Part of the Whole?
Reexamining Racial, Ethnic, and Cultural Influences On Asian American Public Opinion and Political Behaviors

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0. turns out I didn't have many to choose from

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Abstract

Current literature on Asian American political behavior indicates weak and inconsistent racial influence on political behavior. However, recent studies have focused on the impact of panethnicity on the Asian American group as well as a more dimensional approach to race and identity. I hypothesize that Asian Americans do adopt a panethnic identity, but ethnicity still plays an important role. Furthermore, I argue that cultural aspects of the Asian American identity affect how race and ethnicity influence political behavior. Using quantitative data from the 2016 National Asian American Survey and qualitative data from fifteen long-form interviews, I found that Asian Americans do adopt a panethnic political identity. I also find that ethnic identity plays a major role in Asian American political behavior. A surprising result is that several other social factors play a major role in the formation of Asian American political beliefs such as age, income, education, and partisanship. Probable mechanisms for these findings come from the qualitative data where respondents report having major cultural influences on political values. These cultural factors have major implications on the direction of Asian American policy preferences. My study suggests that more research needs to be devoted to understanding how culture and personal experiences play a role in Asian American political behavior, as well as the dimensionality of Asian American politics.

1 Introduction

As an Asian American male living in the United States, I am acutely aware of the implications of my race. Growing up in an area just outside of Los Angeles called the San Gabriel Valley, I was immersed in my Asian heritage growing up. Signs and storefronts devoted more surface area to Chinese characters than English words. Yet, despite living in one of the most progressive and diverse communities within the United States, our voices never mattered. In one of the most Asian American communities on the face of the entire planet, Asians of all different ethnic origins still face discrimination and political oppression on a daily basis. But why?

In recent years, the Asian American population represents one of the fastest growing and most racially diverse social groups in the United States. Immigration originating from Asian countries has exploded in recent years, adding to the sizeable population already residing in the United States from previous immigration waves. Like other minority groups, Asian Americans do not have the full set of social privileges associated with the majority. However, unlike other minority groups, Asian Americans have high average levels of socioeconomic status and completed education. The Asian American group does not exist within the confines of a group, instead lying somewhere between the majority and the minority. In the meantime, Asian Americans continue to suffer from discrimination and racially motivated attacks. Now, more than ever, Asian Americans must mobilize to push their agenda.

In my second year at the University of Michigan, I took a public opinion course taught by Professor Vincent Hutchings of the Political Science Department. His class was very insightful and informative, despite the fact that I was in California for the semester due to the Covid-19 pandemic. I got my first taste in Asian American group politics and realized that this is something I am really interested in. Maybe in part due to the fact that I am Asian American, I felt a slight sense of duty to look at and contribute, however insignificant, to the growing literature on Asian American political behavior.

Despite being a major racial group, much of the existing scholarship on Asian American

political behavior continues to find discrepancies and peculiarities among the Asian racial group. Most important, is that the Asian American group does not function like other major racial groups in the United States. While why this continues to be a mystery, recent scholarship has looked at many potential avenues to explain this. Panethnicity is a growing topic among scholars looking at Asian American politics. The dimensionality of race and identity is also gaining recognition among scholars. The conceptualization of Asian Americans as a monolith is also entering mainstream political discussion. One aspect that the current literature does lack is the impact of ethnicity on Asian American political opinion. The cultural and environmental factors associated with each Asian ethnicity are dramatically different and they should play a role in-group political behavior. While this may not be as strong as racial group influence, it should still have noticeable effect and moderate racial influence. Taking this as a sign, I decided that now would be the time to embark on my own research journey.

The goal of my projects is to contribute towards the growing scholarship on Asian American political attitudes. Specifically, I am looking at the disparate impacts of the panethnic Asian American identity and individual ethnic identities on Asian American political opinion. Additionally, I hope to explore other potential dimensions of race and identity to better measure the Asian American group. The hope is that my small contribution can fill the current ethnic identity gap within the current literature. I hope that my analysis into the distinct cultures of Asian ethnicities will also help to expand the knowledge on how Asian American identity influences political behavior.

Especially with recent anti-Asian American sentiments stemming from the Covid-19 pandemic, more political research on Asian Americans is more important now than ever. By better understanding group dynamics, community leaders can better mobilize the Asian American community to achieve collective goals. Political elites would also be encouraged to pay more attention to Asian Americans and provide more tangible benefits to the group. Having a bigger political voice would also allow Asian Americans to formulate and better

pursue their own agenda. Society would be more aware of the problems that face our community. This will lead to a greater push for meaningful dialogue and also solutions to the problems plaguing the community.

While I am not expecting to make a big contribution to the Asian American community, I hope that I can be at least a part of the movement to enfranchise the group. While we as individuals have very little power to affect change in the world, the movements and ideals behind them can effect lasting changes. A major aspect of my personal identity is being Asian American and so I hope to give back to my heritage and also to honor the many Asian Americans who fought for our rights. Their actions and sacrifices allowed Asian Americans to have the opportunities they do today. So I embark on my first research project on Asian American politics with endless ambition and enough anxiety to fill an ocean.

2 Literature Review

2.1 A History of Asian Americans

The history of Asians in America began long ago. The first major wave of Asian immigration occurred during the mid to late nineteenth century which saw a boom in the population of Chinese Americans (Lien 2001; Wei 1993). In this initial wave, mainly Chinese American laborers moved to the west coast of the United States and formed tightly knit ethnic communities. During the beginning of Asian immigration to America, the term "Asian American" did not exist yet. Individuals with different ethnic origins simply referred to themselves along their ethnic identities. Within the Asian race, most people saw very little in common between ethnic identities. However, from an outside perspective, Asian individuals of various ethnic origins were informally grouped together (Espiritu 2011; Wei 1993). Often in a derogatory manner, white residents and laborers typically considered all Asian immigrants to be "orientals" in reference to the fact that China and other East Asian countries were considered the Far East. While this did very little to formally unite Asians into a common identity, it provided some shared experiences across different ethnic groups.

The story of the Asian American group throughout early to mid-twentieth century is dominated by discrimination and racially motivated attacks against all Asian Americans. Starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act, the United States fought hard to discriminate against Asian Americans (Ancheta 2006; Wei 1993). While the policy specifically targeted individuals of Chinese heritage, Asians of other ethnic origins were also impacted. Later policies such as the internment of Japanese American citizens during World War II highlight the growing adversity facing Asian Americans during this period of time (*Executive Order 9066* 1942; Ancheta 2006). These events still predate the creation of the term "Asian American." Although this long line of discrimination is tragic, it marked the beginning of unity between ethnic groups of Asian countries. While there was still very little formal connections, Asian individuals from across many different ethnicities began fighting for a

common purpose and bridge the cultural divide.

Asian countries have a long and contentious history of conflict. Although they originate from the same continent, Asian ethnicities do not typically associate themselves with other ethnic groups because they view themselves as being incredibly different from one another (Ancheta 2006; Espiritu 2011). In the mid twentieth century, individuals with shared Asian backgrounds began to breakdown these centuries-old ethnic divisions to create a completely new identity. We are still not at the point where the modern Asian American group has been conceptualized yet, but we can start seeing some of the cultural and political norms beginning to form. Media and literature, often distinct between Asian ethnic groups, began to form unified themes. Taking aspects of culture, art, and literature from various Asian ethnic groups, Asian American media and art began to take shape (Chin et al. 1983). While artistic portrayals of Asians in American media had already aggregated different Asian ethnicities into a single group, Asians themselves began highlighting similarities across ethnic groups. Traditional divisions began to blur as many cultural traditions merged to create broader Asian heritages. While out-groups often saw the Asian group as a homogeneous group, the merging and connecting of Asian cultures fundamentally changed how Asian Americans saw one another. They now viewed different ethnic groups as fellow Asians, which soon spilled over cultural similarities and into aspects of political preferences. Asian political movements, particularly in the western United States, fought against Asian discrimination, with ethnic groups fighting together for a common goal (Ancheta 2006). In many ways, even though certain topics only concerned a specific ethnic group, many Asians saw an attack against one group as an attack on all. Asian ethnicities maintained their individuality and ethnic identities, but accepted ties that brought them closer to other groups.

This then leads to the creation of the Asian American racial group during the mid-1900s. In 1968, the term "Asian American" was coined by a pair of students attending the University of California, Berkeley: Yuji Ichioka and Emma Gee (Maeda 2016; Wei 1993). The origins of the word are strictly political in nature, created when naming their organization

the Asian American Political Alliance. The goal of coining the term was to unite Asian Americans across all ethnic origins to fight for a progressive political agenda that countered racism and imperialism in the United States. Much of the political agenda set by the founders is attributed to their connection with the Black Panther movement (Maeda 2016). With the term coined, American society began to label individuals from all Asian ethnic origins simply as Asian American. The diverse range of cultures, languages, and experiences associated with each ethnic identity faded into the Asian American identity. Although Asian Americans are still personally conscious of their ethnic divisions and origins, a significant portion of American society views them as a single homogeneous group.

Today, the Asian American racial group continues to be one of the most diverse and quickly growing communities in the United States (*The Rise of Asian Americans* 2012). As a group, the Asian diaspora has now reached every corner of the United States, and Asian culture has permeated into the main-stream consciousness. However, the Asian American experience continues to be fraught with instances of discrimination and hate. Even after the formation of Asian American political groups, occurrences of hate crimes and anti-Asian sentiments continue to rise today (Maeda 2016; *The Rise of Asian Americans* 2012; Okazaki, n.d.). This is especially salient now with the Covid-19 pandemic ravaging the world. Anti-Asian sentiments are at an all-time high, with many blaming Asian Americans for bringing this disease to the United States (Okazaki, n.d.). These prejudices exist and impact the entire racial group despite the fact that most Asian Americans, including Chinese Americans, have little to no connection with China itself. However, this reminds us of the long and troubled history of Asian Americans in the United States. Despite coming a long way from their humble origins as laborers in the American west, Asian Americans continue to fight for the right to be truly American.

2.2 Social Influences on Political Opinion

The topic of group opinion and political behavior has been extensively researched throughout the mid to late 1900s and into the 2000s. While significant advances have been made in recent years, much of the foundation of group opinion research is still based on early works looking into election and public policy opinion data as well as more modern revisits. The basic model on which most research is based is known as the Michigan Model of Voting, which sets out a clear relationship between social group membership and vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). The model carefully constructs that an individual's social group membership directly impacts their political party identification, which in turn influences vote choice. Group membership is important because groups have political influence and members can either be satisfied or dissatisfied with their political position in society. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008 examine the 2000 and 2004 elections to supplement the original study from the 1950s and identify that historically stigmatized groups have the most distinctive and strong voting behavior. Social groups do evolve over time, and how society is divided into separate political entities can vary.

Building off of the Michigan Model, research in public opinion seeks to divide society into distinct social groups along certain cleavages. Green et al. 2007 analyzes religious divisions and discovers that the individual's religious tradition and commitment to their religion have strong political implications. While political choice is heavily influenced by religious denomination, members are further sorted by their devotion to faith, which is positively correlated with group influence. These factors can even extend to how certain people view how the world ought to be (Luker 1985). By shaping world views, religion can influence opinion on policies particularly related to social norms and roles. Gender can also be influential on political behavior and policy opinion (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Jerit and Barabas 2017). Especially due to the impacts of traditional gender roles and the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities, women are often politically disadvantaged compared to men. Bartels 2008 divides society along economic lines, creating a low-income, middle-income, and

high-income group. Class divisions do impact individual political behavior, particularly in matters concerning the economy and defense. Both social divisions are valid in their own right and tell important stories about how people are influenced politically. Respondents are influenced by membership in several different social groups and each has some impact.

Most scholarship in the field generally agrees that racial and ethnic divisions are the most influential factors in political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Dahl 1961; Fraga 2018; Green et al. 2007; Jardina 2019; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Scholars examine the influence of race through two dynamics, racial identity and race consciousness. Most literature, including this study, defines racial identity as the racial group an individual most strongly considers themselves to be a member of and race consciousness to be politicized racial identity (Jardina 2019; Miller et al. 1981). Politicized racial identity is measured through linked fate, which is a measure of how an individual believes that they are politically connected to their racial or ethnic groups. Although related, racial identity and consciousness are measured independent of each other. Both identity and consciousness have positive relationships with group influence on individual political behavior. A possible mechanism for this trend is that individuals with higher levels of racial identity and consciousness are more aware of the problems facing their racial group and use their political voice to improve the political conditions of their race (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Miller et al. 1981).

Since society can be divided along several different social cleavages, people can belong to and be influenced by several social groups. Social cleavages compete for political influence among individuals and act as a mediator for vote choice (Dahl 1961). According to Dahl 1961, social divisions and groups have unequal distributions of resources that lead to certain groups having more influence on certain individuals. For an individual with membership in several groups, they can be politically influenced by conflicting forces and become cross-pressured. Mason and Wronski 2018 define cross-pressure as the condition where an individual is being influenced in different directions by their social groups. In these situations, individuals are more politically aligned with the social groups they identify with stronger. Therefore, it

is important for research looking at racial group political influence to consider both racial identity and consciousness. Although almost every person belongs to some racial group, they may not feel strongly about their race and may not be politically influenced.

Another important aspect of racial group politics is the intergroup relationships between races. Intergroup interaction is characterized by hostility between social groups against individuals they perceive to be out-group members (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Nier et al. 2001). Bobo and Hutchings 1996 view this as racial competition between social groups for scarce resources, such as political power. Animosity can stem from certain factors such as low socioeconomic status, perceived prejudice, and negative racial perceptions. Nier et al. 2001 approach the issue from a different angle, finding that Blacks who shared social group membership with respondents were treated more positively compared to those who did not. They portray intergroup relationships not as a competition for resources; instead, it is a product of social contact and interaction. Both arguments help contextualize racial intergroup relationships and establish mechanisms for certain racial divisions. It also implies that certain racial groups have different political preferences because they base their behavior on competing for advantages and the opinions of the out-group.

2.3 Asian American Group Influences

In order to understand how Asian American identity can influence political behavior, it is important to analyze group impact on Blacks, Latinos, and Whites. A significant proportion of literature in the topic is dedicated towards understanding Black and Latino political behavior and a growing body of literature focuses on White identity (Barreto 2010; Jardina 2019; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Miller et al. 1981; Stokes 2003). For Black individuals, social group political influence is very strong with nearly all Black voters voting for Democratic policies or candidates (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Miller et al. 1981). Blacks vote so overwhelmingly for Democrats, it is difficult to isolate the impact of racial identity. Group consciousness has a clearer impact, individuals with high levels of political awareness tend to engage in political

participation more than those who exhibit low consciousness. Latino voters exhibit similar behavior though to a significantly lesser extent (Barreto 2010; Stokes 2003). Racial identity and group consciousness for Latinos is also positively correlated with political participation and vote choice. White group influence is a newer political phenomenon and highlights the changing political attitudes of the United States in recent years. Jardina breaks from the prior literature and reveals that both White identity and consciousness are significant forces pushing for more conservative values (Jardina 2019). Whites are increasingly becoming more influenced by their race because they perceive that their group is losing political influence to minorities. These three groups generally follow the same path in terms of group influence. Group influence has a clear positive influence on electoral behavior for Blacks, Latinos, and Whites.

Most literature on Asian American group opinion, however, indicate that their relationship with racial identity and consciousness behaves differently from other social groups. While Asian Americans still exhibit different levels of racial identity and consciousness, their relationship with political behavior is weak at best (Junn and Masuoka 2008; Lien 2001; Lien et al. 2001). Asian Americans who highly identify with their race typically associate with the Democratic Party. While their partisan commitment is significantly weaker than that of other minority groups, the relationship is still stable. The correlation between racial consciousness and political participation is typically weak and even negative at times. Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005 find that individuals scoring higher in Asian American identity and consciousness actually vote less than those who weakly identify with their race. This clearly sets Asian Americans apart from traditional patterns of in-group politics and presents a challenge in understanding Asian American political behavior. Many of the assumptions derived from research in other racial groups such as the positive correlation between consciousness and political participation are not easily applied in the Asian American case.

There are several proposed theories as to why Asian Americans behave so politically different from other races. One explanation is that Asian Americans are culturally distinct

from other races and would behave differently. Western social groups are more characterized by intergroup competition and the distinction between in-groups and out-groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Yuki 2003). Asian groups focus more on intragroup structures that maintain hierarchies within their social groups (Yuki 2003). Applied to Asian Americans, a focus on relationships within the group could explain why Asian American consciousness does not translate into political participation. Without a sense of competition with other racial groups, Asian Americans would not feel the need to vote and advance their political agenda. This theory assumes that a significant portion of Asian Americans are still culturally connected with their ethnic homeland. Asian American group-based resources and organizations could reinforce cultural influences on political opinions (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). Having a strong community of Asian voices strengthens cultural connections and highlights political commonalities among group members. While this is reasonable for immigrants and even first-generation Asian Americans, members who have lived away from their homeland for multiple generations may have very weak connections. Additionally, conflict between other social groups could be pushing Asian Americans to hold certain political beliefs (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Cramer 2016). Considering the Asian American group, it is possible that racial conflicts with other minority groups could be pushing Asian political opinion away from racial minorities.

Another explanation is that Asian Americans are strongly cross-pressured by their racial identity. Asian Americans are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party due to influence of racial groups. However, partisanship may be based on additional social factors such as exclusionary sentiments against Asian Americans by White majority (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017). This would mean that their political values are derived from not only their racial identity, but also environmental factors. Despite associating with the Democratic Party, the policy preferences of Asian Americans are not aligned with their partisanship. Their policy opinions match more closely with Whites, and on certain topics such as affirmative action, Asian Americans appear to hold a conservative stance on the issue (David and Lin 1997;

Zheng 2019). Asian American partisanship and policy preferences are conflicted which is evidence of weak party identification and social cross-pressure. If Asian Americans are being cross-pressured by their racial identity and social upbringing, members would be indifferent of political participation (Mason and Wronski 2018). This concept offers another perspective to why Asian Americans continue to fall behind in voting rates.

Taking a different approach, the influence of Asian American groups may actually function similarly to other races, but manifesting differently. Traditional group opinion research measures voting participation, which is a simple way to quantify political behavior. There are, however, different types of political participation that Asian Americans can engage in that is non-electoral. While Asian American voting rates are low, political participation more broadly is quite high and has a positive correlation with racial identity and consciousness (Lien et al. 2001; Wong et al. 2011; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). This suggests that Asian Americans are being politically influenced by group identity and consciousness but participates through other means because voting is not as effective for them. Fraga 2018 proposes that Asian Americans are less interested in electoral participation because they perceive their vote to have little value. Asian Americans are part of the minority in nearly every electoral district in the United States. Since voting would not yield effective results, Asian Americans instead opt to express their political voice through other means. Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005 confirms this idea, finding that increased racial consciousness is positively correlated with campaign contributions and membership in ethnic organizations. Although Asian Americans still function differently from other racial groups, this model draws parallels between the different races.

What ultimately causes Asian Americans to not participate in voting is unknown to scholars. While none of these theories are capable of drawing conclusions alone, they help provide perspective on the Asian American group. What is possible, is that a combination of these theories are contributing to the low voter turnout of Asian Americans and the inconsistent political opinions (*The Rise of Asian Americans* 2012). This raises the possibility of a more

dimensional perspective of the Asian American group that incorporates multiple aspects of Asian American identity. Culture may be an important factor because the cultural representation of the Asian American group is integral to the creation of the term itself (Chin et al. 1983; Maeda 2016). Integrating a more cultural perspective with traditional political measures could better justify and measure Asian American racial and ethnic influence on political behavior.

2.4 Panethnicity

A growing body of research in public opinion has expressed increasing interest in the effects of panethnicity on Asian American political behavior. Broadly, panethnicity is the phenomenon where distinct groups band together and cooperate to achieve a common goal and identity (Espiritu 2011; Kao and Joyner 2006; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2003; Okamoto and Mora 2014; Strobel 1996). While each individual group retains certain individual characteristics, they also create a larger panethnic identity based on shared cultural, political, and linguistic values. The Asian American racial group is the most ethnically diverse panethnic identity in American society. How it impacts members politically is heavily influenced by the history of Asian Americans in the United States.

The origins of Asian American panethnicity in the United States can be linked to the Asian American movement that coincided with the Civil Rights movement. Before that point, Asian Americans identified with their individual ethnic heritage due to cultural and linguistic differences. With the Civil Rights movement and increasing Anti-Asian sentiments, many community leaders called for the unity of pan-Asian ethnicities to form an Asian American identity that was more than just a term used to perpetuate the exclusion of Asians (Espiritu 2011; Wei 1993). Thus, the Asian American identity was formed as a collection of numerous diverse nationalities for the advancement of shared political goals. Bonded by shared cultural and social structures, the Asian American panethnic identity continues on and has evolved since the inception of the term in 1968 (Maeda 2016). While the term

does encompass all individuals of Asian origin, I will take the term to encompass ten major Asian ethnic groups[1] due to the limitations of my data source. Panethnicity among Asian Americans is also reinforced by group-based resources that mobilize Asian American political opinion (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). These resources and organizations appear to push members to identify closer with their panethnic identity, although the impact is contingent on the type and purpose of the resource.

The extent of the political impact of panethnicity on Asian Americans remains a widely debated topic. Some studies have revealed that Asian Americans with higher levels of identification and consciousness with their panethnic identities have higher rates of political participation (Min 2014; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). The political influence of each individual ethnicity closely matched the impact of the panethnic identity. Although there are slight variations between nationalities, the trend is generally stable. For most members of the Asian American race, their ethnic identity and consciousness are nearly synonymous with their Asian American identity and consciousness. However, there is still evidence of situations where ethnic influence differs from panethnicity. Specifically, in the case of abortion, Asian American policy preferences are divided by ethnic origin (Wu and Ida 2018). Despite sharing many social and political similarities, differences still exist between Asian Americans from different national backgrounds. Understanding these differences will be key in understanding how and in what situations will panethnic identities influence individual political behavior. This also raises questions regarding the extent of political ethnic differences. While abortion is a very narrow policy, it does suggest that other topics could divide the panethnic Asian American community. My research will take a deeper look at ethnic influences on Asian American political behavior and opinion. Even if panethnic influences are stronger, ethnicity may still play a major role.

1. Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Hmong, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Pakistani, Vietnamese

3 Hypotheses and Expectations

Given the results of previous research, I hypothesize that the Asian American race and ethnicity will be correlated with their political behaviors and preferences (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005; Wong et al. 2011). This correlation, however, will be quite weak and inconsistent across different policy topics. The weak relationship is due to the Asian group being so divided between different ethnicities. Additionally, racial and ethnic influence on the Asian American group will not have a consistent ideological pull, instead alternating between conservative and liberal influence between topics. These ethnicities do share certain cultural and linguistic similarities but are still distinct enough to perceive their shared panethnic identity differently from each other. I also hypothesize that Asian American ethnic influence would pull their groups in similar directions despite originating from different nationalities.

The ideological direction that race and ethnicity will pull in depends on the policy in question. I believe that support for policies that make immigration easier and more open will be positively correlated with racial and ethnic identity. Support for policies promoting economic and social equity should have a positive relationship, as well as voting for Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election and identifying as a Democrat. In the opposite direction, Affirmative action will likely be negatively correlated with racial and ethnic scores. The remaining policy positions will probably have insignificant correlations. This means racial and ethnic identity will have insignificant estimates with support for protections for the LGBTQ community, support for abortion, being registered to vote, and voting in the 2016 election. From the expectations set above, the Asian American group is predicted to lean more towards liberal policy positions though not strongly. Asians are unlike other minorities, especially Blacks who are nearly unanimous in their vote choice for Democrats (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). In some sense, they resemble White public opinion, but are most often somewhere between the two groups on the political spectrum (Jardina 2019).

The inconsistent influence exerted by racial and ethnic identity likely stems from cultural heterogeneity and social cross pressures associated with their cultural backgrounds. I

will begin with the heterogeneous nature of the Asian American racial group. The Asian American group, unlike other racial groups, is composed of an incredibly diverse collection of ethnicities that share distinct cultures, linguistics, and political backgrounds. The difference between, for example, a Korean and an Indian is massive. Considering that their languages come from completely different linguistic families and their cultural heritages share few commonalities, there are few commonalities aside from the fact that they both originate from the Asian continent, and even then they are separated by thousands of kilometers. This is true for many Asian ethnicities that share very little in common yet are grouped together as "Asian American". How ethnicity influences their members differs across nationality because of these differences splitting Asian ethnic groups. Additionally, the lack of similarities mean that the perception of being Asian to each ethnic group is different. These different interpretations will likely cause racial influence to be different across ethnicities.

Another key consideration for why racial and ethnic influence on Asian Americans is so inconsistent are the social cross-pressures exerted on individuals. On one hand, Asian Americans are a minority group within the United States. Based on previous research, minorities are better politically represented by liberal-leaning groups and ideology (McClosky and Zaller 1984). This would pressure the Asian American group towards adopting more liberal political opinions. Asian Americans, however, are potentially cross pressured by their cultural upbringing that may disagree with liberal political preferences. Along social lines, many Asian cultures are quite socially conservative due to a variety of factors. Under these circumstances, having stronger ties to ethnic and racial identity could influence members to have more conservative views on policies regarding the LGBTQ community, abortion, and social equity.

Socioeconomically, many Asian cultures emphasize hard work as the the key to personal success. This diminishes their acceptance of programs that may appear to provide "handouts" to people who do not put in work for these benefits. This means that the racial identity will be pulling Asian Americans in opposite political directions simultaneously. This cross-

pressure on Asian Americans between their minority racial status and conservative social backgrounds will ultimately weaken the correlative effect that race and ethnicity has on Asian American political opinion (Mason and Wronski 2018). This suggests that the Asian American group may not be emphasizing sociotropic information when forming their political opinions and behaviors. This differs from previous research which find little evidence for personal pocketbook influence on vote choice (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). This is likely another situation where Asian American politics differ from other American racial groups.

Between race and ethnicity, I believe that the results will support a panethnic Asian American political identity. While ethnicity should have some relationship with certain political opinions and behaviors, race should be more influential in more situations. Racial and ethnic influence should agree with each other in nearly every situation at least on the panethnic level. The magnitude of these relationships may differ drastically but the direction should mostly agree. At the same time, I expect Asian Americans to have higher levels of ethnic identification than racial identification. These two points are seemingly incompatible, however, this makes more sense when considering how members fit into the Asian American group. Average ethnic identification should be higher than racial identification because individuals are closer to their ethnicity. While being Asian American is inclusive of all Asian ethnic groups, it dilutes many of the cultural traditions and connections that define the ethnic identity. Therefore, individuals are more able to identify with their smaller but more personal ethnic groups. The divided nature of ethnicities, however, makes it more difficult to effectively mobilize for political causes. While the Asian American identity is diverse and contains several individual ethnic identities, its unified political power makes pushing for a specific agenda much easier for all members. Therefore, despite people putting less importance on their identity as an Asian American, political influence stemming from race is stronger.

Across ethnic groups, I also hypothesize that other social variables in addition to race and ethnicity will be highly influential on Asian American political opinion and behavior. It

is well studied that several different social cleavages and divisions have influential political pull on their members (Campbell et al. 1960; Dahl 1961; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). This is no different for Asian Americans. In particular, I expect that age, levels of education, household income, and partisanship will have consistently significant relationships with Asian American political behavior. Age is a variable of interest due to the history of Asian immigration and cultural assimilation. Older individuals are more likely to be first- or second-generation immigrants, whereas younger Asian Americans are likely more distantly removed from their ethnic homeland. This creates a strong split within the Asian American group where older individuals are closer to their homeland's cultural and political backgrounds compared to the younger generation who may have never even set foot in Asia. Considering the stark cultural and linguistic differences between Asian countries and the United States, age is likely an important factor. Education and income are also important influences on political behavior since they dictate an individual's socioeconomic status. In addition, I hypothesize that education and wealth are core components of the Asian American identity. Most Asian immigrants came to the United States for better opportunities, and this may also drive the formation of political opinion. Partisanship also has a clear connection with public opinion. The major political parties are distinctly split on certain policy positions and so membership should drive a significant proportion of political behavior.

Another major driving force behind Asian American public opinion should be personal experiences. Despite not being a mechanism unique to Asian Americans, I believe that personal experiences are especially influential to group members. This is partly due to the communal nature of most Asian societies that put heavier emphasis on community as opposed to individuality (Yuki 2003). This suggests that Asian Americans are more likely to consider the personal experiences of their communities and families, as there is a stronger connection among Asian American communities. This focus inward on the in-group may influence how Asian Americans see out-groups. Although not a focus of this study, I will conduct a brief analysis of how out-group stereotypes influence political opinion. Since

this is not the main focus of my research, the results will be reported further down in the discussion section on outside forces. Another factor would be influential group resources that Asian Americans share (Wong et al. 2011). These groups have cultural and political purposes that tie Asian Americans into a closely knit community. Since most communities are likely quite homogeneous in terms of ethnic makeup, their personal experiences in America, during the immigration process, and even back in the home country are likely to be quite similar. This causes personal experiences to resonate among the community and become highly integrated with their identity and political agenda. This would drive a significant portion of the correlative relationship that race and ethnicity has with political opinion.

4 Methodology and Design

For this study, I will be conducting both a quantitative and qualitative analysis to study the influence race and ethnicity have on Asian American individuals. The quantitative analysis will help answer the strength and direction of the relationship that race and ethnicity have on political opinion and behaviors. The qualitative analysis will help account for the mechanisms at play that drive and direct racial and ethnic influence on Asian American political behavior. The results from both analyses will hopefully reinforce each other and present a stronger argument for how the Asian American group interacts with their identities and why it works the way it does.

The quantitative analysis will focus on information gathered from the 2016 National Asian American Survey which we will refer to as the NAAS from now on. (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020). The NAAS contains nationally representative data of adult residents of the United States. The survey collected information from individuals who self-identified as a variety of races[2] before and after the 2016 presidential election. The survey asks respondents their opinions on certain political policies, their vote choice in the 2016 presidential election, demographic questions, and thoughts on their racial and ethnic identity. Their sample was drawn from a random selection of respondents in a national listed sample stratified by race and national origin from Catalist. Additional Latinx respondents respondents from California were drawn from a random selection of respondents in a listed sample of residents of California. The version I am using in this study is the Post-Election Survey which gathered data starting on November 10, 2016 and concluding on March 2, 2017. This time frame is of particular interest to my study, since Donald Trump, the Republican candidate and ultimately the president elect, ran on a racially charged platform. His rhetoric against Asian countries, especially China, was quite strong and negative. In general, along with President Trump's description of political opponents, the 2016 presidential election and the surrounding

2. Asian/Asian American, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, White, African American/Black, Hispanic/Latino, and Multiracial

months were very politically tense. Respondents' political choice and behavior are most fresh in their minds during this time frame. The survey was conducted via telephone interviews with 4,393 interviews of Asian American adults specifically. Of the interviews, 63% were conducted via landline and another 37% via cell phone. The survey gathered a significant sample of ten Asian national origins[3] which form the ethnic basis of this study. This data is weighted by ethnicity, gender, age, state of residence, education, and nativity.

The main variables of interest in this study are race and ethnicity. Since this study is focusing on Asian Americans, I will be looking at those who identify with the Asian race and one of the ten main ethnicities outlined in the above paragraph. Like previous studies, we will be measuring race and ethnicity through measures of identity and consciousness (Jardina 2019; Miller et al. 1981). Racial and ethnic identity are measured by asking respondents how important their race or ethnicity is to their identity. The ordinal answer options allow us to score identity on a scale from 0 to 1. Scoring a zero means that their race and ethnicity are completely unimportant, whereas a one represents extreme importance to the respondent. Racial and ethnic consciousness is measured through linked fate, and whether what happens to other members from the same race or ethnicity will also impact the respondent. This measure is on a binary scale, respondents can only answer whether they are affected or not. Therefore, scoring a zero means that the respondent is not affected while scoring a one represents that they are affected. Since the main objective of my study is to analyze the difference between racial and ethnic influences, I average the measure of identity and consciousness to create racial score and ethnic score. Racial and ethnic score represents both the respondents identification with and consciousness of either their race or ethnicity. While these two scores are measuring different aspects of identity, combining identity and consciousness will make for easier comparisons. Racial and ethnic scores are still scaled from 0 to 1. These two scores are the main independent variable in my study.

3. Bangladeshi (320), Cambodian (401), Chinese (475), Filipino (505), Hmong (351), Indian (504), Japanese (517), Korean (499), Pakistani (320), Vietnamese (501): Numbers in parentheses represent sample size

For this study, I will also control for other social variables across the Asian American group. Youth, sex, education, income, religion, and partisanship are factors of interest. I am interested in both how including these variables will affect the influence of racial and ethnic score and the correlation these variables have with political behavior and policy opinions. Youth is measured by a binary variable where respondents who are below the age of 35 score a one and those 35 or older get a zero. Sex is measured in a similar manner. A binary variable marks respondents who identify as a female with a one while being male yields a zero. Education is measured by an ordinal scale with six response options[4]. These responses are normalized onto a scale from 0 to 1 which goes up by intervals of one-fifth from least amount of education to the greatest amount of education. Income is measured also with an ordinal scale that has seven different income brackets[5]. These responses are also normalized onto a scale from 0 to 1 which goes up by intervals of one-sixth from lowest income bracket to highest income bracket. Being religious is another binary measure distinguishing respondents who profess some religious affiliation and those without any current religious leanings. Respondents with a religion are marked with a one while non-religious respondents score zero. Finally, partisanship is also measured using a binary scale. Respondents who identify as leaning more towards the Democratic party are assigned a value of one while any other party affiliation receives a zero. By normalizing these variables onto the same scale as racial and ethnic score, I will be able to compare the magnitude of the relationships each of these variables have with political behavior and see what is most influential on Asian Americans.

The dependent variable of this study will be various opinions on specific policies[6], vote

4. No schooling completed; Some schooling but no GED; High School degree/GED; Some college but no degree; College/Bachelor's degree; Graduate or professional degree

5. Up to $20,000; $20,000 to $50,000; $50,000 to $75,000; $75,000 to $100,000; $100,000 to $125,000; $125,000 to $250,000; $250,000 and over

6. Support for liberal immigration policies, support for affirmative action policies, support for increasing protections for the LGBTQ community, support for abortion, support for policies promoting economic equity and financial regulation, support for policies promoting social equity

choice in the 2016 presidential election[7], and electoral participation[8]. Each measure for the dependent variables is on either a binary or ordinal scale. Like the independent variables, the dependent variables are also normalized to fit on a scale ranging from zero to one. Though the number of response options vary between measures, the normalization allows me to still compare across political topics. The interval within each scale varies depending on the number of response options. Binary measures are only assigned either a zero or one while ordinal scales have intervals that are equal to one divided by the number of response options available to respondents minus one.

To analyze the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables, I will be conducting multivariate linear regressions using the method of ordinary least squares. These will be regressions across either the entire Asian American sample or a specific Asian ethnicity. For regressions looking only at the relationship within a single ethnic group, I will first filter responses from respondents outside the ethnicity. There are two models in this study. The first regresses only racial and ethnic score on political behavior. This model is represented by the following equation:

$$political\,behavior_i = \beta_1(racial\,score_i) + \beta_2(ethnic\,score_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

This will provide us estimates for the relationship between racial and ethnic score and political behavior across the panethnic or ethnic group. The second model is more comprehensive and includes the control variables outside of race and ethnicity. The second model is represented by the following equation:

$$political\,behavior_i = \beta_1(racial\,score_i) + \beta_2(ethnic\,score_i) + \delta(control\,variables_i) + \varepsilon_i$$

Different from the previous model, the purpose of the second model is to provide more

7. Vote choice for either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton
8. Registration to vote and voter turnout in 2016

information on what else is at play in the formation of Asian American political opinion. This will help answer whether there are stronger social variables at play and whether or not racial and ethnic scores are truly the factors driving Asian American political behavior for certain topics. I use two models in this study in order to control for the omitted variable bias in the first model. How the estimates change between the two will also provide insight into how racial and ethnic identities play into the whole Asian American political picture. By comparing how the direction, magnitude, and significance of the relationships change between the models, I can determine whether racial and ethnic identities are highly dependent. This is important information that separates insignificance due to sample size versus multicollinearity. These two models are closely inspired by the models presented and used by Miller et al. and Wong et al. in their research on group identities and political behaviors (Miller et al. 1981; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). These models are the main drivers of the quantitative analysis portion of this study. The estimates derived from both these models will detail whether or not a relationship between racial and ethnic score and political behaviors exists and the strength and magnitude of such a relationship. Significance will be determined on the 5% level.

The second portion of this study is the qualitative analysis. The qualitative analysis derives results from personally conducted long-form interviews. I conducted fifteen interviews over the course of two weeks. These interviews focus on members of the Asian American community, specifically individuals who identify with one of the ten main Asian ethnic groups described in the NAAS. These long-form interviews are conducted either in-person, face-to-face or via a virtual zoom call. This is due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and the complications associated with it. In-person interviews occur on the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor campus in private conference or study rooms. Zoom calls are set up by me and the link is distributed to the subjects. The interviews take approximately one and a half hours to complete and respondents are asked a series of questions on race and ethnicity, political opinions, political behavior, and the source of their politics. Subjects who complete

the survey are compensated twenty dollars.

The sample for the interviews is drawn from the Asian American population at the University of Michigan. Specifically, I am drawing from the undergraduate student body. Prior to the beginning of the interviews, I reached out to several Asian American and Asian ethnic oriented student organizations affiliated with the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts and the Ross School of Business. These student organizations have various stated goals and missions on and off campus. Most are apolitical in nature, focusing on shared ethnic cultural experiences or promoting hands-on experience in the field of business and economics. A couple of groups do have explicit political agendas or engage in political activities. Both organizations support liberal political causes and organizations though their members are not required to share these opinions. Individuals voluntarily sign up to participate in this study and agree to their responses being used for research purposes. From the voluntary population, I select a sample of fifteen Asian American undergraduate students and contact them to schedule their interviews.

The interview questions[9] are structured in a way that encourages respondents to answer in whatever way they want to. Much of the interview format that I describe below is inspired by previous research into interview research in social sciences (Gallagher 2013). For most questions, I begin by asking for their opinion on a certain policy topic or some information about themselves. After the respondents provide their answers, I prompt the respondent to provide an explanation for their political values and their personal experiences. I also ask whether they believe that their group would agree with their personal opinion. This semistructured interview form gives respondents great freedom to answer how they want. The goal of the qualitative section of this study is to uncover what social factors push racial and ethnic influences on political behavior that are not captured by standard survey responses. Giving respondents the freedom and the initiative to justify their own political opinions provides insight on the mechanisms at play. Furthermore, the conversational format

9. Listed in the appendix

of the interview should hopefully make the interviewees more comfortable to provide their honest opinions and answers to certain questions as well as fully explore the depth of their political thinking. As a precaution to check the validity of certain answers, I employ the triangulation strategy to ensure that the answers are consistent (Gallagher 2013). Since many political policies can be related, checking how rational the responses are can ensure that respondents are being truthful but also check whether they are genuinely informed on their opinions.

At the conclusion of the interviews, common themes and motivations that repeatedly come up across respondents are noted. In particular, I am looking for political connections with respondents' cultural heritage, personal experiences, and community values. These factors are not well measured by traditional survey methods so having a conversational interview hopefully exposes these motivations. If there are consistent answers across our respondents, then it is highly likely that these responses are influential drivers of political influence among Asian Americans. In particular, if there are certain mechanisms that appear to be deeply embedded within their Asian American identity, then that could be driving racial and ethnic influence on political behavior. These mechanisms could explain the hypothesized weak influence of racial and ethnic score on Asian American political behavior.

A potential criticism of the long-form interviews is that the sample is neither completely random nor is it representative. By having subjects volunteer to participate, I will likely get respondents who are more interested and knowledgeable in politics than the average Asian American. Additionally, by sampling only Asian American undergraduates at a single university campus, I will not be getting a diverse group of Asian Americans from very different backgrounds. Another problem with the sample stem from the organizations where volunteers are drawn from. Individuals who self-select into these groups are inherently more cognizant of their Asian American or ethnic identities than others since these organizations specifically cater to these identities. This is compounded by the fact that two organizations do have explicit liberal political leanings. Although this group of students will definitely be

younger, more liberal, more politically involved, and more socioeconomically privileged than the entire Asian American population, the results of these interviews will still be informative on how Asian Americans derive their political opinions. The purpose of the qualitative analysis is not to derive accurate statistics that are representative of the population. Instead, I am looking for potential mechanisms and commonalities that exist across Asian Americans that describe the relationship individuals have with their racial and ethnic identities as well as any other social factors.[10]

Using the information gathered from both types of analysis, I expect the qualitative results to build a reasonable justification for the quantitative results. The estimates from the regressions between the independent and dependent variables will describe relationships that dictate how Asian American political behavior forms. The reason why these relationships exist the way they do should be answered by the qualitative data from the interviews. There are a number of interesting potential mechanisms that are not covered by the NAAS itself such as more modern social developments. Building up an argument using both types of data provides more texture to the arguments presented in this study.

10. More on the long-form interviews is mentioned in the Discussion subsection on limitations

5 Results From the NAAS

5.1 Racial and Ethnic Scores

The first analysis on the data from the NAAS focuses on the levels of racial and ethnic identification that Asian Americans hold. By grouping the respondents by ethnic identification, I am able to average racial and ethnic scores by ethnicity. This allows me to see which identity Asian Americans hold onto closer and the trends across Asian ethnicities. Additionally, by including the panethnic Asian American identity, we can see which ethnic groups deviate the most from the general Asian population and which follow the general trends. As mentioned above, these scores are averages of identity and consciousness normalized onto a zero to one scale. A zero racial or ethnic score would indicate that the individual does not value their Asian American panethnic or ethnic identity. Getting a one would imply that these identities are incredibly important and salient to the respondent. Moderate importance would be around a score of 0.500.

Table 1: Average Scores Across Identities

Ethnicity	Racial Score	Ethnic Score
Asian American	0.548	0.579
Bangladeshi	0.521	0.571
Cambodian	0.588	0.561
Chinese	0.499	0.534
Filipino	0.568	0.586
Hmong	0.725	0.819
Indian	0.491	0.56
Japanese	0.523	0.558
Korean	0.602	0.566
Pakistani	0.484	0.522
Vietnamese	0.535	0.569

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 1 presents the average racial and ethnic scores across the entire Asian American group as well as each Asian ethnic group. Racial score ranges from the Pakistani group at 0.484 on the minimum end to the Hmong group at 0.725 on the maximum end. This means

that the range for racial score across the Asian American group is 0.241. Ethnic score is quite similar. The minimum average ethnic score is 0.522 for the Pakistani ethnic group while the maximum is 0.819 for the Hmong group. The range for ethnic scores is slightly larger at 0.297. For both racial and ethnic scores, each Asian American group scores moderately high which suggests that Asian Americans do highly value both their racial and ethnic heritages. The relatively small variation implies that most ethnic groups have similar perceptions of race and ethnicity. Among the two scores, ethnic score is higher on the panethnic level. This indicates that Asian Americans are closer to their separate ethnic groups on average than their broader racial group. While they do not share the same ethnicity, the trend applies to their own individual ethnicities. This continues among the separate Asian ethnic groups. Of the ten groups, eight ethnicities have higher ethnic scores than racial scores. Only the Cambodian and Korean ethnic groups have higher levels of racial score. Additionally, while ethnic score never drops below an average of 0.500, the Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani ethnic groups all have sub-0.500 scores.

This implies that Asian Americans are more closely associated with their ethnic groups over their race. Higher scores prove that the average level of ethnic identity and consciousness is higher than that of racial identity and consciousness. Ethnic identities are more salient than racial identities at least on a cultural level. While Asian Americans may more closely identify with their ethnicity, this does not mean that they are more politically influenced by race over ethnicity. Even though the average scores are lower, if racial score has more significant estimates then that would imply stronger correlative relationships than ethnic score. This is analyzed using the two models described in the methodology section above. It may also be that racial and ethnic scores alternate in terms of which is more significant for Asian Americans. Certain policy topics could elicit more correlative influence from certain identities because these topics are more salient.

Looking at the correlation between ethnic and racial score across Asian Americans, the two identities are highly correlated across every group. With highly significant correlation

Table 2: Correlation Between Race and Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Correlation
Asian American	0.667
Bangladeshi	0.656
Cambodian	0.671
Chinese	0.642
Filipino	0.739
Hmong	0.561
Indian	0.665
Japanese	0.729
Korean	0.588
Pakistani	0.608
Vietnamese	0.639

Note: Correlation between Ethnic and Racial scores tested significant using regressions ($p<0.01$).
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

scores, Asian American race and ethnicity are likely fairly synonymous among members. Identifying as a member of the ethnic or racial group probably means that the individual is also a member of the other group identity. This is not particularly surprising considering the history of the Asian American race. Since ethnic groups are self selecting into the panethnic identity, they would also self identify with both identities at very similar rates.

While the two scores are highly correlated, this does not necessarily mean that racial and ethnic influences on political behaviors must be the same or interchangeable. There are still certain factors that differentiate both identities from each other. A major factor is the largely political and recent history of the Asian American identity compared to ethnic divisions that stem from long-existing cultural distinctions. The context of the panethnic and ethnic identities may influence how political behaviors and opinions are affected since an individual's relationship with their membership is different. Building on this, how each group interprets their panethnic membership differs between ethnicities. Some groups may be more loyal and culturally invested in being Asian American whereas other groups see being Asian American as just another statistical grouping. These differing views would differentiate racial and ethnic political influence across ethnic groups. Race and ethnicity may have

similar influences on political preferences but it is reasonable to view them separately.

5.2 Immigration Policy

Opinion on immigration is conceptualized through support for three policies; support for easier citizenship pathways for undocumented peoples, increasing the number of work visas issued, and increasing the number of family visas issued. I analyze racial and ethnic correlation with multiple immigration policies in order to replicate the results. Since immigration is such a broad topic, looking at support for multiple policies would better represent the overall opinion on immigration. The following tables summarize the relationship between racial and ethnic scores and support for different immigration policies across multiple Asian American ethnicities. Responses are scaled from 0 to 1, with zero indicating strong disagreement and one signaling strong agreement with the policy. Looking across all the tables, it is immediately clear that Asian American groups look towards both racial and ethnic identities for their political opinions, with some having no significant relationship with either. Another interesting observation is the consistency across groups: which measurement is significant does not flip between policy points.

Starting with the first model, racial and ethnic scores are significant across both the panethnic and ethnic levels for all three policy topics. We can see all the estimates in tables 3, 26, and 27[11]. For support for citizenship pathways, the magnitude of significant estimates for racial scores ranges from 0.111 for the panethnic identity to a maximum of 0.256 for the Cambodian group. Ethnic score ranges from a low of 0.082 for the Asian American identity to 0.294 for the Bangladeshi group. On support for increased issuance of work visas, racial score has a minimum value of 0.097 for the panethnic identity and 0.222 for Indians. Ethnic score ranges from 0.089 for the panethnic identity to a maximum of 0.264 for Bangladeshis. Finally, on support for increased issuance of family visas, racial score ranges from a low of 0.079 for the panethnic identity to a high of 0.298 for the Pakistani group. Ethnic score has

11. Tables 26 and 27 are in the appendix

Table 3: Support for Illegal Immigrant Pathway by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Illegal Immigrant Pathway										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.111***	0.083	0.256***	0.028	0.116	0.057	0.187**	0.245***	0.106	0.055	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.094)	(0.091)
Ethnic Score	0.082***	0.294***	−0.068	−0.069	0.098	0.066	−0.028	0.019	0.054	0.219**	−0.026
	(0.027)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.092)	(0.088)
Constant	0.530***	0.553***	0.580***	0.528***	0.583***	0.737***	0.539***	0.554***	0.418***	0.588***	0.498***
	(0.014)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Observations	3,624	264	270	371	425	262	440	460	461	267	404
R^2	0.022	0.104	0.033	0.002	0.035	0.012	0.021	0.056	0.012	0.044	0.0002
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.097	0.026	-0.003	0.031	0.004	0.016	0.052	0.008	0.037	-0.005
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

a low value of 0.084 for the panethnic group and a high of 0.200 for the Bangladeshi group.

Across the panethnic group, significance is consistent between both scores. Both racial and ethnic scores have highly significant correlations for support in all three immigration policies. These estimates are also very similar in magnitude. The estimates for both racial and ethnic scores across the three immigration policy topics are within a range of 0.050. This hints that the influence exerted by both scores are equal in terms of opinion on immigration. While the estimate for ethnic score has a greater magnitude for increasing the number of family visas, racial score has a larger impact for the other two policies. This suggests that racial score is more influential overall though the difference among the two measures is not significantly great.

On the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores find significance among different ethnic groups across the three policy topics. Beginning with racial score, two ethnic groups have significant estimates across all three policy topics while a total of four have some significance for immigration policies. The Cambodian, Indian, Japanese, and Pakistani ethnic groups all score significant estimates among at least one of the three immigration policies. Of these groups, the Indian and Japanese ethnic groups are significant throughout. The relationship between racial score and support for these immigration policies is consistently positive. This indicates that for opinion on immigration, Asian Americans from different ethnicities are influenced similarly. Panethnicity holds in this situation.

Ethnic score also finds significance among certain ethnic groups though fewer than racial score. Only the Bangladeshi ethnic group has significant estimates across all three immigration policy topics. Aside from this group, only the Pakistani group has any significant estimates across the three topics. Ethnic score has a significant relationship with support for citizenship pathways with regards to the Pakistani group. Overall, ethnic score, when significant, has positive relationships with support for liberalizing immigration policies. While the direction of the relationship is similar to racial score, the depth of this relationship is not. Significantly fewer groups have significant correlations which hints that ethnic score is

less influential than racial score. While the impact it has on Asian Americans is undeniable in the first model, the relationship is weaker than the panethnicity of Asian Americans.

For the second model, the level of significance for both racial and ethnic scores decrease quite dramatically. Looking at tables 4, 35, and 36[12], it is quite clear that there are some dramatic changes. For pathways to legal citizenship, the range of significant estimates for racial score spans from a minimum of 0.084 for the panethnic identity to a maximum of 0.273 for Cambodians. Ethnic score is only significant for the Bangladeshi group at 0.316. Estimates for racial score with support for increased work visas has a low value of 0.089 and a high value of 0.265 from the panethnic and Indian group respectively. Similar to the previous measure, only the Bangladeshi group has a significant estimate with a value of 0.261. Finally, support for family visas by racial score has a low value of 0.087 for the Panethnic group and a high value of 0.294 for the Pakistani group. Ethnic score continues to be only significant for the Bangladeshi group at 0.204.

Comparing the results from both models, the estimates change minimally when controlling for outside social variables. For significant estimates, the direction of the relationship between ethnic and racial score with support for immigration policy does not change. The magnitude of the estimates are also quite similar, neither increasing nor decreasing by a significant value. Standard error increases quite consistently across each ethnic group for both identity scores. This yields a general decrease in significance since most estimates remain quite similar except for increasing standard error. This relationship indicates that ethnic and racial score are not strongly dependent on outside social variables and are fairly independent influences on immigration policy opinion. Since there is very little change among the estimates, these variables should not be highly correlated.

On the panethnic level, racial score dominates across the three policy topics for immigration. Estimates for racial score are significant throughout while ethnic score is insignificant for all immigration policies. While both scores have positive correlation, estimates for racial

12. Tables 35 and 36 are in the appendix

Table 4: Support for Easier Pathways to Legal Citizenship by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Pathways to Citizenship										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.084***	0.018	0.273***	−0.072	0.106	0.017	0.166**	0.206***	0.039	0.020	0.054
	(0.028)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.110)	(0.092)
Ethnic Score	0.052*	0.316***	−0.097	−0.028	0.065	0.042	−0.103	−0.027	−0.058	0.194*	−0.058
	(0.028)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.110)	(0.091)
Under Age 35	0.193***	0.052	0.166***	0.206***	0.176***	0.122***	0.132***	0.167***	0.349***	0.044	0.057
	(0.015)	(0.045)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.064)
Female	−0.015	0.061	0.003	−0.055	−0.041	0.050	0.053	−0.104***	0.028	0.016	−0.039
	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Education	−0.041	0.104	−0.106	0.119	0.034	−0.085	−0.183*	0.041	0.137*	−0.008	0.278***
	(0.025)	(0.122)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.117)	(0.091)
Income	0.063***	0.130*	−0.051	−0.097	0.037	−0.056	−0.067	0.067	0.100*	−0.091	0.106
	(0.024)	(0.077)	(0.105)	(0.084)	(0.062)	(0.099)	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.082)	(0.089)
Religious	−0.012	0.012	−0.194**	0.063	−0.078	0.039	−0.111**	0.006	−0.104**	−0.137	−0.108*
	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.097)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.090)	(0.057)
Democrat	0.069***	0.036	0.017	0.090**	0.125***	0.019	0.193***	0.117***	−0.052	0.083	−0.032
	(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.044)
Constant	0.498***	0.371***	0.769***	0.465***	0.532***	0.709***	0.729***	0.481***	0.390***	0.727***	0.424***
	(0.026)	(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.064)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.144)	(0.084)
Observations	3,088	208	251	277	363	229	354	387	428	216	375
R^2	0.085	0.151	0.088	0.089	0.153	0.070	0.161	0.132	0.237	0.071	0.077
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.117	0.058	0.062	0.134	0.037	0.141	0.113	0.223	0.035	0.057
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

score is consistently greater in value. In terms of immigration at least, Asian Americans generally draw from their shared identity for their opinions as opposed to their individual ethnic identities. Interestingly, the indicator for being young, levels of household income, and identifying as a Democrat are also consistently significant independent variables with levels of education also significant for both policies pertaining to both types of visas. Additionally, the binary variable indicating whether the individual is under 35 years of age is more significant and greater in value than racial score. This suggests that youth may be a characteristic of particular interest and is further explored later in the study.

Across the three tables, only Indians and Japanese have significant relationships between their opinions on immigration policies and their racial identity. Indian support for work and family visas differed dramatically between those with the lowest and highest racial scores; having estimates of 0.265 and 0.242 for the respective policies. These indicate that on average Indians who strongly identify as Asian American are overwhelmingly more supportive of increasing visas than those who do not identify with Asian Americans. The Japanese follow the same pattern but less so, having estimates of 0.206, 0.194, and 0.159 for immigration pathways, work visas, and family visas respectively. While smaller than the Indian group, Japanese racial identity still have an outsized influence on their opinions in immigration policy. Cambodians and Pakistanis are also significantly influenced by racial identity in at least one immigration topic. For Cambodians, racial identity has a significant estimate with support for both illegal immigrant pathways and increasing work visas whereas the Pakistani group only scores significance with support for an increase in family visas. While the significance is not consistent across the three topics, it is still likely that racial identity has a greater influence over ethnic identity among Cambodians and Pakistanis though to a lesser extent than Indians and Japanese.

Across the data, ethnic identity seems to not be a major factor for Asian Americans when considering immigration. For the panethnic Asian American racial group, individual ethnic identity was not a significant estimate of opinion on immigration for any of the three

topics. Only the Bangladeshi group had significant estimates for ethnic identity across all three policies. The group has strong relationships with ethnic identity, an estimate of 0.316 between ethnic score and support for citizenship pathways for illegal immigrants indicates that individuals with high ethnic scores are much more likely to both support the policy and have stronger convictions. This implies that ethnic identity has a greater impact on individuals belonging to the Bangladeshi group for creating opinions on immigration policy than their racial score. Since the panethnic group also lacks any significant estimates, ethnic score does not appear to be a significant influencer of group behavior with regards to immigration policy.

Other ethnic groups appear indifferent between their two identities, having no significant estimates between racial or ethnic identity and the three immigration policies. The Chinese, Filipino, Hmong, Korean, and Vietnamese ethnic groups all score insignificant estimates with respect to both ethnic and racial identities. This can signal one of two possibilities: the group views their racial and ethnic identity as interchangeable or this particular policy point is not influenced by racial nor ethnic identity. If racial and ethnic identity are interchangeable for a particular ethnic group, then the two measures would be highly correlated. This high correlation could cause the regression estimates to become insignificant since their causal impact would be consumed by each other. The other possibility that racial and ethnic identity is not a factor in policy opinion can stem from lack of interest in the topic, near consensus for or against the topic, or strong correlation with other demographic factors.

In the case of immigration, it is unlikely that these groups are uninterested in these policies since Asian Americans account for a large cohort of immigrants in the present and past. Looking at the three tables, we can see that immigration policy opinion is strongly correlated with identification with the Democratic Party, household income, and also age. On its own, this indicates that immigration policy is of interest to Asian Americans and other social factors are also influential. Youth, wealth, and democratic leanings could be dominant driving factors for liberal views on immigration policies. It could also be true that

these identities are significant across policy topics. This might be suggesting that these social identities are closely related to the panethnic Asian American identity and even constructed from these social groups. This will be explored further after each policy category is analyzed.

Table 5: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for Immigration

Ethnicity	Citizenship Pathways	Work Visas	Family	Immigration Aggregate
Asian American	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Strong Racial Positive
Indian	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Strong Racial Positive
Japanese	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Strong Racial Positive
Cambodian	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Neither	Moderate Racial Positive
Chinese	Neither	Neither	Racial Positive	Weak Racial Positive
Pakistani	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Racial Positive	Weak Racial and Ethnic Positive
Bangladeshi	Ethnic Positive	Ethnic Positive	Ethnic Positive	Strong Ethnic Positive
Filipino	Neither	Neither	Neither	None
Hmong	Neither	Neither	Neither	None
Korean	Neither	Neither	Neither	None
Vietnamese	Neither	Neither	Neither	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

5.3 Affirmative Action

Affirmative action is a particularly contentious policy point for the Asian American community. The following tables summarize the regressions for racial and ethnic score along with several demographic controls on support for affirmative action policies. Scores of 1 indicate strong support for the given policy and 0 indicate strong disapproval of said topic. I analyze three major affirmative action topics: preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks in the workplace, preferential hiring and promotion of women in the workplace, and increasing the number of Black and Asian students in post-secondary institutions. I analyze these three policy topics because they encapture multiple dimensions of affirmative action. The policies are split across two dimensions. The policies divide academic and professional affirmative action as well as racial and gender affirmative action. Regressing across multiple dimensions will reveal how opinions on affirmative action changes between dimensions. The results for affirmative action policies are quite surprising. No ethnic group had consistently significant estimates for the relationship between either racial or ethnic score and all three policies.

Groups appear to be less reliant on both racial and ethnic identities for their opinion on affirmative action compared to other social identities.

Starting with the first model, racial and ethnic scores are significant for both the panethnic and ethnic levels for all three policy topics. We can see all of the estimates in tables 6, 28, and 29[13]. For support for preferential hiring of Blacks, the magnitude of significant estimates for racial scores ranges from 0.138 for the panethnic identity to a maximum of 0.265 for the Japanese group. Ethnic score ranges from a low of 0.077 for the Asian American identity to 0.281 for the Pakistani group. On support for preferential hiring of women, racial score has a minimum value of 0.085 for the panethnic identity and 0.262 for Indians. Ethnic score ranges from 0.133 for the panethnic identity to a maximum of 0.417 for the Hmong. Finally, on support for increasing the numbers of Black and Asian students, racial score ranges from a low of 0.120 for the panethnic identity to a high of 0.220 for the Pakistani group. Ethnic score is insignificant throughout.

Across the panethnic group, the significance of racial score is consistent across all three policy topics. Ethnic score is significant in both instances of affirmative action in the workplace. Overall, both scores are still significant influences on affirmative action opinion. Though racial score is more influential overall across the policy area, ethnic score dominates in one situation. On support for preferential hiring of women, the estimate for ethnic score is more significant than racial score which indicates that ethnicity is also an important factor in-group politics. Overall, the results show that for the panethnic identity, opinion on affirmative action for Asian Americans is correlated with their racial and ethnic identities.

On the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores find significance among different ethnic groups across the three policy topics. Beginning with racial score, no ethnic groups have significant estimates across all three policy positions. In total, five ethnic groups have some significant estimates. The groups most influenced by racial score are the Indian and Japanese ethnic groups, which have significant estimates among two affirmative action topics. The

13. Tables 28 and 29 are in the appendix

Table 6: Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Blacks by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Blacks										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.138***	0.192	−0.234*	0.130	0.182*	0.133	0.136	0.265***	−0.040	0.011	0.090
	(0.032)	(0.125)	(0.137)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.123)	(0.095)
Ethnic Score	0.077**	0.032	−0.012	0.025	0.143	0.126	−0.005	0.121	0.175*	0.281**	−0.099
	(0.032)	(0.128)	(0.135)	(0.081)	(0.093)	(0.133)	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.119)	(0.093)
Constant	0.266***	0.349***	0.760***	0.164***	0.182***	0.313***	0.269***	0.096**	0.341***	0.249***	0.365***
	(0.017)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.097)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.049)
Observations	3,701	267	277	377	430	264	447	465	469	270	435
R^2	0.018	0.019	0.020	0.015	0.051	0.018	0.009	0.067	0.008	0.034	0.003
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.012	0.013	0.010	0.047	0.011	0.005	0.062	0.004	0.027	-0.002
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Bangladeshi, Chinese, and Filipino have one significant estimate for supporting an increase in the number of Black and Asian Students. An interesting note about the significant estimates, every value is positive. Having higher racial score increases support for affirmative action policies. This consistency suggests that racial identity has an even influence across ethnic groups which supports a level of panethnicity.

Ethnic score also finds significance among certain ethnic groups though fewer than racial score. No ethnic groups have significant estimates across all three policy topics. In fact, the three ethnic groups with significant estimates are only significant for a single affirmative action policy. The Pakistani, Japanese, and Hmong ethnic groups all have positive significant estimates with support for a single affirmative action policy. Overall, ethnic score has a positive relationship with support for affirmative action though the relationship is quite weak across ethnicities. This shows that ethnic score has a much weaker influence on political opinion with regards to affirmative action compared to racial score.

For the second model, the level of significance for both racial and ethnic scores decrease quite dramatically. Looking at tables 7, 37, and 38[14], the estimates do change. For the preferential hiring and promotion of blacks, the range of significant estimates for racial score spans from a minimum of 0.098 for the panethnic identity to a maximum of 0.271 for the Japanese group. Ethnic score has a minimum estimate of 0.070 for the panethnic identity and 0.396 for the Pakistani ethnic group. Estimates for racial score with support for the preferential hiring and promotion of women are significant only for the Indian ethnic group at 0.271. Ethnic score ranges from a minimum of 0.114 for the panethnic identity to 0.352 for the Hmong. Finally, support for increasing the number of Black and Asian students by racial score has a low value of 0.097 for the Panethnic group and a high value of 0.176 for the Japanese group. Ethnic score is inconsistent throughout.

For policy opinion on affirmative action, the results from both models are quite similar though there are some distinct changes. Across all significant cases, the direction of the

14. Tables 37 and 38 are in the appendix

Table 7: Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Blacks by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Blacks										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.098***	0.174	−0.266*	0.045	0.135	0.192	0.074	0.271***	0.050	−0.020	0.085
	(0.035)	(0.151)	(0.139)	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.133)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.136)	(0.098)
Ethnic Score	0.070**	0.088	−0.027	0.115	0.095	0.010	−0.080	0.079	0.157	0.396***	−0.073
	(0.035)	(0.146)	(0.138)	(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.152)	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.135)	(0.097)
Under Age 35	0.054***	0.007	−0.179**	−0.002	0.060	−0.029	0.050	0.135**	0.113**	−0.113*	0.163**
	(0.019)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.070)
Female	0.025	−0.017	0.173***	−0.029	0.001	−0.044	0.072	−0.043	0.055	0.010	0.052
	(0.016)	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.046)
Education	−0.151***	0.156	0.124	−0.013	0.029	−0.197	0.044	0.036	−0.208**	−0.304**	−0.280***
	(0.032)	(0.190)	(0.116)	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.098)
Income	−0.119***	0.035	0.019	−0.116	−0.246***	−0.409**	−0.137	−0.029	−0.240***	−0.182*	−0.140
	(0.030)	(0.122)	(0.146)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.159)	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.102)	(0.096)
Religious	0.017	−0.119	−0.224	−0.012	−0.041	−0.126	−0.062	−0.018	0.047	−0.203*	0.043
	(0.020)	(0.082)	(0.136)	(0.048)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.112)	(0.062)
Democrat	0.060***	0.011	−0.036	0.042	0.091*	0.155***	0.106**	0.065	−0.002	0.065	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.047)
Constant	0.368***	0.266	0.915***	0.204***	0.265**	0.587***	0.346***	0.078	0.453***	0.709***	0.448***
	(0.032)	(0.188)	(0.163)	(0.071)	(0.120)	(0.157)	(0.130)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.180)	(0.090)
Observations	3,147	209	258	279	368	230	360	391	435	219	398
R^2	0.047	0.036	0.091	0.025	0.079	0.110	0.040	0.091	0.064	0.115	0.055
Adjusted R^2	0.044	-0.003	0.062	-0.004	0.059	0.078	0.018	0.072	0.046	0.081	0.035
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

relationships are consistent between the first and second models. The magnitude is more variable. In most instances the magnitude of the estimates is quite similar but there are key exceptions. For example, the estimate for ethnic score on the Pakistani ethnic group increases by over 0.100 on support for preferential hiring and promotion of blacks. At the same time, standard error did also increase but at a much more consistent and smaller rate. These factors combined means that significance among the relationships actually fluctuate between groups. While significance in most cases is very similar or decrease slightly, some cases have dramatic changes such as the Pakistani ethnic group scoring a much more significant relationship. Overall, however, the differences between the two models are still quite small. Given that the direction of the relationships is still consistent, ethnic and racial score are still relatively independent from outside social factors for opinion on affirmative action policy.

An interesting distinction between race-based and gender-based affirmative action is that race is more significant across the panethnic identity for racially motivated preferential treatment while ethnic score is more significant for gender-motivated treatment. For the Asian American identity, racial score is significant for both race-based affirmative action policies. The value of the estimates are quite small, just below 0.100 for both topics, which indicates a relatively small impact across all Asian Americans. Ethnic score on the panethnic level has a significant relationship with support for preferential treatment of Blacks and women in the workplace. The estimate for racial workplace affirmative action is quite small at only 0.070 indicating only a small impact. The correlation with preferential treatment of women in work is stronger with an estimate of 0.114. This indicates that individual Asian ethnicities may agree on certain policies. Having significance on the panethnic level implies that despite identifying with different groups, the way these groups influence opinion on affirmative action is similar. Other social factors also have significant estimates on a panethnic level. Across all three affirmative action policies, being a Democrat is positively correlated with support for affirmative action policies. The indicator for being young has a positive relationship with both forms of racial affirmative action. Unsurprisingly, being a female has

a significant, positive correlation with preferential treatment of women in work and also has the same relationship with increasing the number of Asian and Black students. Both levels of education and household income are negatively correlated with workplace affirmative action. These results do show that there are other variables at play in the formation of opinions on affirmative action. In some cases, like levels of education and household income, these variables can actually have a greater influence on Asian Americans than both their race and ethnicity.

Racial identity appears to have a stronger influence on Asian American opinion on support for preferential treatment of Blacks in the workplace and increasing the number of Black and Asian students. On an ethnic level, no group possesses significant estimates across all three topics and only the Indian and Japanese groups have significant estimates for at least one policy. The Japanese have a strong relationship with racial identity, having significant estimates of 0.271 and 0.194 for preferential treatment of Black workers and increasing Black and Asian students respectively. Indians score significant estimates of 0.271 and 0.172 between racial score and the preferential treatment of women workers as well as Black and Asian students. These estimates are much greater in value than the panethnic identity meaning these smaller groups have greater positive relationships relative to other ethnicities. While inconsistent, it is still evident that racial score has some relevant correlation with policies concerning affirmative action.

Ethnic score also has significant estimates for affirmative action policies. By ethnic group, the Pakistani and Hmong have strong and significant positive correlation between ethnic score and affirmative action policy opinion. The Pakistani group has estimates of 0.396 and 0.302 for both preferential hiring policies while the Hmong score 0.352 preferential hiring and promotion of women. These scores are incredibly strong, tripling the values for the panethnic identity which indicates that ethnic score, like racial score, is strongly influential among select ethnicities and much weaker across others. While no group strongly disagrees with the general trend outlined by ethnic score, there is inconsistency in the overall

significance. The other Asian American groups do not have consistent preferences for ethnic identity over racial identity for affirmative action policies.

Many ethnic groups have insignificant correlations with either score. The Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, and Vietnamese groups all have insignificant estimates. These estimates are also inconsistent, many alternating between negative and positive values. For these groups, there are similar possibilities from immigration policy. Affirmative action is widely considered to be a hot topic issue for Asian Americans. It could be true that these groups do not have significant estimates with either racial or ethnic scores because members of these ethnic groups all follow very similar policy positions. Racial and ethnic group influence could be so strong that all members are greatly influenced regardless of how much they value their membership. Other factors may also be significant for Asian Americans. Those who lean towards the Democratic party do have higher support for affirmative action policies across the board. Levels of education and household income are significant only for workplace affirmative action policies and have strong negative estimates with support for these policies. It is also no surprise that the binary variable indicating identification as a woman has a strong positive correlation with support for this policy. Being under the age of 35 is surprisingly inconsistent across Asian ethnicities. While the panethnic identity has significant, positive estimates, ethnic groups have both positive and negative correlations. This somewhat defies conventional wisdom since youth is typically associated with more liberal politics. However, looking at the history of affirmative action and Asian Americans makes the situation clearer. The results from the interviews, which will be discussed in depth later in the paper, make it quite clear that Asian Americans regardless of age are quite conflicted over affirmative action policies. In general, these social identities probably have strong opinions on affirmative action that further diminishes the estimate of racial and ethnic score.

Affirmative action policies imply that both racial and ethnic identity can have equal and even similar influences on Asian Americans. Neither score dominated the other and all the

estimates have a very small value. These results could be suggesting two, extremely different, possibilities. This may be suggesting that ethnicity is on an equal level of significance for Asian American groups despite belonging to a panethnic identity. Though each ethnicity may have similar political influences, they are still significant independent of race as a whole. The other possibility is that Asian Americans largely conceptualize their race and ethnicity as the same. Across estimates for the panethnic identity as well as individual ethnicities, all significant correlations are positive while nearly all estimates in total are positive as well. This shows that race and ethnicity behave in highly similar ways. While this could be independent of each other, similar to the previous possibility, it may also suggest that race and ethnicity have blurred boundaries for members of the Asian American community. If highly correlated, it would make sense for both measures to have estimates with the same direction and similar magnitude. It may even be a combination of both possibilities. Race and ethnicity may blend together for certain policy positions and are independent among others. Certain policies may be more salient to a certain ethnicity which brings out ethnic score whereas other policies have similar effects across all Asian Americans.

Table 8: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for Affirmative Action

Ethnicity	Black Workers	Female Workers	Black and Asian Students	Affirmative Action Aggregate
Japanese	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Strong Racial Positive
Asian American	Racial Positive	Ethnic Positive	Racial Positive	Moderate Racial Positive
Indian	Neither	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Moderate Racial Positive
Chinese	Neither	Neither	Racial Positive	Weak Racial Positive
Cambodian	Racial Negative	Neither	Neither	Weak Racial Negative
Filipino	Neither	Racial Positive	Ethnic Positive	Weak Racial and Ethnic Positive
Hmong	Neither	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Weak Ethnic Positive
Korean	Neither	Neither	Ethnic Positive	Weak Ethnic Positive
Pakistani	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Neither	Weak Ethnic Positive
Vietnamese	Neither	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Weak Ethnic Positive
Bangladeshi	Neither	Neither	Neither	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

5.4 LGBTQ Community

Social issues regarding the LGBTQ community have come to the forefront of political debate within the United States. The following tables and some in the appendix summarize the regression estimates between racial and ethnic scores with support for pro-LGBTQ policies with controls. I analyze two measures: support for protecting the Homosexual and Transgender community and support for Transgender bathroom choice. This is to check whether the results are replicable within the broad subject of support for the LGBTQ community. Similar to the previous policy areas, support for these policies is normalized onto a scale from 0 to 1. Those who are completely opposed to the policy score a 0 while individuals in complete support of the policy score a 1. Pro-LGBTQ policies illicit very little response from both racial and ethnic identity. Estimate values are also low across the board aside from a few notable exceptions. Racial score is only panethnically significant for support on the transgender bathroom bill. Instead, many other control variables record large, significant estimates for both the panethnic and individual ethnic identities. This immediately signals that racial and ethnic score may not have a significant influence on Asian Americans when forming opinions on LGBTQ rights and policy.

Starting with the first model, racial and ethnic scores are significant across both the panethnic and ethnic levels for both policy topics. We can see all of the estimates in tables 9 and 30[15]. Support for policies protecting against discrimination of homosexuals and transgenders has a range of significant estimates from 0.202 for the Chinese identity to a maximum of 0.249 for the Indian group. Ethnic score is insignificant across ethnic identities for both policy topics. On support for transgender bathroom choice, racial score has a minimum value of 0.062 for the panethnic identity and 0.211 for the Japanese. Ethnic score ranges from -0.250 for the Hmong group to a maximum of 0.236 for Bangladeshis.

Across the panethnic identity, there is only one significant estimate. Racial score has a significant estimate for support for transgender bathroom choice. Racial score is insignificant

15. Table 30 is in the appendix

Table 9: Support for Protecting the Homosexual and Transgender Community by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Protecting the Homosexual and Transgender Community										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.019	0.193	0.043	0.202**	0.124	−0.108	0.249***	0.063	−0.025	−0.064	0.052
	(0.036)	(0.132)	(0.149)	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.137)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.111)
Ethnic Score	−0.036	0.049	0.055	−0.133	−0.031	−0.224	−0.153*	0.095	0.003	0.050	−0.135
	(0.036)	(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.101)	(0.093)	(0.152)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.125)	(0.110)	(0.106)
Constant	0.677***	0.612***	0.516***	0.634***	0.679***	0.752***	0.748***	0.680***	0.511***	0.744***	0.689***
	(0.019)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.111)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.056)
Observations	1,763	116	131	175	199	135	222	209	233	146	197
R^2	0.001	0.042	0.006	0.022	0.012	0.042	0.034	0.031	0.0002	0.002	0.009
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	0.025	-0.010	0.011	0.002	0.028	0.025	0.022	-0.008	-0.012	-0.001
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

for support for policies protecting the LGBTQ community and ethnic score is insignificant for both policy topics. This shows that both race and ethnicity are not strong influences on Asian American opinion among policies about the LGBTQ community. While racial score is more significant than ethnic score, the correlation is still weak.

On the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores find more significance among different ethnic groups across the two policy topics. Beginning with racial score, four ethnic groups have significant estimates with one policy concerning the LGBTQ community. The Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean ethnic groups all score significant estimates among a single policy protecting the rights of the LGBTQ community. The relationship between racial score and support for these policies among ethnic groups is stronger than the correlation between the panethnic identity. This suggests that the relationship each ethnic group has may be inconsistent which aggregates into an inconsistent relationship. Among the significant estimates, however, each estimate is positive which suggests that racial score has a positive relationship with policies supporting the LGBTQ community. Looking at the insignificant estimates provide more answers, having multiple negative estimates which likely skews the panethnic identity to not have significant values.

Ethnic score is only significant on an ethnic level for support for transgender bathroom choice. For that topic, the Bangladeshi, Cambodian, and Hmong ethnic groups have significant estimates. These estimates do not have a consistent direction. The Bangladeshi and Cambodian groups are positively correlated with support for transgender bathroom choice. However, the Hmong are negatively correlated. This is a prime reason why ethnic score is insignificant for the panethnic identity. The significant estimates for ethnic score point in opposing directions which mean that ethnic score is inconsistent on an aggregate level. This also highlights the fact that different ethnicities could have dramatically different influences on certain policy positions.

For the second model, the level of significance for both racial and ethnic scores decrease

Table 10: Support for Protecting the Homosexual and Transgender Community by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Protecting the Homosexual and Transgender Community										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.002	0.094	0.100	0.070	0.056	−0.093	0.257***	0.003	−0.075	−0.172	0.073
	(0.037)	(0.151)	(0.160)	(0.130)	(0.100)	(0.137)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.108)	(0.134)	(0.119)
Ethnic Score	−0.062*	0.067	−0.029	−0.128	0.033	−0.058	−0.180**	0.091	−0.144	0.063	−0.167
	(0.037)	(0.171)	(0.142)	(0.136)	(0.099)	(0.156)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.112)	(0.136)	(0.113)
Under Age 35	0.183***	0.048	0.044	0.124	0.122**	0.324***	0.154***	0.134***	0.409***	0.119*	0.114
	(0.020)	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.090)
Female	0.018	0.074	0.049	0.026	0.061	−0.016	−0.010	0.008	0.039	−0.025	0.045
	(0.017)	(0.081)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.065)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.056)
Education	0.179***	−0.101	0.079	0.016	0.300**	0.407***	0.203*	0.123	0.086	−0.005	0.105
	(0.033)	(0.208)	(0.122)	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.133)	(0.116)	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.129)	(0.124)
Income	0.122***	0.128	−0.051	0.136	0.136	−0.050	0.057	0.168***	0.191**	0.084	0.042
	(0.030)	(0.125)	(0.157)	(0.119)	(0.086)	(0.150)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.119)
Religious	−0.078***	−0.153*	−0.253*	0.036	−0.060	−0.027	−0.011	−0.053	−0.134**	−0.130	−0.044
	(0.021)	(0.090)	(0.146)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.109)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.102)	(0.074)
Democrat	0.031*	0.018	0.048	0.030	0.037	−0.072	0.032	−0.009	0.073	0.009	0.069
	(0.017)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Constant	0.529***	0.764***	0.698***	0.622***	0.365***	0.462***	0.525***	0.544***	0.433***	0.835***	0.600***
	(0.034)	(0.222)	(0.173)	(0.096)	(0.125)	(0.162)	(0.118)	(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.157)	(0.105)
Observations	1,514	95	121	123	174	120	187	177	221	116	180
R^2	0.143	0.114	0.066	0.049	0.137	0.359	0.117	0.152	0.318	0.080	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.139	0.032	-0.001	-0.018	0.096	0.313	0.078	0.112	0.292	0.012	0.018
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

quite dramatically. Looking at tables 10 and 39[16], we see that the estimates change. For support on policies protecting homosexuals and transgenders, racial score is significant only for the Indian ethnic group with an estimate of 0.257. Ethnic score is only significant also for the Indian group at -0.180. Estimates for racial score with support for transgender bathroom choice has a low value of 0.057 and a high value of 0.144 from the panethnic and Japanese groups respectively. Ethnic score has a minimum significant estimate of -0.191 for the Vietnamese group and a maximum of 0.267 for the Bangladeshi group.

Between the two models for policies regarding the LGBTQ Community, the patterns are quite similar to the previous policy areas. The direction of the estimates again remain the same which shows that there are no massive changes to how racial and ethnic score influences policy opinions. The general trend is again that magnitude decreases and standard error increases slightly going from model one to model two. There are still exceptions to this rule. In some cases, such as for the Indian ethnic group on protections for the LGBTQ community, standard error actually decreases. At the same time, magnitude can increase similar to the Vietnamese group on support for transgender bathroom choice. Significance is typically decreasing across all Asian Americans but there are instances where significance is actually increasing. While these exceptions exist, the general trend remains true and these contrary changes are still quite small. These relationships still suggest that racial and ethnic score are at least somewhat independent from other social variables for opinion on policies impacting the LGBTQ community.

On the panethnic Asian American identity, racial and ethnic scores have very little significant correlation with support for policies protecting the LGBTQ community. As mentioned before, racial score is a significant variable on panethnic identity for transgender bathroom choice. The estimate (0.057) is very small which, combined with the relatively weak significance, indicates that racial score is not a particularly strong force in LGBTQ policy. Ethnic score is even less significant, having no significant correlation across either policies. Many

16. Table 39 is in the appendix

other social variables have significant relationships with support for policies protecting the LGBTQ community. Being young, levels of education, and levels of household income are all positively correlated with support for policies regarding the LGBTQ community. The indicator for being Democrat is positively significant only on support for the transgender bathroom bill. Being religious has significant, negative relationships with both LGBTQ policies. Asian Americans are not necessarily indifferent on policies protecting the LGBTQ community. While they may not be influenced by their race and ethnicity, outside social factors do have a significant influence on the group.

Racial score produces very little significance across both LGBTQ policy points across the panethnic and ethnic groups. Ethnically, only the Indian and Japanese ethnic groups have significant estimates with any LGBTQ policies. The Japanese group has a positive and significant estimate (0.144) for support on transgender bathroom choice. The Indian case is more interesting. Racial score has a significant estimate (0.257) on support for protections for the LGBTQ community. On its own, the estimate is an outlier in terms of magnitude which highlights two points. First that Indians are highly influenced by racial score, and second it emphasizes how insignificant racial score is overall. Aside from its relationship with racial score, what makes this group so interesting is that ethnic score is also significant for LGBTQ protections.

Aside from the aforementioned Indian ethnic group, the Bangladeshi and Vietnamese groups also score significant estimates regarding LGBTQ policy. Ethnic score is positively correlated to support for transgender bathroom choice for Bangladeshis (0.267) while the Vietnamese group has a negative correlation (-0.191). This presents an interesting situation where ethnic scores diverge and influence groups in different directions for the same policy. It reinforces that different ethnicities have different agendas and cultural backgrounds that pull them apart. It is a reminder that panethnicity can only go so far. The Indian ethnic group has a negative, significant estimate (-0.180) for support for LGBTQ protections. Considering that racial score has a positive correlation with support for LGBTQ protections, racial and

ethnic scores are divergent in this situation. This supports the initial hypothesis that certain ethnicities can and will diverge from the panethnic identity. For this specific situation, certain factors specific to Indians; whether it be cultural background specific characteristics of the sample, influences individuals with close affiliation to their ethnicity to support LGBTQ protections less. At the same time, being Asian American influences individuals to support LGBTQ protections more. Members of the Indian ethnic group are cross-pressured by their racial and ethnic membership in this situation. This further emphasizes the need to approach panethnicity cautiously and understand that the groups comprising the Asian American community are extraordinarily diverse.

Most ethnic groups have insignificant correlation with both racial and ethnic scores. Combined with the low panethnic estimates with racial and ethnic scores, this implies that many Asian American ethnicities are not influenced by their racial and ethnic identities when forming opinions on the LGBTQ community. Similar to the broader panethnic identity, several other social factors are far more significant and consistent in how the influence support for policies protecting the LGBTQ community. Several ethnic groups have parallel trends with the panethnic identity. Being young, levels of education, levels of household income, and being Democrat continue to produce positive and significant esitmates across multiple ethnic groups. Additionally, being religious is negatively correlated with support among both significant and insignificant estimates. This shows that certain social variables seemingly affect each ethnicity homogeneously. This highlights the lack of influence racial and ethnic score has on support for the LGBTQ community and reinforce the panethnic nature of Asian Americans. There are a couple potential mechanisms that could explain this behavior. The first possibility is that other social groupings dominate correlation influences. Across both LGBTQ policy topics, age, levels of education, household income, and religiosity are all significantly correlated with support for LGBTQ protections. If membership within these social groupings is more influential, then racial and ethnic score would be obscured and insignificant. This may be compounded by the second factor, cultural aversion to topics on

homosexuality and transgenderism. Across most Asian American cultures, there is an emphasis on the traditional conceptualization of family where a man and woman raise children and support their parents. The LGBTQ community does not fit into this strict definition and so the topic is largely disconnected from identification with and consciousness as a member of the Asian American community. While Asian Americans may still be concerned about policies affecting members of the LGBTQ community, the concern likely stems from other sources.

Table 11: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for the LGBTQ Community

Ethnicity	LGBTQ Protections	Transgender Bathroom Choice	LGBTQ Community Aggregate
Asian American	Ethnic Negative	Racial Positive	Weak Racial Positive
Indian	Racial Positive	Neither	Weak Racial Positive
Japanese	Neither	Racial Positive	Weak Racial Positive
Bangladeshi	Neither	Ethnic Positive	Weak Ethnic Positive
Vietnamese	Neither	Ethnic Negative	Weak Ethnic Negative
Cambodian	Neither	Neither	None
Chinese	Neither	Neither	None
Filipino	Neither	Neither	None
Hmong	Neither	Neither	None
Korean	Neither	Neither	None
Pakistani	Neither	Neither	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

5.5 Abortion

Abortion policy is encompassed by a single question asking the respondent their level of support for the practice of abortion. The responses are scaled and normalized to a score between 0 and 1. On the side of extreme disagreement, a score of 0 represents complete opposition against abortion whereas a 1 represents complete support of abortion, the complete opposite. Abortion policy has very little correlation with racial and ethnic score across all Asian American divisions. Among the two, ethnic score appears to be slightly more significant of the two measures, although the differences are slight. Similar to other policy positions, age, household income, education, and affiliation with the Democratic party are significant controls. New but expected, the indicator variable for being religious is a

significant predictor of support for abortion policy.

Starting with the first model, racial and ethnic scores are significant across both the panethnic and ethnic levels for abortion. We can see all of the estimates in table 12. Support for abortion is significant only among the Japanese ethnic group with an estimate of 0.310. Ethnic score spans a range of 0.066 for the panethnic identity to 0.317 for the Cambodian ethnic group.

Across the panethnic identity, there is only one significant estimate. Ethnic score has a significant estimate for support for abortion. Racial score is insignificant. While only a single measure, this shows that abortion policy is influenced by ethnic score over racial score. This shows that panethnicity does not hold across all policy topics as ethnicity is more influential in this circumstance.

On the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores do have one instance of significant estimates with an ethnic group. For racial score, the Japanese ethnic group is significantly correlated with support for abortion. Ethnic score is only significant on an ethnic level with the Cambodian ethnic group. Overall significance with both scores on the ethnic level is extremely low which shows that the topic of abortion is not particularly influenced by race and ethnicity for the Asian American group. While the estimates for both instances are positive, the influence is still inconsistent. Among the insignificant estimates, ethnic groups have both positive and negative relationships with both ethnic and racial score. This likely contributes to the racial insignificance on the panethnic level.

The results for the second model is depicted in table 13. Looking at the results, we see that the estimates change between models. On support for abortion, racial score is significant only for the Japanese ethnic group with an estimate of 0.206. Ethnic score is only significant also for the Cambodian group at 0.299.

Estimates for racial and ethnic score have some moderate changes across the two models. Direction remains constant among significant estimates between models. Magnitude varies after considering outside social factors. While the panethnic identity remains similar, cer-

Table 12: Support for Abortion by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Abortion										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.016	0.163*	0.034	0.043	0.031	−0.072	−0.028	0.310***	0.100	0.007	0.028
	(0.027)	(0.096)	(0.121)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.107)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.091)	(0.067)
Ethnic Score	0.066**	0.131	0.317***	0.050	0.013	−0.022	0.072	−0.094	0.064	0.097	0.056
	(0.027)	(0.099)	(0.119)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.120)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.088)	(0.065)
Constant	0.459***	0.431***	0.107*	0.492***	0.427***	0.495***	0.643***	0.556***	0.398***	0.479***	0.255***
	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.087)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.035)
Observations	3,701	267	277	377	430	264	447	465	469	270	435
R^2	0.004	0.048	0.052	0.005	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.057	0.017	0.008	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.041	0.045	-0.0005	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	0.053	0.013	0.0003	0.001
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 13: Support for Abortion by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Abortion										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.011	0.104	−0.026	0.032	0.034	−0.023	−0.006	0.206***	0.033	−0.089	0.013
	(0.027)	(0.105)	(0.125)	(0.092)	(0.079)	(0.119)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.095)	(0.064)
Ethnic Score	0.043	0.172*	0.299**	−0.017	−0.035	0.059	0.044	−0.130*	−0.001	0.090	0.041
	(0.027)	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.094)	(0.078)	(0.136)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.095)	(0.063)
Under Age 35	0.113***	0.174***	0.023	0.001	0.239***	−0.072	0.029	0.118***	0.147***	0.123***	0.169***
	(0.014)	(0.049)	(0.078)	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Female	0.008	−0.007	0.053	0.074*	−0.013	0.011	0.022	−0.026	−0.009	−0.005	−0.012
	(0.012)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.030)
Education	0.196***	0.201	0.062	0.253***	−0.135	0.419***	0.098	0.196**	0.131**	0.074	0.133**
	(0.024)	(0.132)	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.097)	(0.078)	(0.065)	(0.102)	(0.064)
Income	0.185***	0.132	0.338**	0.176**	0.157**	0.065	0.052	0.100*	0.020	0.255***	0.185***
	(0.022)	(0.085)	(0.130)	(0.088)	(0.062)	(0.143)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.063)
Religious	−0.168***	−0.098*	−0.115	−0.134***	−0.235***	−0.026	−0.087*	−0.098***	−0.230***	−0.199**	−0.116***
	(0.015)	(0.057)	(0.122)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.079)	(0.040)
Democrat	0.074***	0.042	0.010	0.097**	0.099***	0.055	0.007	0.060*	0.045	0.048	0.089***
	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.031)
Constant	0.345***	0.228*	0.155	0.339***	0.563***	0.275*	0.598***	0.454***	0.508***	0.472***	0.208***
	(0.024)	(0.131)	(0.146)	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.141)	(0.097)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.126)	(0.059)
Observations	3,147	209	258	279	368	230	360	391	435	219	398
R^2	0.174	0.162	0.100	0.141	0.222	0.103	0.024	0.133	0.194	0.159	0.179
Adjusted R^2	0.172	0.128	0.072	0.116	0.205	0.071	0.002	0.115	0.178	0.127	0.162

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

tain ethnic groups have dramatic changes in value. An example is the Japanese ethnic group whose estimate decreases by a value of 0.100 from model one to model two. The overall significance of these estimates are also inconsistent. While the panethnic identity saw decreases in significance, individual ethnic groups vary. While standard error is generally increasing, the fluctuations in magnitude cause some groups to have more significant estimates and some to have less significant estimates. While support for abortion policy is generally not heavily correlated with both racial and ethnic scores, these trends are still interesting. They suggest that under certain circumstances, how racial and ethnic scores influence political opinion can be more dependent on outside social factors. Considering that abortion appears to be inherently less influenced by racial and ethnic scores than previous policy positions, it is possible that dependence increases as policies become more separated from race and ethnicity. While the overall differences are still quite small, the story each change tells is significant.

The panethnic Asian American identity is insignificant for both racial and ethnic scores though the estimate for ethnic score is slightly greater and more significant. Generally, this appears to imply that Asian Americans are not strongly influenced by their race or ethnicity when forming opinions on abortion. Instead, other social groupings pull Asian Americans in different directions to their final position on the policy topic. The indicator for youth, being religious, and identification as a Democrat as well as household income and level of education are significant. Being young, identifying as Democrat, household income, and level of education all have quite strong, positive correlations with support for abortion. Unsurprisingly, there is a negative relationship between being religious and support for abortion policies. While the subject of abortion is not necessarily unimportant to Asian Americans, being Asian American and a member of its numerous ethnicities does not play any particular role in forming opinions on abortion.

Only one Asian ethnicity scored significant correlation with racial score for abortion policy. The Japanese ethnic group has an estimate of 0.206, much larger in value compared to

all other estimates. Most other Asian ethnicities have insignificant values that are also small in value, typically less than 0.100. These estimates are also inconsistent; some ethnicities have a positive correlation and others have negative relationships. This generally implies that the relationship that Asian American ethnicities have with abortion policies does not heavily depend on their racial identities.

Ethnic score on an ethnic level also yields minimal significance. Only the Cambodian group has significant correlation between ethnic score and support for abortion. Similar to the Japanese group, the estimate for ethnic score is quite large (0.299), indicating a strong relationship. Parallel to racial score, estimates for ethnic score have low values and alternate between negative and positive across the other Asian ethnicities. Despite being slightly more significant on the panethnic level, ethnic score is still largely unimportant for the formation of opinion on abortion policy among Asian Americans.

Though uncorrelated with racial and ethnic score, abortion policy overall is not necessarily irrelevant to Asian American ethnicities. Abortion policy has significant correlation with other social variables among Asian Americans outside of their race and ethnicity. Age, income, education, religiosity, and partisanship are all dependent variables with significant estimates which indicates that Asian Americans are drawing their opinions from some source. Estimates for these variables are also relatively large. On the panethnic level, the significant estimates are much higher in value with the indicator for being a Democrat, the smallest, still nearly doubles (0.074) the estimate for ethnic score (0.043). The estimates also follow conventional wisdom in terms of their behavior. Being young, wealthier, more educated, and a Democrat are all independently positively correlated with support for abortion while being religious is negatively correlated with support for abortion. Abortion policy may still be a salient topic within the minds of Asian Americans, however these opinions are drawn from social membership in other groups. This position is made increasingly clear later on from the results of the interviews.

Table 14: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for Abortion

Ethnicity	Abortion
Japanese	Strong Racial Positive
Cambodian	Strong Ethnic Positive
Bangladeshi	Weak Ethnic Positive
Asian American	None
Chinese	None
Filipino	None
Hmong	None
Indian	None
Korean	None
Pakistani	None
Vietnamese	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

5.6 Economic and Social Equity Measures

Support for social and economic equity is an index of aggregate support for policies along the same topic area. Specifically, support for social equity is an averaged score of how strongly respondents agree with six statements [17] and is scaled from 0 to 1. Similarly, support for economic equity is an averaged score of agreement responses to six statements [18] and is scaled from 0 to 1 as well. We group together these questions because they represent similar policies and sentiments. While they would provide interesting insight individually, aggregating these opinions into a single measure provides a better overview of overall support and opinion on support for social and economic equity. I analyze both economic and social equity to

17. 1) Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed 2) We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country 3) One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance 4) This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are 5) It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others 6) If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems

18. 1) The federal government should do more to reduce income differences between the richest and poorest households 2) The federal government should do more to regulate banks 3) The federal government should raise the minimum wage to allow every working American a decent standard of living 4) The federal government should increase income taxes on people making over a million dollars a year 5) The federal government should do more to discourage big American companies from hiring foreign workers to replace workers in the US 6) The federal government should enact major new spending that would help undergraduates pay tuition at public colleges without needing loans

capture both aspects of equality. Since many distinguish economic and social equality, it is important to analyze both dimensions. Along the scale, 0 represents extreme opposition to policies pushing for social or economic equity while a 1 would represent complete support for such policies. These policies do trigger some response from Asian Americans broadly speaking but the magnitude is still not particularly great. However, compared to some previous policy positions, the influence of racial and ethnic score relative to other social divisions is more comparable.

Starting with the first model, racial and ethnic scores are significant across both the panethnic and ethnic levels for both policy topics. We can see all of the estimates in tables 15 and 31[19]. Support for social equality has a range of significant estimates from 0.055 for the Chinese identity to a maximum of 0.101 for the Indian group on racial score. Ethnic score ranges from 0.048 for the panethnic identity to a high of 0.071 for the Pakistani group. On economic equality and financial regulation, racial score has a minimum value of 0.0.059 for the panethnic identity and 0.125 for the Indian group. Ethnic score ranges from 0.037 for the Asian American group to a maximum of 0.136 for Bangladeshis.

Across the panethnic identity, both racial and ethnic score have significant estimates. Racial score has a significant estimate for economic equality but not social equality. Ethnic score is significant across both equality policies. While both racial and ethnic scores do have significant estimates, ethnicity dominates panethnic influence in the first model. Panethnicity in this situation is actually weaker than separate ethnic influences though both influences exist for policies regarding equality.

At the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores find more significance among different ethnic groups across the two policy topics. Beginning with racial score, four ethnic groups have significant estimates with one policy concerning social and economic equality. The Chinese, Filipino, Indian, and Vietnamese ethnic groups all score significant estimates with policies supporting social and economic equality. However, only the Indian group is significant on

19. Table 31 is in the appendix

Table 15: Support for Social Equality by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Social Equality										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.013	−0.034	0.026	0.055**	−0.001	−0.029	0.101***	−0.005	0.005	−0.030	−0.008
	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Ethnic Score	0.048***	0.055	0.022	0.055*	0.053*	0.082*	−0.015	0.060*	0.051*	0.071**	0.057*
	(0.010)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Constant	0.475***	0.517***	0.468***	0.483***	0.478***	0.496***	0.466***	0.472***	0.480***	0.485***	0.434***
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Observations	3,203	238	265	316	393	214	411	428	374	254	310
R^2	0.019	0.011	0.016	0.067	0.019	0.018	0.048	0.014	0.014	0.026	0.014
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.003	0.009	0.062	0.014	0.009	0.043	0.009	0.009	0.018	0.008
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

both policy topics. The relationship between racial score and support for these policies among ethnic groups is again stronger than the correlation between the panethnic identity. Again, I observe that while all the significant estimates are in the positive direction, many of the insignificant estimates for both policies are negative as well. This could help explain why the panethnic identity does not have a significant estimate with racial score for social equality.

Ethnic score finds limited significance on the ethnic level across both measures of support for equality. Only the Japanese and Pakistani ethnic groups have significant estimates. While the Japanese group is only significant for economic equality, Pakistanis have a significant relationship for both policy positions. Among significant estimates, both are positively correlated. Ethnic score has a much more consistent influence even among insignificant estimates. Most are positively correlated with support for policies pushing for equality which explains why the panethnic identity has significant estimates in both policy topics despite having fewer significant estimates than racial score. The results ultimately do not support panethnicity among measures for equality in the first model.

For the second model, the level of significance for both racial and ethnic scores changes. These results are depicted in table 16 and 40[20]. For supporting social equality, racial score is significant only for the Indian ethnic group with an estimate of 0.099. Ethnic score ranges from a low score of 0.047 for the panethnic identity and 0.076 for the Pakistani identity. Estimates for racial score on support for economic equality and financial regulation have a low value of 0.039 and a high value of 0.139 from the panethnic identity and Indian ethnic group respectively. Ethnic score has a minimum significant estimate of 0.100 for the Japanese group and a maximum of 0.111 for the Pakistani group.

For both social and economic equity, the estimates change very little between models. The direction, which is so far unchanging in all policy topics, continues to be consistent across the two models. Magnitude as well is very similar for the estimates. Standard error

20. Table 40 is in the appendix

Table 16: Support for Social Equality by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Social Equality										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.003	−0.041	0.021	0.055*	−0.003	−0.069	0.099***	−0.013	0.005	−0.052	−0.004
	(0.010)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Ethnic Score	0.047***	0.059	0.012	0.054*	0.048	0.091*	−0.035	0.057	0.040	0.076**	0.052
	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Under Age 35	0.024***	0.012	0.051***	0.011	0.030**	0.066***	−0.010	0.033	0.023	−0.001	0.047**
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Female	−0.002	0.0002	0.002	−0.026*	0.0004	−0.023	−0.005	−0.020	−0.0001	0.028*	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education	−0.003	−0.044	0.037	−0.040	−0.024	−0.118***	0.090**	−0.022	−0.020	−0.008	−0.027
	(0.009)	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Income	−0.035***	0.035	0.0001	−0.018	−0.013	0.023	−0.094***	−0.073***	−0.050**	−0.043*	−0.040
	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.033)
Religious	−0.022***	−0.002	−0.004	−0.002	−0.025	0.013	0.028	−0.030*	−0.046***	−0.003	−0.008
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.022)
Democrat	0.017***	0.016	−0.006	0.008	0.027**	0.013	0.014	0.045***	0.023*	0.010	−0.024
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	0.499***	0.517***	0.463***	0.531***	0.505***	0.529***	0.432***	0.523***	0.536***	0.506***	0.465***
	(0.010)	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.032)
Observations	2,758	189	250	237	345	190	337	365	351	207	287
R^2	0.045	0.032	0.084	0.101	0.065	0.099	0.093	0.080	0.080	0.073	0.047
Adjusted R^2	0.042	-0.011	0.054	0.070	0.043	0.060	0.071	0.059	0.058	0.035	0.020
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

increases slightly which in most cases does very little to change the overall picture. In one situation, however, the Filipino ethnic group loses significance with racial score on support for economic equity policies due to these very small changes in magnitude and standard error. This case is the exception, however, and most estimates have negligible changes. This supports both racial and ethnic scores being independent from other social factors.

Asian Americans on the panethnic identity level have some significant correlation between their racial and ethnic score with social and economic equity. Support for policies on economic equality is significantly correlated with racial score in the positive direction. Ethnic score has a significant, positive relationship with support for policies on social equity. These estimates are still rather miniscule in value, 0.039 and 0.047 respectively. While both significant, ethnic score has a stronger significance level with social equity than racial score does with economic equity. These results generally indicate that while the influence of racial and ethnic score may be small in scale, it is still present. Across both policy areas, levels of household income and the indicator for being Democrat are significant estimates. In both instances, higher levels of wealth are negatively correlated with support for equity measures while being a Democrat has a positive relationship with supporting equity socially and economically. For social equity policies, the indicator for being young and being religious are also significant variables. Being young is positively correlated with more liberal views on social and economic equity. Opposingly, more religious respondents have a negative relationship with social and economic equity. These trends are consistent with conventional wisdom. Higher devotion to religion and levels of household income are typically correlated to having more conservative views on political issues. Being young and Democrat typically suggests more liberal views.

On the ethnic level, racial score is significant in very few instances. Only the Indian ethnic group has significant estimates for racial score with both equity policy groups. In both situations, racial score has a positive relationship greater than the estimates for the panethnic identity (0.139 for economic equity and 0.099 for social equity). Even when the

panethnic identity has a significant estimate for racial score with economic equity, the ethnic group estimate is over three times larger. This strongly implies a disconnect between Asian American ethnicities, showing that racial score is inconsistently viewed despite being significant overall and generally positive except for the Vietnamese. For social equity, the Indian group stands alone since the panethnic identity has an insignificant estimate. Additionally, the relationship between racial score and support for social equity alternates positive and negative across ethnicities. The inconsistent correlation that racial score and social equity has suggests that how certain ethnicities perceive and interpret their race varies in terms of their support for social equity. Race is influential on Asian American political opinion concerning policies on equity though it is limited in scope. Economic issues that impact the group more broadly has a stronger interaction while social issues affecting each ethnicity differently has an inconsistent racial influence.

Ethnic score is divided similarly to racial score. The Pakistani ethnic group is the only Asian ethnicity to have significant estimates between ethnic score and both equity policies. The Japanese ethnic group also has a single significant estimate for policies on economic equity. In all three instances, ethnic score has a positive relationship with support for equity policies. These estimates are also much greater than the panethnic scores, the Pakistani group scoring 0.111 and 0.076 for economic and social equity respectively while the Japanese estimate for economic equity is 0.100. For other ethnicities, ethnic score has a more inconsistent influence. Support for economic equity policies is not strongly associated with ethnic score since estimates flip between positive and negative relationships. This is reflected by an insignificant panethnic estimate. Social equity is more consistent, positive across all ethnicities aside from the Indian ethnic group. This seems logical because social equity issues impact and affect each ethnic group differently from others. Despite belonging to the same racial group, each Asian ethnicity have diverse cultures, languages, and characteristics that clearly identify members.

Racial and ethnic score appear to be moderately significant influences on support for

economic and social equity. While the magnitude of the estimates themselves are not particularly great, they are relatively more comparable. Compared to previous regression analyses, the estimates for social factors outside of race and ethnicity are noticeably lower in value. This could indicate a few possibilities. It could be a hint that racial and ethnic score have a greater importance for Asian Americans in forming opinions on equity. They consume a larger share of correlation which would lower the estimates for other social variables. Race and ethnicity may be more important for measures on equity because they are such major factors that play into socioeconomic outcomes and privilege. Society at large is still heavily influenced by racial divisions despite making significant progress. Another possible explanation is the measure itself. Support for economic and social equity is measured by averaging scores on several related policy topics. While related, each individual policy could still independently be influenced by different social factors which, when combined, lose significance. Racial and ethnic score may have a more consistent relationship with such policies while age, partisanship, religiosity, levels of wealth, and education vary more. Regardless, racial and ethnic scores seem to be significant and quite strong influences on Asian American support for economic and social equity.

Table 17: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for Equity

Ethnicity	Social Equity	Economic Equity	Equity Aggregate
Indian	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Strong Racial Positive
Vietnamese	Neither	Racial Positive	Weak Racial Positive
Asian American	Ethnic Positive	Racial Positive	Weak Racial and Ethnic Positive
Hmong	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Weak Ethnic Positive
Pakistani	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Weak Ethnic Positive
Bangladeshi	Neither	Neither	None
Cambodian	Neither	Neither	None
Chinese	Neither	Neither	None
Filipino	Neither	Neither	None
Japanese	Neither	Neither	None
Korean	Neither	Neither	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

5.7 Registration and Turnout

Registration to vote and voter turnout are measured by two binary questions asking whether the respondent is registered to vote and whether they voted in the 2016 election. I look at these two specific measures since analyzing both better captures political participation. While it is true that all voters in the 2016 election must be registered, including registration also accounts for those who do not vote in every election. For both indicators, affirmative responses yield a 1 while negative responses yield a 0. The results from my regression analysis largely align with findings from previous studies. On the panethnic level, both racial and ethnic scores appear to have insignificant correlation with registration and voter turnout. Results on the ethnic level, however, tell a slightly different story. Racial and ethnic scores have some significant correlations among select ethnicities. Across Asian Americans, there are other social factors that influence the probability of registering to vote and turnout in 2016.

Starting with the first model, racial and ethnic scores are not particularly significant influences. We can see all of the estimates in tables 18 and 32[21]. Being registered to vote is insignificant across Asian Americans. Ethnic score ranges is only significant with the Pakistani group at a value of 0.129. On having voted in 2016, racial score has a single significant estimate for the Chinese ethnic group at 0.212. Ethnic score has an estimate of 0.253 for the Pakistani group which is the only significant relationship.

Across the panethnic identity, there are no significant estimates. Even among the insignificant estimates, the direction of the relationships are inconsistent. This highlights that electoral participation among Asian Americans is very weakly associated with racial and ethnic identification. This highlights the fact that Asian Americans do not vote at particularly great rates and turnout is lowest among Asian Americans despite having high marks in social factors that are positively correlated with political participation (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). Though this is only the first model, it reaffirms what previous studies say.

21. Table 32 is in the appendix

Table 18: Registration to Vote by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Registered to Vote										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.011	0.101	0.080	0.103	0.077	0.087	0.022	−0.056	0.104*	0.024	−0.038
	(0.023)	(0.069)	(0.157)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.114)	(0.041)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.069)
Ethnic Score	−0.001	−0.098	0.078	−0.086	−0.081	−0.087	0.019	0.072	−0.030	0.129**	0.096
	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.154)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.128)	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.068)
Constant	0.890***	0.934***	0.529***	0.898***	0.953***	0.782***	0.938***	0.922***	0.872***	0.865***	0.858***
	(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.078)	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.093)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Observations	3,453	263	250	347	402	253	414	430	433	252	409
R^2	0.0001	0.009	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.009	0.036	0.005
Adjusted R^2	-0.0005	0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.028	0.001
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

On the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores find more significance among different ethnic groups across the two measures of political participation. Beginning with racial score, only the Chinese ethnic group has any significant estimates. This is with having voted in the 2016 election. The general lack of significance informs me that racial score is not a particularly great influence on political participation among Asian Americans. This is particularly true for registration to vote since no identities are significant.

Ethnic score finds limited significance on the ethnic level across both measures of participation. Only the Pakistani ethnic group has significant estimates for ethnic score. The group does have significant estimates across both measures of political participation unlike racial score. Across both forms of participation, ethnic score has a positive relationship. While both racial and ethnic scores have extremely weak correlations and largely insignificant estimates, ethnic score has a very slight edge over racial score. By influencing the Pakistani group across both subjects, ethnicity is a bigger influence than race.

For the second model, the estimates for both racial and ethnic scores change. These results are depicted in table 19 and 41[22]. For being registered to vote, racial score is significant only for the Chinese ethnic group with an estimate of 0.168. Ethnic score ranges from a low score of -0.184 for the Chinese identity and 0.188 for the Pakistani identity. Estimates for racial score on having voted in 2017 spans from a low value of -0.178 and a high value of 0.338 from the Vietnamese and Chinese ethnic groups respectively. Ethnic score has a minimum significant estimate of -0.259 for the Chinese group and a maximum of 0.346 for the Pakistani group.

Estimates for participation measures change quite significantly between the two models. Direction remains consistent but both magnitude and standard error are different after considering outside variables. While similar in many cases, magnitude noticeably increases across Asian American ethnic groups. Standard error increases as well though the change is much smaller. This yields estimates that actually become more significant going from the

22. Table 41 is in the appendix

Table 19: Registration to Vote by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Registered to Vote										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.012	0.134*	−0.018	0.168**	0.061	0.063	0.023	−0.087	0.113*	0.006	−0.083
	(0.024)	(0.076)	(0.154)	(0.080)	(0.053)	(0.125)	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Ethnic Score	0.020	−0.096	0.102	−0.184**	−0.053	0.130	0.006	0.079	−0.041	0.188**	0.117*
	(0.024)	(0.074)	(0.153)	(0.082)	(0.053)	(0.146)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.069)
Under Age 35	−0.024*	−0.066*	0.012	−0.057	−0.015	−0.106	−0.032	0.010	0.0002	−0.059*	−0.016
	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.094)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.051)
Female	−0.039***	−0.065*	−0.193***	0.019	0.010	−0.032	0.041**	−0.053*	0.007	−0.033	−0.080**
	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.059)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Education	0.252***	0.147	0.144	0.062	0.062	0.305***	0.121**	0.131*	0.124*	0.062	0.141**
	(0.022)	(0.095)	(0.125)	(0.080)	(0.060)	(0.117)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.070)
Income	0.055***	0.062	0.365**	0.170**	0.0003	0.166	−0.022	0.116**	−0.057	0.145***	−0.021
	(0.020)	(0.061)	(0.155)	(0.078)	(0.040)	(0.153)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.067)
Religious	−0.004	−0.032	0.190	0.015	0.038	−0.122	0.034	0.003	−0.046	0.067	0.062
	(0.013)	(0.041)	(0.143)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.091)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.059)	(0.044)
Democrat	0.065***	0.008	0.184***	0.089**	0.022	0.187***	−0.030	0.046	−0.002	0.047	0.080**
	(0.011)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.056)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Constant	0.679***	0.864***	0.328*	0.781***	0.863***	0.545***	0.849***	0.763***	0.839***	0.663***	0.748***
	(0.022)	(0.094)	(0.173)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.148)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.099)	(0.064)
Observations	2,943	209	233	255	347	222	335	358	406	205	373
R^2	0.099	0.090	0.145	0.091	0.017	0.130	0.048	0.063	0.026	0.115	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.096	0.054	0.114	0.061	-0.006	0.097	0.025	0.042	0.007	0.079	0.037
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

first model to the second model. While these differences are not particularly large, they still provide important context on the behavior of racial and ethnic score. These changes suggest that outside social variables do have some influence in how race and ethnicity forms political opinion. Additionally, both measures of participation also have insignificant estimates with racial and ethnic score on the panethnic level. This highlights the possibility that outside social variables become more correlated with racial and ethnic score among topics that trigger less response from race and ethnicity.

For the panethnic Asian American identity, racial and ethnic score are both insignificant across both voting registration and turnout. The estimates for both are also incredibly miniscule, nearing a value of zero. These results follow conventional wisdom that Asian Americans are generally indifferent over voting. Members with high levels of consciousness vote and are registered at nearly the same rate as individuals with little politicized identity. While racial and ethnic score are insignificant influences, other social variables have significant estimates. Age, sex, education, income, and partisanship are all significant predictors of the probability an individual is registered and votes. The indicator for being female is negatively correlated with being registered to vote while the indicator for being below the age of 35 is negatively correlated with having voted in 2016. The negative relationship between being young and voting in 2016 makes sense since there is a general consensus that the older generation value voting more than the younger generation. The negative relationship that being female has with voting registration is less clear. It is generally true that the gender voting gap in the United States favors women so why are Asian American females less likely to register than males? One possibility is that Asian American culture itself promotes a more traditionalist stance on gender roles. Women are generally expected to take care of the home and serve the family, especially their husbands. These social pressures may be pushing Asian American females away from voting since their roles do not emphasize electoral participation. Levels of education, household income, and being Democrat all have positive relationships with both voting registration and turnout. Education stands out, having estimates significantly

greater in magnitude (0.252 and 0.286 for registration and turnout respectively). This difference is massive, indicating that an individual with the highest levels of education like a PhD are over 25% more likely to vote and be registered than respondents who have only some schooling. While the trend is expected, the scale is somewhat surprising. The data overall suggests that race and ethnicity has nearly no impact on Asian American electoral behavior. Instead, the probability an individual votes is influenced by their membership in other social groups.

While insignificant on the panethnic level, racial score does have significant estimates among a couple Asian ethnicities. The Chinese and Vietnamese ethnic groups have significant correlations between racial score and their electoral participation. For the Chinese, racial score is positively correlated with both voter registration and turnout. Their estimates, especially for turnout in 2016 (0.338), is particularly large in value. The Vietnamese have the opposite relationship, racial score having a negative correlation (-0.178) with voter turnout in 2016. These results are interesting because they provide evidence that being Asian American means different things to different ethnicities. While the Asian American identity is homogeneous, how each part fits in differs. How the Chinese and Vietnamese ethnic groups interact with their race in terms of voting behavior shows that applying a panethnic perspective on all situations may not be accurate. This could also help explain why racial score is insignificant on the panethnic level. Since there are ethnicities with positive relationships and some have negative relationships, the combined identity would have no clear trend since certain groups would be in conflict. This conflict makes panethnicity weaker which highlights the individuality of Asian ethnicities.

Ethnic score also finds instances of significance on the ethnic level. The Pakistani group has significant correlation between ethnic score and both types of voter participation. In both situations, the relationship is positive which shows consistency within ethnic groups. The results for the Chinese and Vietnamese groups again provide insightful information on how ethnicity influences Asian American political opinion and behavior. Ethnic score has negative

relationships with both types of participation for the Chinese and positive correlation with voter turnout for the Vietnamese. There are two major possibilities stemming from these results. First, it suggests that Asian American ethnicities are widely different. If their ethnic scores are pulling them in different directions for the same policy, then ethnicities may differ on opinion. These differences could result from cultural, linguistic, and even social backgrounds that make each Asian ethnicity unique. Additionally, these results combine with the estimates for racial score to suggest that race and ethnicity can disagree. Having relationships in different directions imply that the racial group and the ethnic group can have different opinions on specific policies despite ethnicity fitting under race. This again reinforces that conceptualizing all Asian American ethnicities as being homogenous may not necessarily be inclusive of all perspectives. Second, it could be possible that certain ethnicities are substituting their ethnic and racial identities for each other. While this does assume that perceptions of race are homogenous across ethnicities, it does seem possible for individuals to have synonymous interpretations. This possibility will be further explored using information collected from the open-ended interviews. The data from the NAAS only, however, already provides interesting insights into the Asian American identity. For electoral behavior itself, ethnicity does appear to have some influence for certain groups though the effect also appears inconsistent. On a broader scale, it suggests that more thought must be put into whether it is appropriate to always assume panethnicity.

Other social variables also have an influence on the ethnic level. The relationships these factors have with voting behavior are generally parallel with the panethnic estimates. Along age, sex, education, income, and partisanship, significant estimates for ethnic groups are generally in the same direction as the panethnic estimates. A notable exception is the Indian group where being female is actually positively correlated with being registered to vote. While race and ethnicity may interact differently across each Asian ethnic group, other social factors appear to have a more consistent influence. It is possible that these social factors are independent from race and ethnicity which yields a more homogenous influence

across groups compared to race or ethnicity. These results suggest that registration and turnout are more heavily dependent on factors outside of race and ethnicity, reinforcing the panethnic trends. Even on an ethnic level, where there is significantly more variation across groups, most ethnicities continue to value other social memberships more.

Table 20: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for Participation

Ethnicity	Registered	Voted in 2016	Participation Aggregate
Bangladeshi	Racial Positive	Racial Positive	Strong Racial Positive
Chinese	Racial Positive and Ethnic Negative	Racial Positive	Weak Racial Positive
Korean	Racial Positive	Neither	Weak Racial Positive
Pakistani	Ethnic Positive	Neither	Weak Ethnic Positive
Vietnamese	Ethnic Positive	Ethnic Positive	Strong Ethnic Positive
Asian American	Neither	Neither	None
Cambodian	Neither	Neither	None
Filipino	Neither	Neither	None
Hmong	Neither	Neither	None
Indian	Neither	Neither	None
Japanese	Neither	Neither	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

5.8 Vote Choice and Partisanship

For vote choice and partisanship, we measure these behaviors by analyzing who respondents voted for in 2016 between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton[23] and whether they identify with the Democratic Party. We look at these three questions since they better capture overall partisanship. While we could just ask respondents for their partisan preferences, their voting behavior is just as important to determine party preferences. These three measures are all binary variables with one indicating an affirmative response and zero indicating a negative response. Across all Asian Americans, vote choice appears to be more closely influenced by racial and ethnic score than partisanship. While the relationship is insignificant with partisanship, racial and ethnic score have simultaneously significant relationships with voting for Trump and voting for Clinton. These relationships are also in the same direction, indicating that race and ethnicity agree and pull individuals in the same direction.

23. Third party candidates have too few voters in the sample

Table 21: Vote Choice for Clinton by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Voted for Clinton										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.157^{***}	0.004	0.014	0.372^{***}	0.227^{*}	0.283^{**}	0.155	0.195	0.213^{**}	-0.218^{**}	0.240^{*}
	(0.039)	(0.113)	(0.241)	(0.142)	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.096)	(0.119)	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.127)
Ethnic Score	0.137^{***}	0.107	0.208	0.015	0.211^{*}	0.042	0.104	0.144	0.039	0.259^{***}	0.057
	(0.039)	(0.112)	(0.216)	(0.144)	(0.120)	(0.158)	(0.096)	(0.118)	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.126)
Constant	0.546^{***}	0.791^{***}	0.597^{***}	0.420^{***}	0.376^{***}	0.578^{***}	0.634^{***}	0.511^{***}	0.594^{***}	0.834^{***}	0.388^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.060)	(0.111)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.118)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.068)
Observations	2,447	186	112	216	310	152	319	338	317	192	305
R^2	0.034	0.009	0.019	0.064	0.082	0.047	0.031	0.045	0.025	0.039	0.026
Adjusted R^2	0.033	-0.002	0.001	0.055	0.076	0.034	0.025	0.039	0.019	0.029	0.020
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

FOr the first model, racial and ethnic scores are significant for both the panethnic and ethnic levels for all three policy topics. We can see all of the estimates in tables 21, 33, and 34[24]. On voting for Clinton, racial score significant estimates range from -0.218 for the Pakistani ethnic group to a maximum of 0.372 for the Chinese ethnicity. Ethnic score ranges from a low of 0.137 for the panethnic identity to 0.259 for the Pakistani group. On vote choice for Trump, racial score has a minimum value of -0.307 for the Chinese ethnic group and -0.146 for the panethnic identity. Ethnic score ranges from -0.264 for the Filipino group to a maximum of -0.113 for the panethnic identity. Finally, on identifying most with the Democratic party, racial score is only significant with the Asian American identity with an estimate of 0.087. Ethnic score has a minimum value of 0.074 for the panethnic identity and 0.231 for the Filipino group.

Across the panethnic group, significance is consistent for racial score across all three measures. Racial and ethnic score are significant for both measures of vote choice and also partisanship. Additionally, the direction of the relationships all agree between panethnicity and ethnicity. The magnitudes are also largely the same. This results appears to be suggesting that vote choice and partisanship across the whole Asian American population is equally influenced by both ethnicity and race. While this is still only the first model, both panethnicity and ethnciity are so far looking like strong influences.

On the ethnic level, racial and ethnic scores continue to find significant estimates across the three measures. Beginning with racial score, there are four ethnic groups with significant estimates. The Chinese, Hmong, Korean, and Pakistani ethnic groups have at least one significant estimate among the three measures of vote choice and partisanship. Interestingly, racial score is only significant among vote choice and not partisanship. Of the four ethnicities, only the Pakistani group is conservatively influenced by racial score. The other three groups are all liberally correlated. This is an interesting case which shows that panethnicity does not necessarily hold across all Asian ethnicities even when race is influential. How racial

24. Tables 33 and 34 are in the appendix

identity interacts with an individual could vary and, like this situation, actually push them away from most Asian Americans.

Ethnic score also finds significance among certain ethnic groups though fewer than racial score. The Filipino and Pakistani ethnic groups have significant estimates with vote choice and partisanship. Unlike racial score, ethnic score as a consistent influence across ethnicities and policy topics. For both groups, ethnic score pushes political behavior to the left. Overall, while ethnic score is more consistent, it is also less significant across ethnic groups. Fewer ethnicities are significantly influenced which indicates that panethnicity may still be a bigger influence.

For the second model, the level of significance for both racial and ethnic scores decrease quite dramatically. Looking tables 22, 42, and 43[25], the estimates do change. For vote choice for Clinton, the range of significant estimates for racial score spans from a minimum of -0.354 for the Pakistani group to a maximum of 0.325 for the Chinese group. Ethnic score has a minimum estimate of 0.113 for the panethnic identity and 0.324 for the Pakistani ethnic group. Estimates for racial score with vote choice for Trump ranges from a low of -0.444 among the Hmong and a high of 0.171 for the Pakistanis. Ethnic score ranges from a minimum of -0.220 for the Pakistani identity and -0.087 for the panethnic group. Finally, identifying as a Democrat by racial score is only significant for the Korean ethnic group at 0.229. Ethnic score similarly only has one significant estimate of 0.237 with the Filipino group.

Estimates for vote choice and partisanship see the least consistency between the two models. Direction is stable for the two measures of vote choice but is less consistent on partisanship. While significant estimates have consistent directions, insignificant relationships change direction quite often especially along partisanship. Magnitude is highly variable for vote choice and partisanship with identities noticeably both increasing and decreasing. One consistent trend is that the panethnic identity decreases in magnitude moving from the first

25. Tables 42 and 43 are in the appendix

Table 22: Vote Choice for Clinton by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Asian American Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Voted for Clinton										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.089**	−0.057	−0.246	0.325**	0.223*	0.297**	0.095	0.007	0.115	−0.354***	0.230*
	(0.039)	(0.126)	(0.224)	(0.155)	(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.095)	(0.116)	(0.100)	(0.111)	(0.126)
Ethnic Score	0.113***	0.099	0.211	0.072	0.065	−0.008	0.015	0.130	0.008	0.324***	0.109
	(0.039)	(0.119)	(0.200)	(0.158)	(0.115)	(0.175)	(0.094)	(0.114)	(0.101)	(0.112)	(0.129)
Under Age 35	0.051**	−0.030	0.037	−0.110	0.072	0.174**	0.059	0.165***	0.017	−0.077	0.049
	(0.021)	(0.062)	(0.120)	(0.101)	(0.055)	(0.080)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.089)
Female	0.058***	0.059	0.083	0.088	0.089*	0.026	0.059	0.071	0.059	0.031	0.074
	(0.018)	(0.063)	(0.083)	(0.073)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Education	0.060	−0.272	0.125	0.147	−0.084	−0.113	0.084	0.414***	0.052	−0.142	0.170
	(0.037)	(0.183)	(0.158)	(0.151)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.127)	(0.109)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Income	−0.013	0.144	0.104	−0.268*	0.068	−0.241	0.049	−0.109	−0.117	0.155*	−0.183
	(0.032)	(0.101)	(0.170)	(0.147)	(0.087)	(0.163)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.121)
Religious	0.009	0.118*	0.215	0.011	0.037	0.146	−0.075	−0.068	−0.063	0.203**	0.004
	(0.022)	(0.071)	(0.152)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.116)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.093)	(0.080)
Democrat	0.316***	0.155**	0.412***	0.275***	0.481***	0.178***	0.379***	0.291***	0.376***	0.080	0.249***
	(0.018)	(0.059)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Constant	0.340***	0.770***	0.238	0.271**	0.122	0.390**	0.394***	0.161	0.447***	0.682***	0.177
	(0.037)	(0.179)	(0.199)	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.179)	(0.134)	(0.118)	(0.103)	(0.166)	(0.116)
Observations	2,135	162	105	163	269	136	274	288	303	154	281
R^2	0.169	0.091	0.255	0.169	0.340	0.189	0.230	0.231	0.222	0.129	0.119
Adjusted R^2	0.166	0.044	0.193	0.126	0.320	0.137	0.207	0.209	0.200	0.081	0.093
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

model to the second. Individual ethnic groups are much more variable with groups like the Pakistanis consistently increasing in value while others remain similar. Standard error increases across all three measures. Significance for both measures of vote choice increase while significance decreases for partisanship. This is a consequence of magnitude generally increasing for vote choice estimates and decreasing for partisanship estimates. These trends emphasize that outside social variables do influence race and ethnicity. These factors are strong enough to dramatically change how racial and ethnic scores interact with an individual's political choices.

For the panethnic Asian American identity, racial and ethnic score has a firm influence in vote choice but is insignificant with overall partisanship. Racial score has a significant correlation with voting for both Trump and Clinton. The relationship with voting for Trump is negative while the relationship with vote choice for Clinton is positive. Ethnic score has parallel results. The relationship between ethnic score and vote choice for Trump is negative while the correlation with voting for Clinton is positive. These results generally suggest that the Asian American identity pulls individuals to favor Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in the 2016 election. They also highlight the parallel influence race and ethnicity have on Asian Americans. It represents another situation where both race and ethnicity may be blurring the lines that separate them. This reinforces the panethnic perception of all Asian American ethnicities. It could also be a result of the candidates and general platforms impacting all Asian Americans homogeneously. Particularly policies touching on race, despite each ethnicity being unique in their own way, will broadly affect all Asians similarly. Most individuals outside the community will not take special care distinguishing between each ethnicity which leads to generalizations that make the racial experience similar for all.

For vote choice and partisanship, the panethnic identity also has significant estimates with many other social factors. Age, sex, levels of education, and partisanship have significant relationships with vote choice and partisanship. In terms of vote choice for Donald Trump in

the 2016 election, being young, a woman, a Democrat, and having higher levels of education are negatively correlated. The opposite is true for vote choice for Clinton with youth, being female, and leaning Democratic having a positive relationship. When analyzing partisanship, identifying as a member of the Democrat party is positively correlated with being young, being female, and levels of education. These results generally align with the conventional thinking behind how individuals form their partisanship. Unsurprisingly, partisanship was a particularly strong influencer of vote choice. Being Democrat reduced the probability of voting for Trump by 0.255 while increasingly the probability of voting for Clinton by 0.316. These are incredibly strong forces which make sense because of the political parties the candidates belong to. The other variables are much less pronounced despite still being significant estimates. Most of the social variables included in the analysis pushed the Asian American group to the left on the spectrum of political opinion. Only level of household income and the indicator for being religious influence Asian Americans to the right in our model and they are insignificant estimates.

Racial score on an ethnic level continues to yield significant estimates with partisanship and vote choice. The Chinese, Hmong, Korean, and Pakistani ethnic groups are all significantly influenced by racial score for these political behaviors. Generally, the Asian ethnic groups are influenced by racial similarly, towards the more liberal position or candidate. For the Chinese ethnic group, racial score is significantly correlated with voting for Clinton. The same is true for the Hmong and they also have a negative relationship between racial score and voting for Trump. Racial score for Koreans also has a negative relationship with voting for Trump and is positively correlated with identifying as a Democrat. While the general trend has racial score favoring liberal behaviors, there are instances contrary to the norm. The Pakistani group, for example, is pulled to the right on the political spectrum by racial score. It has a positive correlation with vote choice for Trump and a negative correlation with vote choice for Clinton. These conflicting positions again raise the possibility that the panethnic racial identity is not a homogenous group that impacts all equally. While certain

factors such as the composition of the Asian American race is consistent across ethnicities, how each group perceive their place in the Asian American identity as well as what it means to be Asian American vary.

Ethnic score also scores significant estimates with partisanship and vote choice on the ethnic level. The Filipino and Pakistani ethnic groups have some significant estimates with ethnic score among certain policy points. The Filipino ethnic group has a strong positive relationship between ethnic score and identification as a Democrat. The Pakistani group is influenced mostly in vote choice. Ethnic score is positively correlated with voting for Clinton and negatively correlated with vote choice for Trump. Ethnic score, generally speaking compared to racial score, is more consistently correlated with left leaning political behavior. Especially with vote choice for Clinton and identification as a Democrat, ethnic score has estimates greater in value than racial score and is more stable. While both racial and ethnic score are positively correlated with left leaning political behavior, fewer individual ethnic groups have negative estimates for ethnic score than racial score. Estimates for the Pakistani group have an interesting relationship. Unlike the panethnic group where ethnicity and race agree, the estimates for racial score and ethnic score conflict in direction. With ethnic and panethnic identities pulling in different directions, the results support the possibility that ethnicities can politically disagree with the broader racial group. In this particular situation, ethnicity is more closely tied to the minority, liberal perspective that the other ethnic groups identify with. Though Asian American ethnicities are typically liberal leaning, they are not consistent in how they reach these opinions.

For social factors outside of just racial and ethnic score, most Asian ethnicities are parallel to the panethnic identity. Though they may not all have significant estimates with being young, being female, levels of education, or being Democrat, these variables have higher concentrations of significant correlations. Additionally, most of these significant estimates share the same direction, positive or negative, with the panethnic estimate. This suggests that the panethnic identity is quite representative of the parts it is composed of. On an ethnic

level, a couple other variables have significant relationships with vote choice and partisanship. For the Korean group, household income has a strong negative correlation with identifying as a Democrat. The Pakistani group has a positive relationship between being religious and voting for Clinton. Though religiosity is typically associated with Conservative leaning political behavior, the predominant religion of Pakistanis is Islam. Prior to the 2016 election, Donald Trump stood on an extreme Islamaphobic platform that likely alienated the Muslim community. This explains why Pakistanis who identify as religious are more supportive of voting for Clinton.

While most ethnic groups agree with the panethnic identity, the Pakistani group stands out from the rest. For racial score, it is the only ethnic group that has a significant, negative correlation with liberal leaning political behaviors. Additionally, among vote choice for Trump and Clinton, the Pakistani group is the only group that is not significantly correlated with being Democrat for both vote choice measures. These estimates are also comparably small in value which further distinguishes the group. Levels of education is also negatively correlated with identification as a Democrat, the only significant estimate with this relationship. As mentioned before, the Pakistani group also has a positive relationship between being religious and voting for Clinton, the only instance where being religious is significant. Though the Pakistani group is unique in its significant relationships, the Bangladeshi ethnic group has similar trends that mirror the Pakistani group. For being a Democrat, the Bangladeshi ethnic group is only significant with voting for Clinton. Additionally, though many of its estimates are insignificant, racial score often follows the behavior of the Pakistani group. This supports the assertion that the Asian American community is heterogeneous in nature. There may be similarities across certain ethnicities from similar regions with shared culture, religion, and linguistics, but assuming the broader community is all the same appears to not hold up.

Table 23: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores for Preferences

Ethnicity	Clinton	Trump	Partisanship	Choice Aggregate
Hmong	Racial Positive	Racial Negative	Neither	Moderate Racial Liberal
Korean	Neither	Racial Negative	Racial Positive	Moderate Racial Liberal
Vietnamese	Racial Positive	Racial Negative	Neither	Moderate Racial Liberal
Chinese	Racial Positive	Neither	Neither	Weak Racial Liberal
Pakistani	Racial Negative, Ethnic Positive	Ethnic Negative, Racial Positive	Neither	Moderate Ethnic Liberal, Racial Conservative
Filipino	Racial Positive	Neither	Ethnic Positive	Weak Racial and Ethnic Liberal
Asian American	Ethnic Positive	Racial Negative	Ethnic Positive	Weak Ethnic Liberal
Japanese	Neither	Ethnic Negative	Neither	Weak Ethnic Liberal
Bangladeshi	Neither	Neither	Neither	None
Cambodian	Neither	Neither	Neither	None
Indian	Neither	Neither	Neither	None

Note: Arranged from strongest racial influence to strongest ethnic influence (No relationship at the bottom)
Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

6 Results From Interviews

The long-form interviews took place over the span of two weeks starting from January 20, 2022 and concluding on February 3, 2022. I interviewed sixteen individuals who are all enrolled in a baccalaureate degree program at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. This sample is drawn from members of Asian American organizations at the university who voluntarily signed up for this interview. Of those sixteen individuals, fifteen provided valid responses that will be used in this study and one did not attend the scheduled interview. The sample includes a fairly even split of seven men and eight women. Ethnically, the sample comprises of one Vietnamese identifying individual, one Japanese identifying individual, two Pakistani identifying individual, and eleven Chinese identifying individual. The range of ages represented in the sample are very small, with a minimum age of 19 and maximum age of 21. Highest level of education is consistent across every individual since they are all seeking their first bachelor's degree. The partisanship split in the sample is ten Democrat-leaning, four are split down the middle, and one Republican leaning. We did not collect any information on household income because it is very likely that most would not know their household income or have no source of income aside from parental financial support. We also did not ask individuals if they are religious and instead paid close attention to whether religion was mentioned during their responses.

There are some concerns regarding the sample selected for the interviews. One concern is that the sample is skewed in terms of ethnic representation towards the Chinese ethnic

group. This is an unfortunate effect of drawing the sample from voluntary respondents in Asian American organizations at the university. While the Asian American race is incredibly diverse, Chinese Americans and East Asians make up a substantial portion of membership within Asian American organizations on campus. There is additional bias since I reached out to more organizations that specifically cater to Chinese American students. Another concern is that the sample is extremely narrow and not representative. By only selecting students from the undergraduate population at the University of Michigan, I am unable to get a fully representative sample of all Asian Americans across the United States. A final issue is that I would be interviewing fellow college aged students. Interviewing peers on their political opinions could yield incorrect answers in order to "fit in" more with the mainstream political opinions of the campus. This brings up an interesting comparison between my long-form interviews and the NAAS. In both surveys, respondents are interviewed by members of the their racial in-groups, but the NAAS also has out-group interviewers as well. Though the interviews for the NAAS were conducted over telephone which means physical appearance cannot be used to determine race, some interviewers did report having moderate to strong accents which could lead to racial identification. Names could also clue in respondents on the racial identity of their interviewers.[26][27]

While these concerns are valid, I believe that the interviews provide insightful information that can explore mechanisms driving Asian American political behavior. While each Asian American ethnicity is unique in their own ways, there could still be cultural similarities that transcend national borders. These interviews are not meant to collect quantitative data, rather they are designed to allow subjects to explore what goes into their political opinions. This should limit the amount of bias within the answers each participant provides since this information is less socially controversial than just general political opinion and can still be valid even if they do not give their true opinions. Additionally, applying the triangu-

26. Out-group influence is analyzed in the Discussion subsection on outside forces

27. Concerns and comments regarding the NAAS are further discussed in the Discussion section on limitations and further research

lation strategy during the interviews supported their responses as valid. The reasoning and arguments they make are consistent across policy topics and behavioral tendencies. Also, while the sample is not representative of the true Asian American group, it still provides insight into the group dynamics at play. I can still analyze the panethnic perspective that individuals may have in addition to knowledge individuals have on other ethnicities.

Over the course of the interviews, five distinct reoccurring themes continuously came up during conversation. Though I expected certain themes to repeat on a consistent basis, I was quite shocked to hear all fifteen individuals citing the same cultural and social norms as motivating factors for their personal political values and the values of their communities. The five commonalities across the fifteen interviews are that Asian Americans have a culture of hard work, there is a social and political split across age, family and community are major motivating factors for political values, the conceptualization of being a model minority, and voting with your wallet is heavily embedded within Asian American identities.

6.1 Hard Work Culture

Across all fifteen interviews, each respondent mentioned that a significant component of the Asian American identity is being a hard worker. While each respondent worded the cultural norm slightly differently from each other, the general consensus is that there is an expectation for Asian Americans to work hard in order to succeed. Working hard applies to several aspects in life ranging from education during childhood to work during adulthood. There is an expectation among Asian Americans to sacrifice some amounts of personal happiness and luxury to focus on working or building skills for work. The ultimate goal of working hard is to provide themselves and their future families a comfortable life as well as building generational wealth. The value of hard work leading to future success and prosperity is apparently drilled into the minds of Asian American children by their parents starting from a young age. The fervor and commitment to hard work exhibited by all fifteen subjects suggests that the culture of hard work is something more than just a positive

character trait that is being encouraged to Asian Americans. The virtue of working hard and building success is so deeply embedded within the consciousness of the subjects that over half saw hard work as being a necessary prerequisite for identifying as an Asian. This prompts me to consider the possibility that the culture of hard work among Asian Americans can be a factor driving racial and ethnic influence on political opinion and behavior. This is supported by the several respondents acknowledging that this cultural norm greatly influenced either their personal political opinions or the opinions of their community on certain policies, especially those relating to affirmative action and economic equity.

Education is often cited as a topic of major concern for Asian Americans and every subjects reiterated their commitment to receiving an education. Two subjects went as far as saying that, for most Asian Americans, obtaining a bachelor's degree is considered the bare minimum. This sentiment is extended beyond the immediate family of the respondents and is shared by their communities of extended family and friends. Education is heavily implicated with the Asian American fixation on hard work and success. While this may be slightly skewed since each respondent is an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan, each respondent reiterated the need and pressure to work hard during their academic careers. This creates a culture of extreme competition among Asian Americans between members of their own group and racial out-groups since academic success is so closely linked to their values. With this competition, my respondents noted that academic success should be closely linked to levels of hard work. Those who work hard deserve academic success while those who do not work hard do not deserve academic success. This directly leads to the topic of affirmative action.

Academic affirmative action is a contentious topic among the fifteen survey subjects. While only three out of fifteen are outright against affirmative action, ten noted that such policies are unfair against Asian Americans and thirteen condemned current practices as deeply flawed. Looking at the quantitative data, we can see that support for increasing the number of Black and Asian students in college is not consistently supported across

Asian Americans. While the panethnic identity does have a significant positive estimate for supporting this policy, the small magnitude (0.097) means that Asian Americans who are strongly tied to their racial identity are barely more supportive of affirmative action[28]. Why academic affirmative action is so contentious among Asian Americans stems from the culture of hard work.

The respondents commented that admission into university should be merit based. Those who work hard and achieve high scores in high school and standardized testing while also accomplishing significant extracurricular activities should go to better schools than those with lower scores and rankings. To them, meritocracy and hard work in academics are mostly parallel trends. This makes academic affirmative actions, where social variables outside of academic achievement and merit-based measures are considered in college admissions, very unpopular among Asian Americans. Social variables, particularly race where Asian Americans feel they are disproportionately disadvantaged by for affirmative action, has nothing to do with how hard people work to achieve their academic accomplishments. People who are hard workers and are high academic achievers under affirmative action policies may get into the same or even less prestigious universities as those with lower scores but come from disadvantaged backgrounds. Therefore, affirmative action discounts the hard work that is strongly associated with the Asian American cultural identity. This would logically make Asian Americans less supportive of such policies by their racial identity since hard work is so integral to the Asian identity itself.

Parallel with the results of the quantitative analysis, Asian Americans feel conflicted regarding affirmative action. While twelve respondents still are in favor of having some form of academic affirmative action policies, their Asian American culture did come into conflict. This is likely the driving mechanism behind the small positive relationship for the panethnic identity and why there are few ethnicities with positive significant estimates. Additionally, groups such as Cambodians, Hmong, and Vietnamese all have negative relationships though

28. The interval for this measure is 0.25

these are insignificant. The traditional values of hard work and the importance of education to Asian Americans make affirmative action policies salient in the mind of the group though the impact is conflicted. While the influence of racial score on affirmative action is more positive than initially expected, this likely stems from the measure asking whether respondents support increasing the number of Black and Asian students as opposed to just Blacks. Since Asian Americans are aware that fellow members of their group have similar values of working hard and education, they would be more accepting of increasing their own numbers.

The influence of hard work extends beyond academics and also into the professional work environment. Most respondents reported some support for the idea that an individuals economic and professional position in life is based on the effort they put in. These comments are especially salient while explaining their support for workplace affirmative action policies and policies promoting economic equity. The strength of these convictions, however, are seemingly weaker among the respondents. This could be a result of the fact that none of the individuals in the sample are full time employees. Looking at the quantitative results for measures of economic equity, however, does suggest that racial and ethnic influence on economic topics are more positive.

With regards to providing more equal economic opportunities, more respondents answered positively than negatively. Economic opportunities include more accessible public education, social welfare programs, and safety net programs. Fourteen respondents are in favor of providing equal economic opportunities for all. While the concept of hard work did come up, the rationalization for their support circumvented conflict. The respondents in favor of policies providing equal economic opportunities justified their opinion by stating that everyone deserves the chance at success. While working hard to achieve success is still a critical component of their values, providing equal economic opportunities is not mutually exclusive. With opportunities, things are more fair for disadvantaged groups while still requiring hard work to realize these opportunities. Without hard work, people given equal economic opportunities are still not going to be successful compared to those who do commit

themselves to putting in the effort. This consistent reasoning explains why hard work and economic parity can coexist.

Economic policies that call for equal economic outcomes, however, do conflict with the culture of hard work among Asian Americans. While opportunities focus more on providing individuals a fair starting point in life, outcomes are more fixated on wealth and the ending point. Under these circumstances, only two respondents support policies for more equal economic outcome. All thirteen subjects not in favor of such policies cited the fact that these policies would allow individuals to not work hard for their place in life. These policies conflict with the values they grew up with. Again, there is a heavy emphasis on the connection between hard work and what people deserve in life. Since the value of hard work is diminished by these policies, Asian Americans would be less supportive.

How the respondents respond to their support of economic opportunities and rejection of economic outcomes reinforce two results. The first is that hard work is a highly salient concept within the Asian American identity. Policies on economic opportunities and economic outcomes are quite similar yet respondents are completely divided. Opportunities are nearly unanimously supported whereas outcomes are nearly unanimously opposed. The key difference between the two is that opportunities encourage hard work which aligns with the Asian American cultural influence while outcomes diminishes hard work. This shows that the political influence of racial and ethnic identities are extremely dependent on the mantra of working hard.

The Asian American culture of hard work also has an interesting implication on Asian American political participation. The Asian group in the United States vote at extremely low rates despite having scoring high in variables that would typically increase participation (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). The Asian fixation on hard work may also have a role in the Asian American political participation lag. The quantitative data shows that both racial and ethnic scores are insignificant in influencing Asian American tendencies to be registered to vote and have voted in the 2016 election. From the interviews, eight respondents offer a

potential explanation for these trends. An important implication of the hard work mentality among Asian Americans is that they are also more likely to try and resolve problems by themselves. This mentality makes it so that Asian Americans are more inclined to look inwards for solutions on issues plaguing themselves and their communities. This includes political concerns.

By looking inwards for solutions to political problems, Asian Americans are less concerned about the world around them. Believing that their own hard work will solve whatever problems they may have, they would not feel the need to rely on political institutions. Since Asian Americans do not feel the need to rely on favorable government institutions or policies to improve their situation in life, voting is unnecessary. This makes sense for the Asian American group since they politically participate less than any other minority group and the results from the NAAS show that racial and ethnic score are both insignificant with political participation. Political participation is an unnecessary action to Asian Americans because their cultural background influences them to devalue government intervention. Hard work is then a likely mechanism driving racial and ethnic influence on political behavior.

6.2 The Elders and Youth

Another common factor discussed throughout the interviews is age. Specifically, the divide between elder Asian Americans and younger Asian Americans[29] is quite distinct. A surprising result from the quantitative data is the significance of the measure for being young across multiple policy positions. This significance implies that there is a great generational gap in Asian American political opinion that spans the panethnic identity in multiple measures of political behavior. While being young is known to influence individuals to have more liberal leaning political opinions and behaviors, it is still a notable pattern considering the typical indifference of Asian American political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960; Miller et al. 1981; Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005). Taking the information from the quantitative

29. Though no specific ages were mentioned, it appears that the split is around the late-forties. The distinction is typically between those with grown children and those without.

analysis into the interviews, I took special note of whether respondents would mention any type of generational or age gap within their communities as well as how it influenced Asian Americans. The qualitative results are quite informative. Age proves to be a significant factor guiding the respondents' political behavior and opinion. Though age is important in the context of the Asian American group, it is also segregated from the identity itself.

Among the fifteen respondents, twelve brought up some form of generational or age gap within their communities at some point in the interviews. Broadly speaking, these divides typically separate younger Asian Americans to be more liberal while older Asian Americans are more conservative. This is no surprise considering previous research done on public opinion also discovered such trends (Miller et al. 1981). What is surprising is that age appears to transcend immigrant generation among the respondents. In particular, most of our sample include either first or second generation immigrants. However, one respondent is a fourth generation immigrant. While this individual is the same age as the rest of the sample, their connection to their homeland should be weaker since more generations have passed since immigrating to the United States. With a weaker connection to their homeland, their political behavior as well as their parent's political behavior should be less influenced by race and ethnicity.

However, based on the results of the interviews, this behavior does not hold. Thought the actual political opinions of the respondents differed, they consistently asserted that their relatives one generation above them are more closely influenced by traditional values of their homeland. This includes the family of the third-generation immigrant respondent as well as members of the Asian American community that other respondents knew. The respondents consistently responded that older Asian Americans they personally knew, regardless of their immigrant generation, are typically more influenced by their more socially conservative cultural heritages. One respondent described this phenomena as a result of the older generation, regardless of when or who first immigrated to the United States, being less open to cultural assimilation. Older individuals grew up in highly racially segregated communities

where only fellow members of their race and ethnicity lived. Compared to today where Asian Americans are dispersed throughout the United States, much of the older population were concentrated on the west coast (Wei 1993). This causes older Asian Americans to continue to rely on their homeland's cultural background for political influence. This means that despite being further removed from the actual immigration process, these older Asian Americans still hold more similar beliefs and values to those of the same age rather than those of the same immigrant generation. Admittedly, this sample is incredibly small and highly subject to personal hearsay. However, this does seem to have some statistical grounding based on the strong relationship that the indicator for being young has in the quantitative analysis.

The general trend across policy topics and Asian American ethnic groups is that younger Asian Americans are significantly more liberal leaning than the older generation. The respondents cited that their parents and other older members of the Asian American community that they knew held their Asian heritages closer to their personal values. These cultural influences are described as highly socially conservative. Since older Asian Americans are more influenced by this source of socially conservative values, it makes sense that there is a significant generational gap by age. Younger Asian Americans are more culturally assimilated and so adopt a less socially conservative cultural heritage.

Age pushes Asian American political opinion leftward in many social and economic policies but fails for affirmative action support. From the quantitative data, being young is no longer consistent across the Asian American ethnic groups and the magnitude of the relationship is significantly smaller. Whereas age is a significant estimate for most other policies regarding social equity, affirmative action policies stand out. Less than half of the ten Asian ethnic groups have statistically significant estimates for any of the three policies on affirmative action. Looking at the interview responses, we see why age is not a strong liberal influence on support for affirmative action. When asked about affirmative action policies, all fifteen respondents vocalized some awareness that Asian American youth are particularly disadvantaged by affirmative action policies. These sentiments are particularly salient

among the Asian American youth because many experience the college admissions process first-hand and are exposed to a significant amount of Asian American media. One subject elaborated their position. Asian Americans are subject to higher standards than any other race. This degree of unfair treatment makes it difficult for young Asian Americans to support affirmative action even though they are aware of the benefits affirmative action brings to disadvantaged groups. It is abundantly clear in this situation that young Asian Americans are deeply conflicted in terms of affirmative action. Their youth does influence them to understand the liberal perspective, but personal experiences drive opinion in the opposite direction. This makes being young a weaker liberal influence on Asian American opinion on affirmative action and explains the weakly significant estimates across the panethnic and ethnic groups.

6.3 Family and Community

Across the interview responses, the Asian American group appears to be greatly influenced by their family and community. Specifically, the personal experiences encountered by an individual's family and community will influence their political values. These environmental factors are not insignificant either, with respondents often describing these experiences as the catalyst for their political values on certain topics. I also learned that Asian American media and other sources of information are heavily group oriented and typically cover very Asian American-centric issues. This creates an echo chamber for the respondents and fellow Asian Americans they interact with which reinforces community experiences. This factor is particularly salient among Asian Americans on the subject of immigration.

Immigration policy proved to be a particularly important topic for the respondents. Thirteen individuals expressed great concern over potential changes to current US immigration policy. Among the subjects who expressed interest in immigration policy, ten remarked that they personally knew family members or friends who went through the United States immigration process. Additionally, they cited these interactions as the specific reason why

they support liberalizing immigration policy. It is clear that the respondents are personally invested in immigration policy because people they personally know are being impacted by these policies. Their family and communities are thus influencing the group to have opinions that would benefit the wider community. This is not particularly surprising since we do expect a certain level of political opinion to be driven by personal interests. What is interesting is the extent of this influence for immigration in particular. As mentioned before, nearly every respondent who is informed on immigration policy has some community connection with the subject. While factors such as partisanship and general concern for human rights were brought up, non of these variables are as salient as family and community experiences.

Asian Americans being influenced by the experiences of their family and community pop up sporadically outside of immigration policy. Support for abortion and protecting the LGBTQ community had a few respondents recall personal experiences. However, the mechanism driving this influence changes from personal experience to obligation. Honor and shame are brought up during discussions about these two topics. Starting with the LGBTQ community, eight subjects reported feeling pressured by their families and communities to have a traditional family in the future. Traditional family in the context of this study is a man and woman married with children. Not conforming to this social norm would lead to not only personal shame, but also familial disappointment for not abiding with cultural heritage. While this did not have a direct role on shaping political views for the respondents, they did remark that this could influence other members of the Asian American community.

Abortion elicits similar responses during the interviews. With regards to abortion, six subjects mention that if they became or got someone else pregnant, that it would bring irreparable shame to themselves and their families from the community. We again see that family and community influence continues to pressure Asian Americans via social obligation. Compounding this is the social conservatism surrounding the Asian American community regarding sex and relationships which make the topic particularly taboo. This atmosphere of shame and silence surrounding the subject means that abortion policy is not often discussed

or conscious among the community. The subjects confirm this, generally remarking that while they personally have stances on abortion, it is due to other social factors or from sources outside of their communities.

These results corroborate with and explain the quantitative analysis. Racial and ethnic score have weak and inconsistent relationships with support for the LGBTQ community and are insignificant with support for abortion. Social pressures stemming from Asian American families and communities prevent these topics from coming to the forefront of group political opinion. There is such great risk of social shame and ostracism that the Asian American identity is completely silent on the LGBTQ community and abortion. This pushes racial and ethnic score to have weak and insignificant relationships with these topics. Asian Americans are, instead, informed of their opinions by their membership in other social groups that put more emphasis on these topics. This shows how pervasive family and the community can be in the Asian American identity and even influence political behavior.

6.4 The Model Minority

Another major commonality across the Asian American group that I noted from the interviews is the model minority myth. Of the fifteen interviewed individuals, Eleven discussed the model minority myth in some capacity either by name or by concept. The working conceptualization of the model minority myth derived from the interviews is that the Asian American group is better assimilated into American society both culturally and economically. Therefore, the group is more socioeconomically successful than other minority racial groups. The respondents' views on the model minority myth are divided into a couple distinct answer groups. While both views were generally negative towards the model minority myth, the reasoning behind their opposition are different. Nine cited Asian Americans being labeled as a model minority as a way for Whites to continue their socioeconomic and political dominance over minority groups by creating out-group conflict among minorities. Four subjects described the model minority myth as a way to have Asian Americans statistically

categorized with Whites separately from other minorities.

The more common criticism of the model minority myth focuses on the current status quo maintaining power. By creating greater conflict between minority groups, then they would not be able to effectively mobilize to push for a unified political agenda. This, in the minds of the subjects, keeps all minorities disadvantaged compared to Whites. Political movements and changes that would benefit the Asian American group is therefore intrinsically linked with the fate of fellow minority groups. This conceptualization of the model minority myth would likely push political opinion more liberal. This rationalization aligns Asian American interests closer to other minorities and links their fates together. Looking at previous research, this would push the Asian American group towards the liberal side of the political spectrum (Barreto 2010; Jardina 2019; Miller et al. 1981). Reported by over half of the sample, this conceptualization may be the most pervasive and influential among the group.

Though less commonly reported, seeing the model minority myth as a statistical tool to selectively group Asian Americans with Whites is still quite consequential. This conceptualization of the model minority myth is functionally opposite of the previous line of reasoning. Instead of unifying with fellow minority groups, Asian Americans are in conflict with them. By categorizing Asian Americans with Whites, the respondents say that they are doubly disadvantaged. By being categorized with Whites, Asian Americans are not considered to be disadvantaged. Certain programs and policies such as affirmative action would therefore not benefit Asian Americans and ostracize them from other minorities. At the same time, Asian Americans would still not receive all of the benefits of being the majority racial group in the United States. The result would be that Asian Americans are too white to be a minority and too minority to be white. This characterization of minority racial groups bring Asian Americans in direct conflict. They see other minorities as gatekeepers, preventing Asian Americans from benefiting from minority programs in order to further their own. Listening to the respondents who brought up this characterization, there is a significant amount of

racial tension between Asian Americans and other minority groups. This in turn should push Asian Americans towards the White racial group and their more conservative political values (Jardina 2019).

In terms of political influence, the model minority myth often came up when discussing policies promoting social and economic equality as well as affirmative action. In terms of support for policies promoting social and economic equality, the model minority myth is influential though the direction is not consistent. For social equity policies, the model minority myth is brought up less often. This could be a result of our sample being quite young and socially liberal where no one outright opposed policies promoting social equality. Economic equity is divided. Going back to the two conceptualizations of the model minority myth, it is clear why. Looking beyond the individual's overall support for or against such policies, these conceptualizations have opposing influences.

Those who viewed the model minority myth as a tool for the majority to divide the minority are influenced in favor of policies for economic equality. These respondents use the model minority myth to better empathize with fellow minority groups. Since policies promoting economic equity would improve the plight of minority groups, they are influenced to be in favor of such policies. Those who saw the model minority myth as out-group competition against other minority groups are more influenced against economic equity policies. While half of the four respondents still support some measures of equality, the model minority myth pulls opinion towards the conservative perspective. Due to their views, they see Asian Americans as being in conflict with other minority groups. Knowing this, they are more reluctant to support policies that would improve the situation of out-groups that are in conflict with their own identities. This perspective separates Asian American opinion from the minority groups.

Another political policy linked with the model minority myth is affirmative action. The model minority myth frequently interacted with support for affirmative action among the respondents much in the same way as support for economic and social equity policies. How

the model minority myth influenced opinion on affirmative action is highly dependent on which conceptualization the respondent more closely identifies with. Those who see the myth as a way to maintain the status quo power structure are more influenced to be more sympathetic for affirmative action policies. Those more focused on out-group competition are pushed to be more against these policies. This reinforces the fact that the model minority myth does not have a consistent view among Asian Americans. Some are inspired to better align with fellow minorities whereas others view the situation as a conflict between the races.

6.5 Voting With Your Wallet

The fifth and final component of embedded Asian American culture that arose from the interviews is the concept of voting with your wallet. Voting with your wallet is defined as voting and having political opinions that solely benefit one's personal financial situation as opposed to society as a whole (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). Previous research found that voters typically do not vote with their wallet and are cognizant of the overall health of the economy. The results from my long-form interviews, however, indicates that Asian American culture inherently values self-benefiting behavior. This pushes the Asian American group to adopt a mindset that is parallel with voting with their wallet.

Among the fifteen respondents, ten specified that Asian American political behavior is often rooted in self-interest. Whether the respondents themselves behave only in self-interest or their communities do, the subjects often justify political opinions and behavior in the name of personal benefit. This sentiment extends beyond political behavior and is deeply rooted in Asian upbringing. Particularly among the Chinese subjects but also salient among the Vietnamese and Japanese respondents, Asian American culture heavily emphasizes independent hard work and success. Individuals should strive to work hard in order to be able to sustain their families and build generational wealth. An unintended consequence of this, as one subject commented, is that Asian Americans are more likely to act only in self interest. The drive to achieve success without external support is so

strong within the Asian American psyche that individuals tend to discount other groups. They are focused in benefitting only themselves and their communities which may be to the detriment to others. While Asian American culture is not advocating for harming others, the situation of individuals outside their communities are simply not important enough to especially consider. This cultural aspect of the Asian American identity may be pushing racial and ethnic score to be more selfish and less considerate of other minority groups. Politically speaking, this behavior would push the Asian American racial group to further separate itself from fellow minorities. By voting with their wallet, Asian Americans are influenced to behave in their personal interests and not for the benefit of others.

This cultural phenomena is particularly salient for policies on affirmative action. Of the ten respondents who reported Asian American self-interested behavior, all ten brought it up when discuss opinion on affirmative action. The respondents all agree that Asian Americans are particuarly disadvantaged by policies pushing for affirmative action because they make it harder for Asian Americans to attend elite post-secondary institutions. However, most are also aware of the fact that affirmative action policies bring significant benefit to disadvantaged minority groups and can raise the general well being in society. The benefits, however, are fiercely countered by Asian American desire to maximize personal benefit. Even though there are respondents who support affirmative action, even those who did mentioned that they are conflicted because they would personally benefit from getting rid of such policies. For those who expressed opposition to affirmative action policies, the reasoning is clear. They and their ethnic groups would personally benefit from getting rid of affirmative action policies which is ultimately, according to them, what their Asian upbringing has told them to focus on.

As mentioned above, this could be another mechanism to out-group competition among Asian Americans. This cultural emphasis on only looking out for yourself would draw more suspicion and hostility towards groups who advocate for benefiting society at the cost of certain groups. Particularly amongst minorities and liberals, many of their policy positions

would come with a certain financial or social cost in order to benefit the rest of society. Asian Americans as a group would oppose such policies because they politically behave to maximize outcomes. This breeds hostility between Asians and other minorities since they now view each other as major hurdles to each other's political agenda. This has a snowballing effect on Asian American racial relations. Out-groups and Asian Americans are in a constant cycle of political conflict which elicits more hostility and further deepens the divide between out-groups. This could be especially true among minority groups since they tend to support policies that benefit more disadvantaged groups.

Another situation where voting with your wallet is clear and obvious is partisanship. As analyzed before in the quantitative data, Asian Americans are not particularly loyal to any political party based on racial and ethnic influence. Taking into consideration the fact that Asian Americans will political participate in a manner that is more advantageous for themselves, it is clear why the Asian American vote is not consistent. From the interview responses, fourteen subjects reported that they either personally or knew people who voted a certain way only because believed that would maximize their gains. These subjects also stated that they or their communities are often aware of the fact that only they would benefit as well. According to the respondents, this led to wildly inconsistent voting patterns that only considered personal value. The group would be tempted to flip political allegiances whenever one party promises more benefits to the Asian American group. This is not conducive to party loyalty and it is clear that having a cultural emphasis on self servicing has an affect on Asian American partisan choice. This helps explain why the group does not heavily favor one political party over the other which differs from fellow minority groups.

6.6 Race and Ethnicity

To conclude this section on the interviews, I will discuss the interesting relationship that all fifteen respondents have with their racial and ethnic identities. Despite having a sample that represents four Asian ethnicities, the responses each subject provided was largely the

same. In all fifteen cases, the respondents initially reported that they more closely identified and valued their ethnic identities. However, all fifteen respondents also stated that, from a political perspective, they are more influenced by their race at the conclusion of the interview.

In each interview, the respondent describe being closer to their ethnicity due to shared cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Members of the same ethnic group celebrate the same cultural heritages which brings the community closer together. Sharing a common language as well helps individuals communicate with one another better than those outside the community. The shared experiences individuals have with one another brings them closer together. As one subject put it, those from the same ethnic group "just gets it better" than those outside of their group. When asked which identity is more important to them personally, each respondent answered that their ethnic identity is more valuable. While every respondent acknowledged their Asian identity and even expressed membership, it is significantly weaker. While cultural similarities and linguistic parallels do exist, they vary from ethnicity to ethnicity. This makes it harder for individuals to relate with a group as diverse as Asian Americans. There are simply too many differences within the group to tie individuals together. This also explains why average ethnic score is higher than average racial score across the panethnic Asian American group.

Over the course of the interview, however, it becomes clear that panethnicity is still strong among Asian Americans. Throughout each subjects' responses, they often refer back only to Asian Americans. Despite the questions being in the context of both their ethnic and racial group, respondents tend to answer as a using the term Asian American. This holds true across policy topics and ethnicity. Respondents would refer to themselves and their communities solely as Asian American and only their ethnic backgrounds if prompted to do so. This strongly suggests that the respondents are thinking of political behavior in terms of their racial identity even though most stated that their ethnic identity is more important. In fact, even cultural mechanisms impacting political preferences and behaviors are put into the context of the Asian American group. At the end of the interviews, respondents are

asked whether they believe their racial or ethnic identities are more important to them in a political context. Unlike the previous question, respondents now switched over to their racial identities, indicating that race is a major political influence on Asian Americans. This contrasts drastically from the respondents unanimously indicating that their ethnic identities are more personally important.

To justify their answer changes, respondents focused on the political nature of the term "Asian American" and also the value of being a part of a larger group. Many respondents recall that the term Asian American was created in a political context. While their ethnic identity is rooted in shared cultural experiences and natural ties to their national origins, being Asian American is an artificial connection. Asian Americans, they mention, are tied together through a shared political agenda and identity across ethnic groups. This inherently predisposes individuals to view their Asian American identity through a political perspective. The other justification focuses more on the tangible, political benefits of being a part of a larger group. By having more voting power as a bloc, Asian Americans are better able to assert their political agenda on a national scale as opposed to each individual ethnic group. While they may disagree over certain policy preferences, there are enough shared values to effectively mobilize for certain causes. Identifying with and being influenced by the Asian American identity provides a greater political advantage which makes it a bigger influence on public opinion.

7 Discussion

7.1 Panethnic or Ethnic

Looking at the results from both the quantitative and qualitative data, we have a somewhat clear picture of the interaction between Asian Americans and their panethnic and ethnic identities. Broadly speaking, both the racial and ethnic identities of Asian Americans are important to the community. While both identities do influence group behavior, their weight on certain topics differ. Additionally, preference is inconsistent across Asian American ethnic groups. Comparing the estimates across models, the results most strongly suggests that racial and ethnic scores are fairly independent from outside social factors since direction, magnitude, and significance remain quite consistent. Certain policies that have weak relationships with race and ethnicity, however, do show that Asian American racial and ethnic scores are still influenced by outside factors.

Table 24: Summary of Stronger Significant Influence Between Racial and Ethnic Scores

Ethnicity	Immigration	Affirmative Action	LGBTQ	Abortion	Equity	Participation	Choice
Indian	Panethnic	Panethnic	Panethnic	Neither	Panethnic	Neither	Neither
Japanese	Panethnic	Panethnic	Panethnic	Panethnic	Neither	Neither	Ethnic
Asian American	Panethnic	Panethnic	Panethnic	Neither	Both	Neither	Ethnic
Chinese	Panethnic	Panethnic	Neither	Neither	Neither	Panethnic	Panethnic
Cambodian	Panethnic	Panethnic	Neither	Ethnic	Neither	Neither	Neither
Korean	Neither	Ethnic	Neither	Neither	Neither	Panethnic	Panethnic
Filipino	Neither	Both	Neither	Neither	N either	Neither	Both
Hmong	Neither	Ethnic	Neither	Neither	Ethnic	Neither	Panethnic
Vietnamese	Neither	Ethnic	Ethnic	Neither	Panethnic	Ethnic	Panethnic
Bangladeshi	Ethnic	Neither	Ethnic	Ethnic	Neither	Panethnic	Neither
Pakistani	Both	Ethnic	Neither	Neither	Ethnic	Ethnic	Both

Note: Arranged from most influenced by panethnicity to ethnicity
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Looking at table 24, we see the general trend of which identities are preferred across Asian ethnic groups and political policies. Across groups, more are more influenced by their racial identity. The Cambodian, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean ethnic groups all have more significant relationships with racial score for their political opinions. Among these groups, the Chinese and Indian groups strictly prefer their panethnic identity over ethnic identity, never having a more significant relationship with ethnic score for any policy

area. There are still a solid minority of ethnic groups who are more influenced by ethnic scores. The Bangladeshi, Hmong, Pakistani, and Vietnamese groups have stronger significant relationships with ethnic score over racial score. Among these, the Pakistani group is strictly influenced by their ethnicity more than race across the policy topics. The Filipino group is unique in that it is evenly split. They are equally significantly influenced by both ethnic and racial score across two policies and neither for the rest. This implies that they look to both identities for political influence. Aggregating the ethnic groups into the panethnic Asian American identity, however, reveals that there is a clearly stronger influence exerted by race. While the number of ethnic groups influenced by racial or ethnic score are quite evenly divided, the panethnic group has a much stronger significant relationship with race over ethnicity.

The results also generally support a division between race and ethnicity. Racial and ethnic scores appear to have distinct political influences from each other despite being highly correlated. Among most ethnic groups and policy topics, either racial score or ethnic score have dominating significant relationships over the other. In some instances racial and ethnic scores are also significant in opposite directions which strongly suggest these identities having distinct influences. There are undoubtable similarities in how racial and ethnic scores influence political opinions. In some situations, ethnic and racial score may split correlation and both have marginally significant relationships in the same direction or insignificant relationships. The commonalities, however, do not outweigh the differences in how these identities influence the Asian American group on both the panethnic and ethnic level since most situations clearly favor one over the other. These results highlight the importance of both racial and ethnic identities to Asian Americans in understanding their political preferences. It reinforces the heterogeneity of the Asian American group across ethnic identities.

An interesting pattern arises from the competition between racial and ethnic score for influence among ethnic groups. Observing which groups are influenced more by race versus ethnicity, we see a geographical and political division among the origins of these ethnic

groups. The ethnicities that look to their panethnic identity more often are the major three East Asian nationalities[30] along with the Indian and Cambodian groups which are both major South Asian nationalities[31]. These countries are at the financial, cultural, and political core of the Asian continent. While Cambodia is somewhat of an outlier, the other four nations are definite leaders economically and politically in the Asian world. Also, though Cambodia does not necessarily have the same level of power as the other four countries, they are still a large, populous country. This would suggest that when people conceptualize the Asian American group, individuals of Cambodian, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Korean origin are likely the first ethnicities to be brought up.

Looking at the Filipino ethnic group, which is equally influenced by both identities, the Philippines is still a major Asian nation but lies further from the core of the Asian continent. This means that while Filipinos are still associated with other Asian ethnicities, they are more distant than those at the core of Asia geographically and politically. Looking at the Bangladeshi, Hmong, Pakistani, and Vietnamese ethnic groups, their national origins lie even further on periphery geographically. These ethnicities all originate from South Asia which are often conceived of differently from East Asian and India. Especially among the popular conception of Asian Americans, members of these ethnic groups are often discounted or incorrectly lumped with a larger, neighboring group which explains why they are all more invested in their ethnic identity. They do not truly feel a part of the panethnic group and would be more influenced by their ethnic groups.

Looking at this relationship, we can see a clear trend where panethnicity is strongest among ethnicities originating from the heart of East Asia or India and weakens moving away from the center. This is likely a consequence of how people view the Asian continent. East Asia is the most prominent region of the whole continent due to a slew of cultural, economic, and political reasons (Espiritu 2011). India as well is a major, rising Asian power. When individuals within these ethnic groups and also members of out-groups attempt to define an

30. China, Japan, and Korea

31. India is the largest country in the Indian subcontinent and Cambodia is a major South Asian nation

overarching identity that covers all of Asia, it is inevitable that the panethnic identity focuses on more prominent ethnic groups. The remaining Asian ethnic origins do not fit as well. They are geographically distant from the politically and economically conceptualized center of Asia. While still well within the boundaries of the continent itself, the social perceptions of individuals with these ethnic identities are less strongly associated with Asia itself. This would obviously lead to weaker links to the Asian American identity due to the fact that the definition of Asian Americans is less inclusive of these ethnicities.

Cutting across policy topics, we also see that certain topics elicit more response from specific identities. These is an even greater preference for racial score across policy topics. Of the seven areas I analyze, policies regarding Immigration, Affirmative Action, and the LGBTQ community are all more strongly influenced by racial score. Only abortion is more influenced by ethnic score and policies regarding both social and economic equity are equally influenced by the two scores. Additionally, both political participation and vote choice/partisanship is more closely correlated with the panethnic identity. Similar to divisions across ethnic groups, policy topics also lean towards one identity or the other. While both ethnic and panethnic scores are significant, panethnicity again exerts more influence across Asian American political behaviors.

Looking at how racial and ethnic influences are activated among Asian Americans, the interviews suggest that mobilization solely initiated by party elites. Asian American public opinion appears to be activated by cultural and familial sources within in-group communities. Personal experiences drive how these communities of view certain policies and political parties because of how important communal and familial values are to Asian Americans. If political elites did activate Asian American political behavior, respondents would have been more salient of political sources of information. Instead of family or community values driving public opinion, more mention of political parties and figures would have been made. However, since nearly none of the respondents cited any political sources of their values, community and family values are likely driving activation instead of elites. This causes cultural

norms to be at the center of how racial and ethnic identities influence Asian Americans since groups mobilize around cultural resources. While the results seem to suggest that political elites are not major motivators of Asian American political preferences, more research needs to be done to identify the exact source of political activation.

The results above yield an interesting conclusion. In terms of political influence, Asian American political opinion and behavior are more associated with their racial identity over their ethnicity. This is not consistent across all individual Asian ethnic groups since some are more influenced by ethnic score. Ethnic score still plays a vital role in the formation of Asian American political preferences However, the general trend of political influence is clear. Emphasized by the behavior of the panethnic Asian American identity, it is obvious that racial score is an overall stronger influence on political behavior. This means that on a political level, panethnicity does apply to the Asian American group.

This conclusion, however, seemingly contradicts the fact that Asian Americans self report having higher ethnic scores than racial score. Why would Asian Americans, who seemingly place more importance on their ethnic backgrounds, look to their race for political opinion more than their ethnicity? While this result is initially shocking, it does corroborate with the results from the quantitative analysis. Ethnic identification is high but racial influence on political behavior is stronger. While seemingly contradictory, it is perfectly plausible for both statements to be true. This is likely due to the fact that Asian American-ness is inherently a political concept while ethnic identity is naturally formed from an individual's cultural upbringing and social experiences. While individuals would value their ethnicity more in terms of their personal identity, being Asian American is inherently more political. This means common political agendas would be more salient along panethnic lines.

These results generally suggest that panethnicity does hold across the Asian American group. Though some ethnic groups look to their own ethnicity more than their race for political preferences, Asian Americans are more influenced overall by racial score for their behavior. Even considering that individuals may identify more with their individual ethnic

groups, they do not necessarily reject their Asian identity as a result. The Asian American trend towards a panethnic identity is similar to the Latino racial group. Both racial groups approach public opinion from a more panethnic perspective than on an individual ethnic basis (Barreto 2010; Min 2014; Stokes 2003). Both groups are composed of many distinct ethnicities that come together to form their racial identity. At the same time, the results suggest that ethnic influences should be considered when describing how Asian Americans form political opinions. While primarily panethnic, there are definite situations where ethnicity play a major role. Ignoring ethnic influences would disregard a lot of the social and cultural factors that play towards Asian American political opinion. Additionally, how each ethnic group fits into the overall panethnic group has a significant impact on the magnitude and direction of the relationship race has with political behavior.

7.2 Outside Forces

An important consideration from my results is that racial and ethnic score are often not the most significant nor strongest influence on Asian American political behavior. In fact, more often than not, Asian Americans are more influenced by outside social variables separate from the racial and ethnic identities. This does not mean that race and ethnicity do not matter, rather that the Asian American group is heavily influenced by other identity groups and by factors not entirely captured by social identities. Additionally, comparing estimates between models show that racial and ethnic scores are not completely independent from outside social variables. These correlations suggest that outside social influences are not only moderating the relationship race and ethnicity have with political behavior, but also an aspect of the Asian American and Asian ethnic identities themselves. From the results of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis, there is strong evidence supporting that the panethnic Asian American identity is significantly influenced by factors outside of race and ethnicity.

Social cleavages across age, sex, education, income, and religiosity often have estimates of

greater magnitude than both racial and ethnic score. This implies two separate conclusions for this study. The first is simpler, that Asian American political behavior is not solely dictated by race or ethnicity and is also not internally homogeneous. The fact that race and ethnicity are not the only factors influencing political opinion among Asian Americans is quite obvious. While being Asian American is a major component of people's identity, they still have social identities that are separate and still influential. The other finding is more textured. While it is unreasonable to think that a racial group as large and heterogeneous as Asian Americans would have extremely homogeneous political opinion and behavior, the extent of the variation is quite remarkable. Unlike the Black political opinion for example which heavily favor Democratic party policy, Asian American behavior is much more inconsistent (Miller et al. 1981). Many social factors have very large influences on political opinion which causes strong variability in behavior. This implies that the Asian American group is not particularly loyal to a single ideology or political party. Additionally, it reinforces the fact that Asian Americans exist between the majority and minority groups. They are not as conservative as Whites while also not as liberal as other minorities, especially Blacks or Latinos.

The second major conclusion is that perceptions of panethnic political influences across Asian ethnic groups vary dramatically. Comparing the magnitude of the estimates for racial and ethnic score with other social variables show that the panethnic identity is influenced much less by race and ethnicity than other social factors. While this could simply indicate that Asian Americans are not particularly influenced by race and ethnicity, this goes against the interview responses. Among subjects, race and ethnicity are extremely salient topics. This means that the low estimate value among the panethnic identity must be a result of something else. What is possible and supported by the qualitative evidence is that the perception of race is different across ethncities. How the members of each ethnic group value and are influenced by being Asian American can differ. This means that the direction and magnitude of the estimates across ethnic groups can vary quite dramatically. This means

that when the estimates are aggregated for the panethnic identity, the overall correlation will be low and inconsistent. Other social factors such as age apply consistently across ethnic groups. Being young will have the same liberalizing impact across all Asian Americans because the concept of being young does not change with ethnicity. What being Asian American mean does change and so the overall impact of panethnicity is weaker.

Ethnic score functions largely in the same manner. Ethnicity changes across ethnic groups and so the political influences can differ as well. Certain ethnicities may value certain policies differently or have conflicting political opinions. When aggregating the effect of ethnic score across all ethnicities, the overall impact could be much weaker and inconsistent. This could be even more impactful for ethnic score than racial score. While race is shared, ethnicity is completely different across groups. Even though perceptions of panethnicity can vary, there are still certain ties that bring together Asian Americans. Certain ethnicities may have almost nothing in common and the estimates may be even less similar.

Besides quantifiable social variables, Asian Americans are also greatly influenced by personal experiences and their communities. While difficult to measure, how these interact with political preferences could be key in describing the behavior of the Asian American group. From the interviews, it is clear that a significant amount of political influence can be derived from the personal experiences that Asian American encounter. This is especially salient among respondents regarding familial or personal connection with the policy in question. This shows that regarding the Asian American group, more emphasis should be put into the personal experiences of Asian Americans. This is compounded with the fact that Asian Americans seemingly do somewhat vote with their wallet. This focus on personal gain in political choice and behavior shows that more emphasis on the individual would better predict Asian American political behavior.

Why the group behaves so differently could stem from the fact that the relationship within the Asian group is so different. Since the structure of the Asian American group hierarchy focuses inward rather than out, it makes sense for Asian Americans to value intra-

group factors more than other races (Yuki 2003). As mentioned previously, the community and family are at the core of Asian American personal, cultural, and political values. Consequently, the Asian American group tends to look inward for political influence. This suggests that personal and community experiences should be more important since Asian Americans focus more on issues facing their own group.

How Asian Americans view their out-group relationships and interactions is quite significant and interesting. During the long-form interviews, respondents rarely discuss intergroup competition for resources or racial tension as political motivation. Any mention of racial out-groups typically focus on out-group sentiments or internalized stereotypes of other races. This emphasizes the inward looking nature of the Asian American group. As previously stated in the hypothesis section, I conducted a brief analysis of Asian American out-group sentiments using the NAAS data after the main quantitative and qualitative analysis. As stated before, out-groups have a smaller role in my study due to the sample size of the measures being too small to analyze across ethnic groups and out-groups not being the focus of the study. To measure out-group sentiments, I average responses to how intelligent are Blacks and how easy it is to get along with Blacks. This measure of out-group sentiment is then added to the second model for analysis. This provides a shallow, but highly informative view into how out-groups in the form of racial stereotypes play into Asian American political opinion.

Table 25: Summary of Out Group Significance for Asian Americans

Immigration	Affirmative Action	LGBTQ	Abortion	Equity	Participation	Choice
Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant[1]	Insignificant	Significant

Note: Regressed for panethnic identity.
1) Social equity is insignificant and economic equity is significant.
From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

The results of the brief analysis suggest high levels of correlation. The measure for out-group sentiment is highly correlated with Asian American political behavior. Nearly every policy position has significant estimates with out-group sentiments for the panethnic iden-

tity. Individual ethnic groups are not analyzed since the sample size is far too small. The relationship of racial and ethnic scores with policy position maintain similar direction and magnitude which indicates consistency between model two and this new model. Comparing the out-group and in-group measures, the three estimates had similar magnitudes when significant. Interestingly, there are instances where out-groups have greater correlation than in-groups such as abortion policy where both racial and ethnic scores are insignificant. Generally, however, in-group and out-group estimates do appear to be quite similar. What the results indicate is that out-group sentiments play a significant role in the formation of Asian American political opinion. This out-group relationship appears to be unique to Blacks since a similar measure of White stereotype yields insignificant results[32] and the Latino group was not analyzed[33]. Though important to note that this measure of out-group sentiment may be unique to Blacks, it is still indicative of out-groups influencing Asian American political behavior.

This raises two interesting possibilities for the Asian American group. Out-groups may be the dominating factor in the formation of political opinion over in-group structure, or out-group sentiments complement in-group relationships. While the relationships between out-group sentiments and Asian American political behavior is strong, it does not capture the full picture. If out-group relationships dominate in-group structures, then racial and ethnic scores would likely be insignificant after including the measure of stereotype. Interview responses should also emphasize out-group influences on personal values and politics. Instead of personal experiences, family and community influences, as well as cultural backgrounds, the formation of political opinions should focus on the relationships and dynamics that Asian Americans share with certain out-groups. As our previous results indicate, this does not occur since in-group estimates are still significant. Asian Americans are still strongly tied to their in-group relationships and influenced by their own racial and ethnic identities.

This implies that out-group sentiments complement Asian in-group structures. This is

32. Not presented in this paper but a similar model to Black sentiments was used
33. Latino responses were split in half which was not large enough to analyze

supported by both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Quantitatively, the regressions I perform to determine the significance of out-group sentiments include the independent variables from model two. These variables, including racial and ethnic scores, have similar estimates in terms of magnitude and direction. This shows that in-group identities still have significant relationships with Asian American political opinions and behaviors. Both out-group and in-group factors play a significant role in forming Asian American political preferences and opinions statistically speaking.

The qualitative results add texture to these findings and offer potential mechanisms. One possible explanation uniting Asian American in-group and out-group relationships is that out-group influence stems from internalized racial sentiments and stereotypes. Throughout the interviews, respondents discuss out-groups almost exclusively from the perspective of internalized stereotypes. Though not often brought up, responses include sporadic mention of internalized racial sentiments and stereotypes of out-groups, particularly Blacks, that could influence political behavior. One particular respondent made the comparison that Asian American students are often more hard working than Black students which influences their stance on affirmative action policy. This specific example highlights how out-group sentiments could influence in-group experiences. Certain sentiments or stereotypes of out-groups entrenched within the Asian American community and cultural identity would strongly play into the in-group dynamics of the Asian American group since community and family experiences are such strong influences on political opinion. This further supports out-group sentiments being an internalized complement of in-group structure since the Asian American group is not directly interacting with their out-groups.

Another possibility is that Asian American out-group sentiment is tied to preservation of the status of the in-group. As evidenced by the interviews, the Asian American group may emphasize personal pocketbook politics more than other groups. This implies that the Asian American group would focus on maintaining their personal standards of social and economic powers. This would mean that out-group sentiments would be tied to in-group favoritism.

The direction of this relationship is unknown and it may even be true that the in-group and out-group relationship is cyclical. Generally speaking, favoring the Asian American group is inherently associated with the plight of out-groups such as Blacks. At the same time, opinion of out-groups could influence how the in-group carries out personally interested politics. These relationships between in-group structure and out-group sentiments would function in parallel which again reinforces how both factors could influence Asian American political opinion significantly. Compared to internalized racial sentiments, however, self-interested preservation has more explicit out-group interactions.

A third explanation stems from the model minority myth, particularly the conceptualization that pits Asian Americans in conflict with other groups for resources. In this situation, the out-group directly interacting with the in-group identities. Unlike the previous possibility, the focus is on the out-group claiming resources from the in-group rather than the in-group acting in self interest. The relationship between the in-group and out-group fuels or mitigates political competition. Out-group sentiments and competition would pull political opinion in one direction while in-group structure would have its own political influence. These influences could agree or disagree depending on the policy in question and the circumstances surrounding the individual. Again, neither in-group nor out-group is able to dominate each other since both are integral to the Asian American identity and experience.

Regardless of the exact mechanism at play that makes out-group sentiments influential on political preferences, it is an important variable to consider with in-group factors. Though the Asian American group tends to look inwards due to an emphasis on intragroup hierarchies, out-group relationships still permeate into political preferences. They function in conjunction with one another in influencing Asian American political behavior and opinion. Though both quantitative and qualitative evidence on out-group variables are limited, there is a clear connection between out-groups and the in-group.

The uniqueness of how Asian Americans form their political implies that traditional measures of racial identity and consciousness cannot fully capture the Asian American group.

Instead, measures of race and ethnicity should focus on the multidimensional cultural aspects of the Asian American identity. Looking more at cultural backgrounds and the experiences of members on an individual and community level would provide more accurate and insightful information on how race and ethnicity influence political opinions. Asian cultural norms such as hard work, independence, commitment to community, and social taboos are all closely linked to political preferences and opinions. Constructing a new measure based on these dimensions of Asian American identity could better predict how the group is influenced politically since Asian Americans seem to be highly salient of cultural issues. A multidimentional measure would include traditional political measures of identity as well as measures of cultural norms and personal experiences. Out-group sentiments should also be considered in a multidimensional measure of Asian American political identity. The interaction between in-groups and out-groups better captures the picture of Asian American political preferences and behavior. While the specific weights and measures for a multidimensional perspective on Asian American identity requires further research, it would provide valuable insight into what dictates Asian American political tendencies.

7.3 Limitations and Further Research

A critical limitation of the project is the scale and sample size of the data set. While the NAAS is one of the most comprehensive and nationally representative Asian American political survey, the number of Asian American respondents is still quite low. This is particularly true for ethnic groups with smaller populations with only a couple hundred observations. Even the biggest Asian ethnic group only had a few hundred valid responses. For the project to be more accurate, there would need to be a larger sample size which would mean having a new survey with a larger reach than the NAAS which is not feasible with the given time and resources. Another limitation of the NAAS for this project specifically lie with the survey questions themselves. While the survey covers a broad scope of policy topics, the depth of coverage is not optimal. There could be more questions on policy topics including affirmative

action, the LGBTQ community, and immigration. Measures of independent variables such as Asian American political identity and out-group sentiments or resentment are also lacking. Having a racial resentment battery would provide a much better view into how out-groups influence Asian American political opinion. Additionally, the principle researchers included several survey experiments that split the sample size. This further reduces the number of policy questions that provide results I can use in this study. Any future studies could greatly benefit from an independent survey that has questions tailored to the purposes of the study.

Another key limitation is the limited number and quality of the long-form interviews. While the interviews still provide significant information and insight into how Asian Americans form cultural and personal connections with their racial and ethnic identities, the sample is not representative of the Asian American population. While drawing from the University of Michigan student body made the process significantly easier and cheaper, the composition of the sample is extremely skewed. There is very little variation in terms of outside demographic factors. Another problem arises from the Asian American organizations that the volunteers are members of. Membership within these organizations inherently indicates stronger awareness of their Asian American identity. This is compounded by the political nature of two Asian American organizations that I drew volunteers from. While the results can still suggest possible mechanisms and connections, there are many likely factors and information that are heavily salient among the Asian American group that are not being expressed. Future interviews would attempt to include a more representative Asian American sample from a larger geographic region. Having a greater variety of Asian American experiences and backgrounds would add more weight to the interview responses since I could see whether the responses are more widespread.

For future study, my project can be expanded to analyze political differences among individuals from different regions within Asian nations. This is especially relevant for individuals from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other semi-autonomous regions in China. Immigrants from these regions have a distinct cultural and political background that could set them apart

from other Chinese Americans originating from the mainland. This especially relevant with personal experiences and the importance of communities that the results of this study point to as a critical source of political preference. These distinctions may be especially relevant today given the increasingly contentious political situation in the region. It is possible that these factors are so different within certain Asian ethnicities that both racial and ethnic influence on political opinions could differ since cultural and personal factors are extremely salient. This may also touch on why race and ethnicity have such different influences on Asian Americans compared to other races and prompt further social divisions to achieve similar results.

Another interesting consideration for future research would be to analyze how political preferences change over time for Asian Americans. Especially with the recent rise in anti-Asian hate crimes and the Covid-19 pandemic, Asian American political behavior is likely evolving. Evidenced by a new wave of Asian movements led mostly by young Asian Americans, the evolution of the Asian American group could lead research in multiple directions. One possibility is that the Asian American group slowly adjusts itself to follow more contemporary models of political influence. As the group assimilates both culturally and politically, members could have more consistent racial and ethnic influence ideologically on political preferences or draw opinion less from cultural sources. Analyzing how Asian American political participation changes across time, especially in elections prior to 2020 and after, could be insightful.

Looking at the NAAS, the survey was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 presidential election. This was a monumental moment in the political history of the United States that especially affected Asian Americans given the strong Anti-China platform that Donald Trump espoused. Seeing the immediate and long term impact of the 2016 presidential election on Asian American public opinion and political behavior would provide more context into how the Asian American group reacts to the political environment around them. Though I do not have a reference point to compare how political behavior changes in this

study, it is reasonable to assert that the 2016 presidential election was a major turning point for Asian Americans. An implication of this is that racial and ethnic identity would have been especially salient among Asian Americans during this time because their racial group was being targeted. This is an especially relevant point since Asian American political movements and advocacy have become more prevalent recently. If this survey was fielded during previous elections, Asian American political behaviors and opinion would likely be much less significantly correlated with racial and ethnic score. There would be less Asian political mobilization since the direct threat against Asian communities would not be as prevalent. Racial and ethnic group influences are also more liberal leaning during the 2016 presidential election due to Donald Trump being the Republican candidate. Comparing Asian American political preferences across time periods would provide context into environmental factors that influence Asian American politics. Especially with the unique circumstances of the 2016 election, further studies comparing different election cycles would be insightful.

Another interesting direction that any future research can take would be taking a deeper look into the cultural aspect of Asian American political influence. The cultural significance of hard work and community is incredibly salient across several policy topics among all fifteen interview participants. An interesting idea is whether this emphasis on personal hard work has any influence on the levels of trust Asian Americans have in the government and other political institutions. Since these cultural responses are seemingly so influential on Asian American political behavior, I want to see whether this is a potential mechanism for Asian hesitancy in voting. Other cultural norms that play into the perception of the model minority myth and pocketbook voting could also shed light into how Asian Americans form their political opinions. Building on this, out-group sentiment and racial resentment should also be looked at again. With more measures of sentiments, resentments, and stereotypes in addition to long-form questions that target out-groups, I could gain more insight into how the Asian American group perceives out-groups and interacts with these relationships. Doing so could also see whether in-group or out-group factors are more influential. It would

also help distinguish whether the Asian American group is genuinely different from other social groups or have different manifestations.

Continuing on out-group analysis, an interesting question would be whether being interviewed by members of your in-group or members of out-groups impact interview responses. Since out-groups have such a strong influence on the public opinion and political behaviors of Asian Americans, it would be interesting to see how interviewers could influence responses. It is possible that the respondent's internalized out-group sentiments and racial stereotypes could influence how they perceive the interviewer and interview itself. Those with negative sentiments regarding the out-group the interviewer belongs to may push respondents to answer more negatively towards questions that may benefit out-groups. The opposite could also be true if the respondent has particularly favorable sentiments. Also analyzing how in-group interviewers influence respondents would provide important information on how Asian intragroup structures work. Certain cultural norms could drive how the respondent answers especially if the interviewer belonged to the same ethnic group as well. Comparing how answers change between in-groups and out-groups would also hint at how in-group and out-group dynamics interact with each other. Certain factors, like cultural norms or identity, could be more activated depending on the interviewer.

This plays into the dimensionality of Asian American influence on political preferences. Specifically, how culture, personal experiences, and other social factors play into the Asian American political identity. As mentioned above and evidenced by the results of this study, several social factors besides politicized racial identity plays into the Asian American political behavior. In addition, respondents report that these social factors and cultural norms are actually critical measures of racial and ethnic identity themselves. These are integral to being Asian American and can dictate political opinion or apply political cross pressure. A new multidimensional measure of racial and ethnic identity would incorporate both political consciousness and shared cultural traditions. Identity and consciousness would still be measured in addition to acceptance of certain cultural norms and perspectives. Importance

of hard work, reliance on community and familial resources, and upbringing would factor into levels of Asian American identity. Additionally, it would incorporate both out-group relationships and in-group structures when considering Asian American political behavior. By looking at both factors together instead of each individually, there would be a more complete picture of political behaviors. Given the results from this study, especially the long interviews, it would be insightful to see whether this methodology could better measure racial influence on Asian American political behavior.

8 Conclusion

Panethnicity among the Asian American racial group appears to hold across political preferences. Across both all Asian Americans and a majority of Asian ethnic groups, racial score is a more significant estimate for political opinon and behavior. Additionally, respondents in the interview portion of the study all reported stronger political affiliation with their race. While evidence does suggest that Asian Americans do adopt a panethnic identity, this does not mean that individual ethnic identities are irrelevant. Across certain policies and ethnic groups, ethnic score has greater significance than racial score. This combines with the fact that respondents in the quantitative NAAS survey and my long-form interviews all reported higher personal affiliation with their ethnic heritages. This means that while panethnicity may dominate political influence, future studies should pay closer attention to the influence of ethnic identity.

It also strongly suggests that the Asian American group is not homogeneous and should not be treated as a monolith. Asian Americans have diverse political beliefs and are influenced by different social factors. When aggregating these ethnicities into a single group, the statistical significance of a single variable is dramatically weakened. When regressions are done on each group separately, we see significantly stronger significance among certain ethnic groups[34]. Policy positions are more heavily skewed towards the panethnic identity. Policies on immigration, affirmative action, the LGBTQ community, and political participation are all more influenced by racial score. Policies regarding economic and social equality are more evenly influenced. Vote choice and partisanship on the ethnic level is dominated by panethnicity but the Asian American identity favors ethnic score. Support for abortion is generally more correlated with ethnic score.

As I hypothesized before, racial and ethnic influence on Asian Americans are not strictly consistent across ethnic groups and policy topics. While both racial and ethnic score gen-

34. As stated in the Discussion section: Bangladeshi, Hmong, Pakistani, and Vietnamese are more influenced by ethnic score. Cambodian, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Korean, and panethnic Asian Americans are more influenced by racial score. Filipino is equally influenced

erally pushed the Asian American group left on the political spectrum, there are certain instances where Asian Americans are actually more conservative or conflicted. This is especially true on certain topics like affirmative action and economic equality where the Asian American group has more skin in the game. Looking from the perspective of other racial groups, this reinforces the fact that Asian American political tendencies lie somewhere between Whites and minorities: too liberal for Whites and too conservative for minorities (Barreto 2010; Jardina 2019; Miller et al. 1981). This is reinforced by the long-form interviews where respondents who did vote and have opinions parallel with the liberal ideology still expressed doubt and conflict regarding their personal politics.

Outside social factors also proved to be vital. Age, levels of education, income, and partisanship are consistently significant with opinion on certain policies and often at magnitudes far greater than race and ethnicity. Sex and religion as well found significance among salient topics such as preferential hiring and promotion of women and abortion respectively. In addition to the quantifiable, personal experiences and culture provide vital context for predicting Asian American political behavior and preferences. There is evidence to suggest that Asian American political behavior is highly personalized by the encounters and experiences of their communities. This runs parallel with the fact that Asian Americans express greater tendencies to vote with their wallet. These all suggest that the Asian American group focuses more on their personal groups as opposed to society as a whole.

Cultural backgrounds from both Asian and ethnic identities also play a large role in building Asian American political tendencies. Several personal values and beliefs are strongly ingrained in the Asian American psyche which manifests itself in political opinion. Particularly the emphasis on hard work, family, and the model minority myth are all cultural aspects critical to being Asian American that are not captured in traditional measure of political consciousness. In addition, out-groups also need to be considered when discussing Asian American political behaviors. From the results of this study, out-group sentiments appear to complement rather than dominate in-group relationships so constructing a measure that

incorporates both could help better explore Asian American political behavior. These results support the need for an expanded measure that captures the dimensionality of racial political influence. Especially for Asian Americans, personal experiences and cultural upbringing are major factors that capture how the group behaves and the conflicted opinions of Asian Americans. While the scope of this project does not extend that far, it is possible that the Asian American political participation gap could be a product of cultural heritage.

There are many directions that the Asian American group can take. Many are pushing for a new definition for the Asian American group, one that captures the diversity of its members. While the political consequences of the term is still uncertain, it is blatantly obvious that Asian Americans need to become more politically active. In many political aspects, Asian Americans fall severely behind other racial groups despite having high levels of education and income. With rising anti-Asian sentiments especially in recent years with the Covid-19 pandemic, it is more crucial than ever for the group to mobilize. My biggest hope for the small contribution I have made into the field of Asian American group politics is that Asian Americans will one day achieve better understanding and representation. While Asians in the United States have come a great distance since the very first migrants in the 1800s, there is still a ways to go for the whole group.

9 Appendix

Interview Questions:

Of the following ten ethnic groups, which best describes your ethnic identity: Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Hmong, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Pakistani, or Vietnamese.

How important is your ethnic identity to you?

Do you think that policies that affect other [ETHNIC IDENTITY] will also directly affect you?

Having selected one of the above ten ethnic identities, your racial group is the Asian American identity. How important is being Asian American to you?

If some policy greatly affects other Asian Americans, do you think that you will also be impacted?

Do you think being [ETHNIC IDENTITY] and being Asian American are similar? What makes them similar or different to you?

In your opinion, do you consider yourself more as one over the other?
Do you think that illegal immigrants should have a way to become a legal citizen and why do you think that way?

Do you think that this issue is particularly important for Asian Americans and [ETHNIC IDENTITY]?

On a similar vein, there is also great debate over whether the United States should offer more visas to potential migrants. What do you think about this policy and why do you have this opinion?

Do you think that this policy has the potential to especially impact any of the communities that you belong to?

What are your opinions on affirmative action both in academia and the professional world and what influenced your beliefs the most?

Have you heard of or been a part of the debate within the community? What are you experiences?

Do you think other Asian Americans and ETHNICs would agree with your viewpoint?

Is there any way that you think Affirmative Action could be made more fair?

What are your opinions on combatting discrimination against the LGBTQ community and why is that?

Do you think that the fight for equality among the LGBTQ community has any direct impacts on you or your communities?

Where do you stand on the abortion debate and why?

What influenced you the most in terms of your beliefs on abortion?

Is providing equal economic opportunities to everyone something that we as a society should be concerned about?

Do you think that people like you would benefit from these policies?

What do you think would happen to the US if it focused more on providing economic equality?

Do you think that we should fight for more equal social rights and privileges or are we overreaching?

Do you think that you or those around you would be personally affected by policies like these?

Has anyone from your communities (racial, gender, socioeconomic, etc. . .) influenced your opinion on this topic?

Should the government intervene in social and economic issues like the two questions above?

Do you think that the government would act in the interests of your communities?

Do you think that the government are aware of what your communities want from them in terms of policies?

Are you registered to vote if you are eligible?

Do you think it is important to vote?

Do you think that your vote will be able to make things better for those in similar situations as yourself?

Do you lean more towards the Democratic Party or the Republican Party politically?

Why do you think you lean towards this party?

Do you think that there is a party that genuinely has the interests of your communities at heart?

Does your identity as an Asian American have an impact on your political values?

Does your identity as an [ETHNIC IDENTITY] have an impact on your political values?

Which identity has a greater influence on your political values?

Table 26: Support for Increased Work Visas by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Increased Work Visas										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.097***	−0.025	0.167*	0.104	0.128*	0.036	0.222***	0.192***	0.009	0.117	0.042
	(0.025)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.096)	(0.088)
Ethnic Score	0.089***	0.264***	0.016	0.105	0.093	0.058	0.064	0.024	0.135*	−0.046	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.093)	(0.086)
Constant	0.501***	0.522***	0.619***	0.459***	0.531***	0.620***	0.442***	0.498***	0.372***	0.660***	0.494***
	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Observations	3,485	255	271	352	411	252	429	431	423	261	400
R^2	0.022	0.047	0.027	0.034	0.044	0.005	0.054	0.046	0.012	0.006	0.002
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.039	0.020	0.028	0.039	-0.003	0.049	0.041	0.007	-0.002	-0.003
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 27: Support for Increased Family Visas by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Increased Family Visas										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.079^{***}	-0.033	0.150	0.070	0.107	-0.009	0.207^{***}	0.174^{**}	-0.009	0.298^{***}	0.043
	(0.026)	(0.080)	(0.091)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.078)
Ethnic Score	0.084^{***}	0.200^{**}	0.020	0.062	0.093	0.156^{*}	-0.007	0.065	0.127^{*}	-0.147^{*}	0.112
	(0.026)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.092)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.085)	(0.076)
Constant	0.515^{***}	0.659^{***}	0.621^{***}	0.577^{***}	0.558^{***}	0.571^{***}	0.573^{***}	0.461^{***}	0.381^{***}	0.684^{***}	0.222^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Observations	3,480	256	272	347	410	253	429	429	420	257	407
R^2	0.017	0.032	0.022	0.015	0.038	0.016	0.036	0.050	0.009	0.045	0.014
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.024	0.014	0.009	0.033	0.008	0.032	0.046	0.005	0.038	0.009
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 28: Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Women by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Women										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.085**	0.115	−0.131	0.125	0.196*	−0.225*	0.262***	0.122	−0.076	0.027	−0.075
	(0.034)	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.096)	(0.100)	(0.115)	(0.095)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.127)	(0.103)
Ethnic Score	0.133***	0.235*	−0.093	−0.048	0.186*	0.417***	0.035	0.218**	0.064	0.226*	0.146
	(0.034)	(0.132)	(0.126)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.131)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.123)	(0.101)
Constant	0.399***	0.359***	0.852***	0.359***	0.314***	0.447***	0.321***	0.229***	0.515***	0.427***	0.537***
	(0.018)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.096)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Observations	3,670	264	277	371	427	263	442	459	467	268	432
R^2	0.016	0.040	0.017	0.005	0.061	0.038	0.036	0.043	0.001	0.023	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.033	0.010	-0.0003	0.057	0.030	0.031	0.038	-0.003	0.015	0.0004
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 29: Support for Increasing the Black and Asian Student Numbers by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Increasing the Black and Asian Student Numbers										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.120***	0.220**	−0.053	0.161**	0.166**	−0.068	0.175**	0.168**	0.012	0.072	−0.029
	(0.026)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.101)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.083)
Ethnic Score	0.027	−0.018	0.110	−0.042	0.121	0.120	0.016	0.130*	0.091	0.074	−0.018
	(0.026)	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.113)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.081)
Constant	0.379***	0.397***	0.578***	0.286***	0.284***	0.346***	0.336***	0.310***	0.484***	0.443***	0.418***
	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.083)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.043)
Observations	3,701	267	277	377	430	264	447	465	469	270	435
R^2	0.014	0.026	0.004	0.018	0.060	0.004	0.026	0.061	0.006	0.013	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.019	-0.003	0.013	0.056	-0.003	0.022	0.057	0.002	0.005	-0.004
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 30: Support for Transgender Bathroom Choice by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Transgender Bathroom Choice										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.062**	0.069	−0.069	0.103	0.090	0.116	0.071	0.211***	0.161**	0.00005	0.151*
	(0.027)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Ethnic Score	0.044	0.236**	0.195**	0.005	0.061	−0.250**	0.128*	0.025	0.084	0.077	−0.163*
	(0.028)	(0.101)	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.109)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Constant	0.440***	0.444***	0.340***	0.281***	0.442***	0.497***	0.482***	0.527***	0.234***	0.571***	0.504***
	(0.014)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.078)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Observations	3,398	237	252	359	400	254	397	430	446	248	375
R^2	0.006	0.058	0.021	0.009	0.017	0.021	0.027	0.048	0.026	0.005	0.011
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.050	0.013	0.003	0.012	0.013	0.022	0.043	0.022	-0.003	0.005
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 31: Support for Economic Equality and Financial Regulation by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Economic Equality and Financial Regulation										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.059^{***}	0.044	0.100^{*}	0.064	0.099^{**}	0.078^{*}	0.125^{***}	0.070	0.010	-0.071	0.090^{**}
	(0.015)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Ethnic Score	0.037^{**}	0.027	-0.025	0.013	0.010	0.046	-0.029	0.136^{***}	0.056	0.091^{**}	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)
Constant	0.703^{***}	0.788^{***}	0.704^{***}	0.680^{***}	0.684^{***}	0.679^{***}	0.706^{***}	0.561^{***}	0.671^{***}	0.826^{***}	0.805^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Observations	3,227	238	249	321	385	228	403	423	374	248	358
R^2	0.019	0.016	0.015	0.014	0.031	0.037	0.031	0.070	0.008	0.018	0.022
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.026	0.028	0.027	0.065	0.003	0.010	0.017
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 32: Voted in 2016 by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Voted in 2016										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	−0.002	0.106	0.191	0.212**	0.039	0.084	−0.015	0.014	0.088	−0.049	−0.113
	(0.029)	(0.091)	(0.164)	(0.099)	(0.081)	(0.124)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.081)
Ethnic Score	0.024	−0.096	−0.101	−0.088	−0.057	0.020	0.066	0.015	−0.046	0.253***	0.156*
	(0.029)	(0.093)	(0.163)	(0.100)	(0.080)	(0.139)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.079)
Constant	0.808***	0.876***	0.486***	0.659***	0.876***	0.630***	0.885***	0.929***	0.760***	0.762***	0.815***
	(0.015)	(0.047)	(0.082)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.101)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Observations	3,397	260	235	347	398	253	412	402	431	251	408
R^2	0.0003	0.006	0.006	0.014	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.041	0.009
Adjusted R^2	-0.0003	-0.002	-0.002	0.009	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.004	-0.002	0.033	0.005
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 33: Vote Choice for Trump by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Voted for Trump										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	-0.146^{***}	-0.100	0.008	-0.307^{**}	-0.085	-0.398^{***}	-0.167^{*}	-0.051	-0.277^{***}	0.104	-0.212^{*}
	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.227)	(0.138)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.085)	(0.107)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.125)
Ethnic Score	-0.113^{***}	-0.065	-0.224	-0.032	-0.264^{**}	0.122	-0.047	-0.198^{*}	0.009	-0.237^{***}	-0.029
	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.204)	(0.140)	(0.111)	(0.133)	(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.124)
Constant	0.366^{***}	0.146^{***}	0.354^{***}	0.505^{***}	0.474^{***}	0.320^{***}	0.276^{***}	0.355^{***}	0.364^{***}	0.153^{***}	0.527^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.038)	(0.105)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.099)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.042)	(0.068)
Observations	2,447	186	112	216	310	152	319	338	317	192	305
R^2	0.032	0.039	0.022	0.051	0.064	0.085	0.029	0.032	0.038	0.050	0.018
Adjusted R^2	0.031	0.029	0.004	0.042	0.058	0.073	0.022	0.026	0.032	0.040	0.012
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 34: Idenfitication as Democrat by Racial and Ethnic Score Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Identifies as Democrat										
	Asian American	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.087**	0.108	0.250*	−0.007	−0.085	0.137	0.129	0.145	0.172*	0.100	0.144
	(0.036)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.099)	(0.107)	(0.132)	(0.098)	(0.105)	(0.098)	(0.131)	(0.103)
Ethnic Score	0.074**	0.094	0.089	−0.008	0.231**	−0.123	0.034	0.155	0.064	0.126	−0.024
	(0.036)	(0.137)	(0.132)	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.148)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.127)	(0.101)
Constant	0.398***	0.474***	0.077	0.316***	0.462***	0.455***	0.489***	0.431***	0.438***	0.419***	0.299***
	(0.018)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.108)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.054)
Observations	3,701	267	277	377	430	264	447	465	469	270	435
R^2	0.008	0.012	0.036	0.0001	0.015	0.004	0.010	0.031	0.016	0.015	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.005	0.029	-0.005	0.010	-0.003	0.005	0.026	0.011	0.007	0.002
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 35: Support for Increased Work Visas by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Increased Work Visas										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.089***	−0.163	0.195**	0.111	0.104	0.095	0.265***	0.194***	−0.012	0.110	0.033
	(0.028)	(0.106)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.110)	(0.090)
Ethnic Score	0.049*	0.261**	−0.011	0.043	0.067	−0.088	−0.018	−0.004	−0.015	−0.034	0.024
	(0.028)	(0.102)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.078)	(0.106)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.109)	(0.089)
Under Age 35	0.108***	0.069	0.035	0.048	0.070*	0.109**	0.060	0.070	0.357***	0.017	−0.034
	(0.015)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.062)
Female	−0.012	0.046	−0.047	−0.082**	−0.022	−0.045	−0.021	0.003	0.049	−0.005	0.027
	(0.013)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Education	−0.070***	−0.055	−0.166**	0.139	−0.146	−0.081	0.058	0.019	−0.011	0.065	0.236***
	(0.025)	(0.135)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.106)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.118)	(0.089)
Income	0.049**	0.154*	0.030	−0.011	−0.034	−0.091	0.010	0.069	0.094	−0.139*	0.141
	(0.023)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.085)	(0.062)	(0.108)	(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Religious	0.001	0.067	−0.021	−0.030	−0.032	0.143**	−0.029	−0.007	−0.068*	−0.062	−0.015
	(0.015)	(0.058)	(0.089)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.092)	(0.057)
Democrat	0.029**	0.022	0.030	0.064	0.056	0.020	0.159***	0.027	−0.046	0.041	−0.021
	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.043)
Constant	0.517***	0.460***	0.681***	0.440***	0.662***	0.597***	0.327***	0.448***	0.403***	0.709***	0.355***
	(0.025)	(0.136)	(0.107)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.145)	(0.084)
Observations	2,978	203	252	261	355	218	347	363	397	214	368
R^2	0.040	0.072	0.054	0.071	0.068	0.068	0.105	0.062	0.231	0.022	0.044
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.034	0.023	0.041	0.046	0.033	0.084	0.041	0.215	-0.016	0.023
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 36: Support for Increased Family Visas by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Increased Family Visas										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.087^{***}	-0.032	0.153	0.157^{*}	0.100	0.076	0.242^{***}	0.159^{**}	-0.036	0.294^{***}	0.071
	(0.028)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.102)	(0.076)
Ethnic Score	0.051^{*}	0.204^{**}	-0.011	-0.010	0.104	0.051	-0.020	0.035	-0.007	-0.165	0.105
	(0.028)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.075)
Under Age 35	0.127^{***}	-0.068	0.050	0.118^{**}	0.043	0.076	-0.011	0.139^{***}	0.356^{***}	0.001	0.107^{**}
	(0.015)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.054)
Female	-0.014	-0.045	-0.045	-0.004	-0.037	-0.097^{**}	-0.035	-0.023	0.074^{**}	-0.011	-0.040
	(0.013)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.036)
Education	-0.051^{**}	-0.183	-0.179^{**}	-0.094	-0.010	-0.067	-0.233^{**}	0.193^{**}	-0.024	-0.030	0.312^{***}
	(0.025)	(0.120)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.107)	(0.076)
Income	0.104^{***}	0.104	-0.087	0.023	-0.005	0.022	-0.027	0.005	0.169^{***}	-0.015	0.147^{*}
	(0.023)	(0.078)	(0.099)	(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.107)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Religious	-0.020	0.021	0.007	-0.005	-0.018	0.189^{***}	-0.058	0.001	-0.086^{**}	0.037	-0.077
	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.092)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.083)	(0.049)
Democrat	0.050^{***}	-0.007	0.102^{**}	-0.044	0.079^{**}	0.066	0.095^{***}	0.115^{***}	-0.035	0.042	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.037)
Constant	0.484^{***}	0.790^{***}	0.672^{***}	0.641^{***}	0.546^{***}	0.443^{***}	0.789^{***}	0.256^{***}	0.383^{***}	0.679^{***}	0.059
	(0.025)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.059)	(0.085)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.131)	(0.070)
Observations	2,975	204	253	257	353	219	348	363	393	210	375
R^2	0.058	0.056	0.073	0.056	0.071	0.094	0.086	0.150	0.285	0.051	0.153
Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.017	0.042	0.026	0.049	0.060	0.064	0.131	0.270	0.013	0.134
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 37: Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Women by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Preferential Hiring and Promotion of Women										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.045	0.041	−0.119	0.036	0.199*	−0.251*	0.271**	0.189*	−0.0001	0.018	−0.100
	(0.037)	(0.157)	(0.130)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.128)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.100)	(0.141)	(0.105)
Ethnic Score	0.114***	0.247	−0.121	0.049	0.098	0.352**	−0.053	0.116	0.094	0.302**	0.175*
	(0.037)	(0.153)	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.146)	(0.108)	(0.114)	(0.105)	(0.139)	(0.104)
Under Age 35	0.003	−0.010	−0.045	0.002	−0.052	−0.005	−0.062	0.028	0.034	−0.138**	0.088
	(0.020)	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.076)
Female	0.057***	0.020	0.215***	0.026	0.036	0.027	0.082	−0.041	0.070	0.021	0.162***
	(0.017)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.050)
Education	−0.182***	−0.146	0.063	−0.143	−0.294**	−0.073	−0.089	0.044	−0.395***	−0.100	−0.228**
	(0.033)	(0.196)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.151)	(0.106)
Income	−0.147***	−0.022	0.024	−0.106	−0.192**	−0.374**	−0.130	−0.097	−0.159*	−0.413***	−0.108
	(0.031)	(0.127)	(0.136)	(0.112)	(0.088)	(0.153)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.106)	(0.105)
Religious	0.037*	−0.043	−0.095	0.008	−0.054	0.049	−0.039	−0.001	0.016	−0.272**	0.073
	(0.021)	(0.085)	(0.127)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.093)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.116)	(0.067)
Democrat	0.077***	0.078	−0.070	0.055	0.149***	0.213***	0.034	0.109**	0.058	0.096	0.053
	(0.017)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.051)
Constant	0.513***	0.477**	0.849***	0.433***	0.611***	0.455***	0.522***	0.222**	0.714***	0.881***	0.526***
	(0.033)	(0.195)	(0.152)	(0.084)	(0.126)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.186)	(0.097)
Observations	3,130	206	258	275	367	230	359	387	434	218	396
R^2	0.059	0.047	0.093	0.026	0.111	0.149	0.050	0.058	0.075	0.134	0.067
Adjusted R^2	0.057	0.008	0.064	-0.003	0.091	0.118	0.028	0.038	0.057	0.101	0.048
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 38: Support for Increasing the Black and Asian Student Numbers by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Increasing the Black and Asian Student Numbers										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.097***	0.172	−0.079	0.144*	0.066	−0.008	0.172**	0.176**	0.009	0.050	−0.051
	(0.029)	(0.123)	(0.113)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.116)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.104)	(0.085)
Ethnic Score	0.003	−0.156	0.064	−0.034	0.139*	0.150	0.013	0.036	0.132*	0.083	−0.038
	(0.029)	(0.120)	(0.112)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.132)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.103)	(0.084)
Under Age 35	0.071***	0.007	0.110	0.017	0.130***	0.141**	0.068	0.144***	−0.081*	0.015	0.180***
	(0.016)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.061)
Female	0.032**	0.063	0.112**	0.024	0.008	0.007	−0.019	0.004	0.003	−0.047	0.106***
	(0.013)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.040)
Education	−0.004	−0.286*	0.140	0.049	0.136	−0.039	−0.020	0.128	0.074	−0.006	−0.185**
	(0.026)	(0.155)	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.111)	(0.085)
Income	−0.018	0.369***	−0.150	0.009	−0.039	−0.185	0.049	−0.033	−0.137**	−0.087	−0.004
	(0.024)	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.138)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.077)	(0.084)
Religious	0.015	−0.081	−0.105	0.015	−0.035	−0.072	−0.022	−0.028	−0.036	0.024	0.052
	(0.016)	(0.067)	(0.111)	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.085)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.085)	(0.054)
Democrat	0.085***	0.100*	−0.065	0.090**	0.026	0.098*	0.166***	0.107***	0.069*	0.150***	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.041)
Constant	0.338***	0.553***	0.666***	0.195***	0.224**	0.311**	0.254**	0.220***	0.475***	0.408***	0.426***
	(0.026)	(0.154)	(0.132)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.137)	(0.104)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.137)	(0.078)
Observations	3,147	209	258	279	368	230	360	391	435	219	398
R^2	0.036	0.108	0.056	0.042	0.087	0.071	0.086	0.119	0.041	0.067	0.055
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.073	0.026	0.014	0.067	0.037	0.065	0.100	0.023	0.031	0.036
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 39: Support for Transgender Bathroom Choice by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Transgender Bathroom Choice										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.057**	−0.041	−0.101	0.090	0.068	0.090	0.070	0.144**	0.113	0.023	0.172*
	(0.028)	(0.114)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.082)	(0.106)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.099)	(0.091)
Ethnic Score	0.012	0.267**	0.135	0.079	0.043	−0.110	0.015	−0.026	−0.055	0.045	−0.191**
	(0.028)	(0.113)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.081)	(0.121)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.098)	(0.091)
Under Age 35	0.169***	0.119**	0.021	0.119**	0.213***	0.188***	0.194***	0.146***	0.270***	0.030	0.165**
	(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.064)
Female	0.006	0.059	0.063*	−0.035	−0.004	0.024	0.011	0.085***	−0.015	−0.002	0.040
	(0.013)	(0.058)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Education	0.164***	−0.031	0.138*	0.139	0.019	0.161	0.310***	0.164**	0.186**	0.086	−0.044
	(0.026)	(0.145)	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.108)	(0.092)
Income	0.074***	0.178*	0.281***	−0.031	0.073	0.153	−0.015	0.053	0.054	−0.060	−0.051
	(0.024)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.127)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.089)
Religious	−0.078***	−0.099	−0.103	−0.010	−0.112**	−0.158**	−0.113**	−0.105***	−0.149***	−0.220***	−0.049
	(0.016)	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.044)	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.058)
Democrat	0.113***	0.078	0.063	0.153***	0.139***	0.039	0.208***	0.091***	0.090**	0.038	0.068
	(0.013)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Constant	0.286***	0.386***	0.349***	0.143**	0.371***	0.373***	0.204**	0.386***	0.202***	0.716***	0.523***
	(0.026)	(0.146)	(0.106)	(0.066)	(0.096)	(0.127)	(0.099)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.130)	(0.086)
Observations	2,931	195	235	268	350	222	327	366	416	207	345
R^2	0.136	0.142	0.148	0.098	0.174	0.185	0.202	0.162	0.217	0.051	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.133	0.105	0.117	0.070	0.154	0.154	0.182	0.144	0.202	0.013	0.035

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 40: Support for Economic Equality and Financial Regulation by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Support for Economic Equality and Financial Regulation										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.039**	0.038	0.096	0.021	0.051	0.081	0.139***	0.022	0.021	−0.077	0.083**
	(0.016)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.037)
Ethnic Score	0.031*	0.003	−0.056	0.050	0.034	0.069	−0.050	0.100**	0.014	0.111**	−0.003
	(0.016)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.038)
Under Age 35	0.011	−0.021	0.009	−0.021	0.010	0.031	−0.046*	0.059**	0.065***	−0.016	−0.086***
	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Female	−0.001	0.011	0.024	0.047**	0.006	−0.050**	0.020	−0.007	0.004	0.014	0.025
	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.018)
Education	−0.007	−0.051	−0.005	−0.020	0.100*	−0.153***	−0.018	0.082	−0.021	−0.066	−0.061
	(0.014)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.038)
Income	−0.111***	0.015	0.034	−0.156***	−0.026	0.103*	−0.132***	−0.172***	−0.164***	−0.112***	−0.129***
	(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Religious	0.012	−0.011	−0.053	0.014	−0.042	0.017	−0.007	−0.056**	−0.031	0.007	0.085***
	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.063)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.024)
Dem	0.038***	0.035	0.004	0.026	0.080***	−0.042*	0.040*	0.134***	0.044**	0.031	−0.0001
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Constant	0.740***	0.836***	0.761***	0.722***	0.626***	0.706***	0.794***	0.577***	0.755***	0.902***	0.811***
	(0.015)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.066)	(0.036)
Observations	2,777	192	233	242	336	199	329	359	349	204	334
R^2	0.057	0.028	0.020	0.112	0.084	0.147	0.100	0.216	0.132	0.103	0.209
Adjusted R^2	0.054	-0.015	-0.015	0.082	0.062	0.112	0.077	0.198	0.111	0.066	0.190
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 41: Voted in 2016 by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Voted in 2016										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.015	0.175*	0.098	0.338***	0.042	−0.010	0.034	0.002	0.071	−0.092	−0.178**
	(0.030)	(0.098)	(0.159)	(0.116)	(0.091)	(0.139)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.088)	(0.099)	(0.082)
Ethnic Score	0.032	−0.063	−0.089	−0.259**	−0.034	0.146	0.043	0.010	−0.083	0.346***	0.175**
	(0.030)	(0.095)	(0.160)	(0.120)	(0.090)	(0.162)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.082)
Under Age 35	−0.080***	−0.106**	−0.191**	−0.065	−0.065	−0.110	−0.117***	−0.011	−0.057	−0.122**	−0.022
	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.095)	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.073)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.060)
Female	−0.015	−0.044	−0.112*	0.088	0.034	0.033	−0.0004	0.009	0.002	−0.079	−0.046
	(0.014)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.039)
Education	0.286***	0.252**	0.078	0.318***	0.152	0.099	0.058	0.176***	0.248***	0.297***	0.235***
	(0.028)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.130)	(0.082)	(0.064)	(0.095)	(0.113)	(0.083)
Income	0.080***	0.116	0.442***	0.038	0.025	0.262	0.001	0.083*	−0.003	0.245***	−0.075
	(0.025)	(0.078)	(0.159)	(0.114)	(0.069)	(0.170)	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.080)
Religious	0.008	−0.037	−0.009	−0.013	−0.051	−0.071	−0.015	0.048*	−0.040	0.042	0.083
	(0.017)	(0.053)	(0.146)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.101)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.080)	(0.052)
Democrat	0.109***	−0.052	0.306***	0.129**	0.058	0.171***	0.026	0.012	0.126***	0.176***	0.098**
	(0.014)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.039)
Constant	0.537***	0.728***	0.423**	0.396***	0.753***	0.504***	0.856***	0.719***	0.592***	0.300**	0.641***
	(0.028)	(0.123)	(0.177)	(0.086)	(0.098)	(0.164)	(0.083)	(0.060)	(0.089)	(0.137)	(0.075)
Observations	2,894	207	218	255	345	222	334	333	404	204	372
R^2	0.096	0.115	0.161	0.118	0.024	0.068	0.042	0.055	0.044	0.222	0.067
Adjusted R^2	0.093	0.079	0.129	0.089	0.001	0.033	0.018	0.032	0.025	0.191	0.046
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 42: Vote Choice for Trump by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Voted for Trump										
	Panethnic	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	-0.094^{***}	-0.064	0.211	-0.226	-0.107	-0.444^{***}	-0.111	0.073	-0.183^{**}	0.171^{**}	-0.216^{*}
	(0.036)	(0.082)	(0.218)	(0.154)	(0.100)	(0.118)	(0.088)	(0.106)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.126)
Ethnic Score	-0.087^{**}	-0.069	-0.168	-0.147	-0.097	0.138	0.029	-0.185^{*}	0.072	-0.220^{**}	-0.060
	(0.036)	(0.078)	(0.195)	(0.157)	(0.101)	(0.146)	(0.087)	(0.105)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.129)
Under Age 35	-0.093^{***}	0.051	-0.105	0.110	-0.193^{***}	-0.048	-0.043	-0.103^{*}	-0.102^{**}	-0.021	-0.111
	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.117)	(0.101)	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.088)
Female	-0.045^{***}	-0.057	-0.135^{*}	-0.070	-0.045	-0.024	-0.072	-0.050	-0.065	-0.041	-0.022
	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.044)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.061)
Education	-0.080^{**}	0.127	-0.139	-0.214	0.035	0.054	-0.184	-0.414^{***}	-0.063	0.163	-0.058
	(0.034)	(0.119)	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.117)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.131)
Income	-0.005	-0.070	-0.006	0.268^{*}	-0.066	0.238^{*}	-0.034	0.085	0.134^{*}	-0.117^{*}	0.026
	(0.029)	(0.066)	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.077)	(0.136)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.065)	(0.120)
Religious	0.030	-0.014	-0.006	0.005	0.120^{*}	0.079	0.062	0.085^{*}	0.064	-0.052	0.037
	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.149)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.096)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.080)
Democrat	-0.255^{***}	-0.032	-0.285^{***}	-0.239^{***}	-0.419^{***}	-0.190^{***}	-0.247^{***}	-0.191^{***}	-0.335^{***}	-0.031	-0.212^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.039)	(0.082)	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.059)
Constant	0.542^{***}	0.091	0.471^{**}	0.692^{***}	0.618^{***}	0.338^{**}	0.528^{***}	0.662^{***}	0.494^{***}	0.122	0.648^{***}
	(0.034)	(0.117)	(0.194)	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.149)	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.127)	(0.116)
Observations	2,135	162	105	163	269	136	274	288	303	154	281
R^2	0.158	0.072	0.198	0.142	0.380	0.216	0.150	0.177	0.255	0.088	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.155	0.024	0.131	0.097	0.360	0.167	0.124	0.154	0.235	0.038	0.061

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

Table 43: Idenfitication as Democrat by Racial and Ethnic Score Controlled Across Ethnicities

	Dependent variable:										
	Identifies as Democrat										
	Asian American	Bangladeshi	Cambodian	Chinese	Filipino	Hmong	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Pakistani	Vietnamese
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Racial Score	0.055	0.205	0.228	−0.084	−0.157	−0.144	−0.021	0.100	0.229**	0.057	0.139
	(0.038)	(0.155)	(0.139)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.151)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.100)	(0.147)	(0.105)
Ethnic Score	0.067*	−0.003	0.068	0.071	0.237**	0.106	0.086	0.172	−0.006	0.048	−0.106
	(0.038)	(0.152)	(0.138)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.173)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.104)
Under Age 35	0.106***	−0.076	0.078	−0.036	0.107*	0.194**	−0.007	0.024	0.161***	0.078	0.218***
	(0.021)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.076)	(0.057)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.075)
Female	0.088***	0.062	−0.006	0.067	0.068	0.160**	0.090	0.138***	0.086*	0.203***	0.056
	(0.018)	(0.078)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.073)	(0.050)
Education	0.275***	−0.083	0.277**	0.186	0.046	0.081	0.096	0.236*	0.057	−0.353**	0.178*
	(0.034)	(0.197)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.144)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.156)	(0.105)
Income	−0.008	−0.051	−0.083	0.088	−0.070	0.158	−0.054	−0.016	−0.333***	0.104	0.013
	(0.032)	(0.126)	(0.146)	(0.113)	(0.094)	(0.181)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.110)	(0.104)
Religious	0.034	−0.058	−0.188	0.037	0.079	0.080	−0.023	−0.041	0.019	0.104	0.071
	(0.021)	(0.085)	(0.136)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.111)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.121)	(0.067)
Constant	0.165***	0.668***	0.227	0.134	0.390***	0.219	0.478***	0.244**	0.440***	0.527***	0.132
	(0.035)	(0.189)	(0.162)	(0.085)	(0.132)	(0.179)	(0.143)	(0.112)	(0.101)	(0.191)	(0.097)
Observations	3,147	209	258	279	368	230	360	391	435	219	398
R^2	0.049	0.028	0.093	0.033	0.033	0.059	0.014	0.061	0.076	0.086	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.047	-0.005	0.067	0.008	0.015	0.029	-0.006	0.044	0.061	0.056	0.031
Note:											*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: From the NAAS 2016 (S. K. Ramakrishnan et al. 2020)

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