

**How Foreign Intervention Affects Regime Durability in Saudi Arabia and Jordan:**

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## Chapter 1 What Is Durability and its Relevance

Since World War II, some Middle Eastern countries have seen multiple coups, uprisings, protests and regime changes while others have not. This brings into question of why certain regimes remain durable and others do not. Considering that many of these countries gain access to resources, aid, and military support from external sources, I focus specifically on the role foreign intervention plays in addressing this puzzle. The definition of foreign intervention is where the use of the discretionary power of a government in one society to address perceived problems in foreign societies. (Coyne, 2017). There are three main ways in which foreign intervention occurs: (1) financially through forms of aid, (2) fiscally through economic trade, and (3) militarily through military arms purchasing and direct involvement.

I will be adding to this by discussing how foreign interventions from the West through support monetarily, militarily, or fiscally affect the stability and longevity of a regime, and also determining if aid is the main reason or tool that states use to keep their regime stable and durable. I reviewed two case studies, the Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and found that in the Kingdom of Jordan, the regime implores multiple tactics to keep their regime stable which are (1) sacking prime ministers and governments, (2) reshuffling cabinets and (3) promising a new wave of reform and change. (Topac, 2022). Because of their geopolitical positioning and lack of resources, they are reliant on Western aid through the forms of financial aid and military aid which is vital to their survivability as a regime. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I found that their regime state has the ability to (1) through the legal frameworks and Sharia (Islamic law), (2) Decision making is centralized through the Al Saud ruling family, (3) control over religious institutions, (4) the ability to control dissent within the country, (5) strategic alliances with western nations, and (6) a well build and capable security

and intelligence apparatus. Also, the relationship between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the West, in terms of aid, has more to do with the security of the region and the national security of Saudi Arabia rather than Saudi Arabia's internal and domestic security.

First, I will discuss the field of literature as it relates to regime durability, foreign aid, and whether or not aid is a main factor in determining the durability of a regime. Next, I will discuss the process tracing of the previous work conducted by Dr. Sean Yom in his book, *From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East*, which discussed other cases as it relates to durability and how foreign intervention specifically in Kuwait, Iran, and Jordan. Next, I will discuss my methodology and question whether or not aid is an important determinant of regime durability. Chapter One details the methodology and literature on durability from many established authors in the field like Dr. Yom and many others and how my work adds to this expanding literature. Chapter One details The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where I discuss the beginning of its relationship with the West to its ending where I discuss whether its regime is considered durable or not. Next, Chapter Three is where I discuss the Kingdom of Jordan which echoes a similar structure to my second chapter. Lastly, the fourth chapter is my conclusion where I conclude each of my cases and answer if each regime is durable or not, what factors determine each regime's durability, and if aid is the main factor in their survival. I also discuss future research topics from what I concluded.

## 1.1 Literature Review

Many scholars have tackled the question of how and if foreign intervention through financial, fiscal, and military means, affects the success or stability within regimes. Scholars that have argued that foreign intervention is bad for durability and why mention that foreign aid causes a rearrangement of resources which creates increased struggle over the distribution of this aid. Increased struggle undermines the regime's stability (Arcand & Chauvet, 2001; Grossman, 1992; Azam, 1995; Dal Bó & Powell, 2009). These theories also surround state control where governmental elites have incentives to defend their own control over their state and access to control resources, and rebel or opposition groups have incentives to gain power in the state and access resources. Overall, they point out that whenever aid is involved, the likeliness of civil war increases because aid becomes a part of resources within a state. While positive aid shocks increase resources that regimes and oppositions find interest in, which leads to more violence, Regimes with strong state institutions can install and provide proper checks and balances against predation that regimes with weak state institutions would struggle with. They also add that the onset of civil war. They also add that the onset of civil war should be limited to a subsection of countries with weak state institutions that experience sudden, significant increases in aid influx into their respective countries (Besley & Persson, 2011). In addition, aid can inadvertently increase each combatant's uncertainty about the other side's relative strength, by which it prolongs the civil conflict (Narang, 2015; Blouin & Pallage, 2008; Wood & Molfino 2016; Wood

& Sullivan 2015). Also, the impact of foreign aid is discussed where foreign aid assistance has increased violence within states in civil conflicts and where states depend on the accessibility of aid because of how valuable it is in conflict. (Findley et al., 2011; Strandow et al., 2016). Foreign aid is also hijacked by or given to opposition movements, further increasing instability and undermining the regime. (Addison, Billon & Murshed, 2002). In addition, unexpected decreases in aid through negative aid shocks, transform the domestic balance of power among citizens and elites which makes opposition groups more powerful than a government with less aid. States that become dependent on aid become rentier states, which becomes a problem when trying to end the conflict. In order to settle, the government will have to commit to future transfers to opposition groups, but these promises made are not reliable because the movement of aid is only temporary and could potentially lead to more conflict. (Nielsen et al., 2011). The employment of US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. This creates a dependency on this aid and continues this conflict because actors know that if the war is over, that aid goes away. (Bapat, 2011). In addition, it is mentioned that humanitarian aid favors losers of civil conflicts and can possibly enable the loser to undermine the peace within a state. Also, he points out that humanitarian aid is still susceptible to looting in post conflict periods. (Narang, 2014). Also, it is mentioned that humanitarian aid can create an incentive for regimes and opposition groups to target civilian and non-combatants and engage in violence towards them. (Blouin & Pallage, 2008; Wood & Molfino 2016; Wood & Sullivan, 2015).

Scholars that have argued that foreign intervention is good for durability and why mention that aid during the onset of civil war, can help regimes “win the hearts and minds” of their constituents in their respective countries which stops opposition groups from forming which

creates cooptation. (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). They also mention that foreign aid and its effects on the economy of a state, would have a positive impact on growth and potentially cut off support to opposition groups within states that are on the brink of civil conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Miguel et al., 2004). Lastly, they point out that post war international intervention is needed in order to prevent and stave off the recurrence of war in states. Walter also discusses how foreign aid is a huge component of international intervention especially within in post conflict areas. (Walter, 2002).

Dr. Yom adds to this existing literature where he discusses how the more that outside hegemony intervened to help local rulers squash domestic opposition, the less durable their regimes turn out to be over time. (Yom, 2016). In the book, *From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East*, Dr. Yom highlights three geopolitical mediations that help explain durability which are (1) Geopolitical Seclusion, (2) Geopolitical Substitution, and (3) Geopolitical Subsidization. Geopolitical Seclusion does not mean shielding from all external influences; that's nearly impossible. Rather, it means contexts where leaders lack access to great power support, because either their national territories hold little strategic value, or they refuse offers of outside intervention due to their complicated colonial past. Without the diplomatic boost, economic aid, and military assistance that come from external support and that could help neutralize domestic opposition, such regimes have compelling incentive to approach new social forces and make bargains for their loyalty through promises of enrichment via material means or protection from another threat. Geopolitical seclusion allows for regimes to strengthen and build up coalitional alliances within the country. (Yom, 2016). Geopolitical Substitution is defined where leaders become so reliant upon great power backing that they failed

to raise any level of coalitional support, and this encouraged future revolutions. In such cases, rulers develop their states without having made any commitments to enrich or protect supporters, whether old or new. When a crisis arises that creates civil unrest and mass protests, regimes are so detached from their citizens and mostly reliant on foreign intervention mechanisms. They cannot counter protests by rallying any loyalist factions, lack of credibility to mollify angry crowds with reform promises and have little knowledge of how to co-opt opposing elites. Left dependent upon repression and great power support, such substitutive dictatorships are highly likely to collapse. (Yom, 2016). Lastly, Geopolitical Subsidization relates to how there is a possibility of having longevity without stability. Not all regimes saturated with foreign support become substitutive. Middle-range outcomes of tenuous survival, longevity without stability, due to the periodic threats of uprisings and consistent insecurity can be traced to earlier conditions of geopolitical subsidization. Multiple factors that are at play that relate to geopolitical subsidization. Some countries remain uniquely bifurcated by a single ethnic or sectarian division, producing a large communal majority and cohesive minority fearful of majoritarian takeover. That societal landscape makes leaders sponsored by foreign patrons think twice: even after conflict ends, they can capture loyalty from that minority with the promise of protection but still marginalize most other citizens from their coalition to minimize their power-sharing commitment. Subsidized by that international assistance, new economic and political institutions reflect such segregating logic, disproportionately benefiting minority insiders while directing repression and exclusion toward the rest. This promotes a costly strategy of survival. A dispossessed popular audience can give rise to future revolts and strife; but, so long as it retains the negotiated allegiance of the minority base, it stands a good chance of squashing unrest to endure, albeit through violence. (Yom, 2016). Dr. Yom had three case studies that were

examined, Kuwait, Iran, and Jordan. Dr. Yom classified Kuwait as geopolitical seclusion by way of British neutrality and refusal to intervene which led the Kuwaiti regime to compromise with opposition groups for survival. The Kuwaiti ruling coalition was defined as broad as institutional patronage rehabilitates merchants and labor, rewards tribes, and mobilizes Shi'a support. Dr. Yom classified Iran as geopolitical substitution where as the Pahlavi regime continued, the more detached the regime became from its commitments to the people and coalitional alliances. Dr. Yom stated how the Pahlavi autocracy re-equilibrated without having compromised with opposition or bargained for loyalty and that they believed the unconditional support from the United States, and its coercive apparatus, could guarantee future stability. (Yom, 2016). In addition, the profuse U.S. assistance and aid allowed the Shah Pahlavi to destroy urban opposition and deny grievances. The Iranian ruling coalition was listed as narrow where institutions neglected old alliances with clergy, bazaar, and landowners, and repressed new popular sectors. In Iran, the regime outcome was revolution as mass insurrection overwhelmed the Pahlavi regime, despite the use of coercion and U.S. support in 1979. Lastly, Dr. Yom classified Jordan as geopolitical subsidization where in the 1950s, the Hashemite monarchy exploited the diplomatic, economic, and military support from Washington to eliminate a leftist-nationalist opposition front that, heavily driven by activists from the Palestinian majority, nearly took power. Such victory, however, did not bring lasting security, as communal tensions escalated between Palestinians and the mostly tribal Transjordanian minority.(Yom, 2016). By the early 1960s, an increasing number of Transjordanian elites feared not government but lack of government, of diminishment or even destruction, should the demographic majority become a political reality. Sensing this opportunity, the regime deepened its protective embrace of this selective base, utilizing more American aid and arms to reconfigure state institutions around



Transjordanians from a powerful royal court linking tribal sheiks to King Hussein to new public industries that absorbed tribal labor. (Yom, 2016). Dr. Yom adds that such ethnocentric logic had bloody ramifications in the 1970 Black September Civil War where the regime defeated Palestinian militant groups, drawing upon local resources due to its loyal tribal army and timely Western assistance. (Yom, 2016). Constrained by past commitments, the autocracy recovered by widening the scope of Palestinian exclusion from state institutions even further, more convinced that Transjordanian loyalty could guarantee survival.” (Yom 2016). To elaborate further, the economic collapse in the late 1980s exposed the strengths and weaknesses of this assumption. When tribal riots broke out, the regime enjoyed the political credibility, institutional outreach, and social knowledge needed to quickly demobilize unexpected dissent within its base. The primary concession it gave, political liberalization, still reflected communal hostility, as reforms during the 1990s continued to disenfranchise many Palestinians while sheltering Transjordanian interests in renovated institutions like parliament. (Yom, 2016).

What I seek to do with my research, is to understand how foreign aid along with military intervention, and continuous fiscal support affects regime stability and longevity over time within my case studies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. I am going to add to the discourses surrounding how foreign aid, military intervention, and fiscal support either positively or negatively affect the durability of regimes and I am to answer the question of if aid is the main factor that affects regime survivability.

## **1.2 Spectrum of Durability**

In Dr. Sean Yom's book *From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East*, Yom defines durability as "the overall strength derived from the accountability to a state's population (Yom, 2016)

Samuel Huntington and Theda Skocpol add to the understanding of durability and add that "those regimes which emerge out of sustained ideological and violent struggle from below, and whose establishment is accompanied by mass mobilization and significant efforts to transform state structures and the existing social order". (Levitsky & Way, 2013).

Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Ahmad Way go further to add to Huntington and Skocpol's definitions adding that there are four variables that explain the durability of regimes which are the destruction of independent power centers, strong ruling parties, invulnerability to coups, and enhanced coercive capacity. (Levitsky & Way, 2013).

Dr. Dan Slater and Dr. Sofia Fenner's journal titled *State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*. The main argument of this journal is that state power itself is the most powerful weapon that an authoritarian regime has and that a regime's durability is not only just about duration. Slater and Fenner detail four infrastructural mechanisms that authoritarian regimes use to maintain and stabilize their governments. The four infrastructural mechanisms are (1) coercing rivals, (2) extracting revenues, (3) registering citizens, and (4) cultivating dependence (Slater & Fenner, 2011). Slater and Fenner state that they follow the definition that Anna Grzymala-Busse is arguing for which is that durability is the vector of duration (temporal length) and stability (constant outcome). (Grzymala-Busse, 2011) but also mentions that this is not a "straightforward" answer in that they state "The ultimate form of stability does not entail meeting and overcoming crises, but avoiding and, when they cannot

be totally avoided, resolving crises decisively in the regime's favor. When a regime survives a crisis but fails to eliminate or at least mitigate the underlying factors that precipitated it, that regime should be considered less stable than one in which similar crises are fully resolved or never even occur.” (Slater & Fenner, 2011). Slater and Fenner give examples of authoritarian regimes that they would consider durable and not durable based on their definition and understanding of durability which are Malaysia, Singapore (durable), Myanmar, and Zimbabwe (not durable). They state “Malaysia's and Singapore's regimes are exceptionally durable not just because of their half-century lifespans, but because they have stably managed massive socioeconomic transformations without altering their most important institutional structures. Crises - whether political, economic or otherwise - have been few and far between”. (Slater & Fenner, 2011). In the case relating to non-durable regimes “More unstable regimes like those in Myanmar and Zimbabwe get buffeted by recurrent crises of a much larger magnitude that require more drastic measures to manage” (Slater and Fenner, 2011).

Michael Mann’s definition of infrastructural power, which says that infrastructural power helps regime leaders fulfill all kinds of political tasks, not just the maintenance of authoritarian rule and successful penetration and coordination of society to pursue political objectives depends upon the institutional coherence and efficacy of state agencies themselves then once infrastructural power is gained, infrastructural power can be used for a variety of purposes, not all so narrowly partisan as regime survival. Further, any single political objective - in this case, authoritarian stabilization and survival - can be pursued through multiple "infrastructural mechanisms." (Slater & Fenner 2011; Mann, 1993).

What I am seeking to do with this research is to expand Dr. Yom’s questions and findings to my case studies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, compare the definition of durability with

infrastructural mechanisms, and understand if aid is the biggest factor in determining durability in these cases. With the cases of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, I aim to create a linear spectrum of durability where the previous cases that Dr. Yom discusses and where my cases fall on the spectrum of durability.

From the literature discussed by the various authors on durability, survivability and infrastructural power. I aim to find where my case studies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia fall as it relates to geopolitical seclusion (durable), geopolitical subsidization (tenuous survival), and geopolitical substitution (total regime change).

### **1.3 Methodology**

Through this research, I will be examining the causal mechanism surrounding weakened regime durability within each of the cases. My goal is to research and review how each of these regimes used and employed foreign support either monetarily, fiscally, or militarily to weaken the partnership of opposition groups, and how these regimes rely on this foreign aid and support to maintain stability and longevity of their regime which may or may not be favored by constituents in each of their respective countries or if aid is not a factor at all in the determining if aid affects regime durability. I also plan to determine whether the regime's I examine, are durable based off of the literature of durability, survivability, and infrastructural power.

I am seeking to answer are how do these interventions from Western governments by providing assistance, aid, or military capacity, allow particular regimes to disrupt and undermine coalitional norms and create instability in the region, how do each regime in Saudi Arabia and

Jordan use the support given to them by foreign governments to stabilize their regime durability (stability and longevity), does aid from western nations affect the durability of authoritarian regimes, and do these actions of intervention from these western institutions and governments destabilize the Middle East and North Africa as a whole?

For my design, my independent variables are each of the regime's positions at the beginning before the foreign intervention and creation of the state, the particular amount of foreign intervention coming into the individual countries over time, and the dynamics of the coalition building that goes on in these individual states. my dependent variable in my research is the regime's durability which is its stability and longevity. My unit of analysis will be the Hashemites of Jordan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

I will be organizing this data is by breaking down the history of the regime, the regime's relationship with the West, the country's governmental structure, history of internal conflict, relationships to opposition groups, the regime's internal stability, external stability, and whether or not the regime is considered a durable regime. First, I would break down each of my case study's social opposition, then geopolitical mediation, and ruling coalition and finally, I will reveal the regime outcome based on the research that I have gathered from my case studies. To expound further, I will first detail the initial condition and the social conflict. Second, I will discuss the intervening variable alongside the geopolitical variable. Thirdly, I will point out the independent variable by discussing the country's coalitional and institutional profile and dynamics. Next, I will discuss major crises that arose either conflict involving an inter-state war, intra-state war, extra-state war, or uprising. Lastly, I will discuss the dependent variable along with the regime outcome.

## Chapter 2 Jordan

The Kingdom of Jordan is a country residing the levant region and more specifically located in the Jordan Valley. It borders Saudi Arabia, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. Along its western border is the Jordan River which flows into the Dead Sea. The name Jordan specifically comes from the proximity to the Jordan River. Jordan is considered to be the “crossroads of the continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe”. (Teller, 2002).

The modern history of the Kingdom of Jordan has had multiple iterations that have lasted seven decades. This is from the time of the creation in 1921 of the Amirate of Transjordan under Abdullah of the Hashemite family, the grandfather of King Hussein. (Metz, 1991). Jordan or Transjordan had its beginnings in the British Mandated Palestine region that was established in 1921 after World War I. Transjordan's creation reflected in large measure a compromise settlement by the Allied Powers after World War I that attempted to reconcile Zionist and Arab aspirations in the area. (Metz, 1991). As Transjordan moved toward nationhood, Britain gradually relinquished control, limiting its oversight to financial and foreign policy matters. (Metz, 1991). In 1946 during the Treaty of London, Transjordan (Jordan) had gained statehood and became a Kingdom. However, the region of the Levant was still under heavy oversight by

the British as it relates to Transjordan's neighbor Palestine. Britain continued to subsidize the Arab Legion (Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt) a military force established in 1923. (Metz, 1991). Jordan would later find itself involved in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 as a result of the creation of the State of Israel in the British Mandated Palestine. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Arab Legion gained control of Transjordan of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. (Metz, 1991). The results of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, led to a mass influx of Palestinian refugees into Jordan. The war added about 450,000 Palestinian Arab refugees as well as approximately 450,000 West Bank Arabs to the roughly 340,000 East Bank Arabs in Jordan. (Metz, 1991). Later that year, Transjordan's name was officially changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as King Abdullah was crowned king. In addition, in 1950 the West Bank was officially annexed by the Kingdom of Jordan. (Metz, 1991). However, King Abdullah's reign in Jordan was cut short when he was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1951. King Abdullah's son, Talal, who was in ill health, briefly succeeded to the throne before being obliged to abdicate in favor of his son, Hussein, in 1952. (Metz, 1991).

## **2.1 Overview and Relationship with the West**

As it relates to the relationship between Jordan and the West, it begins where Jordan (Transjordan) is under British Mandate Palestine in 1921. The relationship was established during World War I where a growing sense of Arab nationalism rose along with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. the anticipated breakup of the weakened Ottoman Empire raised hopes among Arab nationalists. The Arab nationalists wanted an independent Arab state covering all the Ottoman Arab domains. The nationalist ideal, however, was not very unified; even among articulate Arabs, competing visions of Arab nationalism—Islamic, pan-Arab, and statist inhibited coordinated efforts at independence. (Metz, 1991). To elaborate further, Britain, in possession of

the Suez Canal and playing a dominant role in India and Egypt, attached great strategic importance to the region. British Middle East policy, however, espoused conflicting objectives; as a result, London became involved in three distinct and contradictory negotiations concerning the fate of the region. (Metz, 1991). Before World War I, in February 1914, Abdullah bin Al-Hussein, the eventual Emir of Transjordan and eventual first king of an independent Jordan, visited Cairo, where he held talks with Lord Kitchener, the senior British official in Egypt. Abdullah inquired about the possibility of British support should his father raise a revolt against the Turks. Kitchener's reply was necessarily noncommittal because Britain then considered the Ottoman Empire a friendly power at the time. (Metz, 1991). During the war in 1916, Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi launched the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire and in October proclaimed himself "king of the Arabs," although the Allies recognized him only as king of the Hijaz, a title rejected by most peninsular Arabs. Britain provided supplies and money for the Arab forces led by Abdullah and Faisal. British military advisers also were detailed from Cairo to assist the Arab army that Abdullah and Faisal were organizing. (Metz, 1991). Later after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, World War I, and the Arab Revolt, in March 1921, Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary, convened a high-level conference in Cairo to consider Middle East policy. As a result of these deliberations, Britain subdivided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf of Aqaba line. The eastern portion—called Transjordan—was to have a separate Arab administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine, with Abdullah appointed as Amir. At a follow-up meeting in Jerusalem with Churchill, High Commissioner Herbert Samuel, and T.E. Lawrence, Abdullah agreed to abandon his Syrian project in return for the amirate and a substantial British subsidy. (Metz, 1991). The Syrian project that was mentioned was in relation to the Abdullah leading revolts against the French in



Syria. Later going into 1922, A British government memorandum in September of that year, approved by the League of Nations Council, specifically excluded Jewish settlement from the Transjordan area of the Palestine Mandate. The whole process was aimed at satisfying wartime pledges made to the Arabs and at carrying out British responsibilities under the mandate. (Metz, 1991). Going into 1923, Britain recognized Jordan as an independent country and maintained a deep relationship with them in terms of shaping their government and preparing them to become for nationhood. Under British sponsorship, Transjordan made measured progress along the path to modernization. Roads, communications, education, and other public services slowly but steadily developed, although not as rapidly as in Palestine, which was under direct British administration. (Metz, 1991). To add, Britain and Transjordan took a further step in the direction of self-government in 1928, when they agreed to a new treaty that relaxed British controls while still providing for Britain to oversee financial matters and foreign policy. The two countries agreed to promulgate a constitution—the Organic Law—later the same year and in 1929 to install the Legislative Council in place of the old executive council. (Metz, 1991). In addition, in 1934 a new agreement with Britain allowed King Abdullah to set up consular representation in Arab countries, and in 1939 the Legislative Council formally became the Amir's cabinet, or council of ministers. (Metz, 1991). Heading into World War II, King Abdullah was a faithful ally to Britain during World War II. Units of the Arab Legion served with distinction alongside British forces in 1941 overthrowing the pro-Nazi Rashid Ali regime that had seized power in Iraq and defeating the Vichy French in Syria. Later, elements of the Arab Legion were used in guarding British installations in Egypt. (Metz, 1991). In March 1946, Transjordan and Britain concluded the Treaty of London, under which another major step was taken toward full sovereignty for the Arab state. Transjordan was proclaimed a kingdom, and a new constitution

replaced the obsolete 1928 Organic Law. (Metz, 1991). After the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, King Abdullah and Jordan continued to have a strong relationship with the British and soon was involved with the United States. The residual special relationship with Britain continued, helping to keep the East Bank relatively free from disturbance. Although not yet a member of the UN, Jordan supported the UN action in Korea and entered into an economic developmental aid agreement with the United States in March 1951, under President Harry S Truman's Point Four program. (Metz, 1991). Later in 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated but the relationship with the West continued after his death. In 1953, Hussein was declared King of Jordan and developed the relationship with the West. Britain agreed to a new financial aid arrangement with Jordan in 1954 in which London evinced an interest in coordinating military and economic aid to Amman, with Jordanian participation, in the context of an overall Middle Eastern defense system. (Metz, 1991). Around the same time, the British approached King Hussein with the idea for Jordan to join alongside Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain in the Baghdad Pact, which was a pact between these countries with the goal of preventing the growth of communism and prevent conflicts throughout the region. However, Jordan declined that invitation due to growing unrest within Jordan surrounding the Baghdad pact. The purpose of the visit was generally known, and Arab nationalist propaganda, especially from Palestinians and Radio Cairo, raised a storm of protest denouncing the pact and the monarchy as 4 'tools of Western imperialism" and a 4 'sellout to the Jews." (Metz, 1991). Moving forward the United States started to get involved with Jordan in terms of aid. The United States replaced Britain as Jordan's principal source of foreign aid, but it did so without a bilateral treaty or other formal alliance mechanisms. (Metz, 1991). To go further, In April 1957, the White House officially noted that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles regarded "the independence and integrity of Jordan as

vital." (Metz 1991). During this time, King Hussein did not specifically request aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine—by which the United States pledged military and economic aid to any country asking for help in resisting communist influence—he did state publicly that Jordan's security was threatened by communism. (Metz, 1991). Jordan started to receive financial aid grants from the United States for economic assistance during this time as well as military aid. (Metz, 1991).

## **2.2 Findings From Dr. Yom About Jordan's Durability**

As mentioned earlier in this paper, Dr. Yom had done research about the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and whether or not Jordan would be considered a durable regime based on his measures of geopolitical seclusion/durable, geopolitical subsidization/tenuous survival, and geopolitical substitution/total regime change. In the book, *From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East*, Yom starts off discussing the history of Jordan starting from the 1950s. Yom states that “in the 1950s, the Hashemite monarchy exploited the diplomatic, economic, and military support from Washington to eliminate a leftist-nationalist opposition front that, heavily driven by activists from the Palestinian majority, nearly took power. Such victory, however, did not bring lasting security, as communal tensions escalated between Palestinians and the mostly tribal Transjordanian minority.” (Yom, 2016). Also, Yom added that “By the early 1960s, an increasing number of Transjordanian elites feared not government but lack of government, of diminishment or even destruction should the demographic majority become political reality. Sensing this opportunity, the regime deepened its protective embrace of this selective base, utilizing more American aid and arms to reconfigure

state institutions around Transjordanians from a powerful royal court linking tribal sheikhs to King Hussein to new public industries that absorbed tribal labor.” (Yom, 2016). Next, Yom states that “Such ethnocentric logic had bloody ramifications in the 1970 Black September Civil War. Then, the regime defeated Palestinian militant groups, drawing upon local resources due to its loyal tribal army and timely Western assistance. Constrained by past commitments, the autocracy recovered by widening the scope of Palestinian exclusion from state institutions even further, more convinced that Transjordanian loyalty could guarantee survival. (Yom, 2016). Lastly, Yom adds that “Economic collapse in the late 1980s exposed the strengths and weaknesses of this assumption. When tribal riots broke out, the regime enjoyed the political credibility, institutional outreach, and social knowledge needed to quickly demobilize unexpected dissent within its base. The primary concession it gave, political liberalization, still reflected communal hostility, as reforms during the 1990s continued to disenfranchise many Palestinians while sheltering Transjordanian interests in renovated institutions like parliament.” (Yom, 2016). In this section, it discussed how Jordan still had fears still permeated between the ruling monarchy and the Transjordanian elites and constituents. The ruling monarchy still tries to provide a selective view or deceptive idea that they are in full control, but there is always concern for new uprisings or crises from opposition groups within the country. In this case, Jordan provided a unique perspective to the research as they experienced geopolitical subsidization and tenuous survival. Yom talks about geopolitical subsidization and how the possibility to have longevity without stability. Yom states that “Not all regimes saturated with foreign support become substitutive. Middle-range outcomes of tenuous survival, longevity without stability, due to the periodic threats of uprisings and consistent insecurity can be traced to earlier conditions of geopolitical subsidization, the third casual trajectory of my theory.”

(Yom, 2016). Yom states that there are multiple factors that are at play that relate to geopolitical subsidization. He says “Some countries remain uniquely bifurcated by a single ethnic or sectarian division, producing a large communal majority and cohesive minority fearful of majoritarian takeover. That societal landscape makes leaders sponsored by foreign patrons think twice: even after conflict ends, they can capture loyalty from that minority with the promise of protection but still marginalize most other citizens from their coalition to minimize their power-sharing commitment.” (Yom, 2016). Finally, Yom adds to this when he says “Subsidized by that international assistance, new economic and political institutions reflect such segregating logic, disproportionately benefiting minority insiders while directing repression and exclusion toward the rest. This promotes a costly strategy of survival. A dispossessed popular audience can give rise to future revolts and strife; but, so long as it retains the negotiated allegiance of the minority base, it stands a good chance of squashing unrest to endure, albeit through violence.” (Yom, 2016).

As mentioned previously for Jordan, the social opposition was the Leftist and Arab Nationalist parties (1953-1957). Jordan’s geopolitical mediation was geopolitical subsidization where there is U.S. support but growing strains that divide the Palestinian majority in the country and the Transjordanian minority in the country. The Jordanian ruling coalition is considered to be ethnocentric, where institutions exclude Palestinians and repress urban areas but incorporates Transjordanians into the state. In Jordan, the regime outcome was tenuous survival where Jordan endured civil war in 1970, popular rioting in 1989, and consistent communal tensions.

### **2.3 Jordan’s Survival Strategies**

In relation to the tactics and strategies that Jordan has used to keep its surviving regime stable, regime survival has been a result of their monarchical system and the space that is created from the government institutions within the state. The governmental institutions within Jordan are the prime minister and the cabinet members. In Ozgun Topac's book, *New Authoritarian Practices in the Middle East and North Africa*, Topac discussed how the monarchy has used prime ministers and cabinet members as buffers between the highest power in the state and an often-restive society. In this case, Jordanian prime ministers exist in order to be fired and in times of crisis, Jordanian kings get rid of the prime minister or reshuffle the cabinet. They may also dissolve parliament before the end of its term, calling for new elections. And for Jordan, new elections almost always mean new electoral laws. (Topac, 2022). As it relates to this point, because of the shake ups in government, political opposition, because of societal pressures are effectively forced to focus on the make-up of the new government, the political tendencies of a new prime minister, and new details of the latest electoral law (Ryan, 2018; Topac, 2022).

Another tool that is used as a survival tactic is the use of new electoral laws in order to maintain the autocratic system. (Lust, 2006; Bustani, 2016; Topac, 2022). Reform proposals, including those endorsed by Western institutions and governments, can be autocratic in its effects like the civil society organizations that establish ties to the state in Jordan are mainly sponsored by the Jordanian ruling family and to go further, Royal NGOs and even those that are more independent are nonetheless licensed and carefully monitored, to where the civil society itself can be a tool of social control (Wiktorowicz, 2000; Topac, 2022). In relation to modern examples of reforms in Jordan, the decentralization process that was introduced in 2015 which aimed to strengthen liberalization and authorization of local governorship in Jordan, ended up being more centralized and linked more to authoritarian progression than liberalization that it seemed to promote.

(Vollmann et al., 2020; Clark, 2018; Topac, 2022). In relation to the stress on the state from popular pressures by civilians and opposition groups, the Jordanian regime has tended to lean to not just to conventional security measures, but also to its standard arsenal of reform projects and initiatives and this is particularly true during the time of the Arab Spring (2011-2013). (Topac, 2022). During the Arab Spring, Jordanian civil society protested in large numbers throughout 2011 to 2013 mainly calling for reform rather than regime change. The main goals of the demonstrations during the Arab Spring focused on denouncing corruption, calling for real and lasting reform, but differed over whether additional goals should include restoration of the social and economic safety net, or a return to political liberalization and democratization. (Topac, 2022). The response from the state is the survival strategies of sacking prime ministers and governments, reshuffling cabinets and promising a new wave of reform and change. (Topac, 2022).

## **2.4 Western Involvement and Regime Security**

Because the country of Jordan is very small and does not have many natural resources within, they rely heavily on its foreign politics rather than its internal or domestic politics. Jordan has always maintained a close relationship with Great Britain, its previous colonial master, and the United States which the relationship began during the Cold War. This relationship includes close bilateral ties between the two militaries as well as between the CIA and GID (General Intelligence Directorate). The Kingdom of Jordan also relies on financial support from the US, the UK and the EU, as well as from Japan, Canada and individual European states. (Topac, 2022). Because Jordan is an aid dependent nation, they do not have any way to meet all of its

annual state budgetary needs without extensive economic aid (Peters & Moore, 2009; Topac, 2022). As a result, Jordan would be classified as a rentier state with aid rather than oil providing its main budgetary resources, many of which go to support or pay off Jordan's vast public sector, governing bureaucracy and security services – supporting a ruling coalition that is often resistant to reform and change (Muasher, 2012; Topac, 2022). The dependence on aid however has also been part of its regime survival strategy (Topac, 2022). According to Topac, The Kingdom of Jordan markets its own key geopolitical position and even its crises to ensure that the aid pipeline continues to support the state and further highlights Jordan's 1994 peace treaty with Israel, where Jordan marketed itself as the pivotal diplomatic and communications hub in the Arab–Israeli peace process (Topac, 2022). To go further, Jordan's large Palestinian refugee and citizen populations have also earned it external financial support (Topac, 2022). Because of Jordan's geopolitical positioning, they have always attempted to postulate continual regional crises in order to collect support from external governments and institutions. (Topac, 2022). Because of this, there is a convergence of both global and regional powers with the Kingdom of Jordan as well as the multiple forms of aid that they receive. (Topac, 2022). In terms of Jordan's international aid that they receive, it comes in the forms of financial support, and in the form of military aid which has strengthened the Jordanian armed forces, while furthermore linking the army and the entire Jordanian state security apparatus into a transnational set of security relationships. (Topac, 2022). An example of this relationship is the GID (General Intelligence Directorate) and their relationship with the CIA and MI-6. The Jordanian armed forces rely heavily on arms, training, and exchange programs with the US and British militaries (Kurd, 2014; Topac, 2022). In the end, I think that the reliance on foreign involvement from western nations and their geopolitical location has been key to the survival of the Kingdom of Jordan.



## 2.5 Is the Regime Considered Durable

As it relates to the Kingdom of Jordan and whether or not the regime is durable, Dr. Yom's definition of durability was the overall strength derived from the accountability to a state's population (Yom, 2016). Also in the book, he classified Jordan as being somewhere in between Kuwait (durable) and Iran (total regime change). Dr. Yom classifies Jordan as a geopolitical subsidization where it is possible to have longevity without stability. Yom states that "Not all regimes saturated with foreign support become substitutive. Middle-range outcomes of tenuous survival, longevity without stability, due to the periodic threats of uprisings and consistent insecurity can be traced to earlier conditions of geopolitical subsidization, the third casual trajectory of my theory." (Yom, 2016). He concluded that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's regime can be classified as tenuous survival rather than being durable or not.

However, after reading Dr. Slater and Dr. Fenner's understanding and definition of durability, which is the vector of duration (temporal length) and stability (constant outcome) (Slater & Fenner, 2011) (Grzymala-Busse, 2011), and Michael Mann's definition of infrastructural power, which says that infrastructural power helps regime leaders fulfill all kinds of political tasks, not just the maintenance of authoritarian rule and successful penetration and coordination of society to pursue political objectives depends upon the institutional coherence and efficacy of state agencies themselves then once infrastructural power is gained, infrastructural power can be used for a variety of purposes, not all so narrowly partisan as regime survival. Further, any single political objective - in this case, authoritarian stabilization and

survival - can be pursued through multiple "infrastructural mechanisms." (Slater & Fenner, 2011; Mann, 1993). I will say that Jordan is still in a unique position as to whether or not they are a durable regime. In terms of the survivability of their regime, the Kingdom's ruling party implores multiple tactics to keep the regime stable, including (1) sacking prime ministers and governments, (2) reshuffling cabinets and (3) promising a new wave of reform and change (Topac, 2022). But because of their geopolitical positioning and lack of resources, they are reliant on western aid through the forms of financial aid and military aid which is vital to their survivability as a regime. In my opinion, I believe that the Kingdom of Jordan is in a unique position as Dr. Yom says but however, I would say that this tenuous survival proves that the Jordanian regime's dependence on western aid because of its geopolitical positioning points me to believe that their regime is not durable.

## Chapter 3 Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula. It has a rich history as it relates to the religion of Islam as it is its birthplace. The word Saudi alludes to the Al-Saud, which is the royal ruling house of Saudi Arabia. This also refers to Saud ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muqrin and his son Muhammad ibn Saud, who is known as the one who conquered most of the Arabian Peninsula during the early eighteenth century. The Al-Saud house has continued to rule the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia up to the present day. (Metz, 1993). The term Arabia alludes to the region, the Arabian Peninsula, which is where Saudi Arabia is located. This geographical region name also refers to the inhabitants and the language of Arabic. This region also features the Arabian Desert which is a vast land mass and borders the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia is also known as a key staple of the Arab World.

Saudi Arabia is also the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula and borders the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea along with its borders with neighbors like Qatar, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, and to the north, Saudi Arabia borders Iraq and Jordan. Something that is unique about Saudi Arabia is that the Kingdom has not been under the direct control of a Western colonial power (Metz, 1993). To add to this point, a more particular

development in the country that had the biggest impact was the birth of the Wahhabism ideologies that not only affected Saudi Arabia but its neighbors also (Metz, 1993). The relationship between the royal house of Al-Saud and Wahhabi Islam would set the foundations for the beginning of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The rise of Al-Saud is closely linked with Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who is an Islamic scholar whose ideologies are the foundations of the Wahhabi movement (Metz, 1993). To understand the impact and significance of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's ideologies and the Wahhabi movement, we must consider the contexts of Islamic practices (Metz, 1993). Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab attached political importance to the idea and principle that there is only one God and that God does not share his power with anyone, not imams and not trees or rocks, which is in reference to Shia Islam and Sufism (Metz, 1993). Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab sought out local leaders, trying to convince them that his teachings were an Islamic issue. He expanded his message and ideologies to include strict adherence to the principles of Islamic Law (Metz, 1993). He also referred to himself as a reformer and looked for a political figure who might give his ideas to a wider audience. (Metz, 1993). This led Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab to meet Muhammad ibn Saud in the city of Ad Diriyah where Muhammad ibn Saud had political renown. In 1744, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud swore a traditional Muslim oath in which they promised to work together to establish a state ruled according to Islamic principles. Until that time, the Al Saud family had been accepted as conventional tribal leaders whose rule was based in longstanding but vaguely defined authority. (Metz, 1993). Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and his ideologies offered the Al Saud family a clearly defined religious mission to which to contribute their leadership and upon which they might base their political authority. This sense of

religious purpose and mission remained evident in the political ideology of Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. (Metz, 1993).

The modern history of Saudi Arabia is broken down into three periods which show the progression of the Al-Saud royal family. The first period is the previously described beginnings of the relationship between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, the second period starts with the rise of Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud who is the founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia, and the third period is the establishment and the present history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Metz, 1993).

### **3.1 History of Relationship to the West**

The Al-Saud royal family first encountered the West during the nineteenth century where the Al-Saud ruling family had fought for control of the Najd while establishing the formation of a Saudi state. The successes of the Wahhabi forces had done much to promote tribal loyalty to the Al-Saud. But the Wahhabi principles of the Al-Saud rule were equally compelling in that after Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's death in 1792, the Al-Saud leader assumed the title of Imam, thus, Al-Saud leaders were recognized not just as Shaykhs or leaders, but as Wahhabi imams, who represented political and religious figures whose rule includes elements of religious authority (Metz, 1993). The British were concerned about Ottoman hostility in the Najd and greater Arabia because of the strategic location of British India being close to the Arabian Peninsula and the creation of the Suez Canal (Metz, 1993). Because of this, Britain became interested in creating contact with the Al-Saud ruling family (Metz, 1993). Throughout the period from the 1830s to the 1880s, the Al-Saud family used their relationships with the Ottomans and

British strategically by playing off of both nations by putting both at odds with each other (Metz, 1993).

Another interaction between the Al-Saud family and the West comes during World War I. In 1915, Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, the leader of the Ikhwan (the religious extremist group that followed the Wahhabism ideologies) was focused on leading the Ikhwan against their opposition which were non-Wahhabi Muslims and non-Muslims. (Metz, 1993). The Ikhwan gave Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud the power he needed to accomplish the goals that he set out which were: (1) take Hail from the Al Rashid, (2) extend his control into the northern deserts in present-day Syria and Jordan, and (3) take over the Hijaz and the Persian Gulf coast (Metz, 1993). In contrast, because of World War I, the British became more involved in the Hejaz and in Arabia, and in effect, the British prevented Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, and the Al-Saud family from taking over the totality of the Gulf coast in which where they had established protectorates with several ruling dynasties there (Metz, 1993). Because of this predicament, Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud focused on Hail instead which also showed how he was capable of balancing his interests as well as the interests of the Ikhwan during this time like their feud with Sharif Hussein bin Ali al Hashimi (Emir of Mecca and later father of King Abdullah I of Jordan and King Faisal I of Iraq) and the Ashraf in Mecca (Metz, 1993). A couple of years later in 1924, Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud and the Ikhwan gained control of the Hijaz and Najd while pushing into central Transjordan (modern Jordan) where they disposed of Sharif Hussein bin Ali and challenged his son Abd Allah (King Abdullah I of Jordan). (Metz 2001). The British, at this time, were trying to establish King Abdullah I after the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans during World War 1 (Metz, 1993). However, Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud again reigned in the Ikhwan in order to avoid issues with the British and also the British did not

intervene in or oppose the conquest of Mecca and Medina. (Metz, 1993). During the period after World War I, Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud now held the title Khadim al Haramayn (the custodian of the two holy mosques) and is established as the leader of the only independent Arab state after the war while maintaining authority under the pressure from Western powers. (Metz, 1993). Entering the 1930s, something that would change the relationship between the now-established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Western powers would be the discovery of oil and oil reserves on the Arabian Peninsula that was once thought to be only on the Iranian side of the Persian Gulf. British and United States companies competed for the rights to explore for oil and eventually, the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), won the bidding and struck small pockets of oil quickly. (Metz, 1993). By the end of the decade, the Standard Oil Company of California discovered enormous deposits of oil that were close to the surface and inexpensive to extract. (Metz, 1993).

After the passing of Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud and the beginnings of the reign of his sons of Saud (1953-1964) and Faisal (1964-1975), the interactions between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the West continued due to many factors like the advent of oil reserves and others. In the realm of foreign relations during the reign of King Saud, Saud wanted to promote Arab unity and aligned himself with President Gamal Abdul Nasser and Egypt. With this, King Saud demanded that Palestine be liberated while in alignment with Egypt. This also led to a defense pact also between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 1955. (Metz, 1993). Also, during this time, King Saud and Gamal Abdul Nasser tried to discourage Jordan from joining the Baghdad Pact, a Western-sponsored pact. (Metz, 1993). In 1956, the invasion of Egypt by France, Britain, and Israel was due to Nasser's nationalization and ownership over the Suez Canal. (Metz, 1993). In response to this escalation, Saudi sent \$10 million to Egypt, severed diplomatic relations with

Britain and France, and placed an embargo on oil shipments to both Britain and France. (Metz, 1993). The US-Saudi Arabia relations during this time were strained early during King Saud's reign on because of nationalists in Saudi Arabia criticizing the use and leasing of the Dhahran air base to the United States, detailing this as a concession to Western imperialism. (Metz, 1993). Because of this, in 1954 the United States Point Four economic aid mission (which was designed to improve social, economic, and political conditions in "underdeveloped" nations) was terminated (Metz, 1993). However, the Saudi Arabian policies towards the United-States' relations started to improve following the United States' condemnation of the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 due to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. (Metz, 1993). Later in 1957, King Saud visited the United States and met with President Dwight Eisenhower during a conference surrounding the Eisenhower Doctrine, in which King Saud supported which Saudi Arabia agreed to a five-year renewal of the lease of the air base and Dhahran by the United States.

In 1962 during Faisal's tenure of being the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, before eventually becoming King of Saudi Arabia, Faisal carried out executive power on behalf of King Saud, created a ten-point plan for reform in Saudi Arabia which included changes in the government like the creation of a consultative council, establishing local government, the formation of an independent judiciary with a supreme judicial council that was composed of secular and religious members, pledged to strengthen Islam and reform the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (Mutawwiin), development of and regulation of economic and commercial activities to help in bolstering the country's resources, creation of provisions for social security, unemployment compensation, educational scholarships, and the abolition of slavery. (Metz, 1993). Also, during this time, Faisal and President John F. Kennedy



had consultations which led to American support for Faisal's reformation plans and territorial integrity in Saudi Arabia and in addition, diplomatic relations between Britain and France had been reestablished and debts to France and Britain were also repaid. (Metz, 1993). Faisal became king of Saudi Arabia in 1964, replacing and deposing King Saud. King Faisal was involved in introducing Western technology in Saudi Arabia but simultaneously, he had to deal with the demands of Western partners and urges of the ulama not to completely change. (Metz, 1993). King Faisal was determined to find a middle ground and not compromise to mitigate two forces in Western associates and the ulama in Saudi Arabia. He ultimately believed that the correct religious orientation would mitigate the adverse effects of modernization. (Metz, 1993). Something that arose in July of 1973 and later increased due to the October War of 1973 between Israel and Egypt and Syria (United Arab Republic) was because of increased economic power, Saudi Arabia threatened to reduce oil deliveries if the United States did not seek to equalize its treatment of Egypt and Israel. (Metz, 1993). Due to the war between Israel and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) imposed a general increase in oil prices and an oil embargo on major oil consumers that were either supporters of Israel or allies of its supporters. (Metz, 1993). The action taken by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries was in response and protest to the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.

After the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Crown Prince Khalid became the new King of Saudi Arabia. Notable interactions that King Khalid had with the West were considered cordial as they related specifically to Saudi Arabia and the United States but a point of contention between the two related to the United States' unwillingness to settle the matter surrounding the self-determination, establishment, and resettlement of a Palestinian state. (Metz, 1993). In the

beginning of 1978, King Khalid met with President Jimmy Carter in Riyadh where Khalid discussed the matter of Israel-Palestine and said peace can only be achieved by the complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the self-determination and resettlement rights for Palestinians. (Metz, 1993). Something else that was also discussed during the meeting was Soviet penetration and the growing influence through arms sales and the treaty of friendship with the two Yemen's (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic). (Metz, 1993). Months after the meeting with President Carter, King Khalid asked to purchase advanced fighter planes from the United States to help with countering communist aggression in the region. (Metz, 1993). Saudi Arabia received F-15 fighter jets, the subsequent United States release of sophisticated equipment to enhance the capabilities of the F-15 aircrafts, and the negotiations resulting in the approval of the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft owed much to King Khalid's insistence on Saudi Arabia being treated as a full partner in all United States-Saudi areas of joint concern. (Metz, 1993).

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has more to do with the security of the region and the national security of Saudi Arabia rather than Saudi Arabia's internal and domestic security. The military relationship between the two nations since the mid-1940s has had its foundations in United States policy to promote stability and peace in the Persian Gulf, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia have had no agreement on bases or facilities, but Saudi Arabia sought the United States in terms of deployments of ships and fighter and surveillance aircraft in emergency situations. (Metz, 1993). To go further, the United States' assistance to Saudi Arabia consisted of weapons and equipment and advisors to help develop organizations and help train Saudi armed forces. Since the mid-1960s and the rise of oil revenues, Saudi Arabia has been capable of paying for the needed armaments, equipment, and

instructors/advisors, in addition to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, of which are responsible for the construction of bases, military housing, and other facilities in Saudi Arabia. (Metz, 1993).

### **3.2 Internal Stability**

The governmental structures and institutions in Saudi Arabia are key in understanding the role Islam plays in decision-making in the country and how the Al Saud regime reinforces its rule. Although the Al Saud kings ruled as absolute monarchs, their power was tempered by sharia (Islamic law) and by the custom of reaching consensus on political issues among the scores of direct adult male descendants of Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud. (Metz, 1993). Because Islam was such a prevalent in the social and political force in Saudi Arabia, there was and is no separation of religion and state and that the political role of the religious scholars (ulama) was second to the Al Saud ruling family in terms of importance in Saudi Arabia. (Metz, 1993). The ulama was and is the conservative force in maintaining the traditional social and political values of Saudi Arabia (Metz, 1993). While Saudi Arabia was established as a country based on the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam (Wahhabi), the role and discovery of oil deposits led to major changes in the role of religion. (Metz, 1993). To add to this, Islam was a huge factor in foreign relations in Saudi Arabia and the relationship between them and the United States after World War II in 1945. (Metz, 1993). An example of this relationship was in result of Saudi Arabia's opposition to the Soviet Union's promotion of atheism during the 1950s. (Metz, 1993).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Saudi Arabia is classified as an absolute monarchy where the King or ruling party does not adhere to a written constitution, legislative authority, or electoral bodies. However, Saudi kings established a majlis ash shura (consultative council), in order to advise them on governmental matters but there was no official enforcement of a governing body. (Metz, 1993). In 1992, King Fahd for example appointed one individual to the majlis ash shura but made no promises to the Saudi public when to expect a convening of the full majlis.

The power of the king is that of the ultimate head of state meaning that every feature of governance of Saudi Arabia flows through the king. Every part of legislation, royal decree, or ministerial decree has to be sanctioned by the king who has ultimate authority. (Metz, 1993). The king also has the power to appoint all cabinet ministers, senior government officials, and governors of provinces throughout Saudi Arabia. The king also acts as the commander in chief of the military and also appoints all military personnel that are above the rank of lieutenant colonel as well as appointing ambassadors and foreign envoys. (Metz, 1993). To add to this, the king's legitimacy is based on the foundations of religion and the successional history of the Al Saud family. (Metz, 1993).

The executive office of the king in Saudi Arabia is called the Royal Diwan which is the king's main advisors that handle matters of domestic politics, religious affairs, and international relations. (Metz, 1993). The king also has his private office where he conducts governmental affairs and the heads of multiple governmental departments like the Office of Beduin Affairs, the Department of Religious Research, Missionary Activities, Guidance, and the Mutawwiin (the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) are in the Royal Diwan. (Metz, 1993). Also, within the Royal Diwan, the majlis would be hosted in order to give and

provide Saudi citizens the opportunity to discuss personal appeals to the king for amends of grievances or assistance in private matters. (Metz, 1993).

Another part of the Saudi governmental institutions is the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers was founded in 1953 under King Abd al Aziz. The functions of the Council of Ministers were to be the main executive organ of the Saudi Arabian government. The Council of Ministers has the authority to enforce ministerial decrees, but it does not have power that is separate from the king who in the end approves all actions. (Metz, 1993). Members of the Council of Ministers include the king, the crown prince, three royal advisers who hold official positions as ministers of state without portfolio, five other ministers of state, and the heads of twenty ministries that include the Minister of Defense and Aviation, Agriculture and Water, Commerce, Communications, Education, Finance and National Economy, Foreign Affairs, Health, Higher Education, Industry and Electricity, Information, Interior, Justice, Labor and Social Affairs, Municipal and Rural Affairs, Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts, Planning, Post, Telephone and Telegraph, and Public Works and Housing. (Metz, 1993).

Another function of the Saudi Arabian government structure is the Civil Service and Independent Agencies. The Civil Service includes a nine-member board that works under the Council of Ministers, and they exercise formal authority over the employees of all ministries, governmental organizations, and autonomous agencies. (Metz, 1993). The Civil Service Board also presides over the Civil Service Bureau, which implements the decisions and rulings as they relate to grade classification, pay rates, recruitment and personnel needs, and personnel evaluations. (Metz, 1993).

The Legal System in Saudi Arabia is based on Sharia (Islamic Law), and this is the foundation of the country itself. Saudi Arabia follows a strict interpretation of the Hanbali school of thought in Sunni Islam. Sharia is sacred and those who interpret Sharia, are named Qadis (judges) who spend a great number of years studying and interpreting sources of Sharia which are the Quran, the Hadith, and the Prophet Muhammad's own rulings and practices. (Metz, 1993). Historically, the decisions of qadis were subject to review by the ruler, whose primary role was to ensure that the Islamic community lived in conformity with Sharia in addition, the judiciary is not an independent institution but an extension of the political authority of the king. (Metz, 1993).

Saudi Arabia's history of internal conflict and uprisings has been mostly under control and stable as compared to its neighbors. In order to ensure domestic stability within Saudi Arabia, most citizens acknowledge and recognize the rule of the Al Saud royal family and the strict conservative observance of Sharia (Islamic Law). (Metz, 1993). However, there have been instances where there has been internal conflict within Saudi Arabia. One of Saudi Arabia's internal conflicts came from international scrutiny after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. There was polarization happening in Saudi society as it relates to one group striving to maintain the religious establishment in terms of conservative Islamic values and another group focusing on accountability by the government and the Al Saud ruling family and pushing for more liberal reform in the country. (Metz, 1993). During this time, there was open criticism and anger towards the royal family and members of the local elites over accusations of corruption that had not been expressed before. (Metz, 1993). During this time, King Fahd promised to create and establish the majlis ash shura (consultative council) for citizens to have a forum to discuss political grievances that they may have had which had not much success previously. (Metz,

1993). Simultaneously, the conservative Islamists in Saudi Arabia also petitioned for a forum similar to the consultative council (majlis ash shura) and also, partook in demonstrations throughout several cities and threw accusations against the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia claiming that they were hypocritical, misusing, and mis-distributing wealth, which led to resentment throughout society. (Metz, 1993). In response to this, the Saudi security apparatus deemed marginal political groups, no matter left or right-leaning, to be illegal and members were subject to arrest or detention. To go further, the groups that were included in this category were members of the Organization of Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab Socialist Action Party, and the Party of God in the Hijaz. (Metz, 1993). In addition to the multiple political groups, there was a large non-native population in Saudi Arabia, and it was estimated that there were 4.6 million non-natives living in Saudi Arabia in 1992 and more than half of that population were a part of the workforce. (Metz, 1993). The Saudi government viewed this as a point of contention and an impactful influence on the attitudes of Saudi citizens. (Metz, 1993). In response to these grievances, in 1990 the Saudi government worked towards legalizing or deporting illegal non-native citizens and these efforts were heightened during the time of the crisis in the Persian Gulf which led to the expulsion of 1 million Yemenis, Sudanese, Iraqis, and Palestinians. (Metz, 1993).

Another internal security concern that the Saudi Arabian government viewed as a threat was the large population of Shia Muslims living in the Eastern province of Al Ahsa. Al Ahsa region was known as an oil-rich region within Saudi Arabia. The Shia population that lived in this region, had to live through multiple periods of Wahhabi suppression and have remained an alienated and estranged community within Saudi Arabia. (Metz, 1993). However, in the late periods of 1979 and into the early periods of 1980, the Shia Muslim population rioted, and they

were believed to be motivated by the recordings of Ayatollah Khomeini (leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran). (Metz, 1993). To add to this dilemma, the Shia citizens made up about half of the labor force of the Arabian American Oil Company (AARAMCO), which led to the Saudi Arabian security apparatuses to view this as a security concern. (Metz, 1993). In response to this internal strife in the Al Ahsa region, the Saudi Arabian government reinforced its military forces as well as sought to respond to grievances that many Shia citizens had as it relates to religious tolerance and societal issues during the 1980s. (Metz, 1993).

Another major event and internal conflict that the Al Saud royal family faced specifically in 1979 was the occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca (Masjid al-Haram) by religious extremists. This event took place around the same time as the overthrowing of Shah Pahlavi by Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iranian Revolution. The occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca was a big deal because the Al Saud kings were deemed Khadim al Haramayn (the custodian of the two holy mosques) after the conquering of Mecca and Medina. The leader of the religious extremists who overtook the Grand Mosque of Mecca, Muhammad Abd al Allah al Qahtani (Juhaiman al Utaiba al Sunni), claimed the reason for taking the Grand Mosque was because of the corruption of the Al Saud royal family and mentioned how the ruling family had abandoned the foundational tenets of Islam. (Metz, 1993). Response to the religious extremists was very slow in the beginning because of the Quranic sacred scripture that prevents the shedding of blood in holy places like the Grand Mosque of Mecca. However, during the takeover, a guard was shot and killed, which is a major violation of Sharia. Because of the complexities of this situation, the ulama (council of Islamic scholars), had deliberations in order to issue an exemption to allow the Saudi Arabian military forces to bring weapons into a holy site and eventually gave that order. (Metz, 1993). The military conflict lasted for two weeks and



ultimately led to a victory for the military forces and as a result, the religious extremists were expelled from the Grand Mosque of Mecca and all surviving males of the group were executed in squares of four Saudi cities. (Metz, 1993).

### **3.3 External Stability**

The external stability of Saudi Arabia appeared to be the major concern for the Al Saud ruling family in terms of the regime's survivability. This has led Saudi Arabia to seek relationships with Western nations more specifically the United States. As mentioned earlier, This increase of concerns goes back to July of 1973 and later increased due to the October War of 1973 between Israel and Egypt, and Syria (United Arab Republic) because of increased economic power, Saudi Arabia threatened to reduce oil deliveries if the United States did not seek to equalize its treatment of Egypt and Israel. (Metz, 1993). Due to the war between Israel and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) imposed a general increase in oil prices and an oil embargo on major oil consumers that were either supporters of Israel or allies of its supporters. (Metz, 1993). The action taken by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries was in response and protest to the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.

In addition, after the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Crown Prince Khalid became the new King of Saudi Arabia. Notable interactions that King Khalid had with the West were considered cordial as they relate specifically to Saudi Arabia and the United States but a point of contention between the two related to the United States' unwillingness to settle the matter surrounding the self-determination, establishment, and resettlement of a Palestinian state. (Metz, 1993). In the beginning of 1978, King Khalid met with President Jimmy Carter in Riyadh where

Khalid discussed the matter of Israel-Palestine and said peace can only be achieved by the complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the self-determination and resettlement rights for Palestinians. (Metz, 1993). Something else that was also discussed during the meeting was Soviet penetration and the growing influence through arms sales and the treaty of friendship with the two Yemen's (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic). (Metz, 1993). Months after the meeting with President Carter, King Khalid asked to purchase advanced fighter planes from the United States to help with countering communist aggression in the region. (Metz, 2001). Saudi Arabia received F-15 fighter jets, the subsequent United States release of sophisticated equipment to enhance the capabilities of the F-15 aircrafts, and the negotiations resulting in the approval of the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft owed much to King Khalid's insistence on Saudi Arabia being treated as a full partner in all United States-Saudi areas of joint concern. (Metz, 1993).

As mentioned before the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has more to do with the security of the region and the national security of Saudi Arabia rather than Saudi Arabia's internal and domestic security. The military relationship between the two nations since the mid-1940s has had its foundations in United States policy to promote stability and peace in the Persian Gulf, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia have had no agreement on bases or facilities, but Saudi Arabia sought the United States in terms of deployments of ships and fighter and surveillance aircraft in emergency situations. (Metz, 1993). To go further, the United States' assistance to Saudi Arabia consisted of weapons and equipment and advisors to help develop organizations and help train Saudi armed forces. Since the mid-1960s and the rise of oil revenues, Saudi Arabia has been capable of paying for the needed armaments, equipment, and instructors/advisors, in addition to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, of which are

responsible for the construction of bases, military housing, and other facilities in Saudi Arabia. (Metz, 1993).

### **3.4 The Al Saud Survival Strategies**

As it relates to Saudi Arabia and its coalition building and its relationship with its citizens, The main opposition to the Saudi Arabian authoritarian regime is the Shi'a minority. Given the history of the religious difference between Sunni Islam and Shi'a Islam and more specifically the Wahhabi ideologies that are prevalent within the relationship of the Al Saud ruling family and Saudi Arabian society, the Shi'a minority in Saudi Arabia have been faced with direct repression by the Saudi state. In Mary Ann Tétreault, Gwenn Okruhlik, Andrezj Kapiszewski, and Juan Cole's book *Political Change in the Arab Gulf States: Stuck in Transition*, they all discuss politics and state measures that are and have been used to adjust or maintain staying power of their particular regimes. The cases that they examine are the Gulf countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. They focus on the political attitudes and political behaviors that take place in this particular region of the Arab world. As it relates to Saudi Arabia and its relationship with the Shi'a minority/opposition group, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole mentions that the Saudi State applies repression and censorship of the Shi'a minority within the country. They highlight that State policy toward the Shi'a has not changed much since the death of Ibn Saud in 1953. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). To go further, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole point out that Censorship is another source of contention, and the religious alienation is combined with social marginalization. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). They also discuss the Shi'a minority in the public sector and what the state allows

them to engage in but with stipulations. Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole say that Shi'ites can work in schools and universities teaching subjects like economics, but they cannot teach religion or proclaim their religious beliefs and that Shi'ites can participate in many areas of Saudi life, including work in the oil fields, however, Saudi authorities quietly restrict the number of people who work in the oil fields. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole 2011). In the political realm, the Saudi State has also applied repressive tactics against the Shi'a political organizations and opposition. The impact of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait were to points of upheaval which led to cracking down on political opponents, mainly the Shi'a minority. According to Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, Cole, and Amnesty International, Saudi authorities detained many Shi'ite opposition figures without trial during the 1980s. Under the Stature of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and Preventative Detention of November 1983, issued by the minister of interior, security forces were empowered to arrest and detain any person simply on suspicion. From the moment of arrest, detainees were denied access to defense counsel and those who refused to admit to the substance of the accusations were placed in solitary confinement and subjected to repeated interrogation and torture until they recanted. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). As it relates to the impact of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 on the Saudi Shi'a Minority, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole say that the Iranian revolution strengthened radical political tendencies among Saudi Shi'a, deepening the mistrust of the Saudi government, which suspected that the Saudi Shi'a were secretly loyal to Iran. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). The impact that the Iraqi 2003 Invasion of Kuwait had on the Saudi Shi'a minority was that the Saudi state was concerned that the majority Shi'a regions of Al-Ahsa ad Qatif would fragment because of the conflict between Iraq and the US coalition forces and the invasion of Baghdad. (Tétreault,

Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). In relation to the modern state of Saudi Arabia, according to Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole, any attempt to make the Saudi system more liberal provokes an attack from those who want to preserve the system and appeal for its complete Islamization. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011).

In terms of changes within the Saudi Arabian state, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole mention that change in Saudi Arabia has moved at a snail's pace. Fear of fracturing the society, such as along sectarian lines, has often been cited by officials as an explanation for the timidity of reforms so far. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). To go further as it relates to Shi'a petitions to the Saudi state, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole state that thus, like all the other petitions, the Shi'i petition setting out a reformist vision of the Saudi future was carefully couched in the language of national unity and acknowledged the rule of the Al Saud family. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). To focus back to reform progress in Saudi Arabia, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole add that reform also is progressing slowly because, like people in other countries, many Saudis are not eager to embrace rapid changes while the Wahhabist clergy are strongly opposed to making Saudi Arabia a more liberal and secular society. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011). To go further, Conservatives are somewhat more in tune than liberals with the values of rural Saudis who resist the calls to change their understanding of Islam even though a more flexible interpretation is acceptable to most of their fellow citizens. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011).

Overall, the relationship between the Saudi State and the Saudi Shi'a minority has always been volatile and shaky as it relates to coalition building. In my opinion, if the religious differences were nonexistent between the Saudi state and the Shi'a minority, I believe that they would be able to coalition build and meet particular demands, however the loyalty of the Saudi

Shi'a will always be in question, and a point of contention which leads to repression of their political and social mobility in Saudi Arabia.

### **3.5 Is the Regime Considered Durable**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's regime is enforced and maintained in multiple ways, (1) through the legal frameworks and Sharia (Islamic law), (2) Decision-making is centralized through the Al Saud ruling family, (3) through the control over religious institutions, (4) the ability to control dissent within the country, (5) strategic alliances with western nations, and (6) a well build and capable security and intelligence apparatus. Moving into the more modern political climate of Saudi Arabia, this becomes ever clearer.

According to Ozgun Topac's book, *New Authoritarian Practices in the Middle East and North Africa*, since 1932, Saudi state-building has focused on maintaining and enhancing the Al Saud family's position as the centerpiece of the state by institutionalizing tribalism and patronage networks around the Al Saud. (Topac, 2022). In Rosie Bsheer's article, *A Counter-Revolutionary State: Popular Movements and the Making of Saudi Arabia*, Bsheer goes into detail saying, that rather than being based on an exchange of oil wealth for political deference, Saudi authoritarianism has in many ways 'always been based on violence – and the extreme threat thereof – coupled with religious legitimation, in return for subordination in all realms of life: economic, political, social, and cultural'. (Bsheer, 2018; Topac, 2022). This is true today with the rise of Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman and his rise to power and push to the future of his authoritarian regime. To go further, Topac notes that the combination of patronage with brute force has been evident in the rise to power of Mohammad Bin Salman, who has seized the coercive apparatus of the state to transform Saudi authoritarianism from a consensus model to

centralized authority. (Topac, 2022). The royal family therefore acted as the ultimate arbiter between Saudi constituencies in a sprawling system that consolidated ultimate power in the hands of the Al Saud while facilitating outreach to key constituencies. It was in this way that the Al Saud co-opted and defused potential threats, effectively institutionalizing corrupt practices in a symbiotic relationship between a central grouping of princes and a surrounding elite. (Topac, 2022). Topac's assertion goes in line with Michael Herb's thoughts on Saudi Arabia and the centralization of power. In Michael Herb's book, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*, Herb describes a strategy of divide and rule, hinging on in-family power distribution, helps hold together a relatively stable autocratic system in the sense that quarrels are internally managed. (Herb, 1997). Herb also points to how the Al Saud kings would appoint their heirs to pivotal positions in order to maintain the survival of their authoritarian dynastic monarchy. Herb says "The succession mechanism is the key to the resilience of the dynastic monarchies. Rulers and aspiring rulers need to build family coalitions to gain and keep power, and to do this they must offer their relatives valuable goods." (Herb, 1997). To this point, I believe the advent of oil and petroleum was a key part of this bargaining/coalition building within the Al Saud ruling family for the survival of the authoritarian dynastic monarchy in Saudi Arabia.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, I believe that Saudi Arabia is an example of a durable regime. The way that they are able to be considered durable is because their state has the ability to (1) through the legal frameworks and Sharia (Islamic law), (2) Decision making is centralized through the Al Saud ruling family, (3) control over religious institutions, (4) the ability to control dissent within the country, (5) strategic alliances with western nations, and (6) a well build and capable security and intelligence apparatus. As it relates to the control over the legal frameworks,

Sharia (Islamic law), and decision-making being centralized through the Al Saud ruling family, and the control over religious institutions, The Al Saud ruling family places members in control of multiple institutions throughout the Saudi governing apparatus. As mentioned before by Metz in the book *Saudi Arabia: A Country Study*, Although the Al Saud kings ruled as absolute monarchs, their power was tempered by sharia (Islamic law) and by the custom of reaching consensus on political issues among the scores of direct adult male descendants of Abd al Aziz Abd ar Rahman Al Saud. (Metz, 1993). To add more, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole's book *Political Change in the Arab Gulf States: Stuck in Transition*, Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, and Cole mention that for the ruling family, it is essential to look at the strategic political relationships between the state and domestic groups. The closest allies and the most adamant advisories of Saudi rulers are the ulama, and relationships with them are of particular importance for the family, and that the Wahhabi religious establishment remains powerful and pervades all aspects of life in the Kingdom. (Tétreault, Okruhlik, Kapiszewski, & Cole, 2011).

As it relates to the ability to control dissent within the country, strategic alliances with Western nations, and a well-built and capable security and intelligence apparatus, The Al Saud ruling family's relationship with countries like the United States has been for the security of the general gulf region and protection from outside or external threats. Metz highlights the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia as having more to do with the security of the region and the national security of Saudi Arabia rather than Saudi Arabia's internal and domestic security. I agree with the assertion that the military relationship between the two nations since the mid-1940s has had its foundations in United States policy to promote stability and peace in the Persian Gulf, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia have had no agreement on bases or facilities, but Saudi Arabia sought the United States in terms of



deployments of ships and fighter and surveillance aircraft in emergency situations. (Metz, 1993). To go further, the United States' assistance to Saudi Arabia consisted of weapons and equipment and advisors to help develop organizations and help train Saudi armed forces. Since the mid-1960s and the rise of oil revenues, Saudi Arabia has been capable of paying for the needed armaments, equipment, and instructors/advisors, in addition to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, of which are responsible for the construction of bases, military housing, and other facilities in Saudi Arabia. (Metz, 1993). Saudi Arabia has always had the capacity to control and repress internal conflict as the citizens of Saudi adhere to the rule of the Al Saud ruling family and Sharia (Islamic Law).

Overall, these factors contribute to the notion that Saudi Arabia would be considered a durable regime not strictly because of the use of foreign intervention but the ability to prevent or neutralize internal conflict. And in this case, foreign aid is used more for the external security of the Saudi regime instead of internal security.

## **Chapter 4 Conclusion**

In the case of the Kingdom of Jordan, I found that Jordan is still in a unique position as to whether or not they are a durable regime. In terms of the survivability of their regime, the Kingdom's ruling party implores multiple tactics to keep the regime stable, including (1) sacking prime ministers and governments, (2) reshuffling cabinets and (3) promising a new wave of reform and change (Topac, 2022). But because of their geopolitical positioning and lack of resources, they are reliant on western aid through the forms of financial aid and military aid which is vital to their survivability as a regime. In my opinion, I believe that the Kingdom of Jordan is in a unique position as Dr. Yom says but however, I would say that this tenuous survival proves that the Jordanian regime's dependence on western aid because of its geopolitical positioning points me to believe that their regime is not durable.

In the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Al Saud regime is enforced and maintained in multiple ways, (1) through the legal frameworks and Sharia (Islamic law), (2) Decision-making is centralized through the Al Saud ruling family, (3) through the control over religious institutions, (4) the ability to control dissent within the country, (5) strategic alliances

with western nations, and (6) a well build and capable security and intelligence apparatus. This leads me to believe that the regime is durable. To back this claim, The Al Saud royal family acts as the ultimate arbiter between Saudi constituencies in a expansive system that in which consolidates ultimate power and authority while simultaneously facilitating outreach to key citizenries. In this way, the Al Saud royal family has been able to co-opt and defuse potential threats, effectively institutionalizing corrupt practices in a symbiotic relationship between a central grouping of princes and a surrounding elite. In addition, Saudi Arabia has always had the capacity to control and repress internal conflict as the citizens of Saudi adhere to the rule of the Al Saud ruling family and *Sharia* (Islamic Law) and this is not because of the use of foreign aid. Foreign aid in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has more to do with the External survivability of the region, in which the Al Saud royal family and the West specifically the United States' interests align, instead of the internal security and survivability. In this way, I believe that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an example of a durable regime.

These two case studies add to an interesting theory about durability within the Middle East and North Africa as it relates to the spectrum of durability. After researching these cases, I was led to begin thinking about how different or similar these relationships with aid when comparing monarchies and democracies within the Middle East and North African region as well as other regions across the globe. I also began thinking about the humanitarian aspect to this understanding of how foreign aid affects not only the regimes but the citizens of these respective countries. I could not help but think about how humanitarian aid can possibly favor losers of civil conflicts and can possibly enable the loser to undermine the peace within a state. As well as how humanitarian aid can be still susceptible to looting in post conflict periods. (Narang, 2014). In addition, I thought about how humanitarian aid can create an incentive for regimes and

opposition groups to target civilian and non-combatants and engage in violence towards them. (Blouin & Pallage, 2008; Wood & Molfino 2016; Wood & Sullivan, 2015). This aspect of foreign aid is often overlooked and I believe that this can be a next step in the literature surrounding foreign intervention and how it affects regime durability not only just in the Middle East and North Africa but globally.

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