence that, if effective, efforts to reduce micro-aggressions in routine social interactions could increase trust in localized contexts.

Limitations

Although the theoretical connection between discrimination and trust is causal, the study's cross-sectional design can only identify associations and cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causation. For example, distrusting individuals are more apt to perceive discrimination in

ambiguous situations. As Bonilla-Silva (2018) has argued in the context of racial discrimination, it is also important to distinguish white people's actual experiences from ideological frames emphasizing reverse discrimination. I reduced the possibility of confounding by including a comprehensive set of controls related to socioeconomic status, life experience, and personality. While it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of reverse causation, the heightened vigilance measure controlled for the propensity to perceive discrimination in ambiguous situations. Future studies could obtain causal estimates of the relationship between discrimination and various forms of trust by using panel data or by adopting an experimental design levering exogenous events to manipulate the experience of discrimination. It is also important to recognize the indirect effects of discrimination that operate through racial inequalities in factors like educational attainment and neighborhood safety that also predict trust (Bonilla-Silva 2018). The fact that racial differences narrowed substantially after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics suggests that the indirect effects of discrimination are substantial.

It is also uncertain if historical and contemporary social factors in Chicago uniquely shaped the attitudes and experiences of survey respondents. Because of Chicago's troubled history of racial segregation and racially biased policing, indirect knowledge of discrimination could be more prevalent than in places with less racial inequality. Unusually low expectations for equal treatment could explain why direct experience did not fully account for racial differences in trust and appeared less salient to trust for Black and Hispanic people. Additionally, the share of Black residents in a majority of Chicago neighborhoods increased from 1960 to 2000 (Sampson 2012). The threat of racial integration could increase white people's sensitivity to perceived mistreatment, particularly by moral authorities like the police. Nonetheless, I would expect similar results in other rustbelt cities with similar histories and contemporary social conditions as Chicago. The findings may generalize more broadly as social media has made information about racial discrimination and police abuse more accessible. Meanwhile, a resurgence of perceived white victimhood should only increase white people's sensitivity to possible unfair treatment.

Conclusion

Discrimination looms large in the literature as the explanation for racial differences in trust. Yet, the present study points to the need for a more theoretically rich conceptual framework for studying patterns of distrust that moves beyond individual prejudice and

discrimination. Here I revisit the earlier discussion of systemic racism to develop a unified framework for understanding persistent distrust among people of color and rising distrust among white people. Feagin and Elias (2013, 936) define systemic racism as "the foundational, large-scale and inescapable hierarchical system of U.S. racial oppression devised and maintained by whites and directed at people of colour." Critically, the theory foregrounds the role of white people in maintaining the racial hierarchy and resistance by people of color.

Systemic racism traces contemporary Black-white race relations from the founding of the U.S. political and economic systems on slavery through the period of legal segregation to overt and color-blind forms of discrimination that persist today (Feagin 2006). At the heart of systemic racism is the realization that white people have a vested interest in maintaining the racial hierarchy because it continues to produce material economic, social, and political benefits (see also Bonilla-Silva 2001). Even today, under the guise of color-blindness, white people continue to block efforts to reduce racial inequality by opposing affirmative action, neighborhood integration, and school busing (Bobo et al. 2012, Bonilla-Silva 2018). In this respect, white people have given people of color, and Black people in particular little reason to trust. As Cook and colleagues (2005, 5) argue, "We trust you because we think you take our interests to heart." This dynamic hardly describes the history of racial oppression in the U.S. where, at every turn, white people have failed to consider the interests of other racial groups. This perspective suggests a reframing of the question from "Why are people of color so distrusting?" to "What can institutions and white Americans do to prove their trustworthiness?" I argue that for trust to flourish, white people and predominately white institutions must demonstrate a sincere commitment to dismantling the racial hierarchy and to policies that reduce racial inequality. It is the demonstration of trustworthiness, not the absence of harm vis-à-vis discrimination, which will give people of color a reason to trust.

Systemic racism also calls attention to acts of resistance by people of color that challenge the racial hierarchy. Racial socialization or "collective memory" is a critical component of resistance because it is how children learn about the history of oppression and exploitation described above (Feagin 2006, Nunnally 2012). Perhaps more so than previous work, the results of the present study suggest that vicarious knowledge of racism contributes more to distrust than personal experience with discrimination. Even if society were to make strides toward eliminating discrimination, collective memory and the enduring effects of racial inequality would sustain

distrust among people of color. Moreover, recent movements like Black Lives Matter that directly challenge the racial hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva 2018) and the dissemination of viral videos capturing acts of discrimination could also contribute distrust by making racism more palpable.

Visible challenges to the racial hierarchy could also have implications for trust among white people. Several scholars have argued that the long-term decline in trust among white people is attributable to the perceived loss of white privilege (Wilkes 2011) or relatedly, the politics of diversity (Arneil 2010). As Arneil explains, distrust stems from challenges to traditional values as racial and sexual minorities and women seek equality and recognition. Accompanying this social upheaval is the increasing perception among white people that they are the primary victims of discrimination (Norton and Sommers 2011). In her ethnography of conservative, white Louisianans, Hochschild (2016, 222) constructs a deep story to illustrate how a sense of white victimization and racial resentment foment distrust: "In that story, strangers step ahead of you in line, making you anxious, resentful, and afraid. A president [reference to President Obama] allies with the line cutters, making you feel distrustful, betrayed." The findings presented here suggest that Hochschild's deep story applies to the broader population of white people. Moreover, the salience of discrimination in policing reaffirms the importance of perceived fairness in public institutions to white people's generalized trust.

In this study, I have argued that it will take more than eliminating individual acts of discrimination to increase trust among people of color. At the same time, the process of dismantling the larger system of racial domination is necessarily destructive in that it also undermines the social solidarity that Robert Putnam (2000) and others have argued underwrites generalized trust. From this perspective, distrust among people of color and white people may be the natural consequence of the struggle for a more equal and just society (Arneil 2010). To the extent racial difference in trust narrow in the future, it is likely to be because of a continued decline in trust among the white population. Paradoxically, this decline makes the trust-enhancing, inequality-reducing policies I have advocated for less politically feasible. In this way, patterns of distrust among people of color and declining trust among white people may be more intertwined than previously recognized.

Table 2.1 Population-weighted descriptive statistics stratified by race for the Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Total (n=2780)				Means			p-values [1]		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White (n=875)	Black (n=1105)	Hispanic (n=727)	Black-White	Hispanic-White	Black-Hispanic
Trust in most people	0.38	---	0.00	1.00	0.64	0.24	0.31	<0.001	<0.001	0.013
Trust in neighbors	0.71	---	0.00	1.00	0.86	0.60	0.75	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Trust in police	0.71	---	0.00	1.00	0.87	0.55	0.78	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Unfair treatment in employment	0.33	---	0.00	1.00	0.26	0.40	0.26	<0.001	0.964	<0.001
Unfair treatment by police	0.25	---	0.00	1.00	0.14	0.39	0.22	<0.001	0.006	<0.001
Unfair treatment in moving to a neighborhood	0.07	---	0.00	1.00	0.03	0.11	0.05	<0.001	0.018	0.003
Everyday discrimination index	0.77	0.78	0.00	4.00	0.67	0.94	0.58	<0.001	0.106	<0.001
Heightened vigilance index	1.24	1.12	0.00	4.00	0.89	1.54	1.08	<0.001	0.002	<0.001
Female	0.59	---	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.57	0.51	0.014	0.907	0.024
Age	42.00	16.30	18.00	92.00	44.42	44.17	38.13	0.701	<0.001	<0.001
Education (years)								<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
<12	0.25	---	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.23	0.45			
12	0.24	---	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.28	0.25			
13-15	0.26	---	0.00	1.00	0.23	0.31	0.21			
16+	0.24	---	0.00	1.00	0.45	0.18	0.10			
Owns home	0.38	---	0.00	1.00	0.51	0.33	0.38	<0.001	<0.001	0.338
Years in current residence	9.77	12.08	0.00	83.00	10.54	11.47	7.37	0.268	<0.001	<0.001
Foreign-born	0.24	---	0.00	1.00	0.19	0.02	0.64	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Speaks Spanish at home	0.15	---	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.56	0.217	<0.001	<0.001
Married	0.36	---	0.00	1.00	0.43	0.30	0.54	<0.001	0.016	<0.001
Has non-adult children	0.36	---	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.33	0.50	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of negative life events	1.32	1.42	0.00	8.00	1.10	1.51	1.10	<0.001	0.903	<0.001
Friendship diversity index	5.28	3.00	0.00	11.00	5.95	4.97	4.82	<0.001	<0.001	0.629
Active member of organizations	0.23	---	0.00	1.00	0.25	0.24	0.12	0.594	<0.001	<0.001
Optimism index	2.28	0.62	0.00	3.00	2.14	2.35	2.33	<0.001	<0.001	0.626
Parental affection index	3.21	0.96	0.00	4.00	3.17	3.30	3.19	0.005	0.922	0.016
Neighborhood safety								<0.001	<0.001	0.020
Extremely dangerous neighborhood	0.06	---	0.00	1.00	0.02	0.07	0.06			
Somewhat dangerous neighborhood	0.29	---	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.32	0.31			
Fairly safe neighborhood	0.53	---	0.00	1.00	0.63	0.54	0.46			
Completely safe neighborhood	0.12	---	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.07	0.17			

Note: Category “other race” not shown but included in the total. Sample restricted to observations with non-missing data.

(1) Adjusted Wald Test.

Table 2.2 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in most people, neighbors, and community police for the Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Most people [Generalized trust]				Neighbors [Particularized trust]				Police [Institutional trust]			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
Race [ref: White]												
Black	-40.3	***	-25.9	***	-25.7	***	-12.0	***	-31.6	***	-20.1	***
Hispanic	-33.2	***	-8.2	*	-10.6	***	-3.1		-9.3	***	-6.2	*
Other	-22.0	**	-18.9	**	-5.9		-4.5		1.1		2.6	
Unfair treatment in employment			-2.4				2.3				**-4.3**	****
Unfair treatment in policing			-2.1				-2.4				**-11.2**	*****
Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood			-4.4				4.4				-2.5	
Everyday discrimination index			-2.3				**-3.6**	****			**-3.3**	****
Heightened vigilance index			**-3.3**	****			-1.1				-0.7	
Female			0.0				-1.4				-1.6	
Age			0.1	+			0.3	***			0.2	***
Education (years) [ref: <12]												
12			5.6	*			-4.1				-1.8	
13-15			12.6	***			-1.3				2.4	
16+			20.8	***			7.7	**			7.8	*
Owns home			2.4				5.7	**			0.2	
Years in current residence			-0.1				-0.1				-0.2	*
Foreign-born			-5.2	+			-2.0				-5.1	
Speaks Spanish at home			-13.6	***			8.4	**			7.9	*
Married			1.1				1.9				3.7	+
Has non-adult children			0.2				-2.2				1.4	
Number of negative life events			-1.9	*			-1.4	*			-0.9	
Friendship diversity index			1.7	***			0.8	*			0.3	
Active member of an organization			8.4	***			6.1	**			0.6	
Optimism index			5.3	***			0.2				0.6	
Parental affection index			2.0	+			1.6				3.2	***
Neighborhood safety [ref: Extremely dangerous]												
Somewhat dangerous			9.3	*			11.7	**			14.1	**
Fairly safe			15.8	***			32.9	***			21.4	***
Completely safe			23.7	***			38.1	***			24.6	***
Observations	2,990		2,990		2,854		2,854		2,893		2,893	

Note: Average marginal effects multiplied by 100.

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table 2.3 Racial differences in the probability of trusting explained by discrimination for trust in most people, neighbors, and community police, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	(1) Most people [Generalized trust]		(2) Neighbors [Particularized trust]		(3) Police [Institutional trust]	
A. Black-White Difference in the Probability of Trusting						
Reduced model	-29.4	**	-13.4	**	-24.7	**
Full model	-25.9	**	-12.0	**	-20.2	**
Difference	**-3.4**	---	**-1.4**	---	**-4.5**	---
Percent of difference explained by discrimination type						
Unfair treatment in employment	0.9		-1.9		1.8	
Unfair treatment in policing	1.8		4.3		10.1	
Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood	0.9		-1.9		0.6	
Everyday discrimination index	1.7		5.3		2.8	
Heightened vigilance index	5.7		4.0		1.3	
Total percent explained by discrimination	**11.6**		**10.4**		**18.2**	
B. Hispanic-White Difference in the Probability of Trusting						
Reduced model	-10.5	**	-3.8		-8.5	**
Full model	-8.1	*	-3.1		-6.1	*
Difference	**-2.3**	---	**-0.7**	---	**-2.3**	---
Percent of difference explained by discrimination type						
Unfair treatment in employment	1.3		-3.7		2.5	
Unfair treatment in policing	3.7		10.9		20.8	
Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood	2.3		-6.6		1.6	
Everyday discrimination index	3.4		12.7		5.7	
Heightened vigilance index	8.6		7.2		2.0	
Total percent explained by discrimination	**22.2**		**18.7**		**27.5**	
Observations	2,990		2,854		2,893	

Note: The reduced model includes all controls from Table 2.2 except for the discrimination variables. The first value in the table indicates that Black respondents were 29.4 percentage points less likely than white respondents to trust most people. After adding the discrimination variables in the full model, the unexplained difference fell to 25.9 percentage points for a reduction of 3.4 percentage points. The discrimination variables accounted for 11.6 percent of the Black-white difference in generalized trust. Heightened vigilance accounted for nearly half of this total, explaining 5.7 percent of the Black-white difference in generalized trust.
+ $p<0.10$ * $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$

Fig 2.1 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models with race-by-discrimination interactions predicting trust in most people, neighbors, and community police, stratified by race for the Chicago Community Adult Health Study



Note Bolded lines indicate significant marginal effects ($p<0.05$). Dashed lines indicate significant Black-white or Hispanic-white differences in marginal effects ($p<0.10$). Results based on logistic regression Models 1-5 reported in Appendix Tables A.1-A.3. Models include all controls used in previous tables. Race-by-discrimination interactions were added one at a time. 95 percent confidence intervals displayed.

CHAPTER III

Durable and Dynamic Associations: Neighborhood Social Context and Trust

Introduction

In his influential book *Bowling Alone*, Robert Putnam (2000) lamented the social consequences of a long-term decline in trust in the United States, noting that trusting people are more likely to give to charity, participate in politics and community, fulfill civic duties, and be more tolerant of minority views. Supporting this view is several decades of social science touting the positive social benefits of trust to individuals, neighborhoods, and nations (Smith 2010). Either alone or as a component of social capital and collective efficacy, empirical studies have linked trust to economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997), civil society and democracy (Putnam 2000, Putnam et al. 1993), lower rates of community violence (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997), positive health outcomes (Kawachi et al. 1997, Subramanian, Kim, and Kawachi 2002), and trustworthy behavior (Glaeser et al. 2000, 226, Sampson 2012). Observed declines in trust, as well as persistent disparities in trust across communities and social groups, could mitigate these perceived benefits or exacerbate existing inequalities.

In the United States, studies consistently find that trust correlates with individual markers of advantage such as education, household income, and a white racial identity (Smith 2010, Smith 1997, Uslaner 2002). Today, scholars are more concerned with how social context influences trust, independent of the characteristics of individual trustors. For example, some worry that rising income inequality (Uslaner 2002) and racial diversity have contributed to a decline in trust in the United States (Putnam 2007), while others emphasize concentrated disadvantage as an explanation for geographic and racial disparities in trust (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010). Thus far, empirical studies on diversity, income inequality, and even disadvantage have yielded mixed results depending on the study site, the geographic unit of analysis, and model specifications. More importantly, because

nearly all studies on this topic rely on cross-sectional data, they have neglected a fundamental aspect of social context.

Often left unsaid in public and scholarly debates over the consequences of diversity for trust is that these controversies are essentially about social change. It is not just diversity but rather the process of *diversification,* wrought by immigration and population dynamics, that is of central concern. Despite concern that increasing diversity is undermining trust, research on these topics has emphasized static comparisons that neglect the crucial issue of social change. Cross-sectional comparisons can tell us, for example, if people living in homogenous neighborhoods are more trusting than those living in diverse neighborhoods, but this research says nothing about the process of diversification.

Relatedly, previous work on the detrimental effects of rising income inequality on trust has focused largely on cross-sectional country-level differences. While many neighborhood-level studies reflexively control for income inequality it has not been the central theoretical focus of these analyses. For this reason, neighborhood-level research has overlooked the obvious connection between income inequality and gentrification. There is good reason to believe that this form of neighborhood change is theoretically distinct from the macro-level processes explaining why, for example, trust is many times greater in low-inequality Sweden than in high-inequality Brazil (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011). Finally, previous work has shown that past neighborhood conditions are often a better predictor of contemporary outcomes than are current conditions (Sampson 2012, Sampson and Graif 2009). Durable associations have been relatively neglected in the trust literature, but the predictive power of past conditions may reveal the limits of altering trust in society.

The present study merges data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses and the Chicago Police Department with geocoded survey responses from the 2001-2003 Chicago Community Adult Health Study (CCAHS) to investigate the association of neighborhood concentrated disadvantage, community violence, income inequality, and diversity with generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in the police. I am primarily concerned with how change in neighborhood social context prior to survey administration (e.g., 1990-2000 and 1980-2000) predict individual levels of trust. I also use lagged measures to assess the durability of the impacts of disadvantage, violence, diversity, and inequality. The results suggest that the change in diversity and inequality are more consequential for *generalized trust* than are static conditions.

But, overall, the association between social context and trust is strongest for *trust in neighbors* and *community police* where both lagged values and change scores are highly predictive of future trust.

Background

Defining Trust

The numerous monographs on the topic of trust (Misztal 1996, Luhmann 1979, Barber 1983, Hardin 2002, Seligman 1997, Uslaner 2002) have not formed a consensus on how to define this deceptively complex concept. My preference is to define trust as the expectation that others will act with goodwill and benign intent (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, Barber 1983, Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013). This simple but flexible definition could apply to many different trust relationships from trust in people we pass on the street to trust in family members or even trust in institutional actors.

Along these lines, one general point of agreement among scholars is that there are different types of trust and that these types lie on a continuum from abstract to personal where prior knowledge of the trustee is the key distinguishing feature (Misztal 1996, Uslaner 2002, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Abstract trust is also known as generalized trust or moral trust and reflects trust in the abstract other, strangers, or fellow citizens. This form of trust is thought to be an indicator of the degree of social cohesion in society and the basis for reciprocity, inclusiveness, and tolerance (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011, Pichler and Wallace 2007). At the other end of the continuum is particularized trust reflecting our trust in specific people or groups with whom we have prior knowledge (Uslaner 2002).[9] In addition to these interpersonal forms of trust, social scientists are also interested in institutional or political, that is, trust in political bodies and government agencies (Nannestad 2008, Newton and Zmerli 2011). Within the institutional context, researchers also distinguish political bodies from the police and judicial systems (Rothstein and Stolle 2003, 2008). According to Rothstein and Stolle, whereas trust in political bodies is likely to be influenced by partisan ideology, trust in the police and judicial system will be based on their impartiality. Factor analyses reveal how generalized, particularized, and institutional trust are empirically distinct (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994,

[9] Some scholars distinguish particularized trust (trust in in-group members) from knowledge-based or strategic trust which grounded in a game-theoretic approach (Uslaner 2002). Newton and Zmerli (2011) argue that the two concepts are theoretically distinct but likely overlap empirically.

Uslaner 2002) but not necessarily at odds with each other (Glanville and Paxton 2007, Freitag and Traunmüller 2009, Newton and Zmerli 2011).

The present study is based on three trust questions related to trust in most people, trust in neighbors, and trust in community police. Respectively, these three questions are specific examples of generalized, particularized, and institutional trust.[10] Although this is hardly the first investigation of how structural factors influence trust in most people and trust in neighbors, there is considerably less work in this area on different forms of institutional trust. For example, many studies on attitudes toward police focus on individual experiences of discrimination or procedural fairness rather than social context as potential predictors (e.g. Weitzer and Tuch 2005, Tyler 2005, Rosenbaum et al. 2005).

Determinants of Trust

Implicit in studies of structural conditions is that our trust in other people and institutions is subject to change with life experience. While this assumption is unproblematic in the context of particularized and institutional trust, which are based in part on knowledge gleaned from repeated social interaction, the relationship between changing social context and generalized trust is less clear. For example, Uslaner (2002) argues generalized trust is largely a stable characteristic developed during early childhood socialization making trust akin to a personality disposition. On the other hand, others have argued that generalized trust is a malleable characteristic formed from trust relations in localized settings (Paxton and Glanville 2015, Glanville and Paxton 2007). This social learning perspective allows for people to update generalized trust expectations based on life experience. Neither of these perspectives forecloses the possibility that neighborhood context is associated with generalized trust, but we may anticipate a stronger association for trust in neighbors and the police as these forms of trust are most proximate to neighborhood context.

Previous research consistently finds that the most significant predictors of generalized trust in the United States are race, educational attainment, age, and personality characteristics like optimism and sense of control are the primary predictors of generalized trust (Uslaner 2002, Smith 2010, Robinson and Jackson 2001, Smith 1997). Unsurprisingly, trust is strongly

[10] Trust in most people is the most common measure of generalized trust. However, it is important to acknowledge that trust in neighbors and the police are examples of particularized and institutional trust rather than actual measures of these concepts. Some studies have found trust in neighbors overlaps with both particularized and generalized trust; although the factor loading was higher for friends and families than for strangers (Newton and Zmerli 2011, Uslaner 2002).

associated with social advantage in that white people report higher levels of trust than racial minorities while trust also increases with education and age. Previous studies have also found that Black-white and Hispanic-white differences in generalized trust persist after controlling for individual markers of socioeconomic advantage (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015, Douds and Wu 2017). Researchers have focused less on particularized trust; although, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) found white adults report higher levels of trust than Black and Hispanic adults for generalized trust as well as trust in neighbors and trust in specific racial groups. Likewise, white people report greater confidence in the police than do Black and Hispanic people (Weitzer and Tuch 2005, Tyler 2005). Yet, as Marschall and Stolle (2004, 126) note, "any serious examination of the origins of generalized trust must go beyond conventional individual-level determinants and include features of the broader milieu in which individuals are situated and in which interactions occur."

The present study contributes to a separate body of work considering how contextual factors external to individual characteristics shape different forms of trust in society. Contextual studies have focused broadly on neighborhood disadvantage, income inequality, and racial and ethnic diversity as possible causes of distrust in the United States and other countries. Structural explanations are of particular interest in the United States where generalized trust has declined in recent decades (Schwadel and Stout 2012, Clark and Eisenstein 2013, Clark 2015, Robinson and Jackson 2001), particularly among the white population (Wilkes 2011). This decline has coincided with a rise in income inequality and racial diversity. Yet, it remains unclear if this correlation is causal. In the following sections, I will both the theoretical and empirical connections between trust and social context characteristics related to disadvantage, inequality, and diversity.

Neighborhood Disadvantage and Violent Crime

Given the relevance of individual social and economic disadvantage to trust, unsurprisingly most studies on social context mention neighborhood disadvantage as a potential source of distrust (e.g., Ross and Jang 2000, Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh 2001, 2002, Abascal and Baldassarri 2015, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010, Sampson and Graif 2009, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, Putnam 2007, Sturgis et al. 2011). As a straightforward matter of composition, disadvantaged neighborhoods will have relatively low levels of trust on average given the relationship between disadvantage and distrust at the individual level. But independent

of compositional effects, why, ceteris paribus, would someone living in a high-disadvantage neighborhood be less trusting than if she lived in a low-disadvantage context?

One possible reason is illustrated by experiments showing that trust is positively correlated with trustworthy behavior (Glaeser et al. 2000, Knack and Keefer 1997). People may take into account average levels of trust in the neighborhood. Therefore, distrust is a rational response to living social contexts where few people trust others. Neighborhood residents can infer trust based on social cues, for example, how people greet each other when passing on the street, interact with shop keepers or community police, or rely on neighbors for help.

An alternative hypothesis is grounded in social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1942). From this perspective, social disorganization—the inability of communities to realize the common values of residents and maintain effective social control—is a consequence of disadvantage, racial or ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility (Sampson and Groves 1989, Bursik 1988). Visible indicators of disorder include physical signs like litter and abandoned buildings and social signs like verbal harassment and public intoxication (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999, Ross and Mirowsky 1999). In turn, neighborhood characteristics such as concentrated disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and commercial land use are highly predictive of both physical and social disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

Ross and colleagues (2000, 2001, 2002) argue that the association between neighborhood concentrated disadvantage and distrust is fully mediated by resident perceptions of local social disorder. However, the use of a subjective measure of social disorder is a major limitation (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999) of these studies as people who are mistrusting may also be more likely to perceive disorder. The fact that in earlier work Ross and Mirowsky (1999) included a question about trust in neighbors in their original social disorder scale calls into question the later use of this scale to predict a specific component.[11]

Work by Sampson and colleagues (1997, 1999) on collective efficacy presents a diverging conceptual model where concentrated disadvantage predicts collective efficacy—an ecological measure embodying mutual trust and shared expectations for social control. They show that concentrated disadvantage is a strong predictor of collective efficacy and that when combined with immigrant concentration and residential mobility explains over 70% of the

[11] Ross and Jang (2000) note the question about trust in neighbors was removed from the scale for this particular analysis and the measure of mistrust used in the study was based on the number of days in the week people "felt it was not safe to trust anyone," "felt suspicious," and "felt sure everyone was against you."

variability in collective efficacy across Chicago neighborhoods (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). In turn, collective efficacy partially mediates the relationship between neighborhood disadvantage and neighborhood violence. In later work, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) demonstrate that the relationship between collective efficacy and neighborhood homicide rates is reciprocal, where homicides also have a substantial negative effect on collective efficacy.

Other studies that did not include measures of social disorder have found a strong negative relationship between poverty and trust (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010, Putnam 2007). Fieldhouse and Cutts argue neighborhood poverty exercises a far greater influence on trust than does racial diversity in the United States. Moreover, the effects of poverty are durable in that Sampson and Graif (2009) show 1970s poverty rates were more predictive of trust at the neighborhood level than 1990s poverty rates and that the change in poverty from 1970-2000 also had a significant negative effect on trust. Two studies based on the national Social Capital Benchmark Survey provide mixed evidence for a connection between crime and distrust. Putnam (2007) found county-level violent crime was positively associated with trust in neighbors while Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) found some evidence of a negative association with generalized trust but no discernable pattern for trust in neighbors or in- and out-group members. Taken together this work suggests concentrated disadvantage will have a deleterious association with trust but the effect of community violence is less clear. The present study will focus on the contribution of objective measures of disadvantage and community violence to trust as opposed to subjective assessments of social disorder.

Income Inequality

Theoretical arguments for the relevance of inequality (and diversity) to trust are implicitly grounded in Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity where social cohesion follows from sameness and familiarity with others in society. In the context of generalized trust, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) argue that trust depends on citizens having a sense of shared fate, a condition that they posit is unlikely to exist in hierarchical societies marred by class conflict and a sense that others benefit from unfair advantages.

Cross-national comparisons reveal a strong negative correlation between inequality and trust. For example, about 60% of people living in high-equality Sweden agree that most people can be trust compared to less than 10% in Brazil where income inequality is nearly twice as high (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, Delhey and Newton 2005). Cross-national correlations persist in

multivariable models controlling for a host of country characteristics also associated with trust and when excluding the exceptional high-trust, low-inequality Nordic countries (Bjørnskov 2008, Delhey and Newton 2005, Uslaner 2002). Similarly, Uslaner and Brown (2005) found that income inequality was a strong predictor of trust in the United States based on a state-level analysis. In their analysis of metropolitan areas in the United States, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) also found that income inequality was negatively associated with trust after controlling for a host of individual-level characteristics, but the association was largely attenuated after accounting for metropolitan area racial and ethnic diversity.

Cross-sectional results are suggestive of a causal relationship; nonetheless, two studies leveraging change in state inequality over time shed some doubt on a causal relationship. Fairbrother and Martin (2013) combined individual-level survey responses from the General Social Survey (GSS) with data on state income inequality for 1973-2004. Consistent with earlier studies they found a strong negative relationship between income inequality and trust in between-state (cross-sectional) comparisons. However, this relationship disappeared in fixed effect models leveraging only within-state change to obtain causal estimates. Indeed, a parallel county-level analysis covering 1993-2004 failed to uncover even a cross-sectional relationship. A more recent replication extending the observation period through 2012 showed that the between-state association identified in the earlier study disappears after including a more flexible measure of time (Hastings 2018). Likewise, within-state estimates failed to uncover any evidence of a causal relationship between inequality and trust.

Most studies of income inequality and generalized trust have measured inequality at a high level of geographic aggregation (e.g., country or state). However, a similar logic may apply in local settings, particularly for trust in neighbors. For example, neighborhood gentrification in cities like Chicago and New York is often met with resistance and mutual distrust on the part of long-term residents and newcomers alike (Pattillo 2007, Newman and Wyly 2006). Gentrification is often accompanied by demographic change as middle- and upper-class white residents displace long-term Black residents in U.S. cities, meaning the process may have both economic and racial aspects. Even so, Pattillo's (2007) ethnographic work illustrates how many of the same problems associated with mutual distrust and tension over community resources emerge when members of the Black middle-class move into historically low-income neighborhoods. To the extent that the police are associated with protecting the interest of wealthy

residents, gentrification could also undermine trust in the police for less-advantaged long-term residents. However, Putnam's (2007) analyses of the Social Capital Benchmark Survey showed that income inequality was positively associated with trust in neighbors. Using the same data, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) found a similar positive association for generalized trust and trust in neighbors, but only for the white subsample. The coefficients for trust in neighbors, in- and out-group members, and specific racial groups were negative for the Black subsample, but none reached conventional levels of statistical significance. One limitation of these studies is that they were based on cross-sectional comparisons of neighborhoods that were ill-suited for understanding the dynamic process of gentrification. Moreover, the authors paid little attention to interpreting the inequality coefficients. More importantly, this work neglects the possibility that rising income inequality at the neighborhood level may be a theoretically distinct process from rising income inequality at the national level, which dominated earlier discussions in the trust literature.

Racial and Ethnic Diversity

Because of immigration and demographic change, many wealthy countries, including the United States, have diversified in recent decades. Perhaps the most contentious debate in the trust literature is the extent to which racial and ethnic diversity undermines trust and social cohesion in society. In his controversial lecture on this topic, Putnam (2007, 149) claimed "Diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation. In colloquial language, people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down' – that is, to pull in like a turtle." Putnam's "constrict theory" predicts increasing diversity will threaten both in- and out-group trust. This theory diverges from earlier work on group threat (Blalock 1967, Quillian 1996, 1995) and social identity (Brown 2000, Tajfel and Turner 1986) theories predicting greater out-group animosity and in-group favoritism, respectively. It also contrasts with contact theory predicting that inter-group contact leads to greater acceptance and positive out-group attitudes (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Scholars have identified two possible mechanisms—one social-psychological and the other contextual—connecting diversity and distrust (Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson 2011, Tolsma and van der Meer 2017, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).

The social-psychological mechanism draws on conflict theory as well as experimental findings showing that trust and trustworthiness are highest in same-race pairings (Simpson,

McGrimmon, and Irwin 2007, Glaeser et al. 2000). From this perspective, it is not diversity per se but rather the relationship between an individual's racial identity and her social context that matters (Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson 2011). As Tolsma and van der Meer (2017, 634) explain, "observed inter-neighbourhood differences in trust are attributable to differences in characteristics of the dyads present in these neighbourhoods, not to a group-level variable such as ethnic heterogeneity." In other words, trust in the average neighbor will be lower in diverse settings.

The contextual explanation for the connection between diversity and trust is often referred to as the anomie hypothesis (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014) or what I call a pure diversity effect. This hypothesis proposes anomie will emerge in heterogeneous communities as individuals experience anxiety over a lack of shared norms and moral values or have difficult coordinating actions because of language barriers, asymmetric preferences, or cultural differences (Tolsma and van der Meer 2017, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014, Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson 2011). As people withdraw from social life, reduced contact with in- and out-group members will lead to a general loss of trust.

Social-psychological and contextual effects are not mutually exclusive and could work in tandem in the same community. However, because there is a strong correlation between diversity and the nonwhite share of communities in the United States, it is difficult to tease apart these two mechanisms by controlling for both factors simultaneously.[12] For this reason, in the present study, I stratify the results by race while controlling for diversity and out-group share in separate models.

Several comprehensive reviews cover the vast literature on diversity and trust and social cohesion (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018, Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020, Schaeffer 2014, Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). Despite considerable scholarly interest in this topic, studies have failed to reach a consensus on the relationship between diversity and social cohesion, leading van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) to describe the literature as a "cacophony of empirical findings." Nonetheless, several suggestive patterns have emerged from this work (Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). First, studies taking place in the United States are more likely to uncover a negative

[12] The exact opposite problem prevails in the present Chicago-based study where white and Hispanic residents on average live in more diverse communities than Black residents.

relationship between diversity and trust than studies in other parts of the world. Second, the negative relationship appears to be stronger for trust in neighbors than for more general forms of trust and when diversity is measured at the neighborhood level as opposed to larger geographic areas.

Even so, several U.S. studies have found a negative association between diversity and generalized trust at the city (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Costa and Kahn 2003a) and state level (Dincer 2011) and for trust in neighbors for neighborhood measures of diversity (Guest, Kubrin, and Cover 2008, Putnam 2007, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010, Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008, Williamson 2014). At the city level, diversity has also been negatively associated with the provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) and face-to-face participation in community organizations (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). Meanwhile, others argue that diversity is most harmful to trust in segregated areas (Uslaner 2011) or that segregation acts independently of diversity to undermine trust (Rothwell 2011).

Finally, others have failed to find the hypothesized negative relationship between diversity and trust. For example, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) found using the nationally representative Social Capital Benchmark Survey that diversity was not related to generalized trust, trust in neighbors, or trust in specific racial groups. This finding held when the analyses were stratified by race. However, they also found that trust increased for white individuals with a rising share of the white population in a neighborhood. This finding suggests it is racial threat rather than diversity per se that matters and that white people may be particularly sensitive to threat mechanisms.[13] Likewise, in a study of Houston-area residents, Douds and Wu (2017) also failed to uncover any relationship between diversity and generalized trust, while Marschall and Stolle (2004) found that diversity was positively associated with generalized trust for Black residents. Collectively, these studies suggest a modest negative relationship between diversity (or outgroup share) and different forms of trust. However, we expect these results to vary for specific cities or when considering trust for specific racial groups.

Present Study

Previous theoretical and empirical work has identified disadvantage and violence, income inequality, and diversity as potential contextual factors contributing to distrust above and beyond

[13] Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found the negative association between diversity and generalized trust was stronger for white respondents than for Black respondents.

individual-level characteristics. Although many studies simultaneously control for contextual characteristics less attention is paid to how these diverging explanations stack up against each other. More importantly, the emphasis on comparisons across neighborhoods or other geographic units in previous work neglects the interesting dynamic forces at play. Static comparisons reveal nothing about the durability of social context or how changes in social context relate to contemporary levels of trust. From a social policy perspective, it is desirable to understand the long-term consequences of disadvantage, inequality, and diversity for trust or if change in these factors is more important than static levels. The present study uses lagged measures and change scores to investigate these possibilities. Moreover, we may expect the association between social context and trust to vary across different types of trust relationships. To my knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly investigate how these specific indicators of social context relate to trust in community police.

Methods

Data

Data for the study come from the Chicago Community Adult Health Study (CCAHS), a multistage probability sample of 3,105 adults ages 18 and older who were interviewed from 2001 to 2003 with a response rate of 71.8 percent (Morenoff et al. 2007). Respondents were sampled from 343 neighborhood clusters (NCs) covering all Chicago census tracts. NCs were formed to be "ecologically meaningful as possible" by combining contiguous census tracts with social demographically homogeneous populations while also respecting geographic boundaries such as parks and freeways (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). On average, NCs consist of two census tracts and approximately 8000 residents, making them considerably smaller than Chicago's 77 established communities. The restricted version of the CCAHS used here includes a crosswalk mapping 866 Chicago census tracts to the NCs.[14] This crosswalk enabled me to match NCs with sociodemographic data from the decennial censuses and homicide data from the Chicago Police Department. Because of missing data on the dependent variables, the analytic

[14] The crosswalk is based on the 2000 census tracts. Because Chicago's census tracts were stable from 1980 to 2000, for main results I did not attempt to harmonize the tracts across census years. However, the results were substantively similar when I used the Longitudinal Tract Database (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014) to harmonize the census boundaries.

sample varied across outcomes: generalized trust (n = 3080), trust in neighbors (n = 2924), and trust in community police (n = 2962).[15]

Trust

The study examines three outcome variables that capture different dimensions of trust: general trust; trust in neighbors; and trust in police. The CCAHS includes the standard measure of generalized trust used in survey research: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people." Individuals could choose between two possible responses, "Most can be trusted" or "You can't be too careful in dealing with people." The CCAHS measured trust in neighbors by asking respondents (on a four-point scale) how strongly they agreed with the following statement: "People in this neighborhood can be trusted." Similarly, Trust in the police was measured by asking individuals how strongly they agreed (on a four-point scale) with the statement: "The police in your local community can be trusted." Trust in neighbors and trust in the police were dichotomized by combining the categories "strongly agree" with "agree" and the categories "strongly disagree" with "disagree," making the three outcome variables binary measures of trust. For all three binary outcomes, responses were coded as one if respondents agreed that others could be trusted and zero otherwise.

Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics

The main predictors of interest are NC measures of concentrated disadvantage, income inequality, diversity, outgroup share of the population, and the homicide rate. Each variable was measured at three points (1980, 1990, and 2000) preceding the administration of the CCAHS and drawn from external sources including decennial censuses and data from the Chicago Police Department. Because all external data sources described here were census tract tabulations, I used the restricted CCAHS crosswalk to aggregate tract counts by NC.

Following previous work (Wodtke, Harding, and Elwert 2011), I used a principal components analysis to construct a standardized seven-item index capturing *concentrated*

[15] The Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan imputed missing household income (n=816) using Sequential Regression Imputation as implemented by IVEware (Raghunathan et al. 2001). I took the mean household income across the five imputed datasets. In a supplemental analysis, I imputed missing household income as well as missing values for the dependent variables and years in current residence (not imputed by ISR) using predictive mean matching with five nearest neighbors. I generated an imputed dataset for the overall sample and a second imputed dataset where the imputation was stratified by race. I used the overall imputation for analyses using the entire sample and the stratified imputation for analyses stratified by race. The logistic regression coefficients from analyses of the 20 imputed data sets were nearly identical to the coefficients for the main results reported in the text. Because there is no straightforward way to obtain predicted probabilities from multiply imputed data, I do not present results from analyses of multiply imputed data.

disadvantage. The seven items were the percent of family households with children under age 18 headed by women in a NC and the percent of NC residents who were in poverty, unemployed, employed in a management or professional occupation, had a bachelor's degree or higher, had less than a high school education, and received public assistance. The principal component analysis was performed on data pooled across the three decennial censuses.

Income inequality was measured with the Gini coefficient which runs from zero (perfect equality where everyone has the same income) to one (perfect inequality where a single person holds all income). Ideally, Gini coefficients are estimated using individual income reports, but the census only reports population counts for binned income categories. Therefore, I used the user-written Stata package *rpme* implementing a Pareto midpoint estimator to estimate Gini coefficients from binned income data (von Hippel, Scarpino, and Holas 2015). This method outperforms simpler approaches using the category midpoints and the bottom of the open-ended top income category.

Racial diversity is measured with the variable *outgroup share* which combines information on the racial identity of individual survey respondents with the population shares for the four racial groups identified above. [16] For example, the outgroup share for non-Hispanic Black respondents is the share of the NC population this not non-Hispanic Black. This measure of diversity is frequently used in place of an alternative measure of diversity known as the fragmentation index.[17] The fragmentation index is interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected people from a population will be from different racial groups. In Appendix Tables B.1-B.3, I report a parallel set of results for the fragmentation index. I focus on outgroup share in the main results because overall the association with trust was stronger than for diversity.

I constructed three-year *homicide rates* for 1978-1980, 1988-1990, and 1998-2000 using the number of annual census tract homicide incidents from Block and Block (2005) and the

[16] The 2000 census first allowed individuals to select multiple racial identities, making it difficult to compare racial demographics with early censuses when individuals were able to select only a single racial identity. Following (Logan 2014), I generated a single-race categories for the 2000 data by coding all respondents who were non-Hispanic Black in combination with any other racial group as Black, non-Hispanic Native American in combination with any other racial group (except Black) as non-Hispanic Native American, and non-Hispanic Asian in combination with any other racial group (except Black and Native American) as non-Hispanic Asian. The category non-Hispanic white consists of all respondents who were non-Hispanic white alone, while all Hispanic respondents were coded as Hispanic irrespective of their race. Because of the relatively small Non-Hispanic Native American and Non-Hispanic Asian populations in Chicago during the study period, I created a combined non-Hispanic Other category. For brevity, I will refer to the categories white, Black, Hispanic, and Other race.

[17] The 1990 correlation between outgroup share and racial fragmentation was 0.87 for Black respondents and 0.60 for white respondents.

Chicago Police Department. For each NC, I summed the number of homicides in the three-year windows and divided by the NC population for the final year in each window. Three-year rates were used to smooth volatility in the annual number of homicide incidents. The homicide rate is expressed as the number of homicide incidents per 100,000 NC residents. Homicide is the most reliable measure of crime and does not suffer from the same degree of underreporting associated with less serious crimes (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

The main results include measures of neighborhood characteristics at baseline (1990 or 1980) and change in the characteristics over time (1990-2000 or 1980-2000). Change scores were estimated by subtracting baseline values from the 2000 values. A positive change score indicates that disadvantage, income inequality, outgroup share, and the homicide rate increased over the period.

Individual Characteristics

The study includes controls that have been found to predict trust in earlier studies, including race, education, and age. Race and ethnicity were identified with indicators for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic other, which includes a small number (n = 89) of Native American and Asian respondents. Years of education completed consisted of indicators for less than 12 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, and 16 or more years. All models include the continuous variables age and age squared, log household income, years in current residence, and binary indicators for if respondents were female, homeowners, foreign-born, speak Spanish at home, married, and have non-adult children.[18] Notably, I chose not to control for individual characteristics like exposure to negative life events and optimism that are also known to be associated with trust (Uslaner 2002, Smith 1997). I exclude these predictors because they are potential mediators that could be in part determined by neighborhood characteristics.

Analysis Plan

Previous trust research was based on static comparisons of neighborhood characteristics. Although it is important to understand if people living in unequal or diverse neighborhood contexts are less trusting than those living in equal or racially homogenous areas, we should also be interested in how prior changes in these contextual factors influence trust. This is particularly

[18] I added one to all household income values before taking the log because 13 respondents reported having no household income.

important in the United States where income inequality and diversity are on the rise and homicides have started to increase again in cities after a long period of decline.

To this end, I estimated logistic regression models to investigate how changes in neighborhood disadvantage, diversity, and homicides related to generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in community police. In separate specifications, I examined short-term (1990-2000) and long-term (1980-2000) changes in the contextual variables while controlling for baseline (1990 or 1980) values of these variables.[19] Previous work has largely ignored the possibility of a feedback loop or bidirectional causal arrow running from contextual factors to trust. If trust is truly a powerful social force, high-trust neighborhoods may have lower rates of poverty and crime, less inequality, and perhaps residents more tolerant of diversity. By using lagged baseline values and change scores, I isolate social conditions preceding the survey measurement of trust. Equation 3.1 uses the change in income inequality from 1990-2000 to illustrate the template for all analyses:

$$\begin{aligned} log\left(\frac{\pi_{i,n}}{1-\pi_{i,n}}\right) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Disadvantage_{n,1990} + \beta_2 \Delta Disadvantage_{n,1990-2000} \\ &+ \beta_3 Income\ Inequalty_{n,1990} + \beta_4 \Delta Income\ Inequality_{n,1990-2000} \\ &+ \beta_5 Outgroup_{n,1990} + \beta_6 \Delta Outgroup_{n,1990-2000} \\ &+ \beta_7 Homicide\ Rate_{n,1990} + \beta_8 \Delta Homicide\ Rate_{n,1990-2000} + \mu P_i \end{aligned} \quad (3.1)$$

where π is the probability of trusting for one of the three trust outcomes for person *i* in neighborhood *n*. Recall that these responses were measured in 2001-2003 with the administration of the CCAHS. *Disadvantage* is the standardized concentrated disadvantage index in 1990 for neighborhood *n*, while $\Delta Disadvantage$ is the change in concentrated disadvantage from 1990-2000. Likewise, *Income Inequality* is the Gini coefficient in 1990 for neighborhood *n*, while $\Delta Income\ Inequality$ is the change in the Gini coefficient from 1990-2000. The remaining coefficients for *Outgroup* Share and *Homicide Rate* follow the same pattern. Meanwhile, *P* is a vector of individual-level controls for person *i*, including race, age and age squared, educational

[19] I introduce all contextual variables at the same time in the main analysis. Tables A4-A7 in the Appendix show results for when inequality, outgroup share, diversity, and the homicide rate are added sequentially while controlling for baseline and change values of neighborhood concentrated disadvantage.

attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. I estimated models for the total and sample as well as for white, Black, and Hispanic subsamples to investigate if the association between neighborhood context and trust varied across racial groups. All models were estimated using Stata's *svy* command to account for the CCAHS's complex survey design and clustering at the NC level.

Finally, there are well-known difficulties associated with substantively interpreting logistic regression coefficients. Compounding interpretation issues, the neighborhood characteristics of interest (disadvantage, income inequality, diversity, outgroup share, and homicide rate) are all on different scales. To facilitate interpretation of effect sizes, I report the average discrete change (see Long and Mustillo 2018) in the probability of trusting associated with moving from a neighborhood in the tenth percentile of a given characteristic to a neighborhood in the ninetieth percentile while all other predictors are held at observed variables.[20] In the main text, I only report results for the neighborhood characteristics of interest.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.1 presents population-weighted summary statistics for all person-level characteristics for the entire CCAHS sample (n=3,105). The observation count in column one shows that in addition to missing values on the three trust outcomes, there were a small number of missing values for years in current residence. Overall, 41 percent of respondents agreed that most people could be trusted, while 74 percent trusted their neighbors, and 75 percent trusted community police. Columns stratifying the variable means by race show that white respondents reported higher levels of trust than Hispanic respondents who, in turn, reported higher levels of trust than Black respondents. Similar patterns prevailed for most of the other sociodemographic characteristics with the notable exception that there was no Black-Hispanic difference in household income or homeownership while Black respondents reported higher educational attainment than Hispanic respondents. There was also no Black-white difference in years in current residence.

[20] This analysis was carried out with the user-written Stata package *spost13* (Long and Freese 2014).

Table 3.2 summarizes each of the five neighborhood characteristics for the 343 NCs for 1980, 1990, and 2000 as well as the change in these variables from 1980-2000 and 1990-2000. Overall, concentrated disadvantage declined over the study period with most of the decline occurring between 1990 and 2000. In contrast, inequality and diversity increased steadily over the twenty-year period while the outgroup share declined. The mean NC homicide rate increased from 1980 to 1990 before decreasing through 2000. The variable minimums and maximums show that there was considerable variation in the levels and changes for the NC characteristics. There were also substantial racial differences. Relative to white and Hispanic respondents, Black respondents lived in more disadvantaged neighborhoods, had greater income inequality, had lower shares of outgroup members and were less diverse, and had higher homicide rates. A notable feature of Chicago is that because of racial segregation, on average, the white population lives in more diverse neighborhoods than the Black population, a pattern that has become truer over time. Nationally, the exact opposite pattern prevails where on average the Black population lives in more diverse neighborhoods than the white population (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015).

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the change in disadvantage, inequality, diversity, and homicides from 1990 and 1980, respectively, to 2000. Each dot in the figure represents one of the 343 Chicago neighborhood clusters. Dots above the 45-degree line signify an increase in the social context indicators from 1990 or 1980 to 2000, while dots below the line signify a decrease. Both figures illustrate the long-term decline in disadvantage and an increase in income inequality. Although, a handful of neighborhoods appear to have experienced the oppositive change. Meanwhile, neighborhoods become more diverse and less white overall. However, in this case, there were quite a few neighborhoods that also experienced a decrease in diversity over the period. Finally, consistent with previous research on Chicago neighborhoods (Hwang and Sampson 2014, Sampson 2012), Figure 3.1 shows neighborhoods that were predominately Black in 1980 remained so in 2000. In other words, from 1980 to 2000 there is little evidence that predominately Black neighborhoods became more white or Hispanic. On the other hand, the cluster of dots bordering the y-axis of the figure show how many neighborhoods with almost no Black residents in 1980 saw a substantial increase in the share of Black residents through 2000. A similar but less pronounced pattern prevailed in Figure 3.2 capturing the 1990-2000 change.

Lastly, Figure 3.3 illustrates the population-weighted mean level and change scores for Chicago neighborhood cluster characteristics for Black, white, and Hispanic residents. In both

1990 and 1980, Black residents were exposed to higher levels of neighborhood disadvantage and violence than white residents with Hispanic residents falling somewhere in the middle on both measures. In terms of change, all racial groups experienced a decline in disadvantage and violence form 1990-2000 with Black and white residents realizing similar improvements. Similar patterns prevail for 1980-2000 change except that on average, Black residents realized a somewhat smaller decline than white residents in disadvantage and an increase in the homicide rate. Meanwhile, all racial groups were exposed to similar levels of income inequality. In this case, Black residents realized a slightly larger increase in income inequality for both 1990-2000 and 1980-2000 than did white and Hispanic Chicagoans. In regard to outgroup share, in both time periods, Hispanic residents lived in neighborhoods with the highest share of outgroup members while the outgroup share was similar for Black and white residents. Over the study period, outgroup share declined slightly for Black residents and more so for Hispanic residents while white residents realized an increase in outgroup share.

Main Results

The main results begin with Table 3.3 summarizing the results from logistic regression models predicting the three forms of trust for the full analytic sample. All models include the full set of individual-level controls discussed earlier, but I limit my discussion to the neighborhood characteristics. The table lists two variables for each neighborhood characteristic. The first corresponds to baseline values for 2000, 1990, or 1990 depending on the model. The second corresponds to change in the characteristic from either 1990-2000 or 1980-2000. The results show the change in the probability of trusting associated with moving from a neighborhood in the tenth percentile of a particular neighborhood characteristic to a neighborhood in the ninetieth percentile for both baseline measures and change scores. Subsequent tables repeat this pattern for different racial groups and long-term residents. Appendix Tables B.1-B.3 repeat the main analysis substituting racial fragmentation for outgroup share, while Tables B.4-B.7 show the average marginal effects for the full set of controls from models where each neighborhood characteristic is added sequentially.

In Table 3.3, the first model for each trust outcome shows the association between neighborhood characteristics and trust when the characteristics are measured in 2000, just before the administration of the CCAHS in 2001-2003. These models are analogous to most cross-sectional studies on this topic where contextual factors are measured contemporaneously with

survey data. Although the first column shows that the four contextual measures are all negatively associated with trust, only concentrated disadvantage reached marginal significance. In this case, going from a neighborhood with a low 2000 disadvantage score to a neighborhood with a high disadvantage score was associated with a 0.09 lower probability of trusting most people. However, the association was considerably stronger for trust in neighbors in column 4. Here, going from a low- to high-disadvantage neighborhood was associated with a 0.29 lower probability of trusting neighbors. Contrary to expectations, the homicide rate was positively associated with trust in neighbors. Moving from a low- to high-inequality neighborhood was associated with a 0.07 lower probability of trusting neighbors. A similar 0.08 association prevailed for out-group share. Column 4 shows that the contemporaneous measures of neighborhood context were also negatively associated with trust in community police. Again, disadvantage had the strongest association, but inequality and outgroup share were also associated with a decline in trust in police. While informative, these models are limited in that they tell us nothing about how changing neighborhood conditions may influence trust.

The second column under each trust outcome illustrates how baseline neighborhood characteristics measured in 1990 and changes in those characteristics from 1990-2000 relate to trust. For example, column 2 indicates that going from a low- to-high disadvantage neighborhood is associated with a 0.10 decline in the probability of trusting. Likewise, there is also evidence that residents living in neighborhoods with high levels of inequality in 1990 had a 0.07 lower probability of trusting than residents of low-inequality neighborhoods. Column 5 shows that trust in neighbors was negatively associated with 1990 levels of disadvantage and outgroup share. However, in this context, several of the change scores are also significant. For example, while living in a high-disadvantaged neighborhood was associated with a 0.28 lower probability of trust relative to living in a low-disadvantage neighborhood, a relative increase in disadvantage from 1990-2000 was also associated with a 0.14 lower probability of trusting.[21] Similar results prevailed for the inequality and outgroup share change scores. In fact, in the case of inequality, it is the change rather than the level of inequality that has the strongest negative association with trust in neighbors. Column 8 shows that 1990 levels of disadvantage, inequality,

[21] I refer to a "relative increase" because the results presented here are based on a 90-10 comparison. It is possible that disadvantage decreased in all neighborhoods but less so for neighborhoods in the ninetieth percentile than for neighborhoods in the tenth percentile. However, the negative maximum values for all neighborhood characteristic change scores in Table 2 indicate that some neighborhoods did experience a worsening of conditions over the study period while others experienced improvements.

and outgroup share were also associated with a lower probability of trusting community police. Likewise, the change scores for disadvantage and inequality were also significant, if only marginally so for inequality.

Lastly, the third column for each trust outcome relates to neighborhood context measured in 1980 and 1980-2000 change scores. In the context of generalized trust in column 3, it is the change scores rather than the levels of disadvantage, inequality, and outgroup trust that are negatively associated with generalized trust. Individuals living in neighborhoods that experienced the largest relative increases in these characteristics had a 0.06-0.07 lower probability of trusting than individuals living in the tenth percentile of the change scores. In the context of trust in neighbors, the 1980 results largely mirror the 1990 results and in the case of the change score for disadvantage and outgroup share, the changes in probabilities are even larger. Somewhat similar results prevailed for trust in police in column 9 where the change scores for disadvantage and outgroup trust were associated with lower levels of trust.

Table 3.3 provides evidence that neighborhood characteristics have a lasting and durable effect on trust. In many cases, the 1990 and 1980 levels were as or more predictive of trust than the 2000 levels. As others have argued, neighborhood disadvantage had the strongest and most consistent negative relationship with each form of trust; although, inequality and outgroup share were also associated with lower levels of trust in neighbors and the police. Finally, changes in disadvantage, inequality, and outgroup share were also negatively associated with trust independent of the baseline values.

Because the descriptive statistics indicate that Black, white, and Hispanic residents of Chicago live in vastly different neighborhood contexts and differ regarding individual-level characteristics, in Table 3.4, I stratify the analysis by race. Rather than go through each result in detail, I will attempt to summarize several main takeaways. First, it appears that levels of concentrated disadvantage were most consequential to generalized trust for Black respondents and to trust in neighbors and the police for both Black and Hispanic respondents. Baseline levels of disadvantage did not predict trust for white respondents. However, the 1980 disadvantage change score was negatively associated with trust in neighbors for all three groups. Levels of inequality were also associated with a lower probability of trusting neighbors and the police for Black and white respondents., although, the statistical significance varied depending on the baseline year. For Black respondents, the inequality change scores were also consequential for

trust in neighbors and the police. Outgroup share and the change in the share were negatively associated with trust in neighbors and the police for white respondents. This effect was particularly large for trust in neighbors. Interestingly, the outgroup share change score was positively associated with trust in the police for Black respondents. The homicide rate was again positively associated with generalized trust for Black respondents, but negatively associated with generalized trust for Hispanic respondents. This is the main exception to the overall pattern that generalized trust appeared to be only weakly associated with neighborhood characteristics.

Although not all results reported in Table 3.3 and 3.4 reached statistical significance, there is remarkable consistency in that the associations are almost uniformly in the anticipated direction, providing consistent evidence that disadvantage, inequality, and outgroup share are negatively associated with trust. An important exception is that in several models, the homicide rate was positively associated with generalized trust and trust in neighbors for the overall sample or the Black and white subsamples. However, there are several reasons to doubt that trust increases with the homicide rate.

First, the homicide rate was highly correlated with disadvantage (e.g., $\rho = 0.80$ for the 1990 homicide rate and disadvantage score). When all other contextual variables were removed from the models, the homicide rate and change in the homicide rate were negatively associated with all forms of trust for the overall sample and each racial group. Also, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the lagged homicide rates ranged from 4.9 to 11.4 for the overall sample and Black and white subsamples, depending on the trust outcome and whether the baseline was measured in 1980 and 1990. This suggests that multicollinearity was a potential problem for the homicide rate measure.

Alternatively, a tragic event like homicide could bring neighbors closer together by forging a stronger sense of solidarity and community. This may be particularly true if perpetrators came from outside of the neighborhood. However, this explanation seems unlikely in the case of the past homicide rates used here. Another possibility is that neighborhoods with high past homicide rates could have realized a reduction in violence over the study period, resulting in greater trust. Future work will explore the interaction between baseline levels and change for homicides as well as the other contextual variables. It may also make more sense to measure the level of homicides rather than the homicide rate, which could also be affected by population change. From a cognitive perspective, it is plausible that the number of homicides in

a neighborhood will be more relevant to individual perceptions than the homicide rate. When I reran the analysis based on levels rather than rates, homicide was negatively associated (and statistically significant in some cases) with the different forms of trust for the overall sample and for Black and Hispanic residents. However, there was still a positive association for trust in neighbors for white residents.

One limitation of the present study is that cross-sectional data does not allow me to account for individual selection into neighborhoods. For example, individuals who feel threatened by outgroup members may choose to live in less diverse communities which could bias the negative association between outgroup share and trust downward. In Table 3.5, I attempt to address the problem of selection by focusing on a subsample of respondents who lived in their current residence for at least ten years. In this case, I am unable to stratify by race given the substantial reduction in sample size. In general, the coefficient estimates are somewhat smaller than they were for the overall sample in Table 3.3. However, the notable exception is out-group share where the change score for 1980-2000 was associated with a 0.14 reduction in the probability of generalized trust and a 0.13 reduction in the probability of trust neighbors. These associations are larger than they were for the overall sample. The 1990 and 1980 baseline measures were also negatively associated with trust in neighbors. Once again, the change in probability was much larger than for the overall sample. These results provide provisional evidence that cross-sectional studies may underestimate the negative consequences of diversity.

Discussion

There remains considerable disagreement among social scientists over the extent to which social context is associated with different forms of trust, independent of individual-level characteristics. The present study investigated the association between disadvantage, violent crime, income inequality, and racial diversity and different forms of trust. Although these characteristics of social context featured prominently in earlier work there has been less effort to give these factors equal theoretical and empirical weighting in the same study context or to contemplate how the associations may vary across different forms of trust.

More importantly, if the supposed benefits of trust are in fact real, society should be concerned about declining trust and persistent racial differences in trust. With respect to individual-level characteristics, we know educational attainment is an important predictor of trust

and specifically generalized trust. Yet, patterns of distrust persist despite rising education levels and greater racial parity in educational attainment. Whereas there is a theoretically plausible causal connection between education and trust, this is not true for the other major predictor of trust—racial identity. Rather, "race is a marker for accumulated social and material adversities [or advantages] that both follow from and constitute racial status in America" (Sampson, Wilson, and Katz 2018, 16). Social context is not only important for understanding patterns of distrust in our society but also for thinking about the potential to build trust by altering underlying social conditions. For example, it is one thing to argue a more *equal* society is a more trusting society and another to argue an *equalizing* society will become a more trusting society. The latter case will depend on both the durability of initial conditions but also the power of social change to transform trust. In contrast to previous studies emphasizing static cross-sectional comparison, the emphasis of the present study is on durable associations and social change. In this respect, the present study makes several valuable contributions to our understanding of trust in society.

First, the association between social context and trust was weakest for generalized trust. While associations were all negative and in the anticipated direction, the associations were relatively modest in magnitude and statistically insignificant in most cases for the overall sample. One exception was concentrated disadvantage where lagged 1990 levels were negatively associated with trust. The association was particularly strong for the Black subpopulation. In no case did the disadvantage change scores appear to matter. Similarly, past homicide rates were negatively associated with generalized trust but only for the Hispanic subpopulation.[22] Neighborhood disadvantage and community violence are correlated over time; nonetheless, these results provide evidence for the durable effects of disadvantage and violence on social trust and particularly for Black and Hispanic residents of Chicago. The results also suggest efforts to alleviate poverty and violence may not have an immediate impact on trust. A remaining puzzle is why concentrated disadvantage mattered for Black residents, while violent crime mattered most for Hispanic residents, and neither factor resonated for white residents.

In this respect, except for the homicide rate, the baseline levels and change scores for other markers of neighborhood context were all negatively associated with trust in neighbors and reached traditional levels of significance. In many cases, the lagged baseline values and change

[22] As noted in the results section, the homicide rate was positively associated with generalized trust for the Black subpopulation, but when homicides enter the equation without other contextual predictors, the association was in the anticipated negative direction.

scores appeared to matter as much as the contemporaneous 2000 measures. Once again, some interesting nuances emerged after stratifying by race. For example, in the context of neighborhood disadvantage, both lagged levels and change scores were associated with less trust in neighbors for Black and Hispanic respondents, but only the change scores appeared to matter for white respondents. One possible explanation is that white respondents are simply not exposed to the same levels of disadvantage as Black and Hispanic respondents.

Perhaps the most interesting finding to emerge from this study is that the inequality change scores were negatively associated with trust for Black and Hispanic residents but not for white residents. This finding is interesting for two reasons. First, it suggests that it is the change in equality and not necessarily static levels of inequality that matter. Second, the significant findings for the Black and Hispanic subpopulations (but not for the white subpopulation) suggest the economic aspect of gentrification could be contributing to distrust. It is notable that all models also controlled for lagged levels and change scores for out-group share, which in the case of Black and Hispanic residents, were unrelated to trust. One interpretation of these findings is in this particular context, the economic aspects of gentrification were more detrimental to trust in neighbors than racial resentment. Previous research has viewed the relationship between inequality and trust from a macro, society-wide perspective with an emphasis on generalized trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, Uslaner 2002, Hastings 2018, Fairbrother and Martin 2013). The findings presented here offer preliminary evidence that income inequality may operate at a more local level and in a more racialized way than previously acknowledged.

Finally, white respondents were the only group for which outgroup share was negatively associated with trust in neighbors. In this case, the association was strongest for the 1980 and 1990 baseline levels. There was also evidence of a decline in trust in neighbors associated with the 1980 change score for white respondents. Appendix Table B.2 shows a much more modest negative association for diversity, providing evidence that it is group threat as opposed to diversity undermining trust among white respondents.

Finally, the results for trust in police largely mirror those for trust in neighbors. For the Black subpopulation, both lagged values and change scores for disadvantage were strongly associated with lower trust. These associations were similar in magnitude to those for trust in neighbors. Likewise, there was evidence of a negative association between inequality and trust in the police for the Black and Hispanic subpopulation and for outgroup share for the white

subpopulation; although the results were only marginally significant in some cases. Interestingly, after controlling for disadvantage and other contextual variables, the homicide rate was not significantly associated with trust in the police. While it is dangerous to base policy solutions on any single study, these findings bolster claims that poverty alleviation through community investment could do more to build trust than effective policing.

Taken together these results speak to the long-running debate in the literature over the extent to which generalized, particularized, and institutional trust are rooted in different bases (Dinesen and Bekkers 2017, Glanville and Paxton 2007, Paxton and Glanville 2015, Uslaner 2002). The findings here do not necessarily undermine previous work arguing generalized trust derives from our experiences in local settings (Glanville and Paxton 2007), but they do indicate other forms of trust like trust neighbors and trust in community police are more directly susceptible to social context. This study shows that it is not only the level that matters but also change over time. Indeed, in the context of generalized trust, it was long-term change more so than contemporary or lagged values of social context that appeared to matter most.

Limitations

The fortuitous timing of the CCHAS allowed me to link the survey to three decades of census data to study neighborhood change prior to survey administration for the entire city of Chicago. That being said, the CCHAS is situated in a particular time and place, which could limit generalizability. Nonetheless, Chicago has been a laboratory for social science research for the past century, precisely because historical patterns of racial segregation and antagonism mirror those found in other rust belt cities throughout the Midwest and Northeast that are still home to millions of people. Different results may prevail in suburban and rural areas or in more integrated cities in the Sun Belt and West that may lack well-defined neighborhoods and historical racial antagonisms. The other limitation is the results presented here are descriptive rather than causal. Although I was able to leverage change in census variables, the survey data were cross-sectional, ruling out other possible causal research designs. Nonetheless, the models included a comprehensive set of individual-level controls and the main contextual variables thought to influence trust.

Conclusion

Like earlier work, the present study identified a strong association between concentrated disadvantage and lower levels of generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in the police

(Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010). Not surprisingly, these associations were strongest for Black and Hispanic residents of Chicago who are at greatest risk of being exposed to neighborhood disadvantage. Because income inequality was also associated with lower trust for these groups, perhaps community investment strategies to simultaneously alleviate poverty and inequality could bolster trust. The study also identified evidence of outgroup threat among white residents for trust in neighbors and the police but less so for generalized trust. These associations were large and apparently durable. This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that trust is most vulnerable when diversity is accompanied by segregation as is the case in Chicago (Uslaner 2012). Previous work on contact theory suggests that inter-racial social ties mediate diversity effects (Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008, Marschall and Stolle 2004), but this work is plagued by endogeneity bias because people who have organically developed inter-racial social ties have already demonstrated a degree of tolerance. It remains to be seen whether public institutions are capable of inducing similar connections through cooperative projects. One could imagine how economic development projects involving community engagement could simultaneously alleviate disadvantage and inequality while helping to forge connections across racial and socio-economic boundaries.

Fig 3.1 Change in Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics from 1990 to 2000, Chicago Community Adult Health Study and U.S. Census



Fig 3.2 Change in Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics from 1980 to 2000, Chicago Community Adult Health Study and U.S. Census



Fig 3.3 Population-weighted mean level and change in neighborhood disadvantage, homicide rate, inequality, and outgroup share by race, Chicago Community Adult Health Study



Note: Mean neighborhood characteristics were weighted using the Chicago Community Adult Health Study population weights corresponding to the 2000 Census.

Table 3.1 Population-weighted descriptive statistics for individual characteristics stratified by race, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Total					Means			p-values 1		
	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White	Black	Hispanic	Black-White	Hispanic-White	Black-Hispanic
Trust most people	3,095	0.41	---	0.00	1.00	0.64	0.24	0.31	<0.001	<0.001	0.004
Trust neighbors	2,939	0.74	---	0.00	1.00	0.86	0.60	0.75	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Trust the police	2,977	0.75	---	0.00	1.00	0.87	0.55	0.78	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Age	3,105	42.47	16.96	18.00	92.00	44.42	44.17	38.13	0.838	<0.001	<0.001
Education									<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
<12	3,105	0.23	---	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.23	0.45			
12	3,105	0.24	---	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.28	0.25			
13-15	3,105	0.25	---	0.00	1.00	0.23	0.31	0.21			
16+	3,105	0.28	---	0.00	1.00	0.45	0.18	0.10			
Female	3,105	0.53	---	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.57	0.51	0.011	0.624	0.046
Household Income (000)	3,105	48.78	---	0.00	1,500.00	69.66	35.68	35.72	<0.001	<0.001	0.947
Foreign-born	3,105	0.27	---	0.00	1.00	0.19	0.02	0.64	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Speaks Spanish at home	3,105	0.15	---	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.56	0.208	<0.001	<0.001
Married	3,105	0.42	---	0.00	1.00	0.43	0.30	0.54	<0.001	0.003	<0.001
Has non-adult children	3,105	0.32	---	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.33	0.50	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Owns home	3,105	0.41	---	0.00	1.00	0.51	0.33	0.38	<0.001	<0.001	0.164
Years in current residence	3,089	9.85	12.14	0.00	83.00	10.54	11.47	7.37	0.238	<0.001	<0.001

Note: Category other race not shown but included in total.

(1) Adjusted Wald Tests.

Table 3.2 Population-weighted descriptive statistics for Neighborhood Cluster characteristics stratified by race, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Total (n = 3105)				Means			p-values [1]		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White (n = 983)	Black (n = 1240)	Hispanic (n = 802)	Black-White	Hispanic-White	Black-Hispanic
Disadvantage Std. (1980)	0.10	0.84	-2.05	2.86	-0.57	0.45	-0.02	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Disadvantage Std. (1990)	0.09	1.00	-2.12	3.75	-0.81	0.57	-0.06	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Disadvantage Std. (2000)	-0.24	0.90	-2.46	2.77	-1.16	0.20	-0.34	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Homicide Rate (1980)	77.11	81.71	0.00	375.55	46.20	103.44	59.43	<0.001	0.051	<0.001
Homicide Rate (1990)	82.69	86.93	0.00	503.93	30.78	130.77	51.77	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Homicide Rate (2000)	75.73	77.74	0.00	519.48	19.68	118.42	48.46	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Inequality (1980)	0.40	0.05	0.29	0.55	0.39	0.41	0.39	0.001	0.787	<0.001
Inequality (1990)	0.42	0.06	0.31	0.63	0.41	0.44	0.40	<0.001	0.034	<0.001
Inequality (2000)	0.44	0.06	0.32	0.68	0.43	0.47	0.42	<0.001	0.221	<0.001
Diversity (1980)	0.27	0.21	0.02	0.74	0.29	0.18	0.32	<0.001	0.114	<0.001
Diversity (1990)	0.30	0.23	0.01	0.73	0.36	0.16	0.38	<0.001	0.114	<0.001
Diversity (2000)	0.33	0.23	0.02	0.74	0.44	0.16	0.41	<0.001	0.208	<0.001
Outgroup (1980)	0.38	0.36	0.01	1.00	0.23	0.24	0.71	0.781	<0.001	<0.001
Outgroup (1990)	0.35	0.33	0.00	1.00	0.30	0.18	0.59	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Outgroup (2000)	0.34	0.31	0.01	1.00	0.39	0.16	0.48	<0.001	0.020	<0.001
Disadvantage Std. Change (1980-2000)	-0.34	0.51	-2.25	0.95	-0.59	-0.25	-0.32	<0.001	<0.001	0.183
Disadvantage Std. Change (1990-2000)	-0.33	0.39	-2.24	0.56	-0.35	-0.36	-0.27	0.707	0.007	0.026
Homicide Rate Change (1980-2000)	-1.38	78.22	-308.10	264.53	-26.52	14.98	-10.97	<0.001	0.012	<0.001
Homicide Rate Change (1990-2000)	-6.96	55.41	-212.47	201.14	-11.09	-12.35	-3.30	0.814	0.016	0.121
Inequality Change (1980-2000)	0.04	0.04	-0.12	0.27	0.04	0.05	0.03	<0.001	0.147	<0.001
Inequality Change (1990-2000)	0.02	0.04	-0.10	0.24	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.020	0.061	0.425
Outgroup Change (1980-2000)	-0.04	0.28	-0.92	0.77	0.16	-0.08	-0.24	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Outgroup Change (1990-2000)	-0.01	0.16	-0.52	0.59	0.09	-0.02	-0.11	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Diversity Change (1980-2000)	0.05	0.20	-0.63	0.59	0.14	-0.01	0.09	<0.001	0.023	<0.001
Diversity Change (1990-2000)	0.03	0.12	-0.36	0.46	0.08	0.00	0.03	<0.001	<0.001	0.033

(1) Adjusted Wald Tests.

Table 3.3 Predicted change in probability of trusting associated with moving from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 90th percentile of each neighborhood cluster characteristic for the full sample, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Generalized Trust (n=3080)			Trust in Neighbors (n=2924)			Trust in Police (n=2962)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.09+	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.29***	-0.28***	-0.20***	-0.16**	-0.17**	-0.10+
Δ Disadvantage		-0.05	-0.06+		-0.14***	-0.21***		-0.09***	-0.14***
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	0.06*	0.02	0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.05	-0.06		0.04	0.05		-0.04	-0.04
Inequality Baseline	-0.05	-0.07+	-0.05	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.12**	-0.06+	-0.09+	-0.13*
Δ Inequality		-0.05	-0.06*		-0.08**	-0.04+		-0.05+	-0.03
Outgroup Baseline	-0.02	-0.01	0.004	-0.08**	-0.09**	-0.08*	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06+
Δ Outgroup		-0.04	-0.07*		-0.04*	-0.10**		-0.03	-0.07*

Note. All models for the control for race, age and age squared, educational attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table 3.4 Predicted change in probability of trusting associated with moving from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 90th percentile of each neighborhood cluster characteristic, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Generalized Trust (n=979)			Trust in Neighbors (n=915)			Trust in Police (n=943)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
A. White Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.11	-0.15	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.07
Δ Disadvantage		-0.05	-0.03		-0.13*	-0.15*		-0.08	-0.08
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.06	-0.01	-0.17	0.10*	0.09	0.12*	0.05	0.04	0.06
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.11	-0.16		0.07	0.09		0.01	-0.01
Inequality Baseline	-0.05	-0.10	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09	-0.13+	-0.05	-0.08	-0.18*
Δ Inequality		-0.05	-0.08		-0.03	-0.02		0.02	0.02
Outgroup Baseline	-0.08	-0.06	0.06	-0.28***	-0.36***	-0.37**	-0.19*	-0.21*	-0.09
Δ Outgroup		-0.06	-0.15+		-0.04	-0.10**		-0.04	-0.08+
	Generalized Trust (n=1232)			Trust in Neighbors (n=1175)			Trust in Police (n=1174)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
B. Black Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.11	-0.22*	-0.20*	-0.25**	-0.23*	-0.17+	-0.28***	-0.23*	-0.19+
Δ Disadvantage		-0.02	-0.04		-0.17***	-0.22***		-0.16**	-0.19**
Homicide Rate Baseline	0.03	0.11*	0.17*	0.09+	0.01	0.10	-0.02	-0.08	-0.05
Δ Homicide Rate		0.00	0.03		0.06+	0.08		-0.03	-0.03
Inequality Baseline	0.00	0.02	0.01	-0.08	-0.04	-0.15*	-0.03	-0.11+	-0.10
Δ Inequality		-0.05	-0.05		-0.12**	-0.07+		-0.08+	-0.05
Outgroup Baseline	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.06	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01
Δ Outgroup		0.04	0.03		0.01	0.00		0.18**	0.16+
	Generalized Trust (n=789)			Trust in Neighbors (n=760)			Trust in Police (n=767)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
C. Hispanic Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	0.01	0.07	0.01	-0.24*	-0.35*	-0.22+	-0.17+	-0.40***	-0.26*
Δ Disadvantage		-0.05	-0.01		-0.06	-0.14*		0.03	-0.07
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.17*	-0.27**	-0.20+	-0.00	0.03	-0.01	-0.07	0.06	-0.01
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.08	-0.17+		-0.02	-0.01		-0.06	-0.04
Inequality Baseline	-0.06	-0.03	0.05	-0.10+	-0.04	-0.08	-0.12*	0.03	-0.08
Δ Inequality		-0.03	-0.07		-0.10+	-0.09+		-0.10*	-0.07
Outgroup Baseline	-0.00	0.01	0.06	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.08	-0.05
Δ Outgroup		-0.03	-0.06		-0.02	-0.04		-0.04	-0.06

Note. All models for the control for age and age squared, educational attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table 3.5 Predicted change in probability of trusting associated with moving from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 90th percentile of each neighborhood cluster characteristic for respondents living in the same place for 10 or more years, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Generalized Trust (n=1027)			Trust in Neighbors (n=985)			Trust in Police (n=988)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.08	-0.06	0.00	-0.18**	-0.18+	-0.15	-0.19**	-0.16+	-0.19*
Δ Disadvantage		-0.07	-0.09		-0.09*	-0.12**		-0.08+	-0.09*
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.03	-0.02	-0.08	0.02
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.07	-0.10		-0.02	-0.04		0.02	0.01
Inequality Baseline	-0.06	-0.10	-0.11	-0.05	-0.01	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.11
Δ Inequality		-0.08	-0.09*		-0.07	-0.05		0.01	-0.01
Outgroup Baseline	-0.07	-0.06	-0.03	-0.14**	-0.16**	-0.15*	-0.08	-0.07	-0.08
Δ Outgroup		-0.07	-0.14*		-0.05	-0.13*		-0.04	-0.07

Note. All models for the control for age and age squared, educational attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

CHAPTER IV

A Longitudinal Study of Diversity and Generalized Trust

Introduction

One of the most contentious debates in the trust literature is over the negative effects of increasing racial diversity in society on social trust (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018). This debate is particularly salient in the U.S., where social trust has decreased over the past fifty years, with white people experiencing the greatest declines (Wilkes 2011). Falling trust has coincided with a rapid increase in racial diversity.[23] These countervailing time trends—falling trust and rising diversity—suggest the two processes may be correlated. Likewise, cross-sectional studies reveal that average levels of trust are lower in racially diverse communities than they are in homogenous communities (Putnam 2007). At the same time, correlated trends could be confounded by other social changes like the concomitant rise in income inequality (Uslaner 2002, Costa and Kahn 2003b, Portes and Vickstrom 2011), while others argue that differences in trust at the community level are a byproduct of compositional effects resulting from preexisting differences in trust across racial groups (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015).

Although part of the controversy revolves around methodological concerns in studies linking racial diversity and trust, there is more at stake than conceptual definitions or problems of unobserved confounding. The debate over diversity and trust strikes an emotional chord with the public and scholars alike because of its troubling ramifications for rapidly diversifying societies. If a diverse society is a less cohesive society, what are the implications for tackling seemingly intractable contemporary problems related to climate change, economic and racial inequality, and police reform or democracy itself?

[23] In the present study, I will refer to racial diversity and racial groups. References to race should be understood to include Hispanic people as a separate and mutually exclusive group even though the U.S. Census considers this to be an ethnicity rather than a race.

Moreover, will meso-level diversification in educational institutions, political bodies, corporations, and neighborhoods threaten cooperation in these contexts? What are the implications of a possible diversity-cohesion tradeoff for immigration reform or the racial integration of schools and neighborhoods? These are uncomfortable questions for scholars, but ones that should not be left entirely to public and political discourse.

Thus far, the inclination among prominent sociologists in the United States has been to deny any relationship between diversity and trust. In a *New York Times* op-ed, sociologists Abascal and Baldassarri (2016) drew on their scholarship to dissuade readers from blaming diversity for distrust. As I will discuss, this claim conflicts with other careful studies on trust and related measures of cohesion. More importantly, this conclusion is at odds with the facts on the ground. If the last five years have taught us anything, it is that the color line is *the* problem of the twenty-first century. This problem is evident in broad-based support among white Americans for building a wall along the southern U.S. border to keep out immigrants and a resurgence of white supremacy.[24]

Yet, these examples—immigration versus tension over a deeply entrenched Black-white racial hierarchy—suggest that diversity may take different forms in the United States. Hispanic and Asian immigration since the 1990s has greatly increased the overall diversity of the U.S. population. The geographic distribution of all racial groups in the United States has also changed in recent decades. For example, the fanning out of native- and foreign-born Hispanic and Asian people away from traditional urban melting pots in coastal cities and Chicago to new destinations in the Midwest and South is reshaping the demographic profile of areas that had few non-white or non-Black residents as recently as the 1990s (Frey 2018, Lichter and Johnson 2009). Black Americans are also reshaping the makeup of states and neighborhoods through reverse migration to the South as well as an exodus from central cities to suburban locations (Frey 2018). Increasing economic and residential opportunities have contributed to increased diversity in some areas even though the overall Black population share has increased only modestly in recent decades. Finally, all racial groups, including the white population, continue to gravitate toward Sunbelt states (Frey 2002). However, many studies of trust in the United States have not

[24] The Pew Research Center (2019) reported that 47 percent of non-Hispanic whites and 82 percent of Republicans supported substantially expanding the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico.

explicitly distinguished true diversity effects from other possible mechanisms like fear of new immigrants or old Black-white racial antagonism.

The present study adopts a causal framework to investigate the relationship between diversity and generalized trust. I link cross-sectional survey responses from the 1993-2018 General Social Survey (GSS) with repeated measures of county racial diversity. I estimate the causal effects of diversity on trust using fixed effects estimation to leverage within-county change in diversity while controlling for time-constant unobserved characteristics of counties that may have led earlier studies to overstate the negative effects of diversity on trust. In addition to using the standard diversity index found in earlier studies, I also perform a stratified analysis for white and Black respondents that considers the effects of specific out-groups on generalized trust while also considering the moderating effects of residential segregation and individual racial prejudice among white respondents. To preview the results, I find that diversity has a modest negative effect on generalized trust.

Background

Trust, Social Capital, and Social Cohesion

The literature on the social consequences of diversity is marred by a lack of conceptual clarity. Scholars frequently use the terms social capital, social trust, and social cohesion interchangeably. Yet, there is considerable disagreement over how these concepts, and social capital specifically, should be defined. Like others before me (Hooghe 2007, Schaeffer 2014), in this study, I focus on social cohesion and generalized trust in particular. Admittedly, this is partly out of convenience as generalized trust is perhaps the only marker of social cohesion measured over long periods in national surveys. However, as I argue here, there reasons beyond practicality to focus on generalized trust.

First, the conceptualization of social capital political scientist Robert Putnam popularized differs from earlier sociological conceptualizations (Portes 1998). Putnam defines social capital as the "connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (2000, 19). Critically, Putnam views social capital as a public good, a property of neighborhoods, cities, and even nations. In contrast, Bourdieu envisioned social capital as the capacity for individuals or families to command resources by virtue of connections to dense social networks, while Coleman was concerned with the capacity

for dense social ties—the structure of relations between actors—to enforce norms through the process of social closure (Coleman 1988, Portes and Vickstrom 2011, Portes 1998, Bourdieu 1983). Sociologists have justifiably criticized Putnam's conceptualization for failing to distinguish social capital from its alleged consequences (Portes 1998, Portes and Vickstrom 2011, Paxton 1999). Even Putnam acknowledges that the causal arrows connecting the components of social capital— civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust—are "as tangled a well-tossed spaghetti" (2000, 137). These conceptual muddy waters suggest that the popular conceptualization of social capital is not an ideal candidate for study as either a cause or consequence of other social phenomena. Yet, there is an undeniable sociological appeal to Putnam's broader claim that societies have properties or qualities external to the individual.

Second, the present study is concerned with how the relationship between diversity and social cohesion has changed together over time. Although Putnam argues in his influential book *Bowling Alone* that social capital declined in the latter half of the 20th century, other empirical work finds little change from the 1970s onward in the level of associations, membership in groups, and informal socializing (Paxton 1999, Schwadel and Stout 2012, Clark 2015). Moreover, declines in traditional organizations have been replaced by alternative forms of social capital and the direct participation of women in the labor force and politics (Ladd 1996, Costa and Kahn 2003b). Others criticized Putnam's backward-looking and romanticized view of the progressive era organizations that excluded groups (e.g., racial and cultural minorities and women) who deviated from white Christian norms (Arneil 2006). On the other hand, there is clear evidence for a downward trend in generalized trust (Robinson and Jackson 2001, Schwadel and Stout 2012, Clark, Clark, and Monzin 2013, Clark 2015) that is most pronounced for white adults (Wilkes 2011). If our interest is in understanding the relationship between diversity and social cohesion or social capital, then it makes sense to focus specifically on generalized trust—the indicator showing a clear downward trend, particularly among the dominant social group that is possibly most threatened by diversity.

Generalized Trust

Perhaps out of convenience, or the fact that social capital suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity and a clearly defined trend, most research purporting to study social capital and diversity focuses instead on generalized trust. Here, I argue that generalized trust is an important outcome, worthy of study, independent of any connection to social capital.

Generalized trust is often defined as the expectation for reciprocity, honesty, and cooperative behavior based on commonly shared norms and values (Fukuyama 1995). Others describe generalized trust as the expectation that others will act with goodwill and benign intent (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994, Barber 1983, Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton 2013) or couch trust in moralistic terms as the belief that others share the same fundamental moral values and fate (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, Uslaner 2002). All of these definitions point toward generalized trust as a powerful indicator of the degree of social cohesion in society (Pichler and Wallace 2007). Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011, 787) argue generalized trust is consequential because it is "the basis of reciprocity, social connectedness, peaceful collective action, inclusiveness, tolerance, gender equality, confidence in institutions, and democracy itself."

Critically, generalized trust is theoretically and empirically distinct from knowledge-based trust or trust in particular people and institutions like neighbors or the police (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009, Uslaner 2002, Newton and Zmerli 2011). There are two diverging perspectives on generalized trust (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018). Uslaner (2002) is the primary proponent of the dispositional perspective, arguing that trust is formed in early childhood and largely immune to life experience. Glanville and Paxton's (2007, 2015) contrasting social learning perspective holds that generalized trust is formed from trust relations in localized settings (e.g., work, church, neighborhood). In the context of the present study, both perspectives suggest that the diversity-trust connection may be somewhat weaker for generalized trust than for trust in specific groups like neighbors. Although the social learning perspective allows for experience with diversity to influence generalized trust, this would be a second-order effect filtered through localized trust experiences, for example, trust in neighbors in a diversifying community. Indeed, recent reviews and meta-analyses have concluded that the empirical relationship between diversity and trust is stronger for trust in specific groups like neighbors than for generalized trust (Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020, Schaeffer 2014, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).

Nonetheless, considering the social and political upheaval in recent years, society should be more concerned with broad indicators of social cohesion like generalized trust than trust in specific groups. Our sense of shared fate (or lack thereof) could provide insight into resistance to wearing masks during a pandemic, distrust of life-saving vaccines, debates over police brutality, and refusal to accept political defeat.

Diversity and Generalized Trust

The contemporary controversy over diversity and social cohesion is rooted in older theoretical approaches to group relations, including group threat theory (Blalock 1967, Blumer 1958), social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and group contact theory (Allport 1954). From the group threat perspective, actual and perceived threats to the dominant group's prerogatives in the form of out-group size and economic competition influence attitudes toward out-group members (Quillian 1995, 1996). In contrast, Allport's (1954) contact theory predicts that under optimal conditions (e.g., equal status between groups, shared goals, cooperation, and institutional support), contact between groups will reduce intergroup prejudice.[25] Meanwhile, social identity theory relates to an individual's emotional attachment to a group (e.g., racial or ethnic group, religion, gender) (Tajfel and Turner 1986). From this perspective, people seek to maintain a positive self-identity through favorable comparisons with other groups (Brown 2000), leading to ingroup favoritism but not necessarily more hostility toward out-groups (Schaeffer 2014). Although there is empirical support for all three of these theories, more recent work suggests that the group threat and contact hypotheses occur simultaneously but work in offsetting directions (Wagner et al. 2006, Schlueter and Wagner 2008, Schlueter and Scheepers 2010), while others argue that face-to-face contact in diverse but integrated communities mitigates group threat (Oliver and Wong 2003, Rocha and Espino 2008, Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000).

Research on diversity and social cohesion rehashes many of these earlier debates, but there are important differences. First, whereas research on intergroup relations was primarily concerned with prejudicial attitudes or discrimination toward out-group members, research on social cohesion typically emphasizes generalized trust, trust in specific groups (e.g., neighbors or specific racial groups), or participation in formal or informal associations. Although we may expect that prejudice attitudes toward a specific racial group and trust in that racial group are correlated, these concepts are not identical. This is particularly true of broader measures of social cohesion like generalized trust or trust in neighbors that leave the out-group unspecified.

Second, Putnam (2007, 149) added a new wrinkle to old debates over intergroup and intragroup relations with his "constrict theory" that "people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down' – that is, to pull in like a turtle," imperiling *both* in- and out-group trust.

[25] Others have argued that the Allport's optimal conditions facilitate but are not necessary for positive group contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).

Unfortunately, Putnam's theoretical justification rests on little more than the observation that "diversity seems to trigger not ingroup/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation" (2007, 149). Because the present study leverages longitudinal data, I am unable to provide a direct test of conflict theory which would require repeated observations for in- and out-group trust. At the same time, the measure of generalized trust used in the present study leaves the object of trust undefined meaning that the question captures a mixture of in- and out-group trust (Delhey, Newton, and Welzel 2011).[26]

Why would we expect a person living in a diverse community to trust other people less than an otherwise identical person living in a homogenous community? Several scholars have sought to answer this question by placing the relationship between diversity and social cohesion on firm theoretical footing (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014, Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson 2011, Tolsma and van der Meer 2018, Schaeffer 2014, Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020, Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018, Koopmans, Lancee, and Schaeffer 2015). Among the many theoretical perspectives, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) and Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson (2011) offer particularly lucid accounts that distinguish traditional socio-psychological explanations from what I refer to as true diversity effects. Socio-psychological and true diversity effects represent two distinct pathways by which diversity may affect trust, and I turn to these next.

Socio-psychological Explanations

The socio-psychological mechanism is relational in that it takes into account the social identity (race in the present context) of the potential trustor as well as the interaction between this identity and the social context (Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson 2011). From the sociological perspective, we are more likely to trust others who share a common identity in respect to race, ethnicity, and socio-economic status and feel threatened by a rising share of out-group members. Therefore, the connection between diversity and trust in out-group members is relatively straightforward. However, it is less clear why diversity would lead to lower levels of trust in ingroup members or generalized trust. In this regard, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) draw the social disorganization perspective to argue that because people distrust out-group members, they will avoid interracial interactions in diversifying areas, leading to a broader

[26] However, Delhey, Newton, and Welzel (2011) note that in the U.S., the standard measure of generalized trust leans more toward an assessment of out-group trust.

retreat from social life and a loss of social control and trust at the community level. A slightly different take is that people base perceptions of trustworthiness on cues gleaned from everyday experiences in local contexts (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015, Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh 2001). Because people place less trust in racial out-groups, exposure to out-groups in localized contexts will cause people to infer that others are less trustworthy in general (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015). Both explanations depend on Glanville and Paxton's insight that people develop general perceptions of trustworthiness from localized experiences (2007).

Socio-psychological explanations point to a potential problem with many studies in this literature that rely on the standard diversity index without taking into consideration the race of the trustor. The standard diversity index is color-blind in that it does not distinguish a neighborhood that is 80% white and 20% Black from one that is 20% white and 80% Black. As Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) observed, outside of having the same diversity score, these two neighborhoods are likely to share little in common. Moreover, the neighborhoods will also look quite different from the perspective of the trustor. For example, we may expect a Black person living in the primarily Black neighborhood may have relatively high levels of trust because she is embedded among ingroup members, whereas a white person living in the same neighborhood embedded among out-group members will be less trusting. Because people of color in the United States live in more racially diverse neighborhoods than white people (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015), diversity may be associated with living among ingroup members, potentially mitigating the harmful effects of diversity on trust. Furthermore, because of historical cleavages and contemporary economic competition, out-groups are not exchangeable. From the perspective of Black Americans, the historical legacy of anti-Black oppression may influence trust relations in an 80% white neighborhood whereas competition over jobs and economic resources may be more of a factor in a majority Hispanic neighborhood (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). In the present study, I account for trustor-context dyads by stratifying all results by race and by supplementing an analysis using the standard diversity measure with models that control for the presence of specific out-groups.

True Diversity Effect

What I call a true diversity effect, is what Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson (2011) refer to as a "pure contextual" effect or the "homogeneity hypothesis." From this perspective, diversity erodes trust regardless of the social position of the individual embedded in the system.

For example, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) took Putnam to task for failing to consider that the most common measure of diversity is insensitive to the racial composition of an area. While this valid criticism points to an alternative mechanism (namely the previously discussed socio-psychological mechanisms), it also sidesteps Putnam's fundamental point which is that it is diversity itself rather than historical cleavages or threats that drive down trust. Öberg, Oskarsson, and Svensson (2011) argue that low conflict and dense social networks characterize homogenous communities. This argument mirrors Coleman's concept of social closure where strong community ties make it possible to sanction community members for violating norms (1988). Therefore, independent of individual social identity, the likelihood of trusting should be high in relatively homogenous communities because behavior is governed by adherence to community rules and norms. Similarly, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) emphasize that anomie will take hold in diverse communities where people grow anxious about shared social norms and values because they lack reliable information. Once anomie takes hold, people withdraw from social life because they "no longer know how to behave in public," opening the door for isolation, a loss of social control, and eventually generalized distrust. Relatedly, coordination problems may also arise in diverse settings because of language differences or asymmetric preferences (Koopmans and Schaeffer 2015, Habyarimana et al. 2007). Finally, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) mention a related mechanism that has been relatively neglected by sociologists. It is well established that Black and Hispanic people in the United States report substantially lower levels of trust than white people (Smith 2010). It could be that everybody trusts less in diverse communities (with high percentages of Black or Hispanic residents) in response to low average levels of trust.

Conditional Effects of Diversity

Drawing on the contact theory literature, some have argued that the negative effect of diversity on generalized trust is conditioned by interracial contact at the local level (Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008, Uslaner 2012). From this perspective, trust will be relatively higher in diverse but integrated communities relative to diverse communities with little integration. For example, we may expect trust to be relatively low in diverse but racially segregated Chicago relative to Houston, which is also diverse but somewhat more integrated. This theory is usually tested in one of two ways. The first is to interact an objective measure of racial segregation with the standard diversity index (Uslaner 2011), while the second approach interacts individual reports of interracial interactions or friendships with the diversity index (Douds and Wu 2017,

Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008). The latter approach is plagued by obvious endogeneity problems in that more trusting people are likely to have more interracial friendships and contact (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018).

Although scholars have focused almost exclusively on interracial contact, other possible individual-level characteristics could also moderate the relationship between diversity and trust. For example, Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018) note that individual personality characteristics are a relatively unexplored area of interest. It is difficult to envision a causal analysis given the endogeneity of personality characteristics to trust. Nonetheless, from a descriptive perspective, it would be interesting to know if the effects of diversity vary across individuals depending on individual prejudices or political leanings. The present study is one of the first to take up this issue in the context of generalized trust.

Evidence on Diversity and Social Cohesion

Several recent reviews have focused on specific aspects of this debate including social cohesion (Portes and Vickstrom 2011, van der Meer and Tolsma 2014, Schaeffer 2014), generalized trust (Dinesen, Schaeffer, and Sønderskov 2020, Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018), and attitudes toward immigrants (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018). The evidence for a negative relationship between diversity and social cohesion is decidedly mixed as demonstrated by one meta-analysis finding a near-even split between studies finding an effect of diversity versus no effect (Schaeffer 2014), while another meta-analysis examining a wider range of social cohesion indicators found even less support for a negative effect of diversity (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). However, these meta-analyses also revealed that U.S. studies were more likely than non-U.S. studies to find that diversity has negative consequences for cohesion.

Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018) argue that U.S. exceptionalism may be a statistical artifact resulting from larger study samples. However, it is equally plausible that the country's unique 400-year history of racial oppression and segregation has contributed to this exceptionalism. Whereas rising racial diversity is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe, driven by immigration from former colonies, the U.S. has a permanent and large minority population and has also experienced rising immigration (Hooghe et al. 2009). Because there are several comprehensive reviews of this topic and the present study focuses specifically on the United

States, I will briefly review the literature on diversity and social cohesion in the U.S. context.[27] Although there may be greater evidence for a negative relationship between diversity and social cohesion in the United States than elsewhere, the findings from these studies are not conclusive.

One challenge in summarizing this literature is that studies differ in how they measure diversity (diversity index, segregation index, or in- or out-group population shares), aggregate diversity (census tract, county or MSA, state, and nation), and measure social cohesion (generalized trust, trust in neighbors, trust in specific racial groups, or general measure of social capital). The aforementioned reviews generally found that the effects of diversity were strongest when diversity was measured at the neighborhood level and for trust in neighbors. Nonetheless, several U.S. studies did identify a negative relationship between diversity and generalized trust, even when diversity was measured at the city (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Costa and Kahn 2003a) and state levels (Dincer 2011). Likewise, similar results prevailed in studies measuring diversity at the neighborhood level and for measures of trust in and attitudes toward neighbors (Guest, Kubrin, and Cover 2008, Putnam 2007, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010, Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008, Williamson 2014) as well as the provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999) and face-to-face participation in community organizations (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). Several important nuances have emerged from this literature.

The first is that in many cases, the relative effect of diversity on different forms of trust is small in magnitude, particularly when compared to other contextual factors like poverty and crime (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010, Sturgis et al. 2011).

Second, several studies show that the negative consequences of diversity or out-group shares for different forms of trust are stronger for white people than for other racial groups (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Abascal and Baldassarri 2015, Uslaner 2011). Although, other studies find that the disproportionate effect for white people largely dissipates after taking into consideration other neighborhood factors like poverty (Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010).

Thirdly, several studies have sought to untangle diversity and compositional effects by focusing on specific racial groups. For example, Guest, Kubrin, and Cover (2008) focus

[27] An older literature on group threat theory finds that white prejudicial attitudes increase with a rising share of the Black population (Quillian 1996, Taylor 1998, Fossett and Kiecolt 1989, Giles and Evans 1985). These findings contrast with the literature on contact theory, finding that intergroup contact reduces prejudicial attitudes (Oliver and Wong 2003, Rocha and Espino 2008, Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000, Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). I do not review these studies here.

specifically on white residents in Seattle. They found the perceived trustworthiness, helpfulness, and noisiness of neighbors decreased as neighborhood diversity increased; although, the effect size was modest. In contrast to previous studies, Guest and colleagues attempted to untangle diversity effects from compositional effects by also examining the association between trust in neighbors and the neighborhood percentage share of Asian, Black, and Hispanic residents. The standardized coefficients for the three groups were similar in magnitude and relatively small, leading Guest and colleagues to conclude that there is a true diversity effect rather than threat effects from a specific racial group. Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) took a similar approach using Putnam's SCBS but reached a much different conclusion. When stratifying the analysis by race for white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian subsamples, they found that for each of these groups, diversity had no effect on generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in specific racial groups. However, these different forms of trust increased for the white subsample with a rise in the neighborhood white population share, providing evidence that for white people it is group threat rather than diversity that drives down trust.

Fourth, several studies show that the negative consequences of diversity are modified by residential segregation and inter-racial contact (Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008, Uslaner 2012, 2011, 2014, Douds and Wu 2017). Importantly, diversity and segregation are not identical concepts in that diversity refers to the overall racial composition of an area whereas segregation refers to the spread of racial groups across geographic areas (Lee, Iceland, and Farrell 2014). Uslaner (2012, 88) argues that "for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics, living in an integrated and diverse neighborhood and having friends of different backgrounds leads to greater trust." Others argue that segregation affects trust independent of diversity. For example, Rothwell (2011) found using the nationally representative GSS that segregation was associated with lower levels of generalized trust. This finding is consistent with the contact hypothesis in that living in racially isolated areas appears to foster a general distrust in others. Yet, Douds and Wu (2017) found using the Houston Area Study that segregation was positively associated with generalized trust. They argue trust is highest in segregated areas because when asked about trust in "most people" respondents are more likely to think of ingroup members than they would in less segregated contexts. Both set of explanations are plausible. That the Houston findings contradict the findings from a national study suggest the importance of local context, for

example, how the racial makeup or dynamics of an individual city can shape the effect of segregation (or diversity) on trust.

Lastly, several studies have found no relationship between diversity and generalized or other forms of trust. In their analysis of Putnam's SCBS, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) make perhaps the most forceful claim that there simply is no relationship between diversity and trust and that any apparent relationship is the product of confounding factors like neighborhood residential stability and economic conditions. They find after controlling for neighborhood context that the relationship between diversity and generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in in- and out-group members disappears. However, is worth noting the main results show that for generalized trust, the other purported causes of distrust, including, neighborhood poverty, inequality, and median household income, homeownership, and residential mobility are also statistically insignificant. More importantly, the main results simultaneously controlled for neighborhood diversity and percent white. The near-perfect negative correlation between these variables in the SCBS (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010, Uslaner 2011) could lead to unstable estimates for both variables. And, as mentioned before, they found strong evidence for group threat for the white subsample in that out-group shares were associated with distrust in neighbors and specific racial groups. Although I would argue in this case that rhetorical force has outpaced empirical evidence, other single-city studies have failed to find a relationship between diversity and distrust in Houston (Douds and Wu 2017) or, in the case of 1970s Detroit, found that trust increases with diversity (Marschall and Stolle 2004). However, is worth noting that Detroit is one of the most segregated cities in the country while Houston is one of the most diverse, so these contexts are hardly representative of typical U.S. communities.

Present Study

The widespread interest in racial diversity and trust is evident from the hundreds of studies published worldwide on this topic. Unfortunately, with few exceptions (e.g., Williamson 2014, Laurence and Bentley 2015), these studies have relied on static, cross-sectional comparisons between diverse and homogenous communities that cannot provide evidence for a causal connection between diversity and trust. The process Putnam describes is both causal and dynamic. From a policy perspective, it is far more interesting to know if areas that are diversifying because of immigration and internal migration patterns experience a concurrent

decline in trust, as opposed to whether people in more diverse contexts are less trusting than those in homogenous contexts.

The present study's fixed effect design leverages within-county changes in diversity over time to estimate the causal relationship between diversity and trust. Like Guest, Kubrin, and Cover (2008), I stratify analyses by race and examine out-group population shares for specific racial groups to discern between diversity and group threat effects. Considering disagreements in the literature on the effect of segregation, I also use within-county change to study segregation both independent of diversity and as a potential moderator of diversity. Finally, Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018) note that scholars have generally neglected interesting person-level moderators. Given the apparent rise in old-fashioned racial prejudice and a resurgence of white nationalism in the United States (Massey 2021), I conclude by testing to see if white respondents who harbor racial prejudices and conservative racial policy attitudes are more influenced by changes in diversity than others. This analysis will determine if individual prejudice moderates the relationship between diversity and social trust.

Methods

Data

Data for this study are a pooled cross-section of survey waves from the 1993-2018 General Social Survey (GSS). This nationally representative survey was administered each year from 1972 to 1994 and biannually thereafter. The GSS's repeated cross-section design, stability in question-wording, and geographic coverage make the survey uniquely well-suited for studying changes in trust over time. Furthermore, restricted-access geocodes enabled me to match individual survey respondents with county sociodemographic characteristics from the U.S. Census and other sources.[28] The primary analysis used cross-sectional data from 14 waves of the GSS fielded from 1993 to 2018 that are merged with annual measures of socioeconomic characteristics for 440 counties to yield 18,212 individual and 2,694 county-year observations for the full sample.[29] This means that I observe counties six times on average. The GSS did not provide county identifiers before 1993.

Generalized Trust

[28] Users must submit an application to NORC to obtain access to the geocoded General Social Survey data.
[29] Note that 20 counties (corresponding to 49 individual observations) are observed in only one year.

This study measures generalized trust using the Rosenberg (1956) misanthropy scale measuring the perceived trustworthiness, fairness, and helpfulness of other people. Generalized trust has been found to correlate with trustworthy behavior (Glaeser et al. 2000, Knack and Keefer 1997) and to be relatively stable at the individual level over time (Uslaner 2008). The summed scale consists of the following three questions: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?" and "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?" Consistent with earlier studies (Smith 1997, Hastings 2018, Fairbrother and Martin 2013), I reverse-coded the scale to range from zero to six where higher values correspond to greater trust. Specifically, I coded responses "can be trusted," "try to be fair," and "try to be helpful" as two, "depends" as one, and "can't be too careful," "would take advantage of you," and "look out for themselves" as zero. The small number of refusals and "don't know" responses were coded as missing.[30] Chronbach's alpha for the scale was 0.66, indicating that the items are modestly correlated. In Appendix Tables C.2-C.6, I report results for a binary measure of generalized trust based on the single trust question. These results were substantively similar to those in the main analysis.

County Measures

Critically, the GSS's restricted-access geocodes enabled me to match individual survey respondents to racial and ethnic demographic data for their county of residence from 1993 onward. I used the National Cancer Institute's Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) bridged, single-race population estimates to calculate the proportion of each county's population for five racial groups. Bridged-race estimates were necessary for the present longitudinal study because individuals were able to select more than one race starting with the 2000 Census. The SEER estimates are based on a modification of the U.S. Census Bureau's annual intercensal population estimates that use person- and county-level covariates to assign multiple-race individuals to one of four primary racial groups, while retaining the original Hispanic origin designation. The SEER population estimates adjust for changes over time in the Census Bureau's racial classification scheme, allowing me to construct a harmonized measure of

[30] Over the study period, 0.64% of respondents refused or answered "don't know."

racial diversity. Diversity was measured at the county level using the racial fragmentation index computed as follows:

$$Diversity_i = 1 - \sum_r p_{rc}^2 \tag{4.1}$$

where *c* represents a county, *r* represents one of five racial groups (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, non-Hispanic American Indian or Alaska Native, and non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander), and *p* corresponds to each race's proportion of the total county population.[31] The fractionalization index is increasing in diversity and can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected people from a population will be of a different racial or ethnic group. I converted the index to a hundred-point scale by multiplying by 100.

Finally, I also considered segregation as an alternative measure of exposure to other racial groups. I investigated segregation as a standalone measure and interacted with diversity. The interaction term allowed me to test the hypothesis that diversity is only harmful to trust when people live in segregated areas (Uslaner 2012). I adopted a measure of residential segregation known as Theil's H or the multi-group entropy index. The entropy index captures the extent to which communities are on average more or less diverse than the larger area (Reardon and O'Sullivan 2004). In the context of the present study, Theil's H summarizes the extent to which diversity at the census tract level differs from the overall diversity in a county and is measured using the following formulas:

$$Theil's\ H = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}[t_i(E-E_i)]}{ET} \tag{4.2}$$

where E is the entropy for a county and E_i is the entropy for tract i and t_i is the population for tract i and T is the total population of the county. Total entropy for counties was calculated as follows:

$$E = \sum_{r=1}^{r} P_r \ln\left(\frac{1}{P_r}\right) \tag{4.3}$$

[31] Hereafter, I will drop the non-Hispanic qualifier.

Where r represents one of five racial or ethnic groups and P_r is the racial or ethnic group's proportion of the total county population. The entropy index for each census tract is measured analogously as follows:

$$E_i = \sum_{r=1}^{r} p_{ri} \ln\left(\frac{1}{p_{ri}}\right) \tag{4.4}$$

where p_{ri} is the proportion of tract i's population for racial or ethnic group r. The county and tract racial proportions were estimated from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 decennial censuses and the 2018 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) harmonized to 2010 tract boundaries using the Longitudinal Tract Database (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014).[32] The segregation index for the remaining years was estimated using linear interpolation. The segregation index was based on the same five racial and ethnic groups used to construct the diversity measure: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, non-Hispanic American Indian or Alaska Native, and non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander. However, results for analyses using the segregation index should be viewed as provisional because the method for harmonizing the racial categories across time at the tract level is less rigorous than those used to construct the SEER county-level estimates.[33] I centered the diversity, segregation, and out-group percentages for the analyses but report uncentered means in the descriptive statistics.

[32] The Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB) is available to the public through Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences (S4) at Brown University (http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Researcher/Bridging.htm).

[33] The Longitudinal Tract Database codebook describes the procedure for combining single-race and mixed-race counts from 2000 onward for non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian or Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, and non-Hispanic American Indian and Alaskan Native (Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences 2017). For 2000 and 2010, non-Hispanic Black Alone or non-Hispanic Black in combination with any other race were combined into a single category. Non-Hispanic American Indian and Alaskan Native Alone or Non-Hispanic American Indian and Alaskan Native in combination with any other race (except Black) were likewise combined to form a single group. Finally, non-Hispanic Asian or Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander Alone or non-Hispanic Asian or Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander in combination with any other race (except Black or American Indian and Alaskan Native) were combined to form a single category. Unfortunately, for the multi-racial category, the 2018 American Community Survey (ACS) did not report Hispanic origin or provide detailed tables for each combination of races. However, the ACS did include Hispanic origin for the following single-race groups (ACS variable B03002): white, Black, Asian, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, and American Indian and Alaskan Native. For each census tract, I estimated the percent non-Hispanic for each of these single-race groups. If a group was not present in a specific census tract, I estimated the percent non-Hispanic for the county (or state if the group is not present at the county level). I estimated the number of non-Hispanic Black people by taking the percent non-Hispanic for the Black Alone group and multiplying it by the count of all Black people (Black Alone plus Black in combination with any other racial group (ACS variable B02009) minus Black Alone (ACS variable C02003)). I then added this product to the number of people who were non-Hispanic Black Alone to estimate the total number of non-Hispanic Black people. Whereas the ACS provided the total number for Black Alone or in combination with any other race, the survey only identified American Indian and Alaskan Native in combination with white. I multiplied the percent non-Hispanic for American Indian and Alaskan Native Alone in each tact by the count for American Indian and Alaskan Native in combination with white. I then add this product to the count of non-Hispanic American Indian and Alaskan Native Alone to estimate the total number for the group. I repeat this process for the Asian or Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander group, applying the percent non-Hispanic Asian or Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific

I also controlled for time-varying county characteristics that could confound the relationship between diversity and trust. For example, income inequality in the U.S. has risen in tandem with increasing diversity, while cross-national and cross-state studies have found that inequality is negatively associated with trust (Bjørnskov 2008, Uslaner 2002, Fairbrother and Martin 2013). Income inequality was measured using county Gini coefficients from the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the five-year 2010 and 2018 ACSs with interim years estimated using linear interpolation. Because earlier findings indicate that at the individual level trust increases with socio-economic status and age, I account for county-level measures of socioeconomic conditions including per capita income in 2018 dollars (divided by 1,000), the percent of people living in poverty, the percentage of the population that is age 65 or older, and logged population density. The sources for all county-level variables are described in greater detail in Appendix Table C.19.

Individual Characteristics

Although this study is primarily concerned with contextual effects, I control for individual-level characteristics that have been found to predict trust in earlier studies and that could confound the relationship between diversity and trust. One of the most persistent findings in the literature is racial and ethnic minorities report substantially lower levels of trust than do majority group members (Smith 2010). Moreover, several studies have found that the effects of diversity on trust vary across racial groups (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015, Marschall and Stolle 2004). I used the GSS indicators for race and Hispanic ethnicity to group respondents into the categories non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, and Hispanic. Because the GSS did not include a separate group for self-identified Hispanic people until 2000, I identified Hispanic respondents based on ancestral origin for earlier years (see Hunt 2007).[34] In addition to race, I control for the person's sex, age in years and age squared (divided by 100), logged family income in constant 2000 dollars, educational attainment (less than high school, high school, some college, and college), employment status (working, unemployed, and not in the labor force), marital status (married, married, divorced or separated, and widowed), parental status (ever a parent), religious service attendance (rarely or never, sometimes, and often), and

Islander Alone to the total Asian in combination with white group and adding this back to the number of non-Hispanic Asian or Native Hawaiian Alone group to form a single category.

[34] For years prior to 2000, I categorized the following four ancestral types as Hispanic: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Spanish, and other Spanish.

place of residence (urban, suburban, and rural).[35] I stratified several analyses by race but only for Black and white respondents owing to the relatively small number of Hispanic respondents in earlier survey years.

Missing Data

The GSS included 37,032 observations for the period 1993 to 2018. I excluded 810 observations for 1993 that were from an earlier sampling frame with no county identifiers. Because of the GSS's split-ballot design, an additional 14,889 respondents were not asked at least one of the three questions used to construct the generalized trust scale. Of those who were asked all three scale questions, I excluded 337 people who responded "don't know" or refused to answer at least one of the questions. Of the remaining 20,996 observations, 13.3% (n = 2,784) were missing data for at least one other study variable. Family income was the largest source of missing data with 11% of observations missing values. Religious services attendance was missing values for 1.2% of observations while all remaining variables were missing data on less than 0.3% of observations. I used listwise deletion, yielding 18,212 observations for the full sample, 13,209 observations for the white sub-sample, and 2,466 for the Black sub-sample.

Analysis Plan

In this study, I estimate a series of models using ordinary least squares (OLS) that control for county and year fixed effects. The fixed effect estimator is also known as the within estimator because the coefficient estimates are based on only within-unit (county) variation. An advantage of the within estimator is that it controls for time-invariant unobserved characteristics that, if correlated with diversity, could lead to biased estimates of the effects of diversity on trust (Allison 2009). The ability to leverage within-county change overcomes the problem of unobserved confounding that plagued earlier studies based on cross-section analyses. In addition, the inclusion of year fixed effects in the form of indicators for each survey year produces estimates of the within-county effect of diversity that account for time-varying factors that are common to all counties, for example, shifts in the national political mood. Although fixed effects designs are still vulnerable to bias from unobserved time-varying confounders, all models include a robust set of county-level controls (income inequality, poverty, per capita income,

[35] The three-category religious service attendance variable aggregates multiple response categories where "rarely or never" includes "never", "less than once a year", "once a year"; "sometimes" includes "several times a year", "once a month", and "two to three times a month"; and "often" includes "nearly every week", "every week", and "more than once a week".

unemployment, age structure, and population density) that could also affect trust. I estimate the effect of diversity on trust with the following two-way fixed effects model:

$$Trust_{i,c,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Diverstity_{c,t} + \mu P_{i,c,t} + \gamma C_{c,t} + \sigma_c + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t} \quad (4.5)$$

where the outcome is the scaled measure of generalized trust for person *i* in county *c* in year *t*; $Diverstity_{c,t}$ is the racial fragmentation index for county *c* and year *t*; P is a vector of person-level controls; C is a vector of time-varying county-level controls; σ_c and δ_t are county and year fixed effects; and $\varepsilon_{i,c,t}$ is an idiosyncratic error term. I also estimate two alternative specifications that account for the possibility that trends in trust vary across geographic areas. The first of these alternative specifications adds a state linear time trend α_{st} consisting of an interaction between state indicators and year:

$$Trust_{i,c,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Diverstity_{c,t} + \mu P_{i,c,t} + \gamma C_{c,t} + \sigma_c + \delta_t + \alpha_{st} + \varepsilon_{i,c,t} \quad (4.6)$$

The second alternative specification includes region-by-year fixed effects λ_{rt} consisting of indicators for each of the nine census regions multiplied by year indicators:

$$Trust_{i,c,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Diverstity_{c,t} + \mu P_{i,c,t} + \gamma C_{c,t} + \sigma_c + \delta_t + \lambda_{rt} + \varepsilon_{i,c,t} \quad (4.7)$$

The region-year fixed effects control for all time-varying confounders at the region level. For example, regions like Appalachia and the Midwest may have experienced a disproportionate decline in trust following the social upheaval associated with the loss of mining and manufacturing jobs and the concomitant rise of the opioid epidemic. Likewise, to the extent that the opioid epidemic reduced the labor supply (Krueger 2017) in these regions, it could also have paved the way for an influx of diversity-enhancing immigrant labor.

Although these models serve as the basis for all reported results, in some analyses I exchange other measures of racial contact for diversity and/or stratify the analyses by race for Black and white respondents. In Appendix Tables C.7-C.18, I also report results for the scaled and binary measures of trust where diversity is measured at the state level. The models used in the state analyses are identical to the models described above except that state fixed effects are

substituted for county fixed effects. These analyses rely on with-in state variation to estimate the effect of diversity and other state-level factors on trust.

Results

Descriptive Results

Table 4.1 presents population-weighted descriptive statistics for all study variables for the full sample and the Black and white sub-samples. The mean generalized trust score was 2.9 with a possible range of zero to six. Reported trust was on average higher for white (3.1) than for Black (1.9) respondents. There were also substantial racial differences for many of the other person-level covariates. Moving to the county characteristics, the mean diversity score indicates that there was a 40.5 percent probability that two individuals drawn at random would be from different racial groups. Black respondents on average lived in counties that were more diverse, segregated, unequal, and impoverished than white respondents.

Figure 2.1 uses scatterplots to illustrate changes in the racial composition for over 3,100 counties by plotting 2018 values for diversity, segregation, percent white, percent Black, and percent Hispanic relative to 1990 levels. The blue dots signify counties that appear at least once in the GSS. Counties that lie above the red 45-degree line experienced an increase in the measures from 1990 to 2018. For example, over this period, most counties experienced an increase in diversity and the percent Hispanic and a decrease in the percent white. Many counties, and particularly those that were highly segregated in 1990, also experienced a decline in segregation. Finally, there was less change in the percent Black with an approximately even number of counties on either side of the red line. Although, some counties with a relatively low percentage of Black residents in 1990 did experience a significant increase in the Black population share. The patterns discussed here are somewhat easier to discern in a companion state figure that is included in Appendix Figure C.1.

It is important to note that two distinct processes could contribute to the observed changes in the racial composition of counties. For example, because Black and white immigration levels were relatively low over this period, changes in the county proportions for these racial groups could be driven by both internal migration patterns and rising (or falling) birth rates but also by an influx of other racial groups. For example, even in the absence of Black residential mobility or changes in birth rates, the percent Black could also change with the in- or

out-migration of white and Hispanic residents. In contrast, because of immigration, there was an overall increase in the Hispanic population that drove the broad-based increase in Hispanic population share in nearly all counties. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to explore these specific mechanisms (internal migration, birth rates, and immigration) in detail, it is important to understand that several factors contribute to changes in diversity and the racial composition of counties.

In Figure 4.2, I present cross-sectional evidence for the relationship between diversity and trust by plotting mean county generalized trust relative to mean county diversity. Each point on the figure represents the 440 GSS counties used in the study where trust and diversity were averaged across all available periods from 1993-2018. Note that most counties were observed in fewer than the maximum 14 waves, while the number of individual survey respondents contributing to the mean trust score varied across counties. The downward sloping regression line suggests a modest cross-sectional association in that trust is lower in more diverse counties. In the next section, I leverage within-county changes in diversity to estimate the causal relationship between diversity and trust.

Diversity and Trust

Table 4.2 reports results for two-way fixed effects models predicting generalized trust.[36] The table is divided into three panels that correspond to the full analytic sample and the white and Black sub-samples. All models here and in subsequent tables control for the person-level covariates summarized in the previous table. I also control for race and ethnicity when analyzing the full sample. Because the primary focus is on county characteristics, I do not show the results for the person-level covariates. In subsequent analyses, I exchange other measures of racial contact for diversity while retaining the same set of county-level controls shown here and identified in the descriptive table.

Model 1 shows that a ten-point increase in the diversity scale is associated with a 0.13 reduction in the trust scale. However, the coefficient did not reach traditional levels of statistical significance. Like previous studies (Hastings 2018, Fairbrother and Martin 2013), there is also little evidence that increasing inequality was associated with lower levels of trust. Indeed, of the county measures, only per capita income was marginally significant. A ten thousand dollar

[36] In supplemental analyses, I tested for the possibility that the relationship between diversity and trust is non-linear by adding a squared term for diversity. I do not report these results because the squared term was not significant in any of the models.

increase in per capita income was associated with a 0.10 increase in the trust scale. Poverty and the share of the population age 65 and over were also associated with greater trust, but neither coefficient was significant. Consistent with earlier work, the unemployment rate (Laurence and Bentley 2015) was negatively associated with trust as was population density (Putnam 2000). The statistical insignificance of the county-level variables persisted in supplemental analyses (not shown) where I introduced the variables one at a time.

Model 2 retains the state and year fixed effects but adds a linear trend for each state. State-specific trends account for the possibility that that trends in trust follow varying trajectories across states.[37] In this specification, a ten-percentage point increase in diversity was associated with a statistically significant 0.21 decrease in the trust scale. In this specification, per capita income was no longer significant, while income inequality and population density flipped signs. Similar results prevail in Model 3 where the state trends were replaced with region-by-year fixed effects, which are an alternative way to account for differing trends across geographies. Although here the effect was a more modest 0.16-point decrease in trust for a 10-percentage point increase in diversity and only signification at $p < 0.10$.

The next two panels repeat the analysis for the white and Black subsamples. The diversity coefficient is negative but non-significant in Models 4-9. The coefficients were somewhat more negative for the Black than for white respondents, but a subsequent statistical analysis revealed that these differences are not statistically significant. On the other hand, a percentage point increase in the poverty rate is associated with a 0.044 increase in the trust scale for the white sub-sample in Model 4. This effect is attenuated somewhat with the addition of state linear trends and region-by-year fixed effects Models 5 and 6. In contrast, a thousand dollar increase in per capita income is associated with a 0.05 increase in the trust scale for the Black sub-sample in Model 7. The addition of state linear trends and region-by-year fixed effects in the subsequent two models slightly attenuate the coefficient.

The models presented in Table 4.3 test an alternative hypothesis, namely that it is not diversity per se but rather the presence of out-groups that drives down generalized trust. I stratified the results by race because in this case, the interest is in the trustor-out-group dyad. Like the previous table, all models control for the complete set of individual and county-level covariates. I also present results for models with state and year fixed effects and alternative

[37] It is possible to add a trend line for each county, but this would introduce an overwhelming number of parameters to estimate.

specifications that add state linear trends and region-by-year fixed effects. The variables of interest are percent Black, Hispanic, and non-white for the white subsample and percent White, Hispanic, and non-Black for the Black subsample. Because of collinearity concerns, I investigate each of these out-group percentages in separate models. In the bottom panel of the table, I also report results for quadratic specifications that include squared terms for each of the out-group percentages.

Overall, there is little evidence that an increase in the share of out-group members negatively affects trust among white people. This finding holds for the percent Black, Hispanic, and non-white. In the quadradic specification with state linear trends in Model 9, there is some evidence for a non-linear effect for the percent Black. The negative coefficient for the linear term indicates that at the mean percent Black, there is a negative relationship between percent Black and trust, while the positive squared term indicates that this relationship turns positive when the percent Black passes 17 percent.[38] Models 4-6 provide strong evidence that for the Black subsample, trust increases with the percent white and the percent non-Black. In this case, the presence of out-group members is associated with greater trust. However, the opposite is true for the percent Hispanic in the quadratic specification in models 10-12. The signs on the linear and quadratic coefficients indicate that trust declines until the percent Hispanic reaches about 30 percent before increasing thereafter. Although the quadratic term is significant in Model 11 for the percent non-Black, the function is increasing until the percent non-Black exceeds 100 percent. The diverging results for the Black subsample show that the composition of the out-group matters.

In the next two tables, I investigate the relationship between segregation and trust. Recall that the multigroup segregation index used here reflects the extent to which census tracts in a given county reflect the county's overall diversity. Table 4.4 is modeled after the results presented in Table 4.2 but substitutes segregation for diversity as the measure of interests. In contrast, to the results for diversity, there is a strong negative relationship between segregation and trust for the full sample shown in Models 1-3. These three models indicate that a one-point increase in segregation is associated with a 0.033 to 0.039 decrease in the trust scale. Nearly

[38] The local minimum is calculated by diving negative the coefficient for the linear term by two times the coefficient for the squared term or -(-0.017) / (2 x 0.002) = 4.05. Because percent Black is centered, this minimum is added to the mean percent Black (12.7) to yield 16.8. Therefore, trust declines as the percent Black increases up until 16.8 at which point further increases in the percent Black are associated with an increase in trust.

identical coefficients prevail for the white subsample in Models 4-6. However, there is no discernable effect of segregation on trust for the Black subpopulation. These results suggest that the negative consequences of segregation for trust are modified by race. Although social scientists emphasize the harmful effects of Black segregation, the results presented here bolster efforts to call attention to the harmful social-psychological effects of taken-for-granted white segregation (Bonilla-Silva, Goar, and Embrick 2006).

In Table 4.5, I test Uslaner's (2012) hypothesis that diversity is most harmful to trust in segregated areas. The models in this table are identical to the earlier diversity and segregation tables except that I interacted diversity and segregation. Although the negative coefficients for the full sample are consistent with Uslaner's hypothesis, the coefficients are small and not statistically significant. Similar results prevail for the white subsample. Although imprecisely measured, the positive coefficients for the Black subpopulation run counter to expectations, indicating that diversity is positively related to trust at higher levels of segregation. This could be an artifact of the generalized trust questions that ask about the trustworthiness, helpfulness, and fairness of "most people." The reference to "most people" may be understood to refer to other Black people in segregated areas but to white people in more diverse contexts. In any event, the table provides little support for the hypothesis that segregation moderates the relationship between diversity and trust. One possible explanation for the non-finding is that the relationship may only hold at smaller units of analysis like neighborhoods. On the other hand, I present results for a parallel analysis in Appendix Tables C.8-C.18 where diversity and segregation are measured at the state level. Interestingly, the diversity and segregation coefficient is negative and significant for the full sample and white subsample, but only for the set tables corresponding to the binary trust outcome. Although the interaction is significant in only one of the specifications for the Black subsample, the coefficients are also negative. These somewhat ambiguous results point toward the difficultly of studying the relationship between the racial composition of areas and social trust. Indeed, the level of aggregation and specific measure of trust used appear to matter.

In the final part of the analysis, I investigate if racial prejudice or conservative political attitudes moderate the relationship between diversity and generalized trust for the subsample of white respondents. Tuch and Hughes (2011) provide a detailed description of the five measures used here: conservative racial policy, racial resentment, racial prejudice, economic

individualism, and conservative political views. The racial policy, resentment, and prejudice questions all refer specifically to African Americans. Descriptive statistics for the subsample of white respondents are shown in Table 4.6 while the question wording for each measure is summarized in Appendix Table C.20. In Table 4.7, I test the hypothesis that diversity will be most detrimental to generalized trust for respondents who harbor conservative attitudes toward policies that advance racial inequality, old fashioned racial resentment, and prejudice, or who have more individualist or conservative views toward economic policy and politics. The top panel of Table 4.7 shows coefficients for the interaction between the county diversity index and the five individual orientations. All of the coefficients are in the expected direction (negative); however, only the racial prejudice interaction reached marginal significance. Meanwhile, none of the interaction terms for county segregation and the attitudinal measures were significant. However, the bottom panel reveals that as the Black population share increases, individuals high on the racial resentment and prejudice scales experience a greater decline in trust than those who are low on the scale. This pattern is clearer in Figure 4.3 plotting the predicted change in trust for the least and most prejudiced individuals. The top panel shows that generalized trust decreases as diversity increases for individuals who are high on the prejudice scale (top 5%). In contrast, trust increases with diversity for those who are low on the prejudice scale (bottom 5%).

Discussion

Over the past five decades, the U.S. has become more racially and ethnically diverse as a result of immigration from countries in Latin American and Asia as well as reduced fertility among white people and an aging white population. Population projections suggest that sometime after 2040 there will be no majority race in the U.S. (Frey 2018). That recent birth cohorts and approximately one-quarter of the hundred largest metropolitan areas are majority-minority signals this transition is well underway. Likewise, other Western democracies, including European countries, Canada, and Australia are also becoming increasingly diverse societies. There is little disagreement that these demographic trends have contributed to concerns among scholars, policymakers, and the general public that increasing diversity may erode social solidarity, presumed to be essential to democratic governance. Although there are hundreds of empirical studies on this issue, with few exceptions (see Williamson 2014, Laurence and Bentley 2015) these studies have neglected the underlying causal process—the dynamic relationship

between diversity and social cohesion—that is of primary concern. To this end, the present study makes several important contributions to this debate.

First, I leverage within-county change in diversity to estimate the causal relationship between diversity and a commonly used scale for generalized trust. Models controlling for a robust set of individual and county-level controls suggest that a ten-percentage point increase in diversity results in a 0.16–0.21 point decline in the four-point generalized trust scale in models that include either a linear state time trend or region-by-year fixed effects. Nonetheless, the size of this effect is relatively modest relative to the 2.2 standard deviations for the trust scale. Subsequent stratified analyses show that the negative relationship held for the Black and white subsamples, but in neither case did the results reach statistical significance. Consistent with Rothwell (2011), I also found that a ten percentage point increase in segregation was associated with about a 0.33–0.39 point reduction in generalized trust, but that this effect was driven entirely by the white subsample. In contrast to previous work (Uslaner 2012, 2011, 2014), I did not find a significant interaction between diversity and segregation in the main results. However, in a supplemental analysis (Appendix Table C.17) examining the binary generalized trust measure and with diversity and segregation measured at the state level, there was a statistically significant negative interaction effect. This suggests the negative effects of diversity are more consequential in segregated states. Taken together, the results provide evidence for the contact hypothesis that living in racially isolated areas is detrimental to generalized trust. However, these effects, and particularly those for the county-level analysis, could be driven by selection if distrusting people are more inclined to live in segregated areas. Lastly, it is also worth noting that unlike previous studies (e.g., Putnam 2007, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010), I found that contextual factors like poverty rates, per capita income, and income inequality had no statistically significant effect on trust for the overall sample while the county poverty rate was positively associated with trust for the white subpopulation.

Second, I discern true diversity effects from socio-psychological threat mechanisms by stratifying analyses by race while also examining out-group population shares for specific racial groups. I did not find any evidence of threat effects for white respondents as the share of the Black, Hispanic, and non-white population was not associated with generalized trust. However, for the Black subsample, I found that the percent white was strongly associated with greater generalized trust with an even larger positive effect for the percent non-Black. This finding is

consistent with work on housing showing that Black people are generally more willing than white people of mixed-race neighborhoods (Krysan and Farley 2002). However, selection effects could be at play if trusting Black people are more likely to select into neighborhoods with a higher percentage of white people. On the other hand, there is evidence of a threat effect for the Black subpopulation in that non-linear models indicate generalized trust decreases with an increase in the Hispanic population share before increasing again at the highest levels of the Hispanic population share. Although previous studies have often emphasized the effects of diversity and out-group shares on white people, this result indicates that the potential for competition among racial minority groups to result in lower generalized trust.

Finally, I test the hypothesis that among white respondents, the negative effect of diversity on trust will be strongest for those with prejudicial attitudes or conservative political leanings. I find limited support for this hypothesis in that the negative effects of diversity on trust increased with anti-Black prejudice, but this effect was marginally significant. On the other hand, in some specifications, the interactions between percent Black and conservative racial policy, racial resentment, and prejudice were negative and statistically significant. The interaction was driven mostly by the fact that trust increased with diversity for white respondents with low levels of prejudice.

Collectively, these results indicate that diversity has a modest negative effect on generalized trust but that segregation may as more important, particularly for white people. Furthermore, because increasing diversity is being driven by growth in the Hispanic and Asian populations, future research should pay more attention to how competition between racial minority groups shapes trust. Finally, I provide preliminary evidence that among white people the negative effects of rising diversity and Black population share appear limited to those who harbor the most racial prejudice.

Conclusion

The present study leveraged longitudinal data to provide some of the first causal estimates of the effects of diversity on generalized trust in the United States. The study results suggest that increasing diversity has at most a modest negative effect on generalized trust. At least when measured at the county level, diversity had a consistently negative effect on generalized trust across model specifications and for both scaled and binary trust measures; although, the results were not statistically significant in all cases. If anything, it appears for white

people, segregation may be a bigger problem; although these results may be particularly vulnerable to selection as less trusting white people might choose to live in segregated areas. In no case would I argue that the effect sizes identified here justify the present hysteria over diversity and trust.

Sociologists have pushed back against this work for overstating the benefits of trust, reserving their harshest critiques for Putnam's work on social capital (Portes and Vickstrom 2011, Abascal and Baldassarri 2015). These scholars are right to point out the real risk of overstating the benefits of trust. Nowhere is this more true in the context of race, where there is little evidence that social capital leads to greater racial equality (Hero 2003). According to these critiques, not only are the benefits of trust or social capital more broadly overstated, trust and social cohesion are themselves markers of social privilege (Wilkes 2011, Arneil 2006, 2010). From this perspective, "backward looking and, hence, reactionary" calls to homogeneity and communitarianism implicit in Putnam's work recall an idealized past that never existed, particularly for marginalized groups (Portes and Vickstrom 2011, 472).

Fig 4.1 Change in county diversity, segregation, and racial composition from 1990 to 2018, U.S. Census



Fig 4.2 Cross-sectional association between mean county diversity and scaled generalized trust from the 1993-2018 General Social Survey and U.S. Census



Table 4.1 Population-weighted descriptive statistics stratified by race, General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Total (n = 18,212)				Means	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White (n = 13,209)	Black (n = 2,466)
Person-Level Variables						
Trust scale	2.9	2.2	0.0	6.0	3.1	1.9
Female	53.1	---	0.0	100.0	52.5	57.9
Age	45.0	16.6	18.0	89.0	46.6	43.3
Family income	52.6	42.6	0.4	178.7	57.0	36.9
Education (%)						
Less than high school	15.2	---	0.0	100.0	12.3	20.0
High school	28.7	---	0.0	100.0	28.9	31.9
Some college	27.5	---	0.0	100.0	27.0	31.4
College	28.7	---	0.0	100.0	31.7	16.7
Employment (%)						
Working	65.3	---	0.0	100.0	64.9	63.3
Unemployed	5.8	---	0.0	100.0	5.2	7.6
Not in labor force	28.9	---	0.0	100.0	29.9	29.1
Marital Status (%)						
Married	55.1	---	0.0	100.0	59.8	35.1
Never married	24.2	---	0.0	100.0	19.8	38.6
Divorced/Separated	15.3	---	0.0	100.0	14.7	19.1
Widowed	5.4	---	0.0	100.0	5.7	7.2
Ever a parent	71.8	---	0.0	100.0	71.7	75.5
Religious Service Attendance (%)						
Attends religious services infrequently	42.6	---	0.0	100.0	45.7	28.0
Attends religious services sometimes	27.8	---	0.0	100.0	25.9	33.3
Attends religious services often	29.6	---	0.0	100.0	28.4	38.6
Urbanicity (%)						
Urban	59.6	---	0.0	100.0	58.5	64.4
Suburban	29.5	---	0.0	100.0	29.0	24.4
Rural	11.0	---	0.0	100.0	12.5	11.2
County-Level Diversity						
Diversity	40.5	19.4	1.9	74.7	36.0	51.3
Segregation	17.2	11.1	0.0	58.0	15.9	22.2
White (%)	68.6	21.1	9.3	99.0	74.2	56.7
Black (%)	12.7	13.3	0.0	67.4	10.9	25.5
Hispanic (%)	13.5	15.1	0.2	88.1	10.5	13.2
Non-White (%)	31.4	21.1	1.0	90.7	25.8	43.3
Non-Black (%)	87.3	13.3	32.6	100.0	89.1	74.5
County-Level Controls						
Gini index	44.6	3.7	33.8	60.4	44.1	46.1
Poverty (%)	13.8	5.4	2.9	37.9	13.1	15.9
Per capita income	45.4	14.3	20.2	193.9	44.7	45.5
Unemployment (%)	5.7	2.3	1.2	17.0	5.5	6.0
Age 65+ (%)	23.0	3.2	9.5	27.3	22.4	23.6
LN Population density	6.1	1.7	1.3	11.2	5.9	6.7

Table 4.2 Coefficients for county-level diversity and other social context variables from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Full-Sample			White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Diversity	-0.013	-0.021 *	-0.016 +	-0.008	-0.014	-0.006	-0.019	-0.030	-0.011
Gini index	-0.001	0.013	0.017	-0.011	0.016	0.029	0.037	0.049	0.081
% Poverty	0.025	0.021	0.012	0.044 **	0.038 *	0.035 +	-0.006	0.008	0.001
Per capita income	0.010 +	0.009	0.009	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.050 ***	0.046 ***	0.042 ***
% Unemployed	-0.026	-0.022	-0.020	-0.050 +	-0.045	-0.033	0.086	0.110 *	0.050
% Age 65+	0.022	0.036	0.021	0.021	0.057	0.039	-0.030	-0.022	-0.085
LN Population density	-0.140	0.150	0.150	0.180	0.370	0.200	-0.670	0.920	0.920
County FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
State trend		x			x			x	
Region by Year FE			x			x			x
R-Squared	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.24	0.27
Observations	18,212	18,212	18,212	13,209	13,209	13,209	2,466	2,466	2,466

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table 4.3 Coefficients for county-level out-group percentage from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Linear Specification											
	White Sub-Sample						Black Sub-Sample					
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
A. % Black / % White	0.005		0.025		0.007		0.049	*	0.074	*	0.032	+
B. % Hispanic	0.009		-0.012		-0.005		-0.022		0.001		0.020	
C. % Non-White / % Non-Black	0.009		-0.002		-0.002		0.100	**	0.150	**	0.088	**
	Quadradic Specification											
	White Sub-Sample						Black Sub-Sample					
	(7)		(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)		(12)	
A. % Black / % White	-0.011		-0.017		-0.010		0.045	+	0.075	*	0.028	
% Black Squared / % White Squared	0.001		0.002	*	0.001		-0.0001		0.0000		-0.0001	
B. % Hispanic	0.003		-0.001		0.008		-0.078	*	-0.063		-0.042	
% Hispanic Squared	0.0002		-0.0004		-0.0004		0.002	*	0.002	**	0.002	+
C. % Non-White / % Non-Black	0.001		-0.011		-0.007		0.037		0.072		0.022	
% Non-White Squared / % Non-Black Squared	0.0003		0.0004		0.0002		-0.001		-0.002	*	-0.001	
County FE	x		x		x		x		x		x	
Year FE	x		x		x		x		x		x	
State trend			x						x			
Region by Year FE					x						x	
Observations	13,209		13,209		13,209		2,466		2,466		2,466	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table 4.4 Coefficients for county-level segregation and other social context variables from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Full-Sample						White Sub-Sample						Black Sub-Sample					
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)	
Segregation	-0.033	*	-0.033	*	-0.039	**	-0.030	*	-0.032	+	-0.040	*	-0.018		0.019		0.001	
Gini index	-0.00003		0.008		0.019		-0.006		0.017		0.036		0.030		0.028		0.075	
% Poverty	0.017		0.016		0.006		0.041	*	0.036	*	0.034	+	-0.016		-0.002		-0.004	
Per capita income	0.010	+	0.008		0.007		0.003		-0.0001		-0.002		0.050	***	0.046	***	0.042	***
% Unemployed	-0.028		-0.025		-0.023		-0.052	+	-0.046		-0.034		0.085		0.110	+	0.050	
% Age 65+	0.013		0.025		0.020		0.019		0.054		0.045		-0.044		-0.050		-0.094	
LN Population density	0.004		0.220		0.230		0.340		0.520		0.400		-0.620		0.530		0.830	
County FE	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
Year FE	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
State trend			x						x						x			
Region by Year FE					x						x						x	
R-Squared	0.21		0.21		0.22		0.20		0.20		0.21		0.22		0.23		0.27	
Observations	18,212		18,212		18,212		13,209		13,209		13,209		2,466		2,466		2,466	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table 4.5 Coefficients for county-level diversity and segregation interaction from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Full-Sample						White Sub-Sample						Black Sub-Sample			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)	(9)
Diversity x Segregation	-0.001		-0.001		-0.001		-0.001		-0.001		-0.001		0.0005		0.001	0.001
Diversity	-0.009		-0.015		-0.012		-0.003		-0.006		-0.002		-0.022		-0.034	-0.017
Segregation	-0.036	**	-0.037	*	-0.043	**	-0.039	*	-0.041	+	-0.049	**	-0.021		0.018	-0.002
County FE	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	x
Year FE	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	x
State trend			x						x						x	
Region by Year FE					x						x					x
R-Squared	0.21		0.21		0.22		0.20		0.20		0.21		0.22		0.24	0.27
Observations	18,212		18,212		18,212		13,209		13,209		13,209		2,466		2,466	2,466

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table 4.6 Population-weighted descriptive statistics for prejudice variables for white sub-sample of the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Conservative Racial Policy	2,504	9.1	2.1	3.0	12.0
Racial resentment	5,691	7.2	1.7	3.0	9.0
Prejudice	5,572	0.5	1.0	-4.0	6.0
Economic Individualism	12,518	10.3	3.5	3.0	17.0
Conservative Political Views	12,900	4.2	1.4	1.0	7.0

Note: Conservative racial policy and racial resentment variables available starting in 1994 and prejudice starting in 1996.

Table 4.7 Coefficients for individual measures of prejudice and racial resentment interacted with county diversity, segregation, and % Black from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust for the white subsample of the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	County and Year FE		State Linear Trend		Region by Year FE	
			Diversity Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	-0.0011		-0.0016		-0.0009	
Racial resentment	-0.0011		-0.0012		-0.0011	
Prejudice	-0.0033	+	-0.0033	+	-0.0031	+
Economic Individualism	-0.0005		-0.0005		-0.0005	
Conservative Political Views	-0.0002		-0.0001		-0.0001	
			Segregation Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	0.0014		0.0012		0.0008	
Racial resentment	-0.0011		-0.0014		-0.0013	
Prejudice	-0.0019		-0.0018		-0.0020	
Economic Individualism	0.0005		0.0005		0.0006	
Conservative Political Views	0.00000		0.00003		0.0003	
			% Black Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	-0.0033		-0.0043	*	-0.0030	
Racial resentment	-0.0040	*	-0.0048	**	-0.0042	**
Prejudice	-0.0056	**	-0.0060	**	-0.0055	*
Economic Individualism	-0.0002		-0.0002		-0.0002	
Conservative Political Views	-0.00027		-0.00022		-0.0003	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: All models include the full set of controls and county and year fixed effects.

Fig 4.3 Predicted generalized trust by county diversity and % Black for respondents scoring high and low on the racial prejudice scale for the General Social Survey, 1993-2018





CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Introduction

Early on in my career as a doctoral student, a faculty member explained to me that dissertations often reflect our thinking on a topic five years ago. When I started working on trust in 2014, Barrack Obama was president, Black Lives Matter was in its infancy, and Covid had yet to take the lives of more than a half-million Americans. At the time, the Tea Party was an emerging political force, but few would have predicted the ensuing election of Donald Trump, U.S. Capitol insurrection, or resurgence of white supremacy groups. In retrospect, my choice to study trust and social cohesion was a prescient one. It has been exciting, not to mention alarming at times, to see my dissertation topic figure so prominently in the national consciousness. Yet, at the same time my enthusiasm has been tempered by the recurring feeling that current events have overtaken my research. As I read the headlines, I am often reminded of the idiom about rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, wondering if our metaphorical ship as already sunk? From the beginning, I was motivated by a desire to understand how social factors have contributed to racial differences in trust and declining trust in the United States. Naively, however, I thought it would be possible to uncover straightforward explanations for these patterns using high-quality survey data. What I learned instead is that easy explanations are elusive when it comes to studying social phenomena like trust. There are no smoking guns or universal truths to be had in this work.

Broad Contributions

Contingencies

Not a single variable of interest, whether discrimination at the individual level or contextual measures of poverty, inequality, and diversity, consistently predicted trust across all models. Moreover, decisions about what form of trust to study, how to measure trust and

predictors like discrimination and diversity, the study location, the appropriate geographic unit of analysis (e.g., neighborhoods, cities, or countries), and model specifications often influence results. I found the highly contingent nature of this work to be true in my experience as a researcher and while reviewing other studies. I attempted to deal with contingencies transparently by exploring multiple forms of trust and by aggregating contextual variables at different geographic levels. Several interesting patterns emerged from these three dissertation studies that speak to larger debates in the trust literature. The first insight relates to the social basis for different types of trust, while the second insight relates to how study results varied across racial groups.

Disposition versus Experience

In the introduction, I called attention to three types of trust identified in theoretical and empirical work: generalized trust, particularized trust, and trust in institutions. Intuitively, we should expect our experiences to affect trust in specific people or institutions. For example, I am likely to distrust coworkers who mistreatment me or the police following a negative interaction. Distrust may also extend to coworkers and the police in the abstract or even other groups of people. Indeed, the results of Chapter 2 suggest that discrimination in one context is associated with distrust in other social relationships. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 showed that social context also is strongly associated with trust in neighbors. Although this finding is consistent with previous research, this was one of the first studies to illustrate that similar associations prevail for trust in police. The relevance of experience and social context to trust in specific groups is, perhaps, not unexpected.

A matter of greater controversy is the extent to which generalized trust is influenced by experience and social context. I did not set out to study this specific issue. Nonetheless, the results across all three studies indicate that generalized trust is less likely to change with experience and social context than other forms of trust. This is not to say that generalized trust cannot and does not change, but it might be less susceptible to contemporaneous experiences and external factors. In this respect, experience and social context may be most influential during childhood as some have suggested (Uslaner 2002). In fact, a significant body of research indicates that generalized trust has declined in successive birth cohorts born after the 1940s (Robinson and Jackson 2001, Putnam 2000, Schwadel and Stout 2012, Clark and Eisenstein 2013). The intergenerational decline in trust is partially attributable to the changing demographic

characteristics of the population (Clark 2015).[39] Still, more recent birth cohorts may also be less trusting having come of age during a period of increasing income inequality, diversity, and social polarization. As Robinson and Jackson (2001, 138) concluded from their age-period-cohort analysis of declining trust, "cohort effects are unlikely to exist apart from some form of period effect." If generalized trust is predominately formed during our early years, there may be little countries like the United States can do in the short run to alter racial differences in trust or to stem the decline in trust.

Race is a Moderator

Another major insight is that the relevance of experience and social context to trust varies across racial groups. In each of the studies, I was careful to either interact the variable of interest with race or to stratify the analyses by race. For example, Chapter 3 showed that while disadvantage was an important predictor of trust for Black and Hispanic respondents, out-group share was only relevant for white respondents. Because of Black-white segregation, racial economic inequality, as well as personal and vicarious experience with interpersonal and institutional discrimination ensure Black and white people in the United States face fundamentally different social realities. If as I have argued, trust reflects the perceived trustworthiness of those around us, then we may expect the social bases for trust to vary across racial groups. While few studies on trust fail to control for race, the results presented here indicate that researchers should also investigate if associations of interest vary across racial groups.

Study Highlights

The emphasis in Chapter 2 focused on the association between individual experience and generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in police. Specifically, the study tested the hypothesis that the pervasive experience with discrimination in interpersonal interactions and institutional settings explains why Black and Hispanic adults report lower levels of trust than do white adults. I was also interested in understanding if the association between unfair treatment and trust was stronger for specific racial groups. I found the different forms of discrimination explained only a fraction of Black-white and Hispanic-white differences in trust. The second

[39] For example, people of color generally report lower levels of trust than white people. Because the United States is becoming increasingly more diverse, average levels of trust will be lower simply because of the change in the racial composition of the population.

stage of the analysis also revealed that the negative association between discrimination and the different forms of trust was strongest in some contexts for white respondents even though they were the least likely to report having experienced unfair treatment. A critical innovation of this study is that I connect these findings with theoretical work in sociology on systematic racism (Feagin 2006) and white habitus (Bonilla-Silva, Goar, and Embrick 2006). I argue that the relationship between discrimination and trust is shaped by expectations for fair treatment. In turn, these expectations are structured by the racial hierarchy in the United States. The other major contribution is to shift emphasis from racial differences in trust to the issue of trustworthiness. Instead of arguing for greater trust among Black and Hispanic adults, I suggest that society should focus on the trustworthiness of white people and white-dominated institutions.

Chapter 3 shifts focus to social context as a potential predictor of trust. I am specifically interested in how neighborhood disadvantage, racial diversity, and income inequality are associated with generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in police. These are three of the most important social factors thought to affect trust in other people. Because rising diversity and income inequality in the United States have mirrored the decline in trust, these two factors, in particular, are thought by some to be potential causes for distrust. Critically, while these debates are essentially about the effect of social change on trust, nearly all studies to date have focused on static cross-sectional comparisons between cities, states, or countries. The major innovation I introduce in Chapter 3 is to investigate what I refer to as the durable and dynamic associations between social context and trust. Specifically, I examine how past levels of neighborhood disadvantage, diversity, and inequality and subsequent changes in these values predict future levels of trust. I find evidence that baseline and change scores measures for all three variables are negatively associated with trust. However, the results are most compelling for trust in neighbors and to a lesser extent, trust in police. Moreover, the strength of these associations is contingent upon the race of the trustee. Disadvantage and inequality appear to matter more for Black and Hispanic respondents. Meanwhile, out-group share was strongly associated with distrust of neighbors for white respondents but positively associated with trust in the police for Black respondents. In many cases, baseline levels of disadvantage, diversity, and inequality were as or more predictive of trust than contemporaneous values, while in some instances the change scores appeared to matter more. Although it is difficult to identify a theoretical basis for these observed

patterns, the study results suggest the importance of studying both durable associations and change in addition to contemporaneous neighborhood characteristics.

Whereas the first two empirical studies focused on Chicago, Chapter 4 leverages three decades of data from the General Social Survey to study changes in generalized trust over time. The primary emphasis of the study is on the controversial claim that increasing diversity is responsible for declining trust in the United States and other Western democracies. I overcome the problem of unobserved confounding that has plagued earlier work on this topic by leveraging within county change in diversity over time using a fixed effects research design. From a theoretical perspective, the study design also allows me to distinguish true "diversity effects" from simple out-group threat. I found that diversity had a modest but statistically negative association with generalized trust for the overall sample. There was more consistent evidence for a negative relationship between segregation and generalized trust, but this association was driven entirely by the subsample of white respondents. I also found evidence for a group threat effect with several important nuances. Among white people, there is little evidence of out-group threat overall and some suggestive evidence that as the Black population share rises, generalized trust increases for white people who harbor little racial prejudice or resentment. For the Black subsample, there was evidence that trust increased with the percent white and percent non-Black in a county but decreased with the county percent Hispanic. These national data suggest that county diversity and segregation play a bigger role than out-group threat for white people. However, for Black respondents, out-group threat appeared to be a bigger issue than diversity but only in the context of the Hispanic population share.

Future Directions

Earlier in this chapter, I alluded to what I would do differently if I started this work today. In the two chapters on social context, I focused on structural characteristics previous work identified as being crucial to trust: poverty, diversity, and inequality. From a practical standpoint, these quantitative studies require some source of variation. Early work focused on cross-country variation, but these studies are of limited use given unique, country-specific historical circumstances. Like other more recent work, I focused on the subnational level by leveraging variation across neighborhoods in a single city and within county change over time in a national sample. As these empirical studies illustrate, the geographical level of aggregation matters.

Unfortunately, there is little theoretical guidance on whether social context should be measured at the neighborhood level or for cities or entire nations. For example, at the neighborhood level, a connection between diversity and trust may depend predominately on interpersonal interactions and visual cues. These processes may be more diffuse at the city or county level but could also be amplified by interracial conflict over schools, local politics, and in the workplace or public spaces like shopping centers or parks. My dissertation research adds to a body of research suggesting that both neighborhood and higher-level social processes may influence trust, but the effect of these factors is too modest to account for changes in generalized trust over time.

The critical piece missing from work on diversity and trust is that diversity is not strictly a demographic or numerical concept. The work of political scientist Barbara (Arneil 2006, 2010) brought to my attention what I will refer to as "symbolic diversity" or what she refers to as "the politics of diversity." In her view, it is not numerical diversity per se that matters to generalized trust but rather challenges by people of color, women, and sexual minorities to existing hierarchies and efforts by entrenched dominant groups to push back against social change. Challenges may be explicit or overtly political but could also take more subtle forms, for example, greater representation of people of color in popular culture, politics, and positions of power.[40] Like structural diversity, the association between symbolic diversity and social trust could also vary across racial groups. Arneil argues that distrust is a natural consequence of the struggle for a more equal and just society. I believe the line of inquiry Arneil describes may hold more explanatory power when it comes to understanding both racial differences in trust and the broader decline in trust. The challenge is how to operationalize these tensions and leverage variation in exposure. Recent work on public attitudes toward immigration has focused on the influence of political and cultural elites (Jones and Martin 2017, Margolis 2018, Flores 2018). Social media, traditional media sources, political speech and polarization, and identity-based groups may also be influential in shaping social trust. There is a strong theoretical justification for starting with structural conditions like poverty, diversity, and inequality. However, I believe these factors continue to dominate the trust literature at the expense of alternative explanations

[40] These two examples are connected in that greater representation is a possible outcome of political struggles. I also recognize that greater representation has a numeric aspect to it, but the type of change I am describing works independently of geography. For example, people living in segregated white or Black communities may experience diversity through the greater representation of Black actors in movies and television without there being any change in diversity at the local level.

because they are easily measured with census data and, as geographic measures, offer a natural source of variation.

Other Possible Moderators

In this work, I focused on race as a moderator between experience and social context and different forms of trust. In Chapter 4, I also examined individual prejudice and racial resentment as possible moderators for the white population. Future work may also consider other potential moderators like gender and socioeconomic status which could also modify the association between experience and social context and trust. If generalized trust is a marker of privilege, then as trust is lower for the Black and Hispanic populations in the United States, we may similarly expect women to be less trusting than men given the history of social exclusion and prevalence of gender-based discrimination. However, unlike race, gender does not consistently predict trust in empirical studies. For example, Appendix Tables A.1-A.3 show that for the Chicago sample, there were no gender differences for generalized trust or trust in neighbors and the police in multivariable models. Likewise, Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) found similar levels of trust among men and women in the nationally representative sub-sample of the Social Capital Benchmark Survey and that women were more trusting than men for trust in neighbors and different racial groups for the larger non-representative study sample, but this result appears to have been driven entirely by white women. However, in the GSS, women consistently report lower levels of generalized trust than men when it comes to trusting "most people," but are more trusting when this question is scaled with questions about helpfulness and fairness (Hastings 2018). I am unaware of any studies in the trust literature that have attempted to resolve these inconsistencies or considered gender as a potential moderator.

In the context of Chapter 2, gender and its intersection with race could be particularly relevant in the case of discrimination. The #MeToo movement has called attention to pervasive gender discrimination and harassment in the workplace and public spaces. Women may have different expectations and experiences than men when it comes to being victims of discrimination. Moreover, from an intersectional perspective, Black and Hispanic women face discrimination across multiple social identities. And, for Black and Hispanic men, the confluence of gender and race is likely to be particularly salient in specific contexts like policing. Gender could also be relevant to the study of social context and trust. The rise in female labor force participation over the past 50 years could have affected social trust for women by transforming

family dynamics as well as participation in formal and informal associations. To give a hypothetical example, from a group threat perspective, economic competition from outside groups could affect men and women differently because of the racial and gender dimensions of occupational segregation. The overrepresentation of women and people of color in the service sector could have resulted in trust-building inter-racial contact. In contrast, group threat could be more salient in male-dominated sectors like manufacturing and construction where exclusionary practices were commonplace. This is just one example of the type of theories that could be explored in future work from a gendered perspective.

Implications for Policy

As a former policy analyst and someone who is still active in public policy research, it would be natural for me to make recommendations for how to build trust in society based on my collective research findings. Nonetheless, the temptation to make firm policy recommendations is one I hope to avoid while instead focusing on broad ideas for how we might think about and potentially address racial trust disparities and declining trust.

Starting with racial differences in trust, Chapter 2 showed there were substantial Black-white disparities in trust that were not explained by differences in individual characteristics like educational attainment or even personal experience with discrimination. Meanwhile, Chapter 3 revealed a strong negative association between neighborhood disadvantage and generalized trust, trust in neighbors, and trust in the police for Black adults in Chicago. Likewise, a rise in neighborhood inequality was also associated with distrust in neighbors. One way to think about persistent racial differences in trust is that trust itself is a marker of privilege (Wilkes 2011, Arneil 2006). From this perspective, I would anticipate racial differences in trust to persist as long as race predicts other markers of social advantage from life expectancy and health to educational attainment, incarceration rates, representation in positions of power, and labor market outcomes.

In Chapter 2, I argue for an approach that would shift emphasis from the problem of trust to the one of trustworthiness. In this respect, white-dominated institutions could enact policies that simultaneously advance racial equity while also demonstrating a commitment to trustworthy behavior. The strong associations between disadvantage and trust at the neighborhood level suggest an approach that is perhaps national in scope but invests in specific communities. Such

an approach would seek to build generalized trust from the ground up by starting at the local level. Furthermore, it is also important to acknowledge past (and present) harms. One politically divisive but perhaps effective approach would be to enact reparations. Although immediate Congressional action on this issue seems unlikely, private actors like the Virginia Theological Seminary are making cash payments to the descendants of Black Americans who were forced into labor during slavery and Jim Crow (Wright 2021). Moreover, the symbolic act of recognizing harm and wrongdoing may be more powerful in the context of trust than actual cash payments. As Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014) has argued, "Reparations would mean a revolution of the American consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image as the great democratizer with the facts of our history." Because generalized trust appears to be less responsive to experience than other forms of trust, I would anticipate greater equity and trustworthiness to influence trust only gradually over the long term. From a normative perspective, these goals are worth pursuing, irrespective of their impact on trust.

Implicit in this discussion is the idea that public policy has the potential to increase trust among Black Americans both directly by demonstrating a commitment to trustworthiness and indirectly by alleviating racial inequality. At the same time, some observers have argued that trust is a necessary precondition for good governance (Uslaner 2002, Putnam 2000). This leaves us with a conundrum that the type of equality-enhancing policies that may increase trust among Black Americans are not likely to be adopted in an increasingly distrustful society.

Putnam's way out of this classic chicken and egg problem is for society to build the trust necessary for good governance through a revival of organizations like bowling leagues and Elks Lodges. I see at least two problems with this approach. As others have noted (Arneil 2006, Portes and Vickstrom 2011), this backward-looking vision papers over fundamental issues of racial inequality and division in our society. Because the United States remains highly segregated by race and socioeconomic status (Bischoff and Reardon 2013, Reardon and Bischoff 2011, Reardon, Fox, and Townsend 2015), greater community involvement is unlikely to forge relationships across racial or economic social divisions. South Dakota may be "awash in social capital" in Putnam's words (as cited in Hallberg and Lund 2005) but it is a conceptual leap to understand how a plethora of bowling leagues builds a national sense of social cohesion or bridges deep-seated racial divides. Secondly, Putnam's approach is at odds with the reality that many people today prefer to join issue- or identity-based organizations. These organizations may

build within-group trust, but as with bowling leagues, I am skeptical that issue- or identity-based organizations contribute to social solidarity more broadly.[41]

Thus far I have focused on how society may increase trust among Black Americans and other people of color. But as this discussion illustrates, the problem of racial disparities in trust is intertwined with the parallel issue of rising distrust among White Americans. As Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate, the traditional structural explanations—diversity and income inequality—are associated with distrust among white Americans, but like previous studies on these topics, I found these explanations fell short of providing a comprehensive explanation for distrust. Earlier, I suggested future work may consider symbolic forms of diversity that challenge the racial hierarchy as well as the role of elites in fostering social cohesion or division. Without a complete reckoning for why trust has been on the decline, it would be premature to make specific recommendations. Yet, in this spirit of greater discussion and debate, I introduce three ideas that should merit greater consideration.

Because generalized trust is much easier destroyed than created (Rothstein and Stolle 2008), I would like to start with the problem of distrust. Like doctors swear to uphold the Hippocratic Oath, "First, do no harm," we should consider the responsibility of political elites to avoid sowing social division (see Cramer 2020). In his work on systemic racism, Joe Feagin (2006) calls attention to the often unrecognized role of elites in upholding the racial hierarchy. It is not a stretch to imagine that when the future president of the United States refers to immigrants as criminals, drug dealers, and rapists (Ye Hee Lee 2015) that these comments influence attitudes toward outgroups, even in communities where people have no actual contact with immigrants (i.e., no change in diversity from a demographic perspective). And, if Glanville and Paxton (2007) are correct that generalized trust derives from trust in other contexts, such comments may undermine social cohesion more broadly. One may reasonably ask of Robert Putnam, how many bowling leagues we will need to offset the harm of this type of political speech? Although we have just witnessed an unprecedented use of presidential power to sow social division, other recent presidential hopefuls have referred to people as a "basket of deplorables" and claimed that 47 percent of Americans are "dependent upon government."[42]

[41] Arneil (2006, 63) argues that both Putnam and Theda Skocpol consider the shift in American civil society from local community-based organizations to identity- and issue-based advocacy organizations to be a largely negative phenomenon.
[42] These phrases were used by presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Mitt Romney, respectively, while on the campaign trail.

Surely other examples of politically divisive speech are to be found among lesser-known politicians and media personalities, not to mention social media companies whose technology provides a platform for such speech. If society values generalized trust—the belief that other share the same fundamental values—as a national resource, then it makes sense for the conservation of this resource to begin with elites.

Restoring generalized trust may prove to be a more difficult project. One idea that gained momentum during the Covid pandemic is a national year of service (Brooks 2020). Whether voluntary or compulsory, this program would bring together young people from across the United States to work collectively on public works projects. A significant body of research on contact theory suggesting that cross-group social interactions can facilitate a reduction in out-group prejudice (Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Contact is particularly effective when people work together toward a common goal. A national year of service has the potential to draw together a diverse group of young people from across the country to cooperate in achieving a common purpose. This idea relates to Putnam's research on civic participation but has more potential to build generalized trust because the program would not be based on local (racially segregated) ties or common interests (e.g., bowling). Moreover, because a national year of service targets young people it would intervene at a stage in the life course when generalized trust may be more malleable.

My last idea is to focus on income inequality. This suggestion runs counter to the findings in Chapter 4 and earlier work finding little connection between income inequality and distrust (Fairbrother and Martin 2013, Hastings 2018). In this case, I am willing to give the theory that income inequality is contributing to distrust the benefit of the doubt. Our measures may not accurately reflect the nature of inequality (or trust) or our methods could be poorly suited for identifying causal relationships. For example, it could also be that it is not inequality per se but rather stagnating economic prospects that is causing distrust or more symbolic forms of inequality embodied in resentment toward elites or conspicuous displays of wealth on social media. In any event, there is a strong theoretical basis for thinking that inequality contributes to distrust that should not be dismissed on basis of a few empirical studies.

As was the case with racial inequality, the question remains, how society can solve this significant collective action problem in the face of declining solidarity. In respect, it is worth revisiting William Julius Wilson's advocacy for race-neutral social policy (2000). (Wilson

(2011) has, reasonably I would add, altered his position and now advocates for a mix of race-neutral and race-targeted policies). He argued that race-neutral policies would be politically palatable to white voters while indirectly helping Black families achieve economic equality. This argument finds support in Arlie Hochschild's book *Strangers in Their Own Land* (2016). Based on her interviews with white Louisiana conservatives, Hochschild illustrates how distrust of government and failed environmental policies are ultimately grounded in racial resentment. Similarly, others have shown how the racialization of cash welfare benefits undermines support for government assistance (Gilens 1999). To the extent that economic inequality and stagnation contribute to racial disparities in trust and declining trust among white people, some degree of race-neutral social policy may be the most politically viable way to address both issues. By making social policy race-neutral, policymakers could increase the chances of enacting trust-enhancing policy in the absence of a deep sense of social cohesion.

Conclusion

Barbara Arneil's work has been deeply influential in encouraging me to think beyond individual experience and diversity as potential causes of distrust in the United States (2006, 2010). In her view, distrust is a natural consequence of disadvantaged or marginalized groups making their voices heard while challenging existing hierarchies. Although social movements like Black Lives Matter are multiracial, these organizations are, unapologetically, not meant to foster social cohesion but rather to challenge existing power dynamics. From this perspective, distrust may be a harbinger of positive social change toward greater equality. Although her theory is difficult to prove using quantitative data, I believe Arneil has correctly diagnosed the cause of distrust. At the same time, I wonder if she has underestimated both the psychological toll of persistent distrust and, perhaps more importantly, the force with which the hierarchy would push back against social change in the United States. If the United States remains locked in a downward spiral of distrust, it could threaten democratic institutions as well as our capacity to realize objectives like greater racial equality that Black Lives Matter hopes to achieve. In other words, distrust could be a barrier to social change while also embodying a more existential threat to our democracy. It remains an open question how society can protect and advance the rights of marginalized groups while also preserving a level of cohesion necessary to sustain a functioning democracy.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Additional Tables and Figures: Narrowing Racial Differences in Trust

Table A.1 Race and discrimination interactions: Odds ratios for trust in most people, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Race [ref: White]										
Black	0.21	***	0.26	***	0.21	***	0.22	***	0.20	***
Hispanic	0.71	+	0.69	*	0.57	**	0.54	**	0.56	*
Other	0.48	+	0.40	**	0.42	*	0.48		0.37	*
Unfair treatment in employment	0.76		0.87		0.88		0.89		0.89	
Unfair treatment in policing	0.87		0.89		0.54	*	0.89		0.89	
Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood	0.76		0.82		0.78		0.76		0.76	
Everyday discrimination index	0.89		0.88		0.88		0.76	*	0.89	
Heightened vigilance index	0.83	**	0.83	**	0.84	**	0.84	**	0.72	**
Black x Unfair treatment in employment	1.89	*								
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in employment	0.86									
Other x Unfair treatment in employment	0.46									
Black x Unfair treatment in policing			2.39	**						
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in policing			2.08	*						
Other x Unfair treatment in policing			0.41							
Black x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					1.18					
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					0.67					
Other x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					0.59					
Black x Everyday discrimination index							1.29			
Hispanic x Everyday discrimination index							1.35			
Other x Everyday discrimination index							0.73			
Black x Heightened vigilance index									1.28	+
Hispanic x Heightened vigilance index									1.22	
Other x Heightened vigilance index									1.05	

Table A.1 Race and discrimination interactions: Odds ratios for trust in most people, Chicago Community Adult Health Study (continued)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Female	0.99		1.00		1.02		1.01		1.01	
Age	1.01	+	1.01	+	1.01	+	1.01		1.01	+
Education (years) [ref: <12]										
12	1.35	*	1.36	*	1.35	*	1.34	+	1.33	+
13-15	1.90	***	1.95	***	1.93	***	1.92	***	1.94	***
16+	2.87	***	2.93	***	2.91	***	2.90	***	2.95	***
Owns home	1.13		1.14		1.15		1.16		1.14	
Years in current residence	0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99	
Foreign-born	0.73	*	0.75	+	0.75	+	0.73	*	0.73	*
Speaks Spanish at home	0.45	***	0.46	***	0.50	**	0.51	**	0.49	**
Married	1.07		1.06		1.05		1.06		1.06	
Has non-adult children	1.02		1.01		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Number of negative life events	0.90	*	0.90	*	0.90	*	0.90	*	0.90	*
Friendship diversity index	1.10	***	1.10	***	1.10	***	1.10	***	1.10	***
Active member of an organization	1.59	***	1.57	***	1.58	***	1.57	***	1.57	***
Optimism index	1.34	***	1.34	**	1.33	**	1.33	**	1.32	**
Parental affection index	1.11	+	1.12	+	1.10	+	1.12	+	1.12	+
Perceived neighborhood safety [ref: Extremely dangerous]										
Somewhat dangerous	1.74	+	1.74	+	1.72	+	1.73	+	1.77	*
Fairly safe	2.51	***	2.46	**	2.44	**	2.45	**	2.49	***
Completely safe	3.77	***	3.70	***	3.74	***	3.70	***	3.77	***
Observations	2,990		2,990		2,990		2,990		2,990	

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table A.2 Race and discrimination interactions: Odds ratios for trust in neighbors, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Race [ref: White]										
Black	0.45	***	0.45	***	0.44	***	0.47	***	0.45	***
Hispanic	0.85		0.76		0.75		0.89		0.75	
Other	0.52		0.68		0.90		0.47		1.09	
Unfair treatment in employment	1.13		1.18		1.18		1.16		1.18	
Unfair treatment in policing	0.85		0.86		0.79		0.85		0.86	
Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood	1.36		0.87		1.37		1.38		1.37	
Everyday discrimination index	0.78	**	0.78	**	0.78	**	0.81		0.78	**
Heightened vigilance index	0.93		0.93		0.93		0.93		0.92	
Black x Unfair treatment in employment	1.09									
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in employment	0.85									
Other x Unfair treatment in employment	3.83	+								
Black x Unfair treatment in policing			1.11							
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in policing			1.22							
Other x Unfair treatment in policing			0.41							
Black x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					1.51					
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					2.14					
Other x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					1.00					
Black x Everyday discrimination index							0.97			
Hispanic x Everyday discrimination index							0.89			
Other x Everyday discrimination index							1.95			
Black x Heightened vigilance index									1.00	
Hispanic x Heightened vigilance index									1.05	
Other x Heightened vigilance index									0.70	

Table A.2 Race and discrimination interactions: Odds ratios for trust in neighbors, Chicago Community Adult Health Study (continued)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Female	0.90		0.91		0.92		0.90		0.91	
Age	1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***
Education (years) [ref: <12]										
12	0.77		0.77		0.77		0.78		0.77	
13-15	0.92		0.92		0.91		0.93		0.91	
16+	1.78	**	1.76	**	1.74	**	1.78	**	1.74	**
Owns home	1.47	**	1.48	**	1.47	**	1.46	*	1.47	**
Years in current residence	0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99	
Foreign-born	0.89		0.87		0.87		0.87		0.86	
Speaks Spanish at home	1.80	*	1.89	**	1.92	**	1.78	*	1.90	**
Married	1.14		1.14		1.14		1.14		1.14	
Has non-adult children	0.86		0.86		0.86		0.87		0.86	
Number of negative life events	0.92	*	0.91	*	0.91	*	0.91	*	0.91	*
Friendship diversity index	1.06	**	1.06	*	1.06	**	1.06	*	1.06	*
Active member of an organization	1.53	**	1.54	**	1.57	**	1.54	**	1.57	**
Optimism index	1.02		1.02		1.00		1.02		1.01	
Parental affection index	1.11		1.11		1.11		1.11	+	1.12	+
Perceived neighborhood safety [ref: Extremely dangerous]										
Somewhat dangerous	1.75	**	1.75	**	1.75	**	1.76	**	1.75	**
Fairly safe	5.99	***	5.97	***	5.98	***	6.01	***	5.99	***
Completely safe	9.03	***	9.23	***	9.33	***	9.07	***	9.33	***
Observations	2,854		2,849		2,854		2,854		2,854	

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table A.3 Race and discrimination interactions: Odds ratios for trust in police, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Race [ref: White]										
Black	0.25	***	0.28	***	0.23	***	0.23	***	0.22	***
Hispanic	0.58	*	0.66	*	0.56	*	0.60		0.57	+
Other	2.64		1.24		4.41	*	5.28	+	3.88	+
Unfair treatment in employment	0.61	*	0.75	*	0.76	*	0.77	*	0.77	*
Unfair treatment in policing	0.50	***	0.50	***	0.34	***	0.51	***	0.51	***
Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood	0.84		0.77		0.86		0.82		0.83	
Everyday discrimination index	0.81	*	0.80	*	0.80	*	0.71	*	0.81	*
Heightened vigilance index	0.96		0.96		0.97		0.96		0.84	
Black x Unfair treatment in employment	1.48									
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in employment	1.29									
Other x Unfair treatment in employment	0.28									
Black x Unfair treatment in policing			2.00	*						
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in policing			1.57							
Other x Unfair treatment in policing			0.06	**						
Black x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					1.32					
Hispanic x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					0.70					
Other x Unfair treatment in moving to a new neighborhood					1.51					
Black x Everyday discrimination index							1.28			
Hispanic x Everyday discrimination index							1.07			
Other x Everyday discrimination index							0.27	*		
Black x Heightened vigilance index									1.23	
Hispanic x Heightened vigilance index									1.12	
Other x Heightened vigilance index									0.45	+

Table A3: Race and discrimination interactions: Odds ratios for trust in police, Chicago Community Adult Health Study (continued)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Female	0.89		0.90		0.92		0.90		0.90	
Age	1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***
Education (years) [ref: <12]										
12	0.89		0.89		0.89		0.89		0.89	
13-15	1.14		1.16		1.13		1.15		1.16	
16+	1.67	*	1.71	*	1.65	*	1.65	*	1.69	*
Owns home	1.01		1.01		1.01		1.01		1.00	
Years in current residence	0.99	*	0.99	*	0.99	*	0.99	*	0.99	*
Foreign-born	0.69	+	0.71		0.68	+	0.66	+	0.67	+
Speaks Spanish at home	1.80	*	1.73	*	1.84	*	1.80	*	1.84	*
Married	1.28	+	1.27	+	1.27	+	1.28	+	1.28	+
Has non-adult children	1.10		1.11		1.08		1.09		1.09	
Number of negative life events	0.94		0.94		0.94		0.94		0.94	
Friendship diversity index	1.02		1.02		1.02		1.02		1.02	
Active member of an organization	1.05		1.04		1.06		1.05		1.06	
Optimism index	1.04		1.04		1.02		1.02		1.02	
Parental affection index	1.24	***	1.24	***	1.23	***	1.24	***	1.24	***
Perceived neighborhood safety [ref: Extremely dangerous]										
Somewhat dangerous	2.09	**	2.14	**	2.10	**	2.09	**	2.13	***
Fairly safe	3.35	***	3.37	***	3.31	***	3.35	***	3.37	***
Completely safe	4.27	***	4.24	***	4.35	***	4.34	***	4.39	***
Observations	2,893		2,893		2,893		2,893		2,893	

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

APPENDIX B
Additional Tables and Figures: Durable and Dynamic Associations

Table B.1 Predicted change in probability of trusting associated with moving from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 90th percentile of each neighborhood cluster characteristic for the full sample, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Generalized Trust (n=3080)			Trust in Neighbors (n=2924)			Trust in Police (n=2962)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.09*	-0.12*	-0.06	-0.30***	-0.29***	-0.22***	-0.16**	-0.16**	-0.10+
Δ Disadvantage		-0.05	-0.07*		-0.13***	-0.20***		-0.08**	-0.14***
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.06*	0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.04	-0.04		0.04	0.05		-0.03	-0.03
Inequality Baseline	-0.05+	-0.08*	-0.07	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.10*	-0.07*	-0.09*	-0.13**
Δ Inequality		-0.06+	-0.06*		-0.08**	-0.04+		-0.05*	-0.03
Diversity Baseline	0.05	0.06+	0.06+	-0.07*	-0.08*	-0.07*	-0.00	-0.01	0.00
Δ Diversity		0.01	0.04		0.00	-0.01		0.02	0.03

Note. All models for the control for race, age and age squared, educational attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.2 Predicted change in probability of trusting associated with moving from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 90th percentile of each neighborhood cluster characteristic, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Generalized Trust (n=979)			Trust in Neighbors (n=915)			Trust in Police (n=943)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
A. White Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.18*	-0.23**	-0.12	-0.32**	-0.30**	-0.21*	-0.16+	-0.19+	-0.18+
Δ Disadvantage		-0.10+	-0.14*		-0.16***	-0.24***		-0.12**	-0.17***
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.08	-0.02	-0.12	0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.00	-0.02	0.07
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.12+	-0.14		0.01	0.02		-0.01	-0.01
Inequality Baseline	-0.06	-0.10	-0.09	-0.08	-0.10	-0.12	-0.06	-0.10	-0.20**
Δ Inequality		-0.05	-0.05		-0.03	-0.02		0.01	0.03
Diversity Baseline	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.09*	-0.11*	-0.11+	-0.01	-0.02	0.04
Δ Diversity		0.01	-0.00		0.01	-0.01		0.03	0.03
	Generalized Trust (n=1232)			Trust in Neighbors (n=1175)			Trust in Police (n=1174)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
B. Black Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.09	-0.20+	-0.16+	-0.27***	-0.28**	-0.20*	-0.32***	-0.32**	-0.22*
Δ Disadvantage		-0.03	-0.06		-0.19***	-0.21***		-0.20***	-0.26***
Homicide Rate Baseline	0.04	0.11*	0.17*	0.09+	0.01	0.1	-0.02	-0.08	-0.05
Δ Homicide Rate		0.00	0.03		0.06	0.08		-0.04	-0.05
Inequality Baseline	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	-0.07	-0.02	-0.13+	-0.01	-0.04	-0.08
Δ Inequality		-0.04	-0.06+		-0.12**	-0.06+		-0.05	-0.03
Diversity Baseline	0.08	0.08	0.10*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.00	-0.11+	-0.11*	-0.07
Δ Diversity		0.00	-0.01		-0.07	0.02		-0.08	-0.12
	Generalized Trust (n=789)			Trust in Neighbors (n=760)			Trust in Police (n=767)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
C. Hispanic Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	0.03	0.07	0.01	-0.19*	-0.25*	-0.16	-0.09	-0.24*	-0.15
Δ Disadvantage		-0.03	0.03		-0.04	-0.11*		0.07	-0.03
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.15+	-0.25*	-0.21*	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.06	0.05	0.00
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.08	-0.17+		-0.02	-0.02		-0.07	-0.05
Inequality Baseline	-0.07	-0.07	-0.00	-0.12*	-0.06	-0.10	-0.15**	-0.03	-0.15
Δ Inequality		-0.06	-0.08		-0.11*	-0.10*		-0.13**	-0.09*
Diversity Baseline	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.12+	0.12*	0.10
Δ Diversity		0.00	0.05		0.04	0.04		0.05	0.10+

Note. All models for the control for age and age squared, educational attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.3 Predicted change in probability of trusting associated with moving from the bottom 10th percentile to the top 90th percentile of each neighborhood cluster characteristic for respondents living in the same place for 10 or more years, Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Generalized Trust (n=1027)			Trust in Neighbors (n=985)			Trust in Police (n=988)		
	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980	2000	Δ 1990	Δ 1980
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.09	-0.08	-0.03	-0.20**	-0.19+	-0.18+	-0.17*	-0.12	-0.17+
Δ Disadvantage		-0.08+	-0.10+		-0.09*	-0.12**		-0.06	-0.08+
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.03	-0.10	-0.04	-0.01	-0.07	0.04
Δ Homicide Rate		-0.08	-0.11		-0.02	-0.04		0.03	0.02
Inequality Baseline	-0.05	-0.09	-0.10	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.08+	-0.08	-0.15*
Δ Inequality		-0.08	-0.08+		-0.06	-0.05		0.00	-0.02
Diversity Baseline	-0.09	-0.09	-0.04	-0.10+	-0.13*	-0.12*	0.04	0.02	0.03
Δ Diversity		-0.04	-0.10+		0.00	-0.04		0.09*	0.08

Note. All models for the control for age and age squared, educational attainment, sex, log household income, homeownership, years in current residence, foreign-born status, primary language, marital status, and parental status. + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.4 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting generalized trust based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the full sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Race [ref: White]								
Black	-0.24***	-0.23***	-0.27***	-0.24***	-0.24***	-0.23***	-0.29***	-0.24***
Hispanic	-0.070+	-0.067+	-0.089*	-0.066+	-0.072+	-0.067+	-0.12**	-0.067+
Other	-0.18**	-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.19**	-0.19**	-0.20**	-0.22**	-0.19**
Age	0.0016+	0.0015	0.0016+	0.0015	0.0015	0.0015	0.0016+	0.0015
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.069*	0.072**	0.073**	0.072**	0.069**	0.074**	0.075**	0.072**
13-15	0.17***	0.16***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***	0.17***
16+	0.27***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***	0.27***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
Female	-0.0035	-0.0023	-0.0021	-0.0024	-0.0029	-0.0024	-0.0013	-0.0023
LN Household Income	-0.0018	-0.0018	-0.0029	-0.0024	-0.0020	-0.0020	-0.0035	-0.0022
Owns home	0.059*	0.065*	0.059*	0.062*	0.062*	0.068**	0.060*	0.063*
Years in current residence	-0.00046	-0.000092	-0.000061	-0.00021	-0.00042	-0.000084	0.000049	-0.00024
Foreign-born	-0.042	-0.041	-0.036	-0.040	-0.042	-0.040	-0.035	-0.040
Speaks Spanish at home	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.14***	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.14***	-0.13**
Married	0.022	0.026	0.027	0.026	0.023	0.026	0.028	0.025
Has non-adult children	0.011	0.016	0.013	0.015	0.012	0.017	0.014	0.016
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.043**	-0.047**	-0.048**	-0.037+	-0.036+	-0.043*	-0.041*	-0.026
Δ Disadvantage	-0.067*	-0.045	-0.045	-0.038	-0.061**	-0.055**	-0.053*	-0.047*
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00029				-0.00041			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00048+				-0.00044+			
Inequality Baseline		-0.46+				-0.38		
Δ Inequality		-0.44				-0.61*		
Diversity Baseline			0.096+				0.10	
Δ Diversity			0.078				0.089	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.017				0.0035
Δ Outgroup				-0.11				-0.099*
Observations	3080	3080	3080	3080	3080	3080	3080	3080

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.4 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting generalized trust based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the white sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.0029+	0.0027	0.0028+	0.0028	0.0028+	0.0027	0.0028	0.0028
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.089	0.092	0.088	0.083	0.092	0.096	0.090	0.088
13-15	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+
16+	0.24***	0.23***	0.23***	0.22***	0.24***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23**
Female	0.0087	0.0078	0.0097	0.0089	0.010	0.0091	0.010	0.0098
LN Household Income	0.0031	0.0022	0.0026	0.00075	0.0022	0.00097	0.0013	-0.00017
Owns home	0.0096	0.011	0.0040	0.012	0.014	0.018	0.0087	0.016
Years in current residence	-0.0013	-0.00092	-0.00098	-0.00093	-0.0013	-0.00087	-0.00086	-0.0011
Foreign-born	-0.072	-0.067	-0.071	-0.069	-0.070	-0.062	-0.067	-0.070
Speaks Spanish at home	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.14
Married	0.043	0.054	0.049	0.052	0.042	0.055	0.051	0.049
Has non-adult children	0.074	0.081+	0.075	0.080+	0.075	0.083+	0.076	0.082+
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.082***	-0.081**	-0.036	-0.061+	-0.063*	-0.069*	-0.027	-0.037
Δ Disadvantage	-0.14*	-0.11*	-0.055	-0.087	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.038	-0.098*
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00074				-0.0010+			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.0013*				-0.0010+			
Inequality Baseline		-0.60				-0.55		
Δ Inequality		-0.39				-0.59		
Diversity Baseline			0.017				0.026	
Δ Diversity			0.059				0.029	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.14				-0.098
Δ Outgroup				-0.20				-0.22+
Observations	979	979	979	979	979	979	979	979

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.4 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting generalized trust based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the Black sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.00031	0.00044	0.00034	0.00039	0.00026	0.00039	0.00036	0.00020
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.023	-0.021	-0.023	-0.020	-0.026	-0.017	-0.022	-0.026
13-15	0.12**	0.13**	0.12**	0.13**	0.12**	0.13***	0.13**	0.12**
16+	0.24***	0.25***	0.24***	0.24***	0.24***	0.26***	0.25***	0.24***
Female	-0.0069	-0.0045	-0.0050	-0.0055	-0.0045	-0.0047	-0.0056	-0.0100
LN Household Income	-0.014	-0.013	-0.012	-0.015	-0.014	-0.013	-0.012	-0.013
Owns home	0.11**	0.100**	0.10**	0.099**	0.11***	0.10**	0.10**	0.11**
Years in current residence	-0.00016	0.000089	-0.00013	-0.000097	-0.00013	0.000025	-0.000087	-0.000035
Foreign-born	-0.036	-0.048	-0.040	-0.036	-0.041	-0.057	-0.040	-0.038
Speaks Spanish at home	-0.062	-0.058	-0.065	-0.067	-0.071	-0.055	-0.066	-0.056
Married	-0.0042	-0.0090	-0.0097	-0.0092	-0.0054	-0.0092	-0.010	-0.0097
Has non-adult children	0.015	0.015	0.013	0.018	0.017	0.015	0.014	0.017
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.053*	-0.028	-0.034	-0.088**	-0.057*	-0.023	-0.030	-0.10**
Δ Disadvantage	-0.045	-0.051	-0.045	-0.044	-0.043	-0.070*	-0.056	-0.050
Homicide Rate Baseline	0.00058*				0.00092*			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.0000021				0.00019			
Inequality Baseline		0.36				0.59		
Δ Inequality		-0.31				-0.27		
Diversity Baseline			0.13+				0.19*	
Δ Diversity			0.044				-0.0056	
Outgroup Baseline				0.060				0.055
Δ Outgroup				0.14				0.056
Observations	1232	1232	1232	1232	1232	1232	1232	1232

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.4 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting generalized trust based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the Hispanic sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.0021	0.0020	0.0022	0.0023	0.0021	0.0020	0.0022	0.0021
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*
13-15	0.21***	0.21**	0.21***	0.20**	0.22***	0.21**	0.21**	0.21**
16+	0.23**	0.23**	0.23**	0.23**	0.23**	0.24**	0.23**	0.23**
Female	-0.0056	-0.0035	-0.0057	-0.0018	-0.0050	-0.0042	-0.0037	-0.00067
LN Household Income	-0.0042	-0.0016	-0.0039	0.00035	-0.0038	-0.0037	-0.0039	-0.0012
Owns home	0.063	0.072	0.065	0.054	0.064	0.070	0.061	0.056
Years in current residence	0.00098	0.0011	0.0013	0.0015	0.0012	0.0012	0.0014	0.0014
Foreign-born	-0.048	-0.056	-0.052	-0.052	-0.053	-0.055	-0.051	-0.048
Speaks Spanish at home	-0.13**	-0.13*	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13**
Married	0.045	0.036	0.039	0.030	0.045	0.039	0.037	0.034
Has non-adult children	-0.051	-0.049	-0.051	-0.047	-0.046	-0.048	-0.052	-0.051
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.040	-0.042	-0.059+	0.024	-0.068	-0.049	-0.051	0.0070
Δ Disadvantage	-0.026	0.0067	-0.059	-0.027	-0.012	-0.0046	-0.061	0.0061
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.0017*				-0.0013+			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00073				-0.0011+			
Inequality Baseline		-0.62				-0.037		
Δ Inequality		-0.48				-0.80		
Diversity Baseline			0.22+				0.19	
Δ Diversity			0.066				0.16	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.027				0.031
Δ Outgroup				-0.20				-0.16
Observations	789	789	789	789	789	789	789	789

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.5 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in neighbors based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the full sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Race [ref: White]								
Black	-0.061*	-0.091**	-0.11***	-0.067*	-0.056*	-0.086**	-0.11***	-0.066*
Hispanic	-0.020	-0.0096	-0.013	-0.013	-0.020	-0.0083	-0.028	-0.011
Other	-0.048	-0.054	-0.021	-0.064	-0.035	-0.050	-0.033	-0.050
Age	0.0042***	0.0042***	0.0044***	0.0042***	0.0043***	0.0042***	0.0043***	0.0042***
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.043	-0.039	-0.040	-0.040	-0.041	-0.041	-0.039	-0.037
13-15	0.0076	0.0079	0.0079	0.0054	0.0083	0.0056	0.0088	0.0093
16+	0.080**	0.079**	0.073*	0.075*	0.085**	0.079**	0.073*	0.079**
Female	-0.0100	-0.011	-0.0098	-0.0093	-0.0093	-0.0098	-0.0091	-0.0081
LN Household Income	-0.0051	-0.0054	-0.0059	-0.0044	-0.0044	-0.0046	-0.0060	-0.0045
Owns home	0.077***	0.075**	0.075***	0.080***	0.073**	0.073**	0.076***	0.079***
Years in current residence	0.0000061	-0.00017	0.000049	0.000060	-0.00026	-0.00015	0.00010	-0.0000053
Foreign-born	-0.013	-0.0068	-0.012	-0.0095	-0.011	-0.0054	-0.011	-0.0075
Speaks Spanish at home	0.086**	0.085**	0.068*	0.082**	0.085**	0.087**	0.068*	0.083**
Married	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.024	0.020	0.020	0.023	0.024
Has non-adult children	-0.016	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014	-0.018	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.089***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.066***	-0.11***	-0.099***	-0.091***
Δ Disadvantage	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.15***
Homicide Rate Baseline	0.000080				-0.00011			
Δ Homicide Rate	0.00037+				0.00023			
Inequality Baseline		-0.51*				-0.93***		
Δ Inequality		-0.79***				-0.42*		
Diversity Baseline			-0.16**				-0.19***	
Δ Diversity			-0.011				-0.043	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.11***				-0.10**
Δ Outgroup				-0.16*				-0.16***
Observations	2924	2924	2924	2924	2924	2924	2924	2924

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.5 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in neighbors based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the white sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.0038**	0.0039***	0.0038***	0.0036**	0.0041***	0.0038**	0.0038***	0.0036**
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.059	0.062	0.061	0.059	0.062	0.074	0.056	0.062
13-15	0.052	0.052	0.068	0.041	0.056	0.069	0.060	0.051
16+	0.11+	0.11+	0.12+	0.090	0.11+	0.13*	0.11+	0.096
Female	-0.041+	-0.042+	-0.041	-0.041+	-0.041	-0.040	-0.039	-0.040
LN Household Income	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.019	0.015	0.016	0.017	0.017
Owns home	0.047	0.032	0.031	0.049	0.042	0.028	0.036	0.049
Years in current residence	-0.0020+	-0.0017+	-0.0017+	-0.0015	-0.0022*	-0.0020+	-0.0018	-0.0016
Foreign-born	0.019	0.017	0.0091	0.022	0.025	0.018	0.015	0.026
Speaks Spanish at home	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Married	-0.044	-0.037	-0.044	-0.032	-0.045	-0.042	-0.044	-0.030
Has non-adult children	0.076*	0.072*	0.077*	0.083*	0.075*	0.069*	0.077*	0.078*
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.10***	-0.089***	-0.012	-0.089***	-0.078***	-0.066**	0.0012	-0.071*
Δ Disadvantage	-0.19***	-0.14***	-0.13*	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.15***	-0.076+	-0.15***
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00060				-0.00050			
Δ Homicide Rate	0.000071				-0.000098			
Inequality Baseline		-0.88*				-1.10**		
Δ Inequality		-0.37				-0.14		
Diversity Baseline			-0.23**				-0.29***	
Δ Diversity			0.043				-0.021	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.34***				-0.34***
Δ Outgroup				-0.094				-0.21*
Observations	912	912	912	912	912	912	912	912

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.5 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in neighbors based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the Black sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.0043**	0.0043**	0.0043**	0.0042**	0.0044**	0.0042**	0.0043**	0.0043**
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.062	-0.061	-0.062	-0.067	-0.064	-0.067	-0.062	-0.063
13-15	0.057	0.054	0.053	0.048	0.051	0.045	0.052	0.050
16+	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*	0.13*	0.14*	0.14*
Female	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.035	0.036	0.038	0.039	0.040
LN Household Income	-0.0082	-0.0074	-0.0073	-0.0053	-0.0057	-0.0069	-0.0074	-0.0072
Owns home	0.064	0.061	0.060	0.058	0.043	0.057	0.059	0.055
Years in current residence	0.0027	0.0027	0.0029	0.0026	0.0026	0.0027	0.0029	0.0027
Foreign-born	-0.18+	-0.17	-0.19+	-0.16	-0.17	-0.18	-0.19+	-0.17
Speaks Spanish at home	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.16
Married	0.039	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.033	0.036	0.036	0.037
Has non-adult children	-0.051	-0.045	-0.044	-0.050	-0.052	-0.044	-0.043	-0.046
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.095**	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.11**	-0.059+	-0.11***	-0.097**	-0.12**
Δ Disadvantage	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.18**	-0.20***	-0.15***	-0.14**	-0.15**	-0.16***
Homicide Rate Baseline	0.000035				0.00024			
Δ Homicide Rate	0.00052+				0.00043			
Inequality Baseline		-0.42				-1.00+		
Δ Inequality		-1.21**				-0.61+		
Diversity Baseline			-0.053				-0.075	
Δ Diversity			-0.31+				-0.0064	
Outgroup Baseline				0.012				0.015
Δ Outgroup				-0.14				-0.073
Observations	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.5 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in neighbors based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the Hispanic sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.0055*	0.0055*	0.0060*	0.0055*	0.0056*	0.0054*	0.0059*	0.0055*
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.096*	-0.087*	-0.092*	-0.088*	-0.094*	-0.087*	-0.091*	-0.087*
13-15	-0.062	-0.063	-0.060	-0.062	-0.060	-0.064	-0.060	-0.063
16+	0.032	0.040	0.033	0.036	0.037	0.037	0.033	0.035
Female	-0.021	-0.019	-0.018	-0.019	-0.021	-0.020	-0.019	-0.020
LN Household Income	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012	-0.011
Owns home	0.078+	0.084*	0.085*	0.085*	0.082*	0.089*	0.090*	0.089*
Years in current residence	-0.00089	-0.0011	-0.0013	-0.0011	-0.0012	-0.0013	-0.0015	-0.0013
Foreign-born	-0.029	-0.030	-0.038	-0.029	-0.032	-0.029	-0.039	-0.031
Speaks Spanish at home	0.073+	0.076+	0.064	0.071+	0.071+	0.075+	0.065	0.073+
Married	0.083*	0.075*	0.077*	0.076*	0.085*	0.073+	0.077*	0.074+
Has non-adult children	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.10*
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.13***	-0.11**	-0.088*	-0.10**	-0.13***	-0.096*
Δ Disadvantage	-0.069	-0.049	-0.090+	-0.050	-0.100**	-0.093*	-0.12**	-0.089*
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.000014				-0.00029			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00020				-0.00025			
Inequality Baseline		-0.41				-0.69		
Δ Inequality		-0.94*				-0.91*		
Diversity Baseline			0.0027				-0.011	
Δ Diversity			0.12				0.051	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.090				-0.095
Δ Outgroup				-0.10				-0.11
Observations	760	760	760	760	760	760	760	760

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.6 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in community-police based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the full sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Race [ref: White]								
Black	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.18***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.18***	-0.13***
Hispanic	-0.076*	-0.064*	-0.068*	-0.071*	-0.075*	-0.063*	-0.071*	-0.071*
Other	0.030	0.025	0.037	0.026	0.037	0.026	0.036	0.033
Age	0.0017*	0.0016*	0.0017*	0.0016*	0.0017*	0.0016*	0.0017*	0.0016*
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.020	-0.016	-0.016	-0.018	-0.017	-0.017	-0.015	-0.016
13-15	0.017	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.016	0.019	0.019
16+	0.062+	0.059+	0.054	0.055	0.066+	0.058+	0.055	0.059+
Female	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.025	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.025
LN Household Income	0.0092	0.0083	0.0080	0.0089	0.0097	0.0089	0.0080	0.0092
Owns home	0.0051	0.0091	0.0064	0.011	0.0024	0.0098	0.0081	0.010
Years in current residence	-0.0022*	-0.0020*	-0.0020*	-0.0019*	-0.0024**	-0.0020*	-0.0020*	-0.0020*
Foreign-born	-0.0092	-0.0089	-0.0061	-0.0098	-0.0059	-0.0071	-0.0056	-0.0087
Speaks Spanish at home	0.11***	0.11***	0.097**	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.098**	0.11***
Married	0.052*	0.054*	0.054*	0.054*	0.049*	0.052*	0.054*	0.053*
Has non-adult children	0.021	0.025	0.024	0.026	0.019	0.025	0.024	0.025
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.069***	-0.084***	-0.089***	-0.067**	-0.054**	-0.084***	-0.088***	-0.048+
Δ Disadvantage	-0.10***	-0.070*	-0.081**	-0.074*	-0.11***	-0.091***	-0.093***	-0.090***
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00034				-0.00059*			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00027				-0.00032			
Inequality Baseline		-0.64*				-1.00**		
Δ Inequality		-0.46*				-0.31		
Diversity Baseline			-0.019				-0.043	
Δ Diversity			0.094				0.052	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.077*				-0.075*
Δ Outgroup				-0.12+				-0.10*
Observations	2962	2962	2962	2962	2962	2962	2962	2962

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.6 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in community-police based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the white sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	-0.000078	-0.00016	-0.000048	-0.00021	0.00035	-0.00026	-0.000097	-0.00018
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.027	0.029	0.026	0.028	0.032	0.033	0.023	0.031
13-15	-0.0081	-0.011	0.00064	-0.014	0.0021	-0.0074	-0.0064	-0.0052
16+	0.080	0.078	0.086	0.069	0.087	0.077	0.076	0.073
Female	0.0027	0.00077	0.0025	0.0015	0.0048	0.0024	0.0045	0.0029
LN Household Income	-0.0023	-0.0032	-0.0039	-0.0031	-0.0057	-0.0040	-0.0034	-0.0050
Owns home	0.0046	-0.0038	-0.0073	0.0053	-0.0037	0.0037	-0.0019	0.0081
Years in current residence	0.00028	0.00077	0.00065	0.00081	0.00013	0.00077	0.00080	0.00077
Foreign-born	-0.0090	-0.0095	-0.016	-0.0055	-0.0030	-0.0040	-0.0092	-0.0044
Speaks Spanish at home	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Married	0.038	0.046	0.039	0.048	0.038	0.047	0.040	0.048
Has non-adult children	0.0088	0.013	0.0088	0.017	0.0048	0.012	0.0096	0.014
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.062***	-0.048*	0.0100	-0.036	-0.041*	-0.035	0.020	-0.020
Δ Disadvantage	-0.13**	-0.099**	-0.070	-0.11**	-0.12***	-0.10***	-0.021	-0.093**
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00063				-0.00062			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00028				-0.00041			
Inequality Baseline		-0.72*				-0.96**		
Δ Inequality		0.087				0.22		
Diversity Baseline			-0.053				-0.062	
Δ Diversity			0.15				0.048	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.24**				-0.22**
Δ Outgroup				-0.11				-0.22*
Observations	940	940	940	940	940	940	940	940

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.6 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in community-police based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the Black sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	0.0062***	0.0061***	0.0061***	0.0061***	0.0062***	0.0061***	0.0061***	0.0062***
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.066	-0.068	-0.066	-0.066	-0.064	-0.068	-0.071	-0.065
13-15	0.014	0.0089	0.0096	0.011	0.013	0.0087	0.0028	0.012
16+	0.061	0.053	0.052	0.057	0.063	0.053	0.041	0.059
Female	0.024	0.022	0.025	0.024	0.023	0.022	0.025	0.026
LN Household Income	0.0070	0.0066	0.0071	0.0074	0.0084	0.0069	0.0074	0.0072
Owns home	0.018	0.020	0.032	0.026	0.011	0.019	0.026	0.024
Years in current residence	-0.0045**	-0.0049**	-0.0049**	-0.0044**	-0.0047**	-0.0049**	-0.0048**	-0.0045**
Foreign-born	-0.16	-0.13	-0.17	-0.17	-0.16	-0.14	-0.17	-0.18
Speaks Spanish at home	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16
Married	-0.000033	0.00059	0.00030	0.00058	-0.0022	0.00070	0.0017	0.00072
Has non-adult children	0.054	0.056	0.059	0.059	0.053	0.056	0.060	0.060
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.12***	-0.17***	-0.15***	-0.11**	-0.096**	-0.16***	-0.15***	-0.098*
Δ Disadvantage	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.17**	-0.19**	-0.20***	-0.21***	-0.15**	-0.18***
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00037				-0.00049			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00024				-0.00027			
Inequality Baseline		-0.51				-0.88		
Δ Inequality		-0.52				-0.37		
Diversity Baseline			-0.19*				-0.17+	
Δ Diversity			-0.31				-0.24	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.044				-0.037
Δ Outgroup				0.38+				0.18
Observations	1174	1174	1174	1174	1174	1174	1174	1174

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.6 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in community-police based on Neighborhood Cluster context for the Hispanic sub-sample Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Age	-0.0038*	-0.0036*	-0.0032+	-0.0039*	-0.0035*	-0.0035*	-0.0031+	-0.0036*
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.0096	-0.0027	-0.0053	0.0033	-0.0073	0.00036	-0.0032	0.0010
13-15	0.066	0.066	0.070	0.071	0.070	0.066	0.071	0.068
16+	-0.014	0.0011	-0.0056	-0.0022	-0.0035	-0.0041	-0.0096	-0.015
Female	0.041	0.043	0.042	0.044	0.038	0.042	0.042	0.043
LN Household Income	0.0088	0.0088	0.0086	0.0084	0.0076	0.0076	0.0074	0.0084
Owns home	0.0045	0.0074	0.0080	0.010	0.0067	0.014	0.014	0.014
Years in current residence	-0.00080	-0.00088	-0.0012	-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.00100	-0.0014	-0.00095
Foreign-born	0.049	0.040	0.037	0.052	0.046	0.042	0.035	0.043
Speaks Spanish at home	0.093*	0.093*	0.082*	0.088*	0.090*	0.098*	0.083*	0.094*
Married	0.13***	0.13**	0.13**	0.13***	0.14***	0.12**	0.13***	0.13**
Has non-adult children	-0.022	-0.021	-0.023	-0.023	-0.021	-0.017	-0.021	-0.016
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.11***	-0.084**	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.098**	-0.10***	-0.14***	-0.11**
Δ Disadvantage	0.022	0.037	-0.020	0.050	-0.049	-0.028	-0.073*	-0.028
Homicide Rate Baseline	0.00015				-0.00032			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00057				-0.00042			
Inequality Baseline		-0.016				-0.71		
Δ Inequality		-1.02*				-0.79+		
Diversity Baseline			0.15				0.11	
Δ Diversity			0.18				0.16	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.096				-0.11+
Δ Outgroup				-0.14				-0.14
Observations	767	767	767	767	767	767	767	767

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.7 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting generalized trust based on Neighborhood Cluster context for sub-population of respondents who lived in the same place for ten or more years Chicago Community Adult Health Study

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Race [ref: White]								
Black	-0.27***	-0.31***	-0.33***	-0.26***	-0.27***	-0.32***	-0.36***	-0.26***
Hispanic	-0.0098	-0.0045	-0.033	-0.0067	-0.015	-0.024	-0.088	-0.012
Other	-0.16	-0.14	-0.13	-0.15	-0.16	-0.16	-0.17	-0.15
Age	0.0022	0.0020	0.0021	0.0020	0.0022	0.0018	0.0020	0.0019
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.045	0.049	0.048	0.050	0.046	0.051	0.053	0.051
13-15	0.17**	0.16**	0.16**	0.16**	0.17**	0.16**	0.17**	0.16**
16+	0.27***	0.27***	0.26***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***	0.27***
Female	-0.0050	-0.0041	-0.0056	-0.0063	-0.0052	-0.0049	-0.0066	-0.0073
LN Household Income	0.029	0.025	0.023	0.026	0.030	0.025	0.023	0.027
Owns home	0.055	0.053	0.051	0.064	0.058	0.058	0.055	0.069
Years in current residence	0.00071	0.00069	0.0011	0.00074	0.00059	0.00076	0.0012	0.00070
Foreign-born	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.11*	-0.12*	-0.12*
Speaks Spanish at home	-0.12+	-0.12+	-0.13+	-0.12+	-0.12+	-0.14*	-0.12+	-0.13+
Married	-0.0045	0.0070	0.0051	-0.00053	-0.0061	0.0093	0.0050	-0.0011
Has non-adult children	0.059	0.061	0.063	0.062	0.057	0.058	0.061	0.062
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.038	-0.062*	-0.051+	-0.029	-0.019	-0.056+	-0.035	-0.014
Δ Disadvantage	-0.098*	-0.078+	-0.064	-0.058	-0.095*	-0.085*	-0.078+	-0.061
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00050				-0.00052			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00064				-0.00067+			
Inequality Baseline		-0.70+				-0.78+		
Δ Inequality		-0.74				-0.77+		
Diversity Baseline			-0.17+				-0.11	
Δ Diversity			-0.12				-0.21+	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.082				-0.050
Δ Outgroup				-0.22				-0.21*
Observations	1027	1027	1027	1027	1027	1027	1027	1027

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.7 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in neighbors based on Neighborhood Cluster context for sub-population of respondents who lived in the same place for ten or more years Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Race [ref: White]								
Black	-0.0016	-0.044	-0.077	0.0031	-0.00074	-0.039	-0.086	0.0014
Hispanic	-0.0057	0.013	0.011	-0.0035	-0.0075	0.011	-0.0021	-0.0026
Other	0.13	0.14*	0.15**	0.14+	0.14+	0.14+	0.14**	0.14+
Age	0.0037**	0.0038**	0.0039**	0.0037**	0.0038**	0.0037**	0.0039**	0.0036**
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	0.017	0.016	0.012	0.015	0.018	0.014	0.014	0.020
13-15	0.043	0.036	0.035	0.036	0.044	0.036	0.037	0.041
16+	0.11*	0.11*	0.097+	0.10*	0.11*	0.10*	0.099*	0.11*
Female	-0.043	-0.042	-0.042	-0.044	-0.043	-0.041	-0.042	-0.044
LN Household Income	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.010	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012
Owns home	0.036	0.032	0.029	0.043	0.035	0.034	0.031	0.045
Years in current residence	-0.0017	-0.0019	-0.0017	-0.0017	-0.0018	-0.0020	-0.0017	-0.0018
Foreign-born	-0.016	-0.030	-0.032	-0.020	-0.021	-0.022	-0.033	-0.021
Speaks Spanish at home	0.10*	0.11*	0.077	0.10+	0.10*	0.11*	0.079	0.10+
Married	0.048	0.047	0.043	0.042	0.045	0.045	0.043	0.043
Has non-adult children	0.022	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.019	0.023	0.024	0.021
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.083**	-0.10***	-0.096***	-0.070*	-0.069*	-0.10***	-0.093***	-0.070+
Δ Disadvantage	-0.091*	-0.091*	-0.092*	-0.097*	-0.10**	-0.11**	-0.100**	-0.096**
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00039				-0.00034			
Δ Homicide Rate	-0.00015				-0.00027			
Inequality Baseline		-0.30				-0.52		
Δ Inequality		-0.68+				-0.55+		
Diversity Baseline			-0.20*				-0.23*	
Δ Diversity			-0.0079				-0.089	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.17**				-0.16**
Δ Outgroup				-0.16				-0.18*
Observations	985	985	985	985	985	985	985	985

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table B.7 Average marginal effects for logistic regression models predicting trust in community-police based on Neighborhood Cluster context for sub-population of respondents who lived in the same place for ten or more years Chicago Community Adult Health Study, CONTINUED

	Change from 1990				Change from 1980			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Race [ref: White]								
Black	-0.15***	-0.13*	-0.20***	-0.14**	-0.16***	-0.14**	-0.20***	-0.15***
Hispanic	-0.072	-0.046	-0.069	-0.076	-0.069	-0.056	-0.056	-0.069
Other	0.026	0.057	0.052	0.029	0.025	0.035	0.059	0.027
Age	0.0041***	0.0039***	0.0040***	0.0038***	0.0041***	0.0039***	0.0040***	0.0039***
Education (years) [ref: <12]								
12	-0.0020	-0.000097	-0.0031	-0.0073	0.0033	-0.00070	-0.0026	0.0015
13-15	0.10*	0.098*	0.096*	0.092*	0.10*	0.100*	0.097*	0.10*
16+	0.089+	0.087+	0.076	0.078	0.092+	0.084	0.077	0.086+
Female	0.037	0.036	0.035	0.032	0.036	0.035	0.035	0.035
LN Household Income	0.010	0.0077	0.0078	0.011	0.010	0.0081	0.0078	0.0081
Owns home	-0.010	-0.00060	-0.010	-0.00060	-0.012	0.0011	-0.0093	-0.0017
Years in current residence	-0.0028*	-0.0026+	-0.0026+	-0.0024+	-0.0027*	-0.0026+	-0.0026+	-0.0026+
Foreign-born	-0.054	-0.066	-0.054	-0.050	-0.048	-0.051	-0.052	-0.047
Speaks Spanish at home	0.14**	0.15**	0.12*	0.14**	0.14**	0.15**	0.12*	0.14**
Married	0.043	0.048	0.048	0.046	0.043	0.047	0.048	0.049
Has non-adult children	-0.028	-0.021	-0.023	-0.021	-0.028	-0.022	-0.021	-0.025
Neighborhood Cluster Characteristics								
Disadvantage Baseline	-0.075**	-0.087***	-0.097***	-0.065*	-0.069*	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.093*
Δ Disadvantage	-0.065	-0.013	-0.043	-0.069	-0.070*	-0.049	-0.059+	-0.055
Homicide Rate Baseline	-0.00044				-0.00018			
Δ Homicide Rate	0.00018				-0.000062			
Inequality Baseline		-0.64+				-0.88+		
Δ Inequality		-0.013				-0.11		
Diversity Baseline			0.017				-0.0088	
Δ Diversity			0.28+				0.10	
Outgroup Baseline				-0.098+				-0.11+
Δ Outgroup				-0.15				-0.11
Observations	988	988	988	988	988	988	988	988

+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

APPENDIX C
Additional Tables and Figures: A Longitudinal Study of Diversity and Generalized Trust

Fig C.1 Scatterplots illustrating the change from 1990 to 2018 in county diversity, segregation, and racial composition, U.S. Census



Fig C.2 Cross-sectional association between mean state diversity and scaled generalized trust from the 1990-2014 General Social Survey and U.S. Census



Table C.1 Population-weighted descriptive statistics stratified by race, General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Total (n = 19,216)				Means	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White (n = 13,947)	Black (n = 2,591)
Person-Level Variables						
Generalized trust	0.34	0.48	0.0	1.0	0.40	0.16
Female	53.2	---	0.0	100.0	52.6	58.3
Age	44.9	16.6	18.0	89.0	46.5	43.3
Family income	52.5	42.5	0.4	178.7	56.9	36.7
Education (%)						
Less than high school	15.2	---	0.0	100.0	12.4	20.0
High school	28.5	---	0.0	100.0	28.8	31.8
Some college	27.7	---	0.0	100.0	27.2	31.6
College	28.6	---	0.0	100.0	31.6	16.6
Employment (%)						
Working	65.4	---	0.0	100.0	65.0	63.2
Unemployed	5.8	---	0.0	100.0	5.2	7.5
Not in labor force	28.9	---	0.0	100.0	29.8	29.3
Marital Status (%)						
Married	55.2	---	0.0	100.0	59.8	35.1
Never married	24.1	---	0.0	100.0	19.7	38.2
Divorced/Separated	15.4	---	0.0	100.0	14.8	19.6
Widowed	5.4	---	0.0	100.0	5.7	7.1
Ever a parent	71.9	---	0.0	100.0	71.8	75.7
Religious Service Attendance (%)						
Attends religious services infrequently	42.7	---	0.0	100.0	45.7	27.8
Attends religious services sometime	27.8	---	0.0	100.0	25.9	33.6
Attends religious services often	29.5	---	0.0	100.0	28.4	38.6
Urbanicity (%)						
Urban	59.7	---	0.0	100.0	58.7	64.3
Suburban	29.4	---	0.0	100.0	29.0	24.5
Rural	10.9	---	0.0	100.0	12.3	11.2
County-Level Diversity						
Diversity	40.4	19.4	1.9	74.7	35.9	51.3
Segregation	17.3	11.1	0.0	58.0	16.0	22.3
White (%)	68.7	21.0	9.3	99.0	74.2	56.7
Black (%)	12.7	13.2	0.0	67.4	10.8	25.5
Hispanic (%)	13.4	15.1	0.2	88.1	10.4	13.2
Non-White (%)	31.3	21.0	1.0	90.7	25.8	43.3
Non-Black (%)	87.3	13.2	32.6	100.0	89.2	74.5
County-Level Controls						
Gini index	44.6	3.7	33.8	60.4	44.1	46.1
Poverty (%)	13.7	5.4	2.9	37.9	13.1	15.9
Per capita income	45.4	14.2	20.2	193.9	44.7	45.4
Unemployment (%)	5.6	2.3	1.2	17.0	5.5	6.0
Age 65+ (%)	22.9	3.2	9.5	27.3	22.4	23.6
LN Population density	6.1	1.68	1.29	11.18	5.9	6.7

Table C.2 Coefficients for county-level diversity and other social context variables from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Full-Sample						White Sub-Sample						Black Sub-Sample					
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)	
Diversity	-0.25		-0.41	+	-0.36	*	-0.21		-0.34		-0.19		-0.03		-0.02		-0.12	
Gini index	-0.13		0.41		-0.18		0.22		1.18		0.50		1.56		0.78		0.89	
% Poverty	0.42		0.32		0.36		0.80	*	0.64		0.65		-0.52		-0.29		-0.58	
Per capita income	0.30	*	0.30	+	0.29	+	0.21		0.21		0.18		0.76	***	0.74	**	0.72	**
% Unemployed	-0.45		-0.30		-0.16		-0.86		-0.57		-0.23		1.18		1.29		1.03	
% Age 65+	0.23		0.63		0.58		1.06		2.02	*	1.70	*	-2.39		-3.63	*	-2.28	
LN Population density	-4.36		5.08		0.68		-0.25		2.64		-3.04		-0.36		48.1	**	33.8	+
County FE	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
Year FE	x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x		x	
State trend			x						x						x			
Region by Year FE					x						x						x	
R-Squared	0.16		0.17		0.17		0.15		0.15		0.16		0.22		0.23		0.27	
Observations	19216		19216		19216		13947		13947		13947		2591		2591		2591	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: County coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.3 Coefficients for county-level out-group percentage from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Linear Specification					
	White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Black / % White	-0.11	0.32	-0.24	0.32	-0.14	0.13
% Hispanic	0.11	-0.33	-0.23	-0.10	1.35	0.65
% Non-White / % Non-Black	0.07	-0.20	-0.27	0.78	0.95	0.86
	Quadradic Specification					
	White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
% Black / % White	-0.19	-0.24	-0.29	0.31	-0.04	0.27
% Black Squared / % White Squared	0.004	0.03	0.002	-0.0002	0.003	0.004
% Hispanic	-0.07	-0.14	0.09	-0.54	0.87	0.19
% Hispanic Squared	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
% Non-White / % Non-Black	-0.10	-0.38	-0.36	-0.27	-0.24	0.08
% Non-White Squared / % Non-Black Squared	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
County FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
State trend		x			x	
Region by Year FE			x			x
Observations	13,947	13,947	13,947	2,591	2,591	2,591

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: County coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.4 Coefficients for county-level segregation and other social context variables from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Full-Sample			White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Segregation	-0.54 +	-0.64 +	-0.76 *	-0.64 +	-0.89 *	-0.86 *	-0.13	0.58	0.30
Gini index	-0.13	0.29	-0.16	0.31	1.23	0.64	1.57	0.64	0.76
% Poverty	0.29	0.22	0.22	0.70 +	0.60	0.59	-0.54	-0.32	-0.62
Per capita income	0.30 *	0.27 +	0.26	0.21	0.18	0.15	0.75 ***	0.76 **	0.73 **
% Unemployed	-0.49	-0.35	-0.22	-0.91 +	-0.61	-0.27	1.17	1.32	1.03
% Age 65+	0.06	0.41	0.51	0.97	1.94 *	1.79 *	-2.41 +	-3.68 *	-2.40
LN Population density	-2.11	6.49	1.83	2.84	7.18	0.71	0.75	44.40 *	31.80 +
County FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
State trend		x			x			x	
Region by Year FE			x			x			x
R-Squared	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.22	0.24	0.27
Observations	19,216	19,216	19,216	13,947	13,947	13,947	2,591	2,591	2,591

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: County coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.5 Coefficients for county-level diversity and segregation interaction from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	Full-Sample			White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Diversity x Segregation	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01
Diversity	-0.18	-0.29	-0.28	-0.12	-0.18	-0.11	0.03	0.06	-0.17
Segregation	-0.60 +	-0.71 +	-0.83 *	-0.75 +	-0.98 +	-0.99 *	-0.11	0.69	0.26
County FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
State trend		x			x			x	
Region by Year FE			x			x			x
R-Squared	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.22	0.24	0.27
Observations	19,216	19,216	19,216	13,947	13,947	13,947	2,591	2,591	2,591

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: County coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.6 Coefficients for individual measures of prejudice and racial resentment interacted with county diversity, segregation, and % Black from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust for the white subsample of the General Social Survey, 1993-2018

	County and Year FE	State Linear Trend	Region by Year FE
		Diversity Interaction	
Conservative Racial Policy	0.005	0.000	0.009
Racial resentment	-0.031	-0.032	-0.031
Prejudice	-0.031	-0.027	-0.033
Economic Individualism	-0.017	-0.016 *	-0.017 *
Conservative Political Views	-0.019	-0.018	-0.019
		Segregation Interaction	
Conservative Racial Policy	0.089	0.083	0.088
Racial resentment	-0.019	-0.022	-0.026
Prejudice	0.078	0.085	0.073
Economic Individualism	0.002	0.002	0.003
Conservative Political Views	-0.020	-0.022	-0.015
		% Black Interaction	
Conservative Racial Policy	-0.002	-0.019	-0.002
Racial resentment	-0.044	-0.053	-0.055
Prejudice	0.029	0.028	0.026
Economic Individualism	-0.013	-0.013	-0.015
Conservative Political Views	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: All models include full set of controls and county and year fixed effects.

Table C.7 Population-weighted descriptive statistics stratified by race, General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Total (n = 17,401)				Means	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White (n = 12,948)	Black (n = 2,264)
Person-Level Variables						
Trust scale	2.9	2.2	0.0	6.0	3.2	1.9
Female	53.3	---	0.0	100.0	52.7	59.4
Age	44.6	16.5	18.0	89.0	46.0	43.2
Family income	51.9	41.5	0.4	178.7	55.6	37.0
Education (%)						
Less than high school	16.2	---	0.0	100.0	13.6	22.7
High school	29.0	---	0.0	100.0	29.4	32.0
Some college	27.4	---	0.0	100.0	27.0	30.7
College	27.4	---	0.0	100.0	30.1	14.7
Employment (%)						
Working	65.6	---	0.0	100.0	65.3	62.9
Unemployed	5.6	---	0.0	100.0	5.1	7.2
Not in labor force	28.8	---	0.0	100.0	29.6	30.0
Marital Status (%)						
Married	57.2	---	0.0	100.0	61.4	37.4
Never married	22.8	---	0.0	100.0	18.9	35.6
Divorced/Separated	14.4	---	0.0	100.0	13.8	19.1
Widowed	5.6	---	0.0	100.0	5.8	7.9
Ever a parent	72.2	---	0.0	100.0	72.0	77.4
Religious Service Attendance (%)						
Attends religious services infrequently	40.7	---	0.0	100.0	43.5	25.2
Attends religious services sometime	28.4	---	0.0	100.0	26.5	35.2
Attends religious services often	30.9	---	0.0	100.0	30.0	39.6
Urbanicity (%)						
Urban	60.1	---	0.0	100.0	59.2	65.0
Suburban	28.8	---	0.0	100.0	28.2	24.1
Rural	11.1	---	0.0	100.0	12.6	10.9
State-Level Diversity						
Diversity	43.1	15.1	4.3	66.7	40.6	46.6
Segregation	29.5	8.9	5.1	50.0	29.6	30.8
White (%)	70.2	14.5	21.8	97.8	72.7	67.3
Black (%)	12.6	8.2	0.3	65.0	12.1	18.3
Hispanic (%)	12.3	11.6	0.4	47.9	10.7	10.5
Non-White (%)	29.8	14.5	2.2	78.2	27.3	32.7
Non-Black (%)	87.4	8.2	35.0	99.7	87.9	81.7
State-Level Controls						
Gini index	59.6	4.0	52.6	71.1	59.2	59.8
Poverty (%)	13.5	3.1	5.7	26.4	13.2	14.1
Per capita income	43.5	7.2	25.7	75.7	43.1	43.1
Unemployment (%)	5.9	1.8	2.3	12.6	5.8	6.0
Age 65+ (%)	23.7	1.8	17.3	26.9	23.5	24.1
LN Population density	5.0	1.0	0.1	9.3	5.0	5.2

Table C.8 Coefficients for state-level diversity and other social context variables from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Full-Sample				White Sub-Sample				Black Sub-Sample			
	(1)		(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		(9)	
Diversity	-0.010		0.028	-0.011	-0.010		0.009	-0.002	0.016	-0.049		-0.074	+
Gini index	0.008		0.013	0.002	0.007		0.022	0.003	-0.008	-0.025		0.033	
% Poverty	0.016		0.007	0.010	0.021		0.008	0.002	-0.026	-0.024		0.025	
Per capita income	0.013		-0.008	0.044	*	0.008		-0.044	0.029	0.015	0.075	+	0.040	
% Unemployed	-0.008		-0.027	0.033	-0.028		-0.040	0.004	0.086	0.110		0.003	
% Age 65+	0.010		0.150	-0.001	-0.004		0.094	-0.013	0.210	0.670	*	0.055	
LN Population density	1.080	**	1.260	1.740	***	0.950	+	1.800	1.970	**	1.080	8.320		2.220	
State FE	x		x	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Year FE	x		x	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	
State trend			x				x			x			
Region by Year FE				x				x				x	
R-Squared	0.18		0.19	0.19	0.16		0.16	0.17	0.12	0.14		0.17	
Observations	17,401		17,401	17,401	12,948		12,948	12,948	2,264	2,264		2,264	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table C.9 Coefficients for state-level out-group percentage from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Linear Specification						
	White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
% Black / % White	-0.064	0.120	-0.052	0.021	0.045	0.047	*
% Hispanic	0.035	-0.068	0.040	-0.010	0.015	-0.006	
% Non-White / % Non-Black	0.002	-0.017	-0.004	0.032	0.088	0.058	+
	Quadradic Specification						
	White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample			
% Black / % White	-0.062	0.120	-0.067	0.010	0.069	0.081	+
% Black Squared / % White Squared	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0004	-0.0003	0.0009	0.0009	
% Hispanic	0.004	-0.080	0.043	0.050	0.020	-0.050	
% Hispanic Squared	0.0005	0.0016	-0.0001	-0.001	-0.003	0.001	
% Non-White / % Non-Black	-0.0002	0.013	-0.003	-0.005	0.260	0.069	
% Non-White Squared / % Non-Black Squared	0.00004	-0.0037	0.0000	-0.001	0.005	0.0002	
State FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	
State trend		x			x		
Region by Year FE			x			x	
Observations	12,948	12,948	12,948	2,264	2,264	2,264	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table C.10 Coefficients for state-level segregation and other social context variables from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Full-Sample				White Sub-Sample				Black Sub-Sample			
	(1)		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)		(9)	
Segregation	0.003		0.016	-0.014	0.001	0.021	-0.014		-0.026	0.002		-0.100	*
Gini index	0.008		0.013	0.002	0.007	0.023	0.002		-0.008	-0.025		0.023	
% Poverty	0.014		0.009	0.009	0.020	0.008	0.002		-0.023	-0.027		0.011	
Per capita income	0.011		-0.008	0.043	**	0.005	-0.044	0.031		0.024	0.074	+	0.030	
% Unemployed	-0.010		-0.025	0.033	-0.031	-0.038	0.004		0.096	0.110		0.032	
% Age 65+	0.012		0.150	0.003	-0.002	0.093	-0.012		0.190	0.670	*	0.082	
LN Population density	1.010	**	1.720	1.510	***	0.890	1.930	1.870	**	1.410	7.580		1.220	
State FE	x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	
Year FE	x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	
State trend			x			x				x			
Region by Year FE				x			x					x	
R-Squared	0.18		0.19	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.17		0.12	0.14		0.17	
Observations	17,401		17,401	17,401	12,948	12,948	12,948		2,264	2,264		2,264	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table C.11 Coefficients for state-level diversity and segregation interaction from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Full-Sample				White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	
Diversity x Segregation	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	+	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	
Diversity	-0.013	0.025	-0.014		-0.012	-0.007	-0.004	0.013	-0.064	-0.068	+
Segregation	-0.022	-0.044	-0.039	+	-0.015	-0.020	-0.030	-0.066	0.024	-0.150	**
State FE											
Year FE	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	
State trend		x				x			x		
Region by Year FE			x				x			x	
R-Squared	0.18	0.19	0.19		0.16	0.16	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.18	
Observations	17,401	17,401	17,401		12,948	12,948	12,948	2,264	2,264	2,264	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Table C.12 Coefficients for individual measures of prejudice and racial resentment interacted with state diversity, segregation, and % Black from OLS models predicting scaled generalized trust for the white subsample of the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	State and Year FE		State Linear Trend		Region by Year FE	
			Diversity Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	-0.0015		-0.0023		-0.0013	
Racial resentment	-0.0028	+	-0.0027	+	-0.0029	*
Prejudice	-0.0031	+	-0.0026		-0.0026	
Economic Individualism	-0.0003		-0.0003		-0.0003	
Conservative Political Views	0.0003		0.0003		0.0004	
			Segregation Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	0.0020		0.0014		0.0021	
Racial resentment	-0.0024		-0.0021		-0.0029	
Prejudice	0.0042		0.0045		0.0044	
Economic Individualism	0.0003		0.0003		0.0003	
Conservative Political Views	0.00032		0.00019		0.0001	
			% Black Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	-0.0055	+	-0.0058	*	-0.0054	+
Racial resentment	-0.0061	*	-0.0059	*	-0.0063	*
Prejudice	0.0008		-0.0011		0.0009	
Economic Individualism	-0.0001		0.0000		-0.0001	
Conservative Political Views	-0.00019		-0.00046		0.0000	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: All models include full set of controls and state and year fixed effects.

Table C.13 Population-weighted descriptive statistics stratified by race, General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Total (n = 18,429)				Means	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	White (n = 13,704)	Black (n = 2,394)
Person-Level Variables						
Generalized trust	0.35	0.48	0.0	1.0	0.40	0.16
Female	53.4	---	0.0	100.0	52.8	59.7
Age	44.6	16.5	18.0	89.0	46.0	43.3
Family income	51.9	41.4	0.4	178.7	55.6	36.8
Education (%)						
Less than high school	16.2	---	0.0	100.0	13.6	22.5
High school	28.8	---	0.0	100.0	29.2	31.9
Some college	27.6	---	0.0	100.0	27.2	31.0
College	27.4	---	0.0	100.0	30.0	14.6
Employment (%)						
Working	65.7	---	0.0	100.0	65.4	62.9
Unemployed	5.5	---	0.0	100.0	5.0	7.0
Not in labor force	28.8	---	0.0	100.0	29.6	30.1
Marital Status (%)						
Married	57.1	---	0.0	100.0	61.4	37.3
Never married	22.7	---	0.0	100.0	18.9	35.2
Divorced/Separated	14.6	---	0.0	100.0	13.9	19.7
Widowed	5.6	---	0.0	100.0	5.8	7.8
Ever a parent	72.2	---	0.0	100.0	72.1	77.4
Religious Service Attendance (%)						
Attends religious services infrequently	40.8	---	0.0	100.0	43.6	25.0
Attends religious services sometime	28.5	---	0.0	100.0	26.5	35.4
Attends religious services often	30.8	---	0.0	100.0	29.9	39.6
Urbanicity (%)						
Urban	60.2	---	0.0	100.0	59.3	65.0
Suburban	28.8	---	0.0	100.0	28.2	24.2
Rural	11.0	---	0.0	100.0	12.5	10.8
State-Level Diversity						
Diversity	43.1	15.0	4.3	66.7	40.6	46.7
Segregation	29.5	8.9	5.1	50.0	29.6	30.7
White (%)	70.2	14.5	21.8	97.8	72.7	67.3
Black (%)	12.6	8.2	0.3	65.0	12.0	18.2
Hispanic (%)	12.3	11.6	0.4	47.9	10.8	10.6
Non-White (%)	29.8	14.5	2.2	78.2	27.3	32.7
Non-Black (%)	87.4	8.2	35.0	99.7	88.0	81.8
State-Level Controls						
Gini index	59.7	4.0	52.6	71.1	59.2	59.8
Poverty (%)	13.4	3.1	5.7	26.4	13.2	14.0
Per capita income	43.6	7.2	25.7	75.7	43.2	43.1
Unemployment (%)	5.8	1.8	2.3	12.6	5.7	6.0
Age 65+ (%)	23.7	1.8	17.3	26.9	23.5	24.1
LN Population density	5.02	1.00	0.06	9.29	4.98	5.22

Table C.14 Coefficients for state-level diversity and other social context variables from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Full-Sample			White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		(9)	
Diversity	-0.15	-0.41	0.00	-0.17	-0.07	0.17	0.44	-1.61		-1.22	
Gini index	0.24	0.27	0.14	0.29	0.60	0.19	-0.75	-1.53	***	-0.35	
% Poverty	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.03	-0.14	-0.30	-0.28	0.09		0.13	
Per capita income	0.15	-0.62	0.38	-0.05	-0.86	0.11	0.56	0.52		1.28	+
% Unemployed	-0.42	-0.58	0.16	-1.06	-0.79	-0.03	2.41	2.66		1.05	
% Age 65+	-0.79	0.32	-0.21	-1.02	0.22	-0.82	1.61	9.57	+	1.29	
LN Population density	10.60 +	33.10	6.25	13.40	-14.30	3.27	11.40	160.10	*	70.60	*
State FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	
State trend		x			x			x			
Region by Year FE			x			x				x	
R-Squared	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.14		0.17	
Observations	18,429	18,429	18,429	13,704	13,704	13,704	2,394	2,394		2,394	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: State coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.15 Coefficients for state-level out-group percentage from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Linear Specification					
	White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Black / % White	-1.78 +	-4.11	-1.26	-0.33	0.42	0.72
% Hispanic	0.61	0.03	0.43	0.97	2.94	0.17
% Non-White / % Non-Black	-0.20	-0.75	-0.38	0.73	7.05 *	1.27
	Quadradic Specification					
	White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Black / % White	-1.30	-5.28	-0.72	-0.37	3.32	1.51
% Black Squared / % White Squared	-0.020	0.07	-0.017	-0.0011	0.110	0.020
% Hispanic	0.12	0.04	0.81	2.20	2.66	1.19
% Hispanic Squared	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.12	-0.03
% Non-White / % Non-Black	-0.19	-0.36	-0.21	2.24	10.10	5.15 *
% Non-White Squared / % Non-Black Squared	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.03	0.08	0.07 *
State FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
State trend		x			x	
Region by Year FE			x			x
Observations	13,704	13,704	13,704	2,394	2,394	2,394

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: State coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.16 Coefficients for state-level segregation and other social context variables from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Full-Sample				White Sub-Sample				Black Sub-Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)		(9)	
Segregation	0.36	-0.79	-0.67	*	0.01	-0.93	-1.03	**	0.52	2.13		-1.26	
Gini index	0.26	0.24	0.08		0.29	0.57	0.09		-0.72	-1.49	***	-0.46	
% Poverty	-0.03	0.00	-0.03		0.00	-0.12	-0.28		-0.16	-0.02		-0.07	
Per capita income	0.00	-0.64	0.47		-0.10	-0.90	0.31		0.53	0.59		1.12	+
% Unemployed	-0.53	-0.65	0.22		-1.10	-0.87	0.06		2.40	2.74		1.42	
% Age 65+	-0.58	0.37	-0.25		-0.99	0.25	-0.90		1.99	9.58	+	1.80	
LN Population density	5.97	25.40	3.96		12.50	-14.90	2.74		8.50	154.20	+	55.00	+
State FE	x	x	x		x	x	x		x	x		x	
Year FE	x	x	x		x	x	x		x	x		x	
State trend		x				x				x			
Region by Year FE			x				x					x	
R-Squared	0.13	0.14	0.14		0.11	0.11	0.12		0.12	0.14		0.17	
Observations	18,429	18,429	18,429		13,704	13,704	13,704		2,394	2,394		2,394	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: State coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.17 Coefficients for state-level diversity and segregation interaction from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust in the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	Full-Sample			White Sub-Sample			Black Sub-Sample		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Diversity x Segregation	-0.03 +	-0.08 *	-0.03 *	-0.05 **	-0.10 *	-0.05 **	-0.03	-0.15 +	-0.06
Diversity	-0.21	-0.10	-0.08	-0.33	0.53	0.07	0.49	-3.43	-1.09
Segregation	-0.34	-2.24	-1.52 **	-1.39 *	-3.49	-2.45 ***	-0.04	2.85	-2.44 +
State FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
State trend		x			x			x	
Region by Year FE			x			x			x
R-Squared	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.17
Observations	18,429	18,429	18,429	13,704	13,704	13,704	2,394	2,394	2,394

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: State coefficients multiplied by 100.

Table C.18 Coefficients for individual measures of prejudice and racial resentment interacted with state diversity, segregation, and % Black from OLS models predicting binary generalized trust for the white subsample of the General Social Survey, 1990-2014

	State and Year FE		State Linear Trend		Region by Year FE	
			Diversity Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	0.008		-0.010		0.015	
Racial resentment	-0.047		-0.048		-0.048	
Prejudice	-0.010		0.002		0.000	
Economic Individualism	-0.011		-0.011		-0.012	
Conservative Political Views	-0.019		-0.022		-0.021	
			Segregation Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	0.067		0.063		0.065	
Racial resentment	0.023		0.022		0.012	
Prejudice	0.150	*	0.160	*	0.140	*
Economic Individualism	0.001		0.001		0.000	
Conservative Political Views	0.001		-0.003		-0.002	
			% Black Interaction			
Conservative Racial Policy	-0.034		-0.034		-0.041	
Racial resentment	-0.056		-0.049		-0.055	
Prejudice	0.220	**	0.200	**	0.210	***
Economic Individualism	-0.026		-0.025		-0.026	
Conservative Political Views	-0.053		-0.058	+	-0.052	

+ 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001

Note: All models include full set of controls and state and year fixed effects.

Table C.19 Data Sources for County Measures

Diversity	SEER Population Estimates (1990-2018)
Segregation	Longitudinal Tract Database (LTDB). I used the LTDB to harmonize census tracts to the 2010 boundaries. Population estimates for each racial group for 1990, 2000, and 2010 were from the LTDB-provided files. Five-year 2018 ACS data were imported separately from Social Explorer. The 2018 data already used the 2010 tract boundaries.
White (%) Black (%) Hispanic (%) Non-White (%) Non-Black (%)	SEER Population Estimates (1990-2018)
Gini index[1]	Census Historical Income Tables for 1990 and 2000 (Table C5) and 5-Year American Community Survey for 2010 and 2018
Poverty (%)[2]	Census Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE)
Per capita income	U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Table CAINC1)
Unemployment (%)	U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Age 65+ (%)	SEER Population Estimates (1990-2018)
LN Population density	Population from SEER Population Estimates (1990-2018) and area in square miles from 1990, 2000, and 2010 Censuses

[1] Gini index was interpolated between years.
[2] Missing poverty data for 1994 was filled in using linear interpolation based on 1993 and 1995 poverty rates.

Table C.20 Wording for General Social Survey questions about racial attitudes and political conservatism

Conservative Racial Policy Attitudes

1. "Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion? are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" [1 (strongly support),2 (support), 3 (oppose), and 4 (strongly oppose)]
2. "Some people think that African Americans have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to African Americans. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?" [1 (government should help) to 5 (no special treatment)]
3. "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I am going to name some of these problems, and for each one I would like you to tell me whether you think we are spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving the conditions of blacks?" [1 (too little), 2 (about the right amount), and 3 (too much)]

Racial Resentment

1. "On average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are: (1) Mainly due to discrimination?" [1 = yes, 2 = no]
2. "Because most blacks just do not have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty?" [1 = no, 2 = yes]
3. "Do you strongly agree, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement? Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors." [1 = disagree strongly, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree somewhat, 5 = strongly agree]

Prejudice

1. "Now I have some questions about different groups in our society. I am going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first statement a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be hardworking. A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group tends to be lazy. A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not toward one end or another, and of course you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand. Where would you rate [blacks/whites] in general on this scale?"
2. Do people in these groups tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent? Where would you rate [blacks/whites] in general on this scale?"
   Note: Intelligent score was reverse coded so 1 is intelligent and 7 is unintelligent. I then subtracted the white ratings from the black ratings and summed across the two questions.

Economic Individualism

1. "Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?" [Government should do more (coded 1) to agree with both (coded 3) to government is doing too much (coded 5)]
2. "Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale?"
3. "Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences.

Conservative Political Views

1. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I am going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative-point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" [(1) extremely liberal, (2) liberal, (3) slightly liberal, (4) moderate, middle of the road, (5) slightly conservative, (6) conservative, (7) extremely conservative].

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