character of the contemporary political debate, this one volume of political writings of James Mill gives good help to answering the question.

Among six essays collected here at least two, *on Government* and *on Education*, have so far been accessible to general readers. But taking each separately, these two essays give a rather confused impression as to the notion of a human being Mill seems to have had. No one will mistake that the whole argument of the former is based upon the assumption of the zero-sum relationship of the interests of members within a given political society. Equally everyone will find in the latter Mill insisting on the almost infinite possibility of progress of human morality. Temperance, fortitude, justice, generosity and intelligence are emphasised as not only the desirable but the attainable goal of education by means of constant manipulation of the association of ideas. Laws of benevolence, and not that of hedonistic ego-centrism of mechanistic utilitarianism seem to be its basic tone.

On considering the historical character of the political thought of Mill, the other four essays in this anthology, i.e. *Jurisprudence*, *Liberty of the Press*, *Prisons and Prison Discipline* and *The Ballot* are very useful for filling this gap. If one reads these four keeping in mind the fact that the *Essay on Government* had a somewhat delicate bearing on the parliamentary reform of 1832, one will find that they abundantly suggest the elements which unite those apparently incoherent two essays, and that it was the republican populism carried by the vehicle of the language of utilitarianism that was persistent in Mill's thinking. Mill was unchangingly on the side of community. He defended the liberty of the press as the sole effective means of letting people know and thereby preventing the corruption of governments. His words in the concluding paragraphs of *The Ballot* that if the ruling class had sufficient motives for the good of the people, 'we should then have a community through which wisdom and virtue would be universally diffused; and of which the different classes would be knit together by the ties of mutual benefaction' (p. 267) sounds almost Godwinian. In this sense, Macaulay's ironical exhortation to Mill that Mill should sing more honestly 'the old republican cant' (Appendix, p. 303) comes to the point accurately.

Despite Macaulay's harsh attack on Mill for being too deductionist and *a priori*, these six essays help us understand that in politics Mill ignored neither experience nor the inductionist method. They also help us realise that he did not ignore the importance of reputation as Macaulay criticised him for having done so, and that the real antagonism between the two did not so much lie in these methodological points as in the idea of polity each thought desirable. The Bibliographical Note in the Introduction is particularly useful.

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Jay Baird has found a very good subject for a book. Questions of memory and memory-making have come to the forefront of a certain kind of cultural history, especially in the fluid interdisciplinary domain of cultural studies, where historians, anthropologists, literary critics, art historians and others have increasingly found some common ground. How the past becomes addressed, appropriated and worked into varying representational
forms for contemporary purposes, sometimes very deliberately in the context of state-directed activity or the practice of political movements, but sometimes less consciously via the complex interactions of history, memory and public policy, has become an issue of particular interest for historians of the twentieth century, where mass-mediated forms of public communication provide a massively expanded arena for studying representations of this kind. Monuments, festivals, and all forms of ritualised public commemoration, together with more elaborate institutional sites like museums and galleries, are now a familiar theme of research, which in the German context has been most prominently associated with pioneers such as Reinhart Kosellek and George Mosse. Moreover, as the Nazis perceived, the new technologies of film, radio and advertising, combined with the spectacular possibilities of grandiose architecture, large spaces and massive numbers of people, allowed public commemorations to be staged to enormous political effect.

Baird's particular interest is in the Nazi cult of heroism, constructed around grand themes of war, sacrifice and death. His book begins with a brief prologue (12 pp.) on the 'myth of Langemarck', the memorialising of the young German soldiers who died at the battle of that name in October 1914, which already bequeathed a powerful conception of the idealized 'front experience' to the makers of right-wing opinion, with its heavy emphases on martyrdom, the sacrament of death, and the spiritual union of the dead with the living in the eternal present of the nation. The book then proceeds through a series of more detailed vignettes, each of which presents a case of martyrdrology and its uses by the Nazi regime: the nationalist Free Corps militant Albert Leo Schlageter executed by the French for his sabotage activity during the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; the Nazi 'Immortals' who died in the march to the Feldherrnhalle during the Munich Putsch of November 1923; the best-known case, that of Horst Wessel, the young hero of the Berlin S.A., who was shot by Communists in 1930; the Berlin Hitler Youth activist Herbert Norkus, also killed by Communists in January 1932; and three exemplars of the Nazi myth-making show in motion, the poets Gerhard Schumann ('Elitist Poet of the Volk Community') and Hans Baumann ('Troubadour of the Hitler Youth'), and the filmmaker Karl Ritter (architect of 'the Heroic Nazi Cinema'). The book ends with a general reflection on 'The Myth of Death in World War II'.

Each of these figures (although both Schlageter and Ritter were somewhat older, actually serving in the First World War, as opposed to living it vicariously) was formed iconographically in the image of their Germanness and youth. Baird's presentation of their lives follows a common technique—first, to describe their actual careers (usually quite briefly, and in a sympathetic narrative form that reproduces perhaps too closely the Nazis', and their own, preferred reading of their lives); and then, to explore the careful construction of their deaths as a sacral event. This is generally well done, and Baird adds a valuable piece to our developing picture of the Third Reich's public culture, which is useful precisely in its concreteness. As such, it not only contributes to the current preoccupations mentioned at the outset of this review, but also adds further to our older understanding of Goebbels and his propaganda apparatus.

There are a number of problems. As already suggested, Baird does not always clearly distinguish between the tones of the Nazis' own heroizing rhetoric, which centred the meanings of these lives around youthful idealism and selfless sacrifice, and the darker and more sordid side, most obviously the existential violence of their stories, the obnoxious brutality of their racialised visions of the world, and the affirmative continuity between these features and the repressive and genocidal criminality to come. Whether in the pathos Baird's exposition imparts to the life of the young proletarian Norkus ('Such was the world of Herbert Norkus. He, like the other youths in the area, never tasted the delights of childhood. For him, concrete and dirt fashioned a world of despair, punctuated only by the melancholy tunes of the proverbial organ-grinder making his rounds through the treeless courtyards of the neighborhood', p. 111), or in the empathy accorded the self-
serving apologia of Baumann for his earlier life ('For the remainder of the war, he fought an inner struggle, guilt-ridden for the role he had played as one of Germany's leading cultural propagandists', p. 156), this book approaches the Third Reich's official culture with a sympathy of understanding that can sometimes disturb. The accounts of Wessel's and Norkus's lives, for instance, required some finer grounding in the quotidian violence whose exercise they celebrated, rather than dwelling so exclusively on the circumstances of their demise. Moreover, there is a kind of familiar seamlessness to the relationship between the immediate subject matter and the deeper contexts of German nationalist culture, that Baird asserts at various points (for example, references in the first paragraph to 'the German idea of heroism' and 'the German cult of heroism', p. xi), but which is never fully laid out. Finally, some explicit engagement with the burgeoning literatures on memory and history, both for comparative purposes and methodologically, is unfortunately missing. In all of these respects, some signs of reflexivity, or perhaps a deconstructive sensibility, would have secured the virtues of this otherwise imaginative book.

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This richly documented, clear and readable study of what its author terms the dawn of religious pluralism in France in the second half of the sixteenth century focusses in its first three chapters on the historical and legislative context of the Edict of January 1562 and its relation to Etienne de la Boétie's Memorandum on pacifying the troubles. Smith, who has published over the years a number of very well-informed studies of Ronsard and Montaigne and the religious polemics, as well as critical editions of La Boétie's Mémoire and his Servitude volontaire, is a most knowledgeable guide to the history of these ideological debates.

In the two years preceding the Edict of January the legislation on religious dissidence changed considerably. Every option and argument was explored and debated, from enforced unity of religion, to tolerance of Reformers, to concord and dialogue between the Protestant and Catholic Churches. Smith considers the crucial role of La Boétie's Memorandum in these developments. In the wake of the death of Henri II the monarchy was moving in the direction of less repressive measures against Reformers. La Boétie argued strongly against tolerance, however, and accused the government of 'dissimulation', i.e. tacit complicity in the establishment of two religions.

The Edict of January elicited opposition from nearly everybody, Catholics and Reformers alike, as well as from the Papacy. But despite its unpopularity and its legal imperfections, it retains the distinction of making France the first European country to sanction two religions in one nation. How could La Boétie, an enlightened humanist defender of freedom in his Servitude volontaire, be against toleration? Smith makes it clear why, during the years when the Chancellor Michel de l'Hospital worked towards conciliation and concord between the two religions, such enlightened Catholics as La Boétie and the early Montaigne resisted freedom of religion. For La Boétie 'freedom of conscience' was an essential right for individuals; what he objected to in 'tolerance' was