Chinese and Greek Rhetorical Theory: Linguistic and Rhetorical Foundations of Modern Communication

Herbert Hildebrandt
University of Michigan Business School

Zhu Yunxia
UNITEC Institute of Technology

Working Paper 02-019
CHINESE AND GREEK RHETORICAL THEORY: LINGUISTIC AND RHETORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMMUNICATION

Herbert Hildebrandt
The University of Michigan Business School
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Zhu Yunxia
UNITEC Institute of Technology
Auckland, New Zealand

Rhetoric today is often used as a pejorative term; it was not always so. Indeed, its ancient lineage positioned it as one of the cores of the ancient Trivium,1 rhetoric, grammar, and dialectic, continuing its educational momentum in the Middle Ages as part of the Quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. And only recently is its ascendency and acceptance as a neo-legitimate academic study finding expression in articles, departments of rhetoric, and in scholarly papers at professional associations. Contrarily, analyses of Chinese concepts of rhetoric are newly being mined; translation impediments holding back its academic analysis except for a few Chinese-language-proficient scholars. While the drive for courses devoted to rhetorical history has fallen over the years, some of that substance has migrated to philosophy, English, comparative literature, history, and even theological domains. Rhetoric seems to have left an academic footprint in different cultures and disciplines, not easily erased.

Bibliographic citations suggest thousands of statements—primarily in English, German, and French—have been written as to rhetoric’s origins, contributions to and involvement in theories of communication since its inception to modern days. Thus it is not our purpose to rehearse rhetoric’s long and intertwined history, rather to focus on three inclusions: rhetorical categories as seminally discussed in selected ancient Greek and Roman theoreticians; rhetoric as understood in selected Chinese works; and reflections of both schools of thought as seen in selected management and business communication texts. Overlapping of those three structural divisions will occur as appear expedient to the authors.
GREEK AND ROMAN PERCEPTIONS OF RHETORIC

Minimal disagreement exists as to the appearance and usage of the term rhetoric, its seminal usage attributed to Plato’s *Gorgias*. (Schippa, 1990, 1992; Martin, 1974; Cary, et al., 1949; Kroll, 1940; Pilz, 1934.) But the definition widely accepted is that of the student of Plato and wholly Aristotelian: “So let Rhetoric be defined as the faculty [power] of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion.” (Aristotle, 1932, 1.2.1355). Conversely—and we shall not dwell on this debate—Plato in his *Gorgias* (1952, 464b1) equates the art of rhetoric with that of cookery, a form of flattery lacking in knowledge. One had simply to learn the techniques and the argument would be won with minimal effort given to content. Regardless, so pervasive was the imprint of rhetoric, or training therein, that to neglect the skill in the ancient world was to risk failure in either the courts of law or the assembly.

Thus there was an undergirding philosophy, a series of rhetorical principles, a mega-rhetoric that has some reflections today. But before we reach modernity, we must briefly review some of the ancient underpinnings of rhetoric, review Chinese principles of rhetoric, then turn to those rhetorical reflections presence today under the rubric of business or managerial communication.

**Basic Canons of Greek and Roman Rhetoric**

Orality, what academicians today call public address or speech, was the centrality of Greek and Roman rhetoric. And only subsequently, but decisively, were those rhetorical principles embedded in the literary or written genre. Five standard categories, or canons, make up the pentad: *inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio* or *pronuntiatio*.

**Inventio**

On a simplistic level, *inventio* (Invention) means discovery, searching out the raw material a speaker uses to persuade an audience. "In rhetoric it designates the discovery of the resources for discursive persuasion latent in any given rhetorical problem." (Heath, 1997, 89). Thus the communicator had to search out evidence/data which when included in a communicative act could be used as support for the core proposition. Here we turn primarily to Aristotle.

Central to his discussion is what he calls artificial/artistic and inartificial/inartistic proofs. (Aristotle, 1932, 1.1.1354). The former is defined as using those forms of proof that the speaker creates. That is, the speaker can turn to *ethos, pathos, or logos*. 
1. Artistic Proofs

_Ethos_

No one has satisfactorily defined _ethos_ to all scholars and practitioners. Fundamentally, it can mean the believability of the speaker, the credibility which the speaker brings to the speech situation. Aristotle's concept is still worthy of attention (Aristotle, 1932, 1.2.1356):

"The character [ethos] of the speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him worthy of belief; for a rule we trust men of probity more, and more quickly, about things in general, while on points outside the realm of exact knowledge, where opinion is divided, we trust them absolutely."

Significant to note is that in ancient Greece an individual had to plead his own case (unless given judicial approval for another to present the case) before the bar, but could hire someone to do so before the assembly. Thus the speaker had to create his own credibility; he had to maintain a moral linkage between himself and his content. It is not difficult, therefore, to see the variable influence itinerant sophists had on their students, seeking to imbue in them those qualities the sophist's considered supportive of a moral _ethos_. Such variability and argument based on probability receives the scorn of Plato's mouthpiece, Socrates, in the _Gorgias_. (Plato, 1952). In brief, any speaker who used appearances in place of truth—as envisioned by Plato, especially in the _Republic_—was promoting a pseudo-art, a cook-book rhetoric.

A more detailed analysis of _ethos_ is found in the Roman Quintilian (1953, 6.2.12-20) who builds on one of his fundamental concepts: "the speaker is a man of good character and courtesy speaking well.” Later we shall see that modern texts give only a perfunctory nod to this quality, usually enrobed in a chapter on ethics.

_Pathos_

Again oversimplified, _pathos_ as an artistic proof focuses on using the emotions as a supplement to a speaker’s other means of persuasion. Aristotle’s list of emotions is long, recommending co-joining them with ethical appeals. Much of his Book 2 (1932, 2.2-2.12) focuses on “…anger and mildness, friendship and hatred, fear and boldness, shame and shamelessness, kindness and unkindness, pity, indignation, and envy, emulation and contempt, will furnish the speaker with means of persuasion subsidiary to logical arguments.” In essence Aristotle was really ahead of his day: focusing on audience analysis, the psychology of what persuades listeners to accept a point of view.
This emphasis on emotion as a legitimate supplement to a speaker’s persuasion is expanded upon in Roman writers: Cicero’s *De oratore* (1958, 2.27.114-115); Cicero’s *Orator* (1952, 5.20), while emphasizing style, suggests that emotions may be joined with the more elaborate style; the author of the *Ad herennium* (1954, 1.5.8 and 2.30.48-2.31.50); Quintilian (1953, 6.1.46) suggests the position of emotion in the introduction and conclusion; while later Quintilian (6.2.ff.) expands ideas similar to those noted above.

Stated in another way, this second part of the artistic process was simply searching out content exterior to the speaker, “creating” those examples which hopefully would arouse emotional feelings in the message receiver. Often those emotions, as recommended by the ancients, were foremost to be in the exordium and peroration. Whether these recommendations occur in modern business communication texts or in Chinese rhetorics remains to be seen.

*Logos*

*Logos* is a mutated, long-historied term, argued over, written about, and debated since its metaphysical accompaniment to Greek philosophy. A form of its original meaning occurs in philosophy, metaphysics, rhetoric, and even religion. Clearly, our intentionally brief focus is upon its usage in concepts of ancient rhetoric.

For our purposes *logos* is plainly this: the logical, rational, evidential underpinning of a speaker’s argument, which Aristotle (1932, 1.1.1354-1.1.1354) felt was underdeveloped. While the two preceding artistic supports seemingly appear more peripheral, it is the logical and reasonable substance that should be part of a communicator’s presentation. *Logos* involved determining the status of a case (Aristotle, 1.2; Cicero, *Orator* 1952, 15., *De oratore* 1958, 2.34.26; Quintilian, 1953, 3.6.80; *Ad herennium*, 1954, 1.11.13); searching out the locations (*Topoi*) of proofs (Aristotle, 1.2.358); ascertaining the facts (Quintilian, 1953, 2.31.14-15; Cicero, *De oratore*, 2.34.99-101); testing the evidence as well as constructing arguments via the enthymeme (Aristotle, 2.20, 2.22., a form of reasoning beginning with probably premises); additional testing of evidence and constructing probable arguments via the syllogism (Aristotle, 3.); the example as a dominant form of evidence (Aristotle, 1.2, 2.20) and philosophic discussions of probability and scientific certainty (Aristotle, 1.2,) in conjunction with inductive and deductive idea movement.

A caution must be inserted. As with *ethos,* and *pathos,* the two preceding artificial-proof sections of *inventio,* one must keep in mind that all discussions of the original author are at least—to use a Platonic metaphor—several removes from truth: (1) the original idea was delivered in open-air lectures given by Plato, Aristotle and others, (2) those remarks were recorded in students’ notebooks, (3) those notes were then restated in some kind of written form, and (4) ultimately a translation of those writings occurred from Greek or Latin to English or whatever. One sees a high risk of severe mutations from the original intent through several layers of metaphysical and linguistic hurdles. Additionally, the many scholarly articles suggest a semantic conflict based on differences of interpretation.
2. Inartistic Proofs

Our preceding discussion was limited to those forms of evidence produced via the speaker’s own creativity. Conversely, inartistic proofs are outside of the speaker, according to Aristotle (1932, 1.15) more applicable to forensic speaking. Lawyers today—and in the ancient world—would call this form of proof “direct evidence.” Basically there are five categories of inartistic proof in the ancient world: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, oaths. A sufficient summary of these groups is that this kind of evidence was usually obtained beforehand, the speaker then weaving them into his argument in the court of law.

Dispositio

Arrangement of the substance gathered under the rubric of inventio is dispositio; a structure has to be imposed on the collected material. For Aristotle (1932, 3.13) such partitioning could be a duo: “A speech has two parts. Necessarily, you state your case and you prove it.” Perhaps on later reflection he extended that to include but not exceed four divisions: proem, statement, argument, and epilogue. (Aristotle, 3.13.1414). While those shorter subdivisions—some would say impatient statements—may be oversimplified, the Ad herennium (1954, 1.3.4) set the direction for the ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance rhetorical world.

- Introduction or exordium, the beginning wherein the speaker desires to capture the attention of the audience
- Statement of facts or narratio, setting out of the facts or events that have occurred or might have occurred.
- Forecast or divisio, a layout of main points the speaker desires to make.
- Proof or confirmatio, presentation of arguments in support of one’s position, with corroboratory evidence.
- Refutation/rebuttal or confutatio, an attempt to destroy the opponent’s arguments.
- Conclusion or conclusio or peroratio, the end of the discourse. “formed in accordance with the principles of the art.

These six subdivisions—and numerous amendments and disorderly variations in other writers are traced elsewhere, (Lausberg, 1984; Martin, 1974; Murphy, 1984; Porter 1997, 51-88)) including whether the topic was more appropriate under inventio than dispositio—laid down some of the conventionally divided parts of a speech. Cicero in the De partitio oratoria (1942, 1.4; 2.33-51) suggests four parts, implies five parts in the De oratore (1958, 2.76.307), and six in the De inventione (1949, 1.9); Quintilian (1953, 4.Pr.6) devotes most of his Book 7 to arrangement, but suggests that four parts are basic to forensic cases, exordium, narratio, proofs, and peroration. Prior to the above divisions of arranging material was Plato’s central theme espoused via his mouthpiece Socrates in the Gorgias: “…every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with
a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.” (Plato, 1952, 264). This tripartite architecture for a presentation is known as organic unity, reflections of which are still evident today.

Elocutio

This third part of the ancient rhetorical pentad focused on style, the clothing of ideas—located via inventio and the arranging of those ideas via dispositio—with suitable language. When compared with the preceding two canons, style received a major emphasis in the ancient world, then continued to gather momentum as theories and exercises and books and teachers mutated simplicity into complexity, perhaps reaching a crescendo in the Renaissance. Far be it for us to trace those convoluted changes, some German scholars looked at the broad picture as well as more micro divisions. (Lausberg, 1984; Volkmann, 1885; Martin, 1974; Norden, 1909; Kennedy, 1963, 1980; Hildebrandt, 1958, 1988).

Suffice it to say that being clear, correct, appropriate, and ornate is the foundation of classical stylistic theory, also know as the virtues of style.

Clarity via Aristotle (1932, 3.2, 5.) was attained in part through familiar words, metaphors based on familiar comparisons, specific rather than general words, and avoidance of ambiguity. Quintilian (1953, 8.2.22ff.) called clarity the first essential of a good style, echoing some of Aristotle’s precepts.

Correctness, and laying aside the issue of whether it should be discussed by the grammarian rather than the rhetorician, parallels somewhat our focus of today: avoiding faults in using single words and avoiding faults in grammatical agreement. (Quintilian, 1953, 1.4-8).

 Appropriateness is adapting the style to the speaker, the subject, and the audience: “Your language will be appropriate, if it expresses (1) emotion and (2) character, and if it is (3) in proportion with the subject.” (Aristotle, 1932, 3.7). For our purposes Cicero (De oratore, 1958, 3.55.210) and Quintilian (1953, 8. and 9) are in agreement.

Ornateness is the polish, the ornamentation of words and sentences applied to content. Thus sentence structure and the innumerable subdivisions of words within those sentences consumed inordinate space within ancient texts and the time of instructors and students. Allied to the immoderate subdivisions was an additional principle: style could be tripartite: plain, medium, and grand, each with criteria appropriate to the speech occasion.

Memoria and actio

We combine these two final canons of ancient rhetoric: they receive the least emphasis in ancient rhetorical texts.
Memoria

The fourth part of rhetoric is memory, the retention of content after collecting and arranging the material. Most ancient texts give brief treatment to the topic, with the *Ad herennium* setting the basic direction: “The natural memory is that memory which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously with thought. The artificial memory is that memory which is strengthened by a kind of training and system of discipline.” (1954, 3.16.28). We need not discuss the intricacies of identifying words or topics with physical objects; suffice it to say that subsequent ancients (Cicero, *De oratore*, 1958, 2.86.350; Quintilian, 1953, 3.2), are in agreement. Aristotle only gives *memoria* a brief nod.

Actio/Pronuntiatio

In the ancient world oral delivery receives more emphasis than memory, usually divided into use of the voice, choice of words as in Aristotle, and the nonverbal. Aristotle’s discussion is brief (1932, 3.1ff.), emphasizing volume, harmony, and rhythm; the *Ad herennium* emphasizes voice quality and physical movement (1954, 3.11.20ff.); Cicero (*De oratore*, 3.55.213) suggests that “Delivery, I assert, is the dominant factor in oratory…” as did Demosthenes as noted in Quintilian (1953, 11.3.6). Quintilian (1953, 11.3.1ff.) offers the fullest ancient-world discussion of delivery. While similar to Cicero, the discussion is more detailed, including topics as the following:

--Voice
--Voice quality
--Pitch
--Volume
--Link style (clear, correct, appropriate, and ornate) to delivery
--Pronunciation
--Inflection
--Adapt delivery to the topic
--And others

--Gesture
--Voice quantity
--Rate
--Practice passages
--Pauses
--Vocal variety
--Facial expression
--Eye contact

Three Genre of the Ancient Rhetorical World

A speaker therefore—as we have noted in the preceding—sought out his materials (*inventio*), arranged them (*dispositio*), clothed them with an appropriate style (*elocutio*), applied mnemonics to remembering the contents (*memoria*), and then practiced delivery (*actio/pronuntiatio*). While all the preceding activity was going on the speaker kept in mind the communicative situation. It was this communication context, this analysis of the audience and situation that determined the kind of presentation to be made. Basically, there is agreement that the genre of speeches is tripartite—epideictic, deliberative, and forensic. These terms may ring hollow today, yet they arose out of the speech situation as envisioned in the ancient world.
What must be kept in mind is the concept—noted in a thoughtful introduction to the genres of rhetoric by Kennedy (Porter, 1997, 43)—that both written and oral compositions are influenced in part by the social contexts in which the communication occurs. Hence, what we today term business or managerial communication did not exist in the Hellenic and Roman world. What did exist were similar but different social contexts, underwritten with this principle: people then had to defend themselves orally in a court of law (forensic) and could, if they wished, also speak on their behalf in governmental assemblies (deliberative). They might even speak in praise or blame of an individual or at one of the numerous classical events (epideictic). In other words, the audience analysis and occasion determined the kind of presentation.

While the preceding three genre appear pristinely separate, in rhetorical texts there was much overlapping of persuasive purposes. We shall briefly look at each of the tripartite genre. Our bias will become apparent: we feel that persuasion is central to all three categories.

**Epideictic**

Aristotle (1932, 1.3.1358), to use Cooper’s translation, suggests that epideictic involves “…panegyrical or declamatory speeches, in the nature of an exhibition or display, eulogies—in general, speeches of praise (or blame). Baldwin (1959, 15) uses the term “occasional,” while Roberts (1924, 1.3.1358) translates Aristotle’s Greek term as “oratory of display.” Subsequent classical writers offer similar discussions (Cicero, De oratore, 1958, 1.141, 2.10 2.43; Ad herennium, 1954, 1.2; Quintilian, 1953, 1.21, 2.23, 3.314-15.). Without worrying about the linguistic/translation distinctions, we suggest that the concern is primarily with the present, with praising or blaming, with more use of the grand style and stylistic ornamentation, with no overt attempt to persuade.

If there is a linkage between oral and written, epideictic would also fit under the rubric of literature: thus as an epideictic speech is aimed at spectators, so too is drama and poetry, or a funeral oration or a celebratory speech; all could also be read. (Aristotle, 1932, 3.12.1414). A preeminent example is Pericles’ Funeral Oration, still read today.

**Deliberative**

As epideictic statements are concerned with the present, the deliberative concerns future action. The intent is overt persuasion: there is a conscious effort to bring about action or changes in belief, perhaps similar to what one may call today changes in fact, value, or policy. In the ancient world a deliberative speech was given primarily in government assemblies, but also elsewhere. In contrast to surviving epideictic orations today, there are fewer deliberative examples. Earlier we noted that individuals themselves delivered their forensic; the deliberative could be done by someone else, or the presentation was written by a logographer for an individual. Such intermediaries would then have less of a desire to preserve a statement.
In sum, deliberative statements sought to bring about change in the auditors. Perhaps one of the clearest statements is captured in Cicero’s clear writing in the *De partitione oratoria*, (1942, 24.83) as a note to his son: “Well, the purpose in deliberating is to obtain some advantage, to which the whole procedure in giving advice and pronouncing an opinion is directed in such a manner, that the primary considerations to be kept in view by the giver of advice or for against a certain course are what action is or is not possible and what course is necessary or not necessary.” Most classical Greeks and Roman did not stray too far from that mark.

**Forensic**

Classical rhetorical textbooks give most space to discussing forensic rhetoric, those speeches given in a court of law to attack or defend; accusation or defense as based on past actions. The audience was the judge or a jury. What makes pristine classification of forensic oratory so hard is that that specie incorporates many of the ingredients and approaches used in the other two genre forms. Thus there was criticism. Aristotle, especially, (1932, 1.1.1354) felt too much effort via handbooks was given to forensic speaking, that emotions had no place in the Areopagus, that irrelevant speaking should be forbidden, that arousing mental attitudes in the judge was accessory, that judgment could be warped by listeners being aroused to anger, jealousy, or compassion. In brief, he felt that proofs (persuasion) should be foremost, with all other arts being accessory. One major question undergirded forensic speaking: whether there is justice or injustice?

Then too, many of the extant examples of forensic oratory, five of which are analyzed by Kennedy (1963, 125-152) were part fiction and part fact. A chronology might run like this: (1) an individual is to appear in court; (2) the individual meets with a logographer who listens to the facts; (3) the logographer writes the individual’s statement who then memorizes it; (4) the individual delivers the statement in the Aeropagus or another court; (5) the court renders a decision, hopefully in favor of the individual; (6) the logographer then rewrites, reedits, reforms, amends the speech and distributes it as an example of his rhetorical and logographer skill. The speech becomes a marketing tool. Readers of that day, and today, would know little of where fact leaves off and where fiction begins. An analogy would be to the U.S. *Congressional Record*, allegedly a document recording what was said in the halls of Congress. What occurs before publishing the *Record*, however, is that congressmen and women are given an opportunity to edit and review their remarks. Thus, changes are made—with a view toward improving both content and style in the remarks said previously. After-the-fact editing is as prevalent today as in the classical world. Hence, actual examples of classical forensic oratory must be read with that caveat in mind.

One other postscript. Rhetorical schools also had students practice *suasoria* and *controversiae*. These were class exercises, the former giving practice for deliberative speeches, the latter for forensic. For improvement in legal pleading students would write out their declamations, memorize them, and then present them using all the five rhetorical canons for critique as well as for public display. Fiction in these exercises was acceptable.
Basically, the sub-genre of forensic oratory follows the pattern of the five rhetorical canons: *inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio* or *pronuntiatio*. That is the thrust of Aristotle (1932, 1.10-15); Cicero (*De partitione*, 1942, 28.98-36.123); and the *Ad herennium*, (1954, Books 1 and 2). Quintilian devoted most of his *Institutes* to forensic oratory. Once the question at issue was determined, under the title of *statis*, the above five canons were applied to the issue at hand.
CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION THEORIES IN THREE CURRENT BUSINESS/MANAGERIAL COMMUNICATION TEXTS

Foremost, it is obvious that classical communication theories, concepts, and practical applications of ancient rhetorical theories will be minimal today. That assertion is discouraging inasmuch as those ancients we previously visited gave inordinate time and space to one-third of their tripartite pedagogic curriculum, namely rhetorical theory or the art of persuasion—albeit it more oral than written. Rhetoric was a major cornerstone of their philosophy. It is less today. No such emphasis appears, especially in three popular communication texts: Murphy, Hildebrandt, Thomas (1997); Locker (2000); Bovée, Thill (1998). Indeed, if one can generalize, what has radically changed is the semantic gymnastics, the excessive micro classifications of situations in which communication may be used. Such exuberance appeared in the Renaissance applicable to style, but today we have managed to sub-divide the sub-divisions.

Although our preceding discussion focused primarily on the oral, there is ample evidence that many of those same theories crossed over into written theories as well, most evident in the Medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians. Thus, we assert that persuasion, whether in the oral or written genre, still under-girds modern communication theories, to which we shall now turn. We shall give a brief overviews of major reflections as we see them in three texts, then offer conclusions.

The Canons of Rhetoric in Modern Business Communication Texts

Our three analyzed texts give only a nod toward inventio, the discovery of arguments and their location. Ethos is mentioned in Murphy, Hildebrandt, Thomas (1997, 385) more as a historical footnote while Bovée, Thill (1998, 161) link ethical behavior with improving the credibility of the communicator.

Pathos receives less than a nod. It seems that whereas the ancients considered that part of persuasion legitimate, we today consider decisions and audience acceptance of an idea to be founded more on the rigors of reason.

Logos, as the raw, logical material infusing argument whether written or oral, receives much emphasis. Clearly, the classical concepts of artistic/inartistic proofs is long gone, replaced with six kinds of “support”(Murphy, Hildebrandt, Thomas, 1997, 437); six kinds of “detail” in Bovée and Thill, (1998, 149); and six “research strategies” in Locker (2000, 380ff). Testing of that evidence is given minimal discussion. Stress is not upon theoretical evaluation of supports used in persuading an audience.

When we turn to dispositio as applicable to written persuasion—the arrangement of material—immoderate recognition is given semantically to the two major classical patterns of organization: inductive and deductive. While these consistent patterns overarch all forms of communication structure, terms as “indirect” and “direct”, “general to particular” or “particular to general” replace them. Authors appear to seek substitutes for the long-established terms, still used by philosophers and theoretical writers. What writers do today is to assert that the two major formats may be divided into
sub-categories, applicable to specific genres of communication. Thus there may be seven
organizational patterns as comparison/contrast, problem/solution, eliminating
alternatives, general-particular and particular to general, geographical or spatial,
functional, and chronological. (Locker, 2000, 412ff.). Similar micro patterns are viewed
in other works. A hasty conclusion is that we today spend excessive time attempting to
recommend patterns that fit the many audiences and occasions.

Dispositio applicable to the oral world of persuasion is closer to ancient precepts
than the written. While Plato’s concept of organic unity—beginning, middle, and end—
is vicariously present, less effort is directed at the exordium and its inclusions, rather
more on the body (discussion) and conclusion (ending, exordium). One of the closest
structural parallels is Murphy, Hildebrandt, and Thomas (1997, 387) where the PAL
structure (porch, aim, layout) matches the classical exordium of beginning, purpose, and
division of the topic.

Elocutio, or style, which inundated the ancient students, is interspersed
throughout our three modern texts. Recall the four-part divisions of the ancients (clarity,
correctness, appropriateness, and ornateness). These four have mutated into seven in
Murphy, Hildebrandt, Thomas (1997, 32ff.) completeness, conciseness, consideration,
concreteness, clarity, courtesy, and correctness. Whether seven is better than four is
debatable; whether discussion of the tone of the message is better than the ancient
four parts of style is also debatable. Whereas the ancients gave much space to style, all
three of our texts place topics as words and sentences and grammar in an appendix, as a
catch-all for the micro details not noted in the text proper.

None of the three texts discuss the levels of style: the grand, the medium, and the
plain. One could argue that those themes are incorporated throughout the texts, but that
argument fails.

Memoria (memory) and actio (delivery) receives minimal emphasis today.
Memory none; delivery a little. Murphy, Hildebrandt, Thomas (1997) give the most
stress to delivery, discussing the traditional principals of oral and non-verbal
communication applicable to the kinds of oral situations. Locker (2000) is surprisingly
quite silent while Bovée and Thill (1998) give minimal discussion. Regardless, none of
the texts today approach the detailed discussion characteristic of the ancient world, where
as one remembers Cicero (De oratore, 3.55.213) writing that “delivery, I assert, is the
dominant factor in oratory…”

Appearance of the Three Genre in Business Communication

Earlier in this paper we stated that classical rhetoric focused more on forensic
oratory than on deliberative and epideictic. All three terms vanish in modern-day texts
with reference to oral communication. Indeed, during the early 50’s when rhetoric as a
discipline co-joined firmly with oral communication, some academic classes and texts did
include reference to those three historical speech categories. A cursory survey beyond
the three texts used in our analysis shows a similar omission.
In place of the original tripartite genre is a tendency to move from a macro overview to the micro. That is, Murphy, Hildebrandt, and Thomas (1997, 408-445) suggests oral communication has two kinds of message transmission: informative at one end of the continuum and persuasion on the other, with variations in between. That division, as well as Locker (2000) and Bovée and Thill (1998) also use a similar pattern.

What we have in modern business communication texts is placing stress on the purpose of the communication rather than the forum in which the communication will occur. That conclusion is easy to understand inasmuch as the ancient world had only three primary forums for communication: the legal arena wherein one had to defend himself orally; the governmental area where leaders focused on matters of state; and ceremonial occasions celebrating historical events. Surely those genre still exist today, but now we have academic disciplines and executive education programs which as part of those programs focus on the communication situations applicable to law or governmental affairs. We know of no program or discipline which focuses solely on epideictic situations.

Surely the three genre are still with us, but hidden under today’s communication terms. While our following semantic list shows overlapping of purposes across the three genre, one can sense the movement from the three ancient genre to micro situations:

**Epideictic:** letters of sympathy; speeches on special occasions; humor in communication; holding the attention of the audience....

**Forensic:** answering questions; pro and con issues in debate; cross-examination of witnesses; persuasive sales letters; preparing proposals; use of evidence to persuade or inform; sincerity of the speaker....

**Deliberative:** addressing a member of Congress; persuasive sales letters; long formal proposals; creating a persuasive resume; law and regulations as impacting cultural variables; responding to questions....

In short, it is impossible to find a precise reflection of the three ancient genre in today’s business/managerial communication texts. A distinct diminution of dependence on the ancients is occurring, attributable we assert, to modern communication scholar’s lack of training in and dependence on classical rhetoric.

By way of chronological contrast, we analyzed an earlier and classic persuasion text published 50 years ago (Brembeck & Howell, 1952) and found innumerable references to *ethos, pathos, and logos*—both authors were steeped in the rhetorical tradition. Then too they focus on the deliberative genre via topics as “Leadership in Government” as depending on persuasion. They defined *persuasion* as “influencing conduct by appeals primarily addressed to the emotions, while *argumentation* is,
essentially, influencing people by means of fact and logic.” (Brembeck & Howell, 1952, 23). Additionally, they give more emphasis to style, even suggesting that figures of speech—and they analyze several—add to the persuasive impact. They even discuss the intricacies of the syllogism; show a dependence on Aristotelian ethos; include an example of a speech to the jury as a speech to actuate (371); and suggest that at times a memorized presentation is acceptable. But the authors are of the classical mold; authors today are more reliant on amended theories of persuasion.

CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions are limited to an analysis of the Greco-Roman theories of rhetoric and their reflection in three successful modern business/managerial communication texts. Certainly this entire area of causality of ancient influence needs additional work; our attempt is simply to lay out some preliminary thoughts.

1. Ancient rhetorical terminology has fallen by the wayside. Such an assertion is not a criticism, but reflects a turning away from Greek and Latin terms used in the ancient world and prolifically throughout the Medieval and Renaissance period. Indeed, each culture desires to use its own linguistic forms, thus the inevitability of semantic changes.

2. Accepting the preceding conclusion implies that modern texts may capture some of the underlying ancient principles, but clothe them with different language as based on advancements in sociological, psychological, and theoretical research.

3. Omitted largely, today, are discussions of the three main communication genre; in place of the traditional tripartite division (epideictic, forensic, deliberative) are the polar extremes of informative and persuasive communication, applicable to either written or oral communication. Time as a criterion affecting content still appears. Thus, letters, speeches, reports depending on past information (forensic) are still discussed as are written and oral media pertaining to the future (deliberative). All texts are silent on epideictic.

4. While ethos in its ancient context of character of the speaker is minimally discussed, the focus shifts to ethical behavior of the communicator. Psychological imprints such as ethical behavior in specific situations are exemplary rather than philosophical. Terms as logos and pathos rarely appear, their topics subsumed under evidence and logic. Emotion is given short space. Discussion of emotions is noted in relation to persuasive contexts.

5. The ancient world is oral: today texts place stress on the written as well, borrowing principles such as the gathering of material, the organizing of that material via inductive or deductive means, and the locating of evidence which adds to the persuasive nature of that written message. Direct and indirect structure, for example, are terms replacing the Aristotelian, Platonic, and Quintilian deductive and inductive.
6. Style applicable to business/managerial communication is all but dropped. Certainly the ancients were microscopic in their division of the topic, but the emphasis today appears focused on the more macro impact a specific communication may have. Examples, pages of them, outrun theoretical explanations.

7. Discussions of memory in delivery is scant. While oral and non-verbal parts of delivery are noted, they do not reach the intricate intensity of the ancient theorists.

We end with this assertion. Logic and evidence—as it was years ago—still underpin both the written and oral world of today, or so is the hope of researchers and teachers. But there is still room for an occasional nod to the ancients who practiced the other parts and skills of communication on which many of our current theories rest.
Notes

1. We shall throughout use English typography for all foreign language terms. If we feel questions may arise as to our translation of foreign language terms or phrases, we will include the original language and our translation.

2. It must be pointed out that the Murphy, Hildebrandt, Thomas (1997) text has a built-in bias for the ancient world. One of its senior authors has for years conducted his research as based on the classical world.

Original Sources


Secondary Sources


I. GREEK AND ROMAN PERCEPTIONS OF RHETORIC

A. BASIC CANONS OF GREEK AND ROMAN RHETORIC

1. **INVENTIO**

   A. ARTISTIC PROOFS

      -- *ETHOS*
      -- *PATHOS*
      -- *LOGOS*

   B. INARTISTIC PROOFS

2. **DISPOSITIO**

   A. EXORDIUM
   B. NARRATIO
   C. DIVISIO
   D. CONFIRMATIO
   E. CONFUTATIO
   F. CONCLUSIO/PERORATIO

3. **ELOCUTIO**

4. **MEMORIA AND ACTIO**

Herb Hildebrandt, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI.
Zhu Yunxia, Unitec Institute of Technology, New Zealand
B. THREE GENRE OF THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL WORLD

1. EPIDEICTIC
2. DELIBERATIVE
3. FORENSIC

II. CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION THEORIES IN THREE CURRENT BUSINESS/MANAGERIAL COMMUNICATION TEXTS

A. THE CANONS OF RHETORIC IN MODERN COMMUNICATION TEXTS

--ETHOS
--PATHOS
--LOGOS
--DISPOSITIO
--ELOCUTIO
--MEMORIA AND ACTIO

B. APPEARANCE OF THREE GENRE IN BUSINESS COMMUNICATION

--EPIDEICTIC
--FORENSIC
--DELIBERATIVE
CONCLUSIONS

1. Ancient rhetorical terminology has fallen by the wayside.

2. Modern terms have replaced ancient Greek and Latin terms.

3. Omitted largely, today, are discussions of the three main communication genre

4. While *ethos* in its ancient context of character of the speaker is minimally discussed, the focus shifts to ethical behavior of the communicator

5. The ancient world is oral: today texts place stress on the written as well

6. Style applicable to business/managerial communication is all but dropped.

7. Discussion of memory in delivery is scant.