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# COMMERCE AND COMPULSION

## GUJARATI MERCHANTS AND THE PORTUGUESE SYSTEM IN WESTERN INDIA, 1500-1600

by

Michael Naylor Pearson

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in the University of Michigan
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Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor J. H. Broomfield, Chairman
Associate Professor K. A. Luther
Professor Rhoads Murphey
Associate Professor T. R. Trautmann

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In Mughal times an Emperor's tutor was sometimes rewarded by being weighed against gold. The favored scholar thus received a weight of gold equal to the weight of his body. Times change; I am not a Mughal emperor, but my thanks to those who have helped me with this dissertation are sincere, even if rather less auriferous.

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## FOOTNOTE ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AHU | Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. |
| ANTT | Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon. |
| ANTTCC | Corpo Chronologico, ANTT, Lisbon. |
| ANTTDR | Documentos Remetidos da India, ANTT. |
| ANTTSL | Colecção de São Lourenço, ANTT. |
| ANTTSV | Colecção de São Vicente, ANTT. |
| APOCR | Archivo Portuguê̂s Oriental, ed. J. H. da Cunha Rivara, Nova Goa, 1857-77, 6 vols. |
| Arabic History | Abdullah Muhammad al-Makhi al-Asafi al-Ulughkhani Ḥajji ad-dabir, Zafar ul Walih bi Muzaffar wa Alihi, trans. M. F. Lokhandwalla, vol. I, Baroda, 1970. |
| Assentos | Assentos do Conselho do Estado, ed. P. S. S. Pissurlencar, Bastorá, Goa, 1953-57, 5 vols. |
| Barreto de Rezende | "Descripçoens das Cidades e Fortalezas da India Oriental" by Pedro Barreto de Rezende, 2 vols., in Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisbon. |
| Barros | João de Barros, Asia, Lisbon, 1945-46, 4 vols. |
| Bocarro, Decada | António Bocarro, Decada 13 da História da India, Lisbon, 1876. |
| Bocarro, Livro | António Bocarro, Livro das plantas de tôdas as fortalezas, cidades e povações do Estado da India Oriental, published in Arquivo Português Oriental, ed. A. B. de Bragança Pereira, Bastorá, Goa, 1937-40, Tomo IV, vol. II, parts 1-3. |

| | |
|---|---|
| B. Mus. | British Museum Library, London. |
| Castanheda | Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, *História do descobrimento e conquista da India pelos Portugueses*, Coimbra, 1924-33, 9 vols. |
| Correa | Gaspar Correa, *Lendas da India*, Lisbon, 1858-64, 4 vols. |
| Couto | Diogo do Couto, *Da Asia*, Lisbon, 1778-88, 15 vols. |
| Descrição | "Descrição das terras da India Oriental, e dos seus usos, costumes, ritos e leis," in Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. |
| DI | *Documenta Indica*, ed. J. Wicki, Rome, 1948-68, 10 vols. |
| DUP | *Documentação Ultramarina Portuguesa*, Lisbon, 1960-67, 5 vols. |
| Factories | *The English Factories in India, 1618-1684*, ed. W. Foster and C. Fawcett, London, 1904-54, 17 vols. |
| Fazenda | "Assentos do Conselho de Fazenda" in HAG, 10 vols. |
| Gavetas | *As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo*, Lisbon, 1960-70, 7 vols. |
| HAG | Historical Archives of Goa, Panaji, Goa. |
| I. O. | India Office Records, London. |
| LM | "Livros das Monções do Reino," HAG. |
| LMBP | *Documentos Remettidos da India ou Livros das Monções*, ed. R. A. de Bulhão Pato, Lisbon, 1880-1935, 5 vols. |
| Mirat | Ali Muhammad Khan, *Mirat-i Ahmadi*, Baroda, 1928, 1965. |
| Pires | *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires*, London, 1944, 2 vols. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Sikandar | The Mirat-i Sikandari, ed. S. C. Misra and M. L. Rahman, Baroda, 1961. |
| Tohfut | Sheikh Zeen-ud-Deen, Tohfut-ul-Mujahideen, London, 1833. |

In references to the chronicles by Barros, Couto, and Castanheda I have followed the usual custom of quoting only decada, book, and chapter numbers. Thus Couto VII, vi, 8, is Couto, decada VII, book vi, chapter 8.

In the interests of avoiding otioseness, four very frequently used foreign words, mahajan, cartaz, cafila, and fidalgo, have not been italicised in this dissertation.

# INTRODUCTION

This dissertation describes and analyzes the response from Gujarat to the claims and demands of the Portuguese in sixteenth-century western India. The thesis is simply that for most of the time neither Gujarat's merchants nor the Gujarati political authorities opposed Portugal's system of trade control, and that this lack of opposition stemmed only partly from economic factors; it is true that neither group stood to lose much from accepting Portuguese control, but a full explanation of the response is possible only when we appreciate the relationship between these merchants and the state to which they were subject. The state did not try to stop the merchants from acquiescing in the demands of the Portuguese, and conversely the merchants were able to accomodate to these demands, because of the very loose relationship between these two groups. Ordinarily state and merchant had little to do with each other's affairs, and the state did not feel that its prerogatives had been infringed on if its overseas trade was controlled and taxed by others. Thus while we will pay some attention to the economics of the response, our major effort is reserved for a consideration of the structure of relations between the Gujarati state and one group of its subjects, the merchants. It is impossible to comprehend fully the response of either state or merchants to the Portuguese

without a very clear perception of their mutual relations.

Historians of modern India sometimes complain of the lack of modern reliable monographs dealing with aspects of their period of study. True, their landscape is only sparsely dotted with such works, but for the sixteenth century it is virtually a desert. This paucity has meant that many topics related to the main theme of the dissertation have had to be investigated from the original sources; very seldom has it been possible to say, for example, "For Portugal's trade between Asia and Europe see Professor X's standard monograph," or "Religious reform movements in sixteenth-century Gujarat are definitively described in Dr. X's recent work."

This explains the arrangement of the work. The first two chapters set the scene. Chapter I sketches the structure of overseas trade in Asia around 1500, and pays considerable attention to the important role of Gujaratis in this trade, and to the economy of their own country. Chapter II deals at length with the system set up by the Portuguese to control sea trade in Asia, and especially in western India. An attempt is made to evaluate the effectiveness of their system, and some information on the horse and pepper trades is used to provide a test case for their whole attempt. Following these two introductory chapters, we look out from Gujarat at the Portuguese. Chapter

III describes and evaluates the response to them from the political authorities of Gujarat, and chapter IV does the same for the merchants. Chapter V moves right into Gujarat, to a discussion of the structure of merchant-state relations, and so ties together the whole thesis by elucidating these relations, thus providing the full explanation for the response to the Portuguese system.

In the conclusion a wider perspective is taken of what we found in chapter V about merchant-state relations. An attempt is made to sketch the structure of the whole political system of this Muslim Indian state, for we contend that the position of the merchants was not unique: it was paralleled by other groups which in sum comprised the whole population of the state. Throughout the dissertation techniques and concepts from other areas and disciplines have been used (as will be seen from the citations and the last section of the bibliography), but in the conclusion some tentative comparisons are made with other roughly contemporary states. The conclusion does not claim to erect a model of the political system of all advanced premodern states, but it contributes to this end by describing the system in one such state.

Apart from this, it is hoped that this dissertation makes modest contributions in other areas. The actual response to the Portuguese should be of some interest, or perhaps concern, to Indian nationalist

historians. Here we find that one of the first groups of Indians who had extensive contact with a European colonial power made no attempt to oppose the arbitrary and exploitative demands of the Portuguese once they realized the Portuguese could enforce their system most of the time. The merchants accommodated rather quickly, and indeed cooperated with their exploiters; to my mind this was a sensible thing to do, and clearly their trade did not suffer from their acquiescence. But the fact is that they did, in modern terms, collaborate. The description of Portuguese-Gujarati relations in chapter III at least fills a gap, and perhaps adds to our knowledge of how the political élite of one premodern Muslim state perceived their interests. Chapters I and II are essential background for the whole thesis, but the latter also represents an attempt to describe and evaluate in objective terms an aspect of the Portuguese empire in Asia. Such studies are still painfully few. Other minor claims can also be made: chapter I places Gujarati traders in their proper position of dominance in international Asian trade around 1500, and should also dispel the myth that Indians in general were essentially a land-oriented people. The discussion of corruption in the Portuguese colonial bureaucracy helps to put this phenomenon in its correct perspective. Our main contribution, however, lies in chapters V and VI.

For the whole dissertation, and especially when

we attempt to depict sub-imperial level political relations, the sources are generally inadequate. Sylvia Thrupp, in her The Merchant Class of Medieval London, has two appendices covering sixty-seven pages in which she lists details on members of aldermanic families, and London landowners in 1436.[1] This is precisely the sort of material we need and do not have for premodern India. All too often our merchants remain disembodied figures, dimly seen through the swirling mists created by the preconceptions of the chroniclers.

To be specific, the footnotes reveal that our main sources for the sixteenth century were Portuguese and Persian chronicles. On the Portuguese side there is some additional documentation available, notably letters sent from Portuguese India to the king in Lisbon. These letters are useful, but it cannot always be assumed that the governor wanted the king to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. What we really need are letters sent from Div to Goa, or the accounts of the factor in Div, or lists of cartazes granted in Div. With pitifully few exceptions, these are no longer extant. Letters from missionaries can be useful, although they also had their preconceptions. We can only sigh for the account books or

[1] Sylvia Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieval London, Chicago, 1948, pp. 321-88.

reminiscences of a Portuguese merchant living in Cambay.

Most valuable of all would be contemporary records of Surat's merchants. From the Gujarati side we have only the Persian chronicles, plus one in Arabic, and some as yet virtually untapped Jain temple records.[2] The chronicles, whether Portuguese or Persian, have profound limitations for our needs. One of the former once dismissed "the events of a particular year as not worth recording 'since what they did chiefly related to trade, a subject unbecoming to a grave history such as this.'"[3] These chronicles were written for kings and sultans by their dependents. They aim to glorify their masters. They reflect the courtly ethos, whether of the fidalgo or of the _khan_. The Persian ones especially do not dwell on, nor sometimes even mention, occasions when their patrons were discomfitted. Thus Malik Ayaz's defeat off Div in 1509 goes unrecorded in the Persian accounts, but is described in detail in the Portuguese chronicles.[4]

[2] See K.H. Kamdar, "Virji Vorah, Surat Millionaire Mahajan" (in Gujarati), in _Journal of the Gujarat Research Society_, XXX, 4, Oct. 1968, pp. 276-9, as an example of the sort of information to be found in these records.

[3] C.R. Boxer in H.V. Livermore (ed.), _Portugal and Brazil. An Introduction_, Oxford, 1953, p. 211.

[4] For the Portuguese chronicles see C.R. Boxer, _Three Historians of Portuguese Asia (Barros, Couto and Bocarro)_, Macau, 1948. For the Persian, Peter Hardy, _Historians of Medieval India. Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing_, London, 1960; Jean Aubin,

Our merchants are but dimly perceived, emerging infrequently to offer defiance or a very large bribe, and retreating speedily to their world outside the cognizance of the chronicler. In all fairness, however, it must be noted that some important early Portuguese works have been lost, most notably João de Barros's Geography; by repute this was a detailed survey of Asia when the Portuguese arrived.[5]

Apart from the chronicles, our bibliography reveals just how many sixteenth and seventeenth-century Portuguese sources have now been published. The bulk of Portuguese colonial records, however, remain in the archives of Goa and Lisbon.[6] It is hoped that this dissertation will help C. R. Boxer's long campaign to bring their value, even indispensability, to the attention of historians of Asia. Despite their limitations, they are crucial. Now that such a large sample is readily available in published form there can be no excuse for not using them.

Concerning the secondary works less needs to be said. The only sophisticated work on the medieval history of Gujarat is by S. C. Misra. For concepts and modus operandi,

"The Secretary of Mahmud Gawan and his lost chronicle" in Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, I, ii, Oct., 1964; S. C. Misra, The Mirat-i Sikandiri, Baroda, 1961, pp. 1-56; S.C. Misra, "The Mirat-i-Sikandari of Shaikh Sikandar and its Predecessors," in Mohibbul Hasan (ed.), Historians of Medieval India, Meerut, 1968, pp. 59-68.

[5] C.R. Boxer, Three Historians of Portuguese Asia, pp. 9-12.

[6] For the Goa archives see C.R. Boxer, "A Glimpse of the Goa Archives," in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, June, 1952, and P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Roteiro dos Arquivos da India Portuguesa, Bastorá, Goa, 1955. For Portugal's archives see Virginia Rau, "Arquivos

my debt to Max Weber and his successors, and to numerous anthropologists, is evident. With the exception of the work of W.H. Moreland, and books originating from Aligarh Muslim University, the less said about secondary works on medieval India the better.

The literature on the Portuguese colonial empire is relatively voluminous, but also disappointing. In Portugal the best work is being done by V. Magalhães-Godinho and Virgínia Rau; the best survey of the whole field is C. R. Boxer's recent The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825, which summarizes a lifetime of study on the subject. Three good essays, by H. V. Livermore, I.A. MacGregor, and J. B. Harrison, appeared in the New Cambridge Modern History, volumes I, II, and III. Our debt to all these authors is apparent, especially in chapters I and II.

The limitations of these sources dictated that we take our evidence from a very long period, roughly 1500-1650, and especially from 1600 onwards, when the relatively voluminous English and Dutch records on Gujarat start. Critics will say that such a procedure is invalid; but we have tried to be honest and not read back from 1660 to the early fifteenth century. In essence we have used the fuller seventeenth-century records to elaborate on hints, indications, partial descriptions, of the sixteenth century. If the slightly later source has more detail on what is clearly a

de Portugal, Lisboa," in Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Luso-Brazilian Studies, Oct., 1950, Nashville, 1953.

parallel sixteenth-century process, then we feel justified in using the former as well as the latter.

In any case, we contend that one of the crucial characteristics of the political systems we are describing is that they change very slowly. The continuity of the Confucian system in China has been stressed by many writers[7], with structural changes occurring only in the later nineteenth century. Similarly, B.S. Cohn's description of the eighteenth-century Indian political system, especially in Benares, makes it clear that at least up to this time major changes had not taken place in the sixteenth-century system with which we are concerned.[8]

For many historians, Akbar's conquest of Gujarat in 1572, or the arrival of the Dutch and English at Surat in the early seventeenth century, make decisive watersheds. The former event was in fact of little moment as regards our main concerns, as will become clear later. Nor did the latter affect political relationships in Gujarat, at least until the eighteenth century. Even in economic terms the presence of the Dutch and English meant little. They settled in Gujarat as simply two more groups of foreign merchants.

[7] For example, J.K. Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer, A.N. Craig, East Asia. The Modern Transformation, Boston, 1965, p. 5.

[8] B.S. Cohn, "Political Systems in Eighteenth Century India," in Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 82, 1962.

The English especially were often heavily in debt to local merchants, and were bullied by them because of their financial weakness.[9] The average capacity of the seventy-six ships the English East India Company bought or built between 1600 and 1640 was 430 tons.[10] The average for local ships was 300-400 tons.[11] Surat remained vastly more important than Bombay as a trade center until the 1720's at least.[12] The average capital employed on the first twenty-six ships sent to the east by the English East India Company was only about Rs. 1,50,000. In the 1620's the Dutch had Rs. 5,00,000 invested in all of India, according to the head of their Surat factory. He considered this to be a large sum.[13] Some Gujarati ships trading

[9] Irfan Habib, "Usury in Medieval India," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, VI, 4, July, 1964, passim; Factories, 1624-29, p. 94; 1633-36, p. 24; 1642-45, p. 108.

[10] K.N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, New York, 1965, p. 95.

[11] A. Jan Qaisar, "Shipbuilding in the Mughal Empire in the Seventeenth Century," in Indian Economic and Social History Review, V, 2, June, 1968, pp. 65-66.

[12] Holden Furber, Bombay Presidency in the Mid-Eighteenth Century, Bombay, 1965, pp. 6, 9.

[13] W.W. Hunter, A History of British India, London, 1899-1900, 2 vols., II, 177; Recueil des voyages qui ont servi a l'établissement et aux progrez de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales formée dans les Provinces-Unies des Pais-Bas, Rouen, 1725, 12 vols., VII, 565.

to the Red Sea in the late sixteenth century were worth more than Rs. 10,00,000 each.[14] How, then, can B.G. Gokhale see the vanias as rising in the seventeenth century thanks mainly to the arrival of the Dutch and English, and the wealth and trade of seventeenth-century Gujarat as new and based on the presence of these two European companies?[15]

What is at issue here is two biases in historical writing on India: "Whiggishness" and "Euro-centricity," the former reading back from the present to find the significance of the past, the latter looking at things Indian through European spectacles. Thus P.R. Roberts finds the British Empire in India stemming inevitably from Hawkins' arrival in Surat in 1608: "From the Eastern aspect it [the first century of the British in India] affords a wonderful spectacle of the advance of a Western civilization into the vast dominions of an Oriental empire--an advance as gradual, yet as irresistible, as the surging-in of the ever-moving ocean through the tidal creeks and lagoons of the Indian shore."[16] One example of the latter bias is

[14] Cf. pp. 220-1, and footnotes, of chapter IV.

[15] B.G. Gokhale, "Ahmedabad in the XVIIth Century," in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, XII, 2, April, 1969, pp. 189, 190-1, 194, and passim.

[16] P.E. Roberts' introduction to W.W. Hunter, op. cit., II, 8.

the unpromising start to a book on the French in India: "L'Asie, berceau du genre humain, n'a pas tenu dans l'histoire de la civilisation du monde la place éminente que lui promettait ce début."[17] In essence, we contend that not to use material from the seventeenth century would be to show the influence of these two biases.

[17] Henri Weber, La Compagnie Française des Indes (1604-1875), Paris, 1904, p. 1. For these biases see Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, London, 1931; J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society, The Hague, 1955, pp. 145-56; John R.W. Smail, "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia," in Journal of Southeast Asian History, II, 2, July, 1961, passim.

# CHAPTER I: THE SETTING

Gujarat and Asian Trade. Even today the economy of south and southeast Asia is largely dependent on the arrival of the monsoon winds, and the amount of rain they bring with them. These monsoons were, and to a large extent are, the governing factor controlling shipping in the surrounding seas. They largely determined when a particular route could be sailed, when a market would be high or low, and when a punitive naval expedition could be undertaken.

In the area with which we are most concerned, from East Africa to Indonesia, the northeast monsoon prevails from about October to March, and the southwest from May or June to September. Trade was regulated in accordance with these winds: for example, the "season" for trade from Gujarat to Aden was from September to May, for Aden to Malabar from October to February. A further refinement may be noted, of particular importance to western Indian trade. A ship coming across the Arabian Sea from East Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, or the Red Sea had to adjust its voyage so that it reached the Indian coast as the southwest monsoon was slackening, in September, for with the full force of the wind behind it a ship would have great difficulty in entering the poor harbors of western India. If, however, it reached western Indian waters too late it would not reach

the coast at all in the face of the beginning monsoon. Similarly, a ship bound for the Cape of Good Hope had to leave western India as soon as possible in the new calendar year in order to round the Cape before the monsoon slackened.[1]

By 1500 the ships trading in these seas on long-distance routes were all of the Arab type. A century earlier Chinese junks had come at least as far as western India, and Arab ships had called regularly at Canton.[2] Now there was a fairly strict dividing line at Malacca, with junks going no further west, and no Muslim ships sailing to China. These Muslim ships were single masted, with very large rudders worked by two cords on either side of the boat. They were primarily held together by cords, but nails and glue were also sometimes used in their construction. Only one large latteen sail was used,

[1] On the importance of the monsoons in Asia see Eric Axelson, The Portuguese in Southeast Africa, 1600-1700, Johannesburg, 1960, p. 2; W.H. Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar, Delhi, 1962, pp. 213-5; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, pp. 119-120; Barros, II, vi, 1. For a detailed description of Div's monsoons see Barreto de Rezende, I, 60-60r. Here, and throughout the dissertation, a footnote at the end of a paragraph or paragraphs means that the paragraph in question has been organically constructed from the cited sources; more precise documentation was not possible.

[2] Barros, II, ii, 9; G.F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring, Princeton, 1951, passim, for early Arab trade; for Arab trade to Southeast Asia see articles by R.R. Di Meglio and M.A.P. Meilink Roelofsz in D.S. Richards, (ed.), Islam and the Trade of Asia, Philadelphia, 1970; for the China trade in the early Islamic period see articles by M. Rogers, G.T. Scanlon, N. Chittick, and G.F. Hudson, in ibid.

and they were not fitted with keels. The ships were not decked, which increased the carrying capacity; huts were provided for the passengers and some of the cargo. These ships were dominant on all the international routes of south and southeast Asia, whether in Gujarat, the Red Sea, Malabar, or Malacca.[3] In capacity the largest seem to have at least equalled contemporary Portuguese ships. The early sixteenth-century records speak of Muslim ships of between 375 and 800 tons capacity.[4] A list of 1525 describes thirty-six Portuguese ships in India, the biggest of which was 550 tons. It was not until 1558 that the Portuguese sent a ship of 1,000 tons to India.[5] Both locals and Portuguese used increasingly larger ships during the century. In the early seventeenth century the sultan of Bijapur owned a monster of

[3] Correa, I, 122-4; Castanheda, III, cxxx. For a detailed study of navigational methods and cartography around 1500 see A. Teixeira da Mota, "Methodes de Navigation et Cartographie Nautique dans l'Ocean Indien avant le XVIe Siècle," in Studia, 11, Jan., 1963, pp. 49-91.

[4] Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, London, 1875-84, 4 vols., II, 122; ANTTSV, XIV, 1r; Descrição, f. 36r. The ship of 800 tons belonged to the sultan of Gujarat, and was captured by the Portuguese at Hurmuz in 1510. It "was the biggest ship that used to sail in that Gulf [of Cambay] and in many parts was famous for its size." (Castanheda, III, xxxv) It should be noted that a ton of capacity meant a quantity of goods sufficient to occupy 60 cubic feet. The 800 ton ship thus had a capacity of 48,000 cubic feet.

[5] ANTTSV, XI, 12r-15r; Bernardo Gomes de Brito, História Trágico-Marítima, Porto, 1942-43, 6 vols., II, 53.

2,000 tons, but the average for local ships was 300-400 tons.[6]

Descriptions of Asian trade around 1500 have tended to focus on the long-distance trade in spices from Indonesia via Calicut to the Red Sea and Europe. There is no doubt that this was an important trade, and that Calicut was a great emporium when the Portuguese first reached India, but it is necessary to be careful of the sources here. Asia's main export to Europe for at least a century on either side of da Gama's voyage was spices; these were what the Portuguese came to India to get, and so Malabar was the area best known to their early writers. The Portuguese capital in Asia was Cochin until 1530. Similarly, we can admit the importance of the trade in spices to Europe, at least to Europeans, to the Mamluks of Egypt, and to the Arab merchants who carried the pepper from Malabar. Nevertheless, we do not need to go so far as the early Portuguese chronicles and later W.H. Moreland[7] in elevating spices and Arabs into the dominant products and merchants in Asian trade.

[6] A. Jan Qaisar, "Shipbuilding in the Mughal Empire during the Seventeenth Century," in Indian Economic and Social History Review, V, 2, June, 1968, pp. 65-66; "Consultas do serviço de partes," HAG, III, 47r; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, p. 124.

[7] W.H. Moreland, "The Ships of the Arabian Sea about A.D. 1500," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, April, 1939, pp. 174-5.

Around 1500 there were in Asia a number of well-defined "international" routes, the most important of which were: from China and Indonesia to Malacca; from Malacca to Gujarat; from Gujarat to the Red Sea; from Malabar to the Red sea; from Gujarat to Malabar and intermediate ports on the western coast; from Aden to Hurmuz; from East Africa to Gujarat; from Gujarat to Hurmuz. Various feeder routes linked areas such as Ceylon, Bengal, Siam, and Coromandel to the great centers of Malacca, Calicut, Cambay, Hurmuz, and the Red Sea. Despite the complexity of this network of routes, one fact stands out: the most important merchants on all these "international" routes, with only two exceptions, were Gujaratis, carrying not only their own cloths, indigo, and opium, but also the goods of others, especially spices.

The greatest port in Gujarat in 1500 was Cambay, or more strictly Gandhar. Cambay itself was, as a result of the silting of the Gulf of Cambay, now one mile inland. Yet this great city, despite its advantages as the best-sited port to serve the most fertile area in Gujarat, faced serious difficulties, first from the continual problem of the silting up of the upper reaches of the gulf, and second from the dreaded tidal bore in the gulf, which by repute could put even a man on horseback in danger.[8] For these reasons,

[8] Barros, IV, v. 1.

ocean-going ships usually put in at either Div or Gogha, and their goods were off-loaded into smaller coastal craft which took them to Gandhar. The inconvenience of this method was apparently such that in 1500 Div was increasing greatly in importance, as more and more of the actual trade, not just transshipment, took place there rather than in Cambay. The other two great Gujarati ports were Surat and Rander, on the left and right banks of the Tapti River. The former rose to preeminence during the century, the latter was destroyed by the Portuguese. The ports south of Surat and west of Div were of less importance in "international" trade.[9]

Gujarat's most important trade was that linking Aden and Malacca via her own great ports. As the most acute contemporary observer said, "Cambay [i.e. Gujarat] chiefly stretches out two arms, with her right arm she reaches out towards Aden and with the other towards Malacca, as the most important places to sail to, and the other places are held to be of less importance."[10] Goods and money from Italy, Greece, and Damascus were brought down the Red Sea by the merchants of Cairo

[9] Descrição, f. 22; Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, Lisbon, 1884-1935, 7 vols., I, 135-6; Barros, II, ii, 9; Couto, IV, vii, 5; Marechal Gomes da Costa, Descobrimentos e Conquistas, Lisbon, 1927-30, 3 vols., III, 256; Pires, I, 34-35.

[10] Pires, I, 42. See an account of 1500 in Arquivo Português Oriental, ed. A.B. de Bragança Pereira, Bastorá, Goa, 10 vols., tomo I, vol. I, part 1, p. 128.

and Jiddah to Aden. There they were either exchanged for goods brought to Aden in local or Gujarati ships, or else the goods from west Asia and Europe continued on in Arab ships to Gujarat. These cargoes included gold and silver, quicksilver, vermilion, copper, rosewater, wools, and brocades. In the great ports of the Gulf of Cambay they were exchanged for local goods, pre-eminently cotton cloths, and imports, especially spices from Malacca. The trade between Gujarat and Malacca was handled almost entirely in Gujarati ships. European and Gujarati products were imported to this great southeast Asian entrepot, and exchanged for Chinese goods, especially silks and porcelains, for rubies and lacre from Pegu, for Bengal and Coromandel cloths, and for the cloves, nutmeg, and mace of the Molucca and Banda Islands. The ships sailing this Gujarat-Malacca route were based on Gujarat, but the merchants were various. The majority were Gujarati, but there were many others from countries in west Asia.[11]

Apart from this blue-ribbon Aden to Malacca route, we find the inevitable Gujaratis with their ubiquitous cloths in many other parts of seaborne Asia. They traded to points east of Aden in the Hadramaut, as far as Hurmuz. They went direct to Bengal, Pegu, and

[11] Pires, I, 43; II, 269-70; Descrição, f. 6r; Barros, I, viii, 1; Stephano's account in R.H. Major (ed.), India in the Fifteenth Century, London, 1857, p. 9.

Sumatra, as well as collecting products from these places in Malacca. They virtually monopolized overseas trade in East Africa, collecting gold and ivory and slaves in exchange for their cloths, for the people of Sofala, like those of Melinde and Mombasa, "want nothing but the cloths of Cambay."[12] Gujaratis also operated in the coastal trade of western India, in Dabhol, Chaul, Goa, and the Malabar ports, from which last they took pepper back to the Deccan ports and their own homeland. "The best house of the area" in Calicut in 1500 was owned by a Muslim from Gujarat.[13]

It has been noted that the spices of southeast Asia--mace, nutmeg, and cloves--were carried by Gujarati ships, though the merchants concerned were heterogeneous. Pepper also was carried by Gujaratis to central and north India, but the celebrated pepper trade from Malabar to the Red Sea, and secondarily from Malabar to Hurmuz, was handled by Arab merchants in their own ships. These merchants were based on Cairo or Jiddah, the port of Mecca. To Malabar, and especially to the great entrepot of Calicut, they brought the same goods as went to Gujarat. In return

[12] Alguns Documentos do Archivo nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, 1892, p. 205; Descrição, ff. 1-1r, 22; Castanheda, I, x; Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, I, 44, 105.

[13] A.B. de Bragança Pereira, op. cit., p. 134; Descrição, f. 55r.

they took the local pepper and ginger, and cinnamon from Ceylon. Some of the goods from Malacca, as spices and Chinese goods, came via Calicut also, but most of them went direct from Malacca to Gujarat.[14]

In terms of total Asian trade, and even in terms of total Asian trade in spices, the carriage of spices up the Red Sea to Suez, Cairo, Alexandria, and Venice was of less than major importance. In the sixteenth century only a tiny part of Asia's total production of spices was used in Europe, the rest being used within Asia.[15] Nevertheless, to the merchants of Venice, and to the Mamluk rulers of Egypt, this trade to Europe was vital. The later medieval prosperity of Venice was based on it, and so were the revenues of Mamluk Egypt. The latter collected taxes at Jiddah, Suez, and Alexandria, at each of which places the spices were transshipped, so that from the time when spices entered Jiddah to when they left Alexandria they would pay taxes of at least 30%.[16]

Many other products and routes could be distinguished, but we shall content ourselves with a mention of the last of the great Asian trade centers, Hurmuz. From this entrepot came goods from Persia, the Persian

[14] Pires, I, 78, 82; A.B. de Bragança Pereira, op. cit., p. 140; Descrição, ff. 36r-37; The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, London, 1928, p. 61; Conti's account in R.H. Major (ed.), op. cit., p. 20; Nikitin's account in ibid., p. 20.

[15] For this see chapter II.

[16] Castanheda, II, lxxv.

Gulf, Afghanistan, and the Oxus River valley, especially pearls, seed pearls, horses, and silks. To this port came merchandise from Aden, Gujarat, and Malacca. The most important item traded to India was undoubtedly horses, for although horses were bred in Kathiawar they were of poor quality, and the best horses were desired in all the Indian states of the fifteenth century both for show and for war. They came in to Vijayanagar at the rate of 3,000-4,000 a year via the Kanara ports of Honavar and Bhatkal, to the Deccan sultanates through Goa and Chaul, to Gujarat through her own ports and also overland, and overland via Qandahar to the sultanate of Delhi.[17]

It is sometimes assumed, with Gibbon, that the products of Asian trade in 1500 were "splendid and trifling." We shall consider later the role of overseas commerce in the economy of the very wealthy state of sultanate Gujarat, but meanwhile we may note that this view is based at least partly on the belief that India in particular was virtually self-sufficient in all essential commodities. This was broadly true of the subcontinent in 1500, but India was only a geographical expression; coastal trade was thus as much "international" trade as was that from Jiddah to Cambay. And on the coastal routes basic foodstuffs

[17] Ibid., II, xvi, lviii; Barros, I, vii, 10; II, v, 2; A.B. de Bragança Pereira, op. cit., p. 127; Marechal Gomes da Costa, op. cit., II, 149; Sikandar, pp. 144, 404.

were carried. Calicut imported nearly all her staple of rice[18], as did the rest of Malabar, from the Kanara area. Goa, then as now, was a deficit rice area. In the seventeenth century, and presumably in the sixteenth, Gujarat imported grains from Malwa and Ajmer.[19] Malacca imported rice from Siam and Bengal. Further, cloths, horses, and even spices can be categorized as necessities. Even basic raw materials were traded. Gujarat imported copper, and madder, a red dye.[20]

Later in this chapter we shall also be investigating the composition of the merchant class of sultanate Gujarat. At this point, however, we should briefly consider who were the dominant overseas traders in Asia at this time. Chinese traders had, for internal political reasons, disappeared from the seas west of Malacca during the fifteenth century. For the rest of the area, it is clear that Muslims were dominant on most of the long-distance routes, but this does not mean that we can talk of a Muslim period, let alone of Moreland's "Arab" one.[21] Certainly Arabs were in control of the trade between Calicut and the Red Sea, and Calicut was dominated by them.

[18] Castanheda, I, xiii.

[19] Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, Bombay, 1963, pp. 73-74.

[20] Descrição, f. 6r.

[21] W.H. Moreland, "The Ships of the Arabian Sea . . ." op. cit., pp. 174-5.

They participated in the trade from the Red Sea to Malacca via Gujarat, but were dominant in it only as far as Aden. On the rest of this route they were out-numbered by other Muslims--Gujaratis, Persians, Turks, and others--and by Gujarati vanias.[22] Hurmuz had an enormous variety of merchants resident during the trading season, but again mostly Muslims. Trade in the western Indian ports of Goa, Dabhol, and Chaul was dominated by Muslims.[23] Non-Muslims, especially Gujaratis, also traded to Calicut, though not from there to the Red Sea,[24] and Malacca was far from being such a Muslim-dominated town as was Aden or Hurmuz. The bulk of the merchants on the great Aden-Gujarat-Malacca route were Muslims, but the feeder trades from Coromandel, Bengal, Indonesia, and China were handled largely by non-Muslims.[25] The less important

[22] The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, p. 61; Pires, I, 82; Stephano's account in R.H. Major (ed.), op.cit., p. 9; A.B. de Bragança Pereira, op. cit., p. 140. It seems that Arabs had been important in Cambay trade circles, but by the fifteenth century had been replaced by local Muslims and others. For their importance in the early fourteenth century see S.C. Misra, The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat, London, 1963, pp. 63-64, 67, 96.

[23] Abd-er-Razzak's account in R.H. Major (ed.), op. cit., pp. 5-6; Nikitin's account in ibid., p. 19; Castanheda, III, viii; The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, p. 47.

[24] A.B. de Bragança Pereira, op. cit., p. 139; Descrição, f. 56.

[25] Alguns Documentos do Archivo nacional da Torre do Tombo, p. 224.

trade to East Africa was controlled by Gujaratis, both Muslim and Hindu.[26]

The long-distance "international" trade of Asia around 1500 was thus largely handled by Muslims of various origins. On what was this dominance based? It is possible that caste prohibitions concerning travel by sea played some part in discouraging Hindus from trading, although in fact such a claim has not been found in any contemporary source, and Gujarat's vanias were certainly not affected by any such theoretical prohibition. A more likely explanation is that the Arabs, as they erupted south and east in the early years of the hijrah, tended to convert mostly people who lived on the coasts and so were most accessible. This was certainly the case in Gujarat and Indonesia,[27] and among such people would be a high proportion of the previously non-Muslim merchants. It is clear that Muslims from different areas combined with their countrymen to discourage competition; this was done by the Arabs on the Calicut-Red Sea route. Muslims from various areas tended to live together under their own headmen, in the great trade centers, but so did Gujarat's vanias at least in Calicut.[28] Whatever the reason for this partial

[26] Castanheda, I, x; Descrição, ff. 1-3r.

[27] Castanheda, II, cxi; III, cxxx.

[28] W.H. Moreland, "The Ships of the Arabian Sea . . .", op. cit., p. 174; Descrição, f. 56; see also chapter VI.

dominance, there is no evidence extant that it was gained or kept by force. There is no mention in the sources that merchants of any kind were prohibited from trading to a particular area, or in a particular product. Certainly outsiders could be, and no doubt were, discouraged from breaking into an area dominated by another group, but apparently the only sanctions used were commercial; this of course does not mean they were ineffective.

Nor is there any evidence that rulers of ports in fifteenth-century south and southeast Asia tried to compel merchants to call and pay duties: merchants called at the great entrepots of their own free will. There are, however, three scattered instances where compulsion was used. In the seventh and eighth centuries the southeast Sumatran state of Srivijaya controlled and taxed trade to China, apparently by force.[29] In 1344 Ibn Batuta found the ruler of the port of Fakaner in south Kanara compelling passing ships to put in and pay duties.[30] It is, however, more significant that Ibn Batuta visited virtually every other major port in south Asia, and does not mention any element of compulsion in any of them,

[29] O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce. A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya, Ithaca, 1967, pp. 238-9, 248-9.

[30] Ibn Batuta, The Rehla of Ibn Batuta. (India, Maldive Islands and Ceylon), trans. Mahdi Husain, Baroda, 1953, pp. 184-5.

except Fakaner.[31] No fifteenth-century account mentions forced trade. Malacca was typical in that its rise in the fifteenth century was due not to a policy of forcing merchants to call but to the strategic location of the port, its good harbor, fair treatment of visiting merchants, and possibly the conversion of its rulers to Islam.[32]

The third instance of compulsion, apart from the Portuguese, concerns the port of Div. A source of 1545 says that in the time of Sultan Bahadur (1526-37) "all the ships going to Cambay went first directly to Div and from there afterwards to where they wished."[33] An official writing in the 1590's also mentions this, but expands considerably as he says that Div was established specifically to be such a trade center, and was maintained as such by the rulers of Gujarat.[34]

[31] Ibid., pp. 150-242. Leeds, however, uses the sole case of Fakaner to construct a general rule of compulsion in pre-sixteenth-century Asian trade so that this area fits into his preconceived definition of a "port of call." (Anthony Leeds, "The Port-of-Call in Pre-European India as an Ecological and Evolutionary Type" in Viola E. Garfield (ed.), Proceedings of the 1961 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society, Seattle, 1961, p. 29, and passim.)

[32] M.A.P. Meilink Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, The Hague, 1962, pp. 33-35, and pp. 36-59 passim for the organization of trade in fifteenth-century Malacca, where there is no mention of any compulsion.

[33] Gavetas, I, 776.

[34] F. Paes, "O Tombo de Diu, 1592," in O Oriente Português, new series, no. 4, Oct., 1932, p. 41.

The earlier source is more likely to be accurate, as it was written only eight years after Bahadur's death. Div rose to be a great trade center for Gujarat because of its location, because of the dangers of the Gulf of Cambay for large ships, and because of the able administration of Malik Ayaz. An attempt to _compel_ all ships to call there was presumably made only by Bahadur after he won close control of the port in 1528. Another Portuguese source implies that Bahadur's warships were used to protect Gujarati traders from the Portuguese rather than to force their ships to call at Div,[35] and this indeed seems the most likely reason why "all the ships going to Cambay went first directly to Div . . ." If, however, this was really forced trade, the idea was presumably copied from the Portuguese, and was a response to their claims. In any case, none of these three instances where forced trade may have existed invalidate what we have said about the situation when the Portuguese arrived in India.

European expansion in Asia went through four stages: itinerant trade on a basis of equality with other merchants in a foreign town; the establishment of a factory, which was often fortified; the seizure or acquisition of a port, and erection of a fort in

[35] Francisco de Andrade, _Chrónica de muyto alto e muyto poderoso Rey destes Reinos de Portugal, Dom João o III deste Nome_, Coimbra, 1796, 4 vols, II, 193-4.

it; the conquest of extensive land areas. In the fifteenth century Asian trade was in the first of these stages. It was not organized or controlled on the basis of the state to which a merchant belonged, so there was no Arab or Gujarati factory in Calicut or Malacca. As we shall see later, the Europeans, organized on state or quasi-state lines, moved straight to stage two, and often soon after to stage three. Stage four was not reached, except in Ceylon, and possibly the Philippines and Java, until the late eighteenth century, when the British began their conquests in India.

What exactly was the position of a foreign merchant in the great trade centers of Malacca, Calicut, Cambay, Hurmuz, and Aden? With the exception of Cambay, the immediate hinterlands of these bustling cosmopolitan cities produced little; the list is virtually complete with pepper and ginger from Calicut and pearls from Hurmuz. All five, even Cambay, were economically dependent on foreign trade, so that the interests of the foreign merchants were safeguarded by the rulers.[36] The influence of the foreign merchants, however, was much less in Cambay than in the other four, for Cambay was part of a large and powerful sultanate. Aden, Hurmuz, Calicut, and Malacca were

[36] As, for example, A.B. de Bragança Pereira, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

in practice small independent states, despite their nominal subordination to more powerful inland states.

In each of these five towns the resident foreign merchants tended to live in defined areas with their fellows, and to enjoy a large measure of autonomy. In Calicut we hear of the heads of the Turkish merchants, of those from Cairo and the Red Sea, and of the local Muslim merchants.[37] There was also a head of all the foreign merchants in Calicut, who "governs and punishes them without the Zamorin having anything to do with this, except what the governor tells him."[38] The situation in Malacca was similar.[39] These heads or governors acted as intermediaries between the local ruler and the merchants they represented. The rulers had little contact with the merchants who made them rich. They provided the essential elements required by the merchants--among them freedom from arbitrary injustice, reasonable taxes, and religious tolerance--and otherwise left them alone. This semi-autonomous status for foreign merchants no doubt had to be conceded, for they could have left if a ruler had tried to impose more direct irksome rule, but in any case such a status was conceded in most south

[37] Castanheda, I, xxxvi; Júlio Gonçalves, _Os Portugueses e o Mar das Indias_, Lisbon, 1947, p. 415.

[38] Descrição, f. 36r; see also Tohfut, pp. 72-73; Ibn Batuta, _op. cit._, pp. 189, 193.

[39] Correa, II, 253; _The Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque_, III, 87-88; Pires, II, 264-5; Barros, II, vi, 3.

and southeast Asian ports at this time. It was enjoyed by the Dutch, English, and French in seventeenth-century Mughal India, and was later the basis of their claim to extra-territorial rights in many ports of southeast and east Asia.

After this brief survey, we may attempt a summary of the major elements of the seaborne trade of Asia around 1500. This trade was carried on under conditions of considerable freedom, for those participating in it owed nothing to land governments except customs duties. Nor was there any forcible attempt to control trade on the part of those who lived by it, or by inland governments. Such sanctions as the merchants used were purely commercial. The ships used were adequate for sailing before the monsoons, and as large as those used in Europe at the time. We may also note that the European traders during their first 150 years in Asian waters did not open up trade in any important new product, or develop any new route, except that via the Cape of Good Hope to Europe, which was, after all, only an alternative to the existing Red Sea route. Asian traders were open to new ideas. This is shown by the rise of Malacca, and later Div, in the fifteenth century. Indeed, perhaps the dominating characteristic, especially as regards Gujarati traders, was flexibility and readiness to adapt. Thus as Malacca developed in the fifteenth century the Gujaratis almost ceased to trade past there to

Indonesia, preferring to let Chinese and Indonesian goods be brought to them in Malacca.[40] The payment of customs duties in Malacca exhibits a similar flexibility. These were usually about 6%, plus presents, and were assessed by the captain, or _shahbandar_, of the group to which the merchant in question belonged. If he needed more money for political purposes at court, he would, with the consent of the merchant concerned, collect duties at a higher rate. If the _shahbandar's_ group stood high at the time he would take less in duties.[41] This willingness to compromise, to pay more if this was necessary to secure their trade, was to stand Gujarat's merchants in good stead in the sixteenth century.

_The Economy of Gujarat_. Having sketched the role of Gujarat's merchants in Asian-wide trade around 1500, it is now necessary to focus more closely on sultanate Gujarat. First, what area was ruled by the sultan of Gujarat? This question is impossible to answer with any finality, as the area expanded under aggressive sultans, notably under Mahmud I (1458-1511) and Bahadur (1526-37), and contracted under others. Further, frontiers were not usually

[40] Pires, I, 45-46.

[41] _Ibid_., II, 273. For shahbandars, see W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas," in _Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society_, Oct., 1920, _passim_.

demarcated in sixteenth-century India; particularly on the edges there was considerable flexibility. Gujarat's westernmost boundary was somewhere on the Gulf of Kutch, or perhaps a little east of this.[42] Beyond was the kingdom of Sind. In the south the border with the sultanate of Ahmadnagar was usually Bombay.[43]

Gujarat's inland boundaries were flexible, and thus not easy to define. We may note that the Portuguese chroniclers sometimes speak of Cambay and Gujarat interchangeably, but in fact the more careful of them were aware that Cambay was the heartland around the Gulf of Cambay, while Gujarat referred to the whole area subordinate to the sultans.[44] This heartland was essentially the ten _sarkars_ which after

[42] Castanheda (III, cxxx, VIII, cvii) has Mangrol in 1514, and "Variune," presumably Vavania, for 1535. Eredia has Cutch (DUP, III, 136), Couto, Dwarka (VIII, iii, 13).

[43] ANTTSL, VI, 31; Eredia, _op. cit._, III, 136; but Castanheda has Gujarat in 1514 extending nearly to Chaul (III, cxxx). _The Cambridge History of India_, basing itself on _Arabic History_, I, 28-29, attempts (III, 310) to define Gujarat's boundaries when they were widest after Mahmud I had conquered Champanir in 1484. The attempt is both confused and confusing, but clearly Gujarat at this time and before and after this included considerable areas which today are not part of the Gujarat State in the Indian Union, but are included in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, or Rajasthan.

[44] See a reference in 1619 to the viceroy "of Cambay and the other lands of Gujarat" (Assentos, I, 24), and Couto's mention of Humayon in 1535 conquering "all the Kingdoms of Cambay" (IV, x, 3). In 1572 Couto spoke of Bassein and Daman as being part of the "Gujarati kingdom"--not the sultanate of Cambay, for these ports were outside the heartland (IX, cap. 13).

the Mughal conquest of 1572 paid revenue, as opposed to the other six *sarkars*, which continued to be governed by *zamindars*, usually Rajputs, and which paid tribute "when it can be enforced."[45] Its limits were approximately the fifty metre contour line, except in the west, where the Little Rann of Kutch must be excluded, and in the south where the limit of Cambay was the Tapti River. Areas outside this were excluded: the less fertile area south of the Tapti,[46] Kathiawar and Kutch, and the area north and east of the low-lying lands around the Gulf of Cambay, where Gujarat shaded off into Malwa and Rajputana. For our purposes Gujarat in fact usually means Cambay, for economically these areas on the outskirts were of less importance. Kathiawar and Kutch produced horses, and timber and provisions came from the minor southern ports of Bassein and Daman.[47] Sawrath had been a wealthy area before it was conquered by Mahmud I; apparently its prosperity then declined due to unsettled political conditions,[48] although its ports of Porbandar, Mangrol,

[45] Mirat, Supplement, pp. 189-90.

[46] We may note that a Persian chronicle refers to Daman as a "*muzafat*," an appendage, of the sultanate (Sikandar, p. 426). See also chapter III, f.n. 82.

[47] F. Mendes da Luz (ed.), "Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas Partes da India, 1582" in *Studia*, 6, 1960, ff. 23r, 26r; Correa, III, 450.

[48] Sikandar, pp. 115-6.

and Somnath continued to export some cotton cloths.

Within the heartland, the area known as Cambay, the greatest product was cotton cloths in an enormous variety of styles, qualities, colors, and patterns. For quality and durability it was considered to be the best in Asia. The great manufacturing centers were Ahmadabad, Pattan, Baroda, Broach, and Surat.[49] Silk weaving, using raw silk from Bengal, was a second great textile concern, especially in Ahmadabad, Surat, and Cambay.[50] Next to textiles ranked indigo, "the blue stone color," which was produced in Sarkhej, near Ahmadabad, but apparently refined at Cambay.[51]

[49] Barreto de Rezende, I, 64; W.H. Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar, pp. 167-71. For an excellent study of Gujarati textiles in the seventeenth century, especially strong on technical matters, see John Irwin in John Irwin and P.R. Schwartz, Studies in Indo-European Textile History, Ahmedabad, 1966, pp. 8-27. Coromandel and Bengal textiles are described in ibid., pp. 28-58, while pp. 57-72 contain a very detailed and valuable glossary. For an account of textile manufacturing processes in northern India see H.K, Naqvi, Urban Centres and Industries in Upper India, 1556-1803, London, n.d., pp. 148-75, and for descriptions of 50 types of cotton cloths, ibid., pp. 176-88.

[50] Duarte Barbosa, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, London, 1918-21, 2 vols., I, 154; W.H. Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar, pp. 160-3; M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, Bombay, 1934, 1957, 2 vols., II, 296-7.

[51] Nikitin's account in R.H. Major, India in the Fifteenth Century, p. 19; Duarte Barbosa, op. cit., I, 154; A. Botelho da Costa Veiga (ed.), Relação das plantas e descrições de todas as fortalezas . . ., Lisbon, 1936, p. 21; Abu'l Fazl Allami, The Ain-i Akbari, Calcutta, 1939-49, 3 vols., II, 248. See Eredia in DUP, III, 138, for a description of the indigo plant.

The sultanate also produced a great variety of drugs and medicinal products, especially opium, but also spikenard, carnelians, arrowroot, lac, borax, and Indian wormwood.[52] Other products were legion; we may note a strong handicraft industry making weapons, furniture, and jewelry.[53]

There is no evidence concerning methods of production in sultanate Gujarat. From early seventeenth-century Dutch and English records, however, we get a picture of the methods used at this time, and there is little reason to suspect that they had changed radically around 1600. It can be assumed that production was done by artisans working at home with their families. They were advanced money by capitalists (usually working through a broker) so that they could buy their raw materials and support themselves while they worked. This indigenous putting-out system was later adopted by the Dutch and English in Gujarat. Although the form of the finished product was not as closely supervised by the capitalist as would have been the case had wage labor been used, some control over form was attained.[54]

[52] Duarte Barbosa, op. cit., I, 154; Eredia, DUP, III, 138; The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema, pp. 44-45; Costa Veiga, op. cit., p. 21.

[53] Barros, IV, v, 1.

[54] M.S. Commissariat, op. cit., II, 302; W.H. Moreland, op. cit., pp. 175-6; W.H. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, London, 1923, p. 192; Irfan Habib,

The capitalists were called shroffs by the English, a corruption of the Arabic word sarraf, a banker. These people were apparently few in number, but played a pivotal role in the economy both under the sultans and later. They issued hundis, which could be used either as letters of credit to distant places or as short-term capital. They lent money on longer terms to officials and others. They financed the production on which Gujarat's prosperity was based, and its petty traders.[55] They changed money, and this raises the question of the degree of monetization of the economy of sultanate Gujarat.

"Usury in Medieval India," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, VI, 4, July 1964, p. 395; Tapan Raychaudhuri, in B.N. Ganguli (ed.), Readings in Indian Economic History, Bombay, 1964, pp. 71-73. I use capitalist in the strict sense of the term: a person controlling capital. Obviously their economic role was quite different from that of a capitalist in a "free enterprise" economy.

[55] W.H. Moreland, India at the Death of Akbar, pp. 231-2; Irfan Habib, "Usury in Medieval India," op. cit., pp. 400, 406; Irfan Habib, "Banking in Mughal India," in Contributions to Indian Economic History, I, New Delhi, 1964, pp. 2-3; D.R. Gadgil, Origins of the Modern Indian Business Class, New York, 1959, pp. 32-33; for the role of wealthy bankers in sultanate Gujarat and the availability of credit see Sikandar, p. 404. Sylvia L. Thrupp says that the London merchants had a class status in that they had a distinctive economic position, referring to the conduct of wholesale trade, and a distinctive political position, that of controlling municipal government. (S.L. Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieval London, 1300-1500, Chicago, 1948, p. xv.) Gujarat's merchants, despite their racial and religious differences, seem to have had at least common occupational identification. They did not do manual work, but lived by employing their capital in trade, and loans of various kinds. Their wealth did not make them distinctive, for some officials

It seems clear that rural Gujarat was not monetized until the seventeenth century, if then. Those areas which depended solely on producing cash crops presumably still paid their revenue in kind. In the great ports of Gujarat, however, money was widely used, along with barter methods, the sixteenth-century Portuguese accounts being full of lists of the rates of conversions of Gujarati and other coins into those of Goa.[56] It is possible that Gujarat was more monetized than Malacca at this time, for Barros claims that the merchants trading from there to India wanted nothing to do with gold, as they made only 25% profit when they took gold to India, while on goods they made much more.[57] From the Red Sea Gujarat's main import was bullion and coin, which must also point to considerable monetization.[58]

"The pivot of the Delhi Sultanate is wheat and barley, and the pivot of the Sultanate of Gujarat

also were wealthy, but the fact that they employed their wealth in the way they did was distinctive. Officials also traded and loaned money, but they used most of their available capital for display and military and political purposes. Merchants did not.

[56] For example, R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), Subsídios para a história da India Portugueza, Lisbon, 1868, pp. 40-56, 61 et seq.; APOCR, V, 324-5; "Provisões, Alvarás e Regimentos," HAG, II, 94-97.

[57] Barros, I, viii, 1.

[58] Duarte Barbosa, op. cit., I, 154; Descrição, f. 6r; Pires, I, 43.

is coral and pearl, because it has eighty-four ports under its control."[59] Thus an aphorism of Sultan Sikandar of Delhi in the early sixteenth century. Was overseas trade really a vital part of the total economy of Gujarat, or was it merely icing on the cake, froth on the beer? We can only present the evidence and some very tentative conclusions. It should first be said that we can form no impression of the extent of Gujarat's "international" inland trade in the sixteenth century. It was probably not large, for a glance at a relief map of western India makes clear the rugged nature of the areas surrounding Gujarat. None of Gujarat's rivers were navigable very far.[60] Further, even in the seventeenth century, when Gujarat was part of and surrounded by the Mughal Empire, land trade was liable to extortion by local _zamindars_, and to robbery by disaffected kolis and rajputs. Yet it seems clear that this seventeenth-century insecurity was less than it had been when Gujarat was independent, divided internally, surrounded by frequently hostile neighbors, and infested by unsubdued bandits. This

[59] Sikandar, pp. 309-10.

[60] For an interesting, although not exhaustive, bibliographical study of roads and routes in Mughal India see Jean Deloche, _Recherches sur les routes de l'Inde au temps des Mogols (Etude critique des sources)_, Paris, 1968, _passim_.

is not to say that sea trade was secure, but it probably was more so than that by land.

It is possible to estimate the value of Gujarat's sea trade (that is, the value of goods passing through Gujarat's ports) from the available figures for customs receipts, and then compare them with other revenue figures and so get some idea of the role of overseas trade in the total economy. This attempt is worth making, even though margins of error are very large. Thus we have no way of knowing how uniformly duties were collected. Nor can we estimate how often a bribe enabled a merchant to avoid all or some duties.

In 1571 the customs revenue of twenty-two ports in Gujarat, excluding Cambay, was Rs. 34,00,000, Rs. 20,00,000 of this coming from Broach, Surat, Gogha, Gandhar, and Rander, and the rest from seventeen ports in Saurashtra.[61] In 1572 the revenue of Cambay port was estimated at Rs. 6,00,000.[62] This gives us a total customs payment of Rs. 40,00,000 in sultanate Gujarat, and a total value of sea trade, assuming duties of 5%, of Rs. 8,00,00,000.

[61] Mirat, p. 14.

[62] Couto, IX, cap. 13. In 1591 it was estimated at "much more" than Rs. 3,00,000, which points to a possible decline. (AHU, Codice 281, f. 139, also in APOCR, III, 293-5.)

This figure is roughly supported by one we have for Surat in 1644. The usual revenue of the port of Surat at this time was Rs. 2,50,000,[63] and with the Mughal duties of 2½% we get a total trade value of Rs. 1,00,00,000. As Surat by 1644 was the greatest port in Gujarat (and India), a value of trade in Surat equal to about one-tenth the value of all Gujarati sea trade seems about right.[64] (This assumes a rise in the value of all Gujarati sea trade in these seventy years.)

If our figures are correct, we can see that sea trade played a very large role in the Gujarati economy, for the jama, or standard assessment, of Gujarat's land revenue in 1595-99, in the Ain-i Akbari, was just under Rs. 1,10,00,000.[65] With a rate of one-third under Akbar we can value agricultural production in the part of Gujarat which paid revenue at this time at Rs. 3,30,00,000. It should be noted that three-eighths of Gujarat paid tribute, so that the value of agricultural production

[63] Mirat, p. 193.

[64] We may note again that the total capital employed by the East India Company of London on 26 ships between 1600 and 1612 was less than Rs. 40,00,000 (W.W. Hunter, A History of British India, London, 1899-1900, 2 vols., II, 177.)

[65] Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, p. 406.

in these usually infertile areas is not included in this Rs. 3,30,00,000. The total revenue of Gujarat in 1571 was claimed to be Rs. 5,75,50,000,[66] but this includes revenue from land, sea and land trade, tribute from the non-revenue paying sarkars, and miscellaneous taxes. It should also be noted that overseas trade in Gujarat was based on Gujarat's own products, unlike that centered on Goa, Malacca, Hurmuz, or Aden. In terms of the role of trade in the total economy this is important, as in Gujarat sea trade thus generated and stimulated production within the economy, which was not the case in the other places mentioned. Given the scattered and unreliable nature of our statistics, we can say only that sea trade was a very important element in the total economy of sultanate Gujarat.

To complete the groundwork for later discussion it is necessary to delineate more precisely who were the merchants of Gujarat in the sixteenth century, in terms of their ethnic and religious divisions. We have already noted that merchants trading by sea from Gujarat were both Muslim and Hindu. There is evidence of a large and rich vania community resident in its own area of Calicut[67]

[66] Mirat, pp. 12-13.

[67] Descrição, ff. 55r-56; A.B. de Bragança Pereira, op. cit., p. 139.

and Muslims from Gujarat also traded to there.[68] Gujaratis, both Hindu and Muslim, traded to Malacca and all the East African ports.[69] On the western Indian coast there were again many Gujarati Muslim merchants, but Albuquerque noted "the banyans of Cambay, who are the main Hindu merchants of these parts."[70] It is clear, however, that the crews of the ships, even those owned by Hindus, were Muslim.[71]

The great merchants at the ports of Gujarat appear to have been either Hindus, Jains, or Muslims originating from outside Gujarat but now resident there. The local Muslim converts were apparently of less importance, with the partial exception of the bohrahs and the khojahs. Most of these "foreign" Muslims were resident in Gujarat, with their own houses there[72], and so were in fact subjects of

[68] Ibn Batuta, _op_. _cit_., p. 193.

[69] Castanheda, I, x; Descrição, ff. 1-3r.

[70] _Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque_, I, 306-7; _The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema_, pp. 48-54.

[71] _Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque_, I, 307. We have the names of the masters of 77 ships licensed by the Portuguese between 1618 and 1622. All of them with two possible exceptions appear to be Muslims. ("Consultas do Serviço de partes," HAG, III, 44-136r.)

[72] Ibn Batuta, _op_. _cit_., p. 172; Varthema, _op_. _cit_., p. 38.

Gujarat, whatever their country of birth, which could be Turkey, Egypt, Arabia, or Persia.[73] Some, however, were only itinerant, being domiciled in such places as Alexandria, Damascus, Persia, Syria, and Afghanistan.[74] The heterogeneity of the Muslim population of Gujarat was not confined to merchants, for the sultans made a practice of tempting capable foreigners to Gujarat with handsome salaries, to serve in their armies.[75]

Among these great merchants living mostly by sea trade, it seems that Hindus and Jains out-ranked Muslims. Our most capable early sixteenth-century observer, Tome Pires, said of the non-Muslims that "There is no doubt that these people have the cream of the trade."[76] In the ports of Cambay and Surat were both Hindu and Muslim merchants[77], but in Rander all the great merchants were Muslims,

[73] Duarte Barbosa, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, I, 119-20. For subjecthood, see chapter VI.

[74] Sikandar, pp. 144, 404; Correa, II, 636; Stephano's account in R.H. Major (ed.), op. cit., p. 9.

[75] As, for example, Malik Ayaz, Rumi Khan, and Khwaja Safar, for whom see the next chapter.

[76] Pires, I, 41.

[77] Castanheda, III, cxxx; Descrição, ff. 15, 22r; Manuel de Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1945-47, 6 vols., II, 193.

while the population of Div was most notable for the large number of Turkish merchants resident there.[78]

In the economy of Gujarat as a whole there is no doubt that the dominant group in all trade matters were the vanias, if only because of their numerical predominance. The Portuguese, and later Dutch and English sources, speak of banyans, and variants such as bunyan, benjan, and baneane, without any discrimination. In fact the vanias were a rather diverse group. They were by varna vaisya, and so traditionally were allowed to lend money. They were, and are, preeminently traders and merchants.[79] There were traditionally forty-one divisions amongst the group in Gujarat, but these divisions were usually not based on occupational characteristics as was the case with other vaisyas.[80] Many of these forty-one divisions in turn had Jain sections, some of the forty-one in fact being dominated by Jains. The Hindu sections were called meshri; during our period most of them became converted to the Vallabhacarya sect of vaishnavism. The Jain sections were called shravak.[81] Inter-

[78] Descrição, f. 22; Varthema, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

[79] See Duarte Barbosa, op. cit., I, 110-14; The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, London, 1885, 2 vols., I, 252-6.

[80] Irfan Habib, "Usury in Medieval India," op. cit., pp. 411-12; D.R. Gadgil, op. cit., pp. 21-22; Census of India, 1911, vol. VII, part 1, p. 307.

[81] Census of India, loc. cit.; A.K. Forbes, Ras Mala, II, 237.

dining between Hindu and Jain sections was common, but marriage was severely restricted even within the forty-one divisions.

In the sixteenth century it is clear that both Hindus and Jains of the vania group were important merchants. Early in the following century B.G. Gokhale finds Hindus dominant[82], but there are records of rich Jains in Gujarat from the twelfth century at least.[83] The two greatest merchant princes of the first half of the seventeenth century--Virji Vorah and Shantidas Jawahari--were both Jains, and there were numerous Jain "millionaires" in the sixteenth century.[84] Jesuit sources of 1611 which speak of "another sort of baneane" are clearly referring to Jains. They are here said to be merchants and brokers and also handicraftsmen.[85]

Among local converts to Islam in Gujarat, the two most important commercially were the khojahs and the bohrahs. The former were an ismaili shia sect, and today recognize the Agha Khan as their

[82] B.G. Gokhale, "Capital Accumulation in XVIIth Century Western India," in Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, vols. 39-40, pp. 53-54.

[83] C.B. Sheth, Jainism in Gujarat, A.D. 1100-1600, Bombay, 1953, pp. 103, 154, 178; Sri Vidyavijay ji Muniraj, Surishwar Aur Samrat. Akbar, Agra, Vira Samvat 2405, p. 15.

[84] Muniraj, op. cit., pp. 7, 27, 47.

[85] DUP, III, 137-8.

head. The latter split into two groups in the early sixteenth century, the larger part being sunni Muslims, most of whom were farmers, and the smaller ismaili shias engaged in trade. In later centuries the shia part was split again several times by doctrinal and inheritance disputes. Their _dai_, or _imam_, moved to Gujarat in the 1560's, residing first in Ahmadabad and later in Surat. Both khojahs and bohrahs retained many Hindu characteristics in such matters as inheritance and even in religious matters; thus the most revered book of the khojahs dealt with the nine incarnations of Vishnu (who had been adopted by them as Adam) and with his tenth as Ali! The retention of Hindu succession laws meant that property was less divided on the death of the head of a family[86], which helped their success

[86] Under Muslim law the property of a deceased was greatly divided, with nine specific relatives, apart from the agnatic heirs, entitled to fixed shares. (N.J. Coulson, A _History of Islamic Law_, Edinburgh, 1964, pp. 16-17.) It is clear that amongst Hindus the letter of the _sastras_, which also enjoined considerable division, was usually not observed in practice. (J.D.M. Derrett, _Religion, Law and the State in India_, London, 1968, pp. 160, 190, 208.) Linschoten claimed that "The Sonnes inherite all a father's goods." (J.H. van Linschoten, _op. cit._, p. 231.) Amongst the _vanias_, a woman's property all went not to her relatives but to her husband if she predeceased him. In the reverse case, wives of _vanias_ could inherit a share of their husband's property. ("Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, II, 16r, and generally ff. 16-20r, printed in APOCR, VI, p. 1269, and generally pp. 1267-73. See also AHU, caixa 16, opinion of March 14, 1644, and caixa 19, opinion of Feb. 13, 1647.)

as merchants, but on the other hand such non-Islamic practices led to considerable persecution, especially during the sultanate period. The Mirat-i Sikandari retails a gratuitous anecdote against the bohrahs, while a Turkish sunni visitor in 1538 said of t' . local Muslims that "when they have to give thanks to God at the hours of prayer they do nothing but beat gongs. Most of them are infidels and half-breeds."[87] In the seventeenth century, as now, the bohrahs were apparently more visible and wealthy than the khojahs.[88]

[87] E.C. Bayley (Trans.), The Local Muhammedan Dynasties, Gujarat, London, 1886, p. 289; ANTTCC, 3-14-44.

[88] M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, II, 96; Factories, 1646-50, p. 157; Mirat, Supplement, pp. 108-9; for these two groups in general see S.T. Lokhandwalla, "Islamic Law and Ismaili Communities," in Indian Economic and Social History Review, IV, 2, June, 1967, passim, and S.C. Misra, Muslim Communities in Gujarat, Bombay, 1964, passim. Also see Ibn Batuta, op. cit., appendix N by Mahdi Husain; R.E. Enthoven, The Tribes and Castes of Bombay, Bombay, 1920-22, 3 vols., s.v.; Khan Bahadur Fazalullah Lutfullah, Gujarat Musalmans, n.p., n.d., pp. 24-57. We may note that until the late seventeenth century the Parsis were not a wealthy community. See S.H. Hodivala, Studies in Parsi History, Bombay, 1920, p. 189, and P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Portuguese Records on Rustamji Manockji, Nova Goa, 1933-36, 2 vols., passim. John Fryer in 1675 found them to be "rather Husbandmen than Merchants." (John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia, London, 1909-15, 3 vols., I, 295.) But earlier in the seventeenth century there were some Parsi traders in Div (LM, v. 28B, ff. 449-r), and one described as a "principal merchant" in Broach in 1650 (Factories, 1646-50, p. 325). The khojahs and bohrahs were presumably not hampered by the Islamic prohibition on usury. More orthodox Muslims

We have already noted how adaptable these Gujarati overseas traders were in their trade practices, especially in Malacca in the late fifteenth century. It is clear that this flexibility and receptivity to new ideas continued in the sixteenth century, and was manifested particularly in religious matters. It was mostly in the sixteenth century that the vaisyas were converted to the Vallabhacarya sect of vaishnavism. Brahmins and the few kshatriyas remained saivite. Amongst the Jains there were several important reform movements in this century, most notably that led by Hira Vijaya Suri. Early in the century the bohrah community split, with many becoming sunni Muslims, while the remaining shias split again into two rival sects in the 1590's. The head of the shia part arrived in Gujarat from the Yemen in the 1560's.[89] The sixteenth century was a time of flux and change in Gujarati religious life. The population, including the merchants, was dynamic and open to

often did observe this prohibition, but there were still many ways in which they could make licit profits, as in the various types of partnerships, and commenda arrangements, used by Muslims. (Udovitch in D.S. Richards, Islam and the Trade of Asia, pp. 42-50, 61-62.)

[89] Census of India, loc. cit.; Muniraj, op. cit., pp. 27, 47; Lokhandwalla, op. cit., p. 171; S.C. Misra, Muslim Communities in Gujarat, pp. 19-30.

new ideas, and this undoubtedly helped them to adjust to the contemporaneous demands of the Portuguese, to whom we must now turn.

## CHAPTER II: THE PORTUGUESE

The slow Portuguese progress down the west African coast in the fifteenth century, the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Dias, and da Gama's triumphant arrival near Calicut in 1498, were inspired by many motives, as with any great human enterprise; and during these decades of effort different motives predominated at different times. The desire of D. Manuel (1495-1521) and his predecessors to open a direct sea route to India was primarily economic, and secondarily religious, in origin. The latter provided a sacral coating for the former, more important, motivation. The two were, however, closely intertwined. Portugal was in some respects still a crusading nation, thrusting across into north Africa from 1415 in continuation of the effort which had freed her from the Muslims. D. Manuel expected that once Portugal found the way to the Arabian Sea the mythical, but hopefully Christian, Prester John would be discovered, and made into an ally for a strike at the Muslim rear. Possibly other Christians would be found around the Cape, and if they were not found they should certainly be created. A strike at the Muslim rear would be a good and holy effort in itself, but more importantly it could very well combine profit with the laying up of eternal merit, for it was

known that the spice trade to Europe was in Muslim hands up to Alexandria. D. Manuel himself put it neatly soon after da Gama's return, when he said: "for our ancestors the main basis of this enterprise was always the service of God our Lord and our own profit."[1]

By 1515 the Portuguese had established formal naval dominance in Asian seas, and seized several strategic ports. The stages in this considerable military achievement were as follows. In 1503 their first fort was built, at Cochin. (They thus wasted no time in moving to the third of our four stages describing European expansion in Asia.) In east Africa Sofala became a tributary of Portugal in 1505, and Mosambique two years later. Soon after, Albuquerque foreshadowed his later aggressive policy by raids along the south Arabian coast as far as Hurmuz, which was also made tributary to Portugal. Muslim ships were freely attacked and sunk, in accordance with the king's orders to the

[1] ANTTSV, III, 513. Cipolla's verdict is that "religion provided the pretext, and gold the motive." (Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the early phase of European Expansion, 1400-1700, London, 1965, p. 136.) It may be noted that the threat to Portugal and the Mediterranean area in general from north Africa was replaced in the fifteenth century by that from the Ottoman Turks. This change if anything increased the peril felt in southern Europe from Islamic attacks.

second Portuguese expedition, in 1500, and thereafter.[2] A minor naval defeat at the hands of a Gujarati-Egyptian fleet off Chaul in 1508 was in fact more notable for the dramatic death of the viceroy's son than for any lasting significance. It was avenged in 1509 by the viceroy himself, D. Francisco d'Almeida, who defeated a combined Gujarati-Egyptian-Calicut fleet off Div. This was Portugal's greatest naval action in Asia in the sixteenth century; never again was there a formal naval engagement between a Portuguese and an Asian fleet. There were innumerable sieges on land and guerilla attacks at sea, but no Portuguese fleet was subsequently challenged by a hostile fleet in Asian waters until the arrival of the Dutch and English.

The most important land conquests were made during Albuquerque's governorship, from 1509 to 1515. Goa was taken in 1510 from the sultan of Bijapur, and Malacca next year from its sultan. A fort was built at Hurmuz in 1515 shortly before Albuquerque's death. Unsuccessful attempts were made to capture Aden and Div. Portuguese fleets roamed far and wide, attacking Muslim and other ships on sight. A flag-showing cruise was made in

[2] Annaes Maritimos e Coloniaes, Lisbon, 1840-46, 6 vols., V, 216.

the Red Sea, and Albuquerque dreamed, not completely unseriously, of disposing of his Muslim enemies by diverting the Nile to the Red Sea, or alternatively by raiding Mecca and holding the Prophet's body to ransom. These were indeed glorious days. Much was conquered, even more was dreamt of, much booty was taken, many infidels were despatched. Such heights were never achieved again. Yet many more conquests were made, so that by 1600 Portugal had some fifty forts or defended areas in Asia, stretching from Sofala to Macao. D. Manuel had anticipated all this in 1499 by adding to his titles that of "lord of the conquest, navigation, and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India."[3]

Manuel's title was for him atypically grandiloquent, but it encapsulated Portugal's economic aims in Asia, which were to monopolize trade in some

[3] Cipolla has a good section on the reasons for these Portuguese successes. (C.M. Cipolla, _op. cit_., pp. 101-7, and _passim_.) A late sixteenth century account describes well the brio of the early Portuguese: "André Furtado de Mendonça was the last example of those first captains who founded the State of India--in pride and vanity fidalgos ["nobles"], in greed vanias, in prodigality nabobs, rough, fanatical, blood-thirsty warriors, heaping up [the bodies of] Muslims and gentiles like wild beasts, but ready for any task or danger, squandering their blood and their lives with the same delight with which they squandered gold and jewels." (F.R. Silveira, _Memórias de um soldado da India_, ed. A. de S.S. Costa Lobo, Lisbon, 1877, p. 90.)

products and control and tax those people trading in all others. This policy varied only in details during the sixteenth century. It was dictated to the Portuguese by sheer economic necessity. Portugal itself was a small, poor country, with a population never over 1,500,000 in the sixteenth century. Any empire would have to support itself, and optimally return a profit to the home country. There was no question of Portugal's being able to maintain an empire simply for prestige, as was sometimes the case with other European empires in the late nineteenth century, and with large parts of Portugal's own empire in the twentieth century. The only way the Portuguese empire could sustain itself was through profits from trade and taxes on trade; an empire consisting of a string of forts on the Asian coastline derived little revenue from the land.

In Goa itself, which was the largest single area of land the Portuguese held in the sixteenth century, the revenue derived from customs duties as a percentage of the total revenue from the area from all sources was: 1545, 63%; 1586-87, 57%; around 1600, 56%, 1616-17, 44%. Over the whole Portuguese Asian empire in 1586-87, and around 1600, the only two times when there are statistics available, the percentage from trade was higher,

for despite large sums from land taxes in Daman, Bassein, and Goa, over 65% of the total was from customs duties. We have no figures on the revenues from the customs payable on land trade between Portuguese and neighboring areas, but it is probable that if they were included the percentage would be close to seventy.[4] Further, some other items of revenue were also based on sea trade, especially the sales of the rights to trade to certain areas, which often yielded large sums: in 1602 a voyage from Goa to Macao and Japan raised about Rs. 55,000 for the crown.[5] There were also

[4] 1545 from Gavetas, III, 213; 1586-87 from AHU, Codice 500, ff. 1-2r, and passim; 1600 from Luis de Figueiredo Falcão, Livro em que se contem toda a Fazenda . . ., Lisbon, 1859, pp. 75-78; 1616-17 from AHU, Caixa 6, account of Nov. 19, 1618. For 1545 see also Simão Botelho's tombo in R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), Subsídios para a história da India Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1868, p. 48.

[5] "Provisões dos vice-Reis," HAG, I, 96. In the seventeenth century other expedients were tried to meet the financial crisis consequent on the decline of trade due to the competition of the English and Dutch. In the mid 1680's Portuguese India was running a deficit of about Rs. 1,05,000 a year. (LM, v. 52, ff. 382-r.) Among the expedients were the sales of offices--of captaincies of forts, of secretaryships, and judgeships, etc. This was done in 1615 and again in 1653. In the former year 108 offices raised Rs. 10,62,000 for the crown. (ANTTDR, v. 38, ff. 334-40. Also see Assentos, III, 250-2.) Other expedients included a tax on food imports to Goa, the collecta, from 1623, the sending of quantities of money from Portugal as relief rather than for trade (thus in 1634 Rs. 1,00,000 were sent--AHU, Caixa 11, King to Viceroy, March 12, 1634) and lifting the prohibition on the celebration of Hindu weddings in Goa in return for a "gift" from the community of Rs. 48,000. (LM, v. 14, ff. 183-r.)

occasional windfalls from sea trade, especially when a ship trading outside the Portuguese system was captured. Such prizes could be worth Rs. 1,00,000 or more for the king, apart from the bounties for the crews of the Portuguese ships involved.[6]

Given this large state income from trade it is not surprising that the governors of Portuguese India usually tried to foster trade and so increase the revenues of the crown. Albuquerque's conquests are described in detail in the literature, but his unobtrusive work to encourage local people to trade in Portuguese areas, and to reassure merchants that they were safe to come and live in Portuguese towns, goes largely unheralded. In Goa he quickly realized the importance of the trade in horses, and offered inducements as well as threats to encourage the merchants of Hurmuz to continue bringing their horses to Goa.[7] Similarly, D. João de Castro is well known as a conquistador, but he also took steps to foster the horse trade. A few weeks after he had bloodily beaten off the Gujarati forces besieging Div in 1546 he sent messages to towns

[6] For example, Correa, III, 419; Couto, VII, iii, 3. See ANTTCC, 1-91-40 for the large booty acquired in Ceylon in 1551.

[7] Correa, II, 74, 402; Castanheda, III, xcv.

nearby encouraging local merchants to return to trade and settle in Div.[8]

<u>The Portuguese System</u>. To govern their far-flung empire the Portuguese set up a comparatively elaborate administrative hierarchy. At the top was the king in Portugal, and after 1580 in Madrid, assisted by his officials. The trade to the east, including the supply of ships, crews, and provisions, was organized by the Casa da India (India House) in Lisbon. However, as a letter written in Goa received a reply at the earliest only after ten months had elapsed, the kings and their officials in Europe could lay down policy only in the most general terms. It was the authorities in Goa, and their subordinates elsewhere, who made the running.

The head of the Portuguese "State of India" was the viceroy or governor, resident at first in Cochin and after 1530 in Goa. A viceroy enjoyed a slightly higher status than did a governor, but their functions and powers were identical. They were undisputed heads of the civil and military government of the whole state, responsible only to the king, and to God.

[8] APOCR, V, 189; Couto, VI, iv, 5. For Nuno da Cunha's similar concern to reassure local merchants after the panic in Div following the death of Sultan Bahadur, see Barros IV, viii, 8.

To assist him in Goa the governor (Here and later "governor" means the head of the state, whether he was entitled viceroy or governor, when the reference is generic.) had at first a loosely organized council. These councils were not institutionalized; they were called into existence more or less at the whim of the governor, and to give advice only on specific, usually military, matters. The members were always fidalgos (literally "son of a somebody," i.e. a "noble") but there was no fixed membership or procedure. In these councils the governor was often only first among equals. If he ignored the advice of the council, and, for example, proceeded with an attack, those disapproving of the action usually would not help him. In most cases, however, a concensus was reached and adhered to by all present.

During the sixteenth century this council evolved and became more institutionalized as the Council of State. Its members, as of 1604, were the governor as president, the archbishop of Goa, two or three of the older fidalgos resident in Goa, the head of the High Court, the captain of the city of Goa, and the Vedor da Fazenda, the official who, under the governor, was head of the smaller Conselho da Fazenda, which was dominated by officials and met regularly in the seventeenth century to decide

economic and financial matters. The governor was also entitled to attend sittings of the High Court.[9]

Religious affairs were usually handled independently of the civil authority by the archbishop or by the heads of the several orders, though there were instances of God in his Goan incarnation trying to influence Mammon and vice versa. There was also the municipal council, elected by the lower strata of the Portuguese population, and at times an influential force on the government.[10] Four areas

[9] Generally for all this section on the administration see V.T. Gune, "An Outline of the Administrative institutions of the Portuguese Territories in India and the Growth of their Central Archives at Goa--16th to 19th Century A.D." in Studies in Indian History. Dr. A.G. Pawar Felicitation Volume, Bombay, 1968, passim; R.S. Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550, London, 1967, pp. 58-75; C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825, London, 1969, pp. 296-9; J.B. Amancio Gracias, Subsídios para a história Economico-Financiero da India Portugueza, Nova Goa, 1909, passim; F.P. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, Lisbon, 1952, passim; Eric Axelson, The Portuguese in Southeast Africa, 1600-1700, Johannesburg, 1960, pp. 1-2; O Oriente Português, I, 480-6; on the High Court see "Livros Azul," HAG, I and II, published in J.I. Abranches Garcia, Archivo da Relação de Goa, Nova Goa, 1872-74, 2 vols., passim.

[10] See C.R. Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics, Madison and Milwaukee, 1965, pp. 12-41, and passim.

of authority can thus be distinguished: in financial matters the Vedor, and later the Conselho da Fazenda, in religious affairs the clerics, in legal the High Court, and in local government the municipal council. Only over the first did the governor exercise appreciable control. However, the governor, assisted by the Council of State, did control military matters and external relations, in a manner befitting the head of what was and in most respects remained a society dominated by the ethos of the conquistador.

The state government in Goa was a macrocosm of that of the other areas and forts. Each had a captain, usually assisted by a Vedor da Fazenda, and other minor officials such as clerks, and more importantly the factor, who supervised the royal trade in the area. There were also various clerics, a judge, and in the larger areas a municipal council.

The increasing bureaucratization in Goa, and the apparently clear chain of command from king to governor to captain, should not blind us to the fact that this was obviously not a modern bureaucratic state in the Weberian sense.[11] This is seen

[11] Max Weber saw "legal domination" as the essential element in a modern state, and the development of a modern bureaucracy as necessary for legal domination to become effective. Several specific characteristics must be found in a bureaucracy in order for there to exist "a system of legal domination in which the exercise of authority consists

particularly in the method of selection for office, and the whole conception of what the holding of an office entailed. Appointments to the higher offices were made by the king, and to lower ones by the governors or captains. They were made on a strictly personal basis, not on the basis of suitability or training. There were two main grounds. First was past meritorious service, usually in a military capacity, either by an appointee or by the forbears of an appointee. Thus the daughter of a deserving fidalgo would receive from the king as her dowry an office, which would go to her successful suitor. Similarly, the great chronicler Diogo do Couto received his position not so much because he had already demonstrated literary ability as because he had served in Portuguese fleets in India for several years. That he emerged as a productive

in the implementation of enacted norms." These include "(1) the continuity of official business; (2) the delimitation of authority through stipulated rules; (3) the supervision of its exercise; (4) and (5) the separation of office and incumbent; and (6) the documentary basis of official business . . ." (R. Bendix, Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait, New York, 1962, p. 424. For Weber's own words see H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, 1958, pp. 196-204.) For an important discussion of the conflict between the ideal of the modern bureaucratic state and the survival of earlier practices in modern southeast Asia see W.F. Wertheim, "Sociological Aspects of Corruption in Southeast Asia" in R. Bendix (ed.), State and Society. A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology, Boston, 1968, pp. 561-80. Gunnar Myrdal finds a rather similar situation prevailing in India today; see G. Myrdal, Asian Drama, New York, 1968, 3 vols., pp. 948-50.

chronicler says nothing for the way in which he was selected. The second criterion, used increasingly as the finances of the state deteriorated, was purchase: offices were put up for sale to the highest bidder. Here also the basis of selection was personal, in this case the determining factor being wealth rather than past service. Training or skill was not considered, although an informal limiting scheme restricted those who could bid for a particular office. Thus a non-fidalgo, however wealthy, could not bid for the captaincy of a prestigious fort such as Div.

Not only the selection for office, but also the conception of office, was governed by personal factors. An appointee's loyalties were not to an impersonal conception of an office, in which he was to discharge certain specific functions, guided by established rules and norms. Rather the Portuguese officials of all grades treated their office holdings as a personal service to the king who had appointed them. They owed obedience and loyalty to him personally, or to his deputy; so long as the king or governor was satisfied there were no other criteria to be met. This personal conception of the duties of an office holder will be taken up and elaborated presently, when we discuss "corruption" in the Portuguese administration. In the meantime, we may

note that such a system was not necessarily totally inefficient even if its bases were so different from those ideally pertaining in a modern bureaucracy. There were innumerable instances of the right man getting the right job, such as Couto himself, or the several Vedors who were capable and conscientious administrators, or the able warriors who so often held the captaincies of forts.

Apart from the various officials, ranging from the lowliest clerk to the governor, and the clerics, there was in Portuguese India a sizeable population of Portuguese not serving in any official capacity. Some of these "private" Portuguese, such as fidalgos resident in Goa while they angled for a new job, were ordinarily servants of the king, and considered themselves as such, but many others had left official service and occupied themselves as artisans or traders. Most of these people had come to India as soldiers, and had left royal employment once their period of service was completed. A few had never worked for the king, but had come out as private subjaets. Among these were a handful of large traders in Goa who were either self-employed or worked as agents for Lisbon financiers.

With this background, we can now consider Portugal's involvement in Asian trade. There were four strands: the trade in Portuguese ships, owned either by the crown or by people contracting with

the crown, from western India to Portugal; voyages to specific areas within Asia, undertaken at first in royal ships and later in ships licensed by the crown; trade within Asia conducted privately by Portuguese; trade by local people all over Asia in their own ships but with passes from the Portuguese. The last involved more capital and ships than any of the others, and obviously concerns us most; before going on to delineate the methods and objects of this control a little should be said about each of the first three strands.

The trade between India and Portugal was done in the celebrated naos or great ships. From a capacity of less than 500 tons in the early sixteenth century they rose to as much as 2,000 tons by the seventeenth. Their passages were regulated by the monsoons. They left Portugal in February or March, reached India, usually Goa, towards the end of the year, and left again for Portugal as soon as possible in the new year. Figures quoted by C.R. Boxer show that between 1500 and 1635 an average of five and one half ships reached India from Portugal each year, while three and one half made the return voyage.[12]

[12] C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 219. These figures are for ships which reached their destinations, not those which left from Lisbon and India respectively.

From Portugal they brought men, money, and goods--men to reinforce Portugal's many garrisons and religious houses, money and goods to pay for the return cargoes.[13] Among the goods, copper predominated, but other European products were also brought out to compete, often unsuccessfully, with identical goods coming via the Red Sea. The cargoes of these ships on their return voyages to Portugal consisted of spices (mainly pepper) for the crown, and a large volume of other goods owned by private merchants and officials in India. As we shall see, among these goods Gujarati cloths predominated. In the later sixteenth century the capital involved in this private trade to Europe was considerable; apparently it amounted to about Rs. 40,00,000.[14] Customs receipts in Lisbon from this trade formed an important part of the royal revenues, being about 27% of the total customs received in Lisbon in 1593.[15] In addition, the king made profits from his own monopolistic trade in pepper. In the

[13] V. Magalhães-Godinho, L'Économie de l'Empire Portugais aux XVe et XVIe Siècles, Paris, 1969, p. 317.

[14] Estimate based on Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, p. 279, and customs duties paid at Lisbon in 1593 from F. Mendes da Luz, Relação de todas as rendas da Coroa . . ., Coimbra, 1949, p. 58. This figure may be compared with our figure for Gujarat's total trade at about the same time of Rs. 8,00,00,000.

[15] F. Mendes da Luz, op. cit., pp. 42, 58.

earlier sixteenth century this trade was usually handled by royal ships, although in an emergency private ships could be used.[16] From the 1580's private merchants often contracted with the state to send their ships to India, at their own risk but on behalf of the crown.[17]

The second area of involvement consisted of voyages to specified places within Asia on a monopolistic basis: only the designated ship could make a given voyage in a particular year. Cargo space on such ships thus sold at a premium. In the earlier sixteenth century voyages of this kind were done in royal ships, though a large part of the goods carried belonged to private merchants.[18] Later it was decided that such a method meant that the king had too much of his own capital tied up in ships and incidental expenses, so individuals were licensed to undertake these voyages from at least the 1540's. The destinations included the Banda Islands, Sofala, the Coromandel coast, Siam,

[16] C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 331; Couto, VII, i, 6; ANTTCC, 1-30-36.

[17] Couto, X, i, 9; X, iv, 5; X, vii, 6; X, x, 6.

[18] F. Mendes da Luz, "Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas Partes da India, 1582," in Studia, 6, ff. 77r-78. See "Livro de Leis de D. Manuel" ANTT, ff. 132-4, for the regulations for the factor on the Cochin-Hurmuz and return voyage of 1520.

Bengal, China, and Japan. Such licences, like appointments to official positions, were given out on several grounds. Sometimes they were bestowed as rewards for meritorious military service.[19] Others were given as dowries to the daughters of prominent but impoverished fidalgos, while some formed part of the perquisites of a particular post. The captain of Malacca had voyages to seventeen different places.[20] Most of the voyages, however, were sold to the highest bidder, either directly by the crown or by the person who had been granted the voyage for one of the above reasons. They could be extremely lucrative for the owner. The best of all was that from Goa to Japan via Macao. A captain on this route in the 1560's usually made a profit of about Rs. 70,000 after expenses. Later he made much more.[21]

Private trade in Asia conducted by Portuguese, whether officials, merchants, or clerics, was considerable. We have noted that many captains

[19] Antonio Baião (ed.), História quinhentista (inedita) do segundo cerco do Dio, Coimbra, 1927, pp. 296-333 for the rewards given by D. João de Castro after the second siege of Div. See also ANTTCC, 1-67-12.

[20] E. Axelson, op. cit., p. 2; F. Mendes da Luz, "Livro das Cidades . . .," op. cit., ff. 101-103r.

[21] Ibid., f. 95; Luis de Figueiredo Falcão, op. cit., pp. 125-6 for voyages and their values around 1600. For the voyage to China and Japan see C.R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, Lisbon, 1959.

owned certain monopolistic voyages during their tenure, and there is ample evidence of these and other officials trading extensively, sometimes illegally, within Asia. Concerning private Portuguese merchants we have less information, for they were usually deemed unworthy of notice by the chroniclers or by officials writing home to Portugal. They were evidently numerous. In 1523 it was reported that wood for shipbuilding was scarce in Cochin as it was all being bought by Portuguese who intended to settle in India, live by their own trade, and die there. They were trading to Malacca, Siam, Pacem, Bengal, Coromandel, the Bandas, Timor, Hurmuz, Chaul, and Cambay.[22] Private Portuguese were trading in Malacca in 1543, in Siam in 1525, in the Bandas in 1525, in the Hadramaut in 1522, 1529-30, and 1538, between Hurmuz and the Mughal Empire in 1546, in Coromandel and in Quilon in the 1550's.[23]

We have already noted that the ships bound for Portugal carried large quantities of goods not owned by the state but by merchants or the crews of the ships. Larger Portuguese merchants found

[22] ANTTCC, 1-30-36.

[23] Respectively Manuel Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1945-47, 6 vols., III, 115; R.J. de Lima Felner, op. cit., pp. 5-6, 9; Barros, IV, vii, 9; R.B. Serjeant, The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast, Oxford, 1963, pp. 55, 61; Couto, V, v, 5; APOCR, V, 188, 193; ANTTSV, X, 128; DI, II, 130.

it profitable to have their agents in Goa to supervise their Indian trade.[24] In fact, it is clear there is little truth in the old canard about the Portuguese, which has every butcher's boy becoming a fidalgo as he rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and thereafter scorning to work, instead spending his time in profligacy in Goa and Cochin.[25] On the contrary, their willingness to turn a quick penny was often such that they did not hesitate to trade with enemies of the state.[26]

The area most favored by private Portuguese traders for their operations was Gujarat, especially the town of Cambay, trade to which had started by at least 1509,[27] and continued thereafter. This trade was carried on despite discouragement from both church and state. The first Provincial Council, of 1567, disapproved of Portuguese settling outside areas in which there were priests, as such people would seldom have the chance to take the sacraments. The governors feared that Portuguese resident in Cambay could serve as hostages in the event of a war between Portugal and the sultanate, or, after 1572, the Mughal Empire; on the other

[24] The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, London, 1885, 2 vols., II, 225-6; APOCR, III, 753-5; "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, III, 73r-74r; Fazenda, VIII, 182, 208, IX, 71, X, 71.

[25] See C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 287, for one such claim.

[26] For example, R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 8-9; DI, II, 130.

[27] Couto, VII, iv, 9.

hand, if the Goa-Gujarat trade was left to "baneanes" they would be hostages for Portugal in case of war.[28] The occasional prohibitions had little effect. When Akbar arrived at Cambey in 1572, during his first campaign in Gujarat, he found fifty or sixty Portuguese, and these, a remnant of the normal population, were only the ones who had been unwilling to leave the war zone because they had goods in the town.[29] In 1594 there were about 100 Portuguese families in Cambay, but the number seems to have decreased in the seventeenth century.[30] Many of these Portuguese traders evidently settled permanently in Cambay and married local women, as a Jesuit who baptised 180 people in Bassein in 1573 noted that among them "were many Eurasian women and boys, children of Portuguese in Cambay . . ."[31] These Portuguese were apparently engaged in buying Gujarati

[28] R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 8-9; APOCR, IV, 52, III, 403-4, 588; "Senado de Goa--Cartas Régias," HAG, I, 28, 34-r; "Livro Morato," HAG, ff. 126-7.

[29] Couto, IX, cap. 13.

[30] Father Felix, "Mughal Farmans, Parwanahs and Sanads issued in favor of the Jesuit Missionaries," in Journal of the Panjab Historical Society, V, 1916, p. 8; Artur Viegas (ed.), Relação Anual das Coisas que Fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas Missões, by Fernão Guerreiro, Lisbon, 1930-42, 3 vols., II, 393-4; P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India (Hindus, Muçulmans, Judeus e Parsees), Bastorá, Goa, 1952, p. 99.

[31] DI, IX, 289.

goods to be sent to Goa, whence they were reexported to Europe and all over Asia on Portuguese ships. Some were presumably agents of large Portuguese merchants in Goa who preferred to buy their goods at the source rather than wait until they had been brought to Goa by Gujaratis.[32]

We lack the detailed statistics which would enable us to rank by relative importance these three strands of trade, and the fourth which we will consider next. However, it has been persuasively argued that in the course of the sixteenth century the rank of the first, the trade to Portugal, declined relative to the other three. This was a result of the great increase in the pepper trade conducted outside Portuguese control, which will be discussed at the end of this chapter.[33] This change was in part simply a result of greater experience, and more detailed knowledge of conditions and markets in Asia, on the part of both Portuguese officials and private traders. The effect was that Portuguese India became increasingly self-supporting, financed almost wholly by profits on the monopolistic voyages

[32] The Voyage of Francois Pyrard de Laval, London, 1887-90, 2 vols., II, 246; The Journal of John Jourdain, London, 1905, p. 173.

[33] I.A. MacGregor in New Cambridge Modern History, II, 610-11; J.B. Harrison in ibid., III, 536-9.

licensed by the crown, and by customs duties derived from the trade of both Portuguese and locals.

Control of Asian Trade. In their private trade the Portuguese were involved in Asian trade on a basis of equality with other merchants in the area, as in Cambay. The fourth strand of involvement was different. In their attempts to control and tax Asian traders the Portuguese tried to operate from a position of dominance based on naval power. It was here, in their cartaz-armada-cafila system, that they produced their greatest impact on Asian trade.

> Now it should be known, that after the Franks had established themselves in Cochin and Cannanore, and had settled in those towns, the inhabitants, with all their dependents, became subject to these foreigners, engaged in the arts of navigation, and in maritime employments, making voyages of trade under the protection of passes from the Franks; every vessel, however small, being provided with a distinct pass, and this with a view to the general security of all. And upon each of these passes a certain fee was fixed, on the payment of which the pass was delivered to the master of the vessel, when about to proceed on his voyage. Now the Franks, in imposing this toll, caused it to appear that it would prove in its consequences a source of advantage to these people, thus to induce them to submit to it; whilst to enforce its payment, if they fell in with any vessel, in which this their letter of marque, or pass, was not to be found, they would invariably make a seizure

> both of the ship, its crew, and its cargo!

The passes thus described by this sixteenth-century Arabic author[34] were the main instrument used by the Portuguese in their attempt to control trade carried on by local people in Asian waters. These passes were something new for Asian merchants, but the Portuguese justified them, at least to themselves, with a legal underpinning.

In the fifteenth century, as we have seen, there was no attempt to control sea trade; those states which profited from the presence of foreign and local merchants did so because they provided attractive conditions for these merchants. In juristic terminology the Indian Ocean was a _mare librum_, there being no concept of sovereignty over it except in some coastal areas and rivers.[35] The Portuguese justification for their attempt to control completely sea trade in Asia was given by the official chronicler, João de Barros. The Portuguese were in Asia lords of the sea, and made all other ships take a safe-conduct or cartaz from them. Ships trading to enemies of Portugal could be seized

[34] Tohfut, pp. 89-91.

[35] C.H. Alexandrowicz, _An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies_, Oxford, 1967, pp. 64-71.

at sight. By common law the seas were open to all, but this applied only in Europe to Christians, who were governed essentially by the principles of Roman Law. Hindus and Muslims, on the contrary, were outside Roman Law as they were outside the law of Jesus Christ, which all men must keep to avoid the eternal fire. Further, Hindus and Muslims had no claim to right of passage in Asian waters, because before the arrival of the Portuguese no one claimed the sea as hereditary or conquered property. There being no preceding title, there was no present or future right of passage.[36]

All ships trading in Asian waters were required to have a pass or cartaz. These were issued by the competent Portuguese authority, usually either the governor or the captain of a fort.[37] They were issued from at least 1502 onwards.[38] The conditions set out in these cartazes varied little during the sixteenth century or later. They included a statement of who was the captain (nakhoda) of the ship, how big the ship was, and what crew it carried.

[36] Barros, I, vi, 1.

[37] From 1596 only the Governor could issue a cartaz for a voyage beyond the coast of India. (AHU, Codice 281, f. 357.)

[38] Correa, I, 298; Marechal Gomes da Costa, Descobrimentos e Conquistas, Lisbon, 1927-30, 3 vols., II, 110.

The quantity of arms and munitions allowed was strictly limited. The ship was to trade only to a Portuguese fort, or at least had to call at a Portuguese fort to pay duties on its cargo before proceeding to its destination. A cash security had to be left at the fort where the cartaz was issued to guarantee that the ship would in fact return to pay duties there on its homeward voyage. At this time a certificate had to be produced if duties had been paid at another fort. Apart from munitions, both the cargo and passengers were restricted. Turks and Abyssinian Muslims, both regarded as enemies of the Portuguese, were not to be carried, and various goods were also forbidden--among them all spices and pepper, iron, copper, and wood, as this could be used to build enemy ships.[39]

Any ship without a cartaz was automatically confiscated as a fair prize if the Portuguese captured it, and its crew, if it escaped instant death, was liable to be sent to the galleys. Even a ship with a cartaz was confiscated if the terms were not kept. As the captain and crew of the Portuguese

[39] "Consultas do Serviço de partes," HAG, III, passim; ANTTCC, 1-62-154; LM, III, 267-8; Correa, II, 50, 330; Bocarro, Decada, p. 56; APOCR, V, 264; Diogo do Couto, Vida de D. Paulo de Lima Pereira, Lisbon, 1903, p. 76.

ship which made a fair prize received fixed shares of the value of the seized ship, they obviously checked very strictly. Thus in 1555 a Gujarati ship was confiscated as it had eight Turks on board. In 1540 another Gujarati ship was seized as its cartaz said it was bound for Kishm, but, judging by its position when the Portuguese checked it, it could not have been going there. Two other ships were seized in the same year, one for trading in Dobbah, with which the Portuguese were at war, and one for having a different captain from that named in the cartaz.[40] It may also be noted that cartazes were required for the coastal trade in western India, whether done by Christians, Hindus, or Muslims, and even for trade from one Gujarati port to another.[41]

[40] ANTTCC, 1-67-47, 1-94-94. For other cases see Studia, 3, pp. 81-82; ANTTCC, 1-106-135; LM, v. 28B, f. 379.

[41] "Livro de Leis de D. Manuel," ANTT, f. 141; "Provisões dos Vice-Reis," HAG, II, 159; "Termo das Fianças," HAG, I, passim; Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino. Legislação Antiga, Lisbon, 1867, I, 128; F. Paes, "O Tombo de Diu," in O Oriente Português, new series, V, 1933, pp. 47-48; ANTTSV, V, 155. This requirement, that all ships trading anywhere, carry a Portuguese cartaz, and also the limitations on the cargoes, differentiate this whole system from modern parallels. Today a citizen of one country can travel and trade to another subject only to the permission of these two countries. A third country has no jurisdiction over such travel. Thus the United States does not try to stop trade by others to "unfriendly" countries such as Cuba or China. Such control by a third country has been claimed occasionally in time of war, most notably recently by Great Britain in the Napoleonic and

The ultimate implications of such claims can best be seen in an incident of 1540. The governor of Surat, Khwaja Safar, had built a new fort to protect his port. The Portuguese viceroy wrote to the sultan of Gujarat asking him to make Khwaja Safar demolish this fort, "because it was bad to build a fort there when there was no need at all for it; because if he was a true friend of the king of Portugal he would not build forts on the edge of the sea, which belonged to the Portuguese, and because no one was ever going to attack him from the sea except the king of Portugal, who would only do so if he did not keep the peace which had been established between them."[42]

The arrival of the English and Dutch in western Indian waters in the early seventeenth century, and their attacks on the Portuguese until 1635 and 1663 respectively, made little difference as regards control of sea trade. The local merchants were now often required to take passes from the Dutch and English as well as from the Portuguese, but this

First and Second World Wars. The extent of the control over neutral shipping claimed in these cases was much less than that claimed by the Portuguese in sixteenth-century Asia, and even the prohibition on direct trade with an enemy was challenged by others. The British never claimed the right to direct all trade, and all cargoes carried, in the Atlantic.

[42] Correa, IV, 143.

was no extra hardship as these two European powers had no customs houses in western India; thus there was no obligation in their cartazes to pay duties.[43] Meanwhile, despite their deteriorating military position in relation to the Dutch, the Portuguese continued throughout the seventeenth century to insist that cartazes be taken, and while there was increasing evasion it is clear that by and large their claims were accepted. In the 1690's the Portuguese were still seizing ships in the Gulf of Cambay if they did not have cartazes, and Awrangzeb still took them for his ships.[44]

The fee charged for issuing the cartaz was negligible, a few rupees only[45], but the cartaz did oblige the ship concerned to call at a Portuguese

[43] Bal Krishna, Shivaji the Great, Bombay, 1932, I, 40; Factories, 1618-21, p. 2; 1622-23, pp. 215-6; The Voyage of Thomas Best, London, 1934, p. 108; Diário do 3rd. Conde de Linhares, Lisbon, 1937-43, 2 vols., p. 255.

[44] P.S.S. Pissurlencar, op. cit., pp. 566-7; P.S. S. Pissurlencar, Portuguese Records on Rustamji Manockji, the Parsi Broker of Surat, Nova Goa, 1933-36, 2 vols., II, 11, 33. See Alberto Iria, Da Navegação Portuguesa no Indico no seculo XVII, Lisbon, 1963, pp. 104-5 for evasion, and for a slightly modified version of the form of the cartaz agreed on in Surat in 1670 see Boletim do governor do Estado da India, Oct. 10, 1873, pp. 367-8; Assentos, IV, 208-12.

[45] "Livro de Leis de D. Manuel," ANTT, f. 141; "Regimentos e Instruções," HAG, III, 122r, 124.

fort, both coming and going, to pay duties. This was the object of the whole exercise, the essence of the arrangement, for we have seen how crucial were customs receipts to the finances of the Portuguese empire in Asia. By comparison with those charged in sultanate or Mughal Gujarat the rates were high. The most important customs house in western India was Goa, for the Portuguese attempted, with some success, to make it the focus for all trade between Gujarat and Malabar, and India and Europe. The rates varied according to the product involved, and were not levied on trade with Portugal, but until 1569 they were as they had been under Bijapur in the fifteenth century, 6% ad valorem. This was paid on both imports and exports, except that goods which had not changed hands in Goa paid no export duty. In 1569 a general meeting in Goa agreed to raise the rates by 1% to pay for warships.[46] During the seventeenth century the rates were increased several times to meet the cost of the struggle against the Dutch--to 8% by 1607, 9% by 1639, and 10% by 1659.[47] Further, a tax on food imports,

[46] "Provisões, Alvarás e Regimentos," HAG, I, 168-71; "Livro de termos e autos," HAG, ff. 182r-83r; R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), Subsídios para a história da India Portugueza, pp. 47-48.

[47] Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, pp. 279-80; APOCR, II, 213; "Termo das Fianças," HAG, II, 143-4; Fazenda, IX, 264r. We may note that in sixteenth-century Lisbon the usual duty was 20%,

known as the collecta, was instituted in 1623. This was a sign of the desperate straits of Portuguese India at this time, for the free importation of food was one of Goa's oldest and most prized privileges.[48]

The rates at other customs houses were roughly similar to those in Goa. In Chaul, where duties were levied only from 1634, the rates were 8% for imports and 6% for exports.[49] In sixteenth-century Malacca, with some variations, they were 6%, and later 7%.[50] In Div the duties were only 3½% until the 1580's, when another ½% was added with the consent of the inhabitants to pay for the armada which protected the trade between Div and Cambay. Again the duties rose in the seventeenth century to meet the costs of defence.[51]

but many specified goods paid less. See Boletim do Conselho ultramarino. Legislação Antiga, I, 157 et seq; F. Mendes da Luz, Relação de todas as rendas . . ., Coimbra, 1949, pp. 44-45, 59, 60.

[48] See "Livro de contrato e concepção da colecta," HAG, passim; "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, III, 43-44r; "Provisões, Alvarás, e Regimentos," HAG, I, 28r-29.

[49] For its Regulation see LM, v. 19D, ff. 1196r-1203.

[50] R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 105-6; P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Regimentos das Fortalezas da India, Bastorá, Goa, 1951, pp. 256-60.

[51] F. Paes, "O Tombo de Diu" in O Oriente Português, new series, IV, Oct. 1932, pp. 38-39; LMBP, III, 157; Fazenda, V, 197r-8r; LM, v. 19D, ff. 1198r-1200; AHU, Caixa 10, account of Sept. 30, 1634; Bibliotheca da Ajuda, 51-VII-30, f. 97.

To avoid confusion in later discussion, it is as well here to mention another sort of cartaz, the free cartaz. These were given to local rulers for political reasons. Before 1571 the sultan of Bijapur had four a year, and by the peace treaty of this year he received two more.[52] The sultan of Ahmadnagar had seven a year, five for ships going to Hurmuz, one for the Red Sea, and one for Malacca.[53] Akbar was given one a year for a ship of his to go to the Red Sea. In all cases these free cartazes were sops to the rulers concerned, designed to prevent any attack from them on the Portuguese settlements on their coasts. The value of such cartazes lay in their exempting the ship carrying one from paying duties on the goods it carried. These ships were, however, still prohibited from carrying forbidden goods and people, and at least in the later seventeenth century they had to pay a small tax, the amount depending on the size of the ship.[54]

The Portuguese maintained several fleets of warships to check on cartazes, to impress local rulers, and to combat piracy. The first viceroy, D. Francisco d'Almeida, was instructed by D. Manuel

[52] APOCR, V, 828.

[53] "Consultas do Serviço de partes," HAG, III, 40r-41.

[54] Boletim do Governo do Estado da India, Oct. 10, 1873, p. 368.

to have two fleets cruising, one from the Red Sea to Cambay, and one from Cambay to Cape Comorin. After Goa was taken in 1510 regular patrols were undertaken north and south of the town, the first going to Chaul or further north to Cambay, and the second to the Kanara and Malabar areas, and even across to the Maldive Islands.[55] As early as 1512 the Portuguese had a total of about fifty ships either operational or being built in India and Southeast Asia.[56] By the 1520's the total was around eighty, the exact figure depending on the source.[57] A list for the 1567-68 season gives a total in the nineties, while in 1620 there were sixty-five ships based on Goa alone.[58] For a special effort even larger numbers could be pressed into service. In 1539 the viceroy, D. Garcia de Noronha, commanded an armada of 121 ships, large and small.[59]

[55] Castanheda, II, i; APOCR, V, 26; Barros, III, i, 7; "Livro de Leis de D. Manuel," ANTT, f. 137r.

[56] Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, III, 350-1.

[57] R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), op. cit., pp. 21-25; ANTTSV, XI, 12r-15r; ANTTCC, 1-30-36. By comparison, the home fleets in about 1550 operating off the coasts of Portugal totalled forty-three ships. (ANTTSV, III, 491.)

[58] Manuel de Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, IV, 27-28; LM, v. 22B, ff. 453-5.

[59] ANTTSL, IV, 247-50.

Apart from such special fleets, there were numerous regular cruises during the sixteenth century, regulated in their times of operation by the monsoons; thus no ship cruised between May and September on the western Indian coast. Off Malacca a small fleet cruised to force ships to call and pay duties.[60] Another fleet covered the Island of Manar, the pearl grounds of south India, and the Coromandel coast.[61] In the Persian Gulf patrolling seems to have been rather sporadic.[62] From Goa several patrols were sent out each season. One fleet was sent to cover the mouth of the Red Sea. The northern fleet cruised as far as the Gulf of Cambay, while others operated off Kanara and Malabar.

The duty of these armadas was to guard ships trading under Portuguese auspices--as we shall see, later in the century these mercantile ships sailed in convoys, accompanied by a small armada of warships--and to find and destroy pirates. Two small fleets based on Div patrolled respectively to the west, to make ships from west Gujarati ports call at Div, and to the Gulf of Cambay, to escort the

[60] ANTTCC, 1-30-36; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 2, p. 24.

[61] F. Mendes da Luz, "Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas . . ." in Studia, 6, f. 52r.

[62] ANTTCC, 1-35-52; ANTTSL, II, 203r-4; "Leis," ANTT, III, 113r.

small ships bound for Div from Cambay.[63]

Later in the sixteenth century the Portuguese were forced to institute a new form of trade control, the cafila or caravan of small merchant ships guarded by a Portuguese fleet. There are scattered references to merchant ships travelling in convoys for security earlier in the sixteenth century[64] but by the 1560's it was the established practice for ships trading within the Portuguese system on the western Indian coast to sail together and be guarded by the Portuguese. In 1596 this was made compulsory: the viceroy decreed that all ships trading on the western Indian coast must travel in cafilas.[65] The reason for this compulsion, and for the earlier more or less voluntary system, was the threat of attacks by the pirates of Malabar on ships trading within the Portuguese system.[66] Apart from the regular Cambay-Div cafila, and a more spasmodic one centered on Hurmuz,[67] all the cafilas came to Goa.

[63] ANTTCC, 1-71-16; IMBP, V, 243; ANTTDR, XVIII, 54; XXIV, 57-57r; Couto, VII, iv, 3; Alberto Iria, op. cit., p. 85.

[64] Marechal Gomes da Costa, Descobrimentos e Conquistas, II, 110, 199.

[65] APOCR, III, 36, 89; O Oriente Português, XVII, 70.

[66] DI, IV, 299; VIII, 120-1, 321, 370; Tohfut, pp. 157-8.

[67] APOCR, III, 36, 89; O Oriente Português, XVII, 70.

To the north two or three cafilas left each year, stopping at Chaul, Bassein, Daman, and, in the seventeenth century, Surat, on the way to Cambay. It was this fleet of small ships which brought to Goa the vital private cargoes for the homeward bound fleet. Two hundred or more small ships could be included in the convoy. We have records of such cafilas from 1569, but they were not undertaken every year until late in the century, apparently after the 1596 decree made them compulsory. Before then they were used when the threat from pirates was great, but sometimes merchant ships simply came to Goa alone and unguarded.[68]

The cafilas to the Kanara area were equally crucial for Goa, for from there came food. Goa had a heavy rice deficit in the sixteenth century and later, so that each year a fleet of at least one hundred small boats made two, three, or four voyages to Barcellor, Mangalore, and Honavar and brought

[68] Couto, VIII, cap. 30; IX, cap. 3; IX, cap. 18; X, i, 8; X, viii, 11; _The Voyage of Thomas Best_, p. 34; Samuel Purchas, _Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas his Pilgrimes_, Glasgow, 1905, 20 vols., III, 176; William Foster (ed.), _Early Travels in India, 1583-1619_, London, 1921, p. 76; _Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East_, London, 1896-1902, 6 vols., VI, 83; _Travels of Pietro Della Valle_, London, 1892, 2 vols., I, 116-53 for his experiences in 1623 on such a cafila. For the official instructions of the cafilas of 1636 and 1638 and 1642 see "Regimentos e Instruções," HAG, III, 19-20, 102, IV, 56r-57r. For the instructions for 1616 see Bocarro, Decada, 654-6.

back food for the city.[69] This cafila was operating from at least the 1560's, and apparently on a regular basis.[70]

The third cafila came from Cape Comorin, via Cochin and Cannanor, to Goa. It began in the 1550's, again as a result of the threat from local pirates. It included larger ships from Malacca, China, Siam, Bengal, and Coromandel, which were met by the guard fleet at Cape Comorin. In Cochin many smaller ships were picked up, and they all proceeded together to Goa. Frequently more than one cafila came from the Malabar area to Goa each year. They brought goods from Southeast Asia, China, and the Bay of Bengal for the ships bound for Portugal which were loading in Goa, and for the markets north of Goa.[71]

[69] "Senado de Goa--Cartas Régias," HAG, II, n.p., published in APOCR, I, ii, 109-10; _Diário do 3rd. Conde de Linhares_, pp. 20, 124; Assentos, III, 217; _Travels of Fray Manrique_, London, 1926-27, 2 vols., II, 3. For Goa's rice imports see "Acordãos e Assentos da Câmara de Goa," HAG, IV, 20r, and Fazenda, III, 4r, 95-97. From this last we find Goa spending Rs. 1,00,000 on rice in November and December of 1629 alone, both in the north and in Kanara. For the regulations for a Kanara cafila see "Regimentos e Instruções," HAG, II, 10r-11r.

[70] Couto, VII, x, 2; VII, x, 19; APOCR, I, ii, 109-10; _Studia_, 3, p. 77.

[71] Couto, VII, i, 7; VIII, cap. 29; X, ii, 15; ANTTDR, XXVII, 222; AHU, Caixa 22, meeting of Dec. 15, 1653; Bocarro, Decada, pp. 77-78; LM, v. 12, f. 170r.

As with the cartazes, these cafilas in theory embodied two principles: profit for the Portuguese customs houses, and protection for the native traders. In fact pirates sometimes did attack cafilas and loot ships in them, but it can be conceded that ships in cafilas were safer than those sailing alone. Nevertheless, it is clear that many native merchants would just as soon have taken their chance outside the cafila system, and certainly would have preferred not to have to call at Goa to pay duties. Thus the escort fleet had two functions: to guard the merchant ships from pirates, and to make sure none of these same merchant ships slipped away to trade outside the Portuguese system.[72] Further, ships in a cafila were at the mercy of the escorting fleet; if it was needed elsewhere the cafila simply had to wait until it returned. If the Portuguese were at war with a ruler on the western coast the cafila was of course not allowed to call at his ports.[73]

[72] Pietro Della Valle, op. cit., I, 385-6, 393-4; "Cartas e Ordens," HAG, I, 55; "Livro Azul," HAG, I, 39; "Assentos e Juramentos da Câmara de Goa," HAG, f. 231. In a similar fashion, tribute missions to the court of Imperial China were "accompanied by troops who combined protection with surveillance." (J.K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, 2 vols., I, 29.)

[73] Bocarro, Decada, pp. 67, 77-78. It may be noted here that the cafilas to Cambay and Kanara continued to run throughout the seventeenth century, (John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia, London, 1909-1915, 3 vols., II, 41; S.N. Sen, Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri, New Delhi, 1949, pp. 163, 166, 183.) but the one to Malabar ceased once the

<u>The System in Operation</u>. Such were the mechanics of the system set up by the Portuguese to control and tax local Asian trade. Its basic elements were cartazes, cafilas, and armadas, each designed to force local traders to pay customs duties to the Portuguese, and secondarily to provide sufficient protection so that those traders survived to make this payment. These at least were the objectives, but how effective was the system, and what was its practical impact on local traders?

Despite all the armadas and forts, and the stringent conditions of the cartazes, it is clear enough that there was in fact in most areas considerable flexibility within the Portuguese system. Indeed, given the motherland's size, poverty, and distance from its empire, and the extended nature of the empire, this was inevitable. In the decrees and king's letters Portuguese claims appear hard and inflexible, but in practice in most of Asia theirs was a "soft," low-profile presence. Specifically, there were gaps within the system itself, there was a good deal of what can briefly be called corruption, and, during the century, a tacit reordering of Portugal's priorities increased the flexibility of the system.

The most serious gap resulted from the failure

forts there were taken by the Dutch in the early 1660's.

to capture Aden. Despite attempts in 1513 by Albuquerque and 1548 by Castro this strategic port was never taken. This was a crucial weakness in the Portuguese system, for by possessing Aden and Hurmuz they could have blocked nearly all trade to Europe by routes other than their own via the Cape of Good Hope. As it was, a fleet had to be sent each season from Goa to lie off the entrance to the Red Sea, usually cruising between Aden and the Bab al-Mandab, and returning to Hurmuz in April. The lack of a closer base created serious logistic difficulties and reduced the fleet's effectiveness. Reports of its operations are often a comedy of errors. The fleet of 1530 consisted of ten ships, and it spread itself across the entrance to the Red Sea "like a net," with each ship in the fleet nearly in sight of the next. But it took few prizes as most of those desiring to trade illegally had left early and were already within the Red Sea.[74] In 1562 the armada saw more than fifty ships slip past and into the Red Sea without being able to stop them.[75] We are told that the captain of the 1538 fleet cruised diligently until the middle of April without stopping anything, whereupon "it being

[74] Barros, IV, ix, 11.

[75] Couto, VII, x, 3.

time to return, off he went."[76] The logistic difficulties involved led to the discontinuance of this cruise in the 1570's, except for special occasions.[77] Evasion became so easy for those wanting to take illegal goods to the Red Sea, that Aden declined, no longer a necessary haven for ships running the Portuguese blockade.[78]

Another gap resulted from Portuguese dependence on puppet rulers, as in Hurmuz, Cochin, and Cannanore. The Malabar rulers in particular did not always dance in step to the Portuguese tune. Thus one of the raja of Cochin's privileges concerned

[76] Couto, V, ii, 7. For more successful patrols see ANTTCC, 1-33-3, 1-94-94. Couto apparently considered this patrol, despite its frequent failures, to be well worth continuing. (Diogo do Couto, Dialogo do Soldado Prático, Lisbon, 1937, p. 170.) For the comparable difficulties of the Dutch blockade of Goa in 1638 see IO, I/3/22, CCCLVIII.

[77] Arthur Viegas (ed.), op. cit., II, 390; Couto, X, vii, 7; António da Silva Rego (ed.), Documentação para a história das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente. India, Lisbon, 1947- , 12 vols. to date, IX, 513.

[78] C.F. Beckingham, "Dutch Travellers in the Seventeenth Century" in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1951, part 1, pp. 79-81; Philip Baldaeus, A Description of the East India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, London, 1703, III, 575.

customs duties at his port. In 1530 João III (1521-57) had allowed him to levy duties on goods coming from southeast Asia and China to western India if they were owned by Portuguese residents of Cochin. They were to pay 6% on goods landed in Cochin, to the raja. Later the raja unilaterally lowered his rates to 3½%. As a consequence, traders all over western India tried, often successfully, to pass off their goods coming from the east as belonging to a resident of Cochin, and thereby entitled to a rate of 3½% rather than the usual 6% rate levied at Goa and Cochin. Evasion became so common that the raja in 1584, under pressure from the Portuguese authorities, agreed to a reform. The Portuguese residents of Cochin then revolted, and finally the Goa government was forced to concede the lower rate. Evasion continued, to the detriment of Portugal's revenues.[79]

A third gap in the system was the failure to establish customs houses in Chaul and Daman. The further a trader had to go out of his way to pay duties to Portugal, the greater was the likelihood of evasion. In 1589 Philip II of Spain (since 1580 also Philip I of Portugal) decreed that a customs

[79] Couto, X, iv, 13; X, vi, 2; "Provisões, Alvarás e Regimentos," HAG, I, 119r; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, pp. 347-8.

house be set up in Chaul, as the crown needed the extra revenue this would provide. As was to be expected, the local inhabitants resisted this proposal. Although it was decided in 1592 that a customs house had to be established, the local Portuguese continued to resist, and it was not until 1634 that the decision was implemented. More shrill complaints to the king followed, and by the 1670's the offending institution had been withdrawn.[80]

In Daman the local Portuguese citizens were eager to see the establishment of a customs house, as they hoped this would lead to their port becoming a great trade center. They dreamed of Daman rivalling and even superseding Cambay. Both king and viceroy shared this dream; the difficulty was that if Cambay was in fact superseded by Daman a rude awakening was likely to follow as an outraged Mughal emperor invaded Daman's scattered and poorly defended territory. But extra fortifications took time to build--several decades in fact--and it was not until late in the seventeenth century that a customs house was established.[81]

[80] LM, v. 19D, ff. 1195-96r; LM, v. 21A, f. 42; v. 12, f. 109; v. 15, f. 6; APOCR, III, 206, also two copies of the same in AHU, Codice 281, ff. 30-30r, 37-37r; "Livro de registo dos alvarás, cartas etc. de differentes feitorias," HAG, f. 16. For the Regimento of 1634 setting up this customs house see LM, v. 19D, ff. 1196r-1203.

[81] APOCR, III, 293-5, 492-3; LMBP, III, 155-6;

Late nineteenth-century British writers on the Portuguese empire, oriented to the high standards, or at least high ideals, of their Indian Civil Service, were fond of comparing the moral rectitude of their own service with the laxness and corruption of the Portuguese sixteenth-century administration. A few side-swipes at the profligacy of life in Goa were usually included for good measure.

What is at issue here is not a "good" administration and a "corrupt" one, so much as a modern bureaucracy and a premodern one. At least in aspiration, the English Indian Civil Service conformed to Weber's definition of a "modern officialdom," characterized essentially by "the abstract regularity of the execution of authority, which is a result of the demand for 'equality before the law' in the personal and functional sense . . . ."[82] On the other hand, the Portuguese Indian administration was, as already noted, very far from any ideal of abstract regularity, being governed mainly by personal factors, both as regards appointment and behavior. A Portuguese official was appointed to a post as a person, and the post became in effect his property during

"Livro . . . de diferentes feitorias," HAG, f. 22; "Tombo de Damão," HAG, f. 3.

[82] H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, p. 224, and generally pp. 196-244.

his tenure. Any distinction between public and private funds was blurred at the best.

The bulk of his salary came not in cash from Goa but in the form of various privileges and perquisites such as the right to collect a certain tax, or to trade on a particular route.[83] Such rights were laid down in the official letter of appointment, but they shaded off into other customary rights, such as the privilege of being allowed to demand a gratuity before issuing a cartaz, which were unspecified but hallowed by tradition. These unofficial but tacitly accepted perquisites in turn merged with outright illegal exactions and abuses, notably demanding forced loans from local traders, and trading in goods which were meant to be royal monopolies. The first and second categories were regarded as unexceptional by the king or governor, but they did try to limit the third.

This system of payment was reflected in the prices paid for the various offices. The posts were seen as property from which the holder expected to make a profit, and he thus was willing to pay much more for a lucrative post than for one where there

[83] For the scope of these legal perquisites in the 1580's see B. Mus., Addl. 28433, ff. 19-74r, and 166-73, where are set out the various voyages and other privileges for the captains of most of the forts of India.

were few opportunities, even if the status of the latter was higher than that of the former. Thus in a sale in 1618 more than twice as much was paid for the post of judge of the Goa customs house as for the captaincy of the city; the high status attached to the latter position could not compete with the perquisites, legal and otherwise, available to an official in the customs. The post of captain of Div was worth five times and that of Hurmuz fourteen times that of Goa, for these two forts were notoriously profitable.[84]

The prevailing attitude was well expressed by the fidalgo who visited a religious house to say good-bye to the religious before leaving to take up an appointment as captain of a fort. One of the clerics counselled him, "Be content with what is yours, favor the poor, and do justice." The fidalgo retorted that he fully intended to get all he could, as did all the others, "because I am not going to my fort for any other reason than to come back rich."[85]

The thinness of the distinction between public and private property can be illustrated by many instances in the sixteenth century. Thus in the

[84] AHU, Caixa 5, account of Feb. 15, 1618.

[85] Diogo do Couto, O Soldado Prático, p. 14.

later years of the century a practice developed of captains of forts taking artillery from the forts for use in their own ships.[86] An account of the revenues of Goa of 1545 ended by saying "This is what Goa yielded last year, apart from what was stolen by the officials."[87] A year later an official complained that he had been trying to get opium for the king's trade, but had been hindered by the fact that more Portuguese seemed to be interested in sending this product to Gujarat (with which Portugal was at war at the time) and other places than in obtaining it for the king.[88] In 1566 another official represented various abuses to the viceroy and for his pains was forced to flee Goa and seek refuge "among the Hindus and lax Christians who live in Bardês."[89] The chronicler Couto perhaps summed up the general state of the administration late in the century when he wrote "for the king's property to increase it should pass through few hands, and the fewer hands of officials it has contact with the greater

[86] APOCR, III, 230, 292.

[87] Gavetas, III, 213.

[88] ANTTSL, IV, 509. For similar conduct in early seventeenth-century Ceylon see P. Pieris, Ceylon and the Portuguese, 1505-1658, Tellippalai, Ceylon, 1920, p. 191, where we are told that "the gems and elephants which belonged to the Crown were dealt with by him [a Portuguese captain] as if they were his private property . . ."

[89] ANTTCC, 1-108-12.

will be its increase."[90] At the forts where traders called to pay duties as required, they were subjected to numerous abuses. Their goods were forcibly bought by the local officials for low prices. They were made to carry on their ships, free of charge, goods belonging to various officials. Sometimes they were even forced to call at a particular port to sell goods belonging to some official, even if this port was not on their desired itinerary.[91]

Such instances of what today would be called "corruption" can usually be explained by the confusion in most official's minds between private and public property; such confusion was part of any administration at this time, for the distinction has been made explicit, and an attempt made to enforce it, only in the last two centuries. Why then the contemporary criticism that has just been quoted? The explanation is that this criticism was of actions regarded as being abuses (the word used is usually "abusos," not the modern "corrução") of the system.

[90] Couto, XII, i, 8. See his Dialogo do Soldado Prático, Lisbon, 1937 for detailed and trenchant criticism of the prevalent abuses. Also see Gavetas, III, 215, for illegal trade by a Portuguese official in 1545.

[91] Couto, VIII, cap. 1; ANTTCC, 1-97-26; APOCR, III, 711-12; J. Wicki (ed.), "Duas Relações sobre a situação do India Portuguesa nos anos 1568 e 1569," in Studia, 8, 1961, pp. 177-8, 184-200; LM, v. 5, ff. 134r-40r; Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Caixa 207, no. 120.

The governors and chroniclers were not complaining of corruption in the modern sense (for they were not twentieth-century men) but of people who went beyond the bounds of custom in taking perquisites. Thus to take the cannon needed for the defence of an important fort was clearly going too far, but no one complained because the captaincy of Hurmuz sold for fourteen times that of Goa; the fact of greater perquisites in Hurmuz was part of the system, and appears remarkable only today.[92]

There still remains the question of the effectiveness of such an administrative system. "Abusos" were clearly dysfunctional, and the governors complained about them, but the whole network of perquisites and influence, of a shadowy line between public and private property, _was_ the system: "corruption" was functional in sixteenth-century terms. The administration was not ideal. It was probably less efficient than a modern bureaucratic structure, or than some other sixteenth-century systems, but it is a solecism to criticize the Portuguese administra-

[92] As is to be expected, the situation in premodern China was similar: "in the Chinese empire the term "corruption" must be understood in a special sense as the carrying to excess of practices that, when not excessive, were a normal and recognized part of government." J.K. Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer, A.M. Craig, _East Asia_. _The Modern Transformation_, Boston, 1965, p. 108, and generally pp. 108-9.

for its failure to fit an ideal nineteenth and twentieth century model. The abuses, however, were a different matter. They were seen as undesirable, and did unnecessarily lessen the efficiency of the administration. The abuses to which some officials subjected native traders who were trying to conform to Portuguese requirements simply increased the amount of evasion. Their incidence apparently grew as Portuguese power declined later in the sixteenth century.

The third factor which helped to make Portuguese control less rigid than may appear from a study of the royal decrees was the change in the relative importance of the four strands of Asian trade with which the Portuguese were concerned. We have already noted that the value of the trade to Portugal declined during the century, thanks largely to the growth of the "illegal" pepper trade, which will be taken up shortly. Portuguese India became increasingly autonomous, financed by the royal monopoly country trade within Asia to specified areas, and by the customs duties derived from local and private Portuguese traders.[93] The corollary of this was less rigidity in the Portuguese system. It was, for example, more important that people trade, and pay duties, than that enemies be denied trade with ships

[93] Cf. f.n. 33 of this chapter.

owned or licensed by the Portuguese.

A clear case was trade to the Red Sea. In the early years the Portuguese tried to ban all such trade, this being a hostile Muslim area.[94] Throughout the century such prohibitions were backed by the clerics, notably in their Provincial Councils.[95] Their views were increasingly ignored by the governors. We have records of trade licensed by the Portuguese from the Red Sea to Div from 1537, to Hurmuz from 1539, to Cannanor from 1546, and to Goa itself from 1556.[96] Similarly, it appeared that the crown would make greater profits if the special voyages were sold off instead of being done directly by the state. As we shall see, the centralization of the horse trade in Goa was slackened. Albuquerque had opposed all private Portuguese trade, for he thought all Portuguese in Asia should serve the king. Apart from the impossibility of enforcing such an idea, the customs receipts from these traders

[94] Castanheda, III, cxxxiii; Marechal Gomes da Costa, Descobrimentos e Conquistas, III, 281.

[95] DI, III, 537, IV, 492; APOCR, IV, 26, 126.

[96] For Div and Cambay, Studia, 10, p. 184; ANTTCC, 1-77-36, 1-100-28; Couto, V, ii, 8. For Hurmuz, Correa, IV, 84. For Cannanor, ANTTSL, III, 160, 162, 180. For Goa, ANTTCC, 1-102-47; DI, III, 569, 651, 712, IV, 427, V, 263, 754.

were too valuable for their trade to be discouraged.

Two Case Studies. In 1513 the king was informed that copper was worth its weight in gold in India, as, thanks to the Portuguese blockade, none was now coming through from the Red Sea. A year later copper was reported to be extremely plentiful and cheap in Div, as many ships laden with it had recently arrived from the Red Sea.[97] C.R. Boxer in his recent authoritative survey cautiously opines that "As a broad generalization it can be said that the Portuguese did more or less effectively dominate the maritime trade of the Indian Ocean for most of the sixteenth century."[98] Having described the mechanics of the system, and considered some of the gaps and weak points in it, we can appropriately close this chapter by addressing ourselves to this apparent conflict of testimony. We consider two Portuguese objectives: to control the horse trade, and to monopolize all trade in spices.

[97] Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, III, 70, 99.

[98] C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, London, 1969, p. 58; other modern writers agree--F.A. Correa, Consequências económicas dos descobrimentos, Lisbon, 1937, p. 63; A. Botelho de Sousa, Subsídios para a história militar marítima da India, Lisbon, 1930-56, 4 vols., I, 61-62; H. Morse Stephens, Albuquerque, Oxford, 1892, p. 95; Luís Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomaz, De Malaca a Pegu. Viagens de um feitor português (1512-1515), Lisbon, 1966, p. 16.

Horses were essential for the rulers of India both for war and for show. Prices of at least Rs. 1,000 each were usual for good horses, but such horses were not produced in India. The best came from the south Arabian coast. Those from Persia were also in demand in India, but the local ones, notably from west Gujarat, were generally despised.[99] Before the arrival of the Portuguese, horses had usually entered western India through Goa, for sale in the five Deccan sultanates. It appears that the tax on the horse trade formed the backbone of the revenues which the sultanate of Bijapur received from Goa, while at the same time it gave the sultans a political sanction against their neighbors, as they could threaten to deny access to Goa's horse sales.[100]

Once Albuquerque had taken Goa, the Portuguese took pains to foster this lucrative trade. Any ship bringing at least ten horses from Hurmuz paid no customs duties on its remaining cargo, and merchants who left Goa having bought five horses were given concessions in the customs houses covering Goa's

[99] Descrição, ff. 8, 12, 27r; Pires, I, 21; Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, New Delhi, 1968, I, 142, 439, 443. Jahangir apparently did prize horses from Kutch, but his highest praise is reserved for one from Persia.

[100] Castanheda, III, viii; Barros, I, vii, 10; II, v, 2.

land trade.[101] The Portuguese also tried compulsorily to centralize the whole horse trade in Goa, so that any ship coming from south Arabia or Hurmuz with horses for the Indian market could come only to Goa. In practice, this was never enforced very strictly, despite some success in the early years. The main chink in the system was that in places outside Goa local rulers and local Portuguese wanted horses for themselves, and both these groups had occasionally to be conciliated by the Goa government for political reasons.[102] Another difficulty was that the religious authorities disapproved of Christians selling horses to infidels, as this was forbidden by a Papal Bull. Finally God and Mammon were both served by a Provision of 1574. Portuguese were no longer allowed to take horses inland from Goa to sell them in Bijapur. Instead the Bijapuri merchants would have to come to Goa to buy them. Thus the consciences of the Portuguese were freed from the sin of taking horses to Muslims, while the

[101] "Provisões, Alvarás e Regimentos," HAG, I, 22; Correa, II, 74.

[102] F. Paes, "Tombo de Ilha de Goa . . . ," in Boletim Vasco da Gama, no. 62; "Livro de Leis de D. Manuel," ANTT, ff. 137-r; P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Regimentos das Fortalezas da India, pp. 271, 314-5, 383; APOCR, III, 14, also published in A. da Silva Rego, Documentação, op. cit., X, 450 et seq; Studia, 3, pp. 54-55, 63; R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), op. cit., p. 116; APOCR, III, supplement, pp. 7, 493, 711-2; AHU, Codice 281, ff. 264r, 359r-60.

goods brought by the Bijapuri merchants increased Goa's customs revenues.[103]

From this trade the Portuguese crown derived both financial and political benefits. Horses paid no import duties in Goa, but when they left they paid Rs. 84 each. As early as 1513-14 this trade was worth Rs. 10,000 to the Goa customs. By 1523 this had risen to Rs. 36,000 and in the 1540's to Rs. 1,26,000. Later in the century receipts fell sharply to around Rs. 30,000 as more and more horses entered India at ports other than Goa.[104] Thus an undated account of about 1580 says that Goa made Rs. 18,000 from the horse trade, but Chaul made Rs. 28,800.[105]

The political benefits, although less direct, were equally substantial. Vijayanagar and the five Deccan sultanates were frequently at war with one another in the sixteenth century, especially before Vijayanagar's great defeat at Talikota in 1565. Each was prepared to offer large concessions to the Portuguese in return for a denial of horse sales

[103] Couto, VIII, cap. 29, 33; IX, cap. 17.

[104] Marechal Gomes da Costa, Descobrimentos e Conquistas, III, 306; ANTTCC, 1-30-36; Gavetas, V, 247; AHU, Codice 500, ff. 1-2r; Luis de Figueiredo Falcão, Livro, p. 75; DUP, I, 231. From this last it appears that only about 300 of the 1500 horses which came to India each year entered through Goa in the late sixteenth century.

[105] B. Mus., Addl. 28433, f. 75r.

to their enemies. Thus in 1547 Bijapur and Vijayanagar were at war, and both sides offered the Portuguese ample and cheap supplies of provisions in return for a monopoly of the horse trade. The Vijayanagar offer was more attractive and they received the desired assurance that the Portuguese would sell no horses to Bijapur.[106]

Our second case study concerns Portugal's attempt to monopolize the Asian spice trade, especially that in pepper.[107] It was in this area that

[106] Correa, IV, 601, 604-5, 621; R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), _op. cit._, pp. 255-7. See also the treaty with Vijayanagar's vassal the raja of Kanara in the same year in Couto, VI, v, 5. For similar rivalry between Bijapur and Vijayanagar and offers of concessions in 1513-14 see Correa, II, 376, 379; Castanheda, III, cxviii; _Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre de Tombo_, Lisbon, 1892, pp. 367-9, 381; _Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque_, IV, 341-3.

[107] Two detailed descriptions of this topic have recently appeared: Jan Kieniewicz, "The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar during the 16th Century," in _Indian Economic and Social History Review_, VI, 1, March, 1969, _passim_, and V. Magalhães-Godinho, _L'Économie de l'Empire Portugais aux XVe et XVIe Siècles_, Paris, 1969, pp. 537-828 _passim_. There is obviously some duplication between these two works and what follows, but our conclusions and emphases often differ, and I have used some sources not seen by either of the above. It is unfortunate that the following was unavailable to me: C.R. Boxer, "Portuguese Reactions to the revival of the Red Sea spice trade and the rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600," a paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Asian History, Kuala Lumpur, August 1968.

the Portuguese made their greatest effort, so this can be seen as a major test case for the effectiveness of their whole attempt to control Asian trade. Throughout the sixteenth century and later, a stream of decrees and instructions from Portugal and Goa insisted that all trade in spices was reserved entirely for the crown and its agents. If this monopoly could be enforced, the Muslim powers in India, the Red Sea, and Egypt would lose their most profitable trade, while the Portuguese would be able to buy cheap in Asia and sell dear in Europe.

The basic policy as regards the spice trade, in effect a codification of the prohibitions of the previous twenty years, was laid down by D. Manuel in 1520, and was repeated with minor variations throughout the century.

> We forbid and order that no captain, factor, secretary of a factory, or any other official concerned with trade or justice, or any other person of whatever rank or status he may be, whether Christian or Muslim or any other, trade, or cause to be traded, or transport, pepper, cloves, ginger, cinnamon, mace, nutmeg, lacre, silk, or borax, nor in any way buy any of these things.

Any Portuguese offending was to lose all his property and salaries, while a Muslim was to be imprisoned, after forfeiting all his goods and the

ship in which the forbidden article was found.[108] Occasionally a closely-regulated trade within Asia was permitted, and puppet rulers sometimes were conciliated by being allowed to trade in pepper in limited quantities. Further, the crews of ships returning to Portugal were paid partly by being allowed to take small quantities of spices with them. Nevertheless, in general Portugal did try to reserve all pepper trade within Asia to agents of the king, and to limit the transport of pepper to Europe to Portuguese ships sailing via the Cape of Good Hope.[109]

In the later sixteenth century this Portuguese trade was done for the crown by contractors. For

[108] Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino. Legislação Antiga, Lisbon, 1867, I, 59. Similar prohibitions throughout the century and later in APOCR, V, 292, III, 6-7, also printed in A. da Silva Rego, Documentação, op. cit., X, 442-3; APOCR, III, 567-8, 650-2; "Livro Morato," HAG, ff. 61-62; "Livro Verde," HAG, I, 101r-3r; LM, v. 19D, f. 1200r. We may note that in 1570 D. Sebastian decreed the freeing of the trade in pepper and spices. This was reversed again in 1573, and in any case the degree of freedom was in fact strictly limited: pepper and spices were to be brought only to Portugal, no official was to trade in them, and they could be bought only in India, not in the growing areas. (A. da Silva Rego, op. cit., XI, 48-60.) For the importance attached by the kings of Portugal to the trade in pepper see APOCR, III, 7, 67, 740, where he says "the substance of those areas [of Asia] and of the revenue they produce for me is the pepper."

[109] Annaes Maritimos e Coloniaes, Lisbon, 1840-46, 6 vols., IV, 120; ANTTCC, 1-27-78; ANTTSV, XIV, 161; ANTTDR, XIII, 183.

most of the 1580's and 1590's pepper was bought in Malabar by a group of private merchants, who took the pepper to Portugal in their own ships and there sold it to the king at a fixed price. Pepper from Kanara was usually bought by contractors in the growing areas and handed over to the king's officials in Goa. In Lisbon itself a group of merchants would often contract to take a set quantity of pepper from the Casa da India, through which pepper imports to Portugal were channeled, at a fixed price. This pepper was sent to Antwerp, the great entrepot, and there sold to buyers from all over Europe. The Portuguese crown at first had its own factor in Antwerp to handle this distribution, but later it limited its role to selling the pepper in Lisbon.[110]

In an influential article, F.C. Lane presents evidence that in the 1560's the Mediterranean spice trade "revived" to a level greater than before the Portuguese reached India. He concludes that, due to corruption in Portuguese India, their control slackened and so the trade via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf regained and surpassed its fifteenth century levels. Lane has statistics to show that

[110] DUP, III, 314; ANTTSV, III, 277-r, XXVI, 294-r; Couto, X, i, 9; X, vii, 1; "Cartas Missivas," ANTT, maço 2, no. 73; F. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, Lisbon, 1952, pp. 240-1; The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, London, 1885, 2 vols., I, 221-3; C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, London, 1969, pp. 60-61.

Venice was getting more pepper from Alexandria in 1560-64 than it had been in the late fifteenth century, and others demonstrating that Venice's imports of spices from Alexandria rose greatly, from a low initial point, in the period 1550-54.[111] We can admit that the "illegal" trade to Europe via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf had two low points, in the early 1500's and in the late 1540's, but Lane has no evidence that the low points of these two short periods extended to the period between them, primarily 1515-1545. The Portuguese sources, admittedly usually non-quantitative, do not show that these two low points were sustained in the intervening years. We will demonstrate that the Portuguese came closest to a monopoly of the pepper trade _to Europe_ during these two short periods, but did not entirely succeed even during them. We will also prove that in the distribution of spices within Asia their role was never large.[112]

[111] F.C. Lane, "The Mediterranean Spice Trade. Further Evidence of its revival in the sixteenth century," in _American Historical Review_, vol. XLV, April, 1940, pp. 581-90.

[112] G.W.F. Stripling, _The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs_, 1511-74, Urbana, Illinois, 1942, pp. 15-17, 26, 31, claims that the Ottoman conquests of the Arab areas, and especially Mamluk Egypt, in the early sixteenth century were made possible by the fact that their control of the European spice trade on which their revenue was based was broken by the Portuguese. The enfeebled Arab areas were thus

There were six main pepper-producing areas in sixteenth-century Asia: Malabar; two areas in west Sumatra; Kedah; Patani; the Sunda Islands. The first and last named were apparently most important.[113] The total production can only be guessed at. A figure of 1611 has 258,000 quintals coming from Malabar and the Kanara area to the north of Malabar proper.[114] As this is only one of the six areas listed above total production was probably close to 1,000,000 quintals. The Portuguese at the most took 50,000 quintals a year via the Cape of Good Hope, but their average was only about half this amount, while an account of 1560 has 40,000 quintals a year coming to Alexandria. In the early 1560's less than 12,000 quintals of this went to Venice.[115] This leaves us with Europe taking less

easy conquests for the Turks. No doubt some revenue was lost, but the Portuguese were never so completely effective as to weaken these states to the extent which Stripling thinks.

[113] Barros, IV, i, 12.

[114] F. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, p. 514. The royal letter based on this is in LMBP, II, 156. An early sixteenth-century source has only 46,000 quintals coming from Malabar. (Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, IV, 175-6.) Even allowing for an increase in production, these two figures are irreconcilable. I prefer the 1611 one as the Portuguese knew a lot more about the area then than they did in 1514.

[115] C.R. Boxer, op. cit., p. 59; F.C. Lane, op. cit., pp. 581-5.

than one tenth of total Asian production. Before expanding on this, we need to investigate how much was going through to Europe via the Near East in the first half of the sixteenth century. Were the levels really so much lower than later in the century? It seems they were not.

In 1565 the viceroy hoped to be able to get two shiploads of pepper a year from the Kanara area; this had previously all gone to the Red Sea. An average shipload was about 6,000 quintals, so from the Kanara area alone, even assuming these two shiploads represented the area's total production, we have 12,000 quintals getting to the Red Sea in the years before 1565.[116] Further, in the early 1540's four or five Gujarati ships left from Malaya for Gujarat or the Red Sea each year with pepper. These ocean-going Gujarati ships can be assumed to be nearly as big as the Portuguese ones, so this is at least 20,000 quintals, going mostly to the Red Sea.[117] From other sources it appears that at least five more large ships loaded with pepper left for the Red Sea each year from Acheh and places in the Bay of Bengal.[118] We thus have at least 50,000

[116] A. da Silva Rego, Documentação, op. cit., X, 159-60; ANTTSL, IV, 303-r.

[117] "Cartas de Vice Reis," ANTT, no. 75.

[118] DI, VII, 88-89; Studia, 3, p. 80.

quintals annually getting to the Red Sea before the 1560's.

There were also many smaller ships taking pepper from the Malabar area each year, but most of the "illegal" trade from here went overland to the Bay of Bengal.[119] Some pepper would be consumed in the Red Sea area, but most of it went on to Alexandria. Lane's figure of 1560 for all spices (the bulk being pepper) coming to Alexandria each year is 40,000 quintals.[120] If we exclude from our own figure that part used in the Red Sea area and Egypt, and from his the part which was spices other than pepper, we have a figure for the earlier years at least equal to his for 1560. Finality is not possible given the very rough statistics available, but it does seem that except in the two short periods, from 1500 to 1515, and late in the 1540's, large quantities of pepper were getting through to the Mediterranean.

Events in Asia suggest that these two periods were exceptional, coinciding as they did with the greatest Portuguese military efforts to control Asian trade. The first encompasses their earliest years in Asia,

[119] J. Wicki, op. cit., pp. 216-7; ANTTSV, XI, 37; ANTTCC, 1-30-36, 1-44-58, 1-106-50.

[120] F.C. Lane, op. cit., p. 585.

when their ardour was undimmed, culminating in Albuquerque's great victories during his governorship. The late 1540's saw D. João de Castro's triumphs during and after the second siege of Div. Such high levels of activity, resulting in high rates of success in blocking "illegal" trade, were not sustained by the Portuguese. Their success in the earlier period was probably also helped by the element of surprise. Their claims and actions were quite unprecedented, and no doubt it took local traders a little time, once they recovered from their shock, to work out how to avoid the Portuguese.

For the later sixteenth century our figures bear out Lane's contention fully: more pepper was getting through via the Red Sea than via the Cape. In 1566 the viceroy estimated that twice as much pepper was going to the Red Sea as was going to Portugal.[121] Between 1587 and 1598 an average of just over 12,000 quintals of pepper reached Portugal each year, but a source of 1585 quoted by C.R. Boxer has 40-50,000 quintals of spices coming to Jiddah from Acheh alone each year (though not all of this necessarily went on to the Mediterranean).[122]

[121] A. da Silva Rego, Documentação, op. cit., X, 157.

[122] C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire,

In the second half of the sixteenth century the European demand for spices doubled, and prices more than doubled, but the Portuguese were actually sending less spices to Portugal towards the end of the century than they had been in the first thirty years.[123] A letter of 1569 summed up Portugal's attempt to monopolize the pepper trade to Europe when it said that despite all Portugal's armadas and efforts, she only got "each year four badly loaded ships, and the Muslims, who just come and trade and leave, take each year via the Red Sea as much as they want without our being able to hinder them, apart from what goes overland, in bullock caravans, which is a very great quantity . . ."[124]

The Portuguese effort to control the trade to Europe met with little success; their attempt to block the trade within Asia itself was a complete failure. We have seen that perhaps nine-tenths of the total production was consumed within Asia, from China to west Asia. The Portuguese tacitly gave up trying to control this trade. If they found a ship with pepper on board they seized it, but

p. 59; Luis de Figueiredo Falcão, Livro, pp. 59-61; see also F. Mendes da Luz, Relação de Todas as rendas . . ., Coimbra, 1949, p. 60, where it is claimed that an average of 20,000 quintals came to Portugal each year, clearly an inflated figure.

[123] C.R. Boxer, op. cit., pp. 59-60

[124] J. Wicki, op. cit., p. 216.

they reserved their main effort for trying to block the trade through the Red Sea to Europe. A brief area by area survey will demonstrate the lack of success of the Portuguese monopoly.

We may start with Malabar, for this was the source of most of the pepper bound for Portugal, and it was there that the Portuguese exercised their greatest control. Throughout the century there are reports of local ships taking pepper up the western coast to Gujarat, and in the early years across the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea. Apart from this, there was a well-established system of bullock caravans, which took the pepper overland from Malabar to the Coromandel coast, from where it was distributed all over south and east India, and the other coasts of the Bay of Bengal.[125]

In the Kanara area, inland from the ports of Honavar, Barcellor, and Mangalore, and just south of Goa, pepper of a higher quality and price than that of Malabar was produced in large quantities. Further, it was easier to load pepper at Goa than at Cochin, as Goa had two fine harbors.[126] From at least the 1530's this pepper area was known to

[125] _Ibid._, pp. 210-11; _Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque_, I, 126; ANTTCC, 1-30-36; 1-44-58; 1-105-90; ANTTSV, XI, 37.

[126] AHU, Caixa 5, account of July 28, 1618; LMBP, III, 219.

at least some Portuguese, but despite its proximity to Goa nothing was done about it. Treaties in the 1540's with local rulers made no mention of pepper.[127] It was not until 1565 that the Portuguese began to get pepper from Kanara; until then a little of the total production of the area had gone inland, but most of it had gone to the Red Sea.[128] Even after this the Portuguese met difficulties in getting pepper from this area. The raja of Cochin disliked their obtaining pepper from areas outside his control, while in Kanara the local rulers in the seventeenth century tended to be difficult. This area had escaped from its loose subordination to Vijayanagar after the latter was defeated at Talikota in 1565. The records of the ensuing period are confused, but around 1600 the area was united by the conquests of Vantacapa Naik. He and his successors were far from being in awe of the Portuguese, and their independent and even insolent attitude annoyed the Portuguese intensely, apart from increasing the price the latter had to pay for pepper.[129]

[127] ANTTCC, 1-44-61, 1-50-49; Couto, V, ix, 3; VI, v, 4.

[128] A. da Silva Rego, Documentação, op. cit., X, 159-60; ANTTCC, 1-108-78; Couto, VIII, cap. 28.

[129] AHU, Codice 281, ff. 21, 23-23r; "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, I, 218r; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, p. 310; Assentos, II, 12-13, 54-56, 167-9; Fazenda, VIII, 99r, 146r, 186r, 194; LMBP, V, 145.

Over the pepper production of southeast Asia, in west Sumatra, the Sundas, and the Malay peninsula, the Portuguese had virtually no control. It seems that they never got much pepper from Malacca; throughout the century the Malabar area and especially Cochin supplied most of the cargoes. Thus Acheh from the 1540's at least was free to send large quantities of pepper to the Red Sea, while much also went to China.[130] All the Portuguese could do was to try and tempt local traders to come to Malacca with their pepper. These locals, especially the Javanese, preferred to pay money for their purchases in Malacca, which points to their having readily available and profitable outlets for their pepper outside the Portuguese system.[131]

Throughout the century in the Persian Gulf large quantities of pepper were available, presumably from the western Indian growing areas. A report of 1522 from Basrah speaks of the arrival of two

[130] Antonio Galvão, Tratado . . ., Lisbon, 1563, f. 40; Studia, 3, p. 80; DI, VII, 88-89; ANTTSL, III, 34, 288.

[131] Studia, 5, p. 107; "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, I, 89r. In Ceylon in the 1620's the Portuguese tried to sow pepper, but this apparently met with little success. (ANTTSV, XIX, 274.) In 1644 a Portuguese claimed that large quantities of high quality pepper were being produced in the Kingdom of Kotte in Ceylon. If this was so, the Portuguese never got any of it. (AHU, Caixa 16, Duarte da Costa Homem to king, n.d., 1644.)

caravans with a total of 1200 camels loaded with gold, both bullion and coin, and other goods, which were exchanged for the ample supplies of pepper available there.[132] Other reports show that this trade continued, and that later in the century the Portuguese in effect accepted it, consoling themselves by hoping that most of the pepper available here would be used locally and would not, as did that in the Red Sea, go straight to the Mediterranean.[133]

The extent of the failure of the Portuguese in this area in which they tried hardest is thus clear enough. The reasons are easy to comprehend: they simply lacked the resources to impose a monopoly over this product. A merchant trading outside the Portuguese system had a good chance of avoiding detection, given always the absence of an effective guard over the entrance to the Red Sea, and the profits such a merchant stood to make were enormous. In the 1540's pepper could be bought in Gujarat or in the Bay of Bengal for about Rs. 15 a quintal,

[132] ANTTCC, 1-27-97.

[133] ANTTSL, IV, 476; ANTTCC, 1-105-139, repeated in 1-106-8; AHU, Codice 281, f. 252; Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Caixa 207, no. 120; "Livro Verde," HAG, I, 101r-103r; "Livro Vermelho," HAG, I, 271r-73.

and this was also the price in 1525 in Gujarat.[134] In Hurmuz the price in 1535 was said to be Rs. 75 per *quintal*.[135] In the Red Sea area in 1512 it was Rs. 38 a *quintal*[136] and this was apparently low as some merchants next year claimed they were getting Rs. 50 at Jiddah.[137] The Portuguese had perhaps succeeded in raising the price a little, as in pre-Portuguese times in Cairo the price was about Rs. 40.[138]

The price in the production area of Malabar in the late fifteenth century had been about Rs. 6 a *quintal* but the Portuguese made contracts with the rajas of Cochin, Cannanore, and Quilon by which they paid only a little over Rs. 5.[139] By the 1550's they were paying Rs. 6[140] and by the end of the sixteenth century Rs. 17 a *quintal*.[141] The price

[134] ANTTSV, XI, 23r-27r; ANTTCC, 1-77-26; "Cartas de Vice Reis," ANTT, nos. 75, 146.

[135] Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Caixa 207, no. 120.

[136] *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque*, III, 199.

[137] *Ibid*., IV, 181-2.

[138] Castanheda, II, lxxv.

[139] Descrição, f. 87; ANTTCC, 1-35-76, 1-80-114.

[140] R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), *Subsídios para a história da India Portuguesa*, p. 34.

[141] DUP, III, 337-8.

paid by the Portuguese thus tripled, and other charges increased these prices considerably; early in the seventeenth century the actual loaded cost of one quintal of pepper in India was reckoned at about Rs. 19. Even after this, transportation charges to Portugal had to be met, so that in the late sixteenth century the cost of one quintal by the time it got to Lisbon was over Rs. 40.[142] The prices they could get in Portugal did not proportionally keep pace with this increase; they only doubled. From a usual price of Rs. 44 in the Casa da India in the early sixteenth century[143] the price rose to Rs. 70 in the 1530's, and to around Rs. 90 in the late sixteenth century.[144] If we exclude transportation and other charges, which we must do for lack of data, the Portuguese made profits of over 700% early in the sixteenth century, but only 500% at the end. These lower profits reflect not only an increase in the amount coming through the Red Sea after the very early years, but also from the 1590's

[142] F. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, p. 509; Luis de Figueiredo Falcao, Livro, pp. 59-69.

[143] ANTTCC, 1-9-132; "Cartas Missivas," ANTT, maço 1, no. 46, maço 2, no. 73.

[144] Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, Caixa 201, no. 64; AHU, Codice 283, f. 164. In 1564 the price in Venice was about Rs. 40. (ANTTCC, 1-107-9.)

the competition of the Dutch. From the mid 1610's the price in Lisbon was less than Rs. 60,[145] dropping Portuguese profits to less than 400%. Generally it is clear that "illegal" traders could afford to pay a little more than the Portuguese in the growing areas and still make large profits in the Red Sea and elsewhere.

The likelihood that this would happen was increased by Portugal's lack of control over the actual areas where the pepper was grown, even in Malabar. They exercised a tenuous control over the coastal area through their puppet rajas, but none at all inland. Given that they tried to pay lower prices than those usual in the late fifteenth century, or than those being offered by other traders in the sixteenth century, and given also that until the 1560's they paid one quarter of the price in goods, usually copper, for which the growers had little use, it is not difficult to understand how easily the "illegal" traders found their cargoes. In 1520 a Portuguese official asked an important trader who had been bringing pepper to the coast and selling it to the Portuguese why he no longer did this. He replied, "because I find that there are many people who beg me to sell it, and pay the price

[145] AHU, Caixa 12, certificate of Nov. 6, 1635; ANTTDR, XVI, 184, XX, 245.

I want in my own house, without troubling me to come to the coast."[146]

The Portuguese were dependent for their supplies on the petty rajas of the producing areas, and on the merchants who operated between the growers and the exporters. To conciliate the rajas they paid them regular pensions, but these were not always sufficient to ensure their good will and cooperation. In 1549 the raja of the most important production area, appropriately called the "king of pepper" by the Portuguese, decided to retaliate against the insults and abuses to which he was subjected by the raja af Cochin. His method was to ally with Portugal's traditional enemy, the Zamorin of Calicut. As a result the Portuguese were involved in four years of war in the area, during which time it was very difficult for them to get cargoes for Portugal.[147]

[146] Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, IV, 174-5. This source on pp. 175-6 estimates the total production of the Malabar area at about 16,000 bares. 2,000-2,500 bares were used locally, 3,000 escaped inland, and 500-600 went to Div by sea. Of the remaining c. 9,000 bares, the Portuguese got some, but a large amount also went to Hurmuz, Div, the Red Sea, and Coromandel. See also DUP, III, 373-5. A report of 1533 explained to the king why he got so little pepper. Other merchants "paid all in money and at the requested price, and Your Highness pays in copper and money and at a fixed price . . ." (ANTTCC, 1-50-65, see also J. Wicki, op. cit., pp. 216-7.)

[147] Couto, VI, viii, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9; VI, ix, 18,

The growers of the pepper were mostly Hindus, but the initial purchasers were St. Thomas (Nestorian) Christians. They, however, were too afraid of the Portuguese to bring the pepper to the coast, so they usually sold it to the Muslim traders who traditionally handled this trade. The Muslims sold it to the Portuguese in Cochin and the other coastal forts, and also to other exporters. Apparently later in the century some of the Christians were persuaded to bring the pepper themselves, but at least in the first half of the sixteenth century the Portuguese were largely dependent for their pepper cargoes on their supposed inveterate enemies, the Muslims. These Muslims often rubbed salt in the wound by supplying pepper which was dirty or wet.[148]

That the Portuguese got poor quality pepper was, however, due more to their own poor management than to the malice of the Muslim traders. The ideal arrangement would have been for the capital to buy the pepper to arrive on the ships from Portugal

19; VI, x, 15, 17. For the pensions see P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Regimentos das Fortalezas da India, pp. 217-9; "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, I, 77; DUP, I, 261-2.

[148] "Cartas de Vice Reis," ANTT, no. 95; A. da Silva Rego, História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente, Lisbon, 1949, p. 390; A. da Silva Rego, Documentação, op. cit., II, 353-4, IV, 479-80; Castanheda, VI, lxxiii.

late in the year. The pepper was harvested in December and January, and the Portuguese would use their capital to make purchases at leisure throughout the next year, buying only clean dry pepper, and at times when the market was low. About fifteen months after the capital had arrived the pepper would be loaded on the ships of the next year and sent off to Portugal. In fact the Portuguese were never able to get this far ahead. The capital arrived late in the year, and the Portuguese had then frantically to buy whatever pepper was available, get it loaded, and the ships off again in time for them to round the Cape of Good Hope before the end of the monsoon. A succession of letters to the king throughout the century describe this unsatisfactory arrangement, and urge him to have the capital available for the whole year, but the king could never afford to do this. He had to have his capital, in the form of pepper, back in Lisbon as soon as possible. As a result, his officials were reduced to trying to borrow money from local Portuguese merchants, the city of Cochin, and the Raja of Craganore.[149] When the capital arrived, a hard-pressed

[149] A. da Silva Rego, _História_, p. 139; A. da Silva Rego, _Documentação_, IV, 495; Barros, III, iv, 7; Artur Basilio de Sá (ed.), _Documentação para a História das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente. Insulíndia_, Lisbon, 5 vols., I, 333-4; LM, v. 21A, f. 222; ANTTCC, 1-30-36, 1-52-32, 1-82-2, 1-86-89, 1-94-73, 1-107-86.

governor would often take part of it for military necessities, despite frequent prohibitions of such conduct from the king.[150]

One final factor should be mentioned, which again decreased the control of the Portuguese crown over the pepper production of Malabar: the tendency of both Portuguese officials and private Portuguese merchants to indulge in the highly profitable "illegal" trade themselves. In 1519 the governor left for a cruise in the Red Sea. Seizing the chance, the remaining officials in India reportedly sent cargoes of pepper north to Cambay in ships belonging to the "pirates" of Malabar.[151] A year later a native official of the raja of Cochin told the king of Portugal that Portuguese officials bought pepper in Cochin for their own illegal private trade at prices higher than the fixed official price at which it was bought for the king. As a result the local merchants wanted to sell all their pepper at this high price.[152] Other reports of Portuguese and local inhabitants of Portuguese areas trading in pepper, both north to Hurmuz and Cambay, and in southeast Asia, continue throughout the century

[150] For example, "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, I, 78-78r, 110, 202r.

[151] ANTTCC, 1-25-108.

[152] ANTTCC, 1-27-69.

and later.[153] In the 1630's even clerics, including one of the Inquisitors, were accused of such trade.[154]

The Portuguese performance in the trade in other spices was even less successful than that in pepper. Cinnamon was obtained in any quantity from Ceylon only in the seventeenth century. The other spices--mace, nutmeg, and cloves--came from the Molucca and Banda Islands. The king of Portugal sent an annual ship there to collect these products, and in the early years apparently made large profits from this trade. A considerable quantity of the spices so obtained were sold locally in southeast Asia and also in Hurmuz. The main reason for the declining revenue which the king derived from this trade was the large number of Portuguese officials who were allowed, as a perquisite of their position, to bring such spices back to India for themselves in these royal ships. In 1552 it was said that two of the king's ships returned from the Moluccas with exactly fifty quintals of cloves for the king. The rest of the cargoes were spices for the officials, and the king's agents had to buy these spices at high prices in order to get a cargo

[153] ANTTCC, 1-83-74, 1-94-54; AHU, Caixa 3, no. 4.

[154] LM., v. 13A, ff. 220-r, v. 17, f. 68.

to send to Portugal.[155] In the last few years in which this trade was carried on by the royal ships private traders also were free to trade in spices, but had to pay heavy duties. From 1560 the crown sold the voyages.

In 1570 the raja of Ternate was killed by a group of unruly Portuguese. The cooperation of this raja had been crucial in order for the Portuguese to get their cargoes of spices, but now a protracted war broke out between them and the new raja. For most of the 1570's trade to both the Moluccas and the Bandas seems to have been abandoned. After a brief revival the Portuguese were finally shut out by the arrival of the Dutch in the early 1590's. Throughout the century the very exiguous nature of Portuguese authority east of Malacca allowed others, especially Javanese, to continue in this spice trade. These Javanese Muslims usually took the spices to Acheh, whence they were carried all over Asia and to the Mediterranean. The Portuguese share of the trade was apparently more profitable for the officials concerned than for the crown.[156]

[155] Gavetas, IV, 377-78 for the extent of these perquisites in 1540. Gavetas V, 315; Couto, IV, viii, 12; ANTTCC, 2-240-53; C.R. Boxer, <u>The Portuguese Seaborne Empire</u>, p. 61.

[156] A.B. de Sá (ed.), <u>op. cit.</u>, II, 104-5, 126-7; J. Wicki, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 140; Couto, VI, ix, 19; VII, ix, 11; ANTTCC, I-100-74; F. Mendes da Luz, "Livro

Despite the seeming rigidity of the Portuguese claims, it is now clear that in fact the effectiveness of their system was often small. We can close this chapter by considering in general terms the whole practicality of Portugal's basic economic aims in Asia.

Aims and Methods. Was it ever realistic to try and monopolize some products and control trade in all others? We may start by noting that both Portugal's kings and their governors in India frequently issued decrees to regulate various aspects of Asian trade which were clearly not enforceable. The kings, operating in the remoteness of Lisbon, and after 1580 Madrid, can be excused their lack of realism, but the governors should have known better. Thus in the early years they tried to stop all trade between Gujarat and the Red Sea, clearly an impossible task at this time when Aden had not been taken and Portugal had no forts in Gujarat.[157] In 1520 D. Manuel decreed that all ships from the

das Cidades e Fortalezas que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas Partes da India. 1582," in Studia, 6, ff. 63-69; F. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, p. 201. This last claims that the king made nearly Rs. 1,75,000 as late as 1610 from the ship to the Moluccas. Even if this is true, the Dutch soon after put a stop to it.

[157] Correa, II, 372-3.

Kanara ports were to trade to Goa, and nowhere else. Further, only very small coastal craft were to be used out of the Kanara ports, presumably so that the local merchants would be physically unable to make longer voyages to Gujarat or the Red Sea.[158] In 1595 Philip II decreed that no non-Christian resident in western India could trade, either directly or through an intermediary, to places other than those on the western Indian coast.[159] Early in the seventeenth century an attempt was made to ban all trade between Mombasa and the Red Sea; as the Portuguese had no forts north of Mombasa, and the fleet to guard the entrance to the Red Sea had been discontinued, this could clearly not be enforced.[160]

Such unrealistic decrees we may treat with the contempt they deserve, as indeed did the native traders who were meant to be regulated by them. Of more importance is a consideration first of whether there was any alternative to the basic Portuguese aim of a monopoly of the spice trade and

[158] "Livro de Leis de D. Manuel," ANTT, ff. 139r-40r.

[159] APOCR, III, 540-2.

[160] "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, I, 160-r. Other fatuous decrees in APOCR, III, 900, 902, 906-7; LM, v. 12, f. 215; Correa, IV, 219; "Senado de Goa--Cartas Régias," HAG, I, 54-r.

control of other trade, and second of whether the Portuguese used the most suitable methods if we assume there was no alternative.

If we return to our basic progression in the growth of European power in Asia presented in chapter I, which it will be remembered went from trade in foreign towns to factory to fort to land conquest, we have to ask whether the Portuguese could have traded as equals, possibly with the establishment of factories, or not. In Div, as we will see, Malik Ayaz at least professed a willingness to have the Portuguese come and share in the trade of his port. Certainly he was attacked by the Portuguese, and not vice versa. In Malacca the merchants of Gujarat strongly advised the sultan not to let the Portuguese trade there; a reasonable enough request as the Portuguese had been seizing their ships for several years.

In Calicut also the Portuguese started the hostilities. Da Gama's whole manner had been overbearing in 1498, and the instructions for the second Portuguese voyage laid down that Muslim ships were to be attacked on sight, and an attempt made to get the Zamorin to expel the Muslims (presumably those from the Red Sea only) from Calicut. This second Portuguese fleet found it difficult to obtain a cargo in Calicut, due to the opposition of the

Muslim merchants, an opposition using commercial, not military, sanctions. Finally the Portuguese lost their tempers, seized a Muslim ship, and took its cargo. In retaliation a mob burned down the Portuguese factory. The situation from then on deteriorated quickly. The Portuguese responded by bombarding the town and then sailing south to Cochin to trade. Later they established a fort there, although the raja of Cochin was at least in theory a vassal of the Zamorin. In 1502 da Gama returned to India and demanded that the Zamorin expel from Calicut all Muslims from Cairo and the Red Sea. The Zamorin refused "to expel more than 4,000 households of them who live in Calicut as natives, not as strangers, and from whom his kingdom had received much profit."[161]

It is clear enough that the Portuguese could have traded on a basis of equality in all three of these great ports. Certainly those then in control of the trade would have competed hard, but on past performance it seems that they would not

[161] Barros, I, vi, 5. For these events see Barros, I, v, 6; Tohfut, p. 79; Júlio Gonçalves, Os Portugueses e o Mar das Indias, Lisbon, 1947, p. 415. This modern Portuguese writer considers the forcible seizure of the cargo to be "Dangerous and unjust violence to which the tolerant commerce of the Orient was not accustomed." Also see Castanheda, I, xix, xxxvi, xxxviii, xxxix, xl; for the instructions of 1500 see Annaes Maritimos e Coloniaes, Lisbon, 1840-46, 6 vols., V, 216.

have been the first to use force. As for the rulers, the Portuguese would have been welcomed as merely another group of foreign merchants come to trade and so increase their customs receipts. Further, given the lower costs of the Portuguese around the Cape of Good Hope, as compared to the Red Sea route, they could probably have taken over a large part of the spice trade to Europe. But peaceful competition was never the Portuguese aim.[162]

For the Portuguese, peaceful trade alongside Muslims on a basis of equality was impossible, for the crusade element was inherent in their presence in the Indian Ocean. The aim of the fifteenth-century kings was, it will be remembered, not only their profit but also the service of God. God, or at least the God of the Portuguese, could be served by the forcible dispossession of Muslim merchants, especially those based on the center of the abomination, the city of Mecca. To see these "moors" deriving huge profits from their trade was to ignite a short fuse in the easily-combustible Portuguese. If the Muslims could be ousted from the spice trade not only would God be served but the true believers would profit on earth, as well

[162] For a lone cry in the wilderness of Portuguese atrocities, a letter of 1510 calling for at least a little less force, see Gavetas, III, 758-60.

as later in heaven, by replacing them.

The battle was thus joined, and can be seen as inevitable from the time Dias rounded the Cape. Yet even once the Portuguese aim of dominance is accepted, did they go about things in the most practical way? In particular, were fifty forts and one hundred warships really necessary? This opens up the subject of the debate between d'Almeida, the first viceroy, and Albuquerque, the first governor, over the *modus operandi* to be followed in achieving their common aim of dominance.

Almeida's much-quoted advice to D. Manuel was that "As long as you may be powerful at sea you will hold India as yours; and if you do not possess this power, little will avail you a fortress on shore." In accordance with this policy he refused the offer of Malik Ayaz to hand over Div to Portugal after the Portuguese naval victory before the town in 1509.[163]

Albuquerque on the other hand followed an opportunistic yet reasonably coherent policy of seizing strategic points as occasion offered. In the Indian Ocean he desired only Aden, Hurmuz, Div,

[163] Correa, I, 947-9; Barros, II, iii, 7. Almeida's letter in "Livro de varios papeis manuscriptos," Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisbon, Mss. Azuis, A64, f. 300.

and Goa.[164] Three of these four were acquired, but later in the century gaps kept appearing in the net, so more and more forts were built in a vain effort to seal them. For any governor it was a crowning ambition to build a fort somewhere, or anywhere, and have his name carved for posterity above the entrance. For the same reasons of prestige, almost no governor was prepared to scrutinize the merits of the forts under his control, and abandon those which were obviously inessential to the main design, although several acute observers in the sixteenth century and later in effect backed up Almeida by telling the king how costly and useless many of his forts were, and how much better his money could be spent on the armadas.[165] Following the disasters of the first third of the

[164] Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, London, 1875-84, 4 vols., IV, 24.

[165] For example, M.B. Amzalak (ed.), "Alegación en favor de la Compañia de la India Oriental y comercios ultramarinos, que de nueva se instituyo en el Reyno de Portugal" by Duarte Gomes Solis, in Anais do Instituto Superior de Ciências, Ecónomicas e Financeiras, vol. XXIII, tomos 1 and 2, tomo 1, p. 181; ANTTSL, V, 116r; A. de S.S. Costa Lobo (ed.), Memórias de um soldado da India, by F.R. Silveira, Lisbon, 1877, pp. 232-8; ANTTCC, 1-71-43; D. João de Castro in ANTTSL, V, 126; Arquivo Português Oriental, ed. A.B. de Bragança Pereira, tomo IV, vol. I, part 1, pp. 537, 551; and more recently Alfredo Botelho de Sousa, op. cit., I, 444-5; José F. Ferreira Martins, Crónica dos Vice-Reis e Governadores da India, Nova Goa, 1919, I, 562.

seventeenth century in the wars with the Dutch, one of the viceroys was even looking enviously on the English position in India, for they had no forts at all.[166]

On a cost-effectiveness basis it is clear that the Portuguese spread themselves too thin, and would have done much better to have settled for a few strong forts, one land area, perhaps Ceylon, as a base for supplies, and a stronger armada. By trying to save every minor fort as it came under attack, Portugal only succeeded in spending more and more money on military purposes, with a smaller and smaller return. As early as 1564 Portuguese India was running a deficit of about Rs. 1,25,000 a year,[167] while the sums spent in the early seventeenth century on naval expeditions and the defence of Ceylon were often many times this; the high seas armada of Nuno Alvaro Botelho cost more than Rs. 10,00,000 in a period of a little over one year.[168] We can

[166] "Livro de Ordens Régias," HAG, I, 193.

[167] "Regimentos e Instruções," HAG, I, 10-10r. See also B. Mus. Addl 20892, f. 38r, where the king in 1563 agrees with the municipal council of Goa that it is very bad that the Portuguese state in in India is not living on its income.

[168] Alfredo Botelho de Sousa (ed.), Nuno Alvares Botelho, Capitão-general da Armada de Alto Bordo e Governador da India, Lisbon, 1940, p. 55. The fleet which viceroy Azevedo took to Surat in 1612 to drive out the English cost nearly Rs. 2,00,000. (LM, v. 15, ff. 210r-215.) For the large expenses

conclude that Portugal could have shared in and probably dominated the spice trade without using force, but that this was not attempted, and that her use of military means was in fact badly planned and designed in view of the ends she wished to achieve. In Gujarat, however, Portugal came closer than in any other area to realizing her goals.

in Ceylon see _Diário do 3rd. Conde de Linhares, Vice-Rei da India, Lisbon, 1937, 1943_, p. 182; ANTTDR, XLI, 66; "Noticias dos Estados da India extrahidos de Varios Livros e Papeis Manuscriptos . . ." in Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisbon, Mss. Azuis, A58, f. 45; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, pp. 378-403. For the costs of the northern and Kanara armadas in the 1630's see Baretto de Rezende, II, 146r, 149. We may note other extravagances also: was it necessary to spend Rs. 1,06,750 a year on the viceroy and his establishment (AHU, Caixa 5, no. 7), or Rs. 69,750 on the very wealthy religious orders (AHU, Caixa 2, no. 215) as was done in the early seventeenth century?

# CHAPTER III: THE STATE

One day in 1581 at Akbar's court, Muhammad Qulij Khan was in attendance when an official brought to the emperor the cartazes that Akbar had requested from the viceroy of Goa. They gave permission for his ship to sail to the Red Sea. At this time Qulij Khan was aged 49, and had been captain of Surat fort since its conquest by the Mughals in 1573. He was a proud man, a strict sunni Muslim, a Turk of the Jani Qurbani tribe, and a confidant of the Emperor. Aiming to impress Akbar, he boasted that he also was going to send a ship to the Red Sea, but the cartaz it was going to carry was the handle of the dagger he had in his belt. He instructed his brother in Surat to prepare a ship so strong that it need not worry about the Portuguese.

News of this projected defiance spread quickly in Surat, and soon reached Goa. A fleet of eight Portuguese ships sailed north to blockade the Tapti River. After its cartaz was inspected, a fine ship of Akbar's was allowed to sail, but the captain of Qulij Khan's ship was warned not to leave without a cartaz. His ship was strong and well armed; the prudent Portuguese summoned three more ships from Goa. Then the long wait began, with the tedium broken only by occasional skirmishes on land. In

these the Portuguese did badly, suffering a heavy defeat from the troops of Qulij Khan's brother at Rander. The blockade, however, remained in effect.

Finally Qulij Khan, still at court, was advised of the stalemate. His response was apparently a crafty one. Without saying anything to Akbar he got the captain of Broach to undertake a diversionary attack on Daman. The local Portuguese withdrew to the city, sent off their women and children to Bassein, and desperately summoned help from Chaul, Goa, Div, and Bassein. Further, the blockading fleet had to leave Surat and sail south to help in the defence. But no major attack was launched by the powerful Mughal army. The captain of Broach was interested only in forcing the Surat blockaders to leave, so he spent his time making feints towards the city, and pillaging and burning in the undefended area the Portuguese had deserted. When the rains of 1582 came he packed up and left, his mission accomplished.

Surat was unguarded, but Qulij Khan's ship never sailed. The merchants refused to load any goods on it. They had had seventy years' experience of Portugal's power at sea, and knew that even if the ship was now able to leave, there would certainly be a Portuguese fleet waiting for it when it came back. No doubt Qulij Khan had been very clever, but they were not going to risk their lives and

property. Thus Qulij Khan lost after all, and soon was in deep trouble, for Akbar was furious with him for arranging the attack on Daman without his permission.[1]

Worse still, the caution of the merchants was proved justified, for after the rains of 1582 the viceroy sent twenty ships into the Gulf of Cambay. Their mission was to retaliate for the attack on Daman by seizing all ships returning from the Red Sea. One of Akbar's was captured in Gogha, but after pressure from the governor of Cambay the viceroy released it, "for good and weighty reasons," which here means fear of irritating so powerful a ruler. One other ship was sighted, in September, and hotly pursued. After some days the captain agreed to hand over the ship and its cargo if the lives of those on board were spared. This was done, but such peaceful conquests were not to the liking of the Portuguese soldiers and sailors. Their aim was to board a ship, shouting "Santiago" and waving their swords. In the resultant confusion all sorts of trifles, such as jewels and gold, often disappeared, and so never

[1] For Muhammad Qulij Khan see Sikandar, 455; S.A. A. Rizvi, Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Agra, 1965, pp. 218, 236 f.n.; Samsam-ud-daula Shah Nawaz Khan, Nawwab, Maathir-ul-Umara, trans. H. Beveridge, revised B. Prashad, Calcutta, 1941, 1952, 2 vols., II, 534-7. These events from Couto, X, ii, 4-8.

appeared in the official inventory. Such trifles were later discreetly sold in Goa. Disappointed in their hopes of an easy fight and a profitable sack, most of the Portuguese mutinied and set off in fourteen of the ships to Daman. Here they took over the town, terrorised the locals, and waited for their unsporting admiral to come back so that they could murder him. He evaded them, and found sanctuary in a monastery. After twenty-four hours of negotiations the mutiny was ended when the admiral agreed to give the soldiers and sailors some of the booty.[2]

Qulij Khan was not the man to accept such a failure. In 1585 he tried again. As usual the news travelled fast; a fleet of five ships was sent north from Goa. On the way they called at Daman, and were delayed by the local inhabitants, who complained strongly and demanded that the ships go no further. Daman's citizens knew that if anything happened to Qulij Khan's ship the lands of Daman would suffer as they had three years before. The admiral shrugged off these craven fears and proceeded to Surat, from whence he requested and got two more ships from Goa.

Again the cat and mouse game was played. The Portuguese admiral warned Qulij Khan not to despatch

[2] Couto, X, iii, 4-5.

his ship without a cartaz, and reminded the local merchants that they would do well to refuse to put their goods on the ship for the Portuguese intended to burn it if it left without permission. An attempt by the merchants to bribe the admiral into letting the ship sail failed. Finally they told Qulij Khan they were not going to risk their goods on his ship, which the annoyed _khan_ then disarmed. The Portuguese, reassured, lifted the blockade.

This was another trick, for the ship left soon after, in April 1585, and without a cartaz. In Jiddah all the goods for the return voyage were off-loaded to ships with cartazes. Qulij Khan's ship was crammed with artillery and munitions and 200 chosen soldiers. In the midst of a storm it suddenly loomed up before the waiting Portuguese fleet in the Gulf of Cambay. Scorning their bombardment, it dashed right through their midst with cannon thundering from both sides. A narrow entrance north of Surat was missed, and Qulij Khan's ship ran aground. The Portuguese ranged up and for several days bombarded her at leisure. Anxious to save both his ship and his pride, Qulij Khan sent fourteen of his own ships to aid the stranded vessel, and came in person with his cavalry. He told the Portuguese he had ordered troops south to invade Daman again, but the Portuguese staunchly held on and kept firing.

Finally another storm arose. The ship broke up; Qulij Khan "lost his ship, and, which disturbed him more, his reputation."[3]

What was the meaning of these alarms and excursions? Was Portugal often challenged at sea by Gujarat's rulers? Were merchants, both Portuguese and Gujarati, usually so circumspect?

This chapter will trace relations between the Portuguese and the Gujarati state. The aim is not to provide a detailed diplomatic survey, but rather to bring out the various constraints and perceptions in Gujarat which dictated the response to the Portuguese. This isolation of the upper political level is not done arbitrarily, or for organizational convenience. Sultanate Gujarat and Mughal India were pre-modern states. There were distinct links between various levels, but to a large extent each level, including the upper, the military-political ruling elite, looked after itself and its interests and did not concern itself in detail with the affairs of other levels. In effect we have sliced off horizontally the top level of the Gujarati political system. Lower levels, and the vertical relations between them and the upper level, will be elaborated later.

[3] Couto, X, vii, 10; X, viii, 7.

Aspects of the Gujarati Political System (Upper Level). Three aspects of the functioning of this upper level of the political system in sixteenth-century Gujarat require elaboration. We need to consider to what extent the sultans exercised effective control over the area known as Gujarat, the relative weaknesses and strengths of the nobles *vis à vis* the sultans, and the degree to which the various resources of this upper level were crucial to its survival. For the purposes of this discussion a noble is defined as a member of the court circle, entrusted by the sultan with some high-level governmental function. This excludes minor court functionaries, and also the hereditary Hindu nobility which controlled large areas of Gujarat, but as tribute payers were not members of the court circle.

The aim of any strong ruler of Gujarat was horizontal, territorial expansion rather than greater vertical penetration. The two most active rulers of sultanate Gujarat were Mahmud Bigarh (1458-1511) and Bahadur (1526-37). Both occupied themselves in conquests on their borders: Mahmud in Sawrath, and to the east in Champanir, Bahadur to the south into Ahmadnagar, to the east into Malwah, and to the north into the Rajput states. Similarly, Akbar brought extensive areas, including Gujarat, into submission to his empire. Gujarat at least was a profitable

area for the Mughal Empire. By its conquest Akbar acquired additional revenue, and also power, for he now controlled more land. But he, and other conquerors, were also motivated by a desire for glory; a great king was one ruling a great area of land. Glory was not won by exercising closer control over one's subjects. Akbar's much vaunted land revenue schemes, for example, were intended to elaborate and refine collection methods, using the existing intermediaries, rather than to establish direct connections with the peasants. Similarly, large areas were forced to tender allegiance to Gujarat at various times, but in considerable parts of the sultanate the Rajputs and Kolis, the pre-Muslim power figures in Gujarat, remained the effective rulers. These, and also local Muslim leaders, paid tribute only when they were forced to. When the center was weak they ran riot, but even under a strong sultan they were entitled to _banth_, or _chauth_, one quarter of the land revenue, in their areas. Only one coherent attempt, and this one ultimately unsuccessful, was ever made to limit the power of these local figures.[4] Usually the sultans contented themselves with trying to subdue only their top-level adversaries, those who paid no

[4] Sikandar, pp. 363-4; S.C. Misra, _The Rise of Muslim Power in Gujarat_, London, 1963, pp. 53, 66, 71, 284-5; _Mirat_, pp. 78, 149-50.

tribute. Those who did pay were left alone.

In effect then large, although unfortunately unquantifiable, areas of Gujarat were outside the direct control of the sultans and their nobles. Even over the areas directly administered by one of his nobles a sultan was not always able to exercise complete control. Max Weber has elucidated the nature of tensions between a "patrimonial" ruler and his "notables,"[5] with the former trying to control closely the notables and the latter endeavoring to expand their power, and ultimately become hereditary or even independent rulers. These tensions were clearly in existence in Muslim India in general, as evidenced in the rise of successor states when the centers of the Delhi Sultanate and later the Mughal Empire weakened. Sultanate Gujarat was not exempt from such tensions. Central authority was weak in the thirty-five years between the death of Bahadur and the conquest by Akbar; during these years Gujarat was in effect divided into several successor states which owed only nominal allegiance to the powerless sultans. In these fluctuating, and often mutually hostile, areas hereditary succession appears to have been the rule.[6]

[5] Reinhard Bendix, _Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait_, New York, 1962, pp. 341-60.

[6] For example, Couto, VII, ix, 8; VII, ix, 14. Generally for the situation in Gujarat in these years

These tensions were muted, but not absent, in the years before Bahadur's death, when Gujarat's sultans were on the whole relatively capable. Indeed, the strongest of them all, Mahmud Bigarh, in effect encouraged his nobles to develop local bases of power, and continue their relatives in their possession, by his decrees. He laid down that when a _jagirdar_ died, his son was to inherit his _jagir_. If he had no sons, his daughter was to be given half of it.[7] Many of his nobles built towns or villages, which points to their having a permanent base.[8] He, and the other sultans, apparently seldom tried to move these nobles from one _jagir_ to another. This could have restricted their ability to build up local power bases. Possibly the sultans simply never thought of such an idea, but more likely they usually lacked the power to be able to enforce such shifts, and so were dependent on other sanctions to restrain their nobles.

What in fact were the bases of power of the nobility and the sultans? Power consisted of control over resources, most notably land and people. A noble could attain this in two ways: through personal

see Couto, VI, x, 16; VII, ix, 8-9, 11-14; _Studia_, III, p. 52; ANTTSL, III, ff. 296r-7; Sikandar, pp. 426-7, and 329-475 _passim_.

[7] Sikandar, pp. 100, 131.

[8] _Ibid_., pp. 162-7.

favor and influence with the sultan, assuming the latter was in relatively effective control, or through control of a specific area in Gujarat. In the latter case, distance from the sultan could be crucial, for if a noble's _jagir_ was located far from the usual Ahmadabad-Champanir axis along which the sultans tended to move, his capacity to increase his power was enhanced. Conversely, a base in the environs of Ahmadabad would mean greater supervision from the sultan. Optimal power would be attained by a noble who could control a large distant local base while retaining influence at court.

A sultan's task was essentially to maximize the degree of authority he had over his nobles, and extend the area of land ruled by himself through them. A strong sultan would thus seek to keep his nobles closely under his control, most typically by demanding frequent attendance at court for those controlling distant areas, and by extracting for himself as much as possible of the revenue collected by these nobles. More obviously, control over greater amounts of resources could be achieved by conquests.

These observations need some qualification in detail.

1. A few nobles had as an important part of their power, resources derived from sea trade; these resources included both profits from their own trade

and taxes on the trade of others. In such cases, a land base in the form of a port was usually required. This base was important not for its extent but for its position on the coast. The bulk of the nobles however had control over land and people as their basic resource, and generally the greater the area controlled the greater the power.

2. The relative positions of sultan and nobles often changed during the course of a reign. Thus Mahmud III was aged eleven years when he became sultan, and for six years he was closely controlled by a noble called Darya Khan. In 1543 the sultan managed to exert his independence, mainly by taking advantage of the jealousy of the other nobles towards Darya Khan. A year later he was again relegated to puppet status as a result of an alliance of most of the powerful nobles against his favorite, a low-born bird-catcher whom the sultan had elevated and who behaved arrogantly to the established nobility.[9] In the absence of any clear concept of primogeniture, a new sultan was usually dependent for support on his predecessor's officials. The story of nearly every reign is of the attempt of the sultan to reduce this initial dependence. Early in every reign rewards and favors were distributed by the new sultan

[9] _Ibid_., pp. 345-8.

to all who had supported him, and to all whose support he wanted. Later in the reign of a successful sultan rewards were given more often to men of his own creation, and established nobles were reduced at will.[10] The initiative was not solely with the nobility even early in a reign. In particular, the advantages to be derived from being one of the first supporters of an ultimately successful claimant to the throne were balanced by the dangers of overly precipitate support to a putative sultan who failed to make good his claim.

3. In the matter of control over military resources the sultans were apparently at a disadvantage. Virtually the whole Gujarati army consisted of troops raised by the nobles. These troops were meant to be ultimately under the control of the sultan, yet in the event of a clash between sultan and noble they often stayed with their immediate superior, the noble. Apparently only Mahmud III tried to raise a body of troops directly under his own control and independent of his nobles, and this body consisted

[10] Ibid., pp. 173, 259-60, 263. For favors to nobles early in reigns, cf. ibid., pp. 92, 93, 327-8. For the role of nobles in selecting a new sultan, Mirat, p. 74. For Mahmud Bigarh later in his reign, Sikandar, pp.95-99, 113-14. In 1526 Sultan Sikandar succeeded his father. He raised to prominence the people who had been associated with him before he became sultan, and ignored his father's nobles. Within the year these old-established nobles had deposed him. (Arabic History, I, 119.)

of a mere 1200 men.[11] The role of the army is elaborated in chapter VI.

4. This apparent disadvantage was usually countered by another consideration, that of legitimacy. A sultan was, even when he was not of age, or was ineffective, at least first among equals, and often first with no equals. Even a weak sultan was the fount of honors, titles and promotions for the nobles. As in the later Mughal Empire, so in Gujarat after 1537 the rulers retained this function to the end, and while an emperor or a sultan could be replaced, the institution remained even if it was shorn of all other sources of power except this one.

5. Influence with the sultan as a source of power for a noble was dependent on the effectiveness of the sultan. Thus complete control of one of the later sultans bestowed less power than did moderate influence with say Mahmud Bigarh.

6. It is apparent that there was arable land to spare in Sultanate Gujarat. This acted as a check on the power of the nobles in their own areas. An unduly extortionate _jagirdar_ could be checked by his peasants simply running away to live under a more moderate _jagirdar_, or in a tribute-paying area con-

[11] E.C. Bayley, _The Local Muhammadan Dynasties. Gujarat_, London, 1886, p. 449.

trolled by a rajput or koli. The harsh jagirdar would find his revenue decreasing as less and less of his land was utilized.[12]

7. The origins of the nobles were important. Sultanate Gujarat has not yet been subjected to the sort of treatment Athar Ali has given Awrangzeb's Mughal India,[13] and indeed it is probable that there is insufficient data in existence for such a study. It is, however, fairly clear that the situation in later seventeenth-century India, where 74.6% of subahdars were close relatives of previous or existing nobles,[14] was paralleled in sixteenth-century Gujarat. The son of a noble enjoyed a head start over an unknown in the battle for patronage. Further, a member of an older-established noble family had a more secure power base from which to operate, for we have noted how frequently jagirs were hereditary, and how often nobles built towns and villages. Nevertheless, this was not a closed system. The new nobility included slaves, foreigners, and natives of lower origin.[15] These people could rise, but

[12] For example, Sikandar, pp. 157-8.

[13] M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, New York, 1966.

[14] M. Athar Ali in Medieval India. A. Miscellany, vol. I, Aligarh, 1969, p. 99.

[15] Malik Ayaz was a slave, two merchants of Rander helped Bahadur in 1526 in his rise to the throne,

early in their careers they were necessarily much more dependent on the sultan's favor than were the older nobility. Some later managed to build power bases for themselves, as did Malik Ayaz in Div or Malik Gupi in Surat. A strong sultan, while taking care to conciliate the older-established nobles, would prefer to rely mostly on new dependent nobles.[16] As a result of this, and also for reasons of status, there are examples of tension between old and new.[17]

8. This leads to a final and more important qualification. The nobles were not a united or homogeneous group, and a skilful sultan could balance one faction against another, and so maintain or increase his control. There was a clear division between slave and free nobles, but there were also factions based on other criteria. The existence of such factions is clear, especially after the death of the

and were rewarded by incorporation in the nobility, and many of the nobles were foreign Muslims. An early sixteenth-century Portuguese source describes the nobility as speaking Arabic, Persian, and Gujarati, and coming not only from Gujarat but also from Turkey, Egypt, Arabia, Persia, Khorasan, and other parts of India. (Descrição, f. 17r.)

[16] From a noble's point of view, heredity combined with ability was the ideal. Thus in the late fifteenth century Jamal-ud-din, a grandson of Sultan Muzaffar, was made _fawjdar_ of Ahmadabad. He succeeded brilliantly, and finally rose to be _vazir_ of Gujarat (Sikandar, pp. 125-6), but would he ever have become even a _fawjdar_ if it were not for his ancestry?

[17] For example, Sikandar, pp. 162-5.

last strong ruler, Bahadur,[18] when the struggle was over control of the sultan. The memberships of the factions of this time seem to have fluctuated considerably, and it is seldom possible to discern their bases. Undoubtedly private interest was important, but other considerations were also influential. Thus one noble, 'Imad-ul-mulk, was described in 1557 as the head of the foreigners,[19] and such a division, between foreign born and Gujarati born nobles, is an obvious one. Ten years earlier another noble, Mujahid Khan, was described as being supported by "all the Rajputs." The countries of origin of the nobles were clearly important, for in the 1550's we hear of Rumi (Turkish), Afghan, Habshi (Abyssinian), Persian, and Mughal groups of nobles in Gujarat.[20] Other likely divisions, for which, however, evidence is lacking, would be based on kin networks, and on the basis of a particular noble's power. Those who controlled ports would presumably have different interests from those whose power was based on control of land, although on the other hand a celebrated quarrel in the 1510's was caused by the

[18] Mirat, pp. 74, 80, 95; Arabic History, I, 318-9.

[19] ANTTCC, 1-102-47; Arabic History, I, 312.

[20] ANTTSL, III, 297; Arabic History, I, 312, 339, 407.

attempts of Malik Gupi, who controlled Surat, to foster his port at the expense of Malik Ayaz's Div.

Eric Wolf has noted that "There are political resources which are essential to the operation of the [political] system, and the system will try to remain in control of these. But there are also resources and organizations which it would be either too costly or too difficult to bring under direct control, and in these cases the system yields its sovereignty to competitive groups that are allowed to function in its entrails."[21] In the case of Gujarat, in terms of revenue control over land was a crucial resource for both the sultans and the nobles, and the Mughal Emperors later. Control of sea trade was much less crucial except for certain of the nobles. This, however, was not because sea trade was of little value, but because it was undertaxed. We have already attempted to assess the role of sea trade in the total economy of Sultanate Gujarat;[22] we found that it was of considerable importance. This trade was taxed at only 3½%. Thus the total revenue derived from customs duties at the

[21] Eric R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies" in Michael Banton (ed.), <u>The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies</u>, New York, 1966, p. 1.

[22] Cf. pp. 38-42.

end of the sultanate was only Rs. 40,00,000, while the five-eighths of Gujarat's land area which paid revenue in the 1590's produced Rs. 1,10,00,000. If we include the three-eighths which paid tribute, and assume that the amount coming from these to the center was a little less proportionally than from the revenue-paying _sarkars_, we still have the land producing at least four times as much revenue as sea trade. For our purposes, the point is that the loss of one or two ports would not be a fatal blow for the revenue of all of Gujarat. A noble actually in control of a port, however, naturally saw things differently. Obviously his port was crucial to him. Other aspects of land and power are considered at the end of this chapter.

The same sort of mechanistic scrutiny needs to be applied to land areas. Here the distinction made in chapter I between Cambay and Gujarat is important. The loss of any part of Cambay would be disastrous, and would be resisted. The loss of one of the "kingdoms of Gujarat" would be less damaging. These areas, especially at the edges of the state, paid only tribute, and this only when they were forced to. They were not part of the heartland, and were at the best of times only very tenuously under the control of either the sultan or his nobles.

Apart from revenue, a modern state has other

resources. These include the power to control some of the activities of its citizens, most notably, for our purposes, in the area of relations with other states. This will be taken up in detail later. For the moment it is sufficient to note that even within its own land area the pre-modern state of Gujarat controlled much less of its subjects' activities than does a modern state. It made no attempt to regulate what its subjects did outside Gujarat; this sort of control was inessential to the operation of the system. In short, the basic resource of Gujarat, both as a sultanate and as a subah of the Mughal Empire, was control over land and consequent on this control over revenue and people. Sea trade produced less revenue and was less crucial, while control over sea traders was less important again. As a reflection of this ranking Gujarat maintained a large army but virtually no navy. Only Mahmud Bigarh and Bahadur seem to have been very interested in naval matters. They both had navies of some size and effectiveness, although they were not capable of standing up to a Portuguese fleet.[23] Among the nobles only Malik Ayaz maintained

[23] Malik Ayaz also had a large fleet, some of which were large ships. See "Livro de varios papeis," Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisbon, Mss. Azuis, A64, f. 292r. Bahadur is quoted as saying "wars by sea are merchants' affairs, and of no concern to the prestige of kings." (Conde de Ficalho,

a fleet of any significance.

Portuguese-Gujarati Relations. Until his death in 1522 the main adversary of the Portuguese in Gujarat was Malik Ayaz, the governor of Div. He combatted the demands of the Portuguese because acceptance of them would have been disastrous for him. He was successful because he had both military power and influence at court.

Malik Ayaz was born in Georgia. He had been enslaved and converted to Islam by the Turks, and finished up in the employ of Sultan Mahmud Bigarh (1458-1511) of Gujarat; he was thus one of the very large number of foreigners, usually Muslim, who served in military capacities in the sultanate.[24] According to the local legend, his rise to fame occurred after a bird defecated on the head of Sultan Mahmud. Malik Ayaz, who was in attendance at the time, brought

Garcia da Orta e o seu Tempo, Lisbon, 1886, p. 118, also quoted in C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, London, 1969, p. 50.) In the light of his interest in naval matters, this sounds like sour grapes, but even so his interest should not be overstressed.

[24] For his death date Sikandar, p. 213, has 929 AH (Nov. 20, 1522 -), Firishta 928 AH (Dec. 1, 1521 -) (John Briggs, Rise of the Muhammadan Power in India, Calcutta, 1908-10, 4 vols., IV, 95.) and M.S. Commissariat 1522. (M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, Bombay, 1934, 1957, 2 vols., I, 279, 299.) Barros has him dead for more than eighteen months early in 1522 (III, vii, 8). His ancestry in Manuel de Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1945-47, 6 vols., I, 255, and Barros, II, ii, 9. For foreigners

the bird down with a well-aimed arrow, and as a reward was given the port of Div to govern. Despite his later wealth and power, he remained a slave of the sultans,[25] as indeed were so many important officials in other Muslim states. Under his rule Div prospered greatly from small beginnings, so that around 1500 it was starting to displace Cambay as the great transshipment center and mart of Gujarat, while Malik Ayaz was second in power only to the sultan. In 1509 he was able to raise about Rs. 6,50,000 in a few days from his own resources and those of the merchants of his town.[26]

Unlike some of Gujarat's sultans and nobles, Malik Ayaz was not willing to accept Portuguese demands. True, he governed large areas in Sawrath apart from Div, and at different times also numbered Patan, Gogha, Surat, and Rander among his possessions.[27]

in Gujarat see Descrição, f. 17r; ANTTSV, XI, 108-108r; Arabic History, I, 27, 243, 439, 459-60. In 1546 Khwaja Safar, himself an Italian, had in his army men who had been in the siege of Rhodes. (Annaes Maritimos, IV, 107.)

[25] Sikandar, pp. 147, 162; "Dhamimah-i-Ma'athir-i-Mahmud Shahi," ff. 92, 107,113; Faria e Sousa, op. cit., I, 256; Nizam-ud-din Ahmad, Khwajah, Tabaqat-i Akbari, trans. B. De, Calcutta, 1927-39, 3 vols., III, 282; P. Baldaeus, A Description of the East India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, London, 1703, III, 584.

[26] Marechal Gomes da Costa, Descobrimentos e Conquistas, Lisbon, 1927-30, 3 vols., II, 269-70. Assuming the same values as given in Appendix II, this is equal to $2,593,500 today.

[27] Castanheda, II, lxxv.

Div, however, was his first and most crucial area. It was the basis of his power. The Portuguese estimated his total income from land revenue, customs duties, and other taxes in all his areas at Rs. 3,20,000, and half of this came from Div alone.[28] Apart from this, he was a very active trader on his own account. His ships sailed far and wide, and he bought up whole cargoes in Div and sold them inland.[29] He used his money to maintain a lavish proto-court, to fortify Div, to establish a strong fleet for its defence, and to maintain his influence at the sultan's court by heavy bribing and present-giving. The cornerstone of all these activities, and so of his very survival, was the possession of Div.

It is clear that Malik Ayaz would have preferred friendship and cooperation for mutual benefit with the Portuguese. He was more than willing to let them trade in his port; thus his customs revenues would increase, while the Portuguese, like all the other foreigners in Div, would benefit from the excellent facilities and location of the town. As the Portuguese chronicler recorded, Malik Ayaz was always pressing the viceroy to send to Div "two ships loaded

[28] Barros, II, ii, 9; R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), Subsídios para a história da India Portugueza, Lisbon, 1868, pp. 34-36.

[29] Castanheda, II, lxxv; Barros, II, ii, 9.

with copper and spices so that he could trade with us . . ."[30] Similarly, in 1513, after a surprise Portuguese attack on Div had failed, he nevertheless let the Portuguese establish a factory there.[31] This factory remained in operation for eight years, and other Portuguese, including agents of the king, traded in Cambay itself.[32] When Goa was besieged by a Bijapuri army in 1511 Malik Ayaz sent the defenders two shiploads of provisions and courtly letters.[33] Later he gave the Portuguese information on the activities of their enemies the Turks in the Red Sea, and there is extant a letter from him to the King of Portugal of 1519, consisting mostly of rhetorical flourishes and affirmations of friendship, but also offering D. Manuel a present.[34] We have already, however, seen the nature of Portugal's demands in Asia. The choice for Malik Ayaz was between resistance and submission; cooperation was not offered.

To confront the Portuguese he relied mostly on his formidable military strength. He had under his

[30] Castanheda, II, lxxv.

[31] Faria e Sousa, op. cit., I, 335-6, and generally see Barros, II, viii, 5.

[32] Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, I, 138-9; "Cartas de Vice Reis," ANTT, no. 13; Castanheda, IV, xxxii; V, iii; Barros, III, iv, 7.

[33] Castanheda, III, lxxii.

[34] ANTTCC, 1-20-132, 1-25-95.

command a large army of both local and foreign soldiers, but the fortifications of Div and its navy were more important. The entrance to the port could be blocked by a large iron chain, and by three large hulks which were kept ready to be sunk when needed. There was also a stockade, and in the middle of the entrance a fort on an artificial island, surrounded by an artificial reef so that ships could not approach it. Other works and artillery were legion. His navy comprised at least 100 *fustas*, each one with twenty-five banks of oars, one heavy cannon, and two lighter pieces. He also had a few larger war vessels, and many armed merchant ships.[35] The Portuguese strategic position was weak, for with no base nearer than Goa or Hurmuz they were unable to lie off Div for the whole season when it was open to navigation.

The town was invulnerable to Portuguese attacks, but on the open sea Malik Ayaz's smaller craft were at a disadvantage. This was made apparent in 1508-9. The customs revenue of Mamluk Egypt had been seriously affected by Portuguese attacks on ships carrying spices from India to the Red Sea, so in 1508 a fleet under Amir Husain was sent south to drive out the Portuguese. Malik Ayaz joined thirty-four *fustas* of his own to this Egyptian fleet, and they sailed

[35] Sikandar, pp. 162-5; R.J. de Lima Felner, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; Barros, III, iv, 9; for his army see *Arabic History*, I, 102-3.

along the western Indian coast in search of D. Lourenço d'Almeida, the viceroy's son. Finding him in Chaul, the Egyptian fleet attacked at once, but Malik Ayaz waited until the outcome was clear, and then joined in to complete the rout of the Portuguese.[36] Despite their defeat, and the death of D. Lourenço, the Portuguese had fought well, so that Malik Ayaz feared reprisals. To avert these he tried to find D. Lourenço's body in order to give it an impressive burial. Failing, he hurried back to Div, where "on the one hand he wrote letters of condolence to the viceroy and on the other he fortified the city, as one who expected repayment for the help he had given Amir Husain, which repayment was not long delayed."[37]

The viceroy, D. Francisco d'Almeida, arrived off Div early in 1509 with a large fleet, determined to avenge his son. He was successful. Although

[36] Castanheda, II, lxxvii. Our sole Persian source, the "Dhamimah-i-Ma'athir-i-Mahmud Shahi," claims that the Egyptian ships went first only as they were heavier and had artillery--ff. 115-117. In fact, Malik Ayaz's ships also had cannon, and in any case this does not explain a delay of two days. For Sultan Mahmud's orders to Malik Ayaz to drive out the Portuguese see "Dhamimah," ff. 106-7. For the battle and Sultan Mahmud's reception of the victors at Bassein see Arabic History, I, 34-35.

[37] Barros, II, ii, 9. See also Castanheda, II, xcvi, where we learn that he also treated the Portuguese captives he had taken at Chaul very lavishly, and got them to write to D. Francisco praising his good treatment of them.

his own fleet suffered heavily, the Egyptian-Gujarati fleet, to which were joined ships from Calicut, was worsted in a long battle. Next day Malik Ayaz sent congratulations to D. Francisco, explaining that he had helped the Egyptians only because he had to, and offering to hand over Div to the Portuguese. It is unlikely that this offer was entirely sincere, for the town itself was as strong as ever, but to his surprise d'Almeida refused it anyway. His whole policy was opposed to the acquisition of land bases. Moreover, his own fleet had suffered in the battle, and he was sure he would not be able to hold Div if the sultan attacked from the land. Malik Ayaz had thus been able to test Portugal's naval strength at very little cost to himself, and he drew the obvious moral. The Portuguese _were_ invincible at sea.[38]

In the remaining thirteen years of his life Malik Ayaz concentrated on defending Div. As part of this defence, in the year before his death he tried to prevent the Portuguese from building a fort at Chaul, for this would give them a base much nearer Div, and so increase the effectiveness of their patrolling. His small fleet was again worsted by the Portuguese, and the fort was built.[39]

[38] Barros, II, iii, 7; Correa, I, 947-8; Castanheda, II, ci; Marechal Gomes da Costa, _op. cit._, II, 268; Faria e Sousa, _op. cit._, I, 269-71

[39] Barros, III, vi, 8-9.

During these last thirteen years Div survived easily two attacks by the Portuguese. In 1513 Governor Albuquerque, after narrowly failing to take Aden, decided to return to Goa via Div and see if he could surprise the port. Two of his ships arrived before the main fleet, so Malik Ayaz was forewarned. Ostensibly all was flowers and sunshine. He sent the Portuguese lavish presents, and provisions, at the same time apologizing for his deficient hospitality, explaining that "he was nothing more than a customs collector for the king of Cambay."[40] Albuquerque asked to be allowed to establish a fort in Div, but Malik Ayaz regretfully explained that first he would have to get permission from the sultan. The conqueror of Goa, Malacca, and Hurmuz left in disgust, telling his captains that "he had never known a more suave courtier, nor a person more skilful in deception while at the same time leaving one feeling very satisfied."[41]

In 1520-21 the Portuguese tried again. After the rains of 1520 the governor, Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, sailed north. He had instructions from the king to take Div by force. To soften up the opposition he first cruised off South Arabia capturing ships

[40] Castanheda, III, cxiv.

[41] Faria e Sousa, op. cit., I, 335-6.

coming from the Red Sea, and apparently by this means caused considerable shortages in Div. Nevertheless, when he arrived to attack the city he found it well prepared. Both sides dissimulated. Diogo Lopes pretended he had no hostile aims, while Malik Ayaz as usual was all friendship. Lavish provisions, secured with considerable effort, and presents were sent to the Portuguese ships, and he asked to be allowed to see a Portuguese woman, "as he wanted to see the women who could conquer [the hearts of] such gallant and noble men as were the Portuguese." Entering into the fun of it, Diogo Lopes produced a very beautiful Muslim woman, but "Malik Ayaz was so shrewd that he said 'Such a one as this could not conquer a Portuguese.'"[42] In a later reconnaissance Diogo Lopes was again deterred by Div's defences, and was also tricked. Malik Ayaz's son told him that his father had gone to court to get permission for the Portuguese to have a fort in Div. Pleased with this good news, Diogo Lopes sailed happily away.[43]

Apart from the military attacks, Malik Ayaz

[42] Barros, III, ix, 7.

[43] There is some confusion in the sources on Diogo Lopes' visits; this seems to be the correct sequence. Correa, II, 574, 606-8, 614-23; Castanheda, V, xlviii, li, lii; Barros, III, iv, 7, III, iv, 9; DUP, I, 376-82.

had also to cover his rear by maintaining his influence at court and so preventing the sultan from granting Div to the Portuguese. True, even had the sultan done this it is unlikely that Malik Ayaz would have tamely submitted. Div, however, would then have been vulnerable from the land. An attack by a Portuguese fleet backed by Portuguese soldiers operating on land, with or without help from the sultan's forces, would have posed a massive threat to Div. Malik Ayaz was thus concerned to block any rapprochement between the sultan and the Portuguese.

Such a rapprochement would almost certainly involve Div, for permission to build a fort there was the prime Portuguese demand, while to the sultans the port was not of crucial value. They received about Rs. 80,000 from the city,[44] much less than the Rs. 120,000 Malik Ayaz received. The port produced one half of Malik Ayaz's official income, and a much greater proportion of his total income, as this included his trading profits from his operations based on Div. For the sultans Rs. 80,000 was a pittance. They would probably be willing to let the port go in the interests of a larger settlement.

Although he had told Albuquerque that he was

[44] R.J. de Lima Felner, _op_. _cit_., pp. 34-36.

"nothing more than a customs collector" for the sultan, and despite his status as a slave, Malik Ayaz was able in 1512-15 to counter a serious Portuguese attempt to get permission from the Gujarati court for them to build a fort in Div. Sultan Muzaffar Shah II (1511-26) had opened the negotiations by sending a messenger to Goa in 1512. The aim was to find some way of stopping Portuguese seizures of Gujarati ships, among them some belonging to Muzaffar himself. It seems clear that the court nobility were prepared to let the Portuguese have a fort in Div if in return their ships were allowed to trade freely. For most of the nobles their own sea trade was more important than whether or not Malik Ayaz kept Div, while one noble, a brahmin called Malik Gupi who was governor of Surat, was actively in favor of a Portuguese fort in Div. This, he hoped, would eliminate Div as a rival to his own port. In his opposition to such a fateful scheme Malik Ayaz was helped by the intransigence of the Portuguese ambassador, who refused to allow free trade even if the fort was conceded, but his own efforts to win over his fellow nobles were more important. No doubt he argued strongly that such a fort would be equivalent to suspending a dagger over the heart of Gujarat's trade, and reminded Muzaffar of his loyal services to both himself and his father. Yet his main, and ultimately successful, weapon was perforce the lavish

giving of bribes and presents to the nobles and the sultan. They could only be bought off, not convinced by what were in retrospect valid arguments, for only to Malik Ayaz was Div a crucial resource.[45]

The Malik died in 1522, and was succeeded by his oldest son, Malik Is-haq, as governor of Div.[46] Until the accession of Sultan Bahadur four years later little changed. The Portuguese reestablished their factory, which had been withdrawn after the hostilities of 1521-22. Gujarati ships continued, as before, to trade under Portuguese auspices, with cartazes, and the Portuguese kept up their prohibition of trade to the Red Sea.[47]

Muzaffar Shah II had been a rather refined, ineffective figure, scholarly, pious, well-meaning, and indecisive. His third son, Bahadur, was dif-

[45] For these dealings see Barros, II, x, 1; Damião de Goes, Crónica do Felicíssimo Rei D. Manuel, Coimbra, 1949-55, 4 vols., III, 243-4; Correa, II, 372-3; Affonso de Albuquerque, Commentaries of Affonso Albuquerque, London, 1875-84, 4 vols., II, 210-17, III, 17, 245, IV, 59-61, 94-103; Castanheda, III, xcv, cxv, cxxcii, cxxxiii; Jean Aubin (ed.), Mare Luso-Indicum, I, Paris, 1970.

[46] Sikandar, p. 203.

[47] Barros, III, ix, 3, IV, i, 5, IV, iv, 4; Castanheda, VII, viii; "Chancellaria de D. João III," ANTT, livro 36, f. 189; Couto, IV, i, 7; ANTTCC, 1-33-113; 2-166-56. The last shows that by early 1531 at least the factor had been withdrawn again.

ferent, as indeed he soon made apparent by his successful fight to gain the throne in 1526. His career provides a classic example of an expansionist ruler, both within and outside Gujarat. His armies expanded the sultanate's frontiers to the north, south and east, at the expense of Ahmadnagar, Malva and the Rajput states. Internally, Bahadur made concerted attempts to exercise a closer control over areas like Div which had been only loosely subject to his father's authority. He sought both horizontal and vertical expansion of his power, although in the latter area he penetrated only to the bottom of the upper level; he was concerned to reduce the independent power of some of his nobles, but he apparently made no attempt to exercise more than usual control below this.

Bahadur was given an easy excuse for an attack on Malik Is-haq, for the Malik had unwisely failed to climb aboard the bandwagon as Bahadur rode to the throne. Once firmly established, Bahadur used the traditional method of a Muslim Indian ruler to separate the loyal from the disloyal: he summoned Malik Is-haq to court to pay homage. The Malik prevaricated, saying he had to remain in Div to defend it from the Portuguese. Bahadur insisted on attendance.[48] Finally the Malik, despairing of his

[48] Barros, IV, v, 6.

prospects in Gujarat, opened negotiations with the Portuguese. By handing over Div to them he hoped to save his own skin and some of his treasure. Foiled by a subordinate loyal to Bahadur, he fled. Soon after the sultan himself arrived and from then on exercised close control over the affairs of the port, a control manifested by his changing the governor of the town four times in the space of five years.[49]

Meanwhile open war had broken out between Portugal and Gujarat. The immediate cause was a threat to the Portuguese fort at Chaul from Bahadur's forces, engaged in war with Ahmadnagar.[50] More important, however, was the bitter disappointment of the king of Portugal, D. João III, over the repeated failure of his governors to take Div, especially that of 1526 when Malik Is-haq had made his offer. The new governor, Nuno da Cunha, arrived in 1529

[49] F. de Andrade, _Chrónica do muyto alto e muyto poderoso Rey destes Reinos de Portugal, Dom João o III deste Nome_, Coimbra, 1796, 4 vols., II, 193-4; Couto, IV, i, 7-8, IV, vii, 2, IV, vii, 4, IV, viii, 3, IV, ix, 1; Barros, IV, v, 6, IV, ii, 14-15; Sikandar, pp. 265, 274, 280; Castanheda, VII, vi-viii, xiii; ANTTCC, 1-35-37 (This letter refers to Malik Ayaz--the Portuguese used his name generically and applied it to his sons as well.).

[50] ANTTCC, 1-42-2.

with instructions to take Div at all costs. He needed little urging, for it seemed that whoever could take Div would be richly rewarded by the king.

Hostilities opened in 1530 with a full-scale attack by a Portuguese armada on Surat--the first time a Portuguese armada had entered the Gulf of Cambay. The town was poorly defended, so its inhabitants with discretion had fled, taking all their valuables with them. The Portuguese landed unopposed and burnt down the empty city. They then crossed the Tapti River to Rander, where light resistance was soon beaten off, and much booty taken. Rander was also burnt, and indeed was never to regain its importance.[51] Early next year the governor himself sailed north to Div. He had with him 3,000 Portuguese soldiers and 5,000 Malabari and Kanarese auxiliaries, in a fleet of over 200 sail, the largest yet assembled by the Portuguese in India. A fortified island near Div was taken after a bloody resistance, but Div itself, bristling with defences, was impregnable. To keep their spirits up, the Portuguese then returned to looting open cities, and in 1531-33 sacked and burnt Gogha, Surat again, Mangrol, Somnath, Bassein and some other smaller

[51] Castanheda, VIII, viii; Barros, IV, iv, 8.

ports.[52]

Even allowing for the hyperbole of the Portuguese chronicles, these attacks caused considerable destruction. Bahadur was unmoved, and indeed unconcerned. Gujarat's overseas traders were, as we shall see, not closely controlled by their sultan in their commercial activities, but the reverse of the coin was that they were not protected by him either. It is true that Bahadur was more interested in sea trade and naval matters than perhaps any of his predecessors, with the possible exception of Mahmud Bigarh. He travelled frequently by sea, and pursued an active policy of building ships for both commercial and military purposes. These ships were admired by the Portuguese themselves, and were apparently as large in number of oars as contemporary Turkish vessels. Bahadur had a fleet of 160 sail at his death in 1537.[53] Yet all this was purely relative. While the Portuguese were raiding in the gulf he was engaged on a more important matter, the conquest of territory.

[52] Barros, IV, iv, 12-15, IV, iv, 17, IV, iv, 22, IV, iv, 24; Castanheda, VIII, xxix, xxxi-v, xliii-v, l-liii; Couto, IV, vii, 2-5; Correa, III, 466-74.

[53] For travel by sea, see Sikandar, pp. 266-67; for ship-building ibid., p. 271; ANTTSV, XI, 97r; for the ships' sizes, ANTTSL, IV, 247-50; for Turkish sizes, ANTTSV, III, 306; for his fleet at his death, Barros, IV, viii, 7; for his attempts to prepare armadas of his own to guard Div's merchant ships, F. de Andrade, op. cit., II, 193-4.

It was only when he got into difficulties here that Bahadur remembered the Portuguese. In 1534 he found himself fighting against both the Rajput states of Chitor and Mandu, and the Mughal emperor Humayun, as well as the Portuguese. To free himself for the first two he liquidated the third. This was a clear indication of his priorities: eliminate the stings of the Portuguese, and then get back to the really important matter of control over land.

In December 1534 Bahadur signed a peace treaty with Governor Nuno da Cunha. The port of Bassein and its surrounding territories were ceded to the Portuguese. All Gujarati ships bound for the Red Sea had to call at Bassein to take a cartaz, and on the return voyage again go first to Bassein and pay duties. Ships trading to places other than the Red Sea were also to take cartazes but were not obliged to pay duties to the Portuguese, while coastal trade required no cartaz at all. Gujarat was to build no more warships, nor use those it already had. Other minor clauses concerned the restoration of Portuguese captives and the regulation of the horse trade.[54]

This treaty was in effect less than one year,

[54] Couto, IV, viii, 8, IV, ix, 2; Barros, IV, iv, 27; British Museum, Addl. 28433, ff. 174-5r; R.J. de Lima Felner, _op. cit._, pp. 134-7; Castanheda, VIII, lxxxiv. Included in the ceded area was the small port, and fine harbor, of Bombay, which in the 1660's was ceded in turn to Charles II of England, and by him leased to the English East India Company.

and so had little practical importance. The provisions concerning cartazes and warships were potentially a considerable threat to Bahadur's independence, but only if they could be enforced. Bahadur in fact saw this treaty as a very temporary measure (as indeed it turned out to be). He ceded a less than crucial resource, the area of Bassein, to end what was to him a less than serious threat.[55] The cession of Bassein was the only tangible gain for the Portuguese, and this was not a great loss for Gujarat. Bassein was in the extreme south of the sultanate, and was only nominally subordinate to Bahadur at the best of times.[56]

His hopes were fruitless. By September 1535 he was in refuge in Div, a fugitive from the all-conquering Mughal armies. Humayun had won lightning successes, and Bahadur was desperate, ready to grasp at any faint hope. In the same month another, more fateful, treaty was signed with Nuno da Cunha. The Portuguese promised to help against Humayun. In return they were given permission to build a fort in Div. The cession of Bassein was confirmed, and ships trading to the Red Sea could now call at either Div or Bassein to get their cartazes. Other ships

[55] Castanheda, VIII, lxxxiv.

[56] J. Wicki, "Duas Relações sobre a situação da India portugueza nos anos 1568 e 1569," in Studia, 8, 1961, pp. 175-6.

were still not obliged to pay duties to the Portuguese, but as before had to have cartazes.[57]

This treaty was in one respect a concession from the Portuguese, for they had as yet no claim to any share of the customs duties paid at Div, and thus ships trading to the Red Sea and calling at Div had only to take a cartaz from the Portuguese--they paid duties to Gujarat. The crucial clause, however, was the permission to build a fort, for this, the Portuguese hoped, would be only the opening wedge whereby they could later negotiate from a position of strength and acquire more rights in Div. In this they were successful, as we shall see, so this treaty was of fundamental importance in the achievement of their aims. In reality the terms of the treaty made Div vulnerable to the Portuguese, and this was arrived at by chance, not military success. Their past attempts to take the port had all failed dismally.

Again we see the importance of Bahadur's assessment of his resources. He also presumably could foresee that a fort would be only a first step for the Portuguese, but the _farangis_ were so obviously anxious to have their fort, and their help against Humayun –

[57] Couto, IV, ix, 7; Castanheda, VIII, c; Barros, IV, vi, 12; Lopo de Sousa Coutinho, _Histógreria de Cerco de Diu_, Lisbon, 1890, pp. 57-58; Arabic History, I, 214-5, 219-20.

would be better than nothing. In any case, Div was not such a great prize to lose even if they did eventually take it all. The port was lost because Bahadur's interests were not those of Malik Ayaz; to the latter it was a vital resource, to the former it was not.

The stages by which the Portuguese acquired full control may now be quickly sketched. In a few months Bahadur bitterly regretted his concession, for Humayun, feckless as ever, decided to leave Gujarat with most of his army in order to deal with the emerging threat from Shir Khan in Bihar. Bahadur, with a very little help from the Portuguese, had no difficulty in retaking all of Gujarat. He had allowed the Portuguese to build their fort, but now had no need of their help. Early in 1537 he returned to Div, apparently interested in destroying the offending fort if this were at all possible. After a period of maneuvering, Bahadur was drowned after leaving a Portuguese ship to return to land. The Portuguese seized the chance to take over the whole island and, in an audacious attempt to interfere deeply in Gujarati politics, set up a previously obscure relation of Bahadur's as sultan. This man, Muhammad Zaman Mirza, gave the Portuguese "thousands and thousands and lakhs and crores [of money] " in return for their allowing his name to be included

in the <u>khutbah</u> at Friday prayers in Div.[58] The Portuguese dictated to him a treaty making large concessions. But this puppet was soon deposed by the supporters of Mahmud III (1537-54) and in 1538 their forces, helped by a Turkish fleet, reconquered the town of Div and laid siege to the fort.[59]

The successful defences of Div in the two sieges of 1538 and 1546 are among the most renowned military exploits of the Portuguese. They are still studied, for they form an important element in the current myth-making in Portugal, undertaken for present political reasons, concerning their sixteenth-century deeds in Asia. The Portuguese fort was built on the island of Div, but the island was easily

[58] Mir Abu Turab Wali, <u>History of Gujarat</u>, Calcutta, 1909, p. 36. The inclusion of one's name in the **khutbah** was an important part of a struggle for a throne. It signalized, or constituted a bid for, support from the orthodox Muslim group.

[59] For these events see Couto, V, i, 2; Lopo de Sousa Coutinho, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 80-84; Castanheda, VIII, clxvi; Barros, IV, viii, 6-10; R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), <u>Subsídios para a História da India Portugueza</u>, p. 228; Arabic History, I, 222-3. The date of Bahadur's death, 943 AH, was found in "Slain by the farangi dogs." (A.A. Tirmizi (ed.), "Tarikh-i-Salatin-Gujarat," in <u>Medieval Indian Quarterly</u>, V, 71.) This dictated treaty of March 1537 gave the Portuguese the whole coastline between Mangrol and the Island of Bete, just east of Div, and between Daman and Bassein, extending five miles inland--ANTTCC, 1-58-73.

accessible from the mainland. On the other hand, the fort was sited so that it could be provisioned from the sea. Thus the sieges took place during the rainy season, during which time navigation to Div was impossible or at least difficult. In both sieges the Portuguese garrisons were able to hold out, although only by the skin of their teeth, until the monsoon ended and help could come from Goa, Bassein, and Chaul.

In the first siege the Gujarati forces were led by Khwajah Safar, an Italian who had been employed as treasurer to Mustafa Khan, a Turkish general who had besieged Aden and then come to Div in 1531 and entered Gujarati service. Mustafa Khan became Rumi Khan and served Bahadur until he deserted to Humayun in 1535. Khwaja Safar remained in Div. He was one of the only two people who accompanied Bahadur on his ill-fated visit to da Cunha's flagship and survived to tell the story. Subsequently he cooperated with the Portuguese for a year, then left, was made captain of Surat, and returned soon after as leader of the Gujarati forces besieging Div by land.[60] In

[60] Faria e Sousa, op. cit., III, 150-4; Correa, III, 784, 852-60; Castanheda, VIII, xv, xxvi, xxxiii, cii; Couto, V, i, 7-9; ANTTCC, 1-56-86; António Baião (ed.), História quinhentista (inedita) do segundo cerco do Dio, Coimbra, 1927, pp. 5, 9.

pressing the siege, however, the ships and artillery of the fleet provided by the Ottoman Turks were most effective. These Turks acted in a most overbearing manner towards their allies, while the Gujaratis were understandably concerned as to what exactly would be the price of the Turks once the Portuguese were defeated. Cooperation was minimal, and the Turkish fleet finally left in a huff. Its admiral later complained of the poor reception he had been given by the Gujaratis, and even cast aspersions on the quality of Islam in Gujarat.[61]

The Portuguese were thus able to hold out, and peace was established in March 1539. Their large gains of 1537 were lost, but the wedge was driven in a little further. Their fort was to be separated from the city of Div by a wall, and all Portuguese were to return to the fort at night. All ships leaving Div were to pay customs duties at the customs house, after which they would be given a cartaz by the Portuguese captain, while ships sailing from other Gujarati ports were also required to obtain a cartaz at Div, but apparently not to pay duties there. These customs revenues were to be divided, with the Portuguese receiving one-third and Gujarat

[61] ANTTCC, 3-14-44. Also see Arabic History, I, 226-7.

two-thirds of the total.[62] Late in the next year the proportions were changed to one-half each. The Gujarati nobles were at this time bitterly divided over who was to control the young Sultan Mahmud III, and their divisions enabled the Portuguese to obtain this concession after a little pressure had been applied.[63]

It was too much to expect Gujarat and Portugal to cooperate harmoniously in dividing up Div's revenues, and tension increased throughout the early 1540's, until its culmination in the second siege of 1546. On the Gujarati side there were numerous complaints, mostly justified, for the Portuguese consistently applied pressure on them and tried to extend their authority. In 1540-41 the Goa government complained to the sultan that Khwaja Safar was fortifying Surat, where he was still captain. The Portuguese rather arbitrarily considered this to be a hostile act, but they were sharply rebuffed by the sultan, who refused to acknowledge that they had any business in what was done in Surat.[64] Off Div Portuguese fustas patrolled, forcing all ships bound for Kambayat

[62] Couto, V, v, 8; R.J. de Lima Felner, op. cit., 228-32.

[63] ANTTSL, V, 98, VI, 6r; Couto, V, vii, 1; Correa, IV, 215-6, 221, but he has his dates muddled.

[64] Correa, IV, 143, 159; Studia, 9, p. 233.

(Cambay) to enter and pay duties in Div, and while they were there the Portuguese captain, D. João Mascarenhas, made these merchants sell him goods at low prices and in other ways abused his position.[65] Further, the Portuguese had destroyed the wall between the town and the fort, as they feared, probably with considerable justification, that it could be used for military purposes. The Gujarati authorities, especially Khwaja Safar, complained of Gujarati ships being forced to take cartazes even when they were only going from one Gujarati port to another.[66] From the Portuguese side, there were complaints of cheating in the division of the customs revenues. Tension increased as neither side was satisfied with the existing situation. In October 1545 Mascarenhas advised the new governor, D. João de Castro: "If you don't have much on your hands there [in Goa] you should take a trip up here and capture this city for the king . . . ."[67] Meanwhile Khwaja Safar had either stopped asking for cartazes for his ships bound for the Red Sea or the Portuguese had refused to give

[65] Correa, IV, 454; Gavetas, V, 327.

[66] ANTTSL, V, 155; Couto, VI, i, 7.

[67] ANTTSL, V, 141r-2. See also ANTTCC, 1-77-36.

them to him. His ships were now sailing well armed, and there were several clashes between them and Portuguese fleets early in 1546.[68] The sultan tried to secure support from Calicut, Ahmadnagar, and Bijapur for a joint attack on the Portuguese forts in western India. After the siege started these efforts were redoubled, and Castro in turn courted Shir Shah in Delhi. As it transpired, these attempts came to nothing, and the second siege was undertaken by Gujaratis alone.[69]

The crucial point about these two sieges, crucial because it explains the Portuguese success and because of the light it casts on the interests of the Gujarati nobility, is that as far as Gujarat was concerned both were largely one man efforts. In the first Khwaja Safar was helped by the Turks, but not by the

[68] Elaine Sanceau, _Cartas de Dom João de Castro_, Lisbon, 1955, pp. 227-30.

[69] _Ibid_., pp. 141-4, 242-3, 327-33; ANTTSL, III, 142-r, 146r, 148, 150-r, 152, 230r, 254; IV, 339; V, 235-8. On III, 150-r is Mahmud III's letter to the Zamorin in which he talks of his great captains who will attack the Portuguese, and how much money he is spending. Apparently this was all talk, solely designed to tempt the Zamorin into helping him by joining in attacking the Portuguese. These other rulers saw no reason to attack the Portuguese just because the sultan of Gujarat asked them to. But both before and after 1546 all three did challenge the Portuguese at times when their own interests were threatened.

other nobles. In the second, Mahmud III undertook these diplomatic maneuvers, presumably at Khwaja Safar's instigation, but he did nothing else to help. Nor did any of the influential nobles at court. The besieging army was led by, and paid by, Khwaja Safar.[70] This Italian renegade had more reason than the other nobles to oppose the Portuguese. His ships, and those of merchants resident in his town of Surat, had been subjected to harassment and their crews to bad treatment in Div. Khwaja Safar's revenue was based on his possession of Surat, and thus ultimately on sea trade. It was a considerable revenue. In 1537 he was estimated to be worth Rs. 12,00,000 at least.[71] This vital trade was being hampered by the Portuguese in Div. Apart from the economic loss here, he claimed it was "belittling" for Gujarati ships to have to take cartazes before they were allowed to sail on their own coast. He thus posed as the champion of Gujarat's traders, as well he might, for his wealth was dependent on their

[70] Annaes Maritimos e Coloniaes, Lisbon, 1840-56, 6 vols., IV, 107; ANTTSL, III, 53r, 60. The account in the Arabic History (pp. 231-41) is long and confused, but it is clear that Khwaja Safar was not helped by any of the important nobles of Gujarat, or by the sultan, although the latter was annoyed at the failure of the siege. During the siege Afzal Khan and the sultan visited Khwaja Safar's camp for three days only, "by way of pleasure."

[71] Studia, 10, p. 191.

trade.[72]

When Khwaja Safar built his fort on the Tapti River in Surat, the date of its completion was found in the chronogram "May this structure prove a load on the chest and life of the farangis."[73] Gujarat's other nobles did not feel nearly so bitter. Portugal's activities on the coasts were of minor concern to them. They were at the time involved in an internecine struggle over control of Sultan Mahmud III. The really important prizes depended on the results of this struggle.

The siege of 1546 also failed, after another desperate defence by the Portuguese. During it Khwaja Safar, and later his son, were killed. The Portuguese reinforcements, headed by Castro's sons and later by the governor himself, drove the Gujaratis from the island; their fleets cruised in the gulf again, sacking and burning. Gujarati peace feelers in December 1546 and later[74] were turned

[72] Couto, VI, i. 7.

[73] Nawwab Samsam-ud-daula Shah Nawaz Khan, Ma'athir-ul-Umara, II, 534. The addition of the numerical values conventionally assigned to the Persian letters of this sentence comes to 947, or the hijrah year corresponding to 1540.

[74] ANTTSL, III, 296r-7; IV, 209.

down by Castro, and the destruction in the gulf continued. Gogha, Surat, Rander, Broach, and Daman were all taken, looted, and burnt.[75] Castro's position, however, was weakening all the time. Bijapur attacked Goa, while various interests were hurt by the continuation of the war and the consequent cessation of trade between Portuguese areas and Gujarat. Such diverse people as the Raja of Cannanor, the citizens of Goa and D. Francisco Lima, a prominent fidalgo, all advised the governor to make peace.[76] When this was done, in January 1549, the Portuguese were negotiating from a much weaker position than they had had late in 1546, for the war, especially as it involved great loss of customs revenues, was very expensive. This is reflected in the terms, which restored the complete status quo ante, neither side making any gains.[77]

The Portuguese were only biding their time. In 1554-55 the Gujarati nobility was even more divided than usual following the murder of Sultan Mahmud III. The Portuguese had been particularly

[75] DUP, I, 582; Manuel de Faria e Sousa, Asia Portugueza, III, 163-77.

[76] ANTTCC, 1-81-104; ANTTSL, III, 185, 189, 480-1r.

[77] Couto, VI, vii, 4.

worried in the early 1550's by the possibility of another Turkish-Gujarati attack on Div,[78] so they now seized the chance to take over the government of the whole island of Div, in 1554, and all its customs revenues in 1555. From this time at least they forced all ships trading to or from Gujarat to call at Div and pay duties to them.[79] The long conquest of Div was at last completed; fifty years after their first contacts with the port they had finally secured it completely for themselves. In their first year of full control the customs house yielded Rs. 2,40,000 for the king.[80] Div was not openly attacked from the land again until 1961.

The next target was Daman, for the possession of this port would give another area in which Portuguese could be settled, and given land as rewards. Further, a fleet patrolling from Div to Daman, a distance of about 120 miles, would be much more effective in guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Cambay than was one operating between Bassein and Div, a distance of 180 miles. The Portuguese and Persian

[78] ANTTCC,1-86-89, 1-86-120, 1-87-50. For divisions after Mahmud III's death, see Arabic History, I, 318-9.

[79] Couto, VI, x, 16, VI, x, 19, VII, i, 9, VII, ii, 3.

[80] Couto, VII, ii, 3.

sources differ concerning the cession of this area to the Portuguese by a Gujarati noble. Sikandar has it being ceded in 1559 by Chengiz Khan, but two Portuguese sources have 1557 and 1558, with the noble responsible being Chengiz Khan's father 'Imad-ul-mulk.[81] The most reliable of the three claims that the area was ceded by 'Imad-ul-mulk, at that time the most powerful noble in Gujarat, in return for peace with the Portuguese, as their attacks hindered the trade of his many ships. 'Imad-ul-mulk gained peace and lost nothing. Daman was effectively controlled by a party of Abyssinians. After its formal cession the Portuguese had to conquer it from these people. Like Bassein, Daman had apparently not been controlled by the center for some time. Thus in 1540 after Bahadur had ceded Bassein the governor of Daman attacked the Portuguese as he claimed part of the area given to the Portuguese was in fact his. The shadowy nature of Gujarat's control in this southern coastal strip is further shown in the way in which as soon as the Portuguese took Daman they started paying a tribute called chauth, later claimed by Sivaji, to another local raja. Further, the

[81] Sikandar, pp. 426-7; ANTTCC, 1-102-47; Couto, VII, iii, 1-2; VII, vi, 3; Arabic History I, 350-2.

Persian source describes Daman as a "muzafat," an appendage, of the sultanate, not as part of its "mulk," or land.[82]

In the remaining thirteen years of its existence the nobility of the sultanate became more and more factionalized, a situation which ultimately led to Akbar's easy conquest in 1572-73. The Portuguese apparently considered themselves at war with Gujarat, at least until 1561, but from when is not clear. In any case, this had little practical effect, and with one exception relations were in fact amicable enough. The exception was an attempt by the Portuguese to seize Surat in 1560-61 which in the event proved abortive.[83]

The change in the status of Gujarat in 1572-73 from an independent sultanate to a subah of the Mughal Empire made little difference to most of its inhabitants, nor did it to the Portuguese. During the

[82] Couto, V, vi, 10, VII, vi, 6; Sikandar, p. 426. This and other Persian sources use several Persian words, apparently interchangeably, for "land" or "country": most often vilāyat (Sikandar, pp. 100, 101, 134, 144, 272) but also bilād, mulk, 'arsah, and aṭrāf (Sikandar, pp. 272, 258, 99). The last of these can have the connotation of district, or environs. There does seem to be a distinction between words meaning "country," and aṭrāf, which implies an area of less than a total country, or muzāfāt, which implies a smaller area located on the edge of a vilāyat such as Gujarat.

[83] Couto, VII, ix, 8-9, VII, ix, 11-14; the future chronicler, at this time aged 18, was part of the Portuguese forces which made this attempt. For the

conquest a gesture was made towards Daman, which Akbar pretended to believe was part of Gujarat. The attack was not pressed, and a treaty of peace, embodied in a farman, was signed in March 1573. The Portuguese were left with Daman, Akbar promised not to shelter the Malabar pirates, and he was given one free cartaz, on which no duties were payable, for a voyage to the Red Sea each year.[84]

By petitioning for, and receiving, the free cartaz Akbar tacitly recognized the Portuguese claim to be controllers of Gujarat's sea trade. Nothing so damaging to his dignity was ever openly admitted by a Mughal Emperor, but throughout the seventeenth century they continued to ask for and to receive their one free cartaz a year. Further, they occasionally would request variations in the usual form--perhaps an additional cartaz, or permission for the ship to leave from a port other than Surat. Akbar had as much pride as any ruler of India ever had. It is clear that he was prepared to do this because he, like most of the sultans and nobles before him, did

continuance of a state of war in 1557 and 1561 at least see ANTTCC, 1-102-47; Studia, 3, p. 52.

[84] Couto, IX, cap. 13. The Mirat-i-Ahmadi, p. 100, has a story of the Portuguese being interested in picking up Surat during the confusion of the conquest, but seeing discretion as the better part of valor once they saw "the grandeur and power of his majesty." This is not mentioned in the Portuguese sources. See Couto, IX, caps. 19 and 28 for other negotiations

not see this as a particular infringement on his sovereignty.

In any case, the situation was not wholly to the advantage of the Portuguese. They were well aware of Akbar's puissance, and of the vulnerability of several of their forts on the western Indian coast, especially Daman. Thus they took pains not to offend the Mughals, although at the same time insisting on their control of sea trade. There were occasions when a free cartaz ship was allowed to leave from Gogha instead of Surat, despite the loss this entailed to the customs revenues of Div, and an extra free cartaz was granted a few times.[85] In fact the whole business of the free cartaz was very irksome for the Portuguese. The merchants of Surat were no fools. In the Red Sea they would load all their most valuable goods onto Akbar's free ship, and these would go direct to Surat and not pay customs to the Portuguese. Their bulkier and less valuable goods were loaded on their own ships in the Red Sea, and

in 1573-75 of no significance, and IX, cap. 32 for a minor crisis of 1575-76. A Portuguese ambassador to Akbar was imprisoned in Cambay as the governor of the town wanted to pressure the Portuguese captain of Div into giving him a very fine horse which the captain had just bought. The captain was forced to comply.

[85] Couto, IX, cap. 19; X, ii, 1; Bocarro, Decada, p. 396; APOCR, III, 198; A. Botelho de Costa Veiga (ed.), <u>Relação das plantas e descrições de todas as fortalezas, cidades, e povoações que os Portugueses tem no Estado da India Oriental</u>, Lisbon, 1936, p. 21.

paid duties in Div. The consequent loss to the Div customs revenue was variously estimated at Rs. 46,000 and Rs. 1,05,000.[86] Despite their grumbles, the Portuguese knew the price was cheap as it usually ensured neutrality from the Mughals.

Relations between the Mughals and the Portuguese were thus tranquil enough most of the time. Such minor clashes as did occur should be seen as aberrations, mistakes rather than attempts to change a _status quo_ in which both sides generally felt that their crucial resources were being protected. The clearest example is the episode narrated at the beginning of this chapter. It seems clear that Muhammad Qulij Khan was just a little slow to understand the system; it is also significant that he is described as being a devout sunni Muslim. Such a man would presumably feel less inclined to submit to the Christian Portuguese than would a Muslim who wore his religion more lightly. More important perhaps, he was governor of Surat, and thus, like Khwaja Safar, Portuguese control was much more immediate to him than to most of his peers. Other Mughal officials apparently felt no need to emulate him. There

[86] Couto, IX, cap. 13; AHU, Caixa 3, no. 4; LMBP, III, 162-3; Artur Viegas (ed.), _Relação Anual das Coisas que Fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas missões_, by Padre Fernão Guerreiro, Lisbon, 1930-42, 3 vols., II, 389-90.

was a half-hearted attempt to take Div by treachery in the 1590's, while the Portuguese remained interested in seizing Surat if this could be done on the cheap, which in fact was never possible.[87] Fairly minor clashes occurred in 1613-15, and 1630, which need not be detailed here, and there was great excitement once in Goa over the supposed conversion of a Mughal ambassador, Muqarrab Khan, who was a close friend of the emperor Jahangir.[88] The situation as regards cartazes hardly changed throughout the seven-

[87] APOCR, III, 201, 475-6; Couto, X, iv, 6-7; X, iv, 9; Faria e Sousa, op. cit., V, 40-41; Artur Basilio de Sá (ed.), Documentação para a história das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente. Insulíndia, Lisbon, 5 vols., V, 153; British Museum, Addl. 20861, ff. 109, 241r.

[88] For 1613-15 see Bocarro, Decada, pp. 221, 230, 259, 301-2, 308-14, 395-7; APOCR, VI, 986; AHU, Caixa 3, no. 37. The war started after a dispute over the Portuguese right to search ships with cartazes to make sure all its provisions were being observed. The Portuguese captain concerned was imprisoned and later fined for his overly-zealous attention to duty. (LMBP, V, 112-3.) For the 1630 war see LM, v. 14, ff. 319, 361-r, 363-4; Assentos, I, 276, 531-5. For Muqarrab Khan's "conversion" see LM, v. 12, f. 23. "This embassy from the Mughal Empire, and the whole agreement, and the hopes people had from it, were all fabulous. As soon as the ambassador got home again he went on being as Muslim as before, with little respect to Christianity . . ." Thus the disillusioned viceroy.

teenth century; as we have seen they continued to be asked for and issued throughout the century.

<u>Analysis of the Response</u>. The detail of this chapter deals with battles and sieges, defiance and retaliation, but it is clear that in fact Gujarati-Portuguese relations in the sixteenth century were on the whole fairly low key. The resistance or defiance of Malik Ayaz, Khwajah Safar and Qulij Khan should be seen as the actions of nobles with special interests. Bahadur was much more typical in that he abandoned Div in an attempt to safeguard what were to him and most of his nobles more important interests. Especially once the major Portuguese demand, the acquisition of Div, had been accepted relations were calm enough.

Why was this? First, it must be stressed that there <u>was</u> an alternative. The sultans, let alone the Mughals, <u>could</u> have expelled the Portuguese from Gujarat. The two sieges of Div failed, but in neither was the full force of the sultanate brought to bear, while Div could never have held out against the expert artillery of the Mughals. Daman and Bassein, being larger and less well fortified, could easily have been overrun. The group of private Portuguese traders living in Kambayat (Cambay) would of course have presented no military problem. Indeed,

these people could be, and on occasion were, captured and used as pawns by the authorities in Gujarat in disputes with the Portuguese. More important, we have seen how crucial to the Portuguese were the goods which went south from Cambay to Goa on the cafilas each year. This trade could easily have been stopped at its source, and this would have been disastrous for the Portuguese. It is true that a coordinated attack would have drawn retaliation in the Gulf of Cambay from the Portuguese, and they would have attempted to block all Gujarat's sea trade. But if Div, Daman, and Bassein were taken, the Portuguese fleets, operating from Chaul and Hurmuz, could not have been effective enough to cause unacceptable damage to the sultans or the Mughals, while they in turn, especially by blocking the cafilas, could have hurt the Portuguese very badly. Such a coordinated attack thus could have succeeded, and been followed by negotiations in which perhaps the cafilas were allowed to start again in return for Gujarati ships not being obliged to take cartazes. It is fair to say that the whole Portuguese control of Gujarat's sea trade was based on a bluff. Why was it never called?

The answer is implicit throughout the previous discussion. The Portuguese <u>were</u> vulnerable, but only if most of the Gujarati upper political level

felt threatened by their activities. Militarily they could have been challenged, but if the majority of the people in Gujarat who could have initiated such a challenge did not feel any urge to do this, then they were effectively invulnerable. They were able to operate their system, secure in the knowledge that the people who could have stopped them did not want to.

This can even be demonstrated in a roughly quantitative fashion from the occurence of names in the very full indexes to the Mirat-i-Sikandari and Couto's Decadas. The latter covers the last sixty years of the sixteenth century in great detail, and lists a total of 24 Gujarati nobles who had dealings of any sort with the Portuguese. The Mirat-i-Sikandari, in its account of the years 1511-1572 has relatively extended mentions of about 110 Gujarati nobles or sultans.[89]

The bulk of Gujarat's nobles, and all the sultans and Mughals, did not face a challenge to any crucial resource. This was reflected in the very considerable independence of action enjoyed by the governors of sea ports. Malik Ayaz acted as he liked against the Portuguese, as did Khwaja Safar and Qulij Khan. In 1531 Malik Tughan, another son of Malik Ayaz, was "Captain of the Sea" under Bahadur. He

[89] Diogo do Couto, Decadas, index volume; Mirat-i-Sikandari, index.

was able, on his own authority, to remit Rs. 60,000 in customs duties owed by a group of Persian merchants, and guarantee them exemption from duties in the future.[90] Yet Bahadur almost alone among the sultans was interested in naval matters. Even to him, let alone to the rest of the sultans and most of the nobles, sea trade and its control meant nothing, for his vision of a powerful man was of a man controlling land and people. In the terms of Eric Wolf's already quoted analysis, control of sea trade was not a political resource essential to the operation of the Gujarati political system. In this area Gujarat yielded its sovereignty to the Portuguese, who were allowed to function in the entrails of the system. The only qualification to be made is that sovereignty was in fact not "yielded," for we have already noted that the Portuguese introduced the concept of control over sea trade to Indian waters. They imported this innovative concept, and were allowed to act on its implications because virtually no one in Gujarat saw any point in trying to wrest control for themselves.

There were many nobles in charge of Gujarati ports who did not oppose the Portuguese. These people are usually nameless in our historical records, but

[90] Sikandar, p. 280.

we can assume that they accepted the Portuguese system. Had they not, the Portuguese chronicles would mention them, if only as Moors who were defeated by the heroic Portuguese. Such people, the governors of Broach and Cambay, for example, were only a small proportion of the total Gujarati nobility, yet their failure to challenge the Portuguese merits some consideration. Part of the answer lies in economics. Ships sailing from their ports paid duties to the Portuguese in Div, and sailed with cartazes under Portuguese control. Nevertheless, they still paid duties at their home ports. Thus neither the governors of these ports, nor the rulers of Gujarat, who derived revenue from their share of the proceeds of these duties, suffered economic loss. Malik Ayaz was not in this position, for the Portuguese wanted to capture Div. Khwaja Safar was in between. The Portuguese did not stop him from collecting duties in Surat, but they did exercise their control in a very irksome way, attacking his ships and abusing the traders when they called at Div.

These sorts of abuses were largely ended soon after the second siege of Div. Complaints of ill treatment there continued, but over all it is clear that the Portuguese later in the century were concerned to encourage local trade under their control, both in Gujarat and elsewhere, for thus Portuguese customs

revenues increased. We have already noted how Portuguese India gradually became self-sustaining, its revenue based on the Portuguese country trade and on control of local trade rather than on the trade to Portugal. As the century wore on the Portuguese made it easier for these governors to accept their control.

It is indeed possible that the "corruption" of the Portuguese officials in Div, as opposed to the straight abuses to which Khwaja Safar objected, made it easier for these few governors to accommodate. The evidence is skimpy, but it is reasonable to assume that Portuguese and Gujarati captains, both holding their offices as personal property rather than as public trusts, were at least at times able to reach agreements which resulted in mutual profit. There are some indications. Thus the governor of Cambay town derived increased customs revenues from the new trade to Goa which the Portuguese created. True, this trade represented only 5% of Gujarat's total trade, but it was at least something.[91] The private Portuguese living in Cambay also helped to increase the town's revenues. Khwaja Safar himself used a Portuguese as his business agent in Div and Goa. This gentleman, Ruy Freire, became so attached

[91] Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, parte 1, pp. 279-88, and cf. pp. 40-41.

to his employer that he finally tried to betray the fort of Div to him.[92] Khwaja Safar also at least once used a Portuguese as a source of capital, for on his death he owed an official in Bassein Rs. 12,000. Portuguese traders and their goods were welcomed in his port of Surat.[93] No doubt there were other arrangements reached--perhaps a small bribe would clear the way for a noble's ship to transport some pepper, or ease the granting of a cartaz for a "forbidden" area.

Nevertheless, too much should not be made of such accomodations. They seem to have been minor enough. Those few Gujarati nobles who were interested in sea trade accepted Portuguese control partly because they did not lose their own revenues by their acceptance, and partly because in the last resort they had no choice. The failures of Khwaja Safar showed clearly that the Portuguese could not be expelled by one noble, however powerful, yet the governor of Cambay, for example, must have known that there was no chance his fellow nobles would help him against the Portuguese.

One other factor must be considered here. This was the whole land-oriented ethos of these Gujarati

[92] Couto, VI, i, 6.

[93] ANTTSL, III, f. 68; Correa, IV, 455.

nobles and their rulers. It is reflected in the rates of customs duties. Sea trade was undertaxed, at rates of only 2½-5%. True, most export products were produced on the land, and so paid land revenue also. Further, there is no reason to suspect that customs officials in Gujarat were any more honest than their Portuguese counterparts; in effect, the bribes and perquisites which they undoubtedly took raised the rates a little. These extra levies can in fact be seen as part of the revenue of Gujarat, for as customary perquisites they formed an accepted part of the salary of an official.[94] Yet the official rates could have been raised, for the merchants were able to pay an extra duty to the Portuguese in Div without apparent hardship. In other countries rates were much higher: the usual rate in sixteenth-century Lisbon was 20%, while Mamluk Egypt took at least 30% from spices as they were transported from the Red Sea to Alexandria.[95]

The whole ethos of the Muslim sultans of Gujarat and their nobles was, with few exceptions, intimately tied up with control over land and people,

[94] Cf. the attitude of the Portuguese officials in chapter II, pp. 94-100.

[95] Boletim do Conselho Ultramarino. Legislação Antigo, Lisbon, 1867, I, 157 et seq; F. Mendes da Luz, Relação de todas as rendas . . ., Coimbra, 1949, pp. 44-45, 59, 60; Castanheda, II, lxxv.

not over the sea. For these nobles, land was the crucial resource, for control over land gave control over men. In their terms, although not in those of a merchant, a wealthy man was a man with a large well-populated land area under his control. Money as such was less important, for it was not very easy to translate money into control over land, and through land over men. Nor was control over sea traders of much importance, for they were by definition men who could not be controlled; they sailed far beyond a noble's reach.

Some Muslim states, notably the Mamluk Empire, had large slave standing armies, and these were paid in cash or kind from the center.[96] The rulers who were the paymasters were thus interested in cash revenue from wherever it came. Sea trade in Egypt was extensive, and could carry heavy taxation, so the rates were around 30%. The Gujarati army, however, was composed almost wholly of contingents raised by the nobles[97] from the land they controlled. The whole army was ordinarily paid in land grants, rather than in cash. There thus seems to have been a fundamental difference between this territorially-oriented Gujarati regime, and such a one as Mamluk Egypt,

[96] Ira M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, pp. 16, 46, 51.

[97] Cf. chapter VI, pp. 306-7.

where money rather than land was crucial.

Considerations of status were interrelated with this. For the nobles of Gujarat social honor was acquired from the amount of land one controlled, and from the size of one's contingent of cavalry. Glory was not won at sea; the whole military ethic of the Turkish Muslim rulers of Gujarat was bound up with land, and horses racing over the plains. As Bahadur said, "Wars by sea are merchants' affairs, and of no concern to the prestige of kings."[98] Similarly, Dr. John Fryer explained that Awrangzeb contented himself "in the enjoyment of the Continent, and styles the Christians Lions of the Sea; saying that God has allotted that Unstable Element for their Rule."[99]

Thes preconceptions, together with the Portuguese failure to impinge decisively on the interests of most of the Gujarati nobility, provide an adequate explanation of their lack of hostility to the Portuguese. Other inhabitants of Gujarat were, however, much more affected by the Portuguese system. We can now turn to the response of Gujarat's sea traders.

[98] Conde de Ficalho, Garcia da Orta e o Seu Tempo, Lisbon, 1886, p. 118.

[99] John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia, London, 1909-15, 3 vols., I, 302.

# CHAPTER IV: THE MERCHANTS

The initial reaction from Gujarati merchants to the claims of the Portuguese was probably surprise at such new and arbitrary ideas. At first the merchants were friendly. In Calicut in 1500 a Gujarati Muslim had given his house to the Portuguese for their short-lived factory, and had taught the Portuguese the customs and trade of the area.[1] Once the Portuguese made attempts to stop the trade to the Red Sea, and to make all ships take cartazes, backing this up with armadas, the Gujaratis resisted. In 1507 a Portuguese fleet attacked unsuccessfully a very powerful Gujarati ship, which was one of the many which were accustomed to load in Gujarat, trade in the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia, then go direct to the Red Sea with spices, and finally return to Gujarat. According to the Portuguese "these ships are so powerful and well armed and have so many men that they dare to sail this route without fear of our ships, as this one did."[2] Indeed, the Gujarati Muslims even attacked, rather than simply acting in self-defence. Off South Arabia in 1517 a fleet

[1] A.B. de Bragança Pereira (ed.), Arquivo Português Oriental, Goa, 10 vols., tomo I, vol. I, parte 1, p. 134.

[2] Correa, I, 787.

of three Gujarati ships attacked unprovoked a Portuguese ship, and two years later the Portuguese factory in the Maldive Islands was sacked by Gujarati Muslims, and all eight Portuguese there were killed.[3] As late as 1538 a ship carrying the Portuguese admiral for the Malacca area was attacked by two Gujarati ships, and the admiral and thirty members of the crew were killed.[4] Reports of Portuguese attacks on Gujarati ships trading to the Red Sea, either from Div or Southeast Asia, are legion until the 1530's, and sometimes these attacks were beaten off by the well-armed Indian ships.[5]

In Malacca the leaders of the opposition to the Portuguese request to be allowed to trade were the Gujarati merchants resident there. Their influence with the sultan helped to get the first Portuguese ships there, in 1509, attacked and the survivors imprisoned.[6] When Albuquerque arrived two years

[3] Barros, III, i, 10; Castanheda, V, ix.

[4] ANTTCC, 1-63-92.

[5] Castanheda, III, xiv; Barros, III, ii, 3; Cavetas, IV, 128; ANTTCC, 2-145-115; Barros, IV, i, 5; IV, ii, 11; IV, iv, 20; Couto, IV, i, 7; IV, iv, 9.

[6] Pires, II, 255; Castanheda, II, cxiii.

later, they redoubled their efforts, offering the sultan the help of 600 "white" (that is, non-Indian) men, and forty cannon.[7] Such opposition is understandable, as the Portuguese were trying to stop the very valuable Gujarati trade from Malacca to the Red Sea via Gujarat; indeed Albuquerque had taken five Gujarati ships engaged in this trade while he was on his way to Malacca in 1511.[8] Albuquerque was not to be denied: Malacca was stormed and taken.

Such open defiance from Gujarat's merchants, perhaps inspired if not aided by Malik Ayaz, virtually stopped in the 1530's. Some of the nobility still tried to avoid taking cartazes, but the merchants usually accepted Portugal's claims.[9] From this time there seemed to be no alternative, most of the time and on most routes, to taking a Portuguese cartaz and paying duties as Div. The Muhammad Qulij Khan episode illustrates the situation perfectly. Here was a Mughal captain prepared to defy the Portuguese

[7] Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, London, 1875-84, 4 vols., III, 69.

[8] Castanheda, III, li.

[9] Elaine Sanceau (ed.), Cartas de Dom João de Castro, Lisbon, 1955, pp. 227-30. For Muhammad Qulij Khan see the beginning of chapter III. See Couto VI, vii, 6, for an isolated case in 1549 when three rich and well-armed ships beat off a Portuguese fleet off Surat.

and send his ship to the Red Sea without a cartaz. Twice he was able to arrange for his ship to leave Surat unmolested by the Portuguese. What was the reaction of the merchants of Surat? Not joy at being aboe to escape the thraldom of the Portuguese, but a careful consideration of the chances of the ship returning safely, and finally nearly universal refusal to have anything to do with the "free" voyage.[10]

There is abundant other evidence of the way in which the Gujaratis accepted Portuguese control. The cafilas to Goa are one example. Several hundred small local ships went each year from the Gulf of Cambay to Goa under the auspices of the Portuguese. Indeed, this trade had been established before the fort at Div was built in 1535; Gujarati traders were eager to sail this route <u>before</u> the Portuguese had established any sort of effective control over the trade of the gulf, although to do so they had to take cartazes and pay duties at Goa.[11] Once Div was taken it is clear that few ships traded from Gujarat to the Red Sea without a cartaz, and so without calling at Div to pay duties. As early as the season of late 1537, thirty-nine ships from the Arabian coast,

[10] For this episode see the opening of chapter III.

[11] F. Paes, "O Tombo de Diu," in <u>O Oriente Português</u>, new series, 5, 1933, p. 48.

Aden, and the Red Sea called at Div.[12] Late in 1545 there were more than twenty large ships from the Red Sea alone in Div. A Portuguese fleet in 1554 stopped twenty-one ships from Gujarat bound for the Red Sea. All of them carried cartazes.[13] Other examples of Gujarati ships being inspected by Portuguese ships and being found with the correct cartaz are legion, much more so than are the very scattered references to Gujarati ships without them.[14]

This acceptance of Portuguese control became deeply engrained. It continued in the seventeenth century, despite the precipitate decline in Portuguese fortunes under the attacks of the Dutch. Cartazes continued to be taken, with little modification in the strictness of their terms, throughout the century, but merchants now also took them from the Dutch and English. An example of 1640 may be quoted. A Gujarati official asked for a cartaz so that one of his ships could sail to China. He had already gotten one from the Dutch for this voyage. The Portuguese agreed eagerly, for they themselves were unable to trade from Goa to Macao because of the Dutch blockade off the Goa bar. They sent a factor

[12] Studia, 10, p. 184.

[13] ANTTCC, 1-77-36; 1-94-94.

[14] For example, Couto, V, ii, 8; VI, i, 7; ANTTCC, 1-62-154, 1-67-47, 1-100-28.

and numerous goods on the Gujarati ship. Their effective power would seem to have been small, yet no chances were being taken by the Gujaratis.[15] Div's revenues did decline in the seventeenth century,[16] for many merchants sent their goods on Dutch and English ships, thus avoiding the payment of duties to the Portuguese; but many others continued to take cartazes.

Gujarat's merchants buckled after their initial defiance and accepted Portuguese control partly through fear and partly because Portuguese control was not in fact so excessively irksome. There were advantages to be gained from cooperation with them. Officially the Portuguese used a stick to enforce compliance; unofficially there was also a carrot. For Gujarat's merchants there was sometimes something to gain, and always a lot to lose.

For logistic reasons the taking of Div was crucial in enforcing Portugal's claims. Once Bassein was acquired in 1534 and Div a year later the Portu-

[15] Fazenda, V, 85r-87; "Regimentos e Instruções," HAG, III, 200r-201. For Gujaratis taking Dutch and English passes see The Voyage of Thomas Best, London, 1934, pp. 108, 118; Factories, 1622-23, pp. 215-6; for the continuance of cartazes in 1670, and a slight modification of their form, see Boletim do Governo do Estado da India, Oct. 10, 1873, pp. 367-8; Assentos, IV, 208-212. For cartazes in 1696 and later, Assentos, V, 14-15, 148, 244.

[16] Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, pp. 113-4; Biblioteca da Ajuda, 51-VII-30, f. 118r.

guese were able to patrol effectively along most of the Gujarati coastline. An even tighter grip was possible after the seizure of Daman in 1559. Evasion of Portuguese fleets was now very difficult for a ship leaving the Gulf of Cambay.

The 1530's were also decisive because it was then that the full force of Portugal's conquistador fury was first turned on Gujarat. The invincibility of her fleets, and the ruthlessness with which she retaliated when attacked, became deeply engrained in the minds of Gujarat's merchants. Fear of being butchered was undoubtedly a potent weight on the side of acceptance.

Although the Portuguese had seized Gujarati ships from 1500 onwards when they were found trading to their enemies, or without cartazes, and her naval power was demonstrated clearly enough in the battle off Div in 1509,[17] it was not until 1529-30 that she first raided in the Gulf of Cambay. These raids followed Nuno da Cunha's thwarted large-scale attack on Div in 1529. His subsequent tactic was to force the cession of Div by inflicting unacceptable losses on Bahadur's coastal areas. We saw that these tactics

[17] Correa, I, 226-7, 346-7, II, 508, 565; Barros, III, i, 7; <u>Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque</u>, I, 112-5, II, 122; Castanheda, IV, xvi; Gavetas, IV, 387-8.

failed, but the destruction of the raids of 1529-34 must have brought home to all sea traders how ruthless the Portuguese were. Every port of any consequence from Bassein around to Mangrol was raided, looted and burnt, except for Cambay, which presumably was inaccessible to the Portuguese ships.[18]

The reprisals after the second siege of Div, in 1546-48, were even more effective, thanks to D. João de Castro's inspiring leadership. He told his son that "it seems best to me, and so I order you, to cut the throats of as many Gujaratis and Moors as you capture, just as I am doing here."[19] Later he proudly told the king how he had sent on ahead of the main fleet "D. Manuel de Lima with twenty foists to cover all the gulf and burn and destroy the whole coast, in which he very well showed his diligence and gallantry, because he caused more destruction on the coast than was ever done before, or ever dreamt of, destroying every place from Daman up to Bharuch (Broach), so that there was no memory left of them [sic] , and he butchered everyone he captured without showing mercy to a living thing. He burnt

[18] Castanheda, VIII, viii, ix, xxix-xxxv, xliii-xlv, l, lii; Manuel de Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1945-47, 6 vols., II, 193, 202-3; Barros, IV, iv, 8; IV, iv, 21-24; IV, iv, 27; Couto, IV, vii, 5.

[19] ANTTSL, IV, 196.

twenty large ships and 150 small ones . . . and the town squares were covered with bodies, which caused great astonishment and fear in all Gujarat."[20] After this the Portuguese seldom needed to repeat the lesson. The taking of Daman in 1559 no doubt helped to remind the traders of their power, as did their successful duel with Qulij Khan, but massacres like these of the 1530's and 1540's were never repeated for the Portuguese had made their point.

Ironically, these barbarities were really the dying gasp of the Portuguese conquistador. In the second half of the sixteenth century they quieted down. The stick was seldom used; the carrot did more to keep the Gujaratis in line. On the official level the Portuguese at least tacitly were more interested in seeing Gujarati trade flourish than in enforcing rigorous restrictions. Unofficially we can dimly perceive an evolving network of mutual benefits from which most Portuguese and a few Gujaratis profited.

Response to the Official System. A contemporary plan of Div shows the city strictly divided

[20] Elaine Sanceau (ed.), Cartas de Dom João de Castro, pp. 263-4. Other reports of these operations of 1546-48 in Faria e Sousa, op. cit., III, 163-4, 168-70, 174-7; DUP, I, 582; Couto, VI, iv, 3.

between the Portuguese area and the Indian one.[21] This symbolizes the official divisions. Similarly, Portuguese restrictions on Gujarati trade remained on paper as stringent as ever. Thus as late as 1595 the king decreed that no Gujarati was allowed to trade even through an intermediary to any place except western Indian ports.[22] We have, however, already noted that during the sixteenth century the Portuguese empire in Asia became much more self-contained and self-supporting. Thanks to the growth of the "illegal" pepper trade, profits from the Goa-Lisbon route declined and the Portuguese became dependent on profits from their own trading voyages, both official and private, and on taxes on the trade of locals. Gujaratis were the most important of these.

The continuance and prosperity of Gujarat's trade was crucial to the finances of the Portuguese in two ways. First, the revenue from the customs house at Div was second only to that of Goa as the single most important source of revenue in Portuguese India. In the palmy days of the sixteenth century around Rs. 1,00,000 were left over after all the port's expenses had been met, and this profit was sent to Goa to help with the general expenses

[21] British Museum, Sloane MSS. 197, ff. 170r-171.

[22] APOCR, III, 540-42; cf. "Senado Régias," HAG, I, 54-54r.

of the state.[23] Second, and more important, was the revenue both direct and indirect derived from the trade from Gujarat to Goa, and points south. From the time of Albuquerque it was realized that the revenue derived from Gujarat's trade to Goa, Cochin and Malacca was crucial to the revenues of Portuguese India; efforts were made to foster and encourage this trade, and ensure good treatment for Gujarati ships and merchants.

When Portugal and Gujarat were at war, as in the late 1540's, Portuguese revenues suffered, and the revenue officials advised that peace be made on any terms; Portugal simply could not afford a long war with Gujarat.[24] Similarly, when the cafilas from Gujarat to Goa stopped during the 1613-15 war the state revenues suffered badly, and it was only by desperate measures that a cargo for the homeward bound ships was procured. Normally the private part of these cargoes consisted mostly of cloths and various other products from Gujarat, and the substitute cargo of 1615, inferior cloths from the Deccan,

[23] British Museum, Addl.28433, f. 116r; cf. LM, v. 19B, f. 517r.

[24] "Cartas Missivas," ANTT, maço 4, no. 208; Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, Lisbon, 1884-1935, 7 vols., I, 51-52; "Provisões, Alvarás e Regimentos," HAG, I, 92r, printed in APOCR, V, 30; ANTTSL, III, 185, 189, 480-1r; ANTTCC, 1-81-104; Correa, IV, 614-5.

was far from satisfactory. Of twelve routes sailed from Goa around 1600, the greatest amount of capital was involved in that to Gujarat. All the others, except that to Portugal, were far behind.[25] In the seventeenth century Portuguese operations in east Africa depended to a great extent on having available cloths from Gujarat to exchange for gold, slaves, and ivory.[26]

Because of this dependence, the Portuguese did not do all that they could to stop Gujarati infringements of their official system for this would have been to cut off their nose to spite their face. There are numerous examples of the Gujaratis evading the Portuguese system, or failing to be influenced

[25] Barreto de Rezende, II, 125-6r, and compare with Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, parte 1, pp. 279-88. For the situation in 1613-15 see LMBP, III, 389; AHU, Caixa 3, no. 16; LM, v. 12, ff. 216-6r; The Voyage of Nicholas Downton, London, 1938, p. 113; Bocarro, Decada, p. 336. For the importance of Gujarati goods in the cargoes of ships bound for Portugal from Goa, see AHU, Caixa 4, no. 98; LM, v. 13B, ff. 392-415r. It should be noted that some of the goods on the Goa-Cambay cafila, and some of the ships, were owned by Portuguese. That is, they sometimes bought goods to send to Portugal, or places within Asia, in Gujarat rather than waiting for the Gujaratis to bring them to Goa. (François Pyrard de Laval, Travels of François Pyrard de Laval, London, 1887-90, 2 vols., II, 246; John Jourdain, The Journal of John Jourdain, 1608-17, Cambridge, 1905, p. 173.)

[26] LMBP, V, 107; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, p. 10; "Alvarás e Provisões de Sua Magestade," HAG, I, 148.

by Portuguese wishes. The best example of evasion concerned the lucrative pepper trade.

Gujarat's merchants were happy to sit in their ports and let the Malabaris bring them pepper, if they could evade the Portuguese. There is no record of Gujarati ships going to Malabar to get pepper, but Gujarati ships, and others, did collect pepper in the Bay of Bengal and Indonesia, and from there take it direct to the Red Sea. Much of this pepper came overland from Malabar, but some came from the Malayan and Sumatran production areas. It was picked up by Gujarati and other traders in Siam, Sumatra, Bengal and Coromandel, and taken direct to the Red Sea. By sailing south of Ceylon, and stopping for water and provisions only in the Maldive Islands, they were able to avoid the Portuguese completely unless they were so unlucky as to be caught at the mouth of the Red Sea; we have already noted the ineffectiveness of this Portuguese fleet. These Gujaratis ostensibly traded innocently within the Portuguese system. They would take a cartaz before leaving Gujarat for a voyage to Southeast Asia, and indeed would often call at Malacca. From there until they got back to Gujarat the voyage was illegal, but rarely capable of being blocked by the Portuguese. We have records, or rather complaints, of this trade throughout the century, but it seems to have been particularly

widespread in the early 1540's.[27] There is also evidence that some trade in pepper to the Red Sea from Gujarat itself continued, even after Div was taken, but this trade became increasingly dangerous and hence sporadic.[28]

Other examples of evasion were numerous. The free cartaz "ploy," by which a merchant's most valuable goods went on the emperor's ship and so avoided paying duties, has already been mentioned. This was extended in the seventeenth century. The free cartaz ship would set off, show the Portuguese its cartaz, and then send the document back to shore. Then another ship would leave, carrying the same cartaz, and thus also avoid the payment of duties.[29] Ships from the

[27] Barros, I, x, 5; _Alguns Documentos do Archivo nacional da Torre do Tombo_, Lisbon, 1892, p. 453; Descrição, f. 22; ANTTCC, 1-62-154; C.R. Boxer, _The Portuguese Seaborne Empire_, London, 1969, p. 59. In the official instructions from D. João III to the new governor, D. João de Castro, in 1545, the king said that after the ships for Portugal had their cargoes of pepper loaded licensed private trade in this product to the Bay of Bengal should be allowed. But this was not put into effect as Castro collected a barrage of expert opinions in Goa saying that this would only make it easier for the Gujaratis and others to trade to the Red Sea with pepper. ("Cartas de Vice Reis," ANTT, nos. 75 and 146; ANTTCC, 1-77-15 to 33, 1-77-42, 1-78-8, 2-240-53, 3-15-31, 3-16-21.)

[28] ANTTCC, 1-108-78; APOCR, III, 364; "Livro Vermelho," HAG, I, 271r-3.

[29] ANTTDR, XLVIII, 333r.

ports west of Div--Nagana, Cutch, Porbander and Mangrol--were meant to go to Div and pay duties before setting off the for Red Sea. Obviously they would not unless the Portuguese sent a ship or a fleet to make them, and it was not always possible to do this. In 1617 no fleet went, and thirty-one ships sailed direct to the Red Sea; the loss to the Div customs house was estimated at Rs. 80,000.[30] In the 1580's Chaul increased its trade greatly, as the Nizam Shahi ruler gave favorable conditions. Many merchants of Gujarat had agents there, and did as much trade as possible through this port rather than through Goa or Div, where they had to pay the high Portuguese duties.[31]

In the seventeenth century it was possible to load goods on English or Dutch ships and so avoid paying duties to the Portuguese, although presumably the freight rates charged took account of this. Some

[30] Fazenda, I, 80r-81; AHU, Caixa 6, account of Jan. 17, 1619; ANTTDR, XXIV, 57-57r.

[31] APOCR, III, 107; F. Mendes da Luz, "Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas . . . ," in Studia, 6, 1960, ff. 18-20r; DUP, I, 262; F. Paes, op. cit., pp. 49-52; Studia, 3, p. 55. Here the editor, J. Wicki, S.J., incorrectly identifies Chaul as Challé, in Malabar. It will be remembered that the Portuguese only established a customs house in Chaul in 1634. The Portuguese fort at Chaul was on the coast, but one half league up the river from it was upper Chaul, part of the sultanate of Ahmadnagar, and a very large and busy trade center. (Couto, XI, cap. 32.)

Gujarati ships sailed without cartazes but protected by English and Dutch ships.[32] The whole situation was summed up in a report to the king of 1597. He was advised to start sending a fleet to the mouth of the Red Sea again, to force the Gujarati traders to call at Div and pay duties. If the armada was not there to force them they would abandon the surety they had left in Div as an earnest of their intention to call there on their return voyage to pay duties, and would recoup the loss of the surety by loading a bigger cargo in the Red Sea.[33]

Apart from such evasion, Gujarati merchants also were not usually influenced by wider Portuguese desires concerning the conduct of their trade. The Portuguese tried to encourage trade from Gujarat to Portugal's own possessions in Asia rather than to areas where they had no forts. In particular, they wanted Gujaratis to continue to trade to Malacca. Their trade to the Red Sea was discouraged, especially as Gujarat's imports from there competed with the

[32] Biblioteca da Ajuda, 51-VII-30, f. 118r. In 1630 Gujarati merchants were reported to have over Rs. 10,00,000 invested in goods on Dutch and English ships. (LM, v. 14, ff. 361-r.)

[33] APOCR, III, 680-3.

goods the Portuguese brought from Europe. The reverse occurred. The trade to the Red Sea continued and flourished greatly in the sixteenth century, while trade from Gujarat to Malacca declined.

Throughout the century the trade to the Red Sea was the most important for Gujarat. In the 1570's, calculating on the basis of duties paid at Div, this trade employed 25% of all capital engaged in overseas trade in Gujarat. This figure is a little low, as it ignores the "illegal" trade from Gujarat to the Red Sea.[34] Some of the Gujarati ships sailing on the route were fabulously wealthy. According to its own "book" one of Akbar's vessels in 1582 came back from the Red Sea with gold and silver worth Rs. 12,00,000 ($4,788,000), among other goods.[35] A ship of Jahangir's returned to Surat from Mocha in 1622 with more than Rs. 2,50,000 in coin alone, most of which belonged to the merchants of Ahmadabad,

[34] See p. 40 and Couto IX, cap. 14. Here he speaks of twelve to fifteen ships going to the Red Sea each year, and the largest ones of them paying Rs. 36,000 in duties. This gives a total from this trade of about Rs. 3,00,000, and with duties of 3½% a total value of Rs. 85,00,000. Assuming an equal value for the return cargo we have Rs. 1,70,00,000. We have then to add the value of the free cartaz ship, which was about Rs. 30,00,000 (see below, and remembering these are all one-way values) which gives a total of Rs. 2,00,00,000 as against a total value of all sea trade of Rs. 8,00,00,000.

[35] Couto, X, iii, 5.

Cambay, and Surat.[36] Another, of 1630, was again worth more than Rs. 10,00,000.[37] We have records of ships trading from the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea for two periods in 1612 and 1616, which show how dominant Gujarat was in this trade. In April of 1612 the total was fifteen, of which six were from Gujarati ports. During a short period in 1616 the total was forty-one, twenty-three of them from Gujarat.[38] The others were from places as various as Acheh, al-Shihr, Sind, Goa, and Calicut, and may well have included some more ships based on Gujarat.

In the fifteenth century Gujarat stretched out two arms: to Aden and the Red Sea, and to Malacca. In the sixteenth century the second arm extended its embrace over a wider area, including most of the Bay of Bengal and Indonesia. The dominance of Gujaratis in Malacca at the time of its capture by the Portuguese in 1511 is well attested. Thus in 1511 Albuquerque knew that "the Guzerates understand the

[36] Recueil des voyages qui ont servi a l'établissement et aux progrez de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales formée dans les Provinces-Unies des Païs-Bas, Rouen, 1725, 12 vols., VII, 564-5.

[37] Assentos, I, 291, 302, and taking a Veneziano at 1200 reis as in Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, p. 124. See also Assentos, II, 74; ANTTDR, XXXVIII, 23; LM, v. 14, ff. 215r-216, and C.F. Beckingham, "Dutch Travellers in the Seventeenth Century," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1951, p. 171 for other values.

[38] Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas his Pilgrimes, Glasgow, 1905, 20 vols., III, 190-3; Recueil des voyages, VII, 462.

navigation of those parts [of Malacca and vicinity] much more thoroughly than any other nations, on account of the great commerce they carry on in those places."[39] After the capture the Portuguese tried to encourage the Gujaratis to continue to trade to Malacca, and apparently, at least according to a letter of 1523, for a time they succeeded.[40] As early as 1518, however, reports were made of the abuses to which the officials of Malacca subjected visiting merchants. A petition from the non-Christian merchants of Malacca of 1527 complained of their being forced to give loans to the officials, and not being repaid, and of not being paid for goods they delivered to the Portuguese factory.[41] Malacca had made its fortune in the fifteenth century as a place where all the products of China and Southeast Asia were available. Now, this oppression discouraged merchants from calling there. Its status as a great trade mart declined.

In particular, reports of the late sixteenth

[39] Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, III, 58.

[40] ANTTCC, 1-30-36; Artur Basilio de Sá (ed.), Documentação para a história das Missões do Padroado Português do Oriente. Insulíndia, Lisbon, 5 vols., I, 50-51; Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, III, 221-2.

[41] ANTTCC, 1-37-84; for 1518 see A.B. de Sá, op. cit., I, 100, and for 1544 Correa, IV, 338.

century and after show that the Gujaratis had abandoned their trade to Malacca. The most noteworthy group of non-Portuguese merchants there in the seventeenth century was the Chinese.[42] The Gujaratis shifted their trade to a wider area--all around the Bay of Bengal, and in Indonesia to Acheh and Bantam. These two ports rose greatly in prosperity in the later sixteenth century thanks to the bad conduct of the Portuguese in Malacca, and Portuguese control in Southeast Asia in general was never effective enough to be able to force traders to come to Malacca. This change on the part of the Gujarati traders was, however, of little significance in their total trade organization. They had to disperse a little, and travel more, but the same Chinese and Southeast Asian goods were collected.[43]

[42] P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Regimentos das Fortalezas da India, Bastorá, Goa, 1951, p. 260; Barreto de Rezende, II, 215; (In this copy of Barreto's work on f. 215 Cambaia is written, but clearly Camboja, i.e. Cambodia, is meant.) P.A. Leupe, "The Siege and capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1640-41" in Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XIV, 1, pp. 102-5.

[43] B.J.O. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, part 1, The Hague, 1955, p. 42; The Voyage of Thomas Best, London, 1934, p. 256; The Travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia, London, 1905-36, 6 vols., III, 135, 329; Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East, London, 1896-1902, III, 126, 227; M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, The Hague, 1964, p. 243. For Gujaratis trading in Sumatra in the fifteenth century see Castanheda, II, cxi.

The Portuguese would also have preferred that Gujarati trade be handled by non-Muslims as much as possible. Here again they had little success. We saw in chapter I that Muslims, Hindus, and Jains were all engaged in sea trade around 1500, and all three were active throughout the following century. Muslims certainly were, and continued to be, the actual sailors and captains of the trading ships, whoever the merchants travelling as passengers, or as owners, may have been.[44] In Surat in the early seventeenth century some of the richest merchants were Muslims, but by number Hindus and Jains were far superior.[45] In Div, judging by the signatures on petitions to the Portuguese, Hindus and Jains again considerably outnumbered Muslims, at least in the seventeenth century, and this appears to mark a change, for it will be remembered that in Malik Ayaz's day Div was known as "Div, the port of the Turks." Most of the foreign merchants coming to Div from the Red Sea or South Arabia were Muslims.[46] There is, however, strong

[44] Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, I, 307. A list of seventy-seven captains of ships issued with cartazes between 1618 and 1622 shows only two possible non-Muslims. ("Consultas do Serviço de partes," HAG, III, 44-136r.)

[45] J.B. Tavernier, Travels in India, I, 6; W.H. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, London, 1923, p. 85; J.N. Sarkar, Shivaji, Calcutta, 1920, pp. 102-3.

[46] APOCR, III, 681-2; ANTTDR, LI, 131-r, 136-r; AHU, Caixa 14, petition of Sept. 10, 1642; Caixa 17, petition of Aug. 20, 1644.

evidence that in the later sixteenth century these foreign Muslims began to lose ground to Gujarati <u>vanias</u> in this trade. Around 1600 many Hindus and Jains were settled in the South Arabian ports and also inland.[47] Basically, however, Gujarat's overseas traders in 1600, as in 1500, were a heterogeneous group. They included, and continued to include, Hindus, Jains, and Muslims both foreign and local.

The Portuguese could have taken stronger measures than in fact they did to enforce their policies. For example, they well knew that the Gujaratis were trading in Southeast Asia without calling at Malacca, and that they were taking pepper to the Red Sea. Logistically it would have been possible to retaliate by more raids in the gulf and a blockade of its trade. The Portuguese, however, would in the long run have been the main losers. They did not like these evasions of their system, and the Gujarati failure to trade to their areas, but given their dependence on customs duties deriving from

[47] Artur Viegas (ed.), <u>Relação Anual das Coisas que Fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas Missões</u>, by Fernão Guerreiro, Lisbon, 1930-42, 3 vols., II, 389-90; India Office, I/3/40, DLXXIX; C.F. Beckingham, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 69, 78; R.B. Serjeant, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 32-33; <u>The Journal of John Jourdain</u>, London, 1905, pp. 95, 99, 104. In 1616 the Dutch merchant van den Broeke found 3,000 "benjans" living in Mocha, occupied as merchants, goldsmiths, bankers and artisans. (<u>Recueil des voyages</u>, VII, 462.)

Gujarati trade there was little they could do to stop them.

Indeed, Gujarati merchants formed something of an élite economic group in Portuguese India, especially in Goa and Div. In 1646 it was estimated that there were 30,000 "baneanes" in Portuguese India.[48] In Div especially they were, despite their being "gentiles," "niggers," and "cowards," in effect the dominant group in the town. They had their own captain and by concerted action could usually win a favorable response when they complained to the governor or the king about some abuse to which they were being subjected.

There is a case as early as 1545 in which the merchants of Div by concerted action forced the Portuguese captain to moderate the demands of one of his officials. In the 1590's the Portuguese king, in one of his recurrent phases of intolerance, decreed that all Hindu temples and Muslim mosques in Portuguese areas be destroyed, except in the puppet town of Hurmuz. The Governor replied that he understood these orders, but "they cannot be put into effect in Div, because everyone would leave and then there would be no trade there."[49] In 1603 Div was

[48] AHU, Caixa 18, letter of Jan. 25, 1646.

[49] ANTTSL, V, 133; AHU, Codice 281, f. 260r.

given the title of city, with its own municipal council. Representation on this was restricted to Portuguese, and they used their new powers to oppress the Indian population. Following complaints from the latter, the title and council were withdrawn.[50]

The Portuguese were even prepared to complain to other Europeans on behalf of Div's merchants. In 1635 a ship of a Muslim merchant of Div was robbed by an English pirate. The governor complained on his behalf to the English president at Surat, and asked Philip IV of Spain to approach Charles I about this pirate.[51] There are many other cases in which the government in Goa showed its concern to protect the merchants of Div from the abuses of local officials and religious. The profits derived directly and indirectly from the trade of Div outweighed for the governors and kings the claims of patronage clients, and even the church.[52] According to one Jesuit,

[50] AHU, Codice 282, f. 126; AHU, Caixa 3, no. 4; ANTTDR, XXIV, 23r; British Museum, Addl. 20863, f. 89r.

[51] Assentos, II, 74; ANTTDR, XXXVIII, 23.

[52] For petitions from Div merchants asking for and usually getting redress, from either the governor or the king; APOCR, III, 840; LM, v. 16B, f. 299, v. 14, ff. 332-3r (part printed in APOCR, VI, 1250-1), v. 19A, f. 238; "Cartas e Ordens," HAG, III, 73, 80-80r, 84, 124r-5; ANTTDR, LI, 131-r, 136-r, LIV, 220, LV, 196; LM, v. 28B, f. 419; AHU, Caixa 13, decree of Nov. 20, 1639, Caixa 14, petition of Sept. 10, 1642, Caixa 16, opinion of Feb. 18, 1644.

the Gujaratis in Div dominated the hapless clergy and were able to prevent anyone except themselves from trading to the Red Sea.[53] A disgruntled Portuguese told the king in 1545 that the "niggers" were given a free hand in Div by the Portuguese captain, as he was an eager trader and anxious to be friends with them, so that "it is better to be favored by the niggers than by the Portuguese . . . ."[54]

In Goa itself the vanias were less dominant than in Div, but they still formed what was apparently the wealthiest Indian group in the town, with the possible exception of the Saraswat Brahmins. Thus in 1659 the governor told the king how the Dutch blockades had ruined Goa's trade, leading especially to an exodus of the Gujarati merchants who had lived there. There were now only seven or eight rich ones left, and about forty agents for Cambay merchants, and "this group was always the most beneficial of all for the revenues of the customs house."[55] Despite this, in the same year the governor was able to raise a loan in a matter of days of perhaps Rs. 1,00,000 from the Gujarati merchants in Goa. It is significant that when money was needed urgently it was the Guja-

[53] APOCR, I, ii, 213; ANTTCC, 1-81-93; Artur Viegas (ed.), op. cit., II, 390.

[54] Gavetas, III, 214.

[55] LM, v. 26B, f. 408; See my article in Jean Aubin (ed.), Mare Luso-Indicum, II, Paris, 1971, for the position of the Saraswat Brahmins in Goa.

ratis to whom the Portuguese applied. If it suited them, these merchants were even able to get the Portuguese to delay the sailing of the cafila to the gulf. Their captain in Goa received various privileges from the Portuguese king, including freedom from imprisonment for any debt.[56]

The élite position of Gujarati merchants on the official, above-board, level was also extended to individuals. Thus a Gujarati Muslim in Bassein in the 1540's was greatly cossetted by the Portuguese, and given concessions in the customs houses and as many cartazes as he wanted for trade to the Red Sea. At the end of the century a Jesuit was sent to Cambay to investigate the possibilities of his working there. He travelled from Div to Cambay on the ship of an important brahmin merchant of Cambay, whose agent in Div had written to him asking him to assist the priest.[57] He was well received in the town. In 1644 the governor wrote to the judge of Bassein that "Nagagissa, a merchant

[56] Fazenda, VI, 131r-2, IX, 247r-8r, X, 55; "Chancellaria, D. Affonso VI," ANTT, book 39, ff. 372-r. For another loan from the Gujaratis in Goa when money was needed urgently, see the diary of Viceroy Sarzedas in "Noticias dos Estados da India," Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisbon, Mss. Azuis, A 58, f. 47r.

[57] R.J. de Lima Felner (ed.), _Subsídios para a história da India Portugueza_, Lisbon, 1868, p. 2; Artur Viegas (ed.), _op. cit._, II, 393-4. "Brahmin" here is almost certainly a mistake for _baneane_, _vania_.

residing in this city, is going to Div to see about curing his sick wife, and as he is a person to whom I am obliged, I order you to give him all the help and favor that may be necessary."[58]

Acceptance of Portuguese control was thus not too irksome for the Gujaratis. The main disadvantages were the necessity to bribe appropriate officials in Div, and pay duties there. Both these simply increased costs a little, and this was no doubt recouped later. The necessity of paying customs both at one's home Gujarati port, assuming one did not reside in Div, and at Div, was not particularly troublesome, for these two duties together never exceeded a rate of 10% in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.[59]

Indeed, there is clear evidence that the merchants of Gujarat not only accepted Portuguese control, but actually cooperated with them in the working of their system. There was a willingness to give and take a little on both sides in such matters as the issuing of cartazes, the organization of the

[58] "Correspondencia de Baçaim," HAG, f. 88.

[59] In Div the rates were 3½% until about 1584. In this year, and again in 1605 and in 1634, increases of ½% were obtained, making a total of 5%. Allowing Gujarati duties of 5% under the sultans, and 2½% under the early Mughals, the rates never exceeded 10%, even after they were increased by Awrangzeb. LMBP, III, 157; F. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, p. 427; AHU, Caixa 10, account of Sept. 30, 1634.

cafilas to Div and Goa, and the collection of duties by the Portuguese. Around 1570, after considerable negotiation, Div merchants granted to the Portuguese a rise of 1% in the duties they would pay on indigo and a particular cloth, in return for a reduction from 5% to 3% on the duties for bullion.[60] Three times between the 1580's and 1634 Div's general customs rates were raised, by ½% each time, and each time this increase was introduced only after the merchants of Div had been consulted and had agreed to the increase. Nor apparently were these agreements given only because the merchants felt they had no choice. They could have voted with their feet and left Div, as indeed at times they threatened to do. Rather they show the merchants prepared to cooperate with the Portuguese in the interests of all; the increases were at least partly for the good of the merchants, being designed to secure more money so that the Malabar "pirates" could be checked and Div defended against the Dutch.[61]

Another aspect of this cooperation was seen in the procedure for paying duties in Div. The merchants of Cambay sent their cloths to Div on

[60] British Museum, Addl. 20861, f. 59r.

[61] LMBP, III, 157; Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon, 51-VII-30, f. 97, printed in F. Mendes da Luz, O Conselho da India, p. 427; AHU, Caixa 10, account of Sept. 30, 1634.

smaller ships, which were guarded by a Portuguese fleet. In Div duties were paid when the goods were transshipped to the larger vessels which took them to the Red Sea or elsewhere. With the fleet of small ships came lists of the contents of each of the bales of cloth, drawn up by the Gujarati merchants. These lists were used as the basis on which duties were paid in Div.[62]

Similarly, both sides were ready to compromise over the cafila from Cambay to Goa. In 1624 the vanias of Gujarat sent a message to the viceroy asking that he send the armada to accompany the cafila early, as they had already gotten their goods and ships prepared. It was neither easy nor convenient for the Portuguese to do this, but it was done anyway and the cafila reached Goa two months earlier than usual.[63] Seven years later the Mughal captain and merchants of Surat told the Portuguese they could not come to Daman to pay duties on those of their ships which usually paid there rather than in Div. They asked that the governor send an agent to Surat to collect the duties. After some discussion the Portuguese agreed to do this.[64] The point is that

[62] ANTTDR, XVIII, 55. This method did apparently lead to considerable cheating.

[63] ANTTDR, XXII, 41r-42.

[64] Fazenda, III, 155.

the merchants and the captain were not trying to avoid paying the duties, or to deny Portuguese control. They simply wanted a special change in the routine for this year, which the Portuguese agreed to make.

One other sign of the stabilization of the relationship, marking the end of any defiance from the Gujaratis, was seen in the 1560's. The Portuguese captain of Div had special grants from the crown to enable him to provide meals for the fidalgos and soldiers in Div, and to pay his own bodyguard. Such warriors were no longer needed or desired by the captains. They usually spent this money on paying people to go as their agents on trading expeditions to Bengal and Malacca.[65] In the same period we are told how all Portuguese trading to Cambay accepted the special regime established there for trade by foreign merchants.[66]

Unofficial Contacts. If we restrict ourselves to a consideration of the Gujarati response to this official level of Portuguese activities we have a picture of merchants giving in and adjusting partly through fear and partly because Portuguese control was in fact not too irksome. There was, however,

[65] ANTTCC, 1-108-24.

[66] Caesar Frederick in Hakluyt, op. cit., V, 375-6. For negotiations in 1670 between Surat merchants

an unofficial level of contact, and here we can dimly see individual Gujaratis, and individual Portuguese in their private capacities, whether they were officials or not, engaged in mutual accomodations for mutual individual benefits. Our evidence for this is not as full as could be desired, but there is no doubt that these sorts of "deals" existed, and that they helped to make Portuguese control easier to accept.

Unofficial contacts were based on the importance of Gujarat as a money market. To sixteenth-century European observers Gujarat was a fabulously wealthy country. An Italian in the 1560's said flatly that "In fine, the kingdom of Cambaia is a place of great trade, and hath much doing and traffique with all men . . ." At the same time a Portuguese claimed tnat "if in any land it can be said that gold and silver flow, it is Cambay." A Jesuit observer of 1600 described how Gujarat, then and for centuries past, received streams of gold from the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and China, and of silver from Portugal.[67] In 1537 as in 1646 Portuguese

and a Portuguese representative to work out a new form of cartaz see Boletim do governo do estado da India, Oct. 10, 1873, p. 367. Here both sides in effect cooperated to evolve a new form of subjection for Gujarat's merchants.

[67] Caesar Frederick in Hakluyt, op. cit., V, 377; J. Wicki (ed.), "Duas Relações sobre a situação da

writers wondered at the wealth of the Gujarati merchants, some of whom had capital at their disposal of Rs. 2,00,000 ($798,000), and at the latter date even more.[68] We have seen how dependent the trade from Goa to Portugal was on Gujarati goods. The revenue of the customs house of Hurmuz was a similar case. In 1523 a new agreement was signed with the puppet sultan. He was to pay the Portuguese 60,000 xerafins a year, but if Gujarat was at war with the Portuguese only 25,000 for most of Hurmuz's revenue came from the Gujarati trade. This was a sensible reservation, for in 1547, as a result of the war following the second siege of Div, Hurmuz was "destroyed and no merchants came to it."[69] The customs revenue alone of Gujarat in the early 1570's was nearly three times the total revenue of the whole Portuguese empire in Asia in 1586-87, when it was at its height.[70]

India portuguesa nos anos 1568 e 1569" in Studia, 8, 1961, p. 177; Artur Viegas (ed.), op. cit., II, 389; Barreto de Rezende, I, 63r-64.

[68] Studia, nos. 13-14, p. 86; AHU, Caixa 18, letter of Jan. 25, 1646.

[69] Couto, V, ix, 1; ANTTSL, II, 69.

[70] See p. 40, and for the Portuguese figure AHU, Codice 500, passim.

This wealth was used mostly in trade and lending. Violet Barbour has shown how seventeenth-century Amsterdam's capital resources were built up partly because there was little land in Holland available as an outlet for surplus capital. Most of this capital was used in trade and associated activities, although some was invested in land outside Holland, and also in industry, in loans, in the expenses of public office, in display, and in other minor activities.[71] The outlets for Gujarati merchants were even more restricted. They took no part in the upper level decision making of their state, and so had no ambitions, or expenses, here. Unlike medieval merchants in Amsterdam or London, they did not even participate in the formal government of their cities. A little was spent on secular display, but not too much, for an obviously wealthy man was increasingly a target for extortion. Rather more seems to have gone on religious display. There are records of Hindus and Jains endowing temples, and other religious buildings. Around 1600 a very wealthy _vania_ of Chaul (presumably a Jain) bequested Rs. 60 to each of the Christian confraternities of the city, and Rs. 8,000 to the bird hospital of Cambay.[72]

[71] Violet Barbour, _Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century_, Baltimore, 1951, pp. 28-29, 85.

[72] DUP, I, 253. A similar case in António da Silva Rego (ed.), _Documentação para a História das Missões_

Gujarati merchants did invest in city property[73] but apparently not in rural land. Their wealth was not translated into control over men and land; they therefore did not compete with sultan or nobles for power in the élite sense. Nor was their capital used for investment as risk capital in proto-industrial ventures; it was lent only on short terms and for specific production.[74] As a Portuguese noted: "They [the vanias] aspire to nothing except to increase their profits, and to be allowed to dress freely and conduct themselves freely, which comes down to being allowed to use palanquins."[75]

There is no evidence that the Portuguese officials in Goa took advantage of this available capital, except for the seventeenth-century Goan instance already cited. On the contrary, the Portuguese complained that the bullion they brought to Goa from Japan and Europe was all vanishing into Gujarat's insatiable maw. Thanks to the flow from

do Padroado Português do Oriente. India, Lisbon, 1947 - , 12 vols., X, 76. For Jain endowments of temples see M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, Bombay, 1938-57, 2 vols., II, 141, 244, 352.

[73] W. Foster, "Sivaji's Raid upon Surat in 1664, pt. II," in Indian Antiquary, Jan. 1922, vol. LI; J.B. Tavernier, Travels in India, I, 6.

[74] T. Raychaudhuri in B.N. Ganguli (ed.), Readings in Indian Economic History, Bombay, 1964, pp. 64-77.

[75] AHU, Caixa 18, letter to king, Jan. 25, 1646.

South America, silver in Europe was cheaper than in Gujarat. The Gujarati merchants trading on the Goa-Cambay cafilas thus took back from Goa little but this silver, and gold from China.[76] This was bad for the Portuguese, who wanted to sell their European goods rather than bullion, but from the Gujarati angle it was not such a great gain. The trade to Goa represented only 5% of their total trade. Most of the inflow came from the Red Sea.[77]

Private Portuguese were more willing to utilize Gujarati capital. We have noted the large number of Portuguese resident in Cambay, and living by trade. Many others visited the town regularly, while still others traded there from Goa. All these Portuguese used Gujarati brokers and their capital in Cambay. There seem to have been more Portuguese traders resident in Cambay than in any other Asian city, so we can assume that a considerable proportion of private Portuguese trade in Asia was financed with Gujarati capital.[78]

[76] APOCR, I, ii, 121, III, 348-50; Artur Viegas (ed.), op. cit., II, 389; K.N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, New York, 1965, pp. 117-22.

[77] See Aziza Hasan, "The Silver Currency Output of the Mughal Empire and Prices in India during the 16th and 17th Centuries" in Indian Economic and Social History Review, VI, 1, March, 1969, pp. 93-95.

[78] François Pyrard de Laval, Travels of François Pyrard de Laval, London, 1887-90, 2 vols., II, 246; The Journal of John Jourdain, p. 173; Caesar Frederick in Richard Hakluyt, op. cit., V, 375-6.

This implies a mutuality of interests between individual Gujaratis and individual Portuguese. Other evidence describing the response in time of war reflects more clearly this point. On this level there was little hostility, especially from the merchants but also from individual officials and nobles. Rather, both sides tried to ignore the wars of their superiors. In 1539 peace was restored between Gujarat and Portugal following the bitter siege of Div in 1538 and some Portuguese raids in the Gulf of Cambay. The merchants appear not to have been particularly embittered by their losses, or if they were they were eager to recoup them as soon as possible. The peace was proclaimed, and the Portuguese ambassador tole the merchants they could now return to Div. At this good news the merchants raised an "astonishing cry of joy" and 2,000 of them set off at once, delirious with delight.[79] During the second siege, of 1546, the local _vanias_ of Bassein continued to trade to Gujarat, and as soon as the besiegers were beaten off, and with the war still raging elsewhere, trade between Gujarat and the Portuguese in Div and Bassein was reopened. The viceroy, Castro, described in a letter to his son how his fleets were cruising in the Gulf of Cambay, looting and burning. But six days

[79] Castanheda, IX, vi.

later, in another letter he said that "the land here is at peace and the trade caravans come and go."[80] While the war continued, a rich Muslim merchant of Cambay, Sidi Muhammad, came to Div with a present of fifteen cartloads of provisions. His aim was to persuade the Portuguese to ask the sultan for peace, or at least open negotiations with him, but in this he failed. He was apparently not acting on behalf of his sultan, but solely on his own initiative.[81]

In similar fashion, after the minor Portuguese-Mughal war in 1613-15 the usual cafila came to Goa in December 1615. As the cafilas had not run during the war, it was the largest for many years.[82] The fact that the emperor had not yet signed the peace treaty, or that the Portuguese had seized two ships belonging to the royal family and raided as usual in the Gulf of Cambay, was far from upsetting to the merchants of Gujarat. They wanted to get back to business as soon as possible. In fact, as an Englishman noted in the 1660's, "a merchant is free here to buy and sell in an enemy's camp unmolested."[83]

[80] ANTTSL, III, 53r-54, 94; IV, 209, 217.

[81] Ibid., II, 3r, 7r-8, 444, III, 100.

[82] Bocarro, Decada, 465-6; Manuel Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa, VI, 89.

[83] Factories, 1665-67, p. 5.

Mughal officials were usually no different. The Portuguese noted of one governor of Surat that he was always eager to avoid war because thus his ports were frequented by traders, no matter whether enemies or friends, and so his customs houses yielded more.[84] Most of the Portuguese were governed by similar desores. It will be remembered that the residents of Daman tried to stop Portuguese ships from going to blockade Qulij Khan's ship in Surat, as they feared the consequences for themselves. The rights and wrongs of the case were nothing compared to their own security. Similarly, in addition to the trade in "illegal" goods by Portuguese, such as in spices, other Portuguese traded with areas with which the state was at war--with Gujarat while the second siege of Div was in progress in 1546, and in 1614 during the war of 1613-15, and with the Dutch in 1633, 1638, and 1641.[85]

Doubtless Portuguese and Gujarati merchants cooperated in other areas also. Very likely some Portuguese invested in trade on Gujarati ships to areas where Portuguese were not allowed, most notably the Red Sea. The Portuguese resident in Cambay

[84] ANTTDR, XLI, 29.

[85] ANTTSL, III, 227; APOCR, VI, 1025; AHU, Caixa 10, King to viceroy, Feb. 5, 1633; "Livro de Segredo," HAG, ff. 17r, 45. See also DI, II, 130.

probably invested either their own or borrowed capital in the production of goods destined for the Goa cafila and ultimately Portugal. We do have evidence of Gujaratis and Portuguese combining to cheat the Raja of Cochin. Indians had to pay higher customs duties to him than did Portuguese, and what could be more obvious than for a Portuguese to claim a vania's goods were his? The vania saved money on duties, and so sold his goods a little cheaper to the Portuguese.[86]

Another aspect of this cooperation lay in the city of Div. Granted that the Portuguese made Gujarati ships call there to buy cartazes and pay duties, yet this compulsion did preserve Div as a great trade center where goods from all over the world were available. Many Gujarati traders would no doubt have called there even if the Portuguese had not forced them to. This is confirmed by the large and wealthy resident Gujarati population of the town. They lived there of their own free will.[87]

[86] Fazenda, II, 25r-26.

[87] Travels of François Pyrard de Laval, II, 255; The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies, London, 1885, 2 vols., I, 58; Caesar Frederick in Richard Hakluyt, op. cit., V, 374; F. Mendes da Luz, "Livro das Cidades e Fortalezas . . .," in Studia, 6, 1960, ff. 29r-30. A seventeenth-century report claims that at its height the city had more than 46,000 hearths, which gives a total population of over 200,000. (ANTTDR, XLVIII, 333, and another copy in ibid., LIV, 184.) Barreto de Rezende

Portuguese officials in Div also took advantage of the capital available in Gujarat. The captains of the fort had as one of their privileges the right to trade to various places, and this trade was often handled for them by _vania_ agents. At least one _vania_ resident in Div made his living from such activities. For thirty years he used his credit with his fellows to get capital for the captains. The latter used this to buy cargoes for their private trade, and to pay off old debts. One captain at the end of his tenure owed this _vania_ Rs. 22,000.[88]

(I, 58) has only 10,000 hearths, which seems more reasonable. Another report speaks of 10,000 householders, which presumably means heads of households, so giving a total of about 50,000--and this figure excluded all christians and itinerant merchants. (A. Botelho da Costa Veiga (ed.), _Relação das Plantas e descrições de todas as fortalezas_ . . ., Lisbon, 1936, p. 20.) The capital, Goa, was only a little bigger. (Barreto de Rezende, II, 121.) Agra, Delhi, and Lahore in the early seventeenth century each had populations of about 500,000. (H.K. Naqvi, _Urban Centers and Industries in Upper India, 1556-1803_, London, n.d., pp. 81-82.) Medieval Cairo and Baghdad had populations of 200,000 to 300,000. (Ira M. Lapidus in I.M. Lapidus (ed.), _Middle Eastern Cities_, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 61.) The prosperity of Div was not just preserved by the Portuguese, it rose during the second half of the sixteenth century. The customs revenues derived from it by the Portuguese doubled between 1556, one year after the Portuguese took complete control, and the 1590's. (ANTTCC, 1-102-47 for 1556. Couto, VII, ii, 3, has a higher figure for 1555, but admits this was exceptional. For the 1590's, LM, v. 14, f. 683, and another copy in AHU, Codice 281, f. 394. For the 1570's see DI, X, 135, for 1586-87 AHU, Codice 500, f. 98, and for c. 1600 Luis de Figueiredo Falcão, _Livro_, Lisbon, 1859, pp. 75-78.)

[88] LM, v. 28B, f. 352; "Livro Morato," HAG, ff. 262-r.

These Portuguese captains saw their posts as sources of profit rather than as opportunities for service. Thus it is natural that they were ready to flout, or at least modify, standing orders in return for a bribe. This sort of cooperation was frequent enough in the area of granting cartazes which exempted a ship from calling at Div to pay duties.[89] In one particularly flagrant case a Portuguese sea captain used his fleet to protect such a transgressor not only from pirates but also from other more law-abiding Portuguese ships.[90]

In another area, it is clear that the head of the _vanias_ in Div sometimes cooperated with the captain of the fort to the detriment of other _vanias_ who presumably were out of favor with their captain. Div's captains had a monopolistic voyage from Div to East Africa. One of the main constituents of the return cargo was ivory. This the captain handed over to the head of the _vanias_, who in turn forced other merchants to buy it.[91]

Some of these activities are very close to being abuses rather than perquisites. There are numerous clear instances of straight abuses inflicted

[89] For example, LMBP, III, 167-8; LM, v. 12, ff. 44r-45; LM, v. 28B, ff. 378-r.

[90] Alberto Iria, _Da Navegação Portuguesa no Indico no seculo XVII_ . . ., Lisbon, 1963, p. 84.

[91] APOCR, VI, 1250-1; cf. ANTTSV, vol. 26, ff. 93r-94r.

on local merchants by these captains. In these cases there was no cooperation; no one profited except the tyrranous captain. The most common practice was forced trade: a local merchant would be forced to buy a product he did not want, and at a high price, or sell to the captain or other officials at a low price. Other traders were forced to carry goods free on their ships, sometimes to places where they did not want to go. Forced loans were frequent, sometimes secured by means of arbitrary arrests.[92] Complaints of these abuses date from the 1540's, but they do seem to increase in frequency late in the century and into the seventeenth century. This is no doubt partly because the documentation for this period is much fuller than that for the earlier years, but it is to be expected that abuses would increase as Portuguese power declined. Div's revenues fell sharply in the seventeenth century thanks to Dutch and English competition. The captains of Div were more and more driven to abuses to make up the sorts of profits they felt they should gain from their

[92] J. Wicki in Studia, 8, 1961, pp. 177-8; Studia, 3, pp. 75-76; "Provisões dos Vice Reis," HAG, II, 129-r; ANTTCC, 1-97-26; APOCR, III, 105-6, 564-6; ANTTSV, v. 26, ff. 93r-94r; Bocarro, Livro, tomo IV, vol. II, part 1, p. 105; "Livro Morato," HAG, ff. 216r-7r; LMBP, II, 30; AHU, Caixa 14, petitions of Sept. to Dec., 1642; Gavetas, V, 327.

position.

These activities were clearly dysfunctional from the official Portuguese viewpoint, and were recognized as such. They diverted part of Div's revenues into private hands, and increased the likelihood that Gujarati traders would avoid calling at Div if they could. The various perquisites, on the other hand, were functional, and part of the administrative system of Portuguese India. On balance, however, it is difficult to say much in favor of the whole Portuguese presence when we reverse the angle of vision. For the defence, we can note that they opened a new trade route, to Europe, which employed perhaps 3% of the total Gujarati capital engaged in sea trade. They made some attempt to combat piracy in western Indian waters. Their own traders provided Gujarati capitalists with a new, but very small, outlet. A very few Gujaratis profited directly, like leeches, from the services they provided Portuguese officials. For the prosecution, we can leave aside such Portuguese activities as their own piracy in the Bay of Bengal (which increased as their power declined), forced conversions, especially in Ceylon and Goa, and the brutality so much in evidence all over the Indian Ocean throughout the century. Our concern is with trade control, and here it can be claimed that the Portuguese directed Gujarati trade,

and taxed it, but provided no service in return. Gujarati overseas trade had been rationally organized in the fifteenth century, and in areas not dominated by the Portuguese, notably Cambay, continued to be so organized. The Portuguese introduced an element of crude exploitation and arbitrary disorganization into the pattern. Accomodations existed, but were far outweighed by the abuses, so that a Portuguese writer could attribute the "universal hatred" in which his countrymen were held in India to the extortions of the captains of the forts.[93] Before the Portuguese arrived a ship could sail from Surat to wherever it liked, paying duties only in Surat and its destination. From the 1530's this was not allowed; extra duties were levied in Div. True, a bribe could obviate the necessity to call at Div, but in the fifteenth century no bribe was necessary. Portuguese control was essentially based on fear, not reciprocity or service, as was recognized by an early seventeenth-century Italian traveller: "The merchants land there [at Div] willingly enough, as well for the good haven as for the cheapness of commodities; also because they fear to enter the Gulf, where contrary winds often prevent them coming

[93] F.R. Silveira, _Memórias de um soldado da India_, ed. A. de S.S. Costa Lobo, Lisbon, 1877, p. 159.

out; but the chief cause is that the Portuguese constrain them to touch there, so as to reap the dues and customs, and thus to make the place more prosperous."[94]

If, however, we take the Portuguese demands as a given, a fait accompli, then we must accept that their presence was not as burdensome as it could have been. Their effective power was small in many areas of Asia, so they could be ignored. They could be bribed or manipulated so that even off Gujarat the king's commands were sometimes ignored. Their actions were crudely exploitative, but luckily they were not very efficient.

The merchants' compliance seemed, to the chroniclers of both Gujarat and the Portuguese, to be only what could be expected from the Gujaratis, and especially the non-Muslims, for it was notorious that they were cowards and weak effeminate people. D. João de Castro considered that "Gujaratis are such men that the women of all other nations are more formidable than them in dexterity, strength and courage as well as in the art and practice of warfare and battles."[95] These strictures, and those

[94] Travels of Francois Pyrard de Laval, II, 255.

[95] Elaine Sanceau (ed.), Cartas de Dom João de Castro, p. 142. In 1546 the Portuguese were at first incredulous that the effeminate Gujaratis

of the chroniclers, reflected the ethic of the warrior, the fidalgo or khan. They are comparable to a battleship criticizing a tramp steamer. It was not the business of merchants to go around fighting and getting their ships sunk. Their job was to exchange goods and make a profit, and once the Portuguese had shown them that to continue to do this they would have to accept Portuguese control, they accepted it. There was no other way for them to carry on with their occupation. To a modern nationalist this is clearly shocking behavior on the part of a wealthy and prominent group in the state, but the merchants were not thinking in these terms. From the viewpoint of their own immediate interests, accomodation was the practical response; thus, and in modern nationalistic terms paradoxically, the group in Gujarat most affected by and most exploited by the Portuguese was the one which was most eager to acquiesce.

Faced with a given set of demands, which so far as they could see were enforceable, they accepted

had attacked Div without help from the Turks. (ANTTSL, II, 321, III, 495.) Similar opinions on the vanias in AHU, Caixa 18, letter of Jan. 25, 1646; APOCR, III, 680-3. The Persian chronicler Sikandar deplored the way in which the merchants had given in to Portuguese control. (Sikandar, p. 162.) For a similar early seventeenth-century English opinion see The Voyage of Thomas Best, London, 1934, p. 230. In 1893 the vanias of South Africa told M.K.Gandhi that "Only we can live in a land like this, because, for making money, we do not mind pocketing insults . . ." M.K. Gandhi, Autobiography, Ahmedabad, 1940, pp. 83-84.

them and continued trading. This is both obvious and explicable. What at first sight is not explicable is how they could be allowed to do this, for today no merchant can act with regard only to his own commercial interests. Why were they able to respond in the way they did? How could the state let them reach an accomodation with the Portuguese, thus allowing its overseas trade to be controlled and taxed by infidel foreigners? The answer lies in the position of these merchants within the political system of Gujarat. We can now turn to an elucidation of this, for it is only when this position has been clarified that we can understand how and why Gujarat's merchants were able to respond as they did.

# CHAPTER V: MERCHANTS AND THEIR STATE

We have not considered the response to the Portuguese from Gujarat as a whole for there was no such thing, no solid monolithic response from all the active members of the political system. Rather, there were various levels, some of which had nothing to do with the Portuguese, some on which the Portuguese impinged only slightly, and one affected directly by their claims. Eric Wolf has noted the existence of "supplementary impersonal sets" operating below or within the "formal organization" of a modern complex society.[1] In its simplest structural form sixteenth-century Gujarati society was similar, but the levels below that of the formal organization of the state enjoyed considerably greater independence than lower levels in a modern society. In this difference lies the answer to the problem of the response of Gujarat's merchants to the Portuguese.

Sociological studies of the pre-modern state have tended to restrict themselves to elaborations of the nature and functions of the upper political

[1] Eric R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies," in Michael Banton (ed.), The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, New York, 1966, p. 19 and passim.

level. Max Weber discussed the essential characteristics of the modern state, and of its predecessors, notably feudal and patrimonial types. His discussion of the character of officials in the various types has been especially influential, but to a great extent his whole typology has been accepted, with modifications of varying importance, by later writers. Talcott Parsons divides societies into three basic types--primitive, intermediate and modern--and finds the crucial criterion dividing the two latter in the Weberian concept of the development of law to the level of "formal rationality." He goes on to distinguish between archaic and advanced intermediate societies, and again to divide advanced intermediate societies into those which did not make the transition to modern societies, and those which while failing to make this evolution did act as seedbeds for the development elsewhere of modern societies. Both see modern societies developing only in western Europe. Thus both in their treatment of Asian societies, especially India and China, tend to concentrate on explaining why these societies did not make the crucial transition, rather than treating them as themselves and in reference to their own times.[2]

[2] Reinhard Bendix, _Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait_, New York, 1962, pp. 329-457; Talcott Parsons, _Societies. Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives_, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966, pp. 26-27, 51-53, and _passim_.

Another important elaboration on Weber's basic schema was produced by S.N. Eisenstadt, who found "historical bureaucratic empires" to be a distinctive stage in the evolution from feudal and patrimonial political systems to modern bureaucratic societies. The crucial characteristics of these empires are "a centralized polity, organs of political struggle, and bureaucratic administration."[3] The typology produced by Sjoberg, while again heavily indebted to Weber, is rather less convincing. His three types of society--folk or preliterate, feudal or preindustrial civilized or literate pre-industrial, and industrial urban--have as the key variable "technology." Such a unitary explanation seems rather simplistic, even if it does, in its elaboration, avoid to some extent the "whiggish" overtones of Parsons and Weber.[4] K.A. Wittfogel's concept of "hydraulic" societies has been deservedly criticized as inaccurate in details, unconvincing in broad terms, and flawed by "Cold War" prejudices.[5]

[3] S.N. Eisenstadt, _The Political Systems of Empires_, New York, 1963, p. 362.

[4] Gideon Sjoberg, _The Preindustrial City. Past and Present_, New York, 1965, pp. 7-13.

[5] K. A. Wittfogel, _Oriental Despotisms_, New Haven, 1957. See especially Irfan Habib, "An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of 'Oriental Despotisms;'" in _Enquiry_, New Series, 6, 1966.

In varying degrees all these works are marked by sophisticated elaborations of types of societies, and the transition from one to another. Our concern here is not to fit sixteenth-century Gujarat, or Mughal India, into any particular category (in fact they appear to be closest to Parsons' advanced intermediate societies) but rather to elaborate on the structure of the political system of sixteenth-century Gujarat: to define other levels apart from the top one on which these writers concentrate, and investigate the crucial linkages existing between levels. In regard to the first of these two aims, the work of W. Eberhard is of importance, not so much for his sketch of the Mughal political system as for his analysis of levels in pre-modern social systems. He finds in earlier societies certain social groups, such as classes, strata, or occupational groups. These all had group consciousness, and can be arranged hierarchically. Different groups frequently overlap territorially with other groups. The "layer" is often itself a community, and in this case may be stratified in itself. There may or may not be social interaction between layers. A common political rule may be superimposed on them all, or on some of them, or on some parts of them.[6]

[6] Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers. Social Forces in Medieval China, Leiden, 1965, pp. 6-9.

A similar concern to get below the upper level of Weber's notables and rulers, to investigate the political "Little Tradition" as well as the "Great," is seen in the work of several anthropologists. Eric Wolf's article does this for a modern complex society, while McKim Marriott and B.S. Cohn have attempted to formulate a structure for Indian civilization in cultural, economic, and political terms.[7] More immediately relevant is Cohn's analysis of political systems in pre-modern societies, and his elaboration of this in his study of eighteenth-century Benares.[8] A.M. Shah wrote a parallel article dealing with eighteenth-century Gujarat.[9] Both writers distinguish various levels within these two political systems.

All the material dealing with the response to the Portuguese demonstrates clearly the existence of two separate levels, among others, in the Gujarati political system, for merchants and rulers responded in very different ways. A few smaller illustrative cases will add to our appreciation of the existence

[7] B.S. Cohn and McKim Marriott, "Networks and Centers in the Integration of Indian Civilization," in _Journal of Social Research_, I, i, Sept. 1958.

[8] B.S. Cohn, "Political Systems in Eighteenth Century India," in _Journal of the American Oriental Society_, v. 82, 1962, p. 313 and _passim_.

[9] A.M. Shah, "Political System in Eighteenth Century Gujarat," in _Enquiry_, I, 1, Spring, 1964.

and functioning of these two levels.

A ship of the English East India Company first visited Gujarat in 1608, and four years later a factory was established in Surat. Trade expanded rapidly, but the legal position of the English in the Mughal Empire remained, in English eyes, rather insecure. The company tried, notably by means of Sir Thomas Roe's embassy, to secure a firm legal basis for their trade in the empire, with such matters as customs duties, ownership of the property of their deceased, trial of English offenders, and their right to buy property and carry arms all clearly set out in a formal treaty. Jahangir did not make treaties in the European sense with anyone; certainly not with a small group of sea traders. The English, therefore, were forced to content themselves with _farmans_ and orders from the emperor and his officials, which were not always observed and were revokable at the whim of the emperor. Friction was common during their early years in India, and it was usually provoked by the English, who had not yet comprehended their position within Mughal India. In 1619 they captured a Sindhi ship and confiscated its cargo because it had a Portuguese cartaz, and England was at war with Portugal. Some of the goods belonged to Indian merchants, who complained at court. The English refused to pay compensation, and finally

their two factors in Agra were imprisoned and the compensation for the lost goods taken from English possessions at Agra.[10]

There were other minor clashes in the early 1620's, and finally the English decided to use force and try to get a firm agreement laying down their rights and giving them redress for past grievances. In October 1623 three English ships arrived off Surat from the Red Sea, escorting eight Gujarati ships which they had seized. Most of the English factors then went on board the ships, and those remaining on land presented their demands. The important point about the ensuing negotiations is that for most of the time they were handled on the Gujarati side by the merchants, not by any official, although the English action was clearly an act of war against subjects of the Mughal emperor. Thus the final Gujarati reply to the English demands was given to them in a merchant's house, and by a group of chief merchants. Further, these merchants felt themselves competent to guarantee good treatment for the English from the officials. To the complaint of the necessity to bribe the customs officials to get their goods cleared, the merchants replied that "they will undertake for the future that our [the English] business

[10] Factories, 1622-23, pp. xvi-iii, 11, 57.

shalbe done with more libertie and freedome, and if the contrary be offered by any of the officers here they will see us righted." Agreement was reached in November, and was signed by both Gujarati merchants and officials. The English then landed, and were taken before Safi Khan, the <u>subahdar</u> of Gujarat. "The latter seemed to be glad to hear that an agreement had been reached, and questioned them as to the terms."

This was not the end of the affair. In January 1624 all the English ships left Surat, and the local merchants then used their influence at court to get the emperor, Jahangir, to pass a series of <u>farmans</u> against the English. They were imprisoned, and their goods were confiscated. Negotiations recommenced, but we may note that while the English were actually in prison, on the orders of the emperor, at least one Surat merchant still found it worthwhile to take a pass from them for his ship. A final agreement was reached in September, and was again signed by both officials and merchants. For our purposes, the grievances of the English and the terms of the agreements are not of immediate interest; what is important is the autonomous way in which the Gujarati merchants, operating through their recognized leaders, negotiated with the English. To the officials this was a merchants' quarrel, and thus of little concern

to them.[11]

The arrival of the English, and especially the establishment of their factory in Surat in 1612, had upset the Portuguese considerably, for they foresaw that this would decrease the quantity of goods on the crucial Cambay-Goa cafila; in any case, England and Portugal were at war. Early in 1613 the Portuguese seized a Gujarati ship returning from the Red Sea, the aim being to force the Mughals to expel the English from Surat. In this case Jahangir himself was involved, as his mother had a large interest in the ship's cargo. A war, mostly notable for its sporadic nature, broke out between the Mughals and the Portuguese. Before it achieved any momentum the Portuguese had regretted their rather rash action, and sent an emissary to Gujarat to invite the merchants to take no notice of the war, and to continue to trade to Goa. At the end of 1614 the Gujarati merchants, who had suffered from the usual Portuguese raids in the Gulf of Cambay, acted independently to try to get peace. They offered to pay to Jahangir the value of the goods seized by the Portuguese, hoping that thus the dispute could be forgotten

[11] W.H. Moreland (ed.), "Pieter Van Den Broeke at Surat, 1620-29," in _Journal of Indian History_, vols. X, XI, 1931-32, X, pp. 2-6; _Factories, 1622-23_, pp. xviii-xix, 268-320, _passim_; 1624-29, pp. v-viii, 27-30.

and they could resume trade. Peace was finally concluded in 1615, and was quickly ratified by the Portuguese viceroy. As far as the Gujarati merchants were concerned this was enough. Jahangir in fact never ratified the treaty, but the merchants started trade at once, and with enthusiasm. If we were to seek a modern offer comparable to that of the Gujarati merchants in 1614, we might imagine American businessmen with Japanese trading interests offering to pay full compensation to the United States after Pearl Harbor so that war could be avoided. As we have seen, for Gujarati merchants war, no matter for what reason, was to be avoided or ignored if at all possible. They were quite prepared to offer full compensation to Jahangir for whatever losses he, their ruler, had suffered from the actions of the Portuguese, his enemies.[12]

There are other cases which show Gujarati merchants operating with similar independence in relations with their own rulers, and handling for themselves negotiations over matters affecting their interests. It will be remembered that in 1546 Div was divided between the Portuguese fort, and the

[12] Bocarro, Decada, pp. 189-92, 200-1, 221, 330-6, 398; Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East, London, 1896-1902, 6 vols., II, 155.

town which was ruled by Gujarat. When the merchants had a complaint against the Portuguese official in charge of valuing coinage in the customs house, they retaliated on their own, not by appealing to the appropriate Gujarati official, but by organizing a boycott. The Portuguese backed down.[13] There was at this time considerable tension in Div between Gujarat and Portugal. On one occasion a minor Portuguese official was killed in the Gujarati town and war threatened, which disturbed the merchants. In this crisis they acted as mediators between the two sides, and finally the *status quo* was restored, with the merchants guaranteeing to the Portuguese the observance of the existing agreements between Gujarat and Portugal.[14] Their efforts were of course in vain, as the second siege of Div began soon after.

Two other cases, in the 1660's, again show the merchants operating through their recognized leaders, negotiating agreements between the officials of the country to which they were subject, and the Europeans, in Surat. In 1661 the English had a dispute with the governor of Surat, Mustafa Khan, over a debt, and finally were put under house

[13] ANTTSL, V, 133.

[14] ANTTCC, 1-77-36.

arrest. They then attempted a reconciliation, and the agreement was negotiated by "the Shahbandar, and certain of the chief merchants . . ." A year later the English, still feeling oppressed by Mustafa Khan, threatened to leave Surat altogether. The merchants complained bitterly to the governor, saying that his arbitrary actions were likely to lose them some of their best customers. The governor finally asked the merchants to come to some agreement with the English, which was done. The English got considerable concessions and guarantees of better behavior in the future on the part of the governor, from _the_ _merchants_.[15]

Finally, a case involving the Dutch may be noted. In 1649 they, like the English in 1623, had numerous complaints, the nature of which need not detain us here. In September they seized two ships belonging to the emperor Shah Jahan, took them to Surat, and demanded redress. The governor appointed several "deputies" to negotiate with the Dutch, these deputies apparently all being merchants. Agreement was quickly reached, probably because the merchants feared that once Shah Jahan heard his ships had been seized he would retaliate, and as usual the merchants would suffer. In this case the

[15] Factories, 1661-64, pp. 12-15, 99-103.

merchants were negotiating to redress a grievance suffered not by themselves directly but by their own emperor.[16]

The merchants were also capable of operating autonomously in negotiations with their own government. In July 1616 the judge of the Surat customs house was dismissed, mainly because, to quote the contemporary English account, of

> some violence done by him to a chief bannyane, the whole multitude assembled shut up their shops and (as their custom), after a general complaint to the Governor, left the city, pretending to go to the Court for justice, but with much fair usage and fairer promise were brought back by Abram Chan [Ibrahim Khan, governor of Surat] , who joining with them informed his master of many insolencies committed by this peevish Customer [that is, the judge of the customs house] , which, with your Lordship's [Sir Thomas Roe's] complaint, is generally observed to be the cause of his expulsion.[17]

Under Awrangzeb the generally tolerant religious policies of his predecessors were not always in evidence. In Surat in the late 1660's there

[16] Philip Baldaeus, A Description of the East India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, London, 1703, III, 566-7, 569-72; Factories, 1646-50, pp. xvi-xxi; India Office, I/3/32, DXIV. For the buildup to this incident see India Office, I/3/32, DIV-DX.

[17] Letters Received . . ., op. cit., IV, 320.

were several cases of forced conversions to Islam, and a particular _qazi_ was acting towards the _vanias_ in a very tyrranous way. Finally, in 1669, they struck back. All the heads of Surat's _vania_ families, numbering some 8,000, left Surat _en masse_ for Bharuch (Broach), and from there petitioned the emperor. They soon got a reassuring reply, and returned, to the pleasure of all.

> In the interim the people of Surat suffered great want, for, the Bannians having bound themselves under severe penalties not to open any of their shops without order from their Mahager or Generall Councill, there was not any provisions to bee got; the tanksell [mint] and customhouse shut; no money to bee procured, soe much as for house expences, much less for trade, which was wholy at a stand; and so it will continue till their returne.[18]

Clearly there are two levels here within one political system, responding in different ways to common demands from the outside, and negotiating with each other within the system. Merchants and rulers were not, however, in watertight compartiments; to a great extent the relationship was symbiotic. Parenthetically, we may note

[18] Factories, 1668-69, pp. 190-2, 205. These instances point to the falseness of Sjoberg's characterization of the political role of non-élite members of a society. He uses such terms as "inenviable," "cringe before their superiors," "harsh," and "inertia," to describe their position. (G. Sjoberg, _op. cit_, p. 223.)

that sociologists,(even Eberhard) have tended to ignore connections between levels; here the anthropological works cited represent a great advance.

There were a number of different linkages between merchants and rulers. Politically the mahajan and its head functioned as the institutionalized link.

Mahajan means different things in different parts of India; it can refer to an individual banker, a money-lender, a merchant, or an unspecified "great man." In Gujarat it usually meant a body representing a group of people engaged in the same commercial occupation, a governing council with an elected or occasionally hereditary headman. Historically its members were usually not all of the same _guyati_ (_jati_). The mahajan ordinarily was concerned solely with commercial matters, regulating such matters as prices, adjudicating disputes within the occupational group, and representing its members in disputes with other mahajans. Religious and social matters were outside its province, these being, as in other parts of India, handled by caste or _guyati panchayats_.

Such mahajans existed only in large towns in Gujarat. In smaller towns and villages people of the same occupation tended to belong to the same _guyati_, and thus the _guyati panchayat_ regulated commercial matters. Two other qualifications also need to be

made. First, the regulatory body for artisans was often called a _panch_, the head being a _patel_, as opposed to the mahajan, whose head was the _sheth_, and which usually functioned for higher economic strata, such as merchants of various sorts, and bankers. Second, at least in Ahmadabad there existed another sort of mahajan, headed by the _nagarsheth_. This was a city-wide body, on which sat representatives of all the occupational mahajans, and sometimes some of the _patels_ as well. It regulated general commercial activities in the city, such as rates of exchange and discount, and holidays.

The city-wide mahajan represented commercial groups of all castes and also of all religions, while even the ordinary mahajans were not coterminous with _guyatis_. This helps to explain why such mahajans were always stronger in Gujarat than in other parts of India. The commercial class in Gujarat was extremely heterogeneous, including both Hindus and Jains, both sunni and shiah Muslims of both local and foreign origin, and Parsis. In other areas one group tended to dominate, so that the communal organization could handle economic matters also, just as they did outside the main towns in Gujarat. Further, Gujarat had been an economically advanced area for several millenia, with an active, dynamic group of merchants. Cambay was a great trade center from

the time of Buddha at least, and Ahmadabad since its foundation early in the fifteenth century. Surat, similarly, was an important port for centuries.[19]

Such has been the general pattern of mahajans in Gujarat for at least the past two millenia. Their power and composition have varied from time to time, in accordance with the strength of the government, the religion of the rulers, and the creation of new merchant groups, most notably that of the several Muslim communities. The continuous existence of such bodies over this long period is clear, and their basic character seems to have changed little until the twentieth century.

There is ample evidence of their existence and functions in fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth-century Gujarat. Thus the great seventeenth-century Jain merchant Virji Vorah was the head of a mahajan in Surat, and also a religious leader. In Ahmadabad another rich Jain, Shantidas Jawahari, was the _nagar-sheth_ of the city-wide mahajan. We shall shortly examine the roles of these two men more closely. Sometimes we read simply of "leading," or "chief,"

[19] E. Washburn Hopkins, "Ancient and Modern Hindu Guilds," in _India, Old and New_, New York, 1901, pp. 169-205; _Census of India_, 1911, vol. VII, part 1, pp. 308-9, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 252; _Census of India_, 1931, vol. XIX, part 1, p. 469; D.R. Gadgil, _Origins of the Modern Indian Business Class_, New York, 1959, pp. 24-27; N.A. Thoothi, _The Vaishnavas of Gujerat_, London, 1935, pp. 122-34, 188-98; _Gazetteer of India, Bombay Presidency_, Ahmedabad, 1879, IV, 106-13. For

merchants, or the "most eminent" merchants, acting on behalf of others. These leaders were clearly _sheths_, or _patels_, most often the former.[20] In 1662, in order to solve a dispute between the governor of Surat and the English, "there was a councell called of all the cheife merchants and other the emanent persons in the towne . . ." In 1619 the merchants of Surat and Broach wanted to stop the English competing with them on the Red Sea route, so they forbade the sale to the English of any goods suitable for this trade. In Surat two merchants who disobeyed were imprisoned.[21] We have already quoted the case

earlier commercial organizations in Hindu Gujarat see D. D. Kosambi, "Indian Feudal Trade Charters," in _Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient_, II, 1959. For merchant groupings in Tamil Nadu in medieval times, their decline by the sixteenth century, and a new form of grouping undertaken in the late seventeenth century at the instigation of the Europeans, see Burton Stein, "Coromandel Trade in Medieval India," in John Parker (ed.), _Merchants and Scholars_, Minneapolis, 1965; W. M. K. Wijetunga, "South Indian Corporate Commercial Organizations in South and South-east Asia," and S. Arasaratnam, "Aspects of the Role and Activities of South Indian Merchants, c. 1650-1750," both in _Proceedings of the First International Conference Seminar of Tamil Studies_, vol. I, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.

[20] _Letters Received_ . . ., _op. cit._, I, 235, IV, 320; Philip Baldaeus, _op. cit._, III, 571; Factories, 1622-23, pp. 57, 276-7, 300-1; 1661-64, pp. 12-15; H.M. Elliot and J. Dowson, _The History of India as Told by its Own Historians_, Allahabad, 1964, 8 vols., VII, 217; Barros, IV, viii, 6-8; IV, x, 6.

[21] Factories, 1661-64, p. 102; 1618-21, pp. 56, 92.

in 1669 when the "Mahager or Generall Councill" of the vanias of Surat shut down the whole town until their complaints over a missionizing qazi were settled.[22] In the 1650's the mahajans of Ahmadabad contributed Rs. 60,000 to repair the fort of the city,[23] and another case, from the 1640's, shows how independent the mahajans were in commercial matters. The mahajan of Cambay considered appealing to the local officials over a case of monopoly in which they were helpless to do anything, "but then their knowledge that the State could not interfere in these affairs, provided import duties were paid in full by the merchant in question, prevented them from doing so."[24]

The roles of the two individual merchants, Virji Vorah and Shantidas Jawahari, and of a particular officer, the shahbandar of Surat, are worth examining in more detail. The two merchants are both described as being enormously wealthy. One Englishman said that Virji Vorah left an estate of Rs. 80,00,000 ($30,240,000 today) when he died in the

[22] Factories, 1668-69, pp. 190-2.

[23] Mirat, p. 273.

[24] M.R. Majmudar, The Cultural History of Gujarat, Bombay, 1968, p. 338. For sheths, nagarsheths, and mahajans in Surat and Ahmadabad in the first half of the eighteenth century see Mirat, pp. 358-9, 363, 457, 576.

1670's. Both, as we have mentioned, were heads of mahajans, and also of particular Jain sects.[25] In their roles as heads of mahajans these two men, and others like them, acted as intermediaries between their mahajan and the government. They were called on by the officials to give advice to them on commercial matters, or to be informed of a government decision affecting the interests of their groups. At the same time, they interpreted such decisions to their groups, and passed on to the officials any grievances of the group subject to official action. They, and other sheths, were "hinge" figures, standing between their mahajans and the officials and interpreting one to the other.[26]

In 1639 Virji Vorah was summoned to court by Shah Jahan to give him an account of the grievances he and other merchants had against a governor of Surat. In 1650 the English were worried about which

[25] M. Escaliot, "The Plunder of Surat by Sivaji in 1664," in Indian Antiquary, VIII, Sept. 1879, p. 260; K.H. Kamdar, "Virji Vorah, Surat Millionaire Mahajan" (in Gujarati), in Journal of the Gujarat Research Society, XXX, no. 4, Oct. 1968, pp. 277-9; M.S. Commissariat, "Imperial Mughal Farmans in Gujarat," in Journal. Bombay University, IX, part 1, July, 1940, p. 17.

[26] There is a problem of terminology here. Anton Blok has described four types of patronage (Anton Blok, "Variations in Patronage" in Sociologische, GIDS, 16th year, no. 6, Nov.-Dec., 1969, passim.), namely vassalage, brokerage, friendship, and disguised patronage. His "brokers" are closest to the people we call "intermediaries," but are not identical.

Malabari merchants they should give passes to, as sometimes they mistakenly gave them to people who turned out to be pirates. To avoid this they got the governor of Surat to nominate to them for passes only those Malabaris known to Virji Vorah. In this commercial matter the governor was to use Virji Vorah as an intermediary, an interpreter for him of merchants' affairs.[27] Seven years later Shah Jahan fell ill, and his fourth son, Murad Bakhsh, who was _subahdar_ of Gujarat, revolted and prepared to seize power. As sinews of war he got a loan of Rs. 5,00,000 from the merchants of Surat, and this sum was advanced by Virji Vorah and another merchant on behalf of all Surat's merchants.[28] Again in 1664 we see him

His brokers provide links in a segmented society between the urban central authority and the countryside. They do not settle disputes as these are their livings. They are frequently marginal men. None of these characteristics apply to our intermediaries. Nor is "mediator" an acceptable term, for R. Firth sees these as external to the units immediately concerned in a dispute. (R. Firth, "A Note on Mediators" in _Ethnology_, 1965, v. IV, pp. 386-8.) He proposes either "intermediary" or "liaison agent" to describe "the more general roles of providing a link between sectors of a society . . ." We have chosen the former.

[27] Factories, 1637-41, pp. 108-9; 1646-50, p. 331.

[28] Jadunath Sarkar, _History of Aurangzeb_, Calcutta, 1924-30, 5 vols., II, 298-9.

acting with others as a representative of Surat's merchants. This was the year of Sivaji's first raid on Surat, and Sivaji presented his demands for ransom to the governor of the town and the three leading merchants of Surat, one of whom was Virji Vorah.[29] Following the raid, there is a report that Virji Vorah and another merchant went to Awrangzeb to ask for better protection for the town.[30]

Shantidas, as the nagarsheth of Ahmadabad, acted on his own as an intermediary between the whole merchant community of the city and the government. The clearest illustration of his position as a link between the two occurred during and after Murad Bakhsh's revolt of 1657. In addition to taking Rs. 5,00,000 from the merchants of Surat, he extorted Rs. 50,00,000 from those of Ahmadabad. Of this, Rs. 5,50,000 was taken from the sons and brothers of Shantidas. Later in the war of succession Shantidas travelled north to the combined camps of Murad Bakhsh and Awrangzeb, and received from Murad Bakhsh a farman guaranteeing repayment of this loan of Rs. 5,50,000. Four days later Awrangzeb showed his hand by arresting Murad Bakhsh, and later having him killed. He did, however, accept responsibility

[29] Factories, 1661-64, p. 299.

[30] K.H. Kamdar, op. cit., p. 276.

for Murad Bakhsh's debts, and Shantidas was able to get a _farman_ from Awrangzeb providing for repayment. More important, Awrangzeb used him as his intermediary to conciliate the people of Ahmadabad, and especially the wealthy business community. In a later _farman_ he was permitted to leave Awrangzeb's camp and return home, and "after his arrival there, he should announce to all the business people, and to the Mahajans, and to all the inhabitants, our desire for just administration and our regard for our subjects, so that all may pursue with peace of mind and satisfaction of heart their respective occupations and professions."[31]

These two merchants both held recognized positions within their merchant communities, but neither held any official position within the Mughal administrative hierarchy. By contrast, the _shahbandar_ of Surat was both a rich and influential merchant and an official. As such he was uniquely placed to act as a "hinge." The holder of this post between 1629 and 1669 was Haji Muhammad Zahid Beg. He was

[31] M.S. Commissariat, _op. cit._, pp. 15-17; Mirat, pp. 210-11. Generally for Shantidas see M.S. Commissariat, _Studies in the History of Gujarat_, Bombay, 1935, pp. 53-59. The title of _nagarsheth_ was made hereditary in his family. For the activities of his grandson in the office in the 1720's see M.S. Commissariat, _History of Gujarat_, Bombay, 1934-57, 2 vols., II, 420-1, and Mirat, pp. 442, 446-7, 487-9, 504-5, 516-8, 708.

one of the richest men in Surat, a great trader and the owner of ships and several of the best houses in the town. He built there both a sarai and a mosque.[32] He seems to have been included in all the important negotiations between the government of Surat and merchants during his tenure of office. He was one of the three leading merchants who were summoned by Sivaji in 1664, he accompanied Virji Vorah on his reputed journey to court after the sack, and in 1657 was jointly responsible with him for lending the Rs. 5,00,000 to Murad Bakhsh. In 1630 he went with the governor of Surat to Balsar to negotiate peace with the Portuguese after the minor war of that year.[33] His predecessor, Khwaja Jala-ud-din Mahmud, and his successor, Hajima Ahmad Ali, also played important roles in similar negotiations affecting government and merchants.[34] Dutch

[32] J.B. Tavernier, Travels in India, London, 1925, 2 vols., I, 6; Factories, 1633-36, pp. 251, 255, 301; 1642-45, pp. 161, 257; 1646-50, p. 169; 1661-64, p. 297; M. Escaliot, op. cit., p. 259.

[33] Factories, 1630-33, p. 100.

[34] Factories, 1622-23, pp. 269-70, 276-7; 1624-29, p. 30; Boletim do Governo do Estado da India, Oct. 10, 1873, pp. 367-8. These cases seem to show that the shahbandar had a position as an official in Surat port, and Moreland and Foster agree that he was the harbormaster controlling the port and custom house. (W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Oct., 1920, p. 527; The Voyage of Thomas Best, London, 1934, p. 40, f.n.) But Jadunath Sarkar calls Haji Muhammad Zahid Beg "the headman of the traders" (op. cit.,

records describe the *shahbandar* of 1615 as one of the main merchants in Surat. This man, Khwaja Hasan Ali, also played a role in official affairs, for in 1614 he asked the Dutch to come to Gujarat and attack the Portuguese.[35]

Doubtless other links also existed. Thus Muslim merchants and rulers presumably had religious and even social ties. Of more importance, however, were financial connections between merchants and rulers. Capital and loans were available from Gujarat's merchants, and both sultans and nobles used these resources. As a result there were clear links based on interest between the two levels, and even some examples of merchants using their wealth to secure admission into the upper political level. Such mobility was usually restricted to Muslim merchants. Few Hindus of any caste became nobles, at least partly because of caste or *jati* restrictions on occupations, and the desire of most Muslim rulers

II, 299) and it is possible that the *shahbandar* in Surat was actually in a position analogous to that of the *nagarsheth* of Ahmadabad. In either case, his role as an intermediary was little affected, except that it would be facilitated a little if, as seems most likely, he was an official. It may also be noted that if he was an official he was clearly not subject to removal at regular intervals, as were most other officials.

[35] India Office, I/3/4, LIII; I/3/6, LXXXVII.

to employ only Muslims, at least at high levels. For the same reasons, marriage ties between nobles and merchants were presumably limited to Muslim merchants. At a less formal level, however, where only loans, not potential equality, was at stake, Hindu merchants had as many links as Muslim ones with the nobles.

In 1526 Bahadur started his campaign for the throne in Surat and Rander. Here he had friends, two merchant brothers. They financed an army for him, and with their help he captured Rander, and later the whole sultanate. The brothers were rewarded with high administrative positions.[36] In the seventeenth century there are at least three cases of merchants, admittedly all Persian Muslims, acquiring places in the Mughal administration. Two, Danishmand Khan and Mir Jumla, rose to very high positions.[37] More generally, there are cases in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the state, or individual officials, lending money to merchants, and merchants lending to the state or nobles. In seventeenth-century Mughal India this connection was especially strong because a _mansabdar_ moving to a

[36] Barros, IV, v, 5; ANTTSL, XI, 93.

[37] Mirat, p. 196; J.N. Sarkar, _The Life of Mir Jumla_, Calcutta, 1951, _passim_; François Bernier, _Travels in the Mogul Empire_, London, 1914, p. 4.

new position had to provide a security for the performance of his duties; this was usually lent to him by a merchant. Many nobles, up to and including the sultan or emperor and their families, traded overseas in their own ships or in those of merchants. In the former case, merchants hired most of the cargo space.[38] Similarly, at least one noble in the 1560's used a vania as his "minister," the position entailing among other duties that of supervising his trading activities.[39] Malik Gupi, the brahmin who governed Surat in the early sixteenth century, had a son called Mir Gupi, who was a considerable merchant;[40] in the early fifteenth century there is even a unique instance of two vanias becoming officials of the sultan.[41] Such connections help

[38] Irfan Habib, "Usury in Medieval India," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, VI, part 4, July, 1964, pp. 398, 407; M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, New York, 1966, p. 60; B.S. Cohn, "Recruitment of Elites in India under British Rule." Paper read at the 27th International Congress of Orientalists, Ann Arbor, Mich., August, 1967, p. 10; Satish Chandra, "Commercial Activities of the Mughal Emperors during the Seventeenth Century" in Bengal Past and Present, LXXVIII, no. 146, July-Dec., 1959, pp. 93-97.

[39] Sikandar, p. 437.

[40] Correa, III, 543.

[41] A.K. Forbes, Ras Mala, London, 1924, 2 vols., I, 318, 324.

to explain the generally benevolent attitude of most of the sultans towards their merchants, and the inclusion of them as one of the groups honored by a sultan on his accession.[42]

These financial connections between individuals no doubt played some part in political relations. The sources are silent here, presumably because the chroniclers saw it as unethical for a <u>khan</u> to be influenced by monetary obligations, but it would be extraordinary if a heavily indebted noble was not sometimes pressed to provide political advantages for his creditor. Bahadur's elevation of the men who financed him to the throne should be seen as an example of this, as also Awrangzeb's <u>farmans</u> to Shantidas. At least partly because he owed Shantidas money, Awrangzeb issued <u>farmans</u> favoring both him individually and the merchants of whom he was a leader. The merchants of Gujarat controlled an enormous money market, and this gave them, either together or as individuals, some political leverage.

The most important financial connection between the two also illustrates this. The main demand of a pre-modern state on its subjects in any sphere of activity was the demand for taxation revenue. Gu-

[42] Sikandar, pp. 105, 137, 144, 245; Khwajah Nizam-ud-din Ahmad, <u>Tabaqat-i-Akbari</u>, Calcutta, 1927-39, 3 vols., III, 189.

jarat's merchants were in fact under-taxed, paying customs duties of only 2½-5%, and minor inland taxes, and the usual bribes, while cultivators paid at least one-third. Nevertheless, customs revenues were to some individual nobles, those controlling ports, of crucial importance. One example of the political significance of this was seen in the episode of 1669 when all the _vanias_ left Surat in protest, and had to be cajoled to come back.

Despite these financial and political links, both official and individual, it must be stressed that the merchants were left strictly alone by the upper level in matters seen as affecting only themselves. In this, as in other pre-modern societies, the scope of such matters was considerably greater than is the case today. In commercial matters the mahajans were completely autonomous. Thus they regulated production standards, interest rates, holidays, and also their own membership. Unlike European guilds, the local governments exercised no control or restrictions over them.[43] Similarly, artisans and employees were left to negotiate on

[43] Violet Barbour, _Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century_, Baltimore, 1951, p. 71, for Amsterdam, and for the non-existence of guilds in Islamic areas see articles by Claude Cahen and S.M. Stern in A.H. Hourani, _The Islamic City_, Philadelphia, 1970, where the work of Massignon and B. Lewis is convincingly demolished.

their own with the mahajan or individual merchants. If we accept that there was considerable slack in the economy,[44] the former must have been in a weak position _vis à vis_ the latter. The rulers limited themselves in economic matters to general expressions of goodwill, and very spasmodic assistance in times of acute distress. They collected taxes, but used the proceeds for things they saw as important, such as the Taj Mahal, the building of Champanir, or the conquest of Qandahar.

These commercial affairs are even today sometimes not closely regulated by the state, but the merchant response to the Portuguese represents a considerable difference in degree. Here we saw that the state did not consider it to be of any concern to itself if Gujarat's merchants wanted to pay extra taxes to the Portuguese, and sail under their direction. Autonomy in matters like this is unthinkable today.

This autonomy is why the state let the merchants respond to the Portuguese as they did, by accomodating and continuing to trade. Arrangements made between merchants and another power were outside the cognizance of the state, so long as its

[44] Tapan Raychoudhuri in B.N. Ganguli (ed.), _Readings in Indian Economic History_, Bombay, 1964, _passim_.

own interests were not detrimentally affected. As we saw, in this case they were not; the interests of the state of Gujarat were relatively unaffected when its merchants chose discretion as their response to the Portuguese. In wider terms, nothing that happened at sea was going to worry most of Gujarat's nobles, for their pride, ethos, and concepts of power were intimately connected to the land. More important, the accepted perception of the position of these merchants in their state meant that they could be free to react as they did. Had their position been that of a modern citizen of a nation state, they could not have been allowed to do this. In sixteenth and seventeenth-century Gujarat the political authorities saw in their response no threat to the prerogatives or jurisdictions of the state. It was thus, at bottom, the perception of the position of a merchant in his state, of the relation between the two, which dictated that the state accepted, or more often ignored, the response of its merchants to the Portuguese.

From the merchants' point of view, a commercial response was clearly best for their interests, once they had appreciated Portugal's strength, and the small cost of compliance. This was _why_ they submitted, and they were _able_ to submit because the state made no attempt to stop them from doing so. Nor, clearly,

did the merchants ask for help from their state against the Portuguese. First, they would not expect the state to concern itself in their affairs. Second, they would not want it to interfere. Their experience throughout the sixteenth century showed them that when the state (for its own ends, not for theirs) challenged the Portuguese, it was they, the merchants, who suffered. Thus, as we have seen, they usually tried either to ignore or to stop wars between the Portuguese and their rulers. This point is important, for it is sometimes claimed that the pre-modern state, although limited in its functions, did provide protection to its subjects in return for revenue. Here, however, the state did not provide protection, even though it could have, nor did its subjects, in this case the merchants, want to be protected. They wanted to be left alone to accomodate, and this they were able to do because of their position within the Islamic Gujarati political system.

# CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

Historians of pre-modern India have too frequently allowed themselves to be restricted by their sources. The result has been a plethora of works which deal only with the upper political level, with the wars and battles of the rulers, and their administrative systems.[1] Such an approach is unsatisfactory in several respects. It ignores the roles and activities of the bulk of the population. It leads to over-emphasis on the power of a ruler, as seen in the descriptions of the Mughal Empire and Muslim Indian states in general as despotisms, or autocracies. Thus Muhammad Mujeeb writes, "In practice, there was no control over him [the sultan] and he controlled everything."[2] The material pre-

[1] Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, London, 1936; P. Saran, The Provincial Government of the Mughals, Allahabad, 1941; S.R. Sharma, Mughal Government and Administration, Bombay, 1965; I.H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Mughal Empire, Karachi, 1966; J.N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb, Calcutta, 1925-30, 5 vols. in 4; Bani Prasad, History of Jahangir, Allahabad, 1940; U.N. Day, The Mughal Government, New Delhi, 1970.

[2] M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, London, 1967, p. 37. Cf. also, for similar opinions, Irfan Habib, "An Examination of Wittfogel's Theory of 'Oriental Despotism'" in Enquiry, new series, 6, 1966, p. 66; Beni Prasad, op. cit., pp. 70-71; Irfan Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India, Bombay, 1963, pp. 317, 319; W.H. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, London, 1923, pp. 233-4; P. Saran, op. cit., p. 157; H.N. Sinha, The Development of Indian Polity, Bombay, 1963, p. 436.

sented in chapter V should dispel these characterizations. Further, such an approach is usually too static, failing to consider what R.E. Frykenberg rather inelegantly calls "ideas of 'structural relativity,' that is, of dynamic relationships of social entities moving within a defined structural whole."[3] And this approach leads especially to a very limited notion of political activities in these pre-modern societies. Politics does not consist merely of the activities of court factions, and negotiations with the Shah of Persia over Qandahar.

What is "politics?" Ashis Nandy recently claimed that in pre-colonial India there was an "apolitical social order" which "the first impact of the Raj" brought "within the compass of politics . . . ."[4] The implicit definition here seems to be far too narrow; we prefer Talcott Parsons' description of political structures as being "concerned with organizing collective action for the attainment of collectively significant goals, whether on a society-wide basis or on more narrow bases . . . ."[5] On this definition,

[3] R.E. Frykenberg (ed.), Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History, Madison, 1969, p. xx.

[4] Ashis Nandy, "The Culture of Indian Politics: A Stock Taking," in Journal of Asian Studies, XXX, 1, Nov. 1970, p. 58.

[5] Talcott Parsons, Societies, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966, p. 13.

mahajans were, among other things, political structures engaged in political activities. Our concern now is to follow the logic of this definition and extend our discussion into a consideration of the position of other groups in the political system.

The political system of Gujarat, whether ruled by sultans or emperors, should be visualized as a series of circles located beneath one larger circle. (See the diagram on page 287.) At the center of the upper, or A, circle, is the ruler, the sultan or emperor. Radiating out from him are people directly connected to him, usually by patron-client ties.[6] These constituents of the A circle include all "nobles," as defined in chapter III, and in fact all members of the administration as set out in the standard works on the subject.[7] Some people not directly in the administration can also be considered as constituents here; all people of the court, whether artists, singers, or employees of the karkhanahs, the state workshops, and in addition certain people with specialized military roles, such as the elephant

[6] Anton Blok defines "patronage" as "a structural principle which underlies asymmetric, personal transactions involving protection and loyalty between two persons or groups of persons. By definition, transactions refer to those sequences of interaction which are governed by reciprocity." Anton Blok, "Variations in Patronage," in Sociologische, GIDS, 16th year, no. 6, Nov.-Dec., 1969, p. 365.

[7] Cf. footnote 1.

corps, the artillery experts, and most notably the élite 7,000 strong body of ahadis, or proto-mansabdars. In short, circle A corresponds to Parsons' "core of more fully integrated members" which provide a society with "an adequate level of integration or solidarity and a distinctive membership status" needed to "constitute a societal community."[8] Note, however, that here we are not referring to the societal role of this, or any other, circle, but only to its function in the political system.

This upper circle exercized authority over the whole state, even though nominal in many places, but its members were not the bulk of the population. The vast mass of the inhabitants should be visualized as members of one or more of the lower circles, which together with the upper one constituted the whole political system. To call these people members of a circle or group is rather vague, but purposefully so, for the precise nature of the solidarity ties between the members of a group is often difficult to define. We may at least note some things which such members were not. Within their circle they were not equal in power, but rather were hierarchically stratified. Nor were all the various circles equal in power to other circles. A circle is not a class, at least not on Weber's definition: "'Classes' are

[8] Talcott Parsons, Societies, p. 17.




Diagram 1 The Muslim Indian Political System

groups of people who, from the standpoint of specific interests, have the same economic position. Ownership or non-ownership of material goods or of definite skills constitute the 'class-situation.'" Nor is a circle a status group: "'Status' is a quality of social honor or lack of it, and is in the main conditional as well as expressed through a specific style of life."[9] A circle is apparently made up of a widely varying number of people who have a common intermediary connecting them to the A level of the political system.

Some more refined criteria are distinguishable. Sometimes occupation formed the solidarity tie of a circle, sometimes religious belief, or the area in which one was resident, or the racial group to which one belonged, or patron-client ties.

The crucial elements in this structure were the links between the lower circles and the upper one; these links articulated demands, requests, and complaints, and were the prime agents in integrating, at least to some extent, the vast bulk of the population in the lower circles with the upper imperial one. These links are the people we call intermediaries. In the diagram they are shown at the centers of the

[9] H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, 1958, p. 405.

lower circles, and their names are underlined. The lines linking them to other circles, or to the A level, represent flows of political communication. These intermediaries were heads of groups of people, whether elected, appointed, or self-chosen. The degree of their authority over their particular circle varied greatly, but structurally their roles were similar. They transmitted orders, or requests, down from the upper level to their members, and passed up complaints or requests from their members to the top circle. The actual person with whom they dealt in the A circle varied; some would have access to the emperor, some only to a fawjdar. These variations did not disguise the fact that all of them were hinge figures,facing both their own circle and the upper one; grounded in the lower circle which they headed but having access to someone in the upper circle, and thus able to interpret one to the other.

Apart from the fact that one man could be included in more than one circle, according to role, there is an additional refinement to be made. Each of the lower circles must be seen as the sum of several smaller circles, whose heads connected to the head of the B circle, and so through him to the A level. Further, one of the C circles could relate to several of the B circles at the same time, and even to the A level on occasion. Within the whole system there was horizontal as well as vertical

communication, as shown by the flow lines in the diagram.

Some examples, in conjunction with the diagram on page 287, may help to clarify this conception of the structure of the Islamic Indian political system. Our merchants provide the best illustration: thanks to the large bulk of European documentation we know more about them than about most other people in sixteenth and seventeenth-century India. Shantidas Jawahari and Virji Vorah, and the shahbandar, should be seen as heads of B level circles, acting as intermediaries between their circles of merchants and different people at different times in the A circle. Thus Virji Vorah and Shantidas both went direct to the emperor on occasion, but normally they were connected at a lower level in the A circle, perhaps to the subahdar of Gujarat, or the captain of Surat. The C level of merchants was composed of smaller groups, as all Jain merchants of a particular sect, or guyati, or all the sarrafs, or all the bohrahs. The mahajan represented them all in a particular town, and its head, the nagarsheth or sheth, was their usual intermediary to the A circle.

The members of a particular trade, with their governing body, the guyati panchayat, and its head, the patel, formed another B level circle. This was a less powerful one, so that the patel would connect

much lower down on the imperial administrative network, as for example to a *kotwal* or market superintendent. Clearly there were horizontal connections also, both between the various C level circles beneath the mahajan, between them and *guyati panchayats*, and between two or more *guyati panchayats*. Thus the head of the cloth merchants would have dealings on behalf of his group with the head of the cloth dyers' *panchayat*, and the dyers and the weavers would obviously have connections both between themselves and with the *nagarsheth* or the heads of the C level merchant circles below them.

Other subjects, in fact all subjects, of Gujarat can be fitted into the structure. Another example of a B level circle is the *sufis*, and their followers. These *sufis* were grouped together in *silsilahs*, or orders, and lived in a *khanqah*, or hospice, under the guidance and headship of their *pir*. The best remembered *pir* in Gujarat is Shah Alam, who died in 1475. One example of his function as an intermediary between his disciples and the state may be quoted. A *qazi* of Broach, tiring of secular life, became a disciple of Shah Alam. Later Sultan Mahmud Bigarh wanted this man to become *qazi* of Ahmadabad. The former *qazi* wanted to remain a *sufi*, so the sultan approached Shah Alam, and finally got him to persuade his pupil to take the posi-

tion.[10] Another case shows the same sultan consulting with a dying *pir* about his successor, and finally, after many objections, accepting the choice of the *pir*.[11] Relations between the *pirs* and the sultans were close; the latter frequently visited the *khanqahs* to get advice on both spiritual and secular matters, and in return supported by grants of land the *pir* and his disciples.[12] The sultan's relations with a *pir* were different from those he had with a *sheth*, but the function of these two within the political structure was similar.

The Ismaili bohrah group, as *shiahs*, were regarded as heretical by the *sunni* rulers, and not favored as were the *sufis*, but the bohrahs lived together, had their own heads, and settled their own disputes. Their *dai* had the final decision in internal civil and religious disputes, and no appeal to the law courts or to government officials was allowed.[13] The Parsis also had their own heads,

[10] Mirat, Supplement, Persian text, pp. 55, 15-16.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[12] Sikandar, pp. 60, 81, 218-9; Mirat, Supplement, trans., pp. 14-15, 27, 35, 49, 61, 66-67, 102. For the development of *silsilahs* in Islam see S.A.A. Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, Agra, 1965, pp. 6-7.

[13] Mirat, p. 459; Mirat, Supplement, trans., p. 13; S.T. Lokhandwalla, "Islamic Law and Ismaili Communities," in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, IV, 2, June 1967, pp. 171-2.

who represented the community before local officials when this was necessary. Usually internal disputes were handled within the community. In the seventeenth century the religious heads of the group lived at Naosari, south of Surat; the economic importance of the Parsis increased greatly in this century, especially in Surat, and their head there, Rustam Manock, was their leader in both religious and secular matters.[14] Finally, various Jain saints and reformers occupied positions similar to the sufis and their pirs, at least under the tolerant Akbar. He acknowledged that in all religious and most secular matters these saints had full jurisdiction over their disciples. At one time he wanted to honor a Jain ascetic, who had impressed him at court, with a religious title, but he was informed that only the head of the ascetic's order could do this. Akbar accordingly obtained the necessary authorization.[15]

For most of the vast rural population the intermediaries were zamindars. The term is only

[14] J.J. Modi, Asiatic Papers, IV, Bombay, 1929, pp. 162, 198; J.J. Modi, A Few Events in the Early History of the Parsis, Bombay, 1905, pp. 60-62, 71; W.H. Moreland, "A Dutch Account of Mogul Administrative Methods," in Journal of Indian History, III, April, 1925, p. 83.

[15] Artur Viegas (ed.), Relação Anual das Coisas que Fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus nas suas Missões, by Fernão Guerreiro, Lisbon, 1930-42, 3 vols., II, 394-5; Siddhicandra, Bhanucandra Carita (in Hindi), Calcutta, 1941, pp. 6, 26, 27, 30, 34-37, 41. For this specific incident see ibid., pp. 32-33.

now being more strictly defined, but we accept here S. Nurul Hasan's classification of them into three divisions: chieftains, intermediary _zamindars_, and primary _zamindars_.[16] The first include the great Rajput rulers of Rajasthan, and the numerous petty Rajput rajas of Gujarat. Like the mahajans, these local power figures had considerable autonomy in matters affecting themselves and the constituents of the circles which they headed. In their areas sizeable battles occurred, and villages changed hands, without the A circle taking any notice.[17] Nor were these people necessarily Hindu; the Afghan rulers of Daman were in a similar position, as was Musa Khan Fawladi, the "absolute ruler" of Patan around 1560.[18]

The intermediary _zamindars_ were primarily the local revenue collectors, usually hereditary and variously called _chaudhuris_, _desmukhs_, _desais_, or _despandes_. Below them were the primary, land holding _zamindars_. The structure here, and the connections between its levels, were enormously complex. Thus in a Rajput state the raja was the link to the A

[16] S. Nurul Hasan, "Zamindars under the Mughals," in R.E. Frykenberg (ed.), _op. cit._, pp. 17-31.

[17] As, for example, in A.K. Forbes, _Ras Mala_, London, 1924, 2 vols., I, 432-4.

[18] For Daman see chapter III, for Patan, Mirat, p. 78.

circle, and normally directly to its center, the emperor. Below the raja were whole mini-structures rather parallel to the imperial one, and again with both vertical and horizontal connections. Similarly, a peasant, or a primary _zamindar_, would have as his intermediary either a chief or an intermediary _zamindar_, but he in turn might not have access to the A level. He could go through another chief, acting as his intermediary, to reach this. The power of the various _zamindars_, and so the level, if any, to which they related in the A level, varied greatly.

Other B level circles could be distinguished almost indefinitely. Two more must suffice. First were the residential-based ones in the cities. Urban inhabitants were usually grouped according to place of residence, and this was not always coterminous with their profession or trade. One of the suburbs of Ahmadabad, Rasulabad, was founded by the great _sufi pir_ Shah Alam. Here lived his descendents, and others, and "these people lived comfortably, and gradually made fine houses and gardens. None of the Nazims or officers troubled the inhabitants, owing to the respect paid to the Saint and the Seyyid. From olden times the Saint's successors have been empowered to decide cases and settle the disputes of the inhabitants and traders. A separate Qazi

was also appointed and attached to the Dargah."[19]

Second were groups of foreigners resident in Gujarat, both merchants and others. The merchants, whether English, Dutch, Turkish, Armenian, or other usually lived in their own areas, whether a factory, a suburb, or a _sarai_, had their own head, settled their own disputes, and were buried in their own cemeteries.[20] The Gujarati army included many foreigners, who again apparently always had their own heads according to their country of origin.[21]

In many of these circles patron-client connections were important in forming solidarity ties. As we noted, these were the crucial determinant in the A level circle. They were also of prime significance in some lower circles. Thus the English

[19] Mirat, Supplement, trans., pp. 14-15. For the duties of street chiefs, see a farman of Akbar's in Mirat, pp. 144-5.

[20] See, for example, Lepo de Sousa Coutinho, _História de Cerco de Diu_, Lisbon, 1890, p. 84; Factories, 1665-67, p. 61; Lwon Khachikian, "Un marchand armenian en Perse, en Inde et au Tibet (1682-1693)," in _Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations_, March-April, 1967, pp. 237-9; ANTTSV, XI, 94r; John Fryer, _A New Account of East India and Persia_, London, 1909-15, 3 vols., I, 252-5. For _sarais_, Fray Sebastian Manrique, _Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrique_, Oxford, 1926-27, 2 vols., II, 152, 190; S.N. Sen (ed.), _Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri_, New Delhi, 1949, pp. lvi-ii, 48; Factories, 1661-64, p. 308; 1670-77, p. 195.

[21] ANTTSV, XI, 108-r; Arabic History, I, 27, 243, 439, 460; Sikandar, 363.

merchants included in their circle their older-established Indian employees. We have a recorded instance of a ship belonging to an Indian broker being treated as an English vessel, and flying the English flag. Similarly, the English tried their Indian employees themselves, and claimed that these Indians should share in the privileges given to the East India Company's servants by the emperors. In 1636, on the other hand, one of their Indian brokers was imprisoned by the local officials when the English were accused of piracy.[22] Clearly the tie here was patronage. Similar ties were important in other circles, perhaps in all circles, but they were probably outweighed by other factors in most of them. Occupation, kin groupings, or racial origin were decisive.

Even from this rather simplistic presentation the complexity of this system should be evident. Apart from the intricacies of vertical and horizontal connections between the various layers and circles it should be noted that one man could have several roles, for each of which he had a different intermediary. Thus a merchant could also be a disciple of a _pir_, as could a member of circle A, from the ruler on down. According to role, one man could

[22] Factories, 1630-33, pp. 328-9; 1633-36, p. 278; 1655-60, pp. 83, 313, 368.

have at different times as his intermediary a street chief, a _patel_, a _zamindar_, or a religious head, depending on whether the matter concerned him as a resident of a particular quarter, as a tradesman, as a man retaining ties to his home village, or as a disciple of a religious leader. Again, one man could be an intermediary for two different, although perhaps overlapping, circles. Shantidas Jawahari was both head of a Jain sect in Ahmadabad and the _nagarsheth_ of the town. Similarly, Virji Vorah was the head of a mahajan, and also of a Jain sect. "Those who wanted to take diksha [renounce the world to become a Jain monk] had to seek his permission, and without it they were not allowed. Virji Vorah constantly checked the knowledge of agam [Jain religious] literature in those seeking diksha, and if he as well as the order was satisfied he would give his assent for diksha."[23] One other complexity, to be dealt with below, was the fact that the members of a circle were not necessarily all resident in one state.

This system clearly differed from modern political systems. The crucial difference lies, however, in degree rather than kind. The merchants and others

[23] K.H. Kamdar, "Virji Vorah, Surat Millionaire Mahajan," (in Gujarati) in _Journal of the Gujarat Research Society_, XXX, 4, Oct. 1968, p. 279.

were simply subject to much less control than is a citizen today. The increase was caused mostly by the spread of ideas of the nation state from the late eighteenth century onwards, and these ideas also helped make possible such control. Also important as a precondition of this greater control was the development of a more efficient bureaucracy, as ideally defined by Max Weber,[24] and of improved communications. One clear sign of this difference in degree is the attitude to the wars of a ruler on the part of his subjects. We have noted Gujaratis and Portuguese ignoring these and continuing to trade. In pre-modern societies this was the rule. Violet Barbour notes how seventeenth-century Amsterdam capitalists were very little influenced by patriotism or ideas of economic nationalism. Their main interest was in money making, and they sold arms to whomever could pay.[25] The merchants of Cambay hastily proclaimed themselves to be subjects of the Mughals as Humayun's armies approached in 1535 and Bahadur fled to Div.[26]

[24] Reinhard Bendix, _Max Weber. An Intellectual Portrait_, New York, 1962, pp. 423-30.

[25] Violet Barbour, _Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century_, Baltimore, 1951, p. 130.

[26] ANTTSV, XI, 110r; A.A. Tirmizi (ed.), Tarikh-i-Salatin-Gujarat," in _Medieval Indian Quarterly_, vol. V, 1963, pp. 66-67.

In 1655 the inhabitants of the Kanara kingdom of Sivapa Naik showed a similar disregard for the wars of their rulers. Portugal and Kanara were at war, but the local merchants either did not know or did not care. They continued to come to Goa with cargoes of rice. The Portuguese protested that such conduct was "much to be abominated" and "very damaging to the credit and reputation of the arms of his Majesty, whom God protect" but bought the rice anyway.[27] Late in 1839 in Canton the First Opium War began. The opening battle was between a Chinese fleet and two British warships who "were trying to keep British merchants from trading at Canton on China's terms. It was typical of the Canton trade, however, that it survived even during the sporadic hostilities of wartime. In the legal trade, American firms like Russell and Company, working closely with their hong merchant friend, Howqua, handled the season's tea exports under the American flag on behalf of the British, for a price. Meanwhile the coastal trade in opium continued, well armed, beyond the reach of Commissioner Lin [the Chinese official who had been sent to Canton to end the opium trade] ."[28]

[27] Assentos, III, 395-8; Diary of Viceroy Sarzedas, in "Noticias dos Estados da India," Biblioteca da Academia das Ciências, Lisbon, Mss. Azuis, A58, f. 48.

[28] J.K. Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer, A.M. Craig, East Asia. The Modern Transformation, Boston, 1965, p. 141.

This sort of behavior raises the whole question of subjecthood and frontiers in pre-modern societies. Clearly being politically affiliated as a subject of the Mughal Empire did not involve a person in all the rights and obligations of modern citizenship. Today's concept of citizenship has evolved during the last two centuries in the nation states of Europe, and is now accepted with minor variations in most states. Such citizenship has been defined as "the bond of dependence which binds an individual to a sovereign state, which implies the total and exclusive submission of the individual to the laws of that state."[29] Nevertheless, there did exist in the period with which we are concerned a clear idea of being an inhabitant of Mughal India and a subject of the emperor or sultan. The basis of subjecthood was <u>jus solis</u>: where a person lived, not where he was born, defined the authority to which he was subject. Thus in 1547 the Portuguese seized a ship of Gujarat, with which they were at war. Several of the merchants of board, however, came from Persia, Ahmadnagar, and Bijapur, and they complained that "they were not involved in the war, nor were they subjects [<u>vassallos</u>] of the king of Cambay, so that they should not have

[29] Visscher in Société Jean Bodin, <u>L'Étranger</u>, 1958, 2 vols., I, 207.

their property confiscated."[30] The outcome is not known. The fact that racial origin or country of birth was not the criterion is shown in a case where a Turkish merchant's ship was captured by the Portuguese. This merchant was resident in Surat, so the governor of Surat raised his case, successfully, with the Portuguese agent in the town.[31]

The concept of subjecthood was thus clear, but to merchants this did not in fact mean very much. Of much more importance, because more real to them, was their membership in a community of merchants who were not all subjects of Mughal India. The ruler saw them as his subjects because they paid taxes to him and lived in his state, and they knew that he regarded them as his subjects. Yet they certainly had much closer ties to other merchants than to their fellow-subjects. Thus a _vania_ merchant of Surat should be seen as a member of a social group extending to the Red Sea and to Indonesia, where other _vanias_ were resident. He shared values and behavior patterns with these other _vanias_, not necessarily with other Gujaratis.

This situation was paralleled by other subjects

[30] Couto, VI, iv, 4; "Chancellaria, D. João IV," ANTT, livro 19, f. 236r; AHU, Caixa 16, opinion of March 14, 1644.

[31] J.J. Medi, _Asiatic Papers, IV_, Bombay, 1929, pp. 138-40.

of Mughal India and pre-modern China. Looking down from circle A, all who paid revenue were its subjects, and in return were usually protected. But looking up from the bottom, the situation (for a peasant let us say) was different. Occasionally a man, usually on a horse, appeared and took away some money. Such visitations had to be accepted. This however meant even less to the peasant than to the merchant. For him what was of immediate relevance was his own social group, as, for example, the fellow members of his guyati. These were not necessarily all resident in Mughal India. In border areas the members of a peasant's guyati could well be situated in two states, apart from the likelihood that the man on a horse could be from one state one year and another the next. Today frontier, state, and nation are interdependent; in pre-modern societies they were not.[32] Thus our circles are not necessarily coterminous with one particular state. For the subject what was of most significance was not his subjecthood but what Geertz calls "primordial attachments": "immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly,

[32] See W. Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, Leiden, 1965, pp. 6-9; E.R. Leach, "The Frontiers of Burma," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, III, 1, 1960, pp. 49-50, and passim; Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History. Collected Papers 1928-58, London, 1962.

but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices."[33]

Several factors determined this sort of loosely-integrated political system. On the practical level, it was not possible for a pre-modern state like Gujarat to control closely its inhabitants. Anyone who reads the European travellers' accounts will be impressed by the difficult, laborious, and dangerous nature of travel in India. Akbar's feat in 1573 of covering nearly 600 miles in eleven days, from Fathipur Sikri to Ahmadabad, is rightly considered to be a considerable achievement. Today, the journey is a comfortable one day by train, and of course even quicker by air, while the radio and telegraph make possible still faster communication. In the sixteenth century poor roads, periodic local disorder, reliance on animals for transportation, and the difficult terrain of much of Gujarat simply made close control from the center over much of the state a physical impossibility.[34] The degree of control

[33] Clifford Geertz, "Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in C. Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States. The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, Glencoe, Ill., 1963, p. 109.

[34] See Jean Deloche, Recherches sur les routes de l'Inde au temps des Mogols (Étude critique des sources), Paris, 1968.

can be visualized as a continuum of shades going from bright scarlet near the court to red to a very washy light pink on the edges. Near the court relatively close control was possible over all levels. Further out, in the red areas, control over the upper levels was considerable, but not over lower levels. On the edges little control was held over the upper levels, and none at all over the lower ones.

Other factors also militated against close control. One is the conception of the duties of a Muslim ruler, which will be taken up later. Suffice it here to note that a Muslim ruler did not _want_ the sort of close control over his population which some more recent rulers have desired. Another is the level of bureaucratic development in Muslim India. As compared to a modern state, or even to traditional China and some Islamic empires such as the Ottoman and Mamluk, the bureaucracies of Sultanate Gujarat and Mughal India seem to have been lacking. This factor is of course closely related to, and largely caused by, the practical difficulties outlined above.

Of more importance was the extreme heterogeneity of the population of Muslim India in general and Gujarat in particular. We lack statistics, but it is sufficient to point to the presence in Gujarat of _vaishnavite_ _vaisyas_, _shaivite_ brahmins, Jains, sunni Muslims, several sects of shiah Muslims, Christians,

and Parsis. In racial terms, we find Gujarati-born people, but also a host of Muslim foreigners who were dominant in military and administrative roles.[35]

The nature of the Gujarati and Mughal armies was in part a mirror image of the groups into which the polity was divided, and in part a cause of these groups. We noted in chapter III the way in which the absence of a large centrally-controlled army decreased the effective power of a sultan vis à vis his nobles; it also made it impossible for a sultan to control closely his subjects. In Gujarat only Mahmud III tried to form a body of troops based at court and loyal to him alone. This attempt failed, and in any case the number concerned was apparently only 1200 men.[36] More typical is a description of the Gujarati cavalry of about 1560, in which the 12,000 men are divided up into eight racial groups, each under its own leader.[37] The Mughal army also

[35] Cf. S.C. Misra, Muslim Communities in Gujarat, Bombay, 1964; N.A. Thoothi, The Vaishnavas of Gujarat, London, 1935.

[36] E.C. Bayley, The Local Muhammadan Dynasties. Gujarat, London, 1886, p. 449. The Misra and Rahim text of the Mirat-i-Sikandari (Sikandar, pp. 377-8) also describes these troops as being solely accountable to Mahmud III, but gives no number. The Arabic History, I, 243, stresses their independence of the nobles, but gives their number as 12,000. I prefer Sikandar's figure; on the reliability of the translation of the Arabic History see my review, forthcoming in the Journal of the American Oriental Society.

[37] Arabic History, I, 460; see also ibid., pp. 27, 243, 439; Sikandar, pp. 112,363.

largely consisted of contingents raised by nobles. The cavalry was again the main arm of the army, and this was recruited by minor leaders, who in turn attached themselves and their group of men to a higher chief. Each soldier tended to follow his immediate chief, with little regard for the interests of the whole army.[38] In such a situation a sultan could move only with the at least tacit consent of most of his nobles.

The scope of the legal system in Gujarat reflects both the limited aims of the sultans and these various practical restrictions on any extension of their control. Judicial officers were called _qazis_, there being a chief _qazi_ at court, another for each province, and others at the district level. Other officials in Mughal India also exercised some judicial functions: at the level of the _subah_ the _subahdar_ and _divan_, and in the districts the _fawjdar_ and the _kotwal_. The _qazis_ handled cases covered by the _shariah_, the sacred law of Islam. Civil cases involving non-Muslims were judged according to their own customary law, which was administered by pandits, or by caste and village _panchayats_. Minor criminal cases were also in practice settled locally, without

[38] V.A. Smith, _Akbar. The Great Mogul_, Delhi, 1966, pp. 261-2; William Irvine, _The Army of the Indian Moghuls_, London, 1903, pp. 57-58.

the state-appointed qazi being involved. In this respect a farman of Awrangzeb's of 1671 is revealing, for it codifies in thirty-three sections various crimes and their punishments. The listed crimes are all major offences against the shariah. Petty criminal cases, and those covered by customary law, are not included. It should also be noted that not even all Muslims were under the jurisdiction of the qazis. In Gujarat Muslims who were converts from Hinduism were not always governed by the shariah; in succession matters they retained their Hindu customary law. In fact, in Gujarat very few cases, except serious criminal offences, ever came before a qazi. He would occasionally be called on in intercommunal disputes, but civil cases were nearly always settled within the community or communities concerned, and not necessarily according to Muslim law.[39]

The Hindu law to which most of Gujarat's inhabitants were subject was itself kaleidoscopic.

[39] N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh, 1964, pp. 16-17, 97-98, 136-37; S.C. Misra, op. cit., pp. 162-3; M.B. Ahmad, The Administration of Justice in Medieval India, Aligarh, 1941, pp. 71-75, 78, 85-86, 91-92, 142-66; A.S. Altekar, History of Village Communities in Western India, Bombay, 1927, pp. 34-38; J.D.M. Derrett, "The Administration of Hindu Law by the British," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV, 1, 1961, p. 17. Awrangzeb's farman of 1671 is in Mirat, pp. 248-52; good general surveys are these by M.B. Ahmad, op. cit., and Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, London, 1936, pp. 306-44.

Leaving aside the major criminal cases of which the Muslim legal authorities took cognizance, all other cases were decided not with reference to some unitary omnicompetent code but according to the varna of the people concerned. This situation has only changed, and perhaps even now not completely, since India became independent. More specifically, J.D.M. Derrett finds four types of decision making and decision enforcement operating in pre-colonial times. Trade and professional groups, agriculturalists, and many other groups handled most cases for themselves, and virtually all in the area of personal law. Thus the beheading of the Hindu legal system resultant on the arrival of Muslim rule was of only theoretical importance for most people.[40]

The merchants of Gujarat living in foreign areas enjoyed a similarly independent position in legal matters, and generally in the regulation of their internal affairs. They usually had a recognized leader, who handled negotiations with the political authority of the area, and who also wielded considerable power over his fellow Gujaratis. In pre-Portuguese Malacca this leader was called the shahbandar,

[40] J.D.M. Derrett, op. cit., passim; Marc Galanter, "The Problem of Group Membership: Some Reflections on the Judicial View of Indian Society," in Journal of the Indian Law Institute, IV, 1962, pp. 331-58, passim, and especially pp. 342-3; J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, London, 1968, pp. 152, 161-2, 188, 211-2.

although of course his function was quite different from that of the shahbandar of Surat. He is described as "the mainstay of all the merchants of Cambay--a man of great credit with the King."[41] In 1653 there was a shahbandar of the vanias at Massaw in the Red Sea, while earlier in the century there are references to the "chiefs" or "consull" or "shabunder" of the Gujaratis or just the vanias at Teco in Sumatra, and at Mocha, al-Shihr, Aden, and Jiddah.[42]

In Portuguese areas also the vanias had their own leaders, at Goa, Div, and Hurmuz; their leader at Div was considered to be the head of all the 30,000 vanias living in Portuguese India. Thanks to their cohesiveness and wealth these vanias exercised considerable power, especially in Div. Their complaints to the governor in Goa, or to the king, were treated with respect; they were even able to oppose successfully overly-zealous priests who tried to infringe on the religious liberties the Portuguese

[41] Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, London, 1875-84, 4 vols., III, 70; Castanheda, III, li; Barros, II, vi, 3.

[42] "Cartas e Ordens," HAG, III, 73; Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East, London, 1896-1902, 6 vols., IV, 92-93; I, 51, 167; Factories, 1624-29, p. 70; The Journal of John Jourdain, London, 1905, pp. 95, 99, 104. See also W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Oct., 1920, pp. 520-4.

had guaranteed them, while it was their complaints which led to the ending of Div's status as a city with its own municipal council. Again they governed most of their own affairs. Thus in 1653 the Hindu and Muslim Gujaratis of Div petitioned through their captain, Goridas Parekh, to the governor in Goa. They complained that a Portuguese judge in Div had interfered in a case concerning debts and inheritance "that the Captain of the said people with four main men, his advisers, was judging." The Gujarati captain had had the guilty imprisoned, "as is the very ancient use and custom which his predecessors used" but the judge had released them.[43] By doing this, according to the Gujaratis he had exceeded his authority.

This position held by the Gujaratis as foreign merchants in various ports was of course far from

[43] LM, v. 28B, ff. 422-6. For the captain of the vanias of Hurmuz, see "Livro Morato," HAG, ff. 331-r; Fazenda, II, 31r. For Div, AHU, Caixa 18, account of Jan. 25, 1646; Barreto de Rezende, I, 58r; LM, v. 14, ff. 332-3, printed in APOCR, VI, 1250-1. For Goa, "Chancellaria, D. Affonso VI," ANTT, livro 39, ff. 372-r. For successful defences of religious freedom see Artur Viegas (ed.), Relação Anual das Coisas, op. cit., II, 390-3; APOCR, VI, 840; ANTTDR, LI, 131-r, 136-r; LM, v. 28B, f. 419; Assentos, I, 227; "Correspondencia de Chaul," HAG, ff. 36-36r; "Livro Azul," HAG, II, 41r-42r; LMBP, I, 247,273, 310. Other examples of the Gujaratis working together to secure privileges or redress of grievances in Fazenda, VI, 131r-2; AHU, Caixa 14, petitions of Sept. 10, 1642.

exceptional. They were simply enjoying the rights held by other foreign merchants in most Asian ports at this time, as sketched in chapter I. These merchants lived according to their own laws and customs, and had a recognized head who was their governor, and who handled negotiations on behalf of the whole group with the political power of the town. Such a status was enjoyed by the Armenians in their own town of Julfa, near Isfahan, by various groups of foreigners in seventeenth-century Ayuthia, in Malacca under both the sultans and the Portuguese, by both foreign and local Muslims in Calicut and Quilon, and by the Dutch and English in seventeenth-century Gujarat.[44]

For all these reasons, inhabitants of Gujarat enjoyed considerable autonomy within their circles. The state did not want to, and could not, interfere deeply in many of their activities. There is, however, no reason to assume that the political system of

[44] Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, London, 1907-8, 4 vols., I, 39; Mesrovb J. Seth, History of the Armenians in India, Calcutta, 1895, pp. 26-27; G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957, pp. 13-14; Commentaries of Afonso Albuquerque, III, 128-9; Barros, II, vi, 7; Castanheda, I, xxxvi, xxxviii; Mahdi Husain (trans.), The Rehla of Ibn Batuta, Baroda, 1953, p. 193; generally see W.H. Moreland, "The Shahbandar in the Eastern Seas," op. cit., passim; W.H. Moreland, From Akbar to Aurangzeb, London, 1923, pp. 220-8; C.H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies. (16th, 17th, and 18th centuries), Oxford, 1967, pp. 97-110.

Muslim India was unique. In other pre-modern societies there was sometimes a greater degree of integration, and this resulted in less autonomy for the various levels in the political system. Nevertheless, the actual mechanics of the political system, the channeling of demands and complaints, seems to have been rather similar in at least three other pre-modern states--China, the Abbasid and Umayyad Empires, and the Mamluk Empire.

It is clear that imperial China was a more closely integrated society than was Muslim India, at least as regards the upper level. This upper level, the active carriers of Chinese culture in all its aspects, comprised essentially the urban élite: the landlords, the scholars, the merchants, and the officials. These people made up less than 20% of the total population.[45] There was considerable mobility both within and into this upper level, for the bureaucrats who dominated government and culture "owed their position more to their own talents than to birth."[46] Kinship ties were important, for one family could include in its members a bureaucrat, a merchant, and a landholder. Indeed, one man alone

[45] J.K. Fairbank, The United States and China, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, pp. 28-29.

[46] E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, East Asia. The Great Tradition, Boston, n.d., (c. 1960), p. 186, and generally pp. 186-7.

could be all three.

This integration was founded on several supports, the most important of which were an efficient bureaucratic system,[47] military power, and acceptance of the Confucian ideal. The last was especially crucial, for it created a touchstone of loyalty to a regime which was "a matter separate from one's origin or race . . . As a consequence, the Confucian monarchy had a basis more cultural than national. Under it might function all those who had assumed a proper place with reference to the Confucian polity."[48] Changes of regime were not of great significance; new rulers could be fitted into the framework, so that until the nineteenth century no fundamental changes occurred in the character and functioning of the Confucian state.[49] No such integrative ideal operated in Muslim India.

We have noted the importance of the lack, in Gujarat, of a strong central army. In China the generally-accepted Confucian system was usually buttressed by military support. Leaving aside the Mongols,

[47] For an impressive demonstration of the expertise of the Northern Sung bureaucracy, at least in regard to economic policy, see R.M. Hartwell, "Financial Expertise, Examinations, and the Formulation of Economic Policy in Northern Sung China," in Journal of Asian Studies, XXX, 2, Feb. 1971.

[48] J.K. Fairbank in J.K. Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions, Chicago, 1957, p. 211.

[49] J.K. Fairbank, E.O. Reischauer, A.M. Craig,

it is clear that both the Sung and Manchu dynasties had large and effective central armies which ensured military supremacy for the dynasty and usually managed to avoid the growth of personal commands and personal loyalties to provincial warlords.[50] A preponderant control of military power is at any time crucial in promoting central control of a society.

We thus find in China a stable integrated gentry group, with the Confucian emperor at their head, and backed by military power. For our purposes the important point is that this gentry class was larger and included many more elements in the total society than did the A level of the Muslim Indian political system, for this in turn meant a stronger state in China, one able to exercise more effective control over more of its subjects than was the case in Muslim India. Two illustrations of this strength are relevant here.

In Gujarat the Portuguese claimed to monopolize and tax all trade. In China they were absorbed into the tribute system. This system saw people from outside the pale of Chinese culture as being irresistably attracted to China. Because the rulers of China had

East Asia, The Modern Transformation, Boston, 1965, p. 5.

[50] E.O. Reischauer and J.K. Fairbank, East Asia. The Great Tradition, pp. 197, 205, 364-5.

the Mandate of Heaven to rule all mankind, it was fitting for them to be compassionate and generous to such outsiders. The barbarians should reciprocate by showing submission. Presents were given by the Confucian ruler as a sign of this compassion and generosity. Reciprocally, tribute was offered by the outsider. Its acceptance signalized admission to the civilization of the Middle Kingdom.[51] This was the theory. In practice, for the outsider at least, and for many Chinese as well, the name of the game was trade, and it was for this purpose that these tribute missions were undertaken. Both the volume and mutual profitability of this trade were substantial.

The Portuguese, confronted by a strong effective Chinese state in which they were unable to profit even from the seventeenth-century change of dynasty, were firmly fitted into the pattern. Thus in 1584 their procurator in Macao was given a mandarinate of the second grade. All ships entering Macao harbor had to pay duties to the Chinese, an ironic reversal of the Gujarati situation. Chinese officials exercised an undefined but considerable control over affairs in Macao. In 1582 they searched Portuguese

[51] J.K. Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 116; J.K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, 2 vols., I, 23 ff.

houses for arms. Ninety-eight Japanese were deported from the town in 1613 on the orders of a Chinese mandarin.[52]

Our second illustration concerns the position of other merchants, both foreign and local, in China before the First Opium War. On the local side, foreign trade in Canton was handled by the Cohong, created in 1720 by a merger of thirteen hongs (business firms). In its greatest period, from 1760 to 1834, the Cohong supervised, under official control, the trade of Europeans in Canton. The Cohong monopolized trade in tea and silk, and legally the Europeans could buy these basic trade items only from them. Individual hong merchants acted as "security merchants" for particular foreign ships and traders, and notified the local officials of the arrival of such ships.[53] These hong merchants were a much more united group than their counterparts in sixteenth and seventeenth-century India, and, more important, they were much more directly under the control of

[52] C.R. Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics, Madison, 1965, pp. 43, 45; C.R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon, Lisbon, 1959, pp. 82-83; C.R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, The Hague, 1948, passim; Tien-Tse Chang, Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644, Leiden, 1933, pp. 48-53, 99, 101.

[53] J.K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 47-51; J.K. Fairbank et al., East Asia, The Modern Transformation, pp. 73-78.

their government. They were closely supervised by, and acted directly on behalf of, the central government; in fact they were as much officials as merchants. The distinction was often blurred. During the First Opium War the son of a leader of the Cohong was deputed by the Canton officials to help in negotiations with the British.[54] There were close interconnections between merchants (except for petty traders) and local and imperial officials.

Less needs to be said about the European merchants, especially the British, for they were content to fit into the tribute system, just as the Portuguese had done. The English East India Company, which monopolized British trade with Canton, probably lacked the power to alter the terms under which they traded in China, but in any case the system was acceptable to them as they made large profits, and these outweighed any misgivings these merchants may have felt about their theoretically inferior position in the eyes of Confucian China.[55] Despite some missions from the British government, most notably that of Lord Macartney in 1793, the British did not try to change the system until their interests in China passed completely from the hands of a trading

[54] J.K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 117.

[55] J.K. Fairbank, in Chinese Thought and Institutions, p. 214.

company to those of the British government. After the end of the East India Company's monopoly on Chinese trade in 1834, British interests in Canton were wholly represented by Lord Napier, a government official, and he was not prepared to accept the basic inferiority premise of the tribute system.[56]

The strength of the Chinese state, and its greater degree of integration of a larger and more varied gentry class, which included the most important merchants, resulted in a very different response to the Europeans as compared with that from Gujarat. Nevertheless, it can be maintained that the structure of the political system of Confucian China was fundamentally comparable to that of Muslim India. After all, more than 80% of the population were peasants, and despite gentry dominance of the society, peasants and others also engaged in political activity as defined at the start of this chapter. Doubtless the power of this non-gentry population, mainly peasants, was small as compared to the power of some of the B or even C levels in Muslim India, yet in structural terms they were organized in social groups, such as classes, communities, occupational groups,

[56] J.K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 3, 78-79; J.K. Fairbank, et. al., East Asia, The Modern Transformation, pp. 134-6.

or more or less corporate villages, and had established channels of communication to the gentry, and especially to the officials. Indeed, these channels must have been strengthened by the greater chance for mobility in Confucian China as compared with Muslim India. It was at least possible for a peasant lineage to acquire landed property and so gentry status, and even to give a son a classical education.[57]

In the case of the Muslim states, it is clear that in broad terms the political structure was again similar to that of Muslim India. We must, however, distinguish between different degrees of societal integration. In the *khalifate* period the degree of integration was clearly comparable to that of Muslim India, and for similar reasons. Starting in the tenth century, the situation changed after the Turkish invasions, and greater integration was achieved. This in turn lessened the autonomy of various groups, so that they paralleled the situation in China. Yet it must be stressed that the four cases show differences only in degree as regards the political systems. In medieval Islam and Confucian China there was less autonomy for the various levels than

[57] E.O. Reischauer *et al.*, *East Asia, The Great Tradition*, pp. 186-7; W. Eberhard, *Conquerors and Rulers*, pp. 6-9; Talcott Parsons, *Societies*, pp. 71-77.

in *khalifate* Islam and Muslim India, but structurally they were similar.

As a result of their rapid conquests of very diverse areas and people, both the Abbasid and Umayyad *khalifates* were faced with the problem of how to establish a unified system of rule. Their solution was not to impose their own bureaucratic hierarchies, but to cooperate with the leaders of the existing order. These people--landowners, élites from the Byzantine and Sassanian empires, Arab tribal chiefs, Muslim religious leaders--were drawn into the élite hierarchy headed by the *khalifs*. Below this level, as could be expected, the state was dependent on the cooperation, or at least acquiescence, of village headmen, elders, smaller landholders, and leaders of various non-Muslim religious groups.[58]

A more integrated society was an impossibility, given the huge size of the two empires, and the extreme diversities of the populations. Further, the army was largely militia, divided into racial groups under leaders of their own race.[59] As in India, the threat of these leaders establishing local bases of power, and ultimately breaking away, was

[58] Ira M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages*, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p. 5; cf. Lapidus in I.M. Lapidus (ed.), *Middle Eastern Cities*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 57.

[59] Claude Cahen in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2cnd. Ed., Leiden and London, 1954 - , s.v. Djaysh.

always present. Indeed, in the collapse of both these empires this threat came to fruition as manifested in the rise of numerous successor states.

In several of these smaller successor states, and most notably in the Mamluk Empire (1250-1517), a much larger degree of social unity was achieved. Partly this was because of the massive power acquired by the Mamluks and their slave armies. "These superbly organized Turkish armies mastered the resources and people of the area and towered over the subject societies in power and wealth."[60] Such a strong, centralized, military organization was lacking in both Muslim India and *khalifate* Islam. Of equal importance, however, was the spread of Islam in these smaller states, and the consequent lessening of religious diversity in them, for this opened the way for another group to help in integrating society more closely. This group was the *ulama*. Its members belonged to many different classes, and had very diverse origins. As such they could cut across the divisions in Muslim society, especially in the towns, and integrate more closely the numerous small communities in Muslim urban society.[61]

[60] I.M. Lapidus, *Muslim Cities*, p. 6; cf. *ibid*., pp. 77-78.

[61] *Ibid*., pp. 113-4. Lapidus here is referring primarily to urban Muslim society, but in his latest work he is concerned to stress the lack of divisions

As in China, so in the Mamluk Empire we see a larger group of people included in the élite. Thus from the fifteenth century there was an increasing assimilation of merchants into state positions, and a growing tendency for official and merchant careers to merge. There were various sorts of "official" merchants, and some of these even became Mamluks.[62]

Despite the power of the military, and the integrating work of the _ulama_, it is not possible to find any structural differences in the political systems of _khalifate_ and medieval Islamic states. Talcott Parsons in his discussion of advanced intermediate societies distinguishes between India and China, where full membership was granted only to an upper group, and Islamic societies, where in theory all Muslims were full members. He then modifies this by pointing out the basic dualism present in all the Islamic empires, as a result of the "lasting anchorage of the Islamic masses in traditional or nomadic societies . . . ."[63] In similar fashion, H.A.R. Gibb shows how there developed a concept of an Islamic polity in which there was an overriding law, the _shariah_, but beneath this was a fair degree of elas-

between town and country in medieval Muslim society. (I.M. Lapidus, in Lapidus (ed.), _Middle Eastern Cities_, _passim_.)

[62] I.M. Lapidus, _Muslim Cities_, pp. 127-30.

[63] Talcott Parsons, _Societies_, p. 85, and cf. _ibid_., pp. 82-86.

ticity according to different situations in different areas. The essential duty of an Islamic governor was only to protect the land and Islam, and respect general principles of Muslim conduct.[64] In no Muslim state was a ruler required or encouraged by the _shariah_ or traditional Muslim concepts of the duties of a governor to interfere extensively or intensively in the lives of his subjects.

Thus despite differences in integration and the strength of the state, it is clear that other pre-modern Islamic societies were essentially comparable to Muslim India. The _millets_ in the Ottoman Turkish empire certainly played a parallel role to our lower circles, while Albert Hourani has recently elaborated on the system in the Islamic city. The parallels here, perhaps best seen by conceiving of the city as a microcosm of the whole system, are striking. Beneath the ruler in the city were various officials, and also

> the heads of quarters, or villages, or crafts, and of non-Muslim communities, whom the government held responsible for

[64] H.A.R. Gibb, "Religion and Politics in Christianity and Islam," in J. Harris Proctor (ed.), _Islam and International Relations_, London, 1965, pp. 7-15. See also S.R. Sharma, _The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors_, Bombay, 1962, pp. 181-5, and A.H. Hourani, _The Islamic City_, Philadelphia, 1970, pp. 18-20. Ira M. Lapidus finds that "Even though the [Abbasid] empire was fragmented, characteristic relations within the official classes

> the payment of taxes and the maintenance of order and obedience. All these could be regarded as emanations of the ruler's personality, as possessing an authority derived from his and existing to carry out his orders and wishes. But on the other hand they had a connection, which could be a close one, with the urban society they controlled, and this not only exposed them to pressures from it, but also made it possible for them to have a social power and influence independent of the ruler. Some of those exercising functions in or for the government might themselves be drawn from the urban population.[65]

In sum, we find only differences of degree in the political systems of these four pre-modern states. The degree of integration, and consequent degree of autonomy of various levels, should be seen as a continuum, starting from the Mamluk Empire and passing through Confucian China and Muslim India to *Khalifate* Islam. The two crucial determinants seem to have been the strength and nature of the central military forces, and the degree of homogeneity of the population, whether expressed in racial or religious terms, or in terms of acceptance of a common ethos. The latter factor largely determined the size of the upper political level, and the extent to which it included people not having specific governmental

and their relations to the rest of the population did not basically change." *Muslim Cities*, p. 6.

[65] A. H. Hourani, *op. cit.*, p. 18, and generally pp. 18-20.

functions. Nevertheless, the crucial point is that none of these upper levels constituted a large proportion of the total population, even if some were dominant in power terms. Most of the population lay outside this level, was grouped together in various ways, and was geared into the upper level by intermediaries of several kinds. Nor in fact is this point particularly new; it has been made by many writers. Parsons contrasts the way in which his advanced intermediate societies included large elements concerning which there was not the presupposition that it was possible or desirable to include them in full membership, with the situation in the modern nation state.[66] The same basic point is made by Sjoberg, Wolf, Cohn, and most strongly by Eberhard. Eisenstadt finds in his historical bureaucratic societies that "The scope of political activity and consequential participation was far more narrow than it is in most modern and contemporary bureaucratic societies."[67] His point is the same, even if his

[66] Talcott Parsons, Societies, p. 71.

[67] S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires, New York, 1963, p. 23; see also ibid., pp. 22-23, 367; Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City, New York, 1965, pp. 244-5, 250-1; W. Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 6-9; Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies" in Michael Banton (ed.), The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, New York, 1966, pp. 1-2. Wolf is here referring to modern societies; clearly his "supplementary interpersonal sets" had much more scope in premodern societies.

definition of political activity seems to be implicitly unduly limited. Our contribution, if any, lies in our attempt to elaborate on the functioning of one such political system, and in particular to delineate more clearly than has been done before the crucial intermediaries which connected the upper level with the lower ones to form a coherent and viable political structure.

Cairo
Suez
Basra
PERSIA
Persian Gulf
Hormuz
RED SEA
ARABIA
Muscat
OMAN
Aden
ABYSSINIA
SOMALIA
GUJARAT
Diu
Damão
Bombay
INDIA
MALABAR COAST
Goa
Bijapur
Calicut
Cochin
Meliapor
Jaffna
Colombo
CEYLON
Maldive Is.
Bengal
Orissa
Hooghly
Arakan
Tongking
Pegu
SIAM
ANNAM
Canton
Macau
FORMOSA
Nagasaki
LUZON
Manila
MINDANAO
PACIFIC
OCEAN
SUMATRA
Malacca
BORNEO
Ternate
Tidor
HALMAHERA
Moluccas
Batavia
JAVA
Macassar
Amboina
Solor
Suva
Ende
TIMOR
EQUATOR
Pate & Faza
Malindi
Mombassa
Pemba
Kilwa
C. Delgado
Ibo
Querimba
Moçambique
R. Zambezi
Sofala
MADAGASCAR
Isle de France
(Mauritius)
Bourbon
(Reunion)
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA

MAP 1 LOCATOR MAP

Scale of miles at the Equator



ASIA and the FAR EAST IN 1610

Foreign Settlements underlined

D · Dutch　P · Portuguese
S · Spanish

MILES
0 200 400 600 800 1000




MAP 3

GUJARAT IN 1500


LITTLE RANN
GULF OF KUTCH
GULF OF CAMBAY
MALACCA BANKS
Bhuj
Anjār
Gāndhi Dhām
Kandla
Mandvi
Mundra
Okha
Nora I
JĀMNAGAR
Dwārka
Khambhāliya
RĀJKOT
Jodiya
Dhrol
Kālāvad
MORVI
Wānkāner
Halvad
Dhrāngadhra
Surendranagar
Wadhwān
Lakhtar
Limbdi
Sāyla
Chuda
Viramgām
Sānand
Kalol
Dholka
Kaira
Sojitra
Petlād
Dharmaj
Borsad
Bhadran
CAMBAY
Dhandhuka
Rānpur
Paliyād
Botād
Barvāla
Jasdan
Gondal
Kāndorna
Jodhpur
Bhāyāvadar
Dhorāji
Jetpur
Upleta
PORBANDAR
Rānāvāo
Kutiyāna
Bhānwār
Mānāvadar
JUNĀGADH
Bāntva
Vanthli
Keshod
Mendarda
Visāvadar
Bilkha
Māngrol
Māliā
Tālāla
Verāval
Somnāth
Kodinār
Una
Diu
Vadia
Amreli
Chital
Lāthi
Bābra
Gadhada
Vallabhipur
BHAVNAGAR
Sihor
Gogha
Dāmnagar
Gariādhar
Pālitāna
Bagasra
Dhāri
Kundla
Talāja
Rājula
Dongar
Mahuva
Shiāl Island
Jāfarābād
Kapadvanj
Bālāsinor
Dākor
Nadiād
Anand
Gorwa
Padra
Karjan
Sinor
BROACH
Ankleshvar
Katargām
SURAT
Mandvi
Bārdoli
Jalālpur
NAVSĀRI
Gandevi
Bilimora
Bulsār
Abhrāma
Dharampur
Pārdi
Damān
Wāpi
MAP 4
GUJARAT TODAY

## APPENDIX I

## NAMES AND TRANSLITERATIONS

Names of places and people have been a problem for two reasons. It is often very difficult to identify names from the extremely corrupt Portuguese versions. How are we to know that "Bisnaga" is Vijayanagar, that "Caliche Mahamede" appears in the Persian sources as Muhammad Qulij Khan, and "Nizamoxo" as Nizam-ul-Mulk, or that "Ulcinde" is Sind? Once identified, there was still the question of an acceptable spelling for this dissertation. It was decided to use what seemed to be the current modern spelling; with regard to Gujarati place names I have usually followed the form used in Plate 3, Western India, of the National Atlas of India, 1965. To write Kambayat for Cambay, or Bharuch for Broach, would be pedantic and confusing. Nor have I used any diacritical marks in the body of the text. A list follows, giving the spelling used in the text on the left, and a correct transliteration, with diacritical marks, on the right. In transliterations from Persian I have followed the scheme approved by the American Library Association and the Library of Congress. Occasionally I have been forced to use names not existing in sixteenth-century Asia, such as Indonesia or Malaya. In such cases I am obviously referring to the areas of these countries today.

Complete consistency is not possible, but with the help of the maps in the text little difficulty should be found in locating places.

| | |
|---|---|
| Agra | Āgra |
| Ahmadabad | Aḥmadābād |
| Ahmadnagar | Aḥmadnagar |
| Akbar | Akbar |
| Awrangzeb | Awrangzīb |
| Bahadur | Bahādur |
| Bhatkal | Bhatkal |
| Bijapur | Bījāpūr |
| Brahmin | Brāhmin (Brāhmaṇa) |
| Broach | Bharūch |
| Cambay | Kambāyat |
| Champanir | Chāmpānīr |
| Chaul | Jīval |
| Chauth | Chauth |
| Daman | Daman |
| Div | Dīv |
| Divan | Dīvān |
| Farman | Farmān |
| Fathipur Sikri | Fatḥipūr Sīkrī |
| Fawjdar | Fawjdār |
| Gogha | Gawghah |
| Gujarat | Gujarāt |
| Gujarati | Gujarātī |
| Guyati | Guyāti |
| Haji Muhammad Zahid Beg | Ḥaji Muḥammad Zahīd Beg |
| Honavar | Honavar |
| Hurmuz | Hurmuz |

| | |
|---|---|
| Imad-ul-mulk | 'Imād-ul-mulk |
| Jagirdar | Jāgīrdār |
| Jahangir | Jahāngīr |
| Jani Qurbani | Jānī Qurbānī |
| Khanqah | Khānqāh |
| Khwajah Safar | Khwājah Ṣafar |
| Koli | Kōlī |
| Mahajan | Mahājan |
| Mahmud Bigarh | Maḥmūd Bīgarh |
| Malik Ayaz | Malik Ayāz |
| Malik Gupi | Malik Gūpī |
| Malik Tughan | Malik Ṭūghān |
| Malwah | Mālwah |
| Mamluk | Mamlūk |
| Mansabdar | Manṣabdār |
| Mughal | Mughal |
| Muhammad Qulij Khan | Muḥammad Qulij Khān |
| Mulk | Mulk |
| Murad Bakhsh | Murād Bakhsh |
| Muzaffar | Muẓaffar |
| Muzafat | Muz̤āfāt |
| Panchayat | Panchāyat (Pañcāyat) |
| Patel | Paṭel |
| Pir | Pīr |
| Qazi | Qāz̤ī |
| Rajput | Rājpūt |
| Rander | Rānīr |

| | |
|---|---|
| Sarraf | Ṣarrāf |
| Sawrath | Sawrath |
| Shahbandar | Shāhbandar |
| Shah Jahan | Shāh Jahān |
| Shaivism | Śaiva |
| Shantidas | Śāntidās |
| Shiah | Shī'ah |
| Shiva | Śiva |
| Sikandar | Sikandar |
| Silsilah | Silsilah |
| Subahdar | Ṣūbahdār |
| Sufi | Ṣūfī |
| Sultan | Sulṭān |
| Surat | Sūrat |
| Ulama | 'Ulamā |
| Vaishnavite | Vaiṣṇava |
| Vaisya | Vaiśya |
| Vania | Vāṇiā |
| Varna | Varṇa |
| Zamindar | Zamīndār |

## APPENDIX II

## MONEY AND VALUES

The problem here was to find one unit of currency for use throughout the dissertation. As this dissertation is concerned with Indian history, I finally settled on rupees. In conversions from other currencies I have taken R.1 as being equivalent to 200 Portuguese <u>reis</u>; thus a Portuguese <u>xerafim</u> is taken as being worth 50% more than a rupee. In this respect C.R. Boxer has been relied on. (C.R. Boxer, <u>The Great Ship from Amacon</u>, Lisbon, 1959, appendix, "Currency, Weights and Measures," pp. 335-42. For rates of conversion from Portuguese to Gujarati currency see footnote 56 of chapter I.) Sometimes a specific rate of conversion is noted in the sources, and in such cases this has of course been used, but normally I have been unable to adjust for the very considerable fluctuations in the price of bullion in sixteenth-century India. Occasionally in the text I give a modern United States dollar equivalent. Here I use C.G.F. Simkin's claim that one <u>cruzado</u> in the sixteenth century was worth £2/17/0 today, at the 1968 price of gold of $35 per troy ounce, and taking £1 at $2.80. (C.G.F. Simkin, <u>The Traditional Trade of Asia</u>, London, 1968, p. 163, footnote.) Hence R.1 in the sixteenth

century was worth nearly $4.00 today. Here again conversions from gold *cruzados* to silver *xerafins* and rupees are obviously perilous. Further, many of our statistics are only slightly more specific than the "thousands and thousands and lakhs and crores" which a sultan of Gujarat once paid to the Portuguese. Still, in a work touching on economic history something had to be decided on; I have tried to be cautious in my use of the sources, and it behooves the reader to treat my statistics in a similarly gingerly way.

## APPENDIX III
## GLOSSARY

This glossary is intended solely for the convenience of readers of this dissertation. Fuller definitions and derivations for most of these words will be found in: H.H. Wilson, _A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms_, Delhi, 1968; Sir Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell, _Hobson-Jobson. A Glossary of Anglo-Indian words and phrases_, Delhi, 1968; S.R. Dalgado, _Glossário Luso-Asiatico_, Coimbra, 1919-21, 2 vols.

| | |
|---|---|
| Baneane | Portuguese corruption of _vania_, q.v. |
| Banyan | English corruption of _vania_, q.v. |
| Bar | An Indian unit of weight which varied widely but in western India was equal to 3½ to 4 _quintals_, q.v., and so equalled 455-520 lbs. avoirdupois. |
| Benjan | Corruption of _vania_, q.v. |
| Bohrah | Member of an Ismaili shiah sect. |
| Cafila | A land caravan, usually of camels; used by the Portuguese to refer to the convoys of small trading ships which sailed under their auspices on the western Indian coast. |
| Cambay | In this dissertation always refers to the town of this name at the head |

| | |
|---|---|
| | of the Gulf of Cambay, except in quotations when Gujarat may be meant. |
| Candil | Unit of weight, widely used in Goa. Often equal to a bar, q.v., or to 3-3/4 quintals, q.v. |
| Cartaz | Pass issued by the Portuguese to a merchant ship. |
| Chauth | Demand for one-quarter of the land revenue of an area. |
| Crore | 10,000,000. Cf. lakh. |
| Divan | Financial official. |
| Farangi | Frank, European. Slightly perjorative. |
| Farman | Order or decree issued by a Muslim ruler. |
| Fawjdar | Administrative head of a sarkar, q.v. |
| Fidalgo | A Portuguese gentleman or petty noble--literally "son of a somebody." |
| Fusta | Single masted oared boat, with about forty oarsmen and of about forty tons. In English, "foist." |
| Guyati | Gujarati for "jati"--a relatively homogeneous Hindu or Jain endogamous group, based mostly on occupation. Loosely used interchangeably with the term "caste." |
| Jagir | An allotment of territory to provide for the support of an official or noble |

| | |
|---|---|
| | in general and his troops and retainers. |
| Jagirdar | Holder of a jagir. |
| Khanqah | A hospice for sufis, q.v. |
| Khojah | Member of the Ismaili shiah sect which today recognises the Agha Khan as its head. |
| Kotwal | Urban police official. |
| Lakh | Indian term meaning 100,000. One hundred lakhs make one crore. |
| Mahajan | A body governing in commercial matters people engaged in a particular occupation. Also a city-wide body regulating all commercial affairs. |
| Nagarsheth | Head, elected or hereditary, of a city-wide mahajan, q.v. |
| Panch | Body regulating trade matters for a group of artisans. |
| Panchayat | A governing council in general. |
| Paroe | Light oared boat, about forty feet, usually with one sail. |
| Patel | Head of a panch, q.v.; headman in general. |
| Pir | Head of a sufi group; a Muslim mystic in general. |
| Qazi | A Muslim judge. |
| Quintal | A basic Portuguese unit of weight, equal to 130 lbs. avoirdupois. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Renda | A source of government revenue in Portuguese India, collected by a contractor. |
| Sarkar | A territorial and administrative unit, several together making up a _subah_, q.v. |
| Sarraf | A banker; a merchant. |
| Sheth | Head of an occupational mahajan. |
| Shahbandar | The head of a group of foreign merchants in a port; in Surat and occasionally elsewhere a port official, a harbor master. |
| Silsilah | A _sufi_, q.v., order. |
| Subah | A province. |
| Subahdar | Governor of a _subah_. |
| Sufi | A Muslim mystic, a member of a sunni Muslim religious order. |
| Vania | A Gujarati Hindu or Jain merchant. |
| Varna | One of the four (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Sudra) largely mythical divisions of Hindu society. |
| Xerafim | The standard Goan silver coin, consisting of 300 _reis_, and roughly equal to Rs. 1½. |
| Zamindar | A holder or controller of an area of land, its products, and its population. |
| Zamorin | Title of the Hindu rulers of Calicut. |

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