
Back in 1981, Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston published a highly original and much acclaimed article: "Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth-Century France and England" (1981). Since then, the scholarly world has been awaiting the book-length version.

What we have finally got is a work somewhat different from what has been widely expected. "Monsters", as such, do not figure in the title and occupy only a chapter of the book. This may be because other scholars have meanwhile produced fine studies of changing models of monstrosity — amongst books, one thinks of Dudley Wilson’s Signs and Portents: Monstrous Births from the Middle Ages (1993) or Dennis Todd’s Imagining Monsters: Mis-creations of the Self in Eighteenth-Century England (1995). But it is clearly chiefly because, over the course of time, Daston and Park have broadened their conception of the kind of work they wished to write. The gain is undoubtedly the reader’s, since the resulting study, focusing on the history of "wonder" — that is, beliefs and sensibilities governing attitudes to the abnormal at large — is all the more ambitious, thought-provoking, and, in the main, highly successful.

While too sophisticated to reduce their analysis to a single linear narrative, Daston and Park nevertheless believe that certain long-term changes may be traced. The medieval era expressed by and large welcoming and positive attitudes to "marvels", be they unicorns, petrifying streams, or gems that shone in the dark. Whole categories of wonders — like the phoenix or headless men — were particularly acceptable when conceived as existing on the margins of Creation, in Africa or the Orient, while individual marvels, like a monstrous birth or a rainstorm of blood, could be interpreted as prodigies, portents and divine signs.

In any case, Christianity fully sanctioned belief in miracles, relics, and the supernatural (including the diabolical), while encouraging expressions of wonder as part of the pious virtue of faith; curiosity, by contrast, had been expressly condemned by St. Augustine as prying and consupiscence. Finally, wonderment assumed a social meaning through the huge collections of rarities amassed by medieval rulers like Frederick II: the capacity to command awe and amazement was essential to the prestige of princes.

There were of course counter-currents. In particular Aristotelian scholasticism, associated with the Thomist philosophy pursued in the new universities, had a heavy investment in the idea of the rationality and orderliness of Nature. In general, however, the medieval mind was entirely comfortable with the notion that Creation was made up of a proper intermingling of the natural, natural wonders, and the supernatural.

In large measure such attitudes continued to be expressed, in modified form, through the early modern era. Renaissance courts remained the sites of collections of curiosities — in particular, the Wunderkammern that teasingly juxtaposed natural and artificial mirabilia. With their insistence upon the reality of natural magic, opponents of neo-Platonism and Hermeticism viewed the wonderful as integral to the divine and spiritual universe. Not least, the discovery of the New World afforded a new treasure-trove of wonders.

It will come as no surprise that Daston and Park perceive far more skeptical and derogatory attitudes to wonder emerging in the seventeenth century and culminating in the eight-
teenth. The mechanical philosophy had little place for the abnormal; Baconianism stressed the cardinal importance of well-accredited facts, and the collective social discipline of organizations like the Royal Society of London worked—at least in the long run—programmatically to exclude the weird and wonderful.

But whereas some have viewed such shifts as part of a much wider transformation of the European mind, Daston and Park choose to stress the social dimension of the change. "How marvels fell from grace in European high culture," they write,

has less to do with some triumph of rationality—whether celebrated as enlightenment or decried as disenchantment—than with a profound mutation in the self-definition of intellectuals. For them wonder and wonders became simply vulgar, the very antithesis of what it meant to be an *homme de lumières*, or for that matter a member of any elite.

In particular they emphasize how thinkers like David Hume and other *philosophes* came to regard a belief in wonders or the miraculous as, at bottom, a mere mark of plebeian vulgarity and—worse still—as symptomatic of pathological "enthusiasm" or "superstition".

Overall, theirs is a persuasive way of looking at a long-term change of mind-set, or, indeed, sensibility. It might, however, be argued that what was actually being witnessed was not so much the decline or elimination of wonder amongst the elite but the redistribution of wonder from the domain of intellectual inquiry into the fields of poetry, painting, aesthetics, the creative arts, and personal religion. These matters receive little attention. Equally, the Enlightenment’s suppression of wonder would appear a much more problematic phenomenon if one concentrates not on (say) Hume but on Mesmer or Lavater—or even, for that matter, on scientific lecturers convinced that the best way to popularize Newtonianism lay through exciting wonder in their audiences.

This is a book of notable erudition. It is finely structured, beautifully written, and handsomely illustrated. Individual sections may not strike the reader as especially path-breaking, in view of the publication in recent years of other works upon these issues—for instance, William Eamon’s *Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture* (1994) or Simon Schaffer’s studies of eighteenth-century ‘demonstrations’.

There is, however, no comparable volume that traces with such command changing sensibilities about marvels over such a long time-span.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by Roy Porter, medical historian in the Academic Unit of the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London NW1 2BE.

This invaluable book will be essential reading for anyone hoping to understand the culture and values of major American universities since 1945. The wealth of information and insight in this work are accented by a unique focus and organization. It opens and closes with synoptic overviews by the two editors, plus Ira Katznelson and David A. Hollinger, on major themes that permeated several disciplines. Bender offers the broadest overview, Katznelson summarizes the sixties, Hollinger with characteristic trenchant insight discusses the "identity debates." Perhaps most important for understanding what came later is Schorske on the "New Rigorism in the Human Sciences, 1940–1960" (1935–1965, or to 2000 and beyond in many fields, might be more accurate). It was this broad effort to conform the human studies to the positivist model of science that led to strong reactions, on empirical and epistemological as well as political grounds.

Sandwiched between the overviews, under the rubric "trajectories of intra-disciplinary change: participant perspectives," are clusters of contrasting/overlapping memoirs-cum-analyses by experts from the last three (at least) generations (M. H. Abrams arrived observantly at Harvard in 1930). Four fields are covered in depth; economics, by Robert M. Solow, David M. Kreps, and William S. Barber; English by Abrams, Catherine Gallagher, and José David Saldívar; philosophy, by Hilary Putnam and Alexander Nehamas; and political science, by Charles E. Lindblom and Rogers M. Smith. The book is so rich that any discussion must be selective. Only one disagreement arises: my observation of humanities professors at Berkeley circa 1950 does not support Bender's claim that "the academic humanities were the possession of Christians in the 1940s"—unless by "Christians" he means "non-Jews." I found polite WASPs, but with a few exceptions like the apocalyptic Maestrean conservative Raymond Sontag, they seemed to be Voltairean skeptics or "atheists for Niebuhr."

The most striking contrast here, one that reminds us that ideological transformations do not occur simultaneously or universally, is that between economics and English. The dramatic shift from "science" in some sense (nicely evoked by Abrams for English) to "history" and "culture" in various senses, which we now take as the master transformation of the last forty years, simply never occurred in economics. For a mix of reasons—the appeal of its methods and results to significant audiences, the satisfaction of its clarity and rigor, its ability and willingness to purge deviants—economics never experienced the sixties. It remains a "discipline" in the classic sense, a group united by shared methods and assumptions about human nature, working to create an empirically testable body of hypotheses deduced from those axioms. Surrounding the central postulate of the rational, profit-maximizing individual is a network of quantifiable, testable propositions about profit-maximizing behavior in all conceivable situations. This paradigm has of course spread to other areas, notably biology, law, and regional planning; indeed, the paradigm is widely influential today except in those cultural backwaters, the humanities departments of major universities.

The transformative power of economic analyses can be glimpsed in the recent rueful comment by a senior professor of regional planning that his field was once known as "visionary." The comment introduced a collection of economistic debunkings of efforts to use the power of the state to interfere with the unfettered workings of the free market—which,
to planners, is expressed spatially in the exurban ideal of single motorists travelling frictionlessly between widely scattered targets, without need for collective intervention beyond the traffic police and the invisible road builders.

How well this economistic paradigm will withstand a major downturn in prosperity remains to be seen. The major rival paradigm in the learned world now inhabits university departments of social science, history, and especially English with its descendant, cultural studies. There is far more variety of assumption and approach here, but—especially among those under about age 55—strong commonalities also. A stress on “history” in the sense on contingency, indeterminacy, and intentionality, and on “power” (rather than the old Darwinian “culture,” or the economists’ rational-choice models), reflect this generation’s intellectual heritage from Marx via Gramsci and English radicalism, and from Foucault. Uneasily coexisting is a historical perspectivism and pluralism, stressing the unavoidable partiality if not complicity of all perspectives, which reflects the experience of deconstructivism, joined to a visceral revulsion from midcentury scientism—itsself fuelled by the conviction that the self-correcting methods of disciplinary criticism lack the ability to compensate for biases built into fundamental axioms.

When this new humanist paradigm is applied to the example of academic planners against planning previously noted, the planners’ free-market models are seen as ideological, serving specific interests—property developers and oil, vehicle, and construction companies—and using advertising and activist propaganda to exploit the middle classes’ fear that public space will be polluted by outsiders, along with classic national myths of free mobility as reward for the virtuous. Given the new humanists’ own insistence on the impossibility of impartiality, it is not surprising that they, like the enthusiastic champions of economism, often seem as much theologians as traditional scholars, applying axioms and epicycles as needed to reconcile external data with imperatively held worldviews. One of the numerous ironies revealed by this rich and essential volume is that it is not only the Christian Right who demonstrate that we have entered a new Age of Faith.

Reviewed by Fred Matthews, who taught History and Humanities at York University in Toronto, Canada, and is now a writer/photographer in Oakland, CA.


Jack Pressman has written a truly important book that addresses fundamental questions about the nature of medical progress and therapeutic effectiveness. This book is all the more remarkable for exploring these questions by way of one of the most discredited medical interventions of the twentieth century, namely, lobotomy. The relatively short life of lobotomy began in 1935 when the Portuguese neurologist, Egas Moniz, pioneered the first surgery. Though surgeons developed a number of modifications to Moniz’s original operations, all aimed at severing, to a lesser or greater extent, a patient’s frontal white matter connections. Despite some opposition, the treatment eventually gained widespread legitimacy, particularly as a treatment of “last resort.” Underscoring the scientific acceptance of the operation, the Nobel Prize Committee awarded Moniz the 1949 prize in physiology and medicine.
Yet as rapid as was the rise of psychosurgery to fame, its descent into ignominy was as swift. Physicians’ use of lobotomy peaked around 1952, and by the early 1960s, except for a few true believers, doctors had all but abandoned the surgery. Doubts regarding the efficacy of the procedure, opposition to its irreversible consequences, and, especially, the introduction of chlorpromazine (trade name Thorazine) in 1954 all combined to quickly quell physicians’ enthusiasm for the intervention. In the late 1960s and 1970s, despite already having largely been consigned to the dustbin of rejected remedies, lobotomy acquired a new life as a symbol of medical hubris and a coercive psychiatric profession bent on disciplining a hapless and mostly captive patient population. Not surprisingly, most historical accounts of lobotomy have been unable to disentangle themselves from its present-day infamy.

In contrast, Pressman convincingly and brilliantly strikes out on an entirely different interpretive course in his chronicle of psychosurgery in the United States. Instead of portraying lobotomy as a kind of cautionary tale of medicine at the periphery run amok, Pressman turns the conventional interpretive tables around and asks: “How could a therapy so highly valued at one point in time later be considered useless?” Pressman answers this question by making evident the scientific, professional, and cultural context that once made lobotomy a viable and efficacious therapy. Lucidly written, his narrative ironically rescues the surgery from its status as a symbol of psychiatric folly and, in so doing, raises profoundly troubling questions about the nature of scientific progress.

A substantially enlarged and reinterpreted version of his doctoral dissertation, Last Resort is an impressive work that certainly justifies its many years of gestation. Beginning his account with 1920s to the mid-1930s, Pressman nicely sketches the intellectual and professional soil in which the science and practice of lobotomy would eventually flourish. The pervasive dominance of Adolf Meyer and his psychobiology provided the psychiatric profession and its patrons, particularly the Rockefeller Foundation, with the intellectual and organizational blueprint by which to expand the scope of psychiatry far beyond the bounds of the asylum. Meyer’s psychobiology, which linked mind and body into a dynamic unit, also justified a diverse therapeutic regimen that ranged from the drastic somatic therapies, such as insulin shock therapy, electroconvulsive therapy, and lobotomy, to the psychotherapies. It was into this eclectic soup that lobotomy would be introduced.

The following two chapters decisively place lobotomy within the mainstream of scientific medicine. Pressman masterfully draws together the professional imperatives and scientific agendas that made psychosurgery a legitimate and respectable intervention. As he compellingly argues, the manner in which lobotomy entered scientific psychiatry was not by way of a “mass delusion among researchers” but through the “normal process by which investigators reach consensus that an opportune moment has arrived” (57). The chair of Yale University’s Department of Physiology, John Fulton, played a crucial role in this process by legitimizing lobotomy’s scientific credentials. Fulton, eager to demonstrate a clear relationship between laboratory investigation and clinically useful interventions, eagerly supported lobotomy during its crucial early years — a support that emboldened many others to perform the surgery.

Among those to undertake the procedure were state hospital physicians, who eventually would perform a majority of the lobotomies. Enthusiastically embraced by departments of mental hygiene throughout the country in the mid to late 1940s, lobotomy was introduced into well over half of the state hospitals in the United States. Pressman explains this widespread acceptance as part of a larger program of the efforts of state hospitals to transform their institutions from places of “brutal custodial neglect” (160) to hospitals infused with a scientifically grounded optimism. Lobotomy, along with insulin shock therapy and electroconvulsive therapy, would propel the state hospitals into the era of modern medicine. Particularly for physicians and families, lobotomy offered a decisive medical treatment, albeit
imperfect, as well as hope for those patients suffering from chronic psychosis who had been unresponsive to the other heroic interventions, such as insulin coma and electroshock.

Yet, Pressman asks, how are we to assess these physicians who so readily deployed this remedy, which appears to our modern sensibilities as, at best, barbaric? Were they malevolent agents of social control, lobotomizing an inconvenient and difficult-to-control patient population? Or, were these doctors simply gullible and poor observers, caught up in the enthusiasm over a new intervention rather than rationally evaluating the true effects of the surgery? Dismissing both questions as too mired in the present, Pressman takes a different and much more useful route and, instead, interrogates the institutional context that made lobotomy an effective therapy for state hospital doctors of the 1940s. He rightly argues that what makes a treatment "work" is historically specific, dependent upon place, time, and context. In the state hospital milieu, physicians believed that improving a patient's social adjustment was just as therapeutic as treating his or her psychopathology. Lobotomy then provided an acceptable treatment that simultaneously pacified the incorrigible patient and alleviated his or her mental ills.

Shifting his focus to an elite private institution, Pressman extends his analysis to actual physician practices at McLean Hospital in order to lay bare various social and clinical "frames" that shaped a physician's decision to lobotomize a particular patient. He reconstructs a social and medical world in which lobotomy made therapeutic sense. “Why psychiatrists of the 1940s,” Pressman writes, “declared lobotomy an effective treatment yet physicians today strongly disagree is not because either group is necessarily wrong. Rather, the world itself has changed in the interim” (235).

Pressman ends his account with a description of the changing psychiatric world of the 1950s and the role of psychosurgery in these transformations. These changes included the ascendancy of psychoanalysis, the psychiatric professions’ move away from state institutions, and, particularly significant for the lobotomy story, the recognition that the psychiatric profession lacked the methodological tools to adjudicate controversies over whether a particular intervention was truly efficacious.

Less a criticism than an observation, one could interpret Last Resort as a sophisticated apology for an admittedly horrendous therapy. Pressman has done such a fine job placing the practice of lobotomy within its social and scientific context that one may be left with the impression that his account completely elides the moral questions raised by this technology. How can doctors be held accountable for interventions, like psychosurgery, given that their social, institutional, and scientific contexts are such strong determinants of the way they use and judge their treatments? I think, however, Last Resort does not let physicians off the hook so easily when it comes to evaluating the ethics of their remedies. By so convincingly writing lobotomy into the narrative of modern medical progress, Pressman’s work tells us that this progress is a thoroughly human endeavor and, for that reason, always caught up in the messy social world of relationships, meanings, and values. No matter how firmly grounded in science a practice may be, it is never separate from the social and cultural world that gave birth to it and, hence, never immune to ethical and moral evaluation. “It would be ironic indeed,” Pressman notes of the lessons that may be learned from lobotomy, “should it turn out that we have cultivated our own hubris in identifying theirs” (17).

Last Resort will no doubt become a model for historians to follow when assessing those easily forgotten therapeutic failures of the past. Nuanced in its argument about the complex issues that it tackles, Last Resort brings significant insights into the nature of medical science and therapeutic effectiveness. It is a book that should not only be read by historians, but anyone interested in the nature of medical and psychiatric knowledge and practice.

The high standard of combined scholarship and readability in the Cambridge Studies in the History of Psychology is certainly sustained in this work, the ninth in the series. Henry Herbert Goddard (1866–1957) was the pioneer of intelligence testing in North America, transporting Alfred Binet’s tests from France into a broad range of American institutions—medical, educational, legal, political, and military. Leila Zenderland provides the first biographical study of Goddard, as well as a detailed analysis of the reactions to testing of different styles of public institution between 1908 and 1918. In the latter respect, her book departs from previous studies of the history of mental testing both in a heavy emphasis on this first decade of its American incarnation, and, as Zenderland claims, in broadening the discussion of the context within which this incursion took place. She argues that the extensive exploration of the nature/nurture debate that has dominated this particular field of research has hitherto overshadowed consideration of other contemporary controversies of particular significance at this early stage, revolving, for example, around issues concerning medical diagnosis, the provision of special education, and criminal responsibility.

In her introduction, Zenderland writes about the need to supplement a broad identification of the social pressures facilitating the adoption of intelligence tests in the United States with a careful unravelling of the actual historical process by which this came about in specific contexts. This goal is exactly what she achieves in the course of the next seven chapters, after which the final two chapters cover Goddard’s career after 1918 and an attempt to appraise his personal significance. Goddard’s faith in psychology, in the power of heredity, and in eugenics are delineated against his evangelical Quaker background and his Darwinian education, leading to his initial involvement with the Child-Study movement and the production of his best-seller, The Kallikak Family (1912). His promotion of the new science of mental testing for the detection of low intelligence is traced within and beyond his own institution, the New Jersey Vineland Training School for Feeble-Minded Girls and Boys, to the American public school system generally; to juvenile and women’s reformatories; to the criminal courts; to selection procedures for immigrants, and by 1917 for soldiers; and within the psychological and medical professions at large. The depiction of Goddard’s views about the distribution of ability as being themselves vulnerable to extrinsic influences such as the potential for de-
ployment of the Vineland experts, or the advent of military mobilization, clearly positions him as a social reformer rather than a theorist. In her final chapter, Zenderland the historian struggles to integrate Goddard’s self-appraisal of his own life and achievements, as resulting rather from chance (‘luck’) than direction, with the underlying patterns her own work has uncovered.

Given the breadth and depth of the research displayed in this monograph, the question as to where will inquiry into the early stages of acceptance by Americans of intelligence testing move next has no obvious answer. Other biographical studies present possibilities, including those of figures outside the emerging psychological profession. The steps whereby tests of other psychological variables besides intelligence gained acceptance have yet, in most instances, to be traced in similar fashion to that demonstrated here. For the conscientious data analyst, cross-cultural comparisons pose a severe challenge. Nonetheless, it would be wonderful to see someone attempt such a task, at a level of erudition equivalent to Zenderland’s, between, say, events in the early history of mental testing in France, Britain, and the United States. Zenderland’s forays into foreign territory are limited to matching Goddard’s career and ideology in outline against those of Binet, and to contrasting his applied approach to the theoretical formulations of the British academics. It would be fascinating to examine the depths underlying the broad resemblances between the early backgrounds in Quakerism and Darwinism shared by Goddard and the British founder of eugenics and staunch hereditarian, Francis Galton. Further afield in the British Commonwealth, in Australia, Elizabeth Skillen, a member of Sydney Teachers College, was trialling her own version of the Binet test in a local school in 1913. A year later Stanley Porteus, a schoolteacher in Melbourne, Australia, presented his Maze Tests, an alternative to the Binet tests devised by him for the use of subnormal and maladjusted children, to the Melbourne meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Porteus (not mentioned in the book) in fact replaced Goddard as Director of Research at the Vineland Training School in 1919. In other words, Goddard set the pace in 1908 when he introduced the Binet technique to the English-speaking world, but not by much. For all its scope, Zenderland’s is, as it purports to be, a regional history, while the acceptance of mental testing was an international phenomenon: a more global approach (not for the faint-hearted) may yield answers to some of the questions posed by this book in the American context, as to the relative weightings of different sets of social, cultural, and institutional influence.

Reviewed by ALISON TURTLE, senior lecturer in psychology at The University of Sydney, New South Wales, Australia 2006.


The tradition of publishing collections of essays by distinguished scholars toward the end of their careers is, like the Festschrift, fading away. Postmodernism mistrusts the concept of wisdom and the possibility of attaining it through a lifetime of reflecting, maturing, and revisiting old issues.

How welcome, then, the increasingly rare volume of collected essays, doubly so when characterized by thoughtful reworking, thematic consistency, and a graceful and compelling writing style. In addition to presenting essays that have appeared in a wide variety of publications over thirty years, the author includes a thoughtful introduction to the themes sounded in the book, as well as a brief intellectual biography. Both place in context many of the issues raised in the other essays, supplying references to some of the defining concerns of modern historians of the author’s generation. In this way, Schorske’s book represents an interesting contribution to the intellectual history of American and European academia.

The linking theme among the essays is “thinking with history”—using the past “in the cultural construction of the present and future” as well as relativizing the observer “self-reflexively to the flow of social time.” (p. 3) Schorske claims they demonstrate the cultural practice of “thinking with history,” a practice increasingly extinguished with the triumph of modernism in the first part of the twentieth century.

Correspondingly, the essays are organized in two major groups, “Clio Ascendant: Historian Cultures in Nineteenth-Century Europe” and “Clio Eclipsed: Toward Modernism in Vienna.” The first group begins and ends with essays on the city. “The Idea of the City from Voltaire to Spengler” argues that ideas about the moral place of cities moved from positive (Enlightenment) to negative (industrialism) to “beyond good and evil.” This is the oldest essay (1963) in the collection and reflects the traditions of Ideengeschichte. The last (and most recent—1995) revisits one of the author’s hallmark objects of study, the architecture and meaning of Vienna’s Ringstrasse project. In this essay Schorske examines the building of the Kunsthistorisches Museum as an example of space “contested” among crown, army, and Vienna’s short-lived Liberal movement. Another essay, on “Burckhardt’s Basel,” sympatheically treats the uses of Clio and their connections to urban patrician culture. Two other essays in this section, “Medieval Revival and Its Modern Content” and “The Quest for the Grail” are good examples of a favorite method of Schorske, to approach themes in intellectual history by contrasting views held by divergent influential figures and often transforming these views into symbols. Coleridge, Pugin, and Distraëls (in the first case); Wagner and William Morris in the second constitute contrasts from which Schorske often wrests thought-provoking insights.

By the author’s definition, modernism meant indifference to the past because history was “useless to its projects.” (p. 4). The second group of essays reflects, perhaps less fully than the first, a thematic coherence involving Clio, but it does revolve around modernism. Beginning with a reflection on the fate of Austria’s “two cultures” deriving from the Baroque and the Enlightenment (“Grace and the Word”), Schorske moves on to revisit another favorite theme, “Generational Tension and Cultural Change.” Schorske views die Jungen and the modernist generation in a more negative light than many other scholars: the aesthetic common ground of the young was “negative,” and it was “as much a phenomenon of rupture and dissolution as of new construction.” (p. 149).
Some readers might find relatively sparse scholarly notes and sometimes sweeping generalizations to be minor weaknesses of this volume, but one must remember they were mostly conceived first as papers or lectures for public presentation, and their strong literary qualities reflect those origins. Anyone who has been stimulated by Carl Schorske’s previous work should find these essays more a further exploration than an encore presentation of it, and well worth reading on their own.

Reviewed by CHARLES E. McCLELLAND, professor of history emeritus, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque NM 87131-1181.


Behavioral therapy has become a broad movement, dealing with health problems that have no definite physiological basis. (One hates to use the term mental health in this context.) Starting with rather primitive behavioristic techniques of conditioning, reward, and punishment, behavioral therapists have adopted sophisticated techniques tuned to a number of specific problems and supported by a variety of conceptual justifications. This field has proliferated since 1970, and the editors and contributors the volume under review try to present these branches in an organized fashion and assess the place of theory in this task.

The volume has two aims: one, the presentation of the different aspects of behavior therapy and their theoretical foundations; and, two, the exposition of the place of a theory underlying the whole of behavior therapy. The principal contributors to this book (and to behavior therapy in general) are, of course, clinicians; and for clinicians the principal criterion of these techniques is their success in alleviating distress. In contrast, the editors, O’Donohue and Krasner, are concerned with the justification of theory in philosophy of science and explicate their views in an insightful discussion in the first and last chapters. The editors present the place of theory based on the work of the logical positivists and of K. Popper, I. Lakatos, L. Laudan, and T. S. Kuhn.

Behavior therapy originated as an alternative to a dominant culture of psychodynamics, but its practitioners no longer feel constrained to defend their work against psychotherapy. They are content demonstrating the clinical success of specific techniques in certain disorders. For clinicians, this demonstration is sufficient; the chapters on the specific techniques give excellent descriptions of the therapies and their rationale. One does not have to wait for an overarching theory to alleviate pressing distress. The scientist, however, will insist that deep understanding should be the ultimate aim; achieving this goal will be satisfying in itself and establish a stable basis for major progress. As modern philosophers of science, in particular Laudan, have insisted, a research program must be evaluated against competing programs; obviously psychotherapy is the indicated comparison.

This comparison looms like a ghost at the feast that the contributors provide. The contrast between behavior therapy and psychotherapy appears in several contexts: in the actions of...
the therapist, in the aim of therapy itself, and in the whole perspective on the nature of the patient and eventually on human nature. The therapists also differ in their basic stance toward the aims of psychology, notably in the admissibility of the concept of mind or its equivalents. Here we reach the still unresolved debate in psychology between mentalist and physical theorists or, in general, the mind-body problem. Behavior theorists seem to have found their niche in this conflict by avoiding mention of either mind or of physiological mechanisms. This scheme becomes doubtful when the authors avoid consideration of a larger picture within therapy.

Consequently, the volume stands as an excellent and valuable reference work, but the reader may miss a well-defined theoretical point of view in a larger framework. In this unbalance the book may reflect the current state of theory in this field, and with the emphasis on instrumental values, we may even see here a symptom of the temper of the time.

Reviewed by KURT W. BACK, JAMES B. DUKE Professor, emeritus, Duke University, Durham. NC 27708.


The history of the cognitive revolution is a succession of two events: Alan Turing’s great mathematical discovery and his philosophical mistake. In 1936, Turing presented the persuasive and complete logical analysis of the concept of computation, and then in 1950 he published the paper entitled, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” based on the assumption of the functional equipollence of human mental processes and machine computations. These two ideas of Turing generated the computational theory of mind, which claims that any form of mental activity comprises the computational processes, or, in other words, the processes of the manipulation of physical symbols according to previously settled rules.

Unfortunately, Turing’s definition of computation refers to human psychophysical acts, not to human internal mental acts or psychological processes. Human cognitive activity in a broad sense—which essentially consists of the use of signs—does not depend just on “internal” processes. L. S. Vygotsky’s hypothesis concerning the “extracortical organization of higher nervous activity” assumes that internal mental functions occur at times because of the existence of functional sets in which “internal” cognitive activity is supported by cultural means and instruments. The simplest example of such an activity based on internal cognitive processes and external means is a calculation that, although possible to perform without a calculator, necessitates at least a piece of paper and a pencil, together with the socially-acquired skill of doing arithmetic on paper. The use of a computer is another example of the coordination between internal cognitive or nervous processes and an external use of cultural instruments. This coordination is, in fact, the “extracortical” modification of an individual’s cognitive activity. Human mentality changed after the invention of the alphabet and writing. The invention of the computer caused another revolution in human mentality.
We, like the advocates of the cognitive revolution, accept the notion that a formalized record of thoughts of a mathematician or a logician is a reflection of "what is going on in his head," but we forget, like Turing in 1950, that if the logician’s thoughts always had the same structure as the formal records he creates, then any perfecting of formal languages would be of importance only for communication between logicians, and learning of formal languages would in no way affect learners’ cognitive skills. Yet the history of mathematics and logic reveals that the requisite for progress in this field is the perfecting of formal languages. Moreover, the use of any formal language automatizes and standardizes human thinking. From that point of view, the computer is not a model or a partner for the human mind. It is only an invention that (like handwriting, formal languages, and the abacus) supports human mental skills.

If we assume that the chapters presented in parts four and five of The Future of the Cognitive Revolution are something that can influence the mainstream of cognitive science, then we can say that cognitive revolution has a future. This future is the realization that culture together with its psychophysical products (like formal languages or computers) constitute the environment of individual minds, that we cannot separate human thought from human action in a particular environment: "All action involves some amount of awareness, as well as vice versa" (270).

Over and above all that, I may say that The Future of the Cognitive Revolution is a consistent collection of more than thirty very good papers written by outstanding authors.

Reviewed by Jerzy Bobryk, associate professor, The Institute of Psychology of the Polish Academy of Science and The Warsaw School of Advanced Social Psychology.
Graste’s most powerful chapters are about emotion. For some, or many, psychologists involved in research on emotion it may come as a surprise to see how the author traces the roots of many cherished ideas in the current cognitive theory of emotion. Graste shows, for example, that action tendencies, as they are called today, were focal for the Greek thinkers: they understood emotions as movements of the soul towards or away from someone or something. In addition, both Greeks and Romans took a cognitive turn, concentrating on the false beliefs that were associated with particular emotions.

Problematic emotions should be tackled with the power of reason, according to the Greeks and Romans, and so they propagated philosophical practice to enhance one’s rational skills. For the Sophists and Socrates, for example, rhetoric was the philosophical instrument to realize catharsis, the cleansing of the soul. The Stoics, in their turn, cultivated the technique of “postponement” to ward off the threat of passionate feelings. According to Graste, these procedures of self-control can be considered “therapeutic methods.” It is, however, a self-applied therapy that functions without a therapist: in the classical care for the soul, patient and therapist were one and the same person.

Graste is quite explicit about the goal of his historical endeavor when he states that an exposure to the Greek-Roman care for the psyche gives us space to think about current mental health care in a different manner. Unfortunately, Graste is vague about the contents and results of this different kind of thinking, which is rather disappointing after having read his thoughtful analyses of the classical texts. His different perspective on contemporary care is probably related to the contrast he puts forward between “cure” and “growth.”

The curative aim of current psychotherapy is rather different from the kind of self-enhancement that was the primary goal of classical care. I am afraid, however, that this contrast is only half of the story. The comparison between the classical period and the present should have included the cultural effect of psychotherapy. In the recent past, a so-called “therapeutic attitude” emerged in Western societies, and by 1970, “working on yourself” had become an essential activity for many people. Pop-psychology offered different kinds of self-help for those who wanted to realize their hidden potentials. A discussion of the parallels between this kind of self-enhancement and the classic version would have been helpful for the reader to grasp better in what sense Greek-Roman care for the psyche has been a foundation for contemporary therapeutics inside and outside institutional settings.

Reviewed by JEROEN JANZ, Experimental and Theoretical Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, the Netherlands.
Allan Bloom’s essay gives the best overall account of Rousseau’s impact. The book is dedicated to Bloom, and all the contributors were once his colleagues, students, or fellow students. Although best known to the wider world as the author of the controversial best-seller, *Closing of the American Mind* (1987), to the narrower world of the Academy he is also remembered as a distinguished Rousseau scholar and disciple of the political philosopher Leo Strauss. Strauss and Bloom, as conservative critics of modernity, were both admirers of Rousseau—for the importance of his contribution to the history of ideas—and critics, for his pivotal role in the evolution of our civilization towards its present crisis. This ambivalent attitude is reflected in most of the essays in the present volume, which address the impact of Rousseau’s thought on the study of the arts, history, culture, the French Revolution, nationalism, international relations, ethnicity and difference, privacy and community, the modern cult of sincerity, and the discovery of political compassion. While most of the essays in this volume reflect Bloom’s general approach to Rousseau and his legacy, and are therefore unrepresentative of the full range of views on the subject, the editors make no secret of this fact; nor should they, since this is not a flaw. The essays are of a uniformly high caliber.

Central to Rousseau’s legacy were his views on human nature and natural history, which are addressed in the essays by Roger Masters, who has a long-standing interest in the relationship between modern science and political philosophy, and Joel Schwartz, who compares and contrasts the views of Rousseau and Freud, the “two greatest writers about human sexuality” (87). These two chapters are likely to be of the most relevance and interest to readers of this journal. Masters’s fascinating and original essay assesses Rousseau’s portrait of human nature from the perspective of modern sciences, such as ethology, neuroscience, and behavioral ecology. His contentious verdict is that Rousseau’s denial of natural human sociability and his distinction between passive and negative emotions have not been borne out by modern science.

All but one of the chapters (Bloom’s) appear in print in this volume for the first time. The collection includes essays by leading Rousseau scholars (e.g., Masters, Bloom, Melzer, Kelly, Plattner, and Schwartz), all of which are accessible to non-specialists. This is reason enough to count this book as an important and original study of the ways and extent to which we now live in a world that is, to a remarkable degree, the legacy of one man.

Reviewed by Graeme Garrard, lecturer in political theory, University of Wales, Cardiff, CF1 3YQ, UK.
the history of American psychiatry. Although the book is subtitled *Insanity in South Carolina from the Colonial Period to the Progressive Era*, it is more about the management of insanity than insanity itself.

The book begins by sketching out details of the treatment of madness in pre-Revolutionary South Carolina. In doing this, the author has used a variety of sources, including correspondence, and legislative, court, and church records. He finds, as one might expect, that in the early eighteenth century, patients in South Carolina were often maintained at home or in jail. The poverty of patients and their families led to the neglect and abuse prevalent elsewhere in the United States during this period. Much of the book describes life at the South Carolina Lunatic Asylum, which was founded in 1828. McCandless describes patients of the asylum and their families, as well as the physicians and the politics of the asylum. He not only describes the moral therapy of patients at the asylum, but discusses at some length the medical approach to madness as well. McCandless documents the interest of asylum physicians in South Carolina, as in most other areas of the country, in adopting a plan of treatment involving both moral therapy and contemporary medical therapeutics.

Despite improvements made by superintendents of the late nineteenth century, the asylum and the treatment it offered had worsened substantially by the early part of this century. Hampered by an uncooperative state legislature, physicians at the asylum encountered financial and political constraints that limited the quality of care that could be provided by the asylum. As a result, during the early twentieth century, patients were poorly treated, and the physical structure of the institution was not maintained.

The research upon which this book is based is exhaustive, and McCandless has consulted a rich array of source material relevant to the story of how madness was treated in South Carolina. In fact, if there is a criticism of the book, it is that the large amount of detailed material would have benefited from more of McCandless’s interpretative guidance. Nonetheless, McCandless’s study is by far the best we have on madness and the treatment of mental illness in the South. He reminds us that, while it is tempting to ignore the history of mental health care in this region because of the difficulty of assembling source materials and the paucity of scholarship in the area, the history of psychiatry in the South remains an area that deserves more serious scholarly attention.

Reviewed by Samuel B. Thielman, department of psychiatry, Duke University Medical Center, Durham NC.

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This is a revised doctoral dissertation and bears all the distinctive marks of the genre. The prose is heavy, almost impenetrable, but careful. The argument is laden with qualifications, and the theoretical discussions often threaten to overwhelm the substance of the narrative. At the same time, Schmidt is intelligent and has done his homework, and his effort is instructive.
The focus is on American scholars who have studied international relations (I.R) over the last 150 years. Schmidt contends that there has been a discernible field since the middle of the nineteenth century and a clearer discipline since the turn of the twentieth century; the history of the area is best studied by attending to the intellectual problems that academics pondered and to the university system in which they flourished.

Schmidt tells us that the field began in the nineteenth century examining the concept of anarchy—a discussion of sovereignty in entities called states and the lack of such sovereignty outside such entities, in interstate relations. The juxtaposition of these intrastate and interstate connections defined the study of politics as an intellectual endeavor, and by the twentieth century international relations had matured as a recognizable area of concentration. The examination of colonial administration and the growth of ideas about public administration contributed to this maturation, but most important was the study of international law, as scholars came to understand how uncivilized states, lacking their own strength, needed to have sovereignty imposed on them.

Thus, the “idealists” who later formulated the problems of international relations in the interwar period were continuous with the academics who preceded them before World War I. Schmidt notes that the idealists were more critical of international law than we have come to think. They were struggling over the issue of anarchy and not merely presuming that a world government was an unalloyed good to be striven for without reflection.

In many ways the entire discussion of international relations before World War II sets up Schmidt’s critical last chapter, in which the triumph of the postwar “realists” is discussed. Schmidt persuasively claims that the realist-idealist paradigm was imposed on the discipline by the likes of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Frederick Kirk, Frederick Dunn, and Nicholas Spykman. They looked back on the recent history of their field of inquiry and reconceived it in a way that would heighten and dramatically contrast their views to those of their older opponents, and did so in favor of their own new “realism.” Schmidt had already laid the groundwork for this interpretation by contending that their predecessors are not best described as “idealists” and that their Wilsonian internationalism was cautious, halting, and critical. In his last chapter, he points out the ambiguity in the ideas of the realists by demonstrating that their realism was tempered by a normative sense of order.

Schmidt writes that his book is an internalist account, and although there is some mention of the international political context in which scholars wrote, he indeed does not do much to contextualize the debates he reconstructs. Perhaps this is what has allowed him to see the way in which realists manipulated the concept of realist-versus-idealism to their advantage, but an internalist focus in the study of international relations seems to me to be not just inadequate but peculiar. For Schmidt, the “discourse” of his title is in some linguistic realm beyond the world where the slaughter of war occurs. He writes that if the purpose is “to understand the discursive history of the field, then the issue of how to assess the impact of external events is... the wrong issue.” Schmidt concludes, “without taking into account the academic context.” (230-31).

I do not know whether this linguistic idealism is intended or confused. Of course, the academic context molded the field of international relations, but it is also plain to me that the history of global politics in the twentieth century shaped I.R. Were these “external” factors, war and diplomacy, mediated by the beliefs scholars held and their own experience of this period? Certainly, it could not be otherwise; and if this is all Schmidt means by his internalism, that people live not by events but by what events mean to them, then his internalist tic may
not be very interesting. This is an intelligent book that would have been made more valuable by a more straightforward analysis of how the trials of foreign policy influenced the structure of international relations.

Reviewed by Bruce Kuklick, Nicholas Professor of American History, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6228.

Enrique González Duro. Historia de la locura en España, tomo II, siglos XVIII y XIX.

Scholarly literature on Spanish psychiatry has been, historically, a very rich field of study in Spain; moreover, in the past few years, it has undergone an extraordinary development. In a recent work, Bibliografía Histórica de la Psiquiatría Española (Madrid, Triacastela, in press), José Lázaro and Francesc Bugosa have identified as many as 1,457 publications on this topic, published between 1859 and 1997. These publications cover a wide range of topics, genres, and levels; readers may find not only thorough Ph.D. theses, but also simple obituary notices, monographs and general books, research papers and brief notes, presentations for academic meetings, and so on. In spite of its heterogeneity, this considerable amount of work (scarcely known, for the most part) justifies the attempt to carry out a general and systematic overview of the historical evolution of psychiatry in Spain. It is certainly not a new idea: the first general history of Spanish psychology and psychiatry was published in German by J. B. Ullersperger in 1871 (though it could be said that, according to present-day historigraphic criteria, Spanish psychiatry was still, at that time, in a prehistoric stage of development).

The most ambitious, systematic, and comprehensive work on this topic is the recent book by Enrique González Duro, Historia de la locura en España. The first volume, published in 1994, examines the evolution of Spanish psychiatry from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries. The second one, which is the main concern of this review, focuses on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The last volume, published in 1996, covers the latest developments, until Franco’s era.

Enrique González Duro is not a professional historian but a psychiatrist, well known through his active involvement with the so-called “anti-psychiatric” movement in the sixties and seventies. He has published several highly controversial books that harshly criticized, from a leftist point of view, psychiatric theory and practice during the Franco Period.

This Historia de la locura en España, no doubt his most mature and serene publication, is an extensive work, both because of its dimension (the three volumes amount to more than 1,250 pages) and because of its scope. González Duro reviews the opinions on mental health held, over time, by Spanish doctors and psychiatrists (who generally assimilated the most influential doctrines of each period, but rarely made original scientific contributions of their own). He centers mainly, however, on the history of mental illness and psychiatric care in Spanish society: the mental disorders of Spanish kings, such as Felipe V and Fernando VI; the emergence, in lower classes, of people possessed of the devil, witches and sorcerers, illuminati and visionaries, flagellants and wonder-working nuns, and so on; the miserable decay of asylums and psychiatric departments; the attempt, in the eighteenth century, to
perform a “general confinement” of madmen and poor people, as well as the plans in the nineteenth century to pass (with a considerable amount of economic and political problems) a welfare law that included mental illness and to set up a “model asylum”; and the struggle between liberal doctors, followers of the new ideas of the Enlightenment, and the political and religious forces of the ancien régime. González Duro does not omit forensic psychiatry, nor the psychopathological contents of some literary works, especially in the Romantic period. He devotes many pages to analyzing general issues of Spanish history, making clear how much “craziness” there is in such a history (in the main characters, the major events, and the artistic production). His purpose is, in short, to trace a total history of Spanish madness, science, and psychiatric practice.

Beginning with its very title, this work is clearly indebted to Michel Foucault; broad descriptions of historical facts lead, ultimately, to an explicitly Foucaultian conclusion. González Duro does not carry out original research work with primary sources; rather, he tries to create a synthetic account, reviewing in a systematic way the existing bibliography. Published by a very commercial but hardly academic editing firm, this book does not include an alphabetical index of names and concepts, which would have highly increased its usefulness as a reference work. Yet, whoever has the opportunity, the curiosity, and the time to read three volumes written in Spanish on the local history of madness (and the attempts to control it) will not find any alternative to this estimable book.

Reviewed by **José Lázaro**, assistant professor of the history and theory of medicine in the Department of Psychiatry in the Universidad Autónoma, 28029 Madrid.

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The ten essays collected in this volume were published over a span of twenty years, from 1973 to 1993, by Linda K. Kerber, a professor of American history at the University of Iowa well-known for her scholarship on women in the Revolutionary era. Kerber voices the hope that her collected essays will help point the way to the next revision of understanding of the major themes in the intellectual history of the United States. In this revision, she tells us, it will be understood that, “both men and women think seriously about large matters, that who is given the time and opportunity to think and to argue is a matter not only of personal intelligence but social history and social situation, and that when women are absent from the narrative histories of ideas, it is not because they are truly absent, but because the historian did not seek energetically enough to find them” (19).

Kerber’s introductory chapter contains a personal narrative placed in sociohistorical context, a fascinating account of Kerber’s own intellectual history in relation to the second wave feminism of the 1970s and to the evolving field of women’s history. The transformation she describes is radical. During her graduate school years at Columbia University, women were invisible, absent from the American history faculty and from the subject matter of the discipline. Working on her dissertation in the mid-1960s she recalls somehow knowing that, “it
was wise to take notes about women," but not knowing "what to do" with the notes she had taken and having "had a hunch that there was more to be said," but being unable to "think how or where to push the research" (7). The feminist movement gathering force in the late 1960s provided an invigorating agenda for feminist historians, as well as a demand and an audience for women's history. Kerber sees her own work in the subsequent three decades—during which women's history became firmly established as a legitimate field of inquiry and the conceptual questions in women's history grew in complexity—as being "done in response to and sustained by" the feminism of her day (7).

The essays selected for inclusion in this volume cover an array of topics, including views on women's education in the early Republic, the role of women in the Revolution, and the conceptualization of female citizenship in the early Republic. While each repays reading as a substantive contribution to women's history, what is perhaps more significant about this work for historians of the behavioral sciences is Kerber's historiographical approach and, in particular, her emphasis on gender as a category of analysis. In her introductory chapter, Kerber describes her growing awareness in the late 1970s, while at work on a book on women in Revolutionary America, that "even when women were absent from legislatures and had not yet organized large-scale political movements, gender was of central significance to the great questions of the relationship between law and liberty" (16). Everywhere she turned, Kerber recalls, "ideas about what women were, what relations between men and women should be, seemed to infuse contemporary understanding of major problems" (16). Reflecting a trend of the 1990s, in this volume Kerber joins many other feminist historians who feel impelled to craft a new historical narrative grounded in gender, especially in the changing social relations of women and men, as well as in the other more traditional historical categories.


Carl Stumpf (1848–1936) is one of the pioneers of modern psychology, yet in most textbooks on the history of psychology he receives less attention than he merits. For almost half of his life (1894–1936) he lived and was professionally active in Berlin. At the University of Berlin he served, with distinction, first as director of the Psychological Seminar (1894–1900) and then of its expansion, The Institute of Psychology (1901–1921). His stature and significance as a university teacher is documented by a long series of his students, including not only such outstanding German psychologists as Johannes von Allesch and Hans Rupp, but a whole galaxy of Berlin gestalt psychologists: Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler, and Max Wertheimer, as well as Kurt Lewin.

Stumpf’s contributions cover three major areas: psychology, philosophy, and musicology. The volume under consideration is concerned primarily with psychology. The book,
published as volume 14 of the important series entitled Contributions to the History of Psychology and edited by Helmut E. Lück, has a two-fold function: One the one hand it is a contribution to the celebration of Stumpf’s 150th birthday. On the other hand, it is a preface to a forthcoming extensive biography that will incorporate information contained in Stumpf’s voluminous correspondence and newly discovered archival materials. In addition to a brief foreword, the present work consists of five parts.

In a brief biography, the authors place Stumpf in the context of his time and outline his life and work, with emphasis on his contributions to general psychology and methodology. The authors portray him as a pioneer of gestalt psychology and describe his interaction with students and coworkers. The biography registers the public acknowledgments Stumpf received in the course of his life and ends by noting some of the reasons why Stumpf was later forgotten.

In the second part, the reader is introduced to Stumpf’s selected writings. These writings concerned the ideas of evolution in contemporary philosophy; psychological phenomena and functions; trends and conflicts in the psychology of the day; body and soul; methods of child psychology; number and quantity in psychology; emotions; and observing, measuring, and experimenting.

The third and fourth parts are bibliographic in nature. The third part contains references to Stumpf’s original writings, book reviews and reports, while the fourth part registers publications dealing with Stumpf. In the latter category, three of the entries that came from the pen of Wolfgang Köhler were written on the occasion of Stumpf’s 80th and 85th birthday anniversaries and in 1938, following Stumpf’s death.

The Sprungs themselves have twelve entries (pp. 67–68) to their credit. Their paper, “William James and Carl Stumpf: Two pioneers of New Psychology,” was presented at the American Psychological Association’s Centennial Convention, held in Washington in 1992. It was published on tape in the series, “European Roots of American Psychology.”

Another paper on James and Stumpf, in English, was written recently by N. Dazzi (“James and Stumpf: Similarities and differences,” Psychologie und Geschichte, 6, 244–257). In 1937, three papers on Stumpf appeared in American journals. They were written by H. S. Langfeld (American Journal of Psychology), K. Lewin (Psychological Review), and C. Ruckmick (Psychological Bulletin).

Reviewed by Josef Brožek, professor of psychology emeritus, Lehigh University, St. Paul MN 55116-3063.


The Wounded Jung carries an endorsement from Stanley Rijnks, describing it as “simply indispensable for a truly existential understanding of Jung’s psychological theory.” The cover blurb goes on to declare that the book is based on an “unprecedented number of primary
sources, including archive research, his own interviews with many of Jung’s intimates, and personal correspondence with Jung himself. A reader expecting either is likely to be disappointed. I did not find a single new archival document in this book, and it is curious that if he actually did conduct any interviews with “many of Jung’s intimates,” why none of them are cited. Smith exchanged a few letters with Jung, shortly before the latter’s death, two of which are printed in the second volume of C. G. Jung Letters (1976). Smith was then writing a thesis on Buber and Jung. Jung’s letters pointed out Buber and Smith’s misunderstandings of his work. The one new piece of information in this book is a paraphrase of an unpublished letter that Jung wrote to Smith in 1960—also critiquing Smith’s misunderstanding of his work. Judging by this book, Jung was none too successful in this regard.

The Wounded Jung is a speculative psychoanalytically informed psychobiography of Jung. Smith’s contention is that the key to an understanding of Jung’s life and work can be found in his childhood traumas. Smith characterizes Jung’s work as “diffuse,” “convoluted,” “muddled,” and he claims that Jung frequently “misleads” his reader. It is supposedly his childhood that provides the missing hermeneutic key. Smith discusses and draws upon earlier work in this genre of the postmortem analysis of Jung via his childhood by George Atwood and Robert Stolorow, John Gedo, Peter Homans, Jeffrey Satinover, Harry Slochower, Anthony Storr and D. W. Winnicott. Their diverging opinions as to whether it was Jung’s mother or his father who was at the bottom of it all provides the one element of comic relief. There are several problems with this genre. Elements from the historical record are woven into a narrative based on a psychodynamic model. Psychoanalytic interpretation fills in the gaps of the historical record, and where it encounters obstacles, events and occurrences are simply resigned to fit into the pregiven frame, through a series of symbolic equivalences in which anything can stand in for anything else. Thus, rather than illuminating anything to do with Jung and the historical foundations of his work, such studies serve merely to illustrate the monotony of their interpretive schemata, through which Jung’s scalp is paraded as a trophy for Klein, Kohut, Kernberg and company. Thus, Smith reductively reads Jung’s psychology of religion, and Christianity in particular, as stemming from the projection of his own childhood traumas on to religious symbols (Yahweh = Freud = Father, etc.) Though he does not deal with Jung’s writings on Eastern religions, he strongly suspects that they had similar origins, thus revealing his own idée fixe.

Furthermore, all these works heavily rely on Jung’s Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1963). Smith seems to be unaware of the history of the publication of the text, as detailed by Alan Elms and myself (Elms, 1994; Shamdasani, 1995). As I established, the text was by no means Jung’s autobiography. Jung’s own statements were edited, cut, and reshaped by numerous editors and translators, and he complained that they had “aunti®ed” him. As a consequence, diagnosing Jung on the basis of this text becomes a recipe for disaster. Smith has consulted a typescript of the draft translation of Memories in the Countway library of Medicine. He states that apart from Freud, Jung does not discuss his relations with men in Memories. If Smith had consulted the German edition of Memories, he would have come across tributes to Heinrich Zimmer, Albert Oeri, and Theodore Flournoy. Furthermore, if he had read the Countway manuscript closely, he would also have found a chapter on William James and a tribute to James Jackson Putnam. So much for his archival research. The Wounded Jung is also marked by a failure to consult the available literature. Smith informs us that the Jung estate has refused to authorize the publication of Jung’s letters to Sabina Spielrein, which remain unpublished. However, these were actually published in German in 1986 (Carotenuto, 1986)! Then again—perhaps works such as Smith’s should simply be marked “history lite.”
According to Beatrice Edgell, John Locke “is often called ‘the father of English psychology.’”3 Locke, in fact, finds a place in most histories and encyclopedic sourcebooks of psychology and usually is credited with a number of doctrines that purportedly served as a starting point for what was to become modern psychology. One author, for example, notes that “it is said that for Locke the mind was a mere passive receptor of sensations, that he espoused a crude faculty psychology, and that he was an important initiator of associationist psychology.” Notably, this commentator continues by pointing out that “when these allegations are not plainly false they are seriously misleading” (Alexander, 1987, p. 439). Certainly Locke’s parentage of associationism has lately come in for considerable scrutiny, (Alexander, 1987) but other questionable claims, such as the notion that Locke’s empiricism “leaves psychology with a single resource, introspection,” still populate the literature in psychology (Pears, 1983). (Relevantly, Locke was already praised in the nineteenth century by Auguste Comte precisely because Locke’s “positive” method allows for the establishment of “mental science” that forgoes introspection.)

During his lifetime Locke tried to maintain absolute anonymity with regard to most of his major works, excepting the Essay concerning Human Understanding. His concern for secrecy went so far that he managed to conceal within his own library that he had written works such as the celebrated and much discussed Two Treatises of Government (Harrison & Laslett, 1971, p. 43). Prior to Jean Yolton’s book, H. O. Christophersen’s A Bibliographical Introduction to the Study of John Locke was the major bibliographical source on Locke. The book under review, which includes more than 370 legitimate entries, surpasses and supersedes all earlier Locke bibliographies.

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In the introduction, Yolton indicates that the primary motivation for the making of this book is to supply a reference guide to those preparing authoritative editions of Locke’s works. A further purpose listed by her is to “show the dissemination and therefore influence of Locke’s writings throughout Europe, not just in the English-speaking world.” (viii) The book indeed is professionally thorough in bibliographical information, providing (for works of Locke published before 1801) titles transcribed in quasi-facsimile, a collation, contents by signature and page number, information on illustrations, technical information on the text, half titles, head titles in quasi-facsimile, headlines, catchwords, signature positions, press figures, references “in terms of the most accessible sources,” notices of the publication as found in scholarly journals, and a section called “Notes,” which describes the “printing circumstances and peculiarities of the specific item, together with any other relevant information, e.g. persons to whom Locke presented copies, how the text varies from a previous edition, etc.” (xiii) This last section, as well as the introductions to each chapter, likely is of greatest interest to those not directly involved in bibliographical research. For example, with regard to the third and fourth editions of Pierre Coste’s French translation of the Essay (originally prepared under Locke’s supervision, see “Note” on 122–123), we read of the translator’s addition of his own explanatory notes on matters such as Locke’s refutation of the Cartesian notion of the soul and the question of the soul in non-human animals (128–129). Or, with regard to an edition of Coste’s translation printed in 1723, we learn that this was a “piracy” (125).

Yolton, moreover, has a long chapter listing “all known works published in response to or criticism of [Locke’s] publications, through 1801” (439), an invaluable resource to the historian interested in the early reception of Locke’s works. Furthermore, the book features a very interesting chapter on “Doubtful and Spurious Works” attributed to Locke,3 a general index and special indexes on editors and translators, illustrators and engravers, recipients of dedications, booksellers and printers, names on title/title pages, languages of text, titles, and provenance; 26 illustrations; as well as a short but informative general introduction, a chronology, and a “Finding List on Bibliographical Materials.”

In summary, this is a rich treasure trove for the serious Locke scholar as well as for the bibliographical scholar, despite the initially forbidding appearance of the technical apparatus deployed. The very wide diffusion of Locke’s works and the continuing increase in publications making reference to Locke’s works raise the question of what makes them so attractive to his many and varied readers. For the historian of the behavioural sciences and, more generally, for the historian of ideas, this book will be an essential complement to Jean S. Yolton and John W. Yolton’s John Locke: A Reference Guide, Roland Hall and Roger Woolhouse’s Eighty Years of Locke Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide, and Hall’s continuing register of Locke scholarship in The Locke Newsletter.

REFERENCES


3 Note, e.g., the attribution of an edition of Aesop’s Fables to him by P. Alexander in Gregory, p.439, contradicted by Yolton on 434.

Anyone familiar with the history of psychiatry and the behavioral sciences is cognizant of the psychopharmacology revolution of the past forty years and the momentous impact of psychoactive drugs not only on clinical practice but also on the very identity and theoretical constructs of psychiatry. This revolution began with the serendipitous discovery of the first antipsychotic drug, chlorpromazine, in the early 1950s in Europe. Once its psychotropic effects were discovered, the use of chlorpromazine marked the most dramatic shift in the treatment of mental disorders since Freud’s psychoanalysis earlier in this century. In fact, the burgeoning psychopharmacology era marked the decline of psychoanalysis as a model for psychopathology and its treatment. The cascade of other antipsychotic drugs, as well as antidepressants, mood stabilizers, and anxiolytics that followed chlorpromazine over the past forty years, cumulatively ushered an inevitable paradigm shift to conceptualizing mental illnesses as a variety of neurochemical lesions that can be reversed or stabilized by different classes of neuropharmacological agents. In many ways, the psychopharmacological discoveries within psychiatry triggered the explosive neuroscience advances of the current generation and was sustained by it as well.

Healy’s book, which is a series of interviews with a select group of pioneering psychopharmacologists presents an entirely different perspective of how new drugs are discovered, developed, marketed, used, and abused. While unstructured interviews can at times be conducive to magnifying one’s own contributions or to a personalized version of history, the insights and behind-the-scenes maneuvers exposed in this book are probably never accessible by reading the hundreds of books and peer-reviewed articles that appeared in the psychopharmacology literature over the past forty years. What is likely to strike many readers is the ferocity of personal views or the politics surrounding the process of generating new scientific knowledge. What may startle some readers is the possibility that the perception of clinical syndromes and diagnostic constructs can be significantly impacted by the marketing aspects of psychopharmaceuticals. Some widely accepted contemporary notions of psychopathology and treatments may have been influenced by business strategies, not simply by empirical and objective laboratory investigation.

As a collection of “mini-autobiographies”, the book presents a wealth of inside personal
and interpersonal aspects of how “human” scientists can be during the competitive process of discovery and achievement. Some stories are poignant, others pretentious, but all gripping for the psychiatrists who were trained during this era or who have used the dozens of pharmacological agents that are now discussed by their developers, the heroes of psychopharmacology. To the nonphysician readers, the tale of altering or modifying the highest functions of the human brain such as thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, can be equally fascinating as a triumph of science but not without some profound economic and sociopolitical consequences, intended or unintended.

For example, it is not surprising that the powerful impact of psychotherapeutic drugs may have contributed to the growth of the antipsychiatry movement that condemned the very progress that legitimized psychiatry as a medical discipline and clinical neuroscience. Few of the interviewers addressed this issue in light of the failure of science, even good science, to provide full answers to the complex human dimensions of mental illness.

In summary, this book, unstructured as it is, fills a gap in the history of psychiatry and specifically psychopharmacology. It is a story of unraveling the neurochemical mysteries of mental illness as collectively told by twenty-three men and two women. The reader is left to sift through the facts and perceptions and is likely to be impressed, educated, and, yes, even disillusioned.

Reviewed by Henry A. Nasrallah, professor of psychiatry and neurology, the Ohio State University, and the University of Mississippi Medical Center, Jackson MS.

David Healy comments:

I am grateful to Henry A. Nasrallah for his sympathetic reading of this volume. Oral history has many pitfalls, some of which he notes. It also has its benefits, perhaps particularly in the fields of behavioral neuroscience/psychiatry, where scientific knowledge has a clear commercial value. In recent years, a number of autobiographical accounts of their careers have begun to appear from some of the most eminent neuroscientists and clinicians from the period. For political and social reasons, such accounts usually necessarily leave out the conflicts and acrimony that go with historical developments. These interviews offer an internal control on the biases inherent in such “club” accounts by juxtaposing accounts from members of different clubs. There are, therefore, accounts from scientists working within the pharmaceutical industry set beside the accounts from clinicians and basic scientists and very often the same event can be seen from these different perspectives. (A second volume of twenty-five interviews has now been published, which covers the same ground as the interviews in this volume [Healy, 1998]. There is also an external control, which is the bias of the interviewer. This can be seen in all its ramifications in a recently published history of the antidepressants [Healy, 1997].)

While oral history has its pitfalls, it also potentially escapes the barb in Voltaire’s jibe that history is a trick the living play on the dead. Working with people who made history, but who are still alive and can contest our accounts, can make more explicit the process by which historians make history. This is a challenge that should not be shirked.

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This book, a companion to the author’s *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self* (1992), is unique and indispensable for any serious student of the history of representations of madness, let alone for a student of madness in Greek tragedy. It is an extraordinary poetic, phenomenological exploration of the madness in Greek tragedy. The author’s point of departure is the recognition of how commonly madness is represented on stage in Greek tragedy. Madness as a metaphor, “You’re mad to think it,” is even more common, augmenting a general sense in Greek tragedy of impending irrational, insane behavior by god or human. Padel makes some forays beyond the classical Greek period for briefer looks at representations of madness in later periods of Western civilization. She asserts that Greek images and concepts of madness have powerfully shaped and informed all subsequent Western representations. Paradoxically, changes that have taken place (especially in the nineteenth century) in views of the person and of the mind make it extremely difficult for us now fully to recognize, let alone characterize, the authentic classical Greek representations.

The greatest strength of the book is the author’s detailed, sensitive collation of the images and poetic contexts within which representations of madness in Greek tragedy are embedded. The explication of the specific vocabulary of madness occupies Part I but extends throughout the book. Further, Padel takes us through the major characteristics of mad characters as they appear in tragedy and the major explanations given for their madness. She observes that, with a few notable exceptions (the recurrent madness of Io, or Orestes), madness is portrayed as acute, time-limited, disastrous, initiated primarily by divine agency, and capricious. The madness is short-lived, though the antecedent buildup and especially the consequences are far more lasting. Chronic madness is not portrayed in Greek tragedy and hardly discussed in early Greek medicine (although it is alluded to in Greek comedy, in Aristophanes’ *The Wasps* in the form of a bad case of “jury-mania”). Repeatedly, the author brings us back to detailed, unprejudiced examination of the texts, and she urges, coaxes, persuades, and occasionally scolds us into looking closely at what the Greeks thought and how they expressed those thoughts.

There is a generally useful combative tone to the book—the author both makes her own points and refutes opposing, or irrelevant, viewpoints that have gained any currency. On the whole, accurate in these battles, offensive and defensive, she takes on classicists, historians of ideas, poets, Shakespearean critics, and psychoanalysts.

Because this reviewer wears several of those hats (professional psychoanalyst and amateur classical scholar), it is fitting to address a particular issue to which Padel does not do full justice to our understanding of Greek tragedy. There is plenty to criticize in psychoanalytic “treatment” of literature (including my own work). The problem is: how do these Greek dramas, written in a very particular time and context, have such a widespread, trans-historical appeal? Padel’s answer, in part, is that there is a history of transmission of the ideas and images, that modern Western viewers are not responding to Greek tragedy as if it were of some distant and totally alien culture. She would argue that we are responding in part by misunderstanding, that we are not responding to the culturally specific meanings of the images that the tragedians may have reflexly invoked and evoked.

What psychoanalytic critics, at their best (or even at their worst) are implicitly dealing with, however crudely, haltingly, and gropingly, is the kind of problem so graphically por-
trayed in Shakespearean studies—how does Shakespeare become so thoroughly Russian or German, or Yiddish, or even (as in Peking opera version of King Lear) so authentically Chinese? How does an audience of a hundred American eighteen-year-olds come into a university auditorium, chewing their gum, wearing their walkman-radio-tape-decks, some even descending to front rows on roller-skates, to watch a marionette performance of Antigone, and become transfixed, transformed, awestruck, and unified in a stunned emotional silence? No one field or profession has a corner on answering that question, including psychoanalysts. Surely, that is a complicated and important enough topic to warrant trying out various assumptions about what is and is not universal in human nature, or human culture; assumptions about what allows us to understand (and what hinders us from understanding) another human being or another culture. Padel’s work should also be used to help us understand how we, today, can still respond to what Aristotle called the “pleasure particular to tragedy.”

Reviewed by Bennett Simon, clinical professor of psychiatry, Harvard Medical School (Cambridge Hospital), and training and supervising analyst, Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, who teaches “Tragic Drama and Human Conflict” to undergraduates at Harvard.


Simon LeVay, a neurobiologist whose research has posited a distinct structural difference in the hypothalamus of gay and straight male brains, has written a survey of scientific research on homosexuality. In Queer Science, LeVay describes various psychological and biological theories of the etiology of homosexuality that have come and gone during the past half century. He also discusses the various therapies to “cure” homosexuality that have accompanied many of these research efforts. While the book is written clearly and is very accessible to the lay reader, the reviews of the various approaches to the study of homosexuality are uneven. LeVay’s predilection for recent biological explanations clouds his presentation of older psychological theories, and his ahistorical sensibility distorts his attempts to discuss the science in former social contexts. Chapters 6, on the brain, and 9, on genetics, are useful for the lay reader, explaining the scientific issues and presenting some of the contemporary debates around the discovery of the so-called “gay brain” and “gay gene.” The chapters on psychoanalysis and learning theories, however, show a remarkably unsophisticated understanding of the scientific, social, and methodological issues at hand. LeVay’s ridicule of psychological theories of human sexuality add nothing to our understanding of the historical or intellectual contexts of such approaches.

While LeVay includes discussions of research on lesbians when relevant or available, class and race figure negligibly in his discussion. His general outlook is that of an educated white gay male scientist. As a scientist, he judges historical science according to contemporary methodological standards; as a white gay male, he judges researchers as right or wrong, dangerous or heroic, depending on his own political position. He does not seem to notice that his own assumptions about what constitutes homosexuality are themselves historically contingent. Most surprising is his adherence to the belief that homosexuality is part of a “package”
of "sex-atypical characteristics," an idea that hearkens back to LeVay's intellectual hero, the nineteenth-century German sexologist and proto-gay advocate, Magnus Hirschfeld. Indeed, LeVay promotes Hirschfeld's classification of homosexuals as a so-called "third sex": people who are neither "completely male nor completely female, but made up of a mosaic of male and female elements, a mosaic that [takes] them outside of the regular, dichotomous conception of sex" (275). Unfortunately, LeVay leaves his assumptions about what constitutes "sex-typical" or "regular, dichotomous" characteristics unexamined and therefore unconvincing.

The title of the book is somewhat deceiving: Queer Science suggests a theoretical and political alignment with the innovative post-modern inquiries of "queer theory." The content of LeVay's polemic, however, is naive in its beliefs in the power of so-called objective modern science to overcome moral and religious intolerance. The overarching theme of the book is that a biological "born-that-way" explanation for homosexuality is both intellectually fruitful and politically liberating. Despite his occasional disclaimer that there are no necessary connections between beliefs about the causes of homosexuality and its acceptance by society at large, LeVay seems to believe that homophobes everywhere would lay down their hatred if only they would accept that homosexuality is biologically based. It is to LeVay's credit that he asserts his politics openly and does not hide behind the "objective" mantle of science. The result of his endeavor, however, contributes little to the pressing theoretical, historical, and social debates that necessarily inform scientific research on human sexual behavior.

Reviewed by Stephanie Kemen, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Cambridge MA 02138.
collection as a survey of sites, ancient and modern, where parts of the complex idea of vision as an active, constructive process emerged. The individual chapters are well-crafted: notable among them are Margaret Atherton’s sensitive reading of the contrast between Berkeley’s and Descartes’s theories of vision, Peg Birmingham’s uncovering of the roots of the Greek concept of taste as rendered by Hannah Arendt, and Rebecca Comay’s somewhat polemic, but rich, recounting of the dialogue between Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno over the theological prohibition of images. The editor, David Michael Levin, author or editor of other recent volumes on the history and philosophy of vision (The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation; Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision), has provided a lengthy introduction (63 pages) in which he adumbrates several of the motifs that are woven into the individual chapters and summarizes each chapter in turn.

This collection will profit a variety of readers. Those who are interested in the development of postmodernist philosophies will gain insight into their history. The book will provide much stimulation and pleasure for those fascinated by vision. Finally, for those psychologists and other social scientists frustrated by aridity and lack of vision in current theory and practice in their fields, Sites of Vision will suggest means for relief. Such readers, however, must bring their own ideas with them, ready to connect to the ideas presented in this text: with the exception of John Dewey, the subject of one chapter, there are very few psychologists or social scientists mentioned or cited. This may be as much a comment on the persistence of materialist, mechanist, and biological ideas of vision within psychology and the other behavioral sciences as it is reflective of the contributors’ intellectual origins.

Reviewed by David C. Devonish, Assistant Professor of Psychology and Coordinator of the Psychology Department, Graceland College, Lamoni IA 50140.


Hans Eysenck was the leader of the “London School” of psychology, which applied Darwin’s theory of evolution to the study of individual differences. The title of his autobiography reflected his lifetime goal to make 20th century human psychology a true science. When Eysenck died, at age 81, from brain cancer in September 1997, his 60 books and 1,000 articles had made him the most cited living person in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Eysenck lived long enough to see the demise of many of his foes. His view that much psychotherapy did not work, once a serious scandal, is now widely accepted. Today consensus exists for his position that personality can be explained in terms of a small number of dimensions (e.g., Intelligence, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism), that these are at least moderately heritable, and that most psychiatric disorders represent extreme positions on these continuous dimensions, not categorical disease states. His data showing that Fascists and Communists have similar personality structures and that social attitudes are partly heritable are also now widely accepted (with specific genes waiting in the test tube to be decoded).

Eysenck organizes his life story both chronologically (mainly the first three and last chapters) and topically (mainly the middle four chapters). He tells of his birth, in 1916 Berlin,
to actor parents whose early divorce left him to be reared by his maternal grandmother (a Protestant later sent to a concentration camp because the Nazis considered her Jewish). He succeeded at school and in sports but claims that he lacked sufficient combativeness truly to excel. He describes the rise of Nazism during the Weimar Republic and his revulsion at being forced to listen to Hitler’s speeches. Deciding he wanted no part of the Third Reich, he arrived in England at age 18, where he enrolled in psychology at the University of London—a strange prelude to later false accusations of fascism.

At University College, in the mid-1930s, Eysenck absorbed the Darwinian-Galtonian tradition, studying individual differences and the psychometrics of Charles Spearman, Karl Pearson, and Sir Cyril Burt (Eysenck’s Ph.D. supervisor). Eysenck describes five principles of that school. The first of these was that human beings were *biosocial organisms*, whose conduct was determined by both genetic and by social factors. The four others—including a mind-body continuum, reconciling correlational and experimental methods, abandoning distinctions between pure and applied psychology, and requiring proof for all assertions—can likewise be seen as part of a program for making psychology into a science and unifying, rather than compartmentalizing, knowledge.

Eysenck describes a mainly happy life. He was married twice (the second time to Sybil for 40 years) and had five children and several grandchildren. During World War II, he worked as an air-raid warden and later as a clinical psychologist. After the war, he visited the United States before founding his own department of psychology (1950) at the University of London’s Institute of Psychiatry. He also writes of his many intellectual friends and enemies, alliances and quarrels.

Other Eysenckian controversies include cognitive behavior modification (a therapy he helped pioneer), personality and crime, smoking and cancer, and ESP and astrology. The most contentious, however, was the issue of race differences in IQ. Simply considering the basis to race differences in IQ as an open question was enough to make Eysenck a political pariah. He was physically attacked at the London School of Economics, an attack this reviewer witnessed as a then graduate student at the L.S.E.

*Rebel With a Cause* is a first-hand account of the human nature wars of the 20th century, central to an understanding of social science history.

Reviewed by J. Philippe Rushton, professor of psychology at the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, N6A 3C2.

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Each time one of Jacques Lacan’s seminars is added to the existing list of his officially published works in French, as happened with *Seminar V: Les formations de l’inconscient* last year, the event produces massive excitement among his followers, although in most cases they have already read and discussed the seminar in one of the numerous earlier “pirated”
versions. The reasons for this excitement vary from one person to another, but they also differ according to the Lacanian group to which the person belongs. For the members of the Association Mondiale de Psychanalyse, the publication of a particular seminar provides an indication of the issues that will be discussed at forthcoming seminars and conferences, and an opportunity to rediscover the power of Lacan’s insights through a properly edited, authorized text. For those belonging to other Lacanian organizations, it is often an occasion to launch a new set of missiles in the direction of Jacques-Alain Miller, the (legally sanctioned) editor of Lacan’s works, for his purportedly flawed transcriptions, his refusal to include a critical apparatus, and his excruciatingly slow publication schedule—one seminar every four to five years, with some fifteen seminars to go, suggesting that neither Miller nor most of us will live long enough to see the project completed.

When one of Lacan’s seminars appears in English, the book induces not even a tenth of the flutter its counterpart triggers in the Roman world. This has nothing to do with the fact that the Anglo-American Lacanians have already scrutinized the original—indeed, most of my Lacanian bedfellows read Lacan only in English—but it is partly related to the lack of French enthusiasm for the publication (some herd-animals require a sign from the group leader to start moving), and partly owing to a certain intellectual inertia, which makes it difficult to assimilate new brainfood if one is still saturated by the old portions. Nonetheless, I believe that the seminars of Lacan in English, and especially the volumes which have appeared since 1988, deserve more attention than they have hitherto received, even by those francophone readers who think they have already absorbed them so thoroughly that an English translation cannot possibly add anything to their knowledge.

The most important reason why a Lacan seminar in English ought to be cherished by devoted Lacanians and interested scholars alike is that it differs significantly from the French original as to its general conception and execution. Unlike the French seminars, all of the post-1988 English versions have hitherto contained a comprehensive bibliography, a detailed name and subject index, and (most importantly) invaluable explanatory notes. It would be an exaggeration to claim that they comprise the critical apparatus so painfully missed in the originals, but they invariably include references and clarifications that help the reader understand some of Lacan’s allusive twists. Needless to say, the bibliography and index are extremely helpful for research purposes, for simply retracing that catchy formula of Lacan’s that has sedimented itself in the mind—but which is so hard to locate.

Admittedly, strong arguments could be raised against the practice of squeezing the master’s words into an academic format or, what is even worse, into the university discourse he himself loathed so much, and rumor has it that some of the previous translators (including the acclaimed John Forrester) have been sacked because they were slightly overzealous in trying to realize exactly this. Yet I remain convinced this academic reinvention of the original text is the only way to convey the spirit of Lacan’s seminar to Anglo-Saxon readers, not only because of his incessant use of puns and homophones or his frequent (implicit) references to obscure authors and books, but primarily because most readers will otherwise be unable to grasp Lacan’s global theoretical itinerary, within which each seminar needs to be placed,

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barred as such readers are from accessing or studying the "pirated" versions of the unpublished seminars. Whereas Miller's "invention" of Lacan's writing during his transcription of Seminar XI in the early 1970s made Lacan's lectures at once more univocal and less open to interpretation, the English translations will further contribute to that semantic process, but I would also expect them to push some readers back to the French text, which may reopen plurality of meaning and semantic ambiguity in his words.3

Lacan's Seminar XX was originally published in 1975—some three years after he delivered it—and only three of the eleven sessions have been translated into English during the past twenty-three years.4 In his preface to this new complete translation, renowned Lacan scholar Bruce Fink writes that the book is long overdue and that in its absence Lacan's work has been "grossly misrepresented" over the last decades (vii). Whether the latter contention holds true, or whether the misrepresentations will disappear after this "complete Seminar XX," remains to be seen, but I can say that Fink's translation has been worth waiting for, however erroneous the interpretations that have been produced during the interval. Seminar XX is neither Fink's maiden trip as a Lacan translator, because he has already published English versions of five Lacan papers, nor is it likely to be his last feat of arms, with full translations of Seminar IV, Seminar VIII, and a completely new translation of the 900-page Ecrits forthcoming.5 Apart from being a translator, Fink has also published two pathbreaking books on Lacan, and he professionally combines theoretical work with a clinical practice in Lacanian psychoanalysis, for which he has been trained in the École de la Cause freudienne.6

From the very first page of this translation, it is clear that Fink not only knows his Lacan, but also his French, for he is able to dissect and explain the nuances of Lacan's contrived contaminations and neologisms with much sense and sensibility, often trying to find Anglo-American equivalents when a translation and explanation will simply not do. I particularly enjoyed the "How do you like them apples!" (19, note 13) as a possible substitute for Lacan's a tire-larigot, but examples of similar inventive suggestions abound throughout the text. More than ever before in an English Lacan seminar, Fink has also unearthed and clarified most of Lacan's implicit references and resituated his ideas into a historical framework by providing references to source materials and previous texts by Lacan himself. In this way, the reader is given a chance to acknowledge that some of Lacan's abstract statements and schemas were


developed over longer periods of time and often went through various alternative formulations. As a result, Lacan becomes less idiosyncratic, more human, less of a demiurge, and more of a creative artist.

Within the space of this review, it is impossible to discuss the contents of Lacan’s seminar or, for that matter, even its main arguments. For some reason, the publishers have opted to relegate the original title of the seminar, _Encore_, to the background and to publish the book with an alternative heading, _On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge_. This is indeed what Lacan talks about in some of the sessions, but I nevertheless wish to warn potential readers that the seminar is not primarily about feminine sexuality. If I were asked to make a suggestion myself, I would define the contents as dealing with “the ethics of jouissance”—or _vice versa_—which is, I think, what Lacan and Miller tried to capture when they decided to put a picture of Bernini’s Saint Theresa on the cover of the French book.

As far as the translation itself is concerned, Fink’s notes and remarks bear witness to his extremely conscientious approach to Lacan’s text, and to his overall concern with rendering the intended meaning as clearly as possible. Taking account of the theoretical difficulty of the original and the extreme convolutedness of some of Lacan’s sentences, Fink has produced an eminently readable text that even the most ardent critics of Lacan’s prose will admire. Despite these strengths (and perhaps inevitably), the translation does include a number of errors and also poses some difficulties in crucial places, of which I will give five examples related to the first session (_On jouissance_).

Throughout this session (1–13), Lacan often uses the circumlocution “ce qu’il en est de l’être,” which Fink has translated as “the status of being.” Yet Lacan’s phrase is very casual and Fink’s rendering transforms it into an austere, highbrow statement. I would have suggested the more prosaic “what being is all about,” which is easy enough to sustain wherever Lacan uses the phrase.

Secondly, on the very first page, Fink translates Lacan’s “je ne puis être ici qu’en position d’analysant de mon je n’en veux rien savoir...” as “I can only be here in the position of an analysand due to my I don’t want to know anything about it...” This translation suggests that the “I don’t want to know anything about it” is the logical condition for Lacan’s position as an analysand, whereas my reading would be that he is there as the one who analyzes his “I don’t want to know anything...” that is, that his refusal to know is exactly what he operates on as an analysand. Hence, the “due to” in Fink’s translation of the phrase ought to have been replaced by “of.” This distinction is quite important, since Lacan later reflects on stupidity in analytic discourse, which is clearly related to this dimension of “I don’t want to know anything about it.” Fink’s translation of Lacan’s term “bêtise” (stupidity) is correct, yet he should have pointed out that “être bête” also means “not knowing anything,” “not having a clue,” and is therefore directly related to the realm of knowledge. Furthermore, I doubt that Lacan’s term “bêtise” is itself a translation of the notion “Dummheit” (nonsense) in Freud’s case-study of Little Hans, as Fink claims, but rather an alternative to “not wanting to know” and “ignorance,” and thus (as Lacan argues) to love as possible ignorance of desire.

Thirdly, Lacan’s sentence “La jouissance de l’Autre,... du corps de l’Autre qui le symbolise, n’est pas le signe de l’amour” (4) should have been translated as “Jouissance of the Other,... of the body of the Other that symbolizes it, is not the sign of love,” rather than “Jouissance of the Other,... of the body of the Other who symbolizes the Other, is not the sign of love.” The latter translation suggests that it is the Other rather than the body that
symbolizes, which does not really make sense, as Fink himself is keen to underscore, since he indicates in a footnote that there seems to be a typographical error in the original text. Yet there is no typographical error at all; it is the body (and not the Other) that symbolizes the Other, which is moreover attested to by what Lacan says on the following page of the text.

Fourthly, in the paragraphs in which Lacan talks about the One, he differentiates (although often surreptitiously) between the (philosophical) One of harmony, unity, and oneness, and the (mathematical) One of numbers and arithmetic. It seems to me that Fink’s translation is confusing these two dimensions, especially when in footnote 19 (5), he puts Lacan’s definition of the philosophical One on a par with his discussion of the mathematical One (the One of pure difference).

Finally, the reference to François Recanati’s paper (13) in Lacan’s journal *Scilicet* is incorrect. It is a mystery to me how such a factual error could have occurred, since Fink points out (correctly) that Recanati had already given a talk at Lacan’s previous seminar on 14 June 1972, and there can be no doubt that the text Fink refers to is not the text of Recanati’s intervention during Lacan’s Seminar XX, because in *Scilicet* the date of the intervention is included and the contents of Recanati’s paper makes immediately clear that it does not tally with the subject matter of Seminar XX. This mistake could have consequences for the rest of the translation, since Lacan himself regularly refers to Recanati’s intervention during the course of Seminar XX.7

It is also a pity that the English edition of Seminar XX has reproduced some of the glaring errors of the original French version. For example, figure 6 on page 125 of Fink’s translation, which is presented by Lacan as a Borromean chain, is not a Borromean chain at all, as was proven in an article in the journal *Ornicar?* shortly after the publication of Seminar XX in French.6 On a different level, Lacan’s Greek quotations from the works of Aristotle and Heraclitus contained some typographical errors in the original edition of the seminar, the most conspicuous one being the systematic confusion of the “spiritus asper” and the “spiritus lenis,” which have not been corrected for this translation. This could have been easily avoided, although I expect that it will pass unnoticed if the reader does not have a classical background or training. Finally, Fink’s translation does not include a separate bibliography, as did all the previous English volumes of the Seminar, which would have been extremely welcome. I am fully aware that some of these points may be perceived as academic nitpicking, but the higher the standards according to which a text has been established, the higher the demands one is allowed to set. I am also aware that it is impossible to produce a perfect translation, and that this kind of enterprise can only be a work in progress, as Fink himself acknowledges in his preface (viii). Fink has done better than any of his predecessors in producing this translation and perhaps realized what many people would have considered altogether impossible: rendering Lacan’s baroque explorations into a recognizable and fairly accessible English.

Reviewed by **Dany Nobus**, who teaches psychology and psychoanalysis in the Department of Human Sciences, Brunel University, Cleveland Road, Uxbridge, Middx, UB8 3PH, U.K.


David Moss, of Harvard Business School, examines an important aspect of the struggles for social insurance and assistance in the United States in the three decades leading to the passage of the Social Security Act, an aspect that has figured peripherally in more general studies, such as Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992) and Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled (1994): the role of a group of reform-minded economists in the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL). University of Wisconsin institutionalist economists Richard Ely and John Commons took the lead in the AALL from the formation of the organization in 1906, together with their student John Andrews (AALL secretary 1910–1943) and the socialist Isaac Max Rubinow, but they enlisted the collaboration of more conservative economists such as Henry Farnam of Yale, the AALL’s second president and most generous donor.

The AALL economists presented themselves as apolitical academic experts, neutral between business and organized labor (each of whom suspected the “experts” of being on the other side), but were committed policy advocates. Affiliated with the International Association for Labor Legislation, the AALL drew inspiration from British and German innovations in health and unemployment insurance and old age pensions and international struggles against the use of phosphorus in match making (the cause of “phossy jaw”).

Training as economists set the AALL leaders apart from other social insurance advocates by making “Internalizing Industrial Externalities” (the title of Moss’s chapter 4) central to their program. Making good use of microfilm editions of the AALL, Commons and Ely papers, Moss explores the conflict over gender-neutral policies versus protective legislation for women (chapter 6), and the conflict of the AALL with labor leaders such as Samuel Gompers, who defended health and unemployment insurance as part of voluntary collective bargaining against the alternative of government-administered compulsory social insurance. Moss also explores why, in contrast to the gradual introduction of occupational safety laws, minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and Social Security for old age and disability, the AALL campaign for compulsory health insurance failed, opposed by insurance companies and Social Security for old age and disability, the AALL campaign for compulsory health insurance failed, opposed by insurance companies and Christian Scientists.

Moss’s study, originally a 1992 Yale Ph.D. dissertation, is meticulously documented, with seventy-two pages of notes, yet is much more readable than a typical dissertation. He has an interesting story and tells it well. He goes too far when claiming that, while not all AALL economists were institutionalist critics of neoclassical economics like Ely and Commons, “it is fair to describe all of them as more or less heterodox in their views” (p. 16). Rejection of “laissez-faire” as a feasible policy by 1906 implied nothing about heterodoxy in respect to economic theory or the economics profession. A counter example to Moss’s generalization, Irving Fisher of Yale, was America’s leading scientific economist from the 1890s to 1930s, a mathematical economist, general equilibrium theorist, neoclassical capital theorist, and pioneering econometrician. Fisher appears, unindexed, as a recipient of letters (pp. 189, 192, 212, 230, 231, 233, 236), but his name appears in the text (p. 131) only as a prohibitionist, without mention that he was an economist, a professor, an AALL member, or the person who appears anonymously on page 27 as “the Association’s fifth president.” In contrast, Skocpol
(1992, pp. 200, 202, 302, 605) notes Fisher’s “leading role in the AALL’s campaign for health insurance,” including his AALL presidential addresses. Fisher also stressed the case for compulsory health insurance in his American Economic Association presidential address in 1918 and in many articles. Ely, Farnam, and Commons had already been AEA president, so the economics profession cannot have viewed the AALL economists as too heterodox. I would also have liked more about two Wellesley economists, the future Nobel Peace laureate, Emily Balch (see Skocpol 1992, p. 405) and Katherine Coman, whose many AALL publications and exchange with Rubinstein are noted only in passing by Skocpol (1992, pp. 601–602), Gordon (1994, pp. 178, 381), and Moss (1996, p. 199). But overall, Moss has provided a valuable, insightful, and readable study of the role of Progressive Wisconsin institutionalists in the social insurance movement.

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Reviewed by Robert W. Dimand, professor of economics at Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1, Canada.


No scholar, I believe, enjoys having to write a negatively critical book review. The fact of a book having made it to the light of day is a cause for congratulation in and of itself. When the book is, overall, of significant worth and value, it seems almost an obligation to ignore the weaknesses that might also have appeared. And such is the case with Bret Carroll’s *Spiritualism in Antebellum America*. At the level of information provided about the spiritualist movement in the nineteenth century, the book is splendid indeed. The author argues convincingly at the level of thesis, demonstrating very well the development within the spiritualist movement of what Carroll calls a kind of ecclesiastical republicanism. At the level of general and specific information provided about spiritualism in nineteenth century America, Carroll’s work is excellent. The author brings together a wealth of primary data and secondary scholarly observations into one volume, and does so in a way that will be of help both to scholars and students of American religious thought.

Carroll’s thesis, amply argued, is that the antebellum spiritualist movement in the United States constituted a two-step call to “come out” of mainstream Christian organization and to “come in” to a spiritually fulfilling religious institution that allowed room for, indeed in many ways promoted, religious freedom. Stated somewhat differently, Carroll demonstrates the ability of spiritualism to hold in balance the American religious need for individualism in belief and practice with the need for order, stability, and not a little conventionality. To be sure, as Carroll points out very well, the cost of this balancing act was an inability to establish
spiritualism as a large scale organization. As with so much of mid-nineteenth century American religious movement, spiritualism was able to provide a communal and ordered religious way, but at the cost of a national religious formation. Spiritualism both flourished and founded on its attempt to balance “excessive individualism” against “excessive centralism.”

So far, very good. So where is the problem with Carroll’s book? It lies at the level of the book’s plot. Put very simply, Carroll assumes a narrative of mid-nineteenth century American spiritual malaise: that American culture was suffering from a dearth of spiritual fulfillment; and that spiritualism appeared as an antidote to that malaise. The difficulty with this narrative (beside the fact that it is fairly worn out) is twofold. First, it gets us no further than the account of the spiritual movement offered by those involved in the movement. While this may not be problematic, it also might be. Critical scholarship needs to go beyond the “spiritual malaise” story, at least try to get behind it to see if something else might be going on. Second, the assumption of this story contributes to the continued “Christianization” of American religious studies. The story of malaise and cure is but a thinly veiled version of the Christian story of sin and salvation, of the Augustinian restless heart, searching for true haven in a heartless world. It is time to move on beyond the Christian story in the discipline of religious studies.

There is, interestingly, a different story noted by Carroll in his book, although it is left at the level of aside and not carried out. It is that mid-nineteenth century American spiritualism stood as an attempt to demystify religious life and experience: proponents trafficking in spirits constituted a “familiar,” almost domestic pattern of life. This story cuts against the grain of another standard story in religious studies, namely, that religion is about encounters with the “wholly other,” with Rudolph Otto’s “mysterium tremendum.” It is a refreshing story, and one that this scholar finds more in line with the facts of American religious history than the standard counterpart. This reader, at least, wishes that Carroll had taken up the track of this story in his book and had followed it out rather than merely mentioning its possibility.

Reviewed by Bennett Ramsey, associate professor of religious studies, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC 27412-5001.


This is a postmodernist deconstructionist work. The author starts in the middle of the nineteenth century, ignoring any medical writing about hermaphroditism before, emphasizes that physicians were gatekeepers and definers who ignored the patients, and concludes with a plea for physicians to listen to their patients. The book is based primarily on English and French writings about hermaphrodites and ignores, except for an occasional reference, the massive amount of German literature on all kinds of sexual topics, including hermaphroditism. Despite these more or less negative comments, the book can be read in a different way, and in fact for much of it, the author ignores her own theory to give an excellent and definitive
historical account of how physicians in England and France dealt with hermaphrodites. Some of the physicians were rather arrogant in trying surgically to alter what nature had given their patients, but many were genuinely puzzled and, since anatomy was often no guide, they somehow tried to make recommendations about sex assignment on the basis of what we now call gender characteristics, most of which were typically erroneous, at least from today’s point of view. Her plea, at the end, is for physicians to listen more to their patients and to the recommendations of the Intersex Society of America and not to resort to drastic interventions until the patient decides. But what she forgets is that the Intersex Society (which I support), is but one voice, a cautionary and necessary one, and that voice is not the only voice of intersexed individuals and not much help when the physicians is confronted with a parent of an intersexed child demanding that he or she do something. There is an excellent bibliography and, whether or not one agrees with Dreger, as I do for the most part, she has compiled a massive amount of well-documented data about hermaphroditism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The book should help stimulate further discussion on how society is to deal with intersex people.

Reviewed by Vern L. Bullough, a SUNY distinguished professor emeritus and currently a visiting professor at the University of Southern California, where he teaches a course on human sexuality.

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This is an impassioned defense of Basaglia’s argument for the deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients and is essentially a critique of psychiatric institutions and the science of psychiatry and therapeutic practice in general. The author successfully expresses the modern crisis in institutions and ideologies and transmits the need to struggle constantly for a psychiatry that is free from social control. These are the most successful aspects of the book.

It does also have several weaknesses, however, the most salient of which are as follows:

1. The historical discussion is controversial; the author depends heavily on secondary sources and draws entirely upon a restricted group of cited authors.
2. The author relies heavily upon Michel Foucault, despite the fact that many of his interpretations are considered debatable today; rather than being a sign of exclusion, the invention of the asylum was a reflection of an intellectual and democratic revolution that altered our relations with madness and madmen.
3. The important contribution made by French institutional psychotherapy and community treatment is dealt with in a summary and simplistic way.
4. The argument is highly ideological. Although the author is against the abandonment of patients, and insists that the existence of alternatives is absolutely necessary, he asserts continually that deinstitutionalization is a moral imperative. His anti-asylum
stance does not distinguish the different meanings of “asylum” as place and as function.

5. The author considers only the sociological and institutional version of alienation, and does not question mental disorder from the perspective of the psychological and biological sciences. There is no reference to neurobiology or psychopharmacology, nor even to psychotherapy, as if mental illness were not intimately related to the private, subjective world of the individual. This is in opposition to the author’s own theoretical position, which is based upon a constructivist epistemology. The complexity raised by psychiatry, and which the author accepts, is then impoverished by simplification. This is exactly what should be avoided in both the study of historical development and in dealings with psychological suffering.

I agree with the author that freedom may be therapeutic as long as the notion of permanent invalidity is rejected, the subject and his/her history are reassessed, and the patients’ rights are protected. But in cases of serious psychiatric illness, the ability to be free may be suppressed. Consequently, the release of such patients without suitable support systems may mean abandoning them to loneliness, illness, and misery. It is not enough to say that deinstitutionalization is a moral imperative. What is required is an ethical code of practice that governs the relationship between the “observing” and the “observed” and that examines the processes that take place during institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. This would serve as counterpoint to the rhetoric of ideology.

Reviewed by José Morgado Pereira, who is in psychiatry at Sobral Cid Hospital and is a Researcher in the Centre for Social Studies, Coimbra, Portugal.


Jean-Paul Sartre has faded from undergraduate memory but not so the cohort of master thinkers who succeeded him—Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault. Niilo Kauppi has set himself the task of explaining how cultural authority passed from Sartre to this new generation of intellectuals. The time is the late 1950s and early 1960s, the setting Paris.

The local intellectual scene, Kauppi argues, was transformed in these years by a knot of related factors. The Paris student population had begun to increase rapidly, and the university system grew to keep pace, creating new posts and sanctioning the creation of new disciplines, in the social sciences above all. An eager and youthful audience craved enlightenment, and the media reorganized to target the waiting market. Paperback publishing flourished. Risk-taking houses like the avant-garde Editions de Minuit and middle-sized Le Seuil cast about for coming authors who could write in an idiom appealing to an idea-hungry youth. Cultural journals, like Le Nouvel Observateur, sprang up to broker between writers and readers, undertaking to explain to the young the complexities of a changing intellectual scene.
This was the opening that Sartre’s successors seized on. They were an interesting crew, not all of them cut from the standard cloth of Parisian intellectual life. Sartre had taken the royal road to success, graduating from the Ecole normale supérieure (rue d’Ulm), France’s premier institution of humanistic education. Certain of the newcomers had gone the same route, Foucault for example, but not Barthes (too frail of health to pursue an ENS degree) or the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who had gotten his training in medicine. A number were transplanted foreigners, like the literary theorists Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov, both of East European background.

What such would-be intellectuals had going for them, Kauppi claims, was not pedigree but a remarkable institutional and media savvy. They sought out a base of operations in a ramifying university system, finding a particular home for themselves in the research-oriented École Pratique des Hautes Études. They launched reviews and prizes to trumpet their views and consecrate their achievements. To make this point, Kauppi devotes a chapter to the workings of the celebrated literary journal *Tel Quel*, founded in 1960, several of whose collaborators were recipients of the Prix Médicis (first awarded in 1957).

But it was the peculiar, hybrid idiom in which such intellectuals wrote that in the end guaranteed their success. They had the right philosophical turn of mind to pass muster by accepted standards of intellectual quality but just enough newness to lay claim to the status of radical iconoclasts. Kauppi is not so much interested in explicating the post-Sartrians’ ideas as in analyzing the formal properties of their mode of argumentation. They talked the talk of “Latin humanism,” sketching out grand and abstract conceptual systems, invoking the classics of the French literary tradition when evidence was needed, and couching the whole in a language studded with Greco-Latin neologisms from “episteme” to “habitus.” It helped to have a solid lycée education to follow what they had to say, and in this regard, they did not differ much from Sartre. But critical differences there were in other respects.

Sartre’s philosophizing had spilled into novels and plays that accentuated the search for a liberating and committed subjectivity. The new generation had their novelistic wing, but the literature they embraced, the so-called *Nouveau Roman* pioneered by Alain Robbe-Grillet and built upon by younger experimentalists such as Philippe Sollers of the *Tel Quel* group, was celebrated less for existential yearnings than for technical innovations and objectivity of tone. Yet, it was in the realm of the human and social sciences that the new school made the greatest impact, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, Bourdrian sociology, Barthian semiology, Foucaultian history. These various systems, Kauppi points out, picked apart Sartrian subjectivity in the name of constraining structures, whether linguistic, discursive, or epistemic in nature. They came accompanied by claims to scientific legitimacy, a claim that Kauppi deems plausible in certain instances (that of Bourdieu, for example) but which in most he is inclined to dismiss as mere pretense.

There is much that is suggestive in Kauppi’s analysis with its careful attention to the delineation of the opportunity structures patterning intellectual production. Institutions, cultural markets, and inherited expectations about how intellectuals are supposed to act and think, all contributed to the creative explosion of the post-Sartrian era. As Kauppi tells it, this is a very French tale. But there is reason to wonder whether it is so French as all that. The expansion of the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s was not unique to France. That expansion played itself out in France, but elsewhere too, against a backdrop of cultural renewal affecting related disciplines such as history as well as various domains of creative activity from cinema to music. Kauppi is sensitive to the French intellectuals’ cult of newness, but the era witnessed not just the emergence of new conceptual systems but of the new social history (as it used to be called), the New Wave in cinema, not to mention a full-scale upheaval
in the realm of commercial music. It may be pushing the point, but there was also a political
dimension to all this. The Cold War, which framed Sartrean thinking in the early fifties, had
begun to recede. The generation of thinkers just coming to the fore might still be marxisant
and anti-bourgeois, but they no longer shared in Sartre’s romanticization of the Soviet ex-
periment. Intellectual politics too had begun to take a new course, heading away from the
Cold War obsessions of old toward different horizons — Marxism, feminism, a whole complex
of positions that might be summed up under the rubric of New Left.
Kauppi has brought into clear focus a major transformation in the constitution of French
intellectual life. At the same time, it should be recognized that this transformation did not
unfold in a closed field but was part of a more encompassing cultural/political change that
found partial expression in the events of 1968 and the burst of new social movements that
proliferated in the years succeeding.

Reviewed by Philip Nord, professor of history at Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544.


Noyes has written an erudite, thoughtful book on masochism. He offers the thought-
provoking observation that people who discussed flogging and other masochistic practices in
the early modern period (i.e., the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries) did not regard such
practices as a problem, disease, or abnormality. Rather, they were presented simply as a
curious habit or even possibly as a cure for impotence. In the nineteenth century, however,
masochism became viewed as problematic, and by the early twentieth century it was seen as
a clinical abnormality requiring both treatment and explanatory theory based on pathological
causes. He ends the book by noting that most modern authors on the topic (including myself)
have begun to reject these clinical approaches and treat masochism as a nonpathological form
of sexual preference. The breadth of Noyes’s scholarship is impressive.

Despite these strengths of Noyes’ book, I confess that I was unable to evaluate or even
understand his explanation of how masochism evolved into a clinical phenomenon and back
out again. A significant part of my difficulty may be that I am a social scientist and have
sought to understand masochism in those terms, whereas this book is thoroughly and utterly
a work of the humanities. Noyes quotes many intelligent sources, describes key texts, and
offers interpretations that invoke parallels to cultural and historical trends. He does not, how-
ever, discuss facts and findings from research or use these as a way of sorting correct theories
from plausible but incorrect ones. Most important, he does not seem to see how social sci-
entists think along those lines.

As a particularly important example, the gradual rejection of clinical and Freudian the-
ories of masochism in recent decades is based largely on research findings that most people
who engaged in sexual masochism showed no signs of mental illness (unless the masochism
is itself defined as abnormal, which would be a circular argument). Yet Noyes never discusses
this crucial development. The empirical finding that people who engage in masochistic sex

Alfred Charles Kinsey was doubtless one of the most controversial cultural figures of the twentieth century. Indeed, historians have already amply assessed his place in history. Much of value has been written about the impact of the Kinsey Reports, while the general outlines of Kinsey’s career are known. He began as a Harvard-trained entomologist working on the gall wasp. Kinsey joined the zoology department at the University of Indiana in 1920. After a few years of teaching general biology to freshmen and sophomores, he gradually came to understand how little his students understood about the workings of their own bodies.
Repeated exposure to the pain and misery such ignorance caused in young people prompted him to turn his attention to the poorly understood subject of human sexuality. He painfully recalled his own Victorian upbringing and remained critical throughout his life of the religious moralizing he experienced as a youth. Insistent that future generations should not be shackled by a culture that associated sex with silence and bodily shame, he put together the first course on marriage and sexuality taught at his university.

As Kinsey’s own interest in sex mushroomed, he became increasingly determined to legitimize the scientific study of sex. He commenced taking sexual histories from student volunteers in his course, in the process perfecting the personal interview that would remain at the heart of his research method. Tapping into a newly enlightened interest in sex among the scientific community, Kinsey gained the support of the Rockefeller Foundation to continue and expand this work. Besides the explosive publications that emerged from these surveys, the Institute for Sex Research on the campus of the University of Indiana remains a permanent and venerable legacy.

Until now, the official portrait of Kinsey was of a passionate sex reformer and dedicated family man, an individual almost obsessed with unveiling the mysteries of human sexuality in order to liberate his fellow human beings. Much like other progressive scientists who saw their discipline as capable of reorganizing social institutions according to scientific principles, Kinsey placed his faith in rationalism, empiricism, and rigorous inquiry. A workaholic, Kinsey dedicated his life to the belief that knowledge could make men free. Indeed, he literally worked himself to death.

Yet, despite the wealth of material available detailing these themes, researchers interested in the relationship between the private Kinsey and his public persona have been hitherto unsatisfied. We all know that studying sex is not the same as studying the gall wasp, however carefully Kinsey crafted his image as a disinterested scientist. Was Kinsey’s own life affected by his increasingly obsessive interest in sex? What influence did his work have on his family and other close personal relationships? How capable were he and his staff of separating scientific investigation from their own personal needs, desires, and longings? That these questions have lingered unanswered is not simply the inevitable result of historians’ much bemoaned inability to get at the whole truth. There has also been the gnawing sense among some Kinsey scholars that certain aspects of his life were deliberately shrouded in secrecy. Who dictated this silence, and what kind of information was being withheld?

Roughly 25 years ago, James Jones wrote his dissertation on the Institute for Sex Research. In the course of that work, he sensed that there was more to the story of Kinsey’s life than he would be permitted to unearth. Convinced that the subject was worth pursuing, he learned to bide his time. Though it has taken him a full quarter century to piece together a narrative that satisfies his own criteria for understanding the man, the biography he has produced is a tour de force of persistence, resourcefulness, and painstaking detective work. Jones’ fascination with Kinsey benefits us all. While this book will not necessarily alter all of the general assumptions we have hitherto fashioned about Kinsey, its extraordinarily detailed and rich portrait will change our understanding of his life and times forever. Few biographies I know of mesh the public and private with such sensitivity and skill.

Jones exposes Kinsey as a man who was anything but a disinterested scientist. The figure he came to know, he makes clear in the introduction, “bore no resemblance to the canonical Kinsey” (vii). Indeed, it was the private Kinsey, plagued by a passionate need to understand his own sexuality and forever attempting to heal himself, that gave birth to the public persona.

Reared in a sexually repressive Victorian family, with a father who was a cruel and
domineering Victorian patriarch, Kinsey’s powerful responses to his home life produced many of the personality traits widely known to be characteristic of the adult man. Kinsey could not bring himself to defy his father until he was twenty years old. Instead, he shrouded his parenally inspired insecurities in overachievement and perfectionism. His entire adolescence was performance-driven. This obsession with achievement and excellence persisted throughout his life and profoundly influenced the research scientist.

Moreover, a misdiagnosed heart condition thought to be the result of rheumatic fever guaranteed that Kinsey’s childhood and adolescence would be a perpetual struggle in another direction as well—to craft a socially acceptable form of masculinity. Following the doctor’s orders, Kinsey’s parents barred him from the conventional athletic activities common to boy culture in the first decade of the twentieth century. As an alternative, Kinsey turned to nature study, hiking, mountain climbing, and scouting. In the Boy Scouts, Kinsey fashioned a muscular Christianity that hardened his body and honed his knowledge of the outdoors. By the time he reached high school he was taking school athletes on grueling camping expeditions that enabled him to prove his mettle. His habit of drawing adversaries onto his own turf in order to best them was a characteristic Kinsey carried into adulthood.

Kinsey grappled with his masculinity in other ways as well. The fanatic and hypocritical religiosity of his parents, coupled with the small town and moralistic atmosphere of South Orange, New Jersey, where he grew up, contributed to a severely troubled adolescent sexual adjustment. Socially isolated by his sickly childhood and guilt-ridden by normal sexual impulses, Kinsey battled mightily powerful homoerotic and sado-masochistic tendencies. By late adolescence he was practicing a form of masturbation—inserting painful objects up his penis—that produced both pleasure and the self-deprecating physical abuse that his guilty conscience craved. His aggressive masturbatory habits plagued him throughout his life, accelerating in the years before he died. At one point Kinsey circumcised himself in his bathroom with a pen knife; on another occasion he gave himself a pelvic infection after vigorously compressing his testicles with a rope.

Jones’ account of Kinsey’s difficult boyhood achieves an intricate balance between public and private narrative that never threatens to become gratuitous. Though readers sense early that the journey of revelation has just begun, Jones argues convincingly that many of Kinsey’s boyhood problems were exaggerated forms of difficulties shared by the majority of Americans living in a country in which important parts of the population were attempting to free themselves from a cultural and religious heritage of sexual repression. His portrait of Kinsey’s early life is richly detailed and skillfully linked to the larger social context. In vividly portraying the sources of both Kinsey’s typicality and uniqueness, it represents one of the most fascinating and significant sections of the book.

There is plenty of material in this biography to shock and titillate those so inclined. Though by early adulthood Kinsey was well aware of his homoerotic fantasies, they did not deter him from craving a stable family life. He needed almost desperately to see himself as a mature and responsible male. He was fortunate in finding a woman who was strong enough to deal successfully with his complexity. Clara Kinsey managed to love her husband and tolerate his idiosyncrasies without totally surrendering herself in the process. Though only a subtheme in this massive volume, the story of this relationship is poignant as well as revealing. Moreover, the loyalty and devotion of his wife was crucial in helping Kinsey present to the world a public image infused with the imprimatur of scientific impartiality enhanced by the stylistic conventionality of a happy family.

Though Kinsey’s sexual self-exploration progressed gradually and in tandem with his growing interest in sex research, Jones shows us a man whose transformation from sex re-
former to sexual rebel was complete by the end of the 1930s. Early in his married life, Kinsey indulged his exhibitionist tendencies by tending his prize-winning garden wearing only a G-string. While the scientist and professor perfected his techniques in taking the sexual histories of students in the marriage course, the private man used such encounters to satisfy his powerful voyeuristic impulses. Exploring his homosexuality began with relationships with several graduate students that became lifelong intimacies. Research trips to homosexual communities in Chicago and elsewhere provided opportunities for further such sexual contacts. His assembled staff, including Clyde Martin, Wardell Pomeroy, and Paul Gebhard, participated willingly in creating what Jones has termed a “sexual utopia, a scientific subculture whose members would not be bound by arbitrary and antiquated sexual taboos. What he envisioned was in every sense a clandestine scientific experiment, if not a furtive attempt at social engineering: unfettered sex would be the order of the day” (603). Indeed, Kinsey began to take pride in his eccentricity, and in the belief that he knew more about sexual behavior than any other living soul. He indulged in and sponsored wife swapping, exhibitionism, voyeurism, cruising, group sex, the filming of a wide variety of sexual activity, and homosexual and sadomasochistic encounters—all with the permission and participation of his wife and his staff. Much of the activity took place in the Kinseys’ upstairs attic, with Clara a willing participant, and, in the words of one friend, “a true scientist to the end” (613). Moreover, when the evening’s activity was over, she often reappeared at the door with milk and cookies for all.

Indeed it was Kinsey’s own singular imagination coupled with his increasingly obsessive sexual need that catalyzed the breadth, scope, and thoroughness of his research. However disturbing this realization, it seems that the enlightenment and tolerance opened up by Kinsey’s ground-breaking scientific work in this case came at the price of the troubled private experimentation that drove him to it. Moreover, the man in Jones’ account was at times aggressive and manipulative. He clearly violated the boundaries of student-teacher relationships, wielding his professional authority and pressuring students into compliance. He displayed none of our contemporary sensitivity to the abuse of unequal power relationships. On the other hand, Kinsey seems to have been a loving, if domineering, husband, an enlightened father, a loyal friend, a compassionate teacher, and a man capable of the most extraordinary generosity and empathy, especially with those whose lives were blighted by sexual ignorance and repression. To these individuals he gave his time, his friendship, his support, and his scientific expertise. Nor did he doubt for one moment that his work was on humanity’s behalf.

Twenty years ago, in an article assessing the impact of the Kinsey Report, I made the point that, although a sexual rebel, Kinsey was no social revolutionary. Jones’ volume has strengthened my conviction that one interesting aspect of Kinsey’s quintessential American-ness is the fact that his sexual rebellion never linked him to the cause of social and political change. If he had been a European, he might have found a place on the political left, much like his counterparts Havelock Ellis, Magnus Hirschfeld, and Wilhelm Reich. But Kinsey never questioned capitalism or the class structure. He believed immigrants must adapt to the Protestant ethic of hard work if they expect to get ahead, and he eventually supported immigration restriction. He passed through two world wars almost oblivious of their political and social implications. Though he pleaded for tolerance and saw civilization as the enemy of sex, he refused to hire a staff member who had supported labor unions and civil rights for blacks. His reasoning was practical: sex research was controversial enough. The irony is that in some ways Kinsey fell victim to his own insularity. In those frenzied years of post-1945 political backlash, when he unsuccessfully defended himself against the Rockefeller Foun-
When does the troubled mind give us an insight into a troubled world or a culture in decline? What does a paranoid’s confusing ramblings tell us about ourselves? These questions have been part of psychoanalytic history from the very outset. Not only Freud, but his followers, the neo-Freudians, the Frankfurt School, and a host of current psychodynamically-oriented theorists, including many feminists and postmodernists, have all bent their efforts to understanding the profound embeddedness of psychic life in culture. This is of more than passing interest to historians of the social sciences, because at the outset of the twentieth century we find in the case of Daniel Schreber, the analysis of which is still contested, a touchstone for accounting for madness and the place of madness in culture. Not only Freud (“one cannot read Schreber except in some sort of dialogue with Freud” argues Santner, p. 17) but a host of other commentators have made Schreber an important figure in the history of madness and psychoanalysis.

What made Schreber’s case so appealing for analysts was its public nature. In 1903, he published the memoirs of his madness, symptoms of which appeared shortly after he was nominated to the position of presiding judge of the Saxon Supreme Court. These memoirs, written between 1897 and 1900, vividly describe Schreber’s condition and the trajectory of his illness. In addition to being an important member of the German middle classes himself, Schreber’s father was the well-known physician, Moritz Schreber, who wrote numerous publications on health, child rearing, and orthopedics, and who is still remembered because of the small garden plots outside German cities, the Schreber gardens, that are named after him. More recent historical material on the elder Schreber was unearthed by William Niederland in the 1950s and has become part of the psychoanalytic literature on the Schreber case. Perhaps most crucial for the continuing legacy of Schreber’s madness is the thesis introduced by Elias Canetti in 1960 that Schreber’s paranoia can be understood as the precursor to National Socialism and, more generally, as prototypical of the paranoia that would characterize totalitarian leadership.

It is the latter thesis, in particular, that Santner expands, elaborates, and ultimately revises
in this volume. For it is Santner’s view that the “crisis of modernity” that led to Schreber’s breakdown is the very same crisis that culminated in the horrible fantasies of Nazism. In contrast to many earlier commentators, however, Santner argues that Schreber manages to avoid the totalitarian temptation precisely through his identification with the feminine and the figure of the Wandering Jew. Thus, Schreber’s crisis is a crisis of authority and hence modernity in which the rites of investiture have lost their symbolic power and collapse inward to produce paranoia. His “perversions” provide insights into the symbolic resources of not just one society’s legitimation crisis, but ultimately, argues Santner, the crisis of the European Enlightenment caused by “the negative space hollowed out by the will to autonomy and self-reflexivity” (p. 145).

Santner’s thesis is daring and bold, and the narrative has an analytic charm, complex yet gripping nonetheless. Whether he eventually succeeds in making his case depends on how willing one is to wager that his post-structuralist variations on analytic themes hold up. Nevertheless, Santner’s revisionism will surely fascinate a new generation of cultural analysts in the case of Daniel Schreber, and it is destined to become a staple of the Schreber literature.

Reviewed by Hendrikus J. Stam, professor of psychology at the University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada.


Children, Race, and Power chronicles the history of the Northside Center for Child Development in Harlem from the 1940s to the 1980s. The book also claims to be an intellectual biography of its co-founders, Kenneth Bancroft Clark and Mamie Phipps Clark, the first African-Americans to earn psychology Ph.D.’s from Columbia University. Attuned to Harlem and New York City politics, the authors use the clinic as “a lens through which to view the history . . . of black-white relations, the War on Poverty, and academic disputes on ‘the culture of poverty’ and the I.Q. controversies” (xx).

The book begins with a useful chapter covering the pre-World War II history of child services in New York. The next chapter documents the center’s origins and provides biographical information on the Clarks. Readers learn how their experiences at predominately black Howard University propelled them into intellectual activist careers. As a psychology graduate student at Howard in 1939, Mamie Clark conducted experiments to assess self-identification in black children. Her conclusions provided the basis for the theory that racism contributed to problems of self-esteem among black children, a concept that helped persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to outlaw public school segregation in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision.

After Howard and Columbia, the Clarks opened the Northside Center in 1946. The first
mental health clinic for African-Americans in Harlem, it also recruited white patients, staff, and board members. Northside provided holistic services that addressed children’s needs. For instance, reading specialists were employed to deal with the lack of literacy among Harlem’s children. As a result, Northside had a policy of openness that incorporated teachers, social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists within a democratic framework where no one perspective or discipline held sway over another.

The center’s eclectic philosophy later clashed with efforts by psychologists and their allies on Northside’s board to control the institution. Here lies the book’s most important contributions. First, the debates among staff and board members revolved around arguments between mental health professionals over how best to serve the needs of African-American children. The Clarks disagreed with the psychiatric and psychoanalytic reliance upon individually centered treatment that ignored social factors. They argued that the whole environment (family, neighborhood, and school) must be considered in any treatment program for children. Towards that end, the Clarks encouraged community initiative and organization that sought to improve housing, education, and social services.

Second, the laudable goal of an integrated facility ironically led to tensions between white liberals, Jews, and African-Americans. Before 1960, Jewish philanthropists provided the majority of the funds for Northside. As the civil rights movement began to heat up, black staff and board members resented upper-class Jewish control. By 1968, the school decentralization campaign in New York pitted the Jewish-dominated teachers’ union against Northside. Similarly, community control advocates were angered by the failure of white liberals to put desegregation into practice. The Clarks bitterly watched as thousands of white children fled urban public schools for either private or suburban schools, resulting in even worse segregation than before the Brown decision.

Children, Race, and Power is a well-written, insightful, and extensively researched book. It does leave several questions partly unaddressed. First, what were the motives of Jews and white liberals who joined the Northside project? While the authors rightfully attribute their joining to genuine concerns for child welfare and racial justice, they do not consider the effect of Cold War politics. Many influential whites supported racial reforms because of the necessity for countering Soviet and Communist charges. If in fact some white board members were affected by anti-Communist ideology, how did this influence the operation of the clinic?

Second, the authors accurately portray the sometimes adversarial relationships among African-Americans, Jews, whites, and Puerto Ricans over Northside’s mission, yet no mention is made of the role played by Caribbean immigrants. How did Jamaican migrants respond to the Clarks’ ideas regarding self-esteem among black children?

Finally, how did the class and ethnic backgrounds of the Clarks affect the choices they made? For instance, both were children of Caribbean immigrants. Mamie Clark (unlike her husband) grew up in Arkansas, where she witnessed firsthand the tragic effects of Southern segregation. As the Clarks became middle-class professionals, how was their understanding of race, childhood, education, and urban issues shaped by their training and privileged position? Only a full-scale biography of the Clarks can answer this question. Nonetheless, this superb book will interest historians, educators, mental health professionals, social scientists, and community activists who are interested in race relations, the civil rights movement, poverty issues, and the urban crisis.

Reviewed by Damon Freeman, graduate student, department of history, Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405.

Heath Pearson has written a concise book designed both to serve as a “pre-history to the ‘new institutional economics’ of the late-twentieth century” and to highlight the centrality of law in nineteenth-century “historical” economics (vii). Origins of Law and Economics provides a first-class pedigree that will be of use to practitioners of the new institutional economics who want to broaden and enrich contemporary debate. Historians of economics, or indeed readers with different agendas, will find its sparse exposition less satisfying.

The defining feature of the new institutional economics is, perhaps, the decision to treat institutions as endogenous to the social system. Neoclassical economic reasoning is content to treat the political and institutional framework, along with tastes and technology, as constraints that limit economic behavior, but that are, analytically, outside the province of economics. Private property of a particular kind, for example, may exist; as economists we have nothing to say about how or why it emerged in the form it did. New institutional economists, by contrast, use economists’ tools, such as the ideas of methodological individualism and rational choice, to determine why and how particular forms of property ownership or contract law emerge in particular societies at particular times. As such, new institutional economics is a research program within economics. It is not a cross-disciplinary study.

Pearson’s intent is to determine the roots of this discourse in nineteenth-century European historical and early-twentieth century American institutional discourse. The greatest merit of his study is the wealth of material that he has uncovered from the German historical school, a natural focus since the economic approach to law was pervasive in German universities where the two disciplines have long been associated in the study of Staatswissenschaft or the “science of state.” Many of these writers, and Pearson has established quite a catalogue, are largely forgotten or appear only peripherally in histories of the discipline, as foils with whom more central actors engaged in debate. This generosity of citation does not extend to the secondary literature; key texts such as Malcolm Rutherford’s do not appear [1].

The chief weakness of Pearson’s book is a variant on the standard criticism that he did not write a different book. If one looks in the index for a particular topic (and there are few such entries in an index that is almost entirely made up of names), “slavery” is an obvious selection. Pearson’s period is 1830 to 1930, and slaves were emancipated throughout the British Empire in 1834 amidst a great deal of parliamentary and popular debate that centered on one of Pearson’s key ideas: the nature and legitimacy of property ownership. Under “slavery,” I am directed to “see hierarchy.” Under “hierarchy,” I am directed to pages 60 to 70, where the discussion begins with the claim that:

The economic approach to rules was extended to cover also that large class of institutions which predicate the subjection of one person to the will of another: archetypically in chattel slavery and in serfdom, but also in patriarchy, in producer cooperatives, and in the capitalist firm. Instead of surveying each of these institutions separately — after all, the point of generalizing science is to reduce specific cases to their common denominators — let us consider the general economic considerations that informed their articulation (60–61).
I would have thought that the differences between patriarchy, producer cooperatives, capitalist firms, and chattel slavery, not to mention the differences between the various compensation schemes proposed for slave owners affected by emancipation both within the Empire, and between British, French, Dutch, and American regimes, worthy of mention. There is nothing inherently wrong with emphasizing similarities, but the “analytical blade of economic choice” (61) is, indeed, a dull one. I could multiply these citations to make the argument more compelling, but I think most historians (including Pearson) would agree that the kind of history that makes a compelling “pre-history” to contemporary debate, as this one does very effectively, leaves cold those historians with a taste for context.

This is a carefully structured, well-researched book that will find a role in contemporary debate. Because that is its author’s intent, it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was designed.

REFERENCE


Reviewed by EVELYN L. FORGET, associate professor of economics, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg MB, Canada.

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*Men, Religion, and Melancholia* probes the lives and works of four leading figures in the psychology of religion: William James (*Varieties of Religious Experience*), Rudolf Otto (*The Idea of the Holy*), Carl Jung (*Answer to Job*), and Erik Erikson (*Young Man Luther*). Donald Capps, who teaches pastoral theology and counseling at Princeton Theological Seminary, has written a book of psychology, *per se*, not a history of psychology. More precisely, this work is a series of psychodynamic case studies of psychologists of religion. Capps has a twofold burden. First, he seeks to demonstrate that each of his four subjects (as well as Martin Luther, in the chapter on Erikson) engaged in a lifelong struggle with melancholia and that in each case the little boy’s loss of his mother’s unconditional love aroused profound feelings of sadness, despair, and rage. Second, Capps contends that this melancholic tendency caused each man’s interest in religion: “Religion serves as a stand-in for the mother” (3), attempting to replace the idealized love lost in childhood. Capps thus reads a significantly autobiographical dimension in the seminal works in psychology of religion. Capps’ social science expressed and compensated for their psychological deficits. Capps is willing to add himself to the list: “the topic of melancholy has for me a personal subtext” (xiii).

Capps does hard digging into the lives and writings of his subjects. For example, he persuasively argues that several anonymous case studies cited by William James are in fact disguised autobiographical material. But this is not a book dominated by historical interests.
As in Erikson’s *Young Man Luther*, psychological theory lays a heavy hand on the available facts. Capps is aware that at crucial points he describes scenarios that are “merely imaginative recreations of what may have occurred” (99). Sigmund Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” and “The Uncanny” provide the omnipresent framework of both explanation and re-creation.

It often seems that Capps’s conclusions simply restate psychodynamic assumptions; the argument leading to those conclusions contains a tenuous train of supposition, speculation, and free association. The thesis of the book stands or falls with the validity of psychodynamic theory as the explanation for melancholy and for male interest in both religion and psychology of religion.

It so happened that I read Augustine’s *The Confessions*—psychology of religion’s mother-lode, along with the Psalms—while reading *Men, Religion, and Melancholia*. The two religious psychologies could not differ more radically. Capps gives no hint of any “Him Who Is” whose love found Augustine, delighting his soul. Instead we hear of “the mother whose love was lost,” crippling the soul with despair and hate. And where Augustine speaks of his mother as a signpost to the living God formerly abandoned by the depraved little boy, Capps speaks of religious interest as a signpost to the depraved mother who formerly abandoned the little boy. For those suffering the melancholic condition, Augustine’s would appear to be the more salutary psychology.

Reviewed by David Powlison, who teaches pastoral counseling at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia and edits the *Journal of Biblical Counseling.*