Abstract

Title of Thesis: Legitimacy and Political Stability: Case Studies on US Military Intervention
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This thesis explores the research question: How does US military intervention impact the political stability of the host state during and after a conflict? US intervention and the implementation of policies by the US in the host state during and after the conflict both aid and hinder the rebuilding and development of the host state in the aftermath of the conflict. Actions taken by the US during the state-building process through policies regarding military presence and aid influenced the strength of the host country in building legitimacy and in creating a politically stable system, such as through the implementation of treaties or aid. This research explores two cases studies, the Korean War of 1950-1953 and the Iraq War of 2003-2011, in order to create a framework for analyzing US military intervention through the lens of political stability and provides a starting point for further research in this area. I begin by discussing key concepts for the thesis and outlining the analytical framework I created, then explore each case individually, before finally comparing them to draw larger conclusions about the research question. This thesis focuses on economic development, continued violence, and legitimacy as the factors for political stability. The analysis and comparison of the two cases showed that action and lack of action from the US in the aftermath of political intervention has implications for the success of the host state in rebuilding. Economic aid provided by the US aided economic development, the methods and reasons for withdrawal lended to continuing conflict in the host state, and the type of relationship between the US and the host state had an influence on the establishment of legitimacy for the host state's government.
Legitimacy and Political Stability: 
Case Studies on US Military Intervention

By

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

Research Question

The United States has a long history of military intervention in wars and conflicts. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011 are just a few of the conflicts that can be named. In these conflicts, the US deployed troops to these states for many publicly stated purposes, including supporting an ally, pursuing the goal of the preservation of democracy, and more. The troop deployments had an impact not only on the direction of the war but also the aftermath, particularly on the political landscape.

To explore these issues, the following question will be explored: *how does US military intervention impact the political stability of the host country during and after a conflict?* In this thesis, I will argue that US intervention and the implementation of policies by the US in the host state during and after the conflict both aid and hinder the rebuilding and development of the host state in the aftermath of the conflict. Actions taken by the US during the state-building process through policies regarding military presence and aid influenced the strength of the host country in building *legitimacy* and *stability* in a new or existing political system.

Exploring this question is important for several reasons. First, history provides a new perspective on issues today. In the summer of 2021, US troops completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, due to the lack of a comprehensive evacuation and defeat of the Afghan army by the Taliban, local populations were left devastated. While many Americans believed that the US had been in Afghanistan for too long, the consequences for those left behind were long-lasting (Doherty). Second, examining this history to analyze the effectiveness of tactics such as military interventions is useful in improving US foreign policy today and in future
conflicts. Third, implementing stronger foreign policy reduces the negative impacts of the US military’s actions on host states and will improve the US’s relationship with the rest of the world. By analyzing past cases, such as the Iraq War and the Korean War, we, as policy makers and researchers in the US, can have a better understanding of how to approach similar situations in the future.

**Literature Review**

*State-building and Peace-building*

State-building and peace-building are big parts of post-conflict transformation literature. These processes come with success and failures, costs and benefits, and usually involve some form of foreign intervention. Foreign intervention manifests in several ways, such as through military action, foreign aid in terms of money and resources, and political influences through diplomacy and negotiation. Although this thesis focuses on military action as a foreign intervention tool, these other forms of foreign intervention may be examined briefly within this discussion on existing state-building literature. This set of sources show how state-building, particularly in regards to economic and political institutions, is impacted in the aftermath of violent conflicts. It also shows how foreign intervention plays a role in the success or failure of state-building.

One source on state-building discussed how peace-building and state-building have become the main approaches for dealing with humanitarian consequences in the aftermath of a conflict and for pushing democratization and economic development (Richmond). Oliver Richmond and Gëzim Visoka discussed how state-building and peace-building have become a part of the international peacekeeping system in that they are common strategies used by states to maintain peace, but also how these approaches were overshadowed by intervention in the name
of preventing terrorism. Particularly when conducted by powerful Western nations, intervention with the supposed goal of peace-building was overrun by these state’s political institutions, which dominate over those of the developing nations they entered into (Richmond). This connects well with Robert Pauly’s article on state-building and US foreign policy. He showed how state-building operations have become a prominent tool of US foreign policy in the agenda for democratization. He argues that the shift from political development aid to monetary aid to the host states in the specific contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan prove the effectiveness of state-building aid as a peacekeeping tool and for the promotion of international cooperation (Pauly). In addition, his discussion into the costs and benefits of such intervention during the state-building process indicated how intervention can be both helpful and harmful. As a result, more militaristic approaches than state-building and peace-building were used more often under the reason to prevent terrorism. Both of these sources, though, lack information on intervention during the conflict itself, choosing to focus on intervention during the peacebuilding process, a form of intervention that may not necessarily fit the category of military intervention because it doesn’t involve the movement of troops.

State-building is most successful when the new state can strongly establish their legitimacy, then they will be able to stay in power (Lake 9). Maintaining this political stability is difficult, though, so often foreign intervention comes into play to stand as an effective catalyst for social order (Lake 4). In his book, David Lake discussed the limits of the foreign nation’s role in state-building being due to the foreign states overwhelming presence such that the host state cannot stand independently, and because the foreign entity has interests of its own it wants to protect when aiding in the state-building (Lake 195). The opposing priorities of the state within which state-building was occurring and of the foreign intervention resulted in what
was known as the state-builders’ dilemma, where more often than not the result was a failed state. These opposing priorities, for example, is when a foreign state enters the host state with the intent of helping the host state, but pursues their own political agendas which are not always aligned with the goals and actions that the host state themselves wants to pursue. Ultimately, though, Lake suggested that there needs to be more incentives for the state’s themselves to contribute more actively to their own state-building in order to create stronger states (Lake 208).

The limited abilities of foreign states in state-building is a common theme throughout state-building literature. Krasner and Risse discuss how actors engaging in state-building activities are limited in the control they can exert because of lacking three factors that are needed for stronger administrative control: legitimacy, task properties, and institutional design (Krasner 547). In this limited statehood, the central authorities are unable to enforce decisions because they don’t have a monopoly over the legitimacy of their power (Krasner 549). Therefore, in cases on limited statehood, often domestic actors are limited in their decision-making powers and external actors hold more of the control. Like in Lake’s book, Krasner and Risse also discuss the failure and success of state-building. The three factors mentioned before, legitimacy, task properties, and institutional design, are the main determinants of successful state-building, alongside having adequate resources to maintain the state (Krasner 546). Overall, this introduction discusses the gap between what states are supposed to do and what they can actually do, and how there still exists plenty of actionable accomplishments in that in-between space. Their introduction of the special issue provides a good overview of the success and failure of state-building from the actions and decisions of both external and domestic actors, but it lacks more information about intervention in these contexts.
The last source in this group of state-building literature takes a slightly different angle on the concept of state-building and the goals of the foreign actors than the others discussed in this section. In their research, Börzel and van Hüllen examine how the efforts of external actors in state-building were specifically to strengthen political institutions and other state capacities in order to reduce corruption (Börzel 615). To conduct their research, they looked empirically at the EU’s corruption-fighting efforts in Armenia and Georgia between 2001 and 2010 (Börzel 614). Their comparison of the two cases through how anticorruption policy was used showed that legitimacy is a key factor in the success of external actors’ state-building efforts. This idea about legitimacy fits with the larger discussion of state-building in this section because, like in Lake’s research, it shows that the legitimacy of the new state is important not only in minimizing corruption, but in achieving a success in state-building.

The common thread to all the sources in this section is that they only looked at state-building in the context of the interventions that occurred directly with the intention of peace-building and only in the aftermath of a conflict. With my research, I will look more closely at US military intervention, as well as how the intervention during the conflict has an impact on state-building in the aftermath. In addition, my research will focus on the goal of political stability, contrasted with the threat of instability, providing one specific lens through which intervention can be examined. The difference between peace-building and military intervention is important to distinguish because one involves more forceful methods than the other, and therefore elicits differing reactions from the host state’s government and citizens. Exploring this difference will further emphasize the necessity of a relationship between peace-building and military intervention.
Connections between foreign military intervention and state-building

Foreign military intervention has a strong influence on state-building, particularly when it comes to political reconstruction and the impact on social order. Three articles written by Andrew Enterline and J. Michael Greig discussed the impacts of imposed democracies on political stability, peace-building, and the futures of these nations where a democracy has been imposed by foreign powers. They drew on specific examples such as the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. In one article, they examined the history of imposed democracies and identified three key conditions for the longevity of these democracies: the degree of democracy, the degree of social divisions, and the level of economic prosperity (Enterline, *Against All Odds* 339). They concluded that, though, historically speaking, the odds are against the survival of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, their trajectories are influenced by policy choices that may point to some chance of success (Enterline, *Against All Odds* 346). In another article, they further discuss the future of Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of political instability. Enterline and Greig compared the conditions present in the successfully maintained stability of West Germany and Japan to Iraq and Afghanistan, and, finding that the conditions of West Germany and Japan were not present in Iraq and Afghanistan, concluded that Iraq and Afghanistan may not have durable democracies (Enterline, *Perfect Storms* 910). This conclusion stands in opposition to the ideas presented in *Against All Odds*, though both were published in the same year. The third article by Enterline and Greig, published a few years prior to the other two discussed here, examined the effect of the American occupation on Iraq and found that if Iraq emerged as an enduring democratic power, greater prosperity and peace in the area may be possible, although the conditions for that to be possible in Iraq in the first place were difficult to establish (Enterline, *Beacons of Hope* 1095). Enterline and Greig’s three articles worked well in tandem to explain the political impacts of imposed democracies and the conditions necessary for the imposed democracies to succeed. In
addition, they discussed the influence of US intervention in particular in the development of these imposed polities, providing a comprehensive look into the topic of political impacts as a result of foreign interventions.

In their recently published book, Carla Machain, who was previously mentioned in the section on instability after US troop withdrawals, along with Michael Allen, Michael Flynn, and Andrew Stravers, examined US military deployments as a central pillar of US foreign policy. Specifically, they analyzed the positive and negative opinions of the public in the host countries as informed by their reactions to the presence of the US military (Machain, *Beyond the Wire* 1). The book was centered on US troop deployments during peacetimes, and they also discussed the US’s long history of using its military presence as a method to expand its influence (Machain, *Beyond the Wire* 9). Machain and the others looked in particular at the links between public diplomacy, soft power, and hard power, and how this informed perceptions of the US military in other countries, such creating negative perceptions of the US military that made it more difficult for them take any actions (Machain, *Beyond the Wire* 15, 22, 26).

The literature discussed in this section provides in-depth information on the impacts foreign military intervention has on a host state’s political stability as well as how it links to future US foreign policy. My own research will fit well into this discussion, providing additional insights into how military movements and deployments impact the aftermath politically, and also by adding the Korean War as another case for discussion. In my thesis, I will also expand the discussion on impacts on political stability/instability for the host state by breaking this lens into three factors, and then using these factors as the basis of my analysis for larger political implications.
Instability after US troop withdrawals and deployments

Instability is one of the impacts explored in the current literature. The literature tries to understand if US military intervention causes instability, and, if so, in what ways, such as politically or economically. In one source, two instances of US redeployments out of Korea were discussed and compared, framing US troop redeployment as the treatment to test whether or not this causes instability (Avey 7). The rapid redeployment of US troops out of Korea were the exogenous events that may or may not cause instability, and, by observing the aftermath of the withdrawal, the researchers evaluated if the cause of instability was the US withdrawal. Quantitative, qualitative, and graphical analyses were conducted for the two exogenous events, and the researchers found that there was no change in instability for either event (Avey 25, 33-34). While their research can have broader implications for the impacts of US military intervention, specifically in the aftermath of an intervention, it is still limited in scope due the evaluation of only two events for the same location. Limiting their cases geographically was useful because similarities between the two exogenous events made the comparison between more valuable and accurate, but it still leaves room for questions on the wider impacts their research has on military intervention literature.

Another source also looks at US troop deployments and the impact it has on the foreign country, but it looks at stability specifically in terms of the ways intervention impacts the host states’ foreign policy. Their research proved a general theory that associates the deployment of troops abroad with other states’ behavior and provided insight into the gaps that may exist in the intended and unintended consequences of US troop deployments (Machain, *The Effect of US Troop*). As Machain and Morgan focused on foreign policy impacts in regards to military policy of the host states in reaction to US troop deployments. This connects to instability because, like
Avey’s research, it shows that the deployment of foreign troops to a host state impacts the policies of the host state, particularly in regards to political structure, and this may affect the balance of power in the host state.

This last source on US military deployment in Korea looks at the impact on stability in yet another way. In general, their research concluded that the US’s military deployments do have a statistically significant impact on South Korea’s domestic and foreign investment, trade, political development, and economic growth, these impacts being mostly positive with some indirect negative consequences (Heo). Their research provided valuable information on four factors where US military intervention can have an influence. In addition, these four factors contribute to the political stability of a state, so, like Avey’s research, it also discusses the impacts of military intervention on instability. Although, unlike Avey’s research, which says that military intervention doesn’t necessarily lead to the instability of the host state, Heo’s research argues that there were impacts on stability as a result of US military troop deployments.

My own research will contribute to this literature by expanding on foreign policy implications, broadening the impacts of US military deployments and movements of troops in regards to political development and stability, and focusing more heavily on qualitative information. I will be using quantitative data which shows if the factors of political instability exist in the conflicts I examine, and then supporting that quantitative data with the qualitative information of the events that occur after the conclusion of the conflict. I will use this data to observe and analyze changes prior to, during, and after the conflict. In addition, as three cases will be compared, more than just Korea will be examined. Specifically, I will be examining the Korean War and the Iraq War.
Conclusion of Literature Review

Overall, the literature discussed here in relation to my research topic of the impact of US military intervention on political stability included specific case research into the impacts of foreign intervention during state-building and peace-building in the aftermath of a conflict, the influence of foreign intervention when it comes to the imposition of political systems, and the stability of states after US military intervention. These three areas can be closely grouped together with other post-conflict transformation literature, and they reveal insights into the history of foreign intervention, what this history implies for current foreign interventions, and the impacts on stability of the host nations. In addition, it discussed how these impacts influence future foreign policy, for the US in particular.

The literature discussed here leaves open room for deeper discussion into the reasons for foreign military intervention. It also leaves room for analysis into how intervention taking place during the conflict influences state-building and political stability in the aftermath because most of the intervention examined here was about intervention which occurred during the post-conflict transformation period. In addition, there are openings in this literature to discuss future foreign policy implications in more detail.

With my research, I will contribute further to the existing ideas on future policy implications and impacts of US military intervention on political stability. Taking both a historical and present-day qualitative perspective on two specific cases, Iraq and South Korea, will provide new angles into the existing literature regarding state-building as it relates to intervention during a conflict. Through my research, I will widen the scope of the ideas presented in the current literature, as well as provide a new angle on these ideas through the lens
of a specific definition for military intervention and the construction of a new analytical framework.

**Overview of Thesis**

In chapter 2, I will discuss the key concepts that are necessary for understanding my analysis of the Korean War and the Iraq War. Then, I will discuss my methods for this research, starting with what data I’m using, from where, and how I am using it. Chapter 2 is the conceptual chapter where I outline my framework for analysis of the cases. In chapter 3, I will analyze the Korean War. I will start with an overview of the history and background of the conflict, and then I will show the quantitative and qualitative information I gathered, making connections between the two to show why and how the US military intervention has an impact on the political development and stability of South Korea after the conflict ends. Chapter 4 is similar in structure to chapter 3 except I will be analyzing the Iraq War. Chapter 5 will compare and contrast the Korean and Iraq War on their characteristics as conflicts, how the US military intervention began and ended, what impact the US had, and the implications of the impacts. Finally, in the conclusion, I will summarize my findings for the argument, and then discuss potential gaps in my thesis that could be explored in future research.
Chapter 2: Building an Analytical Framework for Foreign Intervention

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss in detail the key concepts through which my case studies on the Korean War and Iraq War will be analyzed. This discussion includes defining what political stability is, how I will use this definition in my analysis, and why this particular definition is useful in answering my research question, as well as what the key factors of political stability are that I will be using in the framework of my analysis. These factors for political stability are economic development, cases of continued or internal violence and conflict in the host state, and the legitimacy of the governments and systems established post-conflict. I will discuss why I chose these factors as the most significant ones to analyze and how I am defining them within the context of my research. I will then identify the quantitative indicators I am using to form each factor of political instability and define each indicator. For economic development, the indicator is Gross Domestic Product. For continued violence, I am utilizing data on freedom from torture, freedom from political killings, and CSO repression. For legitimacy, the indicators I am using are domestic autonomy, international autonomy, state authority over territory, rational-legal legitimation, and performance legitimation. I will then define foreign military intervention and discuss why I chose that definition and how it was formed. Following the discussion of the concepts, I will connect these pieces together and discuss the role they will play in the framework of my analysis for each case. The overarching purpose of this chapter is to explain the concepts within my analytical framework for the cases I will be analyzing in this research, and to explain how these concepts will contribute to my analysis. It sets up what to expect for my analysis of each case I chose to support the exploration of my research question, giving the roadmap for how the cases will be analyzed and why it is important to analyze them through these concepts.
Discussion

Defining Concepts

Political instability is when a government and its system cannot function at its full capacity, usually indicated by factors such as ethnic violence, riots, frequent changes in government systems, revolutions, and stagnated economic development (Kitingan 1). In other words, political instability is an indicator of the likelihood of a government collapse (Alesina 1). I chose Kitingan’s definition of political instability as the basis of my thesis because it comprehensively covers and summarizes the major factors that contribute to political instability in a state, as I will explain in the following paragraph.

There are a few theories on the causes of political instability, which Kitingan outlines in his book: the Political Gap Hypothesis, the Economic Gap Hypothesis, and the Frustration Aggression Hypothesis. The Political Gap Hypothesis argues that political instability comes from the slow development of political institutions in conjunction with rapid social change and new groups joining politics (Kitingan 4). One book by Howard D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan constructs political theory with the aim of creating a framework for the analysis of political processes, particularly regarding the relationship between power and society (Lasswell xi). In the first part of this book, they discussed theories related to how political science consists of the “conduct of persons with various perspectives of action, and organized into groups of varying complexity” (Lasswell 1). One of their theories on the behavior of organized groups talked about how a group that is formed on similar beliefs may experience intragroup clashes based on group members’ previously existing loyalties to other groups (Lasswell 33). While the book considers the involvement of a group widely, such as groups based on class loyalties and national loyalties, if we take the considerations of this theory with regards to political groups, we can postulate how social changes and changes in the structures of political groups can give rise to political
instability, as described in Kitingan’s Political Gap Hypothesis. The Economic Gap Hypothesis argues that economic inequalities from gaps in the distribution of wealth are responsible for political violence and instability (Kitingan 5). The relationship between economic development and political instability can go both ways. For instance, political instability reduces investment and slows economic development, but poor economic development can cause political unrest due to poor decision-making or dissatisfactory policies from the government (Alesina 1). In addition, economic volatility and political volatility are closely tied together as a result of uneven and discontinuous economic policy (Aisen 3). This is closely connected with the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, which argues that people become frustrated and angry when they are deprived of the opportunities they want, leading to social conflicts and violence, and therefore political instability (Kitingan 8). One study demonstrates this idea, showing through small-group studies, that when a leader’s actions are in conflict with the norms and standards of the group, the leader will face a loss of position and power, which on a larger-scale, is political instability in the government (Verba 190). Based on these hypotheses, I chose economic development, continued internal violence and conflict, and the legitimacy of the government of the host state as the most prevalent factors for me to analyze to determine whether political instability exists in each case I will delve into.

Economic development is defined as seeking improved well-being and growth of the economy, and a major indicator of economic activity is the Gross Domestic Product or GDP (World Bank). For that reason, when looking at data for indications of stagnated or growing economic development of the host state in each case, GDP is the factor I will focus on because it gives an overall picture of economic growth and standard of living. As such, this indicator fits well with evaluating Kitingan’s Economic Gap Hypothesis in each case analysis because
fluctuations in the overall economic health of a country can be seen in how consumption, investment, government spending, and net exports are added together in GDP. In the case of the Korean War, I am focusing my analysis on South Korea. Based on the time frame for data available from the World Bank, the information I need will not be found for South Korea there. For that reason, I will use the *Journal of Economic History* instead, which has tables on the growth of GDP.

For the next factor, continued internal violence, I am looking specifically at violence between the state and the citizens in the aftermath of the war. This factor connects to Kitingan’s Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, because the indicators I used for it create a picture of how much conflict there is between the people and the government, and thus provide implications for how the people of a state are reacting to the government’s rule. I have broken this factor down into three main sets of data, drawn from the Varieties of Democracy, a project which provides datasets that show the complexity of the democratic system through “distinguish[ing] between five high-level principles of democracy” (V-Dem). The first indicator is Freedom from Torture. The higher the value is of this indicator, the less torture is practiced by political figures and those in authority (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook”). This indicator is on a scale of 0 to 4. The second indicator, Freedom from Political Killings, meaning freedom from killings conducted by the state or agents of the state, is measured similarly to the Freedom from Torture indicator (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”). The final indicator, CSO Repression, which indicates how much the government suppresses civil society organizations, has a similar method of measurement to the previous two discussed indicators (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”). I chose these three indicators for the continued internal violence factor because they demonstrate the levels of tension between the state and the people through the state’s use of their power to cause harm.
against the people, and they show the specific ways in which the violence and tension between the two groups manifests.

Legitimacy is defined as how much authority the government has over their state, and the amount of influence they have in policy- and decision-making. Legitimacy connects to Kitigan’s Political Gap Hypothesis because this hypothesis talks about how the slow development of political institutions and the addition of new groups in political spaces can lead to instability. As such, the more legitimacy the government has in their state, the more likely it is that the political institutions are stabilized. I used five different indicators from the Varieties of Democracy data-set to determine how much control and power the Iraqi government had in Iraq, and how much power the South Korean government has over their territory. The five indicators are domestic autonomy, international autonomy, sovereignty over territory, performance legitimacy and rational-legal legitimacy. Domestic autonomy determines how much autonomy the state has over domestic policy, and it is measured from 0 to 2, with 0 being non-autonomous and 2 being autonomous (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”). The next indicator, international autonomy, is measured similarly to domestic autonomy, and it determines how much autonomy the state has over their foreign policy (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook). State Authority over Territory shows over what percentage of their territory the state has effective authority (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook”). Rational-legal legitimacy determines how much of the current government’s authority comes from legal norms and regulations, and it is measured on a scale of 0 to 4, with 0 being “not at all” and 4 being “almost exclusively.” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook). Performance legitimacy is measured on the same scale as rational-legal legitimacy, and it determines how much of the government’s authority comes from effective policies in areas such as economic growth and security (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook). For each indicator, I looked at
data ten years prior to the conflict, the years during the conflict, and the ten years after the conflict. Each of these five indicators demonstrate the level of power and control the state has over their territory, both in the implementation of policy and in the strength of their rule of law, which is why I chose them for the legitimacy factor of my analysis.

Foreign military intervention is defined as the movement of troops into a foreign country actively used to affect policy or conditions using force (Pearson 434-435). The states are the actors, with goals such as power, expansion of their influence and territory, stability, peacekeeping, and more. Figuring out the goals of the United States military intervention in each case I analyze is important because once the goals are determined, I can then analyze whether they succeeded in their intervention goals, as well as what factors led to the success or failure of the intervention.

Post-conflict peacebuilding are operations which try to create a stable, self-sustaining peace after an end to the violence has been negotiated (Hawk ix). Interventions which occur with the goal of peacebuilding have the most lasting impact (Hawk ix). Depending on the needs of the host state, the foreign intervention proceeds to provide aid in areas such as political and economic development as well as building and maintaining social order. As such, foreign military intervention in the post-conflict period in particular can have a significant impact on the three factors I am examining as indicators of political stability in each case. By looking at the goals of the foreign military intervention and the success or failure of those in each case in conjunction with the political stability of the host will provide the most direct way of analyzing the impact of foreign military intervention on the stability of the host state. Success as related to the foreign military intervention is defined as the goals of the intervening state being accomplished. This can happen in multiple ways, such as with a treaty, the ending of the conflict,
gaining the resources or power they wanted, or, more often, a combination of these ways. Part of this success, in my definition, lies in the post-conflict peacebuilding as a subset of foreign intervention in the period of time after a conflict, particularly in how the foreign intervening power views the importance of peacebuilding and their involvement in it. Failure is then the foreign power not achieving the goals they had established prior to intervening in the host state. As such, examining the goals of the military interventions and their results are necessary in successfully answering my research question.

*Framework of Analysis*

Using the concepts defined and explained in the previous section, I formed a framework for analysis in order to have a clear flow through my analysis of each case in subsequent chapters.

Fig. 1: My Analytical Framework for Case Studies in this Thesis, Part 1
Building off of the concepts I defined in the previous section of this chapter, I will now describe how each piece will connect to each other in the analysis of the cases in the later chapters. The first piece in Figure 1 that starts the case is the host state becoming involved in a war that takes place in their own territory. Understanding how the war begin and why is important in connecting the war to the next piece of the chart, the foreign military intervention. The definition I am using for foreign military intervention comes from Frederick Pearson. The reason I chose his definition is because it had the most flexible definition, which is useful when applying it to multiple cases that have key differences. His definition is flexible because it provides a broad idea for what a foreign military intervention means. With my two cases, the Korean War and the Iraq War, where differences exist in areas such as the method and reason for intervention by the US, the reasons for the conflict, the outcome of the conflicts, and the US’s impact, a broad definition is useful in applying one definition to multiple cases. In this way, Pearson’s definition provides the most applicability for my analysis of the two cases.

The foreign military intervention then branches off into two groups in the aftermath of the conflict. The first is the reaction of the host state to the intervention. What is the host state’s opinion about the foreign military intervention – do they welcome it, or are they opposed to the intervention? How did they react to the foreign presence? Was there a difference in how the civilians of the host state versus how the government of the host state acted? Considering these questions shows that the reaction of the host state determines what actions it may take in terms of their policies, which, as my flow chart demonstrates, has an influence on the factors of political instability.

The other category in the aftermath of the conflict is the actions of the foreign power conducting the intervention. Does the foreign state choose to continue their intervention in the
post-war period? Why or why not? Additionally, were their initial goals coming into the intervention accomplished, and does this have any influence on their decision to continue or withdraw from the intervention? Answering these questions then influences what decisions, if any, the foreign state makes in regards to changes they enact on the host state, influencing policy either through direct actions, or indirectly through their presence. As a result, these policies, specifically the decisions made in regards to their policy for dealing with the host state and imposed onto the host state, both work together to affect the factors of political instability.

These factors of political instability are economic development, continued violence, and the legitimacy of the host government. These factors and the indicators for each factor, shown in Figure 2 below to branch off from the Factors of Political Instability box shown in Figure 1, were previously defined in the concepts section, and the flowchart I created visualizes how each concept and component connects as well as how it will be used in my analysis of each case. The data for the indicators for each factor of political instability was downloaded from the Varieties of Democracy dataset for each host state, and in order to see the trends in the data, each indicator was displayed in a line graph through Microsoft Excel. In order to examine long-term changes and impacts, the years for each indicator begin ten years before the starting year of the conflict and end ten years after the last year of the conflict. This chapter explores the conceptual pieces of my analytical framework and how the pieces fit together. Then, in further chapters, an empirical analysis will be conducted, connecting the conceptual ideas with the quantitative data displayed in graphs.
Conclusion

This chapter defines political instability and the factors which I am using to analyze this stability in each case that I will explore in subsequent chapters. In addition, this chapter defines and explains what foreign military intervention is. Finally, this chapter discusses how I will connect political instability to the foreign military intervention through an analysis of the success or failure of the goals the intervening state had when entering the host state’s conflict and the host state’s reactions to the foreign intervention using a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. While the content of this chapter is essentially an expansion of my methodology, it was necessary to explore the details of my analytical framework and concepts separately in order to fully understand why the analysis is being conducted in this manner and set up how each case, the Korean War and the Iraq War, will be analyzed. One additional point is that the data from the World Bank does not expand far enough back to be used to determine GDP growth for
South Korea in the Korean War case, so more vague data from a different source will be used to give a general picture of economic development at the time. This chapter serves to outline my analytical framework and methods in more detail and provide background for why each case is being analyzed with this framework and methods. In addition, this chapter helps to answer and explore my research question in that it provides context for my analysis of the cases and conflicts, as well as providing my own insights and thoughts into how this context and the concepts discussed in this chapter best support my argument for my research question.
Chapter 3: A Case Study on the Korean War of 1950-1953

Introduction

In this chapter, I will explore the case of the Korean War of 1950. I will begin by giving a brief summary of how and why the war begin, what happened during this war, and how it ended in 1953. I will also summarize at what point in the conflict the United States became militarily involved, why they did so, and what goals the US had in intervening in the Korean War. My analysis is looking specifically at the impacts on South Korea, not North Korea.

Next, I will move into the post-conflict period, giving an overview of what occurred in South Korea from 1953 to 1973. My post-conflict section will begin by discussing how South Korea, specifically the government and the civilians, reacted to the US presence during and after the war. It will also include discussion of whether the US succeeded in their initial intervention goals, if they continued their military intervention even after the war ended, and why they made that decision. I will then examine what policies they enacted in the post-war transition and state-building period, particularly what the relationship between the two countries was like.

Then, I will examine the three factors of instability for South Korea which I previously identified, economic development, continued intrastate violence, and government legitimacy, in order to determine what change occurred in the country over the course of the pre-war, during war, and post-war periods. The pre-war period will specifically begin 10 years prior to the start of the war, beginning in 1940. This analysis will continue a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data is drawn from the Varieties of Democracy datasets, from which I pulled out information that are significant to the three factors of political instability. Using Microsoft Excel, I turned the data into a series of line graphs, which I then used to find the patterns in the data. The quantitative information will be supported by qualitative information.
about the events of the Korean War which were taking place at those times. Finally, I will tie these three sections together by analyzing how the data on political stability may be connected to the US policies.

By analyzing the Korean War, I aim to show one example of the role of the US and their foreign military intervention on a host state’s post-conflict state-building and development. The Korean War was a case where the US provided support to South Korea, both in terms of resources and military power, thus conducting a foreign military intervention. Once a treaty was signed, ending the war, the US made specific decisions regarding the movement of their troops, whether they chose to stay and influence the formation of new systems in South Korea, and in regards to how South Korea grew and recovered in the aftermath. These decisions and actions by the US had an impact on South Korea’s post-conflict state-building. Through this analysis, I argue that the policies implemented by the United States and the presence of their military influence how the host state makes its own decisions. In addition, I argue how the US military presence and the US’s policies can both aid or hinder the host state’s development, specifically in terms of the political stability of the host state in the aftermath. In this chapter, the case of South Korea demonstrates that intervention from and alliance with the US can help in the establishment of state legitimacy.

Background

Approximately eleven years prior to the Korean War, in 1939, World War II began. As a result of this conflict, when World War II ended in 1945, Korea was divided into the communist North influenced by the Soviet Union, and the budding democracy of the South, influenced by the United States (Reece 7). The thirty-eighth parallel line, no more than a line on a map rather than an area marked by any physical boundaries, was determined to be the dividing line between
the Soviet and American military occupations in Korea and set up their own military
governments in their zones (Stueck 12). Following the start of the occupation, the Soviets and
Americans conducted conferences to talk about how to proceed in dealing with Korea, with the
Americans wanting to discuss reuniting the two parts of Korea, and the Soviets only being
willing to discuss trade and transportation with the South (Stueck 15). Japan’s defeat in WWII
and the subsequent removal of their presence from Korea marked the opening of a power
vacuum in Asia, one that the Soviets were eager to fill with their own expansion of communism
– an endeavor which the Americans sought to prevent. Thus, the Cold War between the Soviet
Union and the United States transferred into the conflict between North and South Korea. This
conflict over whether to remain divided and over political ideologies eventually escalated. On
June 25th, 1950, North Korean soldiers launched a surprise attack on South Korea, marking the
start of the Korean War (Reece 6). US forces came to South Korea’s aid with the goal of
preserving democracy, but they were severely unprepared to face off against the North Korean
army, with many being killed within hours of the invasion (Reece 13). Eventually, United
Nations forces joined the US in the battle for South Korea, or rather what South Korea
symbolized – an opportunity to install South Korea as a powerful force in Asia for democracy
(Stueck 88). The Chinese intervened towards the beginning of the conflict as well, siding with
the Soviets and North Korea, aligned in their goals to spread communist ideas and communism.
The goal of the US and the UN was to hold the Soviets and their allies at the thirty-eighth
parallel line, while the other side pushed to advance into South Korea and claim territory there.
By June 1951, the UN, supported by the US, and China was ready to enter negotiations and
peace talks, so in July, fighting scaled down (Reece 78). The negotiations took two years, and
whenever meetings ended, the fighting would continue. Peace talks dragged on, and full fighting
frequently resumed, resulting in massive losses of life. Finally, on July 27, 1953, an armistice was signed, an agreement in which the result of the conflict was essentially a draw (Reece 86). After the armistice was set, the UN created a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, a 2.5-mile-wide strip of land that crossed the thirty-eighth parallel line at an angle, and both sides moved their armed forces back, creating a buffer zone (Reece 89). As such, the DMZ created a clear division of Korea into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea (Edwards 159). With that, this bloody war ended in an uneasy peace.

US Military Intervention

As discussed in the previous section, the US was involved in the Korean War from the beginning. Continuing off of the end of WWII, Soviets involvement in North Korea and their aims to spread communism sparked a response from the US in the form of military support for South Korea with the main goal being the preservation of democracy. It was a continuation of the Soviets and the US’ Cold War. When the North Korean invasion into South Korea began, the US took three steps: first, the President order material aid to be sent to the South Korean soldiers; next, the Air Force was sent to help US citizens in South Korea evacuate; and, third, the US Navy moved into the waters between Taiwan and China to prevent any communist forces from invading Taiwan (Reece 7-8). In addition, the US received permission from the UN to use aggression and force to prevent North Korea from its invasion, and the support of UN forces meant that the US could frame its involvement as supporting the UN rather than officially being at war (Reece 8). With the UN approval, the US was able to freely move its forces into South Korea and act to fight against North Korea, essentially conducting a foreign military intervention.
Initially, during WWII, the US had had no interested in competing with the Soviets regarding Korea, preferring a multipower trusteeship. Once Japan was removed, though, Korea did not have the economic power to support themselves (Stueck 20). With that came the US’ more direct involvement in the conflict in Korea and in advancing their interests for a foothold in Asia, specifically in the cultivation of a democratic power in that region that would be an ally and support the advancement of their goals in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. By the time the thirty-eighth parallel was established, the Soviets and the United States had indeed entered a competition regarding the fate of and control over the Korean Peninsula. While the US troops had initially entered Korea as an occupying force to push out the Japanese presence, them saving South Korea from the communist forces of North Korea helped form a solid alliance between the two nations (Sungjoo 1075). Though the US framed their involvement in the Korean War as rescuing South Korea, it was, in essence, a way to continue the agenda to spread democracy and maintain their own power, a goal in which they partially succeeded, as evidenced by the armistice agreement which was previously discussed. This was only a partial success because South Korea did not immediately become a democracy. While the armistice agreement succeeded in enforcing the division between North and South Korea, South Korea still maintained an authoritarian rule until 1987, when constitutional revisions led to the election of a president (Mo xvi). Fairness in rule of law and government legitimacy are necessary factors for a mature democracy (Mo xv). Thus, while the US’ relationship with South Korea introduced democratic ideas, those were not actually put into practice until South Korea became more economically stable.
Post-Conflict

Next, we will discuss the outcomes of the Korean War and how US involvement and influence continued in the region. As established in the previous sections, the Korean War ended with the signing of an armistice agreement in which North Korea and South Korea became separate countries, divided along the thirty-eighth parallel line and the DMZ that went over it. Since then, the US continued to play a significant role in the development of South Korea. The United States played a vital role in the economic and military development of South Korea. The Mutual Defense Treaty, signed between the United States and South Korea shortly after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, facilitated the US assistance of South Korea. For instance, in the twenty years after its signing, the US gave approximately eight percent of its worldwide economic and military assistance to South Korea; by 1973, they had given South Korea $11 billion in aid, more than any other country except South Vietnam (Sungjoo 1075-1076). In addition, the United States has a pervasive influence over the directions of South Korea’s foreign and domestic policies, playing a significant role in such decisions as the “resignation of President Syngman Rhee in 1960, the establishment of a civilian government in 1963, the dispatch of Korean combat troops to Vietnam in 1965,” and more (Sungjoo 1077).

The relationship established between the United States and South Korea through the Mutual Defense Agreement was largely one-sided, though, in several ways. One was the amount of influence the US had over the policy decisions of South Korea at an international level, meaning that South Korea’s decisions in international matters were colored by their alliance with the US and by what the US chose. Another was that, while the American troops were meant to serve as protection from North Korea, the South Koreans had no protections from actions of violence and another criminal acts that the American soldiers committed against the Koreans –
actions which US governmental institutions such as the Pentagon and Congress ignored and thus refused to renegotiate their bilateral agreement; although an accord was finally reached in 1965 (Stueck 192). On the other hand, the establishment of permanent US military bases led to unity through marriages, which increased immigration in the United States and gave the South Korean government an uncommon amount of influence over the US than it had before (Stueck 193).

**Political Instability**

*Introduction*

In this section of the chapter, I aim to break down the three factors of political instability I’m utilizing for this research, economic development, continued violence, and legitimacy of government, into smaller pieces using GDP data and the Varieties of Democracy data set.

**Economic Development**

The first factor I will examine is how economic development changed over time. Prior to the Korean War, from 1913 to 1950, South Korea experienced a GDP growth rate of -0.9 percent (Maddison 28). When South Korea was created in 1948, it was the poorest country in the world (Seth). As discussed before, South Korea had just begun development at the time, and with the expulsion of Japan from Korea by the United States, South Korea did not have the resources to support itself. In addition, it wasn’t until around 1950-1951 that the US began to have a more active interest in affairs in the Korean Peninsula, so they did not provide much aid either at first. So, in its origins, South Korea was a largely agricultural and poor state in a rapidly industrializing world; in addition, North Korea held much of Korea’s industrial and electrical power (Seth). With the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, the economic situation only worsened. It was not until after the Korean War that South Korea began its long and slow recovery period. From 1950 to 1973, the GDP growth rate in South Korea was 4.9 percent (Maddison 28). From
1961 to 1966, South Korea experienced rapid economic development, with some of the highest economic growth rates in the world, and transformed into a prosperous and industrial society (Seth). This was due to the military government of Park Chung Hee, which came into power in 1961 and focused largely on economic development (Seth). Though they had few natural resources, a combination of state planning and private entrepreneurship facilitated a shift from a labor-intensive to a capital-intensive industry, fostering massive economic growth and development. In addition, the prior administration of Syngman Rhee from 1948 to 1961, employed two major reform policies, land reform and educational development, which were significant boons to the future economic development of South Korea (Seth). As mentioned in the background section, the United States also provided $12.6 billion in aid to South Korea by 1976, from which it can tentatively concluded that this aid played a significant role in supporting the economic development of South Korea (Seth). The data about GDP growth rates as well as the information about steps taken towards economic reform indicated that economic development and stability actually improved after the war and that the US’s aid had a positive influence on South Korea economically by providing resources necessary for the reform to occur successfully.

Continued Violence and Conflict

For the continued violence factor of political instability, I have broken it down into three main sets of data, drawn from the Varieties of Democracy. The first is Freedom from Torture, and the higher the value is of this indicator, the less torture is practiced by political figures and those in authority (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).
In the years leading up to the Korean War in 1950, Figure 3 shows us that the chance of torture was high until 1947, when South Korea split off from North Korea. While the chance of torture was still high, it was not as high as before. Going into the war, it dipped back into the negatives, likely due to the ongoing conflict. Even after the war ended in 1953, the fluctuations in the freedom from torture show signs of continued conflict.

The second indicator, Freedom from Political Killings, meaning freedom from killings conducted by the state or agents of the state, is measured similarly to the Freedom from Torture indicator (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”).
Figure 4 shows that the Freedom from Political Killings indicator sharply increased around 1947, when South Korea split off from North Korea, but due to the start of the Korean War in 1950, freedom from political killings remained in the negatives. It was only after the war in 1953 that freedom from political killings became positive on the graph.

The final indicator, CSO Repression, though, does not follow an entirely similar pattern to Freedom from Torture and Freedom from Political Killings. CSO Repression, which indicates how much the government suppresses civil society organizations, has a similar method of measurement to the previous two discussed indicators.
While there are some improvements and fluctuations in CSO Repressions over the time period shown in the graph, it still remains in the negative the whole time, showing that CSO’s are heavily suppressed by the government in South Korea.

Prior to the Korean War, most conflict and violence was focused on attacks coming from North Korea. By September 1950, the North Korean army had lost half of its forces, so it instead mobilized students and others from the areas of South Korea where they had gained control (Kwon 21). During the Korean War, conflict was once again mostly interstate in the sense that the Korean Peninsula as a whole was having an internal conflict, one in which there was much violence and massacres. While during the war, the majority of the killings and violence were a direct result of North Korean forces clashing with the South Korean uprisings, there were also killings conducted by South Korean police and military forces against people in South Korea.
who had demonstrated communist and socialist leanings or sympathies (Kwon 23). In addition, acts of violence committed by one side in the Korean War, such as North Korea, led to retaliation with even greater atrocities from the opposing side, such as South Korea, resulting in a vicious cycle of terror, fear, and violence. For example, North Korea had combined their frontal assault with an incitation of protests within South Korea, leading to South Korean forces killing even more suspected civilian sympathizers (Kwon 23). In the aftermath of the Korean War, these killings of civilian lives came to light as an example of an abuse of power of the Korean government against civilians. In addition, the Korean War resulted in mass displacement of humans and separations of families (Kwon 38). As such, while there are not necessarily examples of continued internal violence within South Korea itself, the violence perpetuated against civilians during the war had long-lasting impacts, such as trials to determine culpability in the mass killings. The sites of those mass killings also become no-go zones after the war was over as the South Korean government considered those mass graves of traitors, leaving the grieving families with no other recourse or way to mourn (Kwon 47). The violence and internal killings that occurred in South Korea during the Korean War had far-reaching consequences for the families of those left behind, such as the stigma associated with being related to those who had left for the North.

From the three indicators I used when analyzing the continued violence factor of political instability. The first two indicators, freedom from torture and freedom from political killings, show that the US presence did not seem to make a difference, particularly in the aftermath, where the US withdrew. This is similar for the CSO Repression, where, while there was some improvement, it is not clear how much of an influence the US had, if any, on either calming or increasing tensions. While the US formed and maintained an alliance with South Korea in the
aftermath of the war and exerted some degree of influence of policymaking, as I discuss in more depth later in this chapter, economically and with regards to handling of violence and social dissent, the South Korean government maintained their own authority. As I discussed before, the US’s main goal with intervention in South Korea during the Korean War was to establish a foothold in Asia for the potential growth and spread of democracy, this seemed to be more so in terms of the spread of ideas through their relationship with each other rather than a direct exertion of influence and power. It is also worth noting here that although the relationship with South Korea was established with the goal of spreading democracy in Asia (or at least minimally the containment of communism), this did not occur right away, which I will also discuss in the next section. As such, the South Korean government handled its own internal affairs.

**Legitimacy**

For the third factor of political instability, I used five different indicators from the Varieties of Democracy data-set in order to determine how much control and power the South Korean government had in their territory. The five indicators can be split into two groups: sovereignty and legitimacy. The sovereignty group has three indicators: domestic autonomy, international autonomy, and sovereignty over territory. The legitimacy group has two indicators: performance legitimacy and rational-legal legitimacy.

Domestic autonomy, answers the question “Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?” (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”). It is measured from 0 to 2, with 0 being non-autonomous and 2 being autonomous (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”).
In Figure 6, the domestic autonomy is negative until 1947-1948, where it begins to improve with South Korea declaring separation from North Korea. This indicator continues to improve until 1949, where it breaks into the positives, reaching nearly until 2. This indicates that South Korea was nearly completely domestically autonomous from 1949.

The next indicator, international autonomy, is measured similarly to domestic autonomy, and it answers the same question, except with respect to the international and foreign policy of the state rather than its domestic policy (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).
Figure 7 shows that International Autonomy follows the same pattern as Domestic Autonomy and at the same times too. This indicates that the US’s interactions with regards to South Korea were less of taking control of South Korea’s actions, and more of influencing them through diplomatic relations.

The third indicator in the sovereignty group is State Authority over Territory. This indicator answers the question “Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook”). This indicator judges the extent to which the preeminent authority in the state is recognized by its territory as an authority.
After their independence from North Korea, South Korea maintains complete authority over their territory, even during the Korean War.

The next indicator, rational-legal legitimacy answers the question “To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook). This indicator refers specifically to the use of rule of law and elections in the legitimacy of the government, and it is measured on a scale of 0, which is “not at all,” to 4, which is “almost exclusively” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).
Just as other indicators showed, once South Korea formed independently from North Korea in 1947 to 1948, there was a sudden improvement in the rational-legal legitimacy indicator. Nonetheless, despite some fluctuations, this legitimacy indicator remains in the negative for whole period shown here, implying that there is some other way in which South Korea’s government achieved legitimacy.

The final indicator is Performance Legitimacy. This indicator is measured the same way as the rational-legal legitimacy indicator, and it answers the question “To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).
Figure 10 shows that performance indicators, such as providing economic growth, did play a small role in the legitimacy of the South Korean government. While initially, during the war and in the period directly after it, this indicator remained in the negative, around 1959, there was improvement and this indicator became positive.

The five indicators examined in this section show how legitimacy changed over the years for the South Korean government. When South Korea first formed in 1948, they came under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. His party consisted mainly of people who had close ties to the United States, and his government lasted until 1960 (Sungjoo 1082). Rhee was a strong nationalist and believed firmly that South Korea needed the aid of the United States, particularly after the Korean War, to help South Korea in their economic development and security goals (Sungjoo 1082). Since the Korean nationalist movement had been directed at Japan, a non-
Western nation, the support of the United States at that time was not considered objectionable. As such, receiving aid from the United States was viewed as a symbol of liberty and freedom. In that way, there was support from the people for the goals of Rhee’s government.

The 1960’s, though, marked a significant shift in South Korea’s political atmosphere, and an important step towards a participatory political democracy. In April 1960, there were student protests against the autocratic postwar political rule (Kwon 48). The unrest of the civilian population against the postwar authoritarian regime eventually broke that regime’s will, and showed that the lack of legitimacy that that government had with the people caused political turmoil. The protests were not completely successful, though, as shortly afterwards Rhee’s regime was replaced by a stronger military-led anti-communist authoritarian political system (Kwon 49). In terms of government legitimacy in the eyes of the South Korean citizens, the postwar government was not an institution they approved of, pointing to some degree of political instability in the aftermath of the Korean War.

_Tying the three factors of political instability together_

Each of the three indicators of political instability, economic development, continued violence, and legitimacy, are influenced by the US in some way, whether by direct actions taken by the US or by a lack of action and policy implementation. The economic development indicator, which did experience growth, was due to a policy action from the US of providing foreign aid to South Korea as its ally. For the continued violence indicator, the US seemed to have little to no influence, and for the legitimacy indicator, the US had some influence with its alliance with South Korea.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the Korean War as a case for showing the influence of US military intervention on post-conflict state and peacebuilding. I gave a brief overview of the Korean War and when and why the US occupied South Korea. Then I examined the three factors of political instability in detail based on quantitative and qualitative data in order to determine what influence, if any, the US intervention and policy actions had on South Korea. This chapter showed that the US did have some influence over post-conflict state-building in South Korea. The US’s resources and power meant that they were able to offer aid to South Korea in the war, and afterwards, negotiated the armistice agreement on their behalf without giving them a seat at the negotiation table. Still, the US’s continued aid afterwards created an alliance and close relationship between the US and South Korea in which South Korean policy decision-making and development was influenced by this relationship. This chapter and analysis showed the US’s power and influence on other countries as a superpower, but also as an influence through alliances.
Chapter 4: A Case Study on the Iraq War of 2003-2011

Introduction

In this chapter, I will explore the case of the Iraq War of 2003. I will begin by giving a brief summary of how and why the Iraq War begin, what happened during this war, and how it ended in 2011. I will also summarize at what point in the conflict the United States became militarily involved, why they did so, and what goals the US had in joining in the Iraq War.

Next, I will move into the post-conflict period, giving an overview of what occurred in Iraq from 2003 to 2021. My post-conflict section will begin by discussing how Iraq, specifically the government and the civilians, reacted to the US presence during and after the war. It will also include discussion of whether the US succeeded in their initial goals, if they continued their military presence even after the war ended, and why they made that decision. I will then examine what policies they enacted in the post-war transition and state-building period, both in terms of how they chose to interact with Iraq, particularly what the relationship between the two countries was like, and what policies they directly imposed on Iraq, whether intended to aid or influence the direction of Iraq’s development, and for what reasons they did so.

In order to look specifically at the impacts on the political stability of Iraq in the post-war period, I will examine the three factors of instability: economic development, continued intrastate violence, and government legitimacy, to determine what changed in the country over the course of the pre-war, during war, and post-war periods. By comparing the changes over these years, I will be able to identify patterns in Iraq’s development. The pre-war period will specifically begin 10 years prior to the start of the war, beginning in 1993. This analysis will continue a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data is drawn from the Varieties of Democracy datasets, from which I used information that was significant to the three
factors of political instability. Using Microsoft Excel, I turned the data into a series of line graphs, which I then used to find the patterns in the data. The quantitative information will be supported by qualitative information about the events of the Iraq War which were taking place at those times. Finally, I will tie these three sections together by analyzing how the data on political stability may be connected to the US policies regarding their relationship with Iraq and that they may have implemented in Iraq in the aftermath of the war.

By analyzing the Iraq War, I intend to an example of the role of the US and their foreign military intervention on a host state’s post-conflict state-building and development. More specifically, how do the policies implemented by the United States and the presence of their military influence how the host state makes its own decisions, and in what ways does this presence and their policies aid or hinder the host state’s development? These questions both help to answer my larger research question and establish how the development of the host state and the US’ policies are linked in terms of the political stability of the host state. In this chapter, I use the Iraq War as an example to prove how the US’s military presence and the implantation of their policies on the host state influences the host state’s own policy decisions, and how it can both aid and hinder the host state’s development in the aftermath of conflict. The case of Iraq demonstrates how lack of action and planning from the US after their intervention can lead to a politically unstable environment, particularly when it comes to the legitimization of the newly established government. By intervening in another state during a time of conflict, the US has an unavoidable impact on the functioning and stability of the host state once that conflict ends. And to reiterate the definitions of these important concepts, legitimacy is defined as how much authority the government has over their state, and the amount of influence they have in policy-
and decision-making, and political instability is when a government and its system cannot function at its full capacity.

**Background**

The Iraq War from 2003 to 2011 occurred in two phases. The conflict began in March 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq (Council on Foreign Relations). In February 2003, the US’s Secretary of State had argued that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, so the goal of the invasion was to find and remove these weapons, as well as end the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein (Hooker). This invasion came nearly two years after the terrorist attacks in the US by Al Qaeda on September 11th, 2001, so the invasion of Iraq served partially as a reason to display the strength of the United States when fending off threats to the US’s safety and as a way to show the US’ military power (Murray 43). This initial phase of the war, which lasted hardly three weeks, was called *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Hooker). This indicated how the US’ attack was framed as one of freeing the Iraqi people from Hussein’s rule as a method of justifying the measures and force the US took. This phase of the war ended in April 2003 when Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled and the US gained control of Baghdad (Hooker). The end of this phase was officially declared by President Bush in the beginning of May (Hooker).

The second phase of the Iraq War was a direct consequence of the US’ actions following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Once the first phase ended, the US signed an order disbanding the Iraqi army and purged the Baathists, the nationalist party in Iraq, from their government positions (Council on Foreign Relations). The US’ continued military occupation in Iraq eventually led to the formation of revolutionary opposition groups and this, accompanied by their capture of Saddam, signaled a turning point in the conflict – at least that was what the US had hoped (Council on Foreign Relations). Instead, the violence continued to escalate, and
despite the election of a new Prime Minister in Iraq in 2005, tensions avalanched into civil war by 2006 (Hooker). The execution of Saddam Hussein triggered an explosion of the tension between the Sunni and Shiites (Council on Foreign Relations). With this, the US continued its occupation, siding with the Sunni’s, saying that their goal was to maintain and preserve the newly elected government of Iraq. In 2008, the Iraqi parliament entered a security agreement with the US in which the US agrees to have all troops withdrawn by 2011 (Hooker). Though the war and violence continue, the US began its gradual withdrawal, and by 2011, President Obama fulfilled the promise (Hooker).

Although the United States had officially withdrawn, and the war was considered finished by 2011, the US’ involvement was far from over. Although their intervention shifts from a military one to a diplomatic mission, the US military still shows its presence in the next few years following the war. I will discuss this more in the next section on the post-conflict period.

**Post-Conflict**

From what was discussed in the previous section of this chapter, we see that the Sunni’s worked with the US forces, while the Shiite militias opposed them, based around their opposing viewpoints on Saddam Hussein. After Saddam’s fall in 2003, the US showed no signs of an actual workable strategy to help Iraq build-up again, or any interest in actually doing so (Cordesman). Despite American military aid, one could extrapolate that this did not place the US too favorably in the view of the Iraqi people. In addition, the US failed to effectively use any policy or nonmilitary tools following the end of the war in 2011, such as the use of foreign aid, reducing their credibility as a resource (Katulis). This gives a small glimpse into Iraqi reactions to the US presence.
The US forces did fully withdraw by the end of 2011, as promised in their agreement with the Iraqi parliament. By no means, though, does that mean the end of US involvement and intervention in Iraq, in their policies, or in their conflicts. The goals of the United States’ initial intervention – to stop Saddam Hussein and protect the newly formed government in the aftermath – were successful, at least from a US perspective. Saddam was ultimately found, captured, put on trial, and executed. After the US withdrawal in 2011, President Obama declared that Operation Iraqi Freedom was over, and that they had been successful in demonstrating US power, strength, and military force, as intended (Dunne 1287). Overall, the US achieved what they wanted to in their intervention, at least with regards to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, and in the demonstration of US military might.

After their withdrawal, however, the United States failed to have a comprehensive state building plan, one that would effectively aid Iraq as it navigated its post-war condition. They never developed any meaningful plan for Iraq’s economic or political crises in the aftermath and did not show sufficient interest in doing so (Cordesman). As said before, the US deemed their initial goals for the intervention as accomplished, so what aid or policies they did enact were not necessarily helpful in the long run. These aid efforts included humanitarian aid and commercial aid (Tarnoff). The aid plans necessary for Iraq were considered to be more hands-on and in-depth than other times the US had provided development aid, so there were several concerns with any potential plan, such as the time and effort required and coordination concerns with aid provided by the UN and other NGO’s (Tarnoff 5). The efforts to secure peace and stability in Iraq in the aftermath stand as symbols of the deeply rooted power structures and hierarchy of world politics (Dunne 1289). This means that when aid was given, there were unspoken strings attached to the aid, where giving aid was a way of furthering their influence and power in the host state. Thus,
the type of support given by the US in post-conflict period shifted from being that of a hegemonic power to one of an imperial power (Dunne 1297), resulting in numerous policy failures. It was not until ISIS emerged as a threat in 2014 that the United States began to take their aid efforts in Iraq more seriously, with the US enacting broad efforts to provide foreign aid in the form of economic support and engagement on political, economic, and diplomatic matters (US Department of State). The US Department of State website claims that they have also contributed billions of dollars since 2014 towards humanitarian and stabilization aid as well as economic reform.

**Political Instability**

*Introduction*

In this section of the chapter, I aim to break down the three factors of political instability I am utilizing for this research, economic development, continued violence, and legitimacy of government, into smaller pieces using the World Bank data and the Varieties of Democracy data set.

*Economic Development*

To see a broad overview of the changes of economic development in Iraq, I chose to focus on GDP, or Gross Domestic Product, as my indicator.
As we can see in Figure 11, Iraq’s GDP from 2001 to 2003, the years leading up to the start of the war, dropped by nearly $30 billion US dollars (World Bank). This was largely due to the failure of Saddam to enforce and make effective economic policies and trade deals (Murray). Curiously enough, during the beginning of the war itself, from 2003 to 2008, Iraq experienced steady GDP growth. This could be attributed to the billions of dollars that the US spent in war efforts (Dunne). From 2008 to 2009, the GDP dropped again (World Bank), which was around the time that the US had begun to withdraw. Despite the US’ lack of state-building interest from 2009, the GDP began to grow again after that until 2013, where it dropped once more, and more significantly than the one from 2008 to 2009 (World Bank). In September 2013, ISIS, another pro-Al Qaeda organization, began attacking in Iraq (Hooker). This escalation of violence likely disrupted systems in an already struggling Iraq, plunging the GDP down. The US joined the fight
against ISIS in Iraq in 2014, supporting the Iraqi state against them (Hooker). As discussed in the
previous section, it was also around this time that the US began providing billions of dollars in
economic aid and reform. While direct connections between the quantitative and qualitative data
are difficult to draw, by lining up the dates of the events, we can extrapolate the likely effects the
events of these continued conflicts and subsequent aid from the US had on the rise and fall of
Iraq’s GDP, and therefore, on their economic growth and development over the years.

Continued Violence and Conflict

For the continued violence factor of political instability, I have broken it down into three
main sets of data, drawn from the Varieties of Democracy. The first is Freedom from Torture,
and the higher the value is of this indicator, the less torture is practiced by political figures and
those in authority (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook). This indicator is measured on a scale of 0 to
4, with 4 being more freedom from torture.

![Freedom From Torture](image)
In the years leading up to the Iraq War in 2003, Figure 12 shows us that the chance of torture for Iraqi citizens was high, staying at -2.5 from 1993 to 2001, at which point it the freedom from torture suddenly increased significantly. Right at 2003, though, when the Iraq War began, the freedom from torture fell again, likely due to the violence of war. When it fell again, it stayed that way throughout the years of war, falling again after the US withdrew and when ISIS attacked in 2014. Despite some periods of improvement, though, overall, the freedom from torture indicator for Iraq staying in the negatives, showing that while this was already low prior to the war, it did not improve all that much during or after it with US intervention. This may, in part, be due to the previously mentioned failure of the US to enact or have any concrete state-building plans after their withdrawal, leaving Iraq’s conflict between the Sunni and Shiite to continue.
The second indicator, Freedom from Political Killings, meaning freedom from killings conducted by the state or agents of the state, is measured similarly to the Freedom from Torture indicator, in that it is also measured on a scale of 0 to 4, with 4 being the most freedom from political killings (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”).

Figure 13 shows that the Freedom from Political Killings indicator follows a similar pattern to the Freedom from Torture indicator, staying negative the entire time from 1993 to 2021, with a sudden increase from 2001 to 2003 leading up to the Iraq War, and then a fall again soon after, although not as much as the initial value prior to 2001. Overall, this indicator being in the negative shows that there was a constant, continued conflict between the Iraqi state and the citizens as they underwent years of turmoil and violence due to the religious conflicts between the Sunnis and the Shiites.
The final indicator, CSO Repression, though, does not follow an entirely similar pattern to Freedom from Torture and Freedom from Political Killings. CSO Repression, which indicates how much the government suppresses civil society organizations, has a similar method of measurement to the previous two discussed indicators. This means that it is also measures on a scale of 0 to 4, with 4 being the least amount of repression.

While CSO Repression also starts negative and begins to improve around 2001, like the freedom from torture and freedom from political killings indicators did, it continues to improve slightly in 2003, before somewhat leveling out. It does have some small dips leading up to 2020, but overall, it stays pretty even. The CSO Repression level from 2003 to 2020 is still pretty low, so CSO’s, or civil society organization, continued to be heavily repressed, meaning that
organizations formed by citizens for the goal of achieving a particular right or freedom are not given a voice.

From the three indicators I used when analyzing the continued violence factor of political instability, the first two indicators, freedom from torture and freedom from political killings, show that the US presence did not seem to make a difference, particularly in the aftermath, where the US withdrew. This is similar for CSO Repression, where, while there was some improvement, it is not clear how much of an influence the US had, if any, on either calming or increasing tensions. This potential lack of influence is telling, though, in itself. Returning to the point of the US not making any comprehensive plans or grand strategies for aid in the direct aftermath if the Iraq War in 2011 suggests that at that point the US had, for the most part, dropped its interest in Iraq, having accomplished its own goals. Perhaps, if there had been a plan for building peace and the state with US resources, the tensions would have decreased. Although this is merely reasonable speculation, it is a point worth considering.

**Legitimacy**

For the third factor of political instability, I used five different indicators from the Varieties of Democracy data-set in order to determine how much control and power the Iraqi government had in Iraq. The five indicators can be split into two groups: sovereignty and legitimacy. The sovereignty group has three indicators: domestic autonomy, international autonomy, and sovereignty over territory. The legitimacy group has two indicators: performance legitimacy and rational-legal legitimacy.

Domestic autonomy, answers the question “Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?” (Coppedge, “V-dem Codebook”). It
is measured from 0 to 2, with 0 being non-autonomous and 2 being autonomous (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook”).

For all the years shown in Figure 15, the domestic autonomy remains in the negative, showing that Iraq is non-autonomous domestically and that its domestic policy is heavily influenced by other states. From around 2003 to 2011, when the US invades Iraq and the Iraq War begins, the domestic autonomy indicator worsens, falling a significant amount, showing the increased influence of the US on Iraq as a result of their military intervention. After the war though, the domestic autonomy indicator returns to nearly pre-war levels, portraying how the US’ initial lack of interest in Iraq after the war perhaps reduced their influence on Iraq’s domestic autonomy. This means that Iraq had more freedom in their decision making and policy.
formation, and therefore could have more control over the formation of their government systems and in establishing legitimacy.

The next indicator, international autonomy, is measured similarly to domestic autonomy, and it answers the same question, except it’s in respect to the international and foreign policy of the state rather than its domestic policy (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).

Figure 16 shows that International Autonomy follows the same pattern as Domestic Autonomy and at the same times too. This indicates that the US intervention also had a significant influence on how Iraq conducted foreign policy, entirely controlling it. Both the domestic and international autonomy indicators point to just how much influence the US in their foreign intervention, as an external political actor, had over the policymaking and political structures and development of Iraq. In terms of the legitimacy of the government, this means that
the Iraqi government had less control over their own policies, and therefore less legitimacy as a power structure. Their rule of law could not be enforced as much.

The third indicator in the sovereignty group is State Authority over Territory. This indicator answers the question “Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook”). This indicator judges the extent to which the preeminent authority in the state is recognized by its territory as an authority.

![State Authority Over Territory](image)

**Figure 17. Iraq, State Authority over Territory, 1993-2021. Data from Coppedge, “V-Dem Dataset” converted into line graph with Microsoft Excel.**

Just like the previous two indicators in this section, State Authority Over Territory decreases during the period when the US occupies Iraq, which is during the Iraq War. In the case of State Authority Over Territory, the US influence seems to linger even a few years after 2011 until around 2018, when it reaches its pre-war levels again. Iraq’s government does maintain
authority over most of its territory, though, regardless of changes. This means that for a time, the US had control over the governing of parts of Iraq, but as the US withdrew and as their military involvement in Iraq ended, Iraq gained back control over their state, and as a result more authority and legitimacy.

The next indicator, rational-legal legitimacy answers the question “To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook). This indicator refers specifically to the use of rule of law and elections in the legitimacy of the government, and it is measured on a scale of 0, which is “not at all,” to 4, which is “almost exclusively” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).

![Rational-Legal Legitimation Graph](image)

**Figure 18. Iraq, Rational-Legal Legitimacy, 1993-2021, “V-Dem Dataset”**
Initially, from 1993 to 2002, Figure 18 shows that elections and rule of law did have any significance in the establishing the legitimacy of Iraq’s government. For the few years after the US overthrew Saddam’s regime, this legitimacy indicator improved some, before leveling out around -1 after the US troops withdrew. This indicates that there is likely corruption and other influences used by the Iraqi government to maintain power. This makes sense when tying it back to the data on violence, as force was a method used to maintain legitimacy. The US not taking actions that improve this indicator is once again representative of the lack of planning they had in regards to post-conflict state and peace-building.

The final indicator is Performance Legitimacy. This indicator is measured the same way as the rational-legal legitimacy indicator, and it answers the question “To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?” (Coppedge, “V-Dem Codebook).
Figure 19 shows that performance indicators, such as providing economic growth, did play a small role in the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. There does seem to be a small period of improvement after Saddam is overthrown by the US, but once again, the period of improvement is small and short-lived, leveling out from 2005 onwards and not improving after that. Part of the reason for that is the same as what I discussed with the rational-legal legitimacy indicator.

The five indicators examined in this section show how legitimacy changed over the years for the Iraqi government. A legitimacy, which was already not strong in the first place, only weakened further with Saddam’s regime. It then improved a small amount with the US’ removal of Saddam Hussein from power, but there was not any improvement over that. There are two main reasons why this is the case: The US did not have any organized plan for state and peace-building in the aftermath of the Iraq War and so left Iraq to do so on their own for the most part,
and because the US did have influence over who came into power after Saddam was overthrown by supporting the Sunni government in their fight against the Shiite.

*Tying the three factors of political instability together*

Each of the three indicators of political instability, economic development, continued violence, and legitimacy, are influence by the US in some way, whether by direct actions taken by the US or by a lack of action and policy implementation. The economic development indicator, which did experience growth, was due to a policy action from the US of providing foreign aid to Iraq. For the continued violence and legitimacy indicators, their improvement and subsequent decline were based on the US’ actions and intervention during the Iraq War and the lack of significant policy actions and plans after they withdrew.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I discussed the Iraq War as case for showing the influence of US military intervention on post-conflict state and peacebuilding. I gave a brief overview of the Iraq War and when and why the US occupied Iraq, then briefly discussed the policies the US enacted over the course of the war and after it. Then I examined the three factors of political instability in detail based on quantitative and qualitative data in order to determine what influence, if any, the US intervention and policy actions had on Iraq. This chapter showed that the US does have an influence over state-building in Iraq, from actions they did and did not take. This chapter and analysis showed how US power as a hegemony, but also as a more authoritarian influence in countries with less power and resources, can influence how well a host state recovers from and grows in the aftermath of a conflict.
Chapter 5: Comparing US Intervention in South Korea and Iraq

Introduction

In this chapter, I will compare the two cases I examined in the previous two chapters, the Korean War and the Iraq War. I will compare them on four main areas: (1) differences on how, why, and at what point in the conflict the US conducted its foreign military intervention in the host state, (2) compare what type of war occurred in each case and the reason for the conflict, (3) compare the outcomes and aftermath of each war, and (4) finally, compare the US impact on each host state based on the three factors of political instability, economic development, continued violence, and state legitimacy, and when and why the US withdrawal from the host state occurred.

The purpose of comparing these two cases is to show how the US methods in foreign military intervention lend itself to both better outcomes for the host state, but also political instability, in different ways. Comparing the two cases will determine the overarching meaning of the cases in relation to my research question and my argument that US foreign military intervention in conflicts has varying influences on the political stability of the host states in the aftermath.

Discussion

Comparing US Military Interventions

In the Korean War, the US came to the military aid of South Korea right at the beginning of the conflict in 1950 (Reece 13). Their reason for coming was purportedly to help maintain peace, but also with the hopes of establishing a foothold for democracy in Asia through South Korea (Stueck 88). The opposing side of the Korean War, meaning North Korea and their Soviet allies, represented a communist stance, which the United States was looking to put a stop to. Back home at that time period, the US was in the midst of political fear of communism and
communist ideas, known commonly as the Red Scare, and with their ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Korean War and South Korea was the perfect symbol of this struggle between democracy and communism. In addition, the US received permission from the UN to use aggression and force to prevent North Korea’s invasion, and the support of UN forces meant that the US could frame its involvement as supporting the UN rather than officially being at war (Reece 8). With the UN approval, the US was able to freely move its forces into South Korea and act to fight against North Korea, conducting a foreign military intervention as per Frederick Pearson’s definition.

In the Iraq War, the US had already moved its troops into Iraq before the official internal war began. The Iraq War occurred in two phases. The first was in 2003 during which the US entered Iraq with the purpose of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, and they justified their actions as freeing the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship (Hooker). The second phase was in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s removal from power, when a civil war erupted, and the US’s forces, which were still occupying Iraq decided to support the new Iraqi government in fighting off the revolutionary forces (Hooker).

In both cases, the US conducted its military interventions with the goal of creating some sort of change in the host state, but the specifics of those goals and the way they went about achieving them was different. For South Korea, the US had the support of international organizations such as the UN in their actions and in pursuing their goals, whereas for Iraq, the US had the support of only a few allies. Both interventions were framed as for the benefit of the populations of the host state, and both interventions occurred right at the beginning of the war. The how of the interventions were different, since for Iraq, there was just one initial goal, so
there was only a military presence, whereas for South Korea, the goal was aid, so military was not the only aid that was brought by the US.

**Comparing the Conflict**

This section will briefly compare the type of war each conflict was and the reasons they began. The Korean War and Iraq War were both civil wars. They occurred internally, as an intra-state conflict, and though they had different reasons for happening, they were ultimately conflicts that happened within the same state by people in the same state.

The Korean War began because after WWII, Korea became split on political ideologies based on influences from the Soviet Union and the United States. The north had more communist ideas, while the south had more democratic leanings. The thirty-eighth parallel line was determined to be the dividing line between the Soviet and American military occupations in Korea, and they set up their own military governments in their zones (Stueck 12). This marked the divide between North Korea and South Korea. After this, the Korean War began as a matter of determining whether or not for Korea to become divided, but also as a proxy war for the US and the Soviet Union over opposing political ideologies.

In the Iraq War, this conflict began as clash between the Sunni and the Shiites. The Sunni and Shiites were followers of two different forms of Islam, and while Shiites opposed the US occupation and the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni government, which had risen with the US’s aid, had been in support of Saddam Hussein being overthrown (Hooker). The Shiites formed revolutionary forces against the new government after Saddam Hussein was removed from power, and violence and tensions between the two sides eventually escalated into a civil war.
Both conflicts were a civil war, and in both cases, the US had a significant influence over how the conflicts began or played out. In the case of the Korean War, this was in the form of the proxy war with the Soviet Union. For the Iraq War, this was through the forceful removal of Saddam Hussein, and then by siding with a government they had helped bring to power. In both cases, the US had a vested interested in maintaining the side they supported for their own goals and purposes.

**Comparing the Aftermath**

In the aftermath of the Korean War, an armistice was signed, an agreement in which the result of the conflict was essentially a draw (Reece 86). After the armistice was set, the UN created a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea, a 2.5-mile-wide strip of land that crossed the thirty-eighth parallel line at an angle, and both sides moved their armed forces back, creating a buffer zone (Reece 89). With the support of the US as their allies, South Korea became an emerging democracy, continuing to grow and develop as a country.

For the Iraq War, the outcome and aftermath were different than with South Korea. While the US did eventually withdraw, it was not due to an agreement between the opposing sides of the war. Rather, the Sunni government had come to a security agreement in which the US agreed to completely withdraw its forces within three years of the document being signed (Hooker). As such, though the US continued to exert some influence in Iraq just as they did in the South Korea, it was in a different and more limited way. For instance, the US Department of State claimed that they provided economic monetary aid to Iraq. In addition, unlike with South Korea where there was an alliance, the US’ influence with Iraq was more imperialistic in nature (Dunne 1297).
Comparing US Impact on Political Instability

In terms of economic development, the US did have an impact on both South Korea and Iraq in some way. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the US provided economic aid to both countries in the aftermath of the war as a way of supporting the post-conflict state-building. In South Korea, for instance, they provided $11 billion in aid by 1973, although shifts in South Korea’s government also led to better economic development programs (Seth).

For continued violence, on the other hand, the impact of the US was different. In South Korea, while the US maintained the presence of its troops in the Demilitarized Zone, the influence of democracy and democratic ideals did not seem to change violence between the state and the citizens much. As we saw in the Varieties of Democracy data, each indicator, such as freedom from torture and freedom from political killings, remained in the negatives, meaning that torture and political killings still remained prevalent before, during, and the ten years after the war as well. For Iraq, on the other hand, while the indicators I analyzed for continued violence also remained in the negatives, the reasons were different and the US involvement was different as well. Although the war in Iraq ended in 2011 for the US, the conflict between the Sunni and Shiite continued, eventually leading to another violent conflict with the rise of ISIS where the US got involved once more (Hooker).

As for legitimacy, the impact of the US on these factors were different in both cases here as well. In South Korea, the US had established an alliance with South Korea, so while they did help South Korea develop and grow, they were much more independent, maintaining 100 percent state authority over their territory, and being in charge of their own domestic and foreign policy decisions (Coppedge, “V-dem Dataset). Most of the indicators I analyzed for South Korea’s legitimacy eventually became positive and remained that way, implying that the US influence
came more in the form of aid, and in initially setting up the government there at the end of the civil war. In Iraq, on the other hand, most of the indicators, domestic autonomy, international autonomy, rational-legal legitimacy, and performance legitimacy, are in the negative. This essentially means that Iraq’s domestic and foreign policy is heavily controlled or influenced by a foreign state, and their legitimacy as a government is not based on good policy performance or rule of law. Based on what I discussed in the previous section, it can be reasonably inferred that it is the United States which is having such a great influence on the legitimacy of Iraq’s government.

Conclusion

By comparing the two cases in the listed four aspects, I was able to determine that the US has varying impacts on the political instability of the host state through military and policy intervention, and specifically based on how the US approaches its intervention. For the Iraq War, for example, Iraq was more constrained by the US, and its development was stagnated, because the US went into this intervention with a more imperialistic mindset. With the Korean War, the US became involved with the goal of establishing South Korea as a democratic foothold, and as such, formed an alliance with them which was more about mutual aid, therefore leaving South Korea more freedom in the actions and policies it took.

From this comparison, we learn that legitimacy is a significant factor in the development of a state in the aftermath of a conflict. Foreign intervention from the US, particularly with regards to the continued presence or withdrawal the military from the host state, decides how much control the host state has over its internal affairs and construction of a new government. In the case of South Korea, the US withdrawal seemed to be to their benefit, especially in economic development. In addition, they benefited from the US’ continued involvement from a distance
with economic aid and the alliance. Having some degree of freedom in their post-conflict peacebuilding worked for them in gradually becoming more politically stable, despite continued violence and internal conflict. For Iraq, on the other hand, legitimacy continued to flounder after the US withdrawal. While the US withdrawal was based on an agreement between the Iraqi parliament and the US, and was therefore expected to happen within the timeframe that it occurred, it did not resolve the existing issues and conflict in Iraq in any way. The US only remained involved with economic aid, but the violence and divide between the two Muslim groups escalated into violence once more, and the US intervened militarily once more. The failure of the Sunni government to definitively establish legitimacy and therefore political stability was to their detriment as the resources to create peace were lacking.

In this chapter, I compared the two cases of the Korean War and Iraq War as examples of US military intervention and the influence and impact of this intervention on the political stability of the host states. I specifically compared when and why the intervention began for each case, what type of war each conflict was, the outcomes and aftermath of each war, and the US’s impact on each of the three factors of political instability.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss my conclusion. I will begin by talking about my major findings from the previous chapters and then connecting them to my overall argument, and what we learned about legitimacy and political stability from these findings. Then, I will briefly talk about the limitations I had in this project. Next, I will discuss potential gaps in my thesis and ways the ideas in my thesis could be expanded. I will talk specifically about the Afghanistan War, which was the conflict that initially gave me the idea for this thesis. I will also talk about what questions we can ask to learn more about legitimacy and political stability and what I am still wondering about these questions. Finally, I will discuss future directions based on this thesis, and ideas for other research that could be conducted with my thesis as a starting point.

Summary & Major Findings

In this thesis, I discussed key concepts, my framework for analysis, then analyzed the Korean War and the Iraq War through this framework of analysis. Then, I compared the two cases. My research question was: how does US military intervention impact the political stability of the host country during and after a conflict? I argued that US intervention and the implementation of policies by the US in the host state during and after the conflict both aid and hinder the rebuilding and development of the host state in the aftermath of the conflict. In order to analyze these cases for political instability, I analyzed three factors for each case: economic development, continued internal violence, and government legitimacy in the host state. This analysis was conducted by breaking each factor down into quantitative indicators found in Varieties of Democracy and making connections between the quantitative data and the information regarding the actual events of the conflict.
In my analysis, I found that while the US generally achieved their initial goals for the military interventions, goals that related specifically to the expansion of power and influence of the US in other parts of the world, their actions did have impacts on the host states in which they intervened. These impacts both helped and hindered the development of the host states, South Korea and Iraq, in the aftermath of the wars they faced. With regards to economic development, these impacts related specifically to how much freedom the host state had in the determination of their policies for growth and how much monetary aid the US gave each state for the implementation of their new economic policies and programs. In both cases, the US gave billions of dollars in aid. For the continued internal violence factor, Iraq experienced religious and ideological conflicts between the Sunni and the Shiite, two different branches of Islam with differing beliefs, eventually leading to another war. In Korea, the violence was related to the fierce enmity between North and South Korea and how North Korean sympathizers, suspected or otherwise, were treated by the South Korean government. For the legitimacy of the government in the host state, Iraq had a period of being largely controlled by the US military, so when the US withdrew, recovery from the war was slow, which was further hindered by religious and ideological tensions. In South Korea, the government quickly regained control through an authoritarian regime, and the economic policies that they enacted went a long way towards establishing their legitimacy. From the analyses of these two cases, we learned a few things about legitimacy and political stability and the impact that US foreign intervention can have on host states in the aftermath of a conflict. First, the relationship between the US and the host state in the aftermath of the conflict can determine the success of the host state in peacebuilding because it influences what resources they have access to from the US. In addition, the reason for and timing of withdrawal can also determine the success of establishing legitimacy and political
stability. This is mainly based on the question of how much the host state was relying on the US support in the first place during the conflict, and how important their continued intervention is to the development of the host state. The goals of the US in their intervention decided how prepared they were to aid the host state in state-building.

Future Research About Concepts: Legitimacy and Stability

Legitimacy and political stability are broad concepts, and it is difficult to cover all the nuances involved in the time that I had, as well as the focus that I narrowed my topic down to. As such, there are several lingering questions from my thesis on these concepts that could do with further analysis and exploration in the future. For instance, what are other ways in which legitimacy is established? Rule of law was only a concept I briefly touched on in my analysis as it is a necessary part of legitimacy, but it could use more exploration. What other indicators from the Varieties of Democracy dataset could I have used to explore legitimacy and political stability? Are there other sources from which useful data regarding legitimacy and political stability could have been drawn? As I will discuss further in the limitations section, I was unable to use the Polity Project and UCDP in this project, but are there ways they could be utilized in the future, or are there other similar datasets from other sources that could be used?

In addition, there are likely gaps in the three factors I chose to analyze for determining political stability. I focused my analysis on economic development, continued violence, and legitimacy. What factors were potentially missing from these categories and how could they be explored to further develop my research here? The three factors were broad categories within political stability that I used to further identify variables that fell under each category. Was there a better way to organize them or the scope of the project? These are lingering questions that I
have about these concepts, how I used them in my thesis, and that I would like to explore in the further.

**Data Limitations and Next Steps**

There were a few limitations I had over the course of this thesis. The first was the time constraint. With only year to conduct the research, I limited my number of cases to two, which is why this thesis is a case study. Additional cases would provide more data and evidence to support my overarching argument.

In addition, there were difficulties in finding the necessary data. Originally, my data on the legitimacy factor was going to come from the Polity Project, which has datasets regarding political instability and authoritarianism, and the continued violence data was going to be drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which records ongoing violent conflicts. The main issue with the Polity Project was that the website would not let me access the data, and the UCDP did not have data going far enough back to cover both of my cases. The Varieties of Democracy dataset that I used instead was more useful for my purposes, though, and allowed me to further develop my thesis. GDP data presented the largest difficulty for me. While the World Bank contained sufficient data for Iraq, that was not the case for South Korea. World Bank data on GDP only went back as far as 1960. For South Korea, I needed data from 1940 to 1963. Therefore, for South Korea, I had to rely on another source, the Maddison reading from *Journal of Economic History*, which displayed economic growth rates for developing and developed countries, including South Korea in the time period I needed, in a table. While this table provided GDP data for South Korea that was sufficient for my needs, that is for analyzing the growth trends of GDP before, during, and after the Korean War to examine the impact of intervention on economic development, it was limiting in terms of comparison. For the rest of
the indicators, I could reasonably see the graphs side by side for both case studies since they came from the same source and used the same methods for determining the data. That is not the cases for the GDP data, where I could only make speculative comparisons since there was no consistency in data source and methods. Consistency in data source and methods of finding that data is necessary to make dependent variables viable for reasonable comparison between independent variables. Within the context of my thesis, to compare the indicator data between the countries in my cases, a solid comparison is more sufficiently made when the indicators for the factors of political stability were compared across the same data source.

**Future Directions**

This thesis provides a starting point for the analysis of the US impact through military interventions on host states. First, my thesis only analyzes two cases: the Korean War and the Iraq War. There are potentially other conflicts where the US military intervened that can be discussed and analyzed.

One such conflict is the Afghanistan War. I had initially considered the Afghanistan War as a third case to analyze in my thesis, but the issue was that there is not currently a sufficient time period in which to analyze it. Seeing the reactions of the people in Afghanistan to the US withdrawal is what had led me to start this thesis. My thesis looks specifically at the aftermath and impacts of the war, though, and a ten-year period after the end of the war is necessary to start seeing the longer-term impacts, like I did with the Korean War and the Iraq War. Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan was fairly recent, in 2020, only short-term and immediate impacts currently exist for analysis. In the future, though, this would be an interesting case for further consideration within the scope of the ideas I discussed in this thesis.
Another potential intervention case for the future is Ukraine. The invasion of Russia into Ukraine drew a lot of attention from the international community, particularly in terms of support for Ukraine. The United States was one such country that sought to provide aid in Ukraine through intervention methods, installing their military forces in NATO countries around Ukraine (Pew Research Center), as well as providing resources. With the failed US military intervention in Afghanistan at the forefront of the American public’s mind, there is some disapproval from them regarding current President Joe Biden’s actions with Ukraine, but nearly half of American’s approve of the actions taken as of March 2022 (Pew Research Center). The high-level of US military forces deployed to support Ukraine’s independence, though, has been effective in its goals thus far (O’Brien), a stark contrast to what occurred in Afghanistan. With these differences, further examination of Ukraine in the future, especially in comparison to Afghanistan, would be useful in the context of this research. What made these cases different? What did the US change between their military intervention in Afghanistan and Ukraine that has made the results and effectiveness different so far, if anything? Aside from political stability, what other lenses would be useful to consider in this specific case? These are a few of the questions that could be explored in the future.

In addition, my thesis focused on the impacts the US had regarding the political stability of the host state. While this drew on other factors, such as economic development, there are also other avenues for examining the US impact to explore. One is expanding more on the specific impacts the US had not only on economic development in the host state, but also on other indicators regarding economic health, such as GDP per capita and wage inequality. In addition, the US’s impacts culturally and socially could be explored, especially with regards to the relationships between the US soldiers and the civilians of the host state. Other perspectives that I
think would be interesting to explore are through the lens of historical imperialism, and how that may continue in more recent conflicts through the use of military interventions. There is also a gender lens to consider, examining specifically the differences in the US’s impact on men and women and how they were treated both by the US troops and by the government of the host state.

While this thesis provided a general definition for foreign military intervention, the focus was to examine US military intervention specifically. As such, other research for consideration in the future is looking at intervention conducted by other powers, both historically and in the present day. How does NATO as a whole intervene in Ukraine’s fight against Russia? How do countries outside of NATO react? For a more historical example, how did Imperial Great Britain intervene in other states? What comparisons can be made between colonialism and modern military intervention through the lens of imperialism? Another state-building project to consider is China in Africa today. In recent years, China has become a significant trading partner to Africa, rivaled only by the European Union (Handy). China’s interest in Africa and their efforts in that continent have “reignited the interest of Western governments,” and triggered the rivalry between the West, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and the US, versus Russia and China (Handy). China is involved in Africa in multiple ways, such as through economic investments, financial lending, looking to build naval bases, and leading infrastructure projects there (Sheehy). While their intervention exists in a different context than the ones I discussed in this thesis, the key difference of which is that China’s intervention is not isolated to a particular moment of conflict, it still provides interesting avenues for exploration of several questions: How does Chinese intervention differ from Western interventions? How does the different context of the intervention change the impact of the intervention? How does the scale of the intervention, a
continent compared to a single state, create new ways of exploring the concept of intervention? These are just a few of the possibilities for future research based on the ideas I discuss in this thesis.

Overall, my thesis brings a new perspective to the discussion on post-conflict state-building by looking at the connections between the US military intervention and on the political stability of the host state. The framework for analysis that I articulated and demonstrated in this thesis is useful for analyzing future cases and can be used as a base for the other angles of analysis I discussed in this area.
Bibliography


