Institutional Change in Municipal Public Safety and the Logics of Punishment and Care

by

Matthew Bakko

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Social Work and Sociology)
in the University of Michigan
2023

Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Sandra R. Levitsky, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Katie E. Richards-Schuster, Co-Chair
Assistant Professor Sunggeun Park
Professor Celeste Watkins-Hayes

Matthew Bakko

mbakko@umich.edu

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1302-9959

© Matthew Bakko 2023

Dedication

To the carers and cycle breakers

Acknowledgements

This dissertation was made possible through the generous support of fellowships, grants, and awards: the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Health Policy Research Scholars program; the University of Michigan Rackham Graduate School Rackham Merit Fellowship, Graduate Student Research Grants, and Travel Grants; the Institute for Social Research and Rackham Graduate School Summer Training Award to attend the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research Summer Program; the University of Michigan Department of Sociology Research Grants; the University of Michigan School of Social Work W. K. Kellogg Family Endowed Fellowship, Joint Doctoral Program Grant, Joseph Veroff and Katherine Luke Memorial Award, Irene and William Gambrill Fellowship, and Henry J. Meyer Award. I am also grateful for support from the Association for Research on Nonprofits and Voluntary Action and the International Society for Third-Sector Research to participate in each association's Doctoral Fellows program.

I thank the many participants and interviewees who took part in this project. I continue to remain inspired by those who continuously endeavor to improve our collective safety. Thank you for your time and trust.

I am deeply grateful to my dissertation committee, Dr. Sandra R. Levitsky, Dr. Katie E. Richards-Schuster, Dr. Sunggeun (Ethan) Park, and Dr. Celeste Watkins-Hayes. Sandy, you were my first contact at the University of Michigan way back during the application process. From coursework, to prelims, to the dissertation, your guidance and support have been immeasurable. I am consistently moved by your ability to balance rigor with care. Katie, you

kept me dreaming throughout my studies. You have always encouraged me to see the reach and practical impact of my work. You have led by example. I am inspired by the dedication to community that you bring as I find my own north star. Ethan, I would not be the scholar I am today without you. I thank my lucky stars that you landed at the University of Michigan around the same time as me. Your mentorship and research partnership have been invaluable. Thank you for taking a chance on a new doctoral student. Celeste, I feel so lucky you came to the University of Michigan during my time here. I have long admired your work and I am truly humbled by your interest in my doctoral journey. Each of you has been incredibly encouraging to me as I took on and completed this "ambitious" project. Thank you for your belief in me.

Thank you to the many teachers, mentors, and collaborators I have had over my doctoral studies. Dr. Karen Staller, you gave me the intellectual oasis and care I needed to find my own voice and confidence. Dr. Shanna Kattari, you provided me with deep mentorship and opportunities to explore my intellectual horizons. Dr. Barry Checkoway, thank you for being my first advisor and mooring me in the realities and possibilities of graduate school. For each important step in this journey, thank you to Drs. Erin Cech, Fatma Müge Göçek, Rachel Best, William Elliott, Daphne Watkins, Lisa Fedina, Terri Friedline, Odessa Gonzalez Benson, Lorraine Gutiérrez, Joseph Himle, Ashley Lacombe-Duncan, Lydia Li, Kathryn Maguire-Jack, Rogério Pinto, Katie Schultz, Trina Shanks, Addie Weaver, Jennifer Mosley, Leah Jacobs, Amanda Moore McBride, Edward Lawlor, Allaine Cerwonka, and Amy Phillips.

I am grateful to the many doctoral students who have traveled this road with me. My studies were a lot less lonely because of Erin Ice, Valerie Taing, Anna Wood, Sidney Galan, Miriam Gleckman-Krut, Ebony Johnson, Gio Román-Torres, Lolita Moss, Eshe Sherley, Casidy Campbell, Amelia Burke, Colin Garon, and, of course, the Social Forces Kickball Team. Thank

you to both my sociology and social work cohort members. I hold a special place in my heart for the late David Hutchinson. I especially want to thank the "coven," Kathryn Berringer, Yun Chen, Nina Jackson Levin, and Dr. Karen Staller.

I am deeply appreciative of the doctoral program support offered by the Department of Sociology and School of Social Work. Thank you, Dr. William Elliott, Dr. Daphne Watkins, Todd Huynh, and Laura Thomas, for your support.

My doctoral experience would have been so much less sweet without the people I met through the Health Policy Research Scholars program. For your support and mentorship, thank you Dr. Keshia Pollack Porter, Dr. Attia Goheer, Jessica Harrington, Laurie Unruh, Dr. Jelena Todic, and Tara Reynolds. The program gave me many incredible colleagues and friends that I look forward to continuing our relationship far into the future. I especially thank Kevin Nguyen, Alane Celeste-Villalvir, Alberto Cifuentes, Jr., Andrew Arriaga, Anton Avanceña, Brigette Davis, Cristina Gomez-Vidal, Demar Lewis, Kae McCarty, Mónica Gutiérrez, Shanaé Burch, and Sireen Irsheid.

My writing group, PANPO!, was an expected and vital treat that came out of virtual life in the pandemic. Thank you to Ethan Park, Caitlin McMullin, Jade Wong, and Maeve Curtin for all the feedback and fellowship.

For their feedback and help in kickstarting my dissertation writing process, I thank Louis Cicciarelli and my fellow participants in the 2022 Sweetland Center for Writing Dissertation Writing Institute.

To my family, mom, dad, uncle's Dave and Mike, and Cheri, thank you for continuing to support me in taking an unconventional path in life.

I would not have made it here without the most beautiful friendships. Thank you for being friends who do life together no matter where we are, Shannon Bacon, James Bergman, Courtney Kelner, Michael Buck, Ronnie McQuillan, Rory O'Brien, Luis Parra, Jenni Harpring, Seiko Shastri, Naomi Warren, Alex Schroder, Randi Olsen Heinold, Jenny Sheets, Gwen Goos, and Anita Bender. I moved to Detroit halfway through my studies and I thank my new hometown friends for their embrace: Chris Azzopardi, Marc Anderson, Josh Wilburn, David Tes, Zoe Ridolfi-Starr, Megan Douglass, L Tantay, Dain Evans, and Adam DesJardins. My heart is especially full from my relationship with Hani Barghouthi.

K. Tajhi Claybren has provided me with therapeutic support for over three years. Our time together has given me the insight and strength to renegotiate my relationship to work, people, and myself.

Jeffrey the cat was my constant companion through this project. His paws kept my hands and heart steady as I coped with completing a pandemic era dissertation from home.

Finally, Reuben Riggs-Bookman and I have been partners for nearly nine years. For two-thirds of this time, we have been in graduate school together. He has been with me through all the ups and downs. For every conversation, every walk, every care, I thank him from the bottom of my heart. Reuben, no matter where our futures take us, you have been the most essential part of my life and growth.

Table of Contents

Dedication ii

Acknowledgements iii

List of Tables x

List of Figures xi

Abstract xii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

1.1 Institutional Change and Carceral Disruption 3

1.2 Research Questions and Approach 6

1.3 Chapter Summaries 7

Chapter 2 Literature Review 10

2.1 Social Welfare and Carceral Systems: Developments in Policing and Social Services 10

2.2 Institutional Change in Logics 17

Chapter 3 Methodology 26

3.1 Methods 27

3.2 Analytical Approach 34

3.3 Credibility and Dependability 36

3.4 Limitations 38

Chapter 4 From Transformation to Incrementalism: Institutional Accommodation through Multiple Shifts in Institutional Logics of Public Safety 40

4.1 Introduction 40

4.2 Case Summaries 44

4.2.1 Minneapolis, Minnesota 44

4.2.2 Austin, Texas 50

4.3 Cross-Case Analysis: Institutional Accommodation through Disentangling Logics 58

4.3.1 Institutional Change Triggered at Macro-Level 58

4.3.2 Disentangling: Multiple Shifts in Logics 61

4.3.2.1 Institutional Logics of Public Safety..61

4.3.2.2 Change the Dominant Logic..64

4.3.2.3 Support Marginalized Logics 65

4.3.2.4 Separate Conflicting Logics 67

4.3.3 Tempering Institutional Change..69

4.3.4 Both/And Institutional Settlement..71

4.4 Discussion 72

Chapter 5 The Institutional Work of Public Safety: Service Provider Mechanisms that Contribute to Institutional Change 78

5.1 Introduction 78

5.2 Brief Review of Four Institutional Logics of Public Safety..82

5.3 Institutional Work Mechanisms..83

5.3.1 Segmenting 85

5.3.2 Bridging..91

5.3.3 Demarcating..98

5.3.4 Spreading 104

5.3.5 Shaping 110

5.4 Discussion 114

Chapter 6 Carceral Autonomy: The Influence of Service Provider Beliefs about Police Collaboration on Institutional Change in Public Safety..120

6.1 Introduction 120
6.2 Cases 126
6.2.1 Case 1: Behavioral Health Crisis Response 126
6.2.2 Case 2: Community-based Violence Prevention 134
6.2.3 Case 3: Homeless Street Outreach 147
6.3 Discussion 155
Chapter 7 Conclusion 162
7.1 Central Concerns: Institutional Change and Carceral Disruption 162
7.2 Bidirectional Institutional Change 168
7.3 Carceral Challenges to Institutional Change 173
7.4 The Relationship Between Social Work and Police 175
Bibliography 181
Appendix 194

List of Tables

Table 1 Institutional Logics of Public Safety 62

Table 2 Definitions of Key Constitutive Elements of Institutional Logics 63

Table 3 Mechanisms of Institutional Work 84

Table 4 Cases by Service Area, Role, and Relationship-related Dynamic 124

Table 5 Interview Sample Individuals (N = 54) 194

Table 6 Interview Sample Groups (N = 54) 196

Table 7 Institutional Logics of Public Safety: Illustrative Quotes 208

List of Figures

Figure 1 Three Bidirectional Institutional Logic Shifts in the Unsettled Field of Public Safety 4

Figure 2 Bidirectional Institutional Change in Organizational Fields 24

Figure 3 "Case Within a Case" Sampling Approach 30

Figure 4 A Pathway of Institutional Accommodation through Disentangling 73

Figure 5 A Proposed Model for Multiple, Multi-leveled Shifts in Institutional Logics 164

Figure 6 Example of an Abridged Coding Tree for One Institutional Logic 207

Abstract

Following the 2020 murder of George Floyd and related social uprisings, many U.S. cities engaged in efforts to reimagine their public safety systems and shift both funding and responsibility for public safety from police to social services. These efforts disrupted carceral systems by: 1) challenging the punishing nature of policing; 2) supporting alternative public safety approaches that center care; and 3) contesting the relationship between policing and social services, and therefore, punishment and care. Moreover, cities pursued novel changes in social control configurations regarding "how" and "by whom" public safety should be achieved, placing social service organizations and providers in a key position to advance and negotiate their roles and practices from the bottom-up. Theoretically, these efforts involved three interconnected shifts in institutional logics—specifically, logics of punishment and multiple approaches to care—that have long co-existed and frequently been intertwined in public safety fields.

This dissertation explores the sociopolitical possibilities of carceral disruption and how multiple shifts in institutional logics co-occur, including through both top-down and bottom-up change processes. It does so through a multi-site, comparative case study of two United States cities that have taken substantial steps to transform public safety: Minneapolis, Minnesota and Austin, Texas. From June 2020-March 2022, qualitative and virtual ethnographic methodology was used—specifically, virtual observation of field-level institutional change processes and interviews of key public safety actors—to connect top-down institutional change efforts in each city with bottom-up actions by individuals on-the-ground.

I explore institutional change across three empirical chapters. In Chapter Four, by comparing both cities, I show how top-down institutional change happened through multiple, simultaneous shifts in logics, which I develop into a three-part framework of "logic disentangling." As part of this framework, I present the four logics of public safety—Treatment, Repair, Prevention, and Punishment—that were articulated and practiced in the field. Further, I illustrate the institutional change pathway through which logics shifted, showing how the transformational goals of institutional change were tempered into a new incrementalist institutional settlement between competing public safety logics. In Chapter Five, I explore how service providers conducted bottom-up institutional work in the field of public safety. I conceptualize and provide empirical evidence for five inter-related mechanisms of institutional work undertaken by service providers across both cities. These mechanisms were partly about managing boundaries with police and conflicting logics and partly about expanding and modifying logics in the organizational field. In Chapter Six, I explore how shifts in the institution of public safety involved shifts in service providers' beliefs regarding the appropriate relationship between police and service providers, specifically how greater autonomy between the two groups engenders harm or care in comparative public safety service areas. These beliefs informed providers' perceptions regarding the legitimacy of social service organizations and their care-based approaches to public safety, which influenced service provider-police collaborations. This dissertation proposes a model for how the mechanisms of top-down field-level institutional change correspond to bottom-up institutional work mechanisms, undergirded by beliefs relevant to the institution and its logics. I also argue that we must address the relationality between logics and their respective actors in the same organizational field to understand institutional change and carceral disruption.

Chapter 1 Introduction

On June 7th, 2020, just two weeks after George Floyd was killed by police officers and global uprisings were ignited, a veto-proof majority of the Minneapolis City Council announced their intention to dismantle the city's police department and reimagine community safety, policing, and social services in the city. The Council's announcement—motivated by a deadly history of police killing black and brown residents—reflected calls by activists and local leaders for a new model of community-driven public safety, police reform and defunding, and the transfer of police resources and functions to social services. After a contentious, months-long budgeting process, in December 2020 the Minneapolis City Council voted to defund the police by $8 million dollars—approximately 4.5% of the police budget—and transfer some of these resources and associated functions to local social services, including mental health crisis response and violence prevention programming. To various degrees, the councils of many other U.S. cities also committed to reduce police budgets and invest in social services, most notably Austin, Texas, which cut their police budget by $153 million dollars, or one-third of the total budget. The cuts and related investments in social services reflected the beliefs of a wide range of people, including elected city officials, public administrators, and social movement activists, that divesting from systems of carceral punishment while making concurrent investments in systems of social care would improve crime prevention and community safety by addressing the individual or structural factors that lead to crime in the first place.

These change efforts attempted to reverse at least two decades-long public safety trends seen across the United States: yearly increases in municipal police budgets as a share of general

expenditures, while federal aid for social services shrank (Badger & Bui, 2020), and the related expansion of carceral involvement in solving social problems (Hinton, 2016).[1] This latter expansion has seen police increasingly intertwined with solving social problems in conjunction with social services or care-based approaches, including domestic violence response (Kim, 2020), homelessness (Stuart, 2016), and general community relations (Soss & Weaver, 2017), among other service areas. In shifting both funding and responsibility for such problems to social services and reimagining public safety systems, cities contested the dominance of policing over public safety systems, boosted alternative approaches, and created firmer boundaries between policing and social services.[2]

Yet, there is room for caution in viewing social services as a remedy to a punitive past. Scholarship has illuminated the ways that punishment and care logics are also intertwined in welfare systems and social service organizations, particularly for race-class subjugated (RCS) communities,[3] through mechanisms of social control (Piven & Cloward, 2012; Soss et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2009). "Social control" is a broad concept that refers to "the mechanisms of maintaining social order, facilitating coordination, and reinforcing shared norms and communal cohesion," particularly on the part of the state (Kohler-Hausmann, 2018, p. 5). Much depends on the mechanisms through which social control is accomplished. For example, studies of welfare reform implementation have shown how the therapeutic goals of a policy can be stymied by organizational and service provider-level mechanisms that emphasize behavioral discipline and

[1] I use an expansive definition of carcerality adopted by the University of Michigan's Carceral State Project: "…the carceral state encompasses the formal institutions and operations and economies of the criminal justice system proper–but it also encompasses logics, ideologies, practices and structures that invest in tangible and sometimes intangible ways in punitive orientations to difference, to poverty, to struggles for social justice, and to the crossers of constructed borders of all kinds" (Tapia, 2018).

[2] I generally use the term "public safety" to refer to both "public safety" and "community safety." Both terms were used by individuals in the field during this study, often interchangeably.

[3] Following Soss & Weaver (2017, p. 567), "RCS" is used to refer to the "interplay of race and class in the lives of the racialized poor." RCS communities are frequently subject to punishing social control.

punitive sanctions towards clients, resulting in punishing social control towards those seeking help (Brodkin, 2011; Soss et al., 2011). In contrast, social control is not necessarily negative in the normative sense. Care-based goals can also be achieved through social control mechanisms. For instance, some feminists have long argued for crime response systems rooted in community accountability and care rather than carceral punishment, such as restorative justice approaches, to repair harm and achieve community stability (Kim, 2018). In total, these studies indicate both the range of social control configurations in which punishment and care logics can vary and the organizational and individual processes that play a key role in facilitating this variation.

1.1 Institutional Change and Carceral Disruption

Recent efforts to disrupt carceral systems and transform public safety suggest a change in social control configurations regarding "how" and "by whom" public safety should be achieved. These efforts dovetail with broader anti-carceral movements that are gaining momentum, like the Black Lives Matter movement and carceral abolitionism, which advocate for the legitimacy of non-carceral alternatives to public safety (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022; Toraif & Mueller, 2023). Yet, with the overwhelming trend towards, and not away from, carceral expansion in recent decades, less is known about disruptions to carceral expansion. As carceral disruption occurs and new social control arrangements emerge, research is needed to understand how social service systems, organizations, and providers that interact with carceral systems are implicated given these systems' historically intertwined relationships. This issue is of particular concern as social service organizations and providers may advance care-based alternatives in fields of public safety with existing and ongoing organizational ties between carceral and social service systems (Simes & Tichenor, 2022). Will service providers facilitate a break with carceral systems by separating their roles, practices, and relationships from carceral systems and punishing logics?

Or will they perpetuate and repackage punitive logics with a caring visage? Shifts from punishment to care may hinge on how service providers negotiate and influence a shifting system of public safety.

Theoretically, changing public safety involves three interconnected shifts in institutional logics—specifically, logics of punishment and multiple approaches to care (see figure 1). These shifts challenge the settled arrangement of logics in public safety fields where punishment and care have long co-existed and frequently been intertwined. These shifts: 1) challenge the punishing nature of policing; 2) support alternative public safety approaches that center care; and 3) contest the relationship between punishment and care. Understanding how these institutional change efforts occur is urgent in a sociopolitical environment where calls for "dismantling" institutions are common.



Figure 1 Three Bidirectional Institutional Logic Shifts in the Unsettled Field of Public Safety

Yet, the case of institutional change in public safety presents a puzzle for scholarship on institutional change: how do multiple shifts in institutional logics co-occur, including through both top-down and bottom-up change processes? A dominant trend in institutional research, particularly on institutional logics, is to examine top-down shifts in logics, including how different, and often contradictory, logics replace one another (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) or become intertwined in fields and organizations (Battilana et al., 2017; Ocasio et al., 2017). For example, theory can usefully explain how institutional logics connect at the field-level, such as with the blending of welfare and market logics in the social entrepreneurship field (Battilana et al., 2017). Theory also explains how institutional logics intertwine at the organizational level, including through various mechanisms by which field-level logics become interdependent, blended, or (de)coupled in organizational structures and practices (Pache & Santos, 2013; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Alternatively, the recent "institutional work" perspective explains institutional change from the bottom-up, often by exploring individual's motivations, experiences, and actions in pursuing a broad array of institutional goals (Hampel et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2011). For example, in their ethnographic study of reinsurance trading practices, Smets and colleagues' (2015) identify and conceptualize various mechanisms that individuals use to dynamically balance competing logics in their work, which contributes to institutional maintenance.

While institutional scholarship recognizes the multiple ways logics can shift (Lounsbury et al., 2021), these shifts are not typically considered as part of one institutional change process with both top-down and bottom-up components. For example, it is unclear if the bottom-up mechanisms of institutional change pursued by service providers—their "institutional work"—will be similar or different from the top-down institutional change mechanisms observed on the

field-level. Further, it is unclear how individual values and beliefs affect such bottom-up institutional change processes (Lounsbury et al., 2021; Risi & Marti, 2022). For example, how might service providers' institutional work be informed by their beliefs about what counts as legitimate care-based approaches to public safety, including if and how they collaborate with the police? The complexities of institutional change point to the importance of examining the multiple levels (e.g., street-level, organizational, policy, etc.) of policy design and implementation in fields (Sandfort & Moulton, 2015). Recent efforts to change the institution of public safety present a unique and timely opportunity to observe such multiple and bidirectional shifts in institutional logics as they emerge and unfold.

1.2 Research Questions and Approach

To explore institutional change in public safety and carceral disruption at the intersection of social welfare and carceral systems, this dissertation asks: 1) How does top-down institutional change happen through multiple shifts in institutional logics of public safety?; 2) How do service providers conduct bottom-up institutional work in the field of public safety?; and 3) How are institutional changes in public safety influenced by service providers' beliefs about their appropriate relationship to police?

This dissertation addresses these research questions through a multi-site, comparative case study of two United States cities that have taken substantial steps to transform public safety, including through defunding the police and reimagining "how" and "by whom" public safety can be achieved: Minneapolis, Minnesota and Austin, Texas. Comparatively, both cities pursued novel efforts to shift institutional logics of public safety, including through challenging the punishing nature of policing, supporting alternative public safety approaches that center care, and contesting the relationship between policing and social services. As I will show, both cities also

shifted the arrangement of four primary logics of public safety as part of their change processes, including three-care based logics—treatment, prevention, and repair—and punishment. These logics were both articulated through institutional change processes and embedded in specific programs and policies targeting public safety. Yet, the cities' change processes involved key differences in scope (e.g., the range of institutional change, including the variety of alternative public safety social service areas targeted by change efforts in each city) and magnitude (e.g., the depth of funding reinvestment from police to social services). In both cases, institutional change placed local social service providers and related actors in novel negotiations over their roles, responsibilities, and relationships—particularly to police—in a shifting public safety landscape.

1.3 Chapter Summaries

I address the research questions through seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter Two reviews relevant bodies of literature, including those on social welfare systems, carceral and policing systems, and social control; and institutional change, logics, institutional work, and street-level bureaucracy. In Chapter Three, I describe the dissertation's methodology, including the analytical approach. Chapters Four, Five, and Six present the dissertations empirical findings in accordance with the three research questions. Each of these chapters contains relevant introduction and discussion sections that expand upon the dissertation's overall introduction and set up the overall conclusion chapter.

In Chapter Four, I examine field-level change in the institutional logics of public safety. By comparing both cities, I show how top-down institutional change happened through multiple, simultaneous shifts in logics, which I develop into a three-part framework of "logic disentangling." As part of this framework, I present the four logics of public safety that were articulated and practiced in the field. Further, I illustrate the institutional change pathway

through which logics shifted. I show how the transformational goals of institutional change were tempered into a new incrementalist institutional settlement between competing public safety logics. In this chapter, I also provide descriptions of the two municipal cases, which are context for the subsequent chapters.

In Chapter Five, I explore how service providers conduct bottom-up institutional work in the field of public safety. I conceptualize and provide empirical evidence for five inter-related mechanisms of institutional work undertaken by service providers across both cities. These mechanisms are partly about managing boundaries with police and conflicting logics and partly about expanding and modifying logics in the organizational field.

In Chapter Six, I identify service providers' beliefs about the appropriate relationship between service providers and police. I explore how shifts in the institution of public safety involve shifts in service providers' beliefs regarding the relationship between police and service providers, specifically how greater autonomy between the two groups engenders harm or care in comparative public safety service areas. These beliefs inform providers' perceptions regarding the legitimacy of social service organizations and their care-based approaches to public safety, which influences collaboration between service provider-police collaborations.

Finally, in Chapter Seven I summarize and synthesize the dissertation's findings and provide implications and recommendations for future research and practice. Specifically, I connect the three field-level shifts in logics (Chapter Four) to the five institutional work mechanisms of service providers (Chapter Five), undergirded by their beliefs about harm, care, and service provider-police relationships (Chapter Six). These connections will show the multi-directional synergies between top-down and bottom-up approaches to institutional change.

I argue for the importance of paying attention to implementation processes when examining institutional change efforts (Sandfort & Moulton, 2015). The top-down institutional change efforts explored in Chapter Four largely concern sociopolitical policy design processes that are transformational-in-goal and incremental-in-outcome. However, I argue that important elements of institutional change also happen through the bottom-up implementation of public safety policy and programs. Chapters Five and Six point to the important contributions of individuals in the public safety field—namely service providers—to institutional change. With these findings, I provide insight into how service providers' behaviors and beliefs—as policy implementers—contribute to policy-based institutional change that affects historically marginalized groups.

This dissertation is grounded in my motivation to cultivate more equitable and just social service and public safety systems. The painful events of 2020 highlighted the systemic and racialized oppression of our public safety systems. I see institutional change in public safety as an opportunity to challenge this oppression and advance social and community supports that are aligned with a new, holistic vision of public safety. My goal is to contribute to this vision by advancing our understanding of the opportunities and challenges for change on multiple levels.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

This dissertation contributes to two primary literatures: 1) the nexus of social welfare and carceral systems, particularly regarding social control; and 2) institutional change, institutional logics, institutional work, and street-level bureaucracy. In this chapter, I review the literature in these areas, with a particular focus on their relevance to institutional change in public safety and the role of social service providers in institutions.

2.1 Social Welfare and Carceral Systems: Developments in Policing and Social Services

This dissertation is empirically grounded in the historically entangled relationship between the carceral and social welfare sides of the state, as exercised through policing and social services. While some scholars examine policing and social service systems in isolation, others have argued that we must attend to their interrelationship, both in design and implementation, to understand the tight, yet adaptable net of social control exerted by the state (Hinton, 2016; Soss et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2009). The recent institutional change efforts in public safety provide an obvious connection between these two systems: reimagining public safety simultaneously involves calls to defund the police and invest greater resources in social services.

Public safety does not fall to one sector or set of actors. As can be observed through the United Kingdom's embrace of a public safety model in the late 1990's (Gilling, 2001; Pitts & Hope, 1997), it involves approaches to safety that are traditionally understood as carceral, including prisons and policing, as well as approaches traditionally understood as based in care, including social services and welfare. Research grounded in a "social control" paradigm suggests

that carceral and care-based approaches to public safety are interrelated. Scholars have elaborated how the contemporary carceral and welfare states operate in convergent ways to govern and criminalize RCS communities that live under a regime of state-sponsored poverty (Beckett & Western, 2001; Brydolf-Horwitz & Beckett, 2021; Hinton, 2016; Miller, 2014; Roberts, 2012; Soss et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2009, 2012). In theorizing workfare-oriented welfare as the "left hand" and prisons as the "right hand" of the state, Loïc Wacquant (2009, p. 16) encourages scholars to observe "the totality of the actions whereby the state purports to mould, classify, and control the populations deemed deviant, dependent, and dangerous living on its territory."

Public calls to change systems of public safety are not new. Several interconnected conditions undergird historic and contemporary efforts to change how communities achieve safety, including police violence, carceral approaches to solving social problems, and the failure of police reforms, which will each be introduced in turn. First, sociologists, historians, and other social scientists have vividly described the harmful social control practices used systematically by police throughout United States history, including harassment, surveillance, slave patrolling, brutal force, and murder (Bass, 2001; Felker-Kantor, 2018; Harris et al., 2020; Hinton, 2016; Kohler-Hausmann, 2018; Prowse et al., 2020; Soss & Weaver, 2017; Vitale, 2021). Scholars have particularly shown police to be a force of harmful control, rather than improved safety, for those already most vulnerable to crime, including RCS communities (Soss & Weaver, 2017). Felker-Kantor's (2018) history of late-twentieth century policing in Los Angeles vividly demonstrates this point. He argues that police, in concert with elite actors across the political spectrum, repeatedly stoked fears of increased crime, drugs, and juvenile delinquency, which, by overtly coupling criminality with race, fueled the police's expanded punishment and surveillance

powers over RCS communities. These racist and individualist notions of criminality managed to eclipse explanations of crime rooted in structural inequities, including historical poverty and segregation (Felker-Kantor, 2018). As a result, some may view increased criminality as the logical reason for increased contact between racial minorities and the police. In contrast, however, research on crime statistics show that criminal activity is better understood in terms of structural place-based inequities, such as in neighborhood and community resources, which are themselves associated with historic and racialized patterns of segregation, discrimination, and divestment (Braga et al., 2019; Simes et al., 2023).

The criminality assigned to RCS communities has contributed to the expansion in policing and carceral systems. Widespread and aggressive policing strategies like Broken Windows and Zero-Tolerance policing, which portray minor infractions as the seeds of larger social disorder, dominated urban environments in the last decades of the twentieth century. These strategies most acutely targeted communities perceived as overcome with social disorder and criminality, namely RCS communities (Bass, 2001; Harris et al., 2020; Soss & Weaver, 2017). Today, people of color in urban environments have reported a dual experience of feeling unprotected by the state: their communities are over-policed through surveillance and punishment of minor offenses, but under-policed through unresponsiveness to more serious crimes (Prowse et al., 2020), contributing to what Bell (2017) calls "legal estrangement" from the police.

Contemporary efforts at police reform have generally been focused on curbing the worst excesses of police violence while leaving structural inequities and the fundamental power relations between police and communities largely intact (Bell, 2017; Felker-Kantor, 2018; Soss & Weaver, 2017). Since the 1968 Kerner Commission Report, several "soft" reform policies and

programs have been instituted, including racial sensitivity training, diversity hiring, and perhaps most famously, "community policing" (Braga et al., 2019; Lyons, 2002; Rosich, 2007; Soss & Weaver, 2017). Community policing is based in the notion that police involvement in day-to-day problem solving of small issues will improve police-community relations, reduce the incidence of crime, and provide greater informal social control to residents over their own communities. However, there is little evidence that community policing has led to reductions in crime (Braga et al., 2019; Vitale, 2021). Instead, some scholars argue that such strategies most effectively lead to the expansion of surveillance and social control over RCS communities, with police viewing communities as criminal targets rather than sites in need of social support (Akbar, 2020; Soss & Weaver, 2017; Stuart, 2016; Vitale, 2021).

In sum, ongoing police violence towards RCS communities, aggressive criminalizing strategies to solve social problems, and the failure of reforms to curb police violence in any fundamental way have all contributed to recurring calls and movements for change in public safety and the social control exerted by policing (Akbar, 2020; Felker-Kantor, 2018; Soss & Weaver, 2017). While some reforms have occurred, both political elites and police have actively worked to subvert movement activities that challenge the independence of police and their social control role towards RCS communities. Movements led by activists of color have long called for more substantial change, including direct community control over police, oversight through civilian review boards, or replacing the police with social welfare and community-based social services (Felker-Kantor, 2018; Hinton, 2016).

Yet, far from being outside a "social control" paradigm, critical scholarship has also elaborated the various mechanisms through which social welfare policy and services directly regulate, punish, or discipline RCS communities (Abramovitz, 1996; Chapman & Withers, 2019;

Feldman, 2020; Piven & Cloward, 2012; Roberts, 2012; Soss et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2009; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). For example, Roberts (2012) argues that the fundamental function of child welfare systems and protective services is to control the individual behaviors and sociopolitical status of Black women and families. Such studies highlight that even when the state and social service organizations pursue goals of help and assistance, the means can punish already marginalized communities.

Moreover, even punitive systems that undergo purposeful care-based reforms deploy novel social control mechanisms. Studies that examine social service-oriented approaches in incarceration processes, such as “problem-solving” mental health and drug courts or prison reentry services (Castellano, 2011; Dobson, 2019; Kaye, 2019; Miller, 2014), indicate that coupling carceral systems with social services—an entanglement of punishment and care logics—provides the state with a powerful tool for controlling RCS communities, particularly through increasing surveillance and pathologizing individuals for the problems associated with broader structural inequities. These carceral innovations place the burden for solving social problems on changing the behaviors of individuals rather than changing structural inequities. Yet, even ostensibly structural approaches to care may also be implemented in ways that perpetuate individualist behavior control and punishment, as organizational examinations of 1990’s welfare reform have shown (Brodkin, 2011; Soss et al., 2011). Combined, these studies suggest the varied ways social services may take on punishing or caring logics. Some social work scholars have recently employed the concept “carceral social work” to denote those social services that are oriented towards punishment and social control, or that involve formal partnerships between services and police (Jacobs et al., 2021).

The carceral-care connection is elucidated even further by both historical and contemporary studies that have uncovered the direct entanglement between policing and social services (Felker-Kantor, 2018; Garland, 2012; Hinton, 2016; Katz, 1996; Kim; 2020; Patterson & Swan, 2019; Rios, 2006; Soss & Weaver, 2017; Stuart, 2016). Historically, policing and social service systems co-developed in relation to each other. Key developments in both occurred during the War on Poverty. While the Johnson-era suite of legislation attempted to advance structural cures for poverty by expanding the welfare state, it was viewed at the time by many researchers and policymakers across the political spectrum as failing Black urban youth (Hinton, 2016). To them, violence, crime, and urban uprisings among youth were evidence that social programs related to education, health, and housing needed to be combined with "law and order" criminal justice approaches that advanced policing and penal institutions (Felker-Kantor, 2018; Hinton, 2016; Soss & Weaver, 2017). As a result, new "War on Crime" funding streams and federal block grants either mandated or encouraged municipal police to become involved in new areas of community life, such as schools and community-based organizations. Bolstered by research compiled in the Moynihan Report, which pathologized Black people as the cause of their own poverty, policing and social service interventions targeted the individual behavior of RCS communities, thereby superseding interventions geared towards more structural inequities.

Over the next half-century, policy efforts to mitigate criminality increasingly entwined policing and social services, contributing to the expansion of carceral approaches to social problems and the maintenance of structural inequities (Brydolf-Horwitz & Beckett, 2021; Hinton, 2016; Kim 2020).[4] While governmental policy and funding influenced this expansion, social service organizations have also pursued their carceral collaborations and practices in order

[4] In a recent systematic review, Patterson and Swan (2019) stated that there is little empirical evidence that collaborations between police and service providers are effective in preventing crime.

to meet organizational goals (Kim, 2020; Lara-Millán, 2014). The intertwining of carcerality and care has occurred in a variety of areas, including the expansion of carceral logics and practices into such fields as health care, domestic violence, and welfare services (Brodkin, 2011; Garland, 2012; Headworth, 2021; Kim, 2020; Lara-Millán, 2014; Miller, 2014; Richie & Martensen, 2020) and the embeddedness of social services or care within carceral apparatuses, including police departments, jails, and courts (Dobson, 2019; Kaye, 2019; Lara-Millán, 2021; Phelps & Ruhland, 2022; Sweet, 2023; Zozula, 2019). However, this intertwining is not inevitable. To combat carceral collaborations, scholars have called social work scholars and practitioners to support anti-carceral models of practice, including non-police restorative justice, transformative justice, and abolitionist modes of practice (Jacobs et al., 2021). It is an empirical question as to whether current institutional change efforts in public safety will contribute to carceral disruption, including a substantial change in the relationship between policing from social services, or logics of punishment from care.

While enthusiastic about defunding, abolitionist activists have cautioned against placing full faith in social service organizations, which may perpetuate punishment-oriented approaches when providing services (Ritchie, 2021). Instead, they argue that defunding the police must be combined with broader efforts to delegitimize carceral approaches to safety so that carcerality does not reinvent itself through new punishing mechanisms with more caring faces (Schenwar & Law, 2020). Research on how social control is realized in practice is suggestive that organizational processes and individual behaviors play key roles in facilitating punishing or caring approaches (Brodkin, 2011; Lara-Millán & Van Cleve, 2017; Miller, 2014; Soss et al., 2014). Yet, as recent institutional change efforts in public safety are novel, it is unclear how

social service organizations and providers, as central actors involved in social control, may facilitate institutional change in public safety and carceral disruption.

2.2 Institutional Change in Logics

Institutional scholarship is concerned with the ways that institutions—those patterned rules, norms, cultural schemas, and practices that are reproduced in social life—shape and are shaped by social structures, organizations, and individuals (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Hirsch, 1997; Jepperson, 1991; Oliver, 1991; Scott & Davis, 2015; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). This dissertation views the transformation of public safety as a case of change in the institutional complexity of logics. Within institutional theory, complexity refers to the situation where organizations and individuals are faced with managing multiple and potentially contradictory institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). Scholars focused on examining the complex interplay of institutions view the various domains of society as comprised of different institutional logics: "the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 101). In this dissertation, public safety is a domain of life with multiple institutional logics for "how" and "by whom" public safety should be achieved (see Chapter Four).

A central focus of institutional complexity scholarship has been to examine the multiple ways that the settled prioritization of and relationship between logics can shift in different fields and organizational contexts (Lounsbury et al., 2021; Micelotta et al., 2017; Raynard, 2016). In institutional theory, an institutional settlement concerns "field rules and cultural norms. We can say that a field is no longer in crisis when a generalized sense of order and certainty returns"

regarding rules and norms (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 22). The institutional logics perspective perceives an institutional settlement when there is a "widely accepted prioritization of the logics within the field" (Raynard, 2016, p. 312).

Early scholarship on institutional logics focused heavily on transformational logic replacement, where one dominant logic was replaced by another (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). This research has shown that the importance of some logics over others can change in a field over time. Additionally, more recent theoretical and empirical scholarship has also challenged the notion that individual logics are stable and immutable. Instead, the ontological character of logics may be "situated and flexible" (Gümüsay et al., 2020, p. 7; Lounsbury et al., 2021; Quattrone, 2015). This latter area of scholarship is nascent.

Moreover, largely missing from institutional scholarship is the idea that inter-related logics in a field can separate. Extant scholarship that focuses on institutional complexity and logic relationality, such as that on institutional hybridity, often focuses on the formation of new or complimentary connections between logics (Pache & Santos, 2013; Skelcher & Smith, 2015; Smets et al., 2015), or the relatively settled, but tension-filled co-existence between competing logics over time (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Nicolini et al., 2016; Reay & Hinings, 2009; van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011). However, Nicolini et al. (2016) introduce the possibility that co-existing logics can become unsettled and separate. This phenomenon has not been addressed in-depth.

Institutional change in logics can occur through top-down, field-level processes and/or through the bottom-up work of organizations and individual on-the-ground (Lawrence et al., 2011). In terms of field-level processes, research has heavily focused on the successful transformative displacement of one logic by another (Micelotta et al., 2017). Yet, institutional change efforts often result in more modest outcomes. For instance, Micelotta et al. (2017, p.

1902) argue that many institutional change processes may rather be "revolutionary in pace and developmental in scope." In such a case, initial transformative change goals may be complicated by political processes involving agentic challengers and incumbents with varied interests influencing change in a field (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Casasnovas & Chliova, 2021; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Micelotta et al., 2017; Rao & Kenny, 2008; Reay et al., 2021; van Wilj et al., 2013; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Challengers have the goal of substantially transforming the dominance and arrangement of logics, while incumbents seek to maintain the status quo or minimize change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Due to their conflicts, transformative institutional change results in a truce with more modest, incremental change outcomes (Micelotta et al., 2017). In terms of conflict involving institutional logics, we can better understand such a process by examining how "the competition/coexistence between logics [is] constructed and negotiated on the ground" by such actors (Micelotta et al., 2017, p. 1902).

Institutional change can also occur through bottom-up processes. In line with a microfoundational approach to institutions (Hampel et al., 2017; Powell & Rerup, 2017), institutional work theory explores how individuals make institutional change happen (or not). Scholarship particularly focuses on individuals' motivations, experiences, and actions in pursuing a broad array of institutional goals (Hampel et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2011). An institutional work perspective points us towards the more mundane, everyday "muddling through" practices that individuals take to bolster, challenge, or reconfigure institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011). As such, institutional work theory considers a breadth of individual actions and goals, which places it in contrast with other micro-oriented institutional theories; for example, institutional entrepreneurship theory tends to focus on successful institutional change efforts by purpose-driven individuals (Battilana et al., 2009).

Institutional work theory shifts our attention away from discussing institutional change solely as an outcome and towards change as a process involving specific types of actions by groups and individuals (Rahman et al., 2023). Organizations and individuals within may pursue a variety of actions, including actively resisting institutional demands or, in contrast, compartmentalizing seemingly incommensurable logics within different organizational structures and practices (Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Smets et al., 2015; Suchman, 1995). Empirical research in this vein tends to identify specific mechanisms by which institutions and institutional complexity are managed or altered (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Rahman et al., 2023; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). For example, in their ethnographic study of reinsurance trading practices, Smets and colleagues (2015, p. 932) identify and conceptualize segmenting, bridging, and demarcating mechanisms that individuals in the organization use to "dynamically balance coexisting logics, maintaining the distinction between them while also exploiting the benefits of their interdependence."

I bridge institutional work and street-level bureaucracy theories to understand the institutional work of service providers, a core goal of this dissertation. Street-level frameworks examine how individuals that implement policy, including social workers and police officers, adapt to their social and organizational contexts (Lipsky, 2010). Research explores "the systemic features of their [service providers] work life that shape their practices, how routine practices create policy, and the content of policy as they have produced it" (Brodkin, 2008, p. 326). In addition to understanding the formalized behaviors of front-line providers, street-level research has contributed to our understanding of how organizations and individuals pursue discretionary

actions that fall outside the constraining confines of policy rules. Discretionary actions are only possible because street-level service providers exercise agency, an agency that is constrained and shaped by service providers' environments (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012, 2022).

Street-level research highlights the environmental complexity of service provider's work and the multiple factors in the service provider's environment that shape their policy implementation (Brodkin, 2008, 2011; Brodkin & Marston, 2013; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody, 2012, 2022; Soss et al., 2011; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). One such environmental factor is institutions and their logics (e.g., those related to public safety), which interact, complement, or compete with other institutional logics to influence the practices of front-line service providers (Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Hasenfeld, 2010; Spitzmueller, 2016, 2018). For example, Spitzmueller (2016) found that street-level service providers in the community-based mental health field shifted their service implementation away from a service quality-focused therapeutic logic and towards a cost savings-focused managerial logic when the latter became central to organizational survival in a new funding and policy context. Such studies show how institutional change and related shifts in policies and resources influence service provider's agency amid changing contexts.

Given the impact of the environment on service providers, there is a scholarly opportunity to bridge street-level and institutional perspectives. Street-level research provides an understanding of the environmentally constrained actions of service providers and, as such, provides a natural bridge to bottom-up accounts of institutional change like those offered by institutional work theory (Breit et al., 2016; Rice, 2013, 2019). Further, street-level research typically studies the interaction between professionals and their clients. By focusing on the relationship between service providers and police, I extend theory by instead focusing on inter-

professional relationships. The case of carceral disruption and institutional change in public safety system presents an empirical opportunity to address both these theoretical areas.

Relationally, institutions shape interactions between service providers and related individuals in organizational fields. To understand this shaping process, the inhabited institutions approach focuses on examining relationships between different individuals as they navigate institutional environments (Binder, 2007; Binder, 2018; Hallet, 2010; Spitzmueller, 2018). In doing so, our understanding of institutions and organizations then comes from "people and groups making sense of, interpreting, adapting, and often resisting overarching institutional logics" (Binder, 2018, p. 377). This insight dovetails well with street-level research on how relationships influence frontline service providers' actions, including those with managers, service users, and broader professional subcultures (Benjamin & Campbell, 2015; Dias & Maynard-Moody, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).

Given the relational aspect of institutions, this dissertation views public safety as an organizational field—a group of interacting actors negotiating common meaning systems and logics (Scott, 2013; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017)—that, perhaps paradoxically to some, straddles the institutional logics of the state: the social care-oriented "left hand" and the punishing carceral "right hand" (Soss et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2009).[5] Organizational field research has undergone a multi-directional turn recently. Early research was criticized for treating fields as unidirectional

---

[5] In examining a wider organizational field of relations, this study is aligned with the recently proposed governance framework in nonprofit and civil society studies, which calls for scholars to examine the relations between a range of interacting actors and contexts, regardless of sector, "as well as the conditions and rules that frame them, that give rise to goal setting, steering, and implementation regarding public issues" (Marwell & Brown, 2020, p. 233; Marwell & Morrissey, 2020). In taking the organizational field of public safety as the contextual site of examination, this project sidesteps the dominant tendency to examine policy design and implementation in a single pre-determined sector, such as government agencies or nonprofits (Bromley & Meyer, 2017). In shifting away from a sector-centric frame, governance scholars analytically center the relations that circulate around contextually specific and socially constructed policy domains like public safety. Importantly for this dissertation, Marwell & Brown (2020) recommend employing institutional theory to capture the relationship between contextual conditions and organizations in a common field.

mechanisms of external pressure and outcomes on organizations, indicating a distinct theoretical separation between fields and their receptive member organizations. More recently, scholars have called for considering fields as relational spaces in which organizations and actors at multiple levels interact with each other, make sense of their environments, and bidirectionally, are both influenced by fields and contribute to change in fields themselves (Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Institutional scholars argue that understanding institutional complexity requires research designs that extend beyond single organizations to account for the multi-level relationships between organizations, including their individuals within, and the wider fields in which both are embedded (Greenwood et al., 2011; Thornton et al., 2012).

By examining both top-down and bottom-up processes of institutional change, this dissertation is responsive to those arguments (see figure 2). I treat the common meaning system and logics in each field as those related to public safety. Organizational fields of public safety are situated within a wider societal field of public safety that contain widely distributed logics and practices of public safety that actors draw upon. Within each organizational field is a city in which top-down institutional processes occur. Bottom-up institutional processes occur through organizations and individuals that interact with each other as embedded parts of a common public safety field. Bidirectionally, institutional processes at each level can influence the institution of public safety at other levels. Additionally, the theories discussed above highlight numerous factors that influence institutional processes at each level (e.g., street-level bureaucracy theory underscores the impact of public and organizational policy on service provider behaviors). The three empirical chapters in this dissertation discuss many of these factors and they are abstracted in Chapter Seven’s conclusion.



Figure 2 Bidirectional Institutional Change in Organizational Fields

Racism is one major factor that impacts the institution of public safety and change processes. As discussed above, the institution of public safety—whether implemented through policing or social services—has perpetuated racialized violence against RCS communities. Yet, institutional scholarship has underexamined the role of race (Ray, 2019; Rojas, 2017, 2019), including the racialized interplay between logics in institutionally complex organizational fields (Rojas, 2017).[6] The influence of race on institutional logics and change processes is an especially critical issue in social services since logics are infused with moral judgements about clients, including the source of their problems and possible solutions (Hasenfeld, 2000, 2010). Given that clients are often part of RCS communities, service providers' interpretations of client problems and solutions, and thus public safety logics, are racialized (Ray, 2019; Wooten, 2019). This

[6] Rojas's (2017) review of institutional scholarship on race discusses a few, including diversity, (de)segregation, and multiculturalism. Rojas notes that comparative analysis will be especially useful for uncovering the racialized logics used by people in organizations.

assertation is informed by previous empirical research that shows the centrality of race, especially when intersected with class and gender, to the expansion of social control through both carceral and social service systems (Abramovitz, 1996; Hinton, 2016; Soss et al, 2011; Soss & Weaver, 2017; Wacquant, 2009, 2012).

Viewing organizations and their fields as "primary terrain of racial contestation" is a growing field of research that aims to correct the longstanding sidelining of race in institutional and organizational studies (Ray, 2019, p. 30; Ward & Rivera, 2014; Wooten, 2019). Understanding the role of racialized beliefs in institutional processes also addresses a gap regarding the role of values and beliefs in institutional logics research (Lounsbury et al., 2021), particularly the "dark side of values" that may contribute to ongoing, systemic social problems (Risi & Marti, 2022).

Chapter 3 Methodology

This study employed a multi-site, comparative case study method of two United States cities that have taken substantial steps to transform municipal public safety: Minneapolis, Minnesota and Austin, Texas (case descriptions provided in Chapter Four). Comparative design is particularly appealing for research interested in exploring the impact of context on a phenomenon because it allows for looking both within and across contexts (Yin, 2017). Comparatively, Minneapolis and Austin are two cases of institutional change processes in public safety that challenge the punishing nature of policing, support alternative public safety approaches that center care, and contest the relationship between policing and social services. Both city's change efforts involved symbolic processes to reimagine "how" and "by whom" public safety can be achieved, and material processes to defund police and reinvest their resources in alternative public safety approaches, particularly in targeted social service areas. These efforts were highly public and contentious. Yet, the city's change processes involved key differences in scope (e.g., the range of institutional change, including the variety of alternative public safety social service areas targeted by change efforts in each city) and magnitude (e.g., the depth of funding reinvestment from police to social services).

To explore these change processes, including their differences, this study used qualitative and virtual ethnographic methodology grounded in a critical and interpretivist paradigm (Hine, 2008; Howlett, 2022). The study used two primary methods: virtual observation of field-level institutional change processes and interviews of key public safety actors—particularly social service providers—navigating institutional change on-the-ground. These methods were

combined to connect top-down, field-level institutional change efforts in each city with bottom-up actions by individuals.

3.1 Methods

Multi-sited, virtual ethnography was conducted of each city's institutional change process (Hine, 2008; Marcus, 1995). First, observation of open and semi-open meetings was conducted at the field-level, including city council meetings, community engagement meetings, public hearings, public safety task force meetings, and neighborhood engagement meetings. These meetings contained multiple groups of actors interacting with each other, including city councilmembers, public administrators, social service providers, and residents, including social movement activists. To gain a sense of the broader national context in which both cities were embedded, I also attended several relevant national virtual events, such as those focused on police defunding advocacy or discussions on non-police behavioral health crisis response. For most meetings, I participated strictly as an observer. However, a few meetings, especially neighborhood-based ones, were particularly small, and I was asked by facilitators to participate in some small group discussions. In my fieldnotes, I noted the distinction in these roles and tracked how they affected my observations.

Pre-COVID, most of these meetings would have been conducted in person. However, both Minneapolis and Austin held these meetings virtually nearly exclusively throughout the research study, making research access straightforward. Due to the pandemic, individuals were required to be online for most professional activities, which normalized the online interactions involved in this study. The virtual nature of ethnographic activities increased my field site access, allowing me to essentially "be in" two places at once and make real-time comparisons

throughout the research process. Further, public recordings were often available for future use and reference.

Ethnographic fieldwork began in each city in June 2020, shortly after the murder of George Floyd, and ended in March 2022. In each city, fieldwork incorporated two municipal budget cycles to capture how institutional change dynamics shifted or were maintained over time. Municipal budget processes were prime opportunities to observe the articulation, negotiation, and contestation of institutional logics in each city and related dynamics among social service providers. Over 21 months, I conducted roughly 1500 hours of field work, resulting in hundreds of pages of field notes and documents. To account for any major public safety-related changes that took place after the study period that may affect my interpretation of evidence collected during the study period, I continued to receive emails from local government and organizational listservs and scanned local news media for over a year after formal engagement had closed.

Ethnographic observation was primarily used for gaining contextual knowledge of the institutional logics, change processes, and organizational fields in each city (Zilber, 2014). Meetings were formal settings in which actors both constructed and grappled with different institutional logics of public safety. In line with a "pattern inducing" analytical approach (Reay & Jones, 2016), by attending these meetings I was able to understand the contextual construction and characteristics of the institutional logics under consideration, rather than imposing my own understanding, including how different individuals viewed these logics. Additionally, observational settings were important venues for identifying important organizations and individuals. These individuals were both members of social service organizations that were part

of this study's primary sampling frame, or individuals that were important members of the organizational field (e.g., public administrators, funders, or activists.).

My observations produced two kinds of field notes. First, I summarized the content of meetings, including relevant conversations that occurred, presentations conducted, or decisions made. Second, I wrote reflective and analytical field notes on important developments directly relevant to the research questions, including information related to the institutional logics under consideration, activities and events that may affect the institutional change in public safety, and important actors involved. If documents or presentations were produced by the city or other organizations for a meeting, they were downloaded and linked to my field notes. Additionally, I also stayed up to date on local news coverage, reading seven local news publications daily. When local or national media covered public safety-related events, I downloaded, read, and linked these news stories to my field notes.

The second method used in this project was qualitative interviews of individuals in the organizational field of public safety. As interviews involved human subjects research, this project received exempt status from the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board. The sampling strategy was multi-leveled (see figure 3). A "case within a case" approach was taken, in which I identified relevant individuals and organizations through ethnographic fieldwork in each city (Mills, et al., 2009; Yin, 2017). The sampled individuals were embedded in sampled organizations in each city's public safety field. As ethnographic engagement unfolded, it became clear which specific organizations comprised the organizational field of public safety in each city, including social services organizations that received former police funding, organizations working in similar service areas, and relevant advocacy and activist organizations. Most organizations in the sampling frame interacted directly with criminal-legal systems to various

degrees, most often the police, but sometimes courts, prisons, or Departments of Corrections as well. Within the context of institutional change in public safety, individuals within these organizations were often actively recalibrating their relationships to criminal-legal systems.



Figure 3 "Case Within a Case" Sampling Approach

Following Small (2009), this project utilized purposive sampling with a case study logic. Through this logic, sampling is conducted so that the researcher maximizes their chances of achieving a closer understanding of the research question with each subsequent interview, rather than statistical generalization. Recruitment was conducted by relying upon professional contacts in each city who offered their assistance in connecting me with relevant individuals. I sent cold email recruitment messages to individuals with whom I did not have a pre-existing connection. Interview participants frequently offered to connect me with additional relevant contacts. Within all recruitment emails, I outlined the purpose of the study, provided the informed consent document, offered a small research incentive, and requested a formal interview.

Three groups of actors were sampled for interviews (see table 5 and table 6 in Appendix). First, I interviewed individuals in public and private service provider organizations that were the direct recipients of funding redirected from police budgets by city councils. Second, I interviewed individuals in public and private service provider organizations that were not direct recipients of reinvested funding, but worked in the same service areas as those organizations in the first group (e.g., behavioral health crisis response; violence prevention; homeless services and street outreach, etc.). Interviewing this second group was motivated by this project's organizational field approach; it was considered plausible that all social service organizations in the public safety field were navigating and influencing institutional change, even if not direct recipients of new resources. The first two groups were sampled until saturation was achieved, especially by service area. When possible, I interviewed both administrators and frontline service providers in each organization so that perspectives could be triangulated. Finally, the third group of interviewees consisted of individuals that related to and impacted the work of service provider organizations. These included select public administrators (e.g., staff in a city's public safety department), philanthropic actors (e.g., foundations giving money to service provider organizations in the field), social movement activists, and police involved in public safety change processes. These individuals typically focused their work on a specific service area. While not the priority of this project, interviewing this final group was critical for capturing the relationships and institutional logics in service providers' wider fields. For each organization, documents, such as annual reports or training curriculum, were requested to provide insight into past or existing organizational practices that may relate to public safety institutional logics.

In this study, the lines between frontline provider and administrator were often blurry. It was common that interviewees currently or recently took on aspects of both roles in their

organizations, in ways akin to the literature on "hybrid professionals" (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; Hendrikx & van Gestel, 2017; Noordegraaf, 2015). Rather than simplify this complexity in tabular format, I indicate the roles of specific research participants when they are mentioned in the results.

As research highlights the central role of race and gender in the functioning of carceral and social service systems (Abramovitz, 1996; Hinton, 2016; Soss et al, 2011; Soss & Weaver, 2017; Wacquant, 2009, 2012), I also captured these social identities of participants. However, given the small sample size and sampling strategy in which a small number of organizations in each city were eligible for sampling, I conceal the race and gender of each participant to further protect confidentiality and aggregate them (see table 6 in Appendix). Theory highlights the important role social identity plays in the work of service providers (Watkins-Hayes, 2019). As such, I carefully considered the impact of identity throughout the research process, including data collection and analysis. When social identities were particularly relevant to research findings, I indicate this in the text.

Interview questions for the first two groups were designed to understand how social service providers influence and were influenced by institutional change in public safety, including both symbolic (e.g., reimagining public safety) and material (e.g., defunding) processes (see Appendix for the semi-structured interview guide). I sought to understand: What existing practices or organizational structures relate to public safety and its logics? Have any of these changed, or are under consideration for change, due to changes in public safety? In particular, what practices do individuals and organizations use in working with clients, particularly those from RCS communities? What values, frameworks, or experiences inform those practices?

I also asked questions regarding how providers and related individuals viewed their work in relation to the organizational field. What was the organization's vision for public safety, and what external or internal factors affect the organization's ability to achieve that vision or not? How do service providers see their work as different from the police or other service providers? What changes in the organizational field need to occur, including among police and other service providers, for a more caring public safety approach to succeed?

Questions were also directed at uncovering the important interorganizational and intra-organizational factors that can affect how organizations and individuals influence public safety (e.g., service area, funding streams, etc.). In particular, interview questions for the third group centered on the ways their work aligned with the goals of the institutional change processes and how they interacted with and influenced social service organizations and the individuals within.

I began all interviews by discussing the purpose of the study, allowing the participant to ask me any questions, and obtaining permission to record the interview. Opening questions were designed to understand interviewee backgrounds and to establish rapport. In general, I found interviewees excited and reflective about their work and the ways it was contributing to public safety. After each interview, many articulated to me their appreciation in having a dedicated time to contemplate and process their experiences. Interviews lasted between 50 and 150 minutes, with the average interview lasting approximately 90 minutes. Most interviews took place over Zoom, but a few took place over the phone at the request of participants. A few interviews included more than one individual in an organization. In these cases, I carefully tracked the positionality of each participant and how interview dynamics were affected. I conducted 50 interviews with 54 participants. Interviews were transcribed for subsequent analysis. All organizations and interviewees were de-identified to protect confidentiality.

Formal interviews began in July 2021, roughly one year after ethnographic engagement began. As the focus of this project was to examine institutional change as an emergent and unfolding process, interviews mostly focused on events that took place in the first year and a half of change processes in public safety after the events of summer 2020. During the interview period, I attended to the contextually dynamic quality of the field sites. Institutional change was happening in real time. As such, I continued to conduct virtual ethnography while doing interviews to capture potential shifts in change processes, institutional complexity, the organizational field, or related events. Relatedly, I also carefully captured the point-in-time at which interviews were conducted. If a significant change in the field happened over the course of the project's interview timeframe, I documented it and considered its effect on interviews and evidence.

3.2 Analytical Approach

Evidence was analyzed for patterns within and across each case (Yin, 2017), with an attention to comparisons by city, service organization type, service area, and the position of organizations in their fields. Analysis was intended to build an understanding of institutional change in public safety and its associated logics and how organizations and individuals within are affected by and contribute to change processes. All interview data were analyzed using pattern coding and thematic analysis (Gibson & Brown, 2009; Saldaña, 2016). Several iterations of coding were conducted until coherent and patterned themes emerged. Interview themes and codes, field notes, and organizational documents were compared to improve the richness and dependability of the findings. Atlas.ti was used throughout this process.

The first analytical step was to identify and refine the institutional logics at play in public safety, including if and how they shifted in each institutional context. An interpretive pattern

inducing approach was used that identified unique logics and their content through analysis of the practices and narratives used by individuals and organizations (Reay & Jones, 2016; for examples, see Smets et al., 2015; Toubiana, 2020). Pattern inducing privileges the practical and local use of logics by actors as they relate to their context, rather than imposing a priori descriptions. Through analysis, individual's behaviors and beliefs are attached to identifiable logics. In line with this approach (Reay & Jones, 2016), I iteratively coded interview transcripts for individual's behaviors and beliefs associated with different approaches to public safety in their organizations. These codes were grouped into meaningful and patterned categories that constitute overarching logics of public safety (see figure 6 in Appendix for a coding example). Concurrently, ethnographic fieldnotes were analyzed to determine how field-level actors constructed and advanced different logics and practices of public safety in each city. Moving abductively (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012), I also confirmed the existence of these logics through extant literature on public safety, carceral systems, and social welfare (e.g., Anasti, 2023; Reay et al., 2021; Thornton et al., 2012; Toubiana, 2020; Wacquant, 2009, 2012). Evidence from interviews was interweaved with ethnographic observation and extant literature to produce findings. In demarcating the content and boundaries of each logic, I describe the various "constitutive elements" of logics, such as each logic's source of legitimacy, authority, and identity, which bring coherence to each logic (Thornton et al., 2012). In empirical chapters, I display raw data, including text from transcripts and field notes, in written text and tables to illustrate rigorous interpretive analysis.

The second round of analysis focused on the behaviors and beliefs of individuals within each city, particularly service providers in public safety fields and targeted service areas. First, I used interview transcripts to produce codes and themes regarding how individuals within

organizations contributed to institutional change in logics of public safety. This analysis drew upon prior research on institutional work and specific mechanisms by which institutional complexity is managed within organizations and fields (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Hampel et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2011; Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Rahman et al., 2023; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). Second, responding to a recent call to relate institutional processes to inter-organizational relationships (Marwell & Brown, 2020), I analyzed both ethnographic fieldnotes and interview transcripts to produce codes and themes regarding how institutional change is influenced by service providers' beliefs about their appropriate relationship to police. This step showed how these beliefs influence the legitimacy of social service organizations and their care-based approaches to public safety, particularly regarding their collaborations with police.

Interpreted together, all thematic analysis steps allowed me to uncover the possibility for change in institutional logics in fields and organizations embedded therein. These analytic processes were sensitive to the different municipal contexts, service areas, configurations of logics in organizations, and other conditional factors. This analysis resulted in an understanding of institutional change in public safety and how service providers were affected by and contributed to change processes.

3.3 Credibility and Dependability

In addition to pursuing rigorous strategies to study design, sampling, and data analysis, several strategies were pursued to increase the credibility and dependability of the research study (Small & Calarco, 2022; Tracy, 2010). First, I used and triangulated multiple sources of evidence—observation, interviews, and organizational documents—and looked for (in)consistencies throughout analysis. Second, throughout the course of the study I kept an audit

trail of methods decisions. I also wrote detailed reflective and analytic memos after ethnographic encounters and interviews, which provided ongoing insight into my own methodological and analytic process as a researcher. Third, I paid particular attention to the importance of heterogenous multivocality to understand and represent multiple perspectives. For example, when possible, I sampled both administrators and frontline service providers in service provider organizations for interviews. I paid attention to speaker positionality during both analysis and representation of evidence in the results. In several instances, I also engaged in "member reflection," in which I held critical conversations with interlocutors in the field about emerging findings (Tracy, 2010).

Finally, self-awareness and self-reflexivity are of particular importance to rigor (Small & Calarco, 2022). I approached this dissertation project as someone who shares much in common with the organizational professionals I sought to engage and shares less with many of the people and communities these professionals serve. In developing and implementing this project, I took seriously how my experiences and social positions shape the work. In particular, I endeavored to understand how my whiteness and other social identities shape my work and this study. I carried forward lessons from my past involvement in efforts that address institutional change related to racism, including in universities and social movement arenas.

Reflecting critically about myself, and sharing these reflections in dialogue with interlocutors who do and do not share my experiences and identities, is work I undertook as this dissertation project unfolded. For example, when conducting observation, I was critical of whose voices I was centering, including in the notes I took and analyses I conducted. Additionally, in engaging research participants, I began interviews by briefly and carefully sharing why I am undertaking this project. I believe this conveyed my seriousness about the subject and built

rapport with research participants, while balancing the tightrope between transparency and biasing the interview process.

It is likely that some of those I contacted for interviews did not respond due to my social identities, including being white and that I did not physically live in the communities I was studying. However, nearly all contacted participants agreed to be interviewed. For most of these participants, an open and honest interview was facilitated by a reputable referral from shared professional contacts or by me sharing my motivation for the project. Yet, a few participants wanted to know more about me. For instance, one participant, a Black woman, questioned me for 15 minutes at the start of an interview to understand my own experiences with community violence and poverty. At the end of her questions, she told me she asked so many questions to see if we shared any "common ground." She also said her questioning was to provide me with an example of how she built rapport with clients. Upon finishing, she told me that she felt we had built enough rapport where she could answer questions comfortably and authentically. After this interview, and many other interviews, participants invited me to stay in touch. In line with my commitments to social justice and anti-racism, I continue to think heavily about what will ultimately happen with this research and who will benefit.

3.4 Limitations

This dissertation is not without its limitations. First, the virtual nature of this project limited what was ethnographically possible. While I was effectively able to make denotational observations, including the content and context of field site happenings through virtual encounters, I was less able to observe interactions between participants in field sites. Certain encounters were impossible for me to access due to the virtual nature of life during the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., public administrators holding an intra-office meeting online). However, due

to the isolation mandates of the pandemic, many of the interactions between ethnographic participants I was interested in took place primarily in accessible virtual spaces (e.g., council and neighborhood meetings held online). Second, purposive and snowball sampling were used to build the interview sample. Due to this, it is possible that I may not have captured a wider range of perspectives among potential interviewees. However, this limitation was partially addressed by the sampling strategy's case study logic, which centered on sampling for greater theoretical exploration and contextual understanding rather than statistical generalization. Finally, institutional change takes time. I captured the early moments in what is likely a much longer change process. While exploring this timeframe is a particular strength of the project, I was also limited in not observing the longer arc of institutional change.

Chapter 4 From Transformation to Incrementalism: Institutional Accommodation through Multiple Shifts in Institutional Logics of Public Safety

4.1 Introduction

Since the summer of 2020, many cities have engaged in efforts to transform how they achieve public safety. These efforts challenge the punishing nature of policing, support alternative public safety approaches that center care, and contest the relationship between policing and social services. From an institutional lens, these are three inter-related shifts in institutional logics—those of punishment and care—and their settled arrangement in fields of public safety where they have long co-existed and often been intertwined. While institutional scholarship recognizes the multiple ways logics can shift (Lounsbury et al., 2021), these are not typically considered as part of one institutional change process. Yet, the case of institutional change in public safety suggests that multiple shifts in logics and their arrangements can occur within one overarching process.

Moreover, there are different institutional change processes, or pathways, through which logic shifts can occur. Many studies emphasize pathways that result in the significant transformation of field-level logics, such as one logic replacing another. However, there is less research on institutional change processes that may be transformational in goal, yet incremental in outcome (Micelotta et al., 2017). As I will show, the institutional pathway explored in this chapter results in incremental changes in logics. As such, I explore how multiple shifts in logics can be an incremental result of one institutional change pathway.

In this chapter, I contribute to both discussions on logic shifts and institutional change by asking: How does top-down institutional change happen through multiple shifts in institutional logics? This is a two-part question. First, to understand these multiple co-occurring shifts, I develop a three-part framework of institutional logic disentangling, which I define as a phenomenon where logics that previously enjoyed some level of stability, settlement, and relationship, transition to a state where their character, dominance, and relationality are contested. In the field of public safety, I show how disentangling happened through efforts to: 1) change the character of the dominant punishment logic of policing; 2) support the dominance of marginalized care-based logics; and 3) separate the relationship between punishment and care logics.

Second, I show the institutional change pathway through which logic disentangling happened. To do so, I build upon Micelotta et al.'s (2017) concept of "institutional accommodation" to show how the transformational goals of shifting logics in the field of public safety resulted in a new incrementalist institutional settlement between competing public safety logics. This result occurred when the three logic shifts were tempered by sociopolitical challenges and powerful actors, yet had sufficiently shifted during the institutional change process to leave a lasting mark. The new institutional settlement was one where all competing public safety logics could co-exist in the field, albeit unevenly.

I present my findings as a synthetic multi-case study (Yin, 2017). First, I provide separate case summaries of the institutional change process in each city. These provide a high-level overview of key events. Next, I present a synthetic cross-case analysis that shows the important patterns across both cases. The presented patterns represent the major steps of the institutional change process in both cities and specifically pertain to shifts in institutional logics of public

safety and their arrangement in the field. I embed the disentangling framework within this change pathway as a critical step. Finally, I theoretically generalize the pathway and disentangling framework to show their usefulness in understanding multiple logic shifts that occur during institutional change.

Additionally, I identify the contextually specific institutional logics of public safety, a necessary first step to understanding logic shifts. Organizations and individuals articulated the various institutional logics in their field throughout the institutional change process. I present the logics as part of the disentangling framework.

Within institutional scholarship, the different shifts in logics addressed in this chapter have received uneven attention. Early scholarship on institutional change focused heavily on transformational logic replacement, where one dominant logic was replaced by another (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). This research has shown that the importance of some logics over others can change in a field over time. Additionally, more recent theoretical and empirical scholarship has also challenged the notion that individual logics are stable and immutable. Instead, the ontological character of logics may be “situated and flexible” (Gümüsay et al., 2020, p. 7; Lounsbury et al., 2021; Quattrone, 2015). This latter area of scholarship is nascent.

Largely missing from institutional scholarship is the idea that inter-related logics in a field can separate. Extant scholarship that focuses on institutional complexity and logic relationality, such as that on institutional hybridity, often focuses on the formation of new or complimentary connections between logics (Pache & Santos, 2013; Skelcher & Smith, 2015; Smets et al., 2015), or the tension-filled settled co-existence between competing logics over time (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Nicolini et al., 2016; Reay & Hinings, 2009; van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011). However, logic separation is a qualitatively different kind of institutional transformation

than the formation of new connections between logics or the replacement of one dominant logic by another. As such, Nicolini et al. (2016) introduce the possibility that co-existing logics can become unsettled and separate, yet this phenomenon has not been addressed in-depth.

As part of exploring multiple logic shifts, I describe an institutional change pathway of accommodation. This pathway is "revolutionary in pace and developmental in scope", often prompted by disruption and shocks to institutional settlements by actors or external forces (Micelotta et al., 2017, p. 1902). Change goals may be initially transformative, but settlement formation is a political process (Rao & Kenny, 2008) involving agentic challengers and incumbents with varied interests influencing change in a field (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Casasnovas & Chliova, 2021; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Micelotta et al., 2017; Reay et al., 2021; van Wilj et al., 2013; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Challengers have the goal of substantially transforming the dominance and arrangement of logics, while incumbents seek to maintain the status quo or minimize change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Due to their conflicts, transformative institutional change results in a truce with more modest, incremental change outcomes (Micelotta et al., 2017). In terms of conflict involving institutional logics, we can better understand accommodation by examining how "the competition/coexistence between logics [is] constructed and negotiated on the ground" by such actors (Micelotta et al., 2017, p. 1902).[7]

Challengers have called for transformative change in public safety systems, including reform in punishment, support for caring alternatives, and greater boundaries between approaches that punish and those that care, yet they faced obstacles in achieving these results.

---

[7] Micelotta et al. (2017) also advise the use of comparative studies and field-level ethnography to expand our understanding of institutional change in fields. Both are used here.

There is little research on how institutional logic settlements are reached through accommodation processes that temper the progress of transformative change. In this chapter, the process and framework I describe offers one such exploration of how this happens.

4.2 Case Summaries

4.2.1 Minneapolis, Minnesota

Minneapolis is an upper Midwestern city with a population of approximately 425,000 and a metropolitan population of 3.7 million. The city's population is 62.9% White, 18.9% Black, 5.9% Asian, and 9.6% Latinx of any race (ACS, 2020). In May 2020, a white Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officer, Derek Chauvin, murdered George Floyd, a Black man, while three MPD officers stood by. Floyd's death was the latest killing in a long history of racialized police violence in Minneapolis. Just in the last decade, multiple high-profile incidences of harassment, surveillance, and killings put the spotlight on police reform in Minneapolis. During this time, the city council funded new violence prevention efforts that offered an alternative to policing, including founding the Department of Safety Promotion (DSP) to prevent violence through community and public health-based programs, and a crisis co-response program, which paired police officers with mental health professionals when responding to behavioral health crises.

However, the murder of George Floyd energized social movements in Minneapolis and around the world and breathed new life into ongoing organizing for change in policing and public safety (Phelps et al., 2021). In June 2020 most Minneapolis city councilmembers publicly declared their intent "to end policing as we know it and to recreate systems of public safety that actually keep us safe." This declaration started two processes. First, city staff would lead a year-long community engagement process to help develop a new community-driven, long-term vision for public safety in the city. Second, city councilmembers unanimously passed a proposal to

create a Department of Community Safety and Violence Prevention. The Department would replace police with "peace officers," eliminate a minimum police staffing requirement, bring together all public safety-related city entities, including peace officers and community-based violence prevention, and prioritize a "holistic, public health-oriented approach" in all divisions. The proposal would also remove the mayor's "complete power" over MPD—largely seen as opposed to transformational changes—and provide city council with more oversight authority. While the Mayor opposed the amendment and argued to prioritize completing community engagement first, even hesitant councilmembers voted to move the amendment forward in the spirit of letting resident voters decide the issue.

The proposal failed. As a city charter change, it needed to undergo review by the city's charter commission before being placed on the fall election ballot. In their review, commission members echoed similar concerns to the mayor and some councilmembers over the pace of change and reservations, both legal and ideological, about removing the police minimum staffing requirement amid an increase in crime. Given this, the commission ultimately blocked the proposal from moving forward to public vote.

With transformative change blocked, councilmembers turned to the only other way to exert power and oversight over police: the budget. The political fight over the 2021 budget centered on the appropriate balance between policing and alternative public safety approaches, and how the latter should be funded. In council meetings, hearings, and newspapers, the fight was energized by concerns about reduced police staffing amid crime increases, particularly crime attributed to Black youth, and activist's calls to "defund the police" and reinvest in public safety alternatives. Budget proposals generally fell into three camps: 1) A "Both/and" approach to public safety, proposed by the mayor, with minimal cuts to MPD and continuation of MPD cadet

classes, but also increased support of the relatively new DSP; 2) A “People’s Budget,” proposed by progressive community activists and explicitly grounded in abolitionist values to fund “life-affirming institutions,” with substantial cuts to MPD diverted to DSP and other social supports, including mental health and affordable housing; and 3) A “Safety for All” proposal, put forth by progressive councilmembers, which would deepen the mayor’s MPD cuts and reinvestments in alternatives, primarily key DSP violence prevention programs that target Black youth and a new behavioral health crisis response program. This latter proposal would also reduce the permanent MPD staffing level, provide council oversight over the launch of future MPD cadet classes, and create a reserve fund for MPD overtime to avoid “blank checks” to the police.

Throughout budget negotiations, the rhetoric of “both/and” was leveraged to defend opposing positions. The mayor and his allies expressed support for community calls for change to public safety, but not the elimination of police. They used “both/and” rhetoric to argue for funding police and alternatives in the face of “reckless” calls to replace police amid increasing crime. For example, one councilmember argued for increased police staffing: “This is an effort just to get a few more feet on the street and those feet on the streets to a lot of victims really really matter…even a handful of more officers might free up time to investigate…This is not an either/or decision. This is a both/and decision…We need to stop using words like abolish and defund.” Conversely, once attempts to replace police were blocked, other councilmembers argued for deeper cuts and reinvestments by taking up the mayor’s “both/and” rhetoric. For instance, one councilmember opposed staffing increases and argued that his position was “being framed as though ‘if you don’t support this (more police) then you are either/or’…The ‘both/and’ is thinking about how we are combining the resources that are in community whether that’s community members, community organizations, the social services, alongside targeted law

enforcement." Given these multiple rhetorical uses of "both/and," the discussion did not concern whether policing and alternatives should both exist, but rather their relative funding levels, source of funding (e.g., defunding police or not), and ability to solve crime.

The Safety for All amendments to the mayor's budget narrowly passed, with an $8 million, or 4.5%, reduction in the MPD budget. Supporters avoided a threatened mayoral veto by withdrawing the permanent staffing level changes that would set a baseline for future budgets (i.e., permanently lowering the MPD budget). The mayor and allied councilmembers justified their opposition to long-term staffing changes by pointing to the ongoing and incomplete year-long community engagement process, which should provide guidance over questions that divide residents. Ultimately, however, most aspects of Safety for All passed. Progressive councilmembers successfully used the budget as a tool to shift public safety resources and conduct short-term police oversight, even if long-term budgetary changes and more robust support for alternatives failed.

The Safety for All proposal built upon an ongoing, three-part "Transforming Community Safety" initiative that developed in Minneapolis after George Floyd's death, which was explicitly meant to address racialized police violence and community violence. First, and quickly after Floyd's death, the city sought "police policy reform," including banning chokeholds, prioritizing de-escalation over force, and replacing the "warrior-style culture" of the MPD with a "guardian culture" that emphasized conflict resolution. The city intended these efforts to increase community trust of police. Second, Minneapolis invested heavily in DSP programs to "break the cycle of violence before it begins" between community members. These programs were non-carceral, grounded in public health that treated "violence as a disease," and employed community members to prevent and interrupt violence in the streets and among "high risk"

groups, particularly Black men and youth. Finally, the city removed police from non-violent situations. It accelerated development of non-police "alternative response" to a variety of issues, including property damage, theft, and following the April 2021 police killing of Daunte Wright, traffic safety. Most notably it accelerated the development of a mobile behavioral health crisis response program that would largely remove police participation in mental health emergencies that could be better handled by clinicians.

Yet, these initiatives faced backlash during implementation, particularly regarding police reform. For example, police staffing levels was a lightning rod issue. When facing budget cuts, MPD officials threatened cutbacks to community policing and investigations—areas seen as critical to building community trust—in favor of more street patrols. Further, MPD response times to calls slowed down, which some activists argued was a tactic used to generate demand for more police among residents who fear a potential lack of crime control. This tactic seemingly worked. In response, a handful of residents successfully sued the city to increase police staffing levels, which created roadblocks to future defunding efforts. The legal case was emblematic of growing public concern, observed in city hearings and newspapers, about crime increases that could be blamed on councilmembers who defunded and delegitimized the police. Meanwhile, the mayor and police chief expressed to council the desperate need for more police and touted the modest policing reforms they implemented, including a shift towards prioritizing "community-oriented applicants" during hiring. Given these pressures, the city council—with little pushback or public discussion—approved the use of the reserve fund for police overtime and cadet classes to increase police staffing, contradicting the rigorous council oversight proposed during fall 2020 budget negotiations. Subsequently, the mayor successfully lobbied for funding both police overtime and community-based violence prevention programs following the murder of local

three children to gun violence, asserting that effective public safety systems involve "solutions beyond policing, *and* effective, just enforcement." This approach aligned with a general "both/and" appetite for multiple, if unevenly funded approaches to public safety.

Amid backlash and a crime panic, by spring and summer 2021 the sociopolitical climate was generally more favorable to public safety reform, rather than police elimination. Nationally, President Biden launched initiatives to support community policing and alternative approaches. Locally, the possibility of a Department of Justice consent decree held the promise of MPD reform. This climate formed the backdrop of a second attempt to change the city charter and create a new integrated Department of Public Safety. Supportive councilmembers and activists argued the Department was a "both/and" approach. It would move away from a system with policing as a "one-size-fits-all" approach, prioritize public health strategies, and ensure police are "complementary to and supportive of other critical public safety strategies." Yet, the charter amendment suffered from its prior association with police defunding and replacement. Pre-election polling showed voters favored police reform, rather than police reductions. Further, oppositional public comments expressed the view that the amendment was a "power grab" by the Council to usurp the mayor's authority over public safety. The amendment failed to sway voters. Instead, a parallel ballot initiative, proposed by the charter commission, passed that gave the mayor, a proponent of police reform and opponent of reductions, exclusive authority over MPD.

After this, the fall 2021 budgeting process was far different from the previous years. The mayor's proposed budget would restore police funding levels to pre-2020 levels, including new cadet classes amid staffing shortfalls. The police chief argued that more officers would mean more responsive and proactive community policing, which would increase community trust. Yet the budget also maintained support for alternative violence prevention programs, including DSP

programs and non-police behavioral health crisis response. In supporting public safety alternatives, the mayor stated that "it would be disingenuous to expect these new, complimentary programs to succeed simply by breaking down the work of others (police)." In doing so, the mayor publicly framed his budget as a rejection of police defunding and an embrace of a holistic "both/and" safety approach. In response, the council president and her supporters warned that more police would mean more MPD-related lawsuits to deplete city coffers, leaving less funding for public safety alternatives. But they also acknowledged that recent election defeats meant the political winds had shifted away from defunding. As such, the president used "both/and" framing to defend the existing funding balance between police and alternative public safety programs: "Some people call this 'transforming public safety,' some call this a 'both/and' approach to public safety. Whatever language you use, we are dedicated to public safety."

The mayor's budget passed with increased police funding and moderate boosts to alternative violence prevention. Shortly after, he underscored the need for both approaches to solve youth-driven crime with "compassion and accountability." By early 2022, community pressure to defund police had cooled, substantial police policy reforms had yet to materialize, and alternative public safety programs were designed in city departments and run through local nonprofits. Further, the community engagement process initially set up to create a transformative vision of public safety was and would remain incomplete. The following year's budget contained similar sized investments in police and public safety alternatives, suggesting a new "both/and" status quo.

4.2.2 Austin, Texas

Austin is a southwestern city with a population of approximately 966,000 and a metropolitan population of 2.28 million. The city's population is 69.4% White, 7.8% Black,

7.7% Asian, and 33.3% Latinx of any race (ACS, 2020). Austin faced numerous instances of police harassment and violence over the last decade. Prior to 2020, the Austin city council initiated several processes to change public safety in response to ongoing incidents of police harassment and violence, including a gun violence prevention task force, an exploration of behavioral health crisis alternatives, and decriminalizing homeless encampments. However, they initiated few recent police reform efforts, namely addressing racial bias and discrimination within the Austin Police Department (APD). In April 2020, the police killing of Michael Ramos, a Black and Latino man, prompted substantial calls for change in public safety. These calls were then amplified by the national attention drawn to George Floyd's murder and the "defund police" movement.

In June 2020 the city council and mayor unanimously committed to making substantial, immediate, and long-term changes to Austin's public safety systems, including police staffing and budgets. Councilmembers desired to address the "root causes of public safety," promote racial equity, and cited the failure of APD leadership to make needed reforms. They particularly focused on budget priorities, as the 2020-2021 budget process would take place that same summer. One councilmember encapsulated the council's shift towards police divestment and alternative public safety investment: "We have to look at (APD) staffing. We have got to look at our budgets. And I know that I'm resounding the sentiment of so many of our constituents when I say that the time for talk is absolutely over…our budget truly is a moral document and reflects our common priorities."

The council committed to a "Reimagining Public Safety" initiative that sought transformative change to stop racialized police violence and enhance public health and equitable social supports. Specifically, they would push for reform to APD culture and practices and shift

financial resources and responsibilities from APD to independent organizations or alternative public safety programs, the latter of which currently received much less funding than police. Councilmembers cautioned that their goal was not "complete elimination of our police department," as some community activists wanted, but to achieve better public safety outcomes through multiple means. Through weeks of intensive meetings and study, councilmembers debated what constituted the "right response" to various issues and identified an ambitiously broad set of specific reform efforts.

In August 2020, the Austin city council made dramatic cuts to the APD. The council slashed the prior year's budget of $443.2 million by over one-third, or $153.2 million, going well beyond the city managers proposed $11 million in cuts,[8] but below activist demands. The cuts would become part of the larger "Reimagining Public Safety" initiative and fell into three buckets: 1) $31.5 million for one-time modest reinvestments in a broad array of non-carceral public safety alternatives, including violence prevention, behavioral health response, housing and homelessness services, and education, among many other areas; 2) $76.6 million to decouple and transfer some APD duty areas to civilian control, including 911 emergency communications; and 3) $45.1 million to a reserve "reimagine fund" that would support future public safety alternatives based upon a year-long community engagement process. The council also sought oversight over APD for long-standing misconduct issues, requiring a mid-year check-in on reforms and cadet academy curriculum review before holding new cadet classes. Future city communications made clear that their purpose was not to "defund the police," but to "re-think, and in some cases, re-design public safety resources to eliminate service disparities."

[8] In Austin, the city manager is the primary executive of day-to-day operations and proposes the yearly budget.

Implementation of all these areas began immediately. Under council direction and oversight, city staff granted the one-time reinvestment funds to nonprofits and community organizations addressing targeted public safety areas. While administratively complex, the council also recognized the importance of removing police from non-violent mental health crises. As such, the city began the process of decoupling several APD functions into separate departments, including 911. During this time, council and city staff also passed several police reform policies, including those pertaining to use-of-force. Austin's Office of Police Oversight recommended rigorous policy changes based upon the national "8 Can't Wait," a research-based initiative that advocates for policy change in eight key areas associated with police violence. Further, the city began its review of the APD's cadet academy curriculum to combat its "warrior-style culture."

To advance the year-long community engagement process, the city formed a diverse task force to create a long-term vision of "reimagined public safety in Austin and how we get there." Task force members included those most impacted and knowledgeable about policing and represented organizations that addressed a broad range of public safety issues, including public health, interpersonal violence, police reform, and racial and economic justice. Once started, the task force rooted their work in shared progressive values, including "equity," "accountability to community," and a "commitment to liberation and freedom," and historically grounded beliefs, including that "policing as a system was intentionally created to perpetuate the harm and oppression of one group for the benefit of another and of capital." Over many months, the task force conducted a series of meetings, including multiple listening sessions with community members, to develop a series of policy and budget recommendations for city council's mid-year budget review in April 2021. The task force's recommendations effectively offered council a

guiding road map for minimizing policing and harm in Austin (e.g., eliminate neighborhood-based patrol policing; decouple traffic enforcement), while investing in existing and new community-based and social services (e.g., community health workers; trauma recovery centers; civilian violence prevention; non-police behavioral health crisis response) and broad social and economic support (e.g., affordable housing; guaranteed income pilot).

However, the city undermined the task force in the middle of their reimagining process, which compromised long-term change efforts. As in Minneapolis, Austin faced ongoing low police staffing levels amid increases in crime and city officials were under increasing public pressure to resolve it swiftly. In public hearings, some community members vocally stated that Austin was “going out of control,” placing the blame for crime on councilmembers who defunded the police. Given these concerns, the city council considered a plan to reopen the APD cadet academy that was halted the prior summer.

Yet, in addition to addressing crime, police reform was also still a concern for councilmembers. To assuage councilmembers that reopening the academy would address both concerns, the APD chief promised that he and his team were “working diligently and urgently to fulfill our commitment to reimagining our cadet training academy and that we are delivering instruction in line with the expectation that we are building efficient, capable, caring guardians of our community.” The underlying message was that ADP had made significant steps towards addressing racialized police violence, disparities, and equity in Austin. In supporting the academy’s reopening, the mayor asserted the need to address crime and argued that Austin “is a city that does not want to defund police. This is a city that supports our police and we need to make sure that they have the resources to do the job we want them to do, even as we are reimagining what that is in the context of public safety.” Most councilmembers desired to test

out the APD's reimagined "culture change" and voted to fund the academy's reopening. Future funding was contingent upon updates to and review of the academy's curriculum, including incorporation of pedagogical methods that "infuse diversity, equity and inclusion" and "oversight by an independent evaluator."

Most task force members were alarmed that the academy would move forward before curriculum review and their recommendations were complete, particularly since alternative public safety approaches were not yet robustly supported. They submitted a statement to council that expressed how this decision showed the city council's "lack of commitment to the concept of reimagining public safety" and "like so many task forces before, was designed to give the appearance that the city was working toward a goal it had no intention of achieving." They demanded that task force recommendations be meaningfully considered now and in future budget processes. Despite these demands, the city announced the "reimagined cadet class" as a success of the reimagining process, an announcement rhetorically juxtaposed against task force members' claims that the city was "co-opting the language of reimagining public safety."

The promise of change proved short-lived, however. In contrast to the APD chief's promises, in fall 2021 the independent evaluator reported that the academy maintained a "military culture." Further, the APD abruptly paused curriculum review shortly after the 2021-2022 budget—which increased police funding—was passed in August 2021. Nearly two years later, cadet classes had continued, but full curriculum review had not occurred.

The cadet academy scenario was illustrative of how the city's fire for transformative change had been dampened by spring 2021 amid continued crime, police staffing shortages, and a national and local sociopolitical environment less amenable to reducing police. That April, councilmembers received the task force's recommendations, but they made no firm

commitments to their implementation or continued community-led change. Instead, council tasked city staff with conducting an implementation feasibility study of task force recommendations. What resulted was a public dashboard the displayed the implementation (or not) of recommendations, with many marked vaguely as under continued consideration or "incorporated into the respective department's process." Task force members protested their lack of transparency and their inclusion in implementation processes. This, combined with the reopening of cadet classes, broke trust with task force members and their formal involvement in reimagining efforts stopped.

The public safety transformation process faced other backlashes—one fatal—that shaped implementation. First, amid an affordable housing crisis exacerbated by COVID-related employment and financial strain, in spring 2021 Austin residents passed through ballot initiative a ban on public camping and panhandling. The proposal was initiated and supported by a local advocacy organization that supported traditional public safety methods, namely policing. This result reversed a 2019 council-led ordinance that decriminalized these behaviors and prioritized homeless social services over incarceration. It suggested that Austin residents were still invested in addressing a public safety issue like homelessness—a central issue of the reimagining public safety process—through criminalization. Second and significantly, Texas Governor Greg Abbott successfully passed HB1900, partly in response to Austin's reimagining efforts. The bill required Austin to reverse the APD's 2020 budget cuts and punish cities that defunded police with tax penalties and removing annexation powers. To comply with this law and increase the APD's budget to pre-2020 levels, Austin was forced to stop efforts to decouple departments like emergency communications from the APD and reinvest the reimagining public safety reserve fund back into the APD. While task force members and activists asked the city to apply for a

state waiver to continue decoupling efforts, even the most progressive councilmembers conceded that reimagining efforts were less possible amid the new sociopolitical environment and budget constraints.

Given this reality, the subsequent 2021-2022 Austin budget supported a "both/and" public safety approach similar to that in Minneapolis. The APD budget returned to pre-defunding levels, which reflected the punitive legal reality set by the state. Yet, the city maintained its commitments to some key alternative public safety initiatives set during the prior summer, including those for behavioral health crisis response and violence prevention. It also included limited investments in a few new areas advocated for by the task force, like community health workers, non-police violence prevention programs, and a guaranteed income pilot. Despite the uneven funding between police and alternatives, the city justified the budget as a significant "commitment to advancing progress with the transformative reimagining public safety framework" that would address racial disparities. Local activists and task force members balked at the city's assertion and called on it to stop co-opting the rhetoric of "reimagining public safety" without investing more in alternatives that would transform Austin's public safety systems.

Over the following year, policing continued to be the dominant public safety approach in Austin, but with a dominance that was modulated by prior efforts to reimagine public safety. In line with state law, the following 2022-2023 budget maintained prior investments in police and alternatives. While attempts to improve accountability over the police cadet academy were rebuffed, Austin residents also voted down a ballot initiative that would mandate substantial increases to police staffing that would severely compromise the city budget. Overall, the city

faced new constraints in transforming public safety systems, yet the city's prior reimagining efforts left their mark for continuing incremental change.

4.3 Cross-Case Analysis: Institutional Accommodation through Disentangling Logics

In this section, I present a synthetic cross-case analysis of the Minneapolis and Austin case studies. Empirically, I will show patterns in both cases that constitute the major components of their mutual institutional change pathway. Theoretically, I will address how institutional change processes with transformational goals—even with different routes to achieving those goals—faced setbacks that resulted in similar incrementalist institutional settlements between competing logics. I theorize that both city's efforts to disentangle logics created the conditions for new settlements in the face of increasing resistance to change.

4.3.1 Institutional Change Triggered at Macro-Level

Macro-level exogenous changes can trigger institutional change processes with transformative goals (Micelotta et al., 2017). In both Minneapolis and Austin, police killings and subsequent national and local social movement activity were exogenous forces that challenged institutional settlements of public safety. In response, city councilmembers vowed to pursue transformational change in public safety, including to police staffing and non-carceral alternatives. They pursued this goal through various routes, including community engagement and the budget, while also building upon and invigorating prior police reform efforts and nascent alternative public safety initiatives. Taken together, these steps align with the neo-institutionalist view of institutions as both material (e.g., reallocating material resources through defunding and reinvestment) and symbolic (e.g., reimagining our cultural understanding of public safety) (Friedland & Alford, 1991).

The cities' transformation processes proceeded differently along at least three key factors that would affect the scope (e.g., the range of institutional change, including the variety of alternative public safety social service areas targeted by change efforts in each city) and magnitude (e.g., the depth of funding reinvestment from police to social services) of institutional change in public safety. These three factors include level of support, strategy, and timing.

First, there were different levels of support from city officials regarding the initial declaration and steps towards transformative change. In Austin, the city councilmembers, mayor, and city manager all expressed support for transformative change, couched in values of racial equity that aligned with some of the rhetoric used by activist-challengers to the status quo. To assuage their critics, they also publicly expressed that their actions were not aimed at eliminating police entirely. Their unified stand on "reimagining public safety" made the initial reforms and budget cuts possible and substantial, while rhetorically walking the tightrope between challengers and incumbents.

In contrast, the divisions between Minneapolis's councilmembers and mayor quickly shifted transformative goals into incremental change. Many city councilmembers supported substantial transformation of public safety systems, including through the new Department of Community Safety and Violence Prevention. Conversely, the mayor and his allies advocated for more incremental aims that would support *both* reformed policing *and* alternative programs. The mayor threatened to veto the budget if it included long-term reductions to police staffing. His "both/and" rhetoric became a powerful symbolic tool for incremental wins; several councilmembers adopted it to win greater short-term investments in alternatives once their transformative efforts via ballot failed. Later, after the ballot initiative was defeated a second time, and the mayor solidified his power over police, councilmembers once again used

“both/and” rhetoric to defend the new balance between policing and alternatives. Ultimately, challengers co-opted the incumbents’ “both/and” framing to foster and sustain incremental change when facing resistance to transformational goals.

Second, the transformation strategies in each city differed. In Austin, efforts to “reimagine public safety” were intertwined from the outset with budgetary efforts to divest from policing and reinvest in public safety alternatives. This tied together symbolic efforts to re-envision “how” and “by whom” public safety should be achieved with material efforts to shift resources. As city council supported a vision of public safety that was broad and transformative in scope, the magnitude of material cuts to policing were deep as well. Further, this linkage was embedded in the work of the community-engaged task force, who developed a long-term vision for reimagined public safety and the budgetary changes needed to make it happen.

Comparatively, in Minneapolis transformative efforts to reimagine public safety were less linked to budgetary changes. Transformative efforts initially focused on creating a new public safety department; once this failed, councilmembers turned to the budget as a secondary strategy. Additionally, the community engagement process to create a long-term vision for public safety was only tenuously connected to budgetary changes. Some councilmembers pointed to the process’s incompleteness to justify their opposition to a transformative vision and deeper cuts. The lack of consensus on the long-term scope of transformation contributed to budgetary cuts that were short-term and less deep.

Finally, the timing of change efforts mattered. Each city faced a public outcry over its inability to curb increasing violence, with many community members and city officials attributing reduced police staffing, low response times, and prior and ongoing efforts to defund the police as culprits. In Minneapolis, this issue came to the forefront during budget negotiations.

The context made incremental cuts to policing more palatable than deep ones and contributed to the challenge of cutting policing staffing levels more permanently. In Austin, the crime issue was more prominently discussed after the budget was settled. Instead, Austin's budget negotiations took place shortly after George Floyd's murder when activists' calls for transformative change were at their height. This timing was a temporary and important opportunity window for change that was large in scope and magnitude (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; McAdam et al., 2001)

Ultimately, macro-level forces triggered transformational institutional change processes that were modified by context. In Austin, the initial scope and magnitude of change was broad and substantial. This result was supported by unified change actions among city officials during a political opportunity window and a strategy that firmly combined efforts to reimagine public safety with budgetary changes. In Minneapolis, the scope and magnitude of change was narrower. Once transformative efforts through ballot initiatives failed, a lack of political consensus or guiding vision for change, combined with a narrowed opportunity window, resulted in support for more moderate, incremental aims during this initial period of change.

4.3.2 Disentangling: Multiple Shifts in Logics

While the scope and magnitude of change would differ, Minneapolis and Austin pursued three strikingly similar and simultaneous shifts in institutional logics of public safety. These included: 1) attempts to change the character of the dominant punishment logic of policing; 2) efforts to support the importance of marginalized care-based logics; and 3) separating the relationship between punishment and care-based logics.

4.3.2.1 Institutional Logics of Public Safety

To understand these shifts, I first analyzed observational, interview, and document data to discover the field-specific institutional logics of public safety (see Chapter 3 for further

methodological details). This identification process resulted in four primary logics of public safety, including three-care based logics—treatment, prevention, and repair—and punishment (see table 1; also, see table 7 in the Appendix for quotes illustrative of constitutive elements).[9] Theoretically, the process of institutional change in public safety involved the articulation of multiple care-based logics that conflicted with the dominant logic of punishment. Empirically, these logics were embedded in the specific programs and policies targeting public safety.

Table 1 Institutional Logics of Public Safety

Constitutive Elements of Logics	**Treatment**	**Prevention**	**Repair**	**Punishment**
Root Metaphor	Behavior	Environment	Relationship	Control
Sources of Legitimacy	Assessment and diagnosis	Equity and social conditions	Trust and solidarity	Government and procedure
Sources of Authority	Expertise and professionals	Data and lived experience	Shared values and authentic personal rapport	Law, rules, and those who administer them
Basis of Attention	Pathology, trauma, and development	System failures	Division	Deviance and compliance
Basis of Strategy	Healing	Distribution	Connection	Enforcement

[9] Three logics—prevention, treatment, and punishment—were previously expressed by Wacquant (2012, p. 242): "It is important to stress that, as the bureaucratic arm of the nation, the state can seek to remedy undesirable conditions and behaviors in three ways. It can "socialize" them by tackling their roots in the collective organization of society. It can "medicalize" them by treating them as individual pathologies. Or it can "penalize" them by ramping up its law-enforcement agencies and directing them at problem populations. Think of the three ways of responding to homelessness: build low-income housing, offer mental health services, or throw street derelicts in jail." The repair logic loosely aligns with the community logic identified by other institutional scholars (Almandoz et al., 2017; Georgiou & Arenas, 2023; Thornton et al., 2012); recent gray literature points to the importance of social ties for achieving public safety (Partners for Justice, 2023).

Institutional logics are comprised of constitutive elements (i.e., root metaphor, sources of legitimacy and authority, and bases of attention and strategy) that combine to form the symbolic and material basis for each logic (Thornton et al., 2012).[10] To discover the coherence of an individual logic, I analyzed data for key elements common to institutional analysis (e.g., Thornton et al., 2012; Toubiana, 2020). Like Georgiou and Arenas (2023), the definitions provided by Almandoz et al. (2017) were particularly clear and helpful in identifying elements (see table 2). In human service fields, all four logics give rise to theories about clients, as well as theories about the cause of their problems (Anasti, 2023). For example, the logic of prevention views the environment as central to public safety. Prevention is legitimized through beliefs in equity and gains authority through narratives that use data and lived experience to expose inequitable social conditions. Prevention is focused on achieving public safety through solving systemic failures that can be ameliorated through the societal distribution of resources and opportunities. In short, these logics concern distinct approaches to achieving public safety through: 1) changing people's behaviors (treatment); 2) changing people's environments (prevention); 3) changing people's relationships (repair); and 4) controlling people (punishment).[11]

Table 2 Definitions of Key Constitutive Elements of Institutional Logics

Constitutive Elements of Logics	**Definition** (from Almandoz et al., 2017)
Root Metaphor	"The manner in which knowledge is structured and action is organized" (p. 195)

[10] This approach is inspired by the toolkit approach to culture (Lounsbury et al., 2021; Swidler, 1986).
[11] Research on carceral and social service systems suggests that existence of multiple carceral logics besides punishment, including coercion (Anasti, 2020). This study focused on two cities primarily concerned with changing the punishment-oriented practices of policing and formal carceral systems. As such, the data pointed to the primacy of punishment as the central carceral logic of public safety. Future research, such as studies focused on the perspectives of abolitionist activists or service providers, may uncover other carceral logics (Bohrman et al., 2023).

Sources of Legitimacy	"The means by which power or influence is institutionalized and given a moral grounding" (p. 196)
Sources of Authority	"The reason why a particular authority is obeyed" (p. 196)
Basis of Attention	"That which attracts and focuses attention" (p. 198)
Basis of Strategy	"What motivates behavior" (p. 198)

With these logics in hand, I uncovered three simultaneous shifts in logics that occurred in both cities. I collect and present new evidence regarding both the design and implementation of these shifts to understand *what* and *how* logic shifts occurred.

4.3.2.2 Change the Dominant Logic

First, each city attempted to change the dominant and problematized logic in the field: punishment. They did so by pursuing policies that would make practices most associated with punishment—those of policing—less punishing and deadly, such as by changing use-of-force policies (e.g., banning chokeholds; requiring de-escalation attempts), ending racial disparities in police enforcement, and addressing the "warrior-style culture" in each department. Each council used their budgetary powers to increase police oversight, including changes to cadet academy curriculum. The budget was also used to reduce the overall capacity of police in comparison to alternative public safety approaches (i.e., defunding).

In institutional terms, these reforms attempted to change the character—the constitutive elements—of policing's primary punishment logic. Exogenous forces challenged the institutional settlement of public safety, including the authority of police in the field. To regain authority, each city's policymakers took steps towards enhancing police-community relations and trust. This meant changing specific practices, but more generally shifting departments from warrior-style to guardian-style cultures that would undergird and inform all policing practices. This shift

in culture would alter the punishment logic's "basis of strategy" away from aggressive and strict enforcement and towards communicative conflict-resolution, thereby making policing less punishing.

This logic shift provides credence to recent institutional arguments that individual logics may be plastic and malleable, rather than rigid and static across time and space (Fortin, 2023; Gümüsay et al., 2020). Yet, logic elements are institutionalized and entrenched, and therefore difficult to alter, as evidenced by the reported difficulties in changing APD's warrior-style culture. This suggests that there may be less difficulty changing the behavioral manifestation of logics, such as use-of-force practices, compared to the underlying cultural elements of logics. Moreover, as abolitionists have argued (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022), changes to policing may only modify the behavioral manifestations of punishment while leaving intact the logic's overall structure and emphasis on control.

4.3.2.3 Support Marginalized Logics

Second, cities supported alternative, care-based logics that were once marginalized in the field. Councilmembers were responsive to social movement activity that called for a broad range of supports that generally aligned with the three care-based logics. These supports included mental health and substance use (i.e., treatment), affordable housing and economic relief (i.e., prevention), and community-based violence prevention and neighborhood-based restorative justice (i.e., repair).

The scope and magnitude of support for alternatives differed in each city. Contextual factors, including level of support from city officials and city councilmembers' transformation strategies, set limits on what was possible. In Minneapolis, these factors facilitated modest support for alternatives, largely boosting initiatives that were already in process, such as violence

prevention and behavioral health crisis response programs that aligned with repair and treatment logics, respectively. In Austin, the context supported broad and substantial reinvestments in care. Alternatives included boosting pre-existing initiatives, particularly housing and homeless services that aligned with a prevention logic, but also mental health, violence prevention, and host of other service areas. In both cases, the scope and magnitude of support for alternatives received in the initial budget cycle were mostly sustained in the subsequent two cycles.

Further analysis revealed that cities supported multiple care-based logics in single service areas. Through interviews with administrators and service providers in implementing organizations, I discovered that many programs employed multiple logics. For example, in Minneapolis, community-based violence prevention programs blended treatment and repair logics. Programs were focused on creating healing and behavioral change among individuals, particularly youth and young adults, who were assessed as at-risk for perpetuating violence due to their own traumatic experiences and mental health issues. To foster behavioral change, the program also focused on building trusting relationships between individuals and "credible messengers," individuals who could mentor others into developing positive behaviors and facing their traumas. Speaking to the blend of logics, one credible messenger told me that the entire purpose of building trusting community relationships was to create behavioral change: "It's about me helping you map your own life out so that you can get up every morning and look yourself in the mirror with a straight face."

Cities also supported programs that temporarily used multiple logics. For instance, while community-based violence prevention programs do not center a prevention logic, administrators and service providers noted that the presence of stable social supports in the environment can help program participants avoid perpetuating violence. They pointed to the positive association

between poverty and crime. To reduce the influence of poverty, they provided minimal and temporary "stabilization services," such as rental or cash assistance, to relieve the economic desperation that might mitigate the programs behavioral interventions. Additionally, care-based logics may temporarily rely upon a punishment logic, potentially undermining care-based goals. For example, non-police crisis response programs in both cities engaged in police partnerships when they deemed involuntary mental health holds as necessary. Whether temporary or baked into a program's underlying theory of change, organizational hybridity research usefully show how aspects of different logics may be intertwined together and co-exist in field or organizational structures and practices (Battilana et al., 2017; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Prior renderings of public safety approaches (e.g., Wacquant, 2012), do not typically account for this type of relationality between logics.

4.3.2.4 Separate Conflicting Logics

Finally, both Minneapolis and Austin sought to separate conflicting public safety logics. Arguably, no social service area received more attention in 2020 from activists and city officials than behavioral health crisis response. In the public sphere, an oft cited statistic was that people with an untreated mental illness were 16 times more likely to be killed by police (Fuller et al., 2015). Indeed, advocates in both cities highlighted the link between mental health crises and recent police killings. Even police officials acknowledged their limited ability to intervene appropriately in these situations. Given this, councilmembers took steps to minimize police presence in mental health crises, as well as other areas where their presence was deemed unnecessary or potentially harmful, such as property damage calls and traffic enforcement.

Decoupling police from mental health response meant separating the logics of punishment and treatment. This occurred in two ways. In Minneapolis, decoupling involved

separating out the function of each logic. Prior to 2020, Minneapolis already utilized a crisis co-response service that paired police with clinicians. In moving away from co-response and towards non-police response, Minneapolis sought to find a mental health organization that would limit police partnerships. This organization would respond to non-violent crises without police, which separated clinicians and their treatment-based functions from police. City officials argued that this would allow police to focus on what they are trained for: enforcement. Once launched, police officers reported their satisfaction with the crisis response program; it allowed them to focus on other duties and removed them from mental health situations for which they are ill-prepared.

In Austin, decoupling focused on separating the organizational structures that housed logics. As part of Austin's 2020 defunding and reinvestment, city councilmembers directed city staff to move the 911 emergency communications department out of the APD. This department housed dispatch, which determined the type of a caller's emergency (e.g., police, fire, medical, or mental health), and if mental health, forwarded the call to a clinician. In separating the department from police, city officials argued that the increased independence of emergency services from police would foster an environment for continuous improvement and growth in mental health response over time. In other words, organizationally decoupling punishment and treatment would foster a greater investment in treatment.

In addition to separating function and structure, decoupling can also separate both the proximity between and power over logics. For example, in Austin, task force members argued that victim services should be administratively, but not physically, separated from APD. Members argued that administrative decision-making over victim services should be done by a non-APD manager in order to advance trauma-informed treatment for survivors. Yet, members

also acknowledged the important role police play in victim services, including access to criminal-legal data and case updates, which might be compromised by physically decoupling services. Therefore, they advocated for administrative decoupling, but not physical decoupling, which would separate punishment and treatment regarding power over, but not proximity between, logics.

4.3.3 Tempering Institutional Change

Inter-related factors in the sociopolitical environment tempered the progress of institutional change in both cities. Contextually, an increase in crime provided the foundation for actions that mollified progress. In each city, public outcry over increasing violence and officials' inability to curb it continued after the 2020 budget negotiations that cut police budgets. Some blamed the increase on city officials for defunding and delegitimizing police. Concomitantly, alternative public safety approaches were not yet robustly supported enough to contribute sufficiently to crime prevention. Given crime-related political pressures and the inadequacies of all public safety logics in the face of crime, city officials and political actors took steps to support policing and punishment, the still dominant logic of public safety.

Support occurred on two levels. First, officials largely reneged on their prior promises for rigorous oversight of future cadet classes and police overtime. In Minneapolis, city council released funds when confronted by ongoing police staffing problems amid crime increases. The mayor also successfully lobbied council to increase police funding after several high-profile killings. Similarly, the Austin city council approved a plan to reopen the cadet academy after receiving the police chief's assurances that fundamental changes to culture and practices were underway. To justify their decisions, officials in both cities pointed to their ongoing support for police reforms and non-police alternatives. They supported their actions by using the rhetoric of

progressive change, previously used to shift the status quo either transformationally (e.g., "reimagining public safety") or incrementally (e.g., "both/and"). Perversely, these decisions sidestepped or undermined the ongoing community engagement processes that were motivated by transformative change.

Beyond city hall, other political actors moved to reinstate policing and its role in enforcing public safety. In Austin, Governor Abbott's bill stopped and reversed many of the city's changes. The bill required an increase in police funding and staffing, which limited the budget available for supporting public safety alternatives and decoupling key departments out of the APD. Further, Austin residents passed a ballot initiative to recriminalize homelessness, which reintroduced the role of police enforcement, while sidelining social services. In Minneapolis, residents concerned about increased crime successfully sued the city to increase police staffing levels. Further, the city's independent charter commission successfully proposed and passed by ballot initiative a law to give the police-supporting Mayor complete control over MPD. This, combined with the second failed attempt to create a Department of Public Safety, reasserted the role of police in the city and restricted the role of care-based alternatives. Across both cities, these policy efforts were buttressed by a national context that favored police reform, not elimination, alongside alternative public safety approaches.

To summarize, a primary issue addressed by institutional logics of public safety—crime—worsened during an institutionally unsettled time. The dominant logic to respond to this issue—punishment—was less available due to challenges it faced in the institutional environment. Meanwhile, alternative logics did not have the robust institutionalized presence necessary to resolve the issue in place of punishment. Given this state, powerful actors used municipal and political processes to rebuild support for the dominant logic and temper the shifts

in institutional logics. These actions were supported by a sociopolitical context that favored the resurgence of police and punishment as a central public safety approach, as well as progressive rhetoric that could be used or co-opted to legitimize incremental change.

4.3.4 Both/And Institutional Settlement

Regardless of each city's initial scope and magnitude of change, the extent to which the three logic shifts would continue was similarly tempered in both. What began as community-involved transformational change in each city was narrowed into city administrative processes. In both cities, municipal bureaucrats took full control over the reins of designing, implementing, and monitoring public safety reforms and alternative public safety programs. In terms of challenging the dominant logic, police reform stalled in both cities. They restored cadet classes and police funding for staffing to prior levels, while pushing past many of the police reform accountability measures set during the prior budget cycle. Additionally, in terms of logic separation, the need to restore one-third of the police budget in Austin was so vast that efforts to decouple were rolled back, including separating emergency communications out of APD.

Despite these challenges, the cities' institutional change efforts also tempered the dominance of policing and punishment moving forward. City officials passed modest policy reforms to police practices that would continue to be implemented, even if training curriculum changes continued to falter. Further, they funded new organizations and budget lines to support non-police alternatives, which provided some structure for ongoing support. Speaking to this, future city budgets maintained their commitments to many alternatives previously supported, even if that support would no longer come from police dollars. For example, officials continued their efforts to decouple behavioral health crisis response from MPD. While the relative dominance of punishment and care-based logics was unbalanced, each city's institutional change

processes helped maintain attention to both. In both cities, this meant that commitments to "reimagining public safety" and a "both/and" public safety approach could be repurposed to maintain and, in limited cases, make incremental advances in the face of major obstacles to more transformational change.

4.4 Discussion

In this chapter I have shown how the transformational goals of institutional change in public safety resulted in a new incrementalist institutional settlement between competing public safety logics. This is a multi-step process (see figure 4). First, transformational institutional change is triggered at the macro-level. The scope and magnitude of change were attenuated by similar contextual factors in each localized field. Second, three simultaneous shifts in institutional logics occurred that furthered transformational change goals, including changing the dominant logic, supporting alternative marginal logics, and separating conflicting logics. Third, political actors tempered the three logic shifts during an institutionally unsettled time where ongoing issues central to all logics remained unresolved. To do so, incumbents used the progressive rhetoric of institutional change to achieve incremental aims. Yet, the institutional change process had produced sufficient support for both the dominant and alternative logics, ensuring all logics could co-exist, albeit unevenly, in a new institutional settlement.



Figure 4 A Pathway of Institutional Accommodation through Disentangling

How do we explain the "both/and" institutional settlement that resulted in the restoration of police funding, the continued support of public safety alternatives, and ongoing efforts to separate logics of punishment from care? The three logic shifts were critical. The institutional change process challenged the dominance of policing and punishment, boosted the legitimacy of alternative approaches and care-based logics, and normalized the idea that some city services are better when separated from police. While sociopolitical factors and the actions of political actors tempered the progress of these three shifts, they were materially and symbolically sticky

(Pierson, 2000). The institutional change process and logics shifts had sufficiently changed the prior institutional settlement to one that supported *both* policing *and* alternatives. Policing had seemingly been reformed enough to justify its continued use in the face of crime. Alternatives had been supported enough to ensure their continual consideration in the public safety conversation. And the idea of removing police from mental health crises—that logics should stay in their lane—was acceptable to a collection of diverse actors. While change ultimately was, and would continue to be, incremental in the face of contextual obstacles, a new settlement emerged where conflicting public safety logics co-existed.

These findings contribute to a body of institutional scholarship that has provided both uneven and siloed attention to different types of change in logics. Efforts to support marginalized logics contributes to long-standing scholarship on logic replacement (Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Further, more recent scholarship has pointed to the possibility of separating logics (Nicolini et al., 2016) and changing individual logics (Gümüsay et al., 2020; Lounsbury et al., 2021; Quattrone, 2015). I contribute to these respective conversations by highlighting the potential for conflicting logics to separate and one dominant logic to change. Finally, these shifts were not siloed, but happened relationally. Simultaneous logic shifts can occur in one service area (e.g., Austin's efforts to transform crisis response) or as part of a wider initiative (e.g., "Reimagining Public Safety").

Theoretically, I understand the logic shifts presented in this chapter through the metaphor of "institutional knots." Nicolini et al. (2016, p. 229) introduce the "metaphor of institutional knots to identify temporary forms of institutional compromise in which logics are woven together while remaining clearly identifiable." Knots are comprised of different logics that have formed a temporary co-existing settlement in a field.

I build upon this metaphor. Just as knots can be woven together to form a temporarily stable institutional arrangement, the knot can be reversed. Disentangling knots loosens the institutional settlement and changes logics that comprise the knot, including in character, dominance, and relationship to each other. This chapter's findings point to all three. Attempts were made to change the character—the constitutive elements—of the punishment logic, increase the dominance of care-based logics, and separate the relationship between these logics. Metaphorically, we might think of logics as threads in a knot that disentangle and re-tangle, and through this, undergo a change in their fibers (i.e., constitutive elements), importance to the overall knot (i.e., dominance), and weave (i.e., relationship). The extent to which disentangling occurs will depend upon the type of institutional change pathway undertaken.

In this study, that change pathway was one of "institutional accommodation" (Micelotta et al., 2017). Powerful actors tempered the three logic shifts into an incrementalist institutional settlement. They were able to carry out their actions with the backing of public opinion and a shift in the sociopolitical landscape that prioritized the return of policing and punishment as the primary means of addressing rising crime rates. It remains uncertain whether they would have taken these actions, or would have been successful, had the issue of crime not deteriorated during an institutionally unsettled time. In contrast, empirical evidence of a sustained transformative pathway of institutional change—what Micelotta et al. (2017) call "institutional displacement"—would likely show greater signs of care-based logics fully replacing punishment, for instance. More research is needed to understand the kinds of logic shifts involved in different types of institutional change pathways and the contextual factors that influence their success.

I highlight three important implications regarding the incrementalist pathway. First, powerful actors can use the rhetoric of transformative change to achieve incrementalist ends.

Recent research has shown how incumbents can shape institutional change by controlling rhetoric about the value of certain logics over others (Reay et al., 2021). The case of institutional change in public safety illustrates how rhetoric about institutional change goals, like "reimagining public safety," can become twisted away from its original transformative shape into a justification for an incrementalist settlement.

Second, institutional change pathways with different origins can result in equifinality (Zhang & Welch, 2023). Comparatively, despite differences in initial scope and magnitude of change, the institutional change pathways in each city led to a similar "both/and" settlement. In the face of powerful sociopolitical challenges, and powerful actors who took advantage of them, the dominant logic in each city resurged. Yet, the three logic shifts also left their mark in policy changes, new or boosted care-based programs, and changes to organizational structures. These factors combined to produce a comparatively equifinal institutional settlement.

Finally, comparative cases of institutional accommodation illustrate the tension between short-term social movement wins and long-term institutional change (Useem & Goldstone, 2022). Institutions are both material and symbolic, with change requiring shifts in both. In the case of public safety, institutional change requires shifts in resources and symbolic understandings of "how" and "by whom" safety can be achieved. Reallocating material resources away from punishment is an important component of institutional change, yet it does not necessarily dovetail with change in the cultural underpinnings of institutions. The initial scope and magnitude of change in Austin were greater partly because activists and officials tied together efforts to defund and reinvest resources with efforts to reimagine public safety. While in this study forces similarly tempered change in both cities, this is not certain to occur in all cases

of institutional change. This contingent possibility should encourage activists and allied officials to maximize the initial scope and magnitude of transformative change efforts.

In this chapter, I showed how institutional change in public safety happened through multiple, simultaneous shifts in institutional logics. While institutional change was tempered by powerful forces into incrementalist change, the settlement that resulted disrupted the prior dominance of policing and punishment. The process boosted alternative care-based approaches and facilitated new norms regarding the relationship between policing and care-based services. This chapter contributes to a long tradition of scholarship on top-down, field-level institutional change. Yet, institutional change can also occur from the bottom-up through the work of organizations and individuals on-the-ground (Lawrence et al., 2011). It may be especially important to understand bottom-up change when the institutional goals of top-down processes fail to produce transformative results. In the next chapter, I take on the dearth of research on bottom-up change through institutional work. Specifically, within this context of carceral disruption, I examine how service providers who administer and implement care-based logics contribute to the institutional work of changing public safety.

Chapter 5 The Institutional Work of Public Safety: Service Provider Mechanisms that Contribute to Institutional Change

5.1 Introduction

Cities have adopted policies that shift public safety resources and responsibilities to social service organizations and their "alternative" public safety approaches. Yet, beyond policy adoption, institutional change also occurs within the "black box" of these organizations that implement public safety policies and programs (Powell & Rerup, 2017). The social work profession is acutely aware of this. Among social work academics and practitioners, there has been heated debate on how service providers—many of whom are seen as alternatives to police—advance behaviors that range from punishment to care and engage in relationships with police and carceral systems (Abrams & Dettlaff, 2020; Sherraden, 2020). In this chapter, I bring an institutional lens to these conversations to explore how the goals of creating caring public safety are furthered among service providers in cities pursuing institutional change in public safety.

In the shifting institutional field of public safety, social service organizations and providers are in a key position to advance and negotiate their roles and practices as policy implementers. Indeed, street-level bureaucracy research has shown that service providers shape policy and related practices on-the-ground in the face of complex organizational, institutional, and resource environments (Brodkin & Marston, 2013; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012). One such environmental factor is institutions and their logics (e.g., those related to public safety), which interact, complement, or compete with other institutional logics

to influence the practices of service providers (Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Hasenfeld, 2010; Spitzmueller, 2016, 2018). Yet, according to institutional work theory, individuals are not just shaped by the institutional environment. They also can contribute to bottom-up institutional change through their everyday actions (Lawrence et al., 2011). However, research rarely bridges institutional work theory and street-level research on service providers (Breit et al., 2016; Rice, 2013, 2019). Through implementing public safety policy and practices on the micro-level, service organizations and providers may contribute to bottom-up institutional change in public safety that breaks with the carceral past and advances a more caring version of public safety. Thus, in this chapter, I view the institutional work practices of service providers as consequential to the unsettled institution of public safety and the way the institution changes through everyday practices.

In this chapter, I ask: How do service providers conduct bottom-up institutional work in the field of public safety? This institutional question can help us understand how service providers manage their relationships to police, carceral systems, and punishment logics, while also expanding the reach and legitimacy of their own care-based logics. To answer this question, I explore the behaviors of service providers who are embedded in the organizational field of public safety. These service providers are situated within organizations that engage with carceral systems and police in a variety of service areas, including behavioral health crisis response, community-based violence prevention, and homeless services, among others. I engage service providers in multiple service areas to observe patterns of behavior in a diverse but interconnected organizational field of public safety. Within the wider institutional context, as discussed in Chapter Four, these providers and their programs are widely seen as public safety alternatives to

policing and carceral systems. As an indication of this, their organizations and/or service areas were the direct recipients of police defunding resources.

Analytically, I conceptualize and provide empirical evidence for five inter-related mechanisms of institutional work that social service providers use. These mechanisms are partly about managing boundaries with police and conflicting logics and partly about extending their own care-based logics in the organizational field.[12] I provide conclusions that address how and why theses mechanisms are important for institutional change in public safety, as well as institutional scholarship more generally.

This chapter engages with institutional work theory to understand how service providers contribute to institutional change through their everyday practices. This focus is aligned with the literature on the microfoundations of institutions (Hampel et al., 2017; Powell & Rerup, 2017). Research on institutional work explores how individuals make institutional change happen (or not). Scholarship particularly focuses on individuals' motivations, experiences, and actions in pursuing a broad array of institutional goals (Hampel et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2011). An institutional work perspective points us towards the more mundane, everyday "muddling through" practices that individuals take to bolster, challenge, or reconfigure institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011). Importantly, institutional work theory often understands practices as institutionally meaningful whether they are intentional or not. In other words, institutional work practices can involve both practices that purposefully impact institutions or practices that have indirect effects on them (Beunen & Patterson, 2019). As much of the institution of public safety

[12] The findings are a result of interviewing providers who have at least some interactions with police and carceral systems. I may have found different institutional work mechanisms if I had interviewed social workers who circumvent police contact entirely.

plays out in the dynamic relationships between police, service providers, and their logics, the way these relationships are managed is consequential to the unsettled institution of public safety.

To understand how social service organizations conduct the institutional work of public safety, we must pay attention to what individuals do and say within. Organizations and individuals within may pursue a variety of actions, including actively resisting institutional demands or, in contrast, compartmentalizing seemingly incommensurable logics within different organizational structures and practices (Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Smets et al., 2015; Suchman, 1995). Empirical research in this vein tends to identify specific mechanisms by which institutions and institutional complexity are managed or altered (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Rahman et al., 2023; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). For example, in their ethnographic study of reinsurance trading practices, Smets and colleagues (2015, p. 932) identify and conceptualize segmenting, bridging, and demarcating mechanisms that allow individuals in organizations to "dynamically balance coexisting logics, maintaining the distinction between them while also exploiting the benefits of their interdependence."

In contributing to this research stream, I identify five specific institutional work mechanisms that contribute to institutional change. Additionally, I make two other contributions to institutional work theory. First, I apply a relational lens to institutional work (Topal, 2015). As Smets and colleagues (2015) suggest, frontline individuals within organizations are an important unit of analysis in understanding institutional complexity and change. Yet, institutional work also happens via relationships between individuals and organizations embedded within fields. Both organizations and fields are "inhabited institutions" in which individual actors interact while

making sense of logic complexity and pursuing organizational structures and strategies based upon that sense-making (Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Within these contexts, individuals represent conflicting logics, which affects their relational interactions and institutional work (Greenwood et al., 2011; Hampel et al., 2017; Smets et al., 2015). Recent research has conceptualized sites in both the criminal-legal and social welfare fields as inhabited institutions (Spitzmueller, 2018; Ulmer, 2019). I will show that by incorporating a relational perspective into institutional work, we can better understand how individuals contribute to institutional change by managing their relationships with others who are associated with conflicting logics.

Second, there is a dearth of research examining how institutional work within organizations contributes to change in field-level institutional logics (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Hampel et al., 2017; Zilber, 2013). Generally, institutional logics and institutional work scholarship has tended to operate in silos from each other. Yet Hampel and colleagues (2017, p. 573) argue that "the concept of logics could provide a way into understanding how actors work to shape large-scale, cross-field institutions," such as public safety. In line with a bidirectional approach to institutional change, individual actions can feedback to change institutional logics themselves, including their relationship to each other (Ocasio, 2023). In this chapter, I seek to bridge these fields of institutional research by focusing on the institutional work of social service providers that contribute to change in the institutional logics of public safety.

5.2 Brief Review of Four Institutional Logics of Public Safety

1. Punishment: Focuses on addressing failures and deviance of individuals and social groups through discipline and penalties, which may be tied to schemas of social group- and/or

identity-based deviance. Practices may involve social service partnerships/collaborations with police and other carceral entities, including in service delivery and data sharing.

2. Treatment: Care-based logic that focuses on shifts in individual behavior and outcomes, which may be tied to schemas of pathology and trauma. Practices address individual behaviors, attitudes, perceptions, knowledge, skills, and/or agency.

3. Prevention: Care-based logic that focuses on developing and providing social supports and community structures, which may be tied to social justice schemas of systemic inequity and divestment. Practices may involve removing barriers to affordable housing, desired education, civic participation, and long-term sustainable employment.

4. Repair: Care-based logic that focuses on establishing bonds and trust between members that share identities, experiences, and/or local geographies. Practices may involve community building, mentorship, and restorative justice.

5.3 Institutional Work Mechanisms

In this section, I conceptualize and provide empirical evidence for five inter-related mechanisms of institutional work that contribute to institutional change in public safety. These mechanisms are best understood as part of two broader groupings. The first three mechanisms—segmenting, bridging, and demarcating—are about managing boundaries between institutional logics and their associated actors in the organizational field. These three are largely inspired by Smets at al. (2015). The other two mechanisms—spreading and shaping—concern the expansion and modification of logics in the organizational field. Table 3 provides definitions for each mechanism. While distinct, service providers often used multiple mechanisms dynamically to respond to contextually specific opportunities and challenges in the field.

I begin the discussion of each mechanism by defining and situating them within institutional literature. I provide evidence for each mechanism, including their relationship to institutional change and logics of public safety. Based upon my findings, I provide conclusions that address how and why these mechanisms are important for institutional change in public safety and more generally.

Across all mechanisms, my analysis emphasizes the actions and beliefs of individual service providers. In line with much institutional work and street-level bureaucracy theory, I argue for viewing service providers as agentic (Lawrence et al., 2011; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012). Indeed, I found that institutional and organizational contexts can impact service providers' agency as embedded individuals by facilitating or hindering their institutional work. So, when applicable, I discuss how the field-level institutional context, including shifts in it, supported service providers' use of each mechanism. Further, I also highlight when organizational contexts held sway over facilitating the institutional work of service providers, such as when policies and programs provided structure to support or dictate individual actions.

Table 3 Mechanisms of Institutional Work

Mechanism	**Definition**
Segmenting	Individuals separate themselves from a relationship with other individuals associated with a conflicting logic
Bridging	Individuals form situational relationships with other individuals associated with a conflicting logic to obtain a benefit from utilizing that conflicting logic
Demarcating	Individuals protect against having too much or too little of a relationship with individuals associated with a conflicting logic
Spreading	Individuals expand the institutional logics to which they adhere throughout an organizational field where conflicting logics co-exist
Shaping	Individuals associated with one logic use that logic to modify the character of a conflicting logic

5.3.1 Segmenting

In institutional theory, segmenting is a mechanism used by organizations and individuals to manage conflicts between institutional logics. Logic segmentation occurs via organizations separating the structures and practices associated with different logics into different parts of an organization (e.g., organizational subunits; roles) (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007). Additionally, it can occur when individuals enact multiple logics in practice but divide the use of those logics to different tasks or roles as needed (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). With segmenting, organizations or individuals separate logics to avoid the potential conflicts caused by their interaction (Smets et al., 2015).

In this chapter, I conceptualize segmenting as involving relationships between individuals. I define segmentation as a mechanism whereby individuals separate themselves from a relationship with other individuals associated with a conflicting logic. This expands prior conceptualizations that might view segmentation in terms of separating care or punishment logics within various structures or individual roles within a service provider organization. A relational view of segmenting helps explain how social service providers separated themselves and their care-based logics from a punishment logic and the individuals most associated with punishment, the police. Social service providers did institutional work by meaningfully segmenting logics between professionals that might otherwise collaborate extensively as members of the same field.

Many service providers remarked that institutional shifts in the wider public safety field supported their segmentation of punishment from care logics. For instance, Tracy, an

administrator of community-based violence prevention programs in Minneapolis expressed that recent calls from community members for non-police community violence response programs were "indicative of the shift that we're seeing around an appetite from a lot of folks to have people who aren't armed law enforcement officers on the ground as the sole people responsible for keeping peace in community." For Tracy, this shift supported her organization's separation from the police when implementing violence prevention programming. George, a frontline violence prevention specialist who works with Tracy's organization, similarly stated that non-police response is important because "we damn sure don't want another George Floyd situation…Why send police to a situation where it don't even warrant a cop to even be there in the first place?" Rosemary, a City of Austin social services administrator, stated that the need to separate policing from social services was directly responsive to the post-George Floyd sociopolitical environment in which people were increasingly acknowledging that society has "historically relied on police to do what maybe wasn't in their wheelhouse." These examples are emblematic of interviews with administrators, frontline providers, activists, and even police officers who generally acknowledged that the current institutional shifts in public safety were partly about separating police out of service areas that are often better serviced by social service providers, including in mental health crisis response, violence prevention, and homeless outreach.

Service provider's discursive comparisons between themselves and police motivated their segmentation. Service providers viewed the role of policing as comparatively different from the roles and logics of service providers in the public safety field. In making such a comparison, Marcus, a hospital-based violence prevention provider, invoked the differences between a punishment logic and both treatment and prevention logics of public safety: "I don't see it as

we're holding people accountable or are enforcing the law (like police). I see us more as helping people come out of poverty, helping people understand what happened to them, helping them heal, like I said, socially, emotionally, and mentally, 'cause we're there to provide whatever the participant feels that they need." In a similar comparison, for Dave, a behavioral health crisis response administrator and frontline provider, the punishment logic of policing is mainly about securing the immediate physical safety of those in crisis; comparatively, a treatment-oriented approach assesses a client's basic needs like food and shelter, current mental functioning, and ability to care for oneself after a crisis has resolved.

Service providers' role comparisons were couched in practical, task-related differences. For instance, many service providers compared their own violence prevention work to the violence response work of the police. George compared service providers and police in such terms:

> We don't carry guns. We don't carry bullet proof vests. We don't have the authority to protect and serve. Our jobs are there to do is help to engage, deescalate, mediate, transmit situations that's happening before they even happen, so our presence being there is to prevent any of that from happening…The police is called after the danger is already done. We're there to prevent it.

Similarly, other service providers noted that they are equipped to handle different types of situations from police, like those involving non-violent crises in the community, whereas police are better equipped at responding to "imminent threats to life or property."

Amid these discursive comparisons, most providers saw a place—albeit a separate place—for both them and police in the public safety ecosystem. Service providers used various metaphors to explain the separate co-existence of police and service providers. These included

seeing public safety as a "continuum," "toolbox," "both/and," "Swiss army knife," or spectrum of "wrap-around services" in which the "right response"—be it police or service provider—could be used depending on the situation. As discussed in Chapter Four, these metaphors resonated with the "both/and" rhetoric used by political actors in the field who favored co-existence between police and social services, rather than police replacement. Tracy, who frequently used the toolbox metaphor, described segmentation in practical terms: "If there is a murder that happens and the murder suspect needs to be apprehended, you aren't gonna send a mental health practitioner or violence interrupter to apprehend that murder suspect…those two things (police and service providers) can co-exist and respond to things that they are appropriate to respond for." Thus, segmentation doesn't involve arbitrary separation between logics, but instead, keen awareness of the differences between logics and their appropriate place in the organizational field.

In practice, service providers often segmented in situations where the presence of conflicting logics would negatively impact the effectiveness of a care-based logic. For instance, Cheryl, a homelessness service administrator and former frontline provider, avoided calling the police because of their tendency to route her clients—whom often simply need help accessing a doctor—to a hospital or emergency room unnecessarily, and perhaps even involuntarily. In such cases, service providers avoided "bringing in any higher level of intervention" like the police unless violence were involved since police would compromise the goals of a treatment logic. In support of this assertion, a police officer involved in creating new mental health response systems in Minneapolis remarked that service providers are often better equipped to provide a lower level of intervention in mental health crises because clinicians "have access to more of the medical-type information that could tell them what a person's triggers might be or what

medications they should be on that they might not be taking—all sorts of medical-related things that we (police) have no access to and no knowledge of." According to this officer, police response to mental health crises could undermine the clinical needs of those in crisis and heighten "opportunities for critical incidents" where police use force. These findings point to the practical effectiveness of a treatment logic when segmented from the punishment logic of policing.

Organizational policies and programs can explicitly facilitate segmentation. For example, in both Minneapolis and Austin, behavioral health crisis response programs have been developed and funded with former police dollars to further care-based public safety. Emergency dispatch workers were trained to route calls that are explicitly related to mental health issues to crisis teams, whose frontline providers handle numerous calls without involving the police. A dispatch administrator in Austin explained that this system is intended to divert non-violent calls police often receive to non-police responders: "Some homelessness calls we receive where there's no violence. Why send police when the better option would be to send a community health paramedic and a (mental health) clinician?" City officials designed such policies to promote segmentation amid increasing public critique regarding police over-involvement in mental health crises.

Segmentation can also be built into organizational management structures. For example, in Minneapolis, the Department of Safety Promotion coordinates non-police violence prevention programs across the city by contracting with community-based organizations. In the context of promoting "alternative" public safety program, city council members and officials frequently pointed to the importance of separating police from violence prevention efforts. As such, the Department's administrators formally act as a "firewall" between the police and these

organizations. When police contact is necessary, only the Department's administrators engage them, which shields frontline providers from police and supports segmentation. This structure aims to solidify the boundaries between frontline providers and the police, enabling them to co-exist and fulfill their respective roles while minimizing direct contact. Given these findings, I conclude that segmentation often involves the administrative coordination of segmentation between individuals and the institutional logics associated with them.

So far, I have discussed segmentation primarily in terms of service providers separating themselves from police and a punishment logic. Yet, I also found that service providers segmented logics associated with individuals who are not police, yet associated with a conflicting logic. For example, two case managers, based in supportive housing facility for the formerly homeless, advanced a prevention logic by segmenting themselves from the facility's property managers. One case manager, Bridgette, equated property managers to the police because of their focus on enforcing rules and requirements among residents:

> We sit in on eviction appeals when property management says, "You've had too many lease violation."…we sit on those appeals, but we can't be the police and the helper at the same time…It's very important that in the residents' eyes that we're on their side…I don't want to be the rent police. For me it would hinder my role in that.

Providers' segmentation from other types of providers is emblematic of recent critiques regarding the perpetuation of punishment by social service system insiders (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2021).

In this section, I defined segmenting as a mechanism whereby individuals separate themselves from a relationship with other individuals associated with a conflicting logic.

Segmenting involved discursive comparisons between individuals, associated logics, and their separate roles and tasks in the public safety ecosystem. Further, frontline practices guarded care-based services from the potentially damaging impact of a conflicting logic, while organizational policies and structures also supported logic separation. Segmenting practices aligned with an institutional context that, post-George Floyd, highlighted the contrast between punishment, care-based logics, and the individuals associated with them.

5.3.2 Bridging

If segmenting is a mechanism for managing the conflict between logics, bridging is about finding the complementarity between logics that otherwise conflict (Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). Organizational hybridity research has emphasized how different institutional logics may productively associate, or even be synergistic, to create and maintain hybrid organizational forms (Battilana et al., 2017; Pache & Santos, 2013; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Yet, hybridity research can give the sense that organizations manage logic complementarity in highly strategic and organized ways, often through blending logics into organizational structures.

Instead, as Smets and colleagues (2015) argue, bridging is a dynamic process in which individuals combine logics situationally and complimentarily. For them, a bridge offers explanatory imagery: "Metaphorically, they (actors) walk along a bridge between two logics that, like banks of a river, are connected yet separate. In any given situation, actors can cross the bridge as far as they deem appropriate, without necessarily aiming for a midpoint between logics in each situation" (Smets et al., 2015, p. 961). With bridging then, individuals pursue practices that advance the goals of one logic by temporarily taking advantage of a competing logic. Logics maintain their general distinctiveness and competing nature but become situationally

complimentary to provide some benefit, such as resources or legitimacy (Purdy & Gray, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). In line with the relational lens of this chapter, I define bridging as a mechanism whereby individuals form situational relationships with other individuals associated with a conflicting logic to obtain a benefit from utilizing that conflicting logic. In an institutional context that increasingly favors separation between logics, bridging is a mechanism that maintains relationships between logics and their associated actors.

Within this context, I found that service provider participants engaged in situational relationships with police when it met the needs of their own care-based logics. Generally, service providers articulated their cautious restraint in consistently working with the police. They noted that this was particularly important due to an institutional context that increasingly favored separation between them and police. In fact, they discussed a wide variety of tools, like clinical assessments, de-escalation skills and relationship building practices, that usually allowed them to circumvent the need for police intervention with most clients.

Moreover, even when desirable, many service providers stated that it was difficult to maintain consistent relationships with police in the shifting institutional context. For example, Dave, a crisis response provider, told me that, in the aftermath of George Floyd's death, police officers were hesitant to collaborate in situations involving mental health, even though transport for involuntary hospitalization requires police involvement. Dave said this situation has "made it difficult the times that we know someone would benefit from going to the hospital…we don't have those options (police) available to us."

However, I found evidence that service providers occasionally called upon police in highly specific situations, such as to intervene if a client started exhibiting violent behaviors. In such a case of violence, segmentation from the police was seen as potentially harmful. Though,

bridging was not the mere substitution of a punishment logic when a care-based logic proves lacking. Instead, service providers called police when it could benefit their own care-based logics. Cheryl, a homeless street outreach service provider and administrator, discussed such a case:

> If somebody pulls out a weapon…this is the time we want the police to come in because we just wanna make sure physical safety is maintained for everyone involved, but once we're able to get that weapon away, we may need to help us transport this individual, but we don't want 'em to go to jail, it's not ultimately where they need to go…We need to ensure the safety of everyone in the space in a way that maybe a social worker perhaps has not been trained to do, but then once that's that safety's maintained, okay, hospital is the destination.

In this case, service providers decided to call police to intervene when they deemed a situation as high-risk for violence. But their ultimate goal was for a treatment logic to take over once police had ensured the physical safety of those involved. This example points to how service providers perceived and gained some complimentary value by utilizing a conflicting public safety logic.

Other service providers discussed similar cases of situationally calling upon police towards the ultimate benefit of care logics, including police removing weapons prior to clinical engagement or police facilitating transport and admissions to hospitals.[13] For Alex, a behavioral health crisis services administrator and provider, the treatment logic of a clinician can benefit at times from the punishment logic of police. Alex describes a situation where a police officer used his discretion to provide information on a client that she did not have: "The officer pulled me aside and said, 'I know he's calm and cooperative right now, but he's got an extensive criminal

[13] While many service providers view hospitals as a favorable alternative to incarceration, hospitalization, including involuntary transports, are closely linked to a punishment logic (Kim et al., 2021).

justice history, assault history, just very violent. I would not feel comfortable leaving you here.' That was eye opening for me…their expertise allows an opportunity for us all to be safe." Akin to prior examples, this example demonstrates how Alex saw a situational benefit in working with police; bridging to police was important to acquire information that could ensure her safety, without which she believed she could not do her job of providing treatment.

Alex's story is also notable because it reveals how bridging practices are undergirded by individual beliefs about policing. In our interview, she benignly described the information sharing scenario as "good partnership" with police that shows how all professionals have a "common goal" of safety. Alex did not express concerns regarding the police officer's information and its basis in a potentially biased criminal justice system. To back up this claim, several other service providers who engaged in bridging practices stated that the "different perspectives" offered by service providers and police can be leveraged towards the "common goal" of achieving an effective public safety system. These interviews were often marked by either critical silences about biases in criminal legal systems or overt expressions that biases are held by individual "bad apples," but not policing more systemically. Such beliefs minimized the conflicts between caring and punishment logics. Instead, by discursively promoting the complementarity between these logics, these beliefs facilitated bridging.

Based upon such examples, I find that bridging practices are supported by discursive beliefs about the complementarity between logics and associated individuals. Additionally, I also speculate that bridging may be further facilitated when individuals associated with one logic hold less critical, or even positive, beliefs of a conflicting logic. I will explore related beliefs about harm and care in terms of service provider-police collaboration in Chapter Six.

To clarify, I am not suggesting that bridging requires individuals to perceive logics as non-conflicting or predominantly similar.[14] Instead, I argue that differences between logics are, in fact, critical to bridging. Most service providers viewed logics and associated individuals as different and, as such, they engaged in segmenting practices that aligned with a shifting institutional context critical of policing. Bridging involves an acknowledgement of this difference *and* that a highly specific aspect of a conflicting logic can be used to benefit the goals of one's own logic. As such, service providers viewed a conflicting logic as complementarity in time-bound and task-based terms (e.g., police can remove a weapon prior to clinical intervention; police provide service providers with information on risk).

To support this claim further, I found evidence that police also engaged in bridging practices with service providers to benefit their own logic. Jessica, a police officer, partners with case managers conducting homeless street outreach, playing a non-enforcement role. She provides a "safety net" to case managers in "potentially dangerous" interactions with clients and connects homeless individuals to case management services, a benefit to care-based logics. However, she explained that her work can make future homeless ordinance enforcement by other police officers easier:

> Sometimes you go into a location, and you check on these people, find out who they are, what's their history, have they been connected to case management. Some of 'em just don't want it. At least we've done that, and again, I have that, I guess you'd say, benefit, of telling people, "Hey, you are gonna be asked to move." I think it helps those other officers that do have to come in. At least they've had some fair warning. I could say, "Hey, we've offered services. We've offered to do these things."

[14] That type of a situation might result in the hybrid-like blending of logics (Skelcher & Smith, 2015).

Here, Jessica benefits policing and punishment by providing a situational bridge to care-based logics. In lieu of enforcement, she offers referrals to homeless individuals for social supports that advance prevention and treatment logics. Yet, she concomitantly warns that enforcement is coming if services are not accepted. Future enforcement by other officers will only happen after care was already attempted. By serving as a bridge to caring logics, Jessica's actions benefit a punishment logic by providing caring cover to future police actions.

While I have so far largely emphasized the discretionary actions and beliefs of service providers, policies and programs within organizations can support bridging. To show this, I turn to immigration service organizations in Austin where treatment and punishment logics were bridged through a legal aid program.[15] According to Chris, an administrator at one organization, mental health is a particular challenge for their clients: "it's really hard to work on your mental health when you're literally worried every day about the hierarchy of needs, like if there's gonna be food on the table, a roof over your head, and then in our particular case, that you won't be separated from your family." To provide mental health counseling services to immigrant clients, Chris's organization received former police funding from the City of Austin under the umbrella of public safety.

To enact a treatment logic that supports mental health and asylum, Chris's organization bridged to the criminal legal system by participating in the U-Visa Program. Passed in 2000 by Congress, the U-visa allows individuals who have experienced a crime and can be helpful to law enforcement in investigating and prosecuting that crime to stay in the US when they otherwise would be ineligible to do so. In other words, law enforcement cooperation is traded for

[15] Another example includes the Prevention Program for Groups program in Minneapolis that address gang-related violence. The discussion of this community-based violence prevention program in the next chapter highlights the ways bridging is situationally accomplished to benefit a caring logic.

protection from immigration enforcement (Abbasi, 2020; Nanasi, 2017). Immigration service organizations in Austin help process U-visa applications and psychological evaluations are a main requirement of them. While providing mental health care, the counselors at Chris's organization "write up the psychological evaluations for us that we need for certain case types like asylum, like U-visa work." These evaluations are then used to process visas that allow clients to stay in the United States, but only if they agree to aid police and other legal entities in responding to crime. The U-Visa program enables Chris to provide the mental health outcomes that asylum can bring, but this care is only possible by bridging with carceral systems that further a punishment logic.

Finally, as with segmenting, service providers engaged in bridging logics with other individuals who are not police. With supportive housing for the formerly homeless, I previously illustrated how case managers segmented themselves from what they saw as the punishment-oriented logics of property managers. However, Nick, an administrator, describes how supportive housing also requires the enforcement that property managers provide: "In order for the program to be successful, property management has to sometimes be the bad guy. They have to enforce rules…it's a conflict of interest for us to also be the property manager." To support this statement, she told me a story of a resident who repeatedly physically attacked other residents. Staff tried to avoid eviction, but the violence was serious and made other residents feel unsafe. Service providers deemed that eviction enforcement by property management was necessary to avoid "the ripple effect amongst our community which is 'you guys don't care about our safety. Nobody feels safe, and nobody's gonna do anything about it." While case managers said they generally keep their distance from property management, for Nick to enact a prevention logic through communal supportive housing, she must situationally bridge to property

management at times to provide a safety benefit. This case of supportive housing demonstrates how segmentation and bridging mechanisms can work in parallel in the same setting (Smets et al., 2015).

To summarize, I defined bridging as a mechanism whereby individuals form situational relationships with other individuals associated with a conflicting logic to obtain a benefit from utilizing that conflicting logic. In alignment with their institutional context, I generally found that when service providers engaged with a punishing logic, many formed situational—not permanent—relationships with police or related individuals towards caring ends. I also found that individuals' beliefs about the complementarity or lack of conflict between logics, as well as policies and programs within organizations, supported bridging practices.

5.3.3 Demarcating

The segmenting and bridging mechanisms discussed so far are used by individuals to manage logic conflicts and complementarities. Yet, individuals may be cautious or resistant to segmenting or bridging logics too far. For instance, segmenting and bridging may run counter to policies, practices, and relationships in the institutional context. Further, when an institution is unsettled regarding the arrangement and dominance of field logics, segmenting might tip the balance of logics outside of the bounds of acceptable institutional norms, whereas bridging might run counter to emerging norms that challenge the legitimate relational ties between logics. Both situations can cause further conflicts to arise in an institutional context already rife with conflict.

Inspired by Gieryn's (1983) research on boundary work, Smet's and colleagues (2015, p. 961) conceptualize demarcating as "comprising any activities that protect against inadvertent logic blending or slippage by reasserting both the underpinning logics and referent audiences of bridged work practices." For them, demarcating is a response to bridging too far. I find their

conceptualization applicable to the field of public safety, but in addition to over-bridging, I extend it to include protections against over-segmenting of logics. In the case of over-bridging, individuals demarcate to ensure logics remain distinct (Smets et al., 2015), whereas with over-segmenting, demarcating ensures the one logic will not separate too far from other logics. I define demarcating as a mechanism whereby individuals already engaged in segmenting or bridging protect against having too much (i.e., bridging) or too little (i.e., segmenting) of a relationship with individuals associated with a conflicting logic.

With bridging, service providers formed situational relationships with police to advance their caring logics. However, they also protected against too much collaboration with police to protect the integrity of their own logics. For instance, Regina, a service provider engaged in community-based violence interruption, told me that the police will sometimes ask for help from violence interrupters like her to de-escalate low-risk conflicts among youth on the streets. This situational bridged relationship helps Regina to identify and intervene with youth that might require her and her team's "interruption work and trauma work" when police intervention is not necessary. However, organizational policy also dictates that police contact should be highly limited, a policy aligned with Regina's own beliefs about the efficacy of her work. As such, she circumscribes the boundaries of her relationship with police so that it does not compromise her efforts. She explained to me a scenario that would compromise the repair and treatment logics of violence prevention:

> We're not in tandem with them like (where the police say), 'Oh, yeah, go over there and find out that information on that young man. Give us the information so we can lock him up.' No, we don't do that. We absolutely, absolutely do not do that. We're not gonna be

> like, 'Yeah, hey, there's a suspect over here. Get this kid to open up to us—' we, definitely, would never do that. That's against the code of ethics for street work.

While violence interrupters like Regina will engage with police to reach youth who will benefit from care-based logics, they also put boundaries up with the police so that they are not used to advance a punishing logic or confused with the police by the public. When bridging, demarcating ensures that the distinctive integrity of care remains intact.

Demarcating involves walking a careful line between acquiring the benefits of bridging and not compromising the ability to care by over-bridging. For example, Paul provides hospital-based care to individuals who have experienced gun and group-based violence and who frequently are part of racially criminalized communities. He provides clients with treatment, like post-trauma support, and prevention supports, like rental assistance, to change both individual behaviors and environmental contexts that might contribute to violence. Due to prior experiences with police harm, Paul's clients typically "don't want anything to do with the police. When the police is in the room, they're (clients) tight-lipped." Paul said that clients are particularly less tolerant of Paul's interactions with the police after the murder of George Floyd.

Despite this, Paul chooses to form situational, bridging relationships with the police to get information that would be helpful to clients and ensure their "smooth transition" through criminal legal processes. This could include finding out whether the person who shot them has been apprehended, which could increase their sense of safety, and how to get their personal items back that may have been collected for evidence. However, to mitigate the risk of over-bridging, Paul minimizes the amount of information he shares with police about the client and works to reduce the visibility of any relationship to the police. Paul said that he and his colleagues "keep our distance. Yes, we want to speak with the police to get information, but we can't let the

patients see that going on, because then they completely shut down…we would like for them to trust us and know that if we are interacting with the police, it's all for your benefit, it's all for your good." Paul limits information sharing and the optics of such sharing to maintain trust with clients, which is ultimately required to provide care.

As with other mechanisms, demarcating practices can also be supported, or even dictated, by policy. As an example, the field of behavioral health crisis response frequently involves bridging practices between service providers and police. This can involve police removing weapons prior to clinical engagement or police providing clinicians with information on the prior criminal legal system involvement of someone in crisis. While describing these instances, Alex also noted that information sharing in reverse—from clinician to police—is both supported (bridging) and delimited (demarcating) by policy:

> Police will give us information that we ask for…for us on our end, for HIPAA, because, because we are responding in a crisis, we are allowed to provide sharing in the moment to help with that crisis that person is experiencing…We can't divulge too much. It has to be specific to what's happening in the crisis, and we can't give information related to substance use or HIV/AIDS…but in a crisis situation, we are able to communicate more openly because we're responding to a crisis.

In this case, policy creates openings for situational information-sharing relationships with police that may be viewed as necessary to further care. However, policy also dictates that information sharing can only go so far. Even if police officers find information on an individual's substance use history useful in a crisis, service providers must not put such information in the hands of the police. Such a policy protects service providers and clients from over-bridging and reinscribes the distinctiveness of each logic in play.

I now turn to demarcating as a practice that protects against over-segmenting. Across interviews, service providers viewed police and punishing logics as having distinct roles from service providers and caring logics in an inter-connected public safety system. Yet in this context, some service providers saw over-segmenting as dangerous because it can alienate them from police and the tasks they perform. Maria, an administrator and provider who works with homeless domestic violence survivors, suggested that over-segmenting can strain relationships with the police:

> Differences in approach can make it hard because I think as important it is for us to build trust and relationship with survivors, it is important for us to build trust and relationship with law enforcement because they are vital in responding to really dangerous and scary things…That difference in approach can erode some of that trust in relationship with law enforcement too because when they feel like they're responding or they're coming or they're there to help, and they feel that we're not necessarily encouraging a survivor to call the police, or follow through and talk to that detective, or file for a protective order.

For Maria, police are the only ones equipped to provide certain types of assistance for domestic violence survivors. She worried that the shifting institutional context that was more critical of policing would necessitate too much segmenting. In an inter-connected public safety system, over-segmenting can damage the ability for Maria and other service providers to utilize police for the assistance only they can provide.

In particular, many service providers told me that they engaged in demarcating when they perceived situations as too risky or violent to maintain separation from the police. As part of their everyday work, service providers often intervene to mediate conflicts or de-escalate crises. However, what do service providers do when their care-based practices fail? Many call upon

police as a “last resort” to intervene when segmenting and care-based logics failed in a situation. In other words, service providers ultimately required a punishment logic handle a situation. As an emblematic example, Nick told me that she calls upon police rarely and only after care was attempted:

> In terms of mental health crises, law enforcement is always used as a last resort. Probably a handful of times we’ve had to utilize law enforcement, and that’s just when the individual was imminently unsafe because of the crisis. We have exhausted all avenues to connect that person to the services and supports they needed, whether it was impatient, respite, or residential units.

Nick and many other service providers told me that they tried and failed to use care-based approaches in certain high-risk situations, leaving them no choice but to ask police to handle crisis situations.

Demarcating to protect against over-segmenting is different from bridging. With bridging, providers called upon police, for example, to remove a weapon or transport an individual, so that a caring logic could eventually take over. In contrast, with demarcating, service providers connected with police so a punishment logic would take over that could “handle risk” and “ensure safety.” As Charles, a homeless street outreach administrator explained, “we try to have police be a last resort because we know that it’s more than often gonna lead to jail, but sometimes that’s where it’s the best and safest place for the patient as well if they’re having an issue.” In such a case, service providers see a person in crisis as beyond their help. They connect with police across previously segmented boundaries so that a punishment logic can take over.

Even when service providers want to maintain already established separate boundaries with police, policy can dictate demarcation that hinders segmentation. Dave, a crisis response administrator and provider, described several "situations where police are not technically needed, but because of how the procedures and processes are written, they have to be there." For example, Dave may call EMS to transport an individual in crisis to a hospital by ambulance. In his view, the individual in crisis was at low risk for violence, but EMS policy required police presence. He worried that such situations "could retraumatize people who don't see police as support or helpful, or have had trauma from the police." Yet nevertheless, policy dictated police presence. Therefore, even when service providers attempt to maintain segmented boundaries with police, policy can facilitate demarcating that protects against too much separation between providers, police, and their respective logics.

In this section, I defined demarcating as a mechanism whereby individuals already engaged in segmenting or bridging protect against having too much (i.e., bridging) or too little (i.e., segmenting) of a relationship with individuals associated with a conflicting logic. For bridging practices, demarcating safeguards against a conflicting logic becoming too powerful in a situation where it could replace or nullify the influence of a care-based logic. For segmenting practices, demarcating prevents a conflicting logic from becoming too marginalized in an intertwined organizational ecosystem, particularly when that logic performs a central and unique function in comparison to other logics.

5.3.4 Spreading

As individuals manage boundaries between logics (i.e., segmenting, bridging, and demarcating), they may also work to expand their own respective logics in the organizational field. As discussed in Chapter Four, changes at the field-level increased support for public safety

alternatives and care-based logics. Prior studies on institutional change and complexity have highlighted how one institutional logic comes to replace another logic in a field (Battilana et al., 2017; Greenwood et al., 2011). Organizations may seek to "transform" the organizational field in which they are embedded by replacing a dominant logic with their own (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Purdy & Gray, 2009). Yet, wholesale logic replacement is only one possible goal, which may not be possible or even desirable by some organizations or individuals. Alternatively, individuals may seek to increase the legitimacy and usage of their logics towards greater balance with conflicting and co-existing logics. In either case, individuals spread logic-associated practices, norms, and culture in fields where they have been previously marginalized.

I define spreading as a mechanism whereby individuals expand the institutional logics to which they adhere throughout an organizational field where conflicting logics co-exist. In public safety, many individuals, including activists, seek the wholesale replacement of policing and punishment logics. Yet, as discussed previously, many service providers took a "both/and" approach to public safety in which police and social service alternatives could co-exist in different roles. In both cases, care-based logics require legitimacy and uptake to survive. Amid field-level institutional change processes, social service providers engaged in a range of practices to spread and de-marginalize their logics of public safety. I found that service providers engaged in three general spreading practices: 1) spreading awareness of logics; 2) spreading logics throughout material resources; and 3) spreading the direct usage of logics by other individuals. I will discuss these in turn.

First, service providers worked to spread awareness. Many did so with the expressed purpose of increasing the legitimacy of their care-based logics for solving critical public safety-related issues. Linda, a city administrator and service provider, saw an opportunity to do so amid

field-level institutional changes in public safety. She was tasked by city council with designing new violence prevention programming with former police dollars. In spreading awareness of her programs and approach, she explained that she saw her role as

> cultural shaping…to deepen the conversation on what we call violence, who are we identifying as violent, to understand the systemic nature of how some communities may experience violence or identify it as violent and to elevate that understanding and awareness to be able to change the language and culture and rhetoric around violence and public safety…it's to really impact the entire city.

For Linda, building awareness of the root, systemic causes of violence engenders an understanding of how violence is related to "trauma, stress, and mental health" rather than some intrinsic criminality. With this understanding, public safety norms can spread and shift us away from punishment-oriented approaches and towards treatment-based care.

Other service providers similarly engaged in awareness-building campaigns, arguing that they could temper dissent for care-based public safety approaches and eventually increase buy-in and legitimacy. For example, I encountered an organization that provides permanent supportive housing to homeless individuals. Nick, an administrator, explained to me that his organization faced "not-in-my-backyard" pushback from local residents who incorrectly perceived the housing complex as a transitional homeless shelter. In response, he aimed to undertake an awareness-building "campaign of what permanent supportive housing is and how it can help the community as a whole, and more importantly, what it's not." Such a campaign would both correct misperceptions of his organization and its service users and communicate the value of providing supportive housing, which combines both prevention and treatment logics, for overall public safety.

Second, service providers worked to spread logics throughout material resources, including city budgets, grant opportunities, and programs. Among their many roles, social service professionals advocate for policy change and funding (Mosley, 2020). In both Minneapolis and Austin, providers supported localized police defunding and social service reinvestments processes that were part of field-level institutional change efforts. For example, service providers, along with city staff and local activists, held formal committee appointments on Austin's Reimagining Public Safety Task Force, which made recommendations to City Council on the potential social service uses of former police funds. Task force members recommended that public safety-related budgets should divest from punishment and policing and rather support a variety of service areas that could advance a care-based vision of public safety, including mental health, homelessness and housing, and community-based violence prevention, among others. The City Council incorporated some recommendations in future budgets, while the City Manager directed staff throughout city offices to conduct ongoing analyses of each recommendation's feasibility and possible implementation.

As part of this, service providers also engaged in spreading as care-based logics moved from City Council budgets to implementation by city staff. For example, when the Austin City Council announced an immediate defunding of police in summer 2020, service providers successfully advocated for some of this money to be reinvested in harm reduction-based substance use treatment. Yet, according to Sophia, a nonprofit administrator of substance use services, city staff "banned some harm reduction practices" from grant funding eligibility. In response, Sophia and service provider allies launched an advocacy campaign to educate city staff on the value of harm reduction, resulting in city staff reversing their decision. In doing so, service providers ensured that the logics they successfully spread at the city council-level would

also be spread among the material resources stewarded by city staff through city-level policies and programs.

Finally, service providers worked to spread the direct usage of logics by other individuals. Service providers spread logics by using and training individuals who could implement a logic in frontline service provision and represent the logic's effectiveness in advancing public safety.[16] In respective service areas, this often meant that the individual had "lived experience" with racialized violence, mental illness, or homelessness. In the case of community-based violence prevention, recruiting and training these individuals was a formal part of the program's logic model. Program manager Regina sought to advance repair and treatment through people "who are able to build relationships, or who already have relationships with individuals in the community who are causin' some problems or maybe are gang or clique-affiliated…somebody that has turned their life around and now is committed to making the change." Regina tasks these individuals to use their experiences with violence to build relationships with and provide individualized support to those at risk for violence in the community. According to a city administrator in Minneapolis, these individuals are called "credible messengers" because they have "the credibility of people who have lived experience to do this work." They serve as a bridge between the city's violence prevention goals and the implementation of those goals in the street.

[16] In institutional research, such individuals may be conceptualized as "institutional carriers" who represent, identify with, and enact scripts associated with institutional logics (Greenwood et al., 2011; Zilber, 2002). Recent research on inhabited institutions has combated conceptualizations of carriers as script-bearing actors that deterministically enact logics. Instead, some scholars argue that we should view individuals as creatively adapting logics through interactions with others in complex institutional and organizational contexts (Binder, 2007; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Yet, even as interactions and adaptations complicate our understanding of carriers, it may still be true that individuals seek to create or utilize other individuals who can spread logics throughout a field in ways that align with those logics. I found that service providers spread logics through such means.

Due to their lived experiences, service providers saw these individuals as uniquely well-positioned to spread logics in practice and advance a more caring version of public safety. Bridgette supports the mental health of formerly homeless individuals by sharing experiences regarding what helped her through her own lived experience with homelessness: "It could be a little snippet, a little part of your life like 'there was a time when I was unemployed because I had to go to the mental hospital, and it was difficult to go back to that job…these are the things that helped." Similarly, in working with gun violence survivors, Paul, a front-line violence prevention specialist with lived experience, says he's been a "positive cancer in that room (with the client) to where it just spreads, and it changed their whole mentality…just being a person that grew up in the exact same neighborhood that has a positive outlook…and saying you've experienced this, but there's still a way for you to change your life around." Paul, Bridgette, and other frontline providers take the time to build relationships and trust with clients, and once built, they share their experiences about how the care-based approach they are offering once helped them.

Service providers also spread logics by creating new direct users of logics. A crisis response organization in Minneapolis sought to train 1000 people to de-escalate mental health crises so calls to 911 could be avoided. To create a butterfly effect of care-based logic usage, they also encouraged trained individuals to train others in their neighborhoods.

Further, some service providers argued that training was intended to create deeper effects than the instrumental usage of logics; it was meant to change a person. George described a client who was so inspired and impacted by the violence prevention support he received that "he ended up becoming a violence interrupter with us…everything that we were doing, he became a part of. He ended up giving that testimony one day in a meeting, saying that if we didn't come along that

day he probably wouldn't be here to tell the story." In such a case, new users are trained, but also become socialized to identify with and represent logics through their interactions with other logic users (Tyllström, 2021). Using care-based approaches is not just something one does, "it's who you become," according to Sally, a violence prevention administrator. By training and socializing new users to advance caring public safety, service providers envisioned creating a broader "ecosystem" of logic users that supported new cultural norms of care-based public safety. Service users become service providers that spread logics and associated practices of care.

In this section, I defined spreading as a mechanism whereby individuals expand the institutional logics to which they adhere throughout an organizational field where conflicting logics co-exist. Service providers' institutional work spread logics through increased awareness, material resources, and direct usage. Spreading strategies contributed to the expansion of logics throughout public safety fields, not only contributing to their use, but also their broader normalization as legitimate approaches to achieving public safety.

5.3.5 Shaping

While uncovering the spreading practices of service providers, I discovered that some providers not only worked to expand their own care-based logics, but also to shape conflicting logics in the institutional field. Some service providers worked to make the punishment-based practices of police less punishing and more like their own care-based practices. For instance, in the field of youth-based violence prevention, a frontline provider told me his organization teaches police "how to build relationships (with youth) so they can help to defuse versus taking things to the extreme, which is handcuffs, which is court." In this case, police are trained to modify their punishment-based practices with a community-based reparative approach.

I consider such practices as a sub-form of spreading called shaping. I define shaping as a mechanism whereby individuals associated with one logic use that logic to modify the character of a conflicting logic. The term shaping connotes an alteration to an existing logic, rather than replacement. Shaping assumes that institutional logics have no timeless, essentialist character that is resistant to change. Rather, logics are malleable (Gümüsay et al., 2020), and shaping may either attenuate or amplify how they manifest. Service providers who interact with the police gave multiple examples of how they use their care-based logics to shape policing and punishment. They articulated how their shaping efforts were heavily supported by their organizational contexts in which care-based logics dominated.

To illustrate, I turn to a mental health-focused community court. These courts typically handle low-level cases and provide community-based services and alternatives to incarceration to service users and justice-involved individuals. They are hybrid environments characterized by both legal and social service practices and occupied by police officers and social workers. The community court under consideration is a primary entity within the city to achieve a more care-based vision of public safety. To do so, administrative staff have transitioned the court over time into primarily a service-based organization that provides mental health treatment, case management, and housing services in lieu of punishment and incarceration.

Within this environment, service providers have shaped the practices of police officers to be less punishing and more in line with the treatment logic that is dominant in the organization. To shape police behaviors, Robert, an administrator, explained that providers worked "to educate the staff, including people who are not clinicians around de-escalation…It's taken us many years to develop a culture around de-escalation and the importance of service individuals where they are." Within this culture, police are still expected to protect the court's staff, but to do so by

relying upon de-escalation techniques rather than arrest. In other words, providers shape police officers' safety and security function to be less punishing and more caring. According to Robert and other administrators, their successful shaping of police is facilitated by service providers direct, ongoing interactions with police officers, as well as the treatment logics dominant position within the court's organizational context.

Further, Robert told me that shifts in the broader institutional environment after George Floyd's murder have made it more difficult for the court's police to resist shaping: "Unfortunately (with) the situation with the protests that occurred here, attention was brought to police officers' response to situations. I think that there's such a huge focus on the de-escalation that we've been talking about that they have no choice but to embrace that across the board." In this case, field-level institutional changes supported shaping.

Other service providers saw organizational contexts dominated by care-based logics as places amenable to shaping and they sought to create them. For example, I spoke to several service providers who conduct violence prevention programming in schools. These violence prevention specialists, including Adam, described how successful providers intervene in schools' "ecosystems" to "build the dynamics of the culture of the whole school." These providers advocate for school policies that support repair and treatment logics over punishment (e.g., prioritizing restorative justice circles in lieu of suspension, arrest, or school resource officer intervention). Providers also built relationships with school administrators and teachers to increase buy-in for their approach and conduct trainings with all school staff, including police embedded in schools, to facilitate care-based approaches to safety. Speaking to the importance of buy-in and school leadership, Adam said that when a supportive "administrator left and they didn't use the (care-based) process, how it was built to be used…within one year it was a like a

rock wall at the door" and the school became unwelcome to their approach. Within a more supportive ecosystem with broad buy-in and explicit policies that support care-based work, care may become a more normalized logic for achieving safety that facilitates the spreading of care-based practices to individuals embedded within. However, this suggestion requires further research.

In contexts not dominated by care, service providers may shape a punishment logic less successfully. For instance, evaluations of Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training, which is designed to reduce police use of force against individuals involved in a mental health emergency, have shown CIT does not reduce use of force, injury, or arrests (Rogers et al., 2019). These trainings often take place in organizational contexts dominated by police and a punishment-based logic (e.g., police departments), which may be one factor contributing to the maintenance of punishment.

Sally, whose organization was recruited by one city to provide community relations trainings to police after the murder of George Floyd, shared that training police is challenging without changes to their organizational culture and context: "It's so hard (trainings) because police departments have their own culture, and it's like how do you break this culture, which is in all police departments? It's like a gang to me… I guess the policies that the officers have, they really don't want to change a lot of them." In such contexts, police are resistant to shaping. Mental health and related care-based trainings encourage the use of care as a supplement to punishment-based practices, rather than replace or substantially shape them to be different. Instead of shaping, such contexts may facilitate the institutional change mechanism of "grafting" whereby individuals "integrate alternative(s)…with existing practices rather than…replace them" (Purdy & Gray, 2009, p. 368).

Shaping is not logic replacement, however. Service providers who shaped punishment were attempting to create a more caring version of policing, something that many activists, including abolitionists, eschew (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022; Schenwar & Law, 2020). Perhaps most tellingly, one service provider shared that she views her youth mentorship work as holding the potential to shape policing in the long-term: “We’re helping create what could be the future generation of police officers that are going to be different and not like the officers we have now…[they] are going to think differently and not have the same frame of mind.” Such shaping does not replace police or punishment but may instead contribute to its maintenance through a more caring visage.

In this section, I defined shaping as a sub-form of spreading that involves individuals associated with one logic using that logic to modify the character of a conflicting logic. Shaping was facilitated by the dominance of these logics in organizations where shaping takes place. Recognizing the importance of context, service providers actively worked to foster organizational environments conducive to shaping.

5.4 Discussion

Service providers contributed to institutional change in public safety using five mechanisms of institutional work. Providers used these mechanisms both to manage boundaries between themselves and individuals associated with conflicting logics—most often the police and punishment—and to expand and modify logics in the organizational field. The five mechanisms observed here can help us understand questions regarding shifts in the relationship between institutional logics and those associated with them that are core to carceral disruption efforts:

- Segmenting: How do service providers separate themselves from the police and punishment?
- Bridging: How do service providers maintain collaborative ties to the police and punishment, while still being sensitive to a context of carceral disruption?
- Demarcating: How do service providers protect themselves from too much or too little relationship with police and punishment?
- Spreading: How do service providers distribute their logics and practices?
- Shaping: How do service providers directly influence police and punishment?

These mechanisms contribute to urgent discussions taking place among social workers and other service providers regarding their appropriate relationship to police and carceral systems (Abrams & Dettlaff, 2020; Fixler et al., 2023; Jacobs et al., 2021; Murray et al., 2023). These findings point to the fact that, while field-level changes in public safety may be incremental as discussed in Chapter Four, service providers undertake important actions that are consequential to a key aspect of institutional change: the shifting relationships between public safety logics and the individuals associated with them.

Theoretically, these findings contribute to nascent research that explores how institutional work supports bottom-up change in the relationship between institutional logics (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Hampel et al., 2017). Marrying these two perspectives underscores how the institutional work of service providers is based in distinct approaches regarding how and by whom public safety should be achieved (i.e., logics and their representatives). For instance, the institutional work of segmenting helps us understand how service providers restrict their collaborations with police and punishment to further the effectiveness of treatment. Further, the institutional work of shaping helps us understand how service providers attempt to alter the

nature of policing. As primary implementers of care-based public safety services, service providers' usage of these mechanisms impacts the relationship between and character of public safety logics.

Findings also contribute to extant literature on specific institutional work mechanisms for managing conflicting logics. I observed the segmenting, bridging, and demarcating mechanisms found in prior research (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets et al., 2015). However, my findings amend prior conceptualizations of demarcating to include protection against both over-bridging and over-segmenting (Smets et al., 2015). Moreover, these strategies are connected and may be used concurrently in a situation. For example, we saw that Paul, a hospital-based violence prevention specialist, mostly segments from the police, but also engages in situational bridging with them to gather information helpful to clients. He then also demarcates his relationship to police to avoid over-bridging by minimizing the amount of information sharing that happens.

I also observed spreading and shaping mechanisms. As such, I find that institutional work is not only used to manage the boundaries between, but also to expand the use of, logics. Further, these two broader groupings of mechanisms work in parallel and may even influence each other. For example, spreading a logic may increase its uptake and legitimacy in a contested institutional field, which may foster an institutional environment that eases further segmenting. More research is needed to understand the relationship between the mechanisms for managing the boundaries between logics and mechanisms that expand the use of logics. For example, how can service providers segment themselves from police and punishment while also working to shape policing

culture and practices? While these mechanisms are seemingly at odds, future research may reveal surprising compatibilities.

Across all mechanisms, the institutional environment affected service providers' institutional work. On one hand, service providers reported that the institutional environment supported their use of certain mechanisms. For instance, providers noted that segmenting was in line with the shifting institutional context that supported greater separation between themselves and the police. On the other hand, institutional change efforts at the field-level provided direct opportunities for service providers to employ some mechanisms. For example, service providers spread care-based logics through their direct involvement as advocates in efforts to reimagine public safety in each city or through training "credible messengers" in programs funded with former police dollars. As the institutional context can be a crucial enabler or constraint on service provider's institutional work, it is important that service providers—as advocates—support change efforts at the field-level that align with their care-based goals.

Organizational contexts also impacted all institutional work mechanisms. As is well-known in street-level research (Brodkin, 2011; Hasenfeld, 2010), organizational policies and programs can shape, provide support for, or even dictate the actions of service providers. As shown in this chapter, this can happen in multiple ways. First, policy can create organizational structures that segment police from frontline service providers, as was the case with administrative "firewalls" between police and violence prevention service providers in Minneapolis. Second, policy can also set limits on service providers' direct interactions with police. For example, in the case of demarcating against over-bridging, policy set limits on how much sensitive information about clients that service providers could share with police. Third, mechanisms can be embedded within organizational programs. In the case of U-visas, the

program required bridging between service providers and the criminal-legal system. Or, in the case of community-based violence prevention, the program's logic model required service providers to spread care-based logics by training "credible messengers." Finally, service providers who shaped the practices of police officers reported that organizational culture was a particularly important factor in either supporting or mitigating their ability to shape effectively. While the findings of this chapter emphasize the actions and beliefs of individual service providers, organizational policies, programs, and cultures certainly played a role in facilitating or limiting the use of institutional work mechanisms. Practically, social service administrators can develop and implement policies, programs, and cultures within their organizations that support the use of these mechanisms. Future empirical research can explore the extent to which service provider's use of these mechanisms requires supporting organizational policies, programs, and cultures.

Unlike prior research on the mechanisms of institutional work, I apply a relational lens that views these mechanisms as operating across the organizational field. A relational approach conforms to a view of institutional change as taking place in inhabited and interactive fields (Binder, 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011; Topal, 2015; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). This approach reveals how the institutional work of individuals contributes to institutional change by managing their relationships with others who are associated with conflicting logics. Additionally, in contrast to scholarship on relational work, which tends to focus on how actors form collaborations to advance institutional work (Cloutier, 2016; Hampel et al., 2017), my findings also underscore how delimiting collaboration can be important to institutional work. In the field of public safety, service providers actively restricted the relationships between their care-based logics and punishment by segmenting, bridging, or demarcating their collaborations with police.

A relational lens helps us observe the sociopolitical consequences of these mechanisms. For example, bridging presents a unique challenge to institutional change in public safety that involves separating logics of punishment from those of care. Bridging practices—often hidden within organizational black boxes—may run counter to the care-based public safety policy goals supported by anti-oppressive social movements and activists. Even as logics and the relational boundaries between service providers and police are segmented, service providers may still see benefit in working with conflicting logics at times. So, in a practical sense, bridging helps explain some of the ongoing relational ties between service providers, police, and their associated logics amid an institutional context that more generally emphasizes firmer boundaries between them.

In this chapter, I discussed five mechanisms of institutional work used by service providers that mediate institutional change in public safety. These mechanisms impact the relationships between service providers, police, and their associated logics. Yet underneath the use of these mechanisms are service providers' beliefs about how and by whom public safety should be achieved. In the next chapter, I focus on such beliefs about the appropriate relationship between service providers and police. Specifically, within an institutional context that favors greater independence between service providers and police, I focus on beliefs about how independence engenders harm or care in specific public safety-related service areas. These beliefs undergird decisions about service provider-police collaborations (e.g., segmenting, bridging, demarcating), and affect the legitimacy of social service organizations and their case-based approaches to public safety.

Chapter 6 Carceral Autonomy: The Influence of Service Provider Beliefs about Police Collaboration on Institutional Change in Public Safety

6.1 Introduction

Both policing and more care-based public safety alternatives are vying for legitimacy amid institutional change in public safety. Novel and marginalized social service approaches require legitimacy to survive as viable alternatives to policing and carceral approaches (Johnson et al., 2006; Schoon, 2022). Yet, if institutional change in public safety involves a weakening in police legitimacy (Wright II et al., 2022), care-based alternatives that collaborate with police may be challenged in gaining legitimacy themselves. This issue is of particular concern as social service organizations may advance alternatives in fields of public safety with existing and ongoing organizational ties between carceral and social service systems (Simes & Tichenor, 2022). As we saw in Chapter Four, public opinion about policing and public safety issues greatly influenced the actions of individuals making field-level change in public safety. Yet, as service providers and related individuals in public safety design policy and deliver services, they make their own administrative and discretionary decisions over policy implementation and police collaborations. As such, their perception of what counts as legitimate care-based approaches to public safety, including if and how they collaborate with the police, affects what public safety looks like on-the-ground and is therefore of central concern here.

This chapter explores beliefs about service provider and police relationships amid carceral disruption. It asks: How are institutional changes in public safety influenced by service provider's beliefs about their appropriate relationship with police? I argue that the shifts in

institutional logics of public safety discussed in previous chapters also involve shifts in service provider's beliefs regarding the relationship between police and service providers, including how greater autonomy between the two groups engenders harm or care in comparative public safety service areas. These beliefs inform their perceptions regarding the legitimacy of social service organizations and their care-based approaches to public safety, which influences collaborations between police and care-based service providers and among service providers themselves.

This chapter contributes to street-level bureaucracy theory by understanding how service provider's beliefs affect relationship dynamics between service providers and police involved in the field of public safety. Street-level frameworks examine how individuals that implement policy, including social workers and police officers, adapt to their social and organizational contexts (Lipsky, 2010). Street-level research explores "the systemic features of their [service providers] work life that shape their practices, how routine practices create policy, and the content of policy as they have produced it" (Brodkin, 2008, p. 326). Yet, this research typically studies the interaction between professionals and their clients. By focusing on the relationship between service providers and police, I extend theory by instead focusing on inter-professional relationships.

Legitimacy is a core resource cultivated by organizations through their relationships. Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions." Scholars generally view legitimacy as central to the success and survival of organizations (Johnson et al., 2006). For an organization to survive or thrive, it must gain legitimacy from an audience that can confer it. Organizations conform to the expectations of an audience to which it holds a positive relationship to be considered legitimate

(Schoon, 2022).[17] Influential neo-institutional scholarship has viewed organizational conformity to taken-for-granted societal norms as a key form of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2013), yet what individuals consider a legitimate norm can be various. Indeed, in the context of institutional change, this chapter views norms regarding public safety approaches and police collaboration as in flux. Scholars that study legitimacy as a process (sometimes called legitimation) view legitimacy as interactively contested through relationships between actors that seek legitimacy and audiences that confer it, often involving multiple audiences with different notions of what counts as legitimate or illegitimate (Johnson et al., 2006; Schoon, 2022; Suddaby et al., 2017).

I propose that that the *carceral autonomy* of social service organizations, their providers that design and implement services, and their care-based approaches to public safety impacts perceptions of what counts as legitimate public safety alternatives in times of carceral disruption. I conceptualize carceral autonomy as how directly or indirectly independent social service organizations, providers, and care-based approaches are from carceral systems, including the police and other carceral entities.[18] A social service organization, provider, or care-based approach that collaborates extensively would be considered to have low carceral autonomy. Carceral autonomy can be empirically observed through the relationships between and practices of social service and carceral systems, which can shift over time. For example, it can be observed through macro-level policies that mandate cooperation between police and service providers,

[17] Legitimacy is conceptually related to the less theorized concept of institutional trust (Lounsbury, 2023).
[18] Carceral autonomy is indebted to Kim's (2020, p. 256) elaboration of the *carceral creep*, whereby the boundaries between the domestic violence movement and the carceral state dissolved through increasingly formal collaborations between movement-related organizations and law enforcement. Whereas carceral creep emphasizes the merging of service provision and law enforcement, I use carceral autonomy to emphasize independence in these relationships. The focus on autonomy highlights how legitimated norms and practices of police-service provider collaboration are contested or not presumed in times of carceral disruption.

mezzo-level administrative decisions concerning collaborations between service providers and police, and formal or informal street-level activity among providers and police on-the-ground.

Yet, evaluations of carceral autonomy across all these levels--what people *think* of autonomy--are subjective and affect whether social service organizations, providers, and care-based approaches are seen as legitimate or not. In this chapter, I find that carceral autonomy was primarily evaluated by research participants through two inter-related dimensions: 1) *harm mitigation*, or how associations with carceral systems hinder or facilitate the perpetuation of harm by the carceral system, police, or a social service organization and providers; and 2) *care effectiveness*, or how associations with carceral systems hinder or facilitate an organization's or provider's ability to advance caring public safety—as opposed to punishing—in its service area. Importantly, participants evaluated these dimensions differently (e.g., some see associations with police as mitigating harm, while others see it as harmful), which informed their perceptions of social services organizations, providers, and related care-based approaches as legitimate or not. Finally, I address various contextual factors in the public safety field that constrained the manifestation of these dimensions, including type of audience, participants' beliefs about police harms, and state and local policy. In times of carceral disruption, examining carceral autonomy and its inter-related dimensions allows researchers to capture how perceptions about legitimate approaches to public safety impact the ties (or lack thereof) between social service and carceral systems as social service organizations and providers design and implement public safety programs.

Central to these findings is a view of legitimacy as relational, contested, and with multiple audiences-as-sources of legitimacy. Both the legitimacy of police, which has weakened in part due to the spotlight placed on police violence by the Black Lives Matter movement

(Wright II et al., 2022), and public safety alternatives to policing are in a moment of contestation. Service providers' evaluations regarding the legitimacy of care-based alternatives will partly depend on the audience and their expectations they have in mind (Schoon, 2022). The findings of this chapter reveal key dimensions around which the legitimacy of care-based alternatives is assessed, but the evaluations of these dimensions matter differently depending on audience.

I organize my findings into three case studies in three service areas—behavioral health crisis response, community-based violence prevention, and homeless street outreach—that illuminate relationship dynamics amidst institutional change in public safety (see Table 4). These service areas were primary beneficiaries of former police funds in Minneapolis and Austin. In addition to service area, these cases vary in terms of the type of relationship shift between service providers and police. The role of, and relationship to, police and carceral systems are central to institutional change in public safety in each city. Cases illustrate various shifts among service providers regarding collaborations with police, which allows me to illuminate how relationship dynamics matter amid carceral disruption.

Table 4 Cases by Service Area, Role, and Relationship-related Dynamic

Service Area	**Role of Service Provider in Comparison to Police**	**Primary Dynamic in Shifting Relationship Between Police and Service Providers**
Behavioral Health Crisis Response	Alternative to Police	Finding the right amount of police and service provider autonomy
Community-Based Violence Prevention	Dissimilar to Police	Managing breakdowns in existing police and service provider autonomy
Homeless Street Outreach	Oppositional to Police	Managing the need to build up police and service provider autonomy

First, the case of behavioral health crisis response involved research participants evaluating the right amount of collaboration between police and service providers; participants compared different response programs in terms of how various levels of carceral autonomy would impact their care effectiveness and harm mitigation. Yet, in a shifting public safety landscape, all care-based providers viewed service providers' role in response programs as an alternative to police. This case reveals the relationship dynamics in creating a non-police crisis alternative when service providers may or may not consider police collaboration essential to that service, but care-based providers replace police crisis response roles in most instances. Second, in community-based violence prevention, care-based providers take on dissimilar roles to the police in the public safety ecosystem. While they are generally expected to have little to no direct collaboration with the police, events took place during the study that unsettled the pre-existing independence between police and service providers. This case illuminates relationship dynamics when established boundaries between police and service providers breakdown while providers pursue their dissimilar roles. Finally, the case of homeless street outreach illustrates dynamics when police-service provider collaboration is no longer possible and service providers must establish greater autonomy from police. While outreach service providers had a history of collaborating with police to varying degrees, collaboration became nearly impossible amid a homeless encamping ban that placed service providers in an oppositional role to the police in the public safety ecosystem. In total, I discuss these three relationship-role combinations to show how various relationships with police were intertwined with perceptions about the legitimacy of social service organizations, providers, and care-based approaches amid institutional change in public safety.

Examining three cases that vary by service area and relationship responds to pressing concerns in social work about service providers' appropriate relationship to policing in key service areas. This approach also demonstrates that social service organizations and providers are not autonomous individuals, but rather cohere as members of an inter-related organizational field of public safety through relational dynamics. Ultimately, this chapter reveals how carceral autonomy matters for institutional change efforts, including the legitimacy of social service organizations, providers, and their diverse approaches to pursuing public safety.

6.2 Cases

6.2.1 Case 1: Behavioral Health Crisis Response

Like many cities in the United States, in Minneapolis, police are the default responders to a variety of calls made by residents to 911 emergency dispatch. Police acting as first responders to mental health-related emergencies has increased over the past several decades due to a variety of factors, including deinstitutionalization of psychiatric hospitals and budgetary cuts to health and social services (Shapiro et al., 2015). However, cities and counties have developed alternatives to police-only behavioral health crisis response, recognizing both the lack of mental health expertise held by police officers and the criminalization and police violence perpetuated against those experiencing mental health crises. Alternatives to police-only models include co-response programs, where a police officer and mental health professional both respond to crises, and non-police community-based crisis response, such as Eugene, Oregon's CAHOOTS program, which pairs a mental health crisis worker and medic.

Minneapolis developed a co-response program after the 2018 police shooting and death of Travis Jordan, who was experiencing a mental health crisis. Soon after, the City of Minneapolis formed a workgroup to investigate the possibility for non-police response in the

city. This work gained newfound importance and leverage following the 2020 murder of George Floyd and related uprisings, during which activists and other community members called for non-police alternatives to behavioral health crisis response. As part of Minneapolis's broader efforts to reimagine public safety, the workgroup presented a variety of recommendations to city council, including the development of a community-based non-police crisis response to be dispatched through 911 and new mental health training to 911 dispatch staff charged with relaying calls to the appropriate first responder (i.e., police, mental health, emergency medical services [EMS], fire).

The creation of a non-police response through 911 was an innovation to the city's existing co-response program, as well as to the county's non-911 behavioral health crisis response system, called Respond, to which Minneapolis residents already had access. The pilot for the new program was funded out of the police budget during 2021 Minneapolis budget negotiations, which underscores its intended focus on non-police response. With funding, the city launched a Request for Proposals, seeking to contract with an existing community-based mental health organization to meet the city's goal "to give people experiencing a mental health crisis an alternative to police that can properly assess their needs [and] provide appropriate care/support while avoiding unnecessary hospitalization and criminalization." The city selected the BIPOC-led[19] nonprofit organization ConnectToCare (CTC)—whose mission is to center BIPOC and marginalized community members in their work—with the hope "to build trust with the public" while "reducing violent interactions with the police." CTC did not have a history of active police collaborations and would develop a new behavioral health crisis response program.

[19] BIPOC refers to Black, Indigenous, and People of Color. When a study participant used more specific racial or ethnic identifiers, I do as well.

Participants comparatively evaluated the carceral autonomy of CTC and its competing crisis response programs, including Respond. These comparisons centered on perceptions of harm mitigation. Framed by contentious discussions to reimagine public safety after the murder of George Floyd, participants from many behavioral health crisis response programs believed that police involvement in mental health response should be minimized or eliminated to mitigate the potential harms caused by police in mental health. Participants evaluated the potential of organizations and providers to mitigate harm based upon how extensive organizations and providers collaborated with the police.

City staff initially viewed Respond as the likeliest vendor for its new non-police response program, but they discovered through data collection and community engagement efforts that Respond collaborated too extensively with the police. Respond called upon police frequently for situations that instead could de-escalated by a trained service provider. These concerns had some credibility. Dave, a mental health provider familiar with Respond's operations, revealed that Respond partners with the police to decrease the "risk" of mental health crises for its staff, the wider community, or the person in crisis. Respond calls on police when a person is exhibiting violent behaviors, including the real or potential use of weapons, or when needing assistance with a hospital transport. Sometimes police presence is required by policy, such as when EMS is called, regardless of whether Respond sees it as necessary. While actively concerned about the use of physical force by police and the trauma their presence can cause, Dave also cited the "authority of the [police] uniform" as typically helpful in coercing cooperation and decreasing the need to physically restrain a person experiencing a mental health crisis.

Minneapolis city staff wanted to be responsive to the expressed concerns of community members, primarily those BIPOC-identified, about the need to mitigate police-related harms by

finding a mental health provider who would rely upon police less. While city staff (and many local mental health providers) acknowledged that police were needed for some high-risk situations involving violence, Respond's association to the police was too extensive. Comparatively, CTC's willingness to respond to crises without the police fit the city's aims. The city found a provider whose non-police response program ran counter to the pre-existing norm where providers collaborated frequently with the police to provide crisis response. Indeed, as a CTC-affiliated clinician put it: "What we're thinking about when we're going out to the community is how can we minimize the likelihood this person is going to interact with the police?"

Chris, a city staff member involved in reimagining behavioral health crisis response, argued for such an approach:

> If you look at programs across the country, mental health response is significantly less risky than our current state. Right now, we [the police] are murdering people…When you compare it to what we're doing, what we're doing is actually limiting and reducing the risk and liability to our residents and to our city…We know, looking across the country, that most [non-police mental health crisis response] teams never have to call police for backup…They're giving people rides home, or to a community center, or to a clinic, or to a rehab center…They're not killing people…I've learned in my work with many officers, the perspective is that every situation is risky.

For Chris and other city staff, CTC's legitimacy was tied to its willingness to respond even to some risky situations without police, which they view as mitigating potentially harmful police involvement. Meanwhile, they perceived Respond as lacking legitimacy due to its frequent collaborations with police, which suggested that the violent harms against BIPOC communities

caused by police would be perpetuated. Generally here, active collaborations with police and carceral systems—a lack of carceral autonomy—were perceived as negative.

In contrast, for Dave and many of his public safety partners, police collaboration was often critical to fostering both harm mitigation and care effectiveness. In a reversal from the city, these participants expressed concerns about the harm and lack of care that could come from not collaborating. In terms of service delivery and harm mitigation, police collaboration in high crisis situations would involve them removing any weapons or threats, and then clinicians or EMS would provide care, ensuring that police involvement stopped at reducing unsafe risk. Dave stated that, without collaboration between these first responders, mental health clinicians' calls to EMS in a medical emergency would likely go unanswered unless police created a safe environment first. Similarly, Erin, a mental health advocate, stated that "911 needs to be able to send out the appropriate response, whatever it might be. If someone has a weapon, the regular mental health crisis team is not gonna go out. It needs to be a co-responder model because you need to make sure the scene is safe." These participants were hardly naïve to the potential harms and distrust perpetuated when police are involved in behavioral health crisis response. Yet, they believed that collaborating in complimentary ways with the police would better ensure that all public safety professionals could "focus on the person in crisis" in their respective roles, thereby increasing care and reducing the potential for police involvement that was harmful.

Further, in terms of service design and care effectiveness, a multi-organizational team of mental health administrators helping to design a regional response system articulated a desire to collaborate with police to build a public safety system that offered a "comprehensive package of services." In this system, "the right response" could be dispatched dependent upon the nature of any crisis. As one team member put it: "What we want to have is a tailored response. There's

plenty need to have mental health professionals responding to different needs of our communities…Do we bring in EMS, do we bring in police, do they go it alone? How do we tailor that response to meet the individual need of the situation?" Jim, a police officer involved in crisis response design, said that in a time when police are "worried about potentially going to prison if they make a mistake," police welcome an alternative if it proves itself effective. He argued that active collaborations between police and mental health professionals, such as co-response programs, can demonstrate to police the effectiveness of clinicians in crises. Provided with such credible evidence, police might increasingly call on clinicians to handle mental health crises alone. He provided evidence that other cities created police buy-in through such an approach. Thus, collaboration could foster future opportunities for behavioral health crisis response to provide care outside of a police response, which, as a by-product, could also decrease police engagement in mental health crises where harm could be perpetuated by them.

Comparatively, CTC aimed to be a caring alternative for BIPOC members and, as such, viewed its own legitimacy as contingent upon its lack of association with police and public safety-related entities. For example, the decision to dispatch CTC's clinicians through 911 was fraught because it could decrease its effectiveness in reaching residents. A CTC clinician argued that "the public sees 911 connected to the police. We know that can be a barrier to them utilizing these services, or talking to us, or engaging with us when we go out into the community. It was really important for us to lower those barriers to access." Similarly, CTC chose to minimize collecting and storing client's private information to curtail any association with the harmful surveillance of BIPOC communities perpetuated by carceral systems and police.

CTC's data-related decisions fostered derision among many other mental health providers in the city who viewed data collection and sharing between public safety responders as critical to

effective crisis response. In fact, Jim, a police officer, stated that police-clinician collaboration can facilitate data sharing so that police know when to make mental health referrals instead of intervening themselves: “Unless there’s a release of information that the person signs, they [social workers] can’t share that information. Part of its developing relationships…where a social worker could feel comfortable saying, ‘I can’t tell you what we did in this case, but if something like this happened with somebody else, this is likely what we’d be doing.” State policy even facilitated such data sharing; during select crisis situations, protected data could be shared between service providers and police. For Jim, police-provider collaboration was central to providing care.

As suggested by the data sharing example, state policy affects the independence between police and service providers. Due to state policy, even a non-police crisis response program like CTC must cooperate with police to provide transport to a hospital when involuntary psychiatric holds are deemed necessary. Many non-police crisis response workers have mixed views of psychiatric holds, knowing they are sometimes necessary for safety, but that they also take away agency and rights from individuals. For those who consider involuntary holds helpful, collaboration with police may also be viewed as increasing care. For instance, Carol, a clinician, noted that police collaboration is required for involuntary hold transports and hospital admissions. In an environment where police are cautious regarding mental health issues, Carol reported that “there have been situations where police officers ask us to sign the hold paperwork that they’ve already determined is necessary. They’d rather it be a mental health professional. In those situations…we’ve decided to do the hold paperwork for the police if they do the transport.” While those who disagree with the use of involuntary holds may find this type of collaboration harmful, Carol shows the mutual benefit achieved for police and service providers pursuing

holds to increase care; police too may find collaboration beneficial to ease their legitimacy concerns. Such tensions over service providers' carceral autonomy illustrate how the legitimacy of care-based approaches depend on individuals' beliefs about how collaboration facilitates or hinders harm and care.

However, far from being benign disagreements, participants' understandings of racism and racialized police violence fundamentally undergirded their beliefs about collaboration. CTC and city staff made it clear that their investment in non-police response was directly informed by their understanding that white supremacy and racial oppression drove police violence. They also put this understanding into practice by insisting on implementing crisis response programming that was responsive to BIPOC community members through minimal reliance upon the police. Conversely, Dave, Erin, and the team of mental health administrators placed a greater focus on developing the "cultural competency" of crisis responders or police, while leaving the basic structure of the system intact. One of these administrators argued:

> The system really works—I mean if you climb into it, it works really, really well for what it was designed to do. It just wasn't necessarily designed to do this (mental health). Historically when you look back at 911, it's added on over time. We've added on fire, we've added on EMS, and it's evolved. This is yet another opportunity for us to evolve that system.

Their understanding of racism and police violence emphasized cultural adaptations of existing services and devotion to a system that requires moderate adjustments. This suggests that they downplayed attention to power dynamics, structural oppression, and the systemic, racialized harms perpetuated against BIPOC communities, in great contrast to CTC and city staff.

There are other issues upon which carceral autonomy-related legitimacy concerns were expressed in Minneapolis. For instance, some participants held varying views of the professional credentials required to provide non-police behavioral health crisis services. A leader of a community-based organization that provides mental health first aid expressed their goal to train everyday community members in mental health response to "de-professionalize" mental health care; this was important because mental health professionals are connected to the "system" that partners with the police. Additionally, this same organization will not take state funding because it often comes with expectations to collaborate with the police, whom they viewed as perpetuating harm. Professionalization and funding are just two of the many issues around which carceral autonomy dynamics manifested, but participants connected all such issues to their perceptions of harm mitigation or care effectiveness.

In this case, various crisis response service providers designed police alternatives to behavioral health crisis response, but they grappled with how to work with the police (or not) in municipal public safety and emergency systems where police could be central collaborators in both policy and practice. Participants shared the belief that police involvement in crisis response should be minimized to mitigate harm, yet differed regarding the extent to which police should be involved. Providing a police alternative offered flexibility, yet state policies conspired to maintain relational ties between police and service providers. The legitimacy of care-based approaches hinged upon carceral autonomy and individuals' perceptions of how much harm and care are fostered through collaborations with police and associated carceral systems.

6.2.2 Case 2: Community-based Violence Prevention

Localized efforts by cities to curtail violent behavior—often gun-related violence—can take many forms. These include enforcement-based approaches that rely heavily upon the police

and community-based approaches that employ workers unaffiliated with carceral systems. Community-based approaches, like those in Minneapolis, provide social supports to people experiencing or perpetuating violence, with the twin goals of reducing both individual violent behavior and shifting community norms regarding the acceptability of violence. To effectively intervene in local contexts, these care-based programs frequently involve partnerships between cities and local nonprofit organizations. They employ individuals who have direct experience with violence, hold legitimacy among affected communities, and often have similar identities to communities served (Butts et al., 2015). In Minneapolis, these individuals are usually Black and have been directly impacted by carceral systems. To the community they serve, individuals with these experiences are called "credible messengers" of anti-violence.

Minneapolis's recent community-based violence prevention programs grew out of preexisting efforts to intervene in youth and group-based violence. These issues were pushed into the spotlight due to upticks in violence—often attributed to localized conditions, but likely related to the COVID-19 pandemic—and city efforts to address and reimagine public safety before and after the murder of George Floyd. Community-based violence prevention efforts are centrally coordinated by the city's Department of Safety Promotion (DSP). The DSP was created in 2018 with money redirected from proposed increases to the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) budget. Subsequently, the DSP received a substantial boost to its budget and programs during 2021 city budget negotiations, in which MPD funding was cut and redirected to the DSP.

The DSP's funding history is indicative of its place as a central and competing organization in the local public safety ecosystem. While the DSP has benefited from reduced police funding, it considers both itself and police as important tools for advancing public safety, albeit with different purposes. The DSP's toolbox ethos—a product of their rootedness in a

public health framework—holds that the DSP is the primary actor in preventing cycles of violence in Minneapolis. Meanwhile, DSP considers police as necessary partners for intervening during particularly violent incidents or, as will be discussed further below, when police enforcement helps participants conform to the DSP's programmatic goals. DSP administrators view its programs as easing the workload burden on police by de-escalating potentially violent scenarios, which might otherwise require police presence. They view reducing police presence as decreasing opportunities for police violence. As such, community-based violence prevention initiatives in Minneapolis are expected to have minimal to no direct collaboration with the police.

DSP staff view carceral autonomy as critical to the success and legitimacy of it's programs. However, the contours of this autonomy vary by program and are affected by each program's evidence-based model and how each program operates in a shifting field of public safety. I will discuss two such programs, highlighting their intended independence from police and carceral systems, as well as how this independence and related evaluations of harm and care shifted due to institutional changes in public safety and police legitimacy.

One of DSP's primary programs is StreetPrevent, which is based on the national, evidence-based Cure Violence model (Butts et al., 2015). In line with this, DSP contracts with multiple community-based organizations to provide street-based outreach and violence interruption services across the city. In general, these organizations employ teams of violence interrupters to patrol targeted areas of the city and build relationships with individuals—often youth—assessed as vulnerable to violent behaviors. In doing so, violence interrupters focus on de-escalating and mediating immediate conflicts, while also providing more in-depth personal

and professional development that diverts youth away from violent behavior. They also provide case management and resource brokering to other services as needed.[20]

Violence interrupter organizations and individuals must have legitimacy from the communities in which they seek to intervene for the program to work and be effective. According to a DSP administrator, the program's evidence-based model states that interrupters must "be blind" to the police to have legitimacy. This is because violence interrupters work in BIPOC communities that have and continue to face police violence and harms from carceral systems. Police are often not trusted, and it is essential that violence interrupters exhibit firm boundaries with police and their associated harms. Contracts between the city and organizations expressly prohibit direct collaboration between the police and organizations regarding violence interruption work. Instead, DSP handles all necessary contact with the police, shielding interrupters behind a "firewall" that protects their legitimacy.

This programmatic design involves independence from police because independence is perceived as increasing care effectiveness. To illustrate the importance of provider-police boundaries in practice, one violence interrupter said:

> Our job is to be out there, deescalate, mediate situations, identify situations that's going on…we are concerned about what happened in our community, we want to go and find out…It could be one of the young people we engage with. A lot our work, when we see the police in the streets…that can easily be took for something else, like, 'oh, they're working with the police.

Violence interrupters seek to serve their communities, but even casual encounters with police can lead to guilt by association and hinder their effectiveness.

[20] While violence interruption is the primary task of contracted organizations, many also provide several other services, including services for violence that has already occurred, like healing circles and restorative justice.

All service providers decisively stated that their roles are different from police: to prevent violence and employ their unique skills (e.g., de-escalation, conflict mediation), not respond to violence that has already occurred like the police do. Tracy, a DSP administrator, stated that police and violence interrupters are meant to "co-exist and respond to things that they are appropriate to respond to." She gave an example where police are appropriate responders: "if a murder happens and the murder suspect needs to be apprehended, you aren't going to send a mental health practitioner or a violence interrupter to apprehend that murder suspect." In fact, Tracy and several service providers discussed how the role of violence interrupters is to prevent violence that might otherwise require a police response. Thereby, potential arrests and police harms are also prevented since police are not present. Violence interrupters viewed their independence from the police as allowing them to prevent violence effectively, which could be compromised through police collaboration.

However, several events occurred during this study that broke down the existing "firewall" between police and violence interrupters, unexpectedly blurring their lines in the community. After the murder of George Floyd and subsequent uprisings, the resulting weakness in police legitimacy intensified the general intolerability among many community members for collaborations between community-based organizations and police. Amid this context, these events revealed how a breakdown of violence interrupters' carceral autonomy led to negative evaluations of their care effectiveness and harm mitigation, with ramifications for service provider legitimacy.

One major event surrounded the trial of Derek Chauvin, the police officer convicted of murdering George Floyd. The city and DSP set up a proactive approach in anticipation of this high-profile trial. They would contract with community-based organizations to protect protesters

and property during the trial, which they considered a form of violence prevention during a heated time. At least two co-occurring issues conspired to undermine the legitimacy of this approach, as well as community-based violence prevention in the city more generally. First, the community experienced confusion over *who* was doing violence prevention during the trial. Confusion resulted because DSP managed the contracts and relationships with both the short-term trial-focused organizations, as well as the StreetPrevent violence interrupter street outreach teams that patrolled every day. Moreover, both kinds of organizations were similar in mission, composition, and communities served. As such, many community members were confused about the difference between each type of organization, lumping both together as DSP violence interrupters.

This confusion may not have been an issue, except that many community members also expressed alarm over *how* violence prevention was conducted. In interviews, council meetings, and local media, providers, activists, and community members were concerned that contracted organizations were acting as "crowd control" to pacify protestors. Bobbi, a local activist, expressed her alarm at the harmful actions of some violence interrupters: "They're hiring all these people to become cop proxies. What they have been doing, what we have seen them do is beat up people at protests…these messengers are not credible to us." In other words, violence interrupters were viewed as taking on police-like roles. In an environment where police are suspect, and community-based organizations are intended to be different from police, taking on a police-like role that harmed protestors was unacceptable to many participants. Some community members like Bobbi transposed the police-like behaviors of trial-focused organizations onto all violence interrupters hired by the city, damaging their legitimacy. The DSP was sensitive to these legitimacy dynamics; in a later city council meeting, the DSP Director stated that hiring

community-based violence interrupters to provide services at Derek Chauvin's trial was confusing to the public. As such, no DSP-contracted group would perform crowd control at protests in the future.

In a similar instance, the city contracted with a community-based violence prevention organization Heart-To-Heart to remove community members from George Floyd Square. The Square was a space for commemoration, activism, and community-building occupied since Floyd's murder. The city sought to open the square to vehicular traffic. Interfering with this space was controversial and viewed by many activists as causing harm to the community that materialized there. In working for the city, community members and activists described Heart-To-Heart as taking on, or even replacing, the role of police, calling them "quasi-law enforcement" acting as "agents of the state." While community-based organizations are typically viewed as more trustworthy to community members than city offices, Heart-To-Heart's contract placed them in police-like roles associated with the enforcement arm of the state. These blurred roles between violence interrupters and police caused alarm among some city councilmembers, with one later expressing concern about the city's "decentralized subcontracted approach to public safety." Such city councilmembers wanted to maintain firm boundaries between violence interrupters and police, but this goal was challenged by contracts that had interrupters conduct enforcement.

During these events, community-based violence interrupters took on roles associated with the police, controlling and perpetuating harm to the public. Taking on police-like roles damaged the legitimacy of service providers. The perpetuation of harms, combined with the role confusion between various contracted organizations, created concerns about the legitimacy of all DSP-contracted violence interrupters. These scenarios suggest that even indirect behavioral

associations with the police and their harmful practices—where care-based providers take on police-like roles like enforcement—can be considered low carceral autonomy that may damage the legitimacy of police alternatives.

I will now turn to the DSP's Prevention Program for Groups (PPG), which also relied upon carceral autonomy for its success and legitimacy. However, in contrast to StreetPrevent's evidence-based model where strict boundaries between violence interrupters and the police were viewed as critical, PPG's model involved a minimal level of police collaboration, which providers viewed as essential to providing effective care and mitigating harm.

PPG promotes violence prevention by intervening with individuals involved in groups or gangs. It particularly focuses on individuals involved in homicide or other serious violence and those with previous involvement in carceral systems who are at continued risk for involvement. PPG departs from carceral, punishment-oriented interventions, recognizing the harms policing can perpetuate in affected communities. Instead, PPG relies heavily upon case management, mentorship, and connections to social services and resources for basic needs. PPG views violence as a cycle in which those who commit violent acts have also been victims of violence themselves. The DSP hires community members, many with prior experiences of gang involvement and violence, to serve as case managers to PPG-enrolled participants. Case managers offer mentorship and social supports to participants in their journey out of violent groups and behaviors.

PPG engages in a limited form of direct collaboration with police. A national PPG expert expressed the model's undergirding collaborative principle during a local teach-in on the program: "PPG facilitates direct, sustained engagement with the small number of group-involved individuals through a partnership of community leaders, social service providers, and law

enforcement standing and acting together." Police take on several roles in PPG, including sharing information on, and providing referrals of, potential participants—often those at greatest risk of continued involvement in violence—to PPG case managers.

Yet, PPG service providers navigate a context where police legitimacy is increasingly fraught and care-based approaches are emerging as legitimate alternatives among service providers and their collaborators. Ted, a PPG case manager, captures this contextual dynamic, noting that police officers have become more amenable to treatment-oriented approaches like PPG in a shifting public safety landscape:

> They do that [give referrals] because their way of thinking is changing…Nobody wants to go through that paperwork, and nobody wants that headache. Nobody wants that bad reputation of only caring about locking people up…Some officers don't care. They just gonna lock 'em up, because as far as they're concerned, that's their job. 'I'm not a social worker. I'm the damn police.' For those who don't look at it that way, those are the ones that pick up the phone and call me.

Police officers have even allowed Ted to do intake processes with potential participants prior to an arrest, thereby diverting that person from incarceration. Framed by institutional shifts in how and by whom public safety can be legitimately achieved, police are seen by PPG service providers as critical partners in routing individuals to more caring approaches and helping PPG shield them from further harms.

However, PPG staff were wary of involving police more directly in the day-to-day work of PPG. Ted expressed the necessity of boundaries:

> We don't work with law enforcement. We coordinate with them, is the best way to say it…I'm not conversating with law enforcement about a participant, because the way law

> enforcement sees a participant is completely different than how I see him…he's still going to see you under that law enforcement umbrella based off that fact that you're not living within the guidelines of the laws that he has to enforce.

For PPG service providers, involving police officers in PPG more heavily could stand in the way of the program's caring approach. Further, the racism prevalent among police departments made day-to-day collaboration even more precarious. In such a case, carceral enforcement would subvert the legitimacy of supportive approaches among participants and community members. Instead, providers viewed a relatively high level of carceral autonomy—where case managers and police "co-exist and coordinate," but don't "collaborate"—as critical to both PPG's ability to care effectively and to mitigate the harms that clients might face from police if more direct collaboration occurred.

Yet, providers also viewed enforcement as playing a key role in PPG's care effectiveness; a "strategic partnership" with police was necessary to present program participants with the specter of carceral enforcement, provoking conformity to PPG as the clear alternative to incarceration. At the beginning of PPG participation, police, social services, and community-based case managers all speak to participants about their dissimilar roles. Doug, a PPG case manager described the initial meeting:

> Community, law enforcement will be there, and somebody from the city. The law enforcement will tell them, 'You've been under the radar. We know who you are. First one to drop a body, we're coming at you.' Then the city says, 'Hey, we have support for you here.' I come in with the 'I am not the police. I'm here to help you and support you where you're at. Let's try to get things done so we can get you a job, or sustainable housing, and good training so you can make money.

While Doug was clear that the police's presentation of consequences was not meant to be an ultimatum, police were present to remind program participants of the likely carceral consequences if they fail to change through program participation. The benefit of "strategic partnership" was further described by Tracy from the DSP: "We can help you do whatever you need to stay safe, alive, and free. We hope that you choose to avail yourself of those resources. If you don't avail yourself to those resources, there are going to be natural legal consequences if you continue to engage in violent behavior." Expanding upon this view, Doug even noted that prior carceral system involvement was beneficial to program participation: "That's the best time to get somebody is when you're fresh outta prison. You're still thinking about stuff that's positive." The lurking presence of punishment, carceral systems, and police was a foreboding launching pad for participants to make positive changes.

Several service providers expressed that weakened police legitimacy after the murder of George Floyd negatively affected PPG's effectiveness because of the central role of police in the program. In this context with police staffing shortages, the MPD had fewer police officers to devote to PPG. Police were less available to provide information sharing, referrals, and enforcement, all critical components of the program's model. Further, program participants would find it less believable that there would be "natural legal consequences" for violent behaviors when police were short-staffed. As Doug stated:

> It ended up being all the police that were there at one time quit or went to different places or retired. You don't have that dynamic anymore of the law enforcement. It's different now. The police department says their spiel, right? They say that see you. It's like now the effect of the police being hands-on is not there. There's only two people from the police department that work with PPG when it was 15 to 20.

When police legitimacy was weakened, the level of police collaboration available to PPG broke down as well, which service providers perceived as weakening PPG's care effectiveness.[21]

Other service providers from similar community-based violence prevention programs also expressed that minimal collaboration with police can be helpful for both care effectiveness and harm mitigation. In terms of care effectiveness, several providers noted that police will sometimes refer community-based violence interrupters to situations involving youth before they escalate. According to Verta, a program administrator, this type of informal request allows her team to use relational skills the police do not have: "If our team's out and there's an issue with a kid, even if it verges on illegal, the police will ask us to come and intervene. Because they don't wanna arrest kids, but they also don't have the skills that our team has, and they don't have the kind of relationships." Verta further noted that police who observe the effectiveness of her team continue to request their presence. In other words, minimal collaboration between service providers and police created opportunities for providers to care effectively, perceptions of which promoted the legitimacy of service providers as non-carceral alternatives.

In terms of harm mitigation, a school administrator—generally positive about police alternatives to violence prevention—warned that no relationship with the police could cause harm:

> We have no relationship with the MPD anymore. I wish we did. It's a huge risk from a pure security standpoint. Sure, from an equity standpoint, in which cops were causing harm to kids, it's great. Kids aren't being harmed. But I think that someday someone will

[21] Yet, service providers were also adaptable to this situation. While police were less available to provide the enforcement arm of the program, PPG case managers compensated by relying more heavily upon the social services aspect of the program to provide resources. It's possible that weakened police legitimacy has some positive effect on the effectiveness of a more caring approach in the long-run, even if it reduces the effectiveness of programs in the short-run while they continue to rely upon police collaboration.

> call the cops, even though we tell them to call us, and I'm not sure how that will go, and if the cops will comply with how we do things.

Without any police collaboration, there is no relational understanding between the school and police regarding appropriate public safety practices. In case of a violent incident where police are called, police may perpetuate practices misaligned with the school system's public safety strategy. Many such service providers also saw how programs could face difficulties, at least in the short-term, even if they also viewed independence from the police as important for caring violence prevention approaches to succeed more generally.

In this case, violence interrupters took on different, more preventative roles than police. Each program's underlying evidence-based model required limited to no police collaboration. For StreetPrevent, the program was sensitive to the historical and continuing criminalization of BIPOC communities by police and the state. Breakdowns in the "firewall" between police and providers compromised their ability to act upon this sensitivity. Providers that normally took on dissimilar roles from the police became suddenly comparable to them in role and were judged for perpetuating similar harms, which negatively impacted the legitimacy of the city's wider violence interruption efforts. For PPG, the model involved limited, strategic collaboration with police for information sharing and program conformity. Either too much or no collaboration could perpetuate harm and limit the effectiveness of violence prevention. Shifts in police legitimacy, which broke down the level of police collaboration available, were seen by providers as being at odds with the model's ability to advance care and mitigate harm, producing legitimacy challenges for the program. Programs like PPG that serve a different role from police, yet rely upon policing or carceral systems to advance their missions, may face challenges in their ability to care and mitigate harm during times of carceral disruption.

6.2.3 Case 3: Homeless Street Outreach

I now turn to the case of homeless street outreach services in Austin and discuss carceral autonomy-related dynamics amid a ban on homeless encampments. Services and the ban took place during an affordable housing crisis in Austin, where over recent years housing prices skyrocketed and the homeless population increased. During Austin's Reimagining Public Safety process, homelessness was viewed by participants and many community members as a primary public safety issue in Austin that could be solved through social supports rather than criminalization. Homeless supports and street outreach received a substantial amount of redirected police dollars. This case explores carceral autonomy when collaborations between police and service providers are no longer possible and greater autonomy must be established. In such a case, providers began to take on oppositional roles to the police in the public safety ecosystem.

Street outreach services are provided by many organizations operating in Austin's homeless service provider ecosystem. In general, providers bring their services to the streets and target spaces where homeless individuals are located. Mobile street outreach teams are comprised of various service providers, including mental health and medical professionals, who provide services and referrals on the street. Additionally, providers conduct assessments to understand the vulnerability of those in need of housing and prioritize support in a city with inadequate resources.

Through providing services, providers aim to combat the criminalization of homeless individuals by facilitating criminal justice diversion. Street outreach service providers articulated an understanding that homelessness was connected to both structural and individual issues, including inadequate housing, employment opportunities, and persistent mental health issues;

however, homelessness is too often “solved” through criminalization, including citations, arrests, and incarceration. To combat criminalization, some homeless outreach initiatives involve collaborations between police and service providers. The intended goal of these collaborations is for police officers trained in mental health issues to ensure the general safety of outreach efforts, bring a clinical and empathetic lens to safety and security tasks, and build trust between police and the homeless community.

Some providers pointed to the potential of police collaboration—a lack of carceral autonomy—as helpful for both care effectiveness and harm mitigation. For Denise, a provider and administrator, collaboration can stop police from unnecessary enforcement and improve the legitimacy of service providers. She illustrated this point by telling a story of police collaboration prior to the camping ban:

> Sometimes it's like, ‘Eh, I better not have an officer with me.’ They do come from a different perspective. I remember one time one guy that had a lot, a lot of history of difficulty with law enforcement and going to jail. Joe was—this is the other officer—was about ready, but I was able to deescalate and redirect the guy, but Joe was just like, ‘I was ready to arrest him.’ He was trying to egg the officer on. It was just like he could just see this tension and we were able to get through it, but Joe is like, ‘I would have just arrested him if you weren't there.’ I'm like, ‘Thank you for not arresting him.’ Because that would've just totally broken the trust that we're developing. It helped because that didn't happen too. It helped with the relationship with this person because his interaction didn't end up with him going to jail, which was what he was so used to, which just happens all the time. Here he had this interaction, and it didn't resolve in an incarceration. I truly

> believe and looking at that situation I remember thinking, he's more receptive to our help right now. He's engaging better I think because of that incident.

In real time, Denise provided an alternative to Joe's enforcement. Her intervention staved off criminalization and improved the trust and legitimacy Denise had earned among homeless individuals, which further enhanced the care that could be provided.

Yet, other service providers were concerned that police collaboration would compromise the legitimacy afforded to them by the homeless individuals they served. This is because homeless individuals hold a general distrust towards police due to experiences and continued threats of criminalization. Gary, a street outreach medical services provider, described his organization's responsiveness to this distrust:

> We don't work with the police or any law enforcement or anything like that. We try to stay away from that just for our patients. We don't want to blur the lines. We are getting a lot of personal information. Patients are sometimes scared like, 'I have warrants out. I don't wanna give you my information.' They'll give us fake names because of this. We just don't want to blur the lines.

As service providers navigate these dynamics of criminalization and distrust, they mostly called on police officers only as "last resort" to intervene in violent situations where unarmed de-escalation proved untenable. Many service providers limited their active collaborations with police to minimize both potential harms and any associational distrust from homeless individuals that would delegitimize street outreach efforts.

Austin's ban on homeless encampments intensified the divisions between police and service providers. In 2019, a lack of affordable housing prompted the Austin City Council to lift the city's 23-year-old camping ban. They also cited a desire to mitigate ban-related arrests of

unhoused individuals, which presented barriers to employment and housing. Following this, encampments and the number of visibly unhoused people grew in Austin, which prompted a regressive, citizen-led political campaign to reinstate the ban. The city council and staff responded to this threat with several proactive steps, including a new city-wide homeless strategy officer position, a commitment to build 3000 affordable housing units, and, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Homeless Encampment Assistance Link (HEAL) initiative. HEAL was pitched as a response to the COVID-related public health and safety concerns of encampments, including moving homeless people to temporary housing. Services were provided without any threat of enforcement or carceral penalty for non-compliance (e.g., a person is offered temporary shelter, but decides to stay in a camp).

Yet, proponents of a reinstated ban were emboldened by a lack of enforcement. In May 2021, Austin voters reinstated the camping ban, making public camping an enforceable misdemeanor. City officials scrambled to figure out the most humane way to enforce and respond to the ban. Both city staff and police officials publicly declared their intention to take an educational approach to enforcement over the coming months. Police would focus on "voluntary compliance," starting with verbal notifications, before moving on to written warnings, citations, and then arrests. When possible, police would direct those in violation of the ban to the local Community Court, which prioritized social service alternatives to incarceration. This softer enforcement approach was implemented by police over several months, with a goal to cleanup and close camps voluntarily and as humanely as possible.

However, following a local lawsuit aimed at hardening the city's enforcement approach, police began resorting to more punitive measures, including threats of citations, incarceration, and confiscation of belongings. In a strong reversal, police would clear, or "sweep," camps fully,

involuntarily kicking camp residents out. These sweeps were completed quickly to avoid camp "repopulation" by homeless people, ensuring their displacement. Meanwhile, service providers were left with few resources with which to respond due to a lack of shelter space and affordable housing. The lack of resources had consequences; most frequently, campers responded to sweeps by moving to another public location in the city. In other words, without alternative housing supports, the ban was not stopping public encampments nor solving homelessness.

In the context of the camping ban, police and service providers collaborated little with each other. What collaboration did exist involved police informing trusted service providers about which camps were likely to be cleared in the coming days. This minimal "heads up" was welcomed by service providers, as it allowed them to prepare for the type and location of care needed.

However, collaboration mostly stopped there. Instead, service providers took on the role of mitigating the harms of the carceral system and the police charged with enforcing the ban. Janet, a homeless service provider and policy advocate, described the opposing roles of police and service providers:

> Law enforcement enforces laws, but in terms of sweeps, the people who clean up are contractors. The people who actually help people gather their belongings and move them, the people who provide mental health care, the people who do the actual work of the sweep are the grassroots orgs. The cops don't do anything…The police issue citations. That's all they do.

Police cleared camps and issued citations for noncompliance, while service providers helped campers deal with the harmful ramifications of the ban's enforcement.

Yet, service providers were in a bind; collaboration with police during sweeps could potentially soften the harms inflicted, but it could also undermine service provider legitimacy among homeless individuals. Most street outreach workers stated that collaboration during camp sweeps could nurture distrust of service providers and stymie their ability to provide effective care. This is because homeless people might associate all workers involved in sweeps with the punishing reality of losing their homes. The need for clear carceral autonomy to provide effective care was articulated by Jessica, a police officer who worked with a non-enforcement-based street outreach and camp support team:

> I'm generally not doing the enforcement part of it, because it becomes very sticky for me to try to do both…I'm generally looked at as someone that is available to them for services, and to connect to whatever resources they need. I generally do not try to do any of the enforcement aspects. We leave that to a different group of officers, so that I'm not seen in that light of writing tickets or any of that.

Jessica considered herself less like other police officers, and more like a service provider. She had worked for years to build relationships and nurture trust with homeless individuals. She did not want homeless individuals confusing her role with those of other police officers. The potential for service users to associate her with enforcement-related harms could damage her legitimacy, even if she wasn't collaborating with other police. Jessica and other service providers believed that their ability to care effectively for homeless service users would be imperiled by close collaboration with police during camping ban enforcement.

Despite these efforts to improve care through greater independence from police, service providers were challenged by a deadly combination of forces, including a lack of housing supports, ban enforcement-related criminalization, and local policy implementation that de-

prioritized individual vulnerabilities. First, the city and state had not provided adequate alternative housing resources to those pushed out of camps, exacerbating cycles of homelessness. Without these resources, not only did homeless individuals often move to other camps after sweeps, but many were pushed into the woods. Whereas providers used to know the location of service users, they were now difficult to find, making outreach and care provision more challenging.

Second, the camping ban contributed to cycles of criminalization by making criminal justice diversion goals harder to achieve. According to a street outreach worker and administrator, the ban made camping "illegal, which then, of course, lends itself to citations and misdemeanors and, again, just a big cycle of you wanna get people housed, but you're charging them with fines that are gonna prevent them from potentially getting housed." The legal ramifications of the camping ban on individual criminal records made alternative housing harder to achieve, which ran counter to the city's goal of housing more homeless individuals.

Finally, city staff initially chose to implement the ban by focusing on clearing camps with the highest public visibility, rather than prioritizing camps in which individuals more vulnerable to health or other individual risks lived. Much of the temporary shelter in the city was obtained by homeless individuals pushed out of camps during initial sweeps. After this, individuals with potentially more vulnerabilities would have less housing resources available to them during enforcement. A legal advocate expressed her frustration regarding this at a city council meeting:

> One woman who has cancer told me she's been on the waiting list for housing, but she will probably die on the street before she's housed. She pled with me. She wanted to know why she isn't a priority…shouldn't the fact that she's sick, that she's a high risk of

> COVID, mean something to get into housing?...she doesn't know what she's going to do when law enforcement comes to arrest her.

The city's implementation strategy, combined with a lack of housing supports, increased the risk of both health harms and criminalization.

These challenges meant that service providers could take an oppositional role to police enforcement yet were disempowered to mitigate enforcement-related harms. Of note, service providers were placed in the difficult position of having no viable housing alternatives to offer during sweeps. Denise articulated how involvement with camp sweeps without proper solutions could nurture distrust:

> We were with them (homeless camp residents) all the way up until the day that they were going to be asked to move and they have to leave. It was just being there for support but then that day, I don't think anybody was there that day…There's been talks about having the behavioral health support when they're being asked to leave but our sense is like, we didn't want to be associated with that…Just feeling like we'd be seen as enforcing it and not giving any solution.

Providing substantive housing solutions could help mitigate enforcement-related harms. Without these, however, service providers might not be seen by homeless individuals as legitimate alternatives to police, or worse, they might be seen as perpetuating harms as well. Ultimately, service providers needed clear carceral autonomy to provide effective care, but without alternative housing resources, service providers were thwarted in their attempts to mitigate harm in real time without compromising their legitimacy.

In this case, service providers began to take on an oppositional role to the police to protect their legitimacy and mitigate harm. Service providers were aware of the harms

perpetuated against homeless people by police, which contributed to the importance they placed on building high carceral autonomy. While some service providers saw the real time benefits of police collaboration in conducting street outreach, the ban made such benefits difficult to achieve. The camping ban placed service providers in a double bind that placed their legitimacy in a compromised position. They believed that collaborating with the police would foster distrust and stymie attempts to provide care, but providers also lacked the expected alternative housing supports that would mitigate the harms of enforcement. Without alternative housing supports, public safety practices in Austin emphasized carceral enforcement without an adequate counterbalance of care. Perhaps the kind of police collaboration that Denise experienced before the ban could improve care and mitigate harm, adding some legitimacy to service providers that collaborate with police. But the sobering reality of the ban and its harms was palpable for Janet. She recognized that the greater enforcement power granted to police disempowered providers:

> I recently attended the memorial for a woman whose body was left laying as the camp she was in was sweeped. Her body was in full view of everyone as they had to pack up their belongings for multiple hours. It was a very hard day. It should have never happened…how do we prevent these things from happening? So much of our time that could be spent doing positive things is spent dealing with the new messes that we have to clean up.

6.3 Discussion

Institutional change in public safety takes place in municipal contexts with existing ties between organizations and individuals, including between police and service providers. In these contexts, carceral autonomy helps explain how collaborations are influenced by service providers' beliefs about harm, care, and the legitimacy of social service organizations and

providers in terms of their relationships to police. For behavioral health crisis response, participants' views regarding the legitimate amount of carceral autonomy for an alternative response were based upon their differing beliefs in how much harm or care would be fostered through collaboration. These beliefs related to varying understandings of race and racialized police violence, as well as responsiveness to BIPOC community members. In comparison, community-based violence prevention services were driven by evidence-based models that heavily limited the collaboration between police and service providers. These providers also take on dissimilar roles in furthering public safety. Breakdowns in two programs intended carceral autonomy fostered legitimacy concerns over the similarity between service provider and harmful police roles, on one hand, and the ability to care and mitigate harm without a minimal level of police involvement, on the other. Finally, a ban on homeless camping reinforced the need for high carceral autonomy between police and street outreach providers. The ban challenged providers to mitigate the harms of police enforcement. While high carceral autonomy was critical during the ban for service providers to maintain legitimacy among homeless people, a lack of housing supports limited their ability to mitigate police harms and offer an effective caring alternative.

The dynamics explored across the three cases are instructive for understanding three types of shifts in carceral autonomy that service providers and related individuals may negotiate amid institutional change. First, the case of behavioral health crisis response involves unsettled boundaries between police and service providers; programs were newly developing and trying to find the right amount of carceral autonomy. While pre-existing beliefs and practices regarding police and service provider collaboration existed among participants, non-police crisis response services were being newly designed and implemented in a time of novel carceral disruption and

weakened police legitimacy. This case can be viewed as one where service providers negotiated actively unsettled autonomy in newly developing programs. Second, community-based violence prevention programs relied upon pre-established autonomy between police and service providers. However, service providers dealt with weakened police legitimacy and breakdowns in settled autonomy. This case can be viewed as one where service providers negotiated shifts in autonomy from settled to unsettled. Finally, homeless street outreach involved the opposite move from the prior case; service providers negotiated a shift from unsettled autonomy to more settled. Prior to the encampment ban, outreach service providers collaborated with police to varying degrees and they held disagreements about how much harm and care is fostered through collaboration. The encampment ban created the conditions for more settled autonomy, as service providers acted mostly independently to oppose the harms perpetuated by police enforcement of the ban. These three shift types can be useful for future studies that explore institutional change involving relationship dynamics and legitimacy.

Across all three cases, a few common, but contextually distinct factors affected carceral autonomy-related dynamics. First, different audiences and their views matter for legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017). Different participants held different notions of what counts as legitimate police collaboration. Most glaringly, the case of behavioral health crisis response illustrates how there is not one unitary view of legitimate carceral autonomy among providers and related individuals in a service area. Further, in all three cases, many service providers were hyper-aware of how police collaboration could affect their relationship to service users and related communities that have historically faced police harms or criminalization. For example, both homeless street outreach providers navigating the encampment ban and violence interrupters believed that strong autonomy from police was required to achieve legitimacy from service users

and community members. In the case of violence interrupters, breakdowns in autonomy cast a spotlight on the importance of the “firewall” with police—in both relationship and role—for legitimacy from community members to be achieved. In contrast, the sudden lack of police collaboration available to PPG case managers had them worried that service users would fail to comply with programmatic demands, potentially weakening the program’s effectiveness. Service providers and administrators may wish to take advantage of the opportunities provided by carceral disruption to recalibrate their relationship to police by considering the raised concerns and needs of historically marginalized and criminalized service users and communities (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022).

Participants held varying views of how and by whom public safety can be achieved, which relate to broader institutional norms and cultural schemas that compete amid institutional change efforts. Varying conceptions of legitimate carceral autonomy, and the power people hold to make those conceptions reality in a contested organizational field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), will impact institutional change efforts. As care-based alternatives to public safety gain legitimacy, those seeking change on the local level can leverage their understanding that harm mitigation and care effectiveness matter to service providers when they consider police collaborations. Depending on their views, service providers and related individuals may be either allies or opponents to change agents as they pursue purposeful shifts in police-service provider autonomy in dynamic organizational fields.

Second, conceptions of legitimate carceral autonomy were motivated by participants’ underlying beliefs about police harms. These beliefs, which affected relationship dynamics in each case, were informed by participants’ understandings of race and racialized police violence or the criminalization of homeless individuals and were baked into evidence-based models used

to intervene in community violence. This finding aligns with institutional and organizational research that argues that logics are racialized and infused with moral judgements about clients, including the source of their problems and possible solutions (Hasenfeld, 2000, 2010; Rojas, 2017). Findings also help address the ongoing neglect of race in institutional and organizational studies (Ray, 2019; Rojas, 2017, 2019; Ward & Rivera, 2014; Wooten, 2019). Highlighting these beliefs aligns with a recent call within institutional scholarship to uncover the values associated with institutional logics and phenomenon (Lounsbury et al., 2021; Risi & Marti, 2022), which requires consideration in future research.

However, tensions existed among research participants regarding whether autonomy can properly mitigate police harms. For example, prior to the encampment ban, some homeless street outreach providers intervened in interactions between police and homeless individuals to de-escalate conflict and curb criminalization; positive side-by-side collaboration with police made this possible. Similarly, in the case of behavioral health crisis response, some service providers asserted that police collaboration could increase police buy-in of care-based alternatives, potentially reducing police involvement that could harm in the future. In contrast, other providers in both these cases sought to avoid police collaboration so that potentially harmful contact between police and service users would be minimized. While this chapter reveals the harm-related considerations service providers have while navigating collaborations with or independence from police, other research is needed to determine how autonomy causes harm (or not), which may help resolve some of the tensions raised here (Jacobs et al., 2021).

Finally, policy put constraints on carceral autonomy. In Minneapolis, state policy required crisis responders to collaborate with police in conducting involuntary holds. Further, city contracts either expressly prohibited violence interrupters collaborating with police or placed

them in similar roles that compromised their autonomy. In Austin, state and local policy affected the availability of permanent and temporary housing stock, while city staff's camping ban implementation process de-prioritized individual vulnerabilities among the homeless population. Similarly, Simes & Tichenor (2022) highlight how policy, funding, and contracts foster and sustain organizational ties between carceral systems and service providers. This chapter's findings indicate the types of structural and resource constraints facing institutional change efforts that promote greater carceral autonomy.

The dynamics of carceral autonomy pose challenges to institutional change in public safety. Caring approaches to public safety require legitimacy in a field where carceral approaches and expansion have been the norm. When carceral expansion is opposed, individuals' varying beliefs regarding how care and harm are fostered through collaborations with police and broader carceral systems will affect the alternative caring approaches they pursue. When powerful individuals view police collaboration as essential to mitigating police harms and providing effective care, institutional change efforts towards non-carceral approaches to public safety may face difficulties.

Conversely, varying evaluations of carceral autonomy also provide opportunities for local change efforts amidst broader institutional change. Change agents can leverage weakened police legitimacy to enforce boundaries between police and social service organizations. In Minneapolis, community-based violence interrupters were evaluated negatively when the autonomy between them and police broke down. In this context, advocates and community members publicly asserted that the legitimacy of violence interruption was predicated upon strict boundaries with police. In moments where carceral creep can be challenged (Kim, 2020), change agents can expose the dangers of low carceral autonomy or benefits of high carceral autonomy,

while remaining savvy of the diverse conceptions of harm mitigation and care effectiveness that exist in the field.

This chapter captures a novel moment in the convergent and shifting relationship between carceral and social service systems (Hinton, 2016; Wacquant, 2009). It contributes street-level lens to the intersection between social welfare and carceral studies by focusing on service providers' beliefs that concern their relationships to others in a common organizational field. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates how beliefs about the legitimate relationship between service providers and police influence the potential for more caring approaches to public safety and social control to be realized.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 Central Concerns: Institutional Change and Carceral Disruption

This dissertation was motivated by two overarching concerns, one institutional and one sociopolitical. First, this dissertation sought to address an important theoretical puzzle for scholarship on institutional change: how do multiple shifts in institutional logics co-occur, including through both top-down and bottom-up change processes? Collectively, the three empirical chapters presented here provide forward movement in answering this question. In Chapter Four, I showed how three simultaneous shifts in institutional logics occurred on the field-level that furthered changes in public safety, including changing the dominant logic, supporting alternative marginal logics, and separating conflicting logics. In Chapter Five, I identified five inter-related mechanisms of bottom-up institutional work by service providers that contributed to institutional change in public safety. The first three mechanisms—segmenting, bridging, and demarcating—are about managing boundaries between institutional logics and their associated actors in the organizational field. The other two mechanisms—spreading and shaping—concern the expansion and modification of logics in the organizational field. Finally, in Chapter Six, I uncovered how beliefs regarding the legitimate relationship between police and service providers, and how much harm and care is furthered through such relationships, influence service provider-police collaborations and case-based approaches to public safety.

Taken together, I propose a model that captures how multiple shifts in logics co-occur (see figure 5). In this model, I propose that the top-down field-level change mechanisms correspond to bottom-up institutional work mechanisms (e.g., field-level change in the dominant

logic corresponds to the individual-level shaping institutional work mechanism). I also propose that beliefs about care and harm, and how each is furthered by the relationship between logics of public safety, likely undergird these mechanisms. Finally, across empirical chapters, I abstracted the numerous factors that can influence if and how logics shifts occur across levels. As this dissertation conceives of institutional change as bidirectional, these factors could affect any level.



Figure 5 A Proposed Model for Multiple, Multi-leveled Shifts in Institutional Logics

The case of behavioral health crisis response offers a useful illustration of the model and the correspondence between field-level and individual-level logic separation. On the field level, Minneapolis city officials sought to curb the police violence in mental health crises. To do so, they contracted with an organization to respond to behavioral health crises without police, which separated clinicians and their treatment logic from those of police and their punishment logic. The field-level separation of conflicting logics corresponds to the segmenting, bridging, and demarcating institutional work mechanisms used by service providers. To support logic segmentation that mitigates police violence, service providers mostly responded to mental health crises without active police collaboration. With bridging, crisis responders maintained this general segmentation, but engaged in time-bound, task-based situational relationships with police that helped the responder's treatment logic take over. For example, providers called upon police to ensure their physical safety or to mutually share critical information to help them resolve a crisis. Finally, to prevent over-bridging in collaborative situations, service providers demarcated the level of police collaboration. For example, in line with policy, service providers limited the amount and type of information provided to police to that which was specific to an immediate crisis. In such a case, demarcating mitigated the harms that too much collaboration could bring, thereby supporting the overall separation between conflicting logics. Some of the factors that influenced the use of these mechanisms included sociopolitical support from city officials, the weakened legitimacy of police in resolving mental health crises, the existence of a treatment logic to resolve crises in lieu of punishment, a pre-existing organization prepared to design and implement a crisis response program, the mental health goals of crisis response programs, the different roles and logics of police and service providers, public policies that limited information sharing, and beliefs about police involvement in mental health crises that can perpetuate harm.

In total, the proposed model suggests that the three-part framework of institutional logic disentangling, introduced in Chapter Four, can incorporate multiple levels. Just as shifts in the character, dominance, and relationship of logics can (co-)occur on the field-level, so too can they on the individual-level. Further, efforts to shift logics on each level can affect mechanisms on the other level. For example, in Minneapolis, city-wide efforts to support marginalized alternative public safety logics created opportunities for service providers to spread the direct use of care-based logics among individuals, such as by training service users with lived experience to become service providers. By training and socializing new users to advance caring public safety, service providers envisioned creating a broader "ecosystem" of logic users that supported new cultural norms of care-based public safety. Thus, by training logic users, service providers saw the potential to support the wider institutionalization of marginalized alternative logics. This finding underscores how field-level institutional processes can influence organizations and individuals embedded in the field, and, in turn, how institutional work can generate and institutionalize new field-level arrangements in institutional logics (Ocasio, 2023).

In addition to institutional change, this dissertation is concerned with the sociopolitical possibilities of carceral disruption. Can efforts to transform public safety foster change in social control configurations about "how" and "by whom" public safety should be achieved? Can we shift public safety systems from a focus on punishment to one of care, or at least create greater separation between these approaches? And given their historical and ongoing ties to carceral systems and policing, how can service providers facilitate (or not) a break with punishing public safety?

Across the three empirical chapters, I showed the opportunities and challenges for change. In Chapter Four, I showed how exogenous forces, including social movement activity,

provided the groundwork for transformative institutional change, including efforts to challenge the punishing nature of policing, support alternative public safety approaches that center care, and contest the relationship between policing and social services. Yet, political actors worked to temper transformative goals into more incrementalist advances and a "both/and" settlement between logics. Despite these field-level challenges, the overall environment of carceral disruption supported the institutional work of service providers seen in Chapter Five. Providers used mechanisms to modify punishment, spread care, and separate both, thereby making important and practical contributions on-the-ground to carceral disruption in social control arrangements that are not captured through field-level analysis. Finally, Chapter Six reveals how beliefs about harm and care matter for shaking up existing ties between service providers and police. As service providers sought legitimacy for their care-based approaches, these beliefs acted as powerful influences on whether, and to what extent, providers collaborated with police and a punishment logic in various public safety service areas. Together, these findings show that de-legitimizing one logic (i.e., punishment) affects the legitimacy of other logics (i.e., care-based) that function as part of the same institution (i.e., public safety). Given this, I argue that we must address the relationality between logics and their respective actors in the same organizational field to understand institutional change and carceral disruption.

One common thread I highlighted across chapters is the role of racialized beliefs in undermining institutional change and carceral disruption. For example, in Chapter Four I highlighted how racialized beliefs about stopping crime through policing can be a powerfully entrenched force for impeding institutional change in public safety. Beliefs regarding the inherent criminality of certain groups can fuel "tough-on-crime" policies, even when other environmental factors—like the COVID-19 pandemic and economic inequality, as recent

research suggests (Moore et al., 2022)—may be the core factors influencing crime rates. We have seen this dynamic before. In the 1960's, politicians responded to a crime panic about Black youth by viewing recent War on Poverty social programs as a failure and bolstering punitive criminal-legal approaches (Felker-Kantor, 2018; Hinton, 2016; Soss & Weaver, 2017). Such racialized beliefs present a challenge to social movements targeting institutional change in public safety (Rojas 2017, 2019).

Further, as moral judgements about clients undergird decisions about service provision (Hasenfeld, 2000, 2010), racialized beliefs about clients and how they are best served also affect institutional work (Rojas, 2017). In Chapter Six, I observed the impact of racialized understandings of police violence, which affected service provider's beliefs about harm and care and the way they engaged in collaborations with police. The role of beliefs and values, including those related to race (Ray, 2019; Rojas 2017; Wooten, 2019), continues to be a key area of future organizational and institutional research (Lounsbury et al., 2021; Risi & Marti, 2022). Practitioners, activists, and allies committed to change can explore "narrative activism" as a strategy for shifting people's deeply held beliefs regarding public safety, police violence, and historically criminalized groups like RCS communities (Moody-Adams, 2022).

7.2 Bidirectional Institutional Change

Fundamentally, this dissertation addresses research gaps in the bidirectional nature of institutional change, particularly by strengthening the micro-foundationalist side of institutional analysis that has recently gained traction (Hampel et al., 2017; Powell & Rerup, 2017). Future studies can weave together field-level and bottom-up theories to understand the environmental complexities that shape individual action and, in turn, explore how institutional change is influenced by individuals on-the-ground.

To explore bidirectional institutional change processes, in Chapter Five I connected the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives. The mechanisms that were used to conduct bottom-up institutional work were also supported by institutional changes in public safety on the field-level. Typically, scholars pay attention to field-level institutional shifts because they can present novel constraints on organizations that affect their range of available logics and behaviors they may pursue (Reay at al., 2021). This point is well-taken in the field of public safety, in which care-based approaches have long been marginalized in favor of policing and punishment. Yet, in this study's context, the legitimacy of policing had been weakened and relationships with police and punishing logics were constrained (Wright II et al., 2022).

Therefore, amid constraint on police relationships, I argue that organizations and individuals that advance care-based public safety logics are also *enabled* to contribute to institutional change—to do institutional work—in ways that are aligned with more care-based logics. This finding generally aligns with structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012), including the importance of the external environment to collaboration (Seo et al., 2023). It also underscores how disruptive crises in the institutional environment can impact street-level organizations and providers by promoting practices that align with institutional shifts (Brodkin, 2021). Given how incremental field-level change can be, capturing the bottom-up institutional work of providers and other relevant individuals may help us better see the scope of change that may happen through day-to-day implementation processes (Sandfort & Moulton, 2015). Of course, in combination with the institutional context, characteristics of organizations and individuals will also impact the type of institutional work that happens. For example, my findings suggested that bridging practices were supported by individuals' beliefs in the complementarity between logics, as well as less critical beliefs about conflicting logics and their

associated individuals. As such, it is important to pay attention to how *and* why organizations and providers conduct institutional work because those organizations are positioned either to advance or inhibit the care-based goals of policy shifts, including those related to social movements, social justice, and anti-oppression.

Further, institutional work and street-level perspectives can help researchers home in on service providers and related individuals' specific practices that shape institutions and institutional shifts. In Chapter Six, I argue that institutional change in public safety involves shifting expectations regarding how and by whom public safety could be achieved, which influenced service providers' policy design and implementation decisions about police collaboration. Provider practices centered on how individuals evaluated and pursued (or not) collaborative relationships between service providers and police in consideration of policy-based institutional change. These relational practices hold consequences for how public safety policy is achieved that advances institutional change.

By considering relationships, this dissertation adds to our understanding of how the active consideration and management of relational boundaries on the street-level holds consequences for institutional change efforts. Relationships between individuals and organizations are central to policy implementation. Future studies that focus on relationship dynamics among individuals across an organizational field can serve as a bridge to connect our understanding of institutional phenomenon with street-level explorations. Further, research that views relationships as the unit of analysis can build important connections between the multiscalar levels of implementation, including the policy, organizational, and front-line levels (Moulton & Sandfort, 2017; Sandfort & Moulton, 2015).

Yet, this dissertation also carries important insights for understanding field-level institutional change. Theoretically, it helps us understand the "institutional accommodation" pathway of institutional change where transformative goals result in incrementalist outcomes, which is an understudied, yet likely common pathway of institutional change (Micelotta et al., 2017). As shown in Chapter Four, the three simultaneous shifts in logics helped facilitate institutional change. Yet, sociopolitical factors and the actions of political actors tempered the progress of these three shifts. While I qualitatively captured these shifts and processes, future research can examine their quantitative relationship. For example, in the face of factors that temper institutional change, to what extent must each shift in logics occur to increase the likelihood of a "both/and" institutional settlement instead of a regression to the prior status quo? Pursuing such a question can help us understand the extent to which specific shifts are integral to resulting institutional settlements.

Future research can also further examine the impact of multiple field-level logic shifts on organizations and providers working in specific service areas. For example, all three shifts impacted behavioral health crisis response in Austin. City officials sought to separate punishment and treatment by decoupling emergency communications into an independent department. Additionally, they boosted support for the treatment logic by providing resources to the mental health organization in Austin tasked with responding to crises. Finally, partly to mitigate police violence in mental health crises, city officials pursued change in the punishment logic by requiring police to de-escalate conflicts prior to using force. To what extent did each of these field-level shifts—individually and/or collectively—impact the institutional work of service providers and their beliefs about harm, care, and police collaboration in the crisis response field? How much do field-level logic shifts impact organization-level shifts in logics

that service providers pursue? Further, how much do these shifts impact service outcomes for clients? Future research can help us better understand the connections between institutional shifts, organizational policies and programs, service provider behaviors and beliefs, and better service outcomes.

Findings also help us understand how sociopolitical processes shape institutional change, policy, and services, particularly the role of incumbents and challengers in unsettled field arrangements (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Sandfort & Moulton, 2015). These processes necessarily involve issues of power. Yet, institutional theory has often neglected issues of power, oppression, marginalization, and emancipation (Lawrence & Buchanan, 2017). Given this, institutional scholars have called for a “critical institutionalism” (Lok, 2019; Munir, 2014; Suddaby, 2015), which attends to the role of power and oppression in institutional phenomena.

This dissertation points to the importance of paying attention to the intertwined material and symbolic aspects of power in institutional research. For example, in Chapter Four we saw how powerful actors can use the symbolic rhetoric of transformative change (e.g., “reimagining public safety”) to achieve their incrementalist, material goals (e.g., reopening the police cadet academy and boosting staffing levels). Or, in Chapter Six, we saw how some administrators downplayed the role of oppression and racialized harms against BIPOC communities, which informed their focus on making minor adjustments to crisis response systems. These beliefs can be influential in a contested organizational field where some individuals hold the power to turn their beliefs into material reality (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). If institutional scholarship is going to tackle “grand social challenges” (Hampel et al., 2017, p. 581), it must address issues of power in timely, relevant, politically consequential fields like public safety.

7.3 Carceral Challenges to Institutional Change

Ongoing changes in the field of public safety present opportunities for socially engaged institutional research. As noted in Chapter Four, since the events of 2020 the national sociopolitical environment has become more generally favorable to policing, albeit with reforms. For instance, President Biden's "Safer America Plan" invests billions of dollars into building local police forces and advancing community policing. Meanwhile, municipal strategies, like Minneapolis's Operation Endeavor, places police and public safety alternatives under one organizational roof, posing challenges to the institutional separation of punishment and care. Such challenges to institutional change provide opportunities for researchers to leverage institutional theory's strengths in understanding how the environment constrains change efforts (Aksom & Tymchenko, 2020).

Moreover, police violence continues to prompt change efforts in public safety. A report by Mapping Police Violence (2022) shows that the number of 2022 police killings in the United States mirrored or exceeded the number of killings in the prior decade. This echoes a report by the Centers for Disease Control that shows police killings as a prevalent cause of violent death in the United States (Liu et al., 2022). In this context, abolitionists continue to call for defunding the police and reinvesting in community-based solutions by targeting municipal budgets (Ritchie 2021, 2022). Further, advocates push for state-level policy that can ease the pathway towards public safety alternatives, such as policy supports for non-police behavioral health crisis response (El-Sabawi & Carroll, 2021). As these efforts are undertaken in a context that generally favors incrementalist change, institutional scholars continue to have the opportunity to explore how, and to what extent, change occurs amid institutional constraint.

Such studies can focus on the longitudinal arc of institutional change that is not captured by this dissertation. Institutional change takes time and both Minneapolis and Austin hold further empirical opportunities to track their progress. For example, city officials in Minneapolis have established a new Office of Community Safety that will centralize many of the public safety functions that had heretofore been fragmented across city offices, including policing, community-based violence prevention, and behavioral health crisis response. The city's financial investments in all these areas have continued into 2023, yet it remains unclear what centralization means for institutional change outcomes. How might organizational centralization impact long-term change regarding the punishing nature of policing, the marginalization of alternative care-based public safety programs, and the separated relationship between policing and social services, and therefore, punishment and care?

In particular, organizational centralization likely holds many challenges to separating policing and social services. In such a case, it is possible that service providers will be shaped by police, especially if embedded within organizations dominated by a punishment logic. Yet, conversely, it may also hold opportunities for service provider's ability to spread and shape public safety logics by offering them greater access to the people, policies, and structures that make up the public safety infrastructure of the city. As the Minneapolis Police Department is now under two consent decrees that demand police reform, service providers may find additional opportunities to foster changes in policing and public safety. In either case, Austin may continue to offer an interesting juxtaposition to Minneapolis's centralization efforts since Austin continues to pursue a more organizationally fragmented approach to public safety programs in the city.

Future research can use the institutional logics perspective to understand organizational centralization and carceral dynamics within organizations. Specifically, organizational hybridity

research explores how logics relate at the organizational level, such as through blending or (de)coupling in organizational structures and practices (Pache & Santos, 2013; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). It is likely that centralizing various, and often competing, public safety initiatives into one organizational entity would foster tensions between the public safety logics employed by these initiatives. Hybridity research can help us understand the various mechanisms through which these tensions are reconciled.

7.4 The Relationship Between Social Work and Police

Among social work scholars and practitioners, debate continues regarding the profession's appropriate relationship to police and carceral systems. There exists a tension between abolitionist approaches, which call for no relationships between service providers and police (Abrams & Dettlaff, 2020; Jacobs et al., 2021; Murray et al., 2023; Toraif & Mueller, 2023), and reformist approaches, which view social work as having a role in changing police culture and practices (Scott et al., 2023; Sherraden, 2020; Wilson et al., 2022). Recent research underscores this tension (Fixler et al., 2023), suggesting that social workers experience an "ethical practice paradox" when considering collaborations with the police: social workers understand the racialized harms perpetuated by police, yet also feel called to mitigate those harms through collaborations with police.

This paradox indicates that social workers might view the institutional work shaping mechanism as critical to addressing police violence. In Chapter Five, I found evidence that some service providers viewed their direct interaction with police officers as essential to creating a more caring version of policing and punishment. While more research is needed, my findings suggest that three institutional and organizational conditions may influence the ability of social workers to shape the punishing logic of police. First, institutional environments promote the

legitimacy of some logics over others. Shaping may be more successful if the logics being used to shape conflicting logics hold legitimacy in the broader institutional field. Second, organizational context matters. Logics that dominate an organization's culture may be both more successful in shaping conflicting logics in that organization, as well as resisting shaping practices themselves (e.g., not within police departments). Finally, shaping may only be possible when individuals directly interact with the individual and associated conflicting logics they are attempting to shape. Shaping may be impossible when segmenting practices create opaque boundaries between logics and their associated individuals.

Yet, I also found that service providers took actions to separate themselves from police and punishment (i.e., the segmenting mechanism). Given these findings, how can service providers both separate themselves from police and punishment, while also working to modify policing culture and practices? On the road towards abolitionist non-reformist reforms (Gilmore, 2007; Kaba & Ritchie, 2022; Vitale, 2021), these findings call for further research on the (in)compatibilities of these mechanisms of institutional work, including the aspects of policy and organizations that support these mechanisms. Studies should focus on service areas where service providers must frequently manage inter-organizational and inter-professional boundaries between themselves and police, such as behavioral health crisis response. Studies can also differentiate between the multiple ways social workers collaborate with police (e.g., trainings, direct service teams, etc.) (Linhorst et al., 2022).

As an alternative to institutional theory, organizational paradox theory might help us understand how social workers and their organizations manage the tension between segmenting and shaping. While institutional theory emphasizes that such tensions need to be resolved in organizations, often structurally, paradox theory emphasizes the dynamic, interdependent, and

unresolvable nature of such tensions (Smith & Tracey, 2016). As social workers engage in practice contexts with ongoing competing demands, paradox theory might better capture how social workers dynamically manage the "ethical practice paradox" of police collaboration (Fixler et al., 2023).

Given this dissertation's findings, how can service providers be supported in advancing care-based institutional work? First, service providers can benefit from explicit organizational policies and programs regarding collaborations with police and carceral systems. To align frontline provider practices with organizational policies and programs, administrators should take steps to foster organizational cultures and norms that support their intended boundaries between and expansion of logics. For example, organizational cultures can encourage providers to view their effectiveness with clients as partly tied to their ability to maintain segmented boundaries with police. Additionally, policymakers and administrators should consider developing systems that minimize the need for police collaboration. For instance, in Chapter Five, some service providers engaged in the bridging mechanism in high-risk situations; what alternative systems to policing and punishment can be developed that offer service providers a different option? Police collaboration can also be discouraged by tying resource opportunities to programmatic models that require limited to no collaboration.

The implication that there should be less collaboration between police and service providers runs counter to the trend in various threads of organizational research calling for more collaboration between different groups and individuals. For example, research on collaborative governance tends to examine the ways that collaboration can be furthered by attending to various challenges in the collaboration process, such as addressing hierarchies, equal participation, and power sharing (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2015; Emerson et al., 2012). In the

interprofessional collaboration literature, strong boundaries between professions are often seen as negatively inhibiting collaboration (Bucher et al., 2016; Martin et al, 2009). While a recent study on interprofessional collaboration found that greater boundaries between different professionals can enhance collaboration, the goal of collaboration was still assumed (Farchi et al., 2023). Further, research specific to criminal-legal contexts has suggested that service provider-police collaborations can be beneficial to clients (Cohen, 2023).

Yet, other recent research, including this dissertation, highlights the challenges present in collaborations between service providers and criminal-legal system actors (Franke & Shdaimah, 2022), including the potential for police-service provider collaborations to further harms among marginalized clients (Anasti, 2020). An abolitionist perspective calls us to treat collaborations with criminal-legal systems and actors as circumspect (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022). Instead of focusing on "reformist reforms" that re-shape the punishing logic of policing (Gilmore, 2007), abolitionist organizations like Critical Resistance (2020, p. 19) call for actions that reduce "the size, scope and capacity of systems of policing." Restricting service provider-police collaborations reduces the scope and capacity of police to criminalize and punish marginalized populations that service providers regularly serve. In addition to the beliefs about harm and care described in Chapter Six, it is possible that service providers hold normative beliefs regarding the inherent value of inter-professional collaboration that could be a barrier to abolitionist change. In their work on policy implementation, Sandfort and Moulton (2015) call on researchers to examine the values and beliefs that undergird service interventions, including those that may facilitate or stymie inter-agency coordination. Applying an abolitionist lens helps us see the need for more research on the benefits and challenges for professionals not collaborating.

As institutional processes unfold that challenge the ties between police and service providers, and punishment and care, more research is needed to understand the policy and organizational barriers that might delimit change. Resource dynamics remains a major area of consideration. Extant research shows that state-based funding to social service organizations can contribute to the ongoing collaboration between these systems during service design and implementation (Simes et al., 2022). Meanwhile, critical and abolitionist scholarship suggests that liberation from state oppression may be undermined through resource-based ties between the state and nonprofit social service organizations (Gilmore, 2007; Smith, 2007). As police defunding remains a core strategy of abolitionist organizing (Kaba & Ritchie, 2022; Ritchie, 2021, 2022), evidence is needed to understand the state-nonprofit funding dynamics activated through police defunding and how these dynamics contribute to, or liberate us from, carcerality. Future research should examine the spectrum of factors that create organizational ties between carceral systems and service providers, including state funds, contracting mechanisms, and accountability processes. Such research would augment the focus on policy and practice implementation elaborated in this dissertation. Practically, this research could also contribute to advocacy efforts for non-carceral public safety services by uncovering the black box of resource implementation when funding for those services comes through the state.

Social workers and service providers have a significant role to play in furthering carceral disruption and institutional change in public safety. As scholars and practitioners, we should remain inspired by the organizing and protests of 2020, the largest in US history, and committed to playing our part in challenging institutions that perpetuate punishment over care. We should also remain accountable to the communities we serve that have been harmed by social work's relationship to carceral systems and perpetuation of punishing social control. Social workers can

leverage the gains of institutional change in public safety—as incremental as they may be—to challenge state and police violence, refuse collaborations that further punishment, and expand care in ways that make sense to our communities.

Bibliography

Abbasi, G. (2020). Discipline and commoditize: How U-Visas exploit the pain of gender-based violence. *Feminist Criminology*, *15*(4), 464–491. https://doi.org/10.1177/1557085120923037

Abramovitz, M. (1996). *Regulating the lives of women: Social welfare policy from colonial times to the present*. South End Press.

Abrams, L. S., & Dettlaff, A. J. (2020, June 23). An Open Letter to NASW and Allied Organizations on Social Work's Relationship with Law Enforcement. *Medium*. https://alandettlaff.medium.com/an-open-letter-to-nasw-and-allied-organizations-on-social-works-relationship-with-law-enforcement-1a1926c71b28

Akbar, A. A. (2020). An abolitionist horizon for (police) reform. *Calif. L. Rev.*, *108*, 1781-1846.

Aksom, H., & Tymchenko, I. (2020). How institutional theories explain and fail to explain organizations. *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, *33*(7), 1223–1252. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOCM-05-2019-0130

Almandoz, J., Marquis, C., & Cheely, M. (2017). *Drivers of community strength: An institutional logics perspective on geographical and affiliation-based communities* (By R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. Lawrence, & R. Meyer; pp. 190–213). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n3

American Community Survey (ACS). (2020). *ACS demographic and housing estimates 1-year estimates*. www.data.census.gov

Anasti, T. (2020). "Officers are doing the best they can": Concerns around law enforcement and social service collaboration in service provision to sex workers. *Affilia*, *35*(1), 49–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109919889034

Anasti, T. (2023). Human service nonprofits providing services to sex workers: Efforts to manage competing logics and ideologies from an inhabited institutions framework. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, *52*(1), 222–242. https://doi.org/10.1177/08997640221074703

Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *18*(4), 543–571. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032

Badger, E., & Bui, Q. (2020, June 12). Cities grew safer. Police budgets kept growing. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/12/upshot/cities-grew-safer-police-budgets-kept-growing.html

Bass, S. (2001). Policing space, policing race: Social control imperatives and police discretionary decisions. *Social Justice*, *28*(1 (83), 156–176.

Battilana, J., Besharov, M., & Mitzinneck, B. (2017). On hybrids and hybrid organizing: A review and roadmap for future research. *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, *2*, 128–162.

Battilana, J., Leca, B., & Boxenbaum, E. (2009). How actors change institutions: Towards a

theory of institutional entrepreneurship. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *3*(1), 65–107.
Beckett, K., & Western, B. (2001). Governing social marginality: Welfare, incarceration, and the transformation of state policy. *Punishment & Society*, *3*(1), 43–59.
Bell, M. C. (2017). Police reform and the dismantling of legal estrangement. *The Yale Law Journal*, *126*(7), 2054–2150.
Benjamin, L. M., & Campbell, D. C. (2015). Nonprofit performance: Accounting for the agency of clients. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, *44*(5), 988–1006.
Bertels, S., & Lawrence, T. B. (2016). Organizational responses to institutional complexity stemming from emerging logics: The role of individuals. *Strategic Organization*, *14*(4), 336–372.
Besharov, M. L., & Smith, W. K. (2014). Multiple institutional logics in organizations: Explaining their varied nature and implications. *Academy of Management Review*, *39*(3), 364–381.
Beunen, R., & Patterson, J. J. (2019). Analysing institutional change in environmental governance: Exploring the concept of 'institutional work.' *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, *62*(1), 12–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2016.1257423
Binder, A. (2007). For love and money: Organizations' creative responses to multiple environmental logics. *Theory and Society*, *36*, 547–571.
Binder, A. J. (2018). Afterword: New institutional, inhabited institutional, and a cultural-organizational approach to studying elites and higher education. *Universities and the Production of Elites: Discourses, Policies, and Strategies of Excellence and Stratification in Higher Education*, 373–385.
Blomgren, M., & Waks, C. (2015). Coping with contradictions: Hybrid professionals managing institutional complexity. *Journal of Professions and Organization*, *2*(1), 78–102. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jou010
Bohrman, C., Panichelli, M., Hipple, E., Smith, E., & Jones, N. (2023, January 11). *Abolitionist approaches to mental health*. SSWR 2023. https://secure.sswr.org/2023-conference-home/
Braga, A. A., Brunson, R. K., & Drakulich, K. M. (2019). Race, place, and effective policing. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *45*, 535–555.
Breit, E., Andreassen, T. A., & Salomon, R. H. (2016). Modification of public policies by street-level organisations: An institutional work perspective. *Journal of Social Policy*, *45*(4), 709–728.
Brodkin, E. Z. (2008). Accountability in street-level organizations. *Intl Journal of Public Administration*, *31*(3), 317–336.
Brodkin, E. Z. (2011). Policy work: Street-level organizations under new managerialism. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *21*(suppl_2), i253–i277.
Brodkin, E. Z. (2021). Street-level organizations at the front lines of crises. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, *23*(1), 16–29.
Brodkin, E. Z., & Marston, G. (2013). *Work and the welfare state: Street-level organizations and workfare politics*. Georgetown University Press.
Bromley, P., & Meyer, J. W. (2017). "They are all organizations": The cultural roots of blurring between the nonprofit, business, and government sectors. *Administration & Society*, *49*(7), 939–966. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399714548268

Brydolf-Horwitz, M., & Beckett, K. (2021). Welfare, punishment, and social marginality: understanding the connections. In *The Politics of Inequality* (Vol. 28, pp. 91–111). Emerald Publishing Limited.

Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2015). Designing and implementing cross-sector collaborations: Needed and challenging. *Public Administration Review*, *75*(5), 647–663. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12432

Bucher, S. V., Chreim, S., Langley, A., & Reay, T. (2016). Contestation about collaboration: Discursive boundary work among professions. *Organization Studies*, *37*(4), 497–522. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840615622067

Butts, J. A., Roman, C. G., Bostwick, L., & Porter, J. R. (2015). Cure Violence: A public health model to reduce gun violence. *Annual Review of Public Health*, *36*(1), 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122509

Casasnovas, G., & Chliova, M. (2020). Legitimacy trade-offs in hybrid fields: An illustration through microfinance, impact investing and social entrepreneurship. In *Organizational Hybridity: Perspectives, Processes, Promises* (pp. 291–312). Emerald Publishing Limited.

Castellano, U. (2011). Courting compliance: Case managers as “double agents” in the mental health court. *Law & Social Inquiry*, *36*(2), 484–514.

Chapman, C., & Withers, A. J. (2019). *Violent history of benevolence: Interlocking oppression in the moral economies of social working*. University of Toronto Press.

Cloutier, C., Denis, J.-L., Langley, A., & Lamothe, L. (2016). Agency at the managerial interface: Public sector reform as institutional work. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *26*(2), 259–276. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muv009

Cohen, G. (2023). “We’re not the cure, we’re just the band-aid”: The interplay of structure, culture, and practice in police service provision to persons with mental illnesses. *The American Review of Public Administration*, *53*(3–4), 99–114. https://doi.org/10.1177/02750740231165012

Critical Resistance. (2020). *Our communities, our solutions: An organizer’s toolkit for developing campaigns to abolish policing.* https://criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/CR_Abolish-Policing-Toolkit_2020.pdf

Dias, J. J., & Maynard-Moody, S. (2007). For-profit welfare: Contracts, conflicts, and the performance paradox. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *17*(2), 189–211.

DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, *48*(2), 147–160. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101

Dobson, C. (2019). *Merging criminal justice and social welfare in mental health court: The disparate impacts and outcomes of coercive aid in the era of mass incarceration* [PhD Thesis].

Dunn, M. B., & Jones, C. (2010). Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: The contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *55*(1), 114–149.

El-Sabawi, T., & Carroll, J. J. (2021). A model for defunding: An evidence-based statute for behavioral health crisis response. *Temple Law Review*, *94*, 1–49.

Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An integrative framework for collaborative governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *22*(1), 1–29.

https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur011
Farchi, T., Dopson, S., & Ferlie, E. (2023). Do we still need professional boundaries? The multiple influences of boundaries on interprofessional collaboration. *Organization Studies*, *44*(2), 277–298.
Feldman, G. (2021). Social work and the state: Perspectives and practice. *Social Policy & Administration*, *55*(5), 879–890.
Felker-Kantor, M. (2018). *Policing Los Angeles: Race, resistance, and the rise of the LAPD*. UNC Press Books.
Fixler, A. L., Jacobs, L. A., & Davis, C. D. (2023). Police-social work collaboration and the ethical practice paradox: Perspectives from social work's next generation. *Journal of Progressive Human Services*, *35*(1).
Fligstein, N., & McAdam, D. (2012). *A theory of fields*. Oxford University Press.
Fortin, I. (2023). Logic plasticity and bounded custodial work in inter-institutional projects. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 10564926231165680. https://doi.org/10.1177/10564926231165680
Franke, N. D., & Shdaimah, C. (2022). 'I have different goals than you, we can't be a team': Navigating the tensions of a courtroom workgroup in a prostitution diversion program. *Ethics and Social Welfare*, *16*(2), 193–205.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis* (pp. 232–263). University of Chicago Press.
Fuller, D. A., Lamb, H. R., Biasotti, M., & Snook, J. (2015, December). *Overlooked in the undercounted: The role of mental illness in fatal law enforcement encounters*. Treatment Advocacy Center. https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/overlooked-in-the-undercounted
Garland, D. (2012). *The culture of control: Crime and social order in contemporary society*. University of Chicago Press.
Garrow, E. E., & Grusky, O. (2013). Institutional logic and street-level discretion: The case of HIV test counseling. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *23*(1), 103–131.
Gawer, A., & Phillips, N. (2013). Institutional work as logics shift: The case of Intel's transformation to platform leader. *Organization Studies*, *34*(8), 1035–1071.
Georgiou, A., & Arenas, D. (2023). Community in organizational research: A review and an institutional logics perspective. *Organization Theory*, *4*(1), 26317877231153188. https://doi.org/10.1177/26317877231153189
Gibson, W., & Brown, A. (2009). *Working with qualitative data*. SAGE Publications, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857029041
Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society. Berkeley*. CA: University of California Press.
Gieryn, T. F. (1983). Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. *American Sociological Review*, *48*(6), 781–795. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095325
Gilling, D. (2001). Community safety and social policy. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, *9*, 381–400.
Gilmore, R. W. (2007). *Golden gulag: Prisons, surplus, crisis, and opposition in globalizing California*. University of California Press.
Goodrick, E., & Reay, T. (2011). Constellations of institutional logics: Changes in the

professional work of pharmacists. *Work and Occupations*, *38*(3), 372–416.
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses. *Academy of Management Annals*, *5*(1), 317–371.
Gümüsay, A. A., Claus, L., & Amis, J. (2020). Engaging with grand challenges: An institutional logics perspective. *Organization Theory*, *1*(3), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/26317877209604
Hallett, T. (2010). The myth incarnate: Recoupling processes, turmoil, and inhabited institutions in an urban elementary school. *American Sociological Review*, *75*(1), 52–74.
Hallett, T., & Ventresca, M. J. (2006). Inhabited institutions: Social interactions and organizational forms in Gouldner's patterns of industrial bureaucracy. *Theory and Society*, *35*(2), 213–236. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-006-9003-z
Hampel, C. E., Lawrence, T. B., & Tracey, P. (2017). Institutional work: Taking stock and making it matter. *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, 558–590.
Harris, A. P., Walker, H. L., & Eckhouse, L. (2020). No justice, no peace: Political science perspectives on the American carceral state. *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, *5*(3), 427–449.
Hasenfeld, Y. (2000). Organizational forms as moral practices: The case of welfare departments. *Social Service Review*, *74*(3), 329–351.
Hasenfeld, Y. (2010). Organizational responses to social policy: The case of welfare reform. *Administration in Social Work*, *34*(2), 148–167.
Headworth, S. (2021). *Policing welfare: Punitive adversarialism in public assistance*. University of Chicago Press.
Hendrikx, W., & van Gestel, N. (2017). The emergence of hybrid professional roles: GPs and secondary school teachers in a context of public sector reform. *Public Management Review*, *19*(8), 1105–1123. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2016.1257062
Hine, C. (2008). Virtual ethnography: Modes, varieties, affordances. *The SAGE Handbook of Online Research Methods*, 257–270.
Hinton, E. (2016). *From the war on poverty to the war on crime: The making of mass incarceration in America*. Harvard University Press.
Hirsch, P. M. (1997). Review essay: Sociology without social structure: Neoinstitutional theory meets brave new world. *American Journal of Sociology*, *102*(6), 1702–1723.
Howlett, M. (2022). Looking at the 'field' through a Zoom lens: Methodological reflections on conducting online research during a global pandemic. *Qualitative Research*, *22*(3), 387–402.
Jacobs, L. A., Kim, M. E., Whitfield, D. L., Gartner, R. E., Panichelli, M., Kattari, S. K., Downey, M. M., McQueen, S. S., & Mountz, S. E. (2021). Defund the police: Moving towards an anti-carceral social work. *Journal of Progressive Human Services*, *32*(1), 37–62.
Jepperson, R. (1991). Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 143–163.
J.Gibson, W., & Brown, A. (2009). *Working with qualitative data*. SAGE Publications, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857029041
Johnson, C., Dowd, T. J., & Ridgeway, C. L. (2006). Legitimacy as a social process. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *32*(1), 53–78. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.32.061604.123101

Kaba, M., & Ritchie, A. J. (2022). *No more police: A case for abolition*. The New Press.
Katz, M. B. (1996). *In the shadow of the poorhouse: A social history of welfare in America*. Basic Books.
Kaye, K. (2019). *Enforcing freedom: Drug courts, therapeutic communities, and the intimacies of the state*. Columbia University Press.
Kim, M. E. (2018). From carceral feminism to transformative justice: Women-of-color feminism and alternatives to incarceration. *Journal of Ethnic & Cultural Diversity in Social Work*, *27*(3), 219–233.
Kim, M. E. (2020). The carceral creep: Gender-based violence, race, and the expansion of the punitive state, 1973–1983. *Social Problems*, *67*(2), 251–269.
Kim, M. E., Chung, M., Hassan, S., & Ritchie, A. J. (2021). *Defund the police – invest in community care: A guide to alternative mental health responses.* Interrupting Criminalization | Research In Action. https://www.interruptingcriminalization.com/non-police-crisis-response-guide
Kohler-Hausmann, I. (2018). *Misdemeanorland: Criminal courts and social control in an age of broken windows policing*. Princeton University Press.
Lara-Millán, A. (2014). Public emergency room overcrowding in the era of mass imprisonment. *American Sociological Review*, *79*(5), 866–887.
Lara-Millán, A. (2021). *Redistributing the poor: Jails, hospitals, and the crisis of law and fiscal austerity*. Oxford University Press.
Lara-Millán, A., & Van Cleve, N. G. (2017). Interorganizational utility of welfare stigma in the criminal justice system. *Criminology*, *55*(1), 59–84.
Lawrence, T. B., & Buchanan, S. (2017). Power, institutions and organizations. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. Lawrence, & R. Meyer, *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 477–506). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n19
Lawrence, T., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2011). Institutional work: Refocusing institutional studies of organization. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, *20*(1), 52–58.
Linhorst, D., Ojo, C., Maynard, B. R., Termos, M., Oakes, R., & Schafer, J. A. (2022). Models of social worker and police officer collaborations and the social issues they address: A systematic review. *Journal of the Society for Social Work and Research*. https://doi.org/10.1086/723883
Lipsky, M. (2010). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service*. Russell Sage Foundation.
Liu, G. S., Nguyen, B. L., Lyons, B. H., Sheats, K. J., Wilson, R. F., Betz, C. J., & Fowler, K. A. (2023). Surveillance for violent deaths—National Violent Death Reporting System, 48 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, 2020. *MMWR. Surveillance Summaries*, *72*(SS-5), 1–38. https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.ss7205a1
Lok, J. (2019). Why (and how) institutional theory can be critical: Addressing the challenge to institutional theory's critical turn. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, *28*(3), 335–349.
Lounsbury, M. (2007). A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the professionalizing of mutual funds. *Academy of Management Journal*, *50*(2), 289–307.
Lounsbury, M. (2023). The problem of institutional trust. *Organization Studies*, *44*(2), 308–310. https://doi.org/10.1177/01708406221131415
Lounsbury, M., Steele, C. W., Wang, M. S., & Toubiana, M. (2021). New directions in the study of institutional logics: From tools to phenomena. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *47*, 261–

280.
Lyons, W. (2002). *The politics of community policing: Rearranging the power to punish*. University of Michigan Press.
Mapping Police Violence. (2022). *2022 police violence report*. https://policeviolencereport.org/
Marcus, G. E. (1995). Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *24*(1), 95–117. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.24.100195.000523
Martin, G. P., Currie, G., & Finn, R. (2009). Reconfiguring or reproducing intra-professional boundaries? Specialist expertise, generalist knowledge and the 'modernization' of the medical workforce. *Social Science & Medicine*, *68*(7), 1191–1198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.01.006
Marwell, N., & Brown, M. (2020). Towards a governance framework for government-nonprofit relations. *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, 227–250.
Marwell, N. P., & Morrissey, S. L. (2020). Organizations and the governance of urban poverty. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *46*, 233–250.
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2012). Social equities and inequities in practice: Street-Level workers as agents and pragmatists. *Public Administration Review*, *72*(s1), S16–S23.
Maynard-Moody, S. W., & Musheno, M. C. (2022). *Cops, teachers, counselors: Stories from the front lines of public service*. University of Michigan Press.
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805431
Micelotta, E., Lounsbury, M., & Greenwood, R. (2017). Pathways of institutional change: An integrative review and research agenda. *Journal of Management*, *43*(6), 1885–1910.
Miller, R. J. (2014). Devolving the carceral state: Race, prisoner reentry, and the micro-politics of urban poverty management. *Punishment & Society*, *16*(3), 305–335. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474514527487
Mills, A. J., Durepos, G., & Wiebe, E. (2009). *Encyclopedia of case study research*. SAGE Publications.
Moody-Adams, M. (2022). *Making space for justice: Social movements, collective imagination, and political hope*. Columbia University Press.
Moore, K. S., Tom, R., & O'Neil, J. (2022). *The truth behind crime statistics: Avoiding distortions and improving public safety*. https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/2022-08-03-TMI-Truth-in-Crime-Statistics-Report-FINAL-2.pdf
Mosley, J. E. (2020). Social service nonprofits: Navigating conflicting demands. *The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook*, 251–270.
Moulton, S., & Sandfort, J. R. (2017). The strategic action field framework for policy implementation research. *Policy Studies Journal*, *45*(1), 144–169. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12147
Munir, K. A. (2015). A loss of power in institutional theory. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, *24*(1), 90–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492614545302
Murray, B. J., Copeland, V., & Dettlaff, A. J. (2023). Reflections on the ethical possibilities and limitations of abolitionist praxis in social work. *Affilia*, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1177/08861099221146151
Nanasi, N. (2017). The U Visa's failed promise for survivors of domestic violence. *Yale Journal of Law and Feminism*, *29*, 273-320.

Nicolini, D., Delmestri, G., Goodrick, E., Reay, T., Lindberg, K., & Adolfsson, P. (2016). Look what's back! Institutional complexity, reversibility and the knotting of logics. *British Journal of Management*, *27*(2), 228–248.
Noordegraaf, M. (2015). Hybrid professionalism and beyond: (New) Forms of public professionalism in changing organizational and societal contexts. *Journal of Professions and Organization*, *2*(2), 187–206. https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/jov002
Ocasio, W. (2023). Institutions and their social construction: A cross-level perspective. *Organization Theory*, *4*(3), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/26317877231194368
Ocasio, W., Thornton, P. H., & Lounsbury, M. (2017). Advances to the institutional logics perspective. *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, *2*, 509–531.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. *Academy of Management Review*, *16*(1), 145–179.
Pache, A.-C., & Santos, F. (2013). Inside the hybrid organization: Selective coupling as a response to competing institutional logics. *Academy of Management Journal*, *56*(4), 972–1001.
Partners for Justice. (2023, May). *Community and social ties create safety*. https://www.partnersforjustice.org/evidence/strong-social-ties-increase-safety
Patterson, G. T., & Swan, P. G. (2019). Police social work and social service collaboration strategies one hundred years after Vollmer: A systematic review. *Policing: An International Journal*, *42*(5), 863–886.
Phelps, M. S., & Ruhland, E. L. (2022). Governing marginality: Coercion and care in probation. *Social Problems*, *69*(3), 799–816.
Phelps, M. S., Ward, A., & Frazier, D. (2021). From Police reform to police abolition? How Minneapolis activists fought to make Black Lives Matter. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *26*(4), 421–441. https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-26-4-421
Pierson, P. (2000). The limits of design: Explaining institutional origins and change. *Governance*, *13*(4), 475–499. https://doi.org/10.1111/0952-1895.00142
Pitts, J., & Hope, T. (1997). The local politics of inclusion: The state and community safety. *Social Policy & Administration*, *31*(5), 37–58.
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. (2012). *Regulating the poor: The functions of public welfare*. Vintage.
Powell, W. W., & Rerup, C. (2017). Opening the black box: The microfoundations of institutions. *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism*, *2*, 311–337.
Prowse, G., Weaver, V. M., & Meares, T. L. (2020). The state from below: Distorted responsiveness in policed communities. *Urban Affairs Review*, *56*(5), 1423–1471.
Purdy, J. M., & Gray, B. (2009). Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion, and multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional fields. *Academy of Management Journal*, *52*(2), 355–380.
Quattrone, P. (2015). Governing social orders, unfolding rationality, and Jesuit accounting practices: A procedural approach to institutional logics. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *60*(3), 411–445. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839215592174
Rahman, S., Teicher, J., Cox, J. W., & Alam, Q. (2023). Slipstreaming for public sector reform: How enterprising public sector leaders navigate institutional inertia. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *33*(1), 4–18. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac006
Rao, H., & Kenney, M. (2008). New forms as settlements. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R.

Suddaby, & K. Sahlin, *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 352–370). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849200387.n14

Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. (2003). Institutional change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle cuisine as an identity movement in French gastronomy. *American Journal of Sociology*, *108*(4), 795–843.

Ray, V. (2019). A Theory of racialized organizations. *American Sociological Review*, *84*(1), 26–53. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122418822335

Raynard, M. (2016). Deconstructing complexity: Configurations of institutional complexity and structural hybridity. *Strategic Organization*, *14*(4), 310–335. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127016634639

Reay, T., Goodrick, E., & Lu, C. (2020). Institutional settlements and organizational hybridity: The rise and fall of supervised consumption sites. In M. L. Besharov & B. C. Mitzinneck (Eds.), *Organizational Hybridity: Perspectives, Processes, Promises* (Vol. 69, pp. 271–289). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X20200000069012

Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. *Organization Studies*, *30*(6), 629–652. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840609104803

Reay, T., & Jones, C. (2016). Qualitatively capturing institutional logics. *Strategic Organization*, *14*(4), 441–454. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127015589981

Rice, D. (2013). Street-level bureaucrats and the welfare state: Toward a micro-institutionalist theory of policy implementation. *Administration & Society*, *45*(9), 1038–1062. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399712451895

Rice, D. (2019). Adopting an institutional view in street-level bureaucracy research. In P. Hupe (Ed.), *Research Handbook on Street-Level Bureaucracy*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786437631.00015

Richie, B. E., & Martensen, K. M. (2020). Resisting carcerality, embracing Abolition: Implications for feminist social work practice. *Affilia*, *35*(1), 12–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109919897576

Rios, V. M. (2006). The hyper-criminalization of Black and Latino male youth in the era of mass incarceration. *Souls*, *8*(2), 40–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999940600680457

Risi, D., & Marti, E. (2022). Illuminating the dark side of values: A framework for institutional research. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, *31*(3), 253–263.

Ritchie, A. J. (2021). *The demand is still #DefundThePolice: lessons from 2020*. Community Resource Hub. https://communityresourcehub.org/resources/the-demand-is-still-defundthepolice-lessons-from-2020/

Ritchie, A. J. (2022). *The struggle continues*. https://www.interruptingcriminalization.com/struggle-continues

Roberts, D. E. (2011). Prison, foster care, and the systemic punishment of Black mothers. *UCLA Law Review*, *59*, 1474-1500.

Rogers, M. S., McNiel, D. E., & Binder, R. L. (2019). Effectiveness of police crisis intervention training programs. *The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, *47*(4), 414–421. https://doi.org/10.29158/jaapl.003863-19

Rojas, F. (2017). Race and institutionalism. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. Lawrence, & R. Meyer, *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 786–807). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n31

Rojas, F. (2019). Race and organization theory: Reflections and open questions. In *Race, Organizations, and the Organizing Process* (Vol. 60, pp. 15–23). Emerald Publishing

Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X20190000060002
Rosich, K. J. (2007). *Race, ethnicity, and the criminal justice system*. https://dataspace.princeton.edu/handle/88435/dsp01z603r165w
Saldaña, J. (2021). *The coding manual for qualitative researchers*. sage.
Sandfort, J., & Moulton, S. (2014). *Effective implementation in practice: Integrating public policy and management*. John Wiley & Sons.
Schenwar, M., & Law, V. (2020). *Prison by any other name: The harmful consequences of popular reforms*. The New Press.
Schneiberg, M., & Lounsbury, M. (2017). Social movements and the dynamics of institutions and organizations. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. Lawrence, & R. Meyer, *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 281–310). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n12
Schoon, E. W. (2022). Operationalizing legitimacy. *American Sociological Review*, *87*(3), 478–503. https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224221081379
Scott, M., Sabatini, S., & Mama, R. (2023). Defund the police? Or reimagine the police? Leaders in law enforcement's perspective on the role of social workers in law enforcement. *Journal of Evidence-Based Social Work*, *20*(2), 241–257. https://doi.org/10.1080/26408066.2022.2156831
Scott, W. R. (2013). *Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities*. SAGE Publications.
Scott, W. R., & Davis, G. (2015). *Organizations and organizing: Rational, natural and open systems perspectives*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315663371
Seo, D., Bryson, J. M., & Crosby, B. C. (2023). How can collaboration deliver? A structurational approach to understanding collaboration process and effectiveness. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1002/nml.21571
Shapiro, G. K., Cusi, A., Kirst, M., O'Campo, P., Nakhost, A., & Stergiopoulos, V. (2015). Co-responding police-mental health programs: A review. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services Research*, *42*(5), 606–620. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10488-014-0594-9
Sherraden, M. (2020). *Social work and the future of policing: Key points for changes in policy and practice (CSD Policy Brief No. 20-14)*. https://doi.org/10.7936/885H-RH13
Simes, J. T., Beck, B., & Eason, J. M. (2023). Policing, punishment, and place: Spatial-contextual analyses of the criminal legal system. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *49*(1), 221–240. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-031021-035328
Simes, J. T., & Tichenor, E. (2022). "We're here to help": Criminal justice collaboration among social service providers across the urban-rural continuum. *Social Service Review*, *96*(2), 268–307.
Skelcher, C., & Smith, S. R. (2015). Theorizing hybridity: Institutional logics, complex organizations, and actor identities: The case of nonprofits. *Public Administration*, *93*(2), 433–448.
Small, M. L. (2009). `How many cases do I need?': On science and the logic of case selection in field-based research. *Ethnography*, *10*(1), 5–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/1466138108099586
Small, M. L., & Calarco, J. M. (2022). *Qualitative literacy: A guide to evaluating ethnographic and interview research*. Univ of California Press.
Smets, M., Jarzabkowski, P., Burke, G. T., & Spee, P. (2015). Reinsurance trading in Lloyd's of

London: Balancing conflicting-yet-complementary logics in practice. *Academy of Management Journal*, *58*(3), 932–970.

Smith, W. K., & Tracey, P. (2016). Institutional complexity and paradox theory: Complementarities of competing demands. *Strategic Organization*, *14*(4), 455–466. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127016638565

Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Schram, S. (2011). *Disciplining the poor: Neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race*. University of Chicago Press.

Soss, J., & Weaver, V. (2017). Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *20*, 565–591.

Spitzmueller, M. (2018). Remaking "community" mental health: A study of contested institutional logics and organizational change. *Human Service Organizations: Management, Leadership & Governance*, *42*(2), 123-145. https://doi.org/10.1080/23303131.2017.1422071

Spitzmueller, M. C. (2016). Negotiating competing institutional logics at the street level: An ethnography of a community mental health organization. *Social Service Review*, *90*(1), 35–82. https://doi.org/10.1086/686694

Stuart, F. (2016). *Down, out &under arrest: Policing and everyday life in Skid Row*. University of Chicago Press.

Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, *20*(3), 571–610. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080331

Suddaby, R. (2015). Can institutional theory be critical? *Journal of Management Inquiry*, *24*(1), 93–95. https://doi.org/10.1177/1056492614545304

Suddaby, R., Bitektine, A., & Haack, P. (2017). Legitimacy. *Academy of Management Annals*, *11*(1), 451–478. https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2015.0101

Sweet, P. L. (2023). Organizing penal-welfare hybridity: Trauma, vulnerability, and state recognition of crime victims. *American Journal of Sociology*, *128*(6), 1678–1715. https://doi.org/10.1086/724379

Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. *American Sociological Review*, *51*(2), 273–286. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095521

Tapia, R. (2018, October). *What is the carceral state?* https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/dcc-project/publications/

Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990. *American Journal of Sociology*, *105*(3), 801–843.

Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, & K. Sahlin, *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 99–129). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849200387.n14

Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). *The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure and process*. OUP Oxford.

Timmermans, S., & Tavory, I. (2012). Theory construction in qualitative research: From grounded theory to abductive analysis. *Sociological Theory*, *30*(3), 167–186. https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275112457914

Topal, C. (2015). A relational perspective of institutional work. *Journal of Management & Organization*, *21*(4), 495–514. https://doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2015.13

Toraif, N., & Mueller, J. C. (2023). Abolitionist social work. In *Encyclopedia of Social Work*.

Toubiana, M. (2020). Once in orange always in orange? Identity paralysis and the enduring influence of institutional logics on identity. *Academy of Management Journal*, *63*(6), 1739–1774. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2017.0826

Tracy, S. J. (2010). Qualitative quality: Eight "big-tent" criteria for excellent qualitative research. *Qualitative Inquiry*, *16*(10), 837–851. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800410383121

Tyllström, A. (2021). More than a revolving door: Corporate lobbying and the socialization of institutional carriers. *Organization Studies*, *42*(4), 595–614. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840619848014

Ulmer, J. T. (2019). Criminal courts as inhabited institutions: Making sense of difference and similarity in sentencing. *Crime and Justice*, *48*, 483–522. https://doi.org/10.1086/701504

Useem, B., & Goldstone, J. A. (2022). The paradox of victory: Social movement fields, adverse outcomes, and social movement success. *Theory and Society*, *51*(1), 31–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-021-09460-2

van Gestel, N., & Hillebrand, B. (2011). Explaining stability and change: The rise and fall of logics in pluralistic fields. *Organization Studies*, *32*(2), 231–252. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840610397475

van Wijk, J., Stam, W., Elfring, T., Zietsma, C., & den Hond, F. (2013). Activists and incumbents structuring change: The interplay of agency, culture, and networks in field evolution. *Academy of Management Journal*, *56*(2), 358–386. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2008.0355

Vitale, A. (2021). *The end of policing*. Verso Books.

Wacquant, L. (2009). *Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity*. Duke University Press.

Wacquant, L. (2012). The wedding of workfare and prisonfare in the 21st century. *Journal of Poverty*, *16*(3), 236–249. https://doi.org/10.1080/10875549.2012.695540

Ward, J. D. (James D. (2014). *Institutional racism, organizations & public policy*. Peter Lang. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000794791942272

Watkins-Hayes, C. (2009). *The new welfare bureaucrats: Entanglements of race, class, and policy reform*. University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, B. L., Wooten, N. R., & Pitner, R. O. (2023). Examining historical and contemporary policing disparities in the black community: Implications for social work. *Social Work*, *68*(1), 8–17. https://doi.org/10.1093/sw/swac049

Wooten, M. E. (2019). Race, organizations, and the organizing process. In *Race, Organizations, and the Organizing Process* (Vol. 60, pp. 1–14). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X20190000060001

Wooten, M., & Hoffman, A. J. (2017). Organizational fields: Past, present and future. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. Lawrence, & R. Meyer, *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism* (pp. 55–72). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446280669.n3

Wright II, J. E., Gaozhao, D., Dukes, K., & Templeton, D. (2023). The power of protest on policing: Black Lives Matter protest and civilian evaluation of the police. *Public Administration Review*, *83*(1), 130–143. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13498

Yin, R. K. (2017). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods.* (6th ed.). SAGE Publications.

Zhang, F., & Welch, E. W. (2023). Explaining public Organization adaptation to climate change:

Configurations of macro- and meso-level institutional logics. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *33*(2), 357–374. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac027

Zilber, T. B. (2002). Institutionalization as an interplay between actions, meanings, and actors: The case of a rape crisis center in Israel. *Academy of Management Journal*, *45*(1), 234–254. https://doi.org/10.5465/3069294

Zilber, T. B. (2013). Institutional logics and institutional work: Should they be agreed? In *Research in the Sociology of Organizations: Vol. 39 Part A* (pp. 77–96). Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X(2013)0039A007

Zilber, T. B. (2014). Beyond a single organization: Challenges and opportunities in doing field level ethnography. *Journal of Organizational Ethnography*, *3*(1), 96–113.

Zozula, C. (2019). *Courting the community: Legitimacy and punishment in a community court*. Temple University Press.

Appendix

Table 5 Interview Sample Individuals (N = 54)[22]

Respondent ID	City	Pseudonym	Primary Service Area
1	Minneapolis (M)	Mark	Community-Based Violence Prevention (VP)
2	M	Tracy*	VP
3	M	Verta*	VP
4	Austin (A)	Rosemary	Homeless Services and Street Outreach (HSSO)
5	M	Blake	VP
6	M	Chris*	Behavioral Health and Crisis Response (BHCR)
7	A	Sally*	VP
8	M	Herman	VP
9	A	Linda*	VP
10	M	Paul*	VP
11	A	Roberta	Police Reform
12	M	Marcus*	VP
13	A	Shania	Multiple
14	M	Bobbi*	VP
15	A	Gary*	HSSO
16	A	Wilson	Community Development
17	A	Adam*	VP
18	A	Charles*	HSSO
19	A	Cheryl*	HSSO
20	M	Erin*	BHCR
21	M	Corey	BHCR
22	M	Joyce	BHCR
23	M	Cheryl	BHCR
24	A	Sophia*	HSSO
25	A	Nick*	HSSO
26	M	Regina*	VP
27	A	Denise*	HSSO
28	A	Maria*	HSSO
29	M	Jim*	BHCR
30	A	Alex*	BHCR

[22] An asterisk indicates the participant is mentioned by name in the empirical findings.

31	A	Bridgette*	HSSO
32	A	Anna	HSSO
33	M	Rebecca	VP
34	M	Doug*	VP
35	M	Dave*	BHCR
36	M	Ted*	VP
37	A	Leo	BHCR
38	A	Jessica*	HSSO
39	M	Carol*	BHCR
40	A	Arianna	VP
41	M	Ruby	VP
42	A	Zane	Legal Services
43	A	Hannah	Legal Services
44	M	Brianna	Multiple
45	A	Mason	Re-entry
46	A	Brandon	HSSO
47	A	Mina	HSSO
48	M	Cole	BHCR
49	A	Robert*	HSSO
50	A	Elsa	HSSO
51	A	Marissa	VP
52	M	George*	VP
53	A	Lacie	HSSO
54	A	Janet*	HSSO

Table 6 Interview Sample Groups (N = 54)

	Behavioral Health Crisis Response N (%)	Community-Based Violence Prevention N (%)	Homeless Services and Street Outreach N (%)	Other Service Area (e.g., community development; re-entry) N (%)
Total interviewees	11 (20.4)	19 (35.2)	17 (31.5)	7 (13.0)
Race				
Black	3 (5.6)	11 (20.4)	2 (3.7)	3 (5.6)
White	6 (11.1)	6 (11.1)	9 (16.7)	2 (3.7)
Latinx	1 (1.9)	1 (1.9)	3 (5.6)	1 (1.9)
Asian	0 (0)	1 (1.9)	0 (0)	1 (1.9)
Other	1 (1.9)	0 (0)	3 (5.6)	0 (0)
Gender				
Male	4 (7.4)	11 (20.4)	4 (7.4)	3 (5.6)
Female	7 (13.0)	8 (14.8)	12 (22.2)	3 (5.6)
Transgender or Non-binary	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1.9)	1 (1.9)

Semi-Structured Interview Guide: Social Service Organizations (Groups 1 and 2)

Opening: I am conducting an interview with you to discuss your organization and experiences with the recent changes in community and public safety. This assumes you have some knowledge of this topic, but if you don't have an answer to some of my questions, that is perfectly ok. Please let me know if you want to skip any questions. Some of the things we will discuss ask you to reflect upon yourself and will touch on various professional and related personal topics. Everything will be completely confidential, including with any others I may contact from your organization or its partners. This interview will only be used for the purposes of this project. Is all of this fine for you? If so, we can proceed with the interview.

Before I begin asking questions, I would like to tell you a bit about myself. I am a student, but also a social worker. I've worked in housing and homelessness, public health, and education. I am deeply committed to improving the many kinds of services in the community that can sometimes fail those who need them the most. I am interested in talking to you partly because I see so much potential in this moment for positive change that your organization is contributing to. My work right now is to understand organizations like yours so that we all can learn and grow.

1) Introductions and Background

Let's start with telling me about yourself and your organization (note to self: go slowly to build rapport).

- Please tell me a bit about your organization.
    - What kind of work do you do? Who do you serve?
    - What are your organization's goals and main programs for achieving them?
    - What's the history of the organization?

- Who have been your primary funders?

- What is your role in the organization?
  - How did you become part of this organization?

2) The Organization and Field Changes

I would like to ask you some questions about your organization, as well as changes in the city regarding community and public safety that might have affected your organization and its work.

- First, what does public safety mean to you?
  - What has the conversation around public safety in the community been like for you?
  - What has this conversation looked like inside your organization?
- Do you see your organization's work as contributing to public safety? If so, how?
  - What role does your organization play in public safety?
- After George Floyd's death, there's been a lot of conversation around issues of public safety and race. What has been your experience with these conversations?
  - What does it mean to be doing this work in the aftermath of George Floyd's death?
  - Do you see your work as contributing to changes related to race, racism, or related issues in the city?
    - If so, how does your organization address this?
- Have any of the recent changes to public safety in the city affected your organization and its work? If so, how?
  - What are the main challenges in advancing this work? These could be both within your organization or external to it.
  - What are the main opportunities in advancing this work?
- Alternatives:

        - Some people see programs likes yours as alternatives to police. Does your organization see its work this way? If so how?
        - Do you see your organization's work as different from other organizations providing similar services? If so, how?

3) The Organization and its Programs (choice of question path dependent upon organization)

Pathway #1 (only for organizations that received direct funding because of defunding):

I would like to ask you some questions that specifically relate to the new or increased funding your organization has received as a part of the city shifting public safety resources away from the police.

- Can you tell me about X program that the new or increased funding has made possible? (Note: I will refer to a specific program of interest I'm already aware of)
    - What do you hope to achieve in the community with this program?
        - What types of change does your program try to make?
        - Is there a philosophy or guiding framework behind the program? If so, please describe it.
    - Who are your primary clients?
        - How do clients participate in the program?
        - What do you hope to achieve with clients?
            - How is client progress monitored?
            - How is client progress measured?
        - Are there any specific rules they have to follow to participate?
            - What if things aren't going well with a client?
                - Are participants ever kicked out or reprimanded in any way?

        - Are clients rewarded for doing well in the program? If so, how?
    - Can you give me a good example of when your program has worked well with a client?
    - Can you give me an example of when things didn't go well with a client?
    - Does the program ever partner with the police?
- Besides new funding, has this program changed in any other ways due to the conversation around public safety in the city? If so, how?
    - Is there anything that *should* change? And if so, what would be needed to make that happen?
- What does it mean for your organization to receive funding that was formerly in the police budget?
    - Have you had any conversations in your organization about this? If so, can you tell me about them?
- How has this funding impacted your organization?
    - Have any other programs changed?
    - Have any other aspects of your organization changed (like mission, goals, roles, relationships)?

Pathway #2 (only for organizations that have not received any direct funding):

I would like to ask you some questions that specifically relate to the city shifting public safety resources away from the police and into organizations and programs that may be similar to yours.

- Can you tell me about X program? (Note: I will refer to a specific program of interest I'm already aware of, which are similar to the programs being funded with new funding)

    - What do you hope to achieve in the community with this program?
        - What types of change does your program try to make?
        - Is there a philosophy or guiding framework behind the program? If so, please describe it.
    - Who are your primary clients?
        - How do clients participate in the program?
        - What do you hope to achieve with clients?
            - How is client progress monitored?
            - How is client progress measured?
        - Are there any specific rules they have to follow to participate?
            - What if things aren't going well with a client?
                - Are participants ever kicked out or reprimanded in any way?
        - Are clients rewarded for doing well in the program? If so, how?
    - Can you give me a good example of when your program has worked well with a client?
    - Can you give me an example of when things didn't go well with a client?
    - Does the program ever partner with the police?
- Has this program changed in any ways due to the conversation around public safety in the city? If so, how?
    - Is there anything that *should* change? And if so, what would be needed to make that happen?
- What does it mean to you that programs like this are being funded with money that was formerly in the police budget?

- Has any of the discussion around "who should be responsible for public safety" impacted your organization?
    - Have any of the city's budgetary changes impacted your organization?
        - Have you sought any of the new funding?
    - Have any of your programs changed?
    - Have any other aspects of your organization (like mission, goals, roles) changed?

4) Field Actors

I would like to ask you some questions about other groups or individuals in the city that play a role in public safety.

- Do you think there have been any shifts in who plays a big role in public safety and the changes taking place?
    - If so, what are you noticing?
    - Who do you think should be responsible for public safety?
    - Have you or your organization tried to influence any of the changes in the city? If so, how?
- If relevant, how does X group affect your organization's work that relates to public safety?
    - City officials?
    - Funders?
    - Community Activists?
- If relevant, how do your funders shape your organization's work that relates to public safety?
- Finally, what changes do you think still need to occur in the city to make the community safer?
    - What opportunities and challenges does your organization have in moving forward?

- Is there anything else you would like to share?

Semi-Structured Interview Guide: Other Individuals in the Field (Group 3)

Opening: I am conducting an interview with you to discuss your organization and experiences with the recent changes in community and public safety. This assumes you have some knowledge of this topic, but if you don't have an answer to some of my questions, that is perfectly ok. Please let me know if you want to skip any questions. Some of the things we will discuss ask you to reflect upon yourself and will touch on various professional and related personal topics. Everything will be completely confidential, including with any others I may contact from your organization or its partners. This interview will only be used for the purposes of this project. Is all of this fine for you? If so, we can proceed with the interview.

Before I begin asking questions, I would like to tell you a bit about myself. I am a student, but also a social worker. I've worked in housing and homelessness, public health, and education. I am deeply committed to improving the many kinds of services in the community that can sometimes fail those who need them the most. I am interested in talking to you partly because I see so much potential in this moment for positive change that your organization is contributing to. My work right now is to understand organizations like yours so that we all can learn and grow.

1) Introductions and background

Let's start with telling me about yourself and your organization (note to self: go slowly to build rapport).

- Please tell me a bit about your organization.
    - What kind of work do you do? Who do you serve?

- What are your organization's goals and main programs for achieving them?
- What's the history of the organization?
- Who have been your primary funders? (if relevant)

- What is your role in the organization?

2) Reorganization of Public safety

I would like to ask you some questions about your organization, as well as changes in the city regarding public and public safety that your organization is involved with.

- What does public safety mean to you?
    - What has the conversation around public safety in the community been like for you?
    - What has this conversation looked like inside your organization?
- Do you see your organization's work as contributing to changes in public safety in the city? If so, how?
    - What role does your organization play in public safety?
- After George Floyd's death, there's been a lot of conversation around issues of public safety and race. What has been your experience with these conversations?
    - What does it mean to be doing this work in the aftermath of George Floyd's death?
    - Do you see your work as contributing to changes related to race, racism, or related issues in the city?
        - If so, how does your organization address this?
- Have any of the recent changes to public safety in the city affected your organization and its work? If so, how?
    - What are the main challenges in advancing this work? These could be both within your organization or external to it.

- What are the main opportunities in advancing this work?

3) Social Service Providers/Programs

I would like to ask you about the types of organizations and programs that have received new or increased funding as a part of the city shifting resources away from the police.

- Does your organization interact with or support these organizations, financially or otherwise? If so, what's your relationship to them?
  - In what ways does your organization influence, or attempt to influence, these organizations?
  - (if relevant) Do you have any specific expectations for these organizations that are tied to funding? (e.g., in contracts; measurable outcomes)
- How do you see these organizations advancing public safety?
  - What do you hope these organizations achieve?
- In what ways do these organizations need to improve or change to meet the challenges of public safety in this city?
  - What barriers might be standing in their way?
- Is there anything your own organization could be doing differently to assist these organizations in their work?

4) Field Actors

I would like to ask you some questions about other groups or individuals in the city that play a role in public safety.

- Do you think there have been any shifts in who plays a big role in public safety and the changes taking place?
  - If so, what are you noticing?

    - Who do you think should be responsible for public safety?
    - Have you or your organization tried to influence any of the changes in the city? If so, how?
- Finally, what changes do you think still need to occur in the city to make the community safer?
    - What opportunities and challenges does your organization have in moving forward?
- Is there anything else you would like to share?



Figure 6 Example of an Abridged Coding Tree for One Institutional Logic

Table 7 Institutional Logics of Public Safety: Illustrative Quotes

Constitutive Elements of Logics	**Treatment**	**Prevention**	**Repair**	**Punishment**
Root Metaphor	Behavior There's a lot of people who come from a great foundation of structure, a great foundation of moral sense, but they themselves, their own personalities and own personal characteristics, as well as their own trauma, has caused them to live a certain lifestyle or engage in a certain lifestyle or to be attracted to a certain lifestyle. That ain't got nothing to do with structure. That has to do with decisions and choices. (R36)	Environment Violence is not something that is necessarily a choice by bad people. Violence is really the result of a complex interplay between a number of conditions, social conditions, economic conditions, political conditions. It's tied to the legacy of systemic institutional racism in this country, and really, to tackle violence and violence prevention, we need to work to address it at all of those levels. It's impossible to untangle all of those things from individual behaviors. (R2)	Relationship Our idea of public safety is really around the idea of relationship building. It's around the idea of conversation as opposed to confrontation. It is really about getting to know people. (R3)	Control I see policing as such a reactive, defensive, militarized approach to public safety. It's one that emphasizes control over root cause work (R44)
Sources of Legitimacy	Assessment and diagnosis	Equity and social conditions	Trust and solidarity There's a critical mass of trust. Folks know that	Government and procedure

	Our assessments are clinical assessments. We have medical professionals who are clinicians that are working and they're looking at diagnosis, they're looking at risk, they're looking at safety planning and interventions. We respond to anyone who says they're in a mental health crisis, but we're gonna do a clinical assessment. (R35)	How do we talk about basic human rights and basic access to necessities? Because really you're having to change people's values. I wanna believe and be hopeful that you can [laughter], but that's what it comes down to is having to change someone's value of—should you have this belief that I can just be profitable to such a larger extent, but someone else doesn't have anything? That's our belief system (R28)	if they engage in misbehavior in a public manner that someone, some folks in the neighborhood will speak up about it. They'll call if it's something they can't address themselves. Where if there's a barking dog situation, neighbor to neighbor, that they'll have enough trust and relationship, where they can talk to each other about it. They don't have to call the cops for that. (R16)	The policies that the officers have, they really don't want to change a lot of 'em. Just their standards of, 'This is what the government wants and we're not gonna change. We don't care what the community says.' (R7)
Sources of Authority	Expertise and professionals We're giving equal weight to those people calling with a mental health crisis and getting them to a clinician and the best person to help them, as far upstream as we possibly can in the process. (R37)	Data and lived experience I think what data shows us is specifically with individuals who experience severe and persistent mental illness, they're more likely the victims of crime than to cause crimes. When you are living on the streets, and you have no income and you have no money,	Shared values and authentic personal rapport We made it more like a larger community family environment where people—we want people to know each other so that they can humanize each other so when they do have a conflict they'll realize, hey, we're on the same	Law, rules, and those who administer them Myself a clinician and my team don't have the authority or jurisdiction to place someone involuntarily in placements if there is safety concerns or safety issues, so we work very closely with police officers. (R30)

		you're just trying to get your basic needs met. A lot of our folks are getting tickets and charges for shoplifting. They're hungry they just need food, they need new shoes. They're not gonna pull guns on people. (R19)	team. I don't need to resort to violence to settle my conflict. (R8)	
Basis of Attention	Pathology, trauma, and development The more people that we can affect the more you can have a safer community 'cause right now in our community, you have a lotta hurt people out there. It just goes back to what I just said. Hurt people hurt people, and we have to break that cycle. I think that's what my team does is we try to break that cycle of violence because violence is just like mental health too. It's generational. It's passed down. I'm sure if we—if someone who	System failures What creates an unsafe community is having a lot of unhoused folks. They're victimized. They can be the 'problematic parts.' We're not attending to some of the signs that our system isn't designed for the people for whom it was supposed to work. (R47)	Division I think that building community leads to knowledge. It leads to you knowing who's in your community. When you don't know your neighbor or you don't know who live down the street or who shot who or who the situation was or who the victim is, I think a lot of that contributes to this fear, which leads to so many things. Everything from bringin' pies to a neighbor, to a family, to teaching students that go to different parts of the community but stay	Deviance and compliance I'm not conversating with law enforcement about a participant, because the way law enforcement sees a participant is completely different than how I see him. Because even if the law enforcement officer is a human being, nonetheless, he has a job to do. That job is law enforcement. (R36)

	comes in the hospital has been shot, I'm sure we can find someone else in that family has been shot too or has experienced some type of situation with a violent crime. We wanna interrupt and break that cycle. (R8)		connected, a lot of that contributes to violence prevention. (R41)	
Basis of Strategy	Healing Those who may have gone down a path of violence are able to come back and be restored, refreshed, that they're not thrown away, but that they're engaged and they explore their horizons. (R26)	Distribution Getting people off the streets and into homes, where they can, for the first time ever sometimes, be able to experience a sense of safety and security. If that's the only thing that happens, that right there reduces recidivism in both the criminal justice and inpatient mental-health system. (R25)	Connection Bring a couple of other community members out there, go defuse that situation. If you see kids hanging out that's doing something that they're not supposed to do, bring the community out there. You and some other folks, a handful of you all go out there, talk to them, move them around. Then it's also about the older generation just having that dialog with the younger generation, 'cause right now, there's no bridge really. Until that bridge is built, we	Enforcement The easiest thing to do is to make it illegal, which then, of course, lends itself to citations and misdemeanors and, again, just a big cycle of you wanna get people housed, but you're charging them with fines, in quotes, that are gonna prevent them from potentially getting housed. (R18)

			will never see that change. It’s going to take community, and also building that bridge between the youth. Then we’ll see that change that we’re looking for. (R10)	