

Raising Representation? Gender and Village Budgeting Reforms in Indonesia

by

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List of Acronyms and Indonesian Terms

BLT-DD Bantuan Langsung Tunai-Dana Desa (Direct Cash Assistance-Village Fund)

BPD Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (Village Council)

CDD Community-Driven Development

LPMD Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Empowerment Institution)

Musyawarah Forum, deliberation, or consultation

Musyawarah inklusif Inclusive forum for women, children, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups

PKK Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Women's Group)

PNPM Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri Perdesaan (National Program for Independent Rural Community Empowerment, PNPM)

Posyandu Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Community Health Corps)

RT Rukun Tetangga (Neighborhood Association)

Abstract

In local development, male elites often dominate decision-making and implement policies that sideline women's preferences. This dissertation explores challenges and opportunities to increase the representation of women's interests in local development. It examines the gendered dimensions of participation in village community institutions and village budgeting and the stifling effects of elite capture on village policymaking. These issues are studied in the context of village governance in Indonesia, the world's third largest democracy. In particular, this dissertation evaluates the effects of a novel reform implemented in several Indonesian districts, designed to increase women's participation and the representation of women's preferences in village budgeting. This reform, called *musyawarah inklusif*, requires village governments to hold separate forums for women and other marginalized groups to submit proposals for village development plans and budgets.

This dissertation leverages original data from surveys, survey experiments, and village planning documents to evaluate the effects of *musyawarah inklusif* and mechanisms that may contribute to its success or failure. Overall, this reform succeeds in amplifying the voices of women community leaders but fails to shift actual spending towards women's priorities. The evidence shows how elite capture continues to constrain women's participation and the representation of women's preferences even after more women's proposals are submitted through the *musyawarah inklusif* process.

This dissertation contributes to existing literature on gender and politics by identifying specific constraints and opportunities to improve substantive representation. The findings suggest that creating more opportunities for women representatives and other marginalized groups to participate in local governance can be insufficient to expand the substantive representation of their interests for two reasons. First, existing community

leaders may continue to dominate participation in the separate consultations and propose different priorities than the preferences of excluded community members. Second, village heads may be reluctant to change their priorities when presented with new information or requirements related to women's preferences and participation. Understanding these particular challenges may help design more effective reforms aimed at improving the representation of marginalized people's interests in local governance.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs? (Dahl 1961)

The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. (Schattschneider 1960)

In democracies around the world, despite universal suffrage, policymaking is often dominated by an unrepresentative group of decision-makers who may advance their own interests at the expense of their constituents. This can be an especially challenging issue at the local level, where public goods provision can have profound effects on livelihoods but often lacks transparency and accountability (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). In the context of local development, the interests of women and other vulnerable groups are often systematically underrepresented as traditional male elites dominate decision-making (Agarwal 2001; Parthasarathy et al. 2019). This dissertation explores challenges and opportunities associated with efforts to improve the substantive representation of women's interests in local development.¹

Existing approaches to this issue consist of either a) mandating greater women's participation through quotas or participatory budgeting requirements and/or b) providing

¹Substantive representation refers to policy decisions that reflect women's interests or priorities (Clayton 2021).

women training that may empower them to participate or run for office. Such approaches, including gender responsive budgeting, have been implemented in over 100 countries (Ng 2016). Both types of reforms often fail to meaningfully expand substantive representation, particularly at the local level (Beaman et al. 2014; Casey et al. 2012; Karlan et al. 2017; Van der Windt et al. 2018; Casey 2018; Fritzen 2007; Humphreys et al. 2019; Mansuri and Rao 2012; Saguin 2018). One reason these approaches sometimes fail is that men continue to dominate deliberations even when more women are present (Karpowitz et al. 2012; Parthasarathy et al. 2019; Buntaine et al. 2018; Gottlieb 2016).

Given the shortcomings of these types of reforms, this dissertation evaluates the effects of a novel reform in Indonesia, which establishes a dedicated space for women and other vulnerable groups to share their ideas for their village development plans and budgets.² These special forums for women and other vulnerable groups, called *musyawarah inklusif*, seek to empower a broader set of participants to contribute to decision-making. Without the presence of traditional village elites, more women and other marginalized groups may feel more comfortable submitting proposals for community development. The submission of a broader set of proposals through these special forums may then make it easier and more politically expedient for village officials to include a wider range of activities in village development plans and budgets. However, this approach also runs the risk of relegating women's voices to a secondary space, which male decision-makers may continue to ignore. Moreover, in order to better represent the interests of women and other marginalized groups, the separate forums need to attract representatives who reflect the interests of these groups. The types of individuals most likely to be invited to these forums—active community leaders—may have different preferences than community members who are less active in governance or community affairs. Without representative participants and incentives for decision-makers to accommodate women's preferences, separate forums may be insufficient to improve the substantive representation of women's preferences. This dissertation explores the gendered dynamics of participation (Chapter 2) and decision-making (Chapter 3) in village governance in Indonesia and evaluate the

²Vulnerable groups include people with disabilities, the poor, migrant workers, and victims of natural or social disasters.

effects of separate consultations for women on the representation of women's preferences in village policymaking (Chapter 4).

This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, it presents a theory that identifies key constraints to women's substantive representation in local development and suggests how separate forums for women and other marginalized groups may address some of these constraints. Second, it describes the village planning and budgeting process in Indonesia and recent reforms enacted in some districts. Third, this chapter presents original data on villagers' attitudes about the role of women in community decision-making. Fourth, this chapter presents original data that describe variation in the budgetary preferences of female community leaders, male community leaders, male community members, and female community members. Finally, this chapter presents the plan for the rest of the dissertation.

1.1 Research on Women's Representation in Local Development

The existing literature identifies five primary constraints that hinder the substantive representation of women's interests. First, there are barriers for women to participate. Women may be less likely to be invited to participate in political affairs and may not feel welcome in social contexts where men dominate governance (Casey et al. 2012; Cornwall 2003). Moreover, gendered gaps in employment and education can also constrain women's participation in politics (Burns et al. 2001; Inglehart et al. 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008). Second, even when women are invited, they are often not empowered to speak up. Across a broad range of political contexts, men tend to dominate mixed gender deliberations (Karpowitz et al. 2012; Parthasarathy et al. 2019). Third, women representatives who do participate may not share the preferences of women who are often marginalized from political discussions (Htun 2016). This could result in the increased substantive representation of an unrepresentative set of interests (Palaniswamy et al. 2019). Fourth, decision-makers may be ignorant of women's preferences. In many

contexts, politicians misperceive the preferences of their constituents (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Liaqat 2020). Ignorance regarding women's preferences may be especially pronounced in contexts with significant gender gaps in political participation (Clayton et al. 2019). Fifth, decision-makers may ignore women's preferences even if they are aware of them. New information about women's preferences will not necessarily cause decision-makers to update their priorities (Parthasarathy et al. 2019).

This dissertation examines original data that shed light on each of the five aforementioned constraints. This chapter (Chapter 1) explores differences in the policy preferences of men and women and the policy preferences of women community leaders and women community members. Chapter 2 examines obstacles to women's participation. Chapter 3 considers the dominant role of existing decision-makers, particularly village heads and shows how they may not prioritize women's preferences even when primed with information about what women want. Chapter 4, shows how efforts to increase women's participation through special forums for women and other vulnerable groups can be insufficient to increase the substantive representative of women's preferences because of the unrepresentative nature of forum participants (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) and village heads' reluctance to change their own priorities (discussed in Chapter 3).

The two most common policies or interventions aimed at improving the substantive representation of women's interests are a) enacting mandates for greater women's participation through quotas or participatory budgeting requirements and/or b) providing women training that may empower them to participate or run for office. These approaches address some but not all of the aforementioned constraints. Quotas requiring a minimum share of women in legislatures or community forums can increase women's participation (Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani 2009; Deininger et al. 2015). However, if women participants are not empowered to play a meaningful role in policy deliberations, additional women's participation may not yield additional knowledge about women's preferences. Empowerment programs that target women community members may help enable a broader, more representative group of women to engage in politics. However, opportunities for women's participation may still be constrained by the willingness of male

decision-makers to address women's concerns. Therefore, these types of interventions may be insufficient to increase the substantive representation of women's interests.

Recognizing inequalities that persist in mixed gender settings, women's-only groups have been developed across a wide range of settings, including all-women police stations in India (Jassal 2020), women's self-help groups in India (Prillaman 2021), and women's justice centers in Peru (Kavanaugh et al. 2017). In the same vein, *musyawarah inklusif*, which offer a separate space for women and other marginalized groups to share their ideas, are designed to address several of these challenges. They seek to increase the participation and influence of non-elites in the village budgeting process. Given inequalities in participation and responsiveness that manifest when marginalized and non-marginalized citizens attend the same the forum, the establishment of a dedicated space for marginalized community members to deliberate (*musyawarah inklusif*) and a procedure to automatically send their proposals to local decision-makers may increase the representation of marginalized preferences through several mechanisms.

First, *musyawarah inklusif* may increase women's participation in the village budgeting process. Mixed gender meetings often marginalize women and reinforce gender norms (Grillos 2018; Karpowitz et al. 2012; Parthasarathy et al. 2019). In contrast, research on women's self-help groups in India shows how these women-only groups can help empower women to increase their civic engagement and political participation (Desai and Joshi 2014; Joshi et al. 2019; Prillaman 2021). Similarly, *musyawarah inklusif* may lower the stakes for women to attend and speak up at budget consultations. Women may feel more comfortable participating in a forum that explicitly solicits their opinion and where they do not need to compete with men for attention or worry about men's reactions to their ideas. Importantly, men and women tend to have different priorities for government spending (Clayton et al. 2019; Gottlieb et al. 2018; Olken 2010). Therefore, if more women have the opportunity to voice their preferences, a broader set of interests could be heard and accommodated.

However, even in villages with *musyawarah inklusif* requirements, village governments maintain discretion over whom to invite to the consultations. As a result, *musyawarah*

inklusif may not substantially increase participation by women in the process. It may simply shift participation by women and other marginalized groups from regular consultations to separate *musyawarah inklusif* meetings or increase participation by villagers who are already more active in village affairs. In order for substantive representation to follow from descriptive representation, the representatives must accurately represent the preferences of the people they are representing. In contrast with existing research in India and Sub-Saharan Africa (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clayton et al. 2019), this study finds that women representatives who are invited to participate in village consultations in Indonesia, have significantly different preferences than women who are not invited.

Second, *musyawarah inklusif* requirements may increase government responsiveness to women's preferences by the local government. Existing research on gender quotas finds that increased participation by women can provide officials with new information about their preferences or about the importance of addressing women's priorities (Catalano Weeks 2019; Clayton 2021; Zetterberg 2009). However, broader participation and information about constituent preferences does not necessarily increase officials' willingness to accommodate a more diverse set of interests (Parthasarathy et al. 2019; Sheely 2015). The new *musyawarah inklusif* requirements in some Indonesian districts go beyond mandating minimum levels of women's attendance. They require that the village planning and budget drafting teams consider the ideas submitted at the *musyawarah inklusif* and include these ideas alongside the plans and budgets they submit to the district government. This may encourage the village government to include more of women's preferences in the village development plan and budget. The *musyawarah inklusif* process may make the village governments more responsive because of increased salience of women's preferences and/or social and political pressure. The required submission of an ideas list from the *musyawarah inklusif* to the budget drafting team may draw attention to the specific preferences of women. The requirement to attach the ideas list from the *musyawarah inklusif* to the village budget may also make it easier for villagers, civil society organizations, and government officials to evaluate whether women's preferences are represented in the village budget, thereby increasing social and political

pressure to accommodate women’s priorities. The collective nature of the community consultations, in which community leaders and community members come together to discuss and present ideas to the village government, creates a shared understanding of participants’ priorities. This may make it easier for citizens to organize collective action to hold village officials accountable. In Indonesia, women’s voter turnout is slightly higher than men’s voter turnout³. Therefore, accommodating more proposals from women may also be politically expedient for village heads who are directly elected.

However, if proposals from *musyawarah inklusif* are non-binding, village officials may continue to put their own priorities ahead of new proposals submitted by women and other marginalized groups. Village heads in Indonesia tend to win elections by wide margins.⁴ With a strong popular mandate, village heads may feel comfortable placing greater emphasis on implementing the types of development projects they campaigned for rather than on new projects proposed by constituents after they are elected.

Third, existing research suggests that the gender composition of the political environment, including elected officials and the composition of civic groups, can increase women’s level of political efficacy and produce more gender-equal attitudes about participation in governance (Beath et al. 2013; Burns et al. 2001; Deininger et al. 2015; Franceschet 2012; Karpowitz et al. 2012; Mackay 2008; Prillaman 2021). By directly providing women with additional avenues for political participation, *musyawarah inklusif* may alter villagers’ perceptions of the appropriate role for women in community decision-making. This could create a social environment more conducive to the consideration of budget proposals submitted by women.

³E.g., in the 2019 general elections, women’s turnout was 83% while men’s turnout was 80%; General Elections Commission of Indonesia (KPU), <https://opendata.kpu.go.id/>

⁴From a sample of 148 villages in five provinces, the average margin of victory was 34 percentage points.

1.2 Community-Driven Development and Village Budgeting in Indonesia

This dissertation studies constraints and opportunities for women's representation in local development in the context of Indonesia, the world's third largest democracy. Focusing on Indonesia allows us to leverage sub-national variation in requirements for women's participation while holding constant broader social, political, and economic factors. Indonesia is a particularly important case for the study of women's representation in local development. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim majority country, and began experimenting with community-driven development (CDD) around the same time as it began its transition to democracy in 1998. With the support of the World Bank, the Indonesian government launched the *Kecamatan* (sub-district) Development Program (KDP) in 501 *kecamatan* in 1998. A successor program, called *Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri Perdesaan* (National Program for Independent Rural Community Empowerment, PNPM) was gradually expanded to cover all 4,371 *kecamatan* in the country, making it the largest CDD program in the world. Indonesia's CDD programs and subsequent regulations requiring community participation in village budgeting share many similarities with CDD programs implemented dozens of low and middle-income countries throughout the world, such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

Under Indonesia's CDD programs, block grants between Rp 1 - 3.5 billion (US\$100,000-\$350,000) were given to each sub-district to allocate for village projects proposed by village community groups.⁵ Village proposals, one of which must come from a women's group, were sent to a sub-district forum where village representatives evaluated proposals based on predetermined poverty criteria and allocated funding for individual proposals. Facilitators elected by villagers (one man and one woman) held group meetings, including separate women's meetings, to discuss the needs of the village and their development priorities. Villagers then came together at a village-level meeting to decide which proposals

⁵At the time, the exchange rate was around 10,000 IDR to 1 USD.

to send to the sub-district level meeting. Each village could submit up to two proposals (with one proposal coming from the women’s group). Village and sub-district meetings were open to all community members. An inter-village forum composed of elected village representatives made the final decisions on project funding. An impact evaluation of PNPM found that it increased household consumption among the poor, funded basic infrastructure, increased access to health services, and increased employment opportunities (Voss 2012). However, in terms of social dynamics and governance, studies of this program found that participation by women and other vulnerable groups was passive while decision-making was dominated by elite men, and the program had no significant impact on broader village decision-making processes (Voss 2012; Syukri et al. 2013; Woodhouse 2012).

The PNPM program ended in 2016 as a new village-level decentralization law came into effect. The 2014 Village Law (6/2014) created a single planning system with PNPM principles incorporated into the structure, while also significantly increasing village budgets. The Village Law requires village governments to involve community representatives, including religious leaders, farmers, fishers, women’s groups, and marginalized people, in community budgeting and planning meetings (*musyawarah*). However, with some important exceptions, participation in village decision-making appears to remain dominated by elites and men (Damayanti and Syarifuddin 2020). Moreover, village heads often selectively invite members of the elite in addition to community leaders and activists to provide inputs. In this study’s sample, only 20 percent of men and eight percent of women were invited to any *musyawarah*.⁶ Moreover, as will be discussed further in Chapter 2, villagers invited to *musyawarah* are more likely to be wealthier, connected to members of the village apparatus, and active in village community institutions. Unrepresentative participation in *musyawarah* may create distance between priorities in submitted proposals and the preferences of the vast majority of villagers who are not invited to participate in the process. Nevertheless, preferences expressed at *musyawarah* can be consequential. An original analysis of 6,226 proposals submitted at

⁶Survey of 900 randomly sampled villagers in 30 villages. See sample details in Section 4.

regular *musyawarah* in 34 villages finds that at least 41 percent of these proposals are directly included in six-year village development plans and at least 19 percent of proposals are included in annual budgets.⁷

Recognizing barriers to women’s participation in local governance, an Australian aid organization, KOMPAK, advocated for special community consultations for women and other marginalized groups (*musyawarah inklusif*) in districts in which they had established partnerships. KOMPAK generally identified two districts per region for its programs, including advocacy for these special community consultations, primarily based on development criteria in 2015.⁸ Between 2016 and 2019, 10 districts (two in East Java) passed regulations requiring more inclusive community consultation procedures in an effort to expand participation and focus more attention on the interests of these participants. Districts with no connection to KOMPAK—many of which are very similar to KOMPAK districts in terms of economic, social, and political characteristics—did not adopt regulations requiring more inclusive village planning and budgeting consultations.

Village heads are elected to six-year terms. At the start of each term, village governments are required to prepare a six-year village development plan. The requirements for *musyawarah* (both regular consultations and *musyawarah inklusif* in districts that require them) apply to the preparation of the six-years plans as well as annual budgets. The six-year plans limit what projects can be included in the annual budgets for the next six years. Except in cases of emergencies, projects that were not originally included in the six-year plan cannot be added to annual budgets. The six-year plans include indications of which year(s) each budget activity should be implemented and a cost estimate for each line item. However, the prioritization and cost estimates in the six-year plan are non-binding. To maximize flexibility, village governments have an incentive to include more budget activities in the six-year plan than they will ultimately be able to implement. Each year, the village government can decide which items from the six-year plan they want to add to the annual budget. According to personal interviews with village


⁷Only exact matches are counted in this analysis. The actual number of accommodated proposals is significantly higher if inexact matches are included.

⁸Personal interview with KOMPAK officials in Jakarta on February 17, 2020 and in Trenggalek on March 10, 2020.

and district officials, it is standard practice for 20-30 percent of activities in the six-year development plan to not be included in the annual budgets during the corresponding six-year period.

Figure 1.1 illustrates the average priorities in the annual budgets (2017-2019) prior to the implementation of musyawarah inklusif for this study’s primary sample of 30 villages in East Java. The largest categories of spending are village government administration and roads, bridges, and drainage. In Indonesia, public schools, larger health clinics, and inter-village roads are funded by higher levels of government. Therefore, village funds are spent mainly on smaller intra-village roads and can also be spent on preschools and smaller village health posts. There is significant variation across villages in spending priorities. For example, the standard deviation in percent spending on roads, bridges, and drainage is 9 percentage points. The standard deviations for health and education and for empowerment are each approximately 2 percentage points, which is also substantial considering average spending for each of these categories is less than 5 percent of the total budget.

Figure 1.1: Village Budget Spending by Category



1.3 Attitudes about Women and Community Development

The existing research on gender norms in Indonesia reveal seemingly paradoxical findings about the role of women in contemporary society.⁹ Past studies about women in Indonesia, especially women in rural parts of Java, show that women have status and power in Javanese society, with substantial access to resources inside and beyond the home, especially compared to women in other Asian and Islamic societies (Geertz 1989; Jay 1969; Reid 1988). Other studies highlight constraints imposed on Indonesian women by society, suggesting real limits to women's power and autonomy (Berninghausen and Kerstan 1992; Elmhirst 2000; Errington 1990; Keeler 1987; Wieringa 2002; Wolf 1992). These seemingly contradictory perspectives may emerge, in part, from examining different aspects of women's private and public lives in Indonesia. In Indonesia, women typically control household finances and manage property in their own names. In the past several decades, women have also played increasingly prominent roles as public figures in both social and political arenas. However, women's roles remain constrained by "a culturally prescribed, state-reinforced, patriarchal gender ideology" (Tickamyer and Kusujiarti 2012, 16).

During the New Order authoritarian regime (1966-1998), the Indonesian government promoted policies that emphasized women's roles in national development as wives of workers and civil servants, mothers and educators of children, and housekeepers (Suryakusuma 1988), in part, through the establishment of official women's organizations discussed in Chapter 2. Since the fall of Suharto and the implementation of democratic reforms beginning in 1999, successive Indonesian governments have promoted a more progressive approach to gender through a variety of national initiatives, including gender responsive budgeting (Salim 2016). However, conservative gender norms are still widespread, especially when it comes to local affairs in rural communities. Because gender norms remain rather patriarchal at local levels, opportunities for women's involvement in

⁹For a more detailed summary of anthropological research on gender in Java, see (Tickamyer and Kusujiarti 2012, Chapter 1).

local policymaking are often limited. When women do have opportunities to participate, their participation is often circumscribed to specific domains, like health and education, in which women are traditionally more involved.

Data from my survey with 900 randomly sampled respondents (450 women) in 30 rural villages in East Java reveal a combination of more and less conservative gender attitudes held by both women and men. Table 1.1 presents the mean responses for female and male respondents and the p-values for a t-test of the significance of differences between female and male respondents. For each statement respondents were asked to state their level of agreement from 1 = Strongly Agree to 5 = Strongly Disagree. Both women and men believe that women should participate in deliberations (*musyawarah*) where leaders are making decisions affecting the community. However, most women and men also believe that “in village development and budget planning, a wife must always support her husband’s priority.” The only significant difference between men and women’s attitudes is for the statement, “Women’s voice is heard and considered during the decision-making in my neighborhood,” where women were slightly more likely to agree.

I conducted follow-up interviews with nine respondents who agreed with both of these statements to confirm their responses and better understand their perspectives. One 32-year-old woman said, “what is done by my husband is for the village,” but later added, “women also want to participate and suggest” proposals for village development.¹⁰ A 40-year-old woman from the same village said that her husband’s opinion is “better, stronger. My husband knows about the [village development] situation more.”¹¹ A 38-year old woman from a different village in a different district said she always supports her husband’s opinion because he is the head of the family.¹² Another woman from this village (37 years old) also emphasized men’s role as head of the family, “After all, in a family you must follow the wishes of the head of the family.”¹³ A 49-year-old male

¹⁰“Apa yang dilakukan suami itu untuk lingkungan desa. [...] “Perempuan juga ingin berpartisipasi dan ingin mengusulkan.” Personal interview on January 21, 2021.

¹¹“Pendapat suami lebih bagus, lebih kuat. Suami lebih mengetahui keadaan.” Personal interview on January 21, 2021.

¹²“...harus selalu mendukung keinginan suaminya, karena suami kepala keluarga.” Personal interview on January 21, 2021.

¹³“Bagaimanapun juga berkeluarga, maka harus ikuti keinginan kepala keluarga.” Personal interview on January 21, 2021.

respondent from the same village shared this perspective: “if the husband has something that he wants for the village, his wife must support.”¹⁴ As we will see through the rest of this dissertation, these types of perspectives can shape opportunities and constraints for women’s engagement in local policymaking. While women are expected to participate in *musyawarah*, their preferences often come second to the preferences of men.

¹⁴“Seorang istri kan umpama kalau suaminya punya keinginan di desa ya harus mendukung...” Personal interview on January 21, 2021.

Table 1.1: Gender Attitudes

Statement	Women Mean	Men Mean	T-Test P-Value
I am confident in my ability to resolve problems that come up in my life.	1.99	2.05	0.15
My voice is heard and considered during the decision-making in my neighborhood.	2.44	2.38	0.25
Women's voice is heard and considered during the decision-making in my neighborhood.	2.29	2.39	0.03**
My voice is heard and considered during the village development and budget planning.	2.62	2.52	0.24
Women's voice is heard and considered during the village development and budget planning.	2.49	2.51	0.77
People like me do not have any voice that will be considered in deciding what the village government does.	3.24	3.17	0.23
Most people in this village understand that women must participate in a <i>musyawarah</i> where leaders are making decisions affecting the community.	2.23	2.26	0.63
In village development and budget planning, a wife must always support her husband's priority.	2.04	2.1	0.13

1.4 Gendered Budgetary Preferences

An original survey of 900 randomly sampled villagers (450 women) and 300 purposively sampled village government and community leaders (e.g., village heads, village council and neighborhood association chairs and women community leaders) in two districts

(Ponorogo and Trenggalek) conducted in East Java in January 2021 measures preferences for village government spending.¹⁵ This survey shows differences between men and women which are broadly consistent with existing findings in Indonesia and other developing countries (Gottlieb et al. 2018; Olken 2010). However, diverging from existing research in Sub-Saharan Africa (Clayton et al. 2019), the survey conducted for this study in Indonesia reveals significant differences between the preferences of community leaders and community members. This has important implications for whether increased participation by a broader set of community leaders could improve the accommodation of preferences held by community members.

In the survey, respondents were given 30 coins and asked to place them in envelopes with pictures of the following budget categories based on their preferences: 1) roads, 2) bridges, 3) drainage, 4) sanitation and clean water, 5) agriculture, 6) education, 7) health, 8) social, culture, and religion, 9) empowerment activities and assistance for village community institutions (e.g., women’s groups, youth groups, farming groups), 10) sports facilities, 11) neighborhood safety, and 12) community facilities. Figure 1.2 presents the average preferences of each type of respondent. Figure 1.3 shows the differences in preferences between different types of respondents. We can see that women prefer significantly more spending on education and health than men.¹⁶ Women also prefer significantly more spending on health and less spending on roads than male leaders (i.e., village heads, village council chairs, farming group chairs, youth group chairs, and village community empowerment institution chairs).

There are also significant differences in preferences between women community members and women community leaders, namely chairs of women’s community health groups (*posyandu*) and women’s empowerment organizations (PKK). *Posyandu* and PKK are active organizations in virtually every village in Indonesia and receive support from

¹⁵The 900 villagers were selected using stratified random sampling in 30 villages with neighborhoods, households, and individuals within households selected using kish grids. 15 neighborhoods (RT) were randomly selected within each village, two households were randomly selected within each neighborhood, and 1 adult was randomly selected within each household, alternating between woman and man respondents (so one man and one woman is selected from each neighborhood). The response rate for the in-person survey was 100 percent though some respondents declined to answer specific questions.

¹⁶Estimates in Figure 1.3 are from bivariate OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at village level. Whiskers span 95 percent confidence interval.

the government. The chair of the village-level PKK organization is almost always the wife of the village head (94 percent of village heads in Indonesia are men). PKK carries out a range of activities, including promoting literacy, organizing nutrition classes, teaching small skills and crafts, and implementing family planning programs (Lussier 2016, 167). *Posyandu* helps implement public health campaigns related maternal and child health as well as assistance for seniors, including family planning, nutrition, immunization, and disease control. Representatives from *posyandu* and PKK are the women most likely to be invited to attend both regular *musyawarah* and *musyawarah inklusif*.¹⁷ There are no significant differences in the preferences of PKK and *posyandu* leaders, except that PKK leaders prefer slightly less spending on social and cultural activities. Female community leaders prefer significantly less spending on roads and agriculture and significantly more spending on health and empowerment than both men and women community members. Women community members who actively participate in village community institutions (e.g., PKK and *posyandu*) also prefer significantly greater allocation for empowerment activities than women community members who do not actively participate in such groups (See Table 1.1).

Male leaders (e.g., village heads, village council chairs, village community empowerment institution chairs, and youth leaders, and farming group chairs) prefer significantly more spending on roads and drainage compared to all other types of respondents. Male community leaders also prefer significantly less spending on education, health, and empowerment than female community leaders.

Based on a review of proposal lists from regular and inclusive *musyawarah* in 37 villages in East Java, we can see that most proposals from the *musyawarah inklusif* (for women and other marginalized groups) seek funding for empowerment or health activities (Figure 1.4). The plurality of proposals submitted at *musyawarah inklusif* (37 percent) are for empowerment, training and assistance activities for women and vulnerable groups. Health constitutes the second largest category of proposals submitted at *musyawarah inklusif* (27 percent). After that, no single category received more than eight percent of

¹⁷This was confirmed in personal interviews with village officials in 20 villages and a review of attendance lists.

proposal submissions. In comparison, the plurality of proposals from regular consultations were for roads (28 percent). Empowerment and health proposals only constitute 13 and four percent of regular consultation proposals respectively.

Common empowerment and health proposals from the *musyawarah inklusif* include funding for women’s community groups, livelihoods trainings for women, and children’s nutritional supplements to prevent stunting. These types of activities are often carried out by PKK and *posyandu*. Because *musyawarah inklusif* participants are disproportionately leaders of or active participants in PKK and *posyandu*, these proposals could be seen as efforts by community leaders to get more resources for their own groups. Community leaders may enjoy social rents from the funding and implementation of such activities.

Figure 1.2: Budget Preferences by Respondent Type




Figure 1.3: Differences in Budget Preferences by Respondent Type





Table 1.2: Active PKK and *Posyandu* Members Prefer More Empowerment Spending

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Empowerment allocation	
	(1)	(2)
Active PKK Members	0.659** (0.267)	
Active <i>Posyandu</i> Members		0.548** (0.243)
Observations	450	450
R ²	0.012	0.013
Adjusted R ²	0.010	0.011
Residual Std. Error (df = 448)	1.687	1.686
F Statistic (df = 1; 448)	5.555**	5.883**
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Figure 1.4: Budget Proposals from Inclusive and Regular *Musyawarah*



1.5 Contributions

This dissertation contributes to existing literature on gender and politics by identifying specific constraints and opportunities to improve substantive representation. Using original data and methods to identify causal effects, the findings suggest that creating more opportunities for women representatives and other marginalized groups to participate in local governance can be insufficient to expand the substantive representation of their interests for two reasons. First, existing community leaders may continue to dominate participation in the separate consultations and propose different priorities than the preferences of excluded community members. Second, village heads may be reluctant to change their priorities when presented with new information or requirements related to women’s preferences and participation. Without clear incentives to enact women’s preferences into policy, male decision-makers may acknowledge but still deprioritize women’s ideas. Therefore, increasing the salience of women’s preferences is insufficient to shift policy priorities if key decision-makers are free to ignore them.

Focusing on the case of Indonesia, this study identifies differences in the policy preferences of different types of constituents. In addition to differences in the preferences of men and women, differences between the priorities of community leaders and community members are examined. The dissertation also explores differences in how men and women participation in village community institutions and how village heads often dominate village decision-making. It shows how unrepresentative community leaders and unequal opportunities for participation constrain participatory processes as community leaders capture local decision-making and advance their own priorities, which differ from those of their constituents.

The dissertation further shows how institutions and reforms intended to promote greater accountability, including village head elections and special consultations for women and other vulnerable groups (*musyawarah inklusif*), do not affect the distribution of village funds. However, this study does find that *musyawarah inklusif* improves the representation of women community leaders’ preferences in non-binding plans. This means that such a reform can, at least nominally, shift the attention of government

officials towards issues raised by representatives of marginalized groups. Nevertheless, this reform has not yet affected the actual village spending priorities as seen in binding annual budgets. The evidence presented in this dissertation highlight key obstacles to making local governments more accountable to constituents, particularly women, including unequal access to participation, unrepresentative community representatives, and unresponsive village heads. Understanding these particular challenges may help design more effective reforms aimed at improving the representation of marginalized people's interests in local governance.

1.6 Fieldwork

For my dissertation, I conducted a total of 18 months of fieldwork in Indonesia between 2018 and 2021. This research was declared exempt from ongoing review by the University of Michigan Health and Behavioral Sciences IRB (HUM00175595). I pre-registered the research design for my dissertation at <https://osf.io/xsm75/>. All survey instruments used in this dissertation can found on this website.

For my preliminary research, I conducted 45 meetings with NGOs, government officials, and local researchers based in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. I later conducted 97 interviews in three districts in East Java with district and village government officials, village and neighborhood community leaders, and ordinary villagers, including preliminary interviews aimed at refining the theory and survey instruments and post-endline interviews designed to get a deeper understanding of quantitative results. I also contracted a survey firm to conduct a survey with 1,200 respondents in 30 villages in East Java, including 900 community members (450 women), 30 village heads, and 270 community leaders (e.g., village council chairs, neighborhood association chairs, and women community leaders). This survey includes a budget allocation game, vignette experiment, and list experiment. I helped lead the enumerator training, monitored the survey implementation in the field, and conducted my own back checks. In addition, I contracted a survey firm to conduct a phone survey, which also includes a vignette

experiment, with 469 village heads from five districts in East Java, Central Java, and East Nusa Tenggara. Finally, I was granted access to village budgeting and planning documents and village head election results following meetings with district government offices, which allowed me to build the administrative dataset used in my analysis.

I followed Indonesia's elaborate research permitting process, which required multiple visits to the National Research and Innovation Agency, National Police Headquarters, and Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta; village, sub-district, district, and local immigration offices in Yogyakarta; East Java National and Political Unity Agency and East Java Regional Police in Surabaya; and the National and Political Unity Agency offices in Pacitan, Ponorogo, and Trenggalek districts. My research was interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. While pausing my research from March - August 2020, I worked with the University of Michigan International Travel Oversight Committee and Human Research Activation Committee to develop procedures that would allow me to safely resume my research in accordance with a strict COVID-19 health protocol, including screening, masking, testing, and social distancing requirements.

1.7 Plan of the dissertation

This dissertation is organized to explore different factors that affect the substantive representation of women's interests in village budgeting. The next chapter (Chapter 2) examines obstacles to women's participation in local governance. It presents original descriptive data about the types of villagers who are most likely to be invited to, attend, and submit proposals and neighborhood, hamlet, and village-level community consultations, revealing significant gender-based inequities. It also presents the results of a vignette experiment which tests whether women would be more likely to attend a separate consultation that is specifically for women and other vulnerable groups. The experiment finds that women are just as interested in attending mixed gender consultations as separate consultations for women and other vulnerable groups. Finally, Chapter 2 tests the association between descriptive representation (number of women

on village budget drafting teams) and substantive representation (allocating funds towards women's priorities). Finding no significant correlation between descriptive and substantive representation in this case, the chapter concludes by exploring why increased women's descriptive representation does not necessarily lead to greater substantive representation of women's preferences.

Chapter 3 focuses on the dominant role of the village head and other male leaders in village governance. It discusses two different types of elite capture: 1) capturing distribution and 2) capturing decision-making. This chapter provides evidence for the absence of former and the presence of the latter in Indonesia. In addition, Chapter 3 considers whether electoral competition, information about women's preferences, and requirements for separate women's consultations affect budget allocations towards categories preferred by women. The chapter presents evidence that suggests that none of these factors significantly affect village heads' budget priorities.

Chapter 4 evaluates whether *musyawarah inklusif* reforms can increase the substantive representation of women's interests in local governance. In particular, it will test whether these reforms increase the representation of women's preferences in non-binding six-year village development plans as well as binding annual village budgets. It will also assess whether these reforms increase the representation of the preferences of women community leaders more than the preferences of women community members.

This dissertation concludes with a chapter exploring the policy implications of the empirical findings in the preceding chapters. In particular, this concluding chapter will consider what types of participatory budgeting reforms may be better able to overcome the challenges to women's substantive representation identified in this dissertation.

Chapter 2

Gendered Participation in Community Institutions and Development

The previous chapter discussed challenges and opportunities for the representation of women's preferences in local development. We saw how female community members, male community members, male community leaders, and female community leaders have different budgetary preferences in Indonesian villages. The previous chapter also introduced the *musyawarah inklusif* reform implemented in some Indonesian districts in an effort to increase women's participation and the representation of women's priorities in village development plans and budgets. This chapter focuses on participation and examines the gendered dimensions of participation in village community institutions and village governance. It also tests the effects of the *musyawarah inklusif* reform on women's interest in participating in the village planning and budgeting process. Finally, it discusses the link between descriptive and substantive representation and examines whether greater women's involvement in the drafting of village budgets is associated with more funding for women's budgetary priorities.

From the existing literature, we know that women are often less likely to be invited to participate in political affairs and may not feel welcome in social contexts where men dominate governance (Casey et al. 2012; Cornwall 2003). In addition, gendered gaps in employment and education can also constrain women's participation in politics (Burns

et al. 2001; Inglehart et al. 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008). Even when women are invited, they are often not empowered to speak up. Across a broad range of political contexts, men tend to dominate mixed gender deliberations (Grillos 2018; Karpowitz et al. 2012; Parthasarathy et al. 2019). Existing research on women’s self-help groups in India shows that such groups can empower women to increase their civic engagement and political participation (Desai and Joshi 2014; Joshi et al. 2019; Prillaman 2021). However, in some contexts, existing women’s community groups established by the government could also reinforce traditional gender norms (Robinson 2009).

Given the challenges women face to meaningfully participate in mixed gender political spaces and the traditional nature of existing women’s community groups, the establishment of separate spaces for women to submit policy proposals may make it easier for women to engage in the policymaking process. The *musyawarah inklusif* reform introduced in Chapter 1 seeks to accomplish this by mandating separate village budgeting consultations for women and other vulnerable groups. Women may feel more comfortable discussing politics and policy in a forum that explicitly solicits their opinion and where they do not need to compete with men for attention or worry about men’s reactions to their ideas. However, as this chapter will show, even in villages with *musyawarah inklusif* requirements, village governments maintain discretion over whom to invite to the consultations. As a result, *musyawarah inklusif* may not substantially increase participation by women in the process. It may simply shift participation by women and other marginalized groups from regular consultations to separate *musyawarah inklusif* meetings or increase participation by villagers who are already more active in village affairs.

The analyses conducted for this chapter highlight the challenges of increasing women’s participation and the substantive representation of women’s interests: Women are no more likely to participate in special *musyawarah inklusif* forums than regular mixed gender forums. In addition, there is no association between the number of women on village budget drafting teams and the percentage of village funds spent on categories preferred by women. However, the data presented in this chapter also reveal high rates of

women's participation in village community institutions and high levels of interest among women to participate in the village budgeting process if invited.

Indonesia has a rich tradition of community participation through local prayer groups (e.g., *yasinan*), community service (*gotong royong*), community institutions (*lembaga kemasyarakatan desa*), and community forums (*musyawarah*). Some community institutions, such as neighborhood associations, were initially established by occupying Japanese forces during World War II and utilized by the authoritarian New Order Suharto regime (1966-1998) to monitor and control citizens. Since democratization and decentralization beginning in 1998, these village community institutions function more as bottom-up community groups rather than top-down institutions. However, these groups continue to be regulated by the central government and receive support from national ministries. In particular, national regulations still require that every village have the following institutions: neighborhood associations (RT/RW), family welfare/women's groups (PKK), youth organization (*karang taruna*), community health corps (*posyandu*), and community empowerment institution (LPMD). In some cases, they remain closely tied to village government officials. For example, village-level PKK are typically run by the wife of the village head. National requirements for community participation in village planning and budgeting consultation privilege the role of these official village community institutions. As will be shown in Section 2.2, this can limit the degree to which villagers who are less involved in village community institutions can participate in village governance.

The following sections (2.1 and 2.2) explore the ways in which men and women participate in different types of community institutions, how these differences affect the types of people who are invited to participate in village governance, and how differences in participation may affect the types of proposals that are submitted. They draw upon data from the same survey of 900 randomly sampled villagers in 30 villages in East Java used in the previous chapter as well as insights from 97 interviews in three districts in East Java with district and village government officials, village and neighborhood community leaders, and ordinary villagers. Section 2.3 evaluates whether women are more likely to

participate in separate forums. Data for this analysis comes from a survey experiment conducted with 225 women who live in villages without *musyawarah inklusif* (these 225 respondents are also included in the same 900-person household survey discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2). Section 2.4 assesses whether villages with more women on budget drafting teams allocate more funds towards categories preferred by women. Data for this analysis comes from budget data and a phone survey conducted with village heads from two districts in East Java and one district in Central Java. More details on the data and methods used for the analysis in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are discussed in these sections.


2.1 Gendered Participation in Village Community Institutions

Women and men participate in different types of community institutions which focus on different domains. Figure 2.1 presents the percentage of male and female respondents from the household survey who participate in different types of community groups. Fourteen percent of women participate in community health volunteer corps (*posyandu*) compared to only one percent of men. Eighteen percent of men participate in the community youth group (*karang taruna*) compared to only two percent of women.¹ Forty percent of women participate in neighborhood-level rotating credit and savings associations (*arisan*) compared to 33 percent of men. And 30 percent of men participate in farming groups (*kelompok tani*) compared to only nine percent of women.

Some of these groups operate in a more democratic manner than others. For example, 56 percent of farming group members report voting for the leader of their group. However, only 38 percent of PKK participants report being able to vote for the PKK leader (who is almost always the wife of the village head). Only 29 percent of *posyandu* cadres report voting for the head of their group. *Posyandu* members are also less likely to report choosing activities or priorities for their group (43 percent compared to 55 percent of farming group members and 57 percent of PKK members). According to the majority of

¹All respondents were at least 18 years old so this does not capture younger youth group participants. Nevertheless, young adults who are not yet married often continue to participate in *karang taruna*.

Figure 2.1: Participation in Community Groups



participants in these groups, participation levels have increased in recent years: 55 percent of farming group members, 73 percent of PKK members, and 68 percent of *posyandu* members report higher or significantly higher levels of participation today compared to ten years ago. For some of these groups, respondents reported increases in participation among ordinary villagers (*warga desa biasa*) compared to community leaders (*tokoh*). For example, 65 percent of PKK members reported higher or significantly higher levels of participation among ordinary villagers over the past 10 years. However, for *posyandu*, only 47 percent of members reported increases in the level of participation among ordinary villagers compared to community leaders. Among group members, rates of participation in these groups is generally quite active. For example, 97 percent of *arisan* participants, 97 percent of *posyandu* cadres, 75 percent of farming group members, and 74 percent of youth group members report meeting with their group at least once a month. As will be discussed in the next chapter, there is also considerable variation in terms of how participatory and democratic decision-making is within *musyawarah* meetings.

The following subsections provide more details about several types of community institutions, which are especially important parts of village life and can indirectly and directly play important roles in village decision-making. We will see how groups led by men are much more likely to discuss issues related to village development and governance than groups led by women. In addition, groups led by men engage in a broader range of issues, which can be more consequential for village budgeting, than groups led by women. In particular, men tend to focus more on infrastructure, planning, and public leadership, while women focus more on healthcare, early childhood education, and supporting the community. The role of women is not openly viewed as less important than the role of men. However, women can be confined to certain domains and types of responsibilities, which can ultimately affect how they can contribute local policymaking.

2.1.1 Neighborhood Associations

Indonesia's most local unit of administration, neighborhood associations (rukun tetangga, or RT), play a pivotal role in citizens' ordinary lives and in village governance. RT are composed of a maximum of 30 households. National regulations assign a variety of roles and responsibilities to RT chairs. For example, RT chairs are charged with helping the village government collect population data and process permits, sharing information from the village government with community members, organizing community service activities, maintaining neighborhood harmony, and handling neighborly disputes. In addition, RT chairs are almost always invited to hamlet and village planning and budgeting meetings to submit proposals reflecting the needs of their neighborhood. RT chairs also help facilitate the implementation of village development projects. Recently, neighborhood association chairs were also given a formal role in helping to identify eligible recipients for COVID cash transfers (see Chapter 3).

Most neighborhood association chairs are not elected through secret, universal balloting. Instead, voting may occur by hand raising in a public meeting, and in many cases, only heads of household can vote. Based on original survey data from 499 villages, 74 percent of villages have at least some neighborhoods that select the neighborhood

association chair by reaching consensus at a public forum, without voting. In addition, in 27 percent of villages, only heads of household can participate in the selection of their neighborhood association chair. In Indonesia, 85 percent of heads of household are men and close to 100 percent of neighborhood association chairs are men.

Unlike the position of village head, or elected positions at the district, provincial, and national levels, the RT chair position is generally not sought after because the position comes with a trivially small stipend and little power but a lot of bureaucratic responsibilities. Stipends for RT chairs in rural villages are often only around \$3.50 per month while village heads make around \$175 per month. In many neighborhoods, no one campaigns for the RT chair position. Instead, individuals are often pressured by their neighbors to agree to become a candidate to ensure the role will be filled.

Ordinary Indonesian citizens interact more frequently with their neighborhood association chairs than any other government officials (e.g., hamlet heads, village heads, village council members, members of district parliament). From my survey of 900 villagers, 4.4 percent complained about problems to their RT chair within the last year while only 2.9 percent complained to their village head (only 1.3 percent complained to other members of the village apparatus such as the hamlet head or members of the village council; 92.1 percent did not complain to any village officials). Thirty-one percent of respondents have their RT chair's phone number and 16 percent are in a WhatsApp group with their RT chair. In contrast, 17 percent have their village head's phone number and 10 percent are in a WhatsApp group with the village head. Sixteen percent of respondents have the phone number for at least one member of the village council and only six percent are in a WhatsApp group with a village council member.

Some neighborhood associations have regular meetings that can take the form of a social gathering, group prayer, or discussion of community and village affairs. In many neighborhoods, these meetings are only attended by men or by heads of household (85 percent of whom are men). Women generally meet separately in prayer groups (*yasinan*) or rotating credit associations (*arisan*). *Arisan* are most commonly organized at the *dasawisma* level, which is groups of 10 households. In some communities, only women's

arisan groups exist. In others, there are separate *arisan* for men (*arisan bapak-bapak* and for women *arisan ibu-ibu*).

Men who participate in *arisan* groups are nearly twice as likely to report discussing priorities for the village development plan or village budget at *arisan* meetings as women who participate in *arisan* groups: 26 percent of men's *arisan* group members report discussing village development plans or village budgets in *arisan* meetings compared to only 14 percent of women's *arisan* members. My interview data indicate that men are more likely to discuss village development and budgeting than women because these are generally considered to be men's domains. Women tend to focus on taking care of their household and contributing to health and education in the community while men tend to be more involved in infrastructure development and governance in the community. These differences can filter up to the village level. In advance of hamlet and village-level *musyawarah* held to discuss village development plans and budgets, neighborhood association chairs will often hold a special meeting or use a regular meeting to collect proposals, which the RT chair will then submit on their behalf at the *musyawarah*. Because RT chairs are more likely to consult men than women in this process (e.g., through RT meetings or participation in men's *arisan* groups), the proposals they present at *musyawarah* tend to reflect men's priorities, especially physical infrastructure like roads, bridges, and drainage.

2.1.2 Family Welfare and Community Health Groups

PKK was established by the Indonesian government in the 1970s with the goal of promoting health, education, and household-level economic welfare.² PKK are groups of women leaders and volunteers organized at each level of government across the country, including the national, provincial, district, sub-district, village, hamlet, and neighborhood levels. Under Suharto's New Order regime (until 1998), PKK leadership positions were officially determined by their husbands' positions in government (Marcoes 2002; Perkasa and Hendyito 2003). For example, the wife of the provincial governor would automatically

²PKK is an acronym for *Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*, which means Family Welfare Empowerment.

become the head of the province-level PKK. State policy under the New Order regime officially defined women's wifely citizenship duties and the functions of PKK in promoting national development (Robinson 2009, 72). Since Indonesia transitioned to democracy in 1999, PKK (and other official community institutions like RT) have become less political and more autonomous. However, PKK's national hierarchical structure remains in place and most PKK leaders are still the wives of government officials. At the village level, the wife of the village head is almost always the chair of the PKK (assuming the village head is a married man) and the wives of other village officials, such as the village secretary, are usually hold senior positions in the group. However, there are now more opportunities for women who are not related to government officials to join PKK and influence PKK's activities. PKK volunteers engage in different types of activities, such as promoting literacy, organizing nutrition classes, teaching micro-entrepreneurial skills and crafts, and implementing Indonesia's family planning program (Lussier 2016, 167).

Posyandu, initially implemented under the auspices of PKK, began as a national community nutrition program.³ Its activities include infant weight monitoring, vaccinations, and nutritional assistance for children. *Posyandu* cadres are composed of non-medical volunteers from the village, generally all women. *Posyandu* help extend the reach of government health services in rural areas that may have insufficient health facilities, nurses, and doctors. In the 1980s and 1990s, *posyandu* helped instill a “‘modern’ ideal of housebound motherhood” by monitoring women's parenting in addition to children's health (Robinson 2009, 75).

From my random sample of 450 women in 30 villages in East Java, two-thirds of women invited to *musyawarah* are members of PKK and/or *posyandu*. Overall, 18 percent of women in these villages were members of PKK and/or *posyandu*. In my interviews with both male and female community leaders, when I asked about opportunities for women to participate in village affairs and submit proposals for village development, respondents almost always mention the roles of PKK and *posyandu* as evidence of women's involvement.

³*Posyandu* is short for *pos pelayanan terpadu*, which means integrated service post.

2.2 Gendered Participation in Village Development

Indonesian law requires village governments to involve community representatives, including religious leaders, farmers, fishers, women's groups, and marginalized people, in community budgeting and planning meetings (*musyawarah*). However, participation in village decision-making generally remains dominated by elites and men (Damayanti and Syarifuddin 2020). Moreover, village heads often selectively invite members of the elite in addition to community leaders and activists to provide inputs. From this study's random sample of 900 villagers in 30 villages in East Java, only 20 percent of men and eight percent of women were invited to any *musyawarah*.⁴

What are the characteristics of those invited to *musyawarah*? Villagers invited to *musyawarah* tend to be wealthier. A one-point increase on a 10-point self-reported wealth measure, is associated with a 2.7 percentage point increase in likelihood of being invited to a *musyawarah* (Table 2.1 Model 1).⁵ Villagers invited to *musyawarah* are also significantly more likely to be connected to members of the village apparatus as evidenced by membership in the same WhatsApp groups. Members of the village apparatus include the village head, hamlet head, neighborhood association chair, and village council members. Villagers who are in the same WhatsApp group as a member of the village apparatus are 16 percentage points more likely to be invited a *musyawarah* (Table 2.1 Model 2). However, women who are in the same WhatsApp groups as members of the village apparatus are less likely than men who are in the same WhatsApp groups as members of the village apparatus (see interaction term in Table 2.1 Model 3).

In addition, villagers who are invited are significantly more likely to be active participants in village community institutions. For example, regular participants in women's group (PKK) meetings are 40 percentage points more likely to be invited to *musyawarah* than women who are not regular PKK participants (Table 2.1 Model 4). Similarly, members of the community health volunteer corps (*posyandu*) are 22 percentage

⁴Based on a t-test, we can reject the equality of the means for women versus men being invited, p-value < 0.000.

⁵Respondents were asked to self-assess the wealth of their household from very poor (= 0) to very rich (=9). The median response was 4 and the standard deviation was 1.5.

points more likely to be invited to be invited to *musyawarah* than women who are not *posyandu* members (Table 2.1 Model 5). Model 6 presents the results of a regression including Wealth, WhatsApp, PKK, and *posyandu* in the same equation.⁶ Among women who were invited to attend consultations, 93 percent attended. Among these attendees, 50 percent reported giving their opinion or proposal at the consultation. Because most women would attend deliberations if invited but most women are never invited, it is likely that the lack of women’s participation is driven by a lack of opportunity to participate provided by village officials rather than a lack of interest in participating by women.

Table 2.1: Predicting invitation to *musyawarah*

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Invited to any <i>musyawarah</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Wealth	0.027*** (0.008)					0.008 (0.008)
Female			-0.067*** (0.023)			
WhatsApp		0.165*** (0.024)	0.197*** (0.032)			0.103*** (0.030)
Female × WhatsApp			-0.080* (0.046)			
PKK				0.395*** (0.042)		0.290*** (0.047)
<i>Posyandu</i>					0.223*** (0.035)	0.107*** (0.037)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	All	All	All	Women	Women	Women
Observations	893	899	899	450	450	444
R ²	0.114	0.133	0.155	0.274	0.200	0.316
Adjusted R ²	0.083	0.103	0.124	0.222	0.142	0.261

Note:


*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Descriptively, the data report that 45 percent of respondents would definitely attend a regular consultation if invited (a further 44 percent would maybe attend) and 47 percent

⁶Models 1 and 2 include the both men and women respondents while Models 3-5 include only women respondents.

would definitely attend a *musyawarah inklusif* (a further 41 percent would maybe attend). However, only six percent of women respondents reported having ever been invited to attend any hamlet or village-level consultation. Among women who were actually invited to attend consultations, 93 percent attended. Among the women who actually attended consultations, 50 percent reported giving their opinion or submitting a proposal at the consultation. In contrast, 16 percent of male respondents have been invited to at least one hamlet or village-level consultation. Among the men who were invited 99 percent attended. Among those who attended, 57 percent reported giving their opinion or submitting a proposal at the *musyawarah* (See Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2: *Musyawarah* Invitation, Attendance, and Participation by Gender



Village governments are required to invite neighborhood association chairs (*ketua RT/RW*), the leaders of village community institutions (e.g., PKK, *posyandu*, and *karang taruna*), religious leaders (*tokoh agama*), and other community leaders (*tokoh masyarakat*) to *musyawarah*. However, they maintain discretion over how to identify community leaders and may choose to invite additional community members. Officially,

the village council is supposed to decide who to invite.⁷ Village council members represent each hamlet in the village so they are supposed to identify community leaders from their respective hamlets to invite. However, in practice, it is usually the village head who issues invitations, and the village head may invite a smaller circle of community leaders who are most active at the village-level or most connected to the village apparatus.

While a similar percentage of women report giving their opinion or submitting a proposal at *musyawarah* as men (50 versus 57 percent), in-depth interviews with *musyawarah* participants, including village officials and community leaders, reveal that women's participation tends to be more passive and constrained. In a focus group discussion with community leaders and village officials in East Java, the deputy chair of the village PKK said, "Women's confidence is still lacking."⁸ A male hamlet head admitted that women's participation is sometimes constrained by men: "From women, there is a desire and willingness to participate, but sometimes, from men, it is not allowed."⁹ He later added, "In the family, the nature of women is lower than that of men, but outside, if a woman wants to be a district or provincial governor, please go ahead."¹⁰ The head of a village-level Muslim women's group (*Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama*) agreed and added, "So women's responsibilities must be resolved first. Because of culture, the wife must take care of the family first."¹¹

These quotes are indicative of gender dynamics in Java whereby women are broadly supported when they pursue their own careers including higher positions of authority. For example, the governor of East Java (the second largest province in Indonesia) since 2019 and the mayor of Surabaya (the capital of East Java and second largest city in Indonesia) from 2010-2020 are both women who enjoyed high approval ratings throughout their tenure. However, within the community, women are still expected to fulfill their

⁷Ministerial Regulation Number 16 about Musyawarah Desa, 2019, Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration, <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Download/142966/Permendesa%20Nomor%2016%20Tahun%202019.pdf>

⁸Focus group discussion conducted on June 3, 2021. "Kepercayaan diri wanita itu masih kurang."

⁹"Dari perempuan ada keinginan dan kemauan untuk berpartisipasi, tapi kadang dari laki tidak boleh."

¹⁰Kalau di keluarga itu kodrat perempuan di bawah laki, tapi kalau di luar silahkan, mau jadi bupati, gubernur.

¹¹"Jadi tanggung jawab perempuan harus diselesaikan dulu. Karena budaya maka istri harus mengurus keluarga terlebih dahulu."

familial obligations first. Therefore, gender roles are often more conservative at more local levels. As the deputy chair of the village PKK put it, “At the hamlet level, it is still old-fashioned like that.”¹² Case study research by Indonesian scholars reveal similar patterns in rural villages located in other Indonesian provinces both within and outside of Java, including Central Java (Mubarok 2018), Yogyakarta (Kushandajani 2018), Aceh (Fanzikri 2019), South Sumatra (Agnes et al. 2016), and North Sulawesi (Manembu 2017).

These attitudes reflect dynamics that limit the scope of women’s participation in public affairs. According to a female village council chair, usually only courageous women speak at public forums; ordinary women ask other women who are more vocal to speak on their behalf at public forums.¹³ According to a district governor, among women, “usually only public figures speak up” at *musyawarah*.¹⁴ Limited participation by women community members who are not already leaders in community institutions can also affect the types of proposals that get submitted at *musyawarah*. Because most women participants at *musyawarah* are from PKK and *posyandu*, most proposals submitted by women reflect the priorities of those groups, namely health (e.g., nutritional supplements for infants) and empowerment (and money to pay stipends to cadres of these groups). As will be seen in Chapter 4, the types of proposals that emerge from *musyawarah inklusif*—which are specifically for women, children, and people with disabilities—differ dramatically from the types of proposals submitted at regular *musyawarah*.

2.3 Effects of Separate Consultations on Women’s Participation

2.3.1 Research Design

Chapter 1 discussed the introduction of *musyawarah inklusif* in several Indonesian districts, requiring villages to hold separate community forums for women, children,

¹²“Kalau di dusun atas masih kolot seperti itu.”

¹³“Biasanya yang berani bicara hanya itu-itu aja. [...] Jadi untuk yang belum mampu menyampaikan ke forum, perempuan biasa meminta perempuan lain yang vocal untuk menyampaikan ke forum.” Personal interview on March 13, 2020.

¹⁴“...biasanya yang bersuara lebih ke tokoh-tokoh.” Personal interview on January 19, 2021.

and people with disabilities to collect their input for village six-year development plans and annual budgets. One of the goals of this reform was to increase women’s participation. Because women are less likely to be invited to and submit proposals at regular *musyawarah*, the designers of the *musyawarah inklusif* regulation hoped the reform would force village governments to involve more women and make women feel more comfortable to attend *musyawarah* and submit proposals. This section presents the results of a survey experiment, which assesses whether women would be more likely to attend *musyawarah inklusif* than a regular *musyawarah*.

A survey experiment with 225 women in Ponorogo district in East Java tests whether women would be more likely to attend (Model 1) and speak (Model 2) at an *musyawarah inklusif* than a regular consultation if invited to attend (see Table 2.2 for English translations of the vignette treatment).¹⁵¹⁶ In the status quo treatment, women are asked to imagine being invited to attend a regular village budget consultation. In the *Musyawarah Inklusif* treatment, women are asked to imagine being invited to attend a special village budget consultation for women, children, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups. One hundred fifteen respondents were randomly assigned to receive the control vignette and 110 respondents were randomly assigned to receive the treatment vignette. Randomization was blocked by village to ensure balanced treatment assignment within each village. Ponorogo district does not have separate consultations for women, so the treatment vignette describes a novel type of forum, which respondents would not have previously experienced. Attendance and speaking were measured using four-point Likert scales where 1 = definitely attend/give idea or feedback and 4 = definitely not attend/give idea or feedback. Results are estimated with bivariate OLS regressions and standard

¹⁵The sample in Model 2 is smaller than Model 1 because it excludes respondents who said they would definitely not attend a consultation if invited. However, the results in Model 2 are robust to the inclusion of such respondents.

¹⁶This survey experiment was included at the end of survey, which asked other questions about attitudes and participation in village community institutions and forums, budgetary preferences, and other topics related to community affairs and village governance. Because respondents answered other questions related gender and participation earlier in the survey, it is possible that social desirability bias resulted in more respondents declaring interest in participating. However, The experiment immediately follows unrelated questions about receiving COVID-19 cash transfers, which may reduce such bias. In addition, because of the experimental set-up, any social desirability bias should affect responses in the treatment and control groups equally.

errors clustered at the village level. This analysis has a minimum detectable effect for a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ and a power level of 0.8 of 0.38 standard deviations. Using data from the control group, 0.38 standard deviations would be equivalent to 0.31 on the four-point Likert scale.

Table 2.2: Women’s Participation Vignettes

Status Quo Treatment (Control)	Imagine you are invited to attend the village budget consultation . Ideas submitted at the consultation would be given to the village budget drafting team.
<i>Musyawarah Inklusif</i> Treatment	Imagine you are invited to attend a special village budget consultation for women, children, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups . Ideas submitted at the special consultation would be given to the village budget drafting team.

2.3.2 Results and Discussion

The results of this vignette experiment, shown in Table 2.3, indicate that being invited to a *musyawarah inklusif* would not increase a woman’s interest in attending or speaking at the consultation compared to being invited to a *musyawarah reguler*.¹⁷ However, this does not reflect an overall reluctance to participate. In Figure 2.3 below, we can see the distribution of responses between the treatment and control groups, with the vast majority of respondents in both groups reporting that they would maybe or definitely attend. In the control group, 88 percent of women said they would maybe or definitely attend a *musyawarah* if invited and 72 percent said they would maybe or definitely speak at a *musyawarah*.


One might be concerned that the high percentage of women reporting interest in attending *musyawarah* is driven by demand effects. Social desirability bias may make women more likely to report willingness to participate. However, behavioral measures of women’s participation in forums that are open to all women in Indonesia also show relatively high levels of women’s participation. According to World Bank data from 2007-2009, women participated in CDD village meetings at a rate of 48 percent when meetings

¹⁷Standard errors clustered at the village level.

Table 2.3: Effect of *Musyawarah Inklusif* on Participation

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Attend	Speak
	(1)	(2)
<i>Musyawarah Inklusif</i>	-0.075 p = 0.443	0.088 p = 0.529
Observations	225	209
R ²	0.002	0.002
Adjusted R ²	-0.002	-0.002
Residual Std. Error	0.839 (df = 223)	0.903 (df = 207)
F Statistic	0.446 (df = 1; 223)	0.498 (df = 1; 207)

Figure 2.3: Distribution of Responses to Participation Experiment



were required to be open to all community members (Voss 2012).

In addition, evidence from my village head and village council surveys suggest that villagers' lack of interest in participating is not a major contributor to low participation rates among village community members. Seventy-four percent of the villages in my sample reporting holding at least one *musyawarah* within the last year in which no community members were invited. Villages generally hold some *musyawarah* in which

only community leaders and village officials are invited to discuss more technical matters or approve the final version of the village development plan or annual budget. Among the villages that held *musyawarah* without community members, only one village head and one village council chair reported that one of the reasons community members were not invited was because they expected that community members would not attend even if they were invited. The primary explanation given by both village heads (77%) and village council chairs (80%) was that “ordinary” villagers were not invited because there is already sufficient representation by local officials and community leaders.

Follow-up interviews with village heads and women community leaders in five of the 15 Trenggalek (treatment district) villages included in the original survey revealed that there were individuals at the *musyawarah inklusif* who had never previously attended a village planning or budgeting meeting in each of these villages. The additional attendees were a small number of individuals invited to represent particular interests in the community (e.g., preschool and kindergarten teachers, nurse, person with disabilities). However, the majority of female *musyawarah inklusif* participants *are the same women* who previously participated in regular *musyawarah*, namely PKK and *posyandu* cadres. For example, when asked to compare participants in regular *musyawarah* versus *musyawarah inklusif*, one village head said, “The tendency is almost the same people, those who are active in the village are invited. Those who participate in [*musyawarah inklusif*] are people who are used to carrying out activities in the community, so their participation is the same.”¹⁸ The chair of the Trenggalek district-level PKK group (who is the wife of the Trenggalek governor (*bupati*) also acknowledged that, “so far the main ones who have come [to *musyawarah inklusif*] are the heads of village- and hamlet-level PKK, the heads of *posyandu* and *puskesmas*” (village health clinic).¹⁹ She explained that this may be because “they brought their own organization,” meaning that the women who were asked by village governments to invite more women to participate in *musyawarah inklusif* decided to invite women from their own groups to participate. “For outsiders, apart from

¹⁸“Kecenderungannya orangnya hampir sama, yang aktif di desa yang diundang. Yang ikut musrenakeren adalah orang yang sudah biasa melaksanakan kegiatan di lingkungan, maka partisipasinya sama.” Personal interview on May 19, 2021.

¹⁹Personal interview on May 30, 2021.

PKK and *posyandu*,” she said, “it seems they’re not there yet.”

Overall, the evidence shows that *musyawarah inklusif* do not automatically increase participation among women community members. Most women report that they would be willing to participate if invited but most villagers (in villages with and without *musyawarah inklusif*) are not invited. Therefore, *musyawarah inklusif* may make the preferences of women community leaders more salient, but they are unlikely to bring new proposals from women community members to the fore.

2.4 Descriptive and Substantive Representation

The previous section showed how the introduction of *musyawarah inklusif* may be insufficient to increase women’s participation. However, in villages that already feature higher rates of women’s involvement in the village policymaking, do we observe greater prioritization of women’s preferences? The existing literature on gender quotas and reservations finds mixed results. The bulk of the evidence on gender quotas imposed on national parliaments shows that the introduction of quota policies is associated with increased legislative attention to women’s priorities such as public health (Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Clayton 2021; Franceschet 2012; Hughes et al. 2017; Paxton et al. 2020; Wängnerud 2009). One of the ways quotas can influence policy is by changing aggregate legislator preferences and increasing women’s ability to influence legislative decisions (Clayton and Zetterberg 2018). As discussed in Chapter 1, across a wide range of contexts, female politicians tend to advocate for different preferences and priorities than male politicians (e.g., Clayton et al. 2019). However, in some cases, the efforts of female politicians to push their own priorities have been blocked by male politicians (Devlin and Elgie 2008; Yoon 2011; Shalaby 2016; Htun and Weldon 2012).

In the context of village-level governance, existing research from India has shown that women’s leadership on village councils increases investment in public goods prioritized by women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004) and the responsiveness of council leaders to women constituents (Parthasarathy et al. 2019). However, more recent research on

gender reservations in Indian villages shows that women elected through gender quotas are less influential in village council decision-making after their election (Brulé et al. 2021). Research in Kenya shows how gender quotas can be implemented unevenly at the sub-national level, especially in areas with more conservative gender norms (Hassan and O’Mealia 2020). Even if gender quotas are properly implemented, increasing the number of women in government may be insufficient to shift policy priorities, particularly in contexts prone to elite capture (see Chapter 3). If men are still able to dominate deliberations, they may continue to drown out women’s preferences even if more women are participation in decision-making meetings or votes (Karpowitz et al. 2012; Parthasarathy et al. 2019; Buntaine et al. 2018; Gottlieb 2016).

To explore this issue in the context of Indonesia, I examine whether villages with more women on budget drafting teams are more likely to allocate more funds towards women’s priorities. In Indonesian villages, teams are formed by the village head to draft village budgets. Unlike higher levels of government where elected parliaments draft budgets in consultation with the executive, in Indonesian villages, the drafting team organized by the village head—not the village council—draft the budget. According to national regulations, the drafting team must be composed of between seven and 11 members. The village secretary chairs the drafting team and the village head serves as its facilitator. The chair of the village community empowerment institution (LPMD) and hamlet heads (*kepala dusun*) are also members of the drafting team. Most villages have 2-5 hamlets. The village head chooses the remaining members who can come from the village apparatus, LPMD, and the broader community. The drafting team must have at least one woman. From the sample studied here (described below), an average of 32 percent of drafting team members are women. There is considerable variation across villages in terms of the percentage of women on the drafting team with a standard deviation of 12 percent. As will be discussed in the following chapter, village heads, the overwhelming majority of whom are men, tend to wield disproportionate influence over village policymaking, including the budgeting process.

The sample for this analysis is composed of 147 villages from two districts in East Java

and one district in Central Java. This is a convenience sample of villages with village heads who were willing to complete a phone survey and located in districts that were willing to share detailed village budgeting data. The initial sample for these districts included 609 villages. Of these 609 villages, 250 village heads completed the survey. However, 103 village heads answered the question about the number of men and women on the village budget drafting team with the number of men and women who attended the village budget planning meeting. Therefore, this analysis restricts the sample to respondents who identified the total number of participants as between 7 and 11, which would be consistent with the size of the village budget drafting team. However, the results are robust to inclusion of the full 250-village sample. The villages included in this analysis are fairly typical in relation to other villages in Java. For example, according to the Village Development Index from the Indonesian Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, the average village development score for this study's sample is 0.709 and the average for all of Java is 0.698.

In Chapter 1, we showed that in the sample of Indonesian villages included in this study, women prefer significantly more spending on health and education than men. Therefore, this analysis will use spending on health and education as a proxy for women's preferences. The model is an OLS regression with district fixed effects.

The results in Table 2.4 Models 1 and 2 show that there is no significant association between the percentage of women on the village budget drafting team and the percentage of the 2020 village budget allocated towards health and education expenditures.²⁰ This model assumes a linear relationship between the percentage of women on the drafting team and the share of spending on health and education. It may be the case that having a minimum threshold of women on the drafting team is needed to affect budget priorities. Therefore, Models 3 and 4 evaluates the association between having at least one-third of drafting team members be women and percent spending on health and education. From this regression, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect. The results presented in this section are not causally identified so we cannot be certain that increasing the

²⁰Models 1 and 3 use district (*kabupaten*) fixed effects and Models 2 and 4 use sub-district (*kecamatan*) fixed effects.

percentage of women on budget drafting teams would not lead to an increase in funding for women’s priorities. However, these null findings are consistent with findings in other contexts that show how men can continue to dominate deliberations and push their own priorities even when more women participate in the decision-making process.

Table 2.4: Women on Drafting Team and Spending on Health & Education

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Percent Health & Education Spending			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Percent Women on Drafting Team	0.015 (0.076) p = 0.841	0.092 (0.090) p = 0.309		
At Least 1/3 Women			-0.004 (0.018) p = 0.848	0.009 (0.021) p = 0.661
District Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Sub-District Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	147	147	147	147
R ²	0.129	0.541	0.129	0.536
Adjusted R ²	0.111	0.263	0.111	0.256

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed that women and men tend to participate in different types of community institutions and that men are more likely to be involved in discussing and submitting proposals for the village budget. Section 2.3 showed that holding separate consultations for women and other marginalized groups may be insufficient to increase participation by community members, especially if village officials maintain discretion over who to invite to these forums. Finally, Section 2.4 showed that villages with more women involved in budgetary decision-making are not more likely to prioritize budget categories preferred by women.

The survey data presented in this chapter show that the vast majority of women

would attend village budget consultations if invited. However, the women who are invited tend to be an unrepresentative group of community leaders who are particularly active in village institutions and/or connected to village officials. As seen in Chapter 1, these women leaders have different policy preferences than women community members. This suggests a need to invite a broader set of women community members to participate or for women community leaders to collect ideas from women community members in advance of village budgeting deliberations. The high levels of participation among women in village community institutions discussed in this chapter suggest that a broader range of women could be consulted through existing groups, such as PKK, *posyandu*, and *arisan*. In addition, neighborhood association chairs, who already often collect complaints and proposals from male constituents and are invited to hamlet and village deliberations, could gather and submit ideas from female residents as well. A new field experiment I am conducting seeks to spur this type of reform (see Chapter 5).

The finding in Section 2.4, suggests that increasing women's involvement in decision-making is insufficient to increase the prioritization of women's preferences. The next chapter will explore how village elites, particularly the village head, can subvert participatory processes to undermine the preferences of constituents. Chapter 4 further investigate the link between descriptive and substantive representative by evaluating the effects of separate village consultations for women on the representation of women's preferences in village development plans and budgets. Collectively, as will be discussed further in the following chapters, the evidence of this dissertation suggests that in addition to increasing avenues for women's participation and descriptive representation, more must be done to incentivize village leaders, including male village heads, to enact women's proposals.

Chapter 3

Elite Capture in Indonesian Villages

Unresponsive governance is a fundamental challenge of politics. Politicians often misunderstand the preferences of their constituents (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Liaqat 2020; Pereira 2021). And even when politicians accurately understand constituent preferences, they may choose to ignore them (Parthasarathy et al. 2019). Challenges with democratic accountability often persist at local levels of government following national democratic and decentralization reforms (Behrend and Whitehead 2016; Casey 2018; Giraudy 2015; Mansuri and Rao 2012). Lack of governmental responsiveness is particularly common when a small number of elites dominate the decision-making process in local development contexts (Abraham and Platteau 2004). This can be especially problematic for marginalized groups like women, people with disabilities, or ethnic minorities who are often left out of the policy-making process (Clayton et al. 2019).

Elite capture can take many forms. Perhaps the most pernicious entails efforts by elites to capture governmental benefits or resources for their own personal benefit or the benefit of friends, family, or co-partisans. I will refer to this type of elite capture as capturing distribution. High profile cases of public corruption are common.¹ However, existing research finds that, overall, the elite capture of public resources is limited in Indonesia (Alatas et al. 2019). I also find a lack of evidence of capture in the context of

¹For example, in December 2020, the Indonesian Minister of Social Affairs was arrested for taking US\$1 million in bribes from contractors supplying food aid parcels to citizens affected by the pandemic

unconditional cash transfers from village funds distributed during the pandemic (BLT-DD).

Another type of elite capture is when a small number of powerful local elites dominate local decision-making and subvert participatory processes to enact policies that are inconsistent with the preferences of non-elites (Beath et al. 2017; Fritzen 2007; Labonne and Chase 2009; Olken 2010; Platteau and Gaspart 2003). I will refer to this type of elite capture as capturing decision-making. Community-driven development and participatory budgeting initiatives are designed to make decision-making more participatory and democratic and deter elite capture. However, existing research shows that such initiatives are not immune to elite capture (Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Fritzen 2007; Platteau 2004; Platteau and Gaspart 2003). For example, Labonne and Chase (2009) find that in more unequal villages in the Philippines, the elected village leader is more likely to override community preferences in the selection of community-driven development (CDD) proposals.

This chapter examines three factors that may affect the degree to which village elites capture participatory local development processes. First, it considers whether providing village heads with information about women's preferences makes them more willing to accommodate women's budgetary priorities. Experimental evidence from Pakistan and Switzerland shows that providing local politicians with information about constituent preferences makes them shift their policy preferences closer to what citizens prefer (Liaquat 2020; Pereira 2021). However, these results may depend on the context of institutional accountability. In municipalities in Pakistan and Switzerland, the council chairperson needs the support of councilors who are also directly elected to make decisions about local services. In contrast, council members in Indonesian villages are not directly elected and play a mostly symbolic role in the approval of village budgets. This institutional arrangement may make it easier for the village head to ignore constituent preferences and avoid accountability.

Second, this chapter considers whether the *musyawarah inklusif* reform described in Chapter 1, which requires separate forums for women, can make village heads more

responsive to women's preferences. *Musyawarah inklusif* may create more pressure for village heads to address constituent preferences in village development plans and budgets. In particular, the requirement to attach a list of proposals from *musyawarah inklusif* to the village development plan and village budget can also make it easier for village residents, civil society organizations, and government officials to evaluate whether women's preferences are represented in the village budget. This may increase social and political pressure to accommodate women's preferences. The collective nature of the consultation, where community leaders and villagers usually gather to discuss and convey ideas to the village government, creates a common understanding of the priorities of the participants. This can make it easier for residents to organize collective action to hold village officials accountable. In Indonesia, female voter participation is slightly higher than male voter participation². Therefore, accommodating more proposals from women may also be politically beneficial for village heads who are directly elected by the community.

Third, this chapter considers whether the level of electoral competition faced by incumbent village heads is associated with village heads' willingness to accommodate women's budgetary preferences. Established theories of electoral accountability hold that higher electoral competition leads to better public goods provision because voters can punish poor-performing incumbents (Besley 2006; Fearon 1999). Under this model, villages with higher levels of competition may feature more representative outcomes if electoral competition increases the accountability of the village head. Alternatively, village heads who win election by a wide margin may be popular because they effectively represent the needs and preferences of ordinary constituents. Recent research suggests that in developing democracies, electoral competition can actually lead to worse public goods provision because it can reduce the efficiency of legislative bargaining or incentivize the provision of short-term private goods for particular voters (Gottlieb and Kosec 2019; Sanford 2021). In Indonesian villages, it could also be the case that the level of electoral competition does not significantly alter incentives for a village head to represent women's

²For example, in the 2019 general election, female participation was 83% while male participation was 80%; KPU, <https://opendata.kpu.go.id/>

interests if representing women’s interests is unlikely to become a salient campaign issue.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I evaluate the presence of two types of elite capture in Indonesian village governance: capturing distribution and capturing decision-making. I find evidence of the latter but not the former. Second, this chapter considers what factors may affect the responsiveness of village heads to women’s preferences. In particular, I evaluate the effects of 1) information about women’s preferences, 2) inclusive consultations, and 3) electoral competition. The results show that none of these factors induce village heads to change their priorities. Finally, this chapter discusses the implications of this research for future policy reforms that might seek to increase the representation of women’s preferences in village policy-making.

This chapter reports results from five surveys. The first is an in-person survey with 30 village heads from two districts in East Java, hereafter “small sample survey.” The second is a phone survey with 469 respondents from three districts in East Java, one district in Central Java, and one district in East Nusa Tenggara, hereafter “phone survey”.³ In some cases, I report results from questions that were included in both the small sample survey and the phone survey, hereafter “full sample”.⁴ The third is an in-person survey with 900 randomly selected villagers from the same villages as the small sample survey, hereafter “household survey” (this is the same survey used in the preceding chapters). The fourth is a survey of 30 randomly selected neighborhood association (*Rukun Tetangga*, RT) chairs from the same 30 villages in East Java as the small sample village head survey, hereafter “RT survey.” The fifth is a survey of 180 purposively sampled community leaders from the same 30 villages as the small sample, RT, and household surveys, including the leaders of each of the following types of village community institutions: farming group (*kelompok tani*, village community empowerment institution (LPMD), youth group (*karang taruna*), community health corps (*posyandu*) or women’s farming group (*kelompok wanita tani*), women’s group (PKK), and rotating credit and savings

³For the phone survey experiment, discussed in Section 3.3, only 269 of the 469 phone survey respondents completed the experimental module included in the phone survey.

⁴Some questions were only included in the small sample survey because it was designed to be one hour long while the phone survey was designed to be only 30 minutes (because in-person respondents are usually willing to answer more questions than phone respondents). The longer in-person surveys could not be conducted with more respondents due to limited research funds.

group (*arisan*), hereafter “community figure survey.” In addition to these surveys, this chapter also uses village budget and village election data. Village head election and budget data were collected from 183 villages including the 30 villages from the small sample survey and the villages from Ponorogo, Trenggalek, and Wonosobo districts in the phone survey.⁵

3.1 Capturing the Distribution of COVID Cash Transfers?

Is elite capture of distribution prevalent in Indonesian villages? This section studies this question in the context of the distribution of unconditional cash transfers from village funds during the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia issued a series of national regulations to allow village governments to re-appropriate up to approximately 50% of funds from the current year’s village budget to unconditional cash transfers (Bantuan Langsung Tunai-Dana Desa; BLT-DD) to households affected by the pandemic. Prior to the enactment of these regulations, village governments were prohibited from allocating village funds for individually-targeted assistance. Welfare programs were managed by national, provincial, and district governments only and village governments were meant to focus only on the provision of public goods. Part of the rationale for the prohibition on using village funds for individually-targeted assistance was concern that village officials would target the funds in a corrupt or clientelistic manner (Antlöv et al. 2016). Nevertheless, when the pandemic began, the national government realized that many families whose economic or health situation suddenly worsened due to the pandemic could slip through the cracks of the existing national welfare system.⁶ Therefore, the national government required village governments to distribute BLT to households with individuals that are not already receiving assistance from national welfare programs but lost jobs due to the pandemic,

⁵Village budget and election data are not publicly available. They must be requested in person from village or district government offices and only some offices are willing to share these data.

⁶Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, “BLT Desa Tak Boleh Tumpang Tindih,” <https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/publikasi/berita/blt-desa-tak-boleh-tumpang-tindih/>.

suffer from chronic illness, contracted COVID, or have female heads of household.

Around 250 families per village can receive about \$40 per month from these re-appropriated village funds (villages have an average of around 850 families). National regulations specify a procedure through which village governments are supposed to identify and approve eligible recipients. Neighborhood association chairs are supposed to identify families in need of assistance in their neighborhood. Village government officials then cross-check the proposed families with databases of existing welfare recipients to ensure the COVID cash transfers are targeted at households that are not already receiving assistance from other government programs. Finally, villages must hold special *musyawarah* with members of the village apparatus and community leaders to approve the final list of recipients. However, village governments maintain broad discretion over the implementation of this new policy. For example, most of the neighborhood association chairs I interviewed were never consulted by the village government to help identify qualifying families. This COVID cash transfer policy presents a new opportunity to evaluate whether village officials capture the distribution of resources or target distribution in a clientelistic manner. In particular, I evaluate whether village officials favor community leaders, relatives, friends, and/or supporters of the village head in the distribution of BLT-DD.

There have been numerous reports of villages that distribute the cash transfers equally to all households.⁷ However, because this practice violates national government regulations, this practice risks prosecution.⁸ Perhaps due to this risk, the vast majority of villages distributed cash transfers to a minority of households. According to the full sample survey, only 9% distributed cash transfers to more than 50% of households. Nevertheless, village governments enjoy broad discretion in how they identify recipients. Because the assistance is intended to go towards families who are not already

⁷For example, Idham Khalid, June 19, 2020, “BLT Rp 600.000 Hanya Dibagikan Rp 150.000, Warga Laporkan Kepala Desa ke Kejaksaan” [\$40 Cash Assistance Only \$10 Distributed, Residents Report the Village Head to the Prosecutor’s Office], Kompas.

⁸For example, Luqman Nurhadi Arunanta, July 27, 2020, “Bareskrim Temukan 102 Kasus Dugaan Penyelewengan Dana Bansos COVID-19” [The Criminal Investigation Agency of the Indonesian National Police Finds 102 Cases of Alleged Misappropriation of COVID-19 Social Assistance Funds], Detik News, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5109929/bareskrim-temukan-102-kasus-dugaan-penyelewengan-dana-bansos-covid-19>.

receiving assistance through national welfare schemes, neighborhood association chairs and other members of the village apparatus can exercise their own judgment in assessing a household's economic condition during the pandemic. Consequently, clientelistic distribution is difficult to detect.

I assess whether there is elite capture of the BLT distribution process by testing whether the following types of individuals are more likely to receive cash transfers from the village government: 1) community figures, 2) individuals related to members of the village apparatus, 3) individuals in the same WhatsApp group as members of the village apparatus, and 4) individuals who voted for the incumbent village head. Community figures include the leaders of each of the following types of village community institutions: farming group (*kelompok tani*), village community empowerment institution (LPMD), youth group (*karang taruna*), community health corps (*posyandu*) or women's farming group (*kelompok wanita tani*), women's group (PKK), and rotating credit and savings group (*arisan*). Members of the village apparatus include the village head, hamlet head, neighborhood association chairs, village council members, and members of the village plan and budget drafting teams. Overall, 56 percent of respondents are related to members of the village apparatus (part of the same immediate or extended family),⁹ 25 percent are members of WhatsApp groups with village apparatus members, and 75 percent voted for their incumbent village head.

Table 3.1 presents the results of logistic regressions of receiving BLT-DD (dummy variable where 1 = receiving BLT) on the type of individual. The type of individual is coded dichotomously as 1 for community figures (Model 1), individuals related to members of the village apparatus (Model 2), individuals in the same WhatsApp group as members of the village apparatus (Model 3), or individuals who voted for the incumbent village head (Model 4). All models include village fixed effects. The data for Model 1 come from the household survey and the community figure survey and the data for Models 2-4 come from just the household survey.

⁹Sixty-one percent of respondents who are related to at least one member of the village apparatus are related to a neighborhood association chair (*ketua RT*) and 30 percent are related to a hamlet head. Respondents likely interpreted this question to include distant relatives.

Table 3.1: Predicting BLT Recipients

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Received Village Cash Transfer (BLT)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elite	-0.277 (0.220)			
Related		0.153 (0.180)		
WhatsApp			0.030 (0.199)	
Voted for Incumbent				-0.037 (0.200)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,079	899	899	886
Log Likelihood	-515.526	-439.276	-439.626	-435.310
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,093.052	940.551	941.252	932.620

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

From the results in Table 3.1, we can see that 1) elite status, 2) familial relationship to members of the village apparatus, 3) membership in common messaging groups, and 4) and voting for the incumbent village head are not significantly associated with receiving cash transfers from the village government.¹⁰ This suggests that village officials are not targeting assistance to community leaders, relatives, friends, or political supporters. This finding is consistent with previous research in Indonesia which found no systematic evidence of elite capture in the distribution of Indonesia’s largest targeted assistance programs managed by the national government. Specifically, [Alatas et al. \(2019\)](#) find that village elites and their relatives are no more likely to receive aid programs than non-elites in the context of four national welfare programs: a conditional cash transfer program (*Program Keluarga Harapan*), a subsidized rice program (*Raskin*), a subsidized health insurance program (*Jamkesmas*), and an unconditional cash transfer program (*Bantuan Langsung Tunai*). Now that we have established that this capturing distribution type of elite capture does not appear to be widespread in Indonesian villages, we will consider whether village elites are nevertheless capturing other types of policymaking by examining the village budgeting process.

3.2 Capturing Decision-Making in Village Budgeting


Since Indonesia transitioned from the authoritarian New Order regime to democracy in 1999, Indonesian villages have undergone a series of reforms intended to grant them greater autonomy and also encourage greater democratic accountability. Existing research shows that following such reforms, quasi-hereditary village heads have been replaced by village heads with more modest backgrounds and different styles of leadership in at least some parts of Indonesia ([Berenschot et al. 2021](#)).¹¹ However, the emergence of more non-elite and accountable village heads remains uneven across the country. My small sample from East Java shows that village heads are still much more highly educated than the

¹⁰All of these estimates remain statistically insignificant without village fixed effects.

¹¹[Berenschot et al. \(2021\)](#) only studied villages in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, which may be a particularly unrepresentative province because it is a sultanate with a hereditary sultan serving as provincial governor and because it has been a hub of innovation for village governance encouraged by several prominent NGOs, activists, and academics who are based there.

villagers they represent (see Figure 3.1 below).

Figure 3.1: Highest Level of Education for Village Heads and Villagers




Village heads are also often related to other members of the village apparatus. In my sample, 63 percent of village heads are related to at least one member of the village apparatus. Specifically, 40 percent of village head respondents are related to at least one neighborhood association chair (*ketua RT/RW*), 30 percent are related to a hamlet head (*kepala dusun*), and 20 percent are related to at least one member of the village council (*Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD*) in their village. Familial relations among government officials may contribute to the village head's ability to concentrate power and influence over decision-making.

In addition, village heads hold different policy preferences than their constituents and undermine community decision-making powers from the *musyawarah* process. Figure 3.2 presents the average budgetary preferences of village heads from the small sample survey, non-elite villagers from the household survey, and neighborhood association chairs from the RT survey. It also shows the average spending on the same budget categories from the same set of villages from 2017-2019. We can see that village heads prefer significantly more spending on roads than non-elite villagers. Village heads also prefer less spending

on empowerment and education than non-elite villagers. In Figure 3.2, we can also observe that village heads also have different preferences from other male leaders in the village, such as neighborhood association chairs. For example, village heads allocate an average of 28 percentage points more towards roads than neighborhood association chairs (*ketua RT*). Village heads also allocate an average of 3 percentage points less towards education and 4 percentage points less towards empowerment than *ketua RT*. The preferences of neighborhood association chairs are much closer to the preferences of randomly sampled villagers than to the preferences of village heads. Perhaps most importantly, the preferences of the village head are generally closest to the actual budgetary allocations, particularly when it comes to road spending which is the largest budget category other than government administration.

Figure 3.2: Budget Allocation Preferences



The main outlet for community members and community leaders to contribute to village policy-making is through *musyawarah*. As described in Chapter 1, *musyawarah* are community forums in which village officials, community leaders, and community members gather to discuss local issues. *Musyawarah* can be arranged for various purposes but all villages are required to, at a minimum, hold annual *musyawarah* to allow community

leaders and community members to submit and discuss proposals for the village budget. While *musyawarah* are not completely open public forums, village officials are supposed to invite a broad range of community leaders and villagers to participate. Officially, the village council is responsible for deciding who to invite¹². However, in practice, according to my interviews with village officials and community leaders, the village head often decides who to invite. As discussed in Chapter 2, village heads invite significantly more men than women. They also tend to privilege the role of other male leaders in the community. From the small sample survey, village heads believe that the community figures who are most influential in the village are male religious leaders (73 percent). The remainder reported that the most important community figure was a male community leader (*tokoh masyarakat*) or a male youth leader (13 percent each). No village heads reported a female community leader as the most influential person in the village.

There is considerable variation in how *musyawarah* are run in terms of the role of the village head and community members and whether input from the community is considered binding or merely advisory. From the full sample survey, in 20 percent of villages, villagers provide the list of priority proposals to the village government at the *musyawarah* and the prioritization decided at the *musyawarah* is not changed by the village government afterwards. This reflects a more bottom-up approach to decision-making, in which input from the community directly determines village development priorities. In contrast, in 26 percent of villages, the village government presents its own proposals to villagers for feedback. This is a more top-down approach in which community input is less consequential. In 53 percent of villages, villagers provide a list of priority proposals to the village government at the *musyawarah* but the prioritization can be changed by the village government afterwards. This intermediate approach falls somewhere in between the previously discussed bottom-up and top-down arrangements by allowing villagers to shape a menu of options for the government to consider but maintaining the government's discretion over project prioritization.

¹²Ministerial Regulation Number 16 about Musyawarah Desa, 2019, Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration, <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Download/142966/Permendesa%20Nomor%2016%20Tahun%202019.pdf>

There is also significant variation in terms of whether *musyawarah* participants can A) debate and express their views regarding proposals or B) all proposals submitted at *musyawarah* are accepted and submitted to the village government for consideration. The former approach allows for more active community deliberation. In contrast, the latter generates more passive input from the community, often in the form of pre-prepared proposal lists being submitted by community leaders. From the small sample survey, 63 percent of villages have *musyawarah* with debate (A) and 37 percent of villages allow all proposals from *musyawarah* to be submitted without debate (B).

In villages with more top-down and less deliberative procedures, it is especially easy for the village head to play an outsized role in determining village policy. However, even in villages that follow the intermediate (between top-down and bottom-up) process described above, the village budget drafting team can choose how to prioritize among proposals submitted by *musyawarah* participants. The drafting team is composed of the village head, village secretary, village community empowerment institution (LPMD) chair, hamlet heads, and community leaders chosen by the village head¹³. In practice, according to my interviews with village officials from multiple villages located in 3 different districts, the overarching priorities for village development are often decided by village heads when they establish their official vision and mission for their term after the village head election but before *musyawarah* is held. For example, one village official said, “The first priority [for the village development plan] is indeed more towards the physical infrastructure development in accordance with the village head’s village.”¹⁴ Therefore, even in villages with moderately participatory *musyawarah* processes, proposals from villagers that are inconsistent with the village head’s priorities can easily be deprioritized. Moreover, when proposals are deprioritized, they may never get funded and implemented because village funds are limited.

Most Indonesian villagers do not regularly communicate problems they are facing to local officials. Within one year prior to being surveyed, less than eight percent of

¹³Ministerial Regulation Number 114 about Village Development Guidelines, 2014, Ministry of Home Affairs, <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Download/102691/Permen-No.114-TH-2014.pdf>

¹⁴“Prioritas pertama memang lebih ke arah pembangunan fisik sesuai visi Kades.” Personal interview on March 11, 2020.


respondents in the household survey communicated problems to local officials. Of those, 56 percent complained to their neighborhood association chair (*ketua RT*), which is the most local-level leader, and 30 percent complained to their village head. Of those who did complain to their village head, the plurality (43%) complained that they were not satisfied with decisions made by the village government regarding who should receive government assistance. Twenty-four percent complained about village government service for processing official documents, and 14 percent made complaints related to irrigation.

From the small sample survey, 93 percent of village heads report having received complaints from constituents. However, the complaints they remember hearing are not entirely consistent with those described in the household survey. Consistent with the household survey, most village heads do recall receiving complaints about decisions regarding who should receive government assistance (54%). Fifty percent of village heads also recall complaints regarding irrigation. However, in contrast with the household survey results, no village heads reported receiving complaints about village government official document services, which was the second most common type of complaint from the household survey. The full set of responses to this question are reported in Figure 3.3 below. Fifty-four percent of village head respondents claim to have resolved all of the problems reported to them by the community while 43 percent claim to have resolved most (but not all) reported problems.

The majority of villagers surveyed believe their village head can be relied upon for planning village development. Seventy-one percent of villagers said that their village head is very reliable or reliable with regard to village development planning. Villagers also believe their village head is more reliable in village development planning than other village officials including neighborhood association chair (62% believe hamlet heads are very reliable or reliable), hamlet head (61%), village council (48%), and village community empowerment institution chair (38%). This is consistent with the observation that village heads generally do not face resistance when they play a dominant role in village decision-making. With some notable exceptions, village head incumbents tend to be trusted by other village government officials and the general public. However,

general approval of the village head does not mean villagers are broadly satisfied with village policy-making. The primary village policy-making function is the village budgeting process. From the household survey, only 54 percent of villagers are satisfied with the village budgeting process. Moreover, most villagers do not feel included in the process. From the household survey, only 49 percent agree with the statement, “My voice is heard and considered in village development planning and budgeting.”

Figure 3.3: Types of Complaints Reported to Village Heads



3.3 Can Village Head Priorities be Changed?

3.3.1 Vignette Experiment

The following section presents the results of a survey experiment with 268 village heads in Central Java, East Java, and East Nusa Tenggara provinces to assess whether 1) information about gendered preferences and 2) *musyawarah inklusif* requirements significantly affect budget priorities. None of the villages included in this survey experiment currently have *musyawarah inklusif* requirements. This survey experiment was conducted in East Java (Ponorogo, Madiun, Tuban districts), Central Java

(Wonosobo district), and East Nusa Tenggara (Timur Tengah Utara district) provinces in March 2021. It is a convenience sample of districts for which the author was able to collect village-level data and village head contact information from district government offices. While Indonesia is an extremely diverse country, the districts in Central Java and East Java are fairly typical in terms of demographics, levels of development, and political leanings for Indonesia. The villages from East Nusa Tenggara are relatively poor and are majority Catholic. The initial sample for this survey experiment included 1,066 villages from the aforementioned districts. Of these 1,066 villages, 484 responded to the survey, and 268 completed the experimental module within the survey. This experiment was designed to evaluate whether information about gendered preferences or *musyawarah inklusif* requirements would change village heads' preferences for annual village budgets (rather than six-year development plans).

The experiment first asks village head respondents how they would allocate funds before they are presented with any vignette in order to establish their baseline preferences and avoid social desirability bias in response to the treatment vignettes. The Placebo vignette tells respondents that half of attendees (Group 1) prefer funding one set of budget categories while the other half (Group 2) prefers funding another set of budget categories. No information about the characteristics of each group is provided. Therefore, we do not expect the Placebo vignette to change respondents' priorities compared to their baseline answers. Respondents assigned to the first treatment group (T1) are asked which budget categories they would prioritize after being told that women prefer spending on sanitation, education, and empowerment while men prefer spending on roads, bridges, and agriculture. Respondents assigned to the second treatment group (T2) are asked which budget categories they would prioritize after being told the same information about gendered budgetary preferences and also being told that they are required to hold separate consultations for women and attach proposals from the women's (and regular) consultation to the budget they submit to the district government. Table 3.2 presents an English translation of the experimental vignettes. Equation 2 estimates the effects of these treatment conditions.

Randomization was blocked by district and village head gender. Half of the respondents were randomly assigned to the placebo condition, one-quarter were randomly assigned to the T1, and one-quarter were randomly assigned to T2. Based on statistical power calculations, this design has the following minimum detectable effects (MDE) in terms of fraction of a standard deviation for a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ and a power level of 0.8: T1 and T2 vs. Placebo: 0.34; T2 vs. T1: 0.49. Based on the baseline data, 0.34 standard deviations would be equivalent to a 9.7% change in allocation towards women’s priorities and 0.49 standard deviations would be equivalent to a 13.9% change.

Table 3.2: Government Responsiveness Vignettes

Baseline	Imagine you have 100 million rupiah (~\$7,000) left over in the village fund to choose how to spend.
Placebo	Apart from the pandemic situation, suppose in the village budget consultation, half of the attendees (group 1) recommend that more funds be used for building roads, bridges and agriculture. The other half of attendees (group 2) recommend that more funds be used for sanitation, education and empowerment.
T1: Gendered Preference Info	Apart from the pandemic situation, suppose in village budget consultation, men recommend that more budget be used for building roads, bridges and agriculture while women recommend that more budgets be used for sanitation, education and empowerment.
T2: Gendered Preference + <i>Musyawarah</i> textitInklusif Info	Apart from the pandemic situation, suppose that in addition to the usual village budget consultations, the district government requires you to hold a women’s consultation. This consultation should produce a list of proposals for the village budget. At the filing of the village budget, the list of ideas from the special women’s consultation and the normal consultation must be included as evidence of the consultation. Men recommend that more budget be used for building roads, bridges and agriculture while women recommend that more budgets be used for sanitation, education and empowerment.

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{GenderedPreferenceInfo}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{musyawarah inklusifInfo}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{Baseline}_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{WomanVillageHead}_{ij} + \alpha \text{District}_j + \epsilon_i, \quad (3.1)$$

In Model 2 above, i indexes the individual village head respondent, j indexes the district cluster, Y is the village head’s proposed allocation percentage towards categories revealed to have been preferred by women, *Gendered Preference Info* is a dummy = 1 for all respondents who received information about which budget categories are preferred

by women, *musyawarah inklusif Info* is a dummy = 1 for all respondents who received information about *musyawarah inklusif* requirements, *Baseline* controls for respondents' baseline budget preferences revealed before hearing the treatment vignette, *Woman Village Head* is a dummy = 1 for woman village head respondents, and *District* is a district fixed effect. With this model, estimates the effect of receiving information about women's preferences on village heads' prioritization of funding budget categories preferred by women after controlling for village heads' baseline spending priorities. β_2 estimates the additional effect of receiving information about *musyawarah inklusif* requirements above and beyond the effect of receiving information about women's preferences (also after controlling for village heads' baseline spending priorities). This study's pre-registered hypotheses expected that 1) information about women's preferences would lead village heads to allocate more funds towards categories preferred by women, and 2) information about *musyawarah inklusif* requirements would further increase village heads' allocation towards budget categories preferred by women.

3.3.2 Results

In contrast to these hypotheses, the results reported in Table 3.3 show that neither information about gendered preferences nor *musyawarah inklusif* requirements affect village heads' budget priorities. Village heads are reluctant to update their preferences when primed with information about the preferences of women in their community. Information about requirements to hold a separate consultation for women and include proposals from this consultation in reports to the district government are also insufficient to change village heads' budget priorities.

3.3.3 Updating Priors

There are several reasons why politicians may be unswayed by information about gendered preferences. Politicians may already have a clear indication of women's preferences and, therefore, be unmoved when primed with familiar information. However, only 27 percent of respondents identified any of the three woman-preferred categories from the vignette

Table 3.3: Village Head Survey Experiment Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Funding for Women's Priorities
Gendered Preference Information	0.006 p = 0.870
<i>Musyawah</i> Inklusif Information	0.030 p = 0.467
Woman Village Head	0.062 p = 0.298
Baseline	0.373 p < 0.001
District Fixed effects	Yes
Observations	268
R ²	0.239
Adjusted R ²	0.212
Residual Std. Error	0.231 (df = 258)
F Statistic	8.995 (df = 9; 258)

as being generally preferred by women in their village. To test this further, we test the significance of the interaction term between treatment and village heads who did not have priors about gendered budgetary preferences that were consistent with the preferences revealed in the vignette experiment. This interaction term is positive and marginally significant (see Table 3.4, Column 2), indicating that village heads for whom the gendered preference information was new were slightly more willing to accommodate women's preferences.

3.3.4 Electoral Competition and Responsiveness to Women's Preferences

There is significant variation in the level of electoral competition for the village head position. The average village head margin of victory from the full sample is 33.8 percentage points with a standard deviation of 28.4 percentage points. Unlike hamlet head and neighborhood association chair elections, village head elections are always held with a secret ballot and universal adult suffrage. Villages with higher levels of competition may feature more representative outcomes if electoral competition increases

Table 3.4: Village Head Experiment Mechanisms

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Funding for Women's Priorities	
	(1)	(2)
Gendered Preference Info	0.052 p = 0.540	-0.115 p = 0.067
<i>Musyawah Inklusif</i> Info	-0.017 p = 0.870	0.047 p = 0.514
Woman Village Head	0.084 p = 0.375	0.053 p = 0.384
Margin of Victory	-0.127 p = 0.213	
New Info		-0.134 p = 0.007
Baseline	0.290 (0.148, 0.432) p < 0.001	0.370 (0.269, 0.471) p < 0.001
Gendered Preference Info × Margin of Victory	0.132 p = 0.503	
<i>Musyawah Inklusif</i> Info × Margin of Victory	-0.043 p = 0.851	
Gendered Preference Info × New Info		0.149* p = 0.053
<i>Musyawah Inklusif</i> × New Info		-0.023 p = 0.801
District Fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	148	263
R ²	0.236	0.262
Adjusted R ²	0.168	0.227
Residual Std. Error	0.248 (df = 135)	0.227 (df = 250)
F Statistic	3.482 (df = 12; 135)	7.414 (df = 12; 250)

the accountability of the village head. Some studies suggest greater electoral competition leads to higher levels of government responsiveness (André et al. 2015; Arvate 2013; Griffin 2006; Powell 2000). Because women’s preferences are generally underrepresented, higher levels of government responsiveness may result in more spending on budget categories preferred by women.

If village heads facing greater electoral competition are motivated to be more accountable to constituents, they may also be more likely to respond to new information about constituent preferences. Existing research shows that politicians facing electoral competition can be more responsive to social accountability initiatives (Grossman and Michelitch 2018). *Musyawarah inklusif* could increase opportunities for social accountability by creating a shared understanding of citizens’ priorities and by gathering constituents together who could organize collective action to hold government officials accountable. Therefore, village heads motivated by electoral and social accountability mechanisms may also be more responsive to constituent preferences when faced with *musyawarah inklusif* requirements.

Other studies find that the level of electoral competition has no effect on government performance (Cleary 2007; Boulding and Brown 2014; Gottlieb and Kosec 2019). Village heads who win election by a wide margin may be popular because they are interested and able to represent the needs and preferences of ordinary constituents. They may be more confident in their current assessments of priorities and therefore less responsive to new information. Given these competing theoretical predictions, I pre-registered both primary (positive) and alternative (negative) hypotheses for the association between electoral competition and the representation of women’s preferences.

I test the effect of electoral competition on village head responsiveness to women’s preferences in two ways. First, we can test the significance of the interaction between the vignette treatment and margin of victory.¹⁵ Village head electoral competition is measured as incumbent margin of victory in the most recent village head elections. The p-value for this estimate is insignificant (see Table 3.4, Column 1), which suggests that

¹⁵There are fewer observations for the electoral competition model (1) because village election results data are not available for all villages.

electoral competition does not affect politicians' responsiveness to information about women's preferences or about *musyawarah inklusif* requirements.

Second, we can test the association between village electoral competition and actual budgetary spending on categories preferred by women. From the survey results presented in Chapter 1, we know that women tend to prefer spending on health and education compared to men. Accordingly, this analysis uses health and education spending as a proxy for the representation of women's interests. The results in Table 3.5 below show that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no association between village head margin of victory and spending on health and education.

Table 3.5: Electoral Competition and Spending on Women's Priorities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Health & Education Spending
Margin of victory	-0.041 (0.028)
Recent election	0.024 (0.025)
Ponorogo district	-0.018 (0.106)
Trenggalek district	-0.065*** (0.021)
Wonosobo district	0.049** (0.020)
Constant	0.214*** (0.018)
Observations	183
R ²	0.153
Adjusted R ²	0.129
Residual Std. Error	0.105 (df = 177)
F Statistic	6.378*** (df = 5; 177)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

These results are consistent with the theory that electoral competition does not

motivate politicians to be more responsive to constituent preferences, at least in the context of prioritizing women's preferences in village budgets in Indonesia. The level of electoral competition village heads face does not affect their likelihood of prioritizing women's preferences in village budgeting when presented with information about women's preferences or information about *musyawarah inklusif* requirements. In addition, there is no significant association between the level of electoral competition and the level of spending on budget categories preferred by women. This could be because electoral competition does not affect the policy priorities of village governments in general. Alternatively, these findings could reflect a lack of salience of women's preferences in particular to the political considerations of village heads. In Chapter 1, we saw that both men and women tend to believe that women should support their husbands' priorities when it comes to village development planning and budgeting. This belief may contribute to village heads' lack of responsiveness to women's budgetary preferences, even in the face of greater electoral competition.

3.3.5 Personal Priorities

Personal interviews with 19 village heads in four districts suggest an alternative explanation may be the strength of village heads' personal budget priorities. Most village heads acknowledge the importance of community consultations in informing them about villagers' preferences. However, they also refer to their own vision and mission for the village, which they adopt at the start of their terms before community consultations are held. Village heads often have specific ideas about the relative importance or urgency of particular projects, such as road repairs, flood control, or education in their village and may be reluctant to shift priorities even if they are presented with new information. For example, in one village, the village head said, "I came up with the idea myself" to prioritize flood control projects over new road construction based on his personal observations of harm caused by flooding. He said that he "gave an understanding to the community, that

they must secure the road first before building the road itself.”¹⁶

As seen in Chapter 1, male leaders’ preferences are closer to the preferences of male community members than female community members. Therefore, women’s preferences will continue to be under-served if village heads are unwilling to change their personal priorities when presented with information about women’s preferences through *musyawarah inklusif* or other means. The degree to which women’s preferences are accommodated in village development plans and budgets in villages with and without *musyawarah inklusif* will be evaluated in the next chapter.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided evidence that the capturing distribution type of elite capture is uncommon in Indonesian villages. However, the capturing decision-making type of elite capture is present. In particular, village heads dominate the decision-making process around village development plans and budgets. Their preferences differ from those of their constituents, especially women. In spite of participatory requirements, village heads often set the agenda before holding community forums, decide who to invite to the forums and who should serve on the budget drafting team, and dominate decision-making during the drafting process.

The results of the village head survey experiment show that after being presented with information about women’s budgetary preferences, village heads do not shift their priorities. In addition, village heads do not shift their priorities in response to information about requirements to hold separate community budgeting forums for women. Finally, this chapter showed that the level of electoral competition a village head faces does not affect the prioritization of women’s budgetary preferences.

These results have implications for understanding what types of reforms are (un)likely to improve the accountability of village governments in general and the substantive representation of women’s interests in particular. In Indonesia, vertical and horizontal

¹⁶“Pemikiran ini dari saya sendiri. [...] Jadi saya berikan pengertian ke masyarakat, bahwa harus mengamankan jalan terlebih dahulu sebelum pembangunan jalan itu sendiri.” Personal interview on May 27, 2021.

accountability mechanisms are weak at the village level. Village heads often do not face significant electoral competition and even villages that do feature closer elections are no more likely to prioritize women's preferences. In addition, village councils, which are not directly elected, are generally weak and inactive, playing a mostly ceremonial role in village decision-making. In this context, village heads are able to subvert participatory requirements to enact their own priorities even when they are inconsistent with the preferences of constituents. As I will show in more detail in the next chapter, another complication is that even when reforms are implemented to ensure greater women's participation, women leaders—who hold different preferences than non-elite women—can also play an outsized role in community forums, further undermining the representation of non-elite women's preferences.

The persistence of elite capture in Indonesian villages suggests that different types of reforms may be more likely to improve accountability and substantive representation. The non-binding nature of participatory budgeting in Indonesia makes it easy for village heads to place their own priorities ahead of those proposed by constituents at *musyawarah*. Therefore, regulations requiring village governments to include at least a certain percentage of proposals from women at *musyawarah* in annual village budgets may force village heads to be more responsive. This and other possible reforms will be discussed in greater detail in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

Chapter 4

Do Separate Forums Improve Women’s Substantive Representation?

4.1 Introduction

Given existing inequalities in access to power described in the previous chapters, the establishment of a dedicated space for women and other marginalized groups may empower a broader set of participants to contribute to decision-making. In mixed gender settings, we know that women’s voices are often marginalized (Grillos 2018; Karpowitz et al. 2012; Parthasarathy et al. 2019). In contrast, women’s self-help groups can help empower women to increase their civic engagement and political participation (Desai and Joshi 2014; Joshi et al. 2019; Prillaman 2021). In Indonesia, where many women already participate in women’s rotating credit associations (*arisan*), separate forums for political participation (*musyawarah inklusif*) may help women exercise their collective efficacy without the presence of traditional village elites. In this context, more women and other marginalized groups may feel more comfortable submitting proposals for community development. However, in Chapter 2, we saw that *musyawarah inklusif* fails to increase participation among women community members who are not already active in village community institutions. Because the preferences of women community *leaders* and women community *members* sometimes differ, as seen in Chapter 1, the participation

of an unrepresentative group of community leaders in *musyawarah inklusif* may limit the degree to which it can generate a broader set of proposals representing the interests of a wider cross-section of the community.

Nevertheless, the structural emphasis placed on proposals submitted by women and other vulnerable groups through the organization of *musyawarah inklusif* meetings may make these proposals stand out more to village officials compared to proposals submitted by women at regular *musyawarah* alongside men. The submission of a broader set of proposals through these special forums should then make it easier and more politically expedient for village officials to include a wider range of activities in village development plans and budgets. However, in Chapter 3, we saw that village heads can capture participatory processes to push their own priorities even when they are presented with information that makes other priorities more salient. In this context, *musyawarah inklusif* may run the risk of relegating women's voices to a secondary space, which male decision-makers could continue to ignore.

This chapter leverages original data from surveys, survey experiments, and village planning documents to evaluate the effects of district-level regulations in Indonesia, which require separate forums, called *musyawarah inklusif*, for women and other marginalized groups to submit proposals for village development plans and budgets. In particular, the analysis evaluates the effects of *musyawarah inklusif* on the level of congruence between actual budget priorities and women's preferences. Overall, the reform succeeds in amplifying the voices of women community leaders but fails to shift actual spending towards women's priorities. More specifically, these reforms significantly increase the representation of the preferences of women community leaders in non-binding village development plans. However, these reforms do not appear to have significant effects on the representation of women's interests in binding annual village budgets.

Regulations requiring *musyawarah inklusif* were introduced in 10 *kabupaten* (districts) across four provinces in Indonesia, the world's third largest democracy, between 2016 and 2019. This chapter focuses on the regulation enacted in Trenggalek, East Java in 2019, which requires village governments to hold separate community consultations for women,

children, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups. All proposals submitted at both the *musyawarah inklusif* and regular consultations (*musyawarah reguler*) are automatically submitted to village development plan and budget drafting teams. While village governments are not required to incorporate all proposals into final village plans and budgets, the new regulations do require that the list of all activities proposed in the *musyawarah inklusif* be attached to village plan and budget documents submitted to the district government for review. This process ensures that the aspirations of women and other marginalized groups are communicated to policymakers and may increase the likelihood that they are addressed. Designers of the *musyawarah inklusif* policy hope it will result in greater participation by women, followed by a shift in village budget priorities, away from focusing primarily on physical infrastructure like roads, towards categories advocated for by women including health and education.¹

The data for this chapter come primarily from three original data sources. The first is a survey of 900 villagers (450 women), 30 village heads, and 270 other community leaders (e.g., village council and neighborhood association chairs and women community leaders) conducted in person with stratified random sampling in 30 villages from two districts in East Java in January 2021. The observational analysis uses propensity score matching to identify a comparable set of 15 treatment villages that were assigned to receive the *musyawarah inklusif* treatment by the district regulation and 15 control villages that met the same selection criteria but were not chosen to receive the *musyawarah inklusif* treatment because they are located in a different district.² Second, this chapter reports data from a phone survey experiment with an additional 268 village heads from villages in East Java, Central Java, and East Nusa Tenggara provinces in March 2021. Third, this chapter utilizes an original dataset of village-level administrative data, including village head election results, village planning documents, budgets, and proposal lists from

¹Personal interview with Novita Hardini Mochamad, chair of the Trenggalek district PKK women’s group and wife of the Trenggalek *bupati* (district governor), Malang, May 30, 2021.

²While these are not randomly assigned treatments, consistent with the matching design, I use “treatment” to refer to the *musyawarah inklusif* regulation and “control” to denote its absence.

village consultations from 2017-2021,³ which were collected by the author in collaboration with district officials. In addition, the quantitative analysis is complemented by insights from 95 interviews conducted by the author with district and village officials, community leaders, and community members in East Java in 2020-2021.

This chapter demonstrates that requiring separate community consultations for women and other marginalized groups succeeds in amplifying the voices of women community leaders but fails to shift actual spending towards women’s priorities. In particular, these reforms significantly increase the representation of the preferences of women community leaders in non-binding village development plans. However, these reforms do not have significant effects on the representation of women’s interests in annual village budgets. Given the failure of gender quotas in mixed gender community forums to change attitudes about women’s role in the community (Van der Windt et al. 2018), the establishment of separate forums for women and other marginalized groups may be a more promising approach. However, in order for such reforms to increase the prioritization of women’s preferences in actual government policies and programs, the constraints discussed previously in this dissertation—unrepresentative women representatives (Chapter 2) and unresponsive decision-makers (Chapter 3) — must be addressed.

4.2 Preference Alignment

4.2.1 Selection and Matching

Data from an original survey of 900 villagers and 300 community leaders in East Java are used to evaluate the effects of *musyawarah inklusif* requirements on the degree to which six-year village development plans and annual village budgets align with the preferences of community leaders and community members. The most similar pair of districts with and without the inclusive regulation were selected for this analysis: Trenggalek (as treatment)

³This includes three years of baseline budget data (2017-2019) before the regulation was implemented in Trenggalek district, which is the focus of this study, and two years of post-treatment endline budget data (2020-2021)

and Ponorogo (as control).⁴ Trenggalek and Ponorogo are neighboring districts with similar levels of development, and the majority of villages in both districts follow the same village election and budget cycle, allowing for more direct comparisons of village development plan and annual budget outcomes (see Table 4.1 for more details). Personal interviews with senior government officials in both Trenggalek and Ponorogo districts help explain why Trenggalek decided to pass a *musyawarah inklusif* regulation and why Ponorogo did not. The Trenggalek *bupati* (district governor) said that the idea for a *musyawarah inklusif* regulation was introduced to him by KOMPAK and that KOMPAK led the process of drafting the regulation, which he later signed.⁵ In Ponorogo, the head of the district planning agency, speaker of the district parliament, and the secretary of the village and community empowerment agency said that the Ponorogo government would have accepted support from KOMPAK and agreed to implement new regulations they requested if KOMPAK selected their district for programming. For example, the head of the district planning agency said, “If there is innovation like [requirements for *musyawarah inklusif*] in Ponorogo district, we are ready. [...] We are ready if there is a district governor regulation like that.”⁶ Ponorogo was never approached by KOMPAK because it is marginally more developed than Trenggalek as can be seen in its slightly lower poverty rate and slightly higher Human Development Index score, for example, in Table 4.1. A village-level matching design accounts for these differences by matching villages in each district to villages with similar levels of economic development in the other. Figure 4.1 shows the location of these districts on the island of Java.

Within each district, propensity score matching is used to identify a comparable set of 15 treatment villages that were assigned to receive the *musyawarah inklusif* treatment by the district regulation and 15 control villages that met the same selection criteria but were not chosen to receive the *musyawarah inklusif* treatment because they are located in a different district using the following procedure. A logistic regression generated propensity

⁴In Trenggalek, the inclusive *musyawarah* is called *musrenakeren*, which is short for *musyawarah perempuan, anak, disabilitas, dan kelompok rentan lainnya* (women, children, disability, and other vulnerable groups’ deliberation).

⁵Mochamad Nur Arifin, Bupati Trenggalek, Personal Interview on January 19, 2021, Trenggalek.

⁶“Kalau ada inovasi seperti itu di Kabupaten Ponorogo, kami siap. [...] Kami siap jika ada perbup seperti itu.” Ir. Sumarno, Kepala Bappeda, Interview on March 9, 2020.

Table 4.1: Trenggalek and Ponorogo District Characteristics

	Trenggalek (treatment)	Ponorogo (control)
Population	696,295	871,370
Government Expenditure per Capita (IDR/USD)	Rp 2,438,402 / \$174	Rp 2,547,567 / \$182
Unemployment rate (%)	4.17	3.87
Poverty (%)	12.02	10.36
Human Development Index	68.71	69.91
Average Years of Schooling	7.59	7.58
2019 Vote Share for President Joko Widodo	77.01	71.68
Village Election and Budget Cycle	2019-2025	2019-2025

Figure 4.1: Ponorogo and Trenggalek Districts Identified on Map of Java



scores for the probability of treatment assignment (where treatment is being located in Trenggalek district) of 247 villages in Trenggalek and Ponorogo districts based on the following covariates: village fund size in 2019, incumbent village head vote share margin, vote share for President Joko Widodo, village head education level, distance to nearest health clinic, distance to nearest high school, recent prevalence of natural disasters, access to credit, and distance to the district capital.⁷ These variables were used as matching covariates because they could affect the budgetary preferences of village governments

⁷Sixty-three villages in which additional KOMPAK and other NGO programs related to village budgeting and community empowerment are conducted were excluded. Villages with additional KOMPAK and other NGO programs were generally selected by KOMPAK/NGOs on the basis of openness to reform. Therefore, villages with complementary programs would likely have a higher level of treatment compliance (i.e., implement *musyawarah inklusif* in a more robust manner) and better alignment between budget priorities and villager preferences, which would produce positive bias if they were included in the sample. In contrast, excluding these villages is a conservative sampling strategy, which may bias against finding a result. An additional 102 villages from both districts were excluded because they have a different village head election cycle. Thirteen additional villages were excluded because they have women village heads, which could be a confounder that would be difficult to match on or control for with a small sample. Finally, one selected village was replaced with the village with the next closest propensity score in the district at the start of survey enumeration because of a high COVID-19 incidence rate.


and villagers, the responsiveness of village governments to constituents, and village governments' implementation of regulations. The 15 villages from each district with propensity scores closest to 0.5 were selected to be included in the survey for this study.⁸ All villages in Trenggalek district complied with the *musyawarah inklusif* treatment by holding the *musyawarah inklusif* as required by the district regulation and none of the villages in Ponorogo district implemented a *musyawarah inklusif*. The propensity scores based on the matching covariates for the villages included and excluded from the sample are shown in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.3 shows covariate balance before and after matching. The dashed lines are at +/- 0.1 from 0. The matching process produced improved balance on virtually all of the key variables.

Given possible concerns about confounders that could be associated with both village governments' willingness to implement *musyawarah inklusif* reforms and potential outcomes related to women's substantive representation, this design prioritizes internal validity by identifying a most similar set of villages in the treatment and control districts. Nevertheless, the selected villages remain broadly representative of rural villages throughout Java, which is home to nearly 150 million people. For example, according to the Village Development Index from the Indonesian Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, the average village development score for this study's sample is 0.720, the average for East Java province is 0.702, the average for all of Java is 0.698.

One might still be concerned that pre-treatment differences in the responsiveness of village governments could be associated with both district government willingness to enact the *musyawarah inklusif* regulation and outcomes of interest such as preference alignment. To evaluate this concern, the survey asks respondents to rate their level of agreement with the statement, "Five years ago, the village government cared about the

⁸This matching procedure allowed for more flexibility in sampling during survey implementation than selecting the most similar pairs of villages in advance (as opposed to selecting the 15 villages from each district with treatment assignment propensity scores closest to 0.5). Because of the possibility that the survey team would not gain access to a particular village (e.g., because of COVID-19 conditions), this approach enabled the survey team to substitute a village immediately prior to enumeration by selecting the village with the next closest propensity score to 0.5 as the replacement. For the analysis, pair matching is then completed by identifying the most similar village pairs based on matching covariates among the final set of villages in which the survey was completed.

Figure 4.2: Matched and Unmatched Propensity Scores



problems of ordinary villagers like me.” While this question is asked post-treatment, it asks respondents to consider the situation five years ago, which is before the *musyawarah inklusif* reform was introduced. Therefore, respondents’ retrospective evaluation of pre-treatment government responsiveness should not be affected by treatment. As seen in Table 4.2, there is no significant difference in treatment versus control respondents’ evaluation of their village government’s pre-treatment level of concern for ordinary villagers. Figure 4.4 shows that the distributions of responses to this question in the Treatment and Control district are also quite similar.

Figure 4.3: Love Plot of Covariate Balance Before and After Matching





Table 4.2: Balance Check for Pre-Treatment Village Government Responsiveness

	<i>Model:</i>	
	Ordinal (1 = Strong Agree, 5 = Strong Disagree)	Dichotomous (1 = Strongly Agree or Agree)
Treated respondents	0.025 (-0.117, 0.166) p = 0.731	0.019 (-0.056, 0.095) p = 0.613
Constant	2.256 (2.155, 2.358) p < 0.001	0.679 (0.635, 0.723) p < 0.001
Observations	874	874
R ²	0.0003	0.0004
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	-0.001
Residual Std. Error (df = 872)	0.768	0.463
F Statistic (df = 1; 872)	0.229	0.384

Figure 4.4: Distribution of Responses to Balance Check Question



4.2.2 Hypotheses and Preference Alignment Model

Drawing on the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter, the following sections test hypotheses related to the effects of the *musyawarah inklusif* reform on several different outcomes. The main outcome of interest is a measure of substantive representation called preference alignment: the degree to which village development plans or budgets align with the preferences of constituents. Preference alignment for six-year village development plans and annual village budgets is measured separately because development plans are non-binding while budgets are binding as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, preference alignment is measured separately for women community members and women community leaders because the preferences of these two groups differ as described in Chapter 1.

- H1a: *Musyawarah inklusif* increases preference alignment for women community members in non-binding development plans.
- H1b: *Musyawarah inklusif* increases preference alignment for women community members in binding annual budgets.
- H2a: *Musyawarah inklusif* increases preference alignment for women community leaders in non-binding development plans.
- H2b: *Musyawarah inklusif* increases preference alignment for women community leaders in binding annual budgets.

This section reports the effects of *musyawarah inklusif* requirements on the degree to which six-year village development plans and annual village budgets align with the preferences of community leaders and community members.⁹ The estimand in this following analysis is the average treatment effect on the 15 matched villages in the sample that received the *musyawarah inklusif* treatment (ATT). The following OLS model estimates the ATT of *musyawarah inklusif* on preference alignment, controlling for

⁹The 2020-2025 village development plans and 2020 budgets were drafted approximately 14 months before the survey (with the allocation game) was conducted. The 2021 budgets were drafted approximately two months before the survey was conducted.

baseline preference alignment, which is calculated as alignment with combined spending from 2017-2019.¹⁰ The model uses cluster-robust standard errors with pairs identified using genetic matching on the following covariates: size of the 2019 village budget, indicator for the recent occurrence of natural disasters, distance to nearest high school, distance to nearest public health clinic, and a road access index.

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 TreatmentDistrict_{ij} + \beta_2 BaselinePreferenceAlignment_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (4.1)$$

In this model, i indexes villages and j indexes matched village pairs. Y_{ij} measures the difference between respondents' budgetary preferences as measured by an allocation game embedded in an original survey and actual allocations in the village development plan and annual budgets. This preference alignment outcome is calculated as pre-registered in a pre-analysis plan as the additive inverse of the sum of the absolute deviation per allocation category: $-\sum_K |B_{ki} - \bar{C}_{ki}|$, where B_{ki} refers to the percentage of the budget spent on category k in village i and \bar{C}_{ki} is the average of citizen preferences for spending on category k in village i . The higher the preference alignment score, the more closely aligned the village plan or budget is to the preferences of citizens. Consistent with approaches taken in other recent studies of government responsiveness to citizen preferences (e.g. [Gulzar and Khan 2021](#)), this measure of preference alignment captures the level of congruence between village development plans or budgets and the *average* preferences of different groups of respondents (e.g., women community members or women community leaders) in each village. For this village-level analysis, the minimum detectable effect is 1.05 standard deviations, assuming alpha = 0.05 and a power level of 0.8. Based on the baseline data, 1.05 standard deviations would be equivalent to a preference alignment score of 0.29 for female community leaders and 0.21 for female community members.

¹⁰An ANCOVA model is used instead of difference-in-difference because there is no clear pre-treatment trend.

4.2.3 Preference Alignment Results

The results in Table 4.3, Column 3 indicate that *musyawarah inklusif* have a positive and significant effect for the representation of women community leaders' preferences in six-year development plans. This effect remains significant at the 95 percent confidence level after making Benjamini-Hochberg multiple hypothesis testing corrections (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).¹¹ *Musyawarah inklusif* also have a positive and marginally significant effect for the representation of women community members' preferences in the six-year development plans (Table 4.3, Column 2). However, this estimate becomes statistically insignificant after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show that the positive effect on preference alignment for women community members and women community leaders in village development plans do not hold in the 2020 and 2021 village budgets.¹²

Because the preference alignment outcome aggregates constituent preferences within each village and incorporates the level of alignment between constituent preferences and village plan/budget allocations for each budget category, the substantive interpretation of coefficients is not straightforward. To illustrate what better preference alignment looks like in practice, I offer an example using a pair of most similar treatment and control villages (based on the matching process described in Section 4.2.2) and their level of preference alignment for women community leaders on empowerment spending in the six-year village development plans.

Timun village, which is a treated village in Trenggalek district, has an empowerment alignment score of -0.02 for women leaders and the six-year plan while Ceri village, which is a control village in Ponorogo district, has an empowerment alignment score of -0.07.¹³ In Timun village, according to the results of the allocation game, women community

¹¹This correction adjusts for nine comparisons (all regression models in Tables 4.3-4.5). Benjamini-Hochberg-corrected p-values reported in parentheses. $N = 24$ because six-year plans were unavailable for two villages and four villages did not include monetary amounts for budget items in their development plans. The six-year plan was missing for one of these villages because the village head died shortly after being elected, before a new six-year plan was enacted. Therefore, the acting village head used the previous six-year plan until a new village head election could take place.

¹² $N = 28$ for Women Leaders because one village had no surveyed women community leaders who attended any consultations and the matched village also had to be dropped from the analysis.

¹³I use pseudonyms for the village names to preserve the de-identification of the data.

leaders wanted to allocate an average of 5 percent of village funds towards empowerment activities. In the actual six-year development plan for Timun village, 3.2 percent of the total value of projects/activities are designated for empowerment activities for a total of 663,000,000 rupiah (approximately US\$47,357). In Ceri village, women community leaders wanted to allocate an average of 8.3 percent of village funds towards empowerment activities. In the actual village development plan for Ceri village, 1.6 percent is designated for empowerment activities for a total of 446,118,000 rupiah (approximately US\$31,865).

Overall, the results of the preference alignment analyses suggest that preferences from *musyawarah inklusif* are being considered (in non-binding development plans) but not prioritized (in binding annual budgets) by village officials. Moreover, because 20-30 percent of activities in the six-year plan are usually never implemented during the six-year period, women’s preferences may not just be deprioritized—they may ultimately be excluded altogether.

Table 4.3: Six-Year Plan Preference Alignment Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Men 6-Year (1)	Women 6-Year (2)	Women Leader 6-Year (3)
<i>Musyawarah Inklusif</i>	0.183	0.161*	0.264***
Baseline	p = 0.131 (0.230)	p = 0.073 (0.157)	p = 0.008 (0.044)
	0.464*	0.361	0.647***
	p = 0.073 (0.246)	p = 0.129 (0.228)	p = 0.001 (0.167)
Observations	24	24	24
R ²	0.163	0.160	0.449
Adjusted R ²	0.083	0.080	0.396
Residual Std. Error (df = 21)	0.230	0.207	0.203
F Statistic (df = 2; 21)	2.046	2.007	8.549

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.4: 2020 Budget Preference Alignment Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Men 2020 (1)	Women 2020 (2)	Women Leaders 2020 (3)
<i>Musyawarah Inklusif</i>	-0.026 p = 0.732 (0.900)	-0.014 p = 0.861 (0.969)	-0.059 p = 0.468 (0.609)
Baseline	0.547*** p = 0.000 (0.126)	0.492** p = 0.034 (0.232)	0.240 p = 0.109 (0.150)
Observations	30	30	28
R ²	0.387	0.241	0.118
Adjusted R ²	0.342	0.185	0.047
Residual Std. Error	0.183 (df = 27)	0.189 (df = 27)	0.239 (df = 25)
F Statistic	8.534 (df = 2; 27)	4.282 (df = 2; 27)	1.665 (df = 2; 25)

Table 4.5: 2021 Budget Preference Alignment Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Men 2021 (1)	Women 2021 (2)	Women Leaders 2021 (3)
<i>Musyawarah Inklusif</i>	-0.027 p = 0.807 (0.948)	0.012 p = 0.900 (0.973)	-0.138 p = 0.327 (0.454)
Baseline	-0.004 p = 0.986 (0.200)	-0.010 p = 0.962 (0.199)	0.799*** p = 0.001 (0.218)
Observations	30	30	28
R ²	0.004	0.001	0.546
Adjusted R ²	-0.070	-0.073	0.509
Residual Std. Error	0.222 (df = 27)	0.210 (df = 27)	0.247 (df = 25)
F Statistic	0.051 (df = 2; 27)	0.016 (df = 2; 27)	15.017 (df = 2; 25)

4.2.4 Robustness Checks

An alternative way of measuring preference alignment is euclidean distance using the following formula: $-\sqrt{\sum_K (B_{ki} - \tilde{C}_{ki})^2}$. The results are robust to this alternative measure. Six-year plan preference alignment for women community leaders in the treated villages remains significantly higher (Table 4.6 Model 1). Another alternative way of measuring preference alignment is to calculate the absolute deviation between percent spending per budget category and the preferences of each individual respondent instead of first aggregating the preferences of each type of respondent (e.g., women community leaders) in each village. The results are also robust to this alternative measure (Table 4.6 Model 2).

Table 4.6: Alternative Preference Alignment Measures for Women Leaders–6-Year Plan

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Euclidean (1)	Individual (2)
Musyawah inklusif	0.139** (0.055)	0.268*** (0.083)
Baseline	0.561*** (0.147)	0.569*** (0.110)
Constant	−0.196*** (0.055)	−0.482*** (0.097)
Observations	24	42
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Given the small sample used in the preference alignment analysis (constrained by the number of villages in which surveys were conducted), one might be concerned that null results are driven by insufficient statistical power. One way to address this concern is to test the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for all units using randomization inference (Coppock 2019). For this analysis I use the coefficient of the treatment (*musyawarah inklusif*) from a regression of Preference Alignment on treatment, controlling for baseline preference alignment. The observed outcomes are used to generate the null distribution based on 1,000 randomizations. Consistent with the results from the ATT models (Tables 4.3-4.5), Table 4.7 shows that we fail to reject the sharp null hypothesis for all of the 2020 and 2021 binding annual budget models using one-tailed tests.¹⁴ This means that we fail to reject the sharp null hypothesis that *musyawarah inklusif* had no effect on the congruence between women’s preferences and *binding* village budgets for *any* village. However, we can reject the sharp null hypothesis both for women community members’ and women community leaders’ preference alignment with the non-binding six-year village development plans. This means that *musyawarah inklusif* did increase the congruence

¹⁴Two-tailed tests also fail to reject the null at the $\alpha = 0.1$ level.

between the preferences of women and *non-binding* village development plans in at least some villages.

Table 4.7: Sharp Null Hypothesis Tests

Outcome	p-value
Women 6-Year Plan	0.043**
Women Leader 6-Year Plan	<0.001***
Women 2020 Budget	0.555
Women Leaders 2020 Budget	0.732
Women 2021 Budget	0.433
Women Leaders 2021 Budget	0.972

4.2.5 Village Development Plan Priorities

In order to further understand what particular budget categories may be driving the women community leaders preference alignment result, we can observe the effects of *musyawarah inklusif* on the prioritization of each budget category in the six-year village development plans. This analysis uses a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model and controls for baseline spending by category (Zellner 1962). The SUR model assumes correlated errors across the different regression equations for each budget category since each budget category outcome comes from the same village development plan for a given village.

Table 4.8 shows significantly more spending on empowerment activities in treated villages. The effect on empowerment spending remains significant at the $\alpha = 0.10$ level after performing Benjamini-Hochberg multiple hypothesis testing corrections.¹⁵ As shown in Chapter 1, empowerment activities constituted the plurality of proposals from the *musyawarah inklusif* and are significantly preferred by women community leaders (compared to men community leaders and women community members). The increased proposed spending on empowerment activities in village development plans from villages with *musyawarah inklusif*, therefore, contributes to the improved alignment between the preferences of women community leaders and the priorities in the village development plans.

¹⁵This correction adjusts for 12 comparisons (all regression models).

Table 4.8: Six-Year Plan Priorities: Percent Allocation by Budget Category in Treatment versus Control Villages

Outcome	Estimate
Roads	-0.06 <i>p</i> = 0.647
Bridges	0.01 <i>p</i> = 0.618
Drainage	0.01 <i>p</i> = 0.647
Sanitation	-0.09 <i>p</i> = 0.116
Agriculture	0.04 <i>p</i> = 0.949
Education	0.01 <i>p</i> = 0.593
Health	0.01 <i>p</i> = 0.927
Social	-0.01 <i>p</i> = 0.593
Empowerment	0.04* <i>p</i> = 0.080
Youth	-0.01 <i>p</i> = 0.593
Security	-0.00 <i>p</i> = 0.534
Facilities	0.02 <i>p</i> = 0.483

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter evaluated the effects of holding separate village planning and budgeting forums for women and other marginalized groups. This reform was designed to address challenges to the substantive representation of women’s interests in local development that existing interventions, such as gender quotas, have been unable to overcome. The empirical analysis shows that requiring separate community consultations for women and other marginalized groups does improve the representation of women community leaders’ preferences in non-binding development plans. This means that such a reform can, at least nominally, shift the attention of government officials towards issues raised by representatives of marginalized groups. However, this reform has not yet had a

significant effect on actual village spending priorities as seen in binding annual budgets. Improving the representation of women only in non-binding development plans falls short of the *musyawarah inklusif* regulations' goals. This reform sought to shift village budget priorities to better represent the interests of women by, for example, reducing spending on roads and increasing spending on health and education. Such a significant shift has yet to occur. The next chapter will discuss policy implications for programs aimed at improving representation and accountability in local governance.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This dissertation examined issues related to a central question in the study of politics and policy: whose preferences get represented? In particular, this dissertation focused on challenges and opportunities for making local governance more inclusive and representative, especially for women who are often underrepresented in policymaking processes and outcomes. I study these issues in the context of local development where substantial efforts have been made by international organizations such as the World Bank, national governments, and local NGOs to expand and strengthen participatory approaches to local decision-making through initiatives such as community-driven development, participatory budgeting, and quotas for women and other marginalized groups. Existing research has shown that common reforms aimed at increasing inclusive participation in local development can generate positive economic returns but generally fail to meaningfully empower women and the poor or change the dynamics of power in local institutions (Casey 2018).

Given the shortcomings of existing types of participatory reforms, this dissertation evaluates the effects of a novel policy in Indonesia, which establishes a dedicated space for women and other vulnerable groups to share their ideas for their village development plans and budgets. This reform was designed to expand participation by women and increase the attention of village governments to women's proposals. Given the fact that men tend to dominate mixed gender forums, advocates for this reform hoped that separate forums, without the presence of traditional village elites, would make women and other vulnerable

groups feel more comfortable submitting proposals for local development. The submission of a broader set of proposals through these special forums may then make it easier and more politically expedient for village officials to include a wider range of activities in village development plans and budgets. However, the results of this dissertation show that women community *leaders*, whose preferences can differ from women community *members*, are most likely to be invited to these separate forums. In addition, village heads can continue to dominate decision-making, relegating proposals from the separate forums to non-binding village development plans instead of including them in binding annual budgets.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the dissertation's central arguments and findings. Next, it considers reforms related community-driven development programs that may help address the challenges to women's representation identified in this dissertation. Finally, it suggests avenues for future research, including a new field experiment by the author, which is motivated by the findings of this dissertation.

5.1 Summary

This dissertation explored constraints and opportunities for increasing the substantive representation of women's interests in local development. Chapter 1 summarized existing research and described a novel reform recently introduced in some Indonesian districts designed to remove some of the obstacles to women's participation and democratic accountability in village governance. In addition, it presented original survey data on attitudes about the role of women in local development and on the budgetary preferences of different types of citizens. The results show that while men and women share similar attitudes about women's role in community affairs, men and women have different preferences for how village funds should be spent. In addition, community leaders, who are most involved in submitting proposals for village development plans and budgets, have different preferences than the broader community.

Chapters 2 and 3 evaluated several possible mechanisms that may prevent reforms

from improving substantive representation. Chapter 2 found that holding separate consultations for women and other marginalized groups may be insufficient to increase participation by community members if village officials maintain discretion over who to invite to these forums. Without requirements to involve more women community members who are not already active in community institutions, existing women community leaders may dominate these separate consultations. This is particularly important when the individuals who do participate in the process tend to have different priorities than the broader community as is the case in this study's population.

Chapter 3 showed that sharing information about women's preferences and requiring separate consultations for women and other marginalized groups may be insufficient to change village leaders' priorities. While separate forums for women and other marginalized groups to submit budget proposals does improve the visibility of preferences shared by forum participants, this does not guarantee that village officials will change their priorities in response. Therefore, if the results of community consultations are merely advisory, village officials may continue to prioritize their own preferences, which tend to be more similar to the preferences male than female villagers.

Chapter 4 evaluated the effects of holding separate village budgeting consultations for women and other vulnerable groups on the level of alignment between women's budgetary preferences and the priorities in actual village development plans and budgets. The results indicate that this reform significantly increases the representation of the preferences of women community leaders in non-binding village development plans. However, separate consultations do not appear to have significant effects on the representation of women's interests in binding annual village budgets. This suggests that holding separate forums for women and other vulnerable groups can make it easier for proposals from these groups to reach government officials. However, village officials do not appear to prioritize women's preferences in actual budget allocations.

These mixed results highlight the risk of tokenizing women's participation and representation. Requirements to hold separate village forums for women and other vulnerable groups signal the district government's interest in increasing the involvement

of these groups in local policymaking. Village governments comply with these new requirements by holding separate forums and incorporating proposals into village development plans. But if women's proposals remain only in non-binding plans, women's preferences will continue to be underrepresented.

5.2 Policy Implications

The results of this dissertation suggest that in order to increase the prioritization of women's preferences in actual government policies and programs, efforts should be made to increase the participation of women community members who may have different priorities than women community leaders. If participation cannot be expanded to include more non-elite community members, community leaders should consult community members prior to formal budget deliberations so that community leaders can incorporate community members' suggestions into the proposals they submit. Data from this study show that women are eager to participate if invited. However, village officials tend to invite community leaders who are already more active in local governance even when they are required to hold separate forums for women and other marginalized groups.

In addition, attention should be focused on changing the behavior of village leaders who may be unwilling to respond to women's preferences, even when they are clearly presented through participatory processes. The results of the survey experiment presented in Chapter 3 showed that information about women's preferences and requirements for separate women's consultations do not lead village heads to shift their budget priorities towards women's preferences. In addition, the results of the matching analysis from Chapter 4 showed that villages with separate women's consultations have better representation of women's preferences (especially women community leaders' preferences) in non-binding village development plans, but villages with separate women's consultations do not have significantly better representation of women's preferences in binding annual budgets. Therefore, more education or incentives for local officials, especially village heads, to accommodate women's proposals may be needed to prevent

leaders from relegating women's proposals to only non-binding plans. For example, regulations could require that a minimum percentage of proposals submitted by women be accommodated in village development plans and budgets. In addition, Indonesia and other countries could consider adopting a gender reservation system, like the one used in India, to guarantee that a minimum percentage of village heads are women.

5.3 Future Research

In Indonesia and many other low- and middle-income countries, other policy reforms aimed at improving gender representation are also being implemented. For example, women's empowerment training programs seek to increase women's sense of individual and collective efficacy and provide knowledge and skills that will enable them to participate more effectively in local governance. Gender quotas for village councils are another initiative that can increase women's voice and power in local policymaking. Given the disappointing results of many individual reforms, future research should consider whether a combination of several interventions or policy reforms may be needed to induce a larger expansion of the substantive representation of women's preferences.

Motivated by the findings of this dissertation, I am currently implementing a new field experiment in Indonesia, which evaluates the effects of an intervention targeted at 1) neighborhood-level women's groups and 2) neighborhood association leaders designed to increase women's participation in community and village governance. The experimental design will test whether a supply-side strategy that targets neighborhood association leaders is more effective than a demand-side strategy that targets only women's groups.

In this dissertation, we saw how women and women's groups are less engaged in discussions about village development and budgeting. Providing neighborhood-level women's groups with increased political knowledge and skills may help them express their demands in local decision-making through informal and formal channels. This dissertation also showed how local male elites are less likely to invite women to participate in deliberations about development plans and budget and less likely to prioritize proposals

submitted by women. Training neighborhood association leaders about the importance of creating space for women to meaningfully participate in community affairs and governance may increase the supply of opportunities for women's representation.

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