

Explaining War, Congress, and the Public: Fifty Years of Teaching and Research at University of Michigan-Dearborn

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Abstract:

The title says “War, Congress, and the Public”, but what’s that mean? War of course means something specific I published books and articles about, such as World War II or the Vietnam War, but the root meaning comes from an old proto-Indo-European word for confusion, and, hence, strife (breeding even our word “the worst”).

Congress means something specific I wrote about, namely, the US Congress, but more broadly refers to other assemblies in republics or on the international stage among nations, and, even more broadly, meetings and coming together. I finished the title with “the public” because I wrote about public opinion, and the public elects Congress and the President, and shapes war policy; and also, finally, our students are that portion of the public whom we are trying to edify. These title words, thus, convey a sense of what I wrote about and taught and worried about for the past five decades. One might say it’s a study of conflict, on the one hand, and attempts at cooperation, on the other.

The specifics are that I’m going to speak about causes and extent of war; coups, military regimes, the use of force in domestic politics; elections and political identities; the US Congress and the powerful interest groups

that influence it; NATO and more broadly the international community in the North Atlantic area, going back to Churchill and FDR and before – even, I believe, evolving for centuries.

Good afternoon, and thank you for joining me! As I've planned for this day, I've been asking myself: what do I want my legacy to be at U-M Dearborn. In the next little while, I will try to explain this, in terms of my career here as a teacher and a scholar. I arrived in 1972 at a campus only about a decade old and left 51 years later, so there is much to relate.

SCHOLARSHIP:

I will begin with my scholarship.

In general, I have studied conflict on the one hand, and attempts at cooperation, on the other.

Throughout my long academic life I tried to describe the world, explain it, and then, on a sound basis, recommend reforms. And while I have had a miniscule influence, I hope I have improved understanding and pointed out how we can have a more peaceful and equitable world through science. That has been my goal. If we are to have good government, and insofar as possible the equitable rule of law, it will be based on scientific knowledge and education. My story today will show some of the positive results, along with some of the inevitable limitations of such a scientific endeavor.

First, I would like to thank everybody responsible for making it possible for me to tell this story of my career. For today, for instance, Natalia Czap, Sue Steiner, Ron Stockton, Don Anderson, and Kiara Marshall have been a tremendous support. I will be speaking in the first person singular, but, like this lecture and its audience and recording staff, everything has been a team effort. I owe everything to my

wife Dr. Ellen C. Schwartz. I have had twenty or so co-authors, plus colleagues and mentors too many to mention. I will simply say that anything good became possible because of those around me, especially at Cornell University where I went to college, at the Library of Congress and other places where I was briefly employed, at the University of Pennsylvania where I went to graduate school, and at the University of Michigan where I worked the vast bulk of my career, fifty-one years, in a kind of federal system where the main focus for me was the Dearborn campus, but where there was overall guidance from the center in Ann Arbor.

When, at age 25, I started out as a professor, it was essential, if I was to feel my life work was worth it, that what I did would make a difference.

Perhaps the biggest impact my work has had is in the article, "Buying Time." Co-authored with Rick Hall of UM-Ann Arbor, this piece was found to be one of the fifty most-cited articles in the history of the *American Political Science Review*. A colleague of my wife remarked that it was the most important article she had ever read. Why the fuss? When I went to school, there was little good scholarship about the sub-title of our article: "Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias." Since the Watergate scandal had led to passage of campaign finance laws, including the reporting requirement for large donations to candidates, this gave an opportunity to explore the effects of this money. I wrote a journal article showing that money from the military-industrial complex made members of the U.S. Senate slightly more favorable to their views in voting. But Rick Hall and I subsequently turned to Congressional committees. Woodrow Wilson famously remarked (to paraphrase him) that Congress at work was Congress in committees. And indeed we found that campaign contributions made those members of Congress receiving these large contributions more inclined to work for the interests of their donors in committees. Our statistical study showed we were right about these effects of money across

several committees. Money mattered in how members of Congress used their time. After Watergate this paper trail of money could be followed, but now dark money has become dominant, and the window of opportunity for such studies has closed.

Hall and I had shown, perhaps more scientifically than anyone else, that certain of our most powerful institutions of the world were biased against the interests of the people. Was there something also amiss about the people themselves, in how they voted?

In the 1960s and early 70s, the time I was in graduate school and getting started as an assistant professor at Dearborn, there seemed to be a novel development relating to this question: the emergence of new issues galvanizing voters, be these issues social (such as abortion and sexual orientation), racial (racial fears and prejudices of many in the white majority), or criminal (involving how to think about law and order). These new issues, which are still with us, were becoming dominant over economic issues, the voters' main focus before. The old, New-Deal rooted order, with Democrats supporting programs to fix injustices in the economy, and Republicans favoring less government involvement, seemed to be fading, and these new cultural issues appeared to be helping Republicans win power. This opportunity was partly due to Republicans holding the majority position among white voters on some of the new issues, such as racial fears, and because on other cultural and racial issues, they could peel off Democratic voters who were right-wing on those matters. Although some voters certainly became Republican for foreign policy or over economic concerns, the racial motive affected more of the changing voters and is far and away the most statistically significant issue linked to the partisan change.

It seemed to me that we were witnessing a party realignment, which became one of the major threads of my scholarship over the years. A good way to study this theme scientifically was a panel study, interviewing the same voters repeatedly over a few Presidential elections, to examine any change in their tribal identity as Democrats or Republicans, and to find the reasons behind that change.

Ron Stockton and I used just this approach to study this matter in Dearborn, with a panel study of 801 voters we followed for a decade, making it the longest panel study in U.S. politics in the twentieth century. Moreover, it came at a critical time, as the country shifted from a huge landslide for the Democrat Lyndon Johnson to a landslide of equal epic proportions a few years later for the Republican Richard Nixon. What Ron and I realized was that the Republicans, along with the populist George Wallace, were doing well in eroding the Democratic majority by emphasizing new issues, including concerns of race, law and order, and life-style. We saw this as ushering a new era. If you see parallels in the current scene, with its targeting of illegal Mexican immigrants and dramatization of culture war issues, I agree. Like many scholars, I see the current polarization as not just the result of one President, such as Trump, but the culmination of a long-term trend.

Ron Stockton and I showed that these new issues were disrupting the old order, and allowing the surge of George Wallace's racism, as well as more frequent wins for Republicans such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Later work on the Dearborn data with my co-author Bernard Grofman of UC-Irvine found that socially conservative and racially fearful white voters were moving out of the Democratic Party and becoming Republicans. In the U.S. especially, people tend to have a loyalty to their party, called their party identification. However, we found that there were exceptions to this stable situation. By 1984, Reagan's re-election to a second Presidential term, the Wallace voters and those who had voted for Nixon, many of them former Democrats, had transformed into being over 80% for Reagan.

And of the mid-70s Democrats who had later cast three votes for Republicans for President, 60% had become Republicans in party identification. It comes to pass that you “are” what you vote. Many “Reagan Democrats” sooner or later came to think of themselves as Republican. With Wallace voters also becoming Republican, the Republican party was gradually being swamped by racially biased white voters who used to be Democrats, a process gradually purging the Democratic Party of its racially biased supporters. And I would speculate that the movement of these prejudiced people into the party made it easier for people like Trump to win the Republican nomination.

The University of Michigan’s famous *American Voter* study had missed this kind of change in adults’ party identification. This Michigan study from 1960 said simply that voters had a stable party ID. One reason identification change showed up in our study is that, by following the same voters for ten years or more, we allowed enough time to see that party ID was changing, despite its glacial pace. This finding makes issues more important in affecting vote choice, eventually shaping party identification. This in turn has a strong effect on much general election voting. The sad thing is that the racial “issues” – fears and prejudices – show up as the most important issues in this change.

From this panel study, Stockton and I did get a book published, and an article in *Public Opinion Quarterly*. If this issue interests you, you are welcome to take home a complimentary copy of *A Time of Turmoil*, Ron’s and my book from 1984. And Bernie Grofman and I continue to work on this material to this day.

This scrutiny of American voters was a new field for me. My doctoral dissertation, *When the Sword Is Mightier: A Theory of Military Involvement in Politics*, was on the use of force in domestic politics.

This was published as my first book. This early book presented an expected utility calculation, a pioneering rational choice view in comparative politics.

At the time of my first publication, dozens of countries, including Greece, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, and Indonesia, had military regimes. And while it is often said “the pen is mightier than the sword,” could we develop a logical explanation and present evidence (based primarily on looking at casual conditions of use of force, and then also secondarily at its effects) that would constitute a scientific explanation of when this is or is not true? In this first book, I attempted to answer these questions, of when and why, by looking at military rule.

The use of force in politics is an important but perhaps relatively under-studied phenomenon. We saw an instance of it in the January 2021 assault on the U.S. Capitol. There are many manifestations of resort to force. To shed light on this problem, I selected one manifestation, the military regime, and I presented a theory: If people’s values make them care predominantly about their side winning, they’ll attempt a coup when they deem force will be more likely to bring them to power. Several variables, each chosen to indicate one or another of the components of this expected utility model, explain up to about 2/3rds of the variance in military rule. Choices that seem rational from a narrow perspective, however, can be revealed to be harmful in a broader view, and data show that this kind of resort to force is more often than not a leading indicator of mass killings. Mass killings may be of ethnic groups and other targeted groups such as the Jews in the Holocaust, or just anyone the government considers opponents, and even randomly targeted killings. Not only do military regimes carry out such killings, but military regimes fall short economically, producing poor national economic growth in concurrent and subsequent decades. Thus, as a general rule, do not make good rulers. But that is the likely path, when one turns to use of force and military regimes.

For a contemporary example: when it was clear, on Jan. 6th, that Trump was going to lose power if the civil, constitutional path were followed, he still saw a path to power by insurrection and fomented it.

Most of the major ideas, in the literature, about the causes of military rule in the 20th century turned out to be supported by my statistical tests. For instance, a country under constant threat of war was more likely to end up under military rule, as were countries which had recently or currently been experiencing inter-state or civil war. Strongly legitimate civilian political institutions, such as a healthy political party system kept countries cohesive, keeping military rule and resort to force at bay. These democratic political institutions, which I called “civilian,” are much more common in prosperous, modern countries than in the poorest nations. Paradoxically, modernization, undermining the legitimacy of old kingdoms, at first produces a surge in military rule, but sustained modernization produces prosperous democracies that are too difficult for militaries to dominate.

I presented these thoughts in my job talk at UM-D. In the audience was the late English professor, Ted Larry Pebworth. He had noticed my emphasis on how strong civilian political institutions, such as political parties, were one of the best defenses against military rule and summed much of my work up in the following limerick, which you see here:

As I was giving my lecture to him and others, Ted Larry composed and wrote these lines.

A state with an entrenched oligarchy

Is ripe for a military autarchy.

But where there's a million

Institutions civilian

The threat of a coup is malarkey.

What a gift! It was a delight that I was able to walk out of my job talk with Ted's poem in my pocket.

In my dissertation, on the *causes* of military rule, I left unexamined the *effect* of military rule, which I simply presumed was horrible. Sure enough, that's right. While others have shown that democracies are not the perpetrators of many mass killings, I found out that, statistically speaking, even traditional autocracies such as kingdoms are not the worst killers, either. The worst mass killings are mostly limited to communist or to military regimes. Some of these findings were reported in my article with Atsushi Tago, "Explaining the Onset of Mass Killings" in the *Journal of Peace Research*. Further evidence on this that I have recently uncovered shows the most likely source of mass political killings of the defenseless – what we usually call genocide.

It turns out there are two good data sets on this. Harff measures what she calls geno-politicide; Rummel, in the other data set, looks at what he calls "democide." It turns out that the military regimes, when one examines these measures of mass killing (Rummel's or Harff's), are really deadly, and the communists, too.

The worst cases of democide were

Russia (communist regime), 4% of the population exterminated by the government, mostly under Stalin, but also Lenin.

North Korea (communist regime) 3 and a half %

The worst cases of geno-politicide were:

Burundi (military regime) 2% exterminated

South Vietnam (military regime) 2%

Sudan (military regime) a little over 1%

Notice that the military regimes are deadly, but the communists much more so. We can see these patterns in a table:

Table 1: Ranking the Four Types of Regimes by How Deadly They Are.

Type of Mass Killing:	Democide (Rummel)	Genocide-politicide (Harrf/Gurr)
Least deadly regime type:	Liberal	Liberal
Second least deadly:	Personalist	Communist
Second most deadly:	Military	Personalist
Most deadly regime type:	Communist	Military

So, the data you've just seen show regime type really matters. To apply this to the last 70 years, of foreign policy, you might scrutinize in your mind's eye U.S. third-world allies; think of how many military regimes were on the U.S. side in the Cold War. The data we've just looked at confirm that these military regimes tend to be brutal. But, a supporter of U.S. policy would add, much less brutal than the communists that the U.S. opposed. My way out of this dilemma is to say: while U.S. was right to contain communism, yet to do so in alliance with militaristic allies was generally wrong. There are no easy answers here, and much room for discussion.

So, after the first half of my career, I had completed studies of military rule and resort to force in domestic politics, of the influence of money in politics, and of the voters' partisan ways and possible U.S. party realignment.

Some of these studies took a lot of time – a decade or more, in the studies of Congress and Dearborn voters. The University of Michigan – Dearborn was a good place to do such work. I was able to work in several fields, and I am very grateful for this flexibility of my senior colleagues.

All these studies I had done required a research design and the measurement of several variables in order to test hypotheses that would reveal what was going on – what was the underlying cause of political behavior. The tests were usually multiple regression analysis or some variation on it, such as two-stage least squares in the case of reciprocal causation. Whoever prepared my retirement document at the University of Michigan summed it up about as well as words can succinctly express by saying my “research employs quasi-experimental designs and game theory to facilitate a deeper understanding of causality and predictive modeling.”

But that is only taking account of my domestic studies and studies of military rule. The job description at University of Michigan-Dearborn called for me to spend half my time teaching international relations.

One project I wrote about examined approaches to the field. International relations has historically tended to divide into controversies between realists and idealists. In 1994 I published a book with my former student Paul Diehl considering this issue, called *Reconstructing Realpolitik*. Realists tend to think the world is dominated by sovereign states, concerned about their military security. Military

threats are in fact ubiquitous, according to realism, so those who don't protect themselves will be likely to be conquered. Our book title was meant to emphasize that while realism had long been the dominant paradigm for understanding international relations its worthwhile ideas needed supplementing, when appropriate, by ideas from rival perspectives; and by scientific investigation of realist hypotheses we could reconstruct realism into a sound scientific theory one could call "Realpolitik." As inter-state wars and militarized inter-state disputes were on the decline and alternatives such as economic sanctions were on the increase, realism was still relevant, but not as much as in the past.

Another major thrust of my research has been on war. What is the relationship of war to international relations? A late colleague, Stuart Bremer, wrote:

As I survey the history of the field of international relations it appears to me that its central concern has been to provide an answer to the question, "Who fights whom, when, where, and why?"

In my doctoral dissertation, I indicated that wars were similar to military coups, as both involved the use of force. But I wrote that the inter-state wars seemed different in their causes, and I had to leave them for another time, another study. What was known when I was in graduate school was a lot of description of specific wars, and, as to general causes, a lot of speculation. It took the work of a colleague in Ann Arbor, J. David Singer, to go beyond speculation and examine these questions on a scientific footing. The project Singer founded was called The Correlates of War Project (COW for short). It aimed at documenting the presence or absence of war, along with the presence or absence of variables that might plausibly lead to war, for each year since Napoleon. For instance, there would be data on the military expenditures of each country each year, which might show whether or not there was an arms race going on at the time wars broke out.

I became part of the Correlates of War Project's Friday seminars in Ann Arbor for several decades. The project measured not only war, but also a dozen or so other variables (the so-called correlates of war) which might cause war or make war more likely. This allowed one to test hypotheses about the conditions that bred war. While many possible causes of war have been proposed, it is studies such as those in this project that have provided empirical validation to several theories. I have been one of the several dozen people who get cited as the scholars providing such validation. I wrote articles and conference papers about several of those hypotheses, and that became a major focus of my research over the past 50 years.

The first ones I'll discuss are power transitions, and the democratic peace. The theory of power transition comes from Kenneth Organski, a University of Michigan Ann Arbor professor who believed that economics was the main basis of national power. Since countries differed in their rate of economic growth, these differential rates of growth led to power transitions, moments when one country supplanted another as the stronger. Big wars came when the top country was being overtaken by a rising challenger that was dissatisfied. My contribution was to identify a half dozen motives explaining why power transitions would lead to war. All this theorizing led me to expect the power shift to come even as early as the decade before the war, identifying power shifts as an early warning indicator of war.

On Democratic peace: My work on this was presented at conferences of the Peace Science Society and the International Studies Association. I was pleased to see that on Wikipedia, my conference papers are the only non-published essays cited in the entry on the democratic peace. I found that not only do democracies not war against each other, but liberal countries do not fight each other, either. Moreover,

my key finding was that they don't even come close to war. There are about 80 militarized interstate disputes (called "MIDs") between liberal states, defined as clashes involving the threat, display, or use of force, these between liberals usually being things like fishing disputes in territorial waters. This research strengthens the support for the "dyadic inter-democratic peace" hypothesis, the idea that a pair of democracies will not fight wars against each other. In terms of today's theme, regime type once again really matters. Realism, which claimed violence is constant in IR, was, on this matter, just wrong.

I went on to studies in several other areas in international relations.

The expected utility approach, as in my dissertation, sees use of force being initiated by a side that expects to get more that way than by peaceful means. For instance, Putin started a war in Ukraine because he expected to win. In addition, Russia had more military personnel than Ukraine at the war's start. But does military superiority like that really serve as a reliable key to victory? Three of us (David Singer, Gary Goertz, and I) were among the first to produce results on this, in an article, "Capabilities, Allocation, and Success in Militarized Disputes and War," published in *International Studies Quarterly* and reprinted in *Classics of International Relations*.

This article investigated what is most likely to lead to victory: the economic, or military preponderance over one's adversary, or just sheer larger numbers of people (the demographic factor)? We examined the capability balance of the two sides in all inter-state wars in the world from 1816 to 1975. We found that economic superiority led to victory about 70% of the time, ahead of military superiority and a larger population. Heavy military expenditures could weaken one's economy, which is most important to victory. In militarized disputes, such as the Cuban missiles crisis, the side that allocated less of its

economic assets to the military was twice as likely to win, compared to the side that allocated more.

We concluded that “Frederick the Great was soon to be wide of the mark, when he wrote ‘God is on the side of the stronger battalions.’”

Other studies considered polarity and war. Many realists believe that the number of great powers is related to how peaceful the world will be. When there is unipolarity, such as the Roman Empire, you can experience prolonged peace. When there is multipolarity (such as in Europe before each of the World Wars, when there were several approximately equal great powers) you are likely to get a lot of war. In between those two extremes, you could have bipolarity – just two great powers – such as during the Cold War. Waltz, a realist, said the peace (no World War III) was due to bipolarity. I found it was more complicated: the big wars, the World Wars, occurred during multipolarity, but there were a lot of smaller wars (e.g., Vietnam) during bipolarity. This study came out in the *Journal of Peace Research*, and got reprinted later.

I continued the study of alliances and war in a time-series analysis of wars and military alliances. I was curious to see whether alliances were, on net, beneficial or harmful. I found that, over the years after an alliance was formed, war was just as common as before the alliance. In my time-series analysis I showed that as the years went by, two countries that would later become allies became more and more likely to fight together in each other’s wars. It was a budding romance, a growing affinity between the two countries. But beginning in the year that they became allies, they became less and less likely to join each other in war each year. Alliances were like a bad marriage – the two had grown closer and closer, tied the knot, and then immediately started to drift apart.

Turning to other variables that mattered, in producing war, I began to study rivalries. My research showed that war was usually confined to pairs of countries I called rivals. About 1 percent of all the pairs of states were engaged in the bulk of the wars. Most of the world was peaceful most of the time, while over half of the wars of the past two hundred years were between rivals. Rivalries, I found, usually ended when one of the two parties was destroyed: for example, Austro-Hungarian rivalries disappeared when Austria-Hungary was eliminated as a sovereign state by World War I. Only two rivalries of the past two hundred years had clearly ended by something like negotiation or diplomacy: the Israel-Egypt rivalry by Camp David, and the Cold War by Gorbachev and Reagan. Rivalry as a concept was introduced into the IR field by Paul Diehl, on whose dissertation committee I served, and by me, so that's something for the two of us to be proud of.

When the Correlates of War project started, David Singer was told (by Anatol Rapoport), "you guys will not be able to come up with a grand explanation of war, but you will be able to debunk a lot of propaganda of governments that creates an intellectual climate that is dangerous to peace." We did better. By showing the shortcomings of realism, we showed that there needed to be a better balance of ideas in which other schools of thought could give hope and show how to reduce war.

I've focused on what I did, but mature theory comes from many studies (and many authors), not just one. I think it is reasonable to say that, as we see in the work of John Vasquez, Dan Geller, David Singer, Stuart Bremer, Bennett and Stam, and others, my ideas are part of a tapestry that has led to a validated explanation of war, focused on a dozen or so variables that have been shown to matter. I am proud and pleased to have helped advance the study of war in these ways.

But wars are fought by political entities. My project, with Meredith Sarkees published as *Resort to War* produced an extended examination of the different kinds of entities. This book systematized the COW project war data which, up till this time, lacked consolidated definitions of the concepts of war, inter-state war, civil war, or the state. For instance, what is a sovereign state? Is the West Bank or Gaza a state? Based on the answer, would a war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza be an inter-state war? Would it be between two democracies, if Hamas were elected? There were clear answers in COW, but often buried in memos and somewhat under-cited articles. In the first two chapters of *Resort to War* we attempted to clearly and carefully elucidate the concept of the sovereign state as well as the concept of war. We introduced the idea of non-state war, not in COW until us. This is war between two sides that are not sovereign states, and that is geographically outside of the boundaries of the sovereign states. This overlooked group of wars included, for example, two wars a hundred years ago between the Saudis and the Hashemites for control of Mecca and Medina. Also, a little over a dozen of the intra-state wars were inter-communal, meaning the state was on the sidelines and not fighting; an example was war between Nelson Mandela's African National Congress and Chief Buthelezi's Zulu-based Freedom Party in 1987-1994. Looking at the big picture of the past several centuries, you might say that Thomas Hobbes was right, that sovereign states would reduce the amount of killing, but he overlooked how much bloodshed would persist, especially in the form of inter-state war, such as the Napoleonic Wars and World War I and World War II. Sarkees and I established that, while non-state wars persisted and were about ten percent of all wars, the vast majority of the battle deaths involved sovereign states, either in inter-state wars, or as one of the two sides in civil wars.

The second part of the book listed and described all the wars known to this point. Sarkees and I found that there were about twice as many wars in the modern era as COW had previously documented. For instance, the lion's share of the Taiping Rebellion, the third largest modern war and the largest modern

civil war had been missed. This specific omission goes back to the COW definition of the state which required diplomatic recognition by the European powers. Sarkees and I tied up many of these loose ends, in definitions and facts. We also wrote a narrative on each of the six hundred and sixty wars since Napoleon, which offered surprises to many of us who had written statistical articles based on the data set. Its a source of pride that in recent years, the data set gets downloaded about every hour from users around the world, and *Resort to War* has over 1,000 citations in Google Scholar. Probably the greatest achievement pre-dates our book: the COW data made it possible to discover the “democratic peace” – the fact that two democracies have never waged war against each other. It is difficult to find anything else in social sciences, that is true, surprising, and for which there are no exceptions to the rule. With researchers continuing to use the data, we hope important new discoveries await, in the next generation of scholarly work on the causes of war.

At this point, I was at the end of my explanatory studies of war. I was 63 years old and had spent about seven years on *Resort to War*.

And right then a new project presented itself -- my 2014 book, *Predicting the Future in Science, Economics, and Politics*. This came out of my job as President of the Faculty Research Club at the University of Michigan. I wanted a book-length project that would represent as many of the interests of the whole university faculty– as possible, within the confines of what I was capable of understanding. Can anyone predict the future? As thoughtful people tried to steer the planet away from catastrophic climate change, nuclear war and pandemics, nothing seemed more useful to human survival than efforts to predict the future, and to predict the consequences of actions we might take now.

We needed an interdisciplinary team of authors to write the different chapters of our book. The central idea we had was that the future was shaped by humans more than anything. Genes and biology mattered, creating human nature, as did the material world. So, to study something like global warming and its effects, one needs to know about humans' behavior but also about the physical and biological world. In other words, we needed contributions by physical scientists, biological scientists, and social scientists. We began by organizing a conference. As political scientists, we did not personally know all these future contributors, but we invited them anyway. Our keynote speaker was the evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson. Others were physicists, engineers, economists. Wilson and several others signed on to write original articles based on original conference presentations. Wilson was the key because he had won a Pulitzer Prize for his book *On Human Nature*, and also because his book *Consilience* argued that it was possible to have a unified science of all things from evolutionary biology up to societies. This would be based on chains of established cause-and-effect relationships between pairs of variables.

Another long-term project I took on at this time was the construction of a theory of international relations I called *Uncertain Supremacy*.

This project theorizes a balance of power, to explain many of the major features of the international relations scene in modern times. The theory has implications for political economy (what has been the basis of the growth of the wealth of nations) and comparative politics of nations around the world (what has been the reason for the birth and growth of modern liberal democracy), because I argue that the balance of power fosters multipolarity, which in turn provided the seed-bed for modern economic growth. So, the theory is an integration and synthesis of ideas from what are often seen as contending theories of international relations. The theory explains aspects of international cooperation beyond war

and international conflict. In this, I am aiming to explain why self-centered countries would cooperate. The piece I took on was why they would form big semi-permanent international organizations like NATO. The puzzle is that in doing so they are expending their own precious resources to assist their allies. Why would it be in their self-interest to do this?

My view is this. Imagine a substantial island, Britain, offshore from a continent, Europe. This would be the Britain of most of the modern era, from, say, 1740 to 1990. In continental Europe there arise periodically very powerful states, such as Spain in the time of Philip II and the Inquisition, France under the megalomaniacs Louis XIV, and Napoleon, Germany under the Kaiser and Hitler, and the Soviet Union under Stalin. Call Britain the balancer B and the powerful continental states the potent aggressors, A. If Britain can stop them by balancing with the weak, it would prevent concentrated power.

The pattern of history is for most civilizations, to more often than not be unipolar under an emperor, while Europe since the Roman Empire has usually been multipolar. Europe may be multipolar in part because of geography, and in part because Britain steps in to stop the potential aggressor from taking over the small states we have called C. Multipolar Europe is not an unmixed blessing. It developed economic growth and parliamentary democracy and liberalism and limited government and the rule of law, all mostly good, and global imperialism, a bad. Why? My theory is aimed at explaining all that.

The trick is for B, Britain, to have enough power and a reason to protect the small states I've called C. We know it worked. The Spanish Armada sunk. Napoleon lost to several coalitions led by Britain. Hitler lost the war. The British alliance with Portugal, which goes back 700 years, and which blocked

Spain, is the world's oldest extant alliance. Portugal and Britain gained global empires on which the Sun never set.

It worked in practice. The trick is to make it work in theory. Two features matter. First, Britain is, economically, one of the world's two most substantial islands, not more powerful than Europe but powerful enough for defense, and there is the stopping power of water, whereby aggressors have not been able to force across the English Channel since William the Conqueror in 1066. Second, there is a universal law, the offensive-defensive balance, whereby it takes more than one attacker to overcome one defender.

If we just follow the logic, five things follow, which are exactly the five things needed for a multilateral balance of power (one in which B and C are allied) to work:

A cannot defeat B by itself.

A can defeat C.

B cannot defeat C.

A cannot defeat B and C when they are allied with each other.

A and C can defeat B.

A successful scientific theory explains a lot with a little, and that is what I have attempted in looking at the balance of power under insularity. When I spoke of synthesis a moment ago, I was not speaking of a textbook list of pieces; I was speaking of a dozen things explained by a small number of principles and some literature that has not been seen as unified, which I show can be. While elements of my work await needed future scholarship it appears to me that the geo-strategic balance of power theory which is the foundation of this book explains or helps explain many things. Among these are

- the political fragmentation of Europe, which never experienced the imperial unity found elsewhere, such as China; I make the case that the balance of power and multipolarity lead to the initial emergence of modern economic growth, and constitutional government in England, due to its insular position safe from invasion and mayhem.
- international cooperation amidst international anarchy, among the states in the balancing coalition, led by England and later the U.S.
- victory for the Liberal side in world wars, and spread of Liberalism across most of the great powers through those wars, helping to bring about the emergence of a zone of peace in Western Europe and North America.

One major issue in this theory is: How can you explain international cooperation if you have each nation pursuing its own interest? The argument here in my book manuscript is Ben Franklin's. As he put it: "We must all hang together or most assuredly we will all hang separately." The *self-interest* drives nations to cooperate. So, international cooperation in this case can be *proven* to emerge out of international anarchy in which everyone is out for his own self-interest. More remains to be done, but retirement will allow me to pursue this, and other projects as well.

TEACHING:

I will now turn to my teaching. What did I hope to achieve in my classes? First, let me say that one of the joys of teaching at the college level is that you get to include your research findings one of the things you love, into the classroom, the other thing you love.

From the main thrusts of my research and writing – all evidence-based and statistical, not merely speculative – came much of my teaching. Initially, my main courses were American foreign policy and international politics, both of which I taught about fifty times. I taught research methods, which included statistics, a similar number of times. This was in political science, in public policy, in public administration, and even in ancillary fields such as environmental politics and urban studies, as the methods course was cross-listed as a requirement for a number of the small fledgling majors on campus. Beyond that, overall, I taught about twenty different courses in all. A notable one was environmental politics, which Pat Dobel and I started on campus as a team-taught course. We were convinced that environmental destruction had emerged alongside nuclear war as the two main existential threats to the human species. It was also fun teaching environmental politics, since almost all students were committed to environmental protection, not just Pat and me.

I stretched as far as I could to cover our students' interests. It is hard for me to identify any topic in international relations, articulated as an interest to me by any of our students, that I did not try to teach. American foreign policy, international relations, the rise and fall of the great powers since 1492, global patterns of peace and war, the causes of war, the arms race and the threat of nuclear war, international security, terrorism – I taught them all at UM-Dearborn.

When I had just finished graduate school, I did not have any of the above research results to refer to in class, and not a lot of scientific work existed, so I had to explore ideas with students in a speculative way. Later, when the evidence poured in, I think my teaching improved as it became possible to lecture on what speculation had been confirmed, and which speculation had failed that test, and what the big remaining questions seemed to be.

I taught mostly at UM-Dearborn – a little at the Ann Arbor campus and a little at U. of Pennsylvania. At UM-D, we had a large body of first generation college students. We must have been doing something right, because when I was on the Council of Deans I learned that, by SAT and ACT scores, our students on average were typical Big Ten, behind Ann Arbor, equal with Michigan State, a bit ahead of Ohio State. In my classes, I found that I enjoyed the bulk of the students, to the point where I enjoyed, at the end, every bluebook – each of them had something to offer, some good idea that someone else had missed, and that sometimes had not occurred to me in exactly that special way. Once in a while, I'd get a perfect teaching evaluation from a class, but usually I got about a B+ rating. Part of this, I believe, was that I wanted to challenge them with ways of thinking they might find uncomfortable. The course I taught most, for instance, was research methods, emphasizing multivariate statistics such as regression, which attempt to establish causal links between variables. This was a required, and not terribly popular course. Ron Stockton and I taught it for decades, and we were the first university in the state of Michigan to require a methods course for political science majors. It was heartening that a survey published as an article of mine in the journal *PS*, found that our alumni, looking back, rated that methods course and our internship as the two most important classes in their undergraduate dossier. I brought that scientific method to all my courses, in that a term paper should have a thesis, formulated as a hypothesis, that could be tested against data; not all term papers of mine were like that, but the students knew that that was an ideal to aspire to.

Term papers became, as the years went on, a bigger and bigger part of what I supervised. This eventually included several years in which I taught the capstone in political science. I had enough knowledge by then that I could supervise things students had a hankering for. One capstone student gathered data to compare Portugal with other countries in the EU and North America, on drug use.

Portugal, it turns out, had decriminalized marijuana and other relatively benign drugs, and Portugal had seen a drop not only in crime but also some of the medical harm from drug abuse. A remarkable policy innovation. Another student did a master's degree in public policy thesis with me and showed with data the sad fact that the US spends over twice as much on medical care as places like Switzerland, yet has a few years lower life expectancy to show for it. Student research often revealed such fascinating information.

Who were these students? A favorite memory is of Mary Ellen Kolcheff and her daughter Laura McLeod, as they both had me as professor as political science students, two decades apart. I was trying to teach the intellectual content of what would lead to good citizenship, but the world was increasingly driven by the competition to get a job. At first, this worked well, as a quarter of our students went to law school. Later, there was more tension over this tug between job needs and citizen responsibility. One student, Sara Yousef, called me one day and said, I want you to know I'm going to be on TV this afternoon. I watched on CNN. I saw Sara and other interns with FBI director Robert Mueller. There was also footage of Sara alone with Robert Mueller in his office. Sara told me that a couple of years later she was the first to interrogate Saddam Hussein, immediately after his capture. Another student, Sara Wright was my research assistant, as a volunteer, in the May and June after she graduated. She apologized that she was going on to another posting for the rest of the summer, as Professor Elizabeth Warren's research assistant at Harvard Law School. These were ideal cases, of education in things I taught, like American foreign policy, leading to not only a meaningful learning experience, but a career.

One of my students even took one of my courses twice. She was a retired person with a Ph.D. in anthropology from Columbia. These retired people were there as auditors. They came in with the NY Times under their arms and a lifetime of thoughtfulness which added to the richness of the classroom.

Some of my teaching was a little farther afield. I had a few graduate students in Ann Arbor I worked with, including Paul Diehl, who became a professor at U. of Illinois, and Paul Hensel who became a professor at Florida State. Students came from the U. of Windsor to take my course on rational choice, and sound versus flawed decision making. This was in our Master's of Public Policy program. These Canadians wanted exposure to game theory, a new U.S. approach to thinking about international relations. It was refreshing that when I took a break in the middle of the 3-hour class, they went on talking about class topics till class resumed. Memories of such moments, when things clicked in the students' heads in class, are among the very best of my 51 years. One inspired UM-D student, acting as President Kennedy, in a simulation in my class, settled the Cuban missiles crisis peacefully by a secret deal in which the US secretly removed missiles from Turkey in return for the Russians removing missiles from Cuba. A couple of years later, when Cold War documents were de-classified, we learned that this solution was exactly the one that President Kennedy himself had come to, to end the Cuban crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear destruction.

What did I want the students to come away with? In international affairs, I wanted them to know about the role of the US in world affairs. The US was and is the most important global power, and the it was important to have the policy right or we could have a nuclear war, if we were too hawkish, or the killing of millions by communists, if we were too appeasing. Domestically, I wanted to convey the structure and function of various parts of the American government, so my students could become responsible citizens.

Mostly, I am proud that in our classes the students were able to be exposed to the best that had been written about world affairs. Through the wonderful literature on international relations we were able to engage critical thinking about what the world was actually like, and how it really affects us.

GOVERNANCE AND SERVICE:

What about running things? About political power on campus?

Back in the start, I had to sign an oath supporting the constitution of the State of Michigan, which I did not know much about, but which I figured must be OK because it had to be consistent with the U.S. Constitution. Within that framework, the Regents ran the University, but the faculty were the “governing faculty,” responsible for the curriculum, and I was on many “Executive Committees”, by which the Regents meant committees of faculty members (and sometimes others) who had authority to make decisions. Also, we individual tenure-track faculty had tremendous autonomy in the classroom. This was a great joy.

I arrived at UM-D the first year we had four years of students, freshmen to seniors. (Before that we’d just had junior and senior year, and a smaller enrollment.) We had a campus to construct. Part of the faculty’s job was to create a curriculum. We worked in teams, but each of us made a difference. I had a big role in the creation of the political science major. Its main unusual feature was that we were the first college in the state to require a research methods course for majors. Students had to take courses about American politics and about politics in the rest of the world. I was involved in instituting the requirement that UM-D students had to take two classes in English composition; this was controversial,

and would not have passed had not Pat Dobel and I forced a secret ballot of the campus faculty, which supported our measure. But what about funding? Along with three other faculty members I went to Lansing and got Gary Owen, Chair of the House Appropriations Committee to increase the campus base budget by \$60,000, which, adjusted for inflation, is about \$390,000 per year in today's money. Like U. of M. President Robben Fleming, Owen was open to what we had to say and open to taking in information about the growing pains of our campus, where we could hardly keep up with expanding student enrollment. We had a bright young faculty, Big Ten-caliber undergraduate students, heavily first generation college and often working while attending school; these facts drew sympathy and support. When our larger group of Concerned Faculty met with Pres. Fleming and stated why we were there, Fleming's first words were, "What can I do to help?" Back then, faculty committee service could make a difference. On the college executive committee, I worked with Dean Kim Bruhn to create the international studies major, so that our language faculty would be freed from being stuck largely teaching first-year language courses.

Administratively, I was on the Council of Deans for five years, as director of the Division of Interdisciplinary Studies (IDS), which was then a gestation conduit, creating new majors: computer science, environmental studies, the first health program on campus, and urban and regional studies. IDS also became the home of first the master's degree program in computer science (with faculty from business, engineering, and math). This was all in the first dozen years or so I was on campus.

I can't think of a better way to do inter-disciplinary studies. We (Provost Arden, me, the faculty) focused on majors. We had two master's degree programs, in computer science and in public administration. We had faculty from the school of management, the math department, and the engineering school. What could be more important than computer science and public administration?

Then, at the undergraduate level, we had urban and regional studies, to connect the campus to the Detroit metro area, and another major in health policy, and another in environmental studies. Again, what could be more important for our students and the country and the world?

I was most involved in public policy, when, at request of Dean Paul Wong, Don Anderson and I set up the Master's Degree in Public Policy, now integrated into the public administration program.

Later, when my career was better established, I had a most interesting post at the U-M campus in Ann Arbor. For the last 21 years of my 51 years on the faculty, I was on the executive committee of the Wallenberg endowment. We granted the Wallenberg medal to Kailash Satyarthi, who went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize, to Desmond Tutu, and others. I was particularly instrumental in initiating the selection of Aung San Suu Kyi for the medal in 2011. With my dissertation being on military rule, I was particularly aware of the situation she had been under the long-standing military regime in Burma. She had been under house arrest for years, so it was not clear at the time we selected her that she would be free to speak, but I was firm in my conviction that it would work: the military in Burma seemed keen on using her release to explore avenues of exiting from their decades of harsh military rule, toward a regime in which elected officials would have some degree of control over the country. In the end, she did speak via video sent out via courier, and we were able to view it simultaneously and ask her questions and get her reply in real time. It was manifest that she felt strengthened by our show of support.

Speaking to us, Bishop Tutu reflected on how he was viewed as the leader of enormous numbers of ordinary people. He corrected this by saying that those so-called ordinary people were extraordinary. I conclude by noting a similar line of thinking in two of my students. They kindly gave me a rotating,

solar powered globe. It was inscribed with their words, “thank you for making us extraordinary.” There is nothing more devoutly to be wished.