THOU SHALT NOT KILL A FELLOW LIBERAL:

PATTERNS OF MILITARIZED DISPUTES BETWEEN LIBERAL STATES,

1816-1992

by

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Manuscript, c:\war\PSS02libmidsV9 point 80
(onbutwofinaltable).doc (i.e., based on the full list of some 130 inter-liberal MIDs, but some contingency tables still done by hand); this is the liberal, not necessarily the democratic, peace, that is being examined.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I provide fresh reasoning and evidence about how liberal societies avoid war against each other. While such regimes often use force against each other in militarized inter-state disputes, they have shed blood in such encounters only five times in almost two full centuries of record keeping. When blood has been shed, the states involved are just recently liberal, and almost always have a long and still active history of enduring rivalry against one another. Kant, writing in 1795, was familiar with liberal republics (but not with modern democracy) and more recent authors such as Doyle (1986) and Rummel (1983) have followed Kant's lead by focusing on, and documenting, a virtual absence of inter-state war between liberal or free states. To throw new light on this question, I examine the militarized disputes (MIDs) that have occurred between liberal societies, to see how close their disputes have come to war. In this frame of reference, war is defined as sustained combat resulting in substantial fatalities (at least 1,000 killed). MIDs are armed conflict more broadly conceived -- with 96% of them less violent than war itself -- involving the explicit threat to use force or the display of force as well as the use of force. There have been 128 militarized disputes between liberal societies as defined and measured by Doyle (1986; 1997), with the United States and the United Kingdom the most frequent protagonists. I scrutinize these cases using the combination of scientific method and case study found in Ray (1995), who examines cases that some may have considered wars between democracies. I expand this method to inter-liberal MIDs, first examining severe cases. Wars are discussed (e.g., Israel vs. Lebanon 1948, India vs. Pakistan 1999), but they do not qualify (e.g., Israel was not independent, Pakistan was not free). With no actual wars between liberal states, their most severe MID is a declaration of war, by Britain on Finland, Dec. 6, 1941, when both were democratic and liberal. Thanks to the case-study emphasis, I also have discovered corollary declarations of war not in the MID data set: by Australia and Canada on Finland. But one must question the true severity of these incidents, since none of these three Commonwealth nations actually did go on to engage in combat against Finland.

Moving from wars themselves to the MIDs short of war, it is unusual to have such a large number of militarized disputes with so little risk of a war. To see why war is so often avoided, I examine the context of the dispute, as well as the highest severity of action reached by each protagonist in the dispute. Severity is assessed using not only the threat, display, or use of force distinction, but also the more specific underlying action codes, such as blockade, seizure of territory, and mobilization. The context and severity (Maoz 1982) of the actions in the disputes allows an assessment of how close liberal societies have come to waging war against each other. Some incidents involve seizure of fishing boats, or protests about fighter plane incursions into airspace, and hence do not seem to bear the seeds of war. More serious incidents do occur, some in the context of World War I or II, as, e.g., one liberal state seizes another's territory just ahead of an invasion by the Axis powers. In some ways inter-liberal MIDs look as serious as other MIDs. Liberal MIDs often involve the use of force. Liberal MIDs are multilateral (24% of the time) more often than other MIDs (15%). Liberal MIDs are less often reciprocated (44% of the time), but
this is not significantly different than the rate for other MIDs (50%). Liberal MIDs tend to be tit-for-tat incidents (i.e., rarely escalate vertically). Most distinctively, liberal MIDs rarely involve bloodshed and, when leading to use of force, tend toward seizures rather than clashes. The results of my hypothesis tests are consistent with the explanation that liberal societies avoid war with each other for two related reasons: (1) consistent with costly signaling theories, liberal targets tend not to respond militarily to liberal states who initiate MIDs against them, but this difference is not strong enough to achieve statistical significance; (2) a vivid norm of avoiding bloodshed characterizes most of their interactions, and provides a powerful pacifying effect. The main peril of inter-liberal MIDs comes from the weakness of another important norm, against ganging up.

This study is of value for a number of reasons. First, and straightforwardly, the findings help us understand what type of situations breed an armed clash between two liberal societies, and consequently how close these clashes have come to warfare. Second, my findings provide new evidence that has relevance to the democratic peace debate. Several authors have emphasized the existence of a "democratic" peace (Ray 1995; Senese 1997). Studies such as mine, on MIDs in the "liberal" peace, can shed light on the democratic peace debate. While the absence of war between two "democracies" has been hailed as the closest to a law-like finding in world politics, and has stimulated enormous research efforts over the last two decades, much of this research has been based on the Polity data on democracy, which in turn seems to be heavily dependent on a measure of constraints on executive authority (Gurr et al. 1989; Gleditsch and Ward 1997). As an indication of the close connections between the liberal and the democratic peace literature, Russett and Oneal (1997), in perhaps the classic empirical study of the peace in question, title their study, "The Classic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict." Much of the research on the inter-democratic peace is inductive and empirical; to gain a large number of cases for multivariate statistics, the analysts typically use the Correlates of War Project's militarized dispute data rather than its war data (Oneal and Russett 1997; Henderson 2002). Using the outbreak of a MID as the dependent variable in these multivariate study of the democratic peace, however, implicitly assumes that inter-liberal MIDs are just as severe as other MIDs. As I show, that assumption is not warranted. Examining the types of militarized clashes that have occurred between liberal societies allows the reader to ponder the meaning and face validity of the many extant empirical tests of the inter-democratic peace. Although my case studies lend a bit of new support to critics of the democratic peace by pointing out declarations of war that even several authorities on the subject are not aware of, the main weight of my findings is strongly supportive of the democratic peace literature. This is because my statistical patterns, especially on battle deaths, reinforce the democratic peace proposition. Because inter-liberal MIDs (which are mostly also inter-democratic MIDs) are much less likely to lead to mass killing than other MIDs, the analysts like Russett who said "the classic liberals are right" got the correct message out, but somewhat underestimated the full degree to which the classic liberals were right.

With most cases of inter-liberal MIDs surprisingly low in severity and bloodshed, but with some controversial cases (Lebanon-Israel, India-Pakistan, Britain-Finland, Australia-Finland) of war or declaration of war, the debate over the democratic peace is likely to continue.
In this paper, I examine the (infrequent) modern instances in which liberal states have used armed force against other liberal states. The purpose is to see how close these states have come to the brink of war, and why war between them has been averted.

The "inter-democratic peace" sometimes seems to be the major focus of those seeking to understand the causes of war (e.g., Oneal and Russett 2001), and to prevent war in our own time (e.g., the Clinton administration effort to foster democracy). It seems widely (though not universally) agreed among scholars that there have either been no wars between democracies, or far fewer wars than one would expect by chance. But scholars investigating this phenomenon remain in disagreement, including division over two fundamental issues: what is the independent variable, and what is the dependent variable? The first division is between those who emphasize
that the peace between democracies (such as those using Polity data on democracy to study the matter) and those who emphasize the peace between liberal (or "free") societies (such as Kant, Rummel, and Doyle). A second division is between scholars who study wars (such as Ray and Doyle) and the scholars who study militarized inter-state disputes (such as Oneal and Russett and Henderson). In this paper, I take the unprecedented step of combining the study of militarized inter-state disputes (MIDs) with the study of peace between liberal states.

Most of the empirical research on the inter-democratic peace does examine militarized disputes (MIDs) rather than war. But it almost always studies democracy as measured in the Polity data set (or some variation such as democracy minus autocracy) rather than liberalism. This has generated a huge and valuable literature beyond one's power to comprehensively review in a short paper, but useful literature citations are in Maoz (1997), Russett and Oneal (2001), and Henderson (2002). These studies are fine, but our field may benefit by taking a new look, from the point of view of liberalism.

CLASSIFYING STATES AND ARMED CONFLICTS

The contribution I seek to make in this paper is to examine a portion of the MIDs data on which this vast literature rests. While the scholars studying the democratic peace spend a great deal of attention on measurement, much of the measurement work
has focused on how one should measure democracy (as well as regime similarity, and other control variables). To illuminate the subject from a fresh point of view, I simply stipulate that I will measure liberalism of states by the Doyle (1986) method, and switch then look at the kinds of armed conflicts such states get into.

CATEGORIES OF ARMED CONFLICT

I therefore focus us on the somewhat less-examined levels of severity of acts inside militarized disputes, to see what sorts of militarized disputes these liberal societies have had with each other. This is important for two reasons. One, the empirical literature just discussed tends to treat MIDs in a dichotomous fashion (there is a MID or there isn't), and debate has been mostly limited to such issues as whether one should code an ongoing MID as well as the onset of a new MID as an instance of armed conflict (Henderson 2002). Second, regardless of this empirical literature on whether joint democracy affects MID incidence while controlling for other variables, there remains an important substantive question: have the MIDs between democracies usually gotten close to the brink of war, or are they minor technical clashes with little risk to international peace and security?

In other words, my purpose in doing this is to examine some of the implications of switching from the original focus (do
liberal societies go to war against each other) to the statistical focus (do liberal or democratic societies get into militarized disputes with each other). My purpose is not to quarrel with the fine scholarship that has been done, but rather to complement that work and to help everyone in that debate get a richer sense of the evidence base on which their arguments rest. On the one hand, a MID can be a severe event like a declaration of war. On the other hand, a militarized dispute between liberal societies may just be argument between tuna fishermen, in which the coast guard seizes an illegal fishing boat by force. While this is fairly well known, as we shall see I am presenting results of it that have not been known.

If I drive from Ann Arbor, Michigan, across the border to Windsor, Ontario, and get stopped for speeding and escorted to the courthouse by a police car to make sure I pay the fine, this is not coded as an international incident, but if a fishing boat has an analogous encounter and is taken into port under armed guard, this is a MID; do we from this have evidence that democracies are on the brink of war? I will argue that we should be very hesitant to use all the MIDs data to reach inferences about the inter-democratic peace, without carefully examining at least the few cases of armed clashes between democracies on which the debate is going to turn. There is evidence in the MIDs data for both sides. Some inter-democratic MIDs are not going to alarm anyone except the NATO pilot who finds the Swiss angry because he's not in Germany anymore. But
on the other hand the MIDs data do contain surprising cases of intense armed belligerence between two liberal states. One inter-democratic MID is so severe it surprises even some of the researchers who have published statistical studies of the democratic peace.

There have been some studies similar to what I am doing, and the most recent and most similar work on MIDs is that of Senese (1997). Senese conducts a multivariate test to see if, once a MID has started and before it expands to war, joint democracy is a pacifying condition that reduces its chances of "escalating." This is a commendable study, but each individual study has its limits. One limit of Senese's work is that even though he uses the word "escalation" in his title, the MID data set variables do not allow one to measure escalation in the usual sense of the word, namely, the process by which a less severe act by one side is responded to by a more severe act by the other side. This is not possible to examine because the MID data only record the highest action taken by each side, and do not tell us the other actions or the sequence in which the highest actions occurred. A second limitation of Senese's study is that it is a multivariate statistical study of a large number of cases (namely, all MIDs, which is an N in the thousands), and so my purpose is to complement it by looking much more carefully at a subset of important cases (namely, MIDs between liberals, which is an N in the hundreds), to see exactly how severe each one was.
CATEGORIZING SOVEREIGN STATES

One also needs to decide what sorts of states one expects to find in what Doyle dubs the "pacific union." Should one single out countries with "elective governments" (Babst 1964) -- i.e., elections in which the bulk of the population selects their rulers? Or should one look at countries that are free (as emphasized by Kant 1795, Rummel 1983, and Doyle 1986), and if so should one focus on a free economy, a judicial and legislative branch free of executive branch dominance (as emphasized by the Polity data sets), or whether the people are have civil and personal freedom (as emphasized by Freedom House)?

In this paper, I conceive of these different definitions of free states, from Doyle to Polity to Freedom House, as all being slightly varying measures of the basic underlying dimension of being a liberal state. They are all positively correlated with each other, and are usually in agreement in classifying particular governments. The Polity measure, most widely used, emphasizes a different set of the state’s traits than Doyle, and is constructed from a particular algorithm giving it different observed values than Doyle’s. The Polity democracy score will tend to either load either on the same factor as Doyle’s, or on a second factor that is highly correlated with Doyle’s. I use Doyle's liberalism scores because statistical findings on the democratic peace have heretofore been reliant on the Polity-
based measures, and it would be useful to see if the democratic peace thesis holds up when one measures 'liberalism' rather than democracy. This seems appropriate given that the person often first associated with the "democratic peace" is Rummel, who wrote that it was a peace between "free," not necessarily between democratic, societies, and liberalism’s core value is, after all, liberty, or its synonym, freedom. Also, Doyle’s measure goes back the farthest (all the way to the start of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century), and, as a dichotomy, leaves no ambiguity in which I have to intervene to rule on what Doyle thought should be the appropriate threshold between liberal and non-liberal states. Moreover, Doyle's measure is the only one designed to measure the full concept of liberalism and nothing else.

Most importantly, given that quantitative analysis of the democratic peace from 1816 to present has until now been dependent on the Polity data set, it seems a useful thing to do tests of the democratic peace from 1816 to present that were not based on the Polity data. I am not claiming that Doyle’s data are better than the Polity data. I am only claiming that Doyle and Polity each have a measure that can throw useful light on the controversy about the democratic peace, and at this time it is useful to see how things would come out if we took Doyle’s approach seriously.

In my nation-year data matrix from 1816 to 1990, the correlation between the Doyle liberalism variable and the Polity
democracy variable is .73 (n=10,636).\textsuperscript{1} Hence, there is a high
correlation between the Polity democracy score scholars have
been using and the Doyle liberalism measure, with almost
half the variance in one explained by the variance in the other.
Hopefully, Doyle and the Polity team have each done a valid job,
and the difference is the difference between liberalism and
democracy, two strongly interrelated, perhaps interdependent,
but distinct concepts.

It is not the purpose of the present paper to do an
extensive comparison testing the "democratic peace" thesis with
first Polity, then Freedom House, and then Doyle liberalism
scores. Nonetheless, to get some sense of the sensitivity of the
results to using Doyle’s liberalism scores, I have looked to see
how the scoring of the political system of specific countries in
war varies from Polity to Freedom House to Doyle. In the years
on which they overlap (1972 to 1990), Freedom House and Doyle’s
(1986; 1997) ratings are highly consistent with each other. For
those years, the Polity IV democracy score correlates at \( r = -\)
.84 with the Freedom House overall score on freedom, while the
Doyle liberalism score correlates at \( r = .70 \) with that Freedom
House measure and at \( r = .77 \) with the Polity democracy score. I
have also cross-checked with Polity III ratings and political
histories to make sure there is a modicum of inter-coder
agreement and some face validity to the codes in salient cases
where there have been battle deaths or declarations of war
(e.g., Ecuador-Peru, and United Kingdom-Finland). Zeev Maoz has
presented me with a list of inter-democratic MIDs based on Polity data, and I have cross-checked that list with the Doyle-based list to see how sensitive the analysis is to which data set is used. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to do an extensive analysis of these differences, but about 16% of the Maoz inter-democratic MIDs are not in my Doyle-based list of inter-liberal MIDs. The reason is that Polity lists Columbia and Spain as 19th century democracies and Turkey around 1975 as a democracy, but Doyle does not consider them free. (Also, Maoz's Polity-based scoring leads to two MIDs involving anocracies (Honduras in 1911 and Czechoslovakia in 1919) to be treated as democratic vs. anocratic MIDs, and Doyle does not consider either state to be free in those years.) The result is that, although we have seen the correlation (r) between Doyle liberalism and Polity democracy is .73, the correlation between Maoz's inter-democratic coding and my coding of inter-liberal MIDs is only .61 (r²=.37). This is a result consistent with the Casper and Tufis (2002) finding that studies of the democratic peace are surprisingly non-robust across highly correlated Polity and Freedom House scoring. I conclude that the results in my present paper are true for Doyle’s liberalism scores. Anyone trying to generalize to what this means for democracies must proceed with great care.

An important case illustrating state ratings on freedom is the Indo-Pakistani war of 1999. Over three months in the second quarter of 1999, India and Pakistan fought daily, with a total
killed in combat of perhaps 1200. This seems just over the COW threshold of 1,000 battle deaths, the operational indicator of war. At that time, both India and Pakistan had elected governments (the Musharraf military government not having yet seized power in Pakistan). Doyle’s liberalism scores have not been directly applied to this case, since Doyle stopped his scoring at the end of 1990. In the pre-1991 period, when Doyle did rate the South Asian sub-continent, Doyle counts India as liberal in every year except the emergency year toward the end of Indira Gandhi's rule. To Doyle, Pakistan is never a liberal state, and so India-Pakistan is never a liberal dyad, until the 1988 to 1992 period (Doyle 1986; Doyle 1997). However, Freedom House does not count Pakistan as free. They rank states as "free" if they score below 3 on a scale, ranging from 1 for fully free to 7 for totally not free. Freedom House assesses this freedom scale for both political rights and civil liberties. They give a score for political rights followed by a score for civil liberties; hence a state with a Freedom House score of "2, 2" would be rated as free in both political rights and civil liberties. India, with a "2, 3" Freedom House rating in 1998 and in 1999, is classified as free. Pakistan, with a "4, 5" in 1998, is rated "partially free." Later, after the coup, Pakistan in 1999 had a score of "7, 5," which is "not free." (Freedom House 2002) In short, Freedom House scores indicate that the apparent war between India and Pakistan was not a war between truly free states, even though the Pakistani as well as the Indian government had been popularly elected.
In this fashion, by using the Doyle (1986) ratings of a country, updated by Doyle (1997), I examine the period from 1816, when the MID data begin, up to the end of 1990, when the Doyle data stop. Since the MID data many people have analyzed goes on to 1992 (and has recently been updated another decade), I have sometimes included the 1991-1992 years in some tables. My purpose is to help people who have analyzed the 1816-1992 MID data get a sense of how sensitive the analysis is to inclusion or exclusion of 1991-1992 cases. I do this by checking with Freedom House ratings of whether the country remained "free." Based on this, I examine each MID up to the end of 1992 (excluding only MIDs in the 1991-1992 period involving states that became liberal after the end of 1990). To sum up, I would say that there are not critical cases in 1991-92 that I have detected that make a significant difference in the general patterns. This is because there are not a lot of 1991-92 cases, and none of them involve a major controversial clash (such as the India-Pakistan war of 1999).

THE LIBERAL STATE

Liberalism can be viewed as an ideology providing legitimacy to a state and its form of government over society. (By ideology I mean a set of logically connected principles and beliefs about people, politics, and society that explain why a particular form of government and way of life is best.) Max
Weber argued that, in the modernization process, traditional societies had traditional legitimacy. Transitional societies, lacking consistent form of legitimacy, had to rely on the occasional charismatic legitimacy of one individual, and modern societies have legal-rational legitimacy. Charismatic legitimacy is unique in being attached to the life span and leadership of a single human being, while the other forms of legitimacy are more institutionalized. In this Weberian frame of reference, one can view liberalism as one of the three major forms of legitimacy for states in the international system of recent centuries. Traditional legitimacy can be identified with the conservative ideology, while modern societies have based legitimacy on either liberalism, radicalism, or some blend of the two. (In actual practice, life does not exactly follow such ideal types, and there is likely to be a conservative element even in many of the most modern states.)

Liberalism can be seen as an ideology that differs from radicalism and conservatism in its answers to key political questions. The first questions are about human beings. The defining characteristic of liberalism is that it asserts that human beings inherently have rights, before and independent of any government. In the American Declaration of Independence, this is expressed by the words, "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." From this, the other characteristics of liberalism follow. Liberalism, in
contrast to conservatism, emphasizes human equality, because in liberalism, all people have equal rights: Mahatma Gandhi has as many rights as the King of England. Conservatives do not accept that claim that everyone has the same rights; therefore, conservative Englishmen are more likely than liberal Englishmen to resist granting independence to such as Gandhi and his people. Liberals emphasize equality of opportunity, whereas radicals emphasize equality of condition or status. Liberals believe human improvement is possible; they are more optimistic about this than conservatives, but liberals are less optimistic about this than radicals. As for society, liberals favor a broad middle class, whereas conservatives favor an aristocracy and radicals favor the poor and the working class. Liberals believe constructive societal change comes from individual striving, as with great inventors and the free enterprise system. Radicals favor change through central planning (as in Marxism-Leninism) or democratic community planning (as in socialism). Conservatives are in favor of order and stability; they believe that traditional institutions are holy and should be preserved, so there is little change except through "prescription," or the unplanned response of society to changing needs. As for government, liberals favor civic, religious, and property rights. In contrast, radicals emphasize social and (non-property) economic rights that would benefit the poor, such as the right to a job, security, and education. Conservatives emphasize traditional privileges and immunities, especially property rights.
From such a set of liberal political ideas emerges a liberal state, namely, a state organized to promote and represent liberal principles. Doyle’s operational definition of a liberal polity is that to be liberal a state must meet several criteria (1986: 1164). Specifically, there must be

1. A market and private property economy.
2. External sovereignty.
3. Citizens who possess juridical rights.
4. Representative government (with a competitively elected legislature having a role in policy making).
5. Widespread suffrage (greater than 30% of males voting, and women getting the vote within a generation of demanding it).

The second criterion for identifying a liberal state, namely, external sovereignty, simply limits us to sovereign members of the international system, and eliminates colonies, dependencies, and stateless societies not recognized as sovereign, such as the Indian tribes of the Western hemisphere. Some of these entities may have been democratic, but they are not sovereign liberal states. The other four criteria (free markets, judicial freedoms for citizens, representative government, and widespread suffrage) combine to allow Doyle to distinguish between liberal and non-liberal sovereign states. From this he produces a list of sovereign liberal states with the years they were liberal. Free markets and juridical freedoms derive directly from the definition of liberalism as an ideology grounded in each person’s rights, as well as in the practical expectation that
free markets will lead to economic prosperity that will in turn reduce the amount of armed conflict. Representative government and widespread suffrage are derived from the practical experience that gradually led liberals to conclude that government limited by regular, free elections was the best vehicle for safeguarding rights, and that widespread suffrage was the best way of protecting everyone’s rights. One of the earliest liberals, Hobbes, were not convinced of this, and favored a strong leader. What makes even Hobbes a liberal is that in Hobbes people prefer the strong leader because he will best safeguard their rights; the leader is in charge for that reason, and not because he has some special inherited or divine right to rule. As time has gone by and the world has seen more elections and more widespread suffrage, liberals have moved away from Hobbes to a greater confidence in the regularly scheduled, free elections that Lipset sees as the defining characteristic of representative democracy.

While for counting purposes we may reckon a state to be liberal, not even the United States, the most liberal country over the past two centuries, is going to be perfectly liberal. For instance, the U.S. had within it a conservative sub-culture, the South, with plantation slavery, until 1865. Insofar as non-liberal elements in a liberal state alter its foreign policy, that foreign policy may be somewhat non-liberal. The U.S. war against Mexico, for example, was opposed by the liberal congressman, Abraham Lincoln, because a U.S. victory was likely
to expand slavery. British imperialism is not fully consistent with liberalism, partly because British imperialism was often racist; and those who believe one "race" is superior to and should govern others miss the liberal thesis that all people (excepting children, the insane, criminals) have the right to do what they decide, without outside interference.

It would go beyond the bound of my topic here for me to argue over whether liberalism produces a better form of government. What matters is that liberals believe liberalism is better (even though I’m not herein claiming that it is). Consequently, liberals may sometimes wage war against other forms of government because they do not measure up. Therefore, liberal states may get into a lot of wars against non-liberal states (a topic whose empirical assessment lies beyond the scope of my present paper).

It would be ludicrous for anyone to argue that liberalism, even if implemented perfectly, prevents all social injustice. Moreover, liberals themselves would be among the first to point this out, since liberalism is based in part on a belief that human beings are neither "angels" (to use Madison’s term) nor perfectable. "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely" is a notion that leads liberals to construct limits on power, and any government may be led by people who will abuse their power. The Federalist Papers, a classic, predominantly liberal text, is a document filled with concerns about the
potential dangers of abuse of power by the liberal United States government that the authors had just created. There is, furthermore, ample evidence that liberals can be hypocritical, and so there is no certainty that liberal governments led by liberals will achieve liberal aims. The most famous articulator of the liberal ideal, Thomas Jefferson, owned slaves. The classic liberal government, mid-nineteenth century to late nineteenth century England, opposed the slave trade, but presided over the Irish potato famine and over an empire that was often unjust and racist. World peace rarely seems to be the highest priority of liberal authors. Liberal authors, such as John Locke, seem much more concerned with domestic than with international politics. While much of the peaceful idealism of the UN Charter is consistent with liberalism, the idea about international affairs that is most obviously liberal is support of free trade and endorsement of the principle of comparative advantage as a way to improve welfare.

Thus, it is not obvious that liberalism is a doctrine or political movement that will produce world peace (Doyle 1997: 251), yet it would also be a mistake to dismiss positive linkages between liberalism and peace. Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government, the most important foundation of liberalism, is a modification of the work of Thomas Hobbes, the Leviathan (1651). The central aim of government, in the Leviathan, is to prevent the war of all against all that results in life that is nasty brutish and short. The Leviathan was
published three years after, and hence written in the context of, the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the bloodiest international struggle in the history of modern Europe until that time. In that sense and in that context, liberalism has been centrally concerned with replacing a too-violent society with a liberal social order that better protects life, liberty, and property. Commercial enterprise and industrialization, cornerstones of liberalism, provide, in the view of not only liberals but their enemy Karl Marx, an unprecedented opportunity for economic growth. It is the hope of liberals that economic opportunity will attract people away from war.

However, there is no statement in Locke that states founded on his principles will not fight wars against each other. And, there is still no logical proof that liberalism will cause peace to spread. Still, since the liberal support for life, liberty and property rights leads liberals to oppose war, the spread of liberalism would be consistent with the emergence of a more peaceful world. Fukuyama, in "The End of History," argued that if all states supported liberal principles, they would no longer have reason to fight one another. This ignores the possibility that states fight over other things than principles, such as resources, misunderstandings, or other conflicting goals. Indeed, one might expect that liberal states would have things to quarrel over. Lenin, in Imperialism, argued that capitalist states would fight over colonies. The Fashoda crisis, examined herein, illustrates that Lenin’s views were too hysterical. In
the years since his too-famous prediction, there have been more inter-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War project) between Marxist-Leninist states than between liberal states, even though liberal states vastly outnumber communist ones in that period.

THE HYPOTHEZIZED REASON FOR THE INTER-LIBERAL PEACE

But why zero inter-liberal wars? My reason there is none stems from the defining characteristic of liberalism. Because liberals believe in individual rights, liberal government is tolerant of religious and other fundamental differences. Basically, there is no crusading in liberalism, except to defend liberalism. Since liberalism is not a threat to liberalism, there is no need to defend against fellow liberals. To the contrary, liberals have a fundamental respect, noted above, for liberal societies and principles. Hence, they not only have no reason to harm them, but they also actually have a positive disposition to want them to flourish. All this should reduce the armed conflict among liberal states -- but, as noted above, states can still get into armed conflicts over other things than principles, such as struggle over resources. Hence, insofar as those conflictual motives ever became strong enough to overcome the liberal opposition to attacking another liberal qua liberal, it is possible, in proportion to that strength, for a severe armed conflict to occur even between liberal states.
Rather than assert from this argument that there will be peace between liberals, what I want to do in this paper is to hypothesize that the existence of a pair of liberal states causes a characteristic peace between them, and then to test to see if the predicted bivariate associations exist. The characteristic inter-liberal peace, in other words, is hypothetical: it is something that that we have reason to expect to be true, but about which there is uncertainty -- as it may turn out to be only weakly true or even end up lacking empirical confirmation. My central hypothesis is that the existence of a pair of liberal states has indeed limited the severity of militarized disputes between them. This basic proposition, combined with the characteristics of liberalism, leads to several supporting hypotheses that can be tested with available data: pairs of liberal states, when they have MIDs with each other, will tend to avoid use of force and especially war; if they do use force, they will tend to avoid bloodshed; their use force against each other will tend toward commercial actions (such as seizures of fishing boats) rather than clashes between military forces; and the more severe uses of force between liberals will tend to occur between pairs of states only recently liberal, and especially pairs that have a longer history of being rivals than of being liberal.

To do empirical work testing these ideas, I begin with Doyle’s list of the liberal states in world politics, focusing
on the period from Jan. 1, 1816, when the Correlates of War dispute data set begins, to Dec. 31, 1990, when Doyle’s list of liberal states ends. Based on Doyle’s list, I have characterized every state for every year since 1816 as being either liberal, not liberal, or in transition. I define a ‘transition year’ as the first or last year a state is liberal. For example, Doyle classifies India as liberal from independence to 1975, and from 1977 to the end of his study. The period of 1975 to 1977 is the period of "the emergency," in which Indira Gandhi suspended Indian rights and ruled by decree. She declared the start of this period on June 26, 1975, and ended it in March 1977, with a call for free elections (which were promptly held and were relatively free, ending the emergency period). In the nation-year data matrix I created from Doyle’s work, I coded 1975 and 1977 as transition years for India, 1976 as a year India was not liberal, and all the other surrounding years as years in which India was liberal. If a state enters a war or MID in a year the state is liberal, and does so in opposition to a liberal state on the other side, then there is an inter-liberal MID. If the same happens in a transition year, I check to see whether the participation of that state in the war or MID started on a month and day when the state was liberal; if so, there is an inter-liberal MID.

THE INTER-LIBERAL MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES
This method allowed me to identify the 128 MIDs in which a liberal state was on each side. This list is culled from the Correlates of War Project's (COW) version 2, MIDs B list of some 2,000 MIDs in the entire globe since Jan. 1, 1816. Each of my cases is a unique MID; i.e., none are the so-called "continuation cases" of some data sets, in which a new MID-year is created each time an ongoing MID carries over into another calendar year. The levels of action are on a twenty-two point scale of action developed by the COW project, and displayed in Table 1.

It is obviously of central importance to this investigation to get a sense of what might be called the severity or importance of these militarized disputes, so we can see how close liberal societies have come to the brink of war. After all, no war has occurred without a prior MID, and if wars occur, it has been because MIDs escalate. What is the ecalatory ladder, and is its code embedded in the twenty-two categories of hostility level? A first answer is that the index itself is organized in a prima facie way from high severity (war, level 22) to low severity (no militarized action, level one). This is a useful first step, and I will occasionally rely on that ordering in this paper. A coarser answer is provided by the hostility level codes in table 3. These are the codes used by most of the research in the field. Hostility level five (corresponding to action code 22) is inter-state war itself. Hostility level four (corresponding to action codes 15 to 21) is
use of force short of war. Hostility level three (corresponding to action codes 7 to 14) is display of force. Hostility level two (corresponding to action codes 2 to 6) is explicit threat to use of force. Hostility level one (corresponding to action codes 1 and -9) is no detectable or detected militarized action.

An alternative, potentially better, answer is provided by Maoz (1984), who created the first scale of MID severity. Maoz has the first scientifically validated measure of severity of MID actions, and also the first measure that can give exact numerical scores to the severity of each action. Maoz ranks the MID actions on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing war. Unfortunately, Maoz's original scale (which he is now updating) does not scale all 22 levels of hostility. His original scaling (Maoz 1984: 224) is as follows:

100. War (Most Severe)
99. Declaration of War
96. Blockade
84. Occupation of Territory
82. Mobilization
81. Seizure of Material or Personnel
75. Clash
65. Other Use of Military Force
49. Show of Force
30. Threat to Use Force
29. Threat to Declare War
20. Alert
8. Threat to Occupy Territory
1. Threat to Blockade (Least Severe)

While Maoz's list follows approximately the same ranking as the official COW codes, it differs in rank-ordering in two important particulars: alert, a display of force, is according to Maoz much less severe than other types of display of force. He rates alert as about as severe as an average threat to use force. On the other hand, mobilization, another display of force, is rated by Maoz as much more severe than the other displays of force; Maoz says mobilization is as severe as an average use of force. So the Maoz scaling technique provides a thoughtful alternative. Maoz shows that the COW action and hostility codes are imperfectly correlated with his empirically-grounded severity scale. Since each of these indicators has something to be said for it, I worked with the Maoz severity codes and the official COW codes in preparing this paper.

An updated Maoz severity scale would have more value as a research tool. In a first step to update Maoz's scale, I have interpolated, based on my own judgment, scoring for the new MID action categories. The starred scores listed immediately below are those I hypothesize would complete Maoz's scale. In each case I have been sure to give a unique score that will avoid ties:
100. War (Most Severe)
99.5 Use of Chemical, Bacteriological, and Radiological (CBR) Weapons*
99. Declaration of War
96. Blockade
84. Occupation of Territory
82. Mobilization
81. Seizure of Material or Personnel
75. Clash
65. Other Use of Military Force
60. Border Violation*
50. Show of Troops*
49. Show of Ships*
48. Show of Planes*
42. Nuclear Alert*
40. Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons*
30. Threat to Use Force
29. Threat to Declare War
20. Alert
8. Threat to Occupy Territory
1. Threat to Blockade (Least Severe)

I have taken the Doyle list of liberal states (Doyle 1986; updated in Doyle 1997) and coded which MIDs have occurred between these states. Although so far I have identified 123 MIDs between liberal states, the work is preliminary, and there are probably 120 to 135 inter-liberal MIDs depending on one's
possible reclassification of controversial cases. For example, Doyle’s list ends in 1990, but there are six more MIDs between his liberal states in 1991-1992. Including as MIDs some currently excluded cases such as the Australian and Canadian declarations of war on Finland, or the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967 (with 34 battle deaths), would increase the N. Substituting Freedom House or Polity data for Doyle's codes could produce bigger changes in the N, depending on what democracy threshold was selected on these seven and ten point scales. The 123 MIDs that I examine in this paper can be ranked by the highest hostility level each reached. When classified by their most severe incident (Table 2) ninety-four of the MIDs have a severity level between 50 and 100, whereas only thirty have severity between 1 and 49. Thus, the modified Maoz severity scale indicates that these inter-liberal MIDs are mostly characterized by a peak incident that is indeed severe.

By the more traditional classification, of threat, display, or use of force (Table 3), we also have signs that these inter-liberal MIDs often peak in a serious event. There are seventy-five uses of force by the initiating side. Of these, most often the initiator's highest act is a seizure (28 cases) or the residual category, "other use of force" (30 cases). There are also nine clashes, six occupations of territory, one blockade, and one declaration of war (Table 4, rightmost column).

In addition to these cases of use of force by the
initiator, sometimes the target unilaterally uses force. In my 124 cases, this unilateral use of force by a target occurs seven times. In all, this makes 82 cases in which either the initiator or the target used force. This means that 66% (82 out of 124) of the inter-liberal MIDs went to use of force. This is almost exactly the average for the MID data set as a whole, namely, 69% (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 197; see table 3).

THE CASE OF U.K. DECLARATION OF WAR ON FINLAND: DEC. 6, 1941

By far the most severe of these events was the declaration of war by Britain on Finland during World War II. This occurred on Dec. 6, 1941. A declaration of war, rating 99 on Maoz's severity scale, is obviously serious. Finland had regularly scheduled elections and a parliamentary government throughout this period, and it goes without saying that the U.K. was a liberal democracy under Winston Churchill. On the other hand, there are several mitigating circumstances, starting with the oddity that this declaration of war did not lead to an actual war. Finland had been invaded by the Soviet Union a couple of years before, and at the conclusion of that war Finland was forced to cede 10% of its territory. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Finland did, too, not as a Nazi ally but as a co-belligerent. "The Western Allies had ambivalent feelings, torn between their residual good will for Finland and the need to support their vital ally, the Soviet Union. As a result,
Britain declared war against Finland, but the United States did not; there were no hostilities between these countries and Finland." (www.wikipedia.com/wiki/Continuation_War) Churchill apparently had tried to convince Stalin it would be counter-productive to declare war on Finland, and, failing to be convincing, declared war (Churchill, 1950: 528). Under such circumstances, it is perhaps understandable that Britain did not attack Finland, and that Finland did not attack Britain.

In researching the Finnish situation, I found evidence that there has been two other declarations of war by a liberal regime. Australia, following Britain's lead, declared war on Finland (Australian Constitutional Commission 1988). The Dominion of Canada did also (ironically, on Dec. 7, 1941, and overshadowed by another event that day). Neither an Australian nor a Canadian declaration of war on Finland appear in the MIDs data set, so the data set understates the number of severe MIDs between liberal states.

SEIZURE VERSUS CLASH: THE COMMERCIAL SIGNATURE OF INTER-LIBERAL MIDS.

The liberal state’s commercial base should lead to a distinct form of armed conflict, namely, commercial. This is a hypothesis that can be tested using two of the actions in the MID data set. Of the MID data set’s 22 categories of hostility levels, only three are common enough to occur more than ten
percent of the time, and the three all involve use of force. They are seizure (category 17, 13% of the MIDs), clash (category 18, 16% of MIDs), and other use of force (category 19, 32% of MIDs). Seizure is identified as the "capture of material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory." (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 173) Clash is identified as the "outbreak of military hostilities between regular armed forces of two or more system members." (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 173) By ignoring the residual category, "other use of force," one can hypothesize that among the two more specific uses of force, inter-liberal MIDs will tend to be seizures, while other MIDs will tend to be clashes. Seizures, in comparison to clashes, are more likely to be over commercial objects, and are by definition less likely to involve the exchange of fire between armed forces. Consequently, seizures are less likely to involve battle fatalities, and are less likely to entail the escalation of armed conflict that occurs as clashing armed forces bring in reinforcements and counter each other’s battlefield advances. In fact, we see (Table 6a), that the inter-liberal MIDs are significantly less likely than other MIDs to involve clash, and significantly more likely to involve seizures.

CONTAINMENT VERSUS ESCALATION OF INCIDENTS: THE PACIFIC SIGNATURE OF INTER-LIBERAL MIDS.
Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) argue that hostile events occurring between friends tend to be interpreted as not as serious as the same events occurring between enemies, and that consequently the friend attacked will tend to respond in a less hostile manner. This pattern is suggested by these declarations of war on Finland, to which the Finns do not violently respond. The pattern is characteristic of many of the inter-liberal MIDs (see Table 4 and Table 5). In table 4, the principal diagonal shows the tit-for-tat pattern of the target responding with the same action level as the initiator (15% of the cases). The upper right portion of table 5 (above the principal diagonal) shows the cases in which the target response was a less severe action, indicating de-escalation (72% of the cases). There are only fifteen cases in which the target's response is a higher action than the initiator took (representing 12% of the cases).

Simplifying this pattern into use, display, or threat of force, we see (table 5), that liberal states usually do not respond to liberal initiators, even up to declarations of war. In a majority of cases, there is no response from the target, even when there has been use of force against it. In 60% of the cases of initiator use of force, there is no response from the target; in 50% of the threats or displays of force, there is no response from the target. When the target does respond in an inter-liberal MID, the response is usually proportional to the provocation—what might be called tit-for-tat. The hypothesis that inter-liberal MIDs are not likely to be reciprocated is
tested in table 7, using the correlation coefficient Yule's Q. Yule's Q is designed to test the hypothesis that joint liberalism is sufficient to depress the tendency to reciprocate. The Yule's Q of -0.12 is a correlation in the predicted direction, namely, that there is less reciprocation when there is an inter-liberal MID. But in table 7 we see also see that the relationship between joint liberalism and non-reciprocation is not statistically significant (based on the chi-square test).

Sometimes, there is a reciprocation, but it is mild because of the context of the inter-liberal MID. One case is the Swiss protest of NATO overflights of Swiss airspace. While the Swiss have to protect their neutrality and territorial integrity by protesting, they do not have to worry about demonstrating toughness so as to deter a NATO invasion. Sometimes the MID action by the initiator may even be seen as having protective intent. There is a case of Britain moving troops into Scandinavia—-but the intent is clearly to preclude a non-liberal state's hostile occupation of the territory. This is to say, some of the inter-liberal MIDs occur in, and are being interpreted in, the context of a wider war or wars. Liberal states are trying to cope with NAZI and Stalinist aggression, and end up seizing each other's territory or even declaring war on each other. In these cases, considering the more dangerous context, no wonder the target's response to the use of force by a fellow-liberal state is a muted response. Hence, even in the more provocative cases of use of force, we have no response a
greater percentage of the time in inter-liberal MIDs than in the rest of the MID data set.

Also, a substantial portion of MIDs involve more than two states (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 194). Of 130 inter-liberal MIDs, 31 go beyond the bilateral state. Some that are multilateral involve the context of one of the World Wars or the Israeli-Arab conflict. Ominously, these include cases in the early 1920s enforcing the vindictive Versailles peace treaty and thereby helping set the stage for Hitler and World War II. These cases include efforts to block Austrian provinces from voting by plebiscite to join Germany, and French occupation of the Ruhr to punish Germany for falling behind in payment of war reparations (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). Multilateralism is common among liberal states. Overall, the Yule's Q test indicates that the inter-liberal MIDs are more multilateral than the control group of all other MIDs (see Table 8). The Yule's Q of -.17 is against the predicted direction, is stronger than the Yule's Q of -.12 that we examined (above) for reciprocation, but is still not statistically significant. Fifty-six of the 130 inter-liberal MIDs, or 43%, occurred before 1945. It is notable that there has been only nine multilateral cases since 1945, a number involving Lebanon or Jordan versus Israel in the Mideast. Only 12% of the post-1945 inter-liberal MIDs are multilateral, compared to 32% of the pre-war ones. Overall, a Yule's Q test indicates that the inter-liberal MIDs are significantly more
bilateral since 1945 and more multilateral before then. The Yule's Q of -0.55 is strong enough that the result is highly significant (chi-square 7.73, p < .01 for a two-tailed test).

Since World War II, inter-liberal MIDs are usually self-limiting in the sense that they are less likely than other MIDs to go beyond two actors or involve loss of life (horizontal and vertical severity).

Moreover, in support of this line of argument, that inter-liberal MIDs are not severe, inter-liberal MIDs rarely involve bloodshed. In the MID data set as a whole there are 81 wars, 48 additional cases in which there are over 100 battle deaths, and 221 more cases in which there were at least some battle deaths (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 191). In contrast, among inter-liberal MIDs, only five have any recorded battle deaths (table 9). Oddly, three cases involve, of all places, Ecuador against Peru. None involve more than 100 battle deaths. Actually, there are two other erroneous cases in the MID data set. The Ecuador-U.S. case is a fishing boat seizure in which Ecuador blocked Aristotle Onassis's fishing fleet from Ecuadorian waters; it certainly does not involve battle deaths, so the MIDs code of fatalities for that dispute is certainly an error (see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives for a description of the action). Likewise, Iceland vs. U.K. in 1972, the so-called Cod War, was coded in the MID data set as involving 1-25 battle deaths. In fact, the only fatality was an Icelandic coast guard welder who was electrocuted in an accident as he repaired a
ship. No British vessels were in the vicinity, and this is clearly not a battle death. With these two corrections, battle deaths are significantly less common in inter-liberal MIDs than in the control group (i.e., all other MIDs). The significance level (p<.001) provides a confidence level of over 99 percent. Moreover, the Yule's Q correlation (-.58 and -.62, in Tables 9 and 10) is in the predicted direction and is the strongest of the correlations I have examined for this paper.

It would appear to me that there is a norm here: “Thou shalt not kill a fellow liberal.” There are exceptions, but they always involve countries that are only recently liberal. More often than not, they involve countries who have been enduring rivals longer than they have been liberal. Ecuador and Peru have the longest Wayman-Jones enduring rivalry. India and Pakistan, also involved in battle deaths, have a long-running rivalry at the time. The five cases of inter-liberal battle deaths always involve an enduring rivalry, except for Honduras vs. El Salvador. One can imagine the world divided into three types of dyads: on the one extreme, rivalrous (cases in the "zone of war"); on the other extreme, inter-liberal (cases in the "zone of peace"); in between those two extremes, the average dyad. One can hypothesize a Bayesian decision process with updating. In an average dyad, the other side is treated in an average way. In a dyad that is inter-liberal now, the other side is treated in a less-hostile-than-average way; but that treatment may not be so muted if one or both of the states has
only recently become liberal. A recent liberal state may not register as fully deserving of liberal considering that it recently was not liberal. And if that state had been a rival for a long time, then its status as rival may still dominate its status as a member of the inter-liberal club.

To test these ideas, I plot the years liberal on the x axis and the years rivals on the y axis, for each bilateral inter-liberal MID. My central hypothesis is that the more severe MIDs, including especially the ones with loss of life in battle, will appear in the recently liberal area, and are especially likely to occur in pairs of states that were rivals longer than they were both liberal. As a preliminary, we turn to Graph 1, plotting all cases of bilateral inter-liberal MIDs. The x axis is years of joint liberalism (i.e., the consecutive years before the MID that both states were liberal). The y axis is years of enduring rivalry (i.e., the consecutive years before the MID that the states were enduring rivals). This is done for all bilateral cases, but not multi-lateral cases, to avoid the ambiguities in the latter set (e.g., how to deal with averaging two liberal states on one side, how to deal with states on one side that are not liberal).

In Graph 1, instead of the usual social science oval or amorphous scatter-plot, we see a clean delineation, with almost all cases hugging the x or y axis. This is showing that being jointly liberal is incompatible with being enduring rivals. The
only exceptions are cases from before when countries are jointly liberal (and hence lie above the line y=x). The main examples are the U.S.-UK MIDs of the 1816-1861 period. These are eliminated in Graph 2, in which all pre-1870 MIDs are deleted from the data. One can see, in comparing Graphs 1 and 2, that the cases involving U.S.-UK are early cases in the modern era; the U.S.-UK rivalry dates from before the two were both liberal as defined by Doyle. Their rivalry dies out by 1861, and no such cases recur in the nearly century and a half since that time. Since 1870, there is a strong incompatibility between joint democracy and rivalry.

There are seventeen cases of use of force-use of force in liberal dyads. That is to say, seventeen times since 1816, liberals have used force against each other. As a percentage of the 128 inter-liberal MIDs, this is actually not much lower than what one would get for all MIDs. This fact could lead to the erroneous perception that inter-liberal MIDs come close to war. In fact, only five cases, as we have seen, involve bloodshed. These are the crucial cases. Their position is indicated in Graph 3: all five cases are between states just recently liberal. In four of the five cases, they are long-standing enduring rivals. The other twelve cases are not bloody. They involve states that have been jointly liberal for many years, and that have not been enduring rivals.

Statistical analysis of these seventeen cases shows a very
clear separation between the bloody and non-bloody clashes, with the independent variables being years rivals and years jointly liberal. (Alternatively, the difference between the two is used as a single independent variable, with similar results.) The proportion of variance explained is around 50%. When just the one difference variable is used, the results are always statistically significant (more so with OLS, less so but still significant with probit and logit). If two separate independent variables are entered, years of rivalry is more significant than years of liberalism, but the differences in significance level are usually small, indicating that both variables are useful in the explanation. In short, the few (5) instances of bloodshed can largely be explained by a Bayesian perspective in which one asks, given the recent past, whether a long-standing rival that has just recently appeared liberal is really a stable liberal regime or just a persistent rival in new stripes. This should make one cautious, however, about expecting peace between dyads such as India-Pakistan or Israel-Palestine just because one that has been non-liberal is takes on a new constitution.

EXPLAINING THE PATTERNS

To explain why we see these patterns, consider two somewhat contrasting but also interacting hypotheses. The first hypothesis stems from Fearon’s (1994) model of domestic audience costs. In this, democracies (or liberal states) have more
domestic constraints on what the leader can do, and because of that democracies who do manage to take armed action are sending a firm and credible signal to their adversaries. If this is true, we should see two things in the findings (and we do see both). First, we should see that when liberal states do initiate a MID, their move is taken seriously and the other side backs down (e.g., does not respond with a codable militarized act). This is indeed what we saw in Table 7, where 56% of the liberal initiatives get no response (and this goes up 67% when the initiation is use of force, the most serious move). This 56%, however, is not significantly higher than for the other MIDs. The percentage difference is in the direction to support the hypothesis, but the relationship is not sufficiently strong.

A second expectation from the idea of costly signals is that the initiating liberal state would not have to take very strong action because its action will be so credible. The evidence here is supportive. We saw that a lower percentage of inter-liberal MIDs as other MIDs involved the use of force (almost always by the initiator). And, more strongly, inter-liberal MIDs are much less likely to involve bloodshed.

This leads to the contrasting hypothesis: that liberal states are members of a club, and that the club members treat each other according to higher norms. The initiator is much less likely to shed blood, and likewise for the target. This norm held for all the liberal dyads except Peru-Ecuador. The
evidence for the liberal norm on bloodshed (Table 9) is much stronger than for the signaling hypothesis.

The norm against bloodshed can be seen as a norm against vertical escalation. Horizontal escalation is the spread of a dispute from initial parties (bilateral) to others (multilateral). Horizontal escalation against a fellow liberal state can be seen as ganging up on, or bullying, a club member. The test for this norm between liberal states was in table 8, where weak support for it was found: inter-liberal MIDs are more likely to be multilateral.

Why is one club norm strong and the other weak? The bloodshed norm can be seen as a vivid moral imperative: thou shalt not kill. Killing is part of many definitions of war (Vasquez 1993: 23), so the threshold to killing anyone may be more important as a liberal club norm than the 1,000 battle death threshold of the COW Project. In contrast, the horizontal escalation norm may be weaker because liberals are conflicted about it. On the one hand, escalation is indeed viewed as bad. On the other hand, there is a contrasting international norm of multilateralism, as seen in the current debate over Iraq. In the absence of a strong norm preventing it, key liberal states ganged up on Austria and Weimar Germany, helping set the stage for Hitler’s rise to power and World War II.

In short, it appears
CONCLUSIONS

The scientific study of the democratic peace has drawn attention because of its potential ramifications for international relations theory (are realists their liberal-idealistic opponents more correct about the state of the international system? [Wayman and Diehl 1994]), and for foreign policy. Oneal and Russett (2001) represent the predominant view of the empirical-statistical studies, that when one controls for all pertinent alternative causal explanations of armed conflict, one finds that democracies don't engage in armed conflict with each other. Oneal and Russett's findings give a flavor for what the dominant school this literature can produce: they conclude that Immanuel Kant's original conception was correct, namely, that free societies (what I have been calling democracies) will not fight against each other, especially if they trade with each
other and are embedded in a free confederation of states. Henderson (2002) is a good example of the contrarian view, namely, the view that, when one controls for the correct additional variables, one finds that Russett et al. are wrong. Henderson carefully uses Oneal and Russett's measures and procedures, and reports that, when one uses the correct set of control variables, joint democracy (two states both being democracies) does not contribute to the reduction of armed conflict. My conclusion from this debate is (1) both Henderson and Oneal/Russett have done superb statistical analyses; (2) a reader's conclusion about whether joint democracy leads to a reduction in MIDs involvement depends on whether the reader finds Henderson's or Oneal/Russett's work more convincing; (3) if Oneal and Russett are right, then a blow has been dealt to political realism (Mearsheimer 2001) and support has been provided for the Clinton administration efforts to spread democracy; but if Henderson is right the realists are defended and Clinton's efforts were brought into question; (4) neither Russett nor Henderson is addressing the original finding of Rummel (and predecessors) that there have been no wars between democracies. Even if Henderson's analyses are correct, it remains true that there have been no inter-state wars between a clear-cut liberal democracy and another such state. All this empirical literature hangs on the examination of MIDs rather than inter-state wars, so it is important in assessing this literature to see what the occurrence of a MID between liberal democracies has meant, in terms of severity of armed conflict.
The examination of the democratic peace question in this paper in fact lends new support to both sides. On the one hand, a liberal democracy has (once in the MID data set, and in two other instances not recorded in the data set) declared war on another liberal democracy. More generally, inter-liberal MIDs are multilateral, which can be defined as horizontal escalation. Inter-liberal MIDs do involve using force less often than an average MID. Moreover, the modal use of force that can be clearly distinguished in inter-liberal MIDs is seizure, whereas in other MIDs it is clash. This seems to be a significant feature marking inter-liberal MIDs as less bellicose, since a seizure of a fishing trawler is less likely to lead to war than an exchange of fire between armies.

As the case study of declaration of war indicates, we may need more sensitivity to the limitations of the MIDs data set; this data set, like any human creation, may have some errors, at least errors of omission. We need further work on event severity, better understanding of what sort of incidents and MIDs are likely to escalate to war. We certainly could use an incident-level data set, like Leng's BCOW data, so that we do not have to infer such things as tit-for-tat behavior from the bare data of the highest coded hostility reached by the target and by the initiator. We need a better sense of what the distinction is between war and the lesser MID incidents (i.e., threat, display, and use of force short of war). The MID data
set has sustained a flourishing industry on the empirical study of democracy and war. While this industry has provided us with an improved understanding of the inter-democratic peace, those seeking to understand this literature should be made aware of the issues of validity raised in this paper.

The many large N statistical studies of the democratic peace usually use the occurrence of a MID as the dependent variable. This implicitly assumes that inter-democratic MIDs are on average at the same severity level as the other MIDs. I have shown that because of their low levels of fatalities, inter-liberal MIDs are less severe than other MIDs. Hence, the inter-liberal peace is more powerful than one would have concluded from the extant large N, statistical literature. The inter-liberal peace proposition is also, for the same reasons, more powerful than one would have concluded by simply counting the inter-liberal MIDs or calculating what proportion of them involved use of force. Remember, the focus of inquiry is supposed to be on whether there is a inter-liberal peace, meaning an absence of war between two liberal states. We must be careful in switching from the war data set to the MID data set, as many scholars have done, not to lose focus on whether war has occurred or at least came close to occurring. Vasquez, in defining war, says "war must involve organized violence that aims to kill members of a group, not simply to do them harm, otherwise war becomes too much like force." (Vasquez 1993: 23) Since I find that inter-liberal MIDs have a surprisingly low
amount of killing, this study documents an important piece of evidence in support of the inter-liberal peace. The 185-year peace between free societies may end tomorrow, but it has been, on net, slightly more stable than we'd reckoned.
**TABLE 1. HOSTILITY LEVELS OF MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES (MIDs).**

22. Inter-state war  
21. Use of chemical, bacteriological, or radiological weapons  
20. declaration of war  
19. other use of force  
18. clash  
17. seizure  
16. occupation of territory  
15. blockade  
14. border violation  
13. fortify border  
12. mobilization  
11. nuclear alert  
10. alert  
9. show of planes  
8. show of ships  
7. show of troops  
6. threat to use nuclear weapons  
5. threat to declare war  
4. threat to occupy territory  
3. threat to blockade  
2. threat to use force  
1. no militarized action  
-9. missing data (which in these cases means no codable use of force, display of force, or explicit threat to use force by target side has been detected, despite extensive search; later, for visual clarity of presentation, I will sometimes render the -9 fields as blank).
## TABLE 2. Liberal MIDs Ranked by Most Severe Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT AND SEVERITY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CASES</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100. War (Most Severe)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.5 Use of CBRadiological Weapons*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99. Declaration of War</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Blockade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84. Occupation of Territory</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82. Mobilization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81. Seizure of Material or Personnel</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. Clash</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. Other Use of Military Force</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Border Violation*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Show of Troops*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Show of Ships*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Show of Planes*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Nuclear Alert*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Fortify Border*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Threat to Use Force</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Threat to Declare War</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Threat to Occupy Territory</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Threat to Blockade (Least Severe)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Number of Cases in Table: 123

100%
Table 3. Inter-Liberal MIDs Classified by Highest Hostility Level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hostility Level</th>
<th>Inter-Liberal MIDs:</th>
<th>All MIDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Force Short of War</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display of Force</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Use Force</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square test of significant difference between inter-liberal and other MIDs: Chi-square 8.32 is significant, 3 d.f., p < .05 for two-tailed test.

All MIDs column from Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996: 197). Bold figures indicate larger of the two percentages in a row.
Table 4. Initiator Actions and Target Actions in Liberal MIDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiator Action</th>
<th>USE</th>
<th>DISPLAY</th>
<th>THREAT</th>
<th>NONE</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 WAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 CBR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 DECL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 OTHRUSE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 CLASH</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 SEIZE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 OCCUP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 BLOCK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 VIOL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 FORT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 MOBIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 NUCALR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 ALERT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 SPLAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 SSHIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 STROO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 THRNUK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 THRWAR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 THROCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 THRBLK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 THRFOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Initiator and Target Hostility Levels in Inter-Liberal MIDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiator Action</th>
<th>Use of Force</th>
<th>Display of Force</th>
<th>Threat to Use Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of Force</td>
<td>21 (28%)</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display of Force</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
<td>13 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of Force</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>45 (60%)</td>
<td>16 (41%)</td>
<td>9 (90%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.  Seizure or Clash as High Act in Inter-Liberal and Other MIDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of MID:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-Liberal</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Act:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seizure</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clash</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yule's Q = .54
Chi Square 12.23 (1 d.f.), p < .001 level for 2-tailed test.
Percentage difference is in the predicted direction (liberal MIDs more likely to be seizures).
Table 7. Reciprocation (Target Response to Initiator) in Inter-Liberal and Other MIDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MID type, classified by Participants:</th>
<th>Inter-Liberal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>57 (44%)</td>
<td>956 (50%)</td>
<td>1,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yule's Q = -.12
Chi Square 1.84 (1 d.f.), p < .25 level for 2-tailed test.
Percentage difference is in the predicted direction (liberal MIDs less likely to be reciprocated), but is not statistically significant.
Table 8. Bilateralism and Inter-Liberal MIDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MID Type</th>
<th>Classified by Participants:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-Liberal</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>27 (21%)</td>
<td>299 (16%)</td>
<td>326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yule's Q = -.17
Chi Square 2.39 (1 d.f.), .10 < p < .25 level for 2-tailed test. Liberal MIDs are more likely to be multilateral; this difference is not statistically significant.
Table 9. Battle Deaths and Inter-Liberal MIDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MID Type, Classified by Participants:</th>
<th>Inter-Liberal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least one death</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reported Fatalities</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yule's Q = -.58

Chi Square 13.95 (1 d.f.), significant at .001 level for 2-tailed test.
Table 10. Battle Deaths and Inter-Liberal MIDs, excluding Wars.

MID Type, Classified by Participants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inter-Liberal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least one death</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reported Fatalities</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,831</td>
<td>1,961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yule's Q = -.62

Chi Square 11.46 (1 d.f.), significant at .001 level for 2-tailed test.
Graph 1. Years of Rivalry vs. Years Jointly Liberal, for All 93 Bilateral Inter-Liberal MIDs.
Graph 2. Bilateral Inter-Liberal MIDs, 1870-1990.
Graph 3. Bilateral Inter-Liberal MIDs, 1816-1990, in which there Were Battle Fatalities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

I am indebted to Michael Doyle, Errol Henderson, Sheldon Levy, Zeev Maoz, Jim Morrow, Michael Rosano, R.J. Rummel, Paul Senese, J. David Singer, and Paul Williamson for their insightful comments on my essay and its findings; I also appreciate Bruce Russett's helpful suggestions on measuring liberalism and democracy. I would like to thank Phil Schafer for discussing the Correlates of War Project cases of inter-liberal MIDs with me, and Bram Wayman for data-base management and table construction. Jessica Kemeny, Bram Wayman, and Eric Wayman served as able research assistants. Bram Wayman and Phil Schafer were especially helpful in tracking down the transition times (days and months) in which regimes switched from liberal to non-liberal or vice versa. Atsushi Tago assisted with the transposing of matrices to create a data base for correlating indices of liberalism and democracy. I am grateful to Helgi Augustsson, Ambassador to the United States from Iceland, and to Hafstein Hafsteinsson, Director of the Icelandic Coast Guard, for the telephone conversations with me on Jan. 7, 2004, covering the events of the 1972-1973 cod war between Iceland and Britain. George Costaris, of the Canadian Canadian Consulate General in Detroit, and John Hilliker, of the Historical Division of the Canadian Dept. of Foreign Affairs, were very helpful in the study of the Commonwealth declarations of war on Finland. None of the aforementioned bear any responsibility for the remaining limitations of my work.
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021030; rev. 040224, 040414

NOTES:

1 While Doyle’s liberalism measure is correlated positively with Polity democracy scores over the 1816-1990 period, the upper limit of the correlation is reduced by the dichotomous nature of the Doyle coding. For example, assume a variable, such as Polity democracy scoring, ranges from zero to ten. Assume an equal number of cases for each category. Create a dichotomous recode of the original variable into a dummy variable, with zero assigned to categories zero to five and 1 assigned to categories six to ten. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between the original variable and its dichotomous recode will only be .87, not 1.0; hence, the r2 will only be 75% between the original variable and its recode. Also, the correlation between the Doyle liberalism variable and the Polity democracy variable, which is a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient of .73, is the same until the third place after the decimal whether one uses a dichotomous Doyle score [1=liberal; 0=not] or a trichotomous score with the intermediate value for the transition years [2=liberal; 0=not; 1=liberal only part of the year]. Hence, there is a high correlation between the Polity democracy score scholars have been used to using and the Doyle liberalism measure, with almost half the variance in one explained by the variance in the other. But the correlation is lower than the change from a ten-point scale to a dichotomy would explain, and so I infer that a part of the difference is because Doyle has measured something different than a Polity democracy score for
each country.