Historical Violence, Trauma, and Political Identity

by

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation consists of three papers that investigate the influence of violence and trauma on identity and political behavior.

The first paper explores the political legacy of forced migration. Specifically, I empirically assess whether refugees reshape political behavior in receiving areas over the long-term. I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expelles' political champions – the radical right – over time. This relationship is particularly manifest when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. A durable expellee identity, which I document using novel data on expellee monuments and district associations, helps account for these results. Thus, my analyses reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.

The second paper examines whether periods of systemic societal upheaval facilitate the formation of durable political generations. It tests this theoretical expectation in China, using 6 nationally representative surveys spanning 22 years. The findings reveal a distinct Maoist era generation, characterized by heightened political interest compared to pre- and post-Mao cohorts. The paper also provides suggestive evidence for three channels that contribute to the heightened political interest among members of the Maoist generation: systemic state-led

persecution, mass mobilization, and a political climate saturated with indoctrination, fear, and anxiety. Past research has emphasized the lasting impact of persecution and mobilization on subsequent political attitudes. These findings empirically corroborate the notion that enduring legacies can also manifest among peers in the society spared direct exposure to such experiences.

The third paper examines why voters support parties linked to violent groups. Departing from existing literature, which analyses aggregate outcomes, I focus on the micro-foundations of support for such parties. I argue that individuals will support a party linked to an armed group if they perceive the armed group's engagement in violence and the party's post-conflict efforts as having sought to protect the interests of their community. I test this argument by drawing on evidence from nearly 100 interviews and representative public opinion data spanning the first decade after conflict in Northern Ireland. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) described its actions as a response to the oppression of the Nationalist community. Though by no means universal, the resonance of this narrative among Nationalists benefited Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, Loyalist paramilitaries portrayed their activities as protecting Unionists from PIRA violence. This community's general rejection of paramilitarism, given their support of the state security apparatus, prevented parties tied to Loyalist paramilitaries from gaining traction.

Together, these three papers provide several new insights into the long-term impact of political violence on individual attitudes and behaviors. My findings suggest that past trauma, despite differences in context and despite resulting from different forms of political violence, can have an enduring influence on the actions of individuals in both democratic and non-democratic settings.

Chapter I: Introduction

Violence is regrettably a central feature of politics. It can take many forms – from forced migration to civil conflict – and have complex and persistent effects for both individuals and communities (Davenport et al. 2019; Walden and Zhukov 2020; Dincecco et al. 2022). All three papers in my dissertation explore different facets of the enduring influence of political violence on society. Each of them seeks to answer two questions: whether past violence has an effect on subsequent political attitudes and behaviors, and if so, why it has this effect. They focus on three distinct contexts – Germany, China, and Northern Ireland – and employ diverse methodological approaches to analyze data from a wide range of sources. My findings shed light on how past political violence can shape political attitudes and behavior of contemporary individuals and communities. These findings also have the potential to assist policy makers in reaching informed decisions when addressing the long-term effects of violence.

All three papers follow in a tradition of research that has both theoretically and empirically probed the intuition that past events and experiences might shape subsequent socio-economic and political outcomes.[1]

The first paper focuses on forced migration, a form of political violence that, despite being widespread and impacting over 100 million individuals today, has received little attention from political scientists.[2] Forced migration can be deeply traumatizing. This shared trauma can force otherwise heterogeneous populations to develop a coherent identity grounded in their victimization. Do such identities persist, and could they influence political behavior? Could such identity persistence and its inter-generational transmission help explain in part why the far right, anti-immigrant populist politics in Germany is concentrated in rural areas where new immigrants and their impacts are rarely seen?

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[1] For an overview see North et al. (1990); Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Cirone and Pepinsky (2022); Voth (2021); Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg (2018).

[2] For work on the topic by economists see Becker (2022).

I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expelles' political champions – the radical right – over time. This relationship is particularly manifest when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. Mechanism evidence, including novel data on expellee monuments and associations, suggests that a durable expellee identity helps account for these results. My analysis reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration. This paper also engages with a growing literature on the drivers of support for populist right-wing parties (Rodrik 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Kavanagh, Menon and Heinze 2021). Specifically, my findings suggest that the set of deep historical drivers of right-wing support within Germany ought to include the legacy of ethnic German forced migration at the end of WWII (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). Finally, it draws from and corroborates recent scholarship that emphasizes the importance of political context for activating historical legacies (Charnysh 2015; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019).

The second paper of my dissertation studies the legacy of political socialization during the Maoist era. It responds to two appeals in the literature on political violence and contention – the need for greater interaction between disparate literatures studying related issues (Davenport et al. 2019) and for greater focus on countries outside of North America and Europe (Cirone and Pepinsky 2022). Specifically, the paper bridges research on political generations with work on the legacy of political violence. It does so by applying an influential framework from the political generations literature – the impressionable years hypothesis (Mannheim 1952 [1928]) – to empirically assess whether the political interest of cohorts that experienced a period of societal turbulence during their formative years (approximately 18-25 years of age) are distinguishable from that of other cohorts. The paper argues that the sociopolitical turbulence of the Maoist years would have engendered the formation of a distinct and durable political generation. It tests this expectation using 6 nationally representative surveys spanning 22 years.

The findings reveal a distinct Maoist era generation, characterized by heightened political interest compared to pre- and post-Mao cohorts. The absence of a similar generational divide in political interest in cross-national analyses provides additional confidence that these findings for China result from the distinct political socialization environments experienced by different cohorts in the Chinese population. The paper also provides suggestive evidence for three channels that contribute to the heightened political interest among members of the Maoist generation: systemic state-led persecution, mass mobilization, and a political climate saturated with indoctrination, fear, and anxiety. Past research has emphasized the lasting impact of persecution and mobilization on subsequent political attitudes. These findings empirically corroborate the notion that enduring legacies can also manifest among peers in the society spared direct exposure to such experiences. This paper also expands the evidentiary base for research on political generations in China (Jennings and Zhang 2005; Wang 2021).

The final paper of my dissertation examines why voters support parties linked to violent groups. Departing from existing literature, which analyses aggregate outcomes, I focus on the micro-foundations of support for such parties. I argue that individuals will support a party linked to an armed group if they perceive the armed group's engagement in violence and the party's post-conflict efforts as having sought to protect the interests of their community. I test this argument by drawing on evidence from nearly 100 interviews and representative public opinion data spanning the first decade after conflict in Northern Ireland. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) described its actions as a response to the oppression of the Nationalist community. Though by no means universal, the resonance of this narrative among Nationalists benefited Sinn

Fein. Meanwhile, Loyalist paramilitaries portrayed their activities as protecting Unionists from PIRA violence. This community's general rejection of paramilitarism, given their support of the state security apparatus, prevented parties tied to Loyalist paramilitaries from gaining traction.

This is the first paper to investigate the micro-foundations of electoral support for parties with ties to armed groups. By focusing on Northern Ireland, it emphasizes the need for differentiating among civil conflicts of varying geographical scope. The paper also expands beyond the traditional focus on the first post-conflict election (Allison 2010; Daly 2019), by studying voter support for such parties over time. Finally, it builds on research that examines post-conflict political participation among excombatants (Blattman 2009; Bellows and Miguel 2009). My findings suggest that a desire for greater political involvement among excombatants by itself is not sufficient for successful political engagement. Specifically, community perceptions about why excombatants engaged in political violence might be a crucial determinant of whether excombatants succeed in the political arena.

Together, these three papers provide several new insights into the long-term impact of political violence on individual attitudes and behaviors. My findings suggest that past trauma, despite differences in context and despite resulting from different forms of political violence, can have an enduring influence on the actions of individuals in both democratic and non-democratic settings.

Chapter II: The Political Legacy of Forced Migration

Abstract: Do refugees reshape long-term political behavior in receiving areas? I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expelles' political champions – the radical right – over time. This relationship is particularly manifest when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. Mechanism evidence, including novel data on expellee monuments and associations, suggests that a durable expellee identity helps account for these results. My analysis reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.

Keywords: forced migration, identity, voting, radical right, time-varying historical legacy

Violence is a prominent feature of politics and growing evidence illustrates its potential for producing durable political legacies (Rozenas and Zhukov 2019). Studies on the impact of forced migration, a recurring yet understudied form of political violence, suggest that such experiences influence the political attitudes and self-reported behaviors of both refugees and their descendants (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*a*).[3] However, existing research has not examined whether these forced migrant voters reshape long-term electoral behavior in receiving areas. The answer to this question is increasingly important, as there are more refugees in the world today than at any other time since the end of WWII (UNHCR 2021).

Forced migration can be deeply traumatizing. This shared trauma can force otherwise heterogeneous populations to develop a coherent identity grounded in their victimization. Forced migrants have been found to develop such enduring identities whether they were relocated to areas populated by co-ethnics (Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*a*) or non-co-ethnics (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017).

I argue that individuals with a forced migrant identity will support political parties that cater to the group's political demands when their identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. I test this argument by focusing on one of the largest forced migrations in modern history: the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany at the end of WWII. Over 12 million ethnic Germans were forced to relocate into Germany, composing 17.5% of the population.

Evidence of a lasting political legacy among German expellees has broader relevance. Similar to conventional forced migrants, expellees lacked social and economic capital. Like many forced migrants, they also faced tensions with natives, forcing them to rely on each other to overcome their difficulties, fostering a strong group identity. However, unlike some conventional forced migrants, expellees were relocated to areas inhabited by co-ethnics. Such common ground with the native population should have facilitated not deterred their integration, weakening the need for a distinct identity. Thus, if we observe a legacy of forced migration even in this setting, then we should expect it to also manifest in situations were forced migrants are relocated among non-co-ethnics. Take for example the forced migration of Crimean Tartars in 1944. They were rapidly relocated to non-co-ethnic receiving areas and did not receive immediate access to voting rights. Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) found that even after 70 years, descendants of Crimean Tartars who suffered more during their deportation experience identified more strongly with their group, held more hostile attitudes toward Russia, and participated more in politics. Finally, expellees in West Germany, unlike many forced migrants, enjoyed political freedoms and opportunities. However, existing evidence of enduring political preferences among descendants of forced migrants, even in contexts where forced migrants did not have such political freedoms and opportunities, suggest that neither a democratic context nor extensive state-approved activism are necessary conditions for the emergence of a legacy of forced migration (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017).

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[3] The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) defines a refugee as "someone who has been forced to flee their country because of violence or persecution" (UNHCR 2019).

I argue that the radical right has continued to attract expellee voters for multiple reasons. First, persecution by the Soviet Red Army cultivated "deep-seated anti-communism" among expellees (Connor 2018, 190), which in turn would have drawn them to the anti-communism of radical right parties. Second, the radical right has consistently made appeals to expellee voters, portraying the latter as victims of WWII, maintaining calls for the return of expellee lands in Eastern Europe long after such demands were dropped by mainstream parties (Mudde 2002), and lobbying to preserve "the legacy of the German East" (Alternative für Deutschland 2020). Moreover, the radical right's Euroskepticism might also attract expellees who resisted the inclusion of expelling countries like Poland and the Czech Republic into the European Union (Wood 2005). Third, some expellees emphasized their membership in the larger German *Volk* (people) to establish their right to exist in their new surroundings in the face of native hostility. This notion of the *Volk* echoed radical right rhetoric and could have made parts of the expellee community receptive to such politics (Eisler 2018). Fourth, expellee museums, newspapers, youth groups, and various sociocultural events and activities facilitated the intergenerational transmission of a cohesive expellee identity and provided opportunities for radical right ideas to be discussed and disseminated (Süssner 2004; Melendy 2003). Finally, competitive victimhood among some expellee descendants could also help explain their support for anti-refugee radical right parties (Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*b*).[4]

To test this argument, I collected district-level data on expellee allocation across West Germany and electoral statistics from 32 elections over 100 years.[5] My findings suggest that districts which received greater shares of expellees are more supportive of the radical right over time. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the post WWII expellee share adds half a percentage point to *Alternative für Deutschland's* vote share in the 2019 European elections, or a 5% increase in the party's average vote share in that election. However, the association between expellee share and radical right support only manifests when identity-related grievances remain unaddressed and politically significant. It diminishes with broader society's recognition of expellee suffering and strengthens when political developments make the narrative of German suffering during WWII salient. Moreover, consistent with evidence of competitive victimhood and more negative attitudes toward contemporary refugees among some expellee descendants (Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*b*), I find that areas with greater shares of expellees became more supportive of the AfD when it transformed into an anti-refugee party between 2013 and 2017. These findings corroborate a growing body of work that emphasizes the importance of political context for activating historical legacies (Charnysh 2015; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Fouka and Voth 2020).

I address several alternative explanations. First, ecological inference analysis suggests that expellees are driving the relationship and not anti-expellee sentiment among the native population. Second, the time-varying persistence of this relationship helps mitigate alternative explanations that would instead predict constant support for the radical right among expellees. For example, no time-varying persistence should materialize if the relationship reflects long-standing pre-expulsion radical right preferences or if it is the product of organizational inertia, with later radical right parties adopting the party apparatus of the expellee party. Relatedly, the lack of a significant association for the 1969 election, when radical right vote share was the highest in a postwar

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[4] Competitive victimhood refers to the phenomenon where "groups seek the moral and sometimes even material benefits emerging from victimhood status and compete among each other about the magnitude and pervasiveness of their suffering" (Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*b*, 2).

[5] District-level expellee data are unavailable for East Germany. See Appendix (page 95) for details.

Federal election until the 2010s, suggests that the overall electoral appeal of the radical right in a given election cannot account for over time variation in the observed relationship. Moreover, the association is significant in the mid-1980s despite the weaker radical right political supply at the time. Third, deeper historical determinants of radical right support in receiving areas do not account for the observed relationship. Fourth, my findings are not the product of more radical right leaning expellees selecting into districts where their fellow forced migrants formed a larger share of the population. Fifth, the relationship does not represent a spurious correlation where expellees might have resettled elsewhere after their arrival, as it is also retrieved when utilizing expellee statistics from 1960. Finally, the results are robust to including measures for election-year socioeconomic conditions.

Next, I provide mechanism evidence suggesting that an enduring expellee identity helps account for the observed relationship. First, I collected novel data on the locations of two markers of expellee identity - expellee monuments and local expellee associations. More than 1,400 expellee monuments have been constructed since the 1940s and I found that at least one-third of all districts in West Germany had an expellee association in 2020. My analyses indicate that expellee monuments are more likely to exist and in greater numbers in districts that received higher shares of expellees. The same pattern is also true for local expellee associations. Districts that received greater shares of expellees are more likely to have an expellee association today. The presence of these identity markers in turn is associated with greater support for the radical right. Importantly, this association is only significant when identity-related grievances remain unanswered and politically relevant. Second, a potential implication of the proposed mechanism is that forced migrants and their descendants who suffered more victimization should exhibit greater identity strength and political engagement (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017). While all expellees experienced forced migration, those who resided outside the Third Reich also suffered from perceived and actual discrimination during the interwar period. I find that both identity strength and radical right support is stronger in areas that received greater shares of expellees who resided outside the Third Reich. Moreover, I provide evidence which suggests that their support for the radical right during the postwar period is unlikely to be the product of a long-held pre-expulsion predilection for radical right parties.

This paper contributes to research on the long-run political consequences of traumatic experiences by examining an understudied but recurring form of violence: forced migration. It is one of the first efforts to examine the long-term political implications deriving from the expulsion of ethnic Germans at the end of WWII. I build on work that has exploited the initial distribution of post-WWII forced migrants to study a range of political and economic outcomes (Braun and Mahmoud 2014; Peters 2021; Charnysh 2019; Becker et al. 2020). The paper also highlights the experiences and lasting influence of refugee communities, tracing the evolution of electoral behavior in areas that received these forced migrants. I examine the same behavioral outcome across an evolving political and social landscape, a unique opportunity afforded by examining refugee flows from 75 years ago. Finally, this paper also speaks to a growing literature on the drivers of support for populist right-wing parties (Rodrik 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019). My findings suggest that the set of deep historical drivers of right-wing support within Germany ought to include the expellee experience (Voigtländer and Voth 2012; Homola, Pereira and Tavits 2020).

The political legacy of forced migration

The experience of forced migration is often highly traumatizing. Individuals could experience trauma leading up to, during, and after displacement (Miller and Rasmussen 2017). They might be harassed and persecuted prior to eviction (Steel et al. 2017). Displacement itself is very traumatic, with individuals often subject to multiple human rights violations in the process (UNHCR 2021). Their exposure to trauma-inducing factors, however, need not end with displacement. Trauma from displacement can be compounded by factors including but not limited to social isolation (Priebe et al. 2013), perceived discrimination by the receiving population (Ellis et al. 2008), and limited access to resources (Pernice and Brook 1996).

Individuals might overcome a limited exposure to such trauma by relying on their personal reserves of mental and financial resources. However, sustained exposure to trauma can impose a significant strain on individuals, steadily depleting their reservoirs of resilience (Siriwardhana and Stewart 2013). In such circumstances, survivors of trauma have been found to rely on their social support networks (Hobfoll 2002). A strong social network can provide the necessary scaffolding for individuals to continue living in the aftermath of trauma and has the potential to facilitate political engagement through post-traumatic growth (Teodorescu et al. 2012).

Cold reception by the native population can force refugees to rely on social networks consisting mostly of other refugees (Holler 1963). Such segregation would help perpetuate stereotypes among natives and refugees about the other (Nauck 2001), and serve to ossify the refugee group identity (Schweitzer et al. 2006). Perceived discrimination by natives could produce a siege mentality among refugees and foster greater in-group solidarity (Vollhardt, Bilewicz and Olechowski 2015). Sustained discrimination can also facilitate the construction of group narratives that can reinforce the group's identity (Volkan 2001). Finally, a continued sense of discrimination can prompt refugee parents to invest more heavily in the transmission of a positive group identity to their offspring (Bisin et al. 2011), encouraging the inter-generational transmission of a distinct group identity. The interaction of these processes can trigger a vitriolic feedback loop, wherein perceived societal isolation heightens group sensitivity to threats and feeds a confirmatory bias in social cognition that is self-protective (Cacioppo and Hawkley 2009). This could result in the maintenance of a distinct identity that draws on their victimhood. Initial evidence suggests that the strength of such an identity is greater among those who suffered more victimization (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017).

I argue that the persistence of a distinct identity will help mobilize and sustain political participation among members of the forced migrant community in the face of unresolved demands, thus influencing long-term electoral behavior in receiving areas. Specifically, individuals sharing a forced migrant identity would support political parties that cater to the concerns and demands associated with their identity. The successful inter-generational transmission of this identity could extend such political participation to the descendants of forced migrants. Thus, electoral legacies among forced migrants and their descendants belong to the broader camp of identity voting with forced migration being the process that engenders the relevant identity in this instance.

Understanding the process of identity formation is important because these processes shape the nature of grievances that manifest within groups, and thus, in turn, shape the kinds of appeals that can be effectively invoked by political actors seeking support from these groups.

Moreover, drawing on work that stresses the significance of political context for the materialization of historical legacies (Charnysh 2015; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019), I argue that a forced migrant identity is most likely to influence the electoral behavior of refugees in receiving areas when their identity-related grievances are unresolved and politically relevant. The mobilizing potential of this identity would in turn diminish when such grievances are addressed or lose their political salience. Nevertheless, an electoral legacy of forced migration can reappear if subsequent political developments serve to renew identity-based grievances.

The expellee experience

Expulsion

After WWII, the Allied Powers (Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States) agreed to "the disentanglement of populations" across Eastern Europe (Churchill 1945, 297). This "clean sweep" of ethnic Germans into the new German state was intended to prevent future conflicts, which the Allies feared might arise if sizable German minorities remained within the boundaries of other nations (Churchill 1945, 297). The implementation of this forced relocation initiative was to "be effected in an orderly and humane manner" (Potsdam Agreement 1945, 12).

However, expulsions began long before terms were finalized at the Postdam Conference (Douglas 2012). Those who had been oppressed by the Nazis sought vengeance for their wartime experiences. They turned their anger toward ethnic Germans who in many instances had resided in those communities for multiple generations. The uprooting of these individuals proved disorderly and violent. Experts place the lower bound for deaths from these forced expulsions at half a million, with some accounts suggesting loss of life in excess of 1.5 million (Douglas 2012).

Individuals often received little warning of their eviction. They were stripped of all landed property and allowed to take very little of their remaining possessions with them (Schoenberg

1970). Strict restrictions applied to the amount of cash and valuables families could carry when making the westward trek. This meant that expellees had little to no resources to sustain themselves and their families upon arriving in West Germany. Material deprivation was compounded by the loss of social networks cultivated over years if not generations (Holler 1963, 20).

Initial allocation

The task of allocating eight million expellees across West Germany overwhelmed the Allied military administration and "defied the efforts of the countries involved to impose any kind of order on the process. Given the minimal resources dedicated to the operation, the breakneck pace at which it was conducted, and the expelling countries' ambivalence over whether the efficient removal of the deportees should take precedence over their collective punishment or vice versa, it could hardly have been otherwise" (Douglas 2012, 159-160).

Expellees began arriving months before any systematic infrastructure for their reception was established (Connor 2018). This lack of "suitable administrative machinery" arose partly from the Allied governments' refusal "to provide their officials on the ground – most of them mid-ranking military officers with no experience of civil administration – with the most rudimentary information as to the nature and scale of the task before them" (Douglas 2012, 304). Consequently, expellee allocation in the early postwar months proved highly chaotic (Paikert 1962, 22).

While the subsequent distribution of expellees was broadly shaped by distance from the Eastern border and housing availability across districts, the haphazard nature of this process persisted. Official records explicitly acknowledged that the assignment of forced migrants failed to consider their past vocation or other relevant attributes that might have facilitated faster integration into their new surroundings (Schechtman 1963, 300). Efforts by the Western Allies to decentralize Germany's postwar government produced "overlapping spheres of responsibility," which also contributed to the "confusion and frustration" (Douglas 2012, 307). Finally, the rationale of "collective guilt," whereby the entire German population was held responsible for atrocities committed by the Third Reich, might have limited the military administration's desire to correct for allocations that exceeded an area's capacity for expellees (Eberle 1987, 66).

These allocations proved enduring for two reasons. First, expulsion had stripped expellees of most resources, making them reliant on governmental assistance for survival (Connor 2018, Chapter 2). The Allies in turn sought to minimize expellee incentives for relocation by making the latter's access to food rations and administrative support contingent on their remaining in areas where they had been initially assigned (Grosser 2001, 83). Second, the Allies enforced strict restrictions on expellee movement in the initial postwar period. Inter-state movement was deterred by military personnel along state boundaries (Draper 1946, 10). Meanwhile, emigration, though widely discussed as a potential solution to the problem of expellee overcrowding (Wander 1951), was never pursued in any meaningful capacity (Schoenberg 1970, 49).

Immediate postwar years

The local population of postwar Germany was in a "spiritual and moral vacuum," with little time, resources, or sympathy to spare for unwelcome strangers while struggling to piece their lives back together (Schulze 2006; Paikert 1962, 5). Nevertheless, locals were required to house expellees (Holler 1963, 15). Such shared living situations proved difficult for both hosts and guests (Connor 2018, 64-66). Many expellees, who had owned homes in the East, found their entire families confined to a single room (Harris and Wülker 1953). Congested living spaces coupled with cultural differences led to inevitable tensions, which stifled the latter's social integration (Schulze 2006; U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1950, 33-34).[6]

The unique economic challenges faced by expellees exacerbated the situation. Their haphazard allocation led to sizable mismatches between skills and employment opportunities (Harris and Wülker 1953; Connor 2018, 39). Severe restrictions on expellee movement in the early postwar years limited expellees' ability to correct these imbalances (Draper 1946). Moreover, their lack of deep social ties with local employers meant that they were discriminated against, becoming the "last hired and first fired" (U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1950, 40). Faced with these compounded obstacles, expellees fared worse than their native counterparts, providing fodder for native caricatures of the expellee as lazy dead-weights within society (Ther 1996, 791).

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[6] The Appendix (page 95) provides an overview of the research that documents these tensions.

The Allied administration viewed expellees as a potential reservoir of societal agitation and unrest (Connor 2018, 177). General Lucius Clay, military governor of the U.S. zone, repeatedly cautioned German officials about the possibility of radicalization among disillusioned expellees (Demshuk 2006, 390). Occasional violence in overcrowded expellee camps helped maintain such fears (Demshuk 2006, 385). Officials feared that collective political action by the expellee community would hinder efforts at expellee integration, increase tensions between the pre-war local population and expellees, and transform them into focal points for forces interested in destabilizing the postwar order (Connor 2018, 181). Such fears led to the ban of any expellee political parties or groups in the immediate postwar period (Schoenberg 1970, 78-79).

Expellees, living amidst unfriendly neighbors, governed by an administration fearful of their organized potential, and prohibited from verbalizing their grievances, came to perceive themselves as second-class citizens (Demshuk 2006, 384). The inability of natives to empathize with the plight of expellees led the latter to close ranks (Holler 1963, 21). This in turn reinforced the native population's opinion that the expellees were a people apart (Lattimore 1974, 48). The resulting vitriolic feedback loop distanced expellees from natives, with some expellees feeling like outsiders even half a century later (Schulze 2006).

Expectations regarding expellee voting behavior

I have two sets of expectations regarding expellee support for radical right parties: general and temporal. This section first details why identity-based grievances have continued to draw some members of the expellee community to the radical right. I then leverage media reports and existing research on postwar Germany's memory culture to identify periods when the strength of expellee support for the radical right might have fluctuated based on whether identity-based grievances remained unresolved and politically salient.

General expectations: International opinion held the German public collectively culpable for the atrocities of the Third Reich, with the Holocaust casting a long and enduring shadow (Moeller 2003, 147-148). In this diplomatic environment, mainstream parties recognized the revanchist claims of expellees – seeking the return of lost territories – as politically infeasible and gradually sidelined such demands (Moeller 2003, 160). The resulting absence of champions in the political mainstream would have left some expellees vulnerable to aspirants from the political fringe (Schulze 2006, 371).

But the radical right and left did not hold equal attraction for expellees. Persecution by the Red Army and the GDR's immediate recognition of postwar territorial boundaries soured expellees to the political left (Ahonen 1998, 51; Bösch 2016, 158; Connor 2018, 190). The first postwar federal elections in 1949 revealed a "vulnerability to the overtures of nationalist parties" among expellees (Connor 2018, 178). Founded in 1950, the expellee party (BHE) espoused a nationalist, right-wing ideology, underscored by its opposition to postwar denazification policies (Connor 2018, 128). Subsequently, leaders of the BHE helped found the radical right National Democratic Party (NPD) in 1964. The NPD and other radical right parties have explicitly endorsed expellee aspirations and grievances over the years (Fisher 1974, 145; Mudde 2002, 42-43; Alternative für Deutschland 2020). Thus, despite a lack of broad electoral support for radical right parties within German society (Laqueur 1997), they might attract some members in the expellee community.

Expellee efforts to establish their right to exist in their new surroundings, in the face of native hostility, might have also drawn them to the radical right. Specifically, some expellees emphasized their credentials as displaced members of the larger German *Volk* (people) (Eisler 2018, 403-04). Given its association with National Socialism, the notion of a Volk identity was mostly limited to radical right discourse. Consequently, expellee embrace of Volk identity might have made them receptive to discourse from the radical right.

Moreover, the expellee community's continued efforts to sustain their culture and traditions would have facilitated the intergenerational transmission of a cohesive expellee identity and provided opportunities for radical right ideas to be discussed and disseminated. More than 500 expellee museums – state-sponsored sites designed and funded consciously by the expellee leadership in an effort to preserve a distinct expellee identity – came into being during the postwar period (Eisler 2018). Starting in the 1970s, exhibitions in these museums were designed to portray the expellees as innocent victims of war (Eisler 2018, 405-06). Meanwhile, the expellee press advertised a range of expellee-oriented memorabilia; among them picture books, calendars, and decorative plates. A calendar from 1996 celebrating German cities, for instance, still included images of cities from the lost territories, despite half a century having elapsed since the expulsion (Melendy 2003, 47). Within expellee households, such items would have helped trigger memories of the lost lands and impacted the cultural and political socialization of expellee children (Kreisslová and Nosková 2019). Some expellee publications have been accused of becoming platforms for right-wing ideologists (Schoenberg 1970, 126), serving to inculcate ethno-regionalism within the expellee community (Süssner 2004).

Expellee sociocultural events and activities also contributed to the cohesiveness of their identity. Annual gatherings in the 1950s and 1960s attracted hundreds of thousands of expellees and their families (Schoenberg 1970, 118; Melendy 2003, 50-51). A gathering in 1995, the fifty year anniversary of the expulsions, drew an audience in excess of half a million (Melendy 2003, 51). As recently as 2010, the Federation of Expellees had a membership of approximately 500,000 (Ahonen 2016, 125). Meanwhile, expellee organizations encouraged families to familiarize their children with traditions from the East (Holler 1963, 26). In expellee households, children were exposed to narratives about the expulsion that depicted expellees as innocent victims of unlawful actions (Kreisslová and Nosková 2019). Their participation in youth groups also exposed expellee children to others with similar expulsion backgrounds and shaped their own identities (Holler 1963, 35; Melendy 2003, 49; Kreisslová and Nosková 2019, 178). Efforts at cultivating an expellee identity among younger generations continued at least into the 1990s Süssner (2004, 17-19).

Finally, the Euroskepticism of the radical right could also attract some expellees and their descendants. I expect them to hold anti-integration attitudes given their historical grievances with Eastern European nations from which they were expelled. Expellees have long sought recognition of their mistreatment by these countries (Douglas 2012). They strongly opposed the entry of

Poland and the Czech Republic into the EU, and have triggered multiple instances of diplomatic tension between these countries and Germany over the years (Wood 2005; Douglas 2012).

However, it is important to recognize that evidence for such a relationship does not imply that all or most members of the expellee community support the radical right. Indeed, over time many expellees joined mainstream parties (Bösch 2016). Nevertheless, if such sentiments have persisted, we should observe higher levels of support for radical right parties in districts that received more expellees as a share of its population.

Temporal expectations: Based on research that highlights the importance of political context for activating historical legacies (Belmonte and Rochlitz 2019; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Fouka and Voth 2020), I expect that the appeal of the radical right varied over time for individuals with an expellee identity as a function of whether identity-based grievances were unresolved and politically salient. If this is true, we should expect their voting behavior to mirror such temporal variation. If these individuals instead held fixed political predilections, we should not expect temporal variation in private behavior.

In order to identify the periods in which expellee grievances were unresolved and politically salient, I relied on both media reports and existing research by political scientists, historians, and memory regime scholars. These sources indicate that the political salience of the expellee suffering narrative has fluctuated over time. Discussions about WWII from the first two decades of the postwar period featured narratives regarding both the atrocities committed by the Third Reich and suffering endured by Germans at its culmination (Moeller 1996). However, discourse from the late 1960s through 1970s laid heavy emphasis on Nazi atrocities, challenging and contextualizing the expellee suffering narrative in the public sphere (Moeller 1996). Süssner (2004) reports that societal discussions about Germany's National Socialist past in the 1960s also entered expellee households, often turning rank-and-file members away from the radical right political rhetoric of expellee organizations (Edinger 1970; Ahonen 2016). While many expellees continued to attend organization events, "the majority of rank-and-file expellees came to the rallies primarily for more personal, largely apolitical reasons: to meet family and friends, to reminisce, to maintain cultural traditions and connections" (Ahonen 2016, 126). Thus, the appeal of the radical right would have weakened for many expellees during this period despite continued attempts by the radical right to attract expellee voters by evoking expellee grievances (Fisher 1974, 145). When the German grievance narrative regained political salience during the early-mid 1980s, it was again championed by voices within the political right (Moeller 1996; Süssner 2004). Expellee grievances retained their political salience for the rest of the century in the context of conversations surrounding Germany's reunification and Poland's application to enter the EU in 1994 (Süssner 2004; Wood 2005).

Recent work by Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer (2021*b*) provides experimental evidence for a decline in anti-refugee sentiments among expellee descendants when they are informed that broader German society recognized the suffering of their ancestors. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw such societal acknowledgment of the expellees' plight. The political left, in particular, expressed contrition for its past dismissal of expellee grievances (Moeller 2003; Langenbacher 2010). In the presence of such a society-wide 'recognition treatment', which fulfilled the long-standing expellee desire for native recognition of the suffering that they experienced, I expect the appeal of the radical right to have diminished for expellee descendants. Langenbacher (2010) suggests that this increase in societal recognition of expellee suffering had waned by the late 2000s.

Developments from the late 2000s could have plausibly revived expellee grievances. The first concerns events surrounding the ratification of the EU's Lisbon treaty in 2009. Two articles of the treaty – Articles 17 and 19(1) – included provisions that could have deemed any forced migration illegal and made the victims of such actions eligible for compensation from expelling states (Douglas 2012, 327). Under pressure from the then Czech president Václav Klaus, the EU revised the treaty to exclude historical instances of expulsion (a request specifically intended to prevent German expellee claims for restitution). Such explicit denial of their long-standing goals by the EU might have revived unresolved expellee grievances toward EU nations that expelled their ancestors and motivated some members of the expellee community to support Euroskeptic parties. Specifically, an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (Kohler 2009), a long-running conservative

Table 1: Hypothesized relationship between expellee share and radical right vote

Period	**Attraction of radical right for expellees**	**Expected relationship**
1945-1965	Strongest (*rallied by the expellee party*)	Positive
1965-1980	Weak (*societal condemnation of Nazi past*)	None
1980-2000	Strong (*German WWII suffering narrative revived*)	Positive
2000-2010	Weak (*broad recognition of expellee suffering*)	None
2010-2019	Strong (*Lisbon treaty and Refugee crisis*)	Positive

newspaper, notes that revising the Lisbon Treaty to exclude historical instances of forced migration underscored the fact that Sudeten Germans remained second class Europeans. The second concerns events surrounding the Center for Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation. Conceived in the late 1990s and opened in 2021, the Center attracted much controversy (Wood 2005). Despite supporting its establishment in 2005, ex-Chancellor Merkel's unwillingness to back Erika Steinbach (then president of the Federation of Expellees) to the Center's board in 2009 might have been perceived by some expellees and their descendants as a continuation of the German political mainstream's appeasement of EU members at the expense of expellees (Pfister 2009). Voters with an expellee background remained electorally relevant during this period and were catered to by prominent politicians, including ex-Chancellor Merkel (Perron 2021). Consequently, it seems plausible that open tensions with the expellee leader could have shaped electoral preferences for some expellees. These events (transpiring after the elections in that year), which sidelined expellee demands of recognition and restitution, could plausibly have thus renewed identity-related grievances and animosity toward some EU member states. If so, then my theory would lead us to expect increased support for the Eurosceptic AfD of the 2013-2014 period. Meanwhile, Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer (2021*b*) report that expellee descendants who believed that expellees suffered more than contemporary Syrian refugees expressed more negative attitudes toward the latter. The existence of such competitive victimhood among expellee descendants could also help explain their support of an anti-refugee party like the AfD. These temporal expectations are summarized under **Table 1**.

Data and Empirical Strategy

Unit of analysis

I use historical and contemporary data at the level of administrative districts (*kreis*) to test my theoretical expectations. Due to a series of administrative reforms, the number of districts in West Germany declined from 557 to 324 between 1945 and 2020. I harmonized all data used in this study to the 1949 administrative boundaries to avoid estimation biases that may result from endogenous redistricting. The Appendix to this chapter (page 110) contains details regarding the harmonization process. To address concerns that the use of historical spatial units might artificially inflate the number of observations in my analyses, I also provide results from analyzing data harmonized to the current day districts of West Germany (Table 11, Appendix). Both the substantive and statistical significance of my findings are stronger when employing contemporary administrative units.

Electoral data: 1920 – 2019

Voting data for the Weimar Republic (1920–1933) were obtained from Moths and Häisch (1990). Der Bundeswahlleiter (2019) has aggregated data on all post-WWII elections in West Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany. I compute a party's vote share in a given election by dividing the number of votes it received by the total eligible votes cast in that election.

Federal elections in Germany have operated on a two-vote electoral system since WWII. Voters cast their first vote for a specific representative and a second vote for their party of choice. Only the equivalent of the second vote is cast during European Parliament elections. Even in the case of federal elections, the second vote provides a better measure of public support for parties as it is this vote that determines the distribution of seats in the German Parliament (*Bundestag*) and thus less prone to strategic voting. Consequently, the analyses below will focus on the share of second votes received by political parties in the post-WWII period.

To test my argument regarding an enduring electoral legacy among expellees, I will use as the main dependent variables 1) the expellee party's (BHE) vote share during its existence and 2) the total vote share across all radical right parties in Germany in subsequent elections. Radical right parties are characterized by their nativism and display of authoritarian tendencies (Mudde 2007). The literature recognizes four parties as belonging to the radical right in Germany: National Democratic Party (NPD), German People's Union (DVU), the Republicans (REP), and Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Arzheimer 2015; Hansen and Olsen 2019).

Historical expellee data and covariates

Figure 1: Distribution of expellees across West Germany in 1950



The 1946 census is the earliest source of data on the allocation of expellees across Germany. However, a substantial number of expellees entered West Germany during the remainder of the 1940s. Consequently, I rely on expellee statistics from 1950 to construct the primary independent variable of interest; expellees as a share of district population (Statistisches Bundesamt 1953).

Despite its haphazard nature, the allocation of expellees across West Germany (**Figure 1**) was shaped by certain macro-level factors (Harris and Wülker 1953). They could be confounding variables that influence both the distribution of expellees and subsequent support for radical right parties. Therefore, the remainder of this section identifies these potential confounding factors and details how I account for them in my analyses.

Distance from East: Expellees who escaped the western advance of the Soviet Red Army or were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia prior to the official transfers, settled in areas most easily accessible to them (Paikert 1962, 22). Consequently, the eastern most districts of West Germany, being more proximate to the Eastern border, received more expellees. To account for the expellee imperative to settle in areas most easily accessible to them, I include a measure of the cumulative distance for each district included in the analysis to the expulsion regions in the East.

Housing Stock: Housing availability was another factor that drove the administration's allocation of expellees (Schechtman 1963). The Allied bombing campaign had greatly eroded urban infrastructure and reduced the country's prewar housing stock by more than 20% (Harris and Wülker 1953, 16). Expellees, in dire need of housing, were thus assigned to less densely populated, rural areas. To account for the influence of housing availability on expellee flows, I include in all regressions the share of prewar housing stock damaged by the war, population density in 1939, and the average number of rooms per house (Statistisches Reichsamt 1941; Statistisches Bundesamt 1956). These covariates also help account for initial economic conditions across districts, with residual local heterogeneity in expellee allocation being uncorrelated with a wide range of prewar economic outcomes (Braun and Mahmoud 2014; Braun and Dwenger 2019; Peters 2021).

Preexisting radical right support: Rural districts were also more supportive of the Nazi party (Voigtländer and Voth 2012). Thus, though unintended, expellees might have been allocated to locations with greater preexisting radical right predilections. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) also find that the religious makeup of an area predicted its support for the Nazi party. I account for these potential factors that may bias in favor of my hypothesis by including the Nazi party's district vote share in March 1933 (Cantoni, Hagemeister and Westcott 2019), and proportion of a district's Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish populations in 1950.[7] The above mentioned covariates are included in all specifications reported below.[8] Appendix Table 12 provides summary statistics.

Empirical strategy

My main empirical strategy exploits the resulting residual variation in expellee distribution to assess whether there exists any lasting political legacies from the introduction of expellees into West Germany. I estimate the following specification:

$$\textit{Vote share}_{ijk} \; = \; \alpha_{ijk} \; + \; \beta_1 * \textit{Expellee Share}_{ijk} \; + \; \zeta * \mathbf{D}_{ijk} \; + \; \gamma_{jk} \; + \; \xi_k \; + \; \varepsilon_{ijk}, \qquad (1)$$

where i denotes district, j the state, and k the allied occupation zone. $\textit{Vote share}_{ijk}$ represents the vote share of interest in a given election. $\textit{Expellee Share}_{ijk}$ is the share of expellees in a district's 1950 population. The matrix $\mathbf{D}_{ijk}$ denotes the set of factors identified above as having influenced the initial postwar distribution of expellees across West Germany.

The Allies differed in their willingness to accept expellees and their management of expellee allocation. France, citing their absence at the Potsdam deliberations, refused to accept expellees into areas they administered in the west of Germany (Harris and Wülker 1953). Though many expellees were to be found in the French zone by 1950, this policy exaggerated the aforementioned East-West gradient in expellee distribution. Meanwhile, US military administrators devolved more autonomy to German officials compared to their UK counterparts (Schechtman 1963, 292). I account for these differences by including occupation-zone fixed effects (ξ_k). Meanwhile, state fixed effects (γ_{jk}) help address differences in cultural and administrative practices across the different regions of Germany. ε_{ij} represents the error term. I report robust standard errors clustered at the state level and p-values from Moran's I tests for residual spatial autocorrelation.

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[7] I use the Nazi party's vote share from March 1933 to be consistent with (Cantoni, Hagemeister and Westcott 2019). However, the November 1932 elections are considered the last free and fair elections of Weimar Germany. The results are qualitatively unchanged when using the Nazi party's vote share from November 1932.

[8] The Appendix (page 97) documents that the residual variation in expellee allocation, after accounting for factors identified in this section, is not correlated with a range of prewar economic and political outcomes, including but not limited to 1) the prewar manufacturing and agricultural shares, 3) population growth from 1933 to 1939, and 4) share of males in 1946.

I supplement these repeated cross-sectional analyses with results from pooled regressions using data across 1) all postwar elections, 2) all non expellee party elections. These specifications include election-year fixed effects in addition to the covariates and fixed effects discussed above. I also report results from estimating the above equation with weights derived from non-parametric covariate balancing generalized propensity score (npCBGPS) analysis. This method allows for continuous treatments and optimizes covariate balance between treatment and control units while minimizing model dependence (Fong et al. 2018). Finally, I report results from an instrumental variable analysis to account for the possibility that analyses using expellee share in 1950 might produce biased estimates if expellees moved to areas better aligned with their vocational training or political predilections subsequent to initial placement. Specifically, I use a district's 1946 expellee share (Statistisches Amt des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1946), when restrictions on expellee movement were most severe, as an instrument for its 1950 expellee share. The exclusion restriction for these models is that expellee share in 1946 only influences subsequent radical right support through its impact on expellee share in 1950.

Main Results

Support for the expellee party: 1953 – 1961

The expellee party (BHE) attracted a sizable expellee following during its heyday in the 1950s. If my expectation regarding an enduring political legacy among expellees is accurate, we should observe a strong relationship between expellee share and the BHE's vote share. BHE fielded candidates in the 1953 and 1957 Federal elections. Its successor, the GDP, fielded candidates in the 1961 Federal election. **Table 2** contains results from regressing expellee share in 1950 on BHE/GDP vote shares in these elections.

Support for the BHE increases with expellee share across all three elections. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the expellee share (s.d. = 0.09) adds 3.4, 2.8, and 2.4 percentage points to the BHE's/GDP's vote share in the three elections respectively. This translates to a 48%, 49%, and 67% increase from BHE's/GDP's average vote share in these elections.

The over time increase in relative influence of expellee share together with the decline of its influence in absolute terms (percentage points) reflects the declining popularity of the expellee party. Nevertheless, at least in the short-term, districts with a greater share of expellees appear to have exhibited heightened support for the right-wing expellee party and its successor. The p-values from two-sided Moran's I tests for residual spatial autocorrelation, reported under Table 2, mitigate the concern that spatial dependence could be driving these findings.

Table 2: Federal elections of the expellee party

	1953 **BHE**	**1957** **BHE**	**1961** **GDP**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.368^{***}	0.304^{***}	0.257^{***}
	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.038)
Standardized coefficient	0.75	0.87	0.77
Moran's-I two-sided p	0.84	0.77	0.23
Covariates	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable in columns 1-2 is BHE vote share in the 1953 and 1957 elections. Dependent variable in column 3 is the GDP vote share in the 1961 election. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. Also reported are p-values from Moran's I tests for residual spatial autocorrelation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Support for radical right parties: 1969 – 2019

I now estimate the model specified by equation 1 for each election in which one of the four main radical right parties of this period (NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD) fielded candidates.[9] The cumulative vote share across these parties forms my dependent variable of interest.

Expellee share in 1950 is a significant predictor of radical right support in 13 out of 21 elections (Table 13 - including p-values from two-sided Moran's I tests for residual spatial autocorrelation).[10] A one standard deviation increase in expellee share is, on average across these 13 elections, associated with a 9% increase in the radical right's average vote share. The time-varying persistence of this relationship conforms with theoretical expectations (Table 1). This helps to mitigate the concern that the relationship reflects a long-standing pre-expulsion preference for the radical right among expellees, or a sustained radical right conviction developed under the Third Reich or during Nazi occupation. Specifically, **Figure 2** suggests that expellee support for radical right parties declined from the late 1960s through the 1970s, when societal condemnation of Germany's National Socialist past was at its peak. The lack of a significant association for the 1969 election, when radical right vote share was the highest in a postwar Federal election until the 2010s, suggests that the overall electoral appeal of the radical right in a given election cannot account for over time variation in the observed relationship. The association is significant again by the mid-1980s, despite the weaker radical right political supply at the time, when expellee grievances regained their political salience. The markedly higher support for the radical right in the 1989 election is driven by the REP, which campaigned for East-West reunification by framing it as "a first step in the process of full unification that would eventually lead to a Germany having the borders of 1937" (Mudde 2002, 42). As argued in this paper, such a vision would have appealed greatly to members of the expellee community.

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[9] Der Bundeswahlleiter (2019) does not provide district-level vote share data on radical right parties for the 1965 and 1980 Federal elections and the 1979 European election.

[10] No such over time relationship exists between expellee share and support for mainstream parties (Tables 14-17).

The association once again becomes insignificant in the early 2000s, coinciding with broader societal recognition of expellee suffering. The significant association recovered for the 2013 and 2014 elections is not adequately explained by a simple radical right political supply story because these elections occurred prior to the AfD's transformation into a clearly recognizable anti-immigrant radical right party (Cantoni, Hagemeister and Westcott 2019). As mentioned earlier, the potential rekindling of historical hostility toward certain EU neighbors and renewed disaffection with the conservative CDU for not championing expellee grievances might help explain why some individuals with an expellee identity supported the Euroskeptic AfD during this period. The more respectable image of the AfD – compared to either the NPD or REP – has likely also contributed to its appeal. The party has been successful in attracting both voters from other parties and non-voters from past elections (Hoerner and Hobolt 2017; Hansen and Olsen 2019).

Figure 2: Over time relationship between expellee share and radical right support



Note: This figure plots the standardized coefficients (standard deviation change in the outcome variable resulting from a one standard deviation change in the independent variable of interest) reported in Tables 2 and 13. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Shaded areas indicate periods where the political climate prevailing in Germany is expected to facilitate the hypothesized relationship between expellee share and support for the radical right. Please refer to the "Temporal expectations" subsection for details.

The larger standardized coefficients for these elections are consistent with this interpretation.

The AfD's well-documented shift in political platforms between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections (Cantoni, Hagemeister and Westcott 2019) – moving from a focus on fiscal conservatism to anti-immigration and nationalism – offers another opportunity to test the proposed relationship between expellees and the radical right. Specifically, given the feelings of competitive victimhood and more negative attitudes toward contemporary refugees among some expellee descendants (Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*b*), I expect areas with greater shares of expellees to have become more supportive of the AfD when it transformed into an anti-refugee party. Using a first-differences model, where the dependent variable of interest is the difference in AfD vote share between 2013 and 2017, I find support for this expectation (Table 18).

Alternative estimation strategies

The relationship is robust to alternate estimation approaches. It is positive and significant under panel analyses, the first combining all postwar elections and a second using only elections held after the BHE ceased to exist (Table 19). Adding weights derived from npCBGPS analysis to the benchmark specification produce similar results (Table 20). Finally, an instrumental variable approach mitigates the concern that analyses using 1950 expellee share might produce biased estimates if expellees relocated after their initial placement. Official records suggest that though some expellees did manage to cross between occupation zones, such movement was motivated by survival needs and not strategic calculus that might contribute to biased estimates (U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1950, 13). To further account for potential expellee self-selection after initial allocation, I use expellee share in 1946, when movement restrictions were most severe, as an instrument for expellee share in 1950. The results remain robust (Table 21).

Addressing alternative explanations

Expellee voters or anti-expellee sentiment?

I provide both qualitative and quantitative evidence to mitigate the concern that anti-expellee sentiment among natives could be driving the relationship between expellee share and radical right support. First, voters driven by anti-expellee sentiments would not have supported radical right parties because these parties were widely recognized as being sympathetic to expellee political demands (Schoenberg 1970; Congressional Record 1967; Mudde 2002). Leaders of the expellee party helped found the NPD, the oldest surviving radical right party in Germany (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2020). The NPD, REP, and DVU have all expressed support for reclaiming Germany's pre-WWII territories (Mudde 2002; Schoenberg 1970, 299). Meanwhile, the AfD remains committed to expellee outreach even to the present day (Alternative für Deutschland 2020).

Instead, voters frustrated by expellees would have supported parties that capitalized on this anti-expellee sentiment (Dancygier 2010). Such parties manifested in parts of West Germany during the immediate postwar years. The Bavaria Party (BP), for instance, adopted an explicitly hostile stance toward expellees (Braun and Dwenger 2019, 15). In-depth local case studies suggest that local-expellee tensions peaked in the early to mid 1950s before declining in political salience in the late 1950s (Lattimore 1974). The German economic miracle of the 1950s helped alleviate many sources of grievance between the native and expellee populations and contributed to a deescalation of tensions between natives and expellees (Lattimore 1974, 61; Connor 2018, 164).

Second, I employ an ecological inference technique developed by King (1997) to estimate the proportion of expellees and non-expellees who supported radical right parties in each election.[11] The technique utilizes district-level information on subgroup size, total radical right vote share, and the number of eligible voters to estimate the share of expellees and non-expellees who voted for radical right parties, while accounting for all covariates included in the main analyses. Given the absence of district-level expellee statistics after 1960, I have assumed the expellee share of a district's population to remain constant after 1960. Consequently, retrieved voting proportions should be considered suggestive and not precise estimates of actual subgroup voting behavior.

The over time pattern captured by **Figure 3** corroborates multiple theoretical expectations. The expellee party (BHE) and its successor (GDP) appear to have attracted a significant share of the expellee vote in the three Federal elections they contested (1953, 1957, and 1961). Subsequent expellee support for the radical right mirrors changes in the broader political context within Germany. Both expellee and non-expellee voting for the radical right appears to have declined precipitously during the 1970s, when condemnation of Germany's National Socialist past was at its peak. However, the revival of radical right support in the 1980s and 1990s is only observed among expellees, before declining once again with broader society's acknowledgment of expellee suffering. The sharp rise in support for the radical right among expellees in the 1989 European election is likely driven by the REP's framing of its campaign for German reunification as constituting a precursor to recovering lands lost at the end of WWII (Mudde 2002, 42).

The radical right appears to have made similar gains among both groups in the post Great

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[11] See the Appendix (page 98) for details regarding the limitations of existing individual-level expellee data.

Figure 3: Ecological inference estimates for expellee and non-expellee radical right voting



Note: Estimated proportion of expellees and non-expellees who voted for radical right parties. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Recession period. This change is likely driven by the broader popularity achieved by AfD since 2013. Radical right parties have until recently been a fringe phenomenon in postwar Germany. However, AfD has widespread support and is the third largest party in the German Parliament.

Preexisting radical right sentiment?

Could expellee share be serving as a proxy for preexisting radical right sentiment in receiving areas? All specifications reported in this paper already account for deep rooted far-right predilections by including the Nazi Party's (NSDAP) vote share from March 1933 (Cantoni, Hagemeister and Westcott 2019). Alternatively, could expellee share in 1950 be serving as a proxy for community proximity to concentration camps? Homola, Pereira and Tavits (2020) find that proximity to Nazi concentration camps predicts contemporary support for the radical right in Germany. The results are qualitatively unchanged when I include the Euclidean distance from the centroid of each district to the nearest such installation identified by Homola, Pereira and Tavits (2020) to the baseline specification (Table 22). Or, could expellee share be capturing deep-rooted antisemitism? Voigtländer and Voth (2012) find that areas which experienced Jewish pogroms in the mid-14th century were 6 times more likely to support the NSDAP in 1928. The above findings are robust to the inclusion of NSDAP's 1928 vote share (Table 23). Given space constraints, I address other potential preexisting drivers of postwar radical right sentiment in the Appendix (page 98). The results are qualitatively unchanged even after controlling for these factors.

Movement of expellees over time

As described earlier, the initial allocation of expellees produced significant mismatches between labor supply and demand (Harris and Wülker 1953). Many individuals previously employed in industry found themselves in rural areas far from industrial centers. The need to maintain themselves and their families would have driven workers, who had no financial buffer to fall back on, to seek employment in urban centers. Such movement did occur and in some cases was facilitated by Federal and State governments (Connor 2018, 146). Nevertheless, many expellees remained in areas to which they were initially allocated (Paikert 1962, 36; Connor 2018, 146; Peters 2021). Microcensus data from the 1960s also suggest minimal expellee movement in later years (Falck, Heblich and Link 2012).

Additionally, I examined the relationship between expellee share in 1960 and district-level electoral behavior in subsequent elections. We should expect the likelihood of expellees relocating themselves to areas offering greater employment opportunities to have been highest during the first decade after the relaxation of movement restrictions. They would have become increasingly integrated into their new settings over time, increasing the social costs of relocation. The gradual availability of government funding – in the form of loans, tax incentives, and other aid – would have also reduced the need for relocation (Connor 2018, 147). Consequently, retrieving the relationship obtained with expellee share in 1950 when utilizing expellee share from 1960 would at least partially address the concern that the former measure might be serving as a proxy for some other unobserved factor. As confirmed by Table 24, results similar to those reported in Table 13 are retrieved when utilizing the expellee share in 1960. I am unable to provide additional evidence using district-level expellee statistics from later years because the German government discontinued their collection of this information.

Election year socioeconomic factors

Factors like unemployment, share of foreigners, and income have been posited as important predictors of recent right-wing populist support (Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Norris and Inglehart 2019). The above analyses do not include these variables because they are endogenous and would bias the resulting estimates. Nevertheless, to address concerns that expellee share might be serving as a proxy for election-year socioeconomic conditions, I included these variables, when available, and re-estimated the regressions reported under Table 13. Data on election-year unemployment, share of foreigners, and income for recent elections were obtained from Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2019), Thünen Institute (2019), and Statistische Ämter (2019), respectively. Results are robust to the inclusion of these election-year socioeconomic factors (Table 25).[12]

Mechanism evidence

I have argued that a durable expellee identity drives the association between expellee share and radical right support. If this is true, we should expect districts that received larger shares of expellees to exhibit stronger expellee identity.[13] Moreover, these stronger expressions of identity should be associated with greater radical right support, and this association in turn should display the same time-varying persistence identified above. I test these expectations using measures of district-level expellee identity constructed from novel data. Meanwhile, a potential implication of the proposed mechanism is that forced migrants and their descendants who suffered more victimization should exhibit greater identity strength and political engagement (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017). While all expellees experienced forced migration, those who resided outside the

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[12] Meanwhile, expellee share in 1950 is not associated with these election-year characteristics (Table 26-27).

[13] I summarize evidence from existing research in the Appendix (page 104).

Third Reich also suffered from perceived and actual discrimination during the interwar period. Therefore we should expect both identity strength and radical right support to be stronger in areas that received greater shares of expellees who resided outside the Third Reich.

Expellee identity – monuments, district associations, and turnout

Expellees and their descendants can express their group identity in myriad ways. Consequently, the two measures of district-level expellee identity examined below, while informative, capture only some aspects of the underlying concept of interest. Nevertheless, they can provide suggestive evidence regarding the continued existence of a durable expellee identity and how it relates to radical right support over time. Specifically, given my argument that a forced migrant identity is most likely to influence the electoral behavior of refugees in receiving areas when their identity-related grievances are unresolved and politically relevant, these markers of expellee identity are most likely to be associated with radical right voting in the same periods when I hypothesized the radical right to hold appeal for expellees.

Expellee monuments are powerful symbols of identity and have often served as the background for expellee commemorations and community gatherings (Luppes 2010). The Appendix (page 124) provides details on expellee monuments data, variable construction, and analyses. My findings suggest that expellee monuments are 1) more likely to be erected and in greater numbers in districts that received higher shares of expellees (Tables 28-29) and 2) that the presence and numbers of these monuments are associated with greater support for the radical right (Table 30-31). Importantly, these relationships between the existence and number of monuments in a district and radical right support follow the time-varying persistence pattern found in Figure 2.

I employ the presence of an expellee local association in a district as another proxy of enduring expellee identity. The Appendix (page 129) provides details on expellee district association data, variable construction, and analyses. My findings indicate that district associations are 1) more likely to exist today within districts that received greater shares of expellees (Table 32) and 2) that the presence of these associations is associated with greater support for the radical right (Table 33).

This relationship also follows the time-varying persistence pattern reported in Figure 2.

Finally, Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) find that an enduring identity resulting from forced migration can foster increased political participation. I find support for this expectation in West Germany throughout the postwar period. Specifically, my findings suggest that areas which received greater shares of expellees see higher election turnout (Table 34). Taken together, these findings provide additional confidence regarding the existence of an enduring expellee identity. They also bolster the claim that this expellee identity is only associated with radical right support when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient.

Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche

Based on their country of residence during the interwar period, expellees can be divided into *Reichsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche*.[14] The former are ethnic Germans who resided in the Eastern territories of the Third Reich before WWII. The latter are ethnic Germans who were nationals of other countries in Eastern Europe in the interwar period. While all expellees were forced to relocate, the experiences of *Reichsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche* differed qualitatively.

Reichsdeutsche, as citizens of the Third Reich, did not suffer persecution till late in the war. However, *Volksdeutsche* experienced sudden "status anxiety" at the end of WWI (Chu 2012, 85), transformed from a dominant socioeconomic group under the Habsburg and German Empires to a sizable minority in newly formed states like Czechoslovakia and Poland (Connor 2018, 10-11). Such status anxiety and discrimination - both perceived and actual (Glassheim 2000, 469; Douglas 2012, 9-12) - contributed to "a siege mentality, and feelings of injustice" (Chu 2012, 85), which could have engendered a stronger shared group identity among these populations.[15] Indeed, *Volksdeutsche* had become highly politically organized in their home countries prior to WWII and applied these organizational skills in West Germany to maintain and mobilize their expellee identity (Schoenberg 1970, 98-99, 116; Eberle 1987; Süssner 2004, 12-13).

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[14] The terms *Reichdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche* were created by the Nazi regime. This paper only uses these terms to readily distinguish expellees who were citizens of interwar Germany from those expellees who were not.

[15] Other groups like the Jews and Roma experienced far greater discrimination during this period. It is not the relative extent of *Volksdeutsche* discrimination, rather their perceived sense of injustice that would have facilitated the formation of a shared identity.

Consequently, I expect stronger persistence of an expellee identity and in turn greater radical right support in areas with higher shares of *Volksdeutsche* compared to *Reichsdeutsche*. Expellee statistics from 1950, which differentiates these two subgroups, allow me to test these propositions. I find that expellee monuments are more likely to be erected and in greater numbers in districts with higher shares of *Volksdeutsche* (Table 35-36). Contemporary expellee district associations are also more likely to exist in districts with greater shares of *Volksdeutsche* (Table 32). Finally, Table 37 reveals that *Volksdeutsche* share of population in 1950 has a stronger association with radical right electoral support compared to *Reichsdeutsche* share of population. The over time variation in the strength of this relationship during the postwar period follows the exact pattern hypothesized in Table 1 and reported under Figure 2, helping mitigate the concern that it reflects either a long-standing pre-expulsion preference for the radical right among *Volksdeutsche* or a sustained radical right conviction developed during the period of Nazi occupation.[16]

Conclusion

To assess if refugees can reshape long-term political behavior in receiving areas, I analyzed the electoral legacy of ethnic German expellees relocated to West Germany. I find a sizable and enduring relationship between expellee share and support for the radical right over the past seven decades. Expellees, and not their native counterparts, appear to be driving this relationship. The finding, moreover, is not attenuated by expellee movement in the postwar period, proximity to concentration camps, election-year socioeconomic conditions, and other historical drivers of radical right support identified in the literature. Mechanism evidence, including expellee subgroup analyses and novel data on expellee monuments and associations, suggests that an enduring expellee identity helps account for this relationship.

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[16] I address this concern at greater length in the Appendix (page 105).

Based on my theory, the politics of forced migrants are guided by their identity-based grievances. We should expect forced migrants in a different context to vote for a center or left party if such a party happens to champion their identity-based grievances. In future work, I plan to empirically test this expectation by studying additional instances of forced migration.

There are more refugees in the world today than at any other time since the end of WWII (UNHCR 2021). Prolonged conflicts have required many individuals and families to leave behind their homes and seek refuge in alien lands. This study has taken a step toward improving our understanding of the long-term political behavior consequences of such forced displacement. Though my evidence draws from a single instance of forced migration, similarities in the conditions experienced by the expellees and present-day refugees suggest broader applicability for a political legacy from forced displacement. Like refugees today, expellees were bereft of social and economic capital, and faced with hostility from the native population. However, the German expellees were forced to relocate among co-ethnics. Would similar enduring identities manifest in situations where refugees are forced to resettle in areas populated by non-co-ethnics? A shared ethnicity between forced migrants and the native population in the case of German expellees should have facilitated, not deterred, their integration, weakening the need for a distinct identity. Consequently, if we observe a legacy of forced migration even in this setting, we should also expect it to manifest in situations where forced migrants are relocated among non-co-ethnics. Indeed, existing research suggests that individuals subjected to forced migration can develop enduring identities and linked political attitudes when relocated to areas populated by non-co-ethnics (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017). Future studies should focus on behavioral legacies in non-co-ethnic forced migration settings and examine both the magnitude and persistence of such legacies. Similarly, future research should examine if and how delays in forced migrants' ability to vote might shape the strength and durability of any subsequent behavioral legacy.

Chapter III: Maoist Era Upheaval and Political Interest in China

(Co-authored with Jiannan Zhao)

Abstract: This paper bridges research on political generations with work on the legacy of traumatic experiences. We argue that systemic societal upheaval engenders durable political generations. We test this theoretical expectation in China, using 6 nationally representative surveys spanning 22 years. Our findings reveal a distinct Maoist era generation, characterized by heightened political interest compared to pre- and post-Mao cohorts. The absence of a similar generational divide in political interest in cross-national analyses provides additional confidence that our findings for China result from the distinct political socialization environments experienced by different cohorts in the Chinese population. We also provide suggestive evidence for three channels that contribute to the heightened political interest among members of the Maoist generation: systemic state-led persecution, mass mobilization, and a political climate saturated with indoctrination, fear, and anxiety. Past research has emphasized the lasting impact of persecution and mobilization on subsequent political attitudes. Our findings demonstrate that enduring legacies can also manifest among peers not directly exposed to such experiences.

Keywords: *societal upheaval, persecution, fear, political interest, Maoist generation*

Introduction

Research into political generations has shed light on the legacies of authoritarianism (Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar 2019) and identified changing sociopolitical dynamics in developed democracies (Osborne, Sears and Valentino 2011). Meanwhile, an extensive literature on historical trauma has documented its enduring legacy in shaping political attitudes and behaviors (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Wang 2021; Menon 2022). However, key questions at the intersection of these literatures remain understudied. For instance, an influential framework within the political generations literature – the impressionable years hypothesis – would suggest that the political attitudes of cohorts that experienced a period of societal turbulence during their formative years (approximately 18-25 years of age) should be distinguishable from other cohorts (Corning and Schuman 2015). Though work on political generations has explored this prediction in the U.S. context, comparative inquiry remains limited. On the other hand, extensive research has documented the direct legacy of political violence on victims and perpetrators. While researchers have provided evidence for the population-level impact of political violence (Davenport et al. 2019; Walden and Zhukov 2020), few studies have examined if and how individuals belonging to the same cohort, yet were spared direct exposure to violence and mobilization, might be affected by their living through systemic societal upheaval.

To address these questions, we place the literature on political generations and historical trauma in dialogue and empirically assess the resulting insights in the context of the People's Republic of China. Mao Zedong's rise to power initiated a period of state-led societal upheaval, which persisted into the mid-1970s. These years were characterized by extensive state-led persecution, widespread mobilization of the masses, and a climate of political alertness fueled by extensive indoctrination and fear of persecution.[17] China has since enjoyed mostly uninterrupted stability.

We leverage these shifts in the political socialization environment within China to test whether exposure to past societal upheaval has produced a durable Maoist generation. Specifically, we expect individuals who experienced the Maoist period during their formative years to have cultivated a greater interest in politics to help them navigate the fast-changing political expectations that characterized this period. Age-period-cohort models allow us to disentangle the influence of generational membership from potential life-cycle and period effects. Our analyses, which utilize 6 nationally representative surveys spanning 22 years, demonstrate that societal upheaval during the Maoist era left an enduring mark on the Chinese population. Individuals who became politically socialized during the Maoist years express greater political interest compared to individuals born in the pre- and post-Mao eras. The results persist after accounting for education, gender, and income, factors that might be expected to drive generational differences beyond distinct historical socialization experiences (Mishler and Rose 2007). Our findings are robust to the exclusion of post-treatment socioeconomic variables and a variety of model specifications. Finally, cross-national analyses using three waves of the World Values Survey provide an additional layer of confidence that this generational divide in political interest results from the distinct political socialization environments experienced by different cohorts within the Chinese population.

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[17] Following Vasilopoulos et al. (2019), we use the terms fear and anxiety interchangeably.

We also provide suggestive evidence regarding three channels that contribute to the heightened political interest among members of the Maoist generation. The first channel builds on recent research into the political legacies of repression in durable authoritarian regimes (Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Wang 2021). Our results suggest that persecuted individuals exhibit heightened political interest compared to respondents who were not persecuted. Research into the enduring influence of mobilization on political socialization motivates our second channel (Jennings 1987). We find that past participation in revolutionary activities is positively associated with an individual's subsequent interest in politics. The third channel concerns those members of this generation who avoided both state persecution and mobilization, but nevertheless had to navigate the aforementioned political climate. Drawing on insights from affective intelligence theory (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Marcus et al. 2019; Vasilopoulos et al. 2019) and related work on the influence of anxiety on information seeking (Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Valentino et al. 2008; Vasilopoulos 2018), we argue that individuals who became politically socialized during the Maoist period will remain alert to political information in the long-term. Our results indicate that individuals of the Maoist generation exhibit greater political interest compared to individuals politically socialized before and after the Maoist period, even after accounting for the influence of state persecution and mobilization.

Taken together, this paper makes three contributions. First, we demonstrate that systemic traumatic episodes from a nation's history can result in the formation of coherent and durable political generations. The existence of such enduring generational distinctions reinforces growing evidence on the strength of traumatic experiences in shaping long-term sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors. Second, our findings reveal an indirect influence of systemic societal upheaval that has significant implications for the trauma legacy literature. This indirectly affected segment of the population often constitutes a majority within society. Consequently, research that focuses solely on the directly impacted can provide an incomplete picture of the systemic legacy of the relevant traumatic episode. Finally, we bring more robust empirical evidence to the research on political generations in China (Harmel and Yeh 2015; Jennings and Zhang 2005). Existing studies have relied on limited samples or a single survey to identify political generations within the population. This raises concerns regarding the reliability of identified generations, as findings may be an artifact of when the survey was conducted and not reflect stable generational divides. We address these concerns by conducting age-period-cohort analyses on survey data collected over two decades.

The turbulence of Maoist China

Mao Zedong led the People's Republic of China from October 1st, 1949 until his death on September 9th, 1976. During this period, he launched a number of campaigns that resulted in significant socioeconomic and political upheaval. Most prominent among them were the Land Reform Campaign (1950 – 1952), Hundred Flowers Campaign (1956), Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957 – 1959), Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1960), and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976). Many citizens were either persecuted by the state or lived under the constant fear of persecution. Though estimates vary, scholars suggest forty million lives as the lower bound on the cumulative human cost of these policies (Fenby 2008, 351). The campaigns also markedly increased popular participation in politics. Townsend (1967) referred to the Chinese population's active engagement with politics during this period as a "participation explosion" within a society otherwise characterized by "popular isolation from politics" (Zhu, Zhao and Li 1990). Systemic state-led violence, mass mobilization, and a political climate saturated with indoctrination, fear, and anxiety characterized this period.

Mao's campaigns inflicted extensive state-led repression on the population. While intellectuals and individuals from higher socioeconomic backgrounds were particularly vulnerable (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2009), violence impacted individuals from all classes of society (Dikötter 2010; Zhou 2013). Many suffered starvation, public humiliation, hard labor, torture, and execution (CR/10 2018, CR10-0067-HEB). However, "unlike the history of the Holocaust in Europe, in China there is no collective memory, no public monument, no museum, no remembrance day, and no mention of the Great Leap Forward Famine under Mao in any school or history textbook" (Zhou 2013, 12). Public remembrance of other Maoist era campaigns is similarly lacking (CR/10 2018, CR10-0100-BEJ, CR10-0055-JIL, CR10-0070-LIN). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained a strong grip on power, and despite acknowledging the negative consequences of Mao's campaigns (CCP Central Committee 1981), has never attempted to undermine his revered status in Chinese society. For instance, the CCP Central Committee (CCP Central Committee 1981, xx) concluded that Mao's "merits are primary and his errors secondary." Consequently, those persecuted during these years might have feared state censure even after the death of Mao.

During the Maoist era, many citizens participated in a variety of political and revolutionary organizations. Among them, the Red Guards have achieved most notoriety. They consisted mainly of secondary school students (Yang 2016). More than 13 million students attended secondary school in China before the suspension of classes in June 1966. These students were allowed to operate with minimal oversight and restraint in the coming months (CR/10 2018, CR10-0076-BEJ, CR10-0050-SHH). The Red Guards were deeply committed to the revolutionary cause and took to their mission of eradicating the four olds – "old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes" – with horrifying vigor (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2009, 108). Despite state censure (Bernstein 1977; Yang 2013), they remained politically engaged, questioning the ideological tenets that had once driven them to action (Chan 1985).

The state under Mao invested heavily into the ideological indoctrination of society. An iconic example is the little red book, entitled Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, which was owned by many citizens during the Cultural Revolution. Both therein and otherwise, Mao emphasized the need for peasant empowerment and class struggle, arguing that a society devoid of class distinctions could only be obtained through a socialist revolution led by the working poor. To this end, he encouraged citizens to participate in continuous revolution. Biographical accounts from the time underscore how revolutionary passion gripped China. Citizens, both adults and children, chanted slogans in praise of Chairman Mao and other prominent party members (CR/10 2018, CR10-0008-HEB), cadres held frequent meetings (Zhou 2013, 89), the radio provided a constant stream of ideologically charged rhetoric (CR/10 2018, CR10-0054-ZHJ), and many held an unshakable faith in both the Chairman and the party (CR/10 2018, CR10-0102-ANH). Admittedly, improved access to political and economic opportunities also formed part of the calculus that drove such heightened political engagement among the citizenry. However, indoctrination also played a crucial role in increasing citizen political engagement as indicated by the many hardships they suffered in pursuit of their ideological beliefs (Yang 2016, Chapter 2).

Finally, Mao's launch of the Anti-Rightist Movement, in the wake of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, underscores the need for caution that permeated society during this period. In February 1956, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign, inviting criticisms of the state under the slogan "[l]et a hundred flowers bloom, and a hundred schools of thought contend" (Fairbank and Goldman 2006, 364). However, criticism of party policies far exceeded his expectations. Thus, only a year later, in June 1957, Mao launched the Anti-Rightist Movement, resulting in the persecution of individuals who had spoken their mind at the state's behest (Zeng and Eisenman

2018).

Throughout the Maoist years, even casual verbal criticisms of the state became evidence of counter-revolutionary motivations and served as sufficient grounds for persecution (Zhou 2013, 67). “Those who were seriously committed to using wisdom and knowledge to solve China’s problems found themselves denounced as traitors by people possessed by passion, and more particularly, hatred for all who proclaimed the virtues of reasonableness (Pye 1984, 289).” An ill-timed comment, even if uttered within the confines of one’s own home or among friends, could result in public criticism or worse (CR/10 2018, CR10-0096-SHD, CR10-0059-GUZ, CR10-0031-BEJ). Many victims committed suicide due to the stress of constant harassment inflicted upon them. One estimate suggests that about 36 million people experienced various forms of persecution in rural areas alone, resulting in 750,000 to 1.5 million deaths during the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2009, 262). Thus, individuals had to keep themselves highly informed and exercise careful self-policing of their opinions to survive this harsh and ever-changing political environment.

Societal upheaval and political generations

Researchers in the impressionable years tradition posit that individuals develop lifelong political attitudes during late adolescence and early adulthood (between the ages of 18 and 25), a period referred to as the “formative years” (Mannheim 1952 [1928]). Specific political events and the general political environment prevailing during one’s formative years are remembered later on in life (Arnett 2000; Rubin, Rahhal and Poon 1998), and play a defining role in shaping political attitudes (Ryder 1985). These attitudes have been found to undergo minimal change thereafter (Alwin 1994; Krosnick and Alwin 1989; Osborne, Sears and Valentino 2011). According to this hypothesis, events experienced during the formative years, when shared by an entire population, can result in the formation of a distinct generation with a common world view (Corning and Schuman 2015; Jennings and Zhang 2005; Schuman and Corning 2011). It follows that cohorts exposed to markedly different sociopolitical environments would develop distinct political attitudes.

As detailed in the previous section, state-led systemic societal upheaval produced a distinct political socialization environment within China during Mao's time in office. Consequently, we divide the modern-day population of the People's Republic of China into two political generations based on their age during the years of Mao's leadership (1949-1976). Specifically, individuals who experienced at least part of their formative years during this period form the Maoist Generation. We expect the distinct socialization environment of the Maoist years to have heightened their interest in politics. Meanwhile, we do not expect to observe similarly high levels of political interest among individuals politically socialized before and after the Maoist period.

Generations hypothesis: Individuals who were politically socialized during the Maoist era will express greater interest in politics compared to individuals socialized outside of the Maoist era.

Moreover, we argue that systemic sociopolitical upheaval can shape a population's interest in politics through three main channels: persecution, mobilization, and prolonged exposure to a climate of heightened indoctrination and anxiety.

Political persecution

Existing research has identified varied legacies arising from exposure to persecution. Some studies find heightened political awareness (Bellows and Miguel 2006; Carmil and Breznitz 1991) and increased sociopolitical engagement (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009) as potential downstream consequences among persecuted individuals. However, exposure to violence can also result in decreased political participation (Zhukov and Talibova 2018), and apathy (Benard 1994; Wood 2006). Zhukov and Talibova (2018, 269) argue that the continued presence of a strong state repression apparatus can dissuade individuals from political participation altogether if they believe that any subsequent engagement might invite repression.

Wang (2021) finds support for this rationale in the context of China. The author provides survey evidence indicating that individuals in areas that witnessed more violence during the

Cultural Revolution reported lower participation in contentious behavior like protests compared to individuals in areas that saw less violence. However, importantly, the findings also reveal the existence of what the author refers to as "silent dissidents” in such areas. Silent dissidents are “citizens who resent the regime but do not act on this sentiment ... as long as the state can credibly threaten violence” (Wang 2021, 464).

Building on these findings, we argue that in contexts where the state’s repressive capacity remains strong, persecuted individuals would have strong incentives to remain interested in politics to help them avoid actions that might invite the threat of further state censure and repression (Kuran 1997; Rozenas and Zhukov 2019). This expectation is also grounded in a growing body of research linking anxiety to information seeking and specifically political knowledge (Marcus, MacKuen and Neuman 2011). Anxiety has been shown to increase information seeking and learning in the face of political threat (Valentino et al. 2008). Anxious individuals have also been found to read, remember, and agree with threatening information (Gadarian and Albertson 2014). Finally, Söderström (2018) finds that individuals with greater fear in settings characterized by higher exposure to violence amass more political knowledge. Based on these findings, we expect persecuted individuals in China to have maintained a keen interest in political developments.

Persecution hypothesis: Individuals who suffered persecution should exhibit heightened political interest compared to non-persecuted individuals.

Political mobilization

We conceptualize political mobilization as the physical involvement of individuals in political activities. Past participation in protest actions and social movements have been found to produce long term biographical consequences for those involve (Jennings 2002; McAdam 1989). Participants have been found to exhibit greater political engagement decades after their initial involvement (Giugni 2004; Jennings 1987). Research specific to authoritarian settings reveal a more complex picture, with mobilized individuals remaining politically engaged in later years but questioning the ideological tenants that had once driven them to action (Chan 1985). Thus, the cohort of individuals who engaged in active political campaigns during a period of systemic societal upheaval should be expected to retain their interest with politics in later years.

Mobilization hypothesis: Individuals involved in revolutionary groups during the Cultural Revolution should express greater political interest compared to nonparticipants.

Socialization environment

Literature on the legacies of historical trauma has paid little attention to how prolonged exposure to a climate of heightened fear and anxiety might shape downstream political attitudes among individuals not directly exposed to either violence or mobilization. Research from political psychology suggests that such sustained exposure might have a substantial impact on individual attitudes. Experimental evidence demonstrates that anxiety induced through exposure to political threats can contribute to increased information seeking and learning (Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Vasilopoulos 2018; Valentino et al. 2008). Söderström (2018) finds that fear increases political knowledge among individuals situated in environments characterized by high levels of political violence. An ideologically charged environment can also produce "engaged observers," who abstain from participation but nevertheless become shaped by events transpiring within their broader society (Stewart, Settles and Winter 1998). Collectively, this unmobilized segment of the population tends to constitute a majority. Yet, past research has overlooked them due to their lack of direct exposure to either violence or mobilization. We argue, based on evidence from political psychology research, that individuals who became politically socialized during a period of sustained societal exposure to fear would remain alert to political information in the long-term.

Meanwhile, the political socialization environment during a period of systemic societal upheaval can sometimes be saturated with ideological messaging. Such political indoctrination, conceptualized broadly as the process of convincing a person or group to accept a set of beliefs uncritically, has long been practiced by political and military leaders worldwide (Brandenberger 2014; Sait 2019). Successful indoctrination allows leaders to justify the violent actions undertaken at their behest. When wielded by charismatic individuals, ideological narratives have the potential for permeating throughout society, shaping the attitudes of an entire generation. Such ideological conditioning has been found to retain its potency over long durations, shaping political attitudes many years after the cessation of both violence and indoctrination efforts (Burdman 2003; Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella 2016; Voigtländer and Voth 2015).

Nevertheless, the nature of the socialization environment's long-term impact on society differs from that of violence along a fundamental dimension. Violence leaves stark reminders for those affected, leaving scars readily identifiable by researchers. However, the consequences of sustained exposure to fear and indoctrination can be harder to detect, often only coloring the perspectives of affected individuals at a subconscious level.

Environment hypothesis: Individuals not involved in revolutionary groups or subject to persecution, yet were politically socialized in the Maoist era, should be more interested in politics compared to individuals socialized outside of the Maoist era.

Data and Methods

Data

We use data from six nationally representative surveys to empirically assess the above theoretical expectations: the 1993 Survey on Social Mobility and Social Change (1993 SMSC Survey), the 2008 China Survey, and four waves of the World Values Survey (WVS).

The Survey on Social Mobility and Social Change was conducted in 1993 by Tianjian Shi of Duke University in cooperation with the Social Survey Research Center of the People's University of China (Shi 2001). It used a stratified multistage sampling strategy to collect a nationally representative sample of the adult population, with a total of 3,287 respondents (see Table 38 for summary statistics). The China Survey was a national probability sample survey conducted through a collaboration between Texas A&M University and the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University in 2008. The survey used a spatial sampling technique that targeted 5,525 respondents in 59 prefectures (Wang 2021). The end result was a national probability sample of 3,989 individuals aged 18 or over, representing a response rate of 72.2%

(Wang 2021, Online Appendix). Summary statistics can be found under Table 39.

We use the wave 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the World Values Survey in Mainland China. These surveys were conducted in 1990, 2001, 2007, and 2012 respectively. We did not include wave 1 and 3 of the WVS because the first wave did not cover China and political interest was not included in the WVS wave 3 questionnaire. The WVS surveys employs stratified multi-stage sampling, with primary sampling units at the county level. Tables 40-43 provide summary statistics for these surveys.

The resulting database spans from 1990 to 2012 and includes 13,020 respondents. While each survey represents only a snapshot in time, collectively they allow us to disentangle competing explanations for any observed difference in political interest between the Maoist generation and the remainder of the population. Variables

Dependent variable: All analyses in our paper utilize the same dependent variable, the respondents' self-reported interest in politics. We focus on political interest for two reasons. First, we expect individuals who became socialized in an environment where the acceptability of political positions changed frequently to place a premium on being politically informed. Second, individuals socialized during a turbulent political period may be more aware of the potential for retribution by the authoritarian government. They may thus be more likely to mask their true attitudes and actions to escape potential state censure. The use of self-reported political interest may be less prone to such bias, due to its lack of information regarding loyalty toward the state.

Across all surveys included in our analyses, respondents were asked to indicate their degree of interest in politics on a four-point scale ranging from 'not at all interested' to 'very interested'. In cases where the response order was reversed, we recoded the variable so that a positive coefficient could be intuitively understood as an increase in political interest.

Independent variables: Our independent variable of interest is a binary indicator for whether an individual was politically socialized during the Maoist era. We rely on the impressionable years framework to assign respondents into one of two cohorts that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Traditionally, research on political generations has defined the impressionable years as spanning from 18-25 years of age (Tessler, Konold and Reif 2004). Following this definition, we assign respondents born between 1925 and 1957 to the Maoist generation. Everyone born in other years form the comparison group. This categorization ensures that respondents allocated to the Maoist generation spent at least part of their impressionable years under the tenure of Mao (1949-1976).[18]

The inclusion of socioeconomic controls can bias our estimates because the values of these variables could have been shaped by the political socialization environment experienced by our respondents. Differences across surveys in the measurement of these variables can also introduce bias into the resulting estimates. Consequently, we only include age, gender, and random effects for survey-year and 5-year birth cohorts in our benchmark specifications.

Nevertheless, to address concerns that the observed generational divide might be the product of fundamental changes within society (macro-societal change) and not the distinct socialization environment that prevailed during the Maoist years, we also report results from specifications that account for individual income and education attainment (Mishler and Rose 2007). To minimize estimation biases that might result from differences in the measurement of these variables across surveys, we run these analyses on only the WVS subset (using 4 out of 6 surveys). The persistence of a generational divide after accounting for these factors, would undermine macro-societal change explanations and strengthen the case for discrete historical political socialization.

Methods

The difficulty of disentangling age, period, and cohort effects is widely recognized in the political generations literature (Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar 2019; Shorrocks 2018). An individual's political interest could be influenced by their age, the prevailing political climate in a country when the survey was implemented, or as we argue, their discrete historical socialization experiences. A simple binary variable capturing generational membership cannot disentangle between these competing explanations. Consequently, we employ age-period-cohort (APC) models to account for the competing influence of age, cohort, and period, thus allowing us to indirectly test the influence of political socialization under the Maoist period on subsequent political interest. Specifically, we follow recent research and utilize a variant of the Yang and Land (2006) Hierarchical APC model, which treats individuals as nested within both birth cohort and survey year.

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[18] Recent empirical findings, in the context of the United States, suggest that the impressionable years might manifest earlier in an individual's life-cycle, from 15-20 years of age (Bartels and Jackman 2014). Our results are robust to this alternative definition of the impressionable years.

Operationally, this means that our models contain cross-classified random effects for both cohort clusters (by 5-year birth cohorts) and survey years. The macro-level generation variable then allows us to test the influence of generational context (being politically socialized during the Maoist era) on political interest. We also conduct robustness checks recommended in the existing literature (Shorrocks 2018). These include replacing our continuous measure of respondent age with a categorical measure and introducing survey-year as a fixed effect instead of a random effect.

Finally, to explore the channels contributing to our hypothesized generational difference, we utilize data from the 1993 SMSC Survey on individual persecution and mobilization during the Maoist era. The lack of similar data across the other surveys prevent us from conducting APC analyses. However, we still control for age, gender, income, and education in these specifications. Thus, despite data limitations, these results complement our main analyses presented below.

Results

We begin by exploring the bivariate relationship between birth year and self-reported political interest (**Figure 4**). Following cohort analysis conventions (Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar 2019), we averaged political interest across individuals by 5-year birth cohorts. Respondents who became politically socialized during the Maoist era appear to express greater political interest on average compared to everyone else.

We now report results from estimating Hierarchical APC models to provide a more rigorous test for the existence of a Maoist generation in our data. **Table 3** summarizes our main results. The main variable of interest is Maoist Generation. A positive coefficient for this variable would support our theoretical expectation that those individuals who became politically socialized during

Figure 4: Self-reported political interest by 5-year birth cohorts



Note: This figure shows the bivariate relationship between birth year and self-reported interest in politics. Following cohort analysis conventions for minimizing noise arising from outliers, we averaged political interest across all individuals belonging to 5-year birth cohorts. Respondents born in the years contained within the two vertical lines would have experienced at least part of their impressionable years in Maoist China. The three horizontal lines denote the average political interest across respondents belonging to these three periods. Number of respondents = 13,020. **Sources**: 1993 SMSC Survey, 2008 China Survey, and WVS waves 2, 4-6.

the Maoist era will express heightened political interest compared to the remainder of the Chinese population. As confirmed by **Table 3**, both specifications return positive coefficients and are significant at the 1% level. Our findings are robust to alternative model specifications. Similar results are obtained when we replace respondent age with a categorical measure for age (Table 44), use the Bartels and Jackman (2014) definition for the formative years (Table 45), and include survey-year as a fixed as opposed to random effect (Table 46).

We now turn to the 1993 SMSC Survey to distinguish between the various channels that may have contributed to the formation of the Maoist generation. This survey identifies two groups of individuals directly impacted by campaigns undertaken during the Maoist period. The first group consists of individuals who suffered political persecution and/or discrimination by the state. Respondents were coded as being persecuted if they acknowledged a personal experience of political persecution, 0 otherwise. The second group consists of individuals who joined revolutionary organizations during the Cultural Revolution. Respondents were coded as being a member of a revolutionary organization if they reported participation in any of the revolutionary mass organizations that existed during the Cultural Revolution, 0 otherwise. These two groups capture the political persecution and mobilization channels respectively. Political indoctrination and the environment of fear would have been the primary channels shaping political interest among remaining members of the Maoist generation.

Table 3: Membership in Maoist generation and political interest

	Interest in politics	
	All surveys	*WVS only*
Maoist Generation	0.183^{***} (0.025)	0.139^{**} (0.043)
Age	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES
Additional controls	NO	YES
Survey-year Random Effects	YES	YES
Birth-cohort Random Effects	YES	YES
Observations	13,020	5,241

Note: Regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Hierarchical APC models. Dependent variable in both specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Variable of interest is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1925 and 1957. Both columns include respondent age and gender as controls alongside survey-year and 5-year birth cohort random effects. Column 2 also includes measures for education and income as additional controls. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Sources**: Column 1: 1993 SMSC Survey, 2008 China Survey, and waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS. Column 2: Waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS.

Our findings, summarized under **Table 4**, provide support for the persecution, mobilization, and environment hypotheses. We theorized that individuals subjected to state persecution in the past would maintain a greater interest in politics as a means to avoid further state censure. Consistent with this expectation, our results suggest that citizens directly persecuted by the state exhibit higher political interest compared to individuals not subjected to such experiences. Moreover, individuals who joined revolutionary organizations during the Cultural Revolution also express higher political interest compared to those not similarly mobilized.

Table 4: Subgroup analyses using the 1993 SMSC survey

	Interest in politics		
Maoist Generation	0.157^{***}	0.134^{***}	0.137^{***}
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Persecuted		0.175^{*}	0.114
		(0.068)	(0.068)
Revolutionary Org member		0.116^{***}	0.079^{*}
		(0.033)	(0.034)
Age	YES	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES	YES
Additional controls	NO	NO	YES
County Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,159	3,139	3,134

Note: Regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models. Dependent variable across all specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Maoist generation is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1925 and 1957. Individuals were coded as being persecuted if they acknowledged a personal experience of political persecution, 0 otherwise. Individuals were coded as being a member of a revolutionary organization if they reported participation in any of the revolutionary mass organizations that existed during the Cultural Revolution, 0 otherwise. All columns include respondent age and gender as controls. Column 3 also includes measures for education and income as additional controls. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Source**: 1993 SMSC Survey.

Finally, even after accounting for both persecution and mobilization, the Maoist Generation variable remains both positive and statistically significant. This finding, consistent with our environment hypothesis, suggests that direct exposure to state-led violence and mobilization do not by themselves account for the generational divide in political interest. The ubiquitous nature of the indoctrination and anxiety that permeated the Maoist years appears to have left an enduring mark on those who became politically socialized during that period.

Addressing alternative explanations

In this section, we present further evidence, which suggest that our findings for China result from the distinct political socialization environments experienced by different cohorts in the Chinese population. We leveraged the extensive spatial and temporal coverage of the World Values Survey to design an over time cross-country test. This test replicates the generational analysis conducted for China across four neighboring polities. The generational groupings developed based on the historical experience of Chinese citizens should be meaningless for the populations of other countries. Consequently, retrieving similar patterns for political interest to those found in China would weaken our argument that these generations are the result of China's distinct political socialization experience.

We find no evidence for a generational divide similar to the one we find in the Chinese context across any of the four neighboring polities (**Table 5**). Crucially, the patterns retrieved for Taiwan and Hong Kong, two regions that share in the cultural and administrative history of China, clearly differ from those found in China. Results for Japan and South Korea further weaken the case for the applicability of these generational definitions beyond China. Similar results are obtained when we use the Bartels and Jackman (2014) definition for the formative years (Table 47).

Alternatively, could the observed generational divide in political interest be driven by increased apathy toward politics among younger Chinese citizens and not by elevated political interest among members of the Maoist era generation? For instance, it might be argued that the better economic prospects experienced since market liberalization in 1978 engendered a generation of politically apathetic individuals. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence help allay this concern. First, as confirmed by column 2 of Table 3, the heightened political interest among members of the Maoist generation persists even after accounting for socioeconomic factors like education and income. This result undermines the macro-societal change explanation and strengthens the case for discrete historical political socialization (Mishler and Rose 2007). Second, the comparison group in our analyses consist of individuals politically socialized both before and after Mao's

Table 5: Investigating generational divides across four neighboring polities

	Interest in politics			
	Taiwan	*Hong Kong*	*Japan*	*South Korea*
Maoist Generation (traditional)	0.046	0.037	0.063	0.035
	(0.075)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.055)
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey-year Random Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth-cohort Random Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,386	2,044	4,069	3,581

Note: Regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Hierarchical APC models. Dependent variable across all specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Variable of interest is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1925 and 1957. All columns include respondent age, gender, education, and income as controls alongside survey-year and 5-year birth cohort random effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Sources**: Waves 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS.

time in office. The former would have been politically socialized long before these economic improvements materialized.

Lastly, the conclusion that lower political interest appeared as a novel phenomenon among those born in the 1960s and later is premised on these individuals having access to improved economic prospects, which in turn might have shifted their attention away from politics to the pursuit of a higher quality of living. But such prospects were slow to materialize, with many experiencing economic hardships in the late 80s and the 90s. Institutional and organizational reforms to danwei – a redistributive system that provided employees free housing and job security – resulted in the sacking of 43 million workers between 1995 and 2001 (Giles, Park and Cai 2006; Leung 1994; Zhao and Zhou 2017). Thus, atypically elevated political engagement during the Maoist years, and a return to the tradition of "popular isolation from politics", seems a better explanation for the observed generational divide in political engagement (Townsend 1967; Zhu, Zhao and Li 1990, 14).

Conclusion

By bridging research on political generations with work on the legacy of traumatic experiences, we proposed that a period of systemic societal upheaval will facilitate the formation of a durable political generation. The paper identifies three channels capable of shaping a generation's long-term political interest; persecution, mobilization, and an atmosphere of political alertness fueled by indoctrination and fear of persecution. Past research has emphasized the lasting impact of direct persecution and mobilization on political outcomes. This paper extends our current understanding concerning the broader legacy of societal upheavals by theoretically motivating and empirically testing whether the persistent influence of that period manifests among peers not directly exposed to such experiences.

We leveraged shifts in the political socialization environment in China to test whether exposure to past societal upheaval has produced a durable Maoist generation. The analysis of six nationally representative surveys, spanning two decades of public opinion data, demonstrate that the societal upheaval, which punctuated the tenure of Mao, left an enduring legacy in its wake. The generation of individuals who became politically socialized during the Maoist years express greater political interest compared to the remainder of the population. Consistent with theoretical expectations, our results reveal heightened political interest among respondents who experienced either state persecution or revolutionary mobilization. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the Maoist generation exhibits greater political interest compared to the remainder of the population even after accounting for the influence of state persecution and mobilization. Finally, a cross-country analysis, which leveraged three consecutive waves of the World Values Survey, indicate that political generations track country-specific historical experiences.

We believe that our findings have implications for authoritarian regime survival, stability, and consolidation. The proportion of Chinese citizens who experienced the instability resulting from Maoist policies declines with each passing year. Lower political interest among an increasing proportion of the population can diffuse pressures on the regime to hold itself accountable to the masses. Meanwhile, reduced political interest is likely to apply an upward pressure on individual thresholds for participation in collective action (Granovetter 1978). Higher individual thresholds, in turn, can diffuse the threat of large-scale mobilization in opposition to the regime, allowing for greater regime stability and consolidation. A less politically aware citizenry is also more prone to be blindsided by authoritarian overreach. Cumulatively, these developments can lengthen the regime's lifespan.

These implications might also extend to other authoritarian settings that have experienced episodes of political upheaval in the past. Exploring the existence of such political generations, grounded in a careful study of the historical record, can be a fruitful avenue for future research. If they exist, these generations, scarred by past exposure to political upheavals, might contribute to our understanding of how the political landscape of a country evolves over time. Their dominance in the electorate might help explain predilections toward moderate political positions (Carmil and Breznitz 1991), and the natural replacement of these generations by younger cohorts could produce a shift in both the tone and priorities espoused by political actors.

Chapter IV: Protectors or Pariahs

Why voters reward or punish past violence

Abstract: When do voters support parties linked to violent groups? Departing from existing literature, which focuses on aggregate outcomes, I examine the micro-foundations of support for such parties. I argue that individuals will support an armed group affiliated party if they perceive the armed group's engagement in violence and the party's efforts as seeking to protect the interests of their community. I test this argument by drawing on evidence from nearly 100 interviews and representative public opinion data spanning the first decade after conflict in Northern Ireland. The Provos described their actions as responding to the oppression of the Nationalist community. Though by no means universal, the resonance of this narrative among Nationalists benefited Sinn Féin. Meanwhile, Loyalist paramilitaries portrayed their activities as protecting Unionists from Provo violence. This community's general rejection of paramilitarism, given their support of the state security apparatus, prevented Loyalist paramilitary linked parties from gaining traction.

Keywords: *civil conflict, paramilitaries, political parties, electoral support, Northern Ireland*

Introduction

More than half the countries in the world have experienced civil conflicts since 1960 (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Many of these countries contain political parties with links to groups that perpetrated violence. However, there exists substantial variation in the post-conflict electoral performance of these parties. When do voters support parties linked to violent groups?

Existing research has focused on macro-level explanations, aggregate outcomes, and spatial units of analysis to answer this question. While such approaches have improved our understanding of postwar electoral dynamics, they have the potential to produce misleading conclusions about the relative importance of armed group affiliated political parties and individual motivations for supporting them. For example, in the context of a localized civil war that is motivated by and/or limited to only part of the country, focusing on the national electoral map can provide misleading picture as to the popularity and influence of a local party. The absence of a national following for such a party need not be indicative of irrelevance as it might still play a crucial role in shaping the politics of areas in which its affiliated armed actors (and political constituents) are situated. Moreover, a focus on aggregate factors does not help us penetrate the micro-foundations of the support enjoyed by such actors. This paper addresses these shortcomings.

I argue that individuals will support an armed group affiliated party if they perceive the group's engagement in violence and the party's efforts as having sought to protect the community's interests. Moreover, I argue that existing explanations have identified more proximate predictors of electoral performance that are situated downstream from my proposed causal pathway.

It is advantageous to study the question of post-conflict electoral dynamics in Northern Ireland for multiple reasons. First, unlike the civil conflicts that have informed existing explanations, this conflict was highly localized, mostly limited to one of the four countries that compose the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland, therefore, represents a good case to illustrate both a) the theoretical gains to be realized by studying diverse civil conflicts and b) the misleading insights that might be derived from only analyzing national-level electoral patterns. Second, it provides variation in the outcome of interest – electoral support for parties with links to armed groups – in a single case. This allows me to hold the institutional environment constant while attempting to understand what other factor might explain this divergence in electoral fortunes. Third, armed groups in Northern Ireland, regardless of their affiliated party's electoral performance, were substantially weaker both in terms of both manpower and weaponry compared to the British army. Consequently, existing explanations for why parties with ties to armed groups receive votes – the manpower of armed groups during conflict, the extent of their territorial control, or their military strength in relation to the victor at the end of conflict – fail to account for the empirical realities of Northern Ireland.

I test my arguments using evidence from nearly 100 in-person interviews and representative public opinion data spanning the first decade after conflict (1998 - 2007). Interviews with members of paramilitary groups, security services, civil society, politicians, journalists, and academics reveal a marked distinction in how the actions of specific paramilitary groups are perceived within their communities. While there was sympathy for specific acts of retaliation among members of both the Nationalist and Unionist communities during the conflict, only the Republican paramilitary group was perceived as operating in the interests of their community. Analysis of survey data reveals that a comparable minority of respondents in both communities express sympathy for the reasons behind paramilitary activity. However, consistent with expectations, the relationship between sympathy and support for the paramilitary affiliated party is different between the Republican and Loyalist parties. Individuals who express more sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary activity have a greater likelihood of voting for the Republican paramilitary affiliated party both immediately after the cessation of violence and for a decade thereafter. However, the parallel relationship is noticeably weaker for the Loyalist party and diminishes into insignificance by the end of the decade. The involvement of Loyalist paramilitaries in activities detrimental to the community during the post-conflict period help explain this erosion in support.

I address several alternative explanations. First, greater military capacity at the end of the conflict does not explain my findings as both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups possessed substantially lower military capacity compared to the state security services. Even if we limit our comparison to parties in the Nationalist camp, the party with no military capacity outperforms the paramilitary affiliated party in the first post-conflict election. Second, the results persist even after accounting for both individual sectarian identity and the strength of such sectarian identities. Third, the results appear to be driven by attitudes regarding armed group motivations and not perceptions of actualized progress for the community. Specifically, the findings are qualitatively unchanged when I include a measure of perceptions regarding which community (Nationalist/Unionist) benefited more from the Good Friday Agreement (the most visible outcome at the end of conflict in 1998). Fourth, differences in organizational capacity across parties do not explain these findings as such capacity is situated causally downstream from community perceptions. Existing scholarship and my interviews reveal that community perceptions of the reasons behind paramilitary activity were crucial when attempting to convert paramilitary capacity into political organizational capacity. Finally, ex-post rationalization of attitudes toward armed groups by individuals who have decided to vote for the armed group affiliated party cannot account for the findings. Substantially more individuals express sympathy for armed group actions than indicate voting intentions for the armed group affiliated party.

This paper makes several contributions. It is the first paper to investigate the micro-foundations of electoral support for parties with ties to armed groups. Second, by focusing on Northern Ireland, it emphasizes the need for differentiating among civil conflicts of varying geographical scope. Third, it expands beyond the traditional focus on the first post-conflict election (Allison 2010; Daly 2019), by studying voter support for such parties over time. Fourth, it builds on research that examines post-conflict political participation among excombatants (Blattman 2009; Bellows and Miguel 2009). My findings suggest that a desire for greater political involvement among excombatants by itself is not sufficient for successful political engagement. Specifically, community perceptions about why excombatants engaged in political violence might be a crucial determinant of whether excombatants succeed in the political arena. Fifth, relatedly, this paper also adds to research on the post-conflict activities of excombatants in Northern Ireland (Ferguson, Burgess and Hollywood 2015). Sixth, it contributes to a broader literature on the political legacy of violence (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017). Finally, the context-sensitivity of such legacies speaks to related literature, which emphasizes the importance of political context for the appearance of legacies (Rozenas and Zhukov 2019; Menon 2022).

How perceived motivations behind past violence shape electoral support

There is limited research on the factors that shape the electoral support of political parties linked to armed groups. According to Allison (2006), groups that commanded larger numbers of combatants during conflict and with greater popular support will showcase better electoral performances in the postwar period. In subsequent work, Allison (2010) identified a group's control of a region and the extent of violence it perpetrated as additional factors shaping postwar electoral dynamics. Ishiyama and Widmeier (2013) find support for these latter explanations in the context of Tajikistan and Nepal. Most recently, (Daly 2019) has posited that postwar electoral performance is a function of military strength at the end of conflict, with militarily stronger entities being more successful in garnering votes given their ability to claim credit for the postwar peace and security. These explanations, while providing crucial insights into postwar electoral dynamics, have several shortcomings.

First, explanations that focus on the strength of armed actors during or at the end of conflict fail to explain why such actors came to be popular and militarily competent in the first place. Second, in all cases, the theoretical and empirical examination of this issue has been conducted primarily in the context of conflicts that enveloped a substantial proportion of the state's territories and waged by actors who could challenge the coercive monopoly of the state.[19] It is unclear whether the conclusions drawn from such cases might apply to contexts that saw more localized conflict. Third, relatedly, the literature's focus on the outcome of national elections might be misplaced in the context of localized conflicts as parties with links to armed groups in these settings might be intentionally local, only interested in courting voters whose grievances they seek to redress. Moreover, a focus on electoral shares at the national level in these contexts is also likely to understate the influence of parties with links to armed groups by biasing in favor of the status-quo political parties that fields candidates across the entire country. Fourth, empirical support for these explanations derive primarily from analyzing the first postwar elections in various locations. As recognized by Allison (2010), these initial elections can suffer from concerns surrounding fairness and transparency. Moreover, support for parties linked to armed groups might also be depressed in the first election after conflict as civilians might be assessing the resolve of armed actors to maintain their course of action. Fifth, the existing literature, by focusing only on parties with ties to entities involved in armed action, does not consider inter-party dynamics in post-conflict environments. For instance, how might the arrival of a party with ties to armed groups influence the support of other parties that occupy the same or similar ideological space? Finally, if we are interested in why voters vote at all for these entities, and not solely in why they win elections, we should unpack the micro-foundations of such decision making.

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[19] While the cross-country analysis conducted by Daly (2019) does include conflicts of a more localized nature, the primary focus of the author is on the civil conflict that engulfed the whole nation of El Salvador. Moreover, the author retains focus on national elections, which as I argue below, can result in misleading inferences about the postwar political reality.

I argue that two conditions need to be met for individuals to support parties linked to armed groups. First, individuals in the community should believe that the armed group undertook violence to protect and promote the interests of their community. Second, individuals should also believe that the actions of the affiliated party are consistent with this goal. I will now unpack each of these conditions.

Armed groups typically pursue violent action in pursuit of some stated goal. They develop narratives that seek to portray their goal as a just cause and their chosen course of action as necessary to achieve it. A group will garner popular support if its narrative resonates with the community in which it operates. While some portion of this popular support has the potential to translate into recruits for the group, the majority are liable to remain nonviolent. Those that do not condone the group's violent course of action might still be in agreement with their cause, thus constituting a latent pool of support.

An armed group that disengages from violence can mobilize their latent support to the voting booth if the affiliated party is seen to embody of the ideological commitments of the armed group. Given that many members of the armed group often constitute the membership of the affiliated party, ideological continuity might seem a forgone conclusion. However, as illustrated by (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013), such continuity of purpose between armed group and political party should not be assumed. A party that is seen opportunistically deviating from the convictions of its armed group ancestry will see an erosion of hard won popular support. Thus, a history of pro-community efforts is a necessary but not sufficient condition for support.

The continued operation of an armed group in the post-conflict period can enervate such nascent good will within the community. In the absence of a live conflict, their actions will be viewed as hampering and not serving the needs of the community. Support lost through continued violent activity by the party-linked armed group is likely to migrate toward other parties that are deemed more "respectable" due to their abstinence from violence. Similarly, deviation from the ideological roots of its armed group by an affiliated party is likely to drive voters toward other parties, if they exist, that more "faithfully" occupy the same ideological space.

HYPOTHESIS I: *Individuals will support a political party with links to an armed group if they perceive the armed group's engagement in violence and party's actions as having sought to protect and promote the interests of their community.*

HYPOTHESIS II: *If individuals believe that an armed group did not act in the interests of their community, but nevertheless believe in the motivations behind armed action, they will support the political party that best presents such motivations.*

Paramilitaries and the party landscape in Northern Ireland

A number of paramilitary organizations operated across Northern Ireland during the Troubles. They can be categorized into two camps based on their stance regarding the 'constitutional question'. One set of groups (Republican paramilitaries) sought the unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland while the other camp (Loyalist paramilitaries) sought to maintain Northern Ireland's union with Great Britain. Collectively, paramilitary groups have been linked to

3,085 deaths or approximately 87% of all conflict related deaths during the Troubles.

Republican paramilitaries: The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or '*Provos*' was the main paramilitary group on the Nationalist-Republican side. The PIRA was founded in December 1969 following a split with the Original IRA (Horgan and Taylor 1997; English 2008). Their activities have been linked to over 1,700 deaths between 1969 and 1998 (McKittrick et al. 2001). The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), another offshoot of the Original IRA, was also active during the Troubles and is though responsible for over 100 deaths during that time (McKittrick et al. 2001). Both the PIRA and INLA agreed to ceasefires in the late 1990s. Dissent Republicans who opposed these ceasefires have since joined paramilitary groups like the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) (Frenett and Smith 2012). While they have been responsible for some violence in the years since the signing of the GFA, there has not been a return to the sustained violence that characterized the Troubles.

Nationalist-Republican parties: Two parties have competed for the Nationalist vote in the post GFA period – Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Sinn Féin's long-standing ties to the PIRA are well-documented and widely acknowledged among the public (Feeney 2003; Frampton 2016; O'Leary 2019). Since the peace agreement, they have gained a sizable electoral following, consistently attracting over 20% of votes cast in Northern Ireland across both the devolved legislature and Westminster elections since 2000. They are currently the largest party in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, the SDLP differentiated itself from Sinn Féin through its principled rejection of violence as a means of uniting Ireland (O'Leary 2019). Since the peace agreement, they have steadily ceded ground to Sinn Féin, dropping below 10% for the first time in the 2022 Assembly election.

Loyalist paramilitaries: A number of Loyalist paramilitary groups operated during the Troubles (Bruce 1992*a*;*b*; 2001). The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and its close affiliate the Red Hand Commando (RHC) have been linked to nearly 550 deaths between 1966 and 1999 (McKittrick et al. 2001). The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) through its paramilitary wing the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) has been held responsible for 408 killings between 1970 and 1999 (McKittrick et al. 2001). Smaller splinter paramilitary groups like the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) and the Red Hand Defenders (RHD) became into existence during the 1990s.

Unionist-Loyalist parties: The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has attracted the largest share of Unionist voters since the signing of the GFA, averaging over 25% of the total vote share across all elections in this period. While not explicitly linked to any Loyalist paramilitary groups, the party's rhetoric has established it as a hard-line Unionist party, which has often expressed significant resistance to initiatives involving power-sharing with Republicans (McAuley 2004; Tonge et al. 2020). The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is the second largest Unionist party. The UUP's electoral fortunes have seen a marked reversal since the signing of the peace agreement, ceding ground to the DUP among Unionist voters (Tonge et al. 2020). Two paramilitary linked Loyalist political parties existed at the time of the Peace Agreement. One of them, the Ulster Democratic Party, ceased to exist in 2001 (McAuley 2005). The other, the Progressive Unionist Party, continues to operate today and maintains links to paramilitary groups the UVF and RHC (McAuley 2004). In the early post-conflict years, the PUP voiced support for the GFA and expressed openess to power-sharing agreements unlike its more mainstream counterpart the DUP (McAuley 2004). Neither the UDP nor the PUP have achieved sizable electoral followings in the period since 1998.

Data and Empirical Strategy

I combine evidence from extensive interviews and public opinion data from Northern Ireland's first post-conflict decade to test my theoretical expectations.

Interviews

I interviewed nearly 100 individuals across various locations throughout Northern Ireland from January to October 2019 (**Figure 5**). These individuals occupy a variety of backgrounds; members of civil society, victims groups, media, security services, ex-combatants from both Republican and Loyalist backgrounds, politicians from across the political spectrum, and academics who study various aspects of the Troubles and its legacy. The resulting interviewee pool is thus composed of individuals who have in-depth knowledge of how voter preferences have evolved over the past few decades. Indeed, in a number of instances, my interviewees were “in the room where it happens,” helping to shape the current political reality of Northern Ireland. Given procedures implemented to protect the identity of human subjects in accordance with my university’s Institutional Review Board, any quotes from these interviews will be made without attribution.

Figure 5: Network representation of interviews conducted by the author


● Author
● Academic
● Civil society
● Civilians
● Journalists
● Paramilitary - Republican
● Paramilitary - Loyalist
● Politics - Nationalist
● Politics - Unionist
● Politics - Other
● Security
● Victims

Note: Each circle represents an interviewee. Node length was arbitrary chosen by the plotting program and is not meant to convey either the social distance between actors or the strength of their relationship.

Surveys

I leverage four surveys conducted between 1998 and 2007 to empirically interrogate my expectations.These include the 1998, 2003, and 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) surveys and the 1999 European Values Survey (EVS) (NILT 1998; EVS 1999). The NILT surveys are a unique resource that allows researchers to trace the evolution of public attitudes in Northern Ireland society since 1998. The surveys are fielded on random samples that are representative of the adult population of Northern Ireland. The EVS is a longitudinal, cross-national survey that collects public opinion data on a range of topics from citizens in over 40 European countries.

While the scope of questions covered in these surveys vary from year to year, these four surveys included a question that allows for a test of my empirical expectations. Specifically, respondents in Northern Ireland were asked two questions, seeking to gauge the extent of their sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist and Republican paramilitary violence. For example, to measure sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist violence, respondents were asked: *"Finally, thinking about the reasons why some Loyalists groups have used violence during the troubles, would you say that you have any sympathy with the reasons for the violence – even if you don't condone the violence itself? Would you say you have – a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or, no sympathy at all?"* The same question was also asked regarding Republican paramilitary groups.

It is important to recognize that these questions do not inform us as to the reasons behind individual sympathies for armed groups but only captures the extent of "sympathy with the reasons for the violence." This distinction is crucial as vastly different reasons for violence might engender sympathies for the paramilitary groups that operated during this period. As existing scholarship and my interview evidence illustrates, sympathy for Republican paramilitaries among members of the Nationalist community arose from their perception that these armed groups were acting to protect and promote the interests of that community. In contrast, sympathy for Loyalist paramilitaries among members of the Unionist community arose from a desire to see immediate retaliation for Republican paramilitary violence inflicted on members of their community. However, no sustained support appears to have materialized from such sympathy as most Unionists viewed the state security forces as the legitimate protectors of law and order within their communities and paramilitary groups as a deleterious influence. Given this distinction, we should expect sympathy for Republican paramilitaries to be significantly associated with party support and not so in case of Loyalist paramilitaries.[20]

Each of these surveys also asked respondents about their voting intentions.[21] I created six binary variables that indicate respondent intention to vote for one of the following parties: Sinn Féin, PUP, SDLP, DUP, UDP, and UUP. Finally, the surveys include information on respondent age, gender, education, income, and religion. The NILT surveys also provide information on the rough geographical area in which each respondent resided at the time of the survey.

Empirical Strategy

For each of the four surveys, I estimate the following specification:

$$Voting\ intention_{ij} \ = \ \alpha_{ij} \ + \ \beta_1 * Sympathy_{ij} \ + \ \zeta * \mathbf{D}_{ij} \ + \ \gamma_j \ + \ \varepsilon_{ij}, \qquad (2)$$

where i denotes individual and j the general area in which respondent resided at the time of the survey. $Voting\ intention_{ij}$ represents the individual's self-reported intention to vote for a given party. $Sympathy_{ij}$ is the respondent's self-reported sympathy for the reasons behind Republican and Loyalist paramilitary violence. The vector $\mathbf{D}_{ij}$ controls for respondent age, gender, education, income, and religion. Area fixed effects (γ_{jk}) help address differences that might arise from the demographic makeup of respondent location – dividing the political geography of Northern Ireland into Belfast, places East of the Bann River (majority Protestant), and places West of the Bann River

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[20] It might be argued that "sympathy behind the reasons for paramilitary violence" is measuring how an individual feels about the affiliated party and not the armed group. If this is the case, we should expect to see a strong positive relationship between this measure and voting intentions for both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary parties. As seen below, this is not the case.

[21] The 2007 survey did not explicitly ask about respondent voting intentions: "Which Northern Ireland political party do you feel closest to, even if you do not always vote for them?"

(majority Catholic). ε_{ij} represents the error term. I report robust standard errors throughout.

Results

Qualitative evidence

Consistent intra-group similarities and inter-group distinctions emerge from both existing research on Northern Ireland and my interviews. I begin by providing an overview of the evidence from secondary sources before turning to complementary insights shared by interviewees.

Existing scholarship

The Nationalist-Republican community's attitudes toward the IRA evolved over the course of the Troubles. The group's limited defense of Belfast's Republican areas during the early days of the Troubles inspired the suggestion that IRA stood for 'I Ran Away' (Hanley 2013).[22] However, the 1980-81 Hunger Strikes served as a watershed moment for the group, with dying prisoners becoming martyrs within the Republican-Nationalist community (Feeney 2003). Bobby Sands' 1981 Parliamentary by-election victory, while on hunger strike, revealed broad support for the PIRA among members of the Nationalist community (O'Leary 2019). Evidence for such support, by no means universal within the Nationalist community, has also been recorded in later years (Sluka, Rubinstein and Foster 1988; Hayes and McAllister 2005; Murphy 1993).

Time in prison became a badge of honor for PIRA volunteers: "The fact that I have been in jail, while it might be detrimental to you in any other society or country, means I'm looked upon here as someone who was prepared to put their livelihood, life, whatever, on the line ... it gives you "street cred" (Frampton 2016, 15).[23] Frampton (2016) notes that such street cred – the perception that

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[22] Whether such graffiti did actually appear on walls is questioned by (Hanley 2013), but one of my interviewees, a long-time Sinn Féin political strategist recounted the episode to make the case that the group transformed its reputation from a nadir in the late 1960s. Thus, regardless of the historical accuracy of this episode, it has become incorporated into how Sinn Féin describes the PIRA's taking up the mantle of protector.

[23] I also witnessed first-hand the popularity of these individuals on a number of occasions.

PIRA actions were taken in the interests of the Republican community – was crucial in retaining Republican supporters during the transition from armed action to political competition.

The Unionist-Loyalist community's attitudes toward Loyalist paramilitaries, while never broadly supportive, fluctuated with the pulse of conflict. The "core philosophy behind much Loyalist paramilitary activity was to engage in some form of 'counter-terrorism'"(McAuley 2004). However, for many in the Unionist community the state security apparatus consisting of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British Army had the sole mandate on enforcing law and order and protecting their community from paramilitary violence. Given this attitude, Loyalist paramilitaries have always needed "to justify their very existence within Protestant working-class communities" and could hope for little electoral support in the post-conflict political environment (Gallaher 2011; McAuley 2004, 531). An interview excerpt from Shirlow et al. (2013, 107) succinctly captures this sentiment: "...the UVF and the RHC couldn't convert their physical and military strength into the political because the wider unionist community does not accept former prisoners or people involved in paramilitarism as a political representative ... it is not in their psyche, because this is the first time that loyalists went outside the law."

The Loyalist paramilitary affiliated PUP's political fortunes would have been further compromised by two additional factors. First, Loyalist paramilitary groups have been involved in racketeering, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities in the years following the signing of the GFA (McAuley 2004; Gallaher 2011). Indeed, an internal document produced by representatives of Loyalist paramilitary groups since 1998 noted that such activities have contributed "more to destabilize, demoralize, and debilitate Loyalist areas than the Republican movement did in 30 years of attacks" (Gallaher 2011; McAuley 2004, 532). The PUP's perceived association with one of these groups, the UVF, has likely constrained their political fortunes. Second, the PUP's support of the GFA and their willingness to engage in power-sharing agreements "with the traditional 'enemies of Ulster'" would have also soured feelings toward the party among members of the Unionist-Loyalist community (McAuley 2004, 529). Such disaffected individuals could in turn have been attracted by the strong anti-GFA and anti-power-sharing position adopted by the DUP.

Author's Interviews

Through my interviews I was able to corroborate and build on the above distinction in how Republican and Loyalist paramilitary activity was viewed within their respective communities. Moreover, I was able to juxtapose perspectives from a range of actors within society and not focus exclusively on ex-paramilitary members as is often the case in the existing literature. While a number of my interviews yielded information relevant to the question at hand, space constraints require me to focus on a subset of these here. The Appendix (page 144) provides additional excerpts that speak to various aspects of this question.

Members of civil society expressed analyses on the paramilitary-politics situation that was markedly similar to those offered by paramilitary members themselves. An employee at the Shankill Women's Centre, situated in a predominantly working class Loyalist neighborhood, expressed the following sentiments:

> "There was a difference in how Republican prisoners were looked at from their community as what Loyalist prisoners were looked at from their community. Republicans, they were all heroes. The men behind the war. That wasn't the same sentiment within Protestant communities. [...] When the Loyalist prisoners got out, there wasn't the same hero mentality, because a lot of those people got out as political prisoners weren't political prisoners in the first place. Community didn't rally around them the same. One of the other aspects of that is, a lot of the Protestant community didn't think that Loyalist should have took up arms. They should have went down the law and order route, because we're very law abiding citizens."

Veteran journalists, politicians, academics, members of the security services, and ex-paramilitary members all provided remarkably similar analyses of this distinction between the treatment of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary members (see Appendix - page 144). Interviewees from a Nationalist-Republican background recognized the community acceptance of ex-prisoners. One Republican ex-prisoner who now serves as an elected official noted:

> "We were always about trying to create a new Ireland. And we're still about that. We were political activists, with guns. Now, we're political activists without guns. And it's basically as simple as that for us. And the community that we lived in, that supported us during the course of the conflict, and in the end, they support us in the project that we are involved in today. [...] The loyalists don't. The unionist community have always pretended that the killer gangs aren't coming from their communities, and that they were somehow different, they were an element spread apart from anything that we were involved in, or are fairly unlike anything that we were involved in. But they talk about being "our response to Republican activism"."

Meanwhile, interviewees from a Unionist-Loyalist background acknowledged that the larger Unionist community condemned any violent action through non-state channels. They view their allegiance as belonging to the state and toward preserving law and order. Consequently, any involvement in non-state violence was viewed as betraying this allegiance. Despite individual differences in lived experiences, there was universal agreement among Loyalist paramilitaries that the Unionist community largely rejected their violent actions and ostracized armed actors. Even those Loyalist excombatants who are currently involved in post-conflict peace building and civic activism reported facing such community resistance (see Appendix - page 144). Tellingly, some Loyalist excombatants described shame within their own families for their involvement in violent actions. A politician previously affiliated with the PUP summarized the Unionist-Loyalist community's relationship with the party and paramilitary groups as follows:

> "But the DUP were screaming and shouting, "No amnesty, no amnesty." And now what do they want? They want an amnesty but only for soldiers and police, not for anybody else. And people within loyalism, those who are close to loyalist paramilitaries have a difficulty with what the DUP are saying, no amnesty for terrorists, because of course some of them were. But their families are saying, "Yes, I agree with DUP." So there's this confusion. Loyalism has always been like a confused child in a family, that one minute it's getting smacked by the leader of the DUP, and the next

> minute it's getting embraced. So it's like, where do we stand? Where do we stand? Where do we stand? Because they're never quite sure where they stand, because they're constantly getting criticized and condemned. And then the next minute, they're getting their arm put around them. So I think there's a confusion there."

However, working-class Loyalist communities in parts of Belfast might have seen these groups as serving the needs of that community. For instance, the same interviewee recounted experiences from childhood that cast Loyalist paramilitaries in the role of protector and provider:

> "I remember the paramilitaries in the street during the Ulster Workers' Council strike in 1974, I think it was, where the shops, you couldn't get milk or bread or anything like that. And then the paramilitaries brought it in. They brought in milk fresh from the farm in big urns. And we had to queue up with our milk bottles, and mom sent us around to get the milk. And then they had bread, and then they had meat. Then they had butter, so they were like these were big men that were looking after the community, if you like."

Consequently, we might expect to see some support for the PUP, especially in areas where Loyalist paramilitaries were engaged in such community-serving activities. Even these pockets of support, however, would have eroded in time with the continued participation of individuals linked to Loyalist paramilitary groups in activities detrimental to the community, like racketeering and drug trafficking. Some of these disillusioned voters in turn might have migrated to the other, more hard-line, party occupying this ideological space:

> "The PUP, where are they? PUP are lost, and their relationship with the UVF has ended their political prospects completely. They're never going to get anywhere, and if they align themselves with this DUP and align themselves with that sort of trajectory, people will, they'll finish completely, because people will just vote for the DUP. [...] I don't accept that the continued existence of loyalist paramilitaries are

> providing lessons for the community and keeping young people out of trouble. I think they are part of the problem, and I've told this to the leadership. So I'm not telling you anything that I haven't told them. The continued existence of the UVF and the UDA, the continued recruitment of both organizations of young people is adding to the cancerous, the disease within our communities. [...] They think that the continued existence of organizations is beneficial to the community in some way, and they can't see that they are the problem. [...] And instead of educating young people within their community to be of benefit to the community, they're just turning out rogues, more rogues, more rogues, more rogues, more people involved in criminality, more people involved in organized crime, more people involved in drugs. And they can't see it. They absolutely can't see it. So our communities are wrecked, wrecked by these people."

Survey evidence

I begin my reporting over time variation in the main independent and dependent variables of interest. Sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence (combining respondents who reported either "a little sympathy" or "a lot of sympathy") ranges from 13.39% in 1998 to 28.16% in 2007. Meanwhile, sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence ranges from 19.06% in 1998 to 28.67% in 2007.[24] This over time increase in revealed sympathy for Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups, summarized in **Figure 6**, is consistent with the idea that respondents feel comfortable with revealing their true preferences with increasing distance from the cessation of violence.

The proportion of the sample expressing an intent to vote Sinn Féin doubled during this period, increasing from 6% in 1998, 6.4% in 1999, 8.89% in 2003, and 12.89% in 2007 (Figure 13). This trend mirrors the electoral fortunes of the party from 1998 to 2007. However, these percentages

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[24] I do not have ex-ante expectations regarding the levels of sympathy toward Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups. My argument is not about the levels of sympathy, but whether such sympathy translates into votes.

Figure 6: Sympathy for reasons behind paramilitary violence: 1998 – 2007



Note: This figure summarizes over time responses to the following question: "*Thinking about the reasons why some Loyalist/Republican groups have used violence during the troubles, would you say that you have any sympathy with the reasons for the violence - even if you don't condone the violence itself? Would you say you have – a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or, no sympathy at all?*"

are lower than the actual vote shares obtained in elections, suggesting the potential for social desirability bias. It is unclear whether such under-reporting will bias in favor or against my expectations. On the one hand, individuals who are hesitant to report sympathy for the reasons behind paramilitary violence might also hesitate to express support for Sinn Féin, biasing against my expectations. On the other hand, it might be possible that some voters, who don't hold sympathy for the reasons behind paramilitary violence, might nevertheless vote for Sinn Féin for other reasons. For example, electoral considerations might move an SDLP supporter to vote for Sinn Féin. They might then be hesitant to reveal this decision (to vote for Sinn Féin) given its sectarian motivations. If such a dynamic is at work, then under-reporting of the intent to vote for Sinn Féin could bias in favor of my expectations. I tackle this concern directly in the next section, and find that including measures of sectarian identity and strength of sectarian identification do not impact the findings.

In contrast, intent to vote for the PUP collapsed during this period, initially increasing from 1.78% in 1998 to 2.4% in 1999, but decreasing thereafter to .78% in 2003 and down to a single voter (.08%) in 2007. These intent to vote percentages conform more closely with the actual realized vote of the PUP during this period.

I now turn to the relationship between sympathy and voting intention. Based on my theory, we should expect sympathy for the reasons behind Republican violence to be strongly correlated with the intent to vote for Sinn Féin. The correlation between sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist violence and the intent to vote for the PUP is expected to be weak or non-existent. This expectation receives support over time as summarized under **Figure** 7. The weaker association observed in 2007 could be driven either by a weakening of the proposed relationship or because some supporters of Sinn Féin viewed the party's compromise with the DUP on questions of policing as departing from the ideological foundations of armed Republicanism. I explore this issue at greater length below.

Finally, I turn to the results from multivariate analyses. Based on Hypothesis I, we should expect individuals with sympathies for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence during the Troubles to be more likely to express an intent to vote for Sinn Féin. Based on Hypothesis II, we should expect the association between individual sympathies for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence during the Troubles and support for the PUP to be much weaker. Instead, these voters should be more likely to support the DUP, the party that has most vocally embraced the reasons behind Loyalist violence while not being tarnished by association with violence.

The results (**Figure 8**) provide consistent support for Hypotheses I and II. In 1998, when compared to individuals who reported no sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence, the probability that an individual who reported "a little" or "a lot" of sympathy will vote

Figure 7: Distribution of bootstrap correlations



Note: Distributions are calculated based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. Distributions of correlations between sympathy for reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary actions and PUP support are mapped in orange. Distributions of correlations between sympathy for reasons behind Republican paramilitary actions and Sinn Féin support are mapped in green.

for Sinn Féin increases by 14.78 percentage points (pps) ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.148, standardized coefficient (**s**$\boldsymbol{\beta}$): 0.197, **p**: < 0.001, **95% CI**: 0.086 – 0.209) and 30.48 pps ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.305, s$\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.209, **p**: < 0.001, **95% CI**: 0.152 – 0.458), respectively. This relationship remains robustly significant throughout the first post-conflict decade and has a greater magnitude in later survey years.

Figure 8: Association between sympathy for reasons behind paramilitary violence and party vote



Note: This figure plots the coefficients reported in Tables 49 - 52. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable is self-reported voting intention. Variable of interest for Sinn Féin and SDLP is degree of sympathy for reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence (comparison group: no sympathy). Variable of interest for PUP, UDP, UUP, and DUP is degree of sympathy for reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence (comparison group: no sympathy). All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

The parallel relationship between sympathy for Loyalist paramilitaries and PUP voting is less robust, reaching statistical significance only at the higher level of sympathy ("a lot of sympathy") and only in two years. In 1998, when compared to individuals who reported no sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence, the probability that an individual who reported "a lot" of sympathy will vote for PUP increases by 16.97 pps ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.169, s$\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.214, **p**: < 0.01, **95% CI**: 0.055 – 0.285). Consistent with the qualitative evidence, this relationship weakens over time and cannot be estimated in 2007 as only one respondent reported voting for the party that year.

Meanwhile, consistent with Hypothesis II, voters with sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence appear more likely to support the DUP. In 1998, when compared to individuals who reported no sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence, the probability that an individual who reported "a little" or "a lot" of sympathy will vote for DUP increases by 8.26 pps ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.0826, **s**$\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.107, **p**: < 0.001, **95% CI**:0.035 – 0.130) and 15.62 pps

($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.156, s$\boldsymbol{\beta}$: 0.091, **p**: < 0.05, **95% CI**: 0.034 – 0.278), respectively.

Interestingly, coefficient magnitudes declined for both Sinn Féin and DUP in 2007. The 2007 survey was fielded months after the signing of the historic St. Andrews Agreement, which saw both these parties make compromises to restore functioning of the Northern Ireland Assembly (Nagle 2018). Specifically, the Agreement required Sinn Féin to recognize and support the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and DUP to power-sharing with Republican politicians. These accommodations, while necessary for the continued functioning of governmental institutions, might have been viewed by supporters of either party as deviating from the convictions central to their voting intentions. Such feelings might have been aggravated by visuals of DUP's Ian Paisley and Sinn Féin's Martin McGuinness sharing a joke at the restarting of the Northern Ireland Assembly (Nagle 2018). As central figures for their respective camps during the *Troubles*, their actions would have carried immense weight, and fraternizing with historical enemies might have been viewed by some as betraying their cause.

Finally, the relationship between paramilitary sympathy and support for SDLP and UUP reveals a consistent and instructive pattern. In both cases, these parties occupy a more centrist position within their respective camps (Nationalist and Unionist) compared to Sinn Féin and DUP. And in both cases, the relationship between sympathy for reasons behind paramilitary violence and party vote is consistently negative. For example, in 1998, when compared to individuals who reported no sympathy for the reasons behind Republican/Loyalist paramilitary violence, the probability that an individual who reported "a lot" of sympathy will vote for SDLP/UUP decreases by 19.10 pps ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: -0.191, **s**$\boldsymbol{\beta}$: -0.077, **p**: < 0.01, **95% CI**: -0.318 – -0.136) and 21.04 pps ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$: -0.210, s$\boldsymbol{\beta}$: -0.080, **p**: < 0.01, **95% CI**: -0.383 – -0.163), respectively.

Addressing alternative explanations

Ex-post rationalization?

Could voters who decided to vote Sinn Féin be retroactively updating their attitude toward Republican paramilitary groups? If the causal arrow travels from voting intention to paramilitary sympathy (the opposite of the direction proposed in this paper), we should expect a larger group of individuals to have expressed their intention to vote for Sinn Féin than expressed any sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. However, the data decisively reject this expectation (Figure 14).

Military strength at the end of conflict

Daly (2019) argues that parties with ties to armed groups that possess greater military strength at the termination of conflict will be more successful in the first post-conflict election. Specifically, the author suggests that their greater military strength helps such parties to gain voters by building "a reputation for competence on the provision of security" (Daly 2019, 747).

Neither Republican nor Loyalist paramilitary groups could militarily compete with the British armed forces. In this light, the poor performance of the PUP might be seen as consistent with the military strength explanation. However, despite the PIRA possessing substantially less military strength relative to the state security services, its affiliated party Sinn Féin garnered 17.63% of the votes cast in the 1998 Northern Ireland elections. Thus, in the very first post-conflict election, it became the fourth biggest party, trailing the largest party by only 4%. Meanwhile, if we use the number of killings claimed by a paramilitary group as a crude proxy for its military capacity, we see that Loyalist paramilitaries could claim capacity comparable to Republican groups toward the end of the conflict, with Loyalist paramilitaries claiming more lives than Republican paramilitaries in a number of years during the 1990s (Hayes and McAllister 2005, 603). Despite Loyalist paramilitaries possessing such capacity, the PUP only received 2.6% of the 1998 total vote share.

Given the salience of sectarian identities in Northern Ireland, it might be argued that the appropriate comparison for Sinn Féin's electoral performance is the other major Nationalist party, the SDLP. The SDLP was on principle opposed to political violence and was not in government for 25 years prior to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Consequently, it could claim no military strength at the end of conflict. Nevertheless, SDLP and not Sinn Féin emerged as the largest Nationalist party with 22% of the total vote share. Military strength at the end of conflict, thus, fails to account for the empirical realities of Northern Ireland.

Institutionalized Sectarianism

Some scholars have argued that the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent changes to it through the 2007 St. Andrews Agreement have served to institutionalize sectarianism within Northern Ireland (McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Nagle 2018). Some of my interviewees, especially politicians belonging to more middle-of-the-road parties like the Greens, Alliance, SDLP, and UUP argued that this institutionalization of sectarianism has played a role in the electoral success of Sinn Féin. Based on this argument, it might be argued that "sympathy for the reasons behind paramilitary violence" is merely a proxy for the intensity of an individual's sectarian identity.

I address this concern in multiple ways. First, it is important to recall that three of the four surveys used in the above analyses were completed long before the St. Andrews Agreement and thus not influenced by the institutionalized sectarianism it engendered. Second, based on this line of argumentation, if my sympathy measure is indeed capturing the strength of an individual's sectarian identity, we should expect the relationship to grow stronger not weaker in the 2007 survey, which was fielded after the St. Andrews Agreement. However, contrary to this expectation, **Figures 7 and 8** reveal a weakening of the relationship between sympathy for the reasons behind paramilitary violence and an individual's intention to vote Sinn Féin or DUP.

Third, I directly address the concern that my measure of sympathy might be serving as a proxy for the intensity of an individual's sectarianism. I control for sectarianism in two different ways across all of the NILT surveys, and a third way in the 1998 survey. All three surveys asked respondents two questions that probe their sectarian identity: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a unionist, a nationalist or neither? (Unionist, Nationalist, Neither)" and "Which of these best describes the way you think of yourself? (British, Irish, Ulster, Northern Irish)". I added both measures as categorical controls in the specifications reported under **Figure 9**, in addition to the controls included previously. A question asked only in the 1998 survey allows for a further robustness check. Respondents in this survey wave were asked the degree of their attachment to their self-reported identity grouping: "Would you call yourself a very strong (unionist/nationalist), fairly strong, or not very strong?". Results from including this measure as a categorical variable for the 1998 analysis are reported under Table 56. The relationship between sympathy and intent to vote Sinn Féin is qualitatively unchanged by the inclusion of these additional controls, suggesting that the relationship is not explained by sectarian predilections.

Figure 9: Conditional association between sympathy for paramilitary group and party voting



Note: This figure plots the coefficients reported in Tables 53 - 55. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable is self-reported voting intention. Variable of interest for Sinn Féin and SDLP is degree of sympathy for reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence (comparison group: no sympathy). Variable of interest for PUP, UDP, UUP, and DUP is degree of sympathy for reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence (comparison group: no sympathy). All specifications include controls for sectarian identity described in Section 6.3, age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Political organizational capacity

Sinn Féin, as the largest party in Northern Ireland, boasts a well-oiled party machine. It might be argued that only parties with sufficient organizational capacity can translate sympathy for paramilitary groups into votes. However, community perceptions of the PIRA's motivations arguably shaped the development of this organizational capacity (Feeney 2003; Frampton 2016).

As English (2008, 350-51) notes, “[...] there was a need for Catholic self-protection in the late 1960s (and beyond). Catholic communities did (and do) come under attack, and the state was not providing anything like adequate protection. The impulse towards communal self-defence made sense.” Resulting policing of Republican communities by the PIRA created inroads for Sinn Féin (Frampton 2016, 26-27). In contrast, as the interview evidence has illustrated (see Section 5.1.2), the Unionist/Loyalist community’s general rejection of paramilitarism and their commitment to the state’s security apparatus curtailed the ability of Loyalist paramilitaries to transform their paramilitary capacity into political organizational capacity Shirlow et al. (2013, 107). This situates organizational capacity causally downstream from community perceptions.

The election of Bobby Sands in 1981 also weakens the case for organizational capacity. The modern iteration of Sinn Féin (Provisional Sinn Féin) had pursued an ‘anti-electoral’ strategy up to this point in the Troubles (Feeney 2003, 269-270). It fielded its first candidate in 1981, when Bobby Sands famously stood as the party’s candidate in a by-election while on hunger strike in the H-Blocks. Sinn Féin had a limited cadre of political activists and minimal experience as a political party (Feeney 2003; Frampton 2016). It also had yet to explicitly articulate its ‘Armalite and ballot box strategy,’ which marked its pivot into electoral politics. Nevertheless, Bobby Sands won this election, at least in part because the hunger strikers had “broadened the battlefield” by becoming martyrs for the Nationalist community (Clarke 1987). Indeed, Frampton (2016, 11) argues that “it was only in the aftermath of the hunger strike that the movement began to view ‘politics’ as a serious project.” Thus it was the increased community sympathy for Sinn Féin, resulting from the hunger strikes, that paved the way for subsequent organizational capacity building.

Is it the intent or realized outcome that matters?

Could it be the realized outcome of the conflict (victory/defeat) and not the intent of the armed group that matters to voters? From this perspective, voters support Sinn Féin not because they saw the PIRA’s engagement in violence as having sought to protect the interests of their community but because they were able to actually advance the interests of the Nationalist community. Similarly, according to this explanation, the PUP's electoral failures would be the result of their failing to advance the interest of the Unionist community. While advancing the interests of one's constituency would reward a political party, this line of reasoning fails to provide a complete explanation of the historical record and the empirical evidence.

First, as mentioned above, Bobby Sands won the by-election in 1981 long before a 'victory' could have been claimed by the PIRA. The hunger strike, if anything, helped establish the idea that the PIRA were acting in the interests of the community. Sinn Féin's electoral success in this election and in some subsequent contests prior to 1998 were achieved in the absence of any clear victories for either Sinn Féin or the Nationalist community.

Second, I directly address this concern by controlling for respondent beliefs regarding which community benefited more from the Good Friday Agreement - the realized outcome of the armed struggle engaged in by the various paramilitary groups. Specifically, the 1998 and 2003 NILT surveys asked respondents the following question: "Thinking back to the Good Friday Agreement now, would you say that it has benefited unionists more than nationalists, nationalists more than unionists, or that unionists and nationalists have benefited equally?" They were provided the following five response options: Unionists benefited a lot more than nationalists, Unionists benefited a little more than nationalists, Nationalists benefited a lot more than unionists, Nationalists benefited a little more than unionists, and Unionists and nationalists benefited equally. If success (realized outcome) is what matters, then the inclusion of such a control should diminish the relationship between sympathy and vote. However, the results are qualitatively unchanged from the inclusion of this categorical measure of perceived success (Tables 57-58). The 2007 survey asked respondents a slightly different question: "Looking back now at the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, do you think it was a good thing for Northern Ireland, a bad thing or did it not make much difference?" Once again the results are qualitatively unchanged from the inclusion of this categorical measure of perceived success (Tables 59).

Conclusion

I combined evidence from nearly 100 interviews and public opinion data from Northern Ireland's first post-conflict decade to assess whether voters reward paramilitary-linked political parties when the paramilitary group is perceived as having acted in the interests of the community. My findings provide strong support for this argument. Voters who express sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence are substantially more supportive of Sinn Féin throughout this period. While a similar relationship exists between those who express sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist violence and support for the PUP, it is markedly weaker, diminishes over time, and nonexistent by the end of the decade. Voters who express such sympathies for Loyalist paramilitaries appear to instead support the non-paramilitary affiliated but hard-line DUP. Importantly, however, this later relationship appears contingent on the DUP maintaining its hard-line position as the relationship fails to materialize in survey evidence from 2007, fielded after DUP's compromise with Sinn Féin on power-sharing.

This paper adopted a micro-foundations approach to examine how past civil conflict might shape electoral dynamics in a post-conflict environment. Existing research has focused primarily on the electoral fortunes of parties that follow in the footsteps of armed groups and on the immediate post-conflict election. My findings suggest that the training our attention on the broader electoral landscape both over time and across the ideological distribution can enhance our understanding concerning the legacy of conflict. Future work should assess the viability of this argument in other contexts.

Chapter V: Conclusion

All three papers of my dissertation seek to answer two questions: does past violence have an effect on subsequent political attitudes and behaviors? If so, why does it have this effect? Together, these papers provide several new insights into the long-term impact of political violence on individual attitudes and behaviors. My findings suggest that past trauma, despite differences in context and despite resulting from different forms of political violence, can continue to shape the actions of individuals in both democratic and non-democratic settings over many years if not decades. The first paper, on the legacy of forced migration in post-WWII Germany, finds that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expellees' political champions – the radical right – over time. The second paper, on the legacy of being politically socialized during Mao's tenure in China, concludes that these individuals remain distinguishable today in their political engagement from the remainder of the country's population. Finally, the third paper, on the electoral legacy of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, suggests that community perceptions regarding past violence might help explain why voters support parties linked to violent groups in post-conflict elections.

These papers suggest multiple avenues for future research.

My analyses of the electoral legacy of forced migration in post-WWII Germany had to be conducted at an aggregate spatial unit of analysis due to data limitations. While I provide both theoretical and empirical evidence to mitigate the concern that ecological fallacy could be driving my results, future work should attempt to procure individual level data to further interrogate the micro-foundations of this finding. Moreover, it will be important to ascertain whether similar electoral legacies manifest in a) other settings where forced migrants are relocated to co-ethnic receiving areas and b) settings where they arrive in areas populated by non-co-ethnics. Additional empirical testing of my theoretical framework will help us better understand the scope conditions of such legacies. As detailed below, I hope to study electoral legacies among other forced migrants relocated to areas with co-ethnics in a book project that builds on my paper. I hope to study the legacy of forced migration into non-co-ethnic settings in subsequent work.

The paper on the legacy of political socialization during Maoist China has implications for scholars of authoritarian regime survival, stability, and consolidation. The proportion of Chinese citizens who experienced the instability resulting from Maoist policies declines with each passing year. Lower political interest among an increasing proportion of the population can diffuse pressures on the regime to hold itself accountable to the masses. Meanwhile, reduced political interest is likely to apply an upward pressure on individual thresholds for participation in collective action (Granovetter 1978). Higher individual thresholds, in turn, can diffuse the threat of large-scale mobilization in opposition to the regime, allowing for greater regime stability and consolidation. A less politically aware citizenry is also more prone to be blindsided by authoritarian overreach. Cumulatively, these developments can lengthen the regime's lifespan. These implications might also extend to other authoritarian settings that have experienced episodes of political upheaval in the past. Exploring the existence of such political generations, grounded in a careful study of the historical record, can be a fruitful avenue for future research. If they exist, these generations, scarred by past exposure to political upheavals, might contribute to our understanding of how the political landscape of a country evolves over time. Their dominance in the electorate might help explain predilections toward moderate political positions, and the natural replacement of these generations by younger cohorts could produce a shift in both the tone and priorities espoused by political actors.

The paper on the electoral legacy of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland offers an alternative explanation for why voters support parties affiliated with armed groups in the post-conflict environment. In future research, I plan to test my theory in (1) settings where the civil conflict enveloped the entire territory, (2) settings where the armed group and subsequent parties do not rely on religious or ethnic linkages for continued support, and (3) settings where the armed group affiliated party departed drastically from the political direction of the armed group. Based on my theory, I expect to recover a similar relationship as in Northern Ireland in both the first and second instances. While I provide multiple pieces of empirical evidence to mitigate the concern that sectarianism could be driving my results, future work situated in non-sectarian post-conflict environments will serve as a more compelling response to this concern. In the third instance, I expect individuals who believed the armed group to have acted in the interests of the community to not support the affiliated party given the lack of political continuity between the two entities. (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013) have already reported support for this expectation in aggregate-level analysis for Tajikistan. Finally, as detailed below, I am also excited to explore other facets of the legacy of prolonged conflict and paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. In particular, I hope to study the transmission of group narratives in post-conflict societies, with a specific emphasis on understanding the role played by community maintenance of such narratives in perpetuating tensions between groups.

The remainder of this conclusion outlines my plans for developing two of my dissertation papers into independent book projects before providing an overview of ongoing projects that build on issues at the core of my dissertation.

The paper on the electoral legacy of forced migration in post-WWII Germany will form the core of a book on the Political Legacy of Forced Migration. Specifically, I plan to explore the relationship between the development and persistence of a forced migrant identity and political behavior in comparative perspective. In order to do so, I will investigate two additional cases of forced migration in Europe from the 20th century; the expulsion of ethnic Greeks from Turkey into Greece in 1922, and the forced displacement of ethnic Serbs from parts of former Yugoslavia into newly independent Serbia during the 1990s. Similar to the German case, the arrival of these forced migrant populations had a seismic effect on the politics of these countries. Moreover, the comparability of these cases is enhanced by the fact that in all three instances the refugee population shared a common ethnic background, albeit contested by the native populations, with the populations in receiving areas. To assess whether the same type of identity emerged and had a similar impact on political behavior in these two cases, I will employ a mixed-methods approach, bringing to bear evidence from archival materials and when possible, interviews with forced migrants and their descendants.

The paper on Northern Ireland will be enhanced by the inclusion of survey data from 2022 (yet to be fielded), allowing me to investigate whether the legacy recovered in the first post-conflict decade has persisted to the present day – 25 years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. This paper will in turn be part of a larger book, which will employ a mixed-methods strategy to examine whether and how the legacy of the Troubles and the broader history of conflict in Northern Ireland shapes the attitudes and behaviors of various stakeholders (politicians, women, paramilitary members, civil society, and victims) in society. The book format will allow me to make full use of my extensive interview corpus, tracing how complex interactions between the individual and community can produce private truths and public lies, leading legacies of political violence to manifest and endure. While voting is an important dimension of this legacy, the decision to vote is in turn shaped by narratives about the past maintained within communities. Exploring the formation, maintenance, and evolution of these community narratives will be an important contribution to the literature. Finally, the book will also explore whether and how the legacy of political violence in Northern Ireland has weakened since 1998.

I am also working on a number of projects that are related to and build on the ideas developed in my dissertation. Through a series of papers my co-authors and I are examining both the causes and consequences of historical conflicts in Asia. The first paper (Dincecco et al. 2022), both theoretically and empirically builds on Charles Tilly's 'wars make states' hypothesis (Tilly 1992) in the context of India. We document a robust positive relationship between pre-colonial conflict exposure and local economic development today. Drawing on archival and secondary data, we show that districts that were more exposed to pre-colonial conflict experienced greater early state-making, followed by lower political violence and higher investments in physical and human capital in the long term. A second paper is investigating whether and how the introduction of New World crops (maize, cassava, coconuts, tomatoes etc.) reshaped conflict dynamics across Asia. We have constructed a database consisting of all conflicts from antiquity to 2010 across all of Asia (a region housing more than half of the world's population). Our findings suggest that areas which saw an increase in caloric capacity as a consequence of the introduction of New World crops also experience an increase in conflict over subsequent centuries. The evidence supports a rapacity effect – increases in the gains from appropriation to Asian and non-Asian belligerents – as a mechanism. A third paper is examining whether and how variation in exposure to conflict might have shaped gender norms and the status of women in India. Specifically, we are investigating if an increased need for combatants engendered a preference for male offspring that has endured over time. To test this hypothesis, we are bringing together both historical and contemporary data, including information on the gender of primary deities at temples across the country, sex ratio at the district level during both the colonial and post-independence period, and individual level survey data from over 600,000 households across India.

Another set of papers is examining if and how the evocation of historical trauma influences political attitudes and behaviors. In one paper, my co-authors and I study how attachment to Jewish identity, affinity toward a Jewish state, and support for the Israeli government are impacted when Jewish Americans are exposed to narratives about a) continued security threats to Israel, b) continued security threats and a history of persecution, and c) continued security threats and rising antisemitism in the United States. Surprisingly, and contrary to our pre-registered expectation, we find no average treatment effects for any of our dependent variables across any of the treatment groups (compared to a no narrative control). This null finding has important implications for the literature when juxtaposed with recent studies that have recovered significant treatment effects with equally, if not weaker, experimental prompts. In a second paper, my co-authors and I are employing survey experiments in four countries – Germany, Israel, United Kingdom, and United States – to identify whether Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's emotive use of historical parallels in addresses to the legislative bodies in these countries might have been an effective rhetorical strategy in capturing the hearts and minds of publics in these countries. We are utilizing verbatim excerpts from his speeches in each country as our experimental manipulations and measuring support for various foreign policy initiatives and emotions (as mechanisms).

In a third paper, my co-author and I are investigating how evoking different episodes of historical trauma or triumph might influence public attitudes toward both domestic and foreign policy issues in Thailand. Specifically, we will be evoking an instance of historical trauma (the Burmese invasion of the Siamese capital in the 18th century) and a triumph (Thailand is among the only countries in the world that successfully resisted external domination by a colonial power). Finally, I am further probing the effectiveness of appeals to past triumphs in a comparative perspective by employing survey experiments to study how references to the "good old days" by politicians like Donald Trump and Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. (Dulay et al. 2022) could be contributing to populist success at polling booths in recent years.

Together, my dissertation and related projects seek to deepen our understanding of how political violence can have both a visible and invisible impact on the world around us. The papers in this dissertation suggest that past trauma can continue to shape the actions of individuals in both democratic and non-democratic settings over time, across different cultural contexts and despite resulting from different forms of political violence. My ongoing and future work will seek to test expectations that have been developed and primarily tested in the context of Western Europe and North America. I am particularly excited about the projects that are probing how the use of historical grievances and traumas by political entrepreneurs might be shaping public attitudes and behaviors on both domestic and foreign policy concerns. Such appeals, while by no means a novel rhetorical strategy, now reach global audiences. However, systematic study of their influence on public opinion remains nascent. My work on these issues, I hope, will yield both deeper insight into the micro foundations of why such appeals prove effective and provide actionable proposals to fight their deleterious influences on democratic stability.

APPENDICES

Appendix to Chapter II

Detailed notes

Analyses limited to West Germany

Analyses presented in the main text support the hypothesized relationship between expellee share and radical right support for the districts of West Germany. Does this relationship also exist across the districts of erstwhile East Germany? Contemporary support for the AfD is markedly higher among the states of erstwhile East Germany. Consequently, retrieving similar results for the East would increase the substantive importance of the findings reported in this paper. However, I have been unable to find district-level data on expellee allocation for the Soviet Occupation Zone, which later formed East Germany. A similar dearth of qualitative records concerning expellees within East German archives has been reported by other scholars (Ther 1996, 781). The Soviet administration, unlike in the West, did not allow expellees to assert their distinct identity and did not maintain demographic statistics that would allow researchers to differentiate expellees from the native population.

Tensions between natives and expellees

The process of accommodating millions of expellees during the immediate postwar years produced significant tensions between the native population and the newcomers (Connor 2018). The Allied administration's mandate requiring natives to house these strangers served to intensify their dislike of expellees (Schulze 1989). The natives' resulting cold reception of the newcomers during the immediate postwar years was acknowledged by the Allied military administration and is well documented (Schulze 1989, 332).

Schulze (1989) provides extensive documentation of native resentment and hostility toward expellees. Tensions arose from a variety of quarters, with natives perceiving expellees as unwelcome strangers introducing a deleterious foreign influence into their midst. “The original population perceived the newcomers as a threat to their way of life, their cultural traditions and the very fabric of rural society” (Connor 2018, 81). The police had to be called upon in many instances to ensure that expellees were allowed space within native households (Eberle 1987; U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1950). Expellees were often assigned to the smallest rooms (Connor 2018). Many expellees, who had owned homes in the East, found their entire families confined to a single room (Harris and Wülker 1953). Expellee homesickness and trauma-induced lethargy “reinforced the widespread prejudices of the native residents that expellees were lazy and constituted a financial drain on the country” (Ther 1996, 791).

“Most refugees and expellees tried to tell their stories after they arrived in their new homes in the west, but especially in the rural regions most encountered the experience that the natives were not interested and did not want to know” (Schulze 2006, 374). Decades later, expellees recounted “being regarded as different and therefore inferior” (Schulze 2006, 373). The native population also expressed dissatisfaction with expellee entry into education and politics, fearing the detrimental effects of the latter’s foreign influence (Schulze 2006). Lattimore (1974) provides a detailed account of the political tensions that arose between natives and expellees during the immediate postwar years.

Interviews conducted by Schulze (2006) reveal that such tense interactions in the early postwar years were felt acutely by the expellees and have not been forgotten even five decades later. Expellees reported “a lingering feeling that they have retained some of the qualities of a stranger, of an outsider, and do not totally ‘belong’” (Schulze 2006, 372).

Addressing concerns of endogenous allocation

Analyses employing the 1950 expellee share might produce biased estimates if expellees could have situated themselves in areas better aligned with their vocational training and/or political predilections. Multiple pieces of qualitative and quantitative evidence help allay this concern.

First, the expulsion had stripped this community of most material resources, making them reliant on governmental assistance for survival (Connor 2018, Chapter 2). The Allied military administration in turn sought to minimize expellee incentives for relocation by making the latter's access to both food rations and administrative support contingent on their remaining in areas where they had been initially assigned (Grosser 2001, 83).

Second, the Allies enforced strict restrictions on expellee movement in the initial post-war period. Inter-state movement was deterred by the presence of military personnel along state boundaries (Draper 1946, 10). Though some expellees did manage to cross between the occupation zones, such movement was motivated by survival needs and not strategic calculus that might contribute to biased estimates (U.S. House Judiciary Committee 1950, 13). Meanwhile, emigration, though widely discussed as a potential solution (Wander 1951) to the problem of expellee overcrowding, was never pursued in any meaningful capacity (Paikert 1962; Schoenberg 1970, 49).

Third, Braun and Mahmoud (2014, Appendix Table A1), Braun and Dwenger (2019, Appendix Table D1), and Peters (2021, Appendix Table A3) have shown that a wide range of economic outcomes are uncorrelated with expellee distribution in 1950 after accounting for housing damage, population density in 1939 (or 1933), distance from expulsion regions, and state fixed effects. Unless otherwise stated, all specifications in this paper account for these factors and pre-existing radical right sentiment (including controls for both the Nazi Party's vote share and the religious makeup of districts (Voigtländer and Voth 2012)). Taken together, this diverse body of evidence suggests that the residual variation in the expellee distribution, after accounting for the on the ground realities detailed above, is not correlated with pre-war economic and political outcomes.

Lack of individual level data

The Allied administration and early postwar governments of West Germany maintained detailed aggregate statistics on expellees. However, with the economic boom of the 1950s and the dissolution of the expellee party in 1961, popular opinion deemed the expellees integrated into West German society (Süssner 2004, 10). The dissolving of the Federal Ministry of Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims in 1969 also reflects this perceived success of expellee integration. Since 1970, publicly available surveys fielded in Germany have generally not collected systematic information on an individual's expellee background. This is also true of long-running surveys like the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).

Moreover, to my knowledge, no publicly available survey has measured respondents' attachment to an expellee identity, the mechanism identified in this study as driving expellee support for the radical right. Even the early surveys that identified expellee respondents did not measure the strength of their expellee identity.

Other potential preexisting drivers of radical right sentiment

Voigtländer and Voth (2012, Table VI) also find that areas with higher shares of Jews in the interwar period experienced greater antisemitic behavior. Could the Third Reich's removal of its Jewish citizens to concentration camps have opened up housing stock, which in turn came to be occupied by expellees? If so, the observed association between expellee share and support for the radical right might be driven by expellees being allocated to areas with greater levels of antisemitism. However, the relationship between expellee share and radical right support remains robust to including Jewish share of the population in 1925 and 1939 (Tables 6-7).

Alternatively, it might be the case that the Nazi regime intensified local hostilities toward Jews through its pursuit of systemic antisemitism between 1933 and 1945. Could regional differences in the extent to which such efforts influenced communities be driving postwar regional variation in support for radical right parties? I account for this possibility by including measures for changes in the Jewish share of a district's population from 1925–1939, 1939–1945, and 1925–1945 as proxies for the depth of such antisemitism. First, a decline in the Jewish share of the population from 1925–39 is conceptualized as indicating a less welcoming environment for those of the Jewish faith. Second, a decline in the Jewish share of the population from 1939–1945 is conceptualized as indicating greater community compliance with the Nazi regime's goal of eradicating Jews. Third, a decline in the Jewish share of the population from 1925–1945 is an overall measure of increased antisemitism. The main results are robust to the inclusion of all three measures (Tables 8-10).

Table 6: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Jewish share of population '25)

				ELECTIONS 1969–1989			
	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.012	0.002	0.002	0.003***	0.011***	0.005**	0.111***
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.020)
Standardized coefficient	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.3	0.31	0.17	0.22
				ELECTIONS 1990–2004			
	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.023**	0.019**	0.032**	0.032***	0.027***	0.003	0.017
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.021)
Standardized coefficient	0.12	0.19	0.14	0.23	0.25	0.07	0.13
				ELECTIONS 2005–2019			
	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.003	0.005	0.016	0.045***	0.080***	0.071**	0.049*
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Standardized coefficient	-0.03	0.06	0.2	0.37	0.39	0.23	0.23
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include the 1925 Jewish share of population as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 7: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Jewish share of population ’39)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.003^{***}	0.010^{***}	0.005^{**}	0.120^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.023)
Standardized coefficient	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.28	0.3	0.14	0.24

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.027^{**}	0.020^{**}	0.035^{***}	0.031^{***}	0.027^{***}	0.003	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.023)
Standardized coefficient	0.14	0.2	0.15	0.22	0.24	0.05	0.1

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.005	0.005	0.015	0.044^{***}	0.082^{***}	0.078^{***}	0.053^{*}
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Standardized coefficient	-0.05	0.06	0.2	0.36	0.41	0.26	0.25
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: “**F**” refers to Federal elections and “**E**” refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district’s 1950 population. Please refer to the “Historical expellee data and covariates” subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include the 1939 Jewish share of population as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 8: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Δ Jewish Share 1925-1939)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	1972 (F)	1976 (F)	1983 (F)	1984 (E)	1987 (F)	1989 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.003***	0.010***	0.005**	0.127***
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.023)
Standardized coefficient	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.27	0.29	0.14	0.25

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	1994 (F)	1994 (E)	1998 (F)	1999 (E)	2002 (F)	2004 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.030**	0.021***	0.037***	0.031***	0.027***	0.003	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	0.15	0.21	0.16	0.22	0.24	0.05	0.1

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	2009 (F)	2009 (E)	2013 (F)	2014 (E)	2017 (F)	2019 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.005	0.006	0.016	0.046***	0.087***	0.087***	0.059**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	-0.05	0.07	0.21	0.38	0.43	0.29	0.28
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include the change in Jewish share of population between 1925 and 1939 as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 9: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Δ Jewish Share 1939-1945)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.0001	0.001	0.001	0.003**	0.009***	0.005*	0.121***
	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.028)
Standardized coefficient	0	0.05	0.08	0.26	0.28	0.14	0.25

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.028**	0.021**	0.036**	0.029**	0.023***	0.003	0.014
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.025)
Standardized coefficient	0.15	0.2	0.16	0.21	0.21	0.05	0.11

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.006	0.005	0.017	0.046***	0.079***	0.072**	0.049
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Standardized coefficient	-0.07	0.07	0.23	0.38	0.39	0.24	0.23
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	533	533	533	533	533	533	533

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include the change in Jewish share of population between 1939 and 1945 as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 10: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Δ Jewish Share 1925-1945)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.009	0.002	0.002	0.003^{***}	0.010^{**}	0.006^{**}	0.109^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.025)
Standardized coefficient	0.05	0.06	0.1	0.29	0.3	0.17	0.22

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.022^{*}	0.020^{**}	0.033^{**}	0.030^{**}	0.023^{***}	0.004	0.021
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.022)
Standardized coefficient	0.11	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.21	0.08	0.15

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.004	0.006	0.019	0.048^{***}	0.076^{**}	0.062^{*}	0.046
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Standardized coefficient	-0.04	0.08	0.25	0.39	0.38	0.21	0.22
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	533	533	533	533	533	533	533

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include the change in Jewish share of population between 1925 and 1945 as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

On inter-generational transmission of expellee identity

Many of the ethnic Germans who experienced forced migration between 1944 and 1952 are now dead. However, multiple sources provide evidence for the inter-generational transmission of an expellee identity. First, Ahonen (2016, 125) reports that the Federation of Expellees (BDV) had a membership of 500,000 as recently as 2010. Second, Süssner (2004) reports that expellee youth groups and their efforts to cultivate an expellee identity among younger generations continued at least into the 1990s. Third, Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer (2021*a*, 653) "examine the extent to which the memory of past forced displacement persists among children and grandchildren of the displaced by asking respondents to choose an event from the country's history that they consider most crucial for inclusion in history school textbooks." Based on evidence from a survey they conducted in August 2018, the authors conclude that there has been a "successful transmission of refugee identity to the second and third generations of descendants" Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer (2021*a*, 654).

Multiple pieces of evidence also suggest that descendants with such a forced migration identity might have been supportive of the radical right in the 2010s, when identity-based grievances were unresolved and politically salient. First, in a sample of German respondents, which oversampled descendants of German expellees (more than 95% of respondents with an expellee background were first- or second-generation descendants), (Dinas, Fouka and Schläpfer 2021*b*) found substantial levels of competitive victimhood among expellee descendants. 71.14% percent of expellee descendants expressed agreement with the statement that "German expellees during WWII have suffered more than Syrians suffer now," while agreement with the statement that "No one outside Germany has paid attention to how much German expellees have suffered after the WWII." was 81.34%. Importantly, they found that individuals who expressed such sentiments were likely to hold substantively more negative attitudes toward contemporary refugees (Figure 2 of their paper). Second, consistent with lingering sentiments of competitive victimhood, I find that areas that received greater shares of expellees in 1950s were more likely to see increases in AfD support from 2013 to 2017 when the party transformed from a fiscally conservative Euroskeptic party to an anti-immigrant party (Table 18). This first-differences model (accounting for all time-invariant factors in each area), like all models reported in this paper, controls for historical radical right predilections (Nazi party vote share in the interwar period) in these areas, which preceded the arrival of expellees. Finally, recognizing expellee descendants as a potential voting bloc of interest, the AfD has created a "Working Group of Displaced Persons" in the late 2010s.

Pre-existing radical right sentiment among *Volksdeutsche*?

Two pieces of evidence mitigate the concern that the relationship between *Volksdeutsche* share and radical right support could be the product of political convictions forged at a much earlier date. First, electoral patterns across the four successive interwar elections in Czechoslovakia, whose expellees constituted 60% of the *Volksdeutsche*, do not support the notion that expellees were always predisposed to the radical right. The first three elections in 1920, 1925, and 1929 saw ethnic Germans support ethnic parties that sought to collaborate with other political actors in the Czechoslovakian nation (Glassheim 2000, 469). Moreover, the DSAP, a left-wing party, procured majorities in much of the ethnic German enclaves in these elections (Figure 10). The elections in 1935 saw a sudden reversal in this pattern, with the newly formed *Sudetendeutsche Partei* (SDP) dominating across predominantly ethnic German areas of the country. Lees (2015, 236) cautions against interpreting this change in the political landscape as indicative of overwhelming Nazi sympathies among the Czechoslovakian ethnic German population. Declining economic fortunes due to onset of the Great Depression help in part to explain these electoral dynamics (Glassheim 2000, 470).

Second, over time variation in the strength of this relationship during the postwar period follows the exact pattern hypothesized in Table 1 and reported under Figure 2, helping mitigate the concern that it reflects either a long-standing pre-expulsion preference for the radical right among *Volksdeutsche* or a sustained radical right conviction developed during the period of Nazi occupation. If either of these explanations were at work, we should not expect the relationship to fluctuate in response to over time changes in the political context in Germany. However, my findings reveal that this relationship diminishes with broader society's recognition of expellee suffering and strengthens when political developments make the narrative of German suffering during WWII salient (Table 37).

Figure 10: Interwar elections of Czechoslovakia


Kartogram 1
Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny 1920
Vítězné strany v soudních okresech
BdL
ČSDSD
ČSL
ČSNS
DCV
DDFP
DSDAP
DW20
RSZML
SMDŽRČS
volby se nekonaly
Kartogram 2
Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny 1925
Vítězné strany v soudních okresech
BdL
ČSDSD
ČSL
ČSSaKT
DCV
DSDAP
RSZML
KSČ
DFSP
DNSAP
DNP
PZLR

(a) 1920

(b) 1925


Kartogram 3
Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny 1929
Vítězné strany v soudních okresech
DW20
ČSDSD
ČSL
ČSNS
DCV
DSDAP
RSZML
KSČ
PaŽ
DNSAP
DNP
Kartogram 4
Volby do Poslanecké sněmovny 1935
Vítězné strany v soudních okresech
SDP
RSZML
ČSL
ČSDSD
ČSNS
KSČ
AB
NárSj

(c) 1929

(d) 1935

Note: The above maps capture district-level electoral returns from the four interwar elections held in Czechoslovakia. The first three elections in 1920, 1925, and 1929, saw ethnic Germans support ethnic parties that sought to collaborate with other political actors within the Czechoslovakian nation. Moreover, the DSAP, a left-wing party (yellow), procured majorities in much of the ethnic German enclaves in these elections. The elections in 1935 saw a drastic reversal in this pattern, with the newly formed *Sudetendeutsche Partei* (SDP) dominating across the predominantly ethnic German areas of the country.

Spatial harmonization

Procedure

The harmonization process involved the following steps. I first mapped variables to their original spatial units. For instance, electoral returns from the May 1924 Weimar election were mapped to 1924 districts. I accomplished this by merging each variable with the district-level shape file of Germany from the year in which it was measured. The History GIS Collection from the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research contains shape files for the German Empire (1871–1945), the Federal Republic (1949–1989), and the reunified Federal Republic (1990–2009) (MPIDR 2011). This procedure resulted in 31 distinct data layers, which were superimposed on the 2019 base layer to create spatially weighted measures. Raw counts of relevant variables were retained to minimize any measurement error that might result from spatially weighting population shares. The final step, therefore, utilized these recomputed raw counts to produce share variables.

Figure 11: Changes to administrative units within West Germany over time



(a) 1949 **(b)** 2019

Contemporary administrative units

Table 11: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Contemporary administrative districts)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.009	0.004	0.003	0.005***	0.017***	0.007**	0.187***
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.035)
Standardized coefficient	0.05	0.12	0.14	0.4	0.51	0.21	0.38

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.046***	0.030***	0.056***	0.037***	0.035***	0.005	0.036
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.033)
Standardized coefficient	0.24	0.29	0.24	0.26	0.3	0.09	0.25

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.003	0.010	0.026	0.068***	0.125***	0.135***	0.104**
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Standardized coefficient	-0.03	0.12	0.31	0.55	0.61	0.45	0.46
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	321	321	321	321	321	321	321

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 2020 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Robustness checks and additional analyses

Tables referenced

Table 12: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
DNVP – June 1920	556	0.129	0.113	0.006	0.046	0.175	0.691
DNVP – May 1924	556	0.146	0.124	0.007	0.057	0.202	0.771
DNVP – Dec 1924	556	0.039	0.043	0.002	0.012	0.049	0.343
NSDAP – May 1928	556	0.176	0.087	0.024	0.108	0.232	0.559
NSDAP – Sep 1930	556	0.354	0.153	0.085	0.231	0.465	0.793
NSDAP – July 1932	556	0.323	0.144	0.061	0.208	0.421	0.728
NSDAP – Nov 1932	556	0.107	0.137	0.000	0.007	0.156	0.798
NSDAP – Mar 1933	556	0.443	0.123	0.137	0.353	0.529	0.801
BHE – 1953	556	0.071	0.046	0.006	0.033	0.103	0.200
BHE – 1957	556	0.058	0.033	0.007	0.032	0.083	0.201
GDP – 1961	556	0.036	0.031	0.001	0.014	0.048	0.267
Radical right – 1969	556	0.048	0.018	0.016	0.035	0.056	0.119
Radical right – 1972	556	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.008	0.019
Radical right – 1976	556	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.016
Radical right – 1983	556	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.007
Radical right – 1984	556	0.009	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.010	0.023
Radical right – 1987	556	0.006	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.008	0.024
Radical right – 1989	556	0.101	0.047	0.023	0.061	0.137	0.230
Radical right – 1990	556	0.032	0.018	0.005	0.015	0.046	0.101
Radical right – 1994 (F)	556	0.022	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.029	0.051
Radical right – 1994 (E)	556	0.049	0.022	0.012	0.029	0.064	0.118
Radical right – 1998	556	0.031	0.013	0.007	0.020	0.038	0.087
Radical right – 1999	556	0.020	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.026	0.070
Radical right – 2002	556	0.010	0.005	0.003	0.006	0.012	0.044
Radical right – 2004	556	0.029	0.013	0.009	0.019	0.037	0.112
Radical right – 2005	556	0.021	0.009	0.005	0.013	0.027	0.070
Radical right – 2009 (F)	556	0.019	0.007	0.005	0.014	0.025	0.049
Radical right – 2009 (E)	556	0.018	0.007	0.005	0.013	0.021	0.064
Radical right – 2013	556	0.058	0.011	0.029	0.050	0.066	0.101
Radical right – 2014	556	0.085	0.019	0.033	0.071	0.096	0.161
Radical right – 2017	556	0.118	0.028	0.051	0.097	0.137	0.210
Radical right – 2019	556	0.094	0.020	0.040	0.081	0.105	0.177
Reichsdeutsche share 1950	556	0.091	0.075	0.008	0.042	0.111	0.320
Volksdeutsche share 1950	556	0.095	0.072	0.010	0.030	0.153	0.319
Expellee share 1950	556	0.186	0.094	0.018	0.102	0.253	0.441
Expellee share 1960	556	0.183	0.088	0.025	0.129	0.236	0.486
Proportion housing stock damaged	556	0.179	0.205	0.000	0.037	0.247	0.879
Mean rooms per house	556	4.405	0.504	3.053	4.027	4.818	5.654
log(Population density 1939)	556	5.141	1.220	3.530	4.201	5.881	8.229
log(Expulsion distance)	556	18.420	0.143	18.101	18.311	18.537	18.711
log(Distance to nearest concentration camp)	556	11.502	0.595	8.983	11.198	11.956	12.400
Percentage Protestant 1925	556	0.462	0.359	0.003	0.087	0.851	0.984
Percentage Protestant 1946	533	0.454	0.301	0.012	0.146	0.763	0.933
Percentage Protestant 1950	556	0.456	0.299	0.020	0.153	0.756	0.935
Percentage Catholic 1925	556	0.517	0.369	0.004	0.116	0.900	0.997
Percentage Catholic 1946	533	0.518	0.312	0.051	0.209	0.840	0.987
Percentage Catholic 1950	556	0.521	0.310	0.037	0.217	0.836	0.979
Percentage Jewish 1925	556	0.006	0.007	0.000	0.001	0.008	0.054
Percentage Jewish 1946	533	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.0001	0.0004	0.016
Percentage Jewish 1950	556	0.0003	0.001	0.000	0.00003	0.0002	0.013
Percentage Jewish 1939	556	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0002	0.002	0.026

Note: See text for variable descriptions and data sources.

Table 13: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	1972 (F)	1976 (F)	1983 (F)	1984 (E)	1987 (F)	1989 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.003***	0.010***	0.004**	0.128***
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.27	0.29	0.14	0.25
Moran's-I two-sided p	0.46	0.66	0.33	0.22	0.38	0.12	0.3

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	1994 (F)	1994 (E)	1998 (F)	1999 (E)	2002 (F)	2004 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.030**	0.021***	0.037***	0.031***	0.027***	0.003	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	0.15	0.21	0.16	0.22	0.24	0.05	0.09
Moran's-I two-sided p	0.71	0.79	0.81	0.79	0.51	0.86	0.9

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	2009 (F)	2009 (E)	2013 (F)	2014 (E)	2017 (F)	2019 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.005	0.006	0.016	0.046***	0.087***	0.087***	0.060**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Standardized coefficient	-0.05	0.07	0.21	0.38	0.43	0.29	0.28
Moran's-I two-sided p	0.68	0.27	0.64	0.6	0.71	0.82	0.59

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. Also reported are p-values from Moran's I tests for residual spatial autocorrelation. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 14: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (CDU/CSU (Union) vote share)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F) **Union**	**1972 (F)** **Union**	**1976 (F)** **Union**	**1983 (F)** **Union**	**1984 (E)** **Union**	**1987 (F)** **Union**	**1989 (E)** **Union**
Share of Expellees – 1950	-0.203^{**}	-0.161^{**}	-0.123^{*}	-0.064	-0.073	-0.014	-0.101^{**}
	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Standardized coefficient	-0.16	-0.13	-0.1	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01	-0.11

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F) **Union**	**1994 (F)** **Union**	**1994 (E)** **Union**	**1998 (F)** **Union**	**1999 (E)** **Union**	**2002 (F)** **Union**	**2004 (E)** **Union**
Share of Expellees – 1950	-0.053	0.003	-0.067	-0.028	0.034	-0.015	-0.049
	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Standardized coefficient	-0.06	0	-0.08	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.05

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F) **Union**	**2009 (F)** **Union**	**2009 (E)** **Union**	**2013 (F)** **Union**	**2014 (E)** **Union**	**2017 (F)** **Union**	**2019 (E)** **Union**
Share of Expellees – 1950	-0.025	-0.010	-0.002	-0.012	-0.094	-0.096	-0.079
	(0.112)	(0.091)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.078)	(0.062)	(0.085)
Standardized coefficient	-0.02	-0.01	0	-0.02	-0.11	-0.16	-0.08
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is CDU/CSU vote share. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 15: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (FDP vote share)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F) **FDP**	**1972 (F)** **FDP**	**1976 (F)** **FDP**	**1983 (F)** **FDP**	**1984 (E)** **FDP**	**1987 (F)** **FDP**	**1989 (E)** **FDP**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.035*** (0.009)	−0.002 (0.018)	0.028 (0.022)	0.019 (0.017)	0.015 (0.011)	0.036 (0.021)	0.014 (0.020)
Standardized coefficient	-0.14	-0.01	0.11	0.1	0.09	0.15	0.07

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F) **FDP**	**1994 (F)** **FDP**	**1994 (E)** **FDP**	**1998 (F)** **FDP**	**1999 (E)** **FDP**	**2002 (F)** **FDP**	**2004 (E)** **FDP**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.048 (0.031)	0.014 (0.021)	0.004 (0.014)	0.005 (0.017)	−0.004 (0.012)	−0.017 (0.018)	−0.005 (0.026)
Standardized coefficient	0.18	0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.07	-0.02

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F) **FDP**	**2009 (F)** **FDP**	**2009 (E)** **FDP**	**2013 (F)** **FDP**	**2014 (E)** **FDP**	**2017 (F)** **FDP**	**2019 (E)** **FDP**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.018 (0.031)	0.020 (0.029)	0.002 (0.033)	−0.004 (0.016)	0.0004 (0.013)	0.049* (0.023)	0.002 (0.012)
Standardized coefficient	0.08	0.07	0.01	-0.04	0	0.21	0.01
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is FDP vote share. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 16: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (SPD vote share)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F) SPD	**1972 (F) SPD**	**1976 (F) SPD**	**1983 (F) SPD**	**1984 (E) SPD**	**1987 (F) SPD**	**1989 (E) SPD**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.219**	0.162**	0.099*	0.055	0.048	−0.021	−0.066
	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.042)
Standardized coefficient	0.19	0.15	0.09	0.05	0.04	-0.02	-0.06

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F) SPD	**1994 (F) SPD**	**1994 (E) SPD**	**1998 (F) SPD**	**1999 (E) SPD**	**2002 (F) SPD**	**2004 (E) SPD**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.035	−0.056	−0.042	−0.019	−0.057	0.002	−0.011
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.040)
Standardized coefficient	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	-0.05	0	-0.01

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F) SPD	**2009 (F) SPD**	**2009 (E) SPD**	**2013 (F) SPD**	**2014 (E) SPD**	**2017 (F) SPD**	**2019 (E) SPD**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.006	−0.005	−0.008	−0.025	−0.040	−0.056	−0.019
	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.026)
Standardized coefficient	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05	-0.09	-0.03
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: “**F**” refers to Federal elections and “**E**” refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is SPD vote share. Variable of interest is expellee share of district’s 1950 population. Please refer to the “Historical expellee data and covariates” subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 17: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Greens vote share)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F) **Greens**	**1972 (F)** **Greens**	**1976 (F)** **Greens**	**1983 (F)** **Greens**	**1984 (E)** **Greens**	**1987 (F)** **Greens**	**1989 (E)** **Greens**
Share of Expellees – 1950				−0.011	−0.007	−0.010	0.014
		Party founded in 1980		(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Standardized coefficient				-0.07	-0.03	-0.04	0.05

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F) **Greens**	**1994 (F)** **Greens**	**1994 (E)** **Greens**	**1998 (F)** **Greens**	**1999 (E)** **Greens**	**2002 (F)** **Greens**	**2004 (E)** **Greens**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.005	−0.007	−0.005	−0.009	−0.010	0.014	0.019
	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.058)
Standardized coefficient	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F) **Greens**	**2009 (F)** **Greens**	**2009 (E)** **Greens**	**2013 (F)** **Greens**	**2014 (E)** **Greens**	**2017 (F)** **Greens**	**2019 (E)** **Greens**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.014	−0.006	0.026	−0.005	0.019	0.005	−0.004
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.071)
Standardized coefficient	0.05	-0.02	0.06	-0.02	0.05	0.01	-0.01
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is Greens vote share. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 18: First-difference estimator: AFD 2017 - AFD 2013 vote share

	AFD **Δ(2017 - 2013)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.046** (0.019)
Covariates	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES
Observations	556

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the difference in AfD's vote share in each district between the 2017 and 2013 Federal elections. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 19: Federal and European Elections: 1953 – 2019 (time series)

	All postwar elections	**All non-BHE postwar elections**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.077*** (0.016)	0.029*** (0.006)
Standardized coefficient	0.15	0.07
Covariates	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES
Election Fixed Effect	YES	YES
Observations	13,344	11,676

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable in column 1 is the radical right vote share in each election for all elections in the post-war period. Dependent variable in column 2 is the radical right vote share in each election for all non-BHE elections in the post-war period. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 20: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (npCBGPS matching weights)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.011	0.005*	0.002	0.003***	0.010***	0.006***	0.139**
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.043)

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.038*	0.020**	0.034*	0.027***	0.019***	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.008)

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.009***	−0.003	−0.00002	0.035**	0.073**	0.058	0.012
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.023)

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 21: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Instrumental variable analysis)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.009	0.005**	0.003***	0.003***	0.007***	0.004*	0.125***
	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.037)

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.036**	0.023***	0.046***	0.029**	0.015	0.001	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.028)

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.002	0.012*	0.016	0.048***	0.081***	0.113***	0.081***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.024)

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	443	443	443	443	443	443	443

Note: “**F**” refers to Federal elections and “**E**” refers to European elections. Estimation method is 2SLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district’s 1950 population. Instrument is expellee share of district’s 1946 population. Please refer to the “Historical expellee data and covariates” subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 22: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Distance to concentration camps)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	1972 (F)	1976 (F)	1983 (F)	1984 (E)	1987 (F)	1989 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.009	0.001	0.002	0.003***	0.011***	0.006**	0.116***
	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.021)
Standardized coefficient	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.28	0.32	0.19	0.23

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	1994 (F)	1994 (E)	1998 (F)	1999 (E)	2002 (F)	2004 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.030**	0.023***	0.041***	0.042***	0.032***	0.007	0.027
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Standardized coefficient	0.16	0.23	0.18	0.3	0.29	0.14	0.2

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	2009 (F)	2009 (E)	2013 (F)	2014 (E)	2017 (F)	2019 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.005**	0.013***	0.022**	0.043***	0.076***	0.101***	0.067**
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	0.05	0.17	0.29	0.35	0.37	0.33	0.32
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include the distance to nearest concentration camp identified by Homola, Pereira and Tavits (2020) as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 23: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (NSDAP vote share '28)

Elections 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	1972 (F)	1976 (F)	1983 (F)	1984 (E)	1987 (F)	1989 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.003***	0.010***	0.004**	0.128***
	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.27	0.29	0.14	0.25

Elections 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	1994 (F)	1994 (E)	1998 (F)	1999 (E)	2002 (F)	2004 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.030**	0.022***	0.038***	0.032***	0.027***	0.003	0.013
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.024)
Standardized coefficient	0.15	0.21	0.16	0.23	0.25	0.05	0.09

Elections 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	2009 (F)	2009 (E)	2013 (F)	2014 (E)	2017 (F)	2019 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1950	−0.005	0.006	0.016	0.046***	0.087***	0.088***	0.060**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Standardized coefficient	-0.05	0.07	0.21	0.38	0.43	0.29	0.28

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. All specifications include NSDAP vote share from 1928 as an additional control. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 24: Federal and European Elections: 1969 – 2019 (Expellee share 1960)

Elections 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1960	−0.014	0.001	0.002**	0.004***	0.016***	0.008**	0.130***
	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)
Standardized coefficient	-0.07	0.02	0.11	0.34	0.44	0.22	0.24

Elections 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1960	0.010	0.014	0.018	0.022	0.029**	0.002	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.034)
Standardized coefficient	0.05	0.13	0.07	0.14	0.25	0.03	0.03

Elections 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share of Expellees – 1960	−0.015	−0.003	0.014	0.061***	0.108***	0.029	0.038*
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Standardized coefficient	-0.15	-0.04	0.17	0.47	0.5	0.09	0.17
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1960 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 25: Radical right support across postwar elections: 1969 – 2019 (election-year socioeconomic controls)

ELECTIONS 1998–2005

	1998	1999	2002	2004	2005
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.036^{***}	0.027^{***}	0.004	0.014	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.009)
Standardized coefficient	0.26	0.24	0.08	0.1	-0.03

ELECTIONS 2009–2017

	2009	2009	2013	2014	2017
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.007	0.014	0.041^{***}	0.070^{***}	0.090^{**}
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.027)
Standardized coefficient	0.09	0.17	0.33	0.35	0.29
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Only the unemployment rate is included as an additional control for the 1998 and 1999 elections. GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and log(private household income) are included as additional controls for elections from 2002 to 2014. The 2014 election specification also includes share of foreigners in the population as an additional control. The 2017 election specification only includes log(private household income) as an additional control. Please refer to the "Election year socioeconomic factors" subsection for details on election-year controls. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 26: No association between expellee share and election-year unemployment rate

	1998	**1999**	**2002**	**2004**	**2005**	**2009**	**2013**	**2014**
Share of Expellees – 1950	−2.546	−1.822	−1.360	−0.958	0.034	0.998	2.154	2.502
	(2.281)	(2.238)	(2.402)	(2.175)	(2.121)	(1.762)	(2.035)	(1.952)
Standardized beta	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04	0	0.04	0.09	0.1
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is unemployment rate. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 27: No association between expellee share and election-year household income

	2002	**2004**	**2005**	**2009**	**2013**	**2014**	**2017**
Share of Expellees – 1950	0.466	0.453	0.417	0.354	0.374	0.375	0.375
	(0.879)	(0.848)	(0.840)	(0.814)	(0.809)	(0.814)	(0.821)
Standardized beta	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is log(private household income). Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Measures of district-level expellee identity

Expellee monuments

In 2008, the Federation of Expellees published a record of all known monuments dedicated to the expulsion and expellees across Germany (Bund der Vertriebenen – Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände 2008). At the time of its publication, they had identified 1,461 such monuments. Almost 95% (1383) of these monuments are located in West German districts. Figure 12 summarizes the timing of their construction. The over time variation in the frequency of their construction appears to follow the temporal expectations summarized under Table 1.

Figure 12: Expellee monument construction by decade



Note: This figure depicts the number of expellee monuments constructed in West Germany in each decade, from the end of WWII until 2008. Shaded areas indicate periods where the political climate in Germany is expected to facilitate the hypothesized relationship between expellee share and support for the radical right. Please refer to the “Temporal expectations” subsection in the paper for details.

I digitized this record and used the monument location data to create two proxies for expellee identity at the district level for each election year. The first set of proxy variables are binary measures. Each of these binary variables indicate whether at least one expellee monument is

Table 28: Presence of expellee monument – by election year

PRESENCE OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1969–1990

	1969	1972	1976	1983	1984	1987	1989	1990
Share of Expellees – 1950	9.929***	10.344***	10.081***	9.665***	9.743***	9.012***	9.728***	10.221***
	(2.502)	(2.512)	(2.503)	(2.491)	(2.496)	(2.487)	(2.521)	(2.528)

PRESENCE OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1994–2009

	1994	1998	1999	2002	2004	2005	2009	
Share of Expellees – 1950	10.576***	10.858***	10.783***	10.991***	11.349***	11.349***	10.937***	
	(2.552)	(2.592)	(2.595)	(2.621)	(2.633)	(2.633)	(2.628)	
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is binomial logistic regression. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable for each specification is a binary measure, which is assgined a value 1 if there existed at least one expellee monument in a district by the election year indicated by the column header, 0 otherwise. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

located in a given district at the time of a given election. The second set of proxy variables are count measures. Each of these count variables equals the total number of monuments located in each district at the time of a given election.

Analyses utilizing these data reveal a consistent picture that corroborates the main results. First, the conditional association between expellee share in 1950 and both sets of proxy measures is positive and statistically significant throughout the postwar period (Table 28-29). Second, this relationship is stronger among districts that received greater shares of the *Volksdeutsche* compared to the *Reichsdeutsche* (Table 35-36). Third, the conditional association between both sets of proxy measures for expellee identity and radical right support is only positive and statistically significant during those periods in time when I hypothesized that those with an expellee identity might be drawn to radical right parties (Table 30-31). Each of the specifications include the same covariates as the baseline specifications. Lastly, I do not analyze the relationship between the monument measures and elections in the 2010s as the monument data do not extend to this period.

Table 29: Number of expellee monuments – by election year

NUMBER OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1969–1990

	1969	**1972**	**1976**	**1983**	**1984**	**1987**	**1989**	**1990**
Share of Expellees – 1950	5.930^{***}	5.875^{***}	6.134^{***}	5.590^{***}	5.811^{***}	5.883^{***}	6.021^{***}	5.935^{***}
	(1.150)	(1.129)	(1.094)	(0.985)	(0.971)	(0.918)	(0.890)	(0.882)

NUMBER OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1994–2009

	1994	**1998**	**1999**	**2002**	**2004**	**2005**	**2009**	
Share of Expellees – 1950	5.906^{***}	5.443^{***}	5.293^{***}	5.124^{***}	5.224^{***}	5.228^{***}	5.129^{***}	
	(0.862)	(0.838)	(0.833)	(0.821)	(0.818)	(0.817)	(0.810)	
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is poisson regression. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable for each specification is a count measure, which equals the number of expellee monuments in each district by the election year indicated by the column header. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 30: Radical right support across postwar elections: 1969 – 2009

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Presence of expellee monument	0.002	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002^{**}	0.001^{**}	0.0004^{**}	0.007^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.002)

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Presence of expellee monument	0.002^{*}	0.001	0.002	-0.00003	-0.0002	-0.0004^{*}	-0.002^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.0002)	(0.0005)

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**				
Presence of expellee monument	-0.001^{**}	-0.001^{**}	-0.001^{***}				
	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0003)	Monument data ends in 2008			
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: “**F**” refers to Federal elections and “**E**” refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is a binary measure, which is assgined a value 1 if there existed at least one expellee monument in a district by the election year indicated by the column header, 0 otherwise. Please refer to the “Historical expellee data and covariates” subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 31: Radical right support across postwar elections: 1969 – 2009

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Number of expellee monuments	0.0004	0.00004	0.00002	0.0001***	0.0002***	0.0001	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.00004)	(0.00003)	(0.00001)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.001)

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Number of expellee monuments	0.001	0.0002***	0.001*	−0.00004	0.0001	−0.00003	−0.00005
	(0.0003)	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**				
Number of expellee monuments	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.00001				
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)		Monument data ends in 2008		

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is a count measure, which equals the number of expellee monuments in each district by the election year indicated by the column header. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Expellee district associations

I collected information on the location of all expellee district associations across West Germany that remained active in 2020 by visiting the state-level websites of the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen 2020). This information, however, was not available across all states. Indeed, there is a strong correlation (.83) between a state's *Volksdeutsche* share of the population in 1950 and the availability of information regarding expellee district associations. This could be the result of either an absence of district level expellee associations in the other states or a lack of website maintenance. Both these explanations are consistent with my expectation that the *Volksdeutsche* have been able to better maintain their expellee identity compared to the *Reichsdeutsche*.

Expellee websites for Baden Württemberg, Bayern, Hessen, and Niedersachsen contained information about district-level expellee associations. Consequently, analyses that explore expellee identity as measured through the presence of district expellee associations are limited to districts within these states. I operationalized district-level expellee identity as a binary measure, which takes the value 1 for districts that reported an active expellee association in 2020, 0 otherwise. Given that this variable was constructed with contemporary data, it is likely to measure the presence of district-level expellee associations with increasing noise for periods further back in time. However, given that the total number of expellee district associations existing today is likely to be a subset of all expellee associations to have existed, I expect the resulting noise in this measure to bias against my hypothesis.

Analyses utilizing these data reveal a consistent picture that corroborates the main results. First, the relationship between expellee share in 1950 and the expellee association measure is positive and statistically significant (Table 32). Second, this relationship is stronger among districts that received greater shares of the *Volksdeutsche* compared to the *Reichsdeutsche* (Table 32). Third, bearing in mind the above mentioned caveat that this proxy for expellee identity is likely to be more noisy for earlier periods in time, the relationship between the expellee association measure and radical right support is only positive and statistically significant during those periods in time when I hypothesized that those with an expellee identity might be drawn to radical right parties (Table 33). Each of the specifications include the same covariates as the baseline specifications. Given the lack of data on the exact coordinates for these expellee association offices (the websites in many cases only listed the names of contemporary districts that contained an expellee association office), these analyses use 2020 administrative districts as the unit of analysis.

Table 32: Presence of expellee association

	Presence of expellee association	
Share of Expellees – 1950	19.377^{***} (5.080)	
Share Volksdeutsche		23.035^{***} (5.749)
Share Reichsdeutsche		11.234 (7.095)
Covariates	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES
Observations	211	211

Note: Estimation method is binomial logistic regression. Unit of analysis is 2020 districts. Dependent variable is a binary measure, which is assgined a value 1 if there existed an expellee association in the district in 2020, 0 otherwise. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 33: Radical right support across postwar elections: 1969 – 2009 (expellee associations)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Presence of expellee association	0.002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.007** (0.002)

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Presence of expellee association	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.0004)	0.003 (0.001)

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Presence of expellee association	0.0001 (0.0005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.005* (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	211	211	211	211	211	211	211

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 2020 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variable of interest is a binary measure, which is assgined a value 1 if there existed an expellee association in the district in 2020, 0 otherwise. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 34: Turnout across postwar elections: 1969 – 2009

Elections 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	1972 (F)	1976 (F)	1983 (F)	1984 (E)	1987 (F)	1989 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1960	0.176***	0.116***	0.089***	0.055***	0.054	0.053**	0.127**
	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.045)	(0.016)	(0.041)
Standardized coefficient	0.53	0.52	0.4	0.25	0.05	0.16	0.2

Elections 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	1994 (F)	1994 (E)	1998 (F)	1999 (E)	2002 (F)	2004 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1960	0.120***	0.104***	0.139***	0.075***	0.105*	0.049*	0.209***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.059)
Standardized coefficient	0.27	0.28	0.19	0.22	0.13	0.18	0.25

Elections 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	2009 (F)	2009 (E)	2013 (F)	2014 (E)	2017 (F)	2019 (E)
Share of Expellees – 1960	0.085**	0.111**	0.108**	0.110***	0.072	0.058	0.051
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Standardized coefficient	0.28	0.3	0.16	0.28	0.09	0.17	0.11

Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is election turnout as a share of the population. Variable of interest is expellee share of district's 1960 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 35: Presence of expellee monument – by election year (expellee subgroups)

PRESENCE OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1969–1990

	1969	**1972**	**1976**	**1983**	**1984**	**1987**	**1989**	**1990**
Share Volksdeutsche	9.597^{***}	9.643^{***}	9.679^{***}	9.871^{***}	9.861^{***}	10.318^{***}	11.012^{***}	11.631^{***}
	(2.882)	(2.888)	(2.886)	(2.914)	(2.918)	(2.958)	(3.004)	(3.019)
Share Reichsdeutsche	10.539^{***}	11.631^{***}	10.812^{***}	9.312^{***}	9.540^{***}	6.887^{*}	7.667^{**}	7.970^{**}
	(3.642)	(3.664)	(3.639)	(3.587)	(3.597)	(3.548)	(3.582)	(3.588)

PRESENCE OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1994–2009

	1994	**1998**	**1999**	**2002**	**2004**	**2005**	**2009**	
Share Volksdeutsche	11.505^{***}	11.708^{***}	11.361^{***}	11.323^{***}	11.744^{***}	11.744^{***}	11.460^{***}	
	(3.034)	(3.090)	(3.088)	(3.125)	(3.139)	(3.139)	(3.139)	
Share Reichsdeutsche	9.089^{**}	9.517^{***}	9.862^{***}	10.469^{***}	10.729^{***}	10.729^{***}	10.119^{***}	
	(3.620)	(3.671)	(3.693)	(3.729)	(3.737)	(3.737)	(3.734)	
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is binomial logistic regression. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable for each specification is a binary measure, which is assgined a value 1 if there existed at least one expellee monument in a district by the election year indicated by the column header, 0 otherwise. Variables of interest are Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 36: Number of expellee monuments – by election year (expellee subgroups)

NUMBER OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1969–1990

	1969	1972	1976	1983	1984	1987	1989	1990
Share Volksdeutsche	6.570^{***}	6.445^{***}	6.724^{***}	6.594^{***}	6.739^{***}	6.699^{***}	6.692^{***}	6.599^{***}
	(1.228)	(1.205)	(1.168)	(1.056)	(1.041)	(0.985)	(0.956)	(0.948)
Share Reichsdeutsche	3.849^{**}	4.001^{**}	4.180^{**}	2.460	2.908^{*}	3.345^{**}	3.930^{***}	3.881^{***}
	(1.864)	(1.835)	(1.787)	(1.595)	(1.572)	(1.487)	(1.442)	(1.425)

NUMBER OF EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 1994–2009

	1994	1998	1999	2002	2004	2005	2009	
Share Volksdeutsche	6.408^{***}	6.021^{***}	5.858^{***}	5.538^{***}	5.663^{***}	5.650^{***}	5.644^{***}	
	(0.928)	(0.904)	(0.899)	(0.887)	(0.883)	(0.882)	(0.873)	
Share Reichsdeutsche	4.355^{***}	3.706^{***}	3.605^{***}	3.880^{***}	3.901^{***}	3.952^{***}	3.566^{***}	
	(1.396)	(1.344)	(1.332)	(1.317)	(1.311)	(1.310)	(1.297)	
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: Estimation method is poisson regression. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable for each specification is a count measure, which equals the number of expellee monuments in each district by the election year indicated by the column header. Variables of interest are Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 37: Radical right support across postwar elections: 1969 – 2019 (*Reichsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche*)

ELECTIONS 1969–1989

	1969 (F)	**1972 (F)**	**1976 (F)**	**1983 (F)**	**1984 (E)**	**1987 (F)**	**1989 (E)**
Share Volksdeutsche	0.015	0.002	0.001	0.004**	0.011***	0.006**	0.157***
	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.019)
Share Reichsdeutsche	−0.014	−0.0003	0.001	0.002	0.008*	0.002	0.073**
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.028)
Standardized coefficient – Volks	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.24	0.24	0.13	0.24
Standardized coefficient – Reichs	-0.06	-0.01	0.06	0.14	0.19	0.05	0.12

ELECTIONS 1990–2004

	1990 (F)	**1994 (F)**	**1994 (E)**	**1998 (F)**	**1999 (E)**	**2002 (F)**	**2004 (E)**
Share Volksdeutsche	0.039***	0.028***	0.054***	0.052***	0.041***	0.008	0.028
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.030)
Share Reichsdeutsche	0.013	0.009	0.006	−0.007	0.001	−0.008	−0.016
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.035)
Standardized coefficient – Volks	0.15	0.21	0.18	0.28	0.28	0.13	0.16
Standardized coefficient – Reichs	0.05	0.07	0.02	-0.04	0.01	-0.13	-0.1

ELECTIONS 2005–2019

	2005 (F)	**2009 (F)**	**2009 (E)**	**2013 (F)**	**2014 (E)**	**2017 (F)**	**2019 (E)**
Share Volksdeutsche	0.004	0.014	0.025	0.057**	0.103***	0.131***	0.094**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Share Reichsdeutsche	−0.021	−0.010	−0.001	0.024	0.056*	0.006	−0.005
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Standardized coefficient – Volks	0.03	0.14	0.25	0.36	0.39	0.33	0.34
Standardized coefficient – Reichs	-0.18	-0.1	-0.01	0.16	0.22	0.02	-0.02
Covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
State Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Allied Power Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	556	556	556	556	556	556	556

Note: "**F**" refers to Federal elections and "**E**" refers to European elections. Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is 1950 districts. Dependent variable is the cumulative vote share across four radical right parties: NPD, DVU, REP, and AfD. Variables of interest are Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche share of district's 1950 population. Please refer to the "Historical expellee data and covariates" subsection in the paper for details on pre-treatment covariates. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Appendix to Chapter III

Table 38: Sample characteristics – Social Mobility and Social Change Survey 1993

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political interest	3,159	2.6	0.7	1.0	4.0
Male	3,287	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age	3,287	42.5	15.2	18	93
Education	3,285	1.3	1.3	0.0	6.0
Household income	3,287	5.2	2.1	1	11
Maoist era cohort	3,287	0.6	0.5	0	1
Pre-Mao cohort	3,287	0.1	0.3	0	1
Post-Mao cohort	3,287	0.4	0.5	0	1

Table 39: Sample characteristics – 2008 China Survey

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political interest	3,921	2.4	0.9	1.0	4.0
Male	3,989	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age	3,989	46.0	15.6	18	92
Education	3,989	1.5	1.1	0	5
Household income	956	7.5	1.8	1.0	11.0
Maoist era cohort	3,989	0.4	0.5	0	1
Pre-Mao cohort	3,989	0.01	0.1	0	1
Post-Mao cohort	3,989	0.6	0.5	0	1

Table 40: Sample characteristics – World Values Survey 1990

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political interest	979	2.9	0.8	1.0	4.0
Male	998	0.6	0.5	0.0	1.0
Age	1,000	39.4	14.0	18	85
Education	901	3.5	1.1	1.0	5.0
Household income	981	3.2	1.7	1.0	10.0
Maoist era cohort	1,000	0.6	0.5	0	1
Pre-Mao cohort	1,000	0.03	0.2	0	1
Post-Mao cohort	1,000	0.4	0.5	0	1

Table 41: Sample characteristics – World Values Survey 2001

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political interest	956	2.9	0.9	1.0	4.0
Male	1,000	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age	1,000	40.3	11.5	18	65
Education	1,000	2.7	1.0	1	5
Household income	954	5.9	2.1	1.0	10.0
Maoist era cohort	1,000	0.4	0.5	0	1
Pre-Mao cohort	1,000	0.0	0.0	0	0
Post-Mao cohort	1,000	0.6	0.5	0	1

Table 42: Sample characteristics – World Values Survey 2007

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political interest	1,755	2.8	1.0	1.0	4.0
Male	1,991	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age	1,991	44.7	13.3	18	70
Education	1,991	2.6	1.3	1	5
Household income	1,577	4.0	1.9	1.0	10.0
Maoist era cohort	1,991	0.4	0.5	0	1
Pre-Mao cohort	1,991	0.0	0.0	0	0
Post-Mao cohort	1,991	0.6	0.5	0	1

Table 43: Sample characteristics – World Values Survey 2012

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Political interest	2,252	2.4	0.9	1.0	4.0
Male	2,300	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age	2,300	43.6	15.0	18	75
Education	2,300	3.2	1.2	1	5
Household income	2,055	4.4	1.9	1.0	10.0
Maoist era cohort	2,300	0.3	0.4	0	1
Pre-Mao cohort	2,300	0.0	0.0	0	0
Post-Mao cohort	2,300	0.7	0.4	0	1

Table 44: Membership in Maoist generation and political interest – age as categorical

	Interest in politics	
	All surveys	*WVS only*
Maoist Generation	0.183^{***}	0.149^{***}
	(0.025)	(0.042)
Age - Categorical	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES
Additional controls	NO	YES
Survey-year Random Effects	YES	YES
Birth-cohort Random Effects	YES	YES
Observations	13,020	5,241

Note: Regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Hierarchical APC models. Dependent variable across both specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Variable of interest is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1925 and 1957. Both columns include respondent age as a categorical variable and gender as controls alongside survey-year and 5-year birth cohort random effects. Columns 2 also includes measures for education and income as additional controls. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Sources:** Column 1: 1993 SMSC Survey, 2008 China Survey, and waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS. Column 2: Waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS.

Table 45: Membership in Maoist generation and political interest – alternative definition for formative years

	Interest in politics	
	All surveys	*WVS only*
Maoist Generation	0.172^{***}	0.106^{**}
	(0.028)	(0.040)
Age	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES
Additional controls	NO	YES
Survey-year Random Effects	YES	YES
Birth-cohort Random Effects	YES	YES
Observations	13,020	5,241

Note: Regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Hierarchical APC models. Dependent variable across both specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Variable of interest is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1930 and 1960. Both columns include respondent age and gender as controls alongside survey-year and 5-year birth cohort random effects. Columns 2 also includes measures for education and income as additional controls. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Sources**: Column 1: 1993 SMSC Survey, 2008 China Survey, and waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS. Column 2: Waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS.

Table 46: Membership in Maoist generation and political interest – year as fixed effect

	Interest in politics	
	All surveys	*WVS only*
Maoist Generation	0.197^{***}	0.117^{**}
	(0.028)	(0.044)
Age	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES
Additional controls	NO	YES
Survey-year Fixed Effects	YES	YES
Birth-cohort Random Effects	YES	YES
Observations	13,020	5,241

Note: Regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Hierarchical APC models. Dependent variable across both specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Variable of interest is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1925 and 1957. Both columns include respondent age and gender as controls alongside survey-year fixed effects and 5-year birth cohort random effects. Columns 2 also includes measures for education and income as additional controls. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Sources**: Column 1: 1993 SMSC Survey, 2008 China Survey, and waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS. Column 2: Waves 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS.

Table 47: Investigating generational divides across four neighboring polities – alternative definition for formative years

	Interest in politics			
	Taiwan	*Hong Kong*	*Japan*	*South Korea*
Maoist Generation	0.080 (0.072)	0.055 (0.052)	0.010 (0.043)	0.014 (0.057)
Age	YES	YES	YES	YES
Pretreatment covariates	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Survey-year Random Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Birth-cohort Random Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,386	2,044	4,069	3,581

Note: Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors (in parentheses) from Hierarchical APC models. Dependent variable across both specifications is self-reported interest in politics. Variable of interest is the binary indicator for whether an individual experienced part of their formative years between 1930 and 1960. All columns include respondent age, gender, education, and income as controls alongside survey-year and 5-year birth cohort random effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level. **Sources**: Waves 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS.

Appendix to Chapter IV

Detailed notes on interviews

IRB & Interview Procedure

I received human subjects research approval for this project from my institution's Institutional Review Board prior to beginning fieldwork (HUM00152674). All interviewees were first verbally briefed as to the purpose of my research. Interviewees were clearly informed at this stage that they would not be compensated for their time. If an individual agreed to sit down for an interview, they were provided with two consent forms. The first was the main study consent form that detailed the goals of the project and requested interview consent for both a) their participation and b) for recording the conversation. The second consent form detailed their rights under the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Each interviewee was given as much time as they desired to read through these forms, all their questions were answered, and the forms signed and dated before I switched on my recording device. Finally, given the sensitive nature of the activities undertaken by many of my interviewees, I explicitly asked all my interviewees to not state any information regarding past activities that might result in their being prosecuted while the recording was in progress.

The interviews were semi-structured, with individual specific experiences and occupational backgrounds guiding the exact course of the conversation. They varied greatly in length, the shortest interaction lasting about ten minutes to many conversations that exceeded an hour. All conversations began with a broad question that sought to situate the interviewee in the context of the *Troubles* and its legacy. I ended most conversations by asking the interviewee to name and explain the three concerns that they saw as most pressing for Northern Ireland at the time of the interview. In a handful of cases I conducted follow up interviews to clarify certain issues raised in a previous conversation.

Breakdown of interviewees

Table 48: Breakdown of interviewees

Category	**Number of interviewees**
Civilians	5
Academics	18
Victims	8
Paramilitary members	19
Civil society	18
Politicians	14
Journalists	6
Security service members	10
Total	**98**

Quotes on attitudes toward Republican vs. Loyalist paramilitaries

Interviewee A - Journalist

> “Well, I think there’s a perception that every Republican prisoner, every nationalist who went to jail, that they came back into their communities, about were accepted with open arms. And the vast majority of cases, that’s what happened. But not in all cases. But the structure that developed with nationalism, modern nationalism as we know it emerged from the civil rights movement, then you had Blood Sunday, then you had internment, and then you had the hunger strikes, and then you had the cease fires. In all these scenarios, nationalism was emerging, it was evolving. So at the start, the Republicans weren’t a political entity. They didn’t want to engage in the political establishment. [...]
>
> On the Loyalist side, they were already part of the establishment. [...] They did what they did, they will argue, to protect the state. So a Loyalist who kills a target will argue, “Well, we did that because we were protecting Northern Ireland.” Republicans were people who wanted to destroy the state, who wanted to kill Protestants, to shoot policemen, and British soldiers and, “We did what we did to protect the state.” But the state were the people who were putting them in jail, who were putting them behind bars. So how did they equate, how did they rationalize, “So we’re part of the state, we were defending the state, but we’re the people in prison.” When they got out of prison, they then, “I’m sorry. We are part of the establishment, or part of Northern Ireland,”

> but they are branded criminals by the larger Unionist community, like middle class Unionism, looked down their noses on Loyalism, on militant Loyalism."

Interviewee B - Unionist Politician

> "They want an amnesty but only for soldiers and police, not for anybody else. And people within loyalism, those who are close to loyalist paramilitaries have a difficulty with what the DUP are saying, no amnesty for terrorists, because of course some of them were. But their families are saying, "Yes, I agree with DUP." So there's this confusion. Loyalism has always been like a confused child in a family, that one minute it's getting smacked by the leader of the DUP, and the next minute it's getting embraced. So it's like, where do we stand? Where do we stand? Where do we stand? Because they're never quite sure where they stand, because they're constantly getting criticized and condemned. And then the next minute, they're getting their arm put around them.
>
> So I think there's a confusion there. And certainly some within loyalism, particularly those that you spoke to, would like to think that they have some credibility and some gravitas within the community. I can assure you, the people that I speak to have no time for them whatsoever."

Interviewee C - ex-Loyalist Paramilitary member

> "We had David Ervine, who was quite a bit of a visionary, and having [inaudible 00:09:33] managed, at that time, to get elected and take it in against all odds, and without much help from anybody, I might say. But that sort of feel good moment only lasted a term, and when that high of the Good Friday agreement, when it came down to earth, then people didn't really continue that support. And, there is a mindset... We believe there is a mindset, I alluded to it earlier, the Roman Catholic population will vote for gunmen, and bombers, and terrorists, and as part of it, wrap the Irish flag round me, and it's the cause, and it's all a [inaudible 00:10:09] thing, and it's the whole [inaudible 00:10:10] anthology.
>
> So they will vote very easy, very readily for someone who has killed and bombed. The Protestant population have a completely different mindset, completely different mental attitude, and they will not vote for people who are being killers or bombers. They said they won't do it. And that's why you don't have the same population or... Sorry, the same perception, and the same people would be lacking from our side of the fence. Also, we were brought up in working class, and in the middle class here, is that the police was there to protect you, and your politicians who wield the Union Jack would look after you. And somehow, it was slightly treasonous, or slightly not the dumb thing to go out and go against those people, because they were the British army, they were the British establishment. So, you had to support them, and if you didn't, well, then somehow you were being disloyal to that [inaudible 00:11:05], so to say.

That was the main thing in our community, that we... You don't vote for people who have been to jail, but on the Catholic side, it absolutely makes no difference. Some of them could blow up and kill ten people, and they would still get voted into power, so there's two different mental attitudes, absolutely."

Interviewee D - Academic

"The Protestant community, I think has a harder time because I think there's a overarching historical narrative of Republicanism about British colonialism which is, in the 21st century, nearly always told from the ethical position, which is "colonialism was bad."

Now, I suppose if you'd gone to the 19th century in Britain, they might not have had that way of telling the story. It was totally the other way around, but that's the way we tell the story from now because the global positioning is dominated by the anti-colonial realm. So, that's the times we live in. The consequence of that is that those people who can align their story to that narrative, "we were the anti-colonial power" discount the violence of it and they simply say, "well, it was necessary" and that aligns them, then. It's a whole tradition, nearly, across the world. "Yes, we did terrible things, but only because they done terrible things to us first. And to put it, it's the only way to do it." That's the narrative."

[...]

"It does seem in Republicanism as if there was a clear transition from being in the IRA from being part of a family which had suffered in some ways under the British, that there are a disproportionate number of people involved in Sinn Fein who have those histories or have those histories in their immediate families. You went to jail or... there's a story of struggle in awful lot of people who are involved in the political life of Sinn Fein. Of course, that's not the same as saying, "Everybody who had that story went into politics." It may be that it's easier to say, "Politics attracted a disproportionate number of people in some places and that there are people who served in security forces who are very involved in politics and that's part of their political self." There are leadership roles in communities which came out of their roles within military, paramilitary formations. And then, there are powerful stories which appeal to the narrative of electorates, who pull people into political authority. It's too simple to say, "All individuals have this," but there are things in those stories of participation in defending the community or suffering on behalf of the community, which are compelling for other people and which are, therefore, useful and attractive in politics because they tell a clear story and they make it clear appeal."

Interviewee E - ex-Republican Paramilitary member

"I think it's a mistake to compare the Republican, the profession IRA with the UVF because you're not comparing like with like. The provisional IRA had very significant supporters. Electorally they counted for 33 to 35, 36% through the 1980s when it was obvious that a vote for Sinn Fein was a vote for the IRA. Now, going along with that, the other 60 plus percent that didn't vote, I'm talking within the Catholic community, so far as you can use that term that there was, I would describe benign neutrality by and large. Now obviously the British Intelligence had its agents and its assets within that community, but by and large the nationalist community 30% deliberately did not see, did not inform what was happening, the question may be to attack the employment of the tactic, but not the objective.

So, you're talking about quite a considerable purchase within the community, on the other hand what we would call the Protestant parliament never had that same purchase on their communities. It would probably be better to compare the Ulster Defense Regiment or the Royal Irish Rifles or maybe even the RUC with, in terms of their support and their position within the Protestant Unionist community where they were seen as the legitimate expression of the defense of the protection of that community."

Interviewee F - Academic

"I think that in simple terms in the unionist side there is some disdain and some distaste with loyalists paramilitaries. A, from a class perspective, because there's a perception they come from more working class communities, but B, the views that they didn't have to do what they did, they could have joined the RUC, or they could've joined the UDR, or they could have joined the British Army. They could have responded to the conflict in a different way. They did not have to set up paramilitary organizations. On the Republican side, the argument is that they had no choice in those communities. It was kill or be killed from their perspective.

They argue that they picked up arms in response to the struggle because there was no other means of protecting themselves, because the state, if they were at war with the state, and there's no support there, so that they had no choice. That is what they would say. I'm not saying I agree or disagree, but that's what they would say. Throughout the conflict, there was this sense of part of the community protecting the community for the community. Whereas in the unionist loyalist side, it was, there was less support because of the argument that they could have joined security services and they were doing it more to self-interest, self-gain. In terms of the Good Friday agreement, and then the ceasefire years, and then the peace process, republicans then because of that position within the community, they were on their alignment to politics.

They were given places within the community. They were given stature, legitimacy and credibility, so that they, and prominence. Not all, but some. On the unionist loyalist side, they came out and they had nowhere to go because they did not have the same standing in the community. The identity of being a loyalist paramilitary was not the same as being a republican. The identity was different and the value placed on those individuals in the community was different. They did not have the same place to go. They sort of were left there. Whereas, republicans could be integrated back into the community and then assume positions of authority within the community, legitimate positions of authority. That's what happened. They gained legitimacy. On the other side, there was very little legitimacy."

Additional Figures

Figure 13: Voting intentions by survey wave



Note: Other includes every other response, including responses like ‘no party’, ‘blank’, and ‘do not know’.

Figure 14: Sympathy for reasons behind paramilitary violence and voting intentions: 1998 – 2007



Regression tables

Table 49: NILT Survey 1998

	Voting Intention					
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UDP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.148*** (0.031)	−0.018 (0.034)				
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.305*** (0.078)	−0.191** (0.065)				
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.003 (0.008)	0.011 (0.006)	0.031 (0.028)	0.083*** (0.024)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.170** (0.059)	0.037 (0.027)	−0.210*** (0.062)	0.156* (0.062)
Observations	1,710	1,710	1,703	1,703	1,703	1,703

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-6 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 50: EVS Survey 1999

	Voting Intention					
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UDP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.122*** (0.034)	−0.037 (0.040)				
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.647*** (0.092)	−0.348*** (0.077)				
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.020 (0.013)	0.002 (0.006)	−0.020 (0.026)	0.080*** (0.024)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.128 (0.071)	−0.009 (0.006)	−0.136 (0.082)	0.230* (0.093)
Observations	930	930	928	928	928	928

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-6 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 51: NILT Survey 2003

	Voting Intention				
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.174^{***} (0.031)	-0.051 (0.033)			
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.568^{***} (0.056)	-0.237^{***} (0.050)			
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.002 (0.004)	0.026 (0.025)	0.044 (0.025)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.077^{*} (0.030)	-0.163^{***} (0.035)	0.316^{***} (0.064)
Observations	1,690	1,690	1,685	1,685	1,685

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-5 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 52: NILT Survey 2007

	Voting Intention			
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.074^{*} (0.029)	-0.108^{***} (0.029)		
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.318^{***} (0.078)	-0.202^{**} (0.074)		
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.002 (0.026)	0.022 (0.028)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			-0.013 (0.063)	0.078 (0.070)
Observations	999	999	997	997

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-4 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 53: NILT Survey 1998 – Controlling for sectarian identity

	Voting Intention					
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UDP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.123^{***} (0.031)	-0.041 (0.034)				
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.249^{**} (0.079)	-0.242^{***} (0.068)				
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.001 (0.008)	0.010 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.028)	0.059^{**} (0.023)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.171^{**} (0.058)	0.037 (0.027)	-0.237^{***} (0.062)	0.116 (0.062)
Observations	1,710	1,710	1,703	1,703	1,703	1,703

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-6 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Also included are two categorical measures of a respondent's identity: (a) whether they consider themselves a unionist, a nationalist, or neither and (b) whether they consider themselves British, Irish, Ulster, or Northern Irish. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 54: NILT Survey 2003 – Controlling for sectarian identity

	Voting Intention				
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.134^{***} (0.028)	-0.078^{*} (0.034)			
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.454^{***} (0.056)	-0.287^{***} (0.056)			
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.002 (0.005)	0.014 (0.024)	0.024 (0.023)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.075^{*} (0.031)	-0.229^{***} (0.040)	0.211^{***} (0.057)
Observations	1,690	1,690	1,685	1,685	1,685

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-5 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Also included are two categorical measures of a respondent's identity: (a) whether they consider themselves a unionist, a nationalist, or neither and (b) whether they consider themselves British, Irish, Ulster, or Northern Irish. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 55: NILT Survey 2007 – Controlling for sectarian identity

	Voting Intention			
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.055*	−0.106***		
	(0.027)	(0.029)		
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.223**	−0.195**		
	(0.075)	(0.075)		
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			−0.020	−0.001
			(0.025)	(0.027)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			−0.070	0.024
			(0.063)	(0.069)
Observations	999	999	997	997

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-4 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. Also included are two categorical measures of a respondent's identity: (a) whether they consider themselves a unionist, a nationalist, or neither and (b) whether they consider themselves British, Irish, Ulster, or Northern Irish. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 56: NILT Survey 1998 - Controlling for strength of sectarian identity

	Voting Intention					
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UDP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.113***	−0.032				
	(0.030)	(0.035)				
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.215**	−0.227**				
	(0.079)	(0.071)				
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			−0.002	0.010	−0.015	0.059*
			(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.023)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.162**	0.035	−0.273***	0.124
			(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Observations	1,710	1,710	1,703	1,703	1,703	1,703

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-6 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. All specifications also include a categorical measure of a respondent's strength of attachment to either a unionist or nationalist identity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 57: NILT Survey 1998 - Who benefited from the Good Friday Agreement

	Voting Intention					
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UDP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.146^{***} (0.031)	-0.014 (0.034)				
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.294^{***} (0.077)	-0.169^{**} (0.065)				
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.0003 (0.008)	0.010 (0.006)	0.015 (0.029)	0.063^{**} (0.023)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.165^{**} (0.058)	0.037 (0.027)	-0.232^{***} (0.064)	0.133^{*} (0.062)
Observations	1,710	1,710	1,703	1,703	1,703	1,703

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-6 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. All specifications also include a categorical measure of who the respondent believes benefited from the Good Friday Agreement. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 58: NILT Survey 2003 - Who benefited from the Good Friday Agreement

	Voting Intention				
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	PUP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.166^{***} (0.031)	-0.052 (0.033)			
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.515^{***} (0.059)	-0.211^{***} (0.054)			
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.002 (0.005)	0.020 (0.025)	0.024 (0.024)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.077^{*} (0.030)	-0.174^{***} (0.036)	0.250^{***} (0.060)
Observations	1,690	1,690	1,685	1,685	1,685

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-5 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. All specifications also include a categorical measure of who the respondent believes benefited from the Good Friday Agreement. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

Table 59: NILT Survey 2007 - Who benefited from the Good Friday Agreement

	Voting Intention			
	Sinn Fein	SDLP	UUP	DUP
Republican Paramilitaries: some sympathy	0.073^{*}	-0.107^{***}		
	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Republican Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy	0.316^{***}	-0.199^{**}		
	(0.077)	(0.074)		
Loyalist Paramilitaries: some sympathy			0.005	0.011
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Loyalist Paramilitaries: a lot of sympathy			0.004	0.015
			(0.063)	(0.073)
Observations	999	999	997	997

Note: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is individual. Dependent variable in each column is a binary varianle, 1 if an individual indicated their intention to vote for the party indicated in the column header and 0 otherwise. Variable of interest in columns 1 and 2 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Republican paramilitary violence. Variable of interest in columns 3-4 is the degree of sympathy for the reasons behind Loyalist paramilitary violence. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education, income, religion, and area of residence. All specifications also include a categorical measure of who the respondent believes benefited from the Good Friday Agreement. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1%, and .1% level.

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