

APPENDIX A

In this Appendix, we report results from several additional statistical tests we conduct to probe the robustness of our empirical results. In particular, we explore the effects of alternative definitions of our access-to-justice, procedural-justice, outcome-favorability, legitimacy, and income variables. We also address the potential confounding role of the COVID-19 pandemic and online literacy. We explain these tests below and report many of the findings in Tables A1–A9. Details are available from the authors upon request.

We begin by probing for weaknesses in how we measure and control for litigation outcomes. In one set of specifications, we replace our outcome-favorability measure with actual case outcomes based on participants' reporting. Our survey asks participants to report two attributes of their case's resolution (as opposed to their perceptions of the favorability of their case's outcome): (a) whether the court reduced their charge, and (b) whether the court increased, decreased, or did not change their fine. In most traffic cases, courts reduce charges but increase fines, which some litigants prefer as a form of relief. Moving violations (as opposed to non-moving violations like parking infractions) typically result in increases in future auto insurance premiums. The cumulative value of a premium increase can be greater than a higher, one-time court fine, so litigants are often willing to pay a higher up-front fine in exchange for a charge reduction from a moving to a non-moving violation.

With these data in mind, we experiment with two alternative measures of outcome favorability. First, we use an indicator for whether the court increased the party's fines as a replacement for our subjective outcome-favorability measure. Second, we use an indicator variable for whether the court reduced the party's charges as a replacement. The results, which we report in Tables A1 and A2, are consistent with our main findings. An advantage of this analysis, which bolsters the robustness of our findings more broadly, is that our measure of procedural-justice perceptions is much less correlated with actual outcomes than it is with our perceptions-based outcome favorability measure (r [PJ, fine increase] = -0.03 , $p = n/s$; r [PJ, charge reduction] = 0.01 , $p = n/s$).

We also estimate the same models using a different access-to-justice measure. Specifically, we employ a seven-item scale of access to justice, which includes the four factors listed in Table 2 (i.e., ATJ1–4) as well as the following items: "How reasonable were the costs associated with the proceedings?" with answers ranging from 1 (= not reasonable at all) to 5 (= very reasonable); "To what extent did you have time to contemplate next steps?" with answers ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 5 (= very much); and "I understood how the process worked," with answers ranging from 1 (= disagree) to 5 (= agree). One reasonable view of these three new variables is that they could serve credibly as alternative measures of access to justice.

Unfortunately, the answers to these three new questions are highly correlated with our procedural-justice measure. The correlation between procedural-justice perceptions and access-to-justice perceptions is not surprising given the existence of some conceptual overlap, as we describe in the paper. An item such as "I understood how the process worked" is likely to capture people's sense of both access (a comprehensible process that allows lay people to bring their case) and procedural justice (a process that reflects respect and is more conducive to the expression of voice). Consequently, our new, seven-factor access-to-justice variable is highly correlated with our procedural-justice variable ($r = 0.61$), although, probably due to the larger number of items, the seven items form a higher value of Alpha Cronbach (= 0.70). Importantly, measuring perceptions of access to justice in this way yields similar results to our main analysis, which we present in Tables A3 and A4.

We also explore a potential concern that the factor that relates most closely to voice in the construction of our procedural-justice measure—that is, PJ5 ("I had an opportunity to present my case")—may overlap conceptually with our access-to-justice measure. We find that the correlation between PJ5 and our constructed access-to-justice measure is low ($r = 0.21$), but we construct an alternate measure of procedural justice that removes PJ5 as an item. In unreported analysis, we find

TABLE A1 Perceptions of legitimacy with actual outcome metrics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Procedural justice	0.494*** (0.072)	0.444*** (0.081)	0.358*** (0.074)	0.443*** (0.082)	0.422*** (0.082)	0.290*** (0.075)	0.492*** (0.074)	0.446*** (0.082)	0.354*** (0.076)	0.460*** (0.082)	0.425*** (0.083)	0.303*** (0.076)
Increased fines	-0.123 (0.118)	-0.153 (0.117)	-0.141 (0.120)	-0.125 (0.164)	-0.133 (0.116)	-0.133 (0.155)						
Reduced charges							0.046 (0.121)	0.033 (0.121)	0.056 (0.124)	-0.184 (0.167)	0.010 (0.119)	-0.166 (0.161)
Access to justice		0.183** (0.083)	0.195** (0.079)	0.185** (0.084)	0.349*** (0.108)	0.419*** (0.101)		0.171** (0.085)	0.184** (0.078)	0.169** (0.083)	0.344*** (0.109)	0.412*** (0.101)
Higher-income	-0.124 (0.138)	-0.166 (0.140)	-1.259** (0.542)	-0.121 (0.198)	1.332** (0.549)	0.184 (0.698)	-0.118 (0.137)	-0.156 (0.138)	-1.298** (0.545)	-0.545** (0.226)	1.378** (0.545)	-0.107 (0.704)
Proc. justice × higher-income			0.257*** (0.124)			0.375*** (0.126)			0.269** (0.124)			0.371*** (0.125)
Inc. fines × higher-income				-0.065 (0.232)		0.054 (0.237)						
Red. charges × higher-income										0.509** (0.243)		0.474* (0.252)
Access × higher-income					-0.379*** (0.139)	-0.502*** (0.148)					-0.389*** (0.139)	-0.504*** (0.145)
Constant	1.486*** (0.405)	1.112*** (0.408)	1.439*** (0.436)	1.091*** (0.412)	0.616 (0.444)	0.950** (0.456)	1.413*** (0.408)	1.053** (0.414)	1.393*** (0.436)	1.105*** (0.402)	0.556 (0.450)	0.929** (0.446)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.347	0.365	0.378	0.365	0.386	0.413	0.344	0.360	0.375	0.372	0.383	0.421

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of legitimacy (1 = Low; 5 = High) that a defendant ascribes to the legal system following an online traffic court proceeding. We report standard errors in parentheses, including heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all but Columns (3), (6), (9), and (12). We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

TABLE A 2 Future compliance with traffic laws with actual outcome metrics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Procedural justice	0.079 (0.077)	0.026 (0.075)	0.098 (0.098)	0.019 (0.075)	0.007 (0.069)	0.057 (0.090)	-0.003 (0.089)	0.087 (0.078)	0.034 (0.076)	0.113 (0.099)	0.034 (0.077)	0.015 (0.070)	0.075 (0.092)	0.012 (0.090)
Increased fine	0.074 (0.132)	0.042 (0.128)	0.032 (0.126)	0.159 (0.171)	0.060 (0.126)	0.153 (0.171)	0.180 (0.165)							
Reduced charges								-0.125 (0.136)	-0.140 (0.136)	-0.159 (0.136)	-0.144 (0.184)	-0.160 (0.134)	-0.183 (0.184)	-0.149 (0.181)
Access to justice		0.193* (0.108)	0.183* (0.108)	0.202* (0.106)	0.341*** (0.105)	0.313*** (0.098)	0.227** (0.106)		0.200* (0.108)	0.189* (0.108)	0.200* (0.108)	0.353*** (0.107)	0.323*** (0.099)	0.238** (0.109)
Higher-income	-0.141 (0.118)	-0.186 (0.119)	0.723 (0.577)	0.000 (0.224)	1.140 (0.782)	1.715* (0.918)	1.677* (0.931)	-0.144 (0.118)	-0.189 (0.119)	0.785 (0.574)	-0.196 (0.258)	1.168 (0.773)	1.641* (0.879)	1.664* (0.892)
Proc. justice × higher-income			-0.214 (0.134)			-0.156 (0.135)	-0.234 (0.143)			-0.229* (0.133)			-0.163 (0.135)	-0.240* (0.143)
Inc. fines × higher-income				-0.268 (0.266)		-0.237 (0.255)	-0.248 (0.246)							
Red. charges × higher-income											0.009 (0.308)		0.029 (0.306)	-0.069 (0.296)
Access × higher-income					-0.336* (0.194)	-0.271 (0.197)	-0.167 (0.199)					-0.344* (0.192)		-0.294 (0.199)
Legitimacy							0.207*** (0.079)							0.207*** (0.079)
Constant	3.910*** (0.548)	3.514*** (0.572)	3.242*** (0.643)	3.430*** (0.586)	3.075*** (0.649)	2.886*** (0.700)	2.689*** (0.701)	3.983*** (0.537)	3.561*** (0.554)	3.271*** (0.628)	3.562*** (0.554)	3.122*** (0.637)	2.983*** (0.670)	2.790*** (0.669)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.078	0.100	0.111	0.105	0.120	0.129	0.158	0.080	0.105	0.117	0.105	0.126	0.132	0.161

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of future legal compliance (1 = Low; 5 = High) following an online traffic court proceeding. We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

TABLE A3 Perceptions of legitimacy with alternative access definition.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Procedural justice	0.456*** (0.099)	0.302*** (0.110)	0.236** (0.095)	0.324*** (0.105)	0.294*** (0.111)	0.151 (0.115)
Outcome favorability	0.040 (0.061)	0.006 (0.061)	-0.008 (0.059)	-0.053 (0.071)	0.009 (0.062)	-0.012 (0.079)
Alt. access to justice		0.430*** (0.104)	0.433*** (0.108)	0.421*** (0.102)	0.482*** (0.122)	0.639*** (0.136)
Higher-income	-0.121 (0.138)	-0.168 (0.133)	-1.187** (0.530)	-0.624* (0.357)	0.332 (0.618)	-0.128 (0.680)
Proc. justice × higher-income			0.240** (0.121)			0.447** (0.189)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				0.112 (0.080)		0.014 (0.116)
Alt. access × higher-income					-0.127 (0.153)	-0.506** (0.205)
Constant	1.429*** (0.411)	0.636 (0.411)	0.965** (0.444)	0.811* (0.440)	0.458 (0.496)	0.563 (0.469)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.345	0.394	0.406	0.399	0.396	0.424

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of legitimacy (1 = Low; 5 = High) that a defendant ascribes to the legal system following an online traffic court proceeding. We use an alternative, seven-item measure of access to justice. We report standard errors in parentheses, including heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5). We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

that using this alternative definition of procedural justice indicates no reason to be concerned about the robustness of our main findings.

We also consider using a more limited definition of our legitimacy-perceptions measure, one that only includes elements related to a litigant’s obligation to obey courts and judges (i.e., L1 and L2). Existing research (e.g., Tyler & Jackson, 2014) provides a justification for the more inclusive/expansive definition of legitimacy that we use in our main analysis, but, in unreported analysis, we find nothing that is inconsistent with our main findings when we use this alternative, more targeted legitimacy definition. If defining legitimacy to include more than the mere obligation to obey courts is theoretically inappropriate for this project, at least the mismatch is empirically unimportant in the sense that it does not explain our results.

Next, we account for whether a litigant’s case begins before or during the COVID-19 pandemic (using March 11, 2020, the first full day after Michigan’s governor declared a state of emergency, to mark the beginning of the pandemic). We recognize that such a significant and unusual time may produce changes in perceptions of all sorts, including legal legitimacy, due to the onset of the pandemic, various courthouse procedure alterations including temporary lockdowns, and the broad shift to online communication that many experienced over the last few years. The inclusion of a COVID-19 indicator does not have a significant effect on the patterns in our baseline results, as we show in Tables A5 and A6.

Additionally, we test the sensitivity of our results to our chosen threshold for defining our income groups. In our main analysis, we define lower-income litigants as those who report earning less than \$40,000 per year. We classify everyone else as higher-income. We base this income cutoff on our previous work in a similar setting (Mentovich, Prescott, & Rabinovich-Einy, 2020), which derives the same cutoff by assuming full-time work (2000 h per year) for double the minimum wage at the time of the survey (~\$10.00 per hour). We double the minimum wage to approximate an

TABLE A4 Future compliance with traffic laws with alternative access definition.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Procedural justice	0.166 (0.102)	0.092 (0.120)	0.151 (0.135)	0.047 (0.116)	0.073 (0.116)	0.002 (0.155)	-0.032 (0.144)
Outcome favorability	-0.089 (0.067)	-0.105 (0.069)	-0.093 (0.070)	0.011 (0.091)	-0.096 (0.069)	0.016 (0.100)	0.018 (0.099)
Alt. access to justice		0.207 (0.132)	0.204 (0.133)	0.224* (0.131)	0.335** (0.131)	0.303** (0.141)	0.160 (0.150)
Higher-income	-0.137 (0.117)	-0.160 (0.118)	0.761 (0.623)	0.750** (0.375)	1.095 (0.725)	1.055 (0.759)	1.084 (0.773)
Proc. justice × higher-income			-0.217 (0.143)			0.114 (0.215)	0.014 (0.222)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				-0.224** (0.087)		-0.235** (0.112)	-0.238** (0.115)
Alt. access × higher-income					-0.318* (0.181)	-0.189 (0.249)	-0.075 (0.246)
Legitimacy							0.224*** (0.083)
Constant	3.939*** (0.542)	3.558*** (0.544)	3.261*** (0.624)	3.209*** (0.581)	3.113*** (0.643)	3.084*** (0.663)	2.958*** (0.657)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.085	0.098	0.109	0.124	0.111	0.128	0.161

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of future legal compliance (1 = Low; 5 = High) following an online traffic court proceeding. We use an alternative, seven-item measure of access to justice. We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

average household’s income, which we use to compare to “mean household income” at the Zip Code level from the 5-year estimates of the U.S. Census 2013–2017 American Community Survey. In this paper, our survey asks for the respondent’s yearly individual income, so our decision to use \$40,000 a year as a cutoff is more one of convenience, although it does produce two groups of roughly similar size (56% to 44%), which is a more even split than using either \$30,000 or \$50,000 a year as a cutoff.

To test the robustness of our findings to our income-level cutoff choice, we adjust our income threshold up and down by \$10,000, respectively. Our primary findings regarding access-to-justice perceptions as a predictor of legitimacy and the relative importance of access-to-justice perceptions for lower-income parties appear robust in new estimates with these cutoffs. The statistically significant main effect of procedural-justice perceptions also persists with both alternative cutoffs. However, the procedural-justice-by-income interaction coefficient is no longer significant with different income cutoffs, counseling that we take significant care in interpreting that particular result. We record all estimates in Tables A7 and A8.

In unreported analysis available upon request, we further probe the robustness of our decision to rely on a \$40,000 lower- versus higher-annual-income cutoff. We begin by treating our \$10,000 income level bins as a single continuous linear variable to assess the consequences for legitimacy for each additional \$10,000 of income. Our results from our main legitimacy analysis are reasonably robust. Specifically, marginally higher annual incomes are associated with a stronger positive (though statistically imprecise) relationship between procedural-justice perceptions and legitimacy and with a weakening of the relationship between access-to-justice perceptions and legitimacy. Our main compliance results look similar as well. We find that marginally higher annual incomes are

TABLE A 5 Perceptions of legitimacy with additional COVID-19 control.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Procedural justice	0.449*** (0.101)	0.402*** (0.109)	0.331*** (0.092)	0.425*** (0.105)	0.371*** (0.111)	0.249** (0.109)
Outcome favorability	0.038 (0.061)	0.040 (0.063)	0.026 (0.060)	-0.027 (0.072)	0.048 (0.063)	0.039 (0.080)
Access to justice		0.170** (0.085)	0.183** (0.079)	0.168** (0.083)	0.346*** (0.112)	0.417*** (0.103)
Higher-income	-0.120 (0.138)	-0.158 (0.140)	-1.234** (0.548)	-0.674* (0.366)	1.401** (0.556)	0.276 (0.690)
Proc. justice × higher-income			0.253** (0.125)			0.389** (0.179)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				0.127 (0.081)		-0.018 (0.117)
Access × higher-income					-0.395*** (0.142)	-0.511*** (0.147)
Filed post-COVID-19	-0.111 (0.131)	-0.098 (0.131)	-0.084 (0.132)	-0.091 (0.130)	-0.096 (0.130)	-0.075 (0.129)
Constant	1.565*** (0.434)	1.188*** (0.442)	1.496*** (0.466)	1.363*** (0.459)	0.676 (0.477)	0.975** (0.479)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.348	0.363	0.376	0.370	0.386	0.413

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of legitimacy (1 = Low; 5 = High) that a defendant ascribes to the legal system following an online traffic court proceeding. We include an indicator variable that denotes cases filed on or after March 11, 2020, the day after Michigan’s governor declared a state of emergency for COVID-19, which we regard as the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. We report standard errors in parentheses, including heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5). We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

associated with a weaker relationship between outcome-favorability perceptions and compliance expectations.

The lack of a statistically significant relationship of the interaction of procedural-justice perceptions and the continuous income variable with legitimacy perceptions may indicate that the influence of income on these relationships is nonlinear. To explore this idea, we recode income as a variable with four categories: under \$20,000, \$20,000 to \$40,000, \$40,000 to \$60,000, and above \$60,000. In unreported results, we find that litigants who report earning between \$40,000 and \$60,000 are statistically different from those who report earning under \$20,000 in terms of the relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy. However, those earning between \$20,000 and \$40,000 as well as those earning more than \$60,000 do not appear to be statistically different from those earning under \$20,000. This pattern hints that the heterogeneous role of procedural-justice perceptions across income groups in predicting legitimacy perceptions emerges mainly from middle-income litigants.

However, in terms of the relationship between access-to-justice perceptions and perceived legitimacy, our deeper exploration of how best to code income simply confirms our original story—the two lower-income groups of respondents differ from the two higher-income groups in alignment with our main results. Thus, while our interpretation of how procedural-justice perceptions and income level interact may be more complicated than our initial results suggest, our check confirms our hypothesis that the relationship between access-to-justice perceptions and legitimacy differs with income in a way that is theoretically satisfying. Keeping both alternative characterizations of income in mind, we conclude that the approach we take in our main analysis is both reasonable and produces robust results.

TABLE A6 Future compliance with traffic laws with additional COVID-19 control.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Procedural justice	0.168 (0.104)	0.114 (0.106)	0.169 (0.119)	0.075 (0.105)	0.088 (0.100)	-0.003 (0.134)	-0.055 (0.125)
Outcome favorability	-0.088 (0.066)	-0.086 (0.068)	-0.076 (0.069)	0.027 (0.090)	-0.080 (0.068)	0.052 (0.099)	0.044 (0.100)
Access to justice		0.196* (0.111)	0.186* (0.111)	0.199* (0.110)	0.339*** (0.108)	0.343*** (0.100)	0.257** (0.111)
Higher-income	-0.137 (0.117)	-0.182 (0.119)	0.647 (0.580)	0.697* (0.359)	1.085 (0.784)	1.431 (0.881)	1.374 (0.898)
Proc. justice × higher-income			-0.195 (0.134)			0.159 (0.177)	0.079 (0.188)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				-0.216** (0.085)		-0.267** (0.112)	-0.263** (0.115)
Access × higher-income					-0.321* (0.194)	-0.305 (0.196)	-0.199 (0.200)
Legitimacy							0.206** (0.081)
Filed post-COVID-19	0.038 (0.154)	0.052 (0.153)	0.042 (0.152)	0.041 (0.154)	0.054 (0.154)	0.048 (0.154)	0.064 (0.151)
Constant	3.893*** (0.580)	3.458*** (0.624)	3.221*** (0.690)	3.161*** (0.653)	3.042*** (0.683)	2.889*** (0.721)	2.688*** (0.717)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.085	0.109	0.118	0.133	0.127	0.149	0.178

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of future legal compliance (1 = Low; 5 = High) following an online traffic court proceeding. We include an indicator variable that denotes cases filed on or after March 11, 2020, the day after Michigan’s governor declared a state of emergency for COVID-19, which we regard as the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Next, we test for collinearity between our independent variables of interest and find that our procedural-justice perceptions measure is highly correlated with our outcome-favorability perceptions measure ($r = 0.72$). Fortunately, investigating the causes of this correlation reveals that only one of the seven components of our procedural-justice measure, PJ7 (“I felt I was understood by the court”), accounts for a large share of the problem. We find that an alternative measure of procedural justice that excludes PJ7 has lower correlation with outcome favorability. This alternative measure of procedural-justice perceptions produces no significant changes to our baseline findings, as we demonstrate in detail in Table A9. Nevertheless, because we believe that PJ7 is too important for defining procedural justice in light of theory and related research, we retain the original definition in our main analysis.

Finally, we also examine whether online literacy accounts for any of the effects reported in our main analysis. We create a measure of online literacy comprised of answers to four questions on a five-point scale about the frequency with which respondents use online platforms to (1) pay bills, (2) purchase goods, (3) read news, and (4) use social media. We create our measure by taking a simple mean of all four answers ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 0.81$). In unreported analysis, we include an indicator variable for high online literacy (= 1 if the online literacy measure is 4 or higher; = 0 otherwise) in our various regressions. We find that, while our online literacy measure has a positive and statistically significant relationship with legitimacy and a negative, statistically insignificant relationship with compliance, its inclusion does not raise any concerns about the results of our primary analysis.

T A B L E A 7 Perceptions of legitimacy with alternative income-group definitions.

	Higher-income: \$30,000 and above						Higher-income: \$50,000 and above					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Procedural justice	0.453*** (0.102)	0.406*** (0.109)	0.308*** (0.106)	0.421*** (0.110)	0.372*** (0.110)	0.227* (0.137)	0.457*** (0.100)	0.403*** (0.108)	0.385*** (0.089)	0.417*** (0.105)	0.394*** (0.108)	0.391*** (0.104)
Outcome favorability	0.038 (0.062)	0.039 (0.063)	0.028 (0.060)	-0.063 (0.085)	0.055 (0.063)	0.003 (0.102)	0.043 (0.061)	0.045 (0.063)	0.041 (0.060)	0.010 (0.068)	0.050 (0.063)	0.016 (0.077)
Access to justice		0.165** (0.083)	0.182** (0.080)	0.166** (0.081)	0.364*** (0.122)	0.461*** (0.118)		0.193** (0.083)	0.194** (0.079)	0.189** (0.082)	0.259** (0.101)	0.268*** (0.093)
Higher-income	-0.011 (0.131)	-0.053 (0.129)	-0.834 (0.514)	-0.633 (0.418)	1.314** (0.554)	0.457 (0.640)	-0.247* (0.146)	-0.310** (0.148)	-0.670 (0.590)	-0.627* (0.371)	0.643 (0.560)	0.236 (0.788)
Proc. justice × higher-income			0.183 (0.117)			0.261 (0.175)			0.084 (0.134)			0.069 (0.193)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				0.141 (0.092)		0.058 (0.125)				0.077 (0.081)		0.069 (0.122)
Access × higher-income					-0.359** (0.144)	-0.490*** (0.151)					-0.234* (0.140)	-0.277* (0.167)
Constant	1.473*** (0.424)	1.135*** (0.426)	1.572*** (0.491)	1.516*** (0.445)	0.494 (0.506)	1.042** (0.512)	1.402*** (0.412)	0.990** (0.411)	1.079** (0.430)	1.084** (0.426)	0.754* (0.451)	0.868* (0.448)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.343	0.357	0.365	0.365	0.377	0.399	0.353	0.372	0.374	0.375	0.379	0.384

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of legitimacy (1 = Low; 5 = High) that a defendant ascribes to the legal system following an online traffic court proceeding. We report standard errors in parentheses, including heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all but Columns (3), (6), (9), and (12). We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

T A B L E A 8 Future compliance with traffic laws with alternative income-group definitions.

	Higher-income: \$30,000 and above							Higher-income: \$50,000 and above						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Procedural justice	0.165 (0.101)	0.107 (0.105)	0.154 (0.121)	0.097 (0.108)	0.087 (0.105)	0.031 (0.162)	-0.016 (0.153)	0.164 (0.103)	0.108 (0.106)	0.141 (0.117)	0.070 (0.105)	0.091 (0.103)	-0.006 (0.131)	-0.081 (0.124)
Outcome favorability	-0.091 (0.066)	-0.090 (0.067)	-0.085 (0.068)	-0.023 (0.109)	-0.080 (0.067)	-0.005 (0.134)	-0.006 (0.138)	-0.089 (0.067)	-0.086 (0.068)	-0.078 (0.069)	0.003 (0.083)	-0.077 (0.068)	0.030 (0.090)	0.027 (0.091)
Access to justice	0.204* (0.111)	0.196* (0.113)	0.196* (0.113)	0.204* (0.111)	0.329*** (0.116)	0.335*** (0.110)	0.239* (0.122)	0.201* (0.108)	0.200* (0.110)	0.200* (0.110)	0.212* (0.109)	0.332*** (0.120)	0.348*** (0.121)	0.296** (0.131)
Higher-income	-0.199 (0.124)	-0.250** (0.127)	0.121 (0.656)	0.130 (0.438)	0.606 (0.778)	0.700 (0.957)	0.605 (0.968)	-0.133 (0.144)	-0.199 (0.136)	0.483 (0.582)	0.608* (0.329)	1.671** (0.756)	1.754** (0.853)	1.709** (0.863)
Proc. justice × higher-income			-0.087 (0.144)			0.082 (0.218)	0.028 (0.217)			-0.159 (0.137)			0.226 (0.199)	0.213 (0.207)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				-0.092 (0.097)		-0.110 (0.152)	-0.122 (0.155)				-0.197** (0.080)		-0.261** (0.111)	-0.275** (0.114)
Access × higher-income					-0.225 (0.190)	-0.223 (0.178)	-0.121 (0.179)					-0.460** (0.186)	-0.455** (0.188)	-0.402** (0.188)
Legitimacy						0.208*** (0.076)							0.192** (0.078)	
Constant	3.987*** (0.553)	3.569*** (0.572)	3.361*** (0.667)	3.319*** (0.623)	3.167*** (0.659)	3.070*** (0.719)	2.854*** (0.730)	3.951*** (0.551)	3.521*** (0.565)	3.353*** (0.624)	3.283*** (0.586)	3.057*** (0.618)	2.985*** (0.649)	2.818*** (0.648)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.090	0.115	0.117	0.120	0.125	0.127	0.158	0.084	0.109	0.114	0.128	0.139	0.157	0.183

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of future legal compliance (1 = Low; 5 = High) following an online traffic court proceeding. We report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

TABLE A 9 Perceptions of legitimacy with alternative procedural-justice measure.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Alt. procedural justice	0.434*** (0.100)	0.385*** (0.109)	0.306*** (0.091)	0.406*** (0.105)	0.355*** (0.111)	0.222** (0.106)
Outcome favorability	0.065 (0.059)	0.065 (0.061)	0.053 (0.057)	0.000 (0.073)	0.072 (0.061)	0.063 (0.076)
Access to justice		0.172** (0.087)	0.185** (0.079)	0.170** (0.085)	0.351*** (0.112)	0.426*** (0.102)
Higher-income	-0.125 (0.138)	-0.163 (0.139)	-1.329** (0.562)	-0.675* (0.367)	1.422** (0.556)	0.203 (0.695)
Alt. proc. justice × higher-income			0.273** (0.128)			0.417** (0.175)
Outcome fav. × higher-income				0.126 (0.082)		-0.016 (0.111)
Access × higher-income					-0.402*** (0.142)	-0.527*** (0.147)
Constant	1.398*** (0.424)	1.042** (0.421)	1.393*** (0.442)	1.221*** (0.443)	0.524 (0.452)	0.876* (0.454)
No. of observations	216	216	216	216	216	216
R-squared	0.341	0.357	0.371	0.364	0.381	0.410

Note: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is our constructed measure of legitimacy (1 = Low; 5 = High) that a defendant ascribes to the legal system following an online traffic court proceeding. We use an alternative definition of procedural justice, omitting the factor most correlated with our outcome favorability construct (i.e., PJ7). We report standard errors in parentheses, including heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5). We control for courthouse, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level in all models. The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.