

# **Minority Governments and the Promise of Order: a Study of Indonesian Politics under Flames and Ashes, 1945-1947**

## **I. Introduction**

All politicians want to obtain as much power as possible, but some of them want to create and defend the political system that allows them to exist so that power is still obtainable in the future. The subject of this thesis is mainly about the latter politicians. More specifically, this thesis focuses on a political transition from indirect rule with a case study of Indonesia from 1945 to 1947. This thesis analyzes the formation of Sjahrir's minority and technocratic cabinets in an immediate moment after the independence declaration of the republican state of Indonesia in 1945. Looking retrospectively, the formation of three Sjahrir's cabinets, spanning until the mid of 1947, can be considered as the only cabinets in Indonesian parliamentary system that consisted of minority parties but numerous technocrats, that is, those elites who have previous professional experience in bureaucracy and hold no political affiliation. Although Sjahrir's second and third cabinet included a greater number of parties representation, his cabinets consistently retained a plentiful number of these technocratic figures until its demise. After the last Sjahrir's cabinet in 1947, never had cabinets in Indonesian parliamentary system until its breakdown in 1957 had a similar pattern of these personalities.

Existing studies indicate that the creation of minority cabinets was caused by the presence of a large median party (Crombez 1996) and electoral volatility (Strøm 1990). However, none of these variables are applicable to account for the formation of Sjahrir's cabinets. Rather than by the median party, Sjahrir's cabinets had been sponsored by a radical party, Socialist, that resented

the traditional aristocracy in the republican state and, later, enacted a communist insurrection in Madiun, East Java, in 1948. Additionally, none of the emergent politicians from this once colonized population could estimate the volatility of electoral outcomes, because the world behind them had been ordered in an authoritarian regime of "techno-oligarchic" state (Sutherland 1979) and structured based on racial hierarchy (Getachew 2019) for at least two centuries. Needless to say, elections as a mechanism for governments alternation as in modern democratic countries had all along been absent in the tropical colonies.

The appointment of technocrats in cabinet is usually explained by the presence of conditions which require politicians to restore the legitimacy of government, such as economic and political crises (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Wratil and Pastorella 2018; Brunclík and Parízek 2019). True that the Sjahrir's cabinets were formed under the distress and uncertain conditions for the threats of the incoming war with the Dutch colonial administration (NICA). But under the similar condition, the post-Sjahrir parliamentary cabinets, who were led by his colleague in the Socialist party, Sjarifuddin, was composed with completely different patterns of personalities with all coming from the major parties in parliament. It implies that it is true crises may yield this type of government, but it is not necessary.

In contrast to the existing literature, this thesis argues that the *promise* of enactment and maintenance of political orders was what made the Sjahrir's cabinets had received a vote of confidence by the majority parties in parliament. This thesis borrows the idea of Bonapartism developed by Karl Marx in his analysis of the French revolution on the ascendancy of a personage with the promise of enacting "political tranquility" into the study of cabinet formation. Analogous to the ascendancy of Bonaparte, the Sjahrir's cabinets appeared as "the Guardian of Order," to quote Marx's term, (1972 [1934], 91) for the capitalist and the labour who were, in

Sjahrir's own word (1968 [1945], 22), "disappointed" with the presence of anarchism. But, ironically, these cabinets became the bastion of traditional aristocratic classes whom Sjahrir had criticized for their incompetency managing political and social orders. Whilst at the same time, he became the object of resentment of the youth generations of lumpenproletariat, workers, and their middle class allies on whom he had placed so much adoration (see *ibid.*). Thus, equally to "Bonaparte [who] would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes," Sjahrir could not "give to one class without taking from another" (Marx 1972 [1934]., 114). Nevertheless, this peculiar "internal contradiction" became the factor that brought the rise and fall of his cabinets from 1945 to 1947.<sup>1</sup>

To explain the origins of Sjahrir's cabinets and its promise of order, this thesis relies on the path dependence analysis of Indonesian politics since the inclusion of nationalists elites in the Japanese war administration in Indies from 1943, the genesis of the parliamentary system in republican state of Indonesia in 1945, and the date of which the last Sjahrir's cabinet was voted with no confidence in 1947. Under the interval of this periodization, the following sequence summarizes the historical antecedents of the origins and demise of Sjahrir's cabinet: (i) that the indigenous elites from traditional bureaucracy appointed in the Japanese war administration encountered a threat of anarchism after the declaration of republican state of Indonesia they had prepared in 1945; (ii) that in the moment of weakening state structure after the Japanese surrender in 1945, workers and peasants along with urban middle class sought to enact a social

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<sup>1</sup> True that the desire for order is constant over time, but only in the presence of anarchism, this thesis argues, ruling politicians have enough incentives for finding an immediate and optimal solution by supporting a proposal offered by the Bonapartist figure. In this case, in the presence of such situation, Sjahrir's proposal for creating a minority and technocratic with the promise of order, was what made him able to win the majority supports of the parliament. Whilst, his failure to deliver the promise what shifted the norms of cabinet formation after the demise of his last cabinet.

revolution by removing the traditional bureaucracy in local administrations that had all along repressed them under colonialism; (iii) in addition, the attempts of NICA to reinstall colonial administration flamed the dynamite of colonial wars in major metropolitan cities in Java in an immediate moment after the declaration of independence; (iv) that the republican elites felt responsible to control these dissensions with the purpose of obtaining the recognition from the international community regarding the existence of republican state by displaying their ability to maintain order; (v) that the previous republican government that was led by Sukarno failed to countervail anarchism, hence giving birth to the parliamentary system and Sjahrir's cabinet; but (vi) due to the weakening state structure, the pressures from NICA, and criticism from his own initial supporters, the Sjahrir's cabinet were brought down in 1947.

The second section of this thesis will review the existing approach to account for the minority and technocratic cabinets and then contrast it with the idea of Bonapartism which this thesis proposes. Notably, whilst the previous literature explains that factions in parliament will make a joint coalition to form a cabinet with the purpose to maximize utility based on the calculus of *size* and *distance*, this thesis, extending this approach, argues that there exist the primordial interest of ruling politicians, that is to defend the very condition that allows them to exist. Thus, the argument of this thesis is in parallel to Riker (1964) and Budge and Herman (1978) who state that under the threats of anti-system, all pro-system factions will form a broad coalition to defend the system. But, in addition to this argument, this thesis specifies how the minority and technocratic cabinet can be an optimal solution to the problem of threats encountered by the ruling politicians, which is an argument similar to Marx's analysis on the ascendancy of Bonaparte. The third section will detail the methodology being used to justify the argument of this thesis. This section will detail the application of negative case studies (Emigh 1997) by

disputing how the existing arguments reviewed in the previous section are less appropriate to explain the formation of the case under study, hence justifying the necessity of new explanation. Finally, the fourth section will present the main argument of this thesis by displaying the historical process that had conjured the parliamentary system and Sjahrir's cabinets.

## **II. Literature Review**

The study of minority and technocratic governments in a parliamentary system has been a part of larger literature of coalition building theory, which began with the incorporation of deductive modeling of game theory to political science in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the early generation of this literature, such as Gamson (1961) and Riker (1962), did not set the scope of this theory to the formation of government cabinets per se, but as a general proposition of how two or more political factions, be it individuals, states, or parties, form a joint force with each other. Gamson and Riker's theory assumes that these factions behave rationally in intention to maximize their utility with the coalition as the instrument to attain it. Based on this ratio-instrumental assumption, they then seek to establish a systematic expectation of how these rational political factions will form a coalition.

Gamson and Riker's adaptation of game theory departs from different assumptions but arrives at the same expectation regarding the coalition-making behavior. Gamson's theory stresses on the idea of power insecurity, in which he assumes that rational people are necessitated to form a joint force because they do not have a sufficient initial resource in order to control the future decision regarding a political outcome, such as passing a legislation or winning a war (Gamson 1961, 374). Consequently, they have to accrue the partition of resources each by each from others by forming a coalition until they meet what is called the *effective decision point*. Gamson invites his reader to define the latter concept contextually according to the decision-making convention on

which these people function, which is also similar to Riker's theory (Gamson 1961, 375, Riker 1962, 23). In the context of constitutional amendment, for example, securing more than a two-third legislative assembly vote can be considered as a necessary effective decision point, because of the minimum requirement votes mandated in the constitution itself. The coalition that reaches the effective decision point in a particular decision-making institution is then referred to as *the winning coalition*.

Meanwhile, Riker's game theory adaptation is based on the assumption of resource insecurity in which the utility that rational actors can be reaped is limited. He assumes that rational men encounter a zero-sum situation, which incentivizes them to collude and make an agreement to some others by forming a coalition in order to reap the amount available benefits maximally for their group alone by excluding the others. Those who are included in this coalition are winning, those who are excluded are losing.

Nevertheless, both authors arrive at the same idea to characterize the most optimum winning coalition that rational men can attain. Both argue that having a minimal membership in the winning coalition can provide the maximum utility for its members because by doing so they can receive a higher share of the pie. Combined together, Gamson and Riker's theory predicts that a coalition formation is a function of preference of its members that is calculated based on the size of the group and the relative shares of their payoffs in a certain institutional context. This general proposition is then referred to as *the size principle* or in this thesis will be called the calculus of *size*.

Furthermore, with regard to the distribution of payoff, both authors hold different approaches. Gamson recognizes the principle of parity among the members of the winning coalition, by

which these people distribute the reward proportionally based on the resource they have already contributed. By implication, when encountering a situation in which two or more possible winning coalitions are available, rational people will select a coalition on which they have a relatively higher resource than the other potential members, so that they can maximize their share. But, in contrast, Riker's proposition regarding a distribution of resources demonstrates a more relaxed approach to the Gamsonian principle of parity. Riker emphasizes the factor of private agreement or *side-payments* to explain the way in which the payoff will be divided in the winning coalition. Thus, the coalition-maker can have various sources and size of currency to exchange support from others.<sup>2</sup>

Besides the Rikerian and Gamsonian size approach, another approach underscores the factor of non-calculable preference like ideology as a criteria used by the potential members of the winning coalition to explain coalition formation. This approach assumes that political actors will search their potential partners first and foremost based on the ideological proximity until meeting a minimum winning coalition (Lieserson 1966). Although scholars sometimes perceive it as complementary to the Rikerian and Gamsonian size approach (e. g. Taylor and Laver 1973), this approach contradicts the main assumption of earlier theory that regards a coalition operates as an ad hoc solution among factions with conflicting interest (Gamson 1961, 374). Consequently, one should have different expectations regarding the size of a coalition when including ideology as a factor of coalition formations, although this indeed does not deny the potential overlapping coalition with the characteristic of closed ideological proximity and minimized size.

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<sup>2</sup> Riker dedicates chapter 5 to explore the concept of side-payments or what he called "the currency leaders use". See Riker (1962, 108)

The empirical application of this theory to the study of government formation in a parliamentary system encounters a challenge in operationalizing the variable of resource, payoff, and the actual calculus used by politicians to form a political coalition. More specifically, to operationalize variables of resource and payoff, one should ask what actually a faction in a parliament contributes to the formation of government and what are the exciting payoffs they reap? More generally, one should also ask which kind of criteria, e. g. size or ideological distance or both, being used in the coalition calculation in cabinet formation?

By and large, there is no sharp disagreement in the literature with regard to the operationalization of the variable of resources. Rather, the main dispute in this literature is on specifying what kind of payoffs these factions actually receive in the game of coalition building. Early generations of government formation scholars such as Lierserson (1968) and Browne and Franklin (1973) assumed the share of votes in the legislative assembly and the distribution of cabinet portfolios as respectively the resource and the payoff in the game of cabinet formation. These scholars maintain the same supposition: on one hand, parties in a parliament want to control the future policy outcome by securing certain government cabinets to control some policy areas, on the other hand, the formateur of government has to secure minimum voting support from parliament to form the cabinet. As a result, this assumption suggests that the composition of the executive cabinet is a direct function of coalition formation in the legislative assembly.

With this assumption, Browne and Franklin affirm Gamsonian parity distribution of payoff in thirteen European postwar parliamentary democracies on which the cabinet portfolios are allocated proportionally according to the share of votes of the cabinet portfolio holder's party in parliament. Their finding was later emphasized by Browne and Feste (1975) who put forward the variable of the relative cabinet salience to each party. Their finding demonstrates that while



cabinet portfolios are distributed proportionally, the size of parties determine who has the power to determine which parties receive which portfolio. In general, this line of research concurs that the numerical attribute of parties in parliament serve as a function of their bargaining power in the formation of cabinet (see also Bäck, Meier, and Persson 2009).

Nevertheless, the later generation of this research program relaxes the assumption that membership in the cabinets as the sole payoff that parties receive in the parliamentary coalition-building. This line of research coincides that factions in a parliament may primarily pursue the power to influence government policy outputs, but the administrative control is not necessary for them in order to attain it. This assumption is particularly instrumentalized to account for the formation of a minority government, which was the phenomena of a third of post-war cabinets in Europe itself. Strøm (1991) describes that under circumstances where election results are volatile and the structure of parliament makes the non-member of cabinet able to influence the policy output, the minority government tends to occur. Meanwhile, Crombez (1996) argues that if the largest party has the median ideological position in the policy space, a minority government is likely to occur. This is the case because the largest party does not have to invite other factions in parliament to the cabinets because their median position can win majority support from the non-cabinet members in order to pass their policy proposal.

The implication of this shifting assumption is that cabinet inclusion cannot necessarily be considered as a zero-sum game. Rather, parliamentary factions calculate their circumstance and decide whether the inclusion in cabinets is necessary to obtain their goals. This point is also made by Budge and Laver (1986) who analyze the possible consequences when parties hold intrinsic value in the cabinet's office and when they do not. In their deductive exploration, they put forth the importance of lexicographic order by considering both office- and policy-seeking

assumptions in studying the cabinet formation. By doing so, they suggest that the empirical research should identify the parties preference and the constraining circumstance they face (501-2).

Interestingly, the earlier study written by Budge and Herman (1978) also made a similar mark. Although both authors do not specify the underlying circumstances of what makes inclusion in cabinets become important, they argue that parliamentary parties' preference has an order of preference in a coalition-building behavior depending on the circumstance they face. Primarily, as they argue, most parties have to defend the democratic system that allows them to exist. Thus, in the presence of threats to the system, parliamentary factions would seek to build a large government consisting of pro-system politicians. But when such threats are absent, they begin to behave in a way expected by conventional coalition theory. Particularly, they emphasize the factor of distance when the presence of uni-dimensional ideological division appears but the factor of size will be the main concern when such division is absent.

Nevertheless, although the issue of circumstance has been repeatedly discussed in the literature, the empirical research studying how the changing of circumstance affects the change calculus criterion by parties is still minimal. Except a few like Budge and Herman (1978) and Strøm (1991) themselves, mainly the empirical study of cabinet formation is designed to find the confirmation of their deductive model rather than studying the underlying mechanism on which that model operated. Thus, "the bias toward normalcy" in the research design on cabinet formation has made the student of coalition building less interested in the study of payoff of cabinet inclusion and exclusion. This may be the reason for many decades the literature of government formation has neglected the creation of technocratic cabinets, that is the type of government composed mainly of non-partisan experts.

A recent study on European parliament exhibits that a legitimacy crisis may engender the exclusion of politicians whilst more inclusion of technocrats in cabinets. These studies argue that a coalition of political parties in parliament may delegate their cabinets to the group of experts because of the increased electoral cost and decreased policy benefits for being included in the government. These factors are engendered by corruption scandals or unpopular policies when tackling economic downturn that can decrease the legitimacy of government (Brunclík and Parížek 2019). Thus, politicians employed technocrats to shift the blame from voters for unpopular policy, so that they can reestablish their credibility (Wratil and Pastorella 2018, 457-456-7).

However, the more implication of the above argument is still under explored in recent literature. In parallel to the electoral volatility thesis in the minority government literature, the formation of technocratic type of government implies that politicians defer the gratification of being administratively influential in a moment of crises so that they can stay pursuing the office in the future. But the appointment of technocrats indicates a shifting analytical concept in the government formation theory. In the face of crises, factions of politicians transform into unitary actors rather than a separate faction who then appoint experts to clean the mess up for them. This theory thus relates and complements the aforementioned Budge and Herman's (1979) hypothesis that the pro-system parties unite to defend the system allowing them to exist. The difference is, the appointment of technocrats specifies *how* the pro-system parties in parliament are going to offset the presence of the anti-system insurrection.

In order to foresee the further implication of that hypothesis, this thesis invokes the idea of Bonapartism to the study of coalition building in the parliament with a little modification. In Marx's analysis (1972[1934]) on the French revolution, the presence of the threats of anarchism

had made the ruling class willing to sacrifice their own interest in favor of enacting order by strengthening the state machinery. In doing so, as Marx distinguishes, there are two "solutions" invoked by them. First, that was represented by "the party of Order" through a constitutional method. Second, that was sponsored "extra-parliamentary bourgeois" through the support of strong executive figures. Bonaparte arose through the *coup d'etat* against the former with the support of the latter who were considered failing to fulfill the promise of order for the community of ruling classes.

This thesis adopts Marx's analytical categories, which are (i) the presence of threats, (ii) the promise of order, and (iii) the rising of "Bonapartist" figures, with the case study of parliamentary system in Indonesia. The difference is, as will be shown in the few subsequent sections below, that the ruling class is not necessarily a bourgeois, although the threat is similar, whilst Bonaparte is not necessarily an executive figure, but can also be a parliamentarian and their technocratic partners, and the promise of order is not necessarily the political suppression of marginal in favor the ruling class, but can also the promise of policy to countervail anarchism.

To justify the necessity and validity of the new explanation proposed in this thesis, the next section will explain the methodology being used in this research. Especially, the next section will identify the way in which the case study of Sjahrir's cabinets exhibit the distinctive elements that are existing theories about the minority and technocratic cabinets less applicable. Furthermore, the next section will make a methodological premise why the selection of anomalies, as opposed to the inference of general pattern of case studies, is also important for the theoretical development in the cabinet formation literature.

### III. Research Design

There is an explicit tendency in the cabinet formation literature to design research by focusing on the confirmation of assumption and expectation of the deductive model. More importantly, except a few (e. g. Budge and Herman 1978; de Mesquita 1975), the case studies often selected are the post-war European parliaments that are considered as "stable" and "normal". Hence, as stated previously, there is "a normalcy bias" in the literature, whilst the study of rare cases is said to hold no "practical interest" (Strøm 1991, 7). But what actually is the structural mechanism that constitutes "a normal as a normal" is out of the interest of students of this literature.

That scholarly practice proved to neglect an area of interest that this literature can extend more its theoretical insight. For example, initially, the inquiry of minority government had been neglected because this type of government was deemed abnormal, until in the 1990s an observation found that the minority government occurs frequently in a third of postwar European governments (*ibid.*, 8). However, in contrast to the previous practice of research design, this thesis would rather argue that the worth of studying minority government is not because this type of government turns out to be a normal situation, but because it opens the structural condition that has previously been neglected in the study of cabinet formation: *when* do actual politicians deem cabinet posts important? Thus, the epistemological basis of this research is that the knowledge expansion should not only be about pursuing empirical affirmation, but should also be about expanding the content of the theory by opening the scope of condition on which a causation operates.<sup>3</sup> With this epistemological position, the cabinet formation literature should study the varying conditions and calculus used by politicians in building a coalition. Ultimately,

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<sup>3</sup>This is more close to critical realism. See Sayer (1992)

the role of anomalous case study is to uncover the structural context that is not sufficiently explained from previous studies (Emigh 1997).

To operationalize this methodological premise, the main focus of this section is directed to describe why the case study of the Indonesian republican parliamentary government defies the expectation of existing theories on minority government and how it then helps identifying a new condition that is not properly explained by previous literature. In summary, from 1945 to 1947, the government consisted of a minority party in parliament, but from the beginning of 1947 to 1957, the government cabinet became an oversized coalition. There are three existing theories explaining the formation of minority governments that will be assessed in this section. These theories are the role of electoral volatility, median party, and non-hierarchical parliamentary structure. This section will assess each of these theories and then introduce a new explanation that will be elaborated further in the main argument section.

This thesis argument is consonant with the earlier writing of cabinet formation literature, but with modification. While agreeing that the elite's first and foremost concern is to defend the political system that allows them to exist, this thesis argues that executive cabinets formed in Indonesia served as a solution to the problem republican elites encountered during the first five years after the declaration of independence: the territorial threats and state-building. The toleration of parliamentary elites during this period to the minority government was founded by elite profiles appointed in the cabinets that were promised to help them solve those problems, which most of these profiles were technocrats. Before going into detail to this argument in the next section, the following subsection will describe the working of the Indonesian republican parliamentary government to provide a general overview about the case under study and the next subsection afterward will assess existing theoretical accounts each by each.

### *The Parliament*

The origins of the Indonesian republican parliament should be accounted side-by-side with the institutional structure of the consolidated Dutch colonial state in the beginning of the twentieth century and the short three-year period of Japanese war administration in the 1940s. However, while many great details about this aspect will be elaborated in the next section, the following and subsequent subsections will be focused respectively on the descriptive account of the working and characteristic of the republican parliament and executive cabinets from 1945 to 1957.

Originally, the first constitution of republican Indonesia did not design the government to operate as a parliamentary system, in which the executive cabinet is formed by and accountable to the legislative assembly. Rather, the president held the absolute power to create the cabinet and issue a law without even an adjudication by the legislative branch. This executive-heavy constitution failed to revise in the 1950s and survived for the fifty decades afterward, legitimizing the autocratic regimes of Sukarno (1959-1965) and Suharto (1965-1998).

By and large, it is fair to say that the practice of parliamentary government from 1945 to 1957 in Indonesia was begun in a concession of the inner circle of metropolitan elites in Java after the second month of declaration of independence in August 1945. The initial parliamentary assembly appropriated one of the legacies of the Japanese war administration that was just founded a day after the declaration of independence. This body, known as the National Committee of Central Indonesia (KNIP), was a successor of the Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence (PPKI), which was formed by Japan for fulfilling their promise of

independence to nationalist leaders with all of its initial members were appointed by Sukarno and Hatta.

Nevertheless, KNIP originally did not even have a legislative power, until a group of elite networks within them issued a petition to Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta, who were selected in acclamation in the last meeting of PPKI as the head of state, to empower this body with congressional authority and allowed its members to form a cabinet. Thus, with the executive order in October 1945, the government became responsible to KNIP, but with a special commission to a subsection in KNIP, known as the Working Committee. This body had been influential in the first five years of parliamentary government, because the locus of lawmaking and daily interaction with the executive cabinet was delegated to them. Meanwhile, although it had been used as a channel to pressure the government's policy outputs and vote the cabinets, the KNIP's general assembly held a little chance to raise an immediate concern to the government because they held a meeting only once a year.

The initial members of the Working Committee were selected by two preeminent anti-Japanese war administration activists who also then respectively became the first and second prime minister, Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin (see Noer and Akbarsyah 2005, 35). Most probably, they were trusted because the inner circle of elites in Jakarta considered their anti-fascist personalities and their exclusion from the Japanese war administration were instrumental to build an appealing reputation for the republic in international community.<sup>4</sup> After the establishment of the


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<sup>4</sup>Regarding diplomatic strategy of Jakartan elites, see Hatta (2011). Meanwhile, with respect to the connection of both figures to the anti-fascist armed group, see Legge (2010) and Anderson (1972).



parliamentary system, the composition of the Working Committee was based on concessions among factions in KNIP rather than curated by Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin.

However, despite the privilege of Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin in choosing its members, the Working Committee demonstrates a plurality of political factions of the general assembly of KNIP since its inception. Numerically speaking, considering that 24% of KNIP's general assembly were independent politicians and assuming these politicians behaved individually, it is fair to state that the Working Committee represented the majority of factions in KNIP. In total, the Working Committee spoke for 60% to 70% of political factions in the general assembly.<sup>5</sup> Although this comes with a special note: it was indeed there were small political organizations, around 5%, in parliament that were not represented in this body.



**Graph I - Representation in KNIP's Working Committee**

<sup>5</sup> This figure is derived from Noer and Akbar (2005)

Additionally, the relative weight of factions in KNIP and seats that each faction received in the Working Committee seems congruent. The Graph II above expresses the relationship of these two factors in five Working Committees created since November 1945. There are two important observations based on the graph above. First, there was indeed an imbalanced voting power between three biggest parties, e. g. PNI, Masyumi, and Socialist (three points on the right on the I, II, and III KNIP above), and other small factions. But this imbalance indeed represents the real composition of the general assembly between those three parties with others. Apparently, this vote asymmetry was intervened by Sukarno and Hatta in 1947 by reshuffling the composition of KNIP's general assembly, which reduced the relative voting power of these three big parties (see the increased fragmentation in the fourth and fifth Working Committee in the Graph II above).

Second, although the graph above demonstrates the strong parity relationship between the Working Committee and the general assembly, there were anomalies. Obviously, Masyumi was underrepresented in the third reshuffle of the Working Committee. Additionally, it also shows the overrepresentation of an armed youth group who gained eight percent of seats in the first three compositions of the Working Committee, despite their minor power in the general assembly. This indicates that despite the tendency toward a plural representation, the tension and concession among elites played a role in determining the Committee's membership.

Even though the Working Committee was disbanded, the practice of the parliamentary system continued after 1949. The Round Table Conference in the Hague in that year marked the ending of military threats from the Netherland Colonial Administration (NICA) that were trying to re-occupy their former colony. The Conference also resulted in the formation of Federal States of Indonesia, that subsumed the republican parliament, i.e. KNIP, as a part of this new state structure. However, federalism only lasted a few months, for shortly in 1950, the state structure

returned to unitarism with Sukarno and Hatta came back as the head of states, elected in acclamation by both unitarist, i. e. KNIP, and federalist parliament members, which was created by NICA in 1946. Nevertheless, after federalism was shortly abandoned in 1950, the parliamentary system was maintained under a reborn-unitarist republic with a new provisional constitution. In this new era, KNIP was disbanded and the government was fully responsible to the provisional House of Representative (DPRS) until the first national election was held in 1955.

As mentioned slightly above, before the first national election was held, the member of parliament was appointed by Sukarno and Hatta with possible influence from their inner elite circle in Jakarta. In Sukarno and Hatta's defence, the appointment of members in KNIP was justified based on "the representativeness of political streams" in society (see Noer and Akbarsyah 2005, 22). Apparently, they were the only people at the time who had the capacity for doing this because during their tenure under the Japanese war administration they had compiled a massive intelligent report titled "the most influential people in Java".<sup>6</sup>


After the establishment of the parliamentary system in November 1945, Sukarno and Hatta were still responsible for additional KNIP's members because the national election, which was initially scheduled in 1946, could not be organized. But since the parliamentary system was already founded as the basis of governance, Sukarno and Hatta had to acquire support from the members they themselves previously appointed in KNIP if they want to include new personnel. While many great details on this matter should be subjected to another study, the impressionistic view on elite profiles appointed by Sukarno and Hatta in the KNIP indicates that they came from three

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<sup>6</sup> See Guensikanbu, *Orang Indonesia yang Terkemuka di Jawa* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1986)

political streams. These streams were traditional bureaucracy, anti-Japanese underground groups, and experienced politicians from Volksraad, which was the Dutch-created colonial quasi-parliament in the 1930s. Meanwhile, the government publication categorizes each of these elites based on their parties affiliation, regional representation, and functional interest, like peasants and labour.

Sukarno and Hatta's defence of their curation of parliament members may well be justified. The graph below shows the diverse composition between parliamentary factions based on the category created by the official government record. Although the majority of the initial members were from political parties, other factions' voting shares were competitive enough. Especially after the reshuffle of parliament in 1947, the relative power of parties were reduced due to the inclusion of regional and functional groups, e. g. peasant and labour, regional representation from outside Java, and ethnic minority groups, such as Chinese, Eurasian, and Arab. Little is known about what and how these non-parties political factions behaved in the parliament, but looking retrospectively, these groups are the embryonic organization of what is later known as Golongan Karya (Golkar), created in the late of Sukarno's authoritarian regime in the 1960s and had been weaponized afterward to control the parliamentary supports during Suharto's authoritarian regime for thirty years.




**Graph II - Representation in Republican Parliament**

These functional and regional groups played little role in the cabinet formation. As will be discussed below, the functionalist and regional group had almost no inclusion in the cabinets. However, a small number of elites from ethnic groups successfully became a part of the cabinet, despite their minor power in both the Working Committee and KNIP's general assembly. Most probably, compared to ethnic groups, it is reasonable to think the functional and regional groups did not behave as organized factions for their creation was rather as the extended power of the head of states. On the other hands, during Sjahrir's tenure, the ethnic group became more salient, considering there was great inclusion of their leaders in cabinets. Probably, this is because the protection of minorities was declared as the explicit government's political agenda (see Sjahrir 1968 [1945]). On the other hand, the rule of parties in parliaments as well as cabinet became more and more salient after the unitarist transition in 1950. There is no record of the survival of functional and regional groups after the formation of DPRS in this year, while the ethnic groups lost their representation in the parliament after the first national election in 1955.

### Top Parties in Indonesian Parliament, From 1945 to 1959

Four Parties with the Highest Seats in Each Tenure



**Graph III - Top Four Parties in Parliaments**

Although parties in parliament had been highly fragmented, as shown in the Graph III above, there were top four parties whose accumulation of votes represented a half of the legislative assembly. Even more, after the first national election in 1955 their total shares of vote became seventy percent of the assembly. These four parties clearly represent three strands of main cleavage in Indonesian society, which in the Western scholarship known as *aliran* (e. g. Ufen 2008). PNI and PIR-Hazairin served as the voice of secular nationalist with a strong traditional roots in bureaucracy; Masyumi and NU represents the strands of Islamism but the latter had more syncretistic traditional roots than the former; while Partai Sosialis (Socialist), PBI, and PKI represent the leftist spectrum of peasant and working classes. Among these parties, only PNI, Masyumi, and NU had the longest survival in the parliamentary system. Socialist party broke up in 1947 after Sjarifuddin and his followers in the party expressed a strong disagreement with Sjahrir's policy over the matter of diplomatic issues with NICA. Further, the breakup between

Sjarifuddin and Sjahir could no longer be remedied after the former joined the rank of Stalinist movement in East Java to enact the Soviet Republic of Indonesia. Finally, although previously holding high vote shares in the parliament, PIR-Hazairin and PBI lost majority of seats after the first national election in 1955. On the leftist spectrum, only the communist, i. e. PKI, survived until the last day of the parliamentary system in 1957 before their genocide in 1965.

### *The Executive*

This thesis observes eleven executive cabinets since the establishment of the parliamentary system in 1945 to the time of its collapse in 1957 before deciding their focus on the formation of Sjahrir's cabinets (1945-7). This observation excludes all cabinets arranged during the time of emergency (1948), transition to the unitary state (1949 and 1950), and those that were created by the head of states (1948, 1949, and 1957). Indeed, except for the formation of the emergency cabinet in 1948 when NICA took over the capital city and imprisoned most of republican elites in 1948, the formation of those cabinets still rested upon coalition building in the parliament. However, this thesis only focuses on the formation of a cabinet in the authentic, instead of quasi, parliamentary system.

On the median, the duration of most of these eleven cabinets lasted only two and a half hundred days. The longest-serving cabinet was the first Sastroamidjojo's cabinet (1953), of which the formation led by PNI that governed almost for two years, whilst the shortest one was the second Sjarifuddin's cabinet (1947). Serving only around eighty days, Sjarifuddin's tenure was interrupted due to the military occupation by NICA in the capital city. By and large, there were completely no executive cabinets that accomplished a full duration of tenure. Mainly, the breakdown of these cabinets because of pressures from within and outside the parliament.

Because of the short duration of the cabinets, the official Indonesia historiography considers the period of parliamentary democracy unstable. With the basis of its duration, it also frames the practice of governance as not working well. This historical narration then justified the iron-fist of authoritarianism under Sukarno and Suharto regimes, which are regarded as more stable and conducive for governance. However, the political practice in this period is what a completely normal and working parliamentary system looks like, except of the fact that the parliament is a hundred percent appointed rather than elected before the first national election 1955. But the inability to carry out election was not because these elites had a strong intention to dismiss parliamentary democracy, but because their plan to hold election in 1946 was cancelled due to the military aggression by the Dutch colonial government.

Further, the short tenure of cabinets did not devalue its status as a well working and accountable governance system. Rather, the short duration of cabinets signaled that the ruling parties were responsive enough to the demand and pressure from the opposition in and outside parliament. By stepping out from the position of power immediately after the vote of no confidence in the parliament, these elites show that they were willing to follow the rule of law. Therefore, the short duration of the cabinet indicates the political accountability was working very well. Additionally, in length, others (see Noer and Akbarsyah 2005, Feith 1962) have also discussed several important policies being made by the cabinets in open and respectful democratic debates within the parliament during this period, which signifies the practice of governance works well.

The phenomena of democratization during this pressing time is categorized, as Huang (2016) term, the "wartime origins of democratization," on which, "the rebels", e. g. the republican elites, relied upon the mobilization of mass in order to win the war. There was a massive public mobilization during this period which is clearly indicated by the inclusion of a higher number of



political factions in parliament, as discussed previously. Moreover, there are abundance of indications from the public speech among republican elites, for example in Sjahrir (1966[1945]) and Tan Malaka (2005 [1945]), that relying on the power of the masses as a key to win the war for independence against the racist Dutch colonial state. All these things considered, contrary to the common view that this era was a blemish political system in Indonesian history, this period demonstrates a working democratic parliamentary system.

More importantly, contrary to the existing literature in the coalition building, the formation of cabinets in this period showcases an unexplained anomaly. First, despite the awareness of anti-system threats coming from the attempts of NICA to reinstall their colonial administration, these republican elites decided to create a democratic opening by the inclusion of as many political factions as possible, but at the same they were in an agreement to form a minority government. As seen in Appendix I, the representation of parliamentary factions in Sjahrir I (1945) and II (1946) cabinets was very minimal. In total, factions of which elites in these cabinets represented only about thirty five to forty percent shares of votes in the parliament.<sup>7</sup>

It is also noticeable that in the first three cabinets, as shown in the Graph IV below, there was consistently a high number of technocrats appointed as ministers, compared to other cabinets in all periods of the republican parliamentary system.<sup>8</sup> Important to note that the Graph IV below only shows the relative share of parties and technocrats in cabinet in the minister's portfolio alone. It thus excludes the position of deputy ministers in the calculation. Indeed, party's


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<sup>7</sup>This number derives both by the calculation of the relative share of votes among factions in the general assembly and Working Committee. The first cabinet party representation is counted by identifying each elites affiliation after all the major parties—Masyumi, Socialist, and PNI—were formally formed respectively in late November 1945, December 1945, and January 1946.

<sup>8</sup>The figure of technocrats is calculated by counting the number of elites who were not affiliated with any factions in parliament and their experience in bureaucracy.

members were appointed in the secondary positions in ministries, but if these profiles were included, the extraordinary shares of technocrats would not be apparent. As a consequence, the exceptional features of Sjahrir's cabinets are neglected. Why were the role of parties during Sjahrir's tenures relegated as only the deputy ministers? Most importantly, why did all Sjahrir's cabinets secure the full confidence of the absolute majority of the parliament (see Anderson 1972, 299 and 313, Kahin 2003, 170 and 206) despite little representation of major parties in parliament?

Thus, the three Sjahrir's cabinets uncovers unexplained aspects in the theory of oversized coalition. As Riker (1961) and Budge and Herman (1978) hypothesize, factions of different interest will form a united oversized coalition in the presence of threats to the system. But over time, as Riker elaborates, the size of this coalition will reduce until it meets a minimal win. However, what kind of cabinet composition will be formed in a situation of threat is still not specified yet. By using the case studies of Indonesia, this thesis seeks to explain why in awareness of the anti-system threat, minority and technocratic cabinets were formed, but over time this cabinet became oversized.



**Graph IV - Composition of Parties and Technocrats**

After the resignation of the Sjahrir's second cabinet, the representation of parliamentary factions in cabinets had been oversizing the total strength of the share of votes necessary to win the parliament (see Appendix I). Largely, the composition of cabinets after Sjahrir's last tenure (1947) represent sixty percent of the factions in parliament. Moreover, the formation of Sjahrir's cabinets also confronts the views in the existing literature of minority government. To reiterate the review in the previous section, this literature states that the volatility of election, size of the median party, and structure of parliament are responsible for the formation of this government. The variable of electoral volatility is empirically assessed by identifying the fluctuation of parliament composition before and after election (Strøm 1990, 72-3). But this variable is not applicable to the case study of this research because prior to the formation of a minority government, the political rule was ordered based on racial categories with the Dutch (before 1943) and the Japanese (1943-5) on the top hierarchy. Needless to say, there had been no election for ever until 1955.

It is true that republican elites in the immediate period of independence might expect a parliamentary change in an upcoming election, which was expected in 1946. This may be an alternative modified explanation of the electoral volatility variable. Nevertheless, the election in 1946 failed to organize due to the anti-colonial war. After the coming of NICA military troops and the failure of election, the cabinets began to oversize. The increased number of members in the cabinets may mean that parliamentary elites began to see the value of being included in the cabinets. However, with the return of political stability in 1950 and the scheduling of election in 1951, the executive cabinets during this period were still largely composed of oversizing parties representation, following the pattern of pre-1950 politics after Sjahrir's last cabinet. In other words, this shows that while it is true elites shifted their calculation in 1946 by asking for more

representation, the feasibility of election to alternate the ruling government was not a part of their consideration, for the political stability and the presence of expected election in 1950 did not change their coalitional behavior.

The argument of electoral volatility also comes in a package with the ideas of structure of parliament and resourceful parties. But the variable of resourceful parties can be eliminated, because the moment when the minority government was formed, political parties were merely just founded by elites. Thus, it is reasonable enough to think that because of their fledgling organization, the necessity to gain resources by inclusion in cabinets might be the best interest of parties during this period. Nevertheless, the elimination of this variable must come with a note: it is indeed that this variable can explain the creation of an oversize cabinet. But it is still unknown why specifically it was in 1947 that the parties demanded and received more representation in the cabinet.

Meanwhile, the structure of parliament might be the strongest alternative explanation for the formation of Sjahrir's cabinets. The privilege of Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin to select the initial members of the Working Committee might allow them to build tolerable cabinets with minor party representation. Nevertheless, to remind of the observation presented in the previous section, their selection of the Working Committee demonstrates a highly diverse representation in the general assembly. This diversity may open the path for non-cabinets parties to become an influential opposition. There were indeed a small number of factions in the general assembly that were not represented in the Working Committee. This faction later joined an influential extra-parliamentary opposition called the United Front (*Persatuan Perjuangan*) for criticizing Sjahrir's policy, and, further, kidnapped the prime minister (Anderson 1972, 390). This may indicate that the opportunity to be a parliamentary opposition for *some* might be limited and because of that

they should resort to an extra-parliamentary method. Most probably, only those who supported the republican state declared by Sukarno-Hatta and their circles may gain the privilege of being an opposition because they had to be appointed by them. Therefore, it is true that the parliamentary institutions provided a limited opposition opportunity, but whilst this had been the characteristic of the parliamentary system in Indonesia since its inception, there should be an explanation why it is after the third Sjahrir's cabinet and later, it became oversized.

Another explanation to account for the formation of a minority government is the size of the median party. This argument states that when the number of factions is high and political views are sharp, the median party possesses an immediate advantage, because the non-median players have a sharply different interest with each other, causing them unable to form an alternative coalition. As a consequence, the policy position of the median party will be preferable for all players. For this reason, the median party, when selected as a cabinet formateur, does not have to offer portfolio to other parties to gain a vote of confidence, hence creating the phenomena of minority government (Laver 1998, 262; Crombez 1996).

True that the parliamentary system in Indonesia was fragmented not only in terms of the quantity but also in terms of its ideology. As a study has noted, the party system during this period is characterized by 'centrifugal rivalry', in which ideological positions between them were moving in extremely opposing directions (Mietzner 2008). But the Socialist, a party of which Sjahrir was affiliated with and thus responsible for the minority government, is not a median player. This party was a joint of two parties with a similar platform. These, People's Socialist Party and Socialist Party of Indonesia, were initiated in different places by respectively the followers of Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin. They both were rooted in a prewar Left-wing nationalist movement that had a strong suspicion of not only colonialism, but also indigenous feudal and aristocratic classes

who, they considered had a fascistic character. It was indeed that many of elites in these parties had an experience in anti-fascist underground during the war period. Some of Sjarifuddin's followers, for example, were involved in an anti-Nazi underground while residing in the Netherland (Mrázek 2018, 284-6), whilst Sjahrir's anti-fascist underground group was active in Jakarta during Japanese occupation (*ibid*; see also Legge 2010). This political platform placed the Socialist political strand outside of the middle, for in contrast, the two big parties that was potentially to be chosen as a cabinet formateur, respectively, PNI and Masyumi, had a strong entrenched in conservative secular and religious background (see Anderson 1972, 220-7).

### *Summary of Argument*

The full and partial negation of the previous explanation justifies the explanations being offered in this research. Unlike the existing explanations, this thesis argues that the formation of minority and technocratic governments in Indonesia was possible because of two factors: the presence of threats and the policy promise of state-building. When political elites encountered a situation in which their administration was not well organized and its territory was uncertain due to the existence of threats of anarchism and colonialism, the minority government was legitimate. Partially, this is due to the fact that political elites not only want to pursue power, but they also want to protect the very condition that allows them to exist: the independent state. Additionally, the existence of an independent state not only protects their political existence but also gives them the instrument to exercise their power.<sup>9</sup> The instruments of power is the primary objective in the game of coalition building in any parliaments, because when obtaining power in government office, political elites exercise their power *through* the hand of administrator and

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<sup>9</sup>This argument is influenced by Mann's interpretation of the Weberian concept of state. See Mann (1982, 54-63)

implement it *to* certain territory. When these two factors are in absentia, then there would be no beneficial reason to be in the governments. In other words, political elites not only want to pursue power, but they want to *create* and *protect* it.

The establishment of Sjahrir's minority and technocratic governments were made possible because the *promise* and the *credibility* when an immediate resolution needed to be made to solve the problem for the ruling classes in the parliament. Further, Sjahrir and his technocratic team's credibility in the pressing time of national revolution allowed the formation of this type of government. By implication, the demise of this type of government occurred when the promise of order failed to deliver, which explained why the oversized cabinet became a norm after the last Sjahrir's cabinet.

The further elaboration of the above argument in the next section will be organized in the following successive points. First, the next section will explain the emergence of threats during the formation of republican Indonesia and how the minority government came up as a solution to cope with them. As with any rational calculation, the perception of upcoming threats were processed by elites through learning and gathering information from their surrounding circumstance. But the perception of threats has also a temporal dimension: it occurred as a conflict between the expectation of the future's occasion and the presence of obstacles.<sup>10</sup> Hence, to demonstrate the existence of threats, the first part of this section will describe the moment prior to the parliamentary system being founded and how elites built up their expectation relating to future political affairs. Second, the next section will explain Sjahrir's proposal and his background to exemplify how his cabinets came up as a solution to achieve the expectation

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<sup>10</sup>This conception of threats is credited to social learning theory literature. See Legro (2000)

previously constructed. Further, this section will show how the minority government was no longer credible, by detailing an array of government's actions that defied elites expectation who voted for them.

#### **IV. Main Argument**

To identify the elite's perception of threats, the first part of the following section will begin by describing the formation of The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPKI) and PPKI established by the Japanese war administration. These institutions provided a space for republican elites discussing a matter of state-building which became the institutional basis for a political affair Japan surrendered in 1945. Further, the formation of these institutions and appointment of elites in them set a filter of political access to decision-making after the declaration of independence was broadcasted widely in August 1945.

The description being provided in the first section will be the basis for the next argument relating to not only the formation of Sjahrir's minority cabinets, but also the parliamentary system in the next section. During this period, it can be observed that the limited access to BPUPKI and PPKI then, as will be further elaborated below, was the main cause of political clash between the old and younger generation of politicians, of whom the former's political career partly had been based on the colonial bureaucracy and partly from the popularity gained in the 1930s anti-Dutch nationalist movement, while the latter had been based mainly on armed group created by the Japanese war administration. But this clash facilitated an insight among elites relating to the strategy to protect the state and territory they had imagined in BPUPKI and PPKI, hence creating the minority and technocratic cabinets.

#### *The Sense of Threats*



The founding of BPUPKI and PPKI was the policy of contrast by Tokyo, for in the initial occupation of Indies (later became Indonesia) in 1942, they showed less interest in the nationalist movement. In contrast, they froze all political activities and suppressed any political expression for independence (Benda 1956; Aziz 1955, 232). Rather than "liberating Asia", their main motive of expansion to Indies, and other Southeast Asian countries, was to secure necessary natural resources for winning the war and subsuming these regions into an international economic-system blueprint called the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity (Sluimer 1996). There was indeed a recognition of the self-determination for indigenous people in this economic blueprint, but the support for them held insofar it can advance the Japanese interest in economic and political annexation (Aziz 1955, 84).

In order to exercise full control of the Indies territory on which that natural resource was buried, the Japanese Imperial Army had to dismantle the Dutch colonial administration completely and replace them with trustable bureaucrats who would translate and execute the strategic decision of Tokyo. While the Dutch military instrument could easily be defeated due to their lack of preparation from foreign invasion (Benda 1956), the installation of a new administration was a biggest challenge for them because they had little knowledge and experience in this region.<sup>11</sup> In order to achieve their objective, partly, they partnered with some nationalist politicians to gather necessary intelligence information for building the administration. Due to the previous exclusion under the Dutch colonial state, these politicians seemed glad to collaborate as they saw the Japanese as a natural ally against the West. In addition, these politicians were also hoping for the

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<sup>11</sup> Although partly this was also supported by thousands of Japanese civilians who had lived in the Indies, a handful of "Indonesians"-affiliates, and the Japanese "area studies experts" who had supplied intelligence information prior to the occupation. But these political resources were very limited, see Benda (1954)

opportunity to obtain offices in the new bureaucracy by allying with the fascist government (*ibid.*, 1956).

It was indeed such opportunist attitudes gave these indigenous elites an immediate reward, because soon the Japanese war administration appointed them to the top hierarchy of the new bureaucracy. But this appointment lasted only for a short moment and also under strict surveillance of the military. After the Japanese administrators were fully transported to Indies, these elites remained excluded from the state (Aziz 1955, 159; Benda 1956). So too, because most indigenous elites lack technical expertise, the new colonial masters often summoned the former Dutch administrators from the internment camp for helping them with technical issues (Aziz 1955, 168).

However, it is important to note that some other nationalists saw the collaborationist strategy with Japan rather as the opportunity to find an outlet for the independence movement that had long previously been suppressed under the Dutch colonialism, which seems to be the case for the paramount figures such as Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta (*ibid.*, 210). Their strategic political stance made these figures still able to maintain sympathy from the underground nationalist group who refused to participate in the Japanese fascist government whatsoever. Later, the signal these figures sent to the underground nationalist group regarding their "strategic collaboration", instead of office opportunism, allowed them to maintain the support from this group after the declaration of independence in 1945.

However, after a half year of the occupation, by the end of 1942, the Japanese war administration in Indies began to realize their propaganda effort to gain mass support for war was not efficient. At the same time, there was high pressure on them in the Pacific War that made them demanding

support from the population of countries they occupied more than before. Later, these pressures led to the defeat of their defense line in Mariana, which cut the maritime connection between Tokyo and their war administration in Indies in 1944 (Anderson 1961, 2). Because of such pressures, Tokyo reached a final decision to accelerate their process for the subsumption of Indies as a puppet-state of their empire (Aziz 1955, 248-50). As early as in 1943, under the prime minister Tojo, the Japanese government declared, for the first time, their intention to grant independence to "Indonesia". Later, correlating with the increased military pressure on the Japanese army by the Allied, this plan was advanced by the new cabinet under the prime minister Koiso, which ultimately resulted in the formation of BPUPKI and PPKI in 1945.

To demonstrate their concrete action for the "promise of independence", from 1943 to the mid of 1945, the Japanese war administration gradually began to increase the participation of "Indonesians" in the bureaucracy. First and foremost, they granted all prewar anti-colonial organizations to operate in a centralized political vessel, although with strict military surveillance. For anti-colonial Islamic groups, they sponsored the establishment of all-Indonesian moslem organization called Masyumi in order to subsume the prewar moslem confederation called MIAI.<sup>12</sup> In addition, they also granted moslem leaders affiliated in this organization an office in the government religious affair department, which gave these elite more influence in the bureaucracy (Aziz 1955, 205-8). This pattern of bureaucratic appointment was also to be the case in the other departments for non-religious politicians. Particularly, the Japanese war administration increased the presence of indigenous aristocratic elites who had experienced the Dutch colonial bureaucracy for their administrative-building (Anderson 1961, 11-2)

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<sup>12</sup> Even though Kahin stated that the postwar Masyumi party was not similar with this Japanese-sponsored Masyumi (Kahin 2005, ), but the fact that major organizations, such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, included in the prewar Masyumi were similar ones with the postwar Masyumi is not deniable.

Further, as their main propaganda machine, the war administration appointed the widely-recognized prewar populist leader, Sukarno, who was exiled by the Dutch in the 1930s, in two organizations intended for mass mobilization against the Allied. These organizations were the Centralized People's Force (Putera) in 1943 and later the Javanese Hokokai in 1944. Sukarno was paired up with Mohammad Hatta—another prewar nationalist figure that could only compete his popularity—some moslem leaders from Masyumi, and the indigenous bureaucratic elites from the Dutch colonial administration in these propaganda machines. However, it is important to note that the increased participation in the Japanese war administration did not come with an actual increase of political power for these elites, as most of them virtually held no executive roles and functioned more as an advisor and a propagandist (Aziz 1955, 205-16).

The pattern of elite recruitment above was reflected in the profiles of elites appointed by Japan in BPUPKI and PPKI. What significance is, in the former organization, the Japanese war administration seemed to allocate more seats for colonial bureaucrats. It can be observed that 44% of elites appointed in BPUPKI had a prewar professional experience in the colonial bureaucracy (see Appendix II). Meanwhile, moslem leaders from Masyumi held the second to largest group, contributing for 8% of total seats. The remaining were the secular prewar nationalist whose the prewar professional experience were outside the colonial bureaucracy. To be sure, almost all these elites were also appointed in the Japanese war administration. If not in the bureaucracy, they were appointed in a quasi-parliamentary institution called Chuo Sang In, which tasks were but giving advice to the Japanese war administration.

The closely similar pattern of elite appointment was maintained in BPUPKI's successor organization, PPKI, but the influence of colonial bureaucrats seemed slightly to decrease (see Appendix III). In BPUPKI, two colonial bureaucrats, Radjiman and Suroso, were appointed respectively as a chairman and its deputy, but in PPKI it was two popular nationalists leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, who led the organization. But, by and large, the composition of its members closely resembled BPUPKI with the Dutch colonial bureaucrats occupying 40% of the total share of seats. The moslem leaders from BPUPKI were retained in this committee, but their relative quantity to the total member was reduced with a proportion only 7% now. Meanwhile, the remaining number of profiles included in PPKI were the secular prewar nationalist political organizers.

As suggested by its name, BPUPKI was designed to give a space for indigenous leaders to discuss a matter of national independence. In their meetings, this body acted like a parliamentary committee in which its members presented their observations regarding state-building across the world and their proposals necessary for founding a state, such as the constitutional design and an ideological common ground. The upshot of their meetings, which were held in two sessions in late May and the beginning of June 1945, would be compiled as a report to high officials in Tokyo.

The formation of PPKI was suggested in the second session of BPUPKI's meetings. The purpose of this organization was designed to execute a matter that BPUPKI's members already agreed upon. The suggestion to found PPKI was accepted by Japan, which thereafter high officials in Tokyo were planning to grant a permission for a meeting in September in 1945. But as the nuclear bombs were dropped in the two massive urban areas in Japan, the cohesiveness of their war administration in Indies began to weaken. As a consequence, there was an atmosphere of

uncertainty regarding the independence process since the early of August 1945. Some youth armed groups in Jakarta asked for a quick response from PPKI's elites, particularly Soekarno and Hatta who were appointed as its leaders, by declaring independence sooner. Their demand was justified by reason that if independence was declared immediately, they would give a signal to the international community that this state was not a Japanese puppet. Because of this reason, the declaration of independence was held on August 17, 1945 by Soekarno and Hatta, whilst PPKI's sessions were held as soon as a day after it.

The pivotal role played by BPUPKI was that it decided an important institutional design that shaped a path-dependence for the subsequent political affairs culminating in the emergence of the republican parliamentary system. More specifically, this body was responsible for the initial draft of the constitution and a matter of territorial scope of the new state. But, more importantly, what cannot be ignored from BPUPKI is that during the meetings, the elites' perception of threats were made explicit in speeches and in the compiled reports. The perception of threats was what drove most decisions made by them during this critical moment from the declaration of independence until the formation of parliamentary government. This can be observed by analyzing the transcripts of elite discussion in this body.<sup>13</sup>

In the first three days of the first sessions by the end of month of May 1945, some members of BPUPKI suggested their resolution regarding the requirement to establish an independent state, one of which was a territory. Although the final decision regarding the state territory was made in the second session through voting, from their speech in the first sessions, it can be observed

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<sup>13</sup> This thesis utilizes "Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidikan Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) - Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia" which was published by the New Order government with a full recognition that there are *some* parts that were disputed by historian. For example, see Kusuma and Elson (2011). However these disputed parts are not an element of the transcripts that are cited in this thesis.

that these elites seemed to generally agree that the territory of their new state, at least, would be all the Dutch colonial state in Indies. By that, it means that the territory of this new state includes the present-day Indonesian territory, excluding Papua.<sup>14</sup>

Their association with Indies territory was what activated their sense perception of threats. This was spoken, for the first time, by Sukarno on the third day of the first session. In the beginning of his speech, responding the disputes about what are required for "Indonesia" to be an independent state among the speakers of BPUPKI, he stated that,

"If we ever have to finish everything, up into the detail, then I will not experience independence, you too will not experience it, everyone here will not experience it [...]"<sup>15</sup>

This statement created a sense of urgency for these elites to take an *immediate* resolution for Indonesia to obtain independence. He mentioned that what was important then was to obtain independence immediately, so they can replace all the administrators with "Indonesian" people.<sup>16</sup>

This sense of urgency was further justified by Sukarno by stating the on-going war they faced at the moment of the state-building. He stated that,

"We should not forget, we live in the time of war, comrades. We built Indonesia under the storm of war!"<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> However, some would rather think expansively, that is, by including Papua, Malayan Peninsula, and North Borneo for geopolitical and cultural reasons. However, this became only an explicit controversial issue in the second session, but what was indisputable in the first session is that independence meant the removal of all the Western powers in Indies.

<sup>15</sup> "Kalau benar semua hal ini harus diselesaikan lebih dulu, sampai jelimet, maka saya tidak akan mengalami Indonesia Merdeka, tuan tidak akan mengalami Indonesia Merdeka, kita semuanya tidak akan mengalami Indonesia Merdeka." See Government of Indonesia (1995, 64-5)

<sup>16</sup> See. *ibid.*, 66

<sup>17</sup> "Tetapi jangan lupa, kita hidup di dalam masa peperangan, saudara-saudara. Di dalam masa peperangan itulah kita mendirikan Negara Indonesia, — di dalam gunturnya peperangan! Bahkan saya mengucapkan syukur alhamdulillah kepada Allah Subhanau wat'ala, [...] [karena dari sana] timbullah Indonesia Merdeka [...] Indonesia merdeka yang

Furthermore, he mentioned the recent occupation of the Allied army in North Moluccas (Morotai) and Northeast Borneo (Tarakan), which previously both took over by Japan in 1943, rightly when the meeting of BPUPKI was held to elaborate his point about the sense of urgency the "Indonesian" encountered for gaining independence (Aziz 1955, 238).<sup>18</sup> Because of this reason, if the independence was not achieved *immediately*, Sukarno threaten,

"[T]here may be other people who will declare independence in their own way."<sup>19</sup>

The sense of urgency to obtain independence seemed also to be supported by the majority of BPUPKI's members. For example, compared the Sukarno's speech above with a part of the BPUPKI's report summary below,

"That [BPUPKI] will be mindful that we attempt to build a complete and sovereign Indonesia in the extraordinary time, which is in the time of tremendous war."<sup>20</sup>

Regarding the territorial sense of belonging, the BPUPKI's report also stated similar wording like Sukarno's speech,

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digembleng dalam api peperangan, dan Indonesia Merdeka yang demikian itu adalah Negara Indonesia yang kuat, bukan Negara Indonesia yang lambat-laun menjadi bubur." *ibid.*, 83

<sup>18</sup> Sukarno stated, "Ratusan anak-anak Indonesia sekarang mati di Tarakan dan Balikpapan, mereka mati buat apa, dengan harapan apa?" *ibid.*, 97

<sup>19</sup> "[M]ungkin nanti ada lain pihak yang akan menyatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia itu dengan cara yang dia kehendaki dengan cara pemerintahan yang dia kehendaki, dengan pemerintahan kebangsaan yang dia kehendaki." *ibid.*, 90

<sup>20</sup> "Bahwa Badan Penyelidik tidak lupa bahwa kami hendak membentuk negara Indonesia yang bulat dan berdaulat [di dalam] waktu yang maha hebat yaitu [di dalam] waktu peperangan yang [sedahyat-dahsyatnya]," *ibid.*, 375



"That we know and feel pain, that the enemy has invaded a part of *our land*, Morotai and Tarakan and Papua and tried to land their feet in Halmahera and possibly other parts of our beloved land."<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, despite being in a safer place of "Indonesia" in Java, without the sense of association with those regions, the sense of threats will not be activated by these elites. More importantly, in the second session, it was clear that the speakers of BPUPKI had voted that the territory of "Indonesia" will be the former Indies as the main priority for independence with gradual inclusion of North Borneo, Portuguese Timor, and Papua after they consolidated their power in the former.<sup>22</sup> After receiving the report from BPUPKI, the Japanese war administration, however, only wanted to recognize Indies that would be a territory of Indonesia (Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 19).

Besides the sense of threats, the critical moments in the meetings of BPUPKI that set a path-dependence for the upcoming political affair was the decision to create a republic instead of monarchy for the appointment method of the head of state. The majority of BPUPKI's members agreed by voting to choose the former rather than the later. Several reasons of choosing the republic stated in the meeting were to gain international recognition,<sup>23</sup> to avoid conflicts between

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<sup>21</sup> "Bahwa kami tahu dan kami menyatakan sakit pedas, bahwa musuh telah menginjak sebagian dari *tanah kami* yaitu Morotai dan Tarkaan dan Papua dan mencoba mendarat di Halmahera dan mungkin [di bagian] lainnya di Tanah Air kami yang kami cintai," *ibid.*, 375 emphasis added

<sup>22</sup> Among all speakers, one of the most influential figures in Indonesian historiography, Muhammad Yamin, whose arguments were supported by Sukarno in BPUPKI's meeting, was the person who speak the most comprehensive account for the inclusion of all these regions. See Yamin, *ibid.*, 48. Sukarno attempted to establish "Pan-Indonesia" that included all these regions but included Philippines, but he refrained from his intention because he considered Philippines as a sovereign country and Japan had "granted" independence first for them. See Sukarno's speech, *ibid.*, 73. Muhammad Hatta was one of a few figures who demanded "the minimum territory" of Indonesia to avoid what he called as "imperialism". He defined the territory of Indonesia as the present-day Indonesia, exclude Papua. See Hatta's speech, *ibid.*, 146-7

<sup>23</sup> Yamin's speech, *ibid.*, 114

them when choosing the eternal king and its inheritance,<sup>24</sup> and, for moslem leaders, the monarchy was not acknowledged in Islamic principle.<sup>25</sup> Thus, at the beginning of these moments, anyone who supported the declaration of "Indonesia" by Sukarno and Hatta in 1945, was associated as a republican.

The matter of how they would maintain and expand the state administration in that territory was not deeply discussed, but was mentioned in the first constitutional draft. The BPUPKI's plan was to transfer the Japanese administration to the new leadership of the republic of "Indonesia" with all the previous bureaucrats "retained as long as not transferred or fired." Meanwhile, the matter of the military was delegated to Japan as long as the war was still going on but "with an agreement" from the republican leadership.<sup>26</sup>

The majority of the remainder of BPUPKI's meetings were devoted to the extent to which Islamic law should be included in the constitution. For example, these elites debated on whether the president should be a moslem or not, considering the majority of "Indonesia" were associated in this religion. The debate was ended with the presidential candidate is required to be a moslem and to be a "pure Indonesia", meaning they should not be a mix-blood from "foreign race", such as Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian. This decision was voted and agreed by the majority, whilst obviously only the ethnic minority representation in BPUPKI rejected it.<sup>27</sup>

The next section below will elaborate how the activation of the idea of threat discussed above had made these elites more flexible with the matter of system of government after the fall of the Japanese war administration, as long as it can advance their interest to obtain independence

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<sup>24</sup> Sukardjo's speech, *ibid.*, 119

<sup>25</sup> Sanusi's speech, *ibid.*, 124

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, 384

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, 387

*immediately*. This sense of threat allowed the formation of a parliamentary system and the Sjahrir's minority and technocratic governments. This happened especially after Sjahrir published his manifesto, *Our Struggle*, as a plea of promise of order to all republican leaders. Further, the next section will also specify the politics between "the Japanese bureaucrats" and "the Japanese army" to identify how the decision was made. By doing so, the main idea is the following: after the collapse of the Japanese war administration, elites whose careers outside bureaucracy began to be influential in the decision-making process. This is because the idea of threats made "the Japanese collaborators" tolerable to the presence of outsiders in the decision-making process in order to advance their interest. Ultimately, the interaction between these elites resulted in the formation of the minority and technocratic cabinets.

### *The Promise of Order*

After the last session of BPUPKI's meetings in June 1945, the Japanese war administration hastened their process to build the puppet-state of Indies. Immediately, they consolidated their propaganda machine by unifying religious and secular elites of Masyumi and Java Hokokai into a new organization called New People's Movement a month after the meeting. Further, in August 1945, they invited Sukarno and Hatta as the newly founded PPKI's leaders to their central command in Dalat, Vietnam, for them to receive a further instruction for the formation of "independence Indonesia" (Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 15-9).

Meanwhile, on the same day of the meeting in Dalat, the Allied army made a highly aggressive move in Nagasaki and soon in Hiroshima. The news of "the little boys" that were dropped in those cities were heard among the youth nationalists underground network in Jakarta through illegal radio transmission. Recognizing that the fall of Japanese imperialism would be

unavoidable, a vast number of youth groups demanded Sukarno and Hatta to declare independence immediately after these figures returned from Vietnam. These younger nationalists did not know that their demands actually aligned with most of PPKI's elite interests who had previously built a sense of urgency in BPUPKI's meeting for "Indonesia" to obtain independence as soon as possible. They did not know this because the moment after Sukarno arrived in Jakarta, he seemed to be reluctant to fulfill their interest, because he felt responsible to coordinate with other PPKI's members regarding the declaration of independence (*ibid.*, 24-30). Sukarno's attitude, later, maintained his support from the PPKI's members which resulted in the election of him as the president.

August 1945 was the crucial month in the history of republican politics in which the first clash between the older "collaborationist" and the younger generation arose. This clash demonstrates the two political groups with different resources: the older generation with access to the state administration, the younger generation with no political access but to the Japanese weaponry. Amidst this clash, Sjahrir arose as the only figure that can bridge the difference between them. For the former group, Sjahrir's close connection with Hatta, who had been his political mentor since the 1930s, allowed him to get a limited access into the "collaborationist" circle, whilst Sjahrir's exclusion from the Japanese war administration made him a more trustable figure to the youth generation (See Mrazék 2018; Legge 2010). Nevertheless, as will be shown below, beyond Sjahrir's median position, what drove "the collaborationist" elite decision to support his minority governments was the inability of Sukarno's presidential cabinet to control the threats of violence and anarchy by the young generation in and outside the capital city that was incited when NICA sought to re-install the Dutch colonial administration. Therefore, this section will show, after the

declaration of independence, the perception of threats shifted from the threats from invasion to the threats for administrative building.

After the declaration of independence was announced in Jakarta on August 17, 1945, the matter of administrative building began to be drafted in detail by PPKI. In the speech of declaration, which was written exclusively by "the collaborationist" circle, it seems that the older nationalist generation still felt they had to be careful about the transfer of administrative power from the Japanese war administration to the "republic of Indonesia". In the second line of the proclamation text that was broadcasted widely at that time, it was stated that,

"A matter of power transfer and others will be administered in a *careful* and *immediate* way."<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, the youth groups wanted a more radical national transformation by replacing that statement with the following,

"[A]ll existing government organs must be seized by the people from the foreigners who still occupy them." (Reid 1974, 28)

In practice, Sukarno and Hatta, who were formally elected as the head and vice-head of state by PPKI a day after the declaration, preferred to implement what had been planned since BPUPKI's meetings, that is by maintaining the presence of the indigenous bureaucrats from the Japanese war administration. But first and foremost, as the extension of the republican government influence from Jakarta, they appointed new governors, who all of them were a PPKI's member and were also a prewar colonial bureaucrat, in the eight provinces decided as "Indonesia."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>29</sup> See PPKI's meeting transcripts. Government of Indonesia (1995, 510)

Sukarno and Hatta retained the presence of those indigenous colonial bureaucrats in the lower levels of these provincial governments. In Java, in particular, they held a conference for all indigenous colonial bureaucrats of Java and Madura in Jakarta to ask for their loyalty to the republican government with the promise of office (See Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 53-5). Hatta defended this decision as the most efficient policy for "the seizure of power from within," because, he predicted, building a completely alternative government would expectedly yield "a violent struggle" whilst "the victory would not certainly have been ours" (cited in Anderson 1972, 112).

Besides the "peaceful" administration transfer, apparently Sukarno and Hatta and other PPKI's elites sought to detach themselves from the previous Japanese administration by abandoning BPUPKI's plan that they considered inviting "the politics of war." This is apparent in the dissolution of all indigenous army battalions created by Japan, leaving this republican state with completely no military instrument. Rather, they decided to establish what they called, The Agency for the Victim of War, as the only state institution that held a weaponry with the purpose to help the casualties of war.<sup>30</sup> But it seems that the formation of this body was intended for the purpose of a public stunt to signal the international community that the new republic was not interested in continuing the Pacific War. In fact, these elites still held the view of the necessity of the state military, because inside the aid agency, it was founded, the Agency of People Security (BKR), which then became the incipient of the republican military (see Reid 1974, 35). BKR then was strengthened institutionally and gradually in response to the increase of armed contention between NICA and the local population. The urgency for the potential contention of

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<sup>30</sup> See PPKI's meeting transcripts. Government of Indonesia (1995, 510)

the colonial war after the Japanese surrenders also appeared in the transcript of PPKI's meetings, which was not circulated publicly during that time.<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile, elites in Jakarta seemed to be oblivious to the on-going discussion between the British and the Dutch Governments with regard to the transfer of power in Indies, which happened a week after Sukarno as the new president declared that "the war is over" in a radio announcement.<sup>32</sup> By the end of August 1945, both governments reached an agreement that the British army, in the name of the Allied forces, would administer the dissolution of the Japanese war administration and then transferred the authority to NICA. In doing so, they facilitated the transportation of NICA armies and bureaucrats to Indies while at the same time they administered the war prisoners.

In the process of installation of NICA administration, the clash between local population, whose nationalists spirits had been incited by the Japanese war propaganda machines and the Allied forces was unavoidable in the most major metropolises of "Indonesia". In the meantime, in Jakarta, still oblivious about the British-Dutch agreement, Sukarno repeatedly instructed "Indonesian to not hinder the landing of the Allied forces, as long as their arrival intended for maintaining public order." Further, speaking to a foreign press, he tried to make an appeal that "the people's movement in Indonesia was not hostile to foreigners" (see Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 64).

Sukarno's oblivion might be influenced by the British army announcement that they recognized the republic of Indonesia as *de facto* authority in Indies.<sup>33</sup> This announcement signaled to elites

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<sup>31</sup> In the opening of the PPKI's meeting, Sukarno stated that, "This is an express constitution. Later, if the situation is more *conducive*, we will invite the People's Representative Council again to design a more complete constitution." See Government of Indonesia (1995, 445)

<sup>32</sup> See Toer, Toer, and Kamil (1999, 40)

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

in Jakarta that there were no attempts to overthrow the existing republican administration by the arrival of the Allied forces in Indies. However, that recognition was actually a strategic move made by the British army so they can legitimately question the accountability of Jakarta for the clash between them and "Indonesian" in many parts of Indies during their arrival (Reid 1974, 48).

At the same time, Sjahrir and youth nationalist groups had been criticizing the omnipotence of presidential power of the new republican government that they considered reflected Japanese fascism. Because of this reason, they demanded that KNIP should be granted congressional power, rather than as a mere presidential advisory body. To pressure elites in the republican government to fulfill their demand, they collected signs for a petition to the president from 36% of KNIP's members demanding that this body be given with more authority (Noer and Akbarsyah 2005, 27).<sup>34</sup> Although this petition was only signed by the minority of KNIP's members, by October 1945, Hatta, in the name of the republican government, signed a mandate recognizing KNIP as a legislative body with Sjahrir as the first chairman of the Working Committee (Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 86).

However, what makes Sjahrir's critique appealing was that the disassociation from any elements of the Japanese war administration had actually been the general policy stance among "the collaborationist" since the beginning of the declaration of independence. On August 29, 1945, KNIP, which members of BPUPKI and PPKI were also appointed into it, in a manifesto, declared that pursuing an international recognition was the fundamental requisite in order to obtain full sovereignty of independent Indonesia (*ibid.*, 394). As a consequence, encountering a

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<sup>34</sup> Around 50 people out of 137 initial members of KNIP



new international situation in which fascism was its loser, dissociating from the Japanese war administration was a strategic action needed to take. In other words, what made Sjahrir and the youth nationalist group's criticism appealing to KNIP's member itself was that it engaged with the on-going discourse that had built up among them.

As the frequency of armed clashes gradually increased, not only to the Allied forces, but also to the minority groups and local bureaucrats who had been symbolized as the right hand of colonizers, Sjahrir began to attack Sukarno's government again for its inability to maintain order. In a pamphlet circulated in Jakarta in the mid-October 1945 titled with *Our Struggle* (1968 [1945]), he pointed out that the inability of the current government to maintain order because the legacies of Japanese fascism, which, he thought, had intoxicated younger generations with violent thoughts, remained to exist. He accused that the fascism legacies persisted because

"[M]ost of the men who controlled [the republican government] were *former employees and assistants of the Japanese*[, which] has proved an obstacle to purging our society of the Japanese "disease" so dangerous for the moral health of our youth," (Sjahrir 1968 [1945], 19, emphasis added)

Further, he emphasized that these men

"[F]ar too accustomed to kowtow to and run errands for the Dutch and and Japanese. [Because of this reason], [p]sychologically they are irresolute and have proved quite incapable of acting decisively and assuming responsibility" (*ibid.*, 20)

He then urged that the inability to maintain order would thwart the recognition from the international community for the independence of Indonesia. He wrote,

"[W]ith the growing number of incidents, such as looting and murder, which indicate the spread of anarchy among our people, and which can scarcely be regarded as legitimate expressions of our struggle for freedom, international sentiment towards our cause has begun to change, as the events of the last few weeks have showed." (*ibid.*, 22)

Therefore, in order to eliminate the legacies of fascism and to establish an orderly society, he offered a solution that democratic values should be incorporated into the government structure and replace all "nationalist groups who have to kowtow to the fascists" with "revolutionary democrats."<sup>35</sup> By doing this, he promised that,

"Fascist attitudes will automatically disappear with the flowering of the spirit of democracy and humanity. [Further,] [i]nevitable, too, our position vis-á-vis the outside world will be greatly strengthen." (*ibid.*, 30-1).

As the warring situations became more urgent, Sjahrir's resolution became gradually incorporated as the main government agenda. On November 3, 1945, Hatta, in the name of the republican government, released a mandate for people to establish political parties "to lead all ideological streams in society in a more orderly way."<sup>36</sup> A week later, one of the biggest armed clashes after the declaration of independence erupted in Surabaya, the second largest metropolis in Java, between locals and the Allied forces. This battle, which is now commemorated as "heroes day", not only destroyed the city, but also destroyed the credibility of Sukarno's presidential cabinet to maintain order. *A day* after the blows of Surabaya, on November 11, 1945,

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<sup>35</sup> See Sjahrir (1968 [1945], 28)

<sup>36</sup> See Noer and Akbar (2005, Appendix XI)

Sukarno gave the mandate to Sjahrir to form a parliamentary cabinet (Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 137-8).

### *Loss of Credibility*

Four days after Sukarno handed down his executive mandate to the parliamentary government, the composition of Sjahrir's cabinet was announced. The local newspaper dubbed the profile of this cabinet as those with "complete faith in the Dutch Ethical Policy" (Mrázek 2018, 283). The latter policy refers to the Dutch colonial government's "civilizing" mission in the 1900s to raise the education level of indigenous population for them to be considered equal to their colonial master, hence eligible enough to be appointed in the bureaucracy. It was indeed that all figures in this cabinet had a university degree and had experience in the colonial bureaucracy, except Sjahrir who dropped out from college and spent most of his vicenary life as a political prisoner. For someone who lived in an area in which 80% of its population were illiterate, these profiles were exceptional. Because of this reason, NICA had supported this cabinet, calling them as "decent men" (*ibid.*, 293). Further, they saw the option to start a "civilized" dialogue with the republican government with regard to their entitlement to "Indies" territory.

To be sure, most major parties were still in the making when the first Sjahrir's minority and technocratic cabinet was established. Nevertheless, these major parties evolved from the existing structure that bequeathed them with enough resources to obtain recognition and representation in the parliament. Two days before the transition to the parliamentary system, prewar moslem leaders held a convention to retain the Japanese-sponsored Masyumi as a political party with the same name. On the day of the Surabayan battle, PBI was founded and included in KNIP by endorsement from a BPUPKI member (Anderson 1972, 213 - 220). Although Socialist party was

officially established in December 1945, its organizational basis had already existed since November with the backing from Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin (Mrázek 2018, 284-6). Finally, appropriating the institutional remnants of failed experimentation of PPKI's one-state party proposal, PNI was established in January 1946. All these major parties, without any difficulties, were included in KNIP and its Working Committee.

Despite representing minority political affinities in parliament, especially from moslem groups, Sjahrir's cabinet was voted with confidence by the majority of KNIP's members in their plenary session, held in the end of November 1945 (Anderson 1972, 299; Toer, Toer, and Kamil 1999, 191, Kahin 2003, 170). Sjahrir's cabinet was abdicated in February 1946 when he was pressured by inter- and extra-parliamentary political forces that criticized his 'friendly' approach to the Dutch government while the on-going clashes with NICA had cost the lives of thousands indigenous population. His cabinet was then dissolved again when the state of emergency was announced by Sukarno in July 1946, because the faction in a military dissatisfied by his diplomatic approach with NICA kidnapped him and other republican high officials. Finally, Sjahrir completely lost a confidence from his own party in 1947, when he concluded the Linggarjati agreement with NICA that resulted in the formation of an interim government under the Dutch supervision, resulting in the disbandment of the republican state.

Nevertheless, the three Sjahrir's cabinets had initially secured the vote of confidence from the majority of KNIP members (Kahin 2003, 176 and 206). *Only* when Sjahrir failed to carry out the *insurance* that the "Indonesian" territory was not to be confined in Java and Sumatra alone and the *existence* of the republican state ensured did the credibility of his cabinet lose. The critics to his cabinet for failing to ensure "the complete territory of Indonesia" or what they called as "*merdeka* (independence) 100%" was firstly mobilized by an extra-parliamentary organization

called the United Front (*Persatuan Perjuangan*), that was founded by a prewar underground Trotskyist, Tan Malaka, but also masterminded by a BPUPKI's member who had advocated expansive territory of "Indonesia", Muhammad Yamin.<sup>37</sup>

The republican government and KNIP were initially supportive with the foundation of the United Front, but gradually they distanced themselves from this group, calling the Front causing a division among the Indonesian population in an effort to obtain independence. The dissociation of the republican government and the Front occurred when the latter successfully convinced Masyumi to be more aggressive to the Sjahrir's government because failing to insure "100% *merdeka*", which resulted in the first vote of no confidence in February 1946. A month later, the republican government took "a strong action" by arresting the Front's leaders for "causing split" and an attempt "at altering the structure of central government by means outside the terms of the Constitution" (cited in Anderson 1972, 328).

Nevertheless, the idea of "*merdeka* 100%" was widely spread inside the republican army. When Sjahrir's proposal that showed the confinement of "Indonesian" territory limited to Java and Sumatra for the upcoming meeting with NICA was leaked to the public, a faction inside the army kidnapped him by the end of June 1946. Learning about the kidnapping, Sukarno declared a state of emergency and took over the leadership of the cabinet. In a radio announcement, he stated that the activity of this army faction can cause a negative impact on Indonesian international relations. He broadcasted that,

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<sup>37</sup> On January 1946, Yamin distributed a pamphlet about the importance role of Tan Malaka in independence movement, despite Tan's obscure background

"[This] would permit the Dutch to say to the world that Indonesia could not rule [themselves], and that *chaos* and *disorder* prevailed everywhere" (cited in Anderson 1972, 390, emphasis added).

A few days after the kidnapping affair, the Front leaders petitioned the president Sukarno to form a new cabinet consisting mainly of former BPUPKI and PPKI's members but with an inclusion of new figures affiliated with Tan Malaka (*ibid.*, 398) to implement the "*merdeka 100%*" program. This was, of course, rejected by the president who preferred Sjahrir's diplomatic approach. It appeared parties in KNIP still trusted the promise of order carried by Sjahrir's cabinet as the important element for obtaining international recognition, which then in return, the national independence, as they distanced themselves from Tan Malaka's group. The parliamentary system was freezed for the three months after the kidnapping affair. Soon, after Sjahrir was released, the third cabinet was formed, but at this time, with a greater inclusion of major parties, whilst a consistent number of technocrats was retained.

Different from the leaked version that caused the disturbance in 1946, Sjahrir's initial counter-proposal to NICA with regard to the state territory was actually aligned with most nationalists groups in Indonesia, that is by determining the territory of "Indonesia" as the former Netherland Indies and removal of the Dutch troops from all these areas (Taylor 1960, 20). Nevertheless, because the Dutch threatened to prepare for a full scale colonial war, he coincided with an agreement with a distance far from the interest of most republican elites, from the moment until the kidnapping affair, until the signing of Linggarjati agreement. Apparently, this agreement was fully supported by Sukarno and Hatta, and other parties too, in the parliament. Nevertheless, after the Linggarjati agreement, NICA asked for an acceleration for the formation of a commonwealth government with a full supervision by the Dutch, meaning the abandoning of republican state.

Still anticipating the threats of colonial war, Sjahrir failed to make a quick move to counter this proposal, which resulted in his own party, Socialist, petitioning a motion of no confidence to his cabinet (Kahin 2003, 208). Therefore, the failure to protect the existence of the independent state brought the end of Sjahrir's minority and technocratic cabinets.

## **V. Conclusion**

The above sections of this thesis have shown the way in which the perception of threats were learned, activated, and became the fundamental in the calculus of decision-making of republican government in the immediate period after the independence proclamation. These sections showed the sequence of events since the elite formation in initial republican states through the analysis of their appointment in the Japanese war administration and the clash of outsiders and 'colonial bureaucrats' in 1945. The purpose of these sections is to identify how these elites became influential in the first place and how the decision they made was indeed based on the calculus of threats. Further, it also shows how the activation of the perception of threats because of the presence of anarchism that was triggered by the absence of state power after the Japanese surrender and the attempts of re-colonization by NICA had yielded the parliamentary system and the majority support of KNIP to Sjahrir's minority and technocratic governments. Finally, the last section above has demonstrated how, because of the failure to bring order and to insure the existence of republican state, Sjahrir's governments were brought down both by the pressures from extra-parliamentary forces and its own supporters in KNIP.

This thesis argues that, in a situation of danger, factions in the parliament may behave beyond the calculus of size and distance, in an extension to what was suggested in the conventional literature of coalition building and cabinet formation. This argument implies that the extra-parliamentary factors, i. e. the presence of anarchism and international recognition for

independence, were included in the calculation by these factions of politicians, whilst the parliament behaved as a unitary actor that then employed the Sjahrir's minority and technocratic cabinets as their "executive committee of the ruling classes". This argument thus resonates to the literature of technocracy that includes sociological (Centeno 1993, 317; Pasuk and Baker 2014) and international (Teik 2014, 426; Centeno 1993, 318; Anderson 1983, 488; Schnieder 1998) factors, which both relied on extra-parliamentary elements, to explain the recruitment pattern of technocrats to the government cabinets.

Further studies on this topic may provide a greater insight by including additional case studies, not to affirm, but to investigate the structure of mechanism on which the perception of threats may or may not incentivize this type of governments. In contrast to the dominant positivistic tradition of government formations literature, as discussed in the methodological section above, this thesis promotes the inquiry of the government formation based on the critical realism philosophy, that is, the scientific knowledge is accumulated through the expansion of identified scope of conditions of which the deductively-identified causal mechanism operated. As a consequence, the cabinet formation literature may also consider the historical method (e. g. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003), which operated in the similar fashion of critical realism, to uncover the scope of condition of cabinet formation theory.

More specifically, the future studies may focus on to what extent the state capacity influences the durability of the minority and technocratic cabinets. From the analysis in the previous sections, as one can see, the second and last Sjahrir's governments fell more because of their incapability to counter respectively the internal, e. g. the United Front's coup d'etat, and external threats, e. g. NICA's colonial wars, to the government. It is reasonable to think if the republican government had more surveillance capacity to counter the internal threats and military capacity to increase



their bargaining power during negotiation with NICA, Sjahrir's cabinets and other analogously similar ones might last longer. If state capacity is truly influencing the durability of this type of government, it implies that the core principal-agent dynamic between the appointed minority and its majority supporters is the tension between what is *possible* and what is *desired*. Because of their technocratic background, it does make sense to think that Sjahrir's cabinets might base their decision on the utilitarian calculation of available resources, whilst because of their non-technocratic background, its majority supporters in KNIP might base their demand on the passionate interest of the segments of population they represented. For the lack of available resources, Sjahrir's governments were unable to fulfill the interest of its supporters, which resulted in the fall of this government cabinet once and for all in the Indonesian parliamentary system.

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## Appendix I

The following figure is compiled from Feith (1962), Lev (1966), the Government of Indonesia (1970), Anderson (1972), and Noer and Akbarsyah (2005). The percentage of party strength was derived from the first cabinet of each tenure, which are those before reshuffle. The number of technocrats was coded with the criteria of their party non-affiliation and previous experience in the bureaucracy.

Cabinet Name	Formation Date	Formateur	Parties in Cabinet	% of Party Strength in General Assembly	% of Party Strength in Working Committee	% of Technocrat	Status
Sjahrir I	November, 1945	Socialist	Masyumi, Socialist, Parkindo, BK Pemuda	39.13%	39.13% <sup>38</sup>	23.44%	Minority
Sjahrir II	March, 1946	Socialist	Masyumi, Partai Sosialis, Parkindo, PPI, BK Pemuda	36.40%	41.68%	25.00%	Minority
Sjahrir III	October, 1946	Socialist	Masyumi, Partai Sosialis, Arab, BK Pemuda, BTI,	60.53%	62.51%	16.41%	Oversize

<sup>38</sup> This figure is based on the declared party affiliation of elites in the Working Committee and KNIP's general assembly after Sjahrir's cabinet was announced. The first and second Sjahrir's cabinets were calculated under assumption that the Deputy Minister of Public Works from PNI, Laoh, and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Agoes Salim, which was labeled as the representative of Sumatra by the government publication but also a former BPUPKI's member, were not considered as a representative of any factions in the parliament. This comes from the consideration that regional representation did not behave as a unitary faction in the parliament, whilst the PNI's representative had no hold top party leadership in the party. Thus this figure assumes the inclusion of PNI began in the third Sjahrir's cabinet when its top leaderships were included.

			Independent, Parkindo, PBI, PPI				
Sjarifuddin I	July, 1947	Socialist	Socialist, PNI, BK Pemuda, BTI, Chinese, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, PBI, PKI, PSII	33.49% <sup>39</sup>	65.21%	0	Oversize
Sjarifuddin II	November, 1947	Socialist	Socialist, PNI, Masyumi, BK Pemuda, BTI, Chinese, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, PBI, PKI, PSII	65.21%	46.85%	0	Oversize
Natsir	September, 1950	Masyumi	Democratic Fraction, Masyumi, Parindra, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, PIR, PSI, PSII	47.25%	-	0	Winning Coalition (Approximation) <sup>40</sup>
Sukiman	April, 1951	Masyumi	Democratic Fraction, Masyumi, Parindra, Parkindo, Partai Buruh, Partai Katolik, PIR, PNI	56.51%	-	5.00%	Oversize
Wilopo	April, 1952	PNI	Masyumi, Parindra, Parkindo, Partai Buruh, Partai Katolik, PNI, PSI, PSII	66.47%	-	0	Oversize

<sup>39</sup> Despite holding the majority in the Working Committee, the party representation in Sjarifuddin had a relatively lower share of vote in the KNIP's general assembly after Sukarno's reshuffles of the parliamentary members.

<sup>40</sup> It is very possible Natsir's cabinet is a winning coalition, but this data cannot estimate the share of vote of Democratic Fraction.

Sastroamidjojo I	July, 1953	PNI	BTI, NU, Parindra, Partai Buruh, PIR, PNI, PRN, Progressive Fraction, PSII, SKI	47.68%	-	5.00%	Winning Coalition (Approximation) <sup>41</sup>
Harahap	August, 1955	Masyumi	Democratic Fraction, Masyumi, NU, Parindra, Parkindo, Partai Buruh, Partai Katolik, PIR, PIR-Hazairin, PRI, PRN, PSI, PSII, BTI	73.08%	-	0	Oversize
Sastroamidjojo II	March, 1956	PNI	IPKI, Masyumi, NU, Parkindo, Partai Katolik, Perti, PNI, PSII, BTI	73.54%	-	5.00%	Oversize

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<sup>41</sup> As with the Democratic Faction in Natsir's cabinet, this data cannot estimate the share of vote of Progressive Faction, but possibly the first Sastroamidjojo's cabinet was a winning coalition.



## Appendix II

The profile of BPUPKI's member below is compiled from Government of Indonesia (1995):

Name	Status	Prewar Professional Experience	Prewar Political Affinity	Appointment in the Japanese War Administration
Radjiman Wedyodiningrat	Chairman	Doctor	Boedi Oetomo	Yes
Itibangase Yosio	Deputy Chairman	-	-	-
R. P. Soeroso	Deputy Chairman	Dutch bureaucracy	Serikat Islam	Yes
Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso	Member	Engineer	PSII	Yes
Abdul Halim	Member	Moslem leader	Perikatan Oemmat Islam	Yes
Asikin Widjakoesoema	Member	Doctor	-	Yes
M. Aris	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	-	Yes
Abdul Kadir	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	Labour Union	Yes
Boentaran Martoatmodjo	Member	Doctor	-	Yes
Bintoro	Member	Traditional bureaucracy	-	Yes
Ki Hajar Dewantara	Member	Journalist	Indische Partij	Yes
A. M. Dasaad	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	Trade Union	
P. A. H. Djajadiningrat	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	-	
Mohammad hatta	Member	Journalist	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes
Ki Bagoes Hadikoemo	Member	Moslem leader	Muhammadiyah	Yes
R. Hindromartono	Member	Labour	Labour Union	Yes

Muhammad Yamin	Member	Lawyer	Partindo	Yes
Soemitro Kolopaking Poerbonegoro	Member	Labour	-	-
Koesoemah Atmadja	Member	Dutch bureaucracy		Yes
Latuharhary	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Parindra	Yes
Margono Djojohadikoesoemo	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	Gabungan Pusat Koperasi Indonesia	Yes
A. A. Maramis	Member	Lawyer	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes
Masjkoer	Member	Moslem leader	Nahdatul Ulama	-
Mansoer	Member	Moslem leader	MIAI	Yes
Moenandar	Member	-	-	-
A. K. Moezakir	Member	Moslem leader	MIAI	Yes
Otto Iskandar Dinata	Member	Teacher	Pagoejoban Pasoendan	Yes
Parada Harahap	Member	Journalist	Serikat Islam	
B. P. H. Poeroebojo	Member	Traditional bureaucracy	-	Yes
Abdoelrahim Pratalykrama	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Roeslan Wongsokoesoemo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	PNI	Yes
R. Rooseno	Member	Engineer	Parindra	Yes
Agoes Salim	Member	Prewar Nationalist	Serikat Islam	Yes
Samsi	Member	-	PNI	Yes
Sartono	Member	Lawyer	Partindo	Yes
Samsoedin	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Volksraad	Yes
Sastromoeljono	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes
Singgih	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Serikat Islam	Yes
Soekarno	Member	Engineer	PNI	Yes
Soedirman	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Parindra	Yes

Soekardjo Wirjopranoto	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	-
Soekiman	Member	Prewar Nationalist	MIAI	-
Soebardjo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes
Soepomo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy		Yes
Soerahman Tjokroadisoerjo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Soerjo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Soesanto	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Parindra	Yes
Soewandi	Member	Engineer	Parindra	Yes
Sosrodiningrat	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Wachid Hasjim	Member	Moslem leader	MIAI	Yes
Woerjaningrat	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Parindra	Yes
Wiranatakoesoema	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Labour Union	Yes
Wongsonagoro	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Parindra	Yes
Maria Ulfa Santoso	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Kongres Perempuan Indonesia	
Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito	Member	Teacher	Jong Java	Yes
Oei Tjong Hauw	Member	Politician	Chung Hua Hui	-
Oei Tiang Joei	Member	Journalist	Hua Chiao Tong Hui	-
Liem Koen Hian	Member	Journalist	Partai Tionghoa Indonesia	-
Tan Eng Hoa	Member	-	-	-
Dahler	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	Insulinde	
A. Baswedan	Member	Prewar Nationalist	Partai Arab Indonesia	Yes
Abdul Fatah Hasan	Additional Member	Japanese bureaucracy	Organisasi Pelajar Indonesia Malaya	Yes
Asikin Natanegara	Additional Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes

Soerjo Hamidjojo	Additional Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Boedi Oetomo	Yes
Pangeran M. Noor	Additional Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Volksraad	Yes
M. Besar	Additional Member	-	-	-
Abdul Kaffar	Additional Member	Army	-	-

### Appendix III

The profile of PPKI's member below is compiled from Government of Indonesia (1995):

<b>Name</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Prewar Professional Experience</b>	<b>Prewar Political Affinity</b>	<b>Appointment in the Japanese War Administration</b>
Sukarno	Chairman	Engineer	PNI	Yes
Mohammad Hatta	Deputy Chairman	Journalist	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes
Supomo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Radjiman	Member	Doctor	Boedi Oetomo	Yes
Suroso	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Serikat Islam	Yes
Sutardjo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Wachid Hasjim	Member	Moslem leader	MIAI	Yes
Ki Bagus Hadikusumo	Member	Moslem leader	Muhammadiyah	Yes
Oto Iskandardinata	Member	Teacher	Pagoejoban Pasoendan	Yes
Abdul Kadir	Member	Dutch Bureaucracy	Labour Union	Yes
Surjohamidjojo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Boedi Oetomo	Yes
Purubojo	Member	Traditional bureaucracy	-	Yes
Yap Tjwan Bing	Member	Pharmacist	Chinese Youth Organization	Yes
Latuharhary	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Parindra	Yes
Amir	Member	Doctor	Parindra	-

Abdul Abbas	Member	-	-	Yes
Mohammas Hassan	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	-
Hamidhan	Member	Journalist	-	-
Ratulangi	Member	Politician	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes
Andipangeran	Member	-	-	-
I Gusti Ketut Pudja	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	-	Yes
Wiranatakusumah	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Labour Union	Yes
Ki Hadjar Dewantara	Member	Journalist	Indische Partij	Yes
Kasman	Member	-	-	-
Sajuti	Member	Journalist	-	-
Kusuma Sumantri	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	PNI	Yes
Subardjo	Member	Dutch bureaucracy	Perhimpunan Indonesia	Yes