Discursive Approaches to Gentrification Studies: Excavating the Market-Led Paradigm

by

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Abstract

Gentrification is a contentious topic both theoretically and politically. A subset of urbanization, gentrification displaces existing residents as wealthier residents and developers move into an area and invest in local housing, commerce, and public infrastructure. Some view gentrification as a savior for disinvested urban areas while others challenge that it is inequitable and destroys urban communities. Both sides generally understand gentrification as an economic phenomenon and acknowledge that few mechanisms exist to offset its negative externalities. This dissertation challenges both of those assumptions.

In this dissertation, I examine the academic genealogy of gentrification and its contemporary understanding in public discourse. The objective of this study is to understand how our current academic interpretation of gentrification was formed and to understand how that differs from a public understanding of the process. To this end, the dissertation uses a suite of discursive methods to examine the language of gentrification used by both academics and public actors like developers, city officials, and residents. Those methods are textual analysis, actor-network theory, and discursive frame analysis applied to a case study. Adopting this suite of approaches allows for the excavating of the initial meaning of gentrification and its transformation through academic debate. These methods also allow for the interrogation of academia's current logjam of research that may not adequately explicate the complexities of gentrification as it occurs in American cities and abroad.

I show that Ruth Glass's early observation of gentrification in London was a byproduct of unique historic preconditions and changes in technology, demographics, and administrative

policies. In the 1980s and 1990s, influential scholars overlooked these spatiotemporal contextual causes as they renegotiated the cause of gentrification and, thus, its meaning. I show that a new gentrification resulted from those negotiations, one defined as a market-led process with universal application. This interpretation continues to dominate gentrification studies today. My case study centered on a rezoning application for a redevelopment project in Austin, Texas shows that this market-led paradigm fails to capture how different groups understand the causes and scale of gentrification today. Relying on the tripartite contextual framework from the second chapter, I demonstrate that gentrification is fundamentally state-mediated. Further, gentrification is not equal to the materialization of development.

Future research on gentrification should take care to understand local histories and contextual causes. This, coupled with empirical analysis focused on effects, will help close the gap between theoretical significance and political significance in a way that is policy relevant. Future research should also break from the market-led paradigm that dominates gentrification studies, instead focusing on the role of the state in creating the preconditions necessary for gentrification to occur. Understanding the role of the state is key to mitigating the negative effects of gentrification.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Ruth Glass coined "gentrification" in a 1964 essay describing a changing, post-War London. The word only appears once in that essay. Scholars typically cite the paragraph in which it appears and nothing else. This narrow citing of her nuanced description of London obscures her point. The totality of her essay suggests that gentrification, as she saw it, was the social, political, and economic change that manifests visibly in the built environment; it is aided by the machinery of government, especially town planning. This is missed in most future work on gentrification. Her broad description is a valuable way to understand gentrification as it is actually happening and being experienced, and as a way to make sense of debates and conversations on the topic. Perhaps the most visible debate is that between geographers Neil Smith and David Ley. In their rues over the cause of gentrification, they turned the concept into an intellectual battleground that conflated cause with concept. While those exchanges remain foundational, they divorced the experience of gentrification from the academic concept. As a result, gentrification became a narrower concept defined by its cause: the free market. This development discouraged other valuable lines of academic inquiry from occurring. Further, by reducing gentrification to a market-led phenomenon, their debates prevented mitigating policy work from being done; urban planning has limited agency to interfere with the market. We see this come to fruition in the Austin. While redevelopment in Austin is the result of 20 plus years of administrative changes and social restructuring, redevelopment is viewed as an explicitly local phenomena governed by the free market. Market-based thinking leaves the city helpless to intervene on behalf of concerned residents, and it prevents effective organizing strategies to ameliorate the effects of gentrification by mistiming and mislocating when and where gentrification is actually happening.

The legacies and failure of the market-led approach are lost in current research. Instead, anyone who studies gentrification with even a cursory interest is sure to uncover a frustrating curiosity. On one hand, there is an extraordinary range of scholarship pertaining to and contained within gentrification theory. The methods for studying and identifying gentrification are diverse, drawing inspiration from a suite of techniques across many disciplines. No longer contained to London and New York, case studies examine the causes and effects of gentrification on six of the seven continents. It is also a common topic in the public, presumably entering the lexicon of most contemporary urban dwellers. On the other hand, gentrification scholars have been unable to make sense of this knowledge in a way that is grounded and representative of the many instances of gentrification that exist. Despite the astonishing breadth of research, or perhaps because of it, gentrification scholars remain comfortably within their siloed debates, often detached from lived experience. A few deft scholars have found success integrating two or three strands of the literature (e.g., Ghertner, 2015 on broader gentrification theory and international case studies). Of the broadest attempts to move across conversations, the result resembles little more than an ungrounded literature review. The concept aims for universality, but is too diffuse to be useful in any one specific place.

This diffuseness is not an inherently bad quality. It is the failure to ground the diffusion in actual experience which is a problem. To study gentrification is to be confused. Academics volley back-and-forth, capturing different nuances of urban change in heavy-handed assaults on prior work. Each of these takes is valid. However, they fall under the same umbrella, edging each other out into the rain. The intellectual space of gentrification is finite. Neil Smith's rent gap theory (1979) is compatible with David Ley's new middle class (1994), but you would not guess that from reading their acerbic exchanges. This confusion is complicated by the concept's uptake in public,[1] becoming a slogan of the left burdened with resisting most, if not all, urban redevelopment. Among activists, gentrification is a destroyer of the working-class community. In public policy, gentrification may be presented as a solution for neighborhood decline, a symbol of improvement, or a code-word for colonization. These meanings muddy one another as the word further entrenches as a simplism for a range of very different, or dialectical, phenomena. It presents as a myth—a black box—one that is perhaps natural, and certainly ahistorical in that it hides the spatial history that makes gentrification "here and now" possible. It erases violent spatial restructuring and simplifies what is otherwise a complex series of human (inter)actions.

Gentrification is a middle-range theory—a bridge between deviant empirical observation and abstract theory—stuck in the position of grand theorizing. Like any middle-range theory, gentrification research aims to consolidate existing theories of development through empirical analysis. More than that, it aims to be a theory of deviant or niche behavior rather than a total conceptual structure (Merton, 1968, p. 51). But gentrification is continually saddled with the quixotic burden of abstraction. There is no universal theory of gentrification.

Part of the problem is that the phenomenon of gentrification is conflated with its causes and consequences. Causes and consequences are often used to bound or qualify change as gentrification, as I do in the primer (page 7) by bounding gentrification with consequential displacement. The difficulty comes when cause and consequence are conflated and falsely taken to be universal. This alienates otherwise valid work by appealing to some nonexistent purity.

[1] A separate Latent Dirichlet analysis I conducted on newspapers suggests the most significant uptick in public use occurred just after the 2007–2008 foreclosure crisis.

Instead of having a fruitful conversation about the different gentrifications, we have multiple parallel conversations about one gentrification. To an academic outsider like me, none of it makes any sense.

Planning is full of words like this, rife with ambiguity, complexity, and confusion. Think of "city", a vague, spatially-bounded container for municipal action; "public-private partnership" and its clouded implications for accountability and justice; or "neoliberalism"—already the subject of countless manuscripts (see Hackworth, 2007; Harvey, 2007; Peck, 2013). Gentrification is singled out here because of its ubiquity, popularity, and polemical nature in both academic and public discourse. The word is frequently called to action with regards to new developments and infrastructure updates (e.g., bike lanes). In the public, it is commonly politicized to support anti-change agendas; change here referring to economic development and revitalization.[2] In academic discourse, it is a "big Leviathan" (Callon & Latour, 1981) used to understand spatiotemporal urban restructuring even though spatial and temporal restructuring is not directly comparable across place and time respectively. In both cases, the meaning of gentrification is diffuse and there is a dearth of analysis (or even acknowledgment) aimed at this glaring conflict. We are studying, or arguing, or experiencing different phenomena that we all label as gentrification.

To make way towards this broader and more nuanced understanding of gentrification as an academic concept, I use a series of discursive approaches. The intellectual history in Chapter 2 revisits Ruth Glass's 1964 essay where the term originated. What stimuli catalyzed her defining of gentrification? An actor-network method used in Chapter 3 untangles the egoistic debates over the cause of gentrification that followed in the 1980s and 1990s. How did

2 Pro-change groups (developers and the state) often avoid the word due to its negative stigma.

gentrification become a key urban concept in academia? A final case study, Chapter 4, focused on anti-gentrification activism around an ongoing redevelopment project in Austin's East Riverside neighborhood develops the concept of discursive frames to understand stakeholder perception of urban conflict. How is gentrification understood by different urban actor-groups?

The Color Brown: An Extended Metaphor for Gentrification

Electromagnetic radiation is a form of energy made up of synchronized variations of electric and magnetic fields. These variations manifest as waves with length and frequency. The length of an electromagnetic wave, or wavelength, can be as short as 1 picometer (10-12) and as long as 100 megameters (108); shorter waves have higher corresponding frequencies, or occurrences in a discrete time period. Wavelength is also used as an approximate classifier. The shortest waves are called gamma rays, the longest are radio waves. Nestled between these two extremes, from 380 to 740 nanometers, exists the visible light spectrum.

A fully-functioning human eye perceives this narrow band of electromagnetic radiation as light. Our eyes are able to sense this light as information. More specifically, our eyes have three different types of color receptors called cones. One type of receptor is stimulated dominantly by short wavelengths, one medium, and one long. Operating together, the human brain uses data collected by the cones to "triangulate" or synthesize a perceived color in the mind's eye. We, people, named these spectral colors: violet, blue, cyan, green, yellow, orange, and red (smallest to largest wavelength).[3]

3 In a study of basic color terms across cultures, anthropologists Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (1969) discovered that all languages have a word for black (or dark) and white (or light), and they adopt successive colors in the same order. Three color cultures add red, four color cultures add yellow or green, fifth color cultures add yellow or green, and six color cultures add blue. This also means that people whose language has fewer color words perceive fewer distinctions between colors.

The spectral colors correspond to groups of individual, monochromatic wavelengths (e.g., reds occur between 625 and 740 nanometers). There are, of course, other colors that we can perceive both on and off the spectrum.[4] Purples, as compared to the rather dim and dull violets, are polychromatic and non-spectral. They do not have a corresponding wavelength. Instead, they are what we perceive when our eyes sense the royal mixture of red and violet or blue light (i.e., short and long cone stimulation). There are higher order mixtures of colors, the tertiaries, quatenaries, and quinaries. Stranger still is brown.

Brown is not a color, at least not in the sense that color is light. Brown cannot be made with light. There is no brown in a rainbow. Brown is orange, but darker. To make brown with paints, one could add black to orange. But to make or perceive brown light, we need (brighter) context to make the orange light appear dimmer.[5] Like spectral colors, we recognize dark orange as brown, distinct from other shades of orange, because we assigned a name to it. This is different from navy blue, for example, which we see as darker blue but not distinctly different from blue. Brown is its own beast, approximate in boundary but epistemologically significant nonetheless. How are the color brown and the concept of gentrification similar? They are human-defined, characterized by their fuzzy edges that are impossible to make out even under the utmost scrutiny. What I see as brown, you see as orange; what I see as gentrification, you see as urbanization. They are subjective delineations.

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4 Or not perceive. In writing this, I discovered imaginary and impossible colors. The former are theorized points in color space that cannot be produced. The latter includes a subset of perceivable chimerical colors. These can be "seen" by either fatiguing some cone cells through one stimulus before looking at another stimulus, or by looking at two stimuli simultaneously. Templates to "see" chimerical colors are easy to find on the internet and worth exploring, however unrelated to this inquiry they may be.

5 This is described more specifically and precisely by Richard Feynman in his famous *Lectures on Physics* (2010 [1963]).

What is Gentrification? A Primer[6]

Gentrification is typically characterized by serial upgrading of property in a neighborhood by middle- and upper-income people, resulting in rapid neighborhood-character change and the displacement of existing lower-income residents. The process takes many forms across place and time: rehabilitated brownstones in Brooklyn, repurposed industrial space in Detroit, new bike shops and breweries that cater to young urbanites in Denver, and so on. Secondary effects include reinvestment in urban infrastructure and decreased crime. This is at the expense of current residents who may be displaced or priced-out of their communities. Communities undergoing gentrification may lose social diversity and political engagement as well. Above all, Kate Shaw said it best: "Gentrification's myriad of variations can be easily accommodated on a continuum of social and economic geographic change" (2008, p. 1719). That is to say, gentrification is a process of class transformation in and of urban space that takes on many forms.

Gentrification involves rehabilitating housing that directly displaces residents initially and may indirectly displace residents on a longer horizon. Direct displacement is violent. It can include forced and coerced evictions. This could be physical removal against one's will, extra-legal agreements between landlord and tenant *a la* Matthew Desmond's *Evicted* (2016), the installation of bed bug-ridden carpets, or the use of renovation loopholes to terminate leases early. Indirect displacement is more innocuous and occurs over time through price increases. Taxes begin to rise. Demand for housing increases, so do rents. Groceries cost more. Effects are

6 While a key premise of this project is that gentrification cannot be pinned down as a single phenomenon, a primer is needed for those unfamiliar with the concept. This section reflects how I think about gentrification. Most of this section is true to the mainstream understanding of gentrification; the two caveats I offer are less generally accepted but follow from my reading on the subject and understanding of how gentrification plays out on the ground.

not contained to residential tenants. A long-standing business may lose revenue as their target market disperses while simultaneously facing mounting rents or redevelopment pressures.

Argued first by Slater (2006), displacement is a crucial feature of this definition. I agree. Gentrification is upgrading with displacement. This nexus is why we have ascribed a negative ethics to the process. It is how we carve out gentrification as unique from our other urban change words: revitalization, rehabilitation, upgrading, or whatever else is in vogue. Axiomatic displacement is what makes gentrification the *brown* of urban change. For me, displacement is the edge of the concept, the unique characteristic that allows us to draw a fuzzy-bounded box around this color of change. And this must be true, because we do not consider "white flight" to be gentrification even though it was an economic decision by the affluent that restructured urban space. This is a second edge. It has direction. It is characterized by the moving-in of affluence and the resultant moving-out of something less, not the moving-out of affluence and the resultant moving-in of poverty, or the moving-out of poverty and the resultant moving-in of affluence.

Two caveats to this definition must be addressed. First, gentrification is a process of self-destructive community-building. Perceived value—as cost or community—attracts investment. Over time, this destroys the existing community by slowly replacing residents and businesses. The cycle repeats incessantly. The artists are replaced by art galleries and the musicians by studios. Schumpeter's gale of creative destruction (1975 [1942]), Harvey's spatial fix (2010), spares no place. Perhaps the biggest misconception to come out of the gentrification discourse is that community is, or should, or has the right to be, enduring. Community is ephemeral. To use "gentrification" is to resist locally against broader social processes and injustices materializing in place.

Second, the process (separate from its materialization) cannot be pinpointed on a map; developers and rehabbers should not be scapegoated as gentrifiers, despite their agency in the process. There is a web of bureaucracy and capital flows that permits and encourages gentrification to happen. We often talk about white flight and redlining as precursors for gentrification, measures that artificially deflated the urban housing market. The balances that enabled those unjust measures remains in place today. For larger projects there are commission meetings and council meetings, site plan approvals, traffic impact analyses, environmental impact analyses, and so forth, not to mention the global supply chains that support massive urban investments. On the financial side, there are mortgages and lending approvals, comparative assessments, credit scores and less overt risk calculations, all of which impact one's ability to participate in the market. The materialization of gentrification may be on Washington Street, but Washington Street is a very small part of a much grander machine. Likewise, the adventurous few that decide to gut and rehab a home in a declining area are exercising a property right and the American ethos. Is it unfortunate that residents end up displaced from these sorts of projects? Absolutely. Is self-help housing to blame for gentrification? Absolutely not.

Therefore, gentrification is the outcome of a local struggle over space mediated by decentralized economic and social controls, where capital usually prevails over social solidarity. This theme of identifying the location of gentrification will exist throughout the project. "Gentrification" is the discursive tool we use to allude to those decentralized controls. It allows us to comprehend urban political economy without changing scales to substantively engage with those economic and social controls that are structuring urbanization.

Project Structure and Outline

This project wrestles with the concept of gentrification. Using a suite of discursive approaches—textual analysis, actor-network theory, and framing analysis—I re-examined the coining, early history of academic thought, and contemporary understanding of the concept. That discursive examination revealed a disconnect in how gentrification was initially understood versus how it is understood today; the latter narrowed the epistemological boundaries of gentrification to be a market-led process, cutting off valuable lines of inquiry focused on social- and state-led factors. The discursive approach was necessary to re-open the concept for fresh study.

Together, these three chapters provide a new understanding of gentrification that is variable and highly dependent on local spatiotemporal context. Due to the early debates about gentrification, it is often viewed as the market-led redevelopment of disinvested areas. We identify the process at neighborhood-scale and in place because that is where it materializes. However, gentrification begins years before it materializes. Changes in city documents—including master plans, land use maps, and rezoning applications—coupled with restructuring regional economies are two features that enable and encourage gentrification. These changes that may occur five to twenty years (or more) before gentrification manifests in space are crucial insertion points to ensure equitable futures for cities.

I use a three-article format, rather than the traditional manuscript, to reach these conclusions. The three-article format presents each of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 as standalone, publishable papers. This format offers greater flexibility for methodological choice and audience by allowing each chapter to stand on its own merits. I take advantage of this flexibility by focusing each chapter on a different aspect of the discourse that makes up “gentrification”:

phenomenon, cause, and consequence. While each chapter may appeal to a different audience, together they paint a picture of how gentrification is understood today that can be used to craft solutions and future research on the subject.

Chapter 2

The first article analyzes the different aspects of change that supported Ruth Glass's coining of the term gentrification to describe urban redevelopment and displacement in post-War London. I revisit her chapter, the Introduction to *London: Aspects of Change* (1964), which is too often reduced to a single paragraph, adding context where needed, to build a portable framework to better situate and understand gentrification across spatiotemporal contexts. The key aspects of that framework are historical preconditions, administrative change, and demographic change. These contexts are critical to understand and situate gentrification as a part of a larger urban process. Explicating these dimensions of change in future case studies will help to counter the conceptual fuzziness that is increasingly frustrating gentrification studies.

Ruth Glass, a Marxist sociologist, spent her career trying to replicate and improve on the work of Charles Booth, whose comprehensive social survey published as *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1904) pioneered[7] the field of poverty studies. Described by her student Eric Hobsbawm as an "all-purpose ball of fire" (qtd. in Edwards, 2012), she is best known for her dexterous introduction to the anthology *London: Aspects of Change* (1964). The culmination of a several-years-long symposium on urban change, the introduction plaits together primers of case studies on the labor market, economic development, and immigration in and around London. This introduction is also where she originated the gibing term gentrification.

7 The frontier motif is common in gentrification studies.

The paragraph where the word is nested is reproduced *ad nauseum* but to what end? Invoking Ruth Glass is a quirky introductory device to signal some sort of historical understanding of gentrification. Engagement is superficial and adulterated; the essay is a harmless icon. We get that the word itself is clearly rooted in English class structure and wave it away—who cares that there is no identifiable *gentry* in the United States. And we get that the concept involves some sort of cost increase at others' expense. But then we move on. Digging into the full introduction yields something entirely different because it is rich and written with journalistic flair, layering context and observation while tying in the case studies she is ostensibly introducing. We discover that Glass' concept was a response to theories around social Darwinism and the "Malthusian" city that had become dominant in London politics. It works not because the gentry are doing the displacing, rather because they are creating the bureaucratic labyrinth that enables it.

The goal of the first chapter is to counter the simplistic and vulgar reproductions of her text to reassert the prescience of her introduction. To this end, I chose to rewrite and reorganize her text. Line-by-line, paragraph-by-paragraph, I did a close reading of her text, adding historical context where necessary to better understand her arguments and observations. I reorganized her words to highlight themes and to provide greater emphasis.

Chapter 3

The second article applies a sociology of science approach to gentrification studies to show how ideas become dominant and at what cost. It examines the actor-network of geographers vying for explanatory control of the concept during the 1980s and 1990s. During those two decades, structural Marxists and liberal humanists competed in a proxy war defined by the question: "what is the cause of gentrification?" Using actor-network theory, I reconstruct their debates to show how gentrification was established as empirical truth through successive phases. The debates culminated with the implicit acceptance of Neil Smith's rent gap theory as the best explanation, the belief that gentrification was a fundamentally market-led process crystallized. This alignment with dominant neoliberal ideology precluded efforts to mitigate gentrification through policy. The debates also excluded other valuable lines of inquiry that could only be explored after the core question was redefined. I also find that gentrification's value is not only as a name for a process, but as a way to recruit support for the critique of structural and systemic urban issues.

Neil Smith's paper, "Towards a theory of gentrification: A back to the city movement by capital, not people" (1979), on the rent gap reframes urban change as a capital-driven restructuring of the housing market instead of as a change in individual consumer preferences. The piece was a jolt of energy to urban studies, spurring rich debate on what causes gentrification for over a decade. Today, it remains the fourth most cited journal article on the topic (behind Peck, 2005; Smith, 2002; and Wolch, Bryne, & Newell, 2014).

The debates were studied and commented on at the time, but today they are mostly ignored. Yes, they pushed our understanding forward, but their relevance is questionable to most. This is a problem. Gentrification was not a mainstream topic in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; the debates were very much on the fringe of urban studies. Given the ubiquity of the term today, it seems a fitting time to look back at those debates to understand their significance in putting gentrification on the academic map.

The goal of the second chapter is to do just that. I reconstruct the debates with Neil Smith center stage. Using actor-network theory, I delimit the various human and non-human actors—facts, theories, places—that participated in the debates. I show how the acrid, ego-driven exchanges between Smith and others defined the scope of “gentrification” and refined its meaning many times over. This created the market-led paradigm—gentrification is caused by restructuring economic production—that dominates studies, today. In doing so, the debates induced the term gentrification as a key urban concept.

Chapter 4

The third article investigates how different actor-groups perceive the consequences of urban redevelopment by examining the discourse around a controversial rezoning application in Austin, Texas. Informed by frameworks of conflict consciousness and urban materiality, I use discursive frame analysis to examine a corpus consisting of predominantly news media coverage. This analysis showed that different groups—developers, public officials, protesters—rely on different strategies to navigate the redevelopment process. These strategies make clear a cleavage between the problem of gentrification and its political resolution. Gentrification is a problem that materializes in present time and local space. However, it is instituted in past time and municipal space. This spatiotemporal mismatch allows redevelopment to occur without paying heed to legitimate claims by current residents.

Austin is a suitable place to study the pressures and language of gentrification as it is rapidly growing city. Population growth continues to put pressure on the affordable housing market resulting in the emergence of a vocal anti-gentrification presence. The case is illustrative of zealous anti-gentrification activism, increasingly common around large developments in historically disenfranchised areas.

The goal of the case is to understand how the different groups speaking for or against the project discursively framed the issues of gentrification and displacement. The language offered by public officials, activists, and the developers offers a unique comparative lens to understand how these groups understand their role in the changing urban environment. Officials use their powerlessness as a shield and decorum as a sword to exclude the very real concerns of activists and residents. Activists lean on anti-capitalist ideology and displays of “people power”, though they often marginalize themselves in the process. And developers wield the power of private property and potential tax revenue to cut through red tape; with an eye on bureaucratic approval, they have little interest in engaging with the activists.

As much as this is a case about language, it is also a case about the cause of gentrification. I integrate a history of the site with lessons learned from the first two articles to challenge common assumptions about gentrification. In this case, the gentrification via redevelopment is a direct result of Oracle’s new global headquarters across the street. Years of city plans calling for more private investment in the neighborhood in combination with Austin’s growing reputation as a tech-hub encouraged the siting of the new headquarters. Looking at the history of the site and the region shows that gentrification is as much about disenfranchisement as it is about regional restructuring and bureaucratic survival. This is aligned closely with how Glass perceived of gentrification in London.

Chapter 2 Creating Gentrification: Ruth Glass in London

Introduction

Planning scholars rarely write about gentrification without first referencing or quoting the infamous paragraph within which the word first appears. However, they often disregard the remainder of the work in which the term is further described and illustrated. This is a shame. The context offered by author and sociologist Ruth Glass has more to offer than just a word or paragraph reproduced. To reduce the chapter to a single word is an injustice; it obscures the complexity of what she observed in a transitional, post-World War II London. In making a series of astute observations, she brought a new process of urban change to our attention. Gentrification. Confined to thirty pages (including endnotes) at the beginning of *London: Aspects of Change*, Glass's introduction demands an extended examination. It is the introduction that launched a field of study, and it serves as a foundational step to understand the roots of the concept.

For consistency, clarity, and consentience, the pivotal paragraph is reproduced here:

> One by one, many of the working class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews[8] and cottages—two rooms up and two down—have been taken over, when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. Larger Victorian houses, down-graded in an earlier or recent period—which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple

[8] Mews are rows of carriage homes with living quarters above them. The term is chiefly British, though that style of housing exists all over Europe and the United States.

> occupation—have been upgraded once again. Nowadays, many of these houses are being sub-divided into costly flats or 'houselets' (in terms of the new real estate snob jargon). The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their size, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighbourhoods. Once this process of 'gentrification' starts in a district, it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character of the district is changed. There is very little left of the poorer enclaves of Hampstead and Chelsea: in those boroughs, the upper-middle class take-over was consolidated some time ago. The invasion has since spread to Islington, Paddington, North Kensington—even to the 'shady' parts of Notting Hill—to Battersea, and to several other districts, north and south of the river. (The East End has so far been exempt.) And this is an inevitable development, in view of the demographic, economic and political pressures to which London, and especially Central London, has been subjected to. (Glass, 1964, pp. xviii–xix)

Evident within are observations of shifting class dynamics tethered in space; housing market fluctuations and the retrofitting of existing stock to meet demand; the curious relationship between dwelling size, cost, and social status; and contribution of "demographic, economic, and political pressures." She makes word choices that invite tension: invaded, expired, upgraded, displaced, take-over, inevitable. These features introduce the range and dimension of the debates about gentrification in the field to come. If we continue to rely on gentrification as a distinct urban epistemological (Johnson-Schlee, 2019) and ontological concept (Ley & Teo, 2014), we must first understand what justified its creation by asking: what was Ruth Glass observing in

London that others failed (partially or wholly) to recognize? What amalgam of the urban process constitutes Glass's characterization of gentrification?

What develops from this analysis are two different gentrifications. The first is the improvement of an area by wealthier newcomers resulting in the displacement of older, poorer residents. This is what most people think of in reference to Glass and gentrification. It is lean and nimble; the child of a single paragraph. Its simplicity seeded much important work to come. Its malleability fostered new debate along once peripheral cracks and crevices of urban theory. This is Glass's "gentrification" that most are exposed to through quotes and discrete references to her coining of the term (for examples, see Beauregard, 1985; Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2018; He, 2007; Huber & Wolkenstein, 2018; Kwak, 2018; Schlichtman & Patch, 2014; Smith, 2002). We owe a lot to this cursory reading of Glass.

The second gentrification builds from the first and is bounded by what Glass identified in London as the causal mechanisms. Like the first gentrification, it is the present upgrading of housing and businesses by wealthy newcomers resulting in displacement. However, this is only the materialization of broader societal shifts in capital and cultural accumulation caused by a longer horizon of historical, administrative, and demographic change. It is a not-fully-specified machine of levers and knobs that express the myriad unremarkable ways in which the city is interacted with as a canvas in tension with its peripheral suburbs. If the urban is a process that materializes differently in different places due to differences in sociospatial and temporal contexts, then so is gentrification. Glass's second gentrification may be contextually bound in post-World War II London, but it builds a causal framework to understand change across space based on ever-evolving local conditions. Material change is contingent on other, more fundamental forms of social change. For Glass, gentrification is social, political, and economic change that manifests visibly in the built environment. It is aided by the machinery of government, especially town planning.

This second gentrification is the subject of this chapter. I agree with Maloutas (2011) that the identification and study of gentrification is reliant on contextual causality. The concept is not, nor ever was, general enough to be applied universally (as has been attempted by later scholars) because property and legal systems differ across postindustrial, industrial, and preindustrial geographies and time-periods (Ghertner, 2014; 2015). However, instead of focusing on the issues caused by conceptual attachment to, or grounding in, the Anglo-American postindustrial context, I ask what aspects of change constituted the first conceptualization of gentrification in London. Explicating these aspects of change will demonstrate how gentrification can be divorced from its over-represented Anglo-American roots given a proper framework to tease out causality separate from materialization. In other words, gentrification is a middle-range theory—a bridge between deviant empirical observation and abstract theory—too often operationalized as a grand theory—a total conceptual structure divorced from social reality. With her focus on historical, administrative, and demographic change, Glass provides us with the framework to reassess gentrification as the middle-range theory it always was. Thus, comparisons between gentrifications-in-place should take care to control for variations in the causal framework.

After a discussion of methods, this analysis examines the three aspects of change that constitute Glass's causal framework: historical preconditions, administrative change, and demographic change. I conclude with the discussion of Glass's informed understanding of gentrification and its implications for future research.

Methods

This chapter examines Glass's chapter introducing gentrification using qualitative methods. I used two closely linked methods: textual analysis and inductive thematic analysis. I used textual analysis to derive Glass's understanding of gentrification. Close textual analysis makes it possible to "*slow down* the reading experience so that 'events' one does not notice in normal time, but which do occur, are brought before our analytic attention" (Fish, 1972, pp. 389, emphasis in original). It allows us to position the text and her description of gentrification in its historical setting (Jensen, 1991). Thus, this analysis required both the primary text—Glass's essay—and secondary texts to inform both her references and the broader environment from which she was writing.

I identified supplementary texts in three ways. First, I followed her direct and indirect references. For instance, she references the myriad Acts and Plans that were tasked with rebuilding London following World War II. Deeper reading into these policies guided a stronger interpretation of politics and class dynamics. We also know that Glass was influenced by Charles Booth, so understanding his work sheds light on her perspective. Second, I used her previous work to understand her research motivation and trajectory. For example, she draws on her own work to inform a discussion on immigration, and I follow suit. Finally, I developed a subset of texts to inform my understanding of the London she was writing in. These texts informed a deeper understanding of the political landscape and social landscape at the time. Familiarity and explication of this context helped to minimize "subjective misinterpretation" (Larsen, 1991) that is common in textual analysis.

I used inductive thematic analysis, the second method, to derive Glass's framework for contextualizing gentrification; this framework is made up of identified patterns in her text. To identify those patterns, I followed Braun and Clark's (2008) multi-step approach to inductive thematic analysis. The approach offers great flexibility for classifying textual data. I first read her text several times to gain familiarity with her writing and content. I then began manually generating codes to represent the different macro-topics present in her text. These codes were generated from within the text itself and were not analytically-driven (Patton, 2015). From these codes, I searched for and identified themes. Following review, I collapsed the codes into three broad themes that represented her perceived catalysts of gentrification. I named these catalysts historical preconditions, administrative change, and demographic change. A cost of the flexibility offered by inductive thematic analysis is specificity which is true here; to efficiently capture the full range of Glass's observations, the categories are necessarily broad. However, I view this broadness as a feature, not a defect, in that it allows for great portability across contexts.

To guide the textual and inductive thematic analysis, I asked:

1. How did Glass understand gentrification?
2. What contexts and aspects of change in post-World War II London informed Glass's understanding of gentrification?

Aspects of Change: The Causal Framework

A sociologist by training, Glass expresses a keen awareness of the fluid and arrayed population around her. In other writings from this period, she frequently references the diversity of metaphor that loosely makes up urban sociology: Weber as origin stories, Engels as arenas of class conflict, Vaughn as images of social progress, and Simmel as personalities. Above these is Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London,* which views the city as a "universe for the collection of data demonstrating the need for social reform" (Glass, 1955, p. 6). Glass looks to Booth's dying tradition of fact collection and social administration to inform policy formation as a means to reassert the urban in British sociology. Her focus is not on subsets of the urban, which take for granted the novelty of urbanism as a whole, rather her focus is on the overarching interplay between the "broad canvas of urbanism" and its peripheral towns. Her scrutiny may at first appear to be filled with sweeping generalizations, but it is better described as macro-observation. We see this early and often as she focuses on connecting how changes in the city's relationship with its history, administration, and residents affects change in the social and built environment in post-World War II London. Thus, her observation and understanding of gentrification is informed by the context of urban change along those dimensions. By examining the correlations between cause and consequence, we can better understand how Glass perceived gentrification. We can also use the broad categories of change to divorce the concept of gentrification from London-as-place, as it has, to be applied globally. However, it should be resituated in its new context for greater conceptual comparability and clarity that accounts for local conditions. Glass gave us a framework to do this.

Historical Preconditions

"Historical preconditions" is a catch-all for the general context preceding observation. For Glass, the context was dominated by World War II and the austerity-tightened rebuilding effort that followed. Technological change, like the automobile and television, also play a role in shaping Glass's observation of a changing society. This section also serves as a brief history of her essay and the symposium that launched inspired it.

The book which Glass introduces was inspired and compiled from a seminar that met regularly between March 1956 and January 1959, culminating in a symposium. The seminar explored various aspects of London's post-War urban development. Previously, discrete disciplinary perspectives—anthropology, geography, and town planning—discussed post-War urbanization sparingly. The seminar unleashed “inter-disciplinary”[9] research teams on the topic of urban change, something Glass advocated for in an acerbic defense of urbanism and urban sociology in 1955.[10] Seven of the ten chapters were produced and revised in the symposium and in conversation with the others. Glass’s Introduction, the eleventh “chapter”, was the final entry to be written, dated July 1963. In her first book, Glass stated her belief “that the purpose of sociological research was to influence government policy and bring about social change” (1939, p. vii); the activist ethos of their project is very much the same.

The seminar began just shy of eleven years after the German Instrument of Surrender was tendered in 1945, signaling the end of World War II. The resulting book was published in 1964, another eight years after the project began. The intervening years included the reconstruction of London supported by broad political cooperation. The post-War political consensus brought about a more active government to manage demand for and inure a Keynesian welfare state. Under the Labour Government, the National Insurance Act 1946 and the National Health Service Act 1946 initiated robust social safety nets (Reeves & McIvor, 2014). After years of wartime and recovery austerity, many industries were nationalized and full employment was achieved (Francis, 1995). Likewise, equal pay initiatives for teachers and civil servants gained success in the 1950s (Pugh, 2000). The Beat Generation and counterculture expanded sexual morality (August, 2009). Teenagers were identified as working-class consumers for the first time (Abrams, 1961).

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9 Glass uses quotes and hyphen in original, suggesting this was a novel approach (1964, p. xxxv).

10 “It hardly suffices any longer to explain urbanism in terms of non-rural characteristics” (Glass, 1955, p. 5). Later in the piece, she spends several pages decrying the dominant British anti-urbanism and goes on to describe the upper classes as “mere parasites” (Glass, 1955, p. 15).

Though she did not explicitly acknowledge them in the introduction, Glass was shrewd to step back and see these shifts in a broader light: as changing wants and needs, changing social habits, changing occupations, changing cultures. Households were increasingly looking for more space to accommodate and display their new technologies and wealth. By 1963, 82% of British households had a television, 72% a vacuum, 45% a washing machine, and 30% a refrigerator (Burnett, 1986, p. 274). Households became much more private as well, giving up the public, street-focused life that became associated with poor communities and a dearth of private space. This increasing focus on "inside" meant that electrification of the city took on great importance as part of the rebuilding process. Likewise, new reliance on the automobile made property setbacks from the grime of the road a desirable asset. Verticality was another way to distance oneself from the street (Burnett, 1986).

Programs related to housing were probably most relevant to Glass's interest in urban life and housing (see Glass, 1939). Bomb damage from the war decimated many cities across Britain, destroying four million homes and producing over 30,000 tons of wreckage, 61% of which was in London (Ray, 1996). The government aggressively cleared wreckage-turned-slums and built municipal housing, aiming to be affordable for all (though in 1951, the new Conservative Party leadership shifted the provision from affordable-for-all to a more needs-based approach; they did keep housing a priority in their platform) (Hanley, 2017). These sociopolitical events and their effects, especially relating to housing and public health, created a new, albeit dynamic, landscape for academic inquiry focused on the nexus of policy and urban change.

Changes in Technology

Compounding these changes is the ever-inevitable march of technological advancement. It would be hard to argue against the profound impact of the automobile on the urban environment; first as a luxury, then a necessity, and perhaps now as an escape. Similarly, the home, once a shelter, then as an investment, an asset, as collateral to fund consumption. Urbanism itself is a form of technological advancement ordering social and economic production. Where English society—its culture, morals, and (social and economic) organization—was structured by traditional patriarchal values, urbanization also proved to be an (unwelcome) advancement in social organization and behavior characterized by new troubles. Much of this ire was focused on the working-class as urban plague; volumes could certainly be written on urbanization and social reproduction in post-War London.

Early in her essay, Glass observes the negative effects of a more urban and socially connected London. In a sentence that could be written today, Glass describes growing and pervasive social isolation: "And yet, driving in their cars, sitting in front of their television screens, they are more on their own than they used to be" (1964, p. xvi). Driving in their cars, sitting in front of their television screens. Nothing has changed. Continuing, "While knowledge of science and technology is expanding rapidly, though at an unequal rate in different fields, it does so within the framework of a society which is remarkably slow in developing its capacities for self-recognition and rational organization" (Glass, 1964, p. xvi). Glass's observation closely parallels Jacques Ellul's (1973 [1954]) coinciding critique of technology in society.[11] Humanity,

11 Ellul made this critique explicitly but it was derivative of Marx's critique of capital. Glass was surely familiar with the latter but possibly not the former, which was first translated from the original French to English in 1964.

Ellul argues, is subservient to the increasingly rational and efficient "technique"—"the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity" (1973, p. xxv)—produced and enforced by technological development. Urbanism, the city and its plan, is a form of technique.[12] It is also cost and consequence. Technological advancement facilitates population growth and urbanization, and attempts to solve the problems created by them.[13]

Coming back to Glass's critical observation that society is slow to develop the capacity to reconcile with new technology, the problem is more that technology develops so quickly that humanity is forced to adapt. The efficiency offered by new technology is a requirement, as a prerequisite, to participate in society. An artifact of suburbanization, the car becomes a necessity to have a job, to buy groceries, to see friends, and so forth; the house is no longer simply a place to live, but a place to work, an investment vehicle, a project, a spatial relationship (land). "The luxuries of yesterday, or the imitations of yesterday's luxuries, have become the necessities of today for large sections of the population" (Glass, 1964, p. xiv).

And this technology invades society. Knowledge departmentalizes, labor divides, consumer spending increases, the job market calls for new expertise. The "menial" job disappears, replaced by calls for more administrators, engineers, executives, analysts, managers, so on and so forth. Occupational movement erects a mirage of social mobility. As we read her

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12 "The abstract conquest of Space by Man (capitalized) corresponds the limitation of place for men (in small letters). It is scarcely necessary to emphasize the face that this diminution of *Lebensraum* results indirectly from techniques (through population growth) or direct from them (through urban and industrial agglomeration)" (Ellul, 1973, p. 328).

13 In much the same way, it was James C. Scott who harked on the blind, premodern state creating tools to reduce the complex, qualitative features of society to an abstract, organizable legibility. Legibility is a technique in its own right; it "provides the capacity for large-scale engineering" (Scott, 1998, p. 5). And the realization or adoption of technology "made possible new practices (of development, management, and government, to name a few), new claims to expertise, new equivalences, and new silences" (Mitchell, 2002, p. 83).

introduction with housing in mind, it seems that Glass views work and social life as a causal mechanism for gentrification. This helps land her question: “is there more or less social claustrophobia than there was in a previous period?” (Glass, 1964, p. xvi). We do not know. But the question remains unavoidable in modernizing London. She revisits the isolating effects of urbanism, this time as a contributor to social homogeneity:

> Millions of people from different social classes and localities consume the same diet of radio and television programmes, advertisements and films; they are subject to a national network of retail outlets, newspapers, public services, institutions and organizations; they uphold the same national symbols. (Glass, 1964, p. xvii)

Economies of scale contributes to culture at scale. That is to say, the consolidation of culture mass-producers has profound effects on macroculture. It corrupts aesthetic sensibilities and manifests in the built environment. The boundaries between urban, suburban, and rural are blurred by the proliferation of concrete and an increasingly mobile population. Cities aim for rustic charm and rural villages aim to attract residents with urban amenities. The landscape becomes an amalgamation of contradictions. Class distinctions between rich and poor have narrowed and even flipped. We can begin to see how Glass views urban change as fundamentally expressive of social change.[14]

14 Social change is itself a byproduct of technological change. Following Ellul, technological change in its broadest sense is the general quest for improvement of being and condition undertaken by humans and society. As stated before, technique includes urbanism and governance.

Administrative Change

There is a strong emphasis on legal structures apparent in the preceding section. Glass makes this more explicit with extended commentary on several acts of governance. She is focused on their implied philosophy of environmental determinism, that men are clay in the planner's hand (*King James Bible*, n.d. [1759], Jeremiah 18:6). Among imaginations for future cities, Ebenezer Howard's Garden City is one example that sought to insert the prototypical, respectable lifestyle of the countryside into the city as a nostrum for social change. Derivative of Garden Cities, New Towns were a key feature of post-War planning focused on easing the physical and behavioral externalities of industrialization and urbanization in the Great Wen.[15]

The New Towns Act, the Town and County Planning Act, and the London Government Act drew noticeable ire from Glass as instrumental changes to the urban regime with cascading effects on society and the built environment. The New Towns Act expanded the power of the government to designate land for development; designated lands were frequently complimented by hefty and proximate private investment. The later Town and County Planning Act and its revisions ensured that landowners would reap windfalls for owning designated plots, leading to increased speculation. More grievous to Glass, the London Government Act reorganized the bureaucracy of London. Responsibility for management of change was delegated to defunded subsets of the city. London was simultaneously expanding through annexation, creating a labyrinth of power conflicts across municipal levels. In her view, shared responsibility for management would transform into no responsibility. She rails against government incoherence

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[15] The Great Wen was a disparaging nickname for industrializing London. A wen is an abnormal growth or cyst.

fueled by thinly veiled anti-urbanism by those in power; it is a bureaucratic labyrinth designed by the gentry class.

Changes in Housing and Legal Structure

Changes in the housing stock have their foundation in four key government initiatives: two plans and two acts. The County of London Plan came first in 1943, authored by planner Sir Patrick Abercrombie. An artifact of the Second World War (which caused economic depression and destroyed London's built form), the Plan aimed to correct for haphazard development and the lack of planning that preceded it in the city by segregating land uses (Figure 1). The neo-Victorian plan focused primarily on alleviating the negative externalities of traffic congestion, dilapidated housing, and decentralizing industry by relocating half a million Londoners outside of London proper. Moralizing the environment as the cause of civil impropriety served to reinforce the need for stricter land use control; it also supported the Plan's vision to manage and interweave cleansing green spaces into the city. The visually-compelling Plan was widely circulated (Figure 2), well-received, and viewed as a policy document or a binding blueprint for social change.

Figure 1 Social and Functional Zones, County of London Plan 1943

Note: This map shows a sketch of how post-War London communities could be organized based on existing uses and idealized, segregated function. It is based on a survey of existing community and space use. Blue dots are shopping corridors; red dots are town halls. From *County of London Plan*, by P. Abercrombie & J. H. Forshaw, 1943, London: Macmillan and Company.

Figure 2 King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visit the County of London Plan Exhibition

Note: King George VI (second from right) and Queen Elizabeth visit Sir Patrick Abercrombie (left) at his exhibition for the London Plan in 1943. 75,000 people attended the exhibition over two months. From "The County of London Plan, 1943: 'If only we will'", by J. Boughton, 2014, Tuesday 8, (https://municipaldreams.wordpress.com/2014/07/08/the-county-of-london-plan-1943-if-only-we-will/). Copyright by Municipal Dreams.

The Greater London Plan of 1944, again authored by Abercrombie, was a direct follow-up to his 1943 Plan. More comprehensive in scope, it aimed to solve the above externalities by displacing over one million Londoners. The neo-Malthusian Plan (Glass, 1964, p. xix) constructed the city as a spatial entity rigidly bridled by social Darwinism. Restrictions on housing supply by rings (see Figure 3) were meant to control population growth and the metropolitan boundary (read: sprawl) while simultaneously protecting the bucolic countryside. This restrictive ideal may be suitable for stagnant or declining populations (Glass notes a profound fear of the latter), but the Plan failed to account for or adequately accommodate growth within London's inner urban ring. Despite this, the plans "produced an influential body of planning doctrine that provided the foundation for an extremely durable consensus about the future development of London, both at the level of public debate and within local and parliamentary politics" (Mott, 2004, p. 121).

Figure 3 The Four Rings and New Towns, Greater London Plan 1944



Note: Abercrombie's four rings were designed to control development and sprawl. From *Greater London Plan*, by P. Abercrombie, 1944, London: University of London Press.

Per the antecedent Abercrombie Plan—the common name for the combination of the County of London Plan and the Greater London Plan—and supported by findings from the Reith

Commission report in 1945,[16] the New Towns Act was passed in 1946. New towns were planned developments to remedy the urban "diseases" (Osborn, 1918): congestion, pollution, crowding, coincident rural decay, and so forth. They were to be scattered about the periphery of the city as self-contained communities. The New Towns Act 1946 gave the government power to designate land for development. It was the cornerstone of an ambitious program to rebuild housing. The Act also created development corporations responsible for building new dwellings. From 1946 through 1964, housing associations and local authorities built 2.42 million dwellings; private enterprises built 1.78 million dwellings (Figure 4) (Department for Communities, 2012). Over the same period, housing prices in the UK went from £63,616 to £70,896 (in 2020 GBP) (Department for Communities, 2011).

Figure 4 New Housing Construction in England, 1946–1964



16 The Reith Commission, named for the chair of the New Towns Commission, John Reith, recommended "new towns" should be built to accommodate up to 60,000 residents. They should be built on greenfield sites, be single-family and low density, organized around schools and essential commerce, and should balance residential and commercial use. These suggestions led to sprawl.

The new municipal-built housing would be for the working man, the doctor, and the clergyman, paraphrasing then-Minister for Health and Housing, Aneurin Bevan. This was perhaps a great hope of the New Towns Act 1946. Consistent with this ideal, investment in design and build quality meant that these new municipal estates were "frequently superior in design and appearance to the older 'luxury flats' and expensive houses of private tenant or owner-occupiers" (Glass, 1964, p. xviii). This effectively ended the stigma associated with municipal estates, at least in London.

The Town and County Planning Act 1947—the legal basis for town planning in Britain—strengthened the ability of the government to ascribe to the Abercrombie Plan by nationalizing development rights, which served as one anti-speculation measure to stabilize land values. It also "stipulated that a 'development charge' had to be paid into the public purse for the 'betterment' of land values accruing from post-1947 'development' in the statutory sense" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxvii). The importance of these mechanisms cannot be understated, as:

> the permissions for 'development' (given by local planning authorities) would be bound to lead to land speculation…[and thus] to the build-up of considerable pressures to modify the operations of development control so that they yield, generally, the maximum private profits in the use of land. (Glass, 1964, p. xxxvii)

Yet, various amendments to the Act gutted those very provisions and controls, effectively planning the laissez-faire housing economy (Polanyi, 1944). The Town and County Planning Act 1953 removed the development charge for the betterment land values; the Town and County Planning Act 1954 established government-funded compensations for restrictions on private development caused by planning control; the Rent Act 1957 relaxed rent control; and the Town and County Planning Act 1959 stipulated that land acquired by public authorities through compulsory acquisition "should be paid for on the basis of the full current market value of the land, including its full development value" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxvii). This translated liberal ideology into law, pedestaling stratified private interests over the public interest. Reductions in state contributions to municipal housing and the delegation of responsibilities to local authorities were perhaps the final measures of reregulation and reorganization of state planning during this period. The result was expected, calculated—"commercial and speculative developments…driven by an alliance of financiers, property developers, accountants, and a group of commercially minded architects, [became] the major force behind the rebuilding of London" (Mott, 2004, p. 121).

Municipal Incoherence

Doubling down on her cynicism, Glass is not convinced the current governance structure could accomplish much anyway. Notwithstanding the convoluted and uncoordinated organization of power, it seems that those in charge prefer to push out administrative blueprints instead of actual policy: "This is done on the assumption that shortcomings of national policies (or of resources for implementing such policies) can be *a priori* attributed to defects in the machinery of government, and especially that of local government" (Glass, 1964, p. xxvi, emphasis in original). She is again indicting the perceived failures of the Abercrombie Plan and the London Government Act. Due to its public audience and visual appeal, the Plan was viewed as an act of policy, or at least as a substitute for it as Glass suggests. The latter is one example of the sort of tedious response that fingers local government as the scapegoat for policy failure. She calls the Act "conservative" and "deceptively radical" for reasons to come (Glass, 1964, p. xxvi).

The London Government Act consolidated London and its surrounding counties into the Greater London conurbation. Thirty-two boroughs of minimum 200,000 residents, plus the City of London with 5,000, were drawn as local boundaries to be governed by an elected borough council. The boroughs were responsible for their refuse collection, weights and measures, public health inspections, and welfare services among other things. The all-encompassing administrative boundary would be governed by the Greater London Council and would be responsible for emergency services, refuse disposal, motor-vehicle licensure, land drainage, smallholdings, and River Thames flood prevention initiatives. Responsibility for education, roads, planning, housing, sewage, and traffic would be shared (Redcliffe-Maud & Wood, 1974).

As Glass tells it, this reorganization to regional governance was praised and welcomed by the entirety of the political spectrum—"from the Conservatives to the Communist Party" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxix). "The very term 'region' had acquired a rather glamorous connotation—that of large-scale administration, with an eagle's eye view, combined with all the comforts of 'grass-roots democracy'" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxix). However, the Act did not align with this ideal. Instead, it preserved and intensified bureaucratic divisions between different authorities and tiers of governance. In this context, the shared responsibility—and thus the lack of responsibility—for planning, housing, and traffic is especially problematic. And like any transition in organizational structure, the Act reduced expertise and function, at least in the near-term. Perhaps this is why government planning interventions seem so slow and unresponsive to Glass: they are.

This municipal failure is not, as we have seen, the Malthusian solution to population growth and technological advancement that it was intended to be. And thankfully, it seems to not be an impediment either. Unemployment in London in February 1963 was 1.4%, compared to 2.4% in Great Britain as a whole, and over 4% in Wales and Scotland (Glass, 1964, p. xxxix). The resilient regional economy is solidifying Greater London's microcosmic identity as Great Britain, though Great Britain is quickly losing clout on the world stage. The competing effects of urbanization and globalization (or declining imperialism) are, for London, driving fear and uncertainty.

Built Form and Bureaucratic Power

This lack of coherency in policy and institutional structure is reflected in the (re)built environment of London, mostly as an expression of the back-and-forth relationship between planning for the public good and *laissez-faire* planning.

> Large-scale municipal development remains as the testimony of the late forties and early fifties…The growing array of commercial and residential showpieces—of imitation ‘towers’ which are generally more imposing in price than in height or design—represents the latter period. (Glass, 1964, pp. xxiv–xxv)

Her description of the microphallic towers hearkens back to *the* gentrification paragraph, specifically: “The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their size, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighbourhoods” (p. xviii). It seems indicative of a rapid urbanization event, a builder’s market (a free-for-all even). But she is also not quick to forget the resistant *zones of transition* (Burgess, 1925) hidden in the crevices between expanding districts. These spaces are not improved, nor do they seem improvable. This would not be the case if gentrification was a simple market phenomenon that usurped everything within its path.

As evident as this change may seem, it is superficial. The matrix of land uses that order the County and its boundaries from a bird’s-eye remain mostly consistent (Figure 5). Even casualties of the Blitz have been rebuilt with the same intention and persistence. The only apparent exception is the relocation of manufacturing to the urban periphery. Does manufacturing lack the ability to compete or is it an unwanted nuisance *per se*, or both?

Whatever the case, discrete areas are formalizing in use. Where neighborhoods were previously mixed and crowded, they are now ordered, especially as more large spaces are reclaimed.

Figure 5 Proposed Land Use Map, County of London Plan 1943



Note: Map showing proposed zoning for "home, work and play" in Abercrombie's County of London Plan. The legend omits residential uses, though this use is demarked in gray. From *County of London Plan*, by P. Abercrombie & J. H. Forshaw, 1943, London: Macmillan and Company.

Yet while the outer boundary of Greater London remains nebulous, the inner divisions are sharp and honing. What drives this delineation? Glass makes the case that politics plays a key role. Though development—of housing, transportation, and industry—was rarely explicitly coordinated, the effects of public- versus private-oriented state leadership are traceable. Neither group has had sovereign control for an extended period, but "private interests have been influential in grouping like with like—poor with poor; rich with rich" (Glass, 1964, p. xxx). Likewise, "public control has had the effect of introducing some coherence into the operations of diverse separate elements" (Glass, 1964, p. xxx). To the latter, Glass clarifies British public control, or more specifically "public interest", in a footnote comparing British municipal housing with public housing in the United States:

> Public housing in American cities is usually located on sites which are patently unsuitable for residential development…on the 'reject' parcels of land which are not profitable for private enterprise. By contrast, the location of post-war New Towns, new estates and smaller enclaves of municipal housing in Greater London…has been determined largely by straightforward *criteria of suitability*. Accordingly, such schemes are frequently on sites which would have been highly profitable for developments by private enterprise. And for that reason too…recent municipal housing schemes in inner London have in fact attracted rather than deterred, adjacent private development. (Glass, 1964, p. xl, emphasis added)

"Public interest" is a higher standard of responsibility to the public than simply policing private enterprise while preserving the profit motive. This positions public interest as directly anathema to private interest in the immediate (though not indirectly as it still facilitates future development).

Traditionally, a key arbiter of public control was local government. Local councils maintained the delineation between districts within London: "Their decisions (or indecision) are stamped upon the areas within their jurisdiction" (Glass, 1964, p. xxx). Thus, while the larger administrative boundaries are arbitrary, the local administrative boundaries remain coincident with local neighborhoods—especially in localities with politicized councils—even as their role is being usurped by new, entangled administrative configurations. Local self-expression is resilient. But it also entrenches the socio-geographic patterns of the city, namely the extant socioeconomic class structure.

Demographic Change

Large tracts of her essay focus on policy change or the history of London. She connects these sections with text on change in the social environment. These changes are both highlighted as causes and effects of new policies and economic relationships in the City. Shifting economic conditions and technological advancements influence the types of occupations available in the city. Occupational change manifests spatially as land-use change. Likewise, the aesthetics tied to class are also shifting back towards the urbane, though the supply of housing has not kept pace with the multifaceted demand. Similar is the role of culture in reshaping preferences and ultimately demand, for urban housing. Immigration, too, is creating new social pressures. Glass follows Marx in collapsing race into class, as minorities and immigrants are disproportionately represented in the working classes of London. Above all, the demographic change she is focused on is the continued oppression of the working classes by the gentry regardless of race or ethnicity.

Class Imitation

Home-in-place embodies and participates in creating economic, cultural, and social capital. Glass is nonplussed that the upper classes are not despised for their hoarding of capital and power. Rather, they are imitated in a dogfight for symbolic standing; the nineteenth-century effect manifested as suburban sprawl: “The main status symbol of the aspiring middle classes was some version of the aristocratic country house…later on, white-collar and manual workers in steady employment asserted their position in a suburban villa” (Glass, 1964, p. xxxii). It was only the poor who were unable to participate in this struggle for symbolic standing, for it is the poor who do not have the luxury of financial velleity and spatial self-determination. So instead, they remained in London and “retained their loyalties to their own districts” (Glass, 1964, p. xxxi). And for some time, this has been the trend. London has aggregated wealth at its boundaries while growing rather conservatively in the interior. The old district boundaries remain intact and inhibit changes to the socio-geographic order.

There are signs that these trends are reversing course. Upper-class taste is more diffuse and the sovereign urban aversion is quickly fading. These shifting domestic preferences, coupled with earlier marriages, more women in the workplace, and increasing commute costs (both economically and socially) have contributed to a new urban aspiration, reflected pointedly in a new wave of “Contemporary” urban design.[17] So while London continues to expand at its furthest edges, it is not for want; it is the critical shortage of affordable housing that is giving rise to the exodus. The demand for homes near the central city is surging “at a time when the de-control of property values and rents has made private enterprise predominant in urban development; and when the resulting new spurt in real estate speculation has greatly intensified the competition for, and the pressure on, space” (Glass, 1964, p. xxxi).

Cultural Factioning

Class distinctions have not disappeared from London, nor have they segregated as much as the Abercrombie Plan insinuated. However, cultural distinctions have increased. Glass attributes much of this new divisiveness to several shifts in public life after the Second World War, a returning to “normal” so to speak. Rationed consumption became unrestrained; strong public ownership regimes and ideals dissolved; the *status quo* praised and, paradoxically, aspired

17 Glass is referencing the spectacular Festival of Britain in 1951 which vitalized architectural modernism and town planning ideals through grand displays to boost nationalism and feelings of post-War recuperation. What they called “Contemporary” we would later know as “Festival style”.

to. And while some may argue that these developments led to a unifying (parochial) interplay of class and (moral) politics,[18] Glass is clear to disagree. An assemblage of parallel subcultures remains:

> The atavistic, the cranky, the lunatic fringes, the various 'security risks', the backroom boys of business tycoons…the many inbred intellectual and artistic circles; the fraternities of the young; and large sections of the population whose mode of life is unknown because they live, anonymously, in secluded domesticity. (1964, p. xxii)

However, a narrower, homogeneous subset has emerged to form an ostensibly monolithic macroculture with undue influence. She is observing subtle differences in the social terrain, indicative of and anticipating intersectionality amongst the various panorama of subcultures. Yet the most visible commodities (objects, language, etc.) are produced for the least-common-denominator (a byproduct of the profit-motive, no doubt). In effect, difference is sanitized.

Immigration

Drawing on her study of Caribbean immigration into London (Glass, 1960), Glass reveals the cracks in British social structure that immigrants have long been privy to. The most evident is latent social anxiety towards change, exacerbated but not caused by foreigners. The many sub-cultures and cultural enclaves in London welcome these newcomers. It is their appearance alone that makes them susceptible to violence,[19] for it makes them visible. Likewise, it makes the social problems visible, pointing spotlighting

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18 A reference to Daniel Bell's "End of Ideology" (2000 [1962]), a eulogy for Marxism and utopian posturing as forms of mass self-deception. Bell uses the term *ideology* narrowly to address teleological "social movements that seek to mobilize men for the realisation of such beliefs, and in this fusion of political formulas and passions, ideology provides a faith and a set of moral certitudes…by which ends are used to justify immoral means" (Bell, 1988, p. 324).

19 Referring to the Notting Hill race riots in 1958.

"the difficulties which the British have in adapting themselves to their own domestic changes and to the post-colonial world of today" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxiii).

Viewed this way, it is no longer fit to study immigration from a racial standpoint; immigration is best studied as an apparition of social stratification. This is exemplified in studies of two "hidden" immigrant groups: the Polish and their counterfoil, the Irish. She again juxtaposes the experiences of those groups against her findings from studying West Indian migrants. "The Poles…settled in this country as a transitory political minority—as an exile group looking to its national home elsewhere—and still keep themselves conveniently apart" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxiv); they accept their minority status and remain proudly enclaved. On the other hand, the West Indians do not accept their minority status, instead asserting their status as equal British citizens.[20] Likewise, the Irish have a strong sense of national identity that the West Indians lack. Irish and West Indian migrants do share a key characteristic: many tend to be unskilled "marginal men" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxv). In this sense, the groups cause similar frictions within British society; class fissures cause strife and struggle to assimilate. The causes of such troubles can be increasingly found "in our own history—past and present" (Glass, 1964, p. xxxv). She does not write more on the issue, but her concern is evident. Unassimilated immigrants' brunt a majority of housing violence; they are also the backbone of rebuilding efforts. The new problems that London faces today are not, in fact, new or novel. Though the problems may have a new facade, they are, underneath, the resurfacing and rehashing of older issues that the city has faced before and will face again.

20 The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 severely restricted immigration to Britain by citizens of the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Empire). This had far-reaching consequences on rights-claims by migrant groups.

Discussion

Her oft-quoted paragraph (see page 16) takes on a different meaning in the context of the causal framework. Gentrification (as it materializes) is a byproduct, certainly, but never Glass's focal point. Rather, it is the flipped social and economic value placed on smaller, older units in Central London (accompanied by rampant inflation) that captures her attention, the rejection of twenty years of institutionalized sprawl-politics initiated by the Abercrombie Plan and Reith Commission. While those documents were busy emphasizing decentralized, low-density utopias as technical solutions to overcrowding, they ignored the reasons for overcrowding in the first place: a mismatch between the social geography of the city and its economic geography. Likewise, those plans did little to stop growth in the inner ring. Effectively acting as a greenbelt by enforcing low-density suburban development in the outer rings of the city, they ignorantly intensified development and demand pressure resulting in the rising cost of housing that Glass observed. There is great need for a holistic view of the city: "Town planning, by itself, is a misnomer; without the backing of comprehensive social and economic planning, it is bound to be rather slow and incoherent, and is not likely to go very far" (Glass, 1964, pp. xxxii–xxxiii).

"Independent retailers have given way to chain stores; the sites of small food shops have been taken by supermarkets, and those of shabby Italian restaurants by Espresso bars" (1964, p. xxv). No doubt economic techniques (e.g., economies of scale, formula retail) are contributing to this convergence of ownership and simultaneous specialization of service. Likewise, business districts are segregating and solidifying around their respective niches: medical specialties around Harley Street; publishing around Fleet Street; antiques around Kensington (Glass, 1964, p. xxv). In residential areas, a corollary. (Upper-) class convergence is altering the social status of defined neighborhoods. These residents maintain their lifestyle with the few well-paid "prestige" occupations that remain concentrated in central London (e.g., banking, law). More clerical and rudimentary work is pushed outwards (or eliminated through automation). Those workers tend to spread outwards along with their occupations.

Likewise, the displacing effects of this competition for space, especially towards a certain class—"the small enterprises, the lower ranks of people the odd men out" (Glass, 1964, p. xxvi)—prompt Glass to criticize the desultory municipal agenda designed (or not) to counter the constriction described. No municipal action to control land values is present, despite an increasing demand for low-wage service workers in the city. Instead, the focus is on "the current pastime of re-drawing local government boundaries—in the belief that London can be contained by authorizing it to be a 'region'" (Glass, 1964, p. xxix). "The sanctioning of the spiral of real estate values is evidence of disregard for coherent urban development" (Glass, 1964, p. xxvi).

Gentrification is framed as an issue rife with class conflict, but it is caused by something else:

> the 'natural increase' of commerce and related economic activities; the emergence of new occupations and pursuits; the demands for travelling and parking space made by the rapidly growing motorcar population; the improvements and consequent spatial expansion of social, education and ancillary services. (Glass, 1964, p. xix)

Changing economic activity, changing landscape of work and leisure, changing consumer preferences, changing public provisions. For Glass, gentrification in London is an expression of change in everything but actual housing. It is the byproduct of a new urbanization functioning as a mechanism for capital *and* cultural accumulation that materializes in the built environment, aided by urban governance regimes.

This is not to say that Glass's second gentrification is the only *true* gentrification. It cannot be; there is no true gentrification. It is London's gentrification in the score following World War II. More importantly for urban theory, it is a framework to understand the different pathways that may catalyze and constitute gentrification: historical, administrative, and demographic. Glass's introduction describes a situation as much as it describes a process of change. However, debates about gentrification moved forward without a keen awareness of sociospatial and temporal context, instead searching for universal causes at the expense of situational awareness. While these debates elevated a gibing afterthought into a key urban concept, they also failed to understand the deeply Anglo-American perspective of urban development they were inscribing on the field and the world. This perspective has been critiqued extensively (e.g., Ghertner, 2015). Wyly (2019) believes we can move on from this limiting view if we "understand gentrification as a symptom of evolutionary urbanism, an ethos of endless 'innovation', 'creativity', and 'resilience' axiomatically defined by a singularity: competition" (p. 20). I agree. But the focus must be turned towards the state and the ways that our urban administration can mediate competition for urban space in ways that benefit existing residents. We cannot change our history or control technological development, nor can we control macro-cultural change and social preferences. We can change legal structures and invent new planning technologies to equitably guide urbanization. For researchers, this involves a more tactile reading of urban change that links a holistic understanding of cause with policy-solvable effects. Instead of asking how the state has become more involved in encouraging gentrification (see Hackworth & Smith, 2001), ask how the state has always been involved in encouraging gentrification?

In sum, Ruth Glass's essay describes the essence of gentrification: the broad economic, social, and political changes that manifest in the built environment, aided by the institutions of town planning and municipal governance. This suggests the solution to gentrification, if there is a such a thing, lies in protesting governance regimes to equitably plan for aggressive population growth and social change. This is in contrast to current anti-gentrification strategies that protest the effects of gentrification where they manifest—redevelopment projects, luxury mixed-use developments, and the like. Minneapolis's abolition of single-family zoning is a good example of planning for growth in a way that should bring down rents, though equity benefits are disproportionately reaped by homeowners (Minneapolis City Council, 2019). The push to permit accessory dwelling units follows similar logic. Anti-gentrification activism needs to remain focused on forward-looking structural change and alliance building across cities, rather than piecemeal interventions that are selfishly isolated at the neighborhood level and quickly disband after success or failure. This activist work can be further strengthened by comparing administrative successes in other cities while controlling for contextual aspects of change.

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Chapter 3 On the Cause of Gentrification: An Actor-Network Approach to Academic Debates

Introduction

At the time she coined it, Ruth Glass's "gentrification" (1964) was recent in development and limited in scope; it was dependent on the anti-urban sentiment expressed through Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Her understanding of the capital- and culture-intensive process was heavily informed by perceived changes in post-World War II London's administrative structure and demographic character as well as its history and culture. This strictly local application is evidenced in the root "gentri-", an oft-commented-on reference to the armigerous English social class below peerage.

Today, the word is more far-reaching, extending across continents and disciplines. Likewise, the vocabulary of gentrification has expanded to other languages: *altahsin* in Arabic, *ilah* in Hebrew, *garasu-ka* in Japanese, *ùmhlachd* in Scots Gaelic, *addoli* in Welsh, and many more. It is certain that gentrification, the language and practice, influences how we, as scholars and residents, interact with the urban; *gentrification* is a discursive technology to comprehend urban change. Yet we know little about how gentrification became a dominant technology in urban discourse (see Spain, 1992) or how it transformed into the market-based explanation of urban development between Glass (1964) and present-day. Instead, we only have raw articles and various literature reviews therein, which lack a culminating narrative.

Phases of Gentrification Research

The first phase of gentrification scholarship—from Glass in 1964 up until 1979—was suggested by Smith and Williams (1986) to focus on inflowing gentrifiers and the effects they had on a uniscalar place (e.g., Hamnett, 1973; Laska & Spain, 1979; McKie, 1974). At its worst, this research celebrated gentrification as *the* fix for urban decline. In Smith and Williams' words, it was uncritical and took the causes of gentrification for granted (1986). However, this phase did document that gentrification was a small but growing reality for urban communities.

The second phase (Smith & Williams, 1986) of gentrification research was marked by intense debate on the causes of gentrification, supported by theoretical analysis (and sometimes conjecture). Notably, this phase broadened the scope and scale of gentrification from the isolated "islands of renewal in seas of decay" (Berry, 1985) to incorporate macroeconomic shifts occurring in global housing and land markets (Ball, Edwards, Bentivegna, & Folin, 1985; Smith, 1982; Smith, 1996). This shift in focus began with a special supplement on neighborhood revitalization by the *Journal of the American Planning Association* in 1979 (Stegman, 1979) in which three of the ten articles dealt explicitly with gentrification (see Auger, 1979; Laska & Spain, 1979; and Smith, 1979). The issue was a byproduct of renewed Executive Branch interest in preserving urban housing stock beginning in 1976. The importance of this special supplement cannot be overstated as it marked a new agenda in planning research toward urban revitalization. When citing past literature on gentrification, scholars typically jump from 1964 to 1979, as if the prefatory phase produced nothing. I, too, skip over that first phase due to its lack of influence on present research.

A third, more present phase (or perhaps more accurately, a splintering) began sometime around 2000 and continues today. It is represented by smaller debates broadly organized around themes of equity-effects and empiricism. No longer contained to theories of cause and effect, this third phase is a mosaic of debates on how to empirically identify and measure gentrification, on planetary and international gentrification, on climate change, ecology, and gentrification, on schools and education, race and immigration, social justice, and more (see Table 1).

Table 1 Summary of Phase Three of Gentrification Research

Branch of Research	**Exemplary Articles**
Empirical Measurement and Models	Chapple, 2009; Freeman, 2005; Freeman & Braconi, 2004; Glaeser, Kim, & Luca, 2018; Hammel & Wyly, 1996; Hwang & Sampson, 2014; Reades, De Souza, & Hubbard, 2018
Planetary and International	Atkinson & Bridge, 2005; Bridge, 2007; Ghertner, 2011; 2014; Górczyńska, 2017; He, 2007; Ley & Teo, 2014; Murphy, 2008; Rofe, 2003; Slater, 2017; Smith, 1996; 2002; Tang, 2017; Wu, 2016
Climate Change and Ecology	Bouzarovski, Frankowski, & Tirado Herrero, 2018; Di Chiro, 2018; Dooling, 2009; Eckerd, 2011; Gould & Lewis, 2018; Harper, 2020; Murray, 2015; Pearsall, 2012; Quastel, 2009; Thompson, Johnson, & Hanes, 2016
School Location and Education	Keels, Burdick-Will, & Keene, 2013; Jordan & Gallagher, 2015; Pearman, 2018; Pearman & Swain, 2017
Race and Immigration	DeVerteuil, Yun, & Choi, 2017; Freeman & Cai, 2015; Hwang, 2015; 2016; Hwang & Sampson, 2014; Lees, 2016; Linz, 2017; Wyly & Hammel, 2004
Social Justice	Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2018; Hankins & Walter, 2011; Huber & Wolkenstein, 2018; Johnson, 2019; Lees, Annunziata, & Rivas-Alonso, 2018; Marcuse, 2015

This chapter focuses on the debates that constitute the second phase, around the question “what is the cause of gentrification?” and more specifically “what is the mechanism driving new economic investment in the urban built environment?” Debates are useful to understand the development of a specific knowledge. They present us with an opportunity to examine the negotiating and legislating forces that mold and reveal our eventual (social) facts with binocular vision, adding width and depth to our field of view. In this case, we will see how the Phase Two debates took Glass's context-reliant gentrification and transformed it into a pliable concept with universal applications.

While others (e.g., Hamnett, 1991; van Weesep, 1994; Shaw, 2008) have examined this research trajectory, most have not aimed to understand its legacy in contemporary urban studies. A few (Redfern, 1997; Lees, 2000) have tried to make sense of the debates by disentangling or downplaying the "adversarial patrolling". However, the antagonism is a key feature of the debates that offered attention and clout to its participants. The "truth" of gentrification as an embedded market process was established through the Phase Two debates, eschewing Glass's (1964) description of administrative and demographic causality. This diverges from typical coverage that views the debates as nothing more than a prelude to contemporary studies (J. Akers, personal communication, October 18, 2020). Contrary, the debates are an important foundation for the field of gentrification studies that defined and negotiated the epistemology of the concept in academic contexts in a way that narrowed the lines of inquiry. It was during this phase that the core assumption of gentrification—that it is a market-led process—was stabilized and accepted in the social sciences. At the time, this core assumption aligned with the dominant neoliberal ideology, leaving mitigation-through-policy as an afterthought. That core assumption carries today in gentrification literature and continues to hinder policy-driven mitigation strategies.

Phase Two Gentrification Debates as an Actor-Network Case Study

This analysis uses actor-network theory (ANT) to dissect the Phase Two gentrification debates. Examining the network of scholars active during this period like an exploded-view diagram uncovers the negotiations that defined gentrification. The goal of this analysis is to draw critical conclusions about the sequence of conversations that solidified gentrification's core assumptions and to expose researchers to an application of ANT for urban research. This ANT analysis shows how the academic debate on gentrification became divorced from the experience or phenomenon of gentrification.

The following section details the methodology of this analysis. After is an analysis of the Phase Two debates using ANT. A summary of findings and implications concludes this chapter.

Methodology

Actor-Network Theory: A Primer

Social constructivism stresses the important contributions of individuals working together (not necessarily congenially) to construct knowledge artifacts. One method that aligns with this approach is actor-network theory (ANT). ANT provides agency to all individuals in the progression of research. It accounts for the politics of academic knowledge, where "truth" is influenced as much by charisma and gravitas as it is by rigor. ANT views "truths" as "black boxes" masquerading as facts, where black boxes are the ongoing networks of knowledge rendered "invisible by [their] own success" (Latour, 1999, p. 304; see also Whitley, 1970). ANT pries open the black box to understand knowledge production as a social system of negotiation.

ANT states that accepted knowledge is created and supported by actor-networks, which are constituted of the people, facts, and theories that support knowledge. ANT posits that accepted knowledge is validated through debates, known in ANT as "trials of strength". In a trial of strength, researchers work to promote their contributions as valid and necessary while attacking conflicting work. The longer a “truth” (accepted knowledge) can withstand these attacks, the more resistant it is. Resistance, a function of structure (the actor-network supporting the accepted knowledge) and endurance (accepted knowledge’s ability to withstand attacks), determines reality (Latour, 1988). Through trials of strength, *translation* occurs. Translation is the process whereby an actor-network is collapsed by another, becoming a single entity that takes the place of said actor-network. If successful, translation is both an act of erasure and an act of recruitment. Translation permits an actor to reinterpret some node of the network to support and align with said actor’s own interests (Law, 1992).

Callon (1986) founded the “moments of translation” approach to ANT in his study of scallop fishermen interacting with research scientists in France. Studying those interactions, Callon identified four moments of translation (Callon’s findings in brackets):

1. Problematization: the principal actors [research scientists] define the problem facing a set of actors [fishermen, scallops, scientific community]. This establishes the principal actors as indispensable. It allows them to put forth a single solution [scallop breeding program] as the only way forward. This solution is the obligatory passage point (OPP).
2. Interessement: the principal actors interpose themselves on the network. They weaken links between other actors to force the acceptance of their proposed solution, the OPP [scallop breeding program is accepted as the best solution].
3. Enrollment: the principal actors operationalize interessement by defining the roles of the other actors in enacting the OPP [other actors become participants in the breeding program].

4. Mobilization: the principal actors become spokespeople for the network, legitimized by the passive support of the other actors [research scientists speak for the fishermen and scientific community in support of their scallop breeding program].

Each moment involves the displacement of interests. For instance, in the first phase, the fishermen's interest in short-term profit is displaced by the researchers' interest in long-term sustainability. The successful navigating of the moments of translation creates a power relationship that structures our understanding of the social and natural world. The sociology of translation suggests how the few come to speak for the many.

Using ANT to Understand the Conceptual Development of "Gentrification"

To understand the development of gentrification, I applied an interpretive case study framework with ANT to the academic journal articles that constitute the Phase Two gentrification debates. Given the stress ANT places on dissolving the boundary between social and natural world, or society and (in this case, discursive) technology, it is uniquely positioned to advance our understanding on how these worlds clash. ANT does have a growing presence in planning literature with a focus on understanding the transmission of information and practice (Healey, 2013; Neill, 2017; Rydin, 2012). Likewise, it is proven effective at untangling messy academic debates (Yonay, 1994; 1998). I apply it for the latter purpose.

Like Callon (1986) and Heeks and Stanforth (2015), I identified the principal actor that motivated the debates. I followed that actor as they interacted chronologically with other actors. Through narration, I made explicit those interactions and how they built upon each other. Retrospective interpretation of those interactions together allowed me to highlight and isolate nuances that were overlooked by other scholars (Sarker, Sarker, and Sidorova, 2006). The following three guiding principles (Callon, 1986) were applied to this analysis to aid objectivity:

1. Agnosticism: maintain impartiality towards the actors and their arguments.
2. Symmetry: describe conflicts with the same terminology.
3. Free Association: do not define an a priori distinction between nature and society.

Thus, I answered the following key questions to understand the development of the actor-network (the accepted cause of gentrification): who is the principal actor, who/what are the other actors, and how is the network connected and bounded?

My focus on academic writing produced a noticeable absence of thought from other spheres of knowledge production. I do not include articles from the press or interviews with long-time city residents on the subject of gentrification, for example. These perspectives may inform how gentrification was understood at the time, but not how the concept was forged as an academic construct. Likewise, I ignore current events. There is a valid argument to be made that Smith's understanding of neoliberalism and anti-urban austerity politics as Thatcher and Reagan rose to power influenced his perspective of capital-driven urban change. Though deserving of investigation, at the very least as a way to temporally contextualize the gentrification of the 1980s versus today, the argument is circumstantial. Finally, there are numerous scholars (e.g., Peter Marcuse) who participated in gentrification studies, both through articles and referenced conversations, that contributed to the development of our understanding of the concept; they are not included here because they did not directly wade into the debates of focus.

To bound the debates, I started with the 1979 *JAPA* special supplement and its renewed focus on urban revitalization. This is also where Smith's early paper first appeared. The ending of the debates is less clear. I chose 2002. I arrived here first by following the natural progression of the debates as outlined above. I then looked for an acknowledged shift in how gentrification was understood. Though most of the Phase Two debates wrapped up earlier, 2002 is a definitive shift in how gentrification is approached theoretically. Formerly an urban phenomenon, Neil Smith's article "New Globalism, New Urbanism" re-oriented gentrification as an urban governance strategy. Given the focus of this chapter on the becoming of gentrification as a constructed, discursive entity, 2002 is a suitable cut-off point.

The paper proceeds by reconstructing the debates, making explicit the connections between actors in defining gentrification as they engage over the merits of the rent gap theory. A discussion of the implications and significance of the debates follows.

Results

Actors and the Obligatory Passage Point

I identified the principal actor as Neil Smith. Smith is the principal actor because his early article (1979) marked the start of the Phase Two debates and his presence and influence continued in gentrification literature throughout the debates. Smith's rent gap theory is the obligatory passage point, or the answer to the question "what causes gentrification?" After Smith argued that the rent gap explains gentrification, two key causal pathways emerged as schools of thought: production- and consumption-side. Through narration, different actors emerge in context. Others (notably Hamnett, 1991) have ascribed leadership of the production-side to Smith, a geographer studying Philadelphia and New

York, and the consumption-side to David Ley, a geographer studying Vancouver. This is a useful distinction not only for simplicity and consistency but also to foreshadow their significance as actors and recruiters of allies throughout the debates.

As they respond to one another, Smith and Ley's respective supporters mostly fall in line (Figure 6). For example, Eric Clark, Smith's student, becomes a key ally for Smith.[21] Those supporters are actors in their own right. Cities, facts, and theories become actors as well. Urban change in New York and Philadelphia is contrasted to that of Vancouver. The legacy of Marx is put against that of Veblen. The rent gap theory in itself (the set of properties that constitute the theory) is separated from the rent gap's materialization (gentrification). So, too, is the Ley's new middle class jettisoned from itself, becoming a set of properties separate from its existence. In doing so, both theories became actors independent of their authors; this is the mechanism that facilitates their negotiation and development. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the debate itself becomes an actor. It is commented on, and in doing so, it recruits more commentary, allies, and adversaries, which pushes accepted knowledge forward. This all occurs at the expense of being untethered from the lived experience of gentrification.

21 While alliances between actors are not always stable or fully amenable, I do try to group their various works into buckets for intelligibility.

Figure 6 Simplified Genealogy of Phase Two Gentrification Debates



Translating the Gentrification Debates

The gentrification debates problematized the cause of gentrification. Two sides formed, understanding urban change as being caused through one of two pathways: production or consumption. Nestled deep within each side were more fundamental beliefs about the nature of gentrification as a distinct and significant urban process. The debates positioned the competing tenets of structure and agency as opposed, and as Hamnett (1991) observed, the debates served as a proxy debate between the efficacy of structural Marxist and liberal humanist methods for geographic inquiry.[22] While they coexisted, both sides spent effort trying to discredit the other. Thus, the debates attracted considerable attention for their theoretical significance and vitriol, though the latter made the topic a toxic theater hostile to wider contribution and divergent perspectives. The production-consumption dichotomy also limited the scope of inquiry. In doing so, their proxy battleground, gentrification, crystallized around a narrow spectrum of harshly defended ideas about urban political economy. I argue this narrowness of debate hindered effective policy action to counter the negative effects of gentrification for many years.

Problematizing The Cause of Gentrification

Production-Side Gentrification.

In 1979, Neil Smith, then a doctoral student at Johns Hopkins University working under preeminent Marxist geographer David Harvey, published “Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by Capital, not People”. Smith’s paper was a response to the first phase of gentrification research that sought to empirically document the process of middle-class improvement rather than working-class displacement. Smith chastises neoclassical land use theorists for suggesting (as an afterthought) consumer preference as causal: whereas suburbanization reflected the preference for space due to loosening economic constraints, gentrification reflected a yet unspecified preference that the inner city could satisfy (1979, p. 539). Similarly, the cultural explanations for gentrification focused on patterns of consumption, often tied to shifting social preferences. Here, social preference functions as a catch-all for

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22 Smith and Ley, among many others, commented on this debate more explicitly, though not in conversation (see Duncan & Ley, 1982; Smith, 1987a). Vera Chouinard (1997) provides an excellent exposition on the structure and agency debates.

delayed marriage, reduced natality, social exploration, and anything else that may decrease the desirability for single-family, suburban homes (Smith, 1979, p. 538; see also Ley, 1981; Lipton, 1977; Winters, 1978). He specifically targets a paper presented by David Ley (1978) which failed to draw a fine line between individual and collective consumer preference dynamics. Smith aimed to break out of these under-theorized explanations.

Recruiting hearty intellectual bulwark, Smith builds on consumer sovereignty theory (Hutt, 1990 [1936]), historical materialism (Marx, 1990 [1867]), Hoyt's analysis of Chicago land markets (1933), and Alfred Marshall's magnum opus (2013 [1890]; see also Bourassa, 1993; Clark, 1987), to posit the rent gap theory vis-à-vis a historical analysis of localized neighborhood decline mechanisms (redlining, blockbusting, rentiership, landlordism, abandonment).

> The rent gap is the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use…Gentrification occurs when the gap is wide enough that developers can purchase shells cheaply, can pay the builders' costs and profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and can then sell the end product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory return to the developer. (1979, p. 545)

This redefinition of the cause of gentrification expanded the scope of the problem. Not to be contained to consumers in place, Smith's conception suggests that gentrification is a change in the built urban condition brought upon by continually restructuring economic production. So while Smith focused mostly on the role of developers, a diversity of uncredited actors contributes to the opening and closing of the rent gap: banks, realtors, corporations (especially headquarters as spatially sticky drivers of housing demand), the government, and of course, individuals as incumbents or speculators (Feagin, 1986). All of these actors play a role in the production of space, though the failure to explicitly account for them would prove to be a point of penetration for critics of Smith and his rent gap theory.

Consumption-Side Gentrification.

Looking back, two scholars championed shifting consumption patterns as the causal pathway for gentrification. David Ley expanded the near-synonym of gentrification—inner-city revitalization—to account for new consumer preferences (1981). At the time, but writing from Brooklyn, sociologist Sharon Zukin[23] began calling attention to the artistic mode of production, a means to stabilize or increase neighborhood value through cultural value capture and amalgamation (1982a). Not possible without artists, Zukin also identified an equal need by those culture creators to find community: “the residential conversion of loft buildings, like the gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods, derives as much from a search for *placement* as from a search for *place*” (1982b, p. 259, emphasis in original).

These agent-driven approaches to gentrification would be further calloused by Ley’s “new middle class”, a Weberian schematic of urban social class. This new middle class is both sociologically and geographically distinct—liberal, educated, young, and located in central cities. This class is a product of the postindustrial city’s dual labor market—the simultaneous expansion of professional-managerial positions and unskilled service positions with little in between (Bell, 1973). Ley outlines how these demographic shifts have become visible in Canadian cities, focusing on local elections. He argues that

23 Zukin positions herself in line with Smith, considering culture as a structural practice of consumption and accumulation (see also Lees, 1994). I place her on the consumption side because she tends to be cited more from that side of the debate. A second caveat is that “consumption” in the gentrification context most commonly refers to the production of gentrifiers and of culture. Consumption is somewhat derogatory and indicative of a perceived misguided belief in the same way that market fundamentalism is a pejorative smear against *laissez-faire* capitalism.

increasingly adversarial politics are indicative of shifting cultural consumption in favor of an urbane lifestyle. That is to say, gentrification is a byproduct of shifting lifestyle choices and more conspicuous consumption patterns (Ley, 1986; 1994; see also Veblen, 1994 [1899]). Like Smith, this conception ignores the diverse institutional actors that play a part in gentrification. And like Smith, this would be a point of penetration for Ley's critics.

Interessement: David Ley versus Neil Smith

The 1979 HUD Symposium on Neighborhood Revitalization in the *Journal of the American Planning Association* kicked off Phase Two of gentrification research. Rather rare before the issue, studies on gentrification and urban revitalization became increasingly common in its wake. No paper was more influential than Smith's "Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement of Capital, Not People" (1979) which begged the question: what is the cause of gentrification? This redefined the problem facing gentrification studies away from its effects. Smith answered his question with the rent gap theory, the obligatory passage point, based on his observation of Philadelphia's real estate market. By defining and answering the question, Smith, the principal actor, made himself and his theory indispensable to current work on gentrification.

Many of the early responses explicitly looked to interrogate and test Smith's rent gap or fill in and theorize the landscape of actors that Smith alluded to but failed to name. A prime example is Damaris Rose's simultaneous complimenting and critiquing of Smith's work (1984). She cherishes Smith for realizing that gentrification is "not reducible to the behaviour of individuals" (Rose, 1984, p. 50) but equally criticizes his work for subjugating the role of gentrifiers (individuals) as secondary. She compliments the rent gap's anti-positivist construction, which allows for both historical and structural explanation—Smith's paper is exemplary of Marxian attitude. On the other hand, and consistent with trending postmodern thought, she derides Smith for seeking out a single, universal explanation. Rose calls for a theory of gentrification that integrates changes in social production with changes in the production of labor power (social reproduction); that is, the production of gentrifiers and their explicit consumption and reproduction practices. Likewise, she calls for the integration of theoretical and empirical methods of inquiry.

David Ley heeded Rose's call, among others (see Hamnett, 1984; Williams, 1984), and in 1986 attempted to integrate the two approaches. Using empirical data from Canada's 22 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) between 1971 and 1981, Ley tested four theorized explanations of gentrification. Among those tested explanations was Smith's rent gap. Ley: "Evidence is entirely lacking in Canadian cities for the rent gap thesis; indeed, if anything, gentrification has occurred in inner cities with *higher* inner-city–CMA house-price ratios" (p. 531, emphasis in original). The attack produced a response from Smith that follows in the next subsection.

However, before continuing, it is important to note that at this point Ley has abandoned his "inner-city revitalization" concept in favor of "gentrification". At this moment, whether or not Smith and Ley agree is second to the fact that "gentrification" is accepted as the common conceptual terrain to understand "revitalizing" urban investment patterns, and Smith's rent gap is at the center of this battle. And while Ley does not agree with the rent gap theory, he is engaged with it as a dominant explanation for gentrification. In doing so, the Canadian setting that offered perspective for Ley is weakened because Ley is now operating in the broader North American context dominated by Smith. Despite this, Smith's market-led definition of gentrification is yet to be accepted more widely.

Enrollment: Neil Smith versus David Ley

By this point, Smith had asserted himself as a prominent urban scholar working from a Marxian perspective. His work focused on gentrification, the production of space (especially nature) and the history of geographic thought. Within each was a strong anti-establishment tendency that infected geography with new, critical perspectives on urban political economy and ecology. This brash, often acerbic view of the field enabled Smith to continue pushing and defending his rent gap theory as the accepted cause of market-led gentrification.

Returning to the debates, Smith fired back at Ley in a scathing commentary in 1987(b). "In fact, the problem lies first and foremost not with the rent gap thesis nor with Canadian cities but with Ley's comprehension and operationalization of the concepts of gentrification and rent gap" (Smith, 1987b, p. 462). The rent gap "is most likely to occur in areas experiencing a sufficiently large gap between actual and potential land values" (Smith, 1987b, p. 464), not simply absolute housing costs as Ley suggests. Smith levies another critique against Ley in the short commentary. To Smith, Ley does a poor job of defining gentrification, as "change in household social status, independent of the housing stock involved" (Ley, 1986, p. 562) instead of as economic change driving sociospatial change. Smith calls this simplification "conceptual reductionism" towards a "self-fulfilling hypothesis" (Smith, 1987b, p. 463), and in doing so begins to sketch out the epistemological bounds of gentrification that are divorced from place but encompass a wide range of fundamentally economic activities.

Ley was afforded an opportunity to respond to Smith's commentary and took it; his reply directly followed Smith in the same issue of the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (1987). Ley first addresses the critique on defining and measuring gentrification. While Ley's definition may "define away" economic change (no mention of physical change, however), more than half of the empirical variables are economic. Ley also takes careful time to justify his use of education and occupation rather than income or rent variables, calling Smith's critique of the former "arbitrary fiat, representing a minority voice in a larger literature" (Ley, 1987, p. 465).

Ley then aims squarely at Smith's "anxious" defense of the rent gap. Not only was the rent gap a minor part of Ley's paper, but it also may not have been worth including at all. Citing Hamnett, Rose, and Williams (1984; 1984; 1984), Ley notes that Smith's rent gap "framework has not fared well in recent reviews" (Ley, 1987, p. 466). And after ten years, the framework "has still not been made empirically accountable"; "Smith…has no empirical results of his own to report" (Ley, 1987, p. 466). Ley goes on to suggest that the rent gap cannot be operationalized as currently theorized; Smith fuses capitalized ground rent with land use, an apparent contradiction. Finally, Ley compares the "sufficiently large gap between actual and potential land values" to simple profit potential: "This bears striking similarity to neoclassical accounts of developer behavior and as such it is a claim that can be assessed using conventional indicators" (1987, p. 468).

Eric Clark (1987), a student of Smith's, attempted to put the latter claims to rest with his study of land values in Malmo, Sweden. As Smith's ally, Clark first grounds the rent gap in historical land rent theories, placing Smith in conversation with classicists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, neoclassicist Alfred Marshall, and Marxists David Harvey and Michael Ball. On its own, this is legitimizing as it recruits and enrolls the support of more prestigious disciplines and scholars (see Yonay 1994; 1998). Then through case studies and using tax and property records compiled between 1886 and 1985, Clark measures capitalized land rents and infers potential land rents to identify rent gaps in six areas of the city. Analysis of these gaps, combined with a rich historical description of the areas, yielded a major finding that rent gaps are created by local controlling agents, sometimes developers sometimes not, before and leading up to development. Vindication? This applied defense of the rent gap did not put the issue to rest.

Smith (1987c) also responded to the debates with a new article where he attempts to reconcile theories of gentrification as social restructuring (see Beauregard, 1986; Rose, 1984; Williams, 1986) and as economic restructuring (see Aglietta, 1979; Harvey, 1985; Smith, 1984). He explicitly critiques, and accepts, Ley's "new middle class" with the caveat that the "present day counterpart of Veblen's leisure class…is a shallow empirical abstraction…incapable of sustaining theoretical scrutiny" (Smith, 1987c, pp. 165–166). Yet, it is this theory that Smith incorporates into his loose sketch for a comprehensive theory of gentrification, one that nests social restructuring under economic restructuring: "The economic restructuring that followed economic collapse has also been accompanied by a social restructuring in which a new cleavage is being asserted [between the new middle class and industrial and service workers]" (1987c, p. 170). To Smith, the "consumption dream" is, at its core, economic.

In "translating" and incorporating Ley's work into his own, Smith unseated Ley as the key antagonist of the rent gap theory. Instead, he redefined Ley's role as a contributor and refiner of rent gap theory and gentrification as a whole. He does the same for the other theorists: Aglietta, Beauregard, Harvey, Rose, and Williams. Clark, Smith's student, stepped in on his own accord as an ally of Smith's. Clark expanded rent gap theory to Europe with a valid, empirical defense that was long-sought by critics. This further divorced Smith's rent gap from its Philadelphia roots, moving it a step closer to universal explanation. More than that, Clark adds legitimacy to Smith's work by recruiting allies from the more respected discipline of economics.

This enrollment of new actors supports Smith's definition of gentrification as a process defined by restructuring economic production.

Mobilization: Chris Hamnett versus Neil Smith

By incorporating Ley's work, Smith had already become somewhat of a spokesperson for gentrification. This comes to a peak after Chris Hamnett attempted to tie up a decade's worth of theories on gentrification in his 1991 article, "The Blind Men and the Elephant: The Explanation of Gentrification." Like Rose five years before, Hamnett is critical of both one-sided approaches to gentrification. He considers the prominence of those approaches to be a result of gentrification's standing as a theoretical and ideological battleground, "one of the main arenas of conflict between the proponents of culture, preference and human agency, and the proponents of the imperatives of capital and profitability" (1991, p. 174). Spending several pages critiquing both Ley and Smith, much of which had already been levied, Hamnett does offer one key advancement. Neither side truly considers the role of individual action, instead relying on collective or class action to create a pool of "gentrifiers" lacking spatial qualities. Hamnett argues, opposite of Smith, that individual consumption preferences drive economic restructuring, and they can be integrated into gentrification theory. He concludes by quoting Eric Clark: "If it is so that there is empirical support for all these theories, can we arrive at an understanding of the ways in which they stand in a logical relation of *complementarity*?" (qtd. in Hamnett, 1991, p. 188, emphasis in original).

Hamnett's article is a key moment of significance for this actor-network. In the process of assigning agency to Smith and Ley as the blind men in Aesop's fable, Hamnett references the gentrification debates. The debates, formerly a discourse on gentrification, became an object of meaning and substance themselves, an event in this history of scholarship that can be referenced and commented on. Referencing the Smith-Ley debates tidies up ten years of ruthless chatter and refinements, black boxing what is otherwise a rich negotiation of facts and theories. And if there was any doubt about who was king of gentrification, Hamnett's mythification of Smith was all that was needed to solidify his stature as *the* gentrification scholar.

Always quick to defend his rent gap theory, Smith quickly published an operose response to Hamnett's "roguish stomp through recent and not so recent writing" (Smith, 1992, p. 110). Smith admits that the rent gap was one-sided, a deliberate attempt to unseat the neoliberal hegemony dominating early gentrification studies. And it was an effort to demonstrate one "expression of class power within the urban land market" (Smith, 1992, p. 114). However, it was never an attempt to be solely explanatory—or at least *Smith* never made that claim in the 1979 paper. Speaking for himself and Ley, Smith faults Hamnett for not considering the intellectual growth rent gap theory achieved through the debates, calling Hamnett's piece "anti-intellectual reductionism" and "opportunistic, knee-jerk anti-marxism" (Smith, 1992, p. 111).

Finally, Smith critiques Hamnett's "most explicit and most polemical assertion of philosophical individualism *vis-a-vis* gentrification" (1992, p. 112, emphasis in original). That is, Hamnett's assertion that gentrification is, in part, a process undertaken by individuals. Smith claims that gentrification is the result of collective social action—one non-State, non-developer individual cannot gentrify a neighborhood alone. For Smith, social class is the point of entry for understanding urban political economy. Smith makes sure not to offer any credit to Hamnett for spurring this refinement.

Hamnett responded as Smith predicted in his response,[24] choosing to focus on "the arguments not the adjectives" (Hamnett, 1992, p. 116). Clarifying that he is not an anti-intellectual nor an anti-Marxist, Hamnett teases out the middle-ground from Smith's critique. He was not and is not arguing for individualism at the expense of all other work, he is only "opposed to overstatement of the case for structural collectivities at the expense of any role for individual or collective social agency" (Hamnett, 1992, p. 117). He shows where Smith, in past research, conflated individuals with developers (i.e., "occupier developers") as a means to ignore consumption practices. And, following Warde (1991), he shows that Smith ignores the coincidence of individual action that constitutes collective action related to urban restructuring. The key question resulting: how much agency do individuals have in constructing their own consumption preferences? Though theoretically significant, the question is ultimately beyond the scope of Smith's focus of presenting gentrification as an economic process; Smith never responded.

Globalizing Gentrification: A New Problematization

The New Urban Frontier, Smith's 1996 book on gentrification, was the culmination of these debates and growing pains. The book includes revised and original texts that build out and cement his argument. First, he examines theories of gentrification at local and global scales. Second, he applies these theories to three cases. Finally, he uses the opportunity to propose the revanchist city, a response to what we may call the broken windows era in New York City: the anti-poor, anti-immigrant, anti-minority ethos framed as anti-crime. As he pivots away from

24 "Suffice it to say that I obviously have no power to 'determine' Chris Hamnett's choices in life, 'totally' or otherwise, but I *do* feel confident in predicting that he will make a perfectly free choice to reply to this commentary" (Smith, 1992, p. 114, emphasis in original).

gentrification and towards policy, Smith calls for the integration of production- and consumption-side theories to gentrification, echoing calls from others (see Boyle, 1995; Hamnett, 1991) who knew all along that these theories were two-sides of the same coin.

In the Introduction to this chapter, I showed many of the spin-off conversations that occurred after 1996. The first discriminant measurement model to identify gentrification within a city using readily available data appeared in 1996 as an improvement to earlier surveys and aggregated statistical approaches. Notwithstanding that model, the big post-debate moment is 2002. Smith takes a cue from Hammel (1999) and Lees (2000), publishing "New Globalism, New Urbanism". The article breaks with the earlier, local takes on gentrification to outline a new theory of revanchist urbanism, where gentrification becomes the implicit strategy of urban governance to "reclaim" the city (see also Smith, 1996). In his conception of revanchist urbanism, capital production comes to dominate social reproduction; the former evicts the latter as the defining feature of urban scale. Smith, the principal actor, reinvents the concept of gentrification as an agent of globalized neoliberalism, ending the Phase Two debates about the causes of gentrification. A new problematization begins the next phase of gentrification inquiry by asking what is the geography of gentrification? While Smith remains synonymous with gentrification, gentrification is no longer synonymous with Smith. However, gentrification remains a concept defined by capital production and neoliberal policy.

Implications of Phase Two Debates on Phase Three Gentrification Research.

Table 1 (page 51) shows a sample of articles representing a subset of splintering gentrification conversations that occurred after the Phase Two debates took place. More than three-quarters (81.4%) of that sample references Smith's work, over half (53.5%) references Ley's work, and nearly a quarter (23.3%) references the Phase Two debates. From a broad view, this newer work on gentrification still views individual and social practices as reflective of structural economic relationships. This view is harshly defended. Gentrification research that does not center capital, class, and power, or its effects—economic disinvestment and displacement—is derided for its lack of "critical perspective" (see Slater, 2006). However, across the Phase Three branches, the influence of Phase Two is more disparate; Table 2 summarizes those effects which range from the explicit engagement with Phase Two research to the implicit operationalization of gentrification as a primarily market-led process.

Table 2 Summary of Phase Two's Influence on Phase Three of Gentrification Research

Branch of Research	**Phase Two's Influence**
Empirical Measurement and Models	Rely on economic variables to identify and measure gentrification
Planetary and International	Explicitly extend and apply rent gap to global scale as Smith (2002) suggested; consider the role of the State as a primary driver of private development
Climate Change and Ecology	Implicitly use rent gap to comprehend the appropriation of latent environmental resources by public officials and private investors for economic gain
School Location and Education	Explore the role of school choice on urban housing and transportation demand, as well as workforce development
Race and Immigration	Center racial hierarchies in conjunction with policy changes to understand surging urban capital investment and residential succession
Social Justice	Center social class to understand the role of public policy as both a driver and mitigator of gentrification's inequitable economic effects

Implications on Urban Policy: A Counterfactual.

The Phase Two debates established gentrification as a market-led process. This occurred during and aligned with the rise of neoliberal policy that prescribed to supply-side economic theories. Smith's rent gap, a supply-side theory, ascribed agency to the market as the cause of gentrification. Whether or not he intended this, the market fundamentalist ethos—or the unwavering faith in market efficiency—would preclude any strong policy measures to counter the negative effects of gentrification. Instead, gentrification was framed as an inevitable and welcomed prescribed burn for urban blight. Rather than requiring massive state intervention for urban renewal projects, the free market could accomplish the same feat *efficiently*.

Gentrification reframed as a policy issue caused by weak property rights leading to negative externalities for the displaced could have captured the attention of policy-makers guided by the principle of strong property rights prescribed by the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990). The Washington Consensus is a series of ten guiding principles for neoliberal policy that aimed to develop a strong middle-class with entrenched family values. This ideology believes a rising tide lifts all boats. However, demonstrating that the tide only lifts those who *have* boats, leading to the demise of the unified middle-class, would likely have caused state concern and intervention. And in fact, Phase Three of gentrification research has turned towards studying the policy-relevant consequences of gentrification.

To capture policy-attention by focusing only on causes, as the Phase Two debates do, would require research focused on how state-intervention and the Washington Consensus principles facilitated gentrification. Restrictive zoning, preservation policies, and greenbelts artificially inflate costs by strictly controlling land use in ways that only benefit property owners; Minneapolis countered this thinking by abolishing single-family zoning across the city (Minneapolis City Council, 2019). Research could have focused on residents and small businesses being priced-out as a cause of displacement, whether it be through higher taxes, more general cost of living increases, or loss of potential customers. One solution to pricing-out is a tax cut for long-time residents. Residents who have lived in the same place for over five years, regardless of tenure-type, are shown to be more engaged citizens and pillars of strong communities (McCabe, 2016). Finally, work showing that financial liberalization and blanket-encouragement of foreign direct investment into the economy caused gentrification and instability in the housing market may also appeal to neoliberal policy-makers (Nelson & Hines, 2018; Schlichtman, 2020; Smith, 2002). As we know now, this instability and reregulation would eventually lead to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis as the market failed to curb demand for capital to purchase US housing (Krippner, 2011).

Conclusion

Prevailing wisdom suggests that these debates served as little more than a prelude to the current scholarship on gentrification. This is justified if one considers the integration of the production and consumption perspectives as always foregone, a logical conclusion. In hindsight, it was always foregone. However, this significant, oversimplified conclusion hides developments that transpired over seventeen years. The debates were exclusionary as they fixated on a narrow set of perceived incompatibilities, preventing wider urban growth discourse from taking place. That limited discourse also prevented effective policy work from taking place, as a gentrification became widely as a free-market process in alignment with dominant neoliberal ideology. The debates are a boundary that constrains contemporary gentrification studies. I emphasize again the process of refining Smith's market-led explanation of gentrification and its legacy on policy and future research. The process took place over four phases: problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization.

The first phase was most unorganized. It defined the question: what mechanism is causing new real estate investment in cities? David Ley suggested shifting consumer preference as the cause of inner-city revitalization; Neil Smith suggested shifting patterns of economic production as expressed through the rent gap theory as the cause of gentrification. Both theories are economic in nature, differing in agency. The rent gap is made to be the obligatory passage point or the solution that must be addressed.

In the second phase, interessement, David Ley attempts to test the rent gap theory among others. His engagement with the rent gap theory is legitimizing, even though his results contradict the theory itself. In the process, Ley abandons his “inner-city revitalization” language in favor of “gentrification” showing acceptance of the term. Adopting gentrification collapsed two parallel conversations into one focused more broadly around economic determinism and patterns of urban investment.

The third phase, enrollment, is characterized by perhaps Smith’s harshest rhetoric and defenses of the rent gap. However, he also begins to refine his theory. Smith reinterprets Ley’s criticisms as a way to clarify and improve the rent gap theory while also turning Ley into an ally and supporter of the theory. This helps to further legitimize the rent gap theory on an international, or at least North American, scale. A student of Smith’s, Eric Clark, also steps in to suggest that the rent gap theory has an impressive genealogy. These negotiations and refinements expand and validate the rent gap theory. To remain commensurate, “gentrification” also expands to describe all growth and revitalization as a catch-all concept.

In the fourth and final phase, mobilization, Chris Hamnett enters the conversation. In his attempts to wrap up and critique the lengthy exchange between Smith and Ley, he mythifies both characters. Smith steps in to speak for the growth that both he and Ley achieved in refining the definition and causes of gentrification. Smith continued to define gentrification as a process caused by restructuring economic production. When Hamnett accepts this definition and moves to critique a smaller part of the rent gap theory, Smith does not respond. He succeeded in channeling the gentrification conversation around the structural Marxian interpretations of urban growth that persist to this day in both academic literature and common understanding.

The rent gap is released from its prison as the obligatory passage point in 2002 when Smith reformulates gentrification as an urban strategy rather than a local economic anomaly. It is still market-led, but its scale is redefined to accommodate decentralized investment activity rather than centralized social reproduction. This assertion created a new opportunity for problematization around a new question: what is the geography of gentrification? In response to the question, new debates splintered out in various directions. While the Phase Two debates constrained paths of inquiry, they did not exhaust the possibilities (Wyly & Hammel, 1999, p. 718). The debates endowed a concept capable of enlisting support for the critique of the structural and systemic issues facing cities, and especially those issues frustrating, suppressing, and eliminating poorer and minority residents. It is a means to comprehend and embed urban political economy in the routine of everyday life. However, the market-led approach espoused by the debates continues to dominant gentrification studies. This approach hinders alternative mitigation strategies that locate the cause of gentrification outside of the free market. Notably, it will remain difficult to envision gentrification as a byproduct of municipal governance and urban planning practice if we continue to predominantly ascribe agency to the market. This failure will continue to protect municipal governance regimes and urban planning practice from needing to meaningfully address the gentrifications they are responsible for.

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Chapter 4 Framing Gentrification: How Austin Locals Discursively Construct a Displacing Development

Introduction

September 2018. An Austin planning commission meeting. Anti-gentrification protesters pelted a local real estate attorney with plastic snakes. The attorney represented a partnership of developers attempting to rezone a large parcel in southeast Austin. Security moved towards the protesters, who continued to chant and yell as they were escorted from City Hall.

"I don't want to pretend like that didn't just happen," a commissioner said after asking if city staff had reached out to the group of young people.

"It definitely did just happen. It's happened before, and it will probably happen again" another commissioner responded.

A staff member chimed in: "I would hardly call [the protesters] representative of the community" (qtd. in Sans, 2018).

This exchange was characteristic of the year-and-a-half-long battle between activists, officials, and a developer to rezone a 97-acre parcel in Austin's East Riverside-Oltorf neighborhood (see Figure 7, page 97), making way for a multi-phase redevelopment project. The developer proposed to replace over 1,300 affordable housing units with 4,700 luxury units; the rezoning would permit greater height and density to fully realize the latter figure.

Heated debates over local development are far from rare (Berman, 1982; Gibson, 2004a; 2004b; Lowes, 2002) and increasingly, neither are debates about gentrification (Doering, 2020; Henderson, 2015; Hyra & Prince, 2015; Smith, 1996). Often, the two phenomena are incorrectly lumped together as synonyms, even though they are far from equal (Slater, 2004a). While both involve the restructuring and “upgrading” of urban space, gentrification is distinct because it induces a suite of equity issues stemming from the displacement of incumbent residents. These issues are exacerbated by historic practices like urban renewal and redlining and structural constraints (see Reed, 1999). Though the line between development and gentrification can be blurry, this development in Austin is a clear-cut a case of gentrification (defined as redevelopment with displacement). A wealthy developer is aggressively displacing tenants to capitalize on potential land rent, and city officials are not only supportive of the development but dismissive of vocal opponents. It is prototypical developer-led gentrification:[25] a contest of space, economics, and politics.

This is a case about how competing local actor-groups with varying command over political power—through capital, social, or system—understand the consequences of gentrification in their community. Departing from previous studies (Brown-Sacarino & Rumpf, 2011; Gibson, 1994a; Modan & Wells, 2015; Tolfo & Doucet, 2020), this case study changes the unit of analysis from the press to the speaker as a representative of a stakeholder group. Do competing groups frame “gentrification” and its consequences differently in their respective discourses? What are the material effects of those different frames? As part of a larger series on discursive approaches to gentrification studies, this chapter develops conceptual frames to investigate how representatives of different groups spoke about gentrification relating to an application for rezoning put forth by a large developer in Austin’s East Riverside neighborhood. This city and site were chosen for their visibility in the local media. Austin may be unique for its rapid growth, but the local response to development is quite ordinary. Following a description of

25 There is heated debate on who or what causes gentrification. Individuals, the state, and the market, among others, have also been identified as culprits.

the development and site history, the article will turn towards understanding the public discourses that emerged as the developer applied for and negotiated the bureaucratic process of rezoning their parcel. What exposure do different frames have? Were frames covered differently by different media outlets? How is gentrification understood by each group and how does each group understand themselves? Are frames deployed at different scales?

A concluding section will briefly summarize the findings. Drawing predominantly on Davis' (1991) framework of conflict consciousness and Mele (2000) poetics and urban materiality, this case study investigates how different groups understand a displacing development in their community by examining a corpus of news media coverage, a key source of information about local events and conflict.

Following a discussion of relevant literature and previous research using media, I outline my methods. I then present a holistic view of the extra-market site and development history to provide a comprehensive context, very much like Ruth Glass did in her description of gentrification in London (1964). Next, I conduct the frame analysis on my sample of media coverage to show how local actors understand the consequences of gentrification in their community. This chapter concludes with a discussion of findings and implications.

Theory and Previous Research

Urban Studies and Conflict Consciousness

Given the ubiquity of this developer-led gentrification paradigm, one might expect a rich oeuvre of urban studies literature investigating related group conflict consciousness: how does group awareness affect the protection or pursuit of their property interests, where threats to interests are perceived at the group level (Davis, 1991, p. 83)? With few exceptions that focus on gentrification discourse and group conflict (Curran, 2004; Mele, 2000; Slater, 2002), urban studies have largely ignored the perspectives of those experiencing and contributing to gentrification. Instead, the discipline tends to favor theoretical interventions and case studies highlighting the mechanisms, dynamics, and inequities of gentrification (for a broad overview, see Lees, Slater, & Wyly, 2007)—rightfully so as these realms contain the most prolific debates that have advanced our understanding of the phenomenon. The literature explicitly focused on actor-understanding tends to favor a narrow perspective-as-counternarrative rather than a holistic or comprehensive understanding from many viewpoints. For example, Slater (2004b) undermines the conception of gentrification as an emancipatory project undertaken by a cohesive, suburbia-repressed middle-class (Caulfield 1989; 1994). Instead, he presents a more realistic conception of gentrification in Toronto that is rife with intra- and inter-group social tensions undertaken by multiple, fractured classes.

There are few examinations of conflict consciousness induced by gentrification that bear fruit to better understand this manifestation and understanding of the process and its pronounced equity and residential displacement features. Curran (2004) examines gentrification conflict by focusing on intergroup relationships. She triangulates an understanding of gentrification by focusing on the tensions between the city-as-economy, industrial workers, and commercial landlords in Brooklyn’s Williamsburg. There, narratives degrading of physical labor by representatives of the deindustrializing city illustrate the reliance on gentrification as a general strategy of economic development (see also Smith, 2002). Yet it is the same workers displaced by lapsed leases that are relied on for their ability to rehabilitate the neighborhood both physically and through an authenticated reputation. Postindustrial Brooklyn has no place for its working-class to live despite an image that is inextricably made by hand. The workers, for their part, maintain an allegiance and love for their urban, though they acknowledge the feeling is not mutual. Brooklyn's municipal officials view gentrification as inevitable, and so too the loss of "obsolete" and "nostalgic" industries.

In contrast, Slater (2002) makes sense of how narratives such as "postindustrial Brooklyn" fit into broader metaphors to comprehend gentrification. Focusing on two dominant conceptions of the "North American City"—the revanchist city and the emancipatory city; or city-as-tragedy and city-as-comedy—Slater argues that gentrification has spatial specificity that is actively reduced or eliminated through discursive formations. Gentrification is presented as placeless, despite its inherently spatial nature. These formations enable stakeholders to wield discourse with political leverage as a means to facilitate change in the built environment. Understanding the poetics and places of gentrification is critical to overcoming the distorting effects of discourse on how we as scholars and planners understand, contextualize, and attempt to solve problems. One way to do this is to make explicit the processes by which cities come to wear discourse as contestable cloaks of possibility and limitation. For instance, Mele (2000) identifies how stakeholders in early 20th century New York City used discourse to reframe the gentrification of working-class space as part of a larger effort consistent with early twentieth-century rational planning. Efforts by real estate actors had the threefold effect of a) defining redevelopment as normal and beneficial, b) legitimizing the often-violent process and tremendous social costs of gentrification, and c) creating a new place identity. Symbolic practices have a material effect on the built environment, the magnitude of which is certainly tied to political power. These strategies to manipulate conflict consciousness appear at the site in Austin. In conjunction with Davis's typology of domestic property interests (1991), the motivations behind framing strategies by each group can be identified.

Using Frames to Understand Discourse on Gentrification

Implicit in Mele's analysis is a focus on discursive *frames*, a valuable theoretical lens through which to interpret the meaning in concept constructions (Schön & Rein, 1994). Frames are the static rhetorical devices used to bound debate and select or omit relevant evidence (or goals). They are sense-making devices to define parameters. To construct frames, actors undertake the political process of *framing* (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Through framing, we can understand how different agents understand, interact with, and employ the term "gentrification" for their various agendas. For example, activists employ words to alter power relationships—"gentrification" may become a symbol of cultural struggle and historic oppression rather than simple redevelopment. In this way, words can be tools to rally popular support and oppose developments that fail to benefit existing residents by swaying popular opinion with digestible quips or by demonstrating solidarity.

To better comprehend stakeholder action (including discursive action), we must understand the nature of stakeholder interests. For-profit developer interests are fairly straightforward, tied to maximizing return on investment. In this context, the city has an interest in remaining competitive on multiple scales and thus works with an entrepreneurial spirit to capture private investment in the built environment (Harvey, 2001; Molotch, 1976; Peck, 2005). And Davis (1991) helps make sense of grassroots activism and conflict consciousness by focusing on where people live. He argues community power is often built around domestic property interests, rather than class interests as traditionally theorized. This is because urban interests are fundamentally spatial: "any given parcel of land represents an interest and any given locality is thus an aggregate of land-based interests" (Molotch, 1976, p. 310). Davis created a typology of locality-based interests that can be further divided into accommodative and accumulative interests based on the functions of property (Table 3). Accommodative interests are those concerned with property *use* like security and amenity while accumulative interests are those concerned with *exchange* like equity and liquidity. Latent antagonism between these interests drives local conflict as well as corresponding organization and resistance. While Davis applied his framework to competing grassroots groups, a tension between outlined interests exists as a cleavage between grassroots groups fighting displacement and the developer and municipal agents of urban "progress." This suggests an interest-based explanation for discursive action that supports a deeper understanding of frame selection. I use this as a starting point typologize actor groups and understand their respective frame selections.

Table 3 Domestic Property Interest Groups

Tenurial relations	*Do not own domestic property* (Nonowners)			*Do own domestic property* (Owners)						
Functional relations	*Neither accommodation nor accumulation* (Homeless)	*Accommodation* (Tenants)		*Both accommodation and accumulation* (Owner-occupiers)			*Accumulation* (Property capitalists)			
Domestic property interests	(Security)	Security Amenity	Security Amenity Autonomy	Security Amenity Autonomy Legacy (Liquidity) (Equity)	Security Amenity Autonomy Legacy Liquidity Equity	Equity Liquidity Amenity Autonomy Security Legacy	Liquidity Equity (Amenity)	Liquidity (Equity) (Amenity)	Equity (Liquidity)	Equity
Domestic property interest groups	Homeless	Public tenants	Private tenants	Social homeowners	Household homeowners	Acquisitive homeowners	Landlords	Financiers	Developers	Speculators

Note: Reprinted from *Contested Ground: Collective Action and the Urban Neighborhood* (p. 78) by J. E. Davis, 1991, Cornell University Press. Copyright 1991 by Cornell University.

Gentrification Studies Using Print Media as Data

As explained further, I study frames using a corpus of documents that includes many news studies. Print media is viewed as representative of public discourse because of how it catalogs debatable and contestable events (DiMaggio, Nag, & Blei, 2013). Previous gentrification studies have also analyzed the news media, but in different ways. For example, Gibson (1994a) leverages this feature, operationalizing the press to understand the perception of a redevelopment project in downtown Seattle. However, his unit of analysis was the press as an actor itself. Using content analysis on 154 local newspaper articles, Gibson aimed to understand the evolution of debate and consensus-making by the media. Gibson found that around issues with perceived consensus, articles were less critical and featured a narrow range of perspectives. The perspectives presented were mostly homogeneous and represented the civic and development elite. When issues were perceived as controversial, articles featured a wider array of perspectives and often included the voices of residents and local community organizations. In some cases, in-group disagreement amongst elites was presented. Gibson also found that development was presented as a non-controversial business early on in the process, but became controversial and political as the development process went on. The analysis is heavily-dependent on counts of media quote sources (i.e., business, public official, non-profit, or citizen) during different phases of the debate (i.e., negotiation, ultimatum, election, and aftermath).

New research has begun to connect press perception with gentrification; though, like Gibson (1994a), the focus remains on the press as an actor. Browns-Sacarino and Rumpf's analysis (2011) identified four media frames: critical, mixed, supportive, and neutral. There is an apparent relationship between content and frame; critical frames are more common under local conditions of early economic development, while supportive frames depict downtrodden residents with low-status occupations. Tolfo and Doucet (2020) find a similar diversity of perspectives that are both supportive and critical of gentrification. However, they also note that "gentrification is now squarely viewed through the perspective of main-stream, middle-class consumption, lifestyles, and challenges" (Tolfo & Doucet, 2020, p. 15). This could be because more affluent residents are increasingly feeling the effects of price pressures once felt only by the poorest urban residents (Hochstenbach, 2017). Modan and Wells (2015) examined how

Washington DC newspapers framed gentrification. They found that most descriptions of gentrification revolved around the process's semiotic characteristics: what it looks like and who is doing it. These descriptions failed to ascribe agency to civic and development leaders, or broader political and economic arrangements. Instead, gentrification is represented as a "simple, natural, cultural and agentless phenomenon" (Modan & Wells, 2015, p. 7). This case study changes the unit of analysis from the press as a whole to the speaker as a representative of a stakeholder group. This study also focuses primarily on how the consequences of gentrification are framed, rather than on sentiment related to gentrification.

Methods

This case study is about how competing local actor-groups understand the consequences of gentrification in their community. I used qualitative methods to collect and analyze quotes from several sources, including local news media and the rezoning application from Nimes Capital. Using Nexis Uni, I searched for articles directly related to the project and its rezoning application through one of its three names: 4700 East Riverside, Project Catalyst, and Domain on Riverside. I collected 25 newspaper articles published between September 23, 2016 (project announcement) and February 3, 2020 (latest coverage, likely due to Covid-19). The major outlets represented were *Austin Chronicle* (7), *Austin Business Journal* (6), and *Austin Monitor* (6). The remaining articles came from local news affiliates, the *Austin American-Statesman, UT News*, and *Texas Observer*. An expanded search of Google identified independent newspapers, blogs, and social media posts with commentary on the development. Notable is *Incendiary News* with 12 articles on the rezoning application. *Incendiary News* is an independent online press with favorable coverage of activists and equally harsh rhetoric directed towards the developer and City; they exist outside of the growth machine paradigm (Logan & Molotch, 1987) that may color the more mainstream outlets. Even so, print media has a tendency to be one-sided and mediating those differences in coverage may come at the cost of losing more nuanced perspectives that come from in-depth qualitative interviews. Finally, I found the rezoning application and meeting minutes for subsequent public hearings on the matter through the city website. The rezoning application has statements from the developer and invaluable pages of comment cards authored by residents. In total, I have a corpus containing 65 documents.

I organized the documents chronologically in an Excel spreadsheet to understand the media development of the project narrative. After reading each document, I documented all quotations from the corpus and coded by media source, speaker, and keywords. I categorized speakers over two rounds. The initial categories were 1) Resident, 2) Public Official, 3) Developer, 4) Activist, 5) Organizer, 6) Local Business, 7) Student, 8) Non-Profit, and 9) Artist. These categories captured the full range of comments represented in the corpus. For ease of analysis, they were collapsed to 1) Resident, 2) Public Official, 3) Developer, 4) Activist, 5) Organizer, 6) Local Business where Student was combined with Resident, Non-Profit was combined with Organizer, and Artist was combined with Local Business. A speaker was categorized as such if they were directly quoted or paraphrased in an article.

I determined sentiment by speaker and context. If a quote was explicitly for or against the project, I classified it as such. If a quote was not explicitly for or against the project, I classified it as neutral. The only exceptions to this scheme were Developer and Activist which I classified as all for or against the development, respectively. I made this choice because in this case the Developer is always working to advance the project. Likewise, the Activist is always working against this project. In total, 248 quotations were collected from 100 individual speakers (Table 4).

Table 4 Summary of Case Quotes by Speaker and Sentiment, 2016–2020

Speaker	For	Neutral	Against	Total
Resident	5 (5.6%)	27 (30.3%)	57 (64.0%)	89 (35.9%)
Public Official	9 (16.1%)	36 (64.3%)	11 (19.6%)	56 (22.6%)
Developer	49 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	49 (19.6%)
Activist	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	25 (100%)	25 (10.1%)
Organizer	6 (28.6%)	6 (28.6%)	9 (42.9%)	21 (8.5%)
Local Business	1 (12.5%)	6 (75.0%)	1 (12.5%)	8 (3.2%)
Total	70 (28.2%)	75 (30.2%)	103 (41.5%)	248

Note: Percentages represent proportion of quotes by speaker.

This approach made clear that different speakers understood the redevelopment project from very different perspectives influenced by their locality-based interests. To understand these perspectives and assumptions, I grouped quotes by speaker and then examined individually. Like Orlikowski and Gash (1994) I used keywords, sentiment, and content analysis to assign each quote with at least one and up to five descriptors. Once finished, I examined these descriptors across speaker-groups to identify the overarching discursive frames with the goal of representing the greatest number of quotes with the fewest number of frames. I then reexamined the quotes and their respective frames and compared them across speaker groups (Table 7, page 108). Not all quotes were assigned frames; 60 quotes (24.2%) were deemed ambiguous. The majority of those were questions posed by residents on comment cards.

The next section presents a holistic view of extra-market changes to the region and site *a la* Ruth Glass's description of gentrification in London (1964). In addition to the development of the site itself, I contribute insights on the administrative, demographic, and historical conditions that made the redevelopment project possible. This shows that redevelopment is not a single event, but a chain of decentralized events over many years that eventually manifest in space.

Case and Development History

Austin is the capital of Texas. The city—"The Live Music Capital of the World"—is a liberal culture and technology hub in Texas and America's Southwest. As a creative-technology city, Austin is considered an exemplary "technopolis" with politics to match (Smilor, Gibson, & Kozmetsky, 1989). Through extensive recruiting of and catering to high-technology companies since the 1960s, first with IBM, the city garnered the nickname "Silicon Hills" (for more on this history and its effects, see Straubhaar et al., 2012). An effect of the "technopolis" governance strategy is a diminished focus on residential politics (Miller, 2009), instead focusing on importing a high-skilled "creative class" (Florida, 2002) of workers. As a result, Austin is continually one of the fasted growing cities in America. Between 2010 and 2019, it grew over 23%, twenty-second overall in the United States and first among cities with over 300,000 residents in 2010. Thus, it is an ideal environment to study gentrification and growth pressures. One such project pressuring affordable housing is 4700 East Riverside in Austin's East Riverside-Oltorf neighborhood.

Figure 7 Map of Austin and the 4700 East Riverside Site



Note: Maps produced using ArcGIS Online and the City of Austin Open Data Portal. Data from "Land Use Inventory Detailed [Data Set]," by Planning and Zoning, 2021, *City of Austin, Texas Open Data Portal*.

Since the 1970s, the East Riverside-Oltorf neighborhood provided latent value in the form of affordable living for large institutions in and around Austin. The University of Texas at Austin identified East Riverside as an ideal location to situate off-campus student housing in collaboration with local developers. The neighborhood is a quick four miles from the main campus and, at the time, was predominantly suburban bordering on rural with multiple pending proposals for commercial and residential development. Of note to this case due to their location within the 97-acre parcel, both the 72-unit Parke Place and adjacent Pleasant Valley Sportsplex were built during this era. Similar to UT students, employees of Bergstrom Air Force Base found the neighborhood to be affordable and close to both work and central city amenities. However, the base closed in 1993 triggering a demographic shift. Formerly a mix of students and firmly middle-class Americans, the area became a primary port of entry for immigrants of Hispanic and Asian descent (Gaar, 2012). Pockets of student communities still exist and the neighborhood remains renter-dominant with a median income substantially lower than that of Austin (Table 5).

Table 5 Summary of ACS Statistics for Austin, East Riverside, and Case Study Area, 2019

	4700 East Riverside[a]	East Riverside-Oltorf	Austin
Total Population	4,000[b]	43,628	979,263
Black	2,073 (15.0%)	5,364 (12.3%)	76,383 (7.8%)
Asian	1,210 (8.8%)	2,250 (5.2%)	80,300 (8.2%)
White	8,438 (61.2%)	29,515 (67.7%)	714,862 (73.0%)
Hispanic	7,425 (53.8%)	20,822 (48.1%)	318,260 (32.5%)
Non-Hispanic	6,371 (46.2%)	22,446 (51.9%)	661,003 (67.5%)
Median Personal Income	$19,645	$28,334	$55,228
Residents In College	60%[b]	19.9%	37.7%
Housing Units	1,308[b]	18,982	409.903
Renter-Occupied Units	100%[b]	87.9%	55.6%

Note: Percentages represent proportion of total population for the selected area.
[a] The 4700 East Riverside development is in two Census tracts but does not account for the entirety of either tract. [b] Approximations based on media coverage rather than Census data.

The 4700 East Riverside project will demolish 1,308 low-cost apartments—roughly 8% of the neighborhood's rental stock—to build a mixed-use development with up to 4,700 units (10% at 60% AMI). While the developer is offering a right-to-return, only 20% of current residents meet the three-year residency requirement to qualify; relocation assistance is being offered to all residents regardless of tenure. The large-scale displacement and request for zoning changes, among other things, have sparked a backlash from residents and a local community group who pejoratively call the project "Domain on Riverside." This makes the 4700 East Riverside development an ideal focal point to study the modern, applied discourse of gentrification. It is housing-focused, controversial, and directly displacing. Groups with positive and negative opinions of the project are well-represented in the local press, providing ample textual data for analysis.

Phase 0: Administrative Changes to Austin's Development Landscape

In 2004, the City of Austin adopted a new University Neighborhood Overlay district for the City's West Campus neighborhood, the primary off-campus student housing neighborhood. The increase in density in West Campus contributed to diminished focus on East Riverside by the University of Texas, though it still remains a reliable area for affordable student housing.

Beginning in 2009, the City of Austin began drafting its 30-year comprehensive plan entitled *Imagine Austin*. Through extensive community outreach, officials determined six key challenges for the city and six non-respective core principles (Table 6).

Table 6 Key Challenges and Core Principles from Imagine Austin, 2012

Key Challenges	Core Principles
Preserving Our Livability	Grow as a compact, connected city
Expanding Transportation Choices	Integrate nature into the city
Tackling the Ethnic Divide	Provide paths to prosperity for all
Protecting Our Natural Resources	Develop as an affordable and healthy community
Promoting Prosperity for All	Sustainably manage water, energy and other environmental resources
Collaborating Regionally	Think creatively and practice civic creativity

Note: Adapted from *Imagine Austin Comprehensive Plan* by The City of Austin, 2012.

A major part of the plan is infill redevelopment, the development of under-used parcels as determined by current zoning maps. The city is relying on infill as a way to provide more housing and correct for 30-plus years of haphazard growth outside Austin's central business district. Affordability can only be achieved through robust private investment, the plan repeats.

The plan does not incorporate inclusionary zoning as an affordability tool as it is banned by Texas's Local Government Code. The plan also highlights the East Riverside site as a "Town Center" in its Growth Concept Map; Town Centers are second to Regional Centers as major commercial, residential, and transportation hubs. *Imagine Austin* was adopted by Austin City Council in 2012. A revision, adopted in 2019, established the concrete goal that 75% of new housing capacity should be within a half-mile of centers and transportation corridors.

The City of Austin adopted the East Riverside Master Plan in 2010. The plan aimed to increase housing density and public transit while preserving affordable housing and green space. It was compiled after surveys of current residents revealed a preference for vibrant mixed-use "people places" and infill redevelopment. The East Riverside Regulating Plan, based on the Master Plan, was adopted in 2013. Along with land use and site development standards for the neighborhood, this plan notably instituted Development Bonus Standards. The Standards provide increased height and density allowances in exchange for community benefits like provisioning affordable housing. Based on provided maps, most of the 4700 East Riverside property is allowed a 60-foot maximum height without the bonus, and a 160-foot maximum height with the bonus. Both numbers are the respective maximum allowed for the area. The Standards also allow for four bonus square feet for each one square foot of on-site affordable space.

In 2016, the citizens passed a $720,000,000 mobility bond that would later become part of the funding for the $1,400,000,000 Corridor Construction Program. Part of that larger program is the East Riverside Drive Mobility Program, a planned $361,000,000 investment in infrastructure (e.g., road and intersection improvements, bike lanes, pedestrian walkways and beacons) to improve the safety and mobility of East Riverside Drive at the case site.

Phase 1: Nimes Acquires 4700 East Riverside

Beginning in 2014, Nimes Capital acquired adjacent developments on the 4700 East Riverside site (the site was comprised of five independent parcels). They acquired The Ballpark (Figure 8) (formerly the Sportsplex) through a stalking horse auction—a bid negotiated before a bankruptcy auction that functions as a reserve price—and followed in 2015 with the acquisition of The Quad (formerly Parke Place). Nimes Capital's stated intention was to invest $1,500,000 to rehabilitate the majority of the 3,702 bedrooms across 1,308 units total in both developments to demand higher rents (Swiatecki, 2014). The properties were 60% student-occupied and rent for less than the citywide median, though their affordability is not regulated. Nimes Capital and associated holding companies did receive rebates from the City of Austin in early 2016 for energy efficiency improvements on the site completed in the prior year, confirming their stated intention.

Figure 8 Photo of The Ballpark North Apartments

Note: Photo of The Ballpark North Apartments, one of the developments currently situated at the 4700 East Riverside site. From "The Ballpark North: Student Apartments in Austin, Texas", n.a., 2021, *(*https://www.theballparkaustin.com/). Copyright 2021 by Ballpark North.

Phase 2: Oracle Arrives in Austin

In late 2015, technology corporation Oracle announced it purchased a property adjacent to 4700 East Riverside parcel (now 2300 Oracle Way) to build a new 27-acre campus (Figure 9). While the purchase price was not disclosed, the appraised land market value was $15,300,000. Part of the project called for razing approximately 224 low-income units to be replaced with 294 luxury units geared towards housing employees and guests of Oracle. The campus has a capacity for up to 3,000 employees, mostly sales staff. It will augment Oracle's other Austin location, a building 17 miles north of downtown Austin that employs between 1,000 and 2,500 people.

Figure 9 Map of 4700 East Riverside and Oracle's Headquarters at 2300 Oracle Way



Note: Maps produced using ArcGIS Online and the City of Austin Open Data Portal. Data from "Land Use Inventory Detailed [Data Set]," by Planning and Zoning, 2021, *City of Austin, Texas Open Data Portal*.

In March of 2018, Oracle's 520,000 square-foot campus was complete and occupied. At the ribbon-cutting, CEO Larry Ellison said "We have big plans. We have a handful of hubs in the United States, and Austin is one of the key places we want to be because that's where we think our people want to be" (qtd. in Hawkins, 2018, Sept. 24). He went on to say that "he expects the corporate campus in Austin to grow to as large as 10,000 employees" (Hawkins, 2018, Sept. 24). The company immediately submitted site plans to the city that added 420,000 square-feet to the campus's footprint. As of 2020, the site is appraised at $326,000,000 ($60,000,000 is land market value) and with an annual tax liability of $7,300,000, or 2.2%. In December 2020, Oracle announced they would formally relocate their Headquarters to the Austin development in East Riverside.

Phase 3: Nimes Solicits for Development

Subsequent to Oracle's initial 2015 announcement, Nimes Capital solicited input from local real estate brokerages to understand the maximum redevelopment potential for the entirety of their 97-acre, 1,308-unit holding. In September 2016, the resultant maximum development estimate—6,060 units across 9,000,000 square feet—was named "Project Catalyst" for marketing to potential investors.

On March 9, 2018, law firm Armbrust & Brown submitted an extensive rezoning application to the City of Austin on behalf of Nimes Capital. The rezoning request would reclassify all of Nimes's parcels as Corridor Mixed-Use; this would qualify the development to take advantage of the height and density bonus provided in the East Riverside Regulating Plan. The application also requested a release from the two restrictive covenants—one restricting the number of units per parcel and one requiring one parking space per bedroom and a six-foot perimeter fence. Finally, it outlined a revised vision for the site: an urban village with 4,709 housing units (400–565 units at 60% AMI), 600 hotel rooms, 4,000,000 square feet of office space, 60,000 square feet of medical office space, and 435,000 square feet of ground-floor commercial space (Figure 10). An included traffic impact analysis forecasts roughly 47,000 vehicle trips per day,[26] a substantial increase over the current 10,000 trips per day. The application estimates the project will be built in five phases over 25 years, beginning in 2023 with phases beginning every five years thereafter.

26 This number would be later revised upwards to approximately 71,000 unique trips per day.

Figure 10 A Rendering of the Proposed 4700 East Riverside Development, 2018

Note: A speculative rendering of the 4700 East Riverside development from a marketing video. From “Project Catalyst Documents Describe 97-Acre Development at East Riverside”, by J. Rambin, 2018, March 14, (https://austin.towers.net/project-catalyst-documents-describe-97-acre-development-at-east-riverside/). Copyright by JLL Austin.

Phase 4: Defend Our Hoodz – Defiende El Barrio Organizes

A prominent actor in this case study is Defend Our Hoodz – Defiende El Barrio (DOH), a militant anti-gentrification group based in Austin. Defend Our Hoodz was formed in February 2016 as an advocate for East Austin residents. They first organized a boycott against the Blue Cat Cafe, a local establishment attempting to host music events in conjunction with the popular South by Southwest (SXSW) Festival. The group’s distaste for SXSW and Blue Cat Cafe stems from a 2015 incident when local real estate owner F&F Ventures razed a building it leased to a local piñata store, possibly without warning. F&F used the site to throw a SXSW party and eventually rebuilt the property which now houses the Cafe (Hardy, 2018).

In addition to being anti-gentrification, DOH is explicitly anti-capitalist, anti-police, and pro-working class. Their rhetoric is rife with references to class conflict, struggle, and revolution.

They believe direct action is the best strategy to achieve their goals in a rigged system. By direct action, they mean "*taking* and *threatening* rather than asking or 'negotiating' because we know that passive boycotts, petition-signing, and press releases on their own accomplish nothing" (Serve the People, 2017, p. 21, emphasis in original). Their aspiration is a radical revolution that destroys capitalism and the capitalist mode of oppression: "We crush the invisible hand of the market with the unified force of the working class, and free the land for the generations to come" (Serve the People, 2017, p. 26).

The group ousted its founder for being too polite and restrained;[27] they began to militantly organize against the "Domain on Riverside,"[28] their pejorative for the development, in March 2018 (Hardy, 2016). Their first public comment on the project was on March 14, five days after the Nimes's rezoning application was submitted to the city. Throughout the rezoning process, the group organized multiple public protests and boycotts against anyone they viewed as complicit in the gentrification process. They were the dominant oppositional group. In addition to organizing, the group is also credited with several acts of vandalism—spray paint and property damage—targeted at Nimes Capital, its employees, and its affiliates. This type of direct action is not unusual for militant anti-gentrification groups.

27 DOH was founded by Mexican-American activist Bertha Delgado. Delgado is president of the East Town Lake Neighborhood Association and a member of Austin's Community Development Commission. She is the granddaughter of Edward Rendon Sr., a migrant farmer and prominent Mexican-American activist who fought to preserve what is now Rendon Park. Delgado remains active in preserving the Latino culture and character in Southeast Austin.

28 The reference is to a large high-density office, retail, and residential center in Austin called The Domain. It is unclear if the group dislikes The Domain or simply views it as a negative reference point.

Results: The Fight to Rezone East Riverside

In response to the rezoning application by attorney Michael Whellan on behalf of Nimes Capital, Defend Our Hoodz – Defiende El Barrio (DOH) organized to preserve the 1,308 affordable units at the Ballpark and Quads apartments. The rezoning attracted additional commentary from public officials, residents, local businesses, non-profits, and community leaders unaffiliated with DOH. From the introduction of the application to passage by the City Council, the contest lasted just over nineteen months. The rich debate provides ample opportunity to interrogate how different groups understand gentrification and its consequences in their community through their language.

I identified five frames to characterize the range of perspectives and interpretations of the development and its consequences for the surrounding community:

1. Gentrification as Benefit—refers to the positive effects of gentrification on the local community, disregarding negative consequences.
2. Gentrification as Consistency—refers to codified municipal goals that the project is aligned with.
3. Gentrification as Inevitable—refers to the growth imperative facing cities, as well as the lack of municipal tools to manage growth equitably.
4. Gentrification as Injustice—refers to the negative effects of gentrification on the local community, disregarding positive consequences.
5. Gentrification as Bureaucratic—refers to the legal process and decorum that supports redevelopment and anti-development efforts.

Table 7 Summary of Case Quotes by Frame and Speaker, 2016–2020

Speaker	Benefit	Consistency	Inevitable	Injustice	Bureaucratic	No Frame	Total
Resident	4 (4.5%)	0 (0%)	4 (4.5%)	44 (49.4%)	4 (4.5%)	33 (37.1%)	89
Public Official	3 (5.4%)	1 (1.8%)	20 (35.7%)	8 (14.3%)	16 (28.6%)	8 (14.3%)	56
Developer	25 (51.0%)	6 (12.2%)	10 (20.4%)	0 (0%)	3 (6.1%)	5 (10.2%)	49
Activist	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	10 (40.0%)	6 (24.0%)	9 (36.0%)	25
Organizer	5 (23.8%)	0 (0%)	3 (14.3%)	8 (38.1%)	1 (4.8%)	4 (19.1%)	21
Local Business	1 (12.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (62.5%)	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)	8
Total	38	7	37	75	31	60	248

Note: Percentages represent proportion of quotes by speaker.

Gentrification as Benefit

Early on, the redevelopment was framed through its benefits—tax benefits, infrastructure improvements, an affordability provision—to the Austin community by the developer. In introducing the new project, the developer's language focused predominantly on positive aspects to build consensus support. In the rezoning application, attorney Michael Whellan wrote about the project's tax benefits of at least $4.9 million annually for the local Del Valle Independent School District, interconnecting city trails and public parks, and creation of "opportunities for seamless connectivity to Oracle and multimodal connections to key corridors" (Whellan, 2018, p. 2). As the *de facto* spokesperson for the redevelopment, Whellan continued to champion project benefits for the duration of the rezoning process. He commonly expressed benefits quantitatively:

> The development would include 12 acres of complete streets with wide sidewalks and street trees, 14 total acres of public parkland, increase connectivity between Roy

> Guerrero and Mabel Davis parks, and remove nine acres of existing impervious cover from the floodplain. (Ortiz, 2019)

He also referred to improvement costs fronted by the developer, including $19,600,000 in on- and off-site infrastructure improvements as part of a transportation demand management plan, and benefits conditional on the rezoning approval:

> 8-12 percent of the units will be made affordable at 60 percent of the median family income if the zoning case is approved. (Devenyns, 2019)

Whellan carefully rescaled the development to frame it as a benefit to the city as a whole rather than specific to the East Riverside community. Part of this strategy involved highlighting the latent value and potential of the site; this could be read as a reconceptualization of the rent gap (Smith, 1979). He did this concerning housing: “You're helping to meet significant housing needs of the city [with this project]” (qtd. in Salazar, 2019b). He did this concerning office space and employment: “Additional office space will create an independent employment node outside of downtown on a key transit corridor” (O’Sullivan, 2018). And he did this concerning both housing and office space in myriad contexts. Here, the context is traffic and congestion:

> Development in the area would create a district combining residential and business complexes without the congestion seen in downtown Austin. (O’Sullivan, 2018)

This rescaling of benefits was a key strategy to gain approval from a Planning Commission and City Council that represent all 326 square miles of Austin. East Riverside-Oltorf is just 7.7 square miles, 2.4% of the Austin’s land area. One such implicit reaction to the rescaling came from Mayor Steve Adler:

> What we did last night was to give certain zoning to those properties, in exchange for planting permanent affordability, indefinitely into the future. (qtd. in Larned & Betts, 2019)

Here, "permanent affordability" refers to Austin's citywide need for housing. This is in a similar vein to Whellan's unverified claim that the development will offer "the largest on-site affordable housing commitment in a private development in Austin's urban core" (qtd. in Salazar, 2019b).

Direct community benefits incorporated into the project materialized into additional benefit-framed support from outside sources. For example, the developer offered housing for 100 homeless people and $1.75 million for health and supportive services in partnership with the Ending Community Homelessness Coalition (ECHO). This market-led solution to a public health crisis was praised by policy-makers. In response, ECHO Executive Director Matt Mollica was quick to praise the project:

> ECHO is grateful for this commitment to house some of Austin's most vulnerable residents experiencing homelessness. Ending homelessness in Austin and Travis County will require partnerships with the private sector such as this one. This arrangement provides access to a quality home for people experiencing homelessness in Austin. The commitment of supportive service dollars from Presidium and Nimes Real Estate is a crucial component to this agreement. (qtd. in Swiatecki, 2019)

Mollica went as far as to graciously identify the developers as community members.

> These owners recognize that they are a part of this community, and it's why they have gone to such great lengths to listen to what the community wants and needs. They've truly listened and responded with this historic proposal. (qtd. in Swiatecki, 2019)

Rarely, residents came forward to speak about the project's benefits, though lacking explicit substance. Community advocate Larry Sunderland stated:

> I can think of no other project that I have seen come across that offers as much in the way of community benefits and things that we all care about and that can actually be realized in our neighborhood. (qtd. in Austin City Council, 2019)

Which community? Who is "we"? Whose neighborhood? Again, there is a clear scaling of benefits to the city- and county-level by Mollica and ambiguous scaling by Sunderland. These quotes rarely occur in a context that simultaneously acknowledges the negative effects of redevelopment.

Gentrification as Consistency

In addition to benefits-framing (above), the developer adopted consistency framing when interacting directly with public officials. Consistency framing is a response to administrative changes; it aligns the development and rezoning application with the city's newly codified goals related to affordability and mobility. The development was presented as consistent with Austin's administrative goals as expressed through *Imagine Austin* and other city planning documents. The framing was sometimes more explicit to the plans themselves. Michael Whellan:

> There are unique opportunities that we have right here at this particular location to put Imagine Austin and a large number of our city goals into action. It sits at the intersection of a large number of our goals. (qtd. in Salazar, 2019b)

In other interactions, Whellan would be more specific, referencing "the city's long-range goals of building up affordable housing stock and providing improvements in transit options, walkability and low impact to the surrounding environment" (Ortiz, 2019). In one instance, it was even framed as a challenge:

> If this vision can't work here, where can it work? You've got all of these incredibly compelling policy goals from a transportation, affordable housing, housing [and] environmental perspective. If you can't implement those policies and vision on two Imagine Austin corridors…I'm not sure where you could. (qtd. in Salazar, 2019b)

This is setting up a direct conflict between Austin's codified priorities and its actions. While Whellan is not directly forcing approval of the project, he is questioning the Council's commitment to its planning process.

Evidence of the effectiveness of consistency framing is apparent in the similarities between developer and municipal language. Here, Whellan is referencing consistency with long-planned improvements to traffic flow that will impact the adjacent park and explaining how the parcel rezoning will ultimately allow for more parkland to be realized:

> The road plan for this area was approved by the City of Austin back in 2013, as part of the East Riverside Corridor Master Plan – with the goal of improving neighborhood connectivity…While this piece of parkland was always envisioned as part of the future Lakeshore Boulevard, these property owners propose adding more than 10 acres of additional parkland. Overall, it's a big net win from a parkland perspective. (qtd. in Devenyns, 2019)

It translated directly to the planning staff's recommendation for approval:

> Staff's recommendation rests upon the project's fulfillment of goals in the Imagine Austin comprehensive plan and the ERC Plan: multimodal density, the potential for transit hub access, and "compact and connected" development that allows greater mobility and creates opportunities for living and working in one neighborhood. (King, 2019 Aug. 9)

As mentioned in the quote, *Imagine Austin* and the *East Riverside Corridor Plan* were instrumental as justifying documents. Recall those plans' designation of East Riverside as a major commercial, residential, and transportation hub.

The consistency frame was used with increasing frequency as the rezoning application meandered through the labyrinth of bureaucratic hearings. This appeared to be a conscious effort to align project benefits directly with the administrative goals of municipal decision-makers. Where benefits framing seeks to gain broad approval, consistency framing aims for administrative approval based on codified laws, guidelines, and goals. The contrast is stark, as the latter cares measurably less about general or local feelings towards development and more about city-scale benefits and due process. This is consistent with municipal concern for East Riverside as a part of the city as a whole rather than as an individual neighborhood.

Gentrification as Inevitable

One discursive theme that developed from multiple stakeholders over the 19-month contest was the inevitability of gentrification and redevelopment not just at this location but across the city—that the city needs housing to decrease demand pressure, and the lack of municipal control over the specific site in question. This was almost always set in the context of meeting affordability goals by increasing the housing supply. Austin Senior Planner Anne Milne explained that private landowners desire redevelopment and it is the city's role to encourage development per the Master Plan and other policy goals; this is an implicit acknowledgment that the market is responsible for meeting demand, not the city. Part of those goals includes building more quality housing at a variety of price points:

> Austin as a whole—we have a huge demand for housing, so that even places built 30 to 40 years ago are getting top dollar. Older housing in the Riverside area often exhibits a

> lot of code violations, and the answer to affordable housing is not to have terrible housing. We cannot solve the housing crisis by not building. (qtd. in King, 2019 Feb. 15)

The housing crisis is facing the city, not the neighborhood. But East Riverside is part of the solution to a problem it is not experiencing; it is being positioned as a sink to absorb population growth. The fact that the neighborhood is aging and underdeveloped adds to the disparity between its potential and realized value, another nod to Smith's rent gap (1979).

However, there was also an undercurrent of hopelessness punctuating this frame. This hopelessness stems from a lack of municipal control over growth and affordability similar to what Glass observed in London (1964). In Austin, affordable units can be incentivized but not mandated, and there is no inclusionary zoning. Chief among the hopeless is Sabina "Pio" Renteria, Council Member representing Austin's District 3 inclusive of East Riverside.

> When we don't allow or provide any incentive to provide affordable units, they won't (build them). They will just all become high-end units. We are seeing that done now. (qtd. in Jankowski, 2019)

Renteria is astute to shed light on the legislative determinants. But he also acknowledges that it is the market's responsibility to build (affordable) housing. There is a consistent theme that the Council is doing the best they can with what they have available, which is not much:

> But Renteria added that gentrification will continue in the area because of market forces and state laws prohibiting protections such as inclusionary zoning. He said it is important for the city to negotiate the best terms—and the most affordable units—it can. (Freer, 2019)

District 1 Council Member Natasha Harper-Madison was blunter:

> Rejecting this rezoning request will not deflate the redevelopment pressure facing this area. It's a difficult but very real truth. (qtd. in Freer, 2019)

Nor will rejecting the request halt redevelopment, as Nimes already stated they would renovate the apartments to command higher rents if the rezoning is not approved. The Austin City Council has few tools available to equitably control the housing market.

Outside of hopelessness, much of the remaining inevitability framing focused on the quality of the existing property and the potential for overdue and necessary development given current zoning constraints. For instance, John Reidie, CEO of public charity Austin Creative Alliance, expressed frustration with equating this project with gentrification: "If buildings are worn down beyond their useful age, redevelopment is not 'gentrification'" (qtd. in King, 2019 Feb. 15). This is consistent with Milne's quote above. Reidie is a keen supporter of increasing housing capacity and the working space available to nonprofit groups in the neighborhood. Similarly supportive, community advocate Larry Sunderland called out to the history of the neighborhood:

> The environment of East Riverside is a failed late 20th century suburban experiment in how to warehouse people and cars, strip malls, acres of parked cars. It is housing never designed to endure. It was never designed for the comfort and complexity of human beings. (qtd. in Austin City Countil, 2019)

Sunderland's harsh description is suggesting that redevelopment was always a predetermined necessity for this site. Poor past decisions of the past necessitate market-intervention today.

Planning Commissioner Conor Kenny approached inevitability from a different perspective, namely one focused on the current affordability and redevelopment potential of the site versus the larger, Austin context. Here, "potential" calls back to thinking about gentrification in economic terms. Remember that while the rent at this site is below the city-wide median, it is not regulated or mandated.

> This site is going away as market-rate affordable housing. Everyone knows that. They can rebuild on the same entitlements and make it much more profitable. It's not really a question to me of what happens on the site, it's a question of what happens in the larger area…If we don't put the density here, it's going to go further out, and that makes everything in this community worse. (qtd. in Salazar, 2019a; qtd. in Hall, 2019)

Whellan reinforced this perspective, leaning into the degrading quality and lack of potential for the site under current constraints:

> And even though my clients have been investing in upgrades since they bought the properties, the structures are deteriorating. So what do we want them to become? Today the existing zoning…would ensure a suburban-style low-cost development with mobile units. (qtd. in Austin City Council, 2019)

Like both Commissioner Kenny and Whellan, Mayor Steve Adler summed it up well: "These apartments on Riverside Drive will not be there in four or five years even if we didn't rezone" (qtd. in Larned & Betts, 2019). With or without rezoning, the redevelopment will happen. Upgrading the units was planned when Nimes acquired the properties. Rezoning creates the potential to mandate, and thus preserve, affordable units at the site. But the degrading quality and increased demand for luxury units effectively mandate redevelopment regardless of the rezoning.

Gentrification as Injustice

Opponents framed the redevelopment project as an injustice to the community, related to its consequential displacement and lack of affordability. These objections were largely scaled at the individual and neighborhood levels. Individual objections varied from calm to emotionallycharged. One student said: “The reason we choose this apartment complex over others is because it’s affordable. (The development project) is going to take away student housing” (qtd. in O’Sullivan, 2018). Another student said: “Austin has a lack of affordably priced housing as it is, and you’re about to tear down some of the only affordably priced housing that’s left in town” (qtd. in Austin City Council, 2019). The lack of affordable alternatives was not reduced to students. Several refugees live in the current development and share a similar sentiment about the project, which “will benefit a few people financially, but for people like us [refugees] were assigned to come here, we didn’t make a plan B for moving” (qtd. in Ayers, 2019). The distinction between rezoning and redevelopment is lost here, which is common amongst opponents of the project. Redevelopment is happening regardless of rezoning approval, per Nimes. Yet resident-opponents tended to focus on the redevelopment project as a whole, even though the rezoning application is currently the only aspect being litigated:

> I live across the street from this stupid ass shit that’s going to raise my rent, that’s going to make my life shittier! You’re the liberals that are ruining my life, that are ruining my community, because you motherfuckers think that you can have this space too, that you can kick us out, but bitch you can’t! Try again honey! (qtd. in Talavera, 2018)

Similarly:

> I’ve got the letter on my door telling me that they’re trying to displace us! They’re doing this for Oracle! You’re sipping on your drinks and you’re enjoying your art, at what expense? At the expense of people’s lives! (qtd. in Talavera, 2018)

This speaker references both Oracle, the catalyst for redevelopment, and art. The latter refers to an effort by the developer to create an Arts District in the neighborhood. Frequently referred to as “artwashing,” the scheme attracted much negative attention from DOH and community residents:

> [The Arts District] is just one step in a long plan to displace long-term and working class residents. They’re hiding behind art [as a way] to gentrify. (qtd. in Talavera, 2018)

Above, the Arts District is tied to displacement. Below, that tie is framed as an urban strategy around cultural accumulation:

> Greedy developers are using the incoming ‘Riverside (Sell-out) Arts District,’ as a strategy to capitalize on artists’ cultural cred, in order to make the area welcoming for mostly white and wealthy gentrifiers. (qtd. in Talavera, 2018)

Artist and Arts District affiliate Jean-Pierre Verdijo sympathized with DOH but pivoted culpability away from his agency and towards the injustice of pervasive and structural income inequality:

> Gentrification is really a fruit of a much greater issue, which is income inequality. I don't think anyone doesn't want redevelopment of poor areas. But the people who live there now need to be able to afford those new services. (qtd. in King, 2019 Feb. 15)

Given the current housing squeeze in Austin, redevelopment necessitates rising costs. Verdijo is right that income inequality is a major culprit exacerbating the negative effects of gentrification, but fails to connect that idea to the current conflict and his active contribution to Nimes’s efforts to reinvent East Riverside’s image.

Other objections to the project focused on a broader picture of injustice. District 4 Council Member Gregario Casar zeroed in on the trade-off between growth and displacement:

> It's been my long held position that we should avoid speeding up the elimination of low/moderate income homes as we address our housing shortage. There are many other urban places to add more housing. (Casar, 2019)

At other points, Casar railed against upzoning of affordable units and the inequity of a process that prioritizes policy goals at the expense of residents. Using more ideological language, DOH expressed a similar sentiment:

> It is a ruling class attack on the working class. It is going to destroy 1,300 low-cost units in one of the last central areas in Austin where working class people can live. (qtd. in Jankowski, 2019)

A local food truck owner commented on how the changing neighborhood was going to impact her business and those of others. At the time, the landlord that owned the lot where she operated was fielding offers for the land. Her concern was for those that get lost as the neighborhood character changes. The redevelopment, she said, will "take away a lot of opportunities for working people to provide for other working people in the neighborhood." It's self-fulfilling, "places would get replaced by expensive restaurants, not for working people" (qtd. in Disseno, 2019). This is a manifestation of Ley's "new middle class" (1994). Another resident keyed in on the interaction of labor and housing:

> [Workers are] going to be moved away from Austin, away from a lot of the places where they work. But we still work in Austin. We still clean people's offices, we still cook people's food in restaurants in Austin but now we're being forced outside. (qtd. in Villareal, 2019)

The economic geography of Austin is shifting rapidly in one of the city's poorest neighborhoods. Residents and business owners are aware and voicing their concerns, but to what end? There is no institutional power to resist the growing tension between urban castes. A resident blamed the city:

> The council has institutionalized the practice of steroidal development that changes the rent. It changes the land value. This is what developers are seeking to capture. (qtd. in Janakowski, 2019)

Even here, with explicit acknowledgment of the City's agency, criticism is reoriented towards the developers. Like in Glass's London (1964), local municipal governance is both responsible for change and powerless to prevent it.

Though many of the objections were related to displacement and affordability, there were other objections framed around environmental justice. One commenter was concerned with pollution generated by the development. They cited the nearby Colorado River as at-risk, and also cited potential air, noise, and light pollution. This was one of several objections related to the nearby parkland and river system. Another commenter very astutely pointed out the strain on water, wastewater, and traffic infrastructure.

Gentrification as Bureaucracy

A final frame that emerged was narrowly focused on the decorum of the bureaucratic process that enables urban development. Defend Our Hoodz framed the legislative process as unjust and unrepresentative of the local, community-based interests they stood for. They openly refused to cooperate or negotiate in a process they considered a sham:

> We will no longer play by the rules of the gentrifiers! We will no longer play by the rules of the city! We do not want discussions with the gentrifiers and developers. We do not want discussions with the city. We demand that these applications be withdrawn! (qtd. in Sans, 2018)

In a Facebook post, they rephrased this view:

> We must confront the city, not on its own terms, but with uncompromising militance against their efforts to displace the working class and oppressed peoples out of Austin. (qtd. in Salazar, 2019b)

DOH is not the only group that felt the process unfair. Students expressed deep concern with the timing of several key hearings. While the site is majority-occupied by students, many hearings were scheduled during the summer when students are away: “but this timing is ridiculous. We can't have a real conversation about student housing when students are out of town” (qtd. in Austin City Council, 2019).

But it was DOH’s rhetoric, and the accompanying hostile tactics, that the city used to avoid engaging with the merits of their objections to the project. In several weaponizations of decorum and norms of deliberation (Young, 1996), the Planning Commission threatened and removed protesters with force:

> Planning commission chair James Shieh said that if the protesters would not follow procedure that security would escort them out. (Sans, 2018)

And:

> City staffer Jerry Rusthoven threatened that if the meeting could not be conducted in a “civil manner” that he would call the police. Minutes later, he returned to the microphone to say that “we have people on the way to take care of this.” (Talavera, 2019)

This theme was referenced by Mayor Adler at the later City Council meetings:

> There were some disruptions at earlier hearings. I just want to say I intend to have us follow our ordinary rules of decorum so we can appropriately work through our meeting. (qtd. in Martinez, 2019)

The focus on norms and decorum illustrates a process that is distanced from the actual conflict, an inverse of the Consistency frame. Both framing techniques separate material change from the legislative process. Where the Consistency frame empowers the developer and City to act, the Bureaucracy frame disempowers opposition.

In some cases, DOH's rhetoric was used to discredit their stance entirely. Urban Planner Scott Grantham: "I would hardly call [the protesters] representative of the community" (qtd. in Sans, 2018). Whellan called the disruptions "performance politics" (qtd. in Jankowski, 2019). And community advocate Larry Sunderland claimed that protesters were inaccurate and unimaginative:

> As an advocate for our neighborhood, I have to say that I'm disheartened by the completely unimaginative and inaccurate framing of this project from those outside of our neighborhood, those that try to bring an adversarial confrontational, do not provide the feelings of the residents… We are not victims and we don't need saving. (qtd. in Austin City Council, 2019)

Sunderland goes as far as to claim that opposition is only coming from outside of the neighborhood, effectively silencing the contrasting voices.

An interesting comment came from Commissioner Greg Anderson, who claimed the repeated delays due to the application review process and DOH's disruptions were making Austin appear hostile to development in general.

> Commissioner Greg Anderson expressed frustration with the repeated delays, saying that the city was failing to act to address Austin's housing crisis. It's this kind of regulatory behavior, he suggested, that would deter developers around the country from building housing in Austin. (Craver, 2019)

This is an odd rebuke to previously referenced claims that the city is pro-development and anti-resident. While not explicitly tied to the other instances of bureaucratic framing, this instance does effectively rescale the issue much in the same way that Whellan's challenge to the Council created a conflict between codified goals and action.

Discussion

This case study differs from previous gentrification media studies by centering speakers instead of media outlets. The latter approach (e.g Gibson, 1994a; Modan & Wells, 2015) is useful for understanding how redevelopment is framed by the media over time. It is not useful for understanding the group interests that motivate those frames outside of growth machine politics (Molotch, 1976). This chapter developed an interest-based explanation for discursive action by combining frames with Davis's framework of domestic property interests (1991) in the context of a displacing redevelopment project. Frames offer a powerful lens to better understand urban conflict because they are an effective form of biased information transfer which can spur group action in the form of support or criticism. Framing relies on selective admission and omission of information. These decisions are a form of sense-making. Differences in sense-making result in very different expectations around how to approach the rezoning process and broader neighborhood change. Injustice framing, for example, had a particularly polarizing and magnetic effect on residents. In other instances, the frames informed how speakers understood or misunderstood the rezoning application. Consistency framing reminds us that rezoning is a legislative process that is bound by public policy, not public sentiment. However, protesters did not bolster a counter-attack to Consistency framing. Where they could have invoked the principles outlined in *Imagine Austin*—namely preserving livability, developing affordability, and providing paths to prosperity—they instead chose to rely on the ineffective Injustice frame and the detrimental Bureaucracy frame.

Part of the reason for this is not a lack of information on the part of the protesters and residents, but a failure to comprehend the broader locality-based interests of the other stakeholder groups (see Table 3); locality-based interests help explain frame motivations. Tenants' interest is accommodative, a result of their only right to property being that of occupancy. Thus, the primary interest shared by all tenants is security. Short-term security is guaranteed through a lease, but long-term security can only be assumed or hoped for. Redevelopment threatens long-term security. Tenants are also interested in the amenity or quality of their living condition. Redevelopment threatens tenants' amenity with uncertainty, but also the knowledge that they will lose social access to their current community and locational access to Downtown Austin. This is true, too, of residents and their perceived loss of community as a consequence of gentrification. This fight over "right to place" or the "right to stay put" (Hartman, 1984) is the basis for their Injustice framing. It is rooted in the "here and now" because that is the collective interest that binds opponents together.

Nimes Capital's interest is accumulative, a result of their claim to the value of the land and improvements under their control. Thus, their interest is optimizing use and function in a way that maximizes income and wealth. Nimes holds a dual role as developer and landlord. As the developer, they seek to capture the appreciating value of their land due largely to Oracle's choice to build adjacent to their site. They build equity. As the landlord, they seek income in the form of rent and depreciation. They increase their liquidity. Under both roles, redevelopment to capitalize the rapidly increasing potential ground rent is the best course of action to improve their equity and liquidity stakes. Much like in Mele (2000) and Slater (2002), Nimes used discourse to reframe the development as normal and beneficial. They attempted to create a new place identity through “artwashing”. Their discursive techniques were always oriented around maximizing the value of their site for themselves through alignment with the City’s larger goals. Consistency framing outweighed the divisive effects of Benefit framing that undermine tenant security.

While Davis (1991) did not offer a typology of domestic property interests for public officials, it is clear that they have accommodative and accumulative interests, both directly and as custodians. Like tenants, they are concerned with the security and amenity of their community. However, this concern operates on a longer time horizon than that of tenants. Their personal security is dictated by local elections, and their custodial focus extends much further into the future. Compliance with past plans and policy goals is one way to build towards a more secure future that was ostensibly democratically negotiated. Simultaneously, officials have an accumulative interest. Their personal interest is employment (re-election) and, assuming they are owner-occupiers, increasing their personal equity stakes. Their custodial interest is to increase the well-being of the city which is most-often expressed in economic terms: number of jobs created, nominal increase in the tax base, number of units built, and more. This custodial accumulative interest is evident in the final quote by Commissioner Anderson expressing concern that the 4700 East Riverside conflict might deter future developers. These custodial accumulative interests are complicated by a lack of direct ownership of the “city”, and thus a lack of power similar to that of tenants. This was made evident by the consistent references to inevitability, a discursive framing that was also witnessed by Curran (2004). And it was made evident by the consistent rescaling to focus on the entire municipality; to focus on the site apart would undermine their legitimacy by highlighting their lack of power.

This frame analysis made clearer a politics of temporal and physical scale resulting from a cleavage between the problem (displacement caused by gentrification) and its political resolution. Spatially, gentrification is realized at the neighborhood-scale but regulated at a city-scale. Temporally, gentrification's consequences are "here and now" but created over years through disinvestment, policy making, and demographic change. From a broad view, these cleavages materialized in the discourse. The Planning Commission and City Council focused on a future-looking, city-scale. Opposition to development focused on the immediate, local scale. While redevelopment was always going to happen, opponents rallied around the rezoning application as a means to voice their discontents and remain optimistic about the future of their community. Given twenty years of policy goals codified in Austin's planning documents, their opposition did not matter. Governments prioritize planning for their future above planning for their residents (Mearshimer, 2001), and the developer cares about maximizing its capitalization rate. Understanding how framing is used by the different actors offers a new way to approach, diagnose, and explain urban conflict.

Taken together, gentrification is not the solely market-led process debated by Smith (1996), Ley (1986) and others. Like Ruth Glass suggested in 1964, gentrification is a materialization of change catalyzed through multiple, interconnected pathways: administrative change, demographic change, and growth. The class and racial dynamics of displacement and disinvestment remain a prominent feature of the gentrification process (e.g., Huber & Wolkenstein, 2018; Hwang, 2015; 2016). More recent research influenced by the econocentric Smith-Ley debates, broadly focused on the equity-effects of gentrification, does not capture the complexity of interactions demonstrated in this case study. The market-led paradigm that dominates gentrification studies is divorced from how actual people experience gentrification and perceive its causes and consequences. This misunderstanding of gentrification negatively effects grassroots activism strategies. The frames identified in this chapter suggest a nuanced picture of gentrification notable for the instrumentality of targeted political savvy capable of manipulating public policy when applied correctly (Table 8).

Table 8 Understanding Gentrification Through Discursive Frames

Frame	Beneficiary	Victim	Impact on Understanding Gentrification
Benefit	City	None	Rescales benefits for broad approval rather than local, neighborhood approval
Consistency	Developer	City	Dislocates conflict away from development by calling attention to the disconnect between a City's codified priorities and their potential administrative actions
Inevitable	Developer	City	Highlights the powerless of public officials to maintain affordability and the need for housing to be replaced eventually
Injustice	Resident	Developer	Builds resistance at the neighborhood level
Bureaucracy	City	Resident	Dislocates conflict away from development, focusing on behavior of protesters

This case study makes clear that this gentrification in Austin is mediated as a political issue governed directly by twenty years of public policy decisions that encouraged private investment. The state is instrumental in facilitating redevelopment, even when it appears deferential to the free market reminiscent of Polanyi's "double movement" (2001 [1944]). Those decisions were made worse by a lack of government power to maintain or enforce housing affordability across the city. This issue was compounded by demographic growth and change, affecting residents excluded from or not catered to by Austin's technology-centered economy. Future gentrification research should strongly stress the role of governance structures and city planning politics, past and present, as a primary cause or contributor of gentrification. This will lead to structural policy designed to mitigate the negative effects of gentrification, rather than a patchwork of limited interventions that are currently in effect.

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Chapter 5 Conclusion

Introduction

Gentrification research often engages with the phenomenon's aporias: how does one build without displacing? Can redevelopment leave neighborhood character intact? Is socially just development possible? The contemporary rhetoric of gentrification suggests not; it is tinged with morality that hinges on the economic inequities of urban development. This project sought to re-examine the genealogy of gentrification that led to those questions. Using a suite of discursive methods, this project aimed to understand how the term *gentrification* developed from a glib afterthought to a conceptual powerhouse that influences our perception of the urban through three articles. First, I reexamined Ruth Glass's observations of post-World War II London and showed that they were not quirky descriptions to be overlooked. Her observations are the result of an implicit framework that grounds gentrification in a rich historical, administrative, and demographic context. Second, I deconstructed the academic gentrification debates of the 1980s and 1990s to describe how those heated interactions created the market-led paradigm that still underpins our understanding of gentrification today. Finally, I analyzed the discourse around a controversial redevelopment project currently underway in Austin, Texas. On its own, this case study made clear how domestic property interests influence group perception around urban development. Alongside the preceding articles, the case study broke from dominant market-led explanations of gentrification that understate the role of the state to present a new understanding of gentrification as a fundamentally state-mediated process detached from the spatiotemporal materialization of development. This allows (gentrifying) redevelopment to occur without paying heed to legitimate claims made by residents because those claims occur after gentrification was approved by the state and are focused on the developer.

Summary of Research

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 reset the narrative on gentrification by recontextualizing the once-grounded concept. Ruth Glass presented us with the earliest conceptualization of gentrification. Her most commonly quoted line references the newly inverse relationship between cost and size in inner-London housing:

> The current social status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to their size, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with previous levels in their neighbourhoods. (Glass, 1964, p. xviii)

Within gentrification studies, this quote should be very familiar both directly for its frequent references and indirectly for its influence in how we think about and identify urban development as gentrification. However, it is a poor proxy for how Glass understood urban change in post-War London as it fails to capture the context of the city that was driving this inverse relationship, a context that she wrote about at length in the remaining introduction. Her understanding of gentrification was as a byproduct of urbanization as a technology for capital and cultural accumulation. For Glass, gentrification was the materialization of change in the social character and demography of London, change in the administrative structure of the city and its surrounding communities, and the recent history of England following World War II. In her words:

> the ‘natural increase’ of commerce and related economic activities; the emergence of new occupations and pursuits; the demands for travelling and parking space made by the

> rapidly growing motorcar population; the improvements and consequent spatial expansion of social, education and ancillary services. (Glass, 1964, p. xix)

This rich context functions as a causal framework to understand how gentrification occurred in London and how it could begin to be understood elsewhere. In continually reducing her work to the former quote, the context offered by the latter was lost.

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 showed how ideas become dominant and at what cost. Writing from the Eastern United States and Western Canada, respectively, Neil Smith and David Ley abstracted their theories from time and place in their struggle to explain the cause of gentrification as a universal process. This diminished the value of local administrative and demographic causality that was a fundamental feature of Glass's observations. Instead, focus was placed on Smith's rent gap thesis as the causal mechanism:

> The rent gap is the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use…Gentrification occurs when the gap is wide enough that developers can purchase shells cheaply, can pay the builders' costs and profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mortgage and construction loans, and can then sell the end product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory return to the developer. (1979, p. 545)

Through several acerbic volleys with Ley and other scholars, Smith refined and strengthened his rent gap thesis into a simplistic yet theoretically significant juggernaut. This focus on the rent gap forced the theory's core assumption of gentrification—that it is a market-led process—to be accepted as fact by the wider social sciences community. Smith's Anglo-American perspective on urban development was amplified as gentrification became a key concept to comprehend urban political economy. The assumption that gentrification is a market-led process still dominates studies on the topic today. The result is dogmatic and narrow inquiry built around economic indicators and inequities rather than a holistic approach that appreciates the complexity of urbanization.

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 showed that scholarly ideas are inherently political. The case study was concerned with how different local actor-groups (e.g., developers, city officials, protesters) understand and respond to gentrification in their community. It examined a corpus of news media coverage surrounding a rezoning application submitted on behalf of a controversial, displacing redevelopment project in Austin's East Riverside-Oltorf neighborhood. The chapter developed an interest-based explanation for discursive action by centering speakers instead of media outlets, as others do. By grouping quotes by speaker and content, I identified five discursive frames that explained how speakers understood the rezoning application: Benefit, Consistency, Inevitable, Injustice, and Bureaucratic. Tenants were primarily concerned with housing security and use the Injustice frame to bring attention to the present threat: their planned displacement. The developer was concerned with capturing equity and increasing their liquidity. This means that redevelopment was always going to happen, though not at the maximum profitable scale. The developer used the Benefit and Consistency frames to maximize the value of their site by aligning their planned project with the City's codified policy goals: attracting private investment and building high-density mixed-use housing. Public officials had competing interests as both Austin residents and custodians of the public interest. They used Inevitable and Bureaucratic frames to facilitate development in a way that gives themselves credit for preserving affordable housing that was already codified in development bonuses. This helped to increase their personal equity as residents; it positively impacted their job security by bringing jobs and housing units to Austin. This case study also revealed insights about the processes that encourage and permit gentrification. Our understanding of these processes would benefit from the attention of a deeper case study focused on the process of redevelopment itself separate from how it is understood, the latter being done in Chapter 4.

Contribution to Knowledge: The Failure of the Market-Led Paradigm

Ruth Glass's (1964) description of gentrification is grounded in her perception of post-War London. It suggests a phenomenon that manifests in space and is instrumentally tied to broader social and economic change happening at multiple scales (i.e., neighborhood, city, region, country, world). In contrast, Smith's (1979) market-led description explains the mechanism (rent gap) that causes some instances of gentrification (i.e., a rapid change in the character of a neighborhood) at a neighborhood scale. The legacy of Smith's rent gap theory is as a conceptual reduction of gentrification to a market phenomenon. This market-led paradigm, which dominates present understanding of gentrification, explains many of the differences between how the actors in Austin understand and frame the consequences of gentrification and how they aim to solve it. Yet it is Glass who enables us to step back and understand how these frames miss a wider, historically-grounded view of the redevelopment process that cannot be explained solely by the market.

The Benefits and Inevitability frames wielded by developer and city in Austin suggest an economic understanding of gentrification. Those frames employ a utilitarian logic to facilitate value creation here and now. Per the rent gap theory, value can be created because there is a gap between potential value and present capitalized value less redevelopment cost here and now.

This calculus keeps real estate development firms in business. It also explains, at a high level of abstraction, why firms move to the city: opportunity to capture latent value.

The city has a more complicated view of gentrification. On a theoretical (and dramatic) level, economic gentrification robs the city of agency to build affordable housing. Public policy reflects this, with public housing first being largely defunded in the 1980s, and then with the creation of various subsidies (e.g., Low-Income Housing Tax Credits and HOPE VI) that put the onus and incentive to build solely on the free market. The city is continually stripped of power; today it has few measures available to enforce its vision and need for affordable housing (it is unclear whether this is a cause or an effect of the marketization of housing as the time order of events is spurious and developing). In the Austin case, the city offered a density bonus in exchange for affordable units. The bonus increased the potential value of the site for the developer and guaranteed the provision of some affordable units in the new development (though fewer than were originally available). As much as it is a cost-benefit decision (of which there is very little measured economic cost to the city), the density bonus incentive allows the city to encourage the provision of affordable housing without culpable responsibility for building and maintaining it. In this way, the city can "solve" affordable housing, understood as a problem of supply brought about by undercapitalized value, without engaging substantively with their history or policy decisions.

However, Glass shows us that the city is culpable. There are complex interactions between different levels of government that result in demographic change (e.g., the closing Bergstrom Air Force Base, siting UT student housing). Austin also has a long history of incentivizing tech companies to locate in the city through their governance strategy geared toward building a technopolis. These extra-market changes have an impact on the affordability of housing in Austin by influencing demand or augmenting supply.

Residents and activists seem to understand gentrification as more than a market phenomenon, or they at least understand the consequences of gentrification outside of the market. Their Injustice framing suggests a process that has real consequences on the social health of their community and the environment. Yet their strategy of opposition is set on economic terms but without a commensurate discourse. They contest the development in the immediate, but they fail to quantify its economic costs despite measurable consequences—displacement, loss of affordability, loss of customers, environmental degradation—specific to East Riverside. Nor do they engage with the broader, historic policy decisions that facilitate gentrification to occur both in East Riverside and across Austin. As a result, opposition is written off as an emotional appeal.

If we think about this gentrification as market-led, the scope of inquiry narrows to real estate transactions and redevelopment effort. While this is internally consistent with how the consequences of redevelopment were perceived as gentrification, it is inconsistent with how gentrification actually materializes in Austin. This mismatch between understanding and experience precludes effective anti-gentrification activism and ignores the agency of municipal governance. Gentrification materializes over many years in response to administrative decisions and broader economic and social restructuring.

This suggests two problems with the market-led approach to understanding gentrification: 1) it removes agency and culpability from the institutions of municipal governance and town planning, and 2) it locates gentrification narrowly in space and time (here and now). This approach understates the role of the state and bureaucracy in facilitating development, and it fails to capture the spatiotemporal scale at which the state and bureaucracy act.

The All-Powerful Powerless State

Ruth Glass's (1964) description of gentrification in London does a better job of explaining change in Austin than Smith's rent gap, a market-led theory to explain the cause of gentrification. For Glass, gentrification is the social, political, and economic change that manifests visibly in the built environment; it is aided by the machinery of government, especially town planning. She understood the toxic incoherence of municipal governance and planning regimes in post-War London. Government power was decentralized in support of an illegible hierarchy over the London. Her ire for the gentry class suggests decentralization was a scheme to preserve wealth. The result is a lack of local control, replaced by the illusion of control which is hamstrung by powers that reside elsewhere. This is the case in Austin. Without public ownership of land or inclusionary housing provisions (the latter was banned by the state government), the city has limited resources to encourage the private market to build affordable housing. The resources they do have—zoning and density bonuses, which permit more building height in exchange for provisioning affordable units—have limited effect. Austin cannot prevent Nimes Capital from rehabilitating the existing units at 4700 East Riverside to demand higher rents; they can only encourage Nimes to preserve affordability by offering a more intensive zoning designation that allows for a density bonus.

In *Imagine Austin* (2012), the city explicitly calls for more private investment to secure affordable housing and support economic development, despite the limited power of their guiding hand. The plan also played a pivotal role in Nimes Capital's political strategy; Nimes continually stressed consistency with the goals set out in the master plan, aligning their development interest with the interests of the city. This suggests the master plan fell somewhere between a mandate for gentrification and a framework that enables it; in either case, the Planning Commission and City Council must adhere to it as a binding document.

The city is also responsible, in part, for its stature as a technopolis. Austin's governance strategy geared towards attracting technology firms and research institutions is contributing to job growth and population growth. This is not an uncommon strategy, as other cities court the "creative class" (Florida, 2002), going so far as hiring Richard Florida to consult on their growth strategies. However, these jobs are largely inaccessible to those that lack a college degree. This is creating a bifurcated population with high-income earners shaping the housing market demand curve. Low-income earners have fewer opportunities to own homes in the city and are either being pushed to peripheral suburbs or into rentals that lack long-term security.

Time and Space of Urban Development

The importance of *Imagine Austin* as justification for the development suggests a dissociation between when gentrification is enabled or called for and when it actually materializes. The master plan was developed in 2009 and adopted in 2012. This created a framework for growth and justification that Nimes Capital used in 2014 and 2015 to purchase the below-market properties and again leveraged in 2018 and 2019 to achieve their desired end: rezoning of the 4700 East Riverside parcel to permit massive redevelopment. Likewise, Austin's strategy to attract tech companies makes evident that looking only at the development process would ignore much of the context for gentrification. Oracle's move to the adjacent parcel changed the value of the land; this type of corporate development has been a cornerstone of Austin's governance playbook for decades. Thinking broadly, the redevelopment at 4700 East Riverside was never in doubt given the prime location of the site.

A second major dissociation occurs between the scale of development (and objection) and the scale at which urban decisions are made. While one of Austin's City Council Members represents the East Riverside-Oltorf neighborhood, there are nine other Council Members and the Mayor who represent other districts in the city. The Planning Commission represents the city as a whole, as well. While neighborhood-level objections are real and legitimate, the decision to approve the rezoning application was made at the city-level in conjunction with a master plan that was instituted at the city-level. The redevelopment of 4700 East Riverside would create jobs and housing that benefit other districts in accordance with *Imagine Austin*. This utilitarian logic that preferences the will of the many over the experience of the few locates gentrification at a scale that is disconnected from the actual development site. That is, it locates gentrification at the city-scale, though its immediate and harshest effects are locally-contained.

This misunderstanding of gentrification as a neighborhood-scale phenomenon by opponents of the project explains why the anti-gentrification protests began in March 2018 attacking a specific development. Viewed more holistically, the most effective place to prevent gentrification would be at the conception of the *Imagine Austin* master plan and the East Riverside Neighborhood Plan. Thinking of gentrification as an economic condition locates the process in narrow time and space, the here and now. However, the process of urban change operates on a longer time horizon and at the city-scale rather than at the neighborhood-scale.

Recommendations

This dissertation makes clear a need to engage with the contextual nuance of gentrification both theoretically and politically. For academics, I have three recommendations for future research: 1) incorporate cause and effect together, 2) be more place-specific, and 3) break from the market-led paradigm. Over its history, gentrification research has ebbed and flowed between prioritizing understanding the causes or effects of gentrification but rarely both. The cause side, as expressed in Chapter 3, stresses conceptual importance; the effect side, which came both before and after those debates, stresses policy-relevance. Both can be done. In stepping away from the grand theorizing that characterizes much of gentrification studies, we can better understand how cause and effect are linked to be both conceptually important and policy relevant. Policy relevance can be enhanced with more place-specific research that captures the dynamism and nuance of a process that materializes differently everywhere. There is no one gentrification. Use a framework, like that offered by Glass and reiterated in Chapter 2, to understand the spatiotemporal context of gentrification at a specific site. And finally, break from the market-led explanations of gentrification. Yes, gentrification is economic in nature. It is also more than that. Explanations that begin and end from a market perspective miss too much of the complexity of urbanization to be useful more broadly. The beauty of gentrification is that is captures those broader changes as part of a process that has material effects. There is much work to be done on understanding how bureaucracy, corporate siting, politics of care, and cultural demand affect gentrification, among other things.

Further, this project demonstrates the methodological efficacy of inductive thematic analysis, actor-network theory, and discursive frame analysis for planning research. One ongoing debate in the field is on “the range and substance of urban theory” (Scott & Storper, 2014, p. 1; 2016). Much like gentrification, urban theory has expanded to the point of losing specificity. Urban theory now incorporates a plethora of ideas around what it means to research a city, an urban society, the urban scale. Scott and Storper, for their part, outline a framework distinguish the “authentically urban…from the merely contingently urban” (2016, p. 1131). There framework would benefit from understanding how the urban is understood outside of the confines of academic literature. While I deploy discursive frame analysis to understand how gentrification is understood by different groups within a single city, they could deploy the same method to understand how the layperson understands urbanism across both cities and non-cities. This sort of work would benefit from collaboration with other interdisciplinary fields, notably information sciences and complex systems which are leveraging digital and open-source data much more effectively than planning has yet figured out how to do. Likewise, the use of frame analysis to understand master plan adoption, for example, could provide insights on how community members perceive their role in the place they live.

For protesters and residents at-risk of gentrification, you must recalibrate your understanding of gentrification as a manifestation of broader, extra-local change. This recalibration will aid you in identifying effective opportunities for resistance. As a starting point, I recommend being involved in the local planning process. The policy decisions made today will have long-lasting effects and should be made with the utmost care and substantial community input. Challenge the relationship between the state and market. Make it known that districts should have more local control. Take care to build inclusive coalitions that span across district boundaries so more Council Members can be pressured effectively. And most importantly, develop politically savvy strategies oriented around more than inequity and social justice. Despite being true, the rhetoric of inequity is far from enough to unwind the machinery of bureaucracy. This means crafting new language that focuses on the benefits of neighborhood preservation for cities and developers. It also means crafting language that is politically malleable so as not to alienate large chunks of the population by triggering tribal politics. And it means engaging with developers and city officials openly. Reframing anti-gentrification work as the preservation of American life and Protestant values may be one discursive measure to gain legitimacy and clout. For more direct action, consider working with local groups to convert existing housing into community land trusts or limited-equity co-ops. These housing arrangements work to preserve affordable housing by placing units in a stewarded relationship with community.

To cities, their officials, and their planners: a big issue faced is the lack of power to change the urban process. Planning today is not the same as the planning we learn about in school: there is no Howard, Corbusier, or Moses with absolute control. The field is much more about piecemeal change dominated by local politics. Zoning and historic preservation are both technologies of planning that had to be invented, and planning can still be a site of incremental innovation in that vein. For instance, planners could strengthen neighborhood preservation efforts by expanding historic preservation to protect working-class neighborhoods and racial, ethnic, and cultural enclaves. These neighborhoods are fundamentally important to our history and the livelihood of our cities, but are often overlooked by preservation ordinances. Likewise, reducing the blunt power of zoning may be another means to preserve affordability. For example, Minneapolis abolished single-family zoning (Minneapolis City Council, 2019). While the field is patiently awaiting the long-term results of that decision, there is consensus that it will increase the housing supply and reduce demand pressure on their local and regional housing market. A number of other solutions are available to preserve affordable housing. Two that come up frequently are community land trusts and limited-equity co-ops, which remove, at least partially, the profit motive and market effects that drive housing values up. However, though they are worth exploring and implementing where possible, these options are not scalable solutions as they are implemented at local and sub-local levels. The latter solutions face the additional challenge of needing to secure funding.

This work, and specifically the case study, demonstrate that planning and urban governance are technologies of the state. Planners centralize decision-making on behalf of some nebulous power. They hide behind the guise of expertise and, true to form, rely on technological solutions to push their internal agenda forward. Even citizen participation, once a radical strategy to achieve equity, is now a technology to legitimize master planning efforts. Part of the issue is that the governance structure that enables local control has not scaled well over time. The East Riverside neighborhood has nearly 50,000 residents; it is large enough to have its own mayor and council structure. Yet, as a piece of Austin, East Riverside is at the whims of an urban agenda that must abide by a utilitarian logic. A majority of Austin councilmembers agreed that the development should go forward, despite objections by residents and rejections by East Riverside's councilmember. Perhaps this is simply the price a community must pay to be part of robust and thriving economy. The conflict between society and scales of autonomy is bigger than this dissertation.

This conclusion is bleak, but we need not possess an explicit map of what our future will look like or should be. We need only a compass that points us in the right direction. A first step is to recognize the power of language to construct possibilities. Civic leaders should embrace the subjectivity of their own values, actions, and assumptions as they make decisions that affect a plural population. Recognizing the discursive frames used to approve a controversial redevelopment project is one way to do this. They should aim to create a space for genuine dialogue by reflecting on their own knowledge and language instead of discrediting the viewpoints offered by opponents. They should sensitively and reflexively mediate differences in understanding as they continue working towards identifying and solving the problems that face their communities. Gentrification is not a problem to be solved, if could even be called a problem at all. It is process that, at current, hurts many stakeholders. But it is also a process that can be made to benefit many stakeholders by speaking to those it most negatively effects. The hard part is recognizing that want for improvement; the easy part is opening up those lines of dialogue in a genuine, meaningful way. It is only from that point of collective decision-making that we can begin to make equitable improvements to our cities. These recommendations speak to the problems identified in Austin, as well as my own readings on gentrification, affordable housing, and social justice.

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