
This book is part of a larger project to bring together articles by psychologists from the United States and the former Soviet Union and make them available to both English- and Russian-speaking audiences. The English-language version appeared first; the publication of the book in Russia, it is hoped, will follow shortly. The contributions to this volume were carefully chosen to reflect on contemporary changes in both post-Soviet and American societies. They are taken not from conventional academic subdivisions, but from the application of psychology to socially relevant issues: politics and persuasion, mental health, prejudice and ethnic conflicts, ecological and environmental problems. Following the editors’ intention to highlight both differences and similarities between American and post-Soviet psychology, the book is organized in sections each containing parallel articles from U. S. and former Soviet scholars. Sometimes the articles complement each other, sometimes they stand in a striking but instructive contrast.

Interestingly, the view that U.S. psychology is a “normal” science and that psychology in the former Soviet Union should orient itself by reference to the former is shared by many American and non-American contributors. While U. S. authors do not always emphasize the particular American setting of their studies and sometimes generalize their conclusions across cultures, their post-Soviet counterparts tend to stress the particular context of research. Some non-Americans make what they see as their cultural uniqueness into a research subject (specific Russian patterns of truth and lie-telling, specific motives for alcohol abuse, etc.). Others emphasize how their approaches differ from approaches in the West (the use of “psychosemantics” in studies of political attitudes, an existential approach to post-traumatic disorder). Even when non-American authors evaluate the differences between their own and Western studies as quantitative rather than qualitative, hoping that the areas previously non-existent in Soviet psychology will soon develop (e.g., research in advertising and gerontology), they accept Western psychology as a model.

The difference between American and post-Soviet contributors is also reflected in their style: if the former are written in an “objective” language, with balanced and well-supported conclusions, the articles by the post-Soviet authors are often emotional, even bitter and angry, where the problems of their countries are concerned. Placed side-by-side with the stylistically highly professional American articles, the post-Soviet writers may appear “biased” to a Western reader. (Sometimes, as in the article on lying, a comparative study and much more evidence is indeed needed to support the author’s conclusion that lying became the habit of everybody in Soviet society.)

A reader curious about the psychology of everyday life in the emergent countries of the former Soviet Union and willing to interpret all the contributions in context, will have a rich time. To the reviewer, the book provided an abundance of material with which to reflect on the differences between psychological communities. The book also aroused thoughts that

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diverged from the editors’ own conclusion, that “the psychology of former Soviets and Americans will become increasingly similar and merge into a psychology of people, or at least of people with similar cultures in industrial societies” (411). We might ask why a universal science of mind is necessarily to be preferred over a variety of psychologies? And what can it mean to say “that the many differences between former Soviets and Americans are only ‘culture deep’” (411)?

Reviewed by Irina Sirotkina, research fellow, Institute for the History of Science and Technology, Moscow, Russia.


Rudy Bleys’ The Geography of Perversion represents a significant achievement both in the history of anthropology and in lesbian/gay studies. Marshaling over 600 primary sources in languages ranging from English and German to French and Dutch, the book traces the shifting modes of European figurations of non-Western same-sex sexual practices with encyclopedic ambition. In this way, The Geography of Perversion not only functions as an intellectual history of European representations of racial and cultural Otherness, but also as a veritable repository of the often obscure, occasionally bizarre and usually demeaning images generated by the ethnographic imagination as it functioned in the West.

Bleys organizes his empirical evidence in chronological order. The first chapter on pre-Enlightenment legacies is followed by a section on the Enlightenment, in turn setting the stage for three chapters on the long nineteenth century. Within the chapters, Bleys mobilizes a cartographic logic, discussing the myriads of ethnographic texts that comment on same-sex sexual practices in the major regions of the anthropological imagination. In this fashion, each chapter musters a period discourse about the Americas, Africa, Oceania, etc., thereby allowing Bleys to trace the imaging of each area with significant historical depth. Stereotypes of East Asian effeminacy and Arab same-sex proclivities, for example, are thus revealed as long-standing tropes of non-European Otherness.

In general terms, Bleys’ book is grounded in the thesis advanced by Michel Foucault in his History of Sexuality; Bleys builds on Foucault’s genealogical work, contributing—as other scholars have in recent years—as a nuanced periodization of the emergence of the “modern homosexual.” In this manner, Bleys reads ethnographic descriptions of same-sex sexual practices as signposts of altered European conceptions of sexual Otherness. The pre-Enlightenment legacy thus reflected the early modern image of sodomy as a morally reprehensible act that anyone was potentially able to commit—a notion gradually replaced by the idea that sodomy was a form of behavior characteristic of a distinct minority. This shift occurred mainly in the Enlightenment when an etiology of same-sex practices was developed, leading to an emphasis on the anomalous constitution of men engaging in sexual relations with other men (women’s sexuality being largely absent from the debate). At first, this anomaly was understood in bodily terms; but by the late nineteenth century, writers in the emerging disciplines...
of sexology and psychiatry effectively dismissed the idea that homosexuality was a function of anatomical development, championing instead a model of psychopathological deviance.

Bleys documents how this process was reflected by ethnographic depictions of same-sex sexual practices—depictions that were mustered regularly in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debates about the etiology of homosexuality. In this regard, chapter five is particularly illuminating, since it presents the positions of some of the seminal figures in these debates, among them the German zoologist and anthropologist Ferdinand Karsch-Haack and the British writers John Addington Symonds, Henry Havelock Ellis, and Edward Carpenter.

If Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* functions as one of the conceptual pillars of *The Geography of Perversion*, Edward Said’s *Orientalism* serves as the other one. But much like Said—who has been taken to task for presenting the “Orient” both as a Western invention and as a site of genuine cultural difference—Bleys occasionally wanders on treacherous epistemological ground. On the one hand, he seeks to show how shifting images of non-Western same-sex sexual practices reflected European understandings of sodomy and homosexuality—a mode of argument that renders all European accounts of non-Western sexuality inherently suspect, since they appear less as the product of unbiased ethnographic observation than the result of systematic projections of European cultural inventories. While Bleys effectively mines his sources for historical biases, he, on the other hand, repeatedly seeks to recuperate them as truthful renditions of “actual” conditions. Especially in his discussions of the Arab world, Bleys often criticizes western thinkers’ long-standing preoccupation with Arab same-sex sexuality while confirming cultural prominence of this configuration by recourse to the very sources his study compromises and deconstructs.

If *The Geography of Perversion* shares some conceptual problems with Said’s *Orientalism*; it is to Bleys’ credit to have attempted a project of similar magnitude. And much like its model, *The Geography of Perversion* will be a definitive text for years to come.

Reviewed by **Matti Bunzel**, assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Illinois, Urbana/Champaign IL.
contributions to the literature on pragmatism would share the conventional view that pragmatism anticipated yet again some aspect of twentieth-century American experience. For Charlene Haddock Seigfried and James Livingston, the philosophies of Dewey and James prefigured two central intellectual facets of our era, difference feminism and postmodernist social theory.

Seigfried maintains that Dewey helped weave the fabric of contemporary cultural feminism, aided in part by a hitherto unrecognized group of women pragmatists. This effort to reclaim the forgotten history of women’s formative participation in the pragmatist tradition is the most persuasive part of the book, adding some valuable insights to Seigfried’s earlier work and that of Mary Jo Deegan and Rosalind Rosenberg. There is much to recommend considering Jane Addams, Jessie Taft, and other women as part of the pragmatist tradition, not the least of which is a richer understanding of the genealogy of pragmatism.

Also central to Seigfried’s argument, however, is the weaker attempt to reclaim a purportedly feminist side to Dewey’s writing. This pragmatist feminism, she contends, had several features. First, Dewey challenged “the logocentrism of much of mainstream philosophy” (144), offering in its place a relativist appreciation of cultural and gender difference. Second, by validating experience as a contribution to philosophical discourse, Dewey undermined “moral claims to universality” (245), thus providing “a means of legitimating women’s special angles of vision and their tendency to theorize on the basis of [their] experiences” (151). Finally, in making everyday practices and experiences central to philosophical discussion, Dewey minimized the distinction between public and domestic spheres, validating women’s privatized role in social production and their contributions to traditional as well as modern societies. In doing so, he aided the emergence of an ethic of care in the theory and practice of American social science.

These claims, while modest, nevertheless stretch the evidence one can glean from Dewey’s vast collected works, which Seigfried acknowledges contain barely a couple of articles on women and few references either to women’s rights or to gender difference. In order to demonstrate the affinity of pragmatism with feminism, Seigfried cuts the cloth of each so wide that they inevitably overlap, making the margin of disagreement appear narrower than it is. More importantly, although she recognizes some limits to Dewey’s feminism, Seigfried minimizes those lines of pragmatist argument that lead away from the feminist tradition, giving scant attention to the privileging of male experience in Dewey’s social psychology, his compliant reading of the history of American democracy, and his repeated trivializations of class, race, gender, and other maldistributions of power. The worst of Dewey’s shortcomings (she is harsher with James) Seigfried excuses as “unwitting” (62-3).

More ambitious and audacious than Seigfried’s feminization of pragmatism, James Livingston’s book is also less convincing. According to Livingston, as pragmatists such as Dewey and James made their move from liberal theory and foundational epistemology, they reconstructed the notion of the self that emerged from nineteenth-century proprietary capitalism, thereby opening the twentieth century to a postmodernist way of thinking.

At the heart of Livingston’s argument is a revision of what he contends is the conventional cultural history that attacks pragmatism from the vantage point of nineteenth-century republicanism. “Cultural critics” from Lewis Mumford to Jackson Lears, he maintains, romanticized the small proprietor and artisan in a radically republican vein. In contrast, the pragmatists learned to love corporations and industrial development, shocked off nostalgia for proprietary capitalism, and “look[ing] into the communities, solidarities, and traditions taking shape in civil society, where the commodity form already reigned . . . designed a postrepublican model of selfhood” (81). Invoking Kenneth Burke, Livingston argues that we
can find in the work of Dewey, James, and their associates, a "comic frame of acceptance" that permits the pragmatists "to recognize the prototypes of a postmodern subjectivity in the 'social self' and the 'artificial person' sanctioned or validated by corporate capitalism" (278). Such intellectual innovation was led by structural changes in the economy: "[T]he transformation of capitalism pointed the way beyond relations of production and class society" (176), thus allowing for the emergence of a postmodern pragmatism, distinguished by a "refusal to be bound by the categories of necessity, production, or class relations" (176).

Livingston’s polemic against cultural critics is not altogether off the mark, though it ultimately caricatures the meticulous work of historians such as Casey Blake. Moreover, Livingston presents a highly selective misreading of the texts and contexts of Dewey’s pragmatism. While it is true that Dewey accepted capitalism as an irreversible stage in historical development, it is evident from his educational theory, as well as his social ethics, that he was no less critical of rising corporate power and mass production than Henry Demarest Lloyd, Lyman Abbott, Eugene Debs, or other liberal Protestants, social gospellers, and moderate socialists, many of whom, like Dewey, adopted the rhetoric of the republican tradition. Their twentieth-century republicanism included, contrary to Livingston’s claims, the celebration of artisanship and the community of freeholders, the heart of the proprietary ethos. Such a standpoint can also be found in the rhetoric of Dewey’s colleagues (for instance, George Herbert Mead, whose theory of the “social self” Livingston inexplicably neglects) and other close associates in Chicago, including Addams and her co-workers at Hull-House.

While both these books add to our understanding of the complex intellectual currents and rhetorical trends of the early twentieth century, as interpretive frameworks they offer little that is different from the story told by Dewey and his followers, in which pragmatists reconstructed the philosophy of an old order that no longer had a moral and intellectual grip on the brave new world of the twentieth century; call it modern, postmodern, post-industrial, or whatever one likes. It is bad enough that advocates of a philosophy should claim to have detached their beliefs from their intellectual and cultural roots (which they often do); worse for historians (and philosophers doing history) to support that claim.

Reviewed by ANDREW PEPPER, associate professor of history and chair of American Studies, Union College, Schenectady NY 12308.

Charlene Haddock Seigfried comments:

In part one of Pragmatism and Feminism, I seek to recover a forgotten aspect of pragmatist philosophy, namely the contributions of women to its initial formulations. Doing so helps account for the pragmatist preference for the primacy of everyday experience and problems over purely technical puzzles, inclusiveness over demonizing the enemy, and changing attitudes along with social reconstruction. Because they were among the earliest generations of women to study philosophy academically in America, their pragmatist feminist writings can also contribute to filling in the history of feminist thought, even though they did not influence contemporary theories of feminism. Why they were lost to both pragmatism and feminism is itself one of the underlying themes, as are my efforts to demonstrate that both theoretical perspectives take on new dimensions when these earlier contributions are integrated into our understanding of them.

In the second part, I continue interrogating pragmatism from a contemporary feminist perspective, which makes its androcentric biases stand out in bold relief, but also makes aspects of pragmatism available as resources for contemporary feminist theories. Experience
is central to both approaches, which share—to a greater or lesser extent—opposition to dualisms, an emphasis on the contextuality of theory, perspectivism and pluralism, recognition of the impact of differential power relations, and realignment of emotional and intellectual components. A new paradigm can result from combining Dewey’s transactive theory of the experiences of body-minds and feminists’ demonstrations of the impact on experience of differential gender perspectives. The same could be said for the robust social ethics of both sides, ranging from W. E. B. Du Bois, Jane Addams, and Dewey, to contemporary multicultur- al and post-colonial feminists. From a pragmatist feminist perspective, the contemporary version of an ethics of care is critiqued and revised, but also supported. Critical theorists and postmodern feminists are among those criticizing instrumental reasoning, but the way that pragmatists tie instrumental reasoning to embodiment challenges some of their basic assuptions.

As the first book to explore the dimensions of feminism present in American pragmatism and of pragmatism in feminism, in both their historical and theoretical dimensions, it will undoubtedly please neither pragmatists nor feminists, but may nonetheless in time encourage further development of what has the potential to be a helpful new perspective.

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As background for teaching, I have recently read “critical” biographies of Bruno Bettelheim, Henry Murray, Christiana Morgan, and Carl Jung. I came away from these books with stories about sexual folly and private faults, but unfortunately learned very little about the contributions of these figures to the history of psychology. At a time when the American public has become weary of reading about the private life of its President, I have grown weary of biographers who amplify the private faults of a scientist and neglect her or his contributions to the history of ideas. Against this context of my misgivings about the historiography of some contemporary biographies, Kimble’s and Wertheimer’s book was a welcome arrival on my desk. These editors actually believe that historical figures in psychology had ideas worth considering.

This is the third volume of a series that began in 1991. The purpose of this series is to present “informal portraits of some of the giants in the history of psychology” (ix). The editors asked authors to address their papers to an audience of students and teachers, so the papers are not written primarily for the historically sophisticated readers of this journal. The chapters are intended as supplementary material for courses taught to undergraduates. Some of the authors in this volume are well known to readers of this journal, while others are a child of the subject, former graduate students, or amateur historians. The quality of the papers varies from dismal to superb. Some of the papers are tributes more appropriate for reunions and ceremonial occasions than for a critical evaluation.

Among the well-known figures in the history of psychology, the gems of this volume include: Arthur Blumenthal’s paper on Wilhelm Raymond Wundt; Fancher’s paper on Alfred
Binet; Miriam Lewin’s recollections of her father, Kurt Lewin; and Jack Brehm’s paper on Leon Festinger. Among the minor figures in volume 3 are: L. L. Thurstone, the quantitative psychologist; Floyd Allport, the social psychologist; Karl Dunker, the Gestalt psychologist; Milton Erickson, the hypnotist-scientist; Zing-Yang Kuo, the behaviorist; Myrtle McGraw, the developmental psychologist; Henry Nissen, the comparative psychologist; Karl Dunker, the Gestalt psychologist; Milton Erickson, the hypnotist-scientist; Zing-Yang Kuo, the behaviorist; Myrtle McGraw, the developmental psychologist; Henry Nissen, the comparative psychologist; Kenneth Spence, the neobehaviorist; and David Krech, the social and physiological psychologist. Among the unknowns, one might enjoy learning about Laurens Perseus Hickok, the author of a nineteenth-century textbook on psychology.

All three volumes are on my desk as this review is written. Taken as a whole, the series has been inclusive of women and the figures of Gestalt psychology. The preface to the third edition contains a useful guide to all three volumes based on the traditional divisions of psychology, such as abnormal psychology, applied psychology, and the psychology of women. After three volumes, one can ask why has no African-American psychologist been included so far in this series? Fortunately, this gap in appropriate materials for undergraduates about African-American psychologists has been filled by the second edition of Robert Guthrie’s book, Even the Rat was White.¹

I have found this series extremely useful for preparing lectures in my course in the history of psychology. Many of the articles provide excellent supplementary reading for undergraduates.

One of the happy and unintended consequences of the success of the new critical history has been that some of the articles in this journal and many of the books reviewed here are so sophisticated and specialized that they are simply not suitable for undergraduates coming to the subject for the first time. To their credit, Kimble and Wertheimer have neatly solved this problem by asking leading scholars to write simplified versions of their more advanced papers. Much as the papers in Scientific American work as simplified presentations of the complex scientific ideas contained in the original papers, the best papers in this series of portraits provide the reader with the selected psychologist’s most important ideas together with a few biographical details that humanize the individual. I look forward to the fourth volume.

NOTE


Reviewed by Mark Rilling, department of psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing MI 48824.


As someone who teaches the history of psychiatry to psychiatric residents, I have long hoped to find a single textbook to spare me the chore of putting together a reader each year.
Given the tremendous explosion in historical studies of psychiatry over the last thirty years, however, it has seemed unlikely that anyone would be able to produce a comprehensive and accessible history to replace Gregory Zilboorg’s *A History of Medical Psychology*. It was, as a result, with skepticism as well as hope that I turned to Michael Stone’s *Healing the Mind.*

This book is well designed and will be useful to some psychiatrists. It contains many short sketches of great and not-so-great contributors to the field. These sketches are clearly written, and the name of each individual is printed in a wide margin alongside the sketch. If you are curious about Friedrich Scheidemantel, Henrik Sjöbring, or Sacha Nacht, you will find them, along, of course, with Freud and Pinel. One of the nicest features of this book is that it has numerous small pictures of the people mentioned in the text, as well as classic pictures of patients. Psychiatrists lecturing on their research will find this book useful in providing material about early workers in their field as well as material for entertaining slides.

Unfortunately, it will not be very useful in teaching history to young psychiatrists. While the subtitle of the book, “A History of Psychiatry from Antiquity to the Present,” leads one to expect a broad survey, more than half of the 435 pages are devoted to the period after 1960. As a result, the first half of the book is quite sketchy, while the second half reads like a series of literature reviews. More serious, however, is the fact that Stone seems unaware that there has been and continues to be a lively debate about how to interpret the history of psychiatry. While the book has a thirty-two page bibliography, works by Michel Foucault, Roy Porter, Jan Goldstein, Elaine Showalter, and John Burnham are not included. This is not to suggest that this book does not rely on secondary sources. Indeed there are so many references to Zilboorg, as well as to Franz Alexander’s and Sheldon Solsnick’s *The History of Psychiatry* and Richard Hunter’s and Ida Macalpine’s *Three Hundred Years of Psychiatry* that these are referred to simply as “Z.,” “A.&S.” and “H.& M.”

There is constant tension in teaching history to young psychiatrists—between their desire to translate everything historical into familiar terms and the importance of showing them that studying history can help them achieve a critical distance from which to reflect on their work. In this regard, Stone’s book clearly leans toward showing how the remote or strange can be understood in terms of the familiar. Expressions such as “an example of self-mutilation still viewed as demonic possession” (12), or “this view comes closer to our modern conceptions” (13), jump out irritatingly from too many pages.

Over the last thirty years the history of psychiatry has provided a particularly good opportunity for historians to demonstrate how social, economic, and political forces influence theories and practice as well as to explore the experiences of patients. Stone is not interested in these angles of vision. His book is about psychiatrists and their ideas. Unfortunately, his work is not very searching or critical. His discussion of DSM III, for example, gives the reader no idea of the controversies that surrounded this fundamental change in psychiatric thinking about diagnosis.

Psychiatrists will be able to use this book as a reference in certain limited circumstances, but they cannot learn much about the scholarship that has made the history of psychiatry such a rich field of study. Historians and other scholars will not find much reason to turn to this book.

Reviewed by **Edward M. Brown**, clinical associate professor of psychiatry, Brown University, Providence RI 02912.

Pondering the implications of the fossil scraps that illustrate the course by which human form emerged from non-human ancestors has always generated a particular interest. Not only is this because it involves our own ancestry, but it can be arranged to tell a story, and storytelling is a peculiarly human activity. When the story is our own, its fascination for us is assured. Roger Lewin, as an accomplished science journalist, is a skilled story-teller, and his volume, *Bones of Contention*, makes delicious reading.

Near the beginning, Lewin notes that the themes of paleoanthropological debates can be thought of in the same way as the classic opening paragraph to a newspaper story: that is, in terms of questions dealing with the Who?, Where?, When?, and Why?, with the last being "that ultimate of all questions,...W h yd i di t happen?" (29). The "what" was left out of the list, and, actually, he is not really much interested in what happened during the course of human evolution. Curiously, in spite of his emphasis, there is virtually no consideration of the "why" as that applies to the dynamics of the evolutionary process. Lewin’s real focus is on the "who"—not in terms of the fossil hominids themselves, but on the living humans who discover them and argue about their interpretation. The "why" of paleoanthropological interpretations he identifies as conditioned by "homocentrism" (279), and this, in individual instances, boils down to egocentrism.

There are chapters on the arguments concerning the first fossil to share both human and ape-like features found in Africa in the 1920s. This is followed by a presentation of the conflicting interpretations of the Miocene fossil apes from Africa and India during the 1960s and 1970s when some paleontologists were considering the ape/human split to date back to between ten and fifteen million years ago, and the emerging field of molecular biology was advocating dates of around five million. The rest of the chapters concentrate on the discoveries and interpretations of early African hominid fossils that have been made in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the eye of this hurricane, but often involved in the turbulence, are members of the flamboyant and controversial Leakey family. Others are treated as they interact with the members of that extraordinary clan. The very first chapter starts off with the confrontation between Richard Leakey and Donald Johanson on Walter Cronkite’s television program, *Universe*, in January of 1979 (Lewin actually dates this to 1981, but that is irrelevant). Each subsequent chapter starts with a dramatic quotation or a portentous scene-setting. Chapter 7 begins: "’It’s marvelous,’ exclaimed Louis Leakey to his son Richard. ‘But they won’t believe you,’ he added with his characteristic, mischievous laugh’ (128). Although Louis died shortly after this scene is recounted, his redoubtable wife Mary and their colorful son Richard reappear regularly through the rest of the book and keep things from getting dull. Richard Leakey’s 1977 book, *Origins*, is referred to several times as a "best-seller," but no mention is made of the fact that the reason it became so is because it had a co-author who actually did the writing—none other than Roger Lewin himself.

Unfortunately, there is something of the dated to Lewin’s treatment in the present book. This was all fresh and current when the first edition appeared in 1987, but much has happened since that time, and Lewin does not keep his reader up to date. Of the major characters whose
interaction keeps the narrative lively, five, including Mary Leakey, have subsequently died, and four others are no longer active. Richard Leakey himself left his post as director of the National Museum of Kenya in 1989 and has had more than his share of major adventures since that time. In 1993, the plane he was piloting to Koobi Fora may have been sabotaged. In any case, it crashed, and although the passengers were unhurt, Richard lost parts of both legs. As Virginia Morell relates in her wonderful book on the Leakey family, Ancestral Passions (1995), unmentioned by Lewin, Richard, having regained his pilot’s license, is thinking of calling the second volume of his autobiography, Two Feet in the Grave. Richard served as director of the Kenya Wildlife Service until forced out by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi. He has since been instrumental in founding a political party, Safina, to oppose Moi, and, along with some of his supporters, was subjected to a whipping in 1995 by police supporting Moi.

Lewin makes some effort to bring themes of controversy in the search for human origins up to date in a fifteen-page afterword. He misses the new and controversial finds by Richard’s wife, Meave Leakey, and by Tim White, and he does not mention the rift between Tim White and Donald Johanson and the fact that Johanson’s Institute for Human Origins has left Berkeley and moved to Arizona State University at Tempe. Instead, he has referred briefly to the continuing question of whether modern human origins developed in situ out of non-modern ancestors in various parts of the world, as suggested by the skeletal evidence, or was the result of a recent African exodus, as suggested by the molecular genetic evidence. Roger Lewin initially earned his scientific credentials with a doctorate in chemistry, and his basic feelings here are that if the genetic (i.e., chemical) evidence suggests an African origin, then modern human form must have arisen in Africa. But there is nothing in that molecular chemistry that gives a hint as to whether the morphology of the ancestors looked modern or not. Lewin’s stance, then, is no different from the “homocentrism” of Mary Leakey, who held that if the fossil footprints at her Kenyan site of Laetoli looked human, then the creatures that made them must have looked human as well.

Lewin’s lack of grasp of evolutionary biology is evident in his inability to deal with the actual meaning of the evidence for human evolution, but his credentials as a long-term reporter and scientist-watcher are evident in the rousing stories that he has to tell. The book is fun to read.

Reviewed by C. Lorino Bracey, professor of anthropology and curator of biological anthropology at the Museum of Anthropology at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI 48109.

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The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions presents a translation of the fourth book of the six-volume Russian edition of Vygotsky’s collected works. As the title of the book suggests, the reader finds a compilation of the author’s work concerning the development of complex phenomena of consciousness in childhood. In particular, material about the development of separate higher mental functions, which up to now had not been published, will give new impetus to further research on Vygotsky. The cultural-historical approach forms the theoretical starting point of his methodical and experimental analyses, which can be considered as a constructive response to the shortcomings in psychology in the first thirty years of the twentieth century. This concerns in particular behaviorism and reflexology, but also Gestalt psychology, because common to these as well as to many up-to-date research approaches is the characteristic that they reduce complex psychological phenomena to elementary manifestations and negate the specific quality of these integral mental structures. By contrast, the cultural-historical theory undertakes the interesting task of overcoming the traditional gulf that developed between a scientific and humanistic orientation in psychology, with the hope of contributing to their synthesis through a process-related investigation of the higher mental functions.

For Vygotsky, two lines of development fuse in ontogenesis, the genetically-anchored development of the human species and the cultural-historical development of humanity, which attain prime importance for the molding of the personality as a relation between the innate and the acquired, the biological and the social. The development of higher mental functions progresses as a consequence of the alteration of natural regulatory forms of the psyche. If involuntary and voluntary attention, mechanical and logical memory, imagistic thinking, and thinking in concepts are all taken into consideration, the transformation always takes place in the higher mental processes via the fitting of means-stimuli or signs. In this sense, language, number systems, diagrams, schemas, and also works of art—in short, all possible symbols—are mental tools, analogous to human tools, which have the task of mediating in the interaction between humans and the world. If one wants to understand the essence of higher mental functions, one should not, therefore, lose sight of their cultural-historical origin.

The third volume of the English edition, a translation of the first volume from the Russian edition, deals with theoretical and historical problems in psychology. Within a framework of critical debates with prominent psychologists of his time, as well as in other manuscripts, Vygotsky discusses here the equally important questions for theory and practice: the problems of consciousness, the role of the unconscious, and the reflex character of the psyche. He devotes much space to the themes of method and methodology. Robert Rieber and Jeffrey Wollock talk of Vygotsky as a prophet of the contemporary crisis in psychology when referring to the first published text of “The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological Investigation.” In an extensive polemic about the most diverse psychological trends of his time, Vygotsky justifiably turns against their inappropriate claim to be able to represent all of psychology beyond their thematic areas. He also demands a “general” psychology, but would like to see in it the realization of a unity of forms of knowledge. Dialectical materialist thinking serves him with a suitable methodological basis for this, because the inclusion of sociocultural-causal factors, which have developed with time, in the complex mental structure of conditions, create suitable preconditions for an analysis of the phenomena of higher consciousness, which in the stringency of their methodological requirements are equivalent to scientific research.

Additional source material broadens our insight into the working process of this important psychology theorist, who appears in these volumes as a creative developmental psychologist and at the same time as an historical representative of psychology importance today.
This material contains extended commentaries on Vygotsky’s scientific field, on the social situation in post-revolutionary Russia, on Vygotsky’s influence in the development of Russian psychology (Gurgendze, Mikhail Yaroshevsky, Aleksei Leont’ev, Alexey Matyushkin), and on the present position of research on Vygotsky in Western Europe and America (Glick, René van der Veer, Rieber, Wollock).

Reviewed by Renate Topel, professor at the Institut für Psychologie, Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany.


This collection of nine diverse, rambling, and very personal essays is part of a series on the relational perspective in psychoanalysis. The conceptual context is that of one version of contemporary object-relations theory, as it is put into practice in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis here is a psychotherapy technique that is regarded as intersubjective, meaning that the analyst’s perspective and judgment in the interaction with analysands is rarely regarded as authoritative or privileged. The method is marked not only by self-examination and reflexivity, but by constant deconstruction. While a clear (dictionary) definition of religion is offered at least once in this book (44), spirituality is never defined. It seems to refer to a nebulous faith in the supernatural, which does not fit traditional religious labels. “Religion” means Christian traditions in five essays, and Judaism in two essays. The two essays dealing with Buddhism stand out and provide new and fascinating insights.

Historically, psychoanalysis, together with other theoretical disciplines, such as anthropology and sociology, has made an effort to interpret, demystify, and deconstruct religion. This effort is mostly ignored or marginalized, if not completely rejected, in this book, and the traditional psychoanalytic goal of interpreting human behavior outside the consulting room, and especially human cultural processes, is rarely addressed. Moreover, the authors reveal no familiarity with research findings in the psychology of religion.

In the introduction, the editors refer to psychoanalysis and religion as “these two great disciplines of subjectivity” (xiii). This assessment is likely to be challenged by a few psychoanalysts, one would think, as well as by millions upon millions of religious believers, who regard their traditions as anything but a discipline of subjectivity. In light of this view of psychoanalysis and religion, the aims of this volume are defined as “dialogue” (ix), “approachement” (58), “synthesis” (148), “interdisciplinary conversation” (166) and “fruitful dialogue between psychoanalysis and religion” (195-6). The dialogue is supposed to take place between a generic religion and a generic psychoanalysis, while it is quite clear from the essays here that there are quite a few brand names on both sides.

There are obviously other scholarly disciplines whose practitioners deconstruct religious activities, such as sociology, anthropology, or history. Why is it that we rarely hear calls for a dialogue between religion and sociology? The answer may lie not in the supposed greater...
objectivity of sociology or history, but in the fact that of all behavioral science traditions, psychoanalysis has tried to deconstruct and demystify the irreducible core of religion in the most direct way. The success of this ambitious attempt may be doubted or criticized, but here it is interpreted as a passing phase, reflecting just one version of psychoanalytic theory, Freud’s original model of drives and personality structure. As this model is going out of fashion, the collective view of most contributors here is that psychoanalytic theory will no longer be used to deconstruct religion. It is not clear why other theoretical models, including the relational, cannot be used to do just that.

Freud’s ideas about religion are attributed to his personal commitment to science, or to instinct theory. One of the issues here is the methodological atheism of psychoanalysis, which is shared with all academic disciplines. The behavioral sciences treat religion as human behavior and adopt a methodological atheism (i.e., no supernaturalist explanations are offered). Psychoanalysis as a theoretical system is naturalistic, and cannot be used to justify supernaturalism any more than can chemistry. Freud’s personal atheism was not in any way a consequence of a theoretical system or a commitment to science. He had been an atheist long before he developed psychoanalysis.

In several essays, we find the obligatory rejection of positivist science and its presumed certainties, supposedly being replaced by “intersubjectivity” and “social constructivism” (174), which should make us all more sympathetic to religion. Why should moving away from the (presumed) certainties of positivism lead us now into the arms of religious certainties (or uncertainties)? If we are to be truly skeptical and deconstructive, why should we not be skeptical and deconstructive of spiritual claims? If anything, critical reflections and “social constructivism” should make us even more doubtful of “transcendence” claims.

The theme of “reconciliation” between psychoanalysis and religion has been around for about seven decades. Scores of volumes and articles expressing such an idea have been published, and we may now speak of several generations of psychoanalytic apologetics. If this book is representative, than the current generation should be noted for being earnest and quite scholarly.

Reviewed by Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, professor of psychology, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel.


The previous joint books of these authors (together with Nico Stehr) on the work of Karl Mannheim are as respected as they are well known. They have already made a significant contribution to our understanding of this gifted sociologist. And, as we have come to expect from them, this book is also well researched and carefully crafted. It draws on a number of articles written by the team in various combinations over some years, which gives it an overall impression of considered, scholarly reflection. It is a pleasure to read.
The bulk of the book consists of intricate and nuanced reconstructions of the stages of Mannheim’s intellectual development, from Budapest to London via Heidelberg and Frankfurt, in which the personal, biographical, national, political, and academic dimensions are interwoven in an engaging way. It includes an original and illuminating chapter on the reception of *Ideology and Utopia* in America, as well as an interesting section on Mannheim’s anticipation of feminist themes. All of Mannheim’s key ideas, including the finer points of the conception of the *Seinsverbundenes Denken*, are expounded and situated. The twice-exiled Mannheim emerges as a brilliant, mercurial, adaptable and persistent outsider with a sociological “mission,” who was prepared to take intellectual risks, often at great personal cost.

The authors argue that the social and cultural conditions that led to Mannheim’s being misunderstood and dismissed as unrigorous and unsystematic have been transformed. Sociological knowledge of a certain kind is still central for diagnosing the malaise of our times and for reformulating liberalism. Furthermore, in the present more pluralistic age, when grand theories and rigid sociological schools have fallen by the wayside, Mannheim’s commitment to reflection, dialogue, empirical openness, and intellectual experiment, in a spirit of not forcing inquiry into a premature analytical straitjacket, comes into its own.

Kettler and Meja clearly admire Mannheim, but are not entirely uncritical of him. They question, among other things, his political judgment at various times, his tendency not to listen to others, and his failure to properly comprehend the importance of force, violence, and coercion in society. Indeed, if Mannheim had a major sociological weakness, it was his rationalistic bent, which he ruefully acknowledged. Thus, the integration of the role of force, as well as the social management of emotions, into a theory of society, was much more advanced in the work of his friend and contemporary, Norbert Elias.

My only reservation (and even this is a question of emphasis) about this excellent book arises out of the limitations inherent in the authors’ “political theory” reading of Mannheim. This (legitimate) angle of vision does not permit them fully to convey the radical implications of his specifically sociological orientation, *in its own right*. They regard sociology merely as the “idiom” in which he expressed his prior philosophical-political commitments, assumed to be autonomous. The logic of Mannheim’s sociologism, however, suggested that those commitments, as such, had been rendered problematic by the sociology of knowledge, although he apparently did not follow this implication through.

Reviewed by Richard Kilminster, lecturer in sociology at the University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom.

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Robin Dunbar’s *Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language*, is a highly enjoyable speculation, in Neo-Darwinian mode, of how and why humans came to have language.
The argument of the book is the now not unfamiliar argument that the point of talking is being able to make small talk (the “gossip” of the title), and that small talk produces social cohesion and mitigates social conflict. In other words, it does what primatologists have long claimed grooming does for non-human primates. The evolutionary jump in talking, Dunbar suggests, comes from being able to coordinate, soothe, and recruit more conspecifics by small talk than could ever be coordinated by grooming alone because of the one-on-one real-time constraints imposed by grooming. It is hard not to like this explanation for the social origins of language: it gives us functional continuity from grooming to gossiping, it valorizes the small talk most of us spend most of our time making, and it renders the “higher” uses of language such as poetry, and the pursuit of Truth, as glorious but unintended consequences.

The scientific evidence on which the book’s argument hinges is the finding that the neocortical ratio in primates is a good predictor of social group size. The neocortical ratio is the ratio of the size of a species’ neocortex to its body size. The two additional pieces of the argument are: that the bigger the neocortical ratio, the more social and other kinds of complexity a species can handle, and, that big social group sizes have evolutionary advantages. Dunbar tells us that in non-human primates, all relationships have to be mediated by grooming, as the only available means to establish trust and to nurture and recognize allies. The human neocortical ratio, on Dunbar’s model, predicts a social group size of about 150 members, a figure Dunbar finds confirmed by a wide range of anthropological findings and institutional customs. We are shown that this figure would require humans to be engaged in grooming about 40 percent of the time. We simply could not feed ourselves, and adequately rest these huge brains, if we had to groom that much. Thus, to service the additional social relations (big groups) necessary for big-brained puny creatures like ourselves to survive, we needed to be able to chat.

For all the clarity of Dunbar’s argument, it is hard to interpret the special step from grooming to talking required to manage social complexity as consonant with the fervently anti-teleological account of Darwinism he offers. Likewise, the data on endorphins, opiates, and stress is contradictory and confusing. Sometimes stress reduction is presented as good and essential and sometimes as bad and dysfunctional. In the absence of more specification of, for example, optimum amounts of grooming and gossip, the links between high opiates and infertility seem to fly in the face of an evolutionary account where the production of opiates by grooming is a positive evolutionary force.

The book is frequently humorous and charming (albeit in a British male idiom, such as when human social group size is gauged by the number of people one would join for a drink without an invitation!), always readable, and often modest in tone if not in purported explanatory scope. The modesty is a pleasant surprise in the genre of speculative evolutionary narratives. For example, there is a fair amount of unattributed data in the text, that turns out on closer inspection to come from the author’s own research on gelada baboons, complexity, and group size. The citations to his own and others’ original research, and the review of the literature on non-human primate language and grooming practices, are part of what make this book well suited for a general readership, but also appropriate for a more specialized academic and student readership.

Reviewed by CHARIS CUSSEN, assistant professor in the departments of Sociology and Women’s Studies, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL 61801.

Once the province of scholarly specialists in medical history, the history of hysteria has metamorphosed during the past decade into a topic attracting intensive study among Anglo-American literary historians and literary critics. The past four years have seen the publication of Janet Beizer’s Ventriloquized Bodies: Narratives of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century France (1994), Claire Kahane’s Passions of the Voice: Hysteria, Narrative, and the Figure of the Speaking Women, 1850–1915 (1995), Evelyne Ender’s Sexing the Mind: Nineteenth-Century Fictions of Hysteria (1995), and now Peter Melville Logan’s Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century British Prose (1997). Academic conferences, journal articles, and Ph.D. dissertations have proliferated during these same years in literary circles. A recent annual meeting of the Modern Languages Association received over sixty submissions for papers on aspects of hysteria’s literary history.

The new literary hysteria studies typically take hysteria as a metaphor for a range of emotional and psychological states viewed by contemporaries as extreme, irrational, or extravagant. Collectively, this scholarship establishes that during certain periods and in certain cultures, hysteria has been not only a subject of clinical and scientific investigation among medical elites, but a powerful, vibrant presence in the popular and cultural imagination.

Peter Logan’s lively and perceptive study focuses on seven exemplary works: Dr. Thomas Trotter’s A View of the Nervous Temperament (1807), William Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794), Mary Hays’ Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796), Thomas De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1822), Maria Edgeworth’s Harrington (1817), Edwin Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain, and George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871–1872). Logan’s comparative readings of male and female authors; of novels, autobiographies, and nonfictional texts; and of medical, literary, and public health discourses of hysteria make for an engaging series of contrasts. Logan is particularly interested in the historically diverse ways in which narratives of nervousness were grafted onto discourses of the body across eighty years of British middle-class culture. Methodologically, he integrates the ideas and insights of traditional literary-critical studies, cultural biography, the history of the body, the history of sexuality, and the “new historicism.” Readers of this journal are likely to find most interesting his readings of Trotter (a Napoleonic naval physician whose View of the Nervous Temperament is a splendid transitional text between late Georgian and early Victorian medical attitudes) and of Chadwick’s tract on public health, which is not an understudied document but one that benefits from fresh literary-historical analysis.

Historians of the behavioral and social sciences may be frustrated by aspects of recent forays by literary savants into the history of this subject. Emblematically, Logan’s hysteria does not correspond to any clinically or terminologically recognizable definition of the word, but rather denotes a very loose collection of nervous conditions. Similarly, lit-crit theory-speak infects a good portion of this corpus of writing. Thus, such lamentable formulations as: “[w]ithin this interpretive paradigm, hysterical narrative can become valorized as a radical social critique because it is the means of evacuating the phallocentric space of the symbolic
Perhaps the most interesting question is why academic humanists have converged on hysteria as a subject of study in the 1990s. There are doubtless numerous reasons. At a time when the ideology of the avant garde has penetrated the university, the study of hysteria, with its mixture of science, sexuality, and sensationalism, proves irresistible. Likewise, hysteria occupies a prominent position in the mythology of women; studying the past of hysteria, when it often provided theoretical ammunition for female subordination, is part of the great metacritique of gender that is such a distinctive feature of late twentieth-century society.

There is also a reason, I suspect, why American literary critics in particular are drawn to the topic as a metaphor of choice for behavior deemed extreme, emotional, or irrational. As an object of scientific knowledge, hysteria has no fixed or coherent identity of its own. According to nineteenth- and twentieth-century medicine, the syndrome was the masquerading malady that has no essence but rather emerges, chameleon-like, by aping the symptomatic form of other, organic, especially neurological, diseases. It is an image made in the image and likeness of other images, a disease entity that can be discussed only in the language of metaphor. But the unstable ontological identity of hysteria which is such a severe limitation of its scientific study, makes it a topic perfect for literary scholars in a relativist climate preoccupied with crises of knowledge and representation. In a real sense, hysteria is the postmodernist malady par excellence, a signifier without a signified that represents the limits of representation itself. Perhaps for this reason, hysteria has been largely abandoned as a subject of study by physicians today but embraced—quite productively, Logan’s book shows—by academic postmodernists.

Reviewed by Mark S. Michael, university research fellow, University of Manchester, Manchester M1 9 PL, United Kingdom.
seeks to widen this attention by concentrating upon the statistical practices of scientists, specifically, the way in which error of various kinds is assessed and used in experimentation. Along the way, she generates novel interpretations of some classical positions (most notably, those of Popper and Kuhn), delivers a critique of Bayesian approaches to questions of the roots of inference, and seeks to articulate a new account of the epistemology of experimentation. Based in part on Peircean notions, Mayo’s epistemological account draws heavily upon modern notions of statistical inference.

In essence, her position is that progress occurs, not in terms of revising the probability estimates attached to a hypothesis or theory (as the Bayesians would have it), but instead as a result of growth in “experimental knowledge.” Statistical inference is, in short, not about hypothesis testing, but about a set of techniques that permit an investigator to subject an experiment to a “strong test” which, if passed, allows the experiment into the body of experimental knowledge. For Mayo, “experimental knowledge” is defined as “the (actual or hypothetical) future performance of experimental processes—that is, about outcomes that would occur with specified probability if certain experiments were carried out” (11). Mayo thus aligns herself, she claims, with the Neyman-Pearson tradition of statistical inference, leavened with a bit of R. A. Fisher. Peirce enters because of his emphasis on an “error-correcting” view of induction: “The justification for [error-statistical methods in science] lies in their ability to control error probabilities, hence sustain learning from error, hence provide for the growth of experimental knowledge” (p. 413). The implications, according to Mayo, are broad: in fact, she sketches out an “error-statistical philosophy of science” composed of Neyman-Pearson, Fisher, . . . and Peirce.

At the heart of what could be an interesting synthesis, however, lie some serious problems. First of all, she has accepted a kind of “crystal ball” view of statistics, as witnessed by the claim that one learns about the future performance of experimental processes from a statistical test! In fact, no statistical test can do such a thing, however much it may serve to characterize the present performance of the experimental process under observation. We might, of course, forgive such a lapse as merely semantic, except that for Mayo it underpins her entire approach. The “objectivity” of experimental science can be rescued, she claims, because of the warrant for future performance that tests provide! But, of course, no mathematical procedure of analysis can do such a thing. Instead, all tests are based upon a conditional inference that reflects an underlying model—statistical analysis can tell us about the model and how it would behave if true, but the inference that the model is a correct characterization of this experiment will always be extra-statistical. For example, I might posit a hypothetical model of normally distributed scores with mean \( \mu \) and standard deviation \( \sigma \), in which case I expect no more than 5 percent of the samples in a random draw to differ from the mean by more than 1.96 \( \sigma \) units. If I then observe a particular set of real data that differs from \( \mu \) by 3 \( \sigma \) units, then I can conclude that the probability is low that such a sample would have been generated by sampling from the model population. If I take the further step of concluding that my data are not from such a population, however, I have added an inherently non-statistical inference. In my example, as in all statistical tests, the underlying model is a mathematical construction, not an actual “picture” of reality. Tests tell us only how well a given data set approximates such a construction, not how the same experiment, carried out in the future, would perform. To make the further claim, about an experiment’s chance of success in the future, requires more.

Unfortunately, therefore, Mayo’s book will be regarded as a failure by those aware of recent literature on the nature and history of statistical methods, and of their use in the
sciences. Further, her account will fail to satisfy most of those who have followed recent debates on the meaning of statistical significance within psychology and other fields. In fact, Mayo’s proposed “new” philosophy of science sounds suspiciously like a version of the “hybrid model” of inference so scathingly characterized by Gerd Gigerenzer¹ as an unholy blend of Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson approaches. Mayo’s neglect of this literature, of the very large literature on exploratory data analysis, and of the recent debate within psychology about null hypothesis testing, gives her analysis an unreal air. Historians may find useful her characterization of the differing views about Bayesian statistics, and of the sometimes arcane uses made of this approach by philosophers, but they will be dismayed at the absence of discussion of the historical trends that lie behind the tortuous emergence of statistical procedures as a tool of science. For good or ill, those procedures have impacted the behavioral sciences in a myriad of ways, even as their use continues to generate controversy. Mayo’s book, unfortunately, adds little to the debate.

NOTE

Reviewed by RYAN D. TWENEY, professor of psychology at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green OH 43403.

Deborah G. Mayo comments:

Confusion and controversy about Neyman-Pearson (NP) tests originate from two premises, both false: (1) The Behavioristic Model of NP Tests. It is assumed that NP tests provide mechanical rules or “recipes” for deciding to accept or reject hypotheses so as to ensure that one will not behave “erroneously” too often in the long run. (2) The Probabilist’s Image of Induction. It is assumed that inductive inference must take the form of quantifying the support or probability of a hypothesis, given data (as in Bayesian inference). Unsurprisingly, as critics show, if error probabilities (e.g., significance levels) are interpreted as probabilities of hypotheses, misleading and contradictory conclusions are easy to generate. Such demonstrations are not really criticisms but flagrant misinterpretations of NP methods. Nevertheless, lacking an interpretation of statistical tests showing how they provide a genuine account of inductive inference without misinterpreting error probabilities, the choice will appear as: either use a mechanical “cookbook” method unsuited for inference, or else use tests in an inconsistent and schizophrenic fashion, e.g., by adopting a so-called “hybrid approach,” as criticized by Gerd Gigerenzer.¹ A key goal of my book is to remedy this situation. I propose reinterpreting NP tests as tools for obtaining experimental knowledge—knowledge of what would be expected to occur in certain actual or hypothetical experiments. The familiar statistical hypotheses (e.g., null hypotheses) serve to probe key errors: mistaking real effects for chance, mistakes about parameter values, causes, and experimental assumptions. By controlling error probabilities, tests can serve as highly reliable or severe error probes. This conception of tests is based on a careful analysis of their mathematical development, especially in the work of E. S. Pearson, who plainly rejected the behavioristic model of tests declaring that, “no responsible statistician . . . would follow an automatic probability rule.”²

This collection of papers (in French) is the product of an international colloquium devoted to neurophilosophie, a cross-disciplinary domain bounded by faculties of medicine and philosophy in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The colloquium celebrates the centenary of French philosopher Henri Bergson’s Matière et mémoire (1896) and the effects of that important work on developments in both philosophy and the neurosciences. As a commemoration, Bergson et les Neurosciences celebrates a man and a work rather little known today outside the realm of academics and specialists, and Gallois and Forzy do not make it their business to try and rectify this situation. The collection is very much a set of formal and clinical conference proceedings, with only passing reference to Bergson’s larger oeuvre, that at one time made him an international celebrity. Nor is any discussion made of the way Bergsonism has seen something of a 1980s–1990s revival in the idiosyncratic philosophies of capitalism, desire, memory, and cinema of the Frenchman Gilles Deleuze.

The focus of Gallois and Forzy is much more institutional. Indeed, the collection is not really about Bergson so much as it is about the boundaries between academic and clinical disciplines. In this, “Bergson” is not the subject, but simply a case study for examining “the question of the rapports between science and philosophy” (197). Fortunately, Bergson provides an extremely rich case study in that his works were always deeply inflected by developments in psychology, physics, and neurology. He was a great “materialist” philosopher, one who shaped his metaphysical visions within a framework of physiological psychology, Darwinian theory, and years of study on clinical aphasia. The collection will interest readers concerned with the historical development of the neurosciences and “the history of memory.”

In their dozen papers, the collected authors of Bergson ponder the philosopher’s intellectual milieu, contributions to positivism, notions of multiple forms of consciousness, emphases on memory as a form of physiological action, and questions of localization and representations of the past in the brain. Familiar names like Broca, Charcot, Wernicke, and Pierre Marie are noted and discussed throughout. Some general groupings of material can be discerned. Articles like those of Philippe Gallois, Jean Delacour, and Pete Gunter explore Bergson’s twentieth-century legacies; those by John Mullarkey and Jean-Claude Dumoncel study problems of time and perception; and others look at comparisons between the ideas of Bergson and those of some of his intellectual contemporaries.

Philosopher Jean Ladrièr finally does a thoughtful overview of the proceedings in his
closing summary essay, out of which the reader can draw two significant themes: first, the importance of Bergson’s work in moving away from strictly brain-localized ideas of memory, thought, and consciousness; and second, the inescapable impact of metaphysics on clinical neurology, and vice-versa. The first point announces a truly “modern" conception of neurological function in which memory is not a simple location or receptacle, but at once “multiple, dimensional, and animated." The second point attempts to capture how “there is complementarity, and not opposition or separation between science and metaphysics . . . there exists a sort of passage by continuity between mind and matter” (200-201). Long-time students of Bergson will not find these conclusions surprising, but all scholars can find a wealth of new philosophical, neurological, and mathematical insights with which to detail their own researches. More general readers can look forward to an intelligent survey of mind-body issues with a genuinely interdisciplinary spirit, one which seeks the commonalities between philosophical science and scientific philosophy. Bergson, who made this his life’s work, would no doubt be pleased.

Reviewed by Matt K. Matsuda, professor of history, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1108.


Often the darker side of history is illuminating. In Creating Born Criminals, Nicole Hahn Rafter explores the rise and fall of eugenic theories and institutions in New York between the 1850s and the 1970s. Rafter documents the interplay of ideas and social contexts that lent power and respectability to the notion that the propensity for criminal behavior is inherited and can be controlled by stopping defective blood lines. In the introduction, Rafter states her central goals as the reconstruction of eugenic theories of crime and the assessment of their impact on criminal justice practices. She does a wonderful job reconstructing eugenic theories and a sufficient job demonstrating their impact.

Rafter identifies the germ of eugenic institutions in altruistic institutions of the 1850s to educate the feeble-minded. These institutions established two groups: the feeble-minded and the professionals who managed their care. Feeble-mindedness, viewed as a congenital and permanent condition, was distinguished from insanity, a curable affliction in otherwise normal people. Psychiatrists cured the insane, and the feeble-minded needed their professional stewards, institutional superintendents.

Based on theories of degeneracy, institutions of reproductive control for feeble-minded women were operating by 1878. Proponents of the idea of degeneracy asserted that certain individuals with bad heredity had a tendency to devolve to less civilized states. Immoral living accelerated, the degenerative process and damaged the genes, but clean living could reverse the process. Thus, the potential for future degeneracy, not mere criminal acts, landed women in such institutions.

Struggling to establish their professional legitimacy, superintendents established their
professional jurisdiction through eugenics. Within a social context of trust in science and increasing tensions between classes, the superintendents’ search for professionalization transformed the feeble-minded into born criminals. 

Rafter writes poignantly of born criminals as metaphors. At the turn of the century, as members of the middle class believed their authority threatened by social change, eugenic theory provided a means of identifying and protecting the “normal” from the deviant. 

By 1900, indeterminate sentencing and the option of transferring incorrigible prisoners increased the motivation of officers in the correction system to identify born criminals. Initially, criminal anthropology provided means for identification. Viewed as evolutionary throwbacks, born criminals were distinguished by physical characteristics—circumference of the head, for example. By 1910, however, American institutional directors had adopted the Binet-Simon test for inferring criminality from feeble-mindedness. Eugenic thinking was at its height in the United States. 

By 1915, the theory of psychopathy had all but eclipsed born-criminal theories. Most psychopaths were intellectually normal, psychiatrists argued, but suffered from diseases of the mind, not inborn physical defects. Eugenic proponents’ political naiveté delayed official recognition until 1921, but New York’s eugenic institutions operated until 1974, when the Supreme Court reasserted inmates’ due process rights.

Quantiﬁcations of eugenic theories’ impacts are sprinkled throughout the text and in a few tables. The information would have been easier to evaluate had it been distilled into more tables. Rafter opens and closes the book with the compelling anecdote of an inmate who, after being branded a defective delinquent, spent his last days institutionalized. Nearly all of the remainder of the book is devoted to the institutional managers. The impact on inmates is unclear. Eleven thousand inmates were committed to eugenic institutions, but I am not sure of the typical experience. This, however, is a minor point, for no matter the complexion of the incarceration, all inmates were designated genetic threats to society.

In Martin Luther King’s dream world, people are judged by the content of their character; Rafter presents the real world perils of judging people by the content of their DNA. Today, as we use emerging genetic technologies to confront social problems, we should remember that the gate to turn-of-the-century eugenics was opened by altruism.

Reviewed by David A. Jones, doctoral candidate in political science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260.
Gerald Murch, emigrated to the United States following completion of his studies at the University of Göttingen.

Both editors were born in Germany, but Dietrich Albert moved in 1993 from the University of Heidelberg to the University of Graz, Austria, where he chairs the section of General Psychology. In 1990, Horst Gundlach became director of the Institute for the History of Modern Psychology at the University of Passau, which contains a major collection of the classical apparatus of the early era of experimental psychology. A unique item in its collection is a car of the Austrian Federal Railways, which was an aptitude-testing laboratory on wheels and now serves as a mobile museum of applied psychology in the service of the railroads.

The book reviewed here contains papers presented at a symposium bearing the same title as the book and held in Graz, Austria, in 1994 in the context of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Psychology of the University of Graz. Essential for the establishment of the Institute in 1894 was a grant awarded to the university by the Austrian Ministry of Education (Ministerium für Cultus und Unterricht), facilitating the acquisition of instruments needed for research in experimental psychology.

As the subtitle indicates, the book addresses itself to two related topics: the use of psychological apparatus in the past and the uses of psychological apparatus in the present. Readers of this journal will be most interested in the historical significance of apparatus in psychology.

In his chapter on "Senses, Apparatus, and Knowledge," Gundlach suggests that human senses themselves may be viewed as instruments, and their functioning may be greatly enhanced by man-made instruments. He reminds us that Galileo Galilei would have been unable to see the moons of Jupiter without the aid of the telescope. Gundlach goes further, however, and suggests that human beings as a whole may be viewed as instruments. He uses the abbreviation of "M.A.I.—Mensch als Instrument"—for this idea and suggests that it was this model that gave rise to the "new," revolutionary "apparative Psychologie" of the second half of the nineteenth century, whether it refers to F. C. Donders’s mental chronometry,¹ Fechnerian psychophysics, or Helmholtzian "physiological optics."²

It is good to remember that Helmholtz’s Handbuch—one of the basic, early compendia of experimental analysis of sensory functions—did not appear in an encyclopedia of experimental psychology (none existed at that time!), nor of physiology, but of a German general encyclopedia of physics.³ Its editor, Gustav Karsten, was a professor of physics in Kiel.

Other contributions to the symposium have a direct relevance to the history of psychology. H. P. Huber refers to three types of methods of experimental psychology used by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig and focused on external stimuli (Reize), expression (Ausdruck, including somatic expressions of emotions), and reactions (Reaktion). The "reactions" also include such psychological activities (psychologische Akte) as differentiation, recognition, choice, and associations.

On the basis of archival studies, W. Höflechner provides an account of the development of experimental psychology at the universities of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and L. and H. Sprung deal with the subject in the context of the development of psychological methods. R. Benschop focuses on the history of the tachistoscope.

Two chapters deal with the use of laboratory apparatus in psychotechnology. P. J. Strien refers to the developments in Holland, while K. H. Stapf reports on the use of apparatus in this phase of applied psychology in Germany. H. Irtel comments on progress in the research on color vision, from Newton to contemporary systems for the generation of colors controlled by computers (rechnergesteuert).

The central contribution of the symposium to the history of psychology is that it rein-
forces the view that the use of apparatus contributed substantially to the emancipation of psychology from speculative philosophy.

NOTES


Reviewed by Josef Brozek, professor emeritus of psychology, Lehigh University, now at The Plaza, Apt. 220, 2353 Youngman Avenue, St. Paul MN 55116-3063.


This collection puts together much of the finest work of one of the best living scholars in the field of medieval magic. It contains sixteen articles published between 1976 and 1995, the majority of which are now difficult to access. Four further articles are published here for the first time.

Magic and divination are comprehensively discussed by means of their various subdivisions: necromancy (conjuring up the dead for their prophetic powers), chiromancy (prediction on the basis of the numerical values of names), scapulimancy (divination from the shoulder blades of sheep), and also the more learned branches of the art, astronomy and astrology. The period covered extends from the classical to the early sixteenth century, with a concentration upon the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Western interest in Arabic texts. There are excursus upon learning at the court of Frederick II, translators active in medieval Spain, and the possible chiromantic interests of no less a figure than Archbishop Thomas Becket of Canterbury. An especially valuable seven-page appendix revises and corrects the previously published material and adds relevant recent bibliographies. There are indices of names, manuscripts, and initia.

One of Burnett’s great strengths is his command both of palaeography and of the relevant languages. He offers here translations of, and comments upon, texts already printed and also works available only in manuscript; such as, an Arabic treatise on talismanic magic from Ms Oxford, Bodleian Library, Oriental 133, and the Latin version of Arabic and runic astral magic contained in Ms London, B. L. Sloane 3854 (painstakingly reconstructed from disordered gatherings). Burnett has no peer in this field. The transcriptions and translations, in so far as this reviewer is capable of testing them, are careful, and the manuscript scholarship impeccable. The materials relevant to the history of the behavioral sciences deployed here are among the most complex there are, and this is a model of how to explore them.

It must be said that Burnett makes few concessions to the reader; but, then, he is trying...
to show us how that magic the central Middle Ages most respected actually worked. As the aspiring medieval sorcerer’s apprentice had a hard trade to learn, so too has the aspiring modern one. This was, and is, no populist indulgence, to be left to village witches and their like. Persons of great public power and responsibility called upon the services of diviners in this period, and they required evidence of high intellectual attainment in return. One of the great virtues of this book in the author’s demonstration beyond all doubt that the arts of magic could command serious scholarly attention in the Middle Ages, and that they deserve it now.

Reviewed by VALERIE I. J. FLENT, G. F. GRANT professor of history, University of Hull, United Kingdom.


A psychiatrist and director of the public hospital of Cery in Prilly-Lausanne in the canton of Vaud for nearly twenty-five years, Christian Müller has taken an interest in the history of his profession throughout his career. De l’asile au centre psychosocial is the fruit of this reflection. First published in German (Vom Tollhaus zum Psychozentrum, Pressler Verlag, 1993), the book has been partly modified with the addition of some extracts of his articles. The book is not, as the title suggests, a history of psychiatric institutions in Switzerland from the nineteenth century to the present day, but rather a “kaleidoscope of anecdotal sketches.” As the author says, “I enjoyed bringing together typical testimonies and episodes illustrating the Swiss psychiatric landscape.” The genre adopted does, of course, have limits. The author evokes, rather than develops, important subjects in the history of psychiatry and sometimes draws hasty conclusions, justifying too rapidly the psychiatrist’s position, which would, however, merit a more thorough discussion.

These fragments of history do allow glimpses of perspectives inspired by the practical experience of this particular director of an institution:

- the definition of the field of psychiatry in various epochs, and the relationship of psychiatry to other pathological categories (somatic illnesses, deafness, idiocy, epilepsy, neurological illnesses, criminality).
- the status of the institution: a philanthropic organization or a place of confinement?

The author limits himself to a rather unconvincing summary of the contemporary literature to denounce “the oppressive atmosphere of the psychiatric environment in 1930,” nurturing stereotypes to which it is time to give a more multidimensional examination.

- the treatments, notably the early stages of sleep therapy and insulin therapy in Switzerland; but the reader is left unsatisfied over two types of treatment in which Müller has taken an active part: the psychotherapy of schizophrenics and the use of neuroleptics. Concerning the latter, a “discovery of capital importance,” he explains, “at last...
we have been able to effectively treat hallucinating and psychotic patients without inducing sleep [. . .], calm them without losing contact with them.º

Müller seems to acknowledge “the constancy of psychiatric symptomatology” throughout history. He evokes the difficulty of diagnosis, is wary of “labels,” and is concerned about the danger that hospitals might cause the mentally ill to become chronic. He ventures one or two retrospective diagnoses, such as Charlie Chaplin’s childhood traumatism in 1900. Müller highlights, in an anecdotal and sometimes repetitive or chauvinist manner, the role of famous psychiatrists and of Swiss psychiatry in the twentieth century.

This history, full of diversity and suggestions, needs a more nuanced approach; such an approach should focus on the local, rather than the national history, but the restricted focus allows the examination of a long time span with rigor, and the author explores psychiatry in its ordinary practice, not only the psychiatry of great men.

Müller edited for the same publisher a book inspired by five doctoral theses of the University of Lausanne. In Portraits de psychiatres romands J. D. Zbinden describes the career of André Repond (1886–1973), director of a public psychiatric hospital in the Valais region (Maléve), and an internationally reputed theorist of mental health. C. Monod relates the career of Marc-Gustave Richard (1886–1967), a psychoanalyst and teacher in the canton of Neuchâtel. J. A. Flammer explains the intellectual development of the pioneer of psychoanalysis in French-speaking Switzerland, Charles Odier (1886–1954). E. A. H. Barth bears witness to the important work of neuropsychiatrist Hans Steck (1891–1980) in the canton of Vaud; and M. Guggisberg goes back over the work of Joseph Guiulrey (1895–1954), founder of the daydream method in psychotherapy. These biographies, with their very useful bibliographies, are an invitation to read the different authors, rather than a study of intellectual history, which remains yet to be written.

Reviewed by Jacques Gasser, psychiatrist and historian, and Geneviève Heller, historian, Institut universitaire d’histoire de la médecine, CP 196, CH - 1000 Lausanne 4, Switzerland.

Reviewed by: J. D. Zbinden.
To illustrate his points, Liu discusses several Western studies of higher education in the People’s Republic of China. The results of his case study are largely peripheral to the book’s main goal, which is to describe and explain the model.

Liu identifies five aspects of inquiry crucial to the production of balanced, realistic cross-cultural studies. First, he calls for scholars to examine the biases and assumptions they bring to a project and make them transparent to readers. Second, Liu says we must consider the relevance and importance of a research topic to the studied society. Third, are key terms contextualized and discussed in terms of multiple associations and meanings? Fourth, have most significant points of view been addressed, including those that differ from the author’s? And, finally, have we offered a realistic evaluation of the situation under study?

In short, his model reiterates what ought to be taken for granted in cross-cultural accounts: that of course we should examine and reveal our assumptions wasn’t that a main lesson of feminist and postmodern critiques of social scientific research? While all of Liu’s points are well taken, what would be more helpful is some guidance about how to cope with our cultural and scholarly baggage in real, live sticky cross-cultural encounters themselves, not just in the writing of them.

Because the book is written from a philosophical perspective, many social scientists may be put off by its somewhat wordy and dogmatic feel (if Liu did not frequently explain what he means by “realist constructivism” it would be easy to lose sight of his framework, for example). Furthermore, Liu’s constant exhortation that we identify reality in a given social setting, without suggesting how this is to be done methodologically, frustrates even a sympathetic reader. The most powerful part of the book is chapter 7, in which he gives a fairly succinct outline of his key points. This chapter, presented in outline form and supplemented by a few examples, would be a useful teaching tool in directing social science students about how to evaluate their own and others’ attempts at writing about cross-cultural research.

NOTE


Reviewed by Pierri Strawn, a doctoral candidate in the department of anthropology, Yale University, New Haven CT, currently residing in Alexandria VA.


This provocative investigation of the heart, from Pythagoras to Pascal, contributes to the history of subjectivity and the body. Doueih discusses “the interplay between the figurative and the literal, between the visible and the hidden” (10) in depictions of the heart. The Pythagorean dictum, “Do not eat the heart,” pivots Doueih’s study. He first discusses medie-

mal narratives of eaten hearts. Their plot is adultery, revenge, mourning, and a perverse meal of murdered lovers’ hearts. “The double figuration of the heart as both food and the site and
locus of passions (43) belonged to an order of things scarcely imaginable in these days of transplantable hearts.

Doueihi discovers an epistemological break in the Vita Nuova: “Dante’s vision constitutes a radical departure from the conventional articulations of the legend of the eaten heart . . . and locates its generative powers in an environment that heralds the emergence of a specific poetic identity and subjectivity” (59). For Francis Bacon, those who lack friends “are cannibals of their own hearts” (62-63). Friendship “makes it possible to exteriorize the heart” (63). This exteriorization is the decisive shift “from the prohibition dictating what can and cannot be shared as food to the will to share all and everything, and above all one’s self” (63-64).

In the seventeenth century, Jean-Pierre Camus retells the tale of the devoured heart, but “the opposition between . . . two modalities of the heart in Camus’s narrative, constitutes one of the key factors in his radical dislocation . . . from its ‘original’ context, that is, its courtly and pagan context” (82). Yet in Camus’s story, the protagonist still must eat the heart. Exteriorization of the heart gathered strength in the seventeenth century, notably with St. Francis de Sales. The hidden mysteries of the heart are replaced by a heart that must display itself: “Camus’s heart is one that has to be eaten and interiorized within the body in order for it to reveal its real nature and presence, in order for it to become the effective presence of the divine body. Saint François de Sales’s heart . . . is an object and an organ that must be opened up in order for it to reveal its secret” (122). The heart “no longer exists in order to host and hide another” (138), but “will be transformed into a page” (139). The final chapter traces the consequences of this exteriorization in the bifurcation of the heart in Descartes and Pascal: “the end of the reign of the heart as absolute center will come from the evidence of the medical and physiological sciences” (127). A conception of reason arises that has nothing to do with the heart. The heart bifurcated into literalized organ and symbolic “text” embodies modern forms of knowing and of judging.

Doueihi’s analyses attend to the otherness of medieval and early modern works. However, hyperbole mars the text, such as references to the Eucharist as “magic,” without discussion of the problematic of such ascription. The text does not discuss telling illustrations of the Sacred Heart and Augustine’s heart afire. The author states that the work is part of an as yet unwritten history, which we can eagerly await.

Note

1. Curiously, Doueihi does not mention that the heart of St. Francis de Sales was taken from the corpse and kept at Lyons until the French Revolution, when it was taken to Venice.

Reviewed by Robert Kugelmans, Department of Psychology, University of Dallas, Irving TX 75062-4799.
with life in this world and, where relevant, the next,” Phillips organizes his study around a variety of spaces “meant to represent . . . the range of activity in cultural life which the Church felt it necessary to scrutinise” (8). Utilizing a wide range of monographic literature together with numerous citations from seventeenth-century texts, the author, a specialist on the French theater of the seventeenth century, includes material on education, on clerical surveillance in the realms of art and literature, on the virtually ubiquitous influence of Cartesianism, on polemics attached to Biblical exegesis (the duel between Bossuet and Richard Simon is effectively nuanced), on libertinage, and on the varieties of religious belief and unbelief. In light of the many imaginary voyages and utopias in literary works produced during Louis XIV’s reign, Phillips rightly stresses that “the genre of utopia is invested with a particular importance in the sense that it can construct the idea of a homogeneous space, based on the principle of universality, from which religious controversy and organised religion have been evicted” (260).

There are a number of appealing sections in this book; my favorites include Phillips’ account of St. François de Sales and his discussion of details in paintings that censors found objectionable. However, he does not always provide adequate historical contexts for some key issues. His declaration that “one of the major reforms of Trent was the insistence on residence for all members of the hierarchy” (10) glosses over a most rancorous episode at the Council of Trent. In effect, the wishes of the reform wing were foiled since the pope retained discretionary power to waive the requirement that an individual bishop reside in his diocese. (The works of the German historian Hubert Jedin are especially useful here.) Ultimately, the potential abuses in this state of affairs were eliminated during the French Revolution by the draconic Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which contributed to cessation of diplomatic ties between Paris and Rome for ten years. Some minimal review of the role of papal nuncios and their information-gathering services would have proved helpful. In discussing the clergy, he might profitably have used Richard Golden’s The Godly Rebellion: Parisian Curés and the Religious Fronde, 1652–1662, (1981), which explores the pent-up resentments of parish priests, including their attitudes towards Jesuits. A short section on the Church in the French colonies during the century would have added further depth and dimension to his work.

Overall, Phillips provides a useful survey of principal religious and intellectual themes in seventeenth-century France. The book is well written, attractively produced with footnotes at the bottom of the page, and has a serviceable index. Here an obligatory caution: passages in French—whether a line or an entire paragraph—are not translated, a familiar editorial practice in Great Britain, but rare in the United States.

Reviewed by John T. O’Connor, professor of history, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148.
Pavia, Padua, and Vienna and obtained a medical degree in 1858. In his long academic career, he taught legal medicine and psychiatry, mostly in Turin.

His first publication, *Genio e Folli* ("Genius and Insanity," 1864) already preannounces a theme that he developed in an array of books, some translated into various languages (including English). Outstanding among them is, *L'uomo delinquente* ("The Delinquent Man," 1876), continuously revised and expanded.

Influenced by Morel’s concept of degeneration and by the French positivistic school, his main innovation consisted of the introduction of the notion of the delinquent-born individual, presenting atavistic physical traits (mainly in the head, but also in other parts of the body) and manifesting criminal behavior. This contribution framed the controversial debate over responsibility and the insanity defense.

Lombroso was such a prolific author that a comprehensive bibliography of his writings would be an impossible endeavor. The present volume, co-edited by a psychiatrist (Giacanelii) and by two historians (Frigeri and Mangani) consists of a selection of Lombroso’s writings, excerpted from many books and papers (many almost impossible to find in libraries).

The book consists of three parts. In view of its magnitude only a list of its content is given here. The first part, devoted to Lombroso’s clinical writings, deals with his contributions to psychiatry (mainly in regard to mental hospitals), to anthropology, and to biographical descriptions of well-known criminals.

The second part, centered on the theme of deviance, mainly focuses on atavism (as a reversion to primitive morphological and behavioral traits), crime, races, various types of delinquents, and social factors in criminality. The third part is concerned with penal laws, crime, and civilization, and their social situation in Italy during Lombroso’s lifetime.

The editors have done a marvelous job in this enormous endeavor, and the publishing firm — among the leading ones in Italy — should be congratulated for this handsome and thoroughly edited volume (the index, divided by topics and individuals, takes up fifty-five pages).

Nowadays Lombroso’s theories are disregarded as based on biased and uncritically collected data. (With penetrating insight a French critic has called him a “remuer d’idées,” i.e., a stirrer of ideas). However, the theme of genius and insanity, from Aristotle on, continues to tantalize many; and, after a long period of oblivion, hereditary factors in human behavior have gained prominence again. This book definitely fills a wide gap in the history of the behavioral sciences.

Reviewed by GEORGE MORA, research affiliate, section of the History of Medicine, Yale University, New Haven CT 06520.

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At a time when genetic engineering, test tube babies, and cloning have become a reality, *Keeping America Sane* is timely and intriguing. Comparing the Canadian and American
experience. Dowbiggin traces the involvement of leading psychiatrists in curbing the trans-
mission of defective genes through sexually segregating, sterilizing, and castrating the men-
tally unfit and enacting laws to prohibit marriage, tighten medical inspection, and deport 
immigrants.

Dowbiggin’s tale begins with the professional lives of an American, G. Alder Blumer, and a Canadian, Charles Kirk Clarke. Blumer served as chief psychiatrist at Utica Asylum in New York and head psychiatrist at Butler Hospital for the Insane, Providence, Rhode Island. Clarke, Canada’s most prominent psychiatrist at the time, became medical superintendent of Rockwood Asylum and superintendent of Toronto Asylum. At the beginning, both supported moral treatment (that is, treating the asylum inmate with kindness, reason, and discipline to improve his or her mental health). But as conditions in hospitals declined, state funding shrank, patients seemed increasingly incurable, and bureaucracy meddled with the doctor’s autonomy. Clarke and Blumer, in frustration, turned to more extreme, cost-saving methods of eugenics. At Utica, Blumer supported ovariotomies to improve the mental health of women and ensure “the survival of the fit” (84). However, when Blumer got to Butler, a well-endowed hospital with a large, wealthy clientele of New England Brahmins, who believed themselves genetically superior to the arriving southeastern European immigrants, Blumer found the clientele did not want to hear about the inferior lineages of their families, nor were they receptive to suggestions of restricting marriages or sterilization.

In Canada, Clarke and his assistants, Clarence Hincks and Helen MacMurchy, perceiving a disproportionate number of immigrants in asylums, advocated sterilization to cut costs and curb the proliferation, especially by the feeble-minded, prostitutes, criminals, and mentally ill people. In the United States, where there was less confluence between government and psychiatry, views on sterilization differed. The chief proponent of sterilization was William Partlow, Superintendent of the State School for the Mentally Deficient and of Alabama’s Insane Hospitals. Supported by political allies hailing the sterilization efforts of Nazis, Partlow boasted almost 200 sterilizations in his hospitals by 1934 and advocated legislation, which, albeit, was unsuccessful. William Alanson White, superintendent of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital for the Insane in Washington D.C. believed, on the other hand, that sterilization laws were “inviting disaster” (109). In between were those like Dr. Adolf Meyer, Johns Hopkins University, initially a member of the American Breeder’s Association, and Blumer, whose statements on the subject varied. The American Medico-Psychological Association, forerunner of the American Psychiatric Association, though having presidents in favor, never officially endorsed sterilization or prohibiting marriage.

Both Clarke and Thomas Salmon, chief examiner of the New York Board of Alienists, led efforts to tighten medical inspections. After World War I, Dowbiggin maintains, psychiatric interest in eugenics waned in the United States, but not in Canada, due to the belief in the United States that psychiatric casualties were largely a product of environmental stress. British Columbia and Alberta passed sterilization laws by the early 1930s. In addition, the United States Supreme Court declared sterilization constitutional in *Buck v. Bell* (1927), and by 1940, thirty states had enacted laws permitting sterilization of patients, resulting in 18,552 operations.

In *Keeping America Sane*, Dowbiggin skillfully uses comparison to highlight his thesis that state fiscal and bureaucratic pressures influenced the policies of the doctors. He presents a wealth of information in text and footnotes, makes a great effort to be impartial and objective, and demonstrates a wide divergence of sentiment on eugenics among psychiatrists. Still, he leaves questions unanswered. While “in contrast to many accounts of the history of eu-
genics which stress the decisive power of race, class, and gender,” the author argues “that
psychiatrists were drawn to eugenics largely for professional reasons” (ix, x) stemming from government pressure, his thesis does not sufficiently explain why Blumer advocated ovari-otomies in part to ensure the “survival of the fittest.” why Blumer retreated on eugenics when faced with objections from a wealthy clientele; why not all, but some, psychiatrists in Canada and even the United States expressed concern about the allegedly disproportionate rates of nervous and insane Jews in asylums. Nor, except for one fleeting reference to lobotomies and malarial treatment (22), does the thesis explain why in the face of shrinking state budgets, other methods were not used (such as deinstitutionalization.)

To some degree, the answer must therefore lie in psychiatrists being a product of their time, a time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Social Darwinism and the fear of race suicide was prevalent. While the author largely shows how government interests influenced psychiatric policy, not government, swayed by immigrant and shipping company lobbyists, but psychiatrists themselves influenced governments to favor tougher examinations, more deportations, and the elimination of the authority of civilians to override medical diagnoses. Some of these efforts may have been due to “humanitarian considerations” (212), such as reducing competition between immigrants and poor Americans for social services. Yet, Salmon himself expressed concern about the welfare of the returning immigrant in the American Journal of Insanity (1907), and about reports of the New York State Board of Deportation in 1912 and 1913, that indicated insane immigrants, facing high mortality rates, could spend months, even years in asylums awaiting deportation, only to experience unnecessary restraint and improper food on the way home.

Finally, while Keeping America Sane ends in 1940, the experiences of the psychiatrists at the immigration depots and in World War I clearly paved the way for the psychiatric screening program in the United States in World War II.

Reviewed by Rebecca Greene, currently a visiting scholar in the department of history, Rutgers University, Newark NJ. She received her doctorate from Columbia University where she wrote her dissertation on the “Role of the Psychiatrist in World War II” and was a Josiah H. Macy fellow in the Section on Psychiatric History, Cornell Medical Center. She is currently writing a book on psychiatry in World War II.

Ian Dowbiggin comments:

Rebecca Greene, while generally praising my Keeping America Sane, believes that my de-emphasis on race, gender, and class in the history of psychiatrists’ involvement in the eugenics movement leaves some questions unanswered. She is, of course, quite right to in- taminate that these factors were hardly absent in the attitudes, ideas, and behavior of eugenicists, whether in the United States, Canada, or—more appositely—Nazi Germany. But can the history of eugenics be reduced to these themes? As more and more historians of eugenics are realizing, when placed in its own broad historical context, eugenics eludes such a reductive interpretation. Other factors loom equally large, if not larger. To cite only a few: much of the thrust behind eugenicists’ support for immigration regulation came from the longstanding theory that the “Old World” (meaning Europe) was decadent, reactionary, and corrupt. The view from the “City on the Hill” was that Europe was maliciously sending its riff-raff across the Atlantic to the “New World,” essentially exporting its own problems so that foreign governments could handle them. Class prejudices against immigrants? Then why was organized labor in cahoots with progressives in clamoring for restrictions against newcomers? And, as more and more studies are showing, men tended to be sterilized as often and with as
much alacrity as women. Even where and when this was not true, it is worth remembering
the huge and well-documented role of women’s groups in the campaigns for involuntary
sterilization. If feminists like Margaret Sanger and groups like the New Jersey League of
Women Voters were behind non-elective sterilization, it is hard to see how the history of this
social measure derived predominantly from gender bias.

Similarly, a salient issue in the history of North American eugenics was the anti-
Catholicism of eugenicists. This became particularly evident after Pope Pius XI’s 1930 encyc-
lical on birth control, which galvanized the religious prejudices of eugenicists and led to a
virtual culture war that lasted long after the pre-sterilization forces moderated their eugenicist
propaganda. If there was one thing that truly cemented the eugenicists’ alliance, it was this
hegemonic dislike of the Catholic Church, more so than their racism, sexism, and class
prejudices. When combined with the professional frustration of the countless psychiatrists
who endorsed eugenics, this religious animus and other elements made for a highly volatile
brew.

But stressing eugenicists’ anti-Catholicism also runs the risk of distorting the complex
history of eugenics. Mark Adams and many other scholars have been arguing in recent years
that most essentialist interpretations of the history of eugenics founder on the shoals of hard
evidence. As individuals, we may sympathize with or condemn eugenics. But as we begin to
reconstruct a fully contextualized account of eugenics, we must acknowledge that its past was
multidimensional, featuring well-intentioned as well as mean-spirited men and women, and
driven by a rich assortment of agendas and interests. We await the historian to weave all these
strands together in an account that does justice to the past and its personalities.


From the Sage book series, Theory, Culture & Society, Fowler’s book offers a full critical
assessment of Bourdieu’s theory of cultural production that incorporates the French theorist’s
newer work, The Rules of Art (translated into English only in 1996).

Fowler provides an explication of Bourdieu’s work in which she identifies his intellectual
debts and assesses the implications of his theory for understanding modern culture. In addi-
tion, she proposes three “test cases” in which Bourdieu’s theoretical claims are scrutinized in
the light of specific historical evidence of the processes of the development of fields of
production.

Fowler maintains that Bourdieu’s is the most viable cultural theory available for ana-
lyzing the social relations within which art is produced and received. She argues that the
concepts of habitus and social practice are fruitful tools for understanding the rise of the
autonomous artist and artistic modernism.

The most important and original contribution is Fowler’s critique of Bourdieu’s concep-
tion of modernism and the split between high culture and popular culture. She argues that
Bourdieu exaggerates the degree to which the field of modern art can be characterized as
purely formalistic in approach. In her first case, Fowler shows that Impressionist artists were
not solely concerned with developing a radically new stylistic vision; more importantly, they were engaged in exploring the “meaning” of modernity. Bourdieu, she argues, reads the trajectory of Edouard Manet too much through the lens of later modernism, which was more clearly dominated by the formalist ideology of abstraction.

Fowler argues that important vestiges of enchantment with dominant aesthetic judgments have blinded Bourdieu to the mechanisms of the canonization of art. Notably, Bourdieu has failed to study adequately non-canonized “popular” art forms, and has, rather, assumed a priori that these forms are devoid of artistic purpose and solely concerned with ethical and moral issues. Fowler’s second case examines British women writers to show that it is the positioning of women within the cultural field — rather than stylistic conformity or aesthetic sensibility — that prevents their inclusion in the canon. Fowler’s third case provides evidence from popular literature in Britain to argue that Bourdieu has also not examined ways in which works of dominated classes contain elements of cultural resistance.

While the text is not suitable as an introduction to Bourdieu (or as a substitute for reading the theorist’s works), it is useful to those who employ Bourdieu’s conception of modern cultural fields. Fowler offers a caution about Bourdieu’s assumptions concerning the uniformity of practices within fields of high and popular culture. The genesis of fields of culture, she suggests, can be understood by examining historical evidence more thoroughly and by returning to Bourdieu’s basic approach of analyzing social relations and practices (rather than relying on his own assessment of the nature of high or popular culture). Her book also offers encouragement for expanding the analysis of popular culture in order to build a more thorough and empirically grounded conception of the nature and genesis of modern cultural fields. Substantively, the book may be useful to historians of French modernism or Scottish cultural production.

Reviewed by Karen Peterson, Ph.D. candidate in sociology at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville VA 22903.


Once described as “psychology’s faux pas,” phrenology remains the subject of scholarly research. The appeal of phrenology to nineteenth-century physicians, surgeons, educators, prison reformers, employers, and guidance counselors on both sides of the Atlantic made phrenology an eminently useful science; its philosophical materialism (establishing the brain as the seat of the mind) made phrenology the controversial target of clergy-men. Developed in the late eighteenth century by the Viennese surgeon, Franz Josef Gall, and promoted in Britain and America by his German disciple, Johann Caspar Spurzheim, phrenology offered an apparently scientific explanation of human behavior based on the relative size and function of parts of the brain. These “mental faculties” (the total number of which varied according to different phrenologists) were carefully measured in the individual and supposedly identified the traits which distinguished men from women, criminals from responsible citizens, religious
fanatics from rationalists, and the superior nations (northwest Europe) from inferior peoples (the “Hindoo” and Africans).

Charles Colbert has enlarged—our understanding of phrenology in his book, A Measure of Perfection. He provides a clear definition of the pseudoscience and records the progress of phrenology in America during the 1830s, 40s, and 50s. He reminds us how many writers, politicians, and social critics were attracted to “craniology” and how ubiquitous the “head readers” were. Colbert’s main concern is the connection between phrenology and American art: painters, sculptors, and phrenologists all judged their subjects visually—often with the help of calipers and the “craniometer.” As Colbert observes, phrenologists were interested not only in artistic styles but also in fashion: they urged people to display their cerebral endowments. They advised women, for example, to wear their hair in a bun, for this fashion asserted “the high noble foreheads and large domestic faculties” (180).

Given their interest in racial types and in social and gender distinctions, artists readily borrowed from phrenology. They were aware of the claims of phrenology, they used phenological language, and they submitted to the calipers. Did this make them devotees of the new science? Colbert would like to think so, even though he admits that there were many who (like Audubon) “vacillated in their allegiance” or, more tellingly, “refrained from explicit reference to phrenology” (55, 57). How should we regard these reticent artists? Why did they equivocate about the inspiration of phrenology?

One explanation may lie with the variety of social crusades that competed for the attention of all nineteenth-century thinkers. Temperance, spiritualism, slavery abolition, ventilation, feminism, vegetarianism, Swedenborgiaism: here, as Colbert admits, was a formidable array of influences. It was possible to journey from one social cause to another and to combine ideas from them all. Phrenology was part of the mix. It is not surprising that so many artists did not “come out” as phrenologists; as Colbert complains of William Rimmer (87), their concepts of human behavior were “not very systematic” and they “rarely acknowledged their source.”

The major problem of this book is not the reticence of artists, but the generosity of the author. Colbert includes a great number of artistic productions that have no verifiable connection with phrenology. The Absolon lithograph of the Great Exhibition (313) shows a few heads in bonnets and tophats—no easy subjects of phrenological analysis. The Cole painting “Architect’s Dream” (61), offers a single and very distant head, and it is hard to know exactly what arcadian or savage landscapes (267, 366) confirm about phrenology. Similarly, the numerous nude sculptures probably exemplify artistic conventions (neo-classicism, idealism) more than phrenological principles.

Apart from the engaging speculations, Colbert’s book is a useful addition to the early history of psychology. It represents a skillful blend of various histories: artistic, social, and scientific. Although we are short-changed in the index, the publisher must be complimented for providing so many illustrations (as befits a book of this sort), and so much space for endnotes and bibliography.

Reviewed by DAVID DE GIUSTINO, senior lecturer in modern history at Griffith University, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.

Charles Colbert comments:

As your reviewer notes, my book, A Measure of Perfection, was written from the perspective of an art historian, and herein lies the source of a number of interesting issues raised by his analysis. Works of art are not written documents—they do not confess their content
readily. The art historian’s task often involves an effort to coax meaning from a silent object. To do so, he or she seeks to establish the context in which a piece was produced and viewed, and this entails a methodology that may seem alien to those who are unacquainted with the discipline.

A fundamental principle of art history is that style reinforces content, and few familiar with the field would be inclined to maintain that the end of art is to "exemplify artistic conventions (neo-classicism, idealism)." The content of Hiram Powers’s Greek Slave, an ideal nude, can be ascertained from the dozens of references to phrenology made by the artist, his friends, and the critics who wrote about this statue. I will also note that William Rimmer was not reluctant to "come out" as a phrenologist: he lectured to large audiences on the subject (16). The art historian, then, can draw inferences about Rimmer’s oeuvre from his expressed beliefs; no work of art comes down to us hermetically sealed in its own interpretation. Further, I am sure the reviewer realizes that the illustration of Cole’s Architect’s Dream is not the same size as the actual painting (it measures 58 by 84 inches), and that, in the latter, the head is readily recognizable.

I am gratified to learn that, despite misgivings, the reviewer finds my book "a skillful blend of various histories: artistic, social, and scientific." It is the outcome of years of research in medical and historical libraries, and of the consultation of thousands of unpublished documents. I believe that the images and explanations are not capriciously conjoined, and that my weighing of the evidence is not in the least at odds with the standards employed by most art historians.


This volume represents the English translation of a collection of essays originally published in German in 1988. If that dates the book, it can still be read today against the background of missing pieces, as it were—a dearth in the literature by survivors of the Nazi regime about that regime, or by the survivors’ children and grandchildren. With the exception of Jewish survivors and their offspring (who have found this task sufficiently daunting), subjective reflections on those turbulent times are rare, because they often lack courage or an instrumentarium of analysis. This turns out to be both the strength and the weakness of this book.

The strength of this books lies in the fact that several of the incidents related on these pages are as troubling as they are significant—incidents documenting the thirst for knowledge about the Nazi world that parents and grandparents inhabited on the one hand, and the reluctance on the part of parents and grandparents to tell about their experiences, on the other. The most chilling episode is of a young woman who grows up in postwar Germany without a father and in deep longing for him. There are rumors about his having held an important position in the Nazi Reich. After he returns from Russian captivity, the young woman learns, progressively and to her dismay, that he must have been involved in Hitler’s Holocaust, and
finally the father as much as admits this. The reader sympathizes with the woman as she is trying to come to grips with the awful truth. The collection contains other examples of negative bonding between parents and their progeny, all based on totally or partially hidden Nazi pasts and contemporary revelations and discoveries, some involving more guilt and self-guilt, others less.

The disappointing aspect of these essays exists in the fact that most of the authors are psychoanalysts or psychotherapists, sometimes followers of Freud, but usually not, sometimes with impressive academic training, but usually not (and the latter woefully shows). It is the lack of a conceptional or methodological commitment that increasingly annoys the reader, in instances where long-winded sentences tend to supplant succinct analysis, and mere jargon takes the place of exact circumscription. Part of the problem is that as professionals trying to help patients with Nazi-parents memory problems, several of the authors are themselves victims of the ailment that they are seeking to cure. Hence, the distinction between healers and their patients is unclear, and that muddies all the waters.

Another problem relates to the distinction between National Socialism and the Third Reich as fact and as part of a person’s memory—here, too, the lines are frequently blurred, as in this unexplained statement: “National Socialism is not only context and background; it is itself psychic reality and part of interpersonal relation” (Heimannsberg and Schmidt, in the introduction on page 5). Because the book is very unstructured, and the topic—that of alienation between generations caused by the crimes of Nazism—is not systematically pursued, the reader is, too often, left at sea, with a sense of disorder and confusion. Hence, although the principal message is conveyed, namely that the war generation tends to deny or suppress Third Reich memories and causes this to reflect negatively on its descendants, the book cannot go beyond the mere fact that this is so. Beyond the recognition of fact and appreciation of anecdotes and episodal evidence, social scientists need sharper tools to delineate what really went on here and how it is to be explained, within whatever frame of reference that might be chosen.

Reviewed by Michael H. Kater, distinguished research professor of history, The Canadian Centre for German and European Studies, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

Paul Verhaeghe. Does the Woman Exist? From Freud’s Hysteric to Lacan’s Feminine

Freud discovered psychoanalysis by following the path of hysterical desire. Along the way he encountered the unconscious, the power of transference, the formative function of the oedipal complex, the theory of infantile sexuality, the lure of fantasy, and the death drive. However, Freud made one mistake: he wanted to stay ahead of the hysterical game. He thought he could give his hysterical patients the answer to their question: “What does a woman want?” He believed they wanted a master who held the secret of their most unknown wishes. Yet Freud could not crack the riddle of sexual difference. The female side of human desire refused to be caught either in the passive position or in the procreative role. His clever Dora had little patience with such dire prospects. Piqued by her dismissal, and frustrated by the
interminable nature of the analytic process, Freud searched until the end of his life for the
signifier that would finally seize the mystery of femininity.

Lacan took up the challenge and offered an unexpected answer to the riddle: Freud’s
“dark continent” is an hysterical fantasy that keeps the analyst in a false position of mastery
and prevents the treatment from being brought to a close. By breaking down the collusion
between the hysterical and her master, psychoanalysis allows the subject to sever the tie with
the one who is by definition impotent to provide an answer to an impossible question.

Paul Verhaeghe’s lucid presentation of the dialectical process that carries Lacan through
the evolution of Freud’s thought offers profound insights into the place of hysterical discourse
in the social fabric. Patiently and carefully Verhaeghe applies the Lacanian grid to the Freud-
ian text and achieves the extraordinary feat of explaining Lacan’s formulations without turn-

noting the project into a mere recapitulation of the theory. Verhaeghe, along with Serge
André,\(^1\) has inaugurated a genre that is unique: most Lacanian analysts and scholars tend to
proceed as if Freud could be read only through Lacan’s eyes. This has created major confusion
in the Anglo-Saxon world, which can barely recognize their Freud in the French rendition of
his work. In contrast, Verhaeghe’s reading of Freud is straightforward. The reader is informed
along the way not only of Lacan’s own take on Freudian ideas, but also of the arrays of
interpretation that emanate from other trends of post-Freudian literature, including feminist
revisionism.

The approach chosen by Verhaeghe reveals a side of Lacan’s theory that is often for-
gotten. Lacan “exists” only when read in a dialectical relation with the Freudian text. At the
point when Lacan exposes the fundamental lure that underlies the Freudian project—the
mystery of femininity is an hysterical set up—he leaves us with a new enigma. If indeed the
end of analysis allows the subject to move beyond the world of “hysterical make-believe,”
that is, beyond the Freudian world—then what? What are we to make of a desire that is no
longer sustained by a cause that is only an illusion? On this topic even Verhaeghe’s thorough
diligence seems to revert uncharacteristically to a certain poetic vagueness. We can only hope
that Verhaeghe, who has so compellingly described the blindness of the master, will provide
a sequel to Does the Woman Exist? in which the true import of Lacan’s post-Freudian project
will be elucidated. In the meantime, the present volume is a major contribution to the inter-
disciplinary effort to bridge the gap between psychoanalytic theory and the human sciences.

Notes

Reviewed by Judith Fehér-Gurewich, Ph.D., psychoanalyst, director of the Lacan Seminar at the Center for Literary and Cultural Studies, Harvard University, and editor of The Lacanian Clinical Field.
senberg devoting his entire career to the gathering of anthropometric data about Jewish communities and conducting large-scale statistical experiments to determine Jewish skull shape. In his book, *Defenders of the Race*, John M. Efron makes us understand why race science among Jewish doctors of that time was nothing extraordinary and how their work differed from those colleagues who paved the intellectual way to Auschwitz.

The book traces the representation of Jews in race science, i.e., the work of Jewish physical anthropologists from Germany, England, Russia, and Austria between 1882 and 1933, against the background of general intellectual history. Like non-Jewish colleagues, the Jewish race scientists’ aim was to define Jewish peoplehood in biological and anthropological terms: they asked, for example, whether the Jews formed a race, or whether Jews were more susceptible to certain illnesses. They joined the debate about biological properties of the Jewish people, then called the “Jewish question,” to find a rational, scientific, and empirical answer to it.

The period under investigation was the time when race science was frequently pseudoscience: highly subjective and prone to fanciful aesthetic judgments. The science deteriorated to ideas of biological determination and superiority and inferiority of races, and race furnished nationalists and colonialists with a justification for aggression against peoples defined to be of less worth. Work about Jews, the prime targets of racial prejudice, in this field in Efron’s eyes, developed because race science, relying on statistics, measurement, and quantification, at the turn of the century, was an integral element of modern European culture. Race science was not in conflict with the idea of fundamental equality of all people, in principle, and thus was not limited to nationalists and antisemites.

In detail, the Zionists’ relation to race science was a very complex process in which they absorbed, adopted, and manipulated contemporary scientific discourse about the physical nature of Jewishness. They simultaneously employed it, believed in it, and criticized it with its own means. They constructed a sometimes blunt, unitary picture of “the Jew” and warned against its misuse for racial chauvinism. Although they laid a greater stress on the power of environment, the Anglo-Australian Joseph Jacobs, for example, was convinced that the concept of “race” explained specific Jewish fertility. Other Jewish race scientists employed the language of modern race scientists to refute many of their fundamental propositions concerning the Jews.

While Efron stresses the intention of the Jewish race scientists’ work, he can find basic differences from their mainstream Gentile colleagues. In comparison to the Gentiles, the Jewish race scientists were much less concerned with the normative methodology of race science, i.e., defining superiority and inferiority. Jewish race scientists resisted general race science when it turned to biological determinism for chauvinistic purposes. Instead, they intended to defend Jewish identity against reproaches.

Differences are found particularly in the political intentions of Zionist scientists. One aim was to detect the importance of inherited factors in order to measure the Jewish adaptability to a different environmental setting. Instead of claiming Jewish superiority, Zionists used race science to bolster a political cause that was concerned with Jewish inner spiritual and physical regeneration: to create a powerful and uniquely modern representation of Jewish identity.

Efron has given us fundamental evidence why phenomena like intra-Jewish anthropometric research does not have to be in a basic conflict with a positive Jewish identity. Among the recent works on the Jewish body in history, this very clearly structured and written book deserves high appreciation.

Reviewed by **Einhard Wolff**, Institut für Geschichte der Medizin der Robert Bosch Stiftung, Stuttgart, Germany.

Divided into four sections, Cary Wintz’s collection of the speeches and writings of Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and A. Philip Randolph from 1890 to 1930 is an important contribution in understanding the evolution of African-American political thought. Wintz includes an introduction that provides biographical material on each theorist, a discussion of the evolution of his political philosophy, and a brief bibliography. Rather than focusing on the differences between these political theorists, Wintz uses the documents to address the complexities and nuances of African-American political thought. He includes writings that reveal the similarities and linkages between these individuals, as well as documents that illustrate deep ideological and philosophical differences.

Wintz’s treatment of Du Bois and Washington is particularly nuanced. The portrait that emerges of the two men is one of mutual admiration and cooperation that disintegrates into animosity over civil rights tactics and objectives. This portrait includes a series of well-known documents, such as Booker T. Washington’s, “Atlanta Compromise Address” (1890) and W. E. B. Du Bois’ “Declaration of Principles” (1905) that reveal their positions on segregation, integration, and civil rights. However, Wintz also presents numerous documents on Du Bois that transcend his rivalry with Washington and chart his shifting ideas on race and politics during the 1920s, such as “White Co-workers” (1920), and “Race Relations in the United States” (1928).

The inclusion of the activist political philosophies of Garvey and Randolph facilitates critical considerations of radical black thought. Wintz captures Garvey’s appeal to working-class blacks to build the Universal Negro Improvement Association, a grassroots political organization, founded in 1913 in Jamaica, by including writings tracing Garvey’s statements on race and the formation of political organizations, such as his 1916 letter to Robert Russa Moton, Booker T. Washington’s successor at Tuskegee University, and his invitation to the Ku Klux Klan to address the UNIA. Viciously attacked and lampooned by W. E. B. Du Bois and other members of the black elite, Garvey was defended by the radical socialist A. Philip Randolph. Randolph, editor of the Messenger, a socialist daily, migrated from socialism into trade unionism by the 1920s and founded the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and Maids in 1925. The documents presented make tangible connections between the development of his socialist ideas and the ideological concerns Randolph utilized in union organization.

Wintz’s book is an excellent introduction to the varied manifestations of political thought and the interconnections between theories and theorists between 1890 and 1930. Readers looking for more than a survey text will be disappointed. Nevertheless, the work is useful as a primary textbook in United States and African-American history and studies courses. Eminently readable and well organized, Wintz presents black political theorists as critical actors in shaping political approaches to shifting realities for African-American people. Wintz accomplishes this task through the critical selection of primary documents resulting in the presentation of a complex rather than pedestrian portrait of black political thinkers.

Reviewed by Stephen G. Hall, doctoral candidate, department of history, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210-1367.

Over fifty years after the end of the second World War, "Repressing, Remembering, and Working Through" — the title of Cocks’ third essay — is not a problem just for victims and contributors, but apparently for all of us. This fact is reflected by a never ending interest in books, essays, and reports about totalitarian systems. Still, there are many unanswered questions. One of the most interesting is the survival and contribution of psychotherapy in Nazi Germany.

Cocks, arguing with Freud’s psychic determinism, claims that there is an accidental determination of his choice of subject. Whatever was his motivation, he has a good chance of being an objective analyst — if it is possible at all in that case. He is not German, he is not a medical doctor, and he was born after the collapse of the Third Reich. It is another question that there is no historian who could break out of the vicious circle of judging Nazi Germany’s affairs. Cocks himself mentions some historians’ concern about studying any "gray areas" of the fascist regime. My worry is similar: both understanding or not understanding Nazism and the Holocaust are dangerous. If terrifying deeds of fascism are understandable, they are also rational in a way. Nazism was not only superrational, it was irrational in more than one sense: Cocks mentions that, mystic and irrational features of Jung’s theories made him more understanding of Nazi ideology than orthodox Freudianism. However, if we cannot understand something, how can we do anything against it?

The difficulty of that question is reflected by Cocks’ work at a high intellectual level. In his essays on the role of medical doctors, psychotherapists, and, among them, psychoanalysts in the Third Reich, he is attempting to apply the large context of German political and intellectual tradition to the history of medical science and professions in Germany. Both were different from the Anglo-Saxon model: referring to the former in his first essay, Cocks writes that the involvement of the state in medical practice was always greater on the Continent than in Britain or the United States. Nevertheless, he also mentions that professional organizations had their autonomy and could defend their ideas and interests within a complex industrial society. In Hitler’s Germany, this autonomy was very special: as we learn from the book, originally German doctors were not obliged to murder their mentally ill patients, they were only empowered to do so — and a lot of them did (68).

The relationships between Jewish and non-Jewish doctors are also embedded in historical traditions, and Cocks presents them with caution. From his essays we can also learn that there was a complexity of particular motives of collaboration, mixed and mingled with the social - historical conditions. Internal debates and fighting in the psychoanalytic movement; eternal rivalry between psychiatry and psychotherapy; debates in science about the nature of mental illnesses; and simple competition for jobs after a long period of economic depression — all these issues were certainly represented by personal conflicts and decisions. Winners could easily justify their victories with matters of abstract principles and give reasons why losers deserved their fate. Why psychoanalysts and psychotherapists were not armed against that kind of rationalization — could they have a positive impact on political life or ideologies? — is one of the questions that Cocks asks in his essays.

The answer is no. And even worse: psychoanalysis may offer very special ways of rationalizing. One of them is cited in Peter Loewenberg’s introduction: listening to Bohm’s
report about how Christian colleagues felt uneasy about dismissing Jewish psychotherapists from their jobs, Freud said that Christians had to suffer for their convictions, as Jews did—as if protest were a reward that they had to give up. Similar arguments belong to Geigerich (63): Jung was purposefully engaging the shadow of racial prejudice in order to extirpate it; or to Dürrssen: she appreciated the Göring Institute for inducing orthodox Freudian psychotherapists to abandon their elitist and exclusive behavior.

Cocks’s nine essays on medicine and psychoanalysis in Nazi Germany make the picture, outlined by him in his well-known book Psychotherapy in the Third Reich, more complex and nuanced. Through his works we can better understand why and how people, medical doctors, psychotherapists, Freudians, and non-Freudians took part in various affairs of Nazism. But the whole remains absurd anyway.

Reviewed by Zsuzsanna Vajda, professor of psychology, Attila Jozsef University, Szeged, Hungary.


Ann Thomson’s edition of La Mettrie’s Machine Man and Other Writings brings to the English reader the complete text of Machine Man (more usually translated as Man the Machine), Man as Plant, the System of Epicurus, and the Preliminary Discourse to La Mettrie’s collected philosophical works. The volume also includes the first half of two longer works, The Treatise on the Soul and Anti-Seneca. In both cases, Thomson claims that these chapters are sufficient to present the essential arguments of the texts. It is indeed better that these texts be available in some form than not at all, but it would be preferable to have the complete texts. Nonetheless, this collection is important; it includes significant texts that have not been available either in English or, until recently, even in modern editions in French. The publication of this volume in the series, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, attests to a growing interest in La Mettrie and the issues he raised.

Thomson’s translations of the texts are clean, readable, and effectively amplified with essential, but minimal, scholarly citations, most of which point to the likely sources for some of La Mettrie’s specific points. The collection is also well served by useful scholarly apparatus, such as a chronology of the life of La Mettrie, a listing of other works to consult, and a short history of the publication of each text. Thomson’s twenty-six page introduction situates La Mettrie’s work in general within the historical context of the issues fundamental to his work, such as the contemporary discussions of the soul, the current of anti-religious thought, contemporary discussion of matter, and the iatromechanical school of medicine and physiology. She situates La Mettrie as a proponent of the ancients within the ancients-versus-modern polemic because of his adherence to Epicureanism. This identification seems mistaken, not only because by the 1740s the debate had long been resolved in favor of the
moderns, but also because La Mettrie’s philosophy, while indeed indebted to the ancients, was so strikingly novel in the eighteenth century.

Thomson also discusses each text included in the volume, outlining the major themes and sources. Her clear and very useful introduction is marred by an unfortunate reversal in the text. The text on page xxvii, which ends the discussion of The Treatise on the Soul, belongs before the text on page xvi, which treats Machine Man. (The fact that each page begins with a prepositional phrase that is not jarringly out of place complicates the issue.) To the uninitiated reader this misalignment causes some confusion about what Thomson believes are the important issues in these central texts.

La Mettrie’s philosophical works are important to the history of philosophy, medicine, physiology, and ethics. They are of particular interest to readers of this journal because La Mettrie was a pivotal figure in drawing connections between mind and body, the physiological and the philosophical, the biological and the moral. The materialist philosophers with their interests in philosophy, biology, and the physiological understanding of human beings have become more central to the scholarship of the Enlightenment, and La Mettrie’s texts are fundamental in that tradition. Because of his interest in radical philosophical ideas and physiology and brain function, La Mettrie is of great interest to contemporary readers. This collection of La Mettrie’s texts, which presents them to the English reading public in a clear and accessible form, is valuable to both the teacher and the scholar of the eighteenth century.

Reviewed by Kathleen Wellman, associate professor of history, Southern Methodist University, Dallas TX 75275.
standing’ [referring to the existing survey-based literature on the public understanding of science and technology] systematically deflects attention away from the critical debate about science and scientific institutions, about the ownership and control of science and its products (215). Reflecting their class struggle perspective, the editors observe that “...it is important for scientific institutions to recognize that science is often seen by public groups as a resource for the powerful in society—and against the everyday interests of the weak. Only deliberate—and deliberately humble—efforts in this area can begin to address the issues” (220).

Each of the nine reports focuses on a particular example of an interaction between “the public” and “science.” The cumulative image of the public is interesting, but not representative. Wynne focuses on a group of Cumbrian sheep farmers whose animals and pastures were contaminated by fallout from the Chernobyl accident. Irwin, Dale, and Smith examine the attitudes and information acquisition behaviors of two neighborhoods in Manchester that are immediately adjacent to a chemical plant. Lambert and Rose look at the health information and attitudes held by a group of patients with a rare genetic metabolic disorder with an estimated frequency of one in 500. Price studies a group of patients at an infertility clinic, which was a part of a national study of triplets and higher-order births. Michael interviews small groups of volunteers in a home radon study, as well as a small group of electricians from a nuclear power station. McKechnie studies a small number of residents from the Isle of Man concerning their understanding of radiation and the possible effects of the fallout from the Chernobyl accident. McDonald observed the work of a display development team at the London Science Museum. Yearly studies the use of scientific information in environmental campaigns and interviews a small number of campaign managers and leaders. An essay by Rothman, Glasner, and Adams does not involve the public, but focuses on the failure of a British government initiative to foster commercially-viable biotechnology products by providing targeted grants to consortia of industrial and university-based scientists. While this eclectic set of groups appears to reflect the funding decisions of the [U.K.] Economic and Social Research Council more than a rational effort to look at how members of the public encounter and understand science, their summation does not provide a useful or generalizable set of conclusions.

The cumulative definition of scientists is equally atypical. Most of the individuals identified as scientists in these essays are “health physicists,” who are called radiological health technicians in the United States; nurses; physicians; power plant administrators; chemical company public information officers; museum display developers; nutritionists; and Green Party campaign managers. Only the Rothman et al. essay involves practicing scientists, and even in this essay, the major focus of the discussion is the expectations of government and corporate managers. Even if one were to imagine some grand negotiation of the meaning of science, the individuals described in these essays would certainly not be the representatives that the scientific community would send to the table.

The unifying theme of these essays (except Rothman et al.) is that the “deficit model” is an attack on the common sense of the average citizen. Rooted in the work of John Ziman (1991) and Wynne (1991), the idea of the deficit model is that virtually all persons have a common sense understanding of many, if not most, issues and problems that is as useful as formal science, which Irwin and Wynne view as a subjective judgment among scientists. The clear inference is that citizens do not need to understand anything about DNA to make a judgment about genetic engineering or understand radiation to make sense of the debate over the storage of nuclear waste. Because most corporations and scientific institutions are
usually wrong, citizens will be able to use their common sense recognition of the good guys and the bad guys to make political and policy judgments.

Approximately two decades ago, B. S. J. Shen suggested that the public understanding of science and technology might be usefully divided into practical scientific literacy, cultural scientific literacy, and civic scientific literacy. In this context, civic scientific literacy refers to a level of understanding of scientific terms and constructs sufficient to read a daily newspaper or magazine and to understand the essence of competing arguments on a given dispute or controversy. Shen argued:

Familiarity with science and awareness of its implications are not the same as the acquisition of scientific information for the solution of practical problems. In this respect civic science literacy differs fundamentally from practical science literacy, although there are areas where the two inevitably overlap. Compared with practical science literacy, the achievement of a functional level of civic science literacy is a more protracted endeavor. Yet, it is a job that sooner or later must be done, for as time goes on human events will become even more entwined in science, and science-related public issues in the future can only increase in number and in importance. Civic science literacy is a cornerstone of informed public policy.

More recently, another set of scholars wrote “in defense of the deficit model:”

. . . there remains the problem of stigmatization. Clearly to measure levels of scientific understanding within a population is inevitably to assign higher scores to some individuals than others. By analogy with the notoriously controversial issue of IQ testing, this may be seen as inherently normative. Surely, it may be said, by measuring scientific understanding we are automatically branding as inferior those who score badly? Not at all. It is worth remembering that the French psychologist Alfred Binet developed the IQ test in order to identify those pupils who were most in need of educational assistance . . . [demonstrating] that there is nothing necessarily prejudicial about the wish to find out how well individuals are doing in any particular area of educational and scientific attainment.

We do not share Levy-Leblond’s apparent willingness to divorce the ideals of democracy and literacy. On the contrary, we believe that the healthy functioning of democracy depends crucially upon the existence of a literate public, and in modern industrial societies, true democracy must embrace scientific literacy.

Irwin and Wynne begin with a perspective on the structure of social conflict and a constructivist conviction that scientific knowledge is ultimately socially negotiable. This set of closely edited and integrated essays reflect these basic commitments unwaveringly. The contribution that the book makes to the public understanding of science and technology, or to an understanding of the information needs of the public, is minimal.

NOTES


Reviewed by Jon D. Miller, vice president, Chicago Academy of Sciences, and professor of political science, Northern Illinois University, Chicago IL.

This is the first English-language edition of Vygotsky’s *Pedagogical Psychology: A Short Course,* written in the early 1920s as a textbook for future teachers. It deals with a wide variety of subjects (such as, the nervous system, classical conditioning, co-education, and moral education) and gives the reader some insight into the thinking of the young Vygotsky. The book is introduced by the late V. V. Davydov and supplied with notes and biographical entries for several of the authors mentioned. In principle, it could be a useful book for those interested in the development of Vygotsky’s thinking.

Unfortunately, when we compare the present edition with the Russian original, we find that it is marred by a large number of mistakes. I distinguish omissions, additions, and distortions, and will give a few examples of each.

1. Omissions. – Dozens of times, quotation marks are dropped, resulting in the reader believing he is reading Vygotsky, when he is, in fact, reading Munsterberg, James, or some other author. In addition, whole parts of the text have been lost. For example, 3 lines of the Blonskii quote on page 4, 23 lines of the Sherrington quote on page 35, and 60 lines on page 335 (with the result that Chapter 18 ends very abruptly).

2. Additions. – Frequently, the translator adds words or names to the text to make it understandable for the modern Anglo-Saxon reader. For example, “Lange” becomes “N. N. Lange” (3), “Blonskii” becomes “Pavel Petrovich Blonskii, the Soviet psychologist and educational reformer” (1), and “Lange” becomes “the Danish psychologist Lange” (104). These additions are unfortunate (Vygotsky would never write about his colleague Blonskii in such a way) and inevitably reflect the translator’s own incomplete understanding (e.g., the N. N. Lange on page 3 was actually F. A. Lange, and the C. G. Lange on page 104 was a physiologist), which makes it important that they should be recognizable as additions. In the restoration of old paintings it has become a good custom to take care that any additions are recognizable as such and are reversible. This is an excellent principle that editors and translators of historical texts should follow as well.

3. Distortions. – The translator makes a number of serious errors which result in distortions. For example, where Vygotsky writes, “We cannot let life impose pedagogical constraints without the intervention of any science. This is the work of theoretical pedagogics,” the translator has the incomprehensible, “It is impossible to have any sort of life if there is no place for the sciences, nor is it possible to discuss the constraints of pedagogy; here it is a matter of theoretical pedagogics,” (8). He also is inclined to replace plain Russian by such terms as “sine qua non” (6), “seriatim” (27), “Sturm und Drang” (76), “ex nihilo” (150), and “joie de vivre” (304). This is unnecessary and leads to curious mistakes (e.g., “seriatim” is misspelled and has been added to the index as a subject term).

There are many more such distortions of Vygotsky’s original text, and together with the omissions and additions, they make this edition unreliable. The (anonymous) editor of the book could have enhanced its quality by consistently supplying notes whenever a term or quotation required this. However, this was done very unevenly and incompletely, and the
notes that were supplied introduce new misunderstandings. In sum, this edition might have been a useful addition to our collection of Vygotskiania if only some knowledgeable person would have worked on it for half a year more.

By curious coincidence, I already arrived at virtually the same conclusion more than seven years ago, when I first reviewed this very same translation for a major publisher and advised against its publication. Apparently the manuscript then began a lengthy and mysterious peregrination from one desk drawer to another. Manuscripts do not burn, as Bulgakov said. Perhaps they should, now and then.

Reviewed by René Van der Veen, associate professor of education at Leiden University, The Netherlands.


This collection of essays, compiled and edited by historians Norbert Finzsch and Robert Jütte, focuses on the development of hospitals, insane asylums, and prisons in America and Europe between 1500 and 1950 and springs largely from a conference held in June 1992 by the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C. The eighteen contributors from six different countries represent backgrounds in history, sociology, criminology, and public health, providing a significant interdisciplinary scope to the book’s thrust.

Finzsch introduces the book with helpful background information and an overview of the contents, chapter by chapter, which is particularly valuable to any reader, but especially for those wanting to select portions of the book as a reference toward additional study or perhaps for a professor surveying potential course materials. He provides the focus for the book as not only a factual account of institutions of confinement, but an examination of theoretical underpinnings. The work is divided into two sections; the first gives the history of hospitals and asylums, and the second gives the history of prisons.

Of particular interest are the various interpretations of the influence and contributions of several key figures, but mainly Michael Foucault and Norbert Elias, defined by Finzsch as scholars of “social discipline.” These discussions form the basis for the study of whether institutions of confinement were born during the sixteenth or the eighteenth century and many of the essays deal with this question. Along this same line, come the questions of theories: are we looking at social regulation or social discipline as we examine the changes within these institutions of confinement? Furthermore, what are the periodic effects of coexisting institutions such as the state, the military, and the church? And what are the recent effects of increasing populations and capitalistic society?

Dealing with such a broad time span, as well as comparing the histories of American and European institutions, carries the danger of delivering limited perceptions. Can the authors be adequately aware of the conditions and circumstances they record? Obviously, observations drawn from outside the institutions must differ from those taken from within. While many would hasten to argue that internal documentation also carries limitations, scholars and
leaders from the various representative fields must take care to balance the two. Nonetheless, this compilation of essays provides a ready source of additional references and offers a needed perspective on the topic.

Reviewed by JoAnna D. Innés, assistant professor of English, Newberry College, Newberry SC 29108.


Reiner Pommerin’s anthology, Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany, is a most useful piece of work. Writing from the appealing standpoint of historical sociology, the eight authors emphasize the political underpinnings of culture in essays discussing politics, music, and architecture, among other things.

The most interesting essays are those by Reiner Pommerin, Kurt Sontheimer, and Ernst Vollrath. Pommerin analyzes the transition from a culture based on National Socialist centralization and monopolization of authority to a reinvestment of cultural authority to the Länder after World War II. He points to disparities between the tastes of battle-fatigued Germans longing for escapist literature, film, and art and efforts of the Allies to promote humanitarian and democratic attitudes.

Ernst Vollrath has provided the anthology with a remarkable analysis of German political thought. He views Nazism as a codification of the nonpolitical, i.e., a revolt against ordinary politics. A number of the German elite tried to adjust to Nazi ideology in opportunistic ways, but the people who made an obvious transition to Nazism generally had little influence on postwar Germany after it was stabilized.

Kurt Sontheimer discusses the role of intellectuals in the Federal Republic of Germany. He points out that being a true intellectual implies a certain independence that can be brought only through a severance of institutional commitments. He believes that the most significant intellectual life is that which goes on outside of the university.

Left-wing intellectuals in the emerging Federal Republic initially had a deep distrust of all ideologies. In the 1960s, they gradually became more amenable to the ambiguous teachings of Marx, which were applied in both dogmatic and nondogmatic ways, leading to a radicalization of the intelligentsia.

The 1969 election was a major event for Germany’s left-wing intellectuals. In the person of Willy Brandt, they had a sympathetic ear at the head of state. The first five years that Brandt was in office was the heyday of the German left in terms of their influence on the German government. This honeymoon came to an abrupt end when Brandt was replaced by Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt was a pragmatist who was less sympathetic toward left-wing intellectuals than Brandt had been. Left-wing thought became more fragmented. Reformers and revolutionaries found themselves at odds with one another.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the left-wing intelligentsia did not play an important role in the reunification process in Germany. More decisive was pressure for reunification emerging from
GDR citizens and Helmut Kohl’s responsiveness to them, as well as his ability to harvest political capital from the phenomenon. This highly readable volume will be a welcome addition for all academic and public libraries. Furthermore, it will be a useful text for undergraduate courses in German Civilization and Culture, History, or Political Science.

Reviewed by Peter R. Eberhard, lecturer in German at Indiana University/Purdue University of Indiana, Indianapolis IN 46202-5140.


Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere, the editors of The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, and contributors to the anthology, take us on a long and labyrinthine journey into the vast territory that comprises the centuries-old quest of philosophy: to find the source and meaning of consciousness—philosophers’ “source of the Nile.” Though of little concern to the ancient Greeks, the search for consciousness began in earnest in the seventeenth century with Descartes, but at no period in the history of philosophy has it generated the concentrated effort expended in the last two decades.

The thrust of the anthology is threefold. First, the contributors attempt to explain consciousness in terms of its representational properties and content and its relationship to the unconscious and self-conscious in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience.

Second, even after Descartes’ concept of consciousness and the mind-body problem has lost preeminence, there remains a missing link: the nomic connection between consciousness and its neurophysiological underpinnings. In his excellent and comprehensive introduction, Guzeldere explores this gap in terms of functional and causal roles, and the fifty debates in the book probe it in depth.

Third, the editors believe that the debate-rebuttal format is the best means to end the philosophers’ quest. Hopefully, a companion volume about European ideas will appear in the current plethora of publications, and from these two branches a fundamental theory of consciousness may emerge.

Guzeldere’s introduction situates the contributors within two main categories (let us say the two principal branches of the Nile): the naturalists “at heart,” whose leading protagonist is Thomas Nagel; and the full-blown naturalists, foremost of whom are Daniel C. Dennett and Paul Churchland. Nothing in this journey is quite so simple, however: there are thus many off-shoots of these two categories—researchers who are neither full-blown nor “at heart” naturalists, whom I shall call hybrids.

Naturalists at heart embrace naturalism, but do so with reservations, to the extent that they are sometimes labeled “mysterians” or skeptics. Nagel’s qualia (subjective states of awareness) constitute one such landmark in research on consciousness.

The full-blown naturalists assert that consciousness can be studied within a naturalist
framework without theoretical reservations. Churchland and Dennett, along with such close allies, Francis Crick and Patricia Churchland, deny the validity of Nagel’s *qualia* and argue for a neuroscientific interpretation of all mental phenomena.

Among the hybrids, Colin McGinn pessimistically states that achievement of a universally-accepted theory of consciousness is impossible. Block hypothesizes (and David Chalmers concurs) two types of consciousness: phenomenal consciousness (P.C.) and access consciousness (A.C.), that is, access to information via reasoning. The distinction between P.C. and A.C. is termed the explanatory gap.

We continue the exploration with John Searle, who calls himself a biological naturalist. He argues that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, but, because of its subjective appearance, it cannot be ontologically reduced to the neurophysiological substrata of the brain.

Flanagan, in his superb contributions to the anthology, attempts to synthesize P.C. and A.C., thereby rescuing consciousness from its “ghostly past.” With his “natural method,” a tripartite combination of neuroscience, phenomenology, and psychology, together with the process of dreaming, Flanagan makes gigantic strides towards demystifying consciousness.

We near the end of the trek with David Rosenthal’s keen insights into unconscious and conscious mental states. He holds that a mental state is conscious when and only when it is accompanied by a higher-order thought about that state. Rosenthal’s critics counter with higher-order perception rather than thought, but he defends his position.

The fifty timely and diversified debates notwithstanding, the philosophers’ “source of the Nile” remains elusive. I concur wholeheartedly, however, with Flanagan’s humanist stand: convene phenomenologists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists (I would add, especially those in the burgeoning field of artificial intelligence). Armed with these reinforcements, philosophy may be nearing the last leg of its journey to discover the “source of the Nile.” It is not inconceivable that one of the editors or contributors to *The Nature of Consciousness* will frame the fundamental theory of consciousness, but I paraphrase Jerry Fodor’s caveat: this theory will not be ready for next week’s edition!

Reviewed by BARRY J. LUBY, Ph.D., Professor of Spanish in the Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures at John Jay College of The City University of New York, NY 10019.


Darwin scholars and a few historians of anthropology and modern France will recognize the name of Clémence-Auguste Royer, the woman who translated Darwin’s *Origin of Species* into French. Now, with this book, Anglophones have a welcome and detailed account of Royer’s life and her engagement in politics, economics, journalism, and what can be described only as science writ large.

Born in Brittany in 1830 to humble origins and educated in a convent school, Royer embraced republicanism in 1848 and turned her back on the Catholic Church. After the
Second Republic failed, she qualified as a secondary-school teacher, began a series of ruminations on matter theory, and spent a year teaching in Wales. In the mid-1850s, she moved to Switzerland, where she lectured to women on evolution and read from Kant and utopian socialist philosophy. She also met the love of her life, the Republican politician Pascal Duprat, with whom she shared journalistic duties, a companionate marriage, and an illegitimate son. In Lausanne she translated the third English edition of the Origin into French and wrote the fifty-page introduction brimming with materialist, eugenic, and antikerikerical commentary that so infuriated Darwin.

Harvey’s focus on Royer’s life and publications achieves the author’s goal of bringing this interesting woman’s career to light. The book’s many virtues include the author’s careful detective work in diverse archives and a chronicling of the less-well-known features of Royer’s life, those not related to her translation of Darwin or her anthropological theories. Though Royer thought of herself as a political and scientific rebel, many of her ideas were commonly held. Her understanding of science and her vision of its social function tapped into some typical currents of early and mid-nineteenth century French thought. In particular, her serial adherence to rather inchoate versions of demi-utopian and post-utopian socialism, and her late nineteenth-century plea for monism, mark her as an intellectual heir of 1848. Seeking a unified philosophy of science and society, she decried scientific specialization and an emerging professionalization of science that excluded women and all but the most adept autodidacts. Although she became the first woman member of the Anthropological Society of Paris, she was not a member of the inner core, and in the 1870s the group suppressed publication of some of her views on women, sexuality, and demography.

Royer felt her greatest achievement was her final philosophical statement, La Constitution du monde: Natura rerum of 1900. For Royer, matter theory and moral theory were inextricably linked. Never one to shy away from a fight or the big questions, she attempted to rethink Newtonian gravitation and matter theory. Reacting against the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, but retaining the notion of a plenum, Royer envisioned a universe of eternal, sentient, and mutually repulsive fluid atoms. All too briefly, Harvey compares Royer’s thoughts on matter to those of Ernst Haeckel and Herbert Spencer. She might have gone further. Although Royer rejected Darwinian and Buffonian notions of pangenesis in the 1860s, aspects of her matter theory, right down to the organic molecules, seem to mirror those of Buffon.

Solid as a personal biography, the book is not without eccentricities of organization, interpretation, and contextualization. For example, we only learn how Harvey’s Royer differs from those of her other biographers by sifting footnotes and reading through a brief afterword. Also, I finished the book still unclear of Royer’s role in, or relationship to, the Third Republic’s vogue of neo-Lamarckian biological and social theories. Finally, the text could have benefited from a more precise definition of nineteenth-century feminism, and from a greater engagement with the diverse literatures on European women in the nineteenth century.

Reviewed by Michael A. Osborne, associate professor of history and environmental studies, University of California, Santa Barbara CA 93106-9410.

Joy Harvey comments:

Mike Osborne’s review offers me the opportunity to discuss the problem posed when one attempts a biography in the field of history of science. As historians of science, our training is so often in the field of intellectual history, perhaps with a side look at social historical concerns. The temptation is therefore to produce an intellectual biography, analyz-
ing primarily what the person said, what they thought, how they evolved concepts. But as historians and biographers we have an additional obligation to the individual we write about. Most scientific biographies, like most literary biographies, are of well-known figures like Darwin or Newton, where the basic elements of the story are known. If, as in this case, the biography is of a less well-known figure, and a nineteenth century woman at that, encountering and reflecting the scientific as well as the political world of her time, the task becomes more complex. The biographer has an obligation to walk around in her skin, to take a look at her family, at her politics, to ask her, as it were, what her own concerns were in taking certain actions, and to slowly build, layer on layer, a representation of the elements of her life that drove her to take both science and the re-interpretation of the role of women in society as her essential tasks. The primary aim here is to show links between the subject and other scientists, feminists, political men and women with whom she came in contact in some sort of narrative form, as the story of a life. When for example, Royer takes on the translation of Darwin she does so in order to comment upon and understand Lamarck and the other scientists whose writings she had recently encountered, and to place Darwin within economic theory as well as science. Later, when she discusses Darwin, it is often in his own terms, not only in those of a “neo-Lamarckian”. But if, as Mike Osborne seems to imply, we must place upon this life a retrospective interpretation (she was this or that kind of feminist, she was this or that flavor of neo-Lamarckian) does this belong outside the biography proper? I believe that such interpretations, if introduced into the biography itself, break the narrative flow and produce strange anachronisms. What Royer considered to be important in Darwin’s ideas, and how these related in her opinion to Lamarck, is essential within the biography where this enters the narrative of her life. What she thought about the role of women and how this connected to her relationship to Marie d’Agoult, Jenny d’Hericourt, Marguerite Durand and the other feminists of her day enters this biography in the same manner. Other retrospective evaluations of Royer’s thought I have expressed in previous essays on French Darwinism, and Royer, in the critical historiographic essay I placed at the end of the volume, or in my forthcoming essay on the Centennial of Royer’s birth in the Osiris volume on Commemorations (edited by Abir-Am and Elliott).


In his introductory piece to this collection of articles, co-edited with Teresa Brennan, Martin Jay celebrates a burgeoning field of vision theory, drawing on theorists from a wide variety of fields. Jay suggests that such widespread interest in problems of visual experience betokens a cultural paradigm shift, a “pictorial turn” to replace the “linguistic turn” earlier in this century. It is a little disappointing, therefore, to find that the essays collected in this volume do not appear to draw on a wide variety of approaches to vision, but instead bring to the analysis of vision a certain uniformity of outlook. Indeed, almost all the writers involved with this project approach their task through the same conceptual lens, derived in large part
from Jacques Lacan. As Jay himself puts it, “Most of these essays are, we might say, trying to understand ‘visuality after Lacan’” (9). This means, on the one hand, that the book will find its main audience among those who are already convinced that the Lacanian approach is the most useful approach to the theory of vision. The promise of fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration, however, is to some extent undermined by the uniformity of the theoretical underpinnings used by the different contributors.

In fact, vision theory of this sort might well benefit from a richer interdisciplinary context. The historical pieces in particular suffer from a very limited understanding of the nature of the study of vision in the periods under discussion. This failing is illustrated most clearly in Teresa Brennan’s afterword to the collection, in which she rehearses a history of the theory of vision. In her account, the conceptualization of vision is said to have taken a turn from active vision (as expressed by extromission theory) to passive vision (typified by the camera obscura) in the seventeenth century. The notion of vision as passive is then said to dominate through the eighteenth century, finally to be undermined by theories of constructive vision, that begin to make themselves felt in the nineteenth century and dominate the twentieth century. If, however, Brennan had collaborated with historians of philosophy and of the psychology of vision, she might have found much that is problematic in her account. For one thing, the theory that seventeenth-century theorists were most concerned to refute was not any kind of active vision theory, but rather a scholastic-based theory that, so far from taking the eye to be active, was the epitome of a passive theory, holding that vision occurs when little bits of pictures of visible objects enter into and inform the eye. The seventeenth-century response to this theory, however, although varied, almost uniformly portray vision as a multistage process, and the task of the theorist was to describe the ways in which the visual system constructs sight. Thus, many of the features of nineteenth-century visual theory, described in this volume by Gillian Beer in her account of Hermann von Helmholtz, actually characterized much earlier work on vision, not surprisingly, since Helmholtz was building on the work of his predecessors.

Sadly, Brennan’s misapprehensions about the history of the study of vision are shared by other contributors to this volume and seem, in fact, almost to constitute “received wisdom” among workers in this tradition. That this work is dominated by a received wisdom at variance not only with the facts, but with the understanding of workers in other disciplines dealing with this same area, again reduces the possibilities of genuine interdisciplinary cooperation. To my mind, although there is much in this volume that is interesting in its own right, it also represents something of an opportunity lost.

Reviewed by Margaret Atherton, Professor of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee WI 53201.
edited 95 books, most of them in the area of counseling and therapy. In a brief preface, he announces the theme of the present book as a “charting of developments in the major non-psychoanalytic approaches to therapy” (viii). This was not because he has anything against psychoanalysis, but simply to limit the scope of the volume. Indeed, the book covers a broad spectrum of contemporary approaches, including person-centered (Rogerian) therapy, the existential-phenomenological approach, transactional analysis, Gestalt therapy, transpersonal psychotherapy, personal construct therapy, behavior therapy (including applied behavior analysis), cognitive therapy, rational emotive behavior therapy, and, finally, the psychotherapy integration movement. Each chapter author is an expert on the particular type of therapy discussed. The volume addresses historical perspectives through review of the relevant literature and sometimes a recounting of the life experiences of these authors. The book appears to be innocent of any reference to unpublished archival material. The intended audience is trainees and practitioners of counseling and therapy.

Although none of the chapters covers psychoanalysis, the figure of Sigmund Freud looms large in the background of most of them, since he is generally acknowledged as the effective founder of modern psychotherapy. Freud also seems to have served as the role model for many of the founders of other therapeutic schools, such as Carl Rogers, Fritz Perls, and many others. Many of them seemingly felt the obligation to devise a unique theory of psychopathology along with a distinctive type of therapy. Just as was the case with psychoanalysis, many of these schools of therapy later developed schisms and branches. For example, in transactional analysis (TA), there is said to be a classic school (following Eric Berne’s work relatively closely), and two others known as the “redecision” school and the “cathexis” (Schiffian) school of TA—that for a school of therapy that developed only in the 1950s.

To this reviewer it seemed for a while in the 1970s that some new variety of psychotherapy was being announced practically every month, with many of them being practiced in California, where the encounter groups at Esalen became the subject of the popular film, “Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice.” It was therefore pleasing to see in this book some acknowledgment of the excesses of that era. The chapter on Gestalt Therapy (which despite its name is relatively unrelated to the Gestalt psychology of Wertheimer, Köhler, and Koffka) notes that its founder, Fritz Perls, at times “acted unethically” and was “abusive” (p. 96). His legacy of anti-intellectualism has reportedly been widely, if not universally, rejected by present day practitioners of the Gestalt approach. They have also rejected Perls’ confrontational style as being possibly dangerous to clients.

In contrast to psychotherapies greatly influenced by Freud, the behavioral and cognitive therapies are much more closely linked to developments in academic psychology and are more grounded within traditions of experimental research. The progenitors of these therapies include Watson, Pavlov, Skinner, and Hull and their more modern counterparts, such as Joseph Wolpe and Hans Eysenck.

The existence of so many different types of psychotherapy is no doubt confusing to newcomers to the field, who can be pardoned for wondering whether there can really be meaningful differences among them all. For such a reader, the chapter on psychotherapy integration provides a welcome conclusion to this book. Newman and Goldfried’s chapter traces the psychotherapy integration movement back as far as the 1930s and 1940s. Jerome Frank’s 1961 book, *Persuasion and Healing*, is acknowledged as an important milestone in our thinking about what factors might be common to various approaches to healing. In the 1980s, psychotherapy integration became a self-conscious movement. For example, the Society for the Exploration of Psychotherapy Integration (SEPI) was established in 1983. It is
international and interdisciplinary in its scope, holds annual conferences, and publishes a journal.

The non-psychoanalytic therapies have developed largely in the period since World War II, and for this reason it is difficult to view them in historical perspective. This book provides a good narrative introduction to many of these approaches and will have to do until time makes a true history of them possible.

Reviewed by DONALD K. ROUTE, professor of psychology at the University of Miami, Coral Gables Fl. 33124-0721.


As critics of national tendencies seek institutional explanations for intractable problems, universities have increasingly become targets. Sheldon Rothblatt and Elisabeth Leedham-Green have responded with able defenses. A pioneering intellectual historian, Rothblatt began his provocative inquiry into the ways in which universities ought to be perceived and understood with Revolution of the Dons (1968). The Modern University and its Discontents is a series of nine essays, some new and some rethought, all stimulating and original, that explore the ways in which John Henry Newman’s idea of a university has permeated British and American thinking and practice about higher education. Leedham-Green, deputy keeper of the University Archives in Cambridge, has written a scholarly, perceptive, sympathetic history of her university’s evolution from a medieval studium generale to an intellectual colossus. In a concise volume with revealing illustrations, she admirably fulfills two ambitious goals: an explanation of the university’s response to the pressure of external forces and a compelling recreation of the 800 years of university life and institutions shared by students, teachers, and administrators.

From the beginnings of Cambridge as a democratic guild of young teachers, Leedham-Green consistently finds the seriousness of both teachers and students and an exhilarating intellectual climate for those who wanted it. By 1450, the colleges, initially for the support of graduate scholars, were part of the 1300 members of the university changed forever by the new technology of printing, that made texts available for the first time. The scholars transmitted the new learning, and, by Elizabeth’s reign, brought Cambridge closer to the center of power than ever again. In succeeding years, Cambridge endured the Civil Wars with generally royalist sympathies and battled with plague. At the same time, new studies developed apart from the limited curriculum, as did a publishing press and library. The stereotype of eighteenth century torpor evaporates before Leedham-Green’s demonstration of a growing extra-curricular life in modern languages, astronomy, botany, anatomy, and geology and student discussion societies. Victorian reforms before the First World War saw the expansion of triposes, the adoption of examination requirements for B.A.s, extended self-government, and, by 1871, the removal of religious restrictions. From the establishment of the Natural Sciences as a degree subject in 1850, the sciences became ascendant with peerless laborato-
ries, museums, and Nobel Prize winners. After the first World War, the government became increasingly responsible for university funding, and after the second World War, Cambridge welcomed all classes and nationalities. Leedham-Green’s evidence and argument affectionately document the successes of Cambridge, not only as a university, but as an influential and vital force within the greater world.

Rothblatt begins with the idea of a university as a moral response to Coleridge’s question: “What is the meaning of it?” Then, “Consult the Genius of the Place,” a richly-textured history of the role of sensibility and setting, explains why universities were such unique experiences. The development of a student subculture from the later eighteenth century, that helped to define the structure and organization of teaching and learning within academic communities, eventually providing a balanced mixture of compulsion and freedom, is the subject of “The First Undergraduates, Recognizable as Such.” Acquisition of that authority, by which universities arbitrated success and failure through examinations, is explored in “Failure,” while “Historical Remarks on the ‘Federal Principle’ in Higher Education” looks back from the rapidly-changing universities of the late 1990s and their stress upon the mechanisms of evaluation rather than the substance of education. Rothblatt finds a striking pragmatism in American methods in contrast to a British emphasis upon an absolute standard of liberal values maintained through the idea of an intellectual aristocracy. Two chapters on “Supply and Demand in the Writing of University History since about 1790” concentrate on market pressures expressed through local demands. The first looks at institutional and cultural factors influencing families and their educational strategies, while the latter traces the evolution of the University of London to its special status as a civic, national, and international institution. Two final essays raise crucial questions about “Alternatives” in our time. Would academics be better as “clergy,” “unattached” intellectuals, or guild professionals, represented by the specialized sciences? No brief summary can do justice to the complex thought that underlies Rothblatt’s continuing study of universities within a wide and challenging intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and social context. Many recent inquiries into the historical life of universities, including mine, owe him a great debt.

Reviewed by REBA N. SOFFER, professor of history at California State University, Northridge, CA.


Let me clear up any confusion that may be caused by the title of this volume. First, the curiously worded title—An Emotional History of the United States—does not mean that its editors and contributors wrote in such a way as to exhibit how emotionally worked up they got about writing American history. Second, although the textbookish title seems to announce that the contents cover the “history of the United States,” the coverage is necessarily more selective: the authors study aspects of “emotional history” from the Revolutionary era to the present. Needless to say, an epic American history of emotional and psychological life and
identities could easily run to a hundred hefty volumes and still not be anywhere near complete—a sobering recognition that should induce humility in scholars interested in this burgeoning historical field.

What we have here is another recent collective effort to expand the scope of history; more particularly, to demonstrate how history encompasses the social shaping or making of subjectivities, of emotional life, and of psychologized consciousness, families, bodies, and sexuality. Historical Dimensions of Psychological Discourses (1996), co-edited by Carl Graumann and Kenneth Gergen, offers theoretically astute perspectives on the relationships between psychological discourses and the history that produced them. Stearns' and Lewis's anthology touches on the psychology and sexology industry, but mainly examines a range of cultural sources—including correspondence, music, religion, literature, advice books, and journalism—for evidence of changing emotional styles and standards. Inventing the Psychological: Toward a Cultural History of Emotional Life in America (1997), the interdisciplinary book I co-edited with Nancy Schong, argues that one must integrate a history of the commercial and ideological development of psychological discourses and a history of cultural discourses of emotional life in order to envision a complex American history of subjectivities.

Stearns and Lewis have been contributors to this field since the mid-1980s. Lewis's The Pursuit of Happiness: Family and Values in Jefferson's Virginia (1983) and her more recent articles on the history of motherhood are provocative and foreground the strong linkages among histories of the family, of gendering, and of emotional life. Lewis's chapter on the correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Angelica Schuyler Church (his friend) and between Alexander Hamilton and the same Mrs. Church (his sister-in-law) extends her previous work: the letters illuminate, for example, a shift in the political influence that "women" wielded just after the Revolutionary War (from functioning as patrons who could expect favors from powerful male friends to sentimentalized agents whose affective potency was less overtly instrumental). I put "women" in quotation marks because Lewis, for all of her insights, oddly does not address the fact that most women outside of Mrs. Church’s upper class and dominant race had none of the international networking capabilities that Church enjoyed and utilized (before a democratic ethos cramped her style).

Stearns is prolific. His publications include: Emotion and Social Change (1988) (co-edited with Carol Z. Stearns), Anger (1986) (co-authored with C. Z. Stearns), Jealousy (1989), and American Cool (1994). Stearns—around the same time as psychologist James Averill and historian John Kasson—fruitfully elaborated the idea that emotional standards (conventions, expectations) exist and change over time. Stearns certainly has an eagle eye for fascinating subjects, yet some scholars share my perception that Stearns’s admirable productivity is partly achieved by publishing research that is sometimes not quite as detailed or circumspect in interpretation as might be; that in his laudable ambition to explain changes in emotional regimes Stearns sometimes overgeneralizes (for instance, in suggesting how “Americans” “felt” about jealousy in the nineteenth century as opposed to the twentieth century); that his historical arguments sometimes prove the obvious (in the volume under review he argues that middle-class children of consumer culture are more prone to invest emotionally in toys than did their nineteenth-century counterparts); that he is locked into Freudian or psychohistorical assumptions about “repression” (what Michel Foucault terms the repressive hypothesis) that prevent him from reflecting critically on the very historical and ideological conditions that made such a “psychological” premise seem so commonsensically foundational to him.

Stearns’s collaboration with Lewis is worthwhile. In this new relationship Stearns endeavors to acknowledge a larger theoretical repertoire relevant to the historical study of emotional and psychological formation (not always successfully, however, as when the in-
The only theoretical chapter is Kenneth Gergen’s incisive introductory piece, “History and Psychology” (very reminiscent of his writing for his own volume). Gergen surveys the critical assumptions both of an older psychohistory that ostensibly “explores” the “essential” self and of newer histories of psychological discourses that posit the social “constitution” of the self. Numerous chapters make useful contributions to the history of emotional life. Otniel Dror’s “Creating the Emotional Body” scrutinizes the paradox-laden ways in which the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century “body” was encoded (physiologized) as “emotional” (although Dror—whose analysis of racialized emotions and bodies is excellent—scarcely considers how his medical and psychological texts may be participating in class ideologies). Hasia Diner’s smart “Ethnicity and Emotions in America” pioneers the study of group emotional responses to Americanization/ethnicization, particularly among the Jews and the Irish (alas, Diner did not examine how putatively “American” emotional styles were imposed on immigrant groups in schools).

My favorite chapter is Kimberley Phillips’s “‘Stand By Me’: Sacred Quartet Music and the Emotionology of African American Audiences, 1900–1930.” Here Phillips contributes a much-needed chapter on the history of African American emotional life, but— unlike some other workers in historical “emotionology”— she is scrupulous about recognizing differences within groups (differences made visible by extensive research). Specifically, Phillips analyzes African Americans not only as a racialized group but as classed groups: working-class blacks and middle-class blacks had divergent ideological attitudes about intensely emotional (“low down”) gospel-singing and worship, attitudes about subjective-collective potency that tell us much about differences between their respective social and emotional survival strategies.

In sum, Emotional History, Historical Dimensions of Psychological Discourse, and Inventing the Psychological offer a range of new and sometimes exciting theoretical as well as historical work that should be key in laying the intellectual groundwork for this field-information.

Reviewed by Joel Pfeister, professor of American Studies and English, Wesleyan University, Middletown CT 06459-0100.