

Ideological Sabotage, Party Competition, and the Decline in Legislative Capacity in the US House

Supplemental Information

Contents

Appendix A: MRA Data	1
Appendix B: Staff Salary Coding	3
Appendix C: Alternative Model Specifications	8
Appendix D: Extra Figures	9
Appendix E: Staff Spending and Office Experience	12
Appendix F: Models of Spending by staffer type	14
Appendix G: Former member of Congress and Senior Staff Interviews Procedures	20

Appendix A: MRA Data

MRA data was gathered from year-end Statements of Disbursements of the House compiled by the chief administrative officer of the house and published by the Government Printing Office. These records were digitized using optical character recognition (OCR).




Fig A1: Detecting outlier MRAs

We adopted a simple procedure to detect outliers in the OCRed MRA data. We fit a simple mixed effects model of total MRA allocations using congress fixed effects and district level random effects. Any district*year entry with a residual from this model of more than 200,000 was classified as an outlier, replaced with missing, and replaced with an imputed value.

Missing MRA values for district*year entries (including removed outliers) were imputed using the R

package Amelia. Because we intended to use MRAs as a denominator to construct our primary dependent variable *Share of MRA Spend on Legislative Staff*, we needed MRA values for our full time-series from 1994-2013. MRAs, however, were not used in the house until 1996, so we backwards projected MRA values by including 1994 and 1995 in the imputation model.

We used a year level time series imputation model cross-sectionally indexed by district, and included estimated total staff spending as well as both leading and lagging variables for MRA totals and estimated total staff spending. We used third order polynomial effects to account for time. The imputed values used are the mean values of 100 imputations.

The results of the outlier imputation are shown in Figure A2.




Fig A2: Imputed values for MRA outlier values

Appendix B: Staff Salary Coding

As noted throughout, our analyses rely upon a large dataset of staffer responsibility classifications. To develop these classifications, we employ a hybrid human- and machine-based coding algorithm. According to this protocol, certain job titles receive automatic coding decisions, which are assigned via a simple algorithm in Python. However, for more ambiguous job titles, research assistants investigated the staffer's responsibilities for the specified year and quarter in greater detail. This additional investigation involved searching for staffers in quarterly volumes of the *Congressional Yellow Books*,¹ where factors such as the staffer's office location (Washington versus the district), policy portfolio (if one exists), and (occasionally) more descriptive job titles are listed. This information was incorporated systematically into the assistants' coding decisions, as delineated in the coding protocol. We include a facsimile of that coding protocol below.

While some studies have opted to fully automate similar coding decisions, such automation is highly likely to encourage both measurement error and systematic bias. Careful human coding can capture cross-sectional differences and over-time changes in naming conventions and more accurately report staffers' responsibilities. Therefore, this study opts for a hybrid approach that harnesses the efficiency gains of automated coding without forfeiting the nuance provided by human coding.

Several design features of our protocol merit further discussion. Before providing such discussion, however, it is important to reiterate that our codes are meant to correspond with a staffer's *primary* office responsibilities. For example, if a Chief of Staff has legislative issues associated with her *Yellow Book* entry, we assume that a larger portion of her time is occupied by legislative matters than a Chief of Staff presenting no associated legislative issues. This is not to say that such a staffer does nothing but legislative work; rather, it is designed to capture the differences in Chief of Staff duties that is apparent between offices. Chiefs of Staff are particularly important, because they occupy a significant portion of a member's MRA. Other titles are

¹See <https://www.leadershipdirectories.com/Products/LeadershipinPrint/Government/CongressionalYellowBook> for more information.

less consequential, but our process nevertheless treats them with equal care. Interns, for example, are known to perform multiple functions for the office, even though many focus primarily on answering phone calls or giving tours. As such, we instruct our coders to make certain that interns are not listed in the *Yellow Book*, before rendering their coding decision. In some cases, a staffer will exhibit conflicting responsibilities, and no single responsibility category appears to predominate. In this case, after careful consultation with the principal investigator, the coder would split the staffer's salary equally between the conflicting responsibility codes.

Another crucial feature of the coding process is that it is designed to minimize under-estimation of legislative investment. As the protocol indicates, any code may be overridden by the presence of legislative responsibilities within the *Yellow Book*. In practice, research assistants even assured that the "automatic" codes were not underestimating legislative responsibility (although it was exceedingly rare that a Caseworker exhibited legitimate legislative responsibilities). Thus, the protocol as written establishes a baseline procedure that helps coders navigate new or somewhat unique cases, ensuring that member offices are credited with the fullest possible measure of legislative investment. Constituency service is handled similarly. For years in which such information is available, presence in the district moves a staffer into the "Constituency Service" responsibility code, unless they exhibit legislative responsibility.

This coding procedure therefore renders the "Legislative", "Constituency Service," and "Communications" codes as the most precise coding categories available in the dataset. Each such code is associated with an informative, concrete coding rule, bolstered by qualitative evidence of the underlying responsibilities associated with that code. By contrast, "Political Management" and "Office Management" serve as residual categories. While the combination of salary information, absence of legislative responsibilities, and presence in Washington suggest that such staff are not legislative or constituency service, for example, we cannot be certain that staff coded as political managers are executing exactly the responsibilities associated with that

coding category. Nevertheless, our coding scheme ensures that such members are not conflated with legislative staff (who have clearly delineated legislative responsibilities). It also ensures that we are not treating all residual codes similarly, based on pay. Still, users of these data should use these categories with caution, understanding that their presence serves primarily to ensure the accuracy of the legislative, constituency service, and communications investment measures.

In sum, the coding procedure provides a coherent framework for consistently and carefully coding staffer responsibilities. Additional information may be found at [URL redacted for review].

PROTOCOL FOR STAFFER CLASSIFICATION

2016 “Congress and Its Experts” Research Lab

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STEP 1 – CLEANING THE DATA

1. We need these spreadsheets to be basically identical to those made by the RAs collecting the 90s data. Thus you’ll need to do a couple of data-cleaning things.
2. First, clean the member’s name. Instead of their full name, I want the member name to be the *last name only*. Fix it as such. Also, if it is not in all caps (it already should be), please change it accordingly.
3. Next, you’re going to need to fill in the district name, since the data doesn’t have it in the format I want it in. To do this, **wait until after you are at step 5**. Then, once you are in the Yellowbook, you can go ahead and fill in the district number.
 - a. The format I would like is “STATEABBR#”—no spaces. In other words, California’s 10th congressional district would be: CA10.

STEP 1 – CLASSIFICATION: THE EASY CASES

1. For all “easy cases,” I want you to *leave the classification section blank*. I will fill those in with a computer program, which will save you some time in the long-run.
2. A case is “easy” if the job title:
 - a. Contains the letters “legis”
 - b. Contains the letters “constit”
 - c. Contains the letters “casework”
 - d. Contains the letters “district”
 - e. Contains the letters “communic”
 - f. Contains the letters “press”

STEP 2 – THE KINDA EASY CASES

1. There are a couple of “kinda easy” cases that are not as easy to automate with a computer program. So, instead of automating these, I am going to have you enter them.
2. For this, you’ll need to know that category codes. Here they are:
 - a. **Legislative staff = 1**
 - b. **Political management = 2**
 - c. **Communications = 3**
 - d. **Office management = 4**
 - e. **Constituency service = 5**
3. If a title reads “**field representative**,” you can mark this as constituency service.
4. If a title reads “**systems administrator**,” you can mark this as office management.
5. If a title reads “**grants coordinator**,” you can mark this as constituency service.
6. If a title reads “**intern**” or “**paid intern**,” you can mark this as constituency service.

SUMMARY: Step 3 Classifications	
<i>Title</i>	<i>Classification</i>
Systems Administrator	Office management
Field Representative	Constituency service

Grants Coordinator	Constituency service
Intern	Constituency service

STEP 4 – THE HARD CASES

1. If the title does not fall into any of the categories in Step 2 or Step 3, then it is a “hard case.”
2. For all hard cases, please write “unc” into the classification cell and then highlight the cell **blue**.
3. Once you have a decent number of blue cells, turn to the corresponding edition of the *Congressional Yellowbooks*.
4. For each unclear case, look up the name of your staffer. Based on the information you see in the entry, you may be able to make a classification decision.
5. First and foremost, if the staffer has *legislative issues* listed under the name somewhere, **classify them as legislative staff**.
6. If there are not legislative issues, it gets a little complicated:
 - a. If the person is a chief of staff or deputy chief of staff, mark them as *political management*.
 - b. If the person is an administrative, staff, or executive assistant and is **paid more than \$10,000**, mark them as *political management*.
 - i. Similarly, if they are **paid less than \$10,000**, mark them as *office management*.
 - c. If the person is a shared employee, mark them as *political management*.
 - d. If the person is marked as counsel, mark them as *political management*.
 - e. If the person is marked as an office manager, mark them as *office management*.
 - f. If the person is marked as a special projects coordinator, mark them as *constituency service*.
 - g. If the person’s title references veterans or veteran services, mark them as *constituency service*.

SUMMARY: Step 4 Classifications – (assuming no legislative responsibility)	
<i>Title</i>	<i>Classification</i>
Chief of Staff / Deputy Chief of Staff	Political management
Administrative/Staff/Executive Assistant – over \$10k	Political management
Administrative/Staff/Executive Assistant – under \$10k	Office management
Shared Employee	Political management
Counsel	Political management
Office Manager	Office management
Special Projects Coordinator	Constituency service
<i>Includes veterans or veteran services</i>	Constituency service

* \$10,000 refers to a staffer’s *quarterly* earnings, not yearly.

** Shared employees and part-time staff are removed from this analysis, so their associated coding procedures do not affect the results presented in the paper.

Appendix C: Alternative Model Specifications

Majority Control and Legislative Investment

	Percentage of MRA Spent on Legislative Staff						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Elected Post-Contract</i>	-0.201*** (0.045)	-0.206*** (0.063)			-0.051** (0.024)		
<i>Year of Election</i>			-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.005)		-0.034* (0.018)	
<i>Majority</i>	0.060 (0.038)	0.055 (0.040)	0.055* (0.031)	-3.956 (7.215)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.002 (0.003)
<i>Post 1994 * Majority</i>		0.008 (0.051)					
<i>Year of Election * Majority</i>				0.002 (0.004)			
<i>Congress</i>							-0.010*** (0.002)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.029** (0.012)	0.029** (0.013)	0.016 (0.019)	0.015 (0.019)	0.047*** (0.006)	-0.015 (0.037)	0.007*** (0.003)
<i>Seniority²</i>	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.0003)	-0.003*** (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	-0.220*** (0.061)	-0.217*** (0.069)	-0.249*** (0.067)	-0.231*** (0.061)	-0.239*** (0.039)	-0.241*** (0.039)	-0.026*** (0.007)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>	-0.072** (0.037)	-0.071* (0.037)	-0.068* (0.041)	-0.060* (0.032)	-0.062*** (0.022)	-0.059*** (0.022)	-0.005 (0.004)
<i>Power Committee</i>	-0.042 (0.029)	-0.042 (0.036)	-0.054* (0.032)	-0.053 (0.034)	-0.048*** (0.018)	-0.050*** (0.018)	0.002 (0.006)
<i>Extremism</i>	-0.233*** (0.057)	-0.235*** (0.065)	-0.113*** (0.042)	-0.121*** (0.036)	-0.129*** (0.041)	-0.129*** (0.041)	-0.024 (0.023)
<i>Female</i>	-0.053*** (0.020)	-0.053** (0.022)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.026 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	
<i>Vote Share</i>	0.027*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.005*** (0.001)
<i>Vote Share²</i>	-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.0002*** (0.00004)	-0.00003*** (0.00001)
104th Congress					0.199*** (0.032)	0.259*** (0.048)	
105th Congress					0.142*** (0.033)	0.263*** (0.080)	
106th Congress					0.047 (0.034)	0.230** (0.114)	
107th Congress					0.110*** (0.035)	0.356** (0.150)	
108th Congress					0.130*** (0.036)	0.440** (0.186)	
110th Congress					-0.138*** (0.038)	0.302 (0.258)	
111th Congress					-0.117*** (0.038)	0.391 (0.295)	
112th Congress					-0.117*** (0.039)	0.457 (0.332)	
113th Congress					-0.267*** (0.040)	0.371 (0.367)	
Constant	-1.949*** (0.307)	-1.947*** (0.294)	36.911*** (10.415)	39.081*** (9.362)	-2.062*** (0.189)	65.870* (36.543)	0.770*** (0.208)
Observations	4,256	4,256	4,256	4,256	4,256	4,256	4,256
Member-Level FE?	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
R ²	0.066	0.066	0.095	0.095	0.118	0.118	0.554
Log Likelihood	4,313.237	4,313.272	4,392.532	4,393.361	4,458.096	4,457.791	

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Appendix D: Extra Figures




Fig A3: Average number of committee staff by type across all committees except for Appropriations.




Fig A4: The Rise of Leadership Staff in House Committees, reproduced from Lee (2016, Figure 5-2, 114)




Fig A5: Percent of staffer cap used and percent of those on average located in D.C. Data from Brookings Vital Statistics, tables 3.2 and 5.3 (<https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/>)

Appendix E: Staff Spending and Office Experience

To be clear, legislative divestment in Congress is crucially linked to members' unwillingness to dedicate MRA funds to the hiring of legislative staff. However, our interest in such spending derives not just from the decline in the *number* of legislative staff in Congress, but from the decline in experience and quality of those staff. Indeed, deinstitutionalization has led members, lobbyists, and other political elites to complain that present-day legislative lack the experience and skills necessary to "actually legislate."

Given the importance of staff experience to our account of deinstitutionalization, we confirm below that the percentage of a member's MRA dedicated to legislative staff is in fact correlated with the cumulative congressional experience of a member's staff.

As summarized in the table, spending on legislative staff appears able to help members retain more experienced staff, even when controlling for factors like member security and committee position, which themselves help members to attract more senior staff. This appears to be the case even when controlling for key factors like legislator seniority.

Table 1

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Total Staff Experience in Office	
	(1)	(2)
<i>Spending on Legislative Staff / 10,000</i>	0.002*** (0.0005)	0.002** (0.0006)
<i>Seniority</i>	1.991*** (0.002)	1.988*** (0.002)
<i>Extremism</i>		-0.032 (0.022)
<i>Committee Chair</i>		0.047*** (0.013)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>		0.037** (0.018)
<i>Power Committee</i>		0.046* (0.024)
<i>Female</i>		-0.014* (0.008)
<i>Vote Percentage</i>		-0.007** (0.003)
<i>Vote Percentage²</i>		0.00004** (0.00002)
<i>Democrat</i>		-0.004 (0.008)
Constant	-0.096 (0.449)	0.233 (0.455)
Observations	4,338	4,256
Congress-Level FE?	Y	Y
R ²	0.998	0.998
Adjusted R ²	0.998	0.998
Residual Std. Error	0.397 (df = 4326)	0.391 (df = 4236)
<i>Note:</i>	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01	

Appendix F: Models of Spending by staffer type

The main results presented in this paper demonstrate a systematic divestment from legislative staff by members of both parties following the Contract with America. We argue that divestment from legislative staff is driven by the centralization of policymaking in leadership offices, and the way that insecure majorities have refocused members toward activities with more immediate electoral benefits. If the theory we put forward to explain legislative staff divestment suggests we should see different results for non-legislative staffers. In order to test whether the divestment in legislative staff is a part of a secular decline in spending on staffing over the our period of observation, we estimate our core models on each type staffers according to our categorization scheme.

In particular, we should not observe the same types of declines among staffers with more directly representational duties: constituent services staff, and communications staff.

If the theory we put forward is correct, we should not observe statistically significant negative effects on the share of the MRAs that members allocate toward constituent service staff or communications staff for either the pre/post Contract with America dummy variable or the scalar year first elected variable. In table 2 we test our core models on a dependent variable that measures the share of MRAs members allocate toward constituent service staff.

We find a positive association of marginal significance between whether members were elected after the Contract with America and the share of their MRA allocated towards constituent service staff. We find similar positive but not significant results for the year members were first elected to congress. Together, these results suggest that the Members have not faced a similar incentive to divest from constituent service staff, which is consistent with our theory.

Table 5 shows results of the same models estimated on the share of MRAs that members allocate towards communications staff. Here we see strongly positive associations between being first elected after the Contract with America and spending a larger share of their resources on communications staff. These results hold true in models where the primary independent variable of interest is the year members were first elected to Congress as well.

Together, these results show that members have not divested from communications and constituent service staff over time as they have with legislative staffers. In fact, members have increased the share of resources at their disposal which they devote to staff charged with representational duties. This is consistent with our theoretical expectations.

When we estimate these same models on political management staff, we see statistically distinguishable increases in the allocation of staffing resources towards political management staff (e.g. Executive Assistant, Chief of Staff, Counsel) among more recently elected Members and among those elected after the Contract with America. This, too, fits with our expectations regarding the the allocation of staffers away from legislative activities and towards those with more direct potential to impact their electoral fortunes.

On the other hand, we see markedly lower investment in office management staffing (e.g. Staff Assistant, Finance Manager, Personal Assistant, and Receptionist) among Members of Congress first elected in more recent Congresses. This is unsurprising, given that our period of observation includes the rise of information communications technology in administrative duties across government and business settings. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics total employment in from 22.5 million in 1999 to 21.4 million in 2013, despite the fact the overall labor force grew from 127.3 million to 132.6 million in the same period.

The results we have presented in this appendix reveal heterogeneous trends in staff resource allocation across types. More recently elected Members devote a constant or increasing share of their available resources to constituent service, communications and political management staffers, while provisioning a shrinking allotment for legislative and office management staffers. This heterogeneity across staff types demonstrates

Table 2: Testing core models on constituent service staff

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Percent of MRA allocated to constituent service staff			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Elected Post-Contract</i>	0.108 (0.068)	0.089* (0.047)		
<i>Year Elected</i>			0.009 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.036** (0.018)	0.036** (0.017)	0.041 (0.027)	0.037 (0.028)
<i>Seniority</i> ²	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	-0.116 (0.086)	-0.120 (0.086)	-0.101 (0.065)	-0.125 (0.087)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>	-0.010 (0.064)	-0.012 (0.061)	-0.014 (0.059)	-0.010 (0.054)
<i>Power Committee</i>	0.011 (0.021)	0.011 (0.020)	0.015 (0.020)	0.021 (0.022)
<i>Extremism</i>	-0.271*** (0.066)	-0.256*** (0.071)	-0.326*** (0.047)	-0.212*** (0.053)
<i>Female</i>	-0.057* (0.032)	-0.059** (0.026)	-0.065*** (0.021)	-0.080*** (0.020)
<i>Vote Share</i>	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.009)	0.0002 (0.009)
<i>Vote Share</i> ²	0.00002 (0.0001)	0.00002 (0.00005)	0.00002 (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.012 (0.032)	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.020 (0.035)	-19.503** (9.088)
<i>Elected Post-Contract:Democrat</i>		0.036 (0.049)		
<i>Year Elected:Democrat</i>				0.010** (0.005)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.208*** (0.263)	-1.193*** (0.250)	-19.132 (23.197)	-7.204 (23.012)
N	4256	4256	4256	4256
R-squared	0.023	0.023	0.027	0.031
Log Likelihood	3249.422	3249.872	3258.477	3271.736

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Table 3: Testing core models on communications staff

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Percent of MRA allocated to communications staff			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Elected Post-Contract</i>	0.358*** (0.083)	0.251*** (0.081)		
<i>Year Elected</i>			0.029*** (0.008)	0.023*** (0.007)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.014 (0.017)	0.015 (0.018)	0.032 (0.024)	0.029 (0.022)
<i>Seniority</i> ²	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	-0.306*** (0.075)	-0.327*** (0.071)	-0.265*** (0.063)	-0.294*** (0.059)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>	0.038 (0.058)	0.025 (0.053)	0.031 (0.052)	0.028 (0.048)
<i>Power Committee</i>	0.144*** (0.031)	0.146*** (0.032)	0.157*** (0.029)	0.157*** (0.028)
<i>Extremism</i>	0.163** (0.078)	0.242*** (0.090)	-0.011 (0.035)	0.117*** (0.034)
<i>Female</i>	0.018 (0.031)	0.013 (0.032)	0.008 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.026)
<i>Vote Share</i>	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.014)
<i>Vote Share</i> ²	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.170*** (0.053)	-0.091** (0.038)	-21.806*** (4.812)
<i>Elected Post-Contract:Democrat</i>		0.205*** (0.070)		
<i>Year Elected:Democrat</i>				0.011*** (0.002)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.783*** (0.414)	-2.730*** (0.430)	-60.500*** (15.971)	-47.773*** (14.315)
N	4256	4256	4256	4256
R-squared	0.042	0.044	0.056	0.059
Log Likelihood	8444.411	8451.737	8488.140	8496.567

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Table 4: Testing core models on political management staff

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Percent of MRA allocated to political management staff			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Elected Post-Contract</i>	0.287*** (0.056)	0.256*** (0.064)		
<i>Year Elected</i>			0.011 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)
<i>Seniority</i>	0.019 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	0.011 (0.018)	0.011 (0.021)
<i>Seniority</i> ²	0.0001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	0.086 (0.072)	0.082 (0.073)	0.100 (0.064)	0.101 (0.065)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>	-0.045 (0.065)	-0.048 (0.074)	-0.061 (0.062)	-0.061 (0.062)
<i>Power Committee</i>	-0.239*** (0.057)	-0.238*** (0.061)	-0.241*** (0.056)	-0.241*** (0.058)
<i>Extremism</i>	0.158 (0.127)	0.181 (0.163)	0.154* (0.093)	0.144 (0.094)
<i>Female</i>	0.039 (0.050)	0.036 (0.051)	0.038 (0.047)	0.039 (0.043)
<i>Vote Share</i>	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.015)
<i>Vote Share</i> ²	-0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.179*** (0.047)	-0.206*** (0.050)	-0.193*** (0.040)	1.684 (7.634)
<i>Elected Post-Contract:Democrat</i>		0.059 (0.055)		
<i>Year Elected:Democrat</i>				-0.001 (0.004)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.024*** (0.460)	-2.003*** (0.485)	-23.820 (21.208)	-24.859 (21.639)
N	4256	4256	4256	4256
R-squared	0.033	0.033	0.026	0.026
Log Likelihood	4702.858	4703.412	4678.081	4678.135

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

Table 5: Testing core models on office management staff

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Percent of MRA allocated to office management staff			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Elected Post-Contract</i>	-0.772*** (0.126)	-0.658*** (0.102)		
<i>Year Elected</i>			-0.082*** (0.010)	-0.082*** (0.011)
<i>Seniority</i>	-0.074*** (0.022)	-0.073*** (0.024)	-0.134*** (0.025)	-0.133*** (0.024)
<i>Seniority</i> ²	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
<i>Committee Chair</i>	0.088 (0.078)	0.108 (0.069)	0.002 (0.064)	0.004 (0.069)
<i>Subcommittee Chair</i>	-0.099 (0.095)	-0.084 (0.086)	-0.053 (0.055)	-0.054 (0.066)
<i>Power Committee</i>	-0.0004 (0.035)	-0.005 (0.035)	-0.040 (0.026)	-0.040 (0.026)
<i>Extremism</i>	-0.450*** (0.063)	-0.541*** (0.073)	0.057 (0.076)	0.047 (0.066)
<i>Female</i>	0.036 (0.036)	0.043 (0.030)	0.116*** (0.034)	0.117*** (0.029)
<i>Vote Share</i>	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.018)
<i>Vote Share</i> ²	0.00004 (0.0002)	0.00003 (0.0002)	0.00000 (0.0001)	0.00000 (0.0001)
<i>Democrat</i>	-0.091 (0.063)	-0.003 (0.061)	0.006 (0.034)	2.194 (8.027)
<i>Elected Post-Contract:Democrat</i>		-0.221*** (0.082)		
<i>Year Elected:Democrat</i>				-0.001 (0.004)
Constant	-0.871 (0.939)	-0.941 (0.866)	162.662*** (21.044)	161.349*** (23.025)
N	4256	4256	4256	4256
R-squared	0.127	0.130	0.265	0.265
Log Likelihood	5539.948	5549.206	6050.090	6050.188

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1

that the decline in legislative staffing we have analyzed in this paper is not simply part of a consistent secular decline in resources allocated towards staffing.

Appendix G: Former member of Congress and Senior Staff Interviews Procedures

Purpose

The interviews were meant to investigate senior staffers' and former members' perspectives on legislative office management and operations, including career backgrounds and expertise, perspectives on personnel knowledge, skills, and abilities, and views on institutional and professional goals. The objectives were to collect original narratives on opportunities and challenges of working in a characteristically polarized Congress and to probe interviewees for qualitative data to prioritize the more systematic and objective data collection in the subsequent survey stage of the study.

Interviewee Selection and Recruitment

The research team constructed a sampling frame from an institutional subscription to a legislative staff contact list distributed by LegiStorm, LLC. An initial list of senior staff in House and Senate member offices with job titles of Chief of Staff Administrative Assistant (if no Chief of Staff was listed), and Legislative Director, Communications Director were compiled. A second list of senior staff with job titles Staff Director in all permanent chamber and joint legislative committees and subcommittees were compiled. Staff were directly contacted with a request for in-person meetings in Washington offices, with an intention to vary interviewees by chamber, office type, party, gender, ethnicity, and the home state or district of the principal member and chair or ranking member. The selection was not intended to be random, but instead focused on those most willing to share their valuable time. In addition, we asked several interviewees to identify former members of Congress and staff colleagues no longer working in Congress who may be willing to share their hindsight perspectives after having worked in Congress. When explicitly permitted, interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and anonymized. In roughly a dozen cases, transcripts were likely to reveal the interviewee's identity were not made available to the research community outside than the five co-principal investigators approved by institutional review board protocols [IRB protocol redacted to maintain author anonymity]

Semi-structured Interview Protocol

In general, interviews were semi-structured to balance several competing goals, including establishing rapport by allowing respondents to take the conversation in the direction they felt most comfortable, to maximize the amount of novel, idiosyncratic information not otherwise available from existing sources, and to uncover information that the research team could not possibly conjecture *ex ante* (Leech 2002). The interviews varied in practice, but were intended to ask variations of the following questions:

1. Can you tell me about your background?

PROBING QUESTIONS:

- How did you end up in this position? What has been your career trajectory?
- When did you start thinking about Congress as career?
- Did you originally work on the campaign side, or did you do more policy work?

2. What skills and characteristics do people need to be effective in a position like yours?

PROBING QUESTIONS:

- If pay/hours were adequate, would you want to spend your whole career on the Hill?
- If your boss was not returning after the next election (for whatever reason), would you seek another job on the Hill?
- Do you think you'll still be working on the Hill in 5 years?
- Has this job met your expectations?
- What are things you like most about your job? Least?

3. What is more important, specific policy expertise or a deep understanding of how things really work on Capitol Hill?

PROBING QUESTIONS:

- Do you prefer working on policy details or on winning elections?
- IF “BOTH” - In what context is one more important than the other?

4. Some people say there are three types of members – partisan, policy, and constituent service. What kind of office do you think you have?

PROBING QUESTIONS:

- Do you think this is valid? If so, where does your office fit? If not, is there a better typology?
- What is your office most known for on Capitol Hill? [IF “constituency service,” then: what is it most known for inside Washington?]

5. What goals are most important to your member?

- [IF GENERAL OR VAGUE, seek specifics on party/reelection and policy expertise]

6. [WRAP-UP] Are there any questions that I have not asked that you think are important for me to understand how Congress manages its legislative work?

Generally, interview times typically ranged between 30-45 minutes, with some conversations lasting 90 minutes or more.