A Review of Urban Planning in Tallinn, Estonia:
Post-Soviet Planning Initiatives in Historic and Cultural Context

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Abstract

Tallinn, Estonia features one of the best-preserved old towns in Europe. The central part of the city, which dates in part back to the 13th century, has drawn millions of tourists each year since the 1990s. In 2004, 6.7 million passengers passed through Tallinn’s ports.\(^1\) A short (80-km) ferry ride from Helsinki, Tallinn’s location – at the crossroads of east-west and north-south trading routes – has made it highly contested territory since the Crusades.

During the twentieth century, Tallinn was subject to interludes of Russian/Soviet and German rule. Since the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991, economic and political changes have been rapid. A parliamentary democracy, Estonia in 1998 earned the title of “Europe’s purest free market economy”.\(^2\) Estonia joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, and, in the words of one official, now aspires to be “just another boring Nordic country.” Estonia identifies strongly with Scandinavia because of close cultural, linguistic, and economic ties with Finland, and historical links with Sweden and Denmark.

The Finnish architect Eliel Saarinen proposed a city plan for 1913 Tallinn, which exerted a hidden influence during the 50 years of Soviet occupation. Soviet-era migrants were accommodated in housing blocks which appear austere today. Estonians, in contrast, found it difficult to find housing, which may have contributed to the rapid decline of their birth rate. Russian and Estonian districts still remain largely separated, in effect making Tallinn “one city, two towns.”\(^3\) With a population of 430,000, the city continues to confront the problem of integrating its Russian population, along with challenges of intense tourism, privatization of property, increased demands for housing, and the restructuring of open-space planning.

Rapid economic and cultural changes have shaped planning priorities and progress in Tallinn, and have left the city with a physical imprint of its history – and likely future.

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\(^1\) Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
\(^2\) Financial Times
\(^3\) Personal communication, Landscape Architecture Professor Madis Philak
Figure 1: Estonia’s closest neighbors are Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia. Tallinn is marked in red.

Figure 2: Tallinn’s latitude is approximately equivalent to Stockholm. Isotherms show lines of constant temperature in Europe. Most cities fall where the average January temperature is between 0 and -5°C.
Figures 3a-b
Tallinn is located in Harjuu County in northern Estonia (above), 80 km from Helsinki. Tallinn is divided into eight districts (below).

Front Cover Image
View of Tallinn from across the bay at the Vabaõhumuuseum (Open Air Museum), which features traditional Estonian architecture.

Watercolor painting by Vaike Haas
Introduction

Very little has been written about Tallinn’s city planning in English. Even the city’s masterplan documents from 2000-2005 are only available in Estonian. In order to acquaint English-speakers with a sense of the range of issues that Tallinn’s planners have to tackle, this paper will:

- find marks on the city from almost seven centuries of occupation,
- compare today’s progress toward multiculturalism with historic ethnic relations,
- identify the major problems and progress in post-Soviet planning, and
- suggest ways to promote integration through urban planning and design.

Methods

I collected material from sources not readily accessible to English-speakers, in addition to reviewing the literature (in both Estonian and English). I interviewed several city experts and officials, including: the Mayor, the Head of the City Planning Office, the City Landscape Architect, and the former Minister of the Environment. Finally, I photographed historic maps and other
materials with the permission of Tallinn’s Linna Arhiiv (City Archives).

Historic Approach

Estonian culture is a crossroads of East meets West meets Scandinavia, and Tallinn’s struggles to achieve ethnic integration today reflect a long history of multiculturalism and colonization. This analysis begins with a sampling of Tallinn’s significant historic epochs in order to set the city’s urban planning into context. As urbanists Jean-Luc Pinol and Richard Roger explained,

> few contemporary concerns can be understood without reference to the historical development of towns and cities.\(^4\)

In a tiny country little-known to the outside world before 1991, taking an historic-cultural-geographical approach to assessing urban planning was especially relevant. Tallinn, like all cities, is part of a larger narrative.

Tallinn is a town that will never be finished. Legend holds that at midnight in autumn once each year, a small gray old man asks the guards at the town gate whether Tallinn is done being built. The old man wants to open the floodgates restraining the nearby Lake Ülemiste and destroy the city once it is complete; but, each year, the guards tell him construction is ongoing.

This legend has poignant relevance in the post-Soviet era, as Estonians seek to erase Soviet traces and ‘reclaim’ Tallinn’s history. According to conflict resolution specialist David Smith:

> The restoration of statehood according to the principle of legal continuity could not efface the factual legacies – political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and demographic – left behind by fifty years of sovietisation. In this sense, the use of the term ‘post-Soviet’ with regard to Estonia is not only valid, but makes the subsequent progress in domestic reform and European integration appear all the more remarkable.\(^5\)

Tallinn is a city still in the process of rising from the sea, and where lost histories continually come to

\(4\) Clark 2006: xi

\(5\) Smith 2002: xii
light. Tallinn’s layers of history and 700 years of foreign rule have left marks on the city that are all the more apparent because of the ongoing, successional emersion of land. To ground this report’s analysis of post-Soviet transitions and ethnic relations, I first present Tallinn in its historic context of occupation and conflict.

Context and Location

Estonia, the northernmost of three Baltic nations [see Figure 1], was restored to independence in 1991 after 51 years of Soviet occupation. The USSR’s unlawful annexation of the Baltic States was arranged through a clandestine clause of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. The Baltic States secured their independence through what became known as the Singing Revolution, between 1986-1991, and in the years since have experienced sweeping political and economic transformations.

The Baltic countries ‘returned to Europe’ with enthusiasm, shedding the shroud of Sovietization more efficiently and effectively than many other former Soviet Republics. Estonia has achieved the highest standard of living of any former USSR republic. While Estonia has the closest ties with Scandinavia and the most stable market economy, all three Baltic States were able to join the European Union in 2004. While a number of diverse cultures and nationalities have been variously considered “Baltic” since the 11th century, after World War I the Baltic region was more firmly defined as referring exclusively to Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.

Climate

Estonia is a small country (350 by 240 km), with an area of 45,215 km², roughly the size of Denmark. Tallinn’s latitude, at 59°26’, is roughly as far north as Oslo, Stockholm, or the Alaska Peninsula. Tallinn’s winters are slightly colder than Helsinki’s [see Figure 2]. Estonia’s climate is moderated by its proximity to the Baltic Sea. Estonia’s mainland has 1254 km of coastline.

6 Also known as Russification
7 Hackmann and Schweitzer 2002: 362
8 Raukas 1996: 7
Population

Estonia is divided into 15 counties, which are in turn divided into local government areas, or vald districts.9 As of January 2005, Estonia’s capital city Tallinn, in Harju County (see Figures 3a-b) housed 401,821 people, or almost one third of the nation’s population (1,347,000).10 There are around one million ethnic Estonians living in Estonia, and roughly another 100,000 Estonians living abroad (see Appendix for population data). Most of the country’s population (71.5%) is urban.11 Tallinn’s population density (in 2005) was 2,524 people per square km.9 The overall population density of Estonia was 34.9 people per square km in 1989.8

Tourism

Tallinn increasingly emphasizes its links with Helsinki, which manifest both in the form of strong and growing competition (for tourists and residents) and cooperation (investment and services).12 Located on the Baltic Sea, 80 km from Helsinki, Tallinn is a popular tourist destination, attracting 6 million visitors to its port each year.13 In Estonia, with a population of 1.32 million,14 this level of tourism is significant. Tallinn derives much of its tourist appeal from its Old Town (Vanalinn), which is one of the best-preserved medieval town centers in Europe. Old Town escaped much of the wartime bombing that affected other European towns. There are two distinct areas within Old Town: a general enclosed downtown area, and the former fortress Toompea, which is raised 20-30 meters above the city15 by a limestone outcrop (see Figures 4-7).

Environment

Estonians were among the last pagans in Europe, and a devotion to nature continues to shape city structure and urban planning in Estonia. Estonians have always been closely tied to their

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9 Peterson 1994: 6
10 Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
11 Raukas 1996: 21
12 Tallinn City Enterprise Board 2004: 9
13 Statistikaamet 2004: 133
15 Tallinn: A Medieval Pearl on the Baltic Sea 2005: 7
land and forests; in fact, nature conservation in Estonia dates back the 13th century, when sacred groves and trees were protected. Even a few hundred years ago, felling hay was still forbidden within the reach of the canopy of sacred trees. The earliest known state act regulating the conservation of natural resources in Estonia was an order to protect trees issued by the Danish monarch in 1297. Even with increased cultivation under Swedish rule in the 16th-17th centuries, when the overall amount of forest declined, oak, apple, rowan, and cherry tree species remained protected: “in some cases two trees were to be planted for each tree cut.” In fact, conservation was so culturally important that a person caught cutting trees illegally was declared an outlaw. Today, almost one half of the republic remains forested, mostly with temperate mixed forest (see Figure 8, sidebar following page).

A forested buffer of 106 meters was established along the Baltic shoreline in 1764, and in some areas was as wide as 2 km. This buffer protected the region’s topsoil. While the buffer was introduced to serve the ship-building industry, ship-builders were forbidden from cutting oak, maple, elm or pine trees for ship masts.

The Baltic’s first nature preserve was established in 1910 on the Vaika Islands in Western Saaremaa. By 1940, 17 preserves and 90 parks were protected. The 1992 constitution declared:

Everyone shall be obliged to preserve the human and natural environment and to compensate for damages caused by him or her to the environment.

By 1994, 5 reserves and 479 protected areas had been designated (see Figure 9). A respect for nature permeates Estonian culture and the contemporary urban planning process.

Although Estonia averages a mere 50 m above sea level, the northwest part of Estonia, like much of Scandinavia, has been rising at a rate of 2.5 – 3 mm per year since the last glacial

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16 Ratas 1994: 4
17 Peterson 1994: 8
18 Ratas 1994: 5
19 Quoted in Peterson 1994: 6
20 Ratas 1994: 5
21 Peterson 1994: 6
New islands are constantly emerging, and erratic rocks remain scattered across the landscape. Less than one tenth of Estonia is more than 100 m above sea level. Slight runoff and abundant precipitation (50-70 cm per year) also contribute to Estonia’s wetlands (see Figure 10). Estonia has over 1400 lakes. About one quarter of the country (22-30%) is covered by wetlands, most of which are fens with an average peat thickness of 3.2 m. Peat-lands as thick as 16.7 m and as old as 10,000 years give archeologists insightful clues to the region’s early history.

Early Estonian History and Language

Estonia was first inhabited during the glacial retreat of the Mesolithic period, and its earliest settlements, at Sindi and Kunda, date back to the 7th millennium BC. Long history of settlement has contributed to Estonians’ strong tie to their land. The predominant theory is that Estonia’s first settlers were Finno-Ugric tribes, possibly from the Ural Mountains or the Ukrainian Ice Age refuge.

Language

The ‘Ests’ separated from the Livonians in the first millennium BC, completing the last division of Baltic-Finnic tribes. While Livonian today is a dying language, with only around a dozen fluent speakers remaining, Estonian is spoken by more than one million people and staunchly defended as the official national language. The Lithuanian and Latvian languages are in the Indo-European language family, which is not related to Estonian.

As a result of early tribal affiliations, the Estonian language is most closely related to Finnish, Hungarian, Saami (Lapplandish), and several Volga River and Western Siberian tongues. These languages stand out in Europe as the Ural-Altaic, or Finno-Ugric, language family (see Figure 22).

Dominant tree species in Estonia’s forests include:

- *Pinus sylvestris*  
  Scots pine  
  Harilik mänd

- *Betula pendula*  
  European white birch  
  Arukask

- *Betula pubescens*  
  Downy birch  
  Sookask

- *Picea abies*  
  Norway spruce  
  Harilik kuusk

- *Alnus incana*  
  Speckled alder  
  Hall lepp

- *Alnus glutinosa*  
  European alder  
  Sanglepp (must lepp)

- *Populus tremula*  
  European aspen  
  Harilik haab (hall lepp)

Figure 15

The Town Hall is the terminal view for Viru Street.
Estonian language and genetic identity have been “shaped by all the peoples and cultures that swept through a vital crossroads of trade and war.” Certain linguistic peculiarities have led to further speculation of cultural contact with Japan, although similarities between Estonia and Japan’s medieval architecture are hypothesized to be the result of commonalities of climate. The separateness of the Estonian language from Russian, spoken through the rest of the USSR, helped Estonia maintain its culture through Soviet occupation.

Cultural Ties to Scandinavia

Estonia’s cultural ties to Scandinavia have been more definitely established, leading one Estonian geographer to propose the idea of Baltoscandia. Estonia’s link to Scandinavia dates back to the 6th – 7th centuries AD, when periodic raids by Swedes encouraged the development of district town strongholds. Estonians were able to develop friendly relations with the Goths of Gotland. In more recent years, Estonia has looked towards Scandinavia for a model of modern culture that also respects historic tradition.

Medieval Tallinn

In the northern Estonian district of Rävala, the Toompea stronghold was built on a hill overlooking what is now Tallinn’s lower town. The first written mention of the city of Tallinn occurred in 1154, and was recorded by the Arabian geographer Abu Allah Mohhammed Idrisi. The Chronicle of Henricus de Lettis and the Liber Census Daniae concur that Tallinn was located at the intersection of several major highways. With its desirable location and superior natural harbor, Tallinn soon became an important, and hotly contested, trading center on the Baltic Sea within the Rävala district. Tallinn’s importance as a long-range trading center predated its 13th-century membership in the Hanseatic League (see Figure 12).

29 Clemens 2003: 27
30 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
31 Edgar Kant, quoted in Lehti 2002: 432
32 Tarand 1980: 15
33 Pullat 1998: 17
34 Hackmann & Schweitzer 2002: 364
Early Tallinn was inhabited by craftsmen and tradesmen. The town market place was situated in what is now the Town Hall Square, and its historic importance is reflected by this central location (see Figures 13-15). The main roads to the marketplace still exist in Old Town Tallinn today, along with many of the town’s early defensive towers. Parts of the town wall date back to the 13th century; some of the towers built before 1413 have preserved their medieval German names, for instance Kiek-in-de-Kök (see Figure 16).

As an important trading center, Tallinn in the Middle Ages was already rich in ethnic diversity. While Estonians and Germans were the most represented, Swedes, Finns and Russians contributed to the diversity of the city. Trade with Finland was brisk, as coastal Finns got most of their goods from Tallinn. Tallinn’s privileged trading relationship with Finland dates back to a 1326 peace treaty, foreshadowing economic relations today.35

In the early 13th century, the Baltic peoples were among the last pagans in Europe. A papal decree led to a crusade against pagan Estonia from 1208-1227. Tallinn and northern Estonia were conquered by Danish troops in 1219-1220, despite the reinforcing support of military forces from the Russian towns of Novgorod and Pskov. Legend has it that Estonian troops were away from Tallinn at the time, but were able to liberate the city upon their return. Nevertheless, the city fell in turn to Germany, to the German military organization the Order of the Knights

35 Pullat 1998: 65-68
of the Sword, and to Denmark over the next few decades. The following centuries brought Swedish, Tsarist Russian and Soviet colonists; even Scottish mercenaries looted the outskirts of the city in 1573.  

The town wall that surrounds Old Town dates to the late 1200s, and is still visible as a trace of Danish conquest. Danish occupation led Estonians to rename the town known to the Germans as Reval (from the old Estonian names of Rävala or Revala) as taan[i] linn, or "Danish town." The separation of Old Town’s raised fortress on Toompea dates back either to the Danish stronghold or to an earlier, pre-conquest fort that occupied the same site. Tallinn’s small coat of arms (see Figure 17), a white cross on red ground, was modeled after the Danish national flag. Legend has it that the Danes rallied to conquer northern Estonia in 1219-1220 after this flag miraculously fell from the heavens in response to the Archbishop’s prayers.  

**Membership in the Hanseatic League**

In 1285, Tallinn joined the Hanseatic League, a union of trading cities centered on northern Germany. As a result, Tallinn enjoyed considerable autonomy as a center of trade between Europe and Russia for the next 200 years. The most prized architecture in Tallinn’s Old town dates back to the 14th-16th centuries, and attests to close economic and cultural ties with Germany of the period.

Medieval Tallinn was a medium-sized city, by European standards, with a population of 4000 (according to the 1372 tax list). The Tallinn Town Hall, which still stands today, was constructed from 1371-1404. Tallinn’s streets in the 14th century were narrow and lined with plastered limestone houses (see Figures 18-20).

In 1347, a subsidiary of the Teutonic Order purchased the central and southern parts of Estonia, inaugurating 200 years of feudal disunion. Bishops of Saare-Läänemaa and Tartu

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36 Pullat 1998: 77  
37 Pullat 1998: 22  
38 Pullat 1998: 21  
39 Pullat 1998: 67  
40 Tarand 1980: 26
controlled the west and southeast, respectively.\textsuperscript{41} Tallinn and northern Estonia remained part of the German-centered Hanseatic League for two centuries. Tallinn during this time dominated the connection to Russian trade centers such as Novgorod.

German merchants dominated the city through the privileges of class. Conflicts between native Estonians and the German nobility were ongoing during this period, as Germans attempted to subjugate Estonians. Ethnic Estonians were subjected to increasing restrictions: losing the right to work in preferred professions and even, eventually, to trade with gold. Estonians were not allowed to participate in certain trades, and restrictions were placed on inter-ethnic marriages.\textsuperscript{42} However, German merchants needed to speak Estonian in order to conduct business, and took courses to learn the language. Furthermore, feudal law specified that, after a year and a day, landlord nobles lost their claim on serfs who fled to Tallinn – leading to the adage, “City air makes free.”\textsuperscript{43}

A guild system emerged in the mid-14\textsuperscript{th} century, associated with German merchant trades. Goldsmiths, butchers and tailors formed the first trade guilds; later guilds were founded for: stonemasons, blacksmiths, brewers, shoemakers, carpenters, carters, coopers, and even hemp-twisters.\textsuperscript{44} Several of the original guild buildings remain (see Figure 21), and the medieval character of these surviving buildings contributes to the contemporary tourist appeal of Old Town.

The most conspicuous relic of Germanic/Danish rule is, of course, Tallinn’s city wall. Of the 2.35 km of wall built around the city during this period, almost 80\% remains today. Tallinn was one of the most fortified towns of medieval Europe,\textsuperscript{45} with 35 towers along a wall up to 3 meters thick. Of the city’s six original gates, the only ones remaining today are Viru Gate and the Great Coast Gate, but 25 towers remain (see Figures 22-26). Snell Pond is all that remains of the town’s 16\textsuperscript{th} century protective moat (see Figure 27). Buildings in medieval Tallinn were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Tarand 1980: 17
\item \textsuperscript{42} Pullat 1998: 72-73
\item \textsuperscript{43} Pullat 1998: 72
\item \textsuperscript{44} Pullat 1998: 54
\item \textsuperscript{45} Tallinn: A Medieval Pearl on the Baltic Sea 2005: 48
\end{itemize}
Figures 27a-b
The Great Coast Gate connected Pikk Street to the harbor in 1930, and filters auto traffic today.

Figures 28
The oldest of the Three Sisters at 71 Pikk Street, dates to 1415 (right). Typical of medieval merchants’ homes are the front beams used to hoist cargo from the street.

constructed of local limestone, in a heavy and massive Gothic style. Many medieval buildings remain today which demonstrate medieval German and Danish influences, including: the Dome Church, Tallinn’s Town Hall, and the row of buildings known as the Three Sisters (see Figure 28).

Although many medieval buildings remain in Tallinn (see Figures 29-34), UNESCO designated Old Town as a World Heritage Site mostly because the street layout has been preserved (see Figure 32). Pikk Street used to be the main street of the town, where the most important buildings were located. Pikk Jalg (Long Leg) and Lühike Jalg (Short Leg) streets connected Toompea to the lower town in the 13th and 14th centuries (see Figures 36-37).

The Lutheran Reformation

The Lutheran Reformation swept through Estonia on 14 September 1524, when approximately 500 people plundered the monasteries and churches in Tallinn. The Püütra convent and Tallinn monastery were destroyed by fire, for instance, although parts of these structures remain today (see Figures 38-39). Tallinn’s main Lutheran Church, the Cathedral of Saint Mary the Virgin, was restored after a 1684 fire to reflect its original 13th century shape, and therefore does not reflect the usual minimal-Calvinist aesthetic (see Figure 40).

Tension between Estonians and Germans increased as a result of the Lutheran Reformation. The guild system in Tallinn declined in the late 1500s. During the Livonian War (1558-1583), Tallinn attempted to block trade with Russia, effectively breaking from Germany and the Hanseatic League in 1559. Finally, Tallinn swore allegiance to Sweden in 1561 (see Figure 41). Under Swedish rule, Tallinn lost importance as a trade city but became Sweden’s center of colonial power in the Baltic.

The democratic ideals of Lutheranism contributed to Estonia’s growing sense of national identity, and also led to mass literacy once the Bible was published in Estonian. However,
Christianity began to rout pagan customs only in the 1700s. Largely due to the influence of Lutheran Protestantism, the literacy rate in Estonia reached 97% in the 1890s. In 1726, only about 10% of peasants could read.

**Swedish Rule**

Under Swedish rule, Tallinn's trade declined. The city became less cosmopolitan and more provincial. The population of Tallinn, however, continued to grow, reaching 10,000 in 1688. Tallinn's suburbs swelled with an influx of Estonians from rural areas, Germans, Swedes, Finns, Dutch sailors, Russians, and Jews. Many unmarried Scandinavian men, particularly from the Åland Islands, Finland and northern Sweden, immigrated illegally to Tallinn to escape crop failure. While plague and famine contributed to general economic decline, the period of Swedish Rule was afterwards nostalgically referred to as the *Hea Vana Rootsi Aeg* (Good Old Swedish Time).

Swedish rule took steps to eradicate feudalism and to improve living conditions for peasants. The three lions on Tallinn's large coat of arms and the Estonian national crest (see *Figures 42a-b*) were adopted from the Swedes, specifically from King Erik XIV, most likely as an anti-Danish statement. The Kristiine district was planned by the Swedish queen of the same name. Micro-variations in the environment makes Kristiine 2-3° C warmer than the rest of Tallinn, and the Swedish monarch introduced canals to drain this area and to create fishponds, as she intended to use the area as a summer home (see *Figures 43-47*). The square canal in romanticist Löwenruh Park and Kristiine's street grid of long, rectangular blocks were Tallinn's Swedish inheritance. Also during this period, the village green surrounding Old Town was formalized as a park; the streets that ring Old Town today were derived from Baroque promenades.

The war between Sweden and Poland (1600-1629) imposed a new duty on Tallinn, that of billeting Swedish soldiers. Soldiers housed

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47 Smith 2002: 4  
48 Laar 2002: 30  
49 Statistikaamet 2004: 19  
50 Pullat 1998: 88  
51 Smith 2002: 4  
52 Pullat 1998: 23  
53 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
by local residents were sometimes arbitrarily violent. Quarrels between the Tallinn City Council and the Swedish state increased, and townspeople were burdened by the additional requirement to participate in the construction of more fortifications around the city. Furthermore, plague broke out in the Baltics in 1710, as the Tsarist Russian army of Peter the Great besieged Tallinn – bringing an end to Swedish rule in Estonia.

**Estonia under Tsarist Russia: 1710-1917**

The “expansionary zeal” of the Tsars was so great that from 1550-1800, Russia conquered land at an average rate of 35,000 km² per year. The Russian tsars’ appetite for land was largely driven by “difficulties of conducting large-scale cultivation around Moscow.” Moscow needed a broader agricultural base to propel its economic development and population growth.

**Peter the Great**

Weakened by plague and siege, Tallinn surrendered to Russian armies in 1710. Swedes planned to retake the city the following summer, and did not give up their attempts until 1715. Peter the Great coveted the Baltic’s ice-free ports as a “western window to the world.” The port in Tallinn is deep enough for even the largest passenger ferries to dock there today (see Figures 48-49). The only larger port on the Baltic is St. Petersburg, Russia.

Peter started building in Tallinn before his Great Northern War with Sweden was over (see Figures 50-53). Construction for Kadriorg Palace started in 1719, while the Treaty of Nystad incorporated Estonia and Livonia into Tsarist Russia in 1721. Plague, famine and war reduced Tallinn’s population to 3,000 by 1718; thirty years earlier the population had been over 10,000.

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54 Hill & Gaddy 2003: 59
55 Hill & Gaddy 2003: 61
56 Pullat 1998: 82
57 Moscow 1962: 73
58 Pullat 1998: 88
Figure 35
A figure-ground study shows Old Town's medieval street layout.
The Gothic steeple of Oleviste Church was built to facilitate navigation. At 159 m, Oleviste Church was one of the world’s tallest buildings of the 15th-16th centuries. The spire was later reduced to a height of 123 m, after being struck by lightning repeatedly.

Figure 33

The Baltic German nobility wielded considerable influence even in the Russian court, and living conditions for peasants deteriorated rapidly under Tsarist rule. Serfs, directly owned by landlords, were even worse off than peasants, but both groups were “eventually bound to the land that they farmed and subsisted on.” Serfs were no better off than farm animals, and “could be traded for dogs.” Uprisings in 1805 and 1858 resulted in the public punishment of peasants in Tallinn squares (see Figure 54), and contributed to general dissatisfaction with the Tsarist regime. Serfdom was abolished in Estonia in 1816-1819, but peasants still held many unresolved grievances.

During Tsarist rule, the Russian Orthodox Alexander Nevsky Cathedral (see Figures 5, 55-56) was positioned on Toompea to dominate the silhouette of the city, and to replace a monument to Martin Luther. The cathedral’s bulbous spires were added later, reflecting a Historicist style.

Kadriorg Palace

Other traces of Tsarist rule on the city include the Kadriorg Palace complex and grounds (see Figures 57-62), and expansions in Tallinn’s rail and industry. Kadriorg remains one of Tallinn’s most treasured parks, and the palace’s ‘birthday’ is a city holiday each year. The recent installation of 500,000 roses was a diplomatic endeavor by the city, as Russians are particularly drawn to Kadriorg. Tsar Peter built Kadriorg Palace for his wife; although Catherine never set foot in Tallinn, the Baroque site remains a sort of Tsarist botanical museum. Many (especially Russian) couples visit it on their wedding day, as part of the traditional photographic tour to produce a thick album of wedding pictures.

The head architects and engineer for the project were Italians, and the estate shows a strong Baroque influence. The grounds, for instance, were divided into an Upper and Lower Garden, and featured pools, fountains and cascades in a rigidly symmetrical layout (see Figure 63). Kadriorg’s grounds were developed before the palace, and hundreds of trees were planted from...
Construction came secondary to parks.\textsuperscript{63}

The location of Kadriorg was a strategic decision in the war with Sweden. From his second-floor corner office in the Kadriorg palace, Peter the Great had axial views of both Tallinn’s port and Old Town. The center axis of the Kadriorg grounds and the perpendicular road to the port reflect the palace’s defensive location (see Figures 64-66). The port view was later modified by the 1902 addition of a statue commemorating a lost Tsarist ship, the “Russalka” (see Figures 67-69).

\textbf{Tsarist Planning}

Top-down Tsarist regional planning continually ignored social and economic ties at the local level. In the 1850s, summer homes and resort buildings sprung up around Kadriorg (see Figure 70). The radially arranged neighborhood of Kadriorg became a Tsarist mark on the city (see Figures 71-72).\textsuperscript{64} Tallinn briefly enjoyed the status of a holiday resort, foreshadowing its popularity as a tourist destination almost 150 years later. The Nõmme district was originally constructed as a summer resort of Tallinn (see Figures 73-76).\textsuperscript{65}

Industrialization and the foundation of the Central Baltic Railway Works, however, rapidly turned Tallinn into an industrial city. Tsarist Russia built thousands of kilometers of rail lines from 1866-1876, and the expansion of industry provided new jobs for peasants.\textsuperscript{66} The location of the industrial rail-yard in the Põhja-Tallinn district was a Tsarist inheritance. While it made sense to locate industry in this area from the 1870s-1900s, because of Tallinn’s second deep port in Kopli Bay, the rail-yard is perilously close to Old Town and the center city (see Figures 77-79). The rail transport of hazardous and flammable substances near the city center worries city officials today.

\textsuperscript{62} Tamm et al 1988: 175
\textsuperscript{63} Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
\textsuperscript{64} Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
\textsuperscript{65} Kink & Raukas 1997: 21
\textsuperscript{66} Moscow 1962: 103
Figure 37a-c
Short Leg has been a pedestrian link between Toompea and lower town since the 1230s.

The shortcut has scarcely changed; the gatehouse, built from 1454-1456, is still closed at 9 pm.

Figure 36
The Long Leg gate tower was first built in 1380 and was rebuilt two stories taller in the 1450s.
Industrialization

Industrialization in Tallinn occurred at the end of the period of Tsarist rule, and was most rapid in the second half of the 1880s. The town’s medieval gates were demolished in the 1870s-1890s, as Russia’s tsars decided the locations of Tallinn’s industry. The opening of rail communication with St. Petersburg increased Tallinn’s export trade tenfold, and medieval craft guilds were abolished. In 1883, the city forbade the construction of wooden houses near major roads, due to fire hazard concerns. Construction exploded in the 1890s, leading the city to commission a town plan in 1894. Plans from 1828-1897, however, covered only portions of the city, and even August Mickwitz’s survey of 1909 was incomplete.

The number of workers increased rapidly (see Figure 80), from 9,800 laborers in 1871 to 30,000 factory workers in 1917. From 1913-1917, Tallinn’s shipyards attracted skilled laborers from Russia’s interior, and consequently Tallinn housed 30,000 industrial workers in 1917. The Russian Revolution (1917) and the Estonian War of Independence (or Estonian Liberation War, 1918-1920) interrupted industrialization. According to a Tallinn historian:

Antagonisms inherent in the industrial system were..., aggravated in Tallinn by the survival of strong feudal tendencies interlocked, as a local peculiarity, with national conflicts.

A coalition of Estonians and Russians beat Baltic Germans out of the Tallinn town council for the first time in 1904. Finally empowered to shift the focus of municipal attention away from the German-centered Old Town, the city council made rapid infrastructure improvements in the suburbs. A second building boom emerged in 1908-1909. While paving roads and installing sewage lines, gas pipes and street lamps, the city commissioned a survey of the city in 1910 (see Figure 81) and a plan for a new town hall to reflect the emerging spirit of democracy (see Figure 82). The city also entertained proposals

67 Hallas-Murula 2005: 50
68 Pullat 1998: 109
69 Hallas-Murula 2005: 80
70 Pullat 1998: 128
71 Pullatt 1998: 127-128
72 Pullatt 1998: 121
73 Hallas-Murula 2005: 78
for development of the former police yard, Politsei aed (see Figures B3-B4).

While Tallinn rapidly evolved from a provincial town to an industrial city, the idea of an independent Estonian republic entered political discourse. A Baltic German society was founded to investigate local folklore in 1838, and in the 1850s, a small elite coined the term Eesti (Estonia). The period from 1860-1917 is known as Ärkämiseaeg (the Time of Awakening). Before then, Estonian peasants had referred to themselves simply as maarahvas (country people). While today independence is often hailed as the fulfillment of Estonian destiny, the poet Juhan Liiv’s claim that ‘one day there will be an Estonian state’ sounded fanciful when first proclaimed in 1910.

The Rise of Estonian Nationalism

The publication of Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald’s epic poem Kalevipoeg (The Son of Kalev) in 1861 helped promote a sense of national identity, and synthesized traditional Estonian folk poetry into a nationalist mythology. Disseminated widely only in the 1920s-1930s, the epic embodied prominent Estonian themes of the 20th century, including: devotion to nature, distrust of imported Christianity, and “a central place for song in the maintenance and protection of the nation”. While the hero Kalevipoeg is somewhat flawed and awkward, even managing at one point to cut off his legs with his own sword, he protects Estonia by blocking the Gate to Hades with his legless body and fighting off devils. The metaphor of resistance to foreign rule is clear.

The first Song Festival in Tallinn (1869, ostensibly in honor of the tsar’s birthday) followed the publication of Kalevipoeg, drew 10,000, and foreshadowed the so-called ‘Singing Revolution’ that helped Estonia regain its independence in the late Soviet period. Over a hundred years after the inaugural 1869 event, the song festivals in the post-Soviet period drew hordes of singers (34,000 in 2004) and spectators (100,000).
Figure 41
Swedes colonized the Baltic and transformed Tallinn (Reval) into a provincial town.
Under Tsarist rule, such demonstrations were not tolerated. In a 1905 demonstration, the Russian military opened fire on labor movement demonstrators in Tallinn; 90 people were killed and over 200 wounded (see Figure 85).

Civil war broke out in Tsarist Russia from 1918-1920. With popular sentiment firmly entrenched against Tsarist rule, however, the February Revolution triumphed early in Estonia on 15 March 1917 (see Figures 86a-b). Like the other Baltic countries, Estonia first demanded autonomy then declared (and fought for) its independence. The left-wing cultural movement Noor Eesti (Young Estonia) urged its proponents to “remain Estonians but become Europeans.”

Saarinen’s Plan for Tallinn: 1913

Shaking off seven centuries of foreign rule was not easy for the tiny, formative country of Estonia. In the tumultuous years preceding 1918, Estonia respected and wanted to emulate Finland’s more rapidly increasing independence from Russia. (As an administratively separate Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire, Finland had enjoyed greater autonomy for over a century; Finland declared full independence a year before Estonia, in 1917.) For instance, the national anthems for Estonia and Finland share a common source. In a second strategic move designed to emphasize Tallinn’s connection with Helsinki, the city awarded Eliel Saarinen the commission to draft a masterplan for the Tallinn town center and City Port in 1913. Officially, Saarinen received his commission as the result of a design competition. The city decided in November of 1911 that a design competition would be the best way to produce a comprehensive plan for Tallinn, and chose Saarinen to serve as their consultant from 1911-1913. Saarinen’s design competition entry seal, a crest with three gold lions, reflected his insider status (see Figure 87).
Figure 43
Alle Christenen Thale, shown on a 1689 map, preceded modern Tallinn’s Kristiine district. (Note: North arrow points down.)
Figure 44

1688 map shows long, rectangular lots.
The city set the terms for the competition in February of 1912, and received five entries on the 8 April 1913 deadline. Three of these were immediately discarded as not conforming to the competition requirements; in the end, Saarinen’s plan had to compete with only one other entry. Apparently few firms were able to compete because of the “rather inadequate organisation” of the competition; even procuring a base map (see Figure 48) required several volleys of correspondence.84

Saarinen’s Influence

Saarinen’s work was pivotal in Tallinn’s city planning. According to the present City Landscape Architect, “All plans for Tallinn followed Saarinen’s plan, even if that was later hidden from sight.” The written portion of Saarinen’s plan went ‘missing’ during the Soviet occupation, which supposedly explained why the plan was not very well known in Estonia or abroad.85 In reality, Saarinen’s 51-page explanatory letter had already been published in German (1921) and in Russian (1916) before Soviet planners ‘misplaced’ the written portion of the plan.

Saarinen offered some explanation of the plan for Greater Tallinn in his 1961 (English) text, The City: Its Growth, Its Decay, Its Future. Djomkin (1977) and Hallas-Murula (2005) published the plan’s 23 color illustrations, but Hallas-Murula was the first to translate the written portion of Saarinen’s plan from German into Estonian, Finnish and English.

Saarinen’s plan for Tallinn closely resembles plans that he drafted for other cities. Saarinen’s career in urban planning had begun only in 1910, working for the Helsinki firm that planned the new housing district of Mukkiniemi, which resembles the Tallinn plan in parts (see Figure 89).

Saarinen began work on the Tallinn plan in 1911, followed by plans for Canberra (1912), Helsinki (1918) and Perth (1922).86 The Canberra plan is an outlier in this group, as it was heavily influenced by Daniel Burnham’s plan for Chicago (see Figure 90). Saarinen produced the Canberra plan

84 Hallas-Murula 2005: 87
85 Djomkin 1977
86 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
under a tight competition deadline; afterwards, he was careful to address the plan for Tallinn in more detail. Saarinen chose to work with many of the existing features of Tallinn, preserving Old Town and the greenbelt at the foot of Toompea in accordance with the 1906 city plan.

Even though it came early in his career, the Tallinn plan (see Figure 91) embodies Saarinen’s main planning motifs. Saarinen repeated features of his Tallinn plan in Helsinki and Perth. Common characteristics of the three port city plans include: satellite centers, focal traffic arteries, linear greenways, and a formal, axial arrangement of streets focusing attention at genius loci. All three plans also use occasionally forceful architecture to punctuate space against a backdrop of neutral buildings.

Saarinen’s Plans for Growth

Saarinen planned for almost exactly the right amount of growth in Tallinn. Unable to anticipate the setbacks of war, he predicted that the city’s population would reach 500,000 in the year 2000. Tallinn’s population flirted with that number in 1989 before shrinking in the post-Soviet era due to Russian emigration in the early 1990s (see Figure 92). Saarinen estimated that Tallinn had the capacity to house 665,000,87 and that Old Town could accommodate 50,000; in 2004, there were 42,196 residents in Old Town.88

One of Saarinen’s primary concerns was the density of wooden housing around the center city (see Figures 93-94). Several new wooden row-house neighborhoods were constructed from 1900-1920, despite the city’s attempt to force developers to use more fire-safe materials. Construction was particularly fast from 1911-1913, as developers feared the city council would prohibit wooden housing in the center city altogether.89 To accommodate population growth, Saarinen targeted new areas for development outside the center city area. Specifically, he proposed to house 52,000 residents in 25 years and 143,000 in 2000 in a new suburb, Lasnamäe. The Parisian Boulevards of the 1850s visibly influenced Saarinen, along with all of European

87 Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
88 Hallas-Murula 2005: 103
89 Hallas-Murula 2005: 80
planning at the time; before 1918, there were only a few multi-story, stone apartment buildings in Tallinn. The idea of Garden Suburbs entered into planning discourse in Estonia in 1911-1912, and was popular with the Tallinn press.

A second major issue that Saarinen addressed was the constriction of shipping and traffic in the center city area. While in 1908 there were only six cars in Tallinn, Saarinen expected that traffic, in one form or another, would increase. He proposed a network of tram and train lines throughout the city (see Figure 95), and specified that road corridors be left generously wide in order to accommodate future transportation. Saarinen felt that electric trams best met the city's transportation needs, and suggested an express tram to Pirita. Saarinen's most radical proposal, which the city was unfortunately not able to implement, was to move the industrial rail station south, between Old Town and Lake Ülemiste.

Saarinen divided his plan into two phases: short and long term. By separating goals into 25- and 100- year periods, he meant to make the plan's implementation as practicable as possible. While the proposed road network was essentially formal, Saarinen left his plan still somewhat open-ended. He had no intention, for instance, that the city should construct the completely uniform 6-story buildings exactly as planned (see Figures 96-97); rather, Saarinen was more interested in identifying important nodes and zones for growth. Saarinen afterwards explained that he wanted his plan to remain flexible, dynamic, and able to be implemented in a number of ways. He achieved this through zoning. The only building that was built exactly as Saarinen proposed is the Estonian Opera and Theater (see Figures 98-100). Saarinen's plan, with some modifications, was incorporated into Tallinn's masterplan of 1914.
Figure 50
1766 map shows Tsar Peter's Kadriorg.
**Possible Soviet Appropriation**

One node that Saarinen identified as important was the Russian Market [see *Figures 101a-b*]. He proposed a new town hall for the site, with a high-rise tower that would attract attention to the new urban node. One indication that Soviet planners made use of the 1913 plan is the fact that the only downtown high-rise built during the occupation made use of precisely this spot. In recent years, the Viru Hotel complex has attracted a rapidly expanding maze of interconnected shopping, and is a virtual beehive of commerce [see *Figures 102-105*].

The most obvious indications that Soviet planners relied heavily on Saarinen’s ‘lost’ plan can be found in the district of Lasnamäe. Saarinen planned Lasnamäe to house the city’s upper middle-class residents. Lasnamäe, where intense development began in 1977, housed a working-class population of 109,516 as of 2004.⁹¹ Lasnamäe is not the utopian suburb that Saarinen imagined; when construction plans for the high-rise housing district were publicly revealed, one journalist commented, “Tallinn is building a chest of drawers.”⁹² Soviet planners allocated new housing to Lasnamäe and Mustamäe to compensate for historic wooden housing that burned during World War II.

Tarand’s 1980 *Reader on the History of Estonian Urban Architecture* proudly describes the innovative Soviet proposal to channel high-speed through-roads below slower traffic in these new housing districts. Sunken corridors would avoid awkward intersections of traffic at different speeds. The Soviet-attributed illustrations in Tarand 1980 were suspiciously similar to Saarinen’s traffic sections [see *Figure 106*]. Lagna Road through Lasnamäe was indeed built as a channel, and at such an immense scale that the city had to later label each bridge to give residents their bearings [see *Figure 107*]. The 1972 plan also considered moving the railroad station south.

Similar to the case of the Russian Market and Viru Square, the node that Saarinen identified as a focal point in Lasnamäe was also emphasized

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⁹¹ Hallas-Murula 2005: 103
⁹² Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect.
Figure 52
1808 map shows pre-industrial Kopli and an emerging Paljasaare.

Figure 53
1856 map shows the preserved greenbelt around Old Town.
by Soviet planners. In Lasnamäe, the regimented regularity of the street grid suddenly breaks into a haphazard axial arrangement (see Figure 108-109).

Other Soviet-built housing districts also show Saarinen’s influence. Väike-Õismäe and Mustamäe have street layouts that look as if their Soviet planners tried to imitate Saarinen’s approach without being obvious about it (see Figures 110-112). Of course, it’s a distinct possibility that an influential Estonian or two in the planning office might have drawn in Saarinen motifs deliberately, as references to Tallinn’s lost independence.

**Saarinen’s Plans for Greenspace**

More faithfully reproduced, however, were Saarinen’s plans for open space. A number of the proposed green belts were re-introduced by the 1972 plan. These repeating ‘waves of green’ were considered again by the post-Soviet 2005 plan. Even if the actual structure of each individual park differs from what Saarinen planned, the locations are quite consistent (see Figures 113-114). Because of the designation of large park areas like the Botanic Gardens, the borders of Saarinen’s plan closely resemble the city’s limits today.

**The First Period of Estonian Independence: 1918-1940**

World War I delayed the implementation of Saarinen’s 1913 plan. One day before German occupation forces entered Tallinn on 24 February 1918, Estonia became officially independent (see Figure 115). The German occupation, which followed on the heels of this proclamation, failed to resolve conflicts with Russia and halted large-scale industry in Estonia.
The Estonian War of Independence

During the Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920), Estonia fought successfully against Bolshevik Russia’s new Red Army, and neutralized other threats (from counterrevolutionary White Russian, Baltic German, and Reich German forces).

Military and indirect aid from Finland, Britain, France and Poland helped the new Baltic states repel the Red Army, and Soviet Russia acknowledged Baltic independence in 1920. However, the USSR felt “special enmity and aversion” to Finnish and Baltic independence, considering it to be a “temporary phenomenon.” A 1928 secret Red Army report entitled “The Future War” explicitly stated that continuing Baltic independence was an obstacle to Soviet access to key ports. According to the General Staff of the Red Army, independence:

Would generate significant obstructions to economic development in the Soviet Union.... From the economic point of view, the independent existence of those dwarf states is not justified.

Formation of the Estonian Parliament

Estonians meanwhile went about setting up their sovereign state filled with hope for the future. All adult residents of Estonian could participate in the election of the Riigikogu (Parliament). Furthermore, as an independent republic, Estonia took immediate steps to protect the civil rights and cultural autonomy of its ethnic minorities, who formed 12% of the population. The first Estonian Congress of Jewish congregations had proposed the idea of cultural autonomy in 1919. The 1918 declaration of independence included a clause guaranteeing ‘national-cultural autonomous rights’ of the minorities living in the republic.
Ethnic Relations

Ethnic relations in Estonia were relatively peaceful and tolerant. Although different groups occasionally resorted to verbal aggression, there were few incidents of physical ethnic violence while Germans and Russians were displaced from positions of political power. The closest the country came to ethnic unrest accompanied land reform in 1919. Baltic Germans were resented for their privileged status as the land-owning elite. Their manorial estates were confiscated by the new Estonian government and redistributed to veterans of the War of Independence. In a 1919 anti-German Labor Party speech, Aleksander Veilar proclaimed:

> When you want to slaughter an animal you start by breaking the backbone. The [German] manors have been the backbone of the barons.

Relations with Jews were also intermittently tense. However, the arrest of a radical anti-Semitic group between 1923-1924 contributed to Estonia’s position as one of the least anti-Semitic nations in the 1920s.

Similar to Sweden’s contemporary Hemspråk (Home Language) educational policy, the 1920 Estonian constitution legislated the right of ethnic minorities to receive education in their native language. A signed contract guaranteeing minority rights was conditional to Estonia’s admittance to the League of Nations in 1922. In districts where minorities formed the majority, two official languages were promised. Estonia acknowledged the need for minority support to secure its position against Soviet Russia and Estonian Bolsheviks. According to one historian,

> A people of barely one million members just could not afford to be arrogantly egotistic.

A failed Communist coup-d'état in December 1924 further underscored the need for the political support of minorities; on February 5 of the next year, Estonia “adopted the most
liberal ethnic minorities law in Europe.” This law allowed any minority group of over 3000 to form a self-administering public-legal corporation, entitled to run its own cultural affairs without government interference.

Essentially, the cultural autonomy law gave minorities “a share of state sovereignty,” and facilitated the provision of schools in minorities’ native languages. While Swedish and Russian factions never chose to organize themselves under this principle of cultural autonomy, German and Jewish minorities took advantage of the policy to form their own schools. Also, 20 German lecturers were appointed to positions within Tartu University.

Twenty years after its introduction, the cultural autonomy law was considered “a model which should guide the post-war reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe.” Ethnic integration was emphasized as important to the political security of the tiny nation of Estonia, where, in 1934, 14.4% of Tallinn’s population was composed of minorities.

Keren Kajamet, the Jewish National Endowment, honored the Estonian government with a certificate of gratitude for introducing its cultural autonomy law. In 1926, the Jewish Cultural Council was elected to represent 3045 members. By 1934, the number of Jews living in Estonia had reached 4381.

Industrialization and Rapid Expansion

Despite such forward-thinking cultural policies, the first period of Estonian independence was fraught with post-war economic hardship and political instability. Progress, however, was rapid, and industry revived through the expansion of home markets. By the 1930s, industry generated nearly a third of Estonian national income, remaining, however, less important than agriculture and holding a smaller proportion of employment. Industry remained focused in the

References:

104  Laar 2002: 34
105  Housden 2004: 231
106  Housden 2004: 231
107  Housden 2004: 233
108  Housden 2004: 232
109  Pullit 1998: 8
111  Mertelsmann 2003: 153
same areas designated by the tsars, particularly Paljassaare, Põhja-Tallinn and Kopli, due to the location of the industrial port and rail-yard (see Figures 116-117).\footnote{112}

Rapid expansion, however, was not conducive to careful town planning. Baltic Germans, who had founded Estonia’s ‘Garden Schools,’ controlled Tallinn’s parks through the 1930s as the city’s wealthiest citizens.\footnote{113} Elsewhere in Tallinn, the lack of a city plan contributed to haphazard growth. The most rapid growth occurred in districts near Old Town, leading the city to impose more regular streets on the city’s outskirts to try to shape expansion (see Figures 118-119).\footnote{114}

The residential area that Saarinen and the city’s planners had identified as problematic in the 1910s continued to proliferate. Residential development quickly surrounded the industrial rail-yard built in the Tsarist era, partly because factories provided housing for their workers, just as the tsars had done.\footnote{115} The residential areas of Põhja-Tallinn and Kopli expanded in rapid blocks of identical wooden row houses, many of which remain today (see Figures 120-121).

\footnote{112 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect}
\footnote{113 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect}
\footnote{114 Tarand 1980: 66}
\footnote{115 Personal communication, Oksana Ovtsevna, PR and International Relations}
The Era of Silence

A spirit of democracy flourished in Estonia until the early 1930s, but was then undermined by economic depression and the progressively authoritarian rule of President Konstantin Päts. The years from 1934-1940 have been dubbed Vaikiv Ajastu (The Era of Silence).\textsuperscript{116} Consolidated authoritarian rule emerged under Päts in 1938, and the motives for his actions remain ethically questionable. While Päts dealt with the threat of a right wing coup, he has been criticized since as a self-serving politician, thirsty for power at any cost, even as a puppet head of a Nazi or Soviet state.\textsuperscript{117} Despite his heavy promotion of German investment, Päts was not able to deter 5,200 Germans from leaving Tallinn in 1938. Sensing trouble, other foreign citizens soon followed.

In August 1939, Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin negotiated a secret agreement, as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, to divide Eastern Europe between their two dictatorial regimes. The northern boundary of Lithuania was to divide the Baltic states (defined as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) between Germany and the USSR.\textsuperscript{118} This secret initiative became known to Estonia within three days. There was a massive exodus, under Hitler’s orders, of the Baltic Germans from the ‘Soviet sphere of influence.’ Many German families had forged strong cultural and historic ties to the Baltic, and most were both wealthy and well educated. The departure of 20,000 Germans from Estonia within a few months was, socially and politically, problematic.\textsuperscript{119}

The USSR massed 437,235 troops against the Estonian and Latvian borders between September and October of 1939.\textsuperscript{120} President Päts failed to mobilize a standing army larger than 8,000, deciding it was preferable to face an uncertain fate under Soviet control than certain decimation.\textsuperscript{130} The “silent submission” of Estonia’s government contrasted sharply with the attitude of the majority, which was “prepared to fight, ready to defend the independence.”\textsuperscript{121}

In September, the Baltic States were forced to allow basing rights to 25,000 Soviet troops,
although it was claimed that the Red Army would not interfere in domestic policy. By the summer of 1940, 66,946 Soviet troops were based in the Baltic.

The Annexation of the Baltics

Finland resisted a similar imposition when the USSR demanded part of the Karelian Isthmus, leading to Stalin’s reluctant invasion on November 30, 1939 and heavy Soviet casualties in the *Talvisota* (Winter War) that followed. Stalin’s attack was ruled as illegal and Russia was expelled from the League of Nations two weeks later; Allied forces threatened to intervene. Outnumbered four to one, Finland ceded 10% of its territory and 20% of its industry to Russia for 30 years beginning in March of 1940.\(^{122}\) Hostilities between Russia and Finland resumed the next year in the form of the Continuation War. According to one specialist,

> There is anecdotal evidence to suggest the Soviet dictator feared the possible international repercussions of an all-out attack on Estonia in September 1939. Indeed, had this not been the case, it seems doubtful that he [Stalin] would have been so scrupulous in attempting to give a legal veneer to the subsequent forcible annexation of the Baltics. It is thus intriguing to speculate whether a more robust response on the part of the Estonian leadership would have given the Soviets pause for thought.\(^{123}\)

Estonia deposited 11 tons of its gold reserve abroad in the first half of 1940.\(^{124}\) Lithuania was targeted for the first Soviet invasion, under the May pretext that Soviet troops had gone missing in Lithuania. In early June, Soviet troops were made combat-ready, and in mid-June the People’s Commissariat of the Interior of the Soviet Union announced it was ready to accept 65,500 Baltic prisoners of war.\(^{125}\) On 21 June 1940, 90,000 additional Soviet troops marched into Estonia to complete the coup (see Figure 122).


\(^{123}\) Smith 2002: 25

\(^{124}\) Smith 2002: 27

\(^{125}\) Tannberg & Tarvel 2006: 86
Figure 71
1865 map shows growth in Põhja-Tallinn east of the center city, as well as Lake Ülemiste before it was dammed.

Figure 72
The radial street layout in Kadrioru neighborhood betrays a Renaissance influence.
Early Soviet Occupation: 1940-1941

During the Soviet occupation that followed, Estonia’s borders were closed, trade was restricted, and a puppet government was ‘elected’ to add a veneer of legitimacy to the ‘genuine revolution.’ The USSR (and, in recent years, Russian Federation President Putin) claimed that the Baltic countries voluntarily petitioned for membership in the Soviet Union. In fact, labor demonstrations and press releases were staged, and President Päts was used to draft an application for membership in the USSR before being forced to resign. The public statue of President Päts was destroyed on 8 November 1940, after which Päts was deported to Russia with other political and military leaders of the Baltic countries.\(^\text{126}\)

**Guerrilla Resistance**

An Estonian resistance movement formed immediately, once it was clear that legal opposition had failed. When the national volunteer defense organization *Kaitseliit* was disbanded, individual members hid their weapons and proposed armed resistance. Cell leaders were arrested and deported, but ordinary members hid in the forests. Their ranks swelled with Soviet repression, and more people went into hiding. According an Estonian national archive specialist, *In spite of the systematic Soviet security service operations, they could not halt the growth of the resistance movement. By the summer of 1941 underground groups of like-minded people had grown up all over Estonia... The main goal of the civilian resistance movement was to join forces, and its main method was counter-propaganda.*\(^\text{127}\)

On 14 June 1941, more than 10,000 Estonians were deported to prison camps or exile in Siberia. This unprecedented action surprised and terrorized the populace, and resulted in mass flight. “The widespread underground population was born, hiding mostly in forests, looking for arms, and preparing for action.”\(^\text{128}\) The *Metsavennad* (Forest Brothers) began their...
guerrilla war in the summer of 1941. They succeeded in liberating Tartu and organized attacks on district offices and communications.

Population Loss

During the Soviet occupation of 1940-1941, 8000 Estonians were arrested, 10,000 deported, 34,000 mobilized into the Soviet Army, 25,000 evacuated to the USSR, 1,100 went missing, and 500 fled abroad. Soviet occupation ended cultural autonomy in Estonia, and 400 Jews were deported to prison camps in 1941. The irreversible population loss from the first Soviet occupation totaled 44,400 (see Figures 123-126).

Nazi German Occupation: 1941-1944

On 22 June 1941, the Soviet-German War broke out. The German army “had expected a quick summer victory, [but] became bogged down and overextended in the winter.” Retreating Soviet and German armies destroyed or ‘evacuated’ industrial equipment, leaving behind them a trail of destruction. World War II “destroyed the normal development of Tallinn as well as that of entire Estonia.”

Half of Tallinn and a tenth of Old Town were destroyed during World War II. Furthermore, Soviet hit squads were given a free hand in suppressing Estonian ‘bandit battalions,’ and were authorized to shoot ‘bandits’ on sight without trial or conviction. From 1940-1941, Soviet troops caused the death of 4% of the Estonian population. Nevertheless, the Metsavennad were able to liberate most of Southern Estonia before German troops arrived.

Isolated from the West, Estonia relied on the Germans as the only military force that could realistically oppose the Soviet Union (see Figure 129 Noormets 1999: 189

Figures 75a-b
The Baron’s quirky collection of Kalevipoeg and other statues recalls the grotesque statuary of the Italian Baroque.
Furthermore, Germans claimed the destiny of Estonia would depend on their contribution to the war effort. Altogether, 33,000 men from northern Estonia joined the German army, and 10,000 died in German service. Some volunteered, hoping to help prevent another wave of Red Terror; most were drafted. Estonians hoped to maintain independence, pending the expected restoration of sovereignty at the end of the war.

The Holocaust in Estonia

Nazi Germany occupied Estonia from 1941-1944. Estonians were refused their demands for restored independence, and continued destruction and devastation followed. The irreversible population loss during German occupation was 102,740: 81,900 fled the country (including 7,900 ethnic Swedes), 8,800 were executed, 1240 died in labor or prison camps and 800 in Soviet air raids. More than 1000 Estonian Jews fell victim to the Holocaust, especially at the concentration camps of Kalevi-Liiva, Klooga, and Vaivara (see Figures 128a-d). About 20,000 foreign Jews entered the gates of the camp at Vaivara. Thousands of foreign Jews were killed at Kalevi-Liiva, and 2000 died at Klooga (a sub-camp of Vaivara). Fewer than a dozen Jews survived the Holocaust in Estonia; around 3000 escaped to Soviet Russia.

By the end of 1941, the Estonian Police and Home Guard Authority had taken 20,989 Red Army soldiers and 5,646 Soviet partisans prisoner. Some prisoners of war were allowed to work on Estonian farms, where they were treated more humanely than by the Germans. In a paradox typical of Soviet logic, many of the Red Army prisoners who survived German camps were later incarcerated in Soviet ones, for letting themselves be taken prisoner by the enemy. Estonians who had harbored Russian prisoners of war on their farms were later arrested for exploiting prisoner labor.

138 Rahi-Tamm 2005: 38
139 The Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity
140 Noormets 1999: 206
141 Köll 2003
Bombing in Tallinn

Because of the German occupation, the Soviet army bombed Tallinn on the night of March 9, 1944. Soviet bombers destroyed 10% of the buildings in Old Town, killed 634 people, and wounded another 659. As a result of bombing, 20,000 Tallinners lost their homes. This was one of the most visible traces of Soviet impact on the old city (see Figures 129-135).

German forces withdrew from Estonia after the Aster Plan was approved by Hitler's central command on 16 September 1944. In all, 70,000 Estonian civilians fled the country under German military escort, and another 6500 were killed by the German army.

Population Loss

On the front line, Estonian troops were sacrificed to cover the German retreat. More than 60,000 Estonians fled the country, mostly to Sweden and Germany (see Figures 136--138). In Tallinn, independent Estonian government was reestablished for three days “before the invading Red Army drowned all endeavors for freedom in blood.” Altogether, Estonia lost 25% of its population from 1939-1945 (see Figure 139). This loss of population left irrevocable marks on Tallinn, and the shadowy history of WWII can be still felt today in many parts of the city.


The Baltic Sea became no longer a simple geographical divide with the Nordic states of Finland and Sweden; it was what constituted the iron curtain in northern Europe.

- Political scientist Vello Pettai

During the retreat from the Soviet army, Nazi German intelligence left behind files on the leaders of the Estonian resistance movement, complete with names and addresses. The people

\[142 \text{ http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee} \]
\[143 \text{ Laar 1999: 211} \]
\[144 \text{ Rahi-Tamm 2005} \]
\[145 \text{ Pettai 2003: 3} \]
The number of factory workers in Tallinn grew rapidly in the late 1880s, and again from 1913-1917.

The city council commissioned this 1910 plan/map of Tallinn.
on these lists were systematically arrested and interrogated once the Soviets assumed power (see Figure 140). Until the 1950s, the ‘Vyshinskii doctrine’ placed the burden of proof on arrestees, who were presumed guilty until proven innocent.\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{Soviet Repression}

Altogether, 30,000 Estonians were arrested by the Soviet security apparatus, which used methods of interrogation that were quite persuasive. One in three arrestees did not survive the experience. According to Russian author and historian Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn:

\begin{quote}
Interrogators were allowed to use violence and torture on an unlimited basis, at their own discretion, and in accordance with the demands of their work quotas and the amount of time they were given. The types of torture used were not regulated and every kind of ingenuity was permitted, no matter what.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}

At their headquarters at 1 Pagari Street in Tallinn (see Figures 141a-b), the KGB blocked the basement windows with concrete to prevent prisoners’ screams from reaching the street. When the KGB Headquarters was converted to an Estonian police station, the Minister of the Interior Lagle Parek reportedly arranged for an exorcism. Parek, a former religious dissident who had suffered in the Soviet gulag system, felt it would otherwise be impossible for anyone to work in the building peacefully.\textsuperscript{148}

The Germans also left behind entire arsenals, which the \textit{Metsavennad} used to fight Soviets (see Figure 142). As a result, the activity of the Estonian resistance movement peaked in 1945-1949. The total number of Estonians involved with the \textit{Metsavennad} approached 30,000-40,000. The Red Army was brutal in attempting to disassemble the guerrilla movement. For instance, in a small village near Pärnu, Soviets hanged the family of a known Forest Brother and, as a warning, forbade anyone from taking the bodies down. One witness remembered how fragile the bodies of three children seemed, and

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{146} Noor 2005: 81
\textsuperscript{147} Solzhenitsyn 1973: 99
\textsuperscript{148} Personal communication, Ulvi and Rein Ratas to Ain Haas
\end{footnotes}
By 1947, 8,478 members of the resistance movement had been killed or imprisoned. About 3,000 were legalized or neutralized each year until 1950. The last known Forest Brother was killed resisting the KGB in 1978. As Forest Brother Alfred Käärmann explained:

> And what was this drive that forced us, the last Forest Brothers, to stay in hiding? I’ll tell you. We knew that as long as we were still breathing, holding a gun and feeling Estonia’s soil beneath our feet, everything was all right. We knew that it was much worse for our captured comrades. We knew that there was a one-way ticket to Siberia booked for us. We knew that a bullet from our own gun would save us from enemy torture.

The stubbornness with which the Metsavennad clung to their resistance movement manifested also at a civilian scale, in the careful protection of Estonian cultural traditions and symbols throughout Soviet occupation. The KGB’s brutal treatment of the resistance movement did little to win over Baltic loyalties, and rather only repelled the general populace further. Estonians became more circumspect in expressing their dissidence, and found increasing grounds for distrust through exposure to the KGB’s mechanisms of repression.

The KGB was known for appropriating prominent city buildings, even including churches and schools. In Tallinn, these scars on the city’s landscape are well known, but little talked about. For instance, the gun tower known as Paks Margareta (Fat Margaret, see Figures 143a-b) was used as by the KGB as a prison because of its thick walls. The KGB used the spire of Oleviste Church to send radio transmissions, and also bugged every room in the Viru Hotel. Despite new Scandinavian management, the KGB monitoring station on the 23rd floor of the Viru Hotel has been left untouched.

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149 Unpublished memoirs of Ely Haas
150 Laar 1999: 217
151 Laar 1999: 231
Liquidation of the Kulaks

Altogether, Estonia lost 25-30% of its population in 1940-1955. Estonians, like their Baltic neighbors to the south, were targeted as being anti-Soviet. From 25-26 March 1949, Soviets deported another 20,000 Estonians to Siberia in the ‘liquidation of the kulaks as a class.’ Kulaks, an impediment to the “blood-soaked forced collectivisation of agriculture”, were peasants who had prospered under reformations at the end of Tsarist rule. Most of the deported kulaks were women and children. A sudden, violent surge of resistance activity followed, which targeted collaborators and their families. “The nation’s pain was at its peak; its anguish had reached its limits.”

Cultural Tenacity

In Tallinn and other urban areas, the so-called Linnavennad (City Brothers) helped obtain forged documents and provided medical supplies for the resistance movement. This urban counterpart of the Metsavennad also considered it a duty to hoist the Estonian flag on national holidays in prominent public places. In particular, the persistent appearance of the flag on Independence Day, February 24, continued to annoy Soviet authorities. While the possession alone of a blue, black and white flag was grounds for deportation, the flag continued to appear publicly during the entire Soviet occupation with fierce persistence. In Tallinn, the flag was often found topping Pikk Herman (Tall Herman), a feat which remains inexplicable today, considering the steepness of the tower’s walls (see Figure 144).

During the Soviet occupation, Estonia and the other Baltic republics clung to their cultural symbols tenaciously. Finnish TV was widely pirated in northern Estonia, so the Estonian capital was never completely isolated from Western (particularly Scandinavian) fashions and trends. Finns from Helsinki could visit Tallinn rather...
easily. From Radio Free Europe broadcasts and relatives in the West, the population knew that the majority of Western countries never recognized the Soviet Union’s claim to Estonia, and also that Estonian traditions thrived in exile communities. Song festivals became enormously popular, as expressions of national pride that did not directly challenge Soviet authority. As a form of protest, many locals learned only passable Russian and tried to avoid settings where Russian would be required as the primary language. Despite centuries of occupation, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian cultures persisted because of strong national identities, high literacy rates, the preservation of languages and consistent ‘habitat.’ According to historian and former Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar, across the rest of the USSR:

the homogeneity of state symbols, political institutions, educations, physical structures, household goods, forms of entertainment, and language.... engendered a sense of shared experience and of belonging to a common, unified Soviet state.\footnote{Hill & Gaddy 2003: 110}
In the Baltic countries, however, distinctively national characteristics helped Estonia and its neighbors preserve local culture and later reassert their sovereignty: “Culture does not determine what happens, but opens doors and sets limits.”  

Stalin emphasized what he called the ‘history of friendship and cooperation’ between Russia and Estonia; while, locally, the rift between ethnic groups only increased.

**Model Republics**

After Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet repression eased somewhat. Most of the deported kulaks returned to Estonia, and the number of political arrests from 1953-1989 was reduced to 500. In 1988, the first Jewish Cultural Society in the Soviet Union was established in Tallinn.

Because of their superior economic performance in the Soviet context, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were deemed “model republics,” and as such were allowed special economic privileges. Estonia became a testing ground for economic policy, and free market elements were included in its planned economy. Russians dubbed the Baltic ‘The Soviet West’ and ‘Our Abroad.’ In Tallinn, this special treatment led to few differences from other Soviet cities, however. Soviets built huge blocks of housing, districtized heating, prioritized industry and military interests over environmental and cultural concerns, and systematically imposed a pro-Soviet agenda on public space (see Figure 145). Soviet planners also nationalized Tallinn’s infrastructure of highways, harbors, and airports.

**The City in the Green**

Soviet planners emphasized urbanization in a way that the tsars had not, and the early USSR launched “a virtual war of the city against the countryside.” From Moscow, a uniform housing model was imposed on cities across the USSR. Many of Estonia’s Soviet housing

Saarinen’s prediction for Tallinn’s growth (500,000 in 2000) closely resembles actual population patterns, with the exception of population losses from war.
developments were influenced by Le Corbusier's idea of 'the city in the green.' His notions were implemented swiftly in countries like England and Sweden, filtering through the Iron Curtain somewhat later. Hill and Gaddy (2003) describe Soviet-era high-rise developments as:

In the allocation of new housing, migrants from throughout the Soviet Union enjoyed preferential treatment under centralized rule. Migration to Estonia was officially supported: (1) to replace the industrial labor force lost by deportation, death and emigration, and (2) as a means to dilute Estonian cultural identity and resistance. Even in the 1960s, for instance, it was a requirement of employment that Estonians speak Russian in the presence of any non-Estonian speaker; "The system was designed to create a hodgepodge of peoples." 

Attempted Sovietization

Immigrants from the USSR streamed into the Baltic republics in "an unprecedented influx," finding jobs in industry, administration and the military. Soviet-era immigrants assumed social positions of power by replacing the Baltic 'elite' and others who had escaped to the West or been deported to Siberia. Net immigration into Estonia from 1945-1950 alone totaled 240,000. Russian-speaking immigrants served as a kind of 'civilian garrison,' for the most part not bothering to learn the native language of their host country. Feeling themselves part of a great nation, most immigrants "just did not give a damn" about learning even the simplest phrases...
Because of the emphasis on Russian in schools, 80-90% of the Estonian population was conversant in Russian by the late 1980s. By that time, only 12% of the non-Estonian population was fluent in Estonian.

By 1965, over 1 million Russians had immigrated to the Baltic republics (see Figure 146). There were 577,000 Russian-speakers in Estonia in 1989. By means of comparison, the Nazi General Plan Ost had called for 520,000 German colonists to settle the entire Baltic. According to a Soviet historian:

"Whether or not the Kremlin intended to drown the Balts in a sea of non-Balts, the outcome was clear. By the late 1980s, nearly half of Latvia’s population was non-Latvian; 38 percent of Estonia’s; and nearly 20 percent of Lithuania’s…. the Baltic peoples were inexorably advancing toward their ‘annihilation.’"

The Irrationality of Soviet Planning

Whole suburbs of state-subsidized, concrete-block apartments were built quickly and cheaply to house immigrants, while ethnic Estonians found it increasingly difficult to secure adequate accommodations. Immigrants from the USSR were, quite literally, “given keys to new housing at the railway station” — after all, communism was the ‘vanguard of the toiling masses.’ Discrimination in the distribution of housing helped Soviets keep the Estonian birthrate low. Bombing in World War II had created a housing shortage in Tallinn, which remained unchanged for native Estonians even after the accelerated construction of housing in the 1970s and 1980s. While Soviets rebuilt residential neighborhoods, the focus remained on accommodating new industrial workers: i.e., Soviet ones.

The isolation and anonymity of the housing developments built for Soviet colonists recall the problems of post-WWII housing in the US. The separateness of these developments caused
problems of lack of integration that persist today. The issue is not access to employment, as in US project neighborhoods; unemployed residents would happily commute across the city for a job. Instead, the lack of social integration is a direct inheritance of the USSR. Soviet housing blocks were “designed to facilitate their residents’ service to the state, not to foster social connections.”

Surrounded by unused ‘green space’ and built in epic proportions with inferior construction materials, today these housing blocks are for the most part crumbling wrecks. Soviet-era housing construction can often be distinguished from modernist construction of the 1920s-1940s by a taller individual story height, typical of the central planning urge to make everything as big as possible. The “irrationality of central planning” left a huge mark on Tallinn in the form of the Mustamäe and Lasnamäe districts (see Figures 147-150). According to an Estonian architect, a political aspect accompanied the migration of the working class in the former socialist countries, becoming a powerful means for Russification within the boundaries of the Soviet Union – the mixing of the population in a centralised manner. Lasnamäe is a clear example of this. The mother tongue of 60% of its population is not Estonian.

Massive housing blocks were characteristic of a command (vs. market) economy, and provided very little space for retail and other services. The lack of services reflected the Marxist-Leninist view that service is less economically important than production. This model of development contrasts with Sweden’s more successful satellite housing communities of the 1960s, each of which was required to provide a broader swath of basic services: including access by tram to the center city, some places of employment, shops, groceries, schools, and day care. Lasnamäe only sports a few stores and schools, and one tram connection to the central city.

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177 Levy 2000: 319
178 Hill and Gaddy 2003: 108
179 Personal communication, Urve Ratas
180 Hill and Gaddy 2003: 2
181 Tõnu Laigu, www.ehituskunst.ee
182 Levy 2000: 319
Environmental Damage from Soviet Activity

Like housing, Soviet industrial projects were subject to what Gorbachev’s economic advisor termed “gigantomania.”\(^\text{183}\) The plume of industrial waste from industrial plants at Maardu, for instance, reached Finland.\(^\text{184}\) By the 1980s, 90% of Estonian industry was under the administration of all-Union ministries in Moscow. Delocalized administrations prioritized military and industry needs over local landscape considerations.

Pollution was particularly high in Soviet military encampments,\(^\text{185}\) which in Tallinn covered 863 hectares.\(^\text{186}\) The dumping of airplane and rocket fuel in military areas contaminated Estonia’s groundwater. Near Keila-Joa, Soviets poured 10-15 tonnes (11-16.5 US tons) of samine, a liquid fuel used in ballistic missiles, directly onto the ground; halting its spread through groundwater cost 4.6 million EEK ($372,000).\(^\text{187}\) Leaking oil, silage, and sewer storages polluted groundwater in upper aquifers, as did dumping, ash and spoil heaps.\(^\text{188}\) The estimated cost to decontaminate Estonia’s former Soviet military areas alone is 60-65 billion Euros ($76-83 billion).

The Soviet military also set up roadside checkpoints, which remain today as a visible reminder of how people were tied to cities as administrative centers. For the most part now boarded up and abandoned (see Figure 151), these military outposts were placed along major routes to check whether travelers had the proper papers to cross jurisdiction boundaries. One of these military checkpoints, on Pärnu Mantee, has been converted to a fast food restaurant.

Soviet planning was highly centralized and lacked civil or local participation. During Soviet occupation, the role of Tallinn’s city council was reduced along with private property ownership. The effect of centralized planning had dire long-term consequences in Estonia.

Collectivized agriculture contributed to the contamination of surface and ground water.
Soviet official guidelines recommended using up to 180 kg per hectare of nitrogen, for instance, to boost production: a level which would have resulted in the pollution of all of Estonia’s drinkable groundwater (to a depth of 40 m), had it continued. Groundwater and coastal waters were further contaminated by inadequate sewage treatment: only 52% of sewage in 1982 was processed, and that without chemical treatment. The *E. coli* index on Pärnu’s beach was 5000 times the permissible level in 1989. In addition, Soviet mining operations “deformed” 200 km² of Estonian land. Air pollution in Tallinn remains staggering: 7, 12, and 20 times the limit for sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides, respectively (as of 2005). Industrial air pollution reduced Estonia’s forest growth by up to 50%.

**Orphaned Parks**

The Soviet indifference to local landscapes also meant that Estonia’s parks were orphaned when the Baltic Germans left Estonia. The last “really detailed” book on Tallinn’s parks, for instance, was written in the 1930s; since then, “It’s been hard to tell what parks are still green space and which ones are full of trash,” the City Landscape Architect, Tiina Tallinn, admitted. “The Soviets got rid of landscape architecture because it didn’t bring them production, and the emphasis was completely on industry.” Tiina Tallinn added, “That’s also why there are so few really qualified landscape architecture instructors in Estonia.”

In the 1960s, Tallinn’s discredited landscape architects and coalesced to form a coffee club which they called the *Haljastajate Klubi* (Green Space Maker’s Club). Its members met once or twice a month in Tallinn cafés to share their knowledge of landscape architecture, botany, and other related fields. Their most influential member was the last landscape architecture ‘diplomat’ to the USSR, Alexander Niine. Niine’s life’s work was the Tallinn Botanic Gardens, although he continued to teach at the *ENSV Teaduste Akadeemia* (ESSR Academy of Sciences) until his death in 1975. Other well-known members of the *Haljastajate Klubi* included H. Tamm and Andres
Tarand, who later served as Environmental Minister and Prime Minister.

While many parks were planned during the Soviet era, few were actually built; there were already more than 600 parks in Estonia. There were two central planning organizations in charge of parks: the Haljasalade Trust (Green Space Consignment) and the Haljastur REV (Remont, Ehitus, Valitsus – Green Space Repair and Construction Administration). Both organizations controlled parks throughout the entire USSR. The Eesti Metsamajanduse ja Looduskaitse Ministeerium (Estonian Ministry of Forestry and the Environment) was the steward of natural preserves during this time.

In Tallinn, the emphasis on industry and new housing meant that Soviet planners treated parks largely as marks on paper. The persistence of parks marked on Saarinen’s 1913 plan through the Soviet occupation can be explained by central planning’s essential disinterest in landscape architecture; these areas were protected from development essentially by default.

Soviet parks planners instead focused on constructing monuments celebrating Soviet occupation. The hulking, concrete Marjamägi Memorial was built in 1975 to commemorate Soviet soldiers who died in 1941. The obelisk (1960) commemorates Red Army soldiers who died in the Estonian War of Independence in 1918-1920. Unsurprisingly, the Memorial remains unpopular today and Pirita commuters blatantly ignore it (see Figures 152-153).

**Soviet Marks on the City**

The one Soviet contribution to Tallinn’s parks was the greenway along Piritä’s shore (see Figures 154a-c), known at the time as Rahvastesõprus Park (The Peoples’ Fellowship Park). The creativity behind this act of planning should not be over-estimated; however, an emerging shoreline, occasionally buffeted by storms, probably quite simply could not be built as either industry or housing.
Other Soviet marks on Tallinn include a 314-m Teletorn (TV Tower) built for the 1980 Olympic games, and the 1960 Song Festival Grounds (see Figures 155-156). One Soviet mark on Tallinn’s blue space (public space that features visual or physical access to water) is Linnahall, a concrete hulk that looms over the harbor near the passenger ferry terminal. Built as an ice-skating rink and public town hall around the 1980s, the concrete structure is already in visible disrepair. Its endless steps have proven hopelessly inappropriate during Tallinn’s long winters (see Figures 157a-c). Paradoxically, the outside of the structure is protected as a historic site and cannot be removed. Linnahall is typical of central planning projects imposed on Tallinn’s landscape: huge in scale, poorly built, requiring difficult and frequent renovation, and failing to consider local factors.


Economic restructuring after the 1980s led to “more flexible, fragmented and entrepreneurial forms of governance.”

During the Singing Revolution (1986-1991), the Baltic States regained independence through non-violent methods. Spontaneous youth protests precipitated the movement (see Figure 158), averting the danger of violent conflict. Acts of resistance included graffiti, singing national songs, and rewriting prayers.

The Independence Movement

Public protests from August 1987 – February 1988 resulted in rapid change. The most significant protests occurred in 1988. On 15 April, 10,000 demonstrators gathered around a display of blue, black and white bolts of fabric covering the façade of the University Students’ Union Building in Tallinn. On 4 June, a group of young people with flags congregated in Old Town, singing patriotic songs, and then marched to the song festival grounds. Along the way, about 100,000 people gathered. The march happened
nightly for weeks, and the ‘Singing Revolution’ was born.\textsuperscript{195} Song became a strong symbol of cultural resistance. The 1990 Estonian Song and Dance Festival in Tallinn drew half the Estonian population. Non-violent demonstrations set a precedent for integration of the mostly Russian ethnic minority in the post-Soviet period.

While Estonia’s nationalist movement initially only hoped for increased autonomy through “a restructuring of the Soviet Union along more democratic, federalist lines”,\textsuperscript{196} in November 1988 the Estonian parliament proclaimed that it was prepared to secede if its demands were not met. On 23 August 1989, several million people formed the Baltic Chain linking the three Baltic capital cities (see Figure 159) to draw international media attention, much to the Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev’s chagrin. As one historian explained,

\begin{quote}
It would be harmful to the image of perestroika in the West if tanks were sent to silence thousands of singing people. Moscow had to look for an alternative.\textsuperscript{197}
\end{quote}

Estonians’ long-standing tie to their land, and sense that the Soviet occupation was temporary, helped keep the transition to independence non-violent. The sense of an interim occupation was echoed internationally in the persistence of Estonian embassies in other countries, including the US, and an exiled Estonian government that met in Scandinavia.

The Singing Revolution achieved independence at the cost of fewer than 50 Baltic lives, and ultimately helped undermine the USSR.\textsuperscript{198} The Soviet bloc had started to crumble in 1989, and was dissolved in December of 1991 by an agreement among the presidents of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.\textsuperscript{199} When Soviet police killed 13 Lithuanian democracy demonstrators in Vilnius in January 1991, the public outcry “cost Gorbachev his constituency and cleared the way for Yeltsin.”\textsuperscript{200} The USSR let the Baltic States go quietly to save face, but in 1995-1996 launched a bloody struggle to keep Chechnya that cost tens of thousands of lives.

\textsuperscript{195} Laar 2002: 80
\textsuperscript{196} Pettai 2003: 3
\textsuperscript{197} Laar 2002: 80
\textsuperscript{198} Clemens 2003: 24
\textsuperscript{199} Freeland 2005: 198
\textsuperscript{200} Freeland 2005: 205
Reestablishment of Independence

On 21 August 1991, after 54 years and 75 days of Soviet-Nazi-Soviet occupation, Estonian independence was reestablished on the premise of legal continuity. The Supreme Council resolved unanimously to uphold the continuity of the 1918 Republic as a matter of international law. This provided the legal framework for disengaging from Moscow. Estonia joined the United Nations on 17 September 1991, and in the summer of 1992 replaced the ruble with the kroon, pegged first to the German mark and later to the Euro. Two small corners of Estonia, with predominantly Russian-speakers, were ceded to Russia (see Figure 160) as sovereignty was restored. Stalin had annexed the town of Petseri/Pechory and the territory behind the Narva River to Russia in 1944. This seemed a small price to pay for independence, particularly compared to the Russian Federation’s violent refusal to release Chechnya.

Reverse Migration

The mostly Russian districts of Narva and Sillamäe attempted to secede from Estonia in mid-1993, falsely expecting the Aliens Act to revoke the right to residency. The secessionist referenda were rejected as unconstitutional, however, and Narva and Sillamäe remain Estonian territory.

Estonian independence caused a portion of the country’s Russian-speaking population to panic. Political leaders, agitators in charge of boosting morale and production at the Soviet factories, informed their employees that Estonian independence would be bad for Russian workers. One Ukrainian-Estonian remembers hearing, ‘They will massacre you. You need the protection of the Soviet Regime.’ ... Soviets purposely terrified the Russian-speakers to try to keep control. The whole thing was miscalculated.

In 1991, there were 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the borders of the Russian...
Figure 113
Proposed green space in Saarinen’s 1913 plan (Figure 91) is largely preserved by the 2000 plan. The difference in shape of the Paljassaare preserve resulted from emergent land area. Note particularly Kopli Poolsaare, Merimets, the Tallinn Zoo, Järve, and the two waves of green formed by Kadriorg and Maarjamäe.

Federation, of which 3 million returned to Russia. The wave of reverse migration peaked in 1994.\textsuperscript{206} The net emigration of non-Estonian workers and military families between 1992-1994 was substantial, at 54,900.\textsuperscript{207} At the critical junction, the Ukrainian-Estonian recalled:

\begin{quote}
Russians had it bad from both sides. There was this sense of deep, emotional panic.... Many Russians left their houses and apartments to seek the protection of Mother Russia. It turned out to be a catastrophic mistake.
\end{quote}

Recalling the fate of one Ukrainian-Estonian family that returned to Ukraine, she continued:

\begin{quote}
The father was absolutely heartbroken over the lost opportunities that his sons would’ve had here in Estonia.\textsuperscript{208}
\end{quote}

The Russian-speakers who chose to stay in Estonia seemed to be those who were less...

\textsuperscript{206} Hill & Gaddy 2003: 178
\textsuperscript{207} Raukas 1996: 21
\textsuperscript{208} Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
vulnerable to Soviet propaganda, less dependent on Soviet industry, or more connected to Estonia through private social networks. The last Soviet troops withdrew from Estonian soil in August 1994 (see Figure 161). Tallinn was restored as the capital city of a sovereign state, and as such was eager to shrug off the legacy of Soviet central planning.²⁰⁹

The Second Period of Independence: 1991-Present

The world was quick to recognize the restored Baltic republics. Although the rest of the world generally viewed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as a single block, historically the three countries had “little in common except their Soviet past.”²¹⁰ Throughout history, Estonia was culturally drawn to Scandinavian culture and policy, while Latvia and especially Lithuania were more closely linked with central Europe. Estonia tried to distance itself from its neighbors in the early post-Soviet period, fearing that slower political and economic transformations in Latvia and Lithuania could slow down Estonia’s ascendency to the EU.²¹¹ Latvia and Lithuania, for instance, allocated 4- and 6-year transition periods to the free market.

‘Shock Therapy’

In Estonia, the most rapid change occurred in 1990-1994.²¹² In the first years of independence, Estonian politics were volatile and unstable. Several key officials were forced to resign after votes of no confidence. According to a political scientist,

... a number of the specific legacies from the communist era – such as the lack of a genuine civil service tradition, fragmented personnel management, and underdeveloped foreign relations skills – ... constituted the real substance of administrative incapacity during the mid 1990s.²¹³

²⁰⁹  Feldman 1999: 4
²¹⁰  Feldman 1994: 104
²¹¹  Pettai 2003: 6
²¹²  Laar 2002: 17
²¹³  Pettai 2003: 9
Figure 117
1929 map shows industry in Tallinn.

Figure 118
1920 map of Tallinn shows regular, rectangular blocks, in Kristiine, containing the haphazard growth that accompanied industrialization.

Figure 119
1939 plan incorporates Kristiine's property lines into the street grid.
“Very high levels of uncertainty, ambiguity and fluidity”\textsuperscript{214} similarly plagued urban development. From 1993-1998, however, Estonia earned its title ‘the little country that could,’ as a set of radical measures known as ‘shock therapy’ was introduced to stabilize and privatize the economy.\textsuperscript{215} Progress, however, was bought at a long-term social price, according to one specialist:

\begin{quote}
The ability to initiate and sustain [economic] ‘shock therapy’ can be attributed at least partly to the political marginalisation of the Russian-speaking settler community, the group which had the most to lose from the transition to a market economy.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

The prevalent fear at the time was that a conservative Russian constituency could block a rapid economic transition, because it was Russian-speakers that stood to lose in the shift to an Estonian-centered state.\textsuperscript{217} Poland pioneered ‘shock therapy’ in 1990, and several post-Soviet economies also sought to “first to demolish the communist structure and then to erect a market economy on the cleared site.”\textsuperscript{218} Massive economic and political restructuring allowed Estonia to make the transition to a free market quickly. Estonians were able to cope with the economic transition with the same mechanisms that had gotten them through the bread lines and shortages of the Soviet occupation, including household plots and social networks.

Russia, burdened by its much greater geographical expanse, population of 147 million, and a more stubborn adherence to the legacy of central planning, found the transition to capitalism difficult. In 1994, Russia was subject to $10-20 billion in capital flight\textsuperscript{219} and remained burdened by a business culture that “tended to automatically discriminate against outsiders.”\textsuperscript{220}

In contrast, the economic situation in Estonia began to improve already in 1993, partly as the result of 80-90% foreign investment. Estonia’s heaviest foreign investors are Sweden and Finland,

\begin{itemize}
\item 214 Feldman 1999: 21-22
\item 215 Smith 2002: xiv
\item 216 Smith 2002: xv
\item 217 Pettai 2003: 5
\item 218 Freeland 2005: 33
\item 219 Freeland 2005: 97
\item 220 Freeland 2005: 82
\end{itemize}
and Finland became Estonia’s largest trading partner. Significant exports in 1994 included: foodstuffs, textiles, machinery, equipment, timber, and furniture. Real estate, retail and wholesale trade rose in economic importance.  

‘The Eastern Neighbor’

In Estonia, conflicts with ‘the eastern neighbor,’ were ongoing, most visibly in the first few years of independence. Russia accused Estonian of violating human rights by requiring Estonian language competency as a condition of citizenship. This led to international criticism and provoked the interest of organizations like the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), although in the end Estonia’s policies were judged acceptable by various teams of Western observers. Furthermore, in 1992, Russia stopped fuel exports to Estonia, provoking a fuel crisis that jeopardized Tallinn’s heating and public transport as well as vital services throughout the nation. Finally, in 2001, when 14% of Estonia’s transit trade was with Russia, ‘the eastern neighbor’ banned the import of Southeast Asian goods through Estonia to protect the interests of Russian business.

Post-Soviet Economic Development

By 1993, Estonia not only had the highest standard of living of any former Soviet Republic, but also a per capita income 40% greater than the former Soviet Union average. The inflation rate in 1992 was almost 1000%, but by 1995 was reduced to 29%. The average monthly income per household member continued to increase by 39% in 2000-2004, from 2183 EK to 3029 EK ($176 to $245). By 2005, the monthly income per household member reached 3578 EK ($289), with the average gross monthly wage at 9259 EK ($748). Wages in Tallinn are about 20% higher than in the rest of Estonia.

Figure 121
Historic wooden row houses in Põhja-Tallinn were built in the early 1900s.

Figure 122
Estonia joined NATO and the EU in 2004, which “significantly strengthened Estonia’s security”\textsuperscript{228} and economic development. The three Baltic countries regained a “clear and acknowledged place in the construction of Europe”.\textsuperscript{229} Estonia was the first former Soviet republic recommended for admittance to ‘fast track’ negotiations for EU membership.\textsuperscript{230}

Communism left the eight countries that joined the European Union in 2004 (the Accession 8, or A8) with a significant economic gap to close, and Estonia was eager to catch up. Despite their combined population of 74 million, the A8 initially contributed only 5\% to the EU’s overall GDP, and the cost of labor in the A8 was just 18\% of the EU-15 average.\textsuperscript{231} Because of Estonia’s economic growth and stability, Tallinn has been a gateway for several foreign banks’ development campaigns in the Baltic.\textsuperscript{232} Estonia’s economic success can be attributed partly to its small size and favorable location for trade, according to one economist-historian team:

\begin{quote}
The easier it is to exchange and the more trade there is, the greater the degree of specialization is possible and, therefore, the more productive the citizens can be. Complex exchange is virtually synonymous with a high level of economic development…. The mere fact of being located in a dense region makes economic activity more productive.\textsuperscript{233}
\end{quote}

**Adaptation of New Technology**

In Estonia, foreign investment and a willingness to embrace innovative technology contributed to the atmosphere of entrepreneurship. In 1998, a *Financial Times* survey called Estonia “Europe’s purest free market economy” enjoying “the thrill of the laissez faire.”\textsuperscript{234} In 2006, Estonia’s GDP rocketed to $23.93 billion.\textsuperscript{235} The eagerness to bypass intermediate measures and move straight to the most innovative technologies has made Estonia one of the most wired countries in the world and contributed to a boom of new

\textsuperscript{228} http://www.vm.ee/eng/nato/kat_359/1006.html
\textsuperscript{229} Pettai 2003: 1
\textsuperscript{230} Smith 2002: xi
\textsuperscript{231} http://www.fedee.com/accession1.shtml
\textsuperscript{232} Tallinn City Enterprise Board 2004: 5
\textsuperscript{233} Hill & Gaddy 2003: 11-16
\textsuperscript{234} Financial Times 1998, cited in Feldman 1999: 239
\textsuperscript{235} http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonia
IT businesses; for instance, Estonia recently received international attention for Skype, the Internet phone service now based in Tallinn. A mobile parking system was developed locally to allow drivers to pay for parking with cellular phones.\textsuperscript{236} The first electronic local elections have been held. Many Estonians who had never held a checking account moved straight to internet banking; 98\% of Estonia’s bank transactions are now performed electronically.\textsuperscript{237}

\textbf{Pension Plan Reform}

Pensioners formed the only society sector in Estonia that was hard-hit by economic reform (see Figures 162a-d). According to the Financial Times Moscow bureau chief,

\begin{quote}
This was the generation that had made huge personal sacrifices to build the Soviet Union. Now, in its twilight years, it was suffering the double indignity of a decline in an already modest standard of living and a loss of the spiritual compensations of living in a great power.\textsuperscript{238}
\end{quote}

A Ukrainian-Estonian elaborated,

\begin{quote}
Older people might long for the social benefits of the Soviet state, but they all understand that it is better for the younger generation now. They are not nostalgic.\textsuperscript{239}
\end{quote}

Estonia was required, by the European Commission’s 2000 Agenda, to reform its pension program.\textsuperscript{240}

\textbf{Land Reform}

Land reform in the early 1990s was designed to restore land to its former (pre-WWII) owners or subsequent tenants. Until 1993, non-residents were allowed to rent land under 33-, 66-, or 99-year leases, but not to purchase it.\textsuperscript{241} The confusion over privatization and land restitution took several years to untangle, and in some cases resulted in bitter feuds among inheritors.\textsuperscript{242}
many, perhaps even most, cases, the rightful property owner had been long dead, deported, or exiled. With several claimants vying for the same property, the whole transformation of land ownership was befuddling. Even if the rightful owners (or their descendents) could be located, in some cases residents had made significant improvements or even added new buildings after Soviet expropriation. In cases where the return of a parcel was not practical, the government offered an equivalent property instead. As of 2005, 47.8% of Tallinn’s territory remained “un-reformed state-owned land.”

As one scholar commented:

> There is little benefit in trying to grasp the post-socialist transformations through the old dualisms of private/public, market/hierarchy or capitalism/socialism because the emerging institutions and organizational arrangements blur those dichotomies.

Only 9.1% of Tallinn is municipally owned. Independence and the free market have changed how planning works “completely and truly, in all areas,” according to the Head of the City Planning Office. By retaining so little of Tallinn’s territory as municipal land, city planning became a matter of private property. Tallinn didn’t hold back much public property during privatization, and later ran into trouble trying to reconcile multiple stakeholders in drafting the 2000 masterplan. According to the Head of the City Planning Office,

> The issue of private vs. public property is a very political question, in Tallinn.

As in the rest of Eastern Europe, 50 years of Soviet occupation initially gave “all forms of planning a bad name.” In the first years of independence, rapid political flux and economic concerns took precedence over long-term planning.
Post-Soviet Sources and Influences of Power within Tallinn

Most of the dust of political and economic turmoil settled in Estonia in the first decade after independence. Growing but nebulous class distinctions contributed to the emergence of a new ruling elite, estimated as including about 1000 members. \(^\text{249}\) In new Russia, in contrast, the economy was dominated by an oligarchy of only a handful of members. \(^\text{250}\) In addition, many émigrés returned from abroad to make contributions to the restored republic, spearheading Estonia’s ‘Return to Europe’ in academia, government and business.

### Sensitivity to Corruption

Russia was less able to efface central planning’s twin economic and political legacies. Russia continues to be plagued by “a nonmarket distribution of labor and capital”, \(^\text{251}\) and President Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election was transparently manipulated. While Yeltsin’s “steely lieutenants…. thought the new Russia too fragile for Western morals and manners”, \(^\text{252}\) sensitivity to corruption remained high in Estonia. According to an employee of the foreign relations office,

> There is less corruption in Estonia than in Russia because the country is smaller; everyone knows everyone else. \(^\text{253}\)

One example of zero tolerance is drunk driving by politicians, an offense for which public servants are not only thrown out of office, but also expelled from their party. Another Tallinn politician was expelled for letting a family member use a government apartment. The rapid-fire frequency of votes of no confidence, however, faded from the political sphere early in the post-Soviet period. Confidence and political stabilization led to the dominance of the Center Party, and, in Tallinn, the election of the youngest mayor in the European Union (Jüri Ratas, age 27). Young people were often successful in post-Soviet political and
economic spheres, because they “had come of age late enough to be almost unscarred by the Soviet experience” and were generally perceived to have less potential for corruption (see sidebar). Estonia’s former Prime Minister Mart Laar was 32 when he took office.

**Inter-Ethnic Politics**

The Center Party’s success was based, in part, on its platform emphasizing the need for inter-ethnic cooperation. The involvement of the Russian minority in ruling Central Party politics was a marked change from shock therapy’s dependence on the marginalization of the Russian vote. Stateless persons are allowed to vote in local elections; Russian names appear on the ballot in all parties (although candidates are required by law to be proficient in Estonian). As a result, ethnically based parties and protest campaigns by aggrieved minorities are fading.

In Estonia’s Parliamentary democracy, town-planning decisions remained subject to the influence of local government, district councils, and the City Council (see Figure 163). Ultimately, the Supreme Court also plays a role in upholding planning law, which is regulated by the Law of Planning and Construction. Conflicts between developers and the city’s masterplan are mediated by district councils, in which neighborhood residents play an increasingly important role. Since 2004, the goals of the European Union have also permeated Estonia’s public planning policy.

**EU Membership**

While Estonia was somewhat hesitant to join the EU, popular referendum narrowly decided that the security of membership in a larger population (of 350 million) outweighed the cost of any reductions in autonomy. Furthermore, Estonia will be entitled to the support of EU structural funds until its GDP reaches 75% of the EU-25 average. A condition of EU support is policy

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254 Freeland 2005: 236
255 Quoted in Freeland 2005: 140
256 Sandercock: 144
257 Statistikaamet 2004: 63

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Vladimir Gusinsky, new Russian oligarch:

“I cannot say that I am an absolutely honest man, an example for everyone. Nor can any person who survived in this country before 1985, or who built great things after 1985. We all have things which we would not like to tell our children.”

Figure 130

*When Soviets bombed Tallinn from around 2 to 4 AM on the morning March 10th, they were careful to spare all centers of industry. The weigh-house in Town Hall Square burned in the night.*
integration, which has potentially significant implications for Tallinn town planning. Accession requires compliance with EU standards, and therefore increased spending on “infrastructure and environmental quality.”

Specifically, the EU’s European Commission considers sustainable development “a key dimension of solidarity, which is one of the core values of European integration.” There are a number of groups in Europe that actively promote sustainable development (see sidebar). In its Strategy for Sustainable Development, the European Commission emphasized four policy areas: “climate change, transport, public health, and natural resources.” Citing the need to address the increase in transport associated with GDP growth, the Commission stated that:

A sustainable transport policy should tackle rising volumes of traffic and levels of congestion, noise and pollution and encourage the use of environment-friendly modes of transport as well as the full internalisation of social and environmental costs.

Emphasizing the difference between ‘user pays’ and ‘polluter pays,’ the EC coined a catchphrase for internalizing costs: ‘Getting prices right’ (see sidebar). The EC emphasized structuring town planning through the availability and connectivity of public transport.

Post-Soviet Form and Meaning of the Physical City

Contrary to EC goals, new construction in Tallinn’s satellite suburbs, including Pirita and Nõmme, has been drastic in recent years (see Figure 164). Protected natural areas at the city’s borders have prevented much lateral expansion, but development has been rapid within the city limits. Neighborhood mini-malls, each featuring a supersized grocery, a smattering of accompanying

Groups in Europe promoting sustainable development:

Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign, International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Eurocities, The Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), The United Towns Organization (UTO), and the Commission de Villes de l’Europe.

“Getting prices right’ so that they better reflect true costs to society of different activities would give everybody the right incentive to integrate the effects their behaviour has on others into their everyday decisions about which goods and services to make or buy. It is therefore one of the most important tools available to policy makers.”

258 Kennen & Meade 2003: 5
259 Göke French, President of the Economic and Social Committee, quoted by European Commission 2002: 99
260 Beatty 2000
261 European Commission 2002: 12
262 European Commission 2002: 13
263 European Commission 2002: 88
264 Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
businesses and an expansive parking lot, have proved successful. The proliferation of car-driven commerce raises the proportion of ‘value-free landscapes’ and steals away some of the uniqueness [and boundaries] of Tallinn’s eight component districts. Parts of the road to Nõmme, for instance, look as if they could be anywhere in Scandinavia: with gleaming new shopping malls, Lexus and Toyota car dealerships, and the modern roadside generic-ness of an Ikea parking lot (minus the tram stop).

New construction in Tallinn very much emphasizes glass, even in the most unnecessary places, for instance, as a veneer over an older, restored building (see Figure 165). Having had LeCorbu stuffed down their throats once, Estonians seem to be craving high-rises without concrete. Eager to emulate Scandinavian aesthetics, Tallinners now favor modern architecture over Soviet monumentalism, which is not surprising since Scandinavian investment drives much of new construction. The blue-green sparkle of the new cluster of skyscrapers adjacent to Old Town (see Figures 166a-b) forms a sharp contrast to the stark concrete of the Soviet heyday. The rooflines of smaller buildings also present a before-after dichotomy, featuring either traditional steep geometry or prairie style flatness, but seldom anything in between (see Figure 167).

Rapid Growth

Under the assumption that the downtown area would house an increasing amount of office and retail space (up to 1.5 square meters per person), Tallinn’s 2000 town plan specifically directed new residential growth to Pirita, Lasnamäe and Haabersti. While some redevelopment has happened in Tallinn’s downtown, that epicenter of Estonian economic action (see Figure 168), the majority of new construction occurs in satellite suburbs. Pirita is a rapidly sprawling mass of single-family homes; the other areas targeted for expansion, Lasnamäe and Haabersti, are less popular. Separated from places of work, these two bleak Soviet-era neighborhoods are dominated
by huge high-rise housing developments (see 
Figures 169-170).

Lasnamäe is one relic of Soviet central planning 
that is overwhelming in scale, and houses almost 
a quarter of Tallinn’s population. While a few 
of the regimented high-rise apartment buildings 
have been renovated, for the most part buildings 
languish in various states of bleak disrepair: An increasing number of the apartments are 
now vacant: with virtually no workplaces, few 
schools, and the barest minimum of services 
and shopping, most residents try to move out. 
Lasnamäe houses more Russians than Estonians, 
but that would be hard to deduce from casual 
inspection; there is very little human activity to be 
seen. Recently, Finns have started to purchase 
apartments (especially in newer buildings with 
a view of the sea) to serve as a second home 
during their visits to Tallinn.

One of Tallinn’s most difficult post-Soviet legacies 
has been the misallocation of housing. Tallinn has 
expanded, despite a stable population, because 
its now wealthier residents want (and can afford) 
single-family homes. After 50 years of cramped 
living, the collective desire for privacy is almost 
over-powering, especially when combined with 
easier bank loans. During the Soviet occupation, 
young people often shared an apartment with 
their parents indefinitely; now this generation is 
setting up households of their own *en masse*. A 
small army of starter homes for new couples, for 
instance, has been constructed at the city's edge 
outside Haabersti, in a pattern of development 
that recalls the post-WWII period in the US.

**Transportation Problems**

The post-Soviet economic boom has resulted in 
amuch higher disposable income for Estonians, 
and for Tallinners in particular. In the first years 
of independence, Estonians rushed to replace 
the boxy Soviet-produced cars that dominated 
roads in the 1980s (see *Figures 171a-b*) with 
comparatively luxuriant models, such as the 
top-selling Peugeot, Toyota and Volkswagen.²⁶⁵ In 
2004, 32.1% of Estonians owned a car.
While in 2004 new companies own 89% of new cars in Estonia, the higher rate of car ownership, combined with the exodus to single-family homes in the suburbs, has increased traffic congestion. Estonian commuters are guilty of not only traveling alone in their cars, but, as one Tallinner expressed it, “Leaving only 5 minutes to get to work.” Thus, Tallinn faces considerable problems of urban sprawl and traffic jams – even in the absence of population growth (see Figure 172). As one American expatriate expressed it, Estonians are:

rushing headlong into western-style automobile dominated culture, almost as if they want to suffer LA-style gridlock as soon as possible.

Swedes have coined a term for the spreading and unnecessary reliance on automobiles: bilism. Tallinn’s plans to improve auto congestion are likely to attract even more traffic to widened roads (see Figures 173a-b). Congestion is an immediate sustainable development concern in the larger EU context, as central planning has left accession countries with higher carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP than the pre-2004 EU Member States.

The extreme concentration of Estonia’s economic activity within and around Tallinn, however, provides Harju County with the potential to pursue improvements in public transport. Existing transit systems include tram, trolley (electric bus) and ordinary bus lines servicing many areas of the city (see Figure 174), but changes in commuting patterns in recent years have left important gaps in transportation coverage. New construction in Pirita, for instance, has increased commuter pressure on the single arterial road leading to the city (see Figure 6B-b). Pirita is only peripherally connected to the city center and is served by city buses, but not by trams. New construction is not likely to achieve sufficient density to support extended rail transport.

In general, Tallinn’s private development shows the problematic tendency to collect in strips

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266 Statistikaamet 2004: 134
267 Personal communication, Karin
268 http://talesmag.com/rprweb/the_rprs/europe/estonia.shtml
269 European Commission 2002: 60
along major arterial roads. What used to be summer homes just west of Tallinn’s Haabersti district have, in recent years, been converted for year-round use. Commuters brave formidable traffic and distances as far as 40 km in order to enjoy the perks of rural living, in a paradoxical situation that is comparable to US rural residential development.

Tallinn resembles Swedish cities in the high proportion of apartments (usually privately owned) to single family housing: roughly 83% and 17%, respectively. However, Swedish cities are more deliberate in their expansion patterns, allowing new construction only at a density that preserves green space and can support new rail transport and neighborhood businesses. Tallinn has so far lacked the self-discipline to structure its growth around extensions in public transportation or ‘green wedges’ of open space.

Transit that connects to green space, a recurring theme in European town planning, is also not always adequately considered in the course of Tallinn’s open space improvements. The new, 3-million EEK ($242,000) beach added at Katariina Kai in Põhja-Tallinn, for instance, is only marginally served by the city’s bus network (see Figure 175). Tallinn’s new boom of construction makes it more important than ever that city resources be allocated with sensitivity and discretion.

**Tallinn’s 2000 Plan**

Facing these planning problems, Tallinn’s City Council approved a 2000 City Plan on 11 January 2001. The 2000 Plan was designed to meet the long-term development goals of greater Harju county. The Plan assumed little or no population growth, based on the low (and still falling) birth rate and increasingly elderly population. With population growth a non-issue, the Plan’s two main goals were:

*to accelerate the inflow of investments to improve the living environment of children and young people,*

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270  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
271  www.acrr.org/members/tallinn/
It is interesting to note that the economy merits first mention and as much emphasis as all other planning considerations combined. This is symptomatic of Tallinn’s shortsighted focus on economic restructuring, which in city planning seems to comprise a kind of collective irresponsibility.

Private Development

The effects of a laissez-faire attitude on planning can be demonstrated by the story of the development project Merirahu near Haabersti. Merirahu is nestled in an enviable location, on the shore of Kopli Bay, next to two highly popular green-space areas, Üismäe and Rocca al Mare (see Figures 176-177). The houses under construction in Merirahu display the wealth and expansive windows typical of new construction in Tallinn. The neighborhood’s lollipop cul-de-sacs, however, seem out of place against the nostalgic thatch-roof architecture of the adjacent Vabaõhumuseum (Open Air Museum, see Front Cover). Merirahu has been a source of civic contention since construction in the gated community resumed, after a 10-year delay, due to the bankruptcy of the original financier. Because the Kopli beachfront is susceptible to erosion and Merirahu blocks off public access to the shoreline, doubts linger, as to whether construction should have been allowed so close to the beach at all.
The acclaimed role of the 2000 Plan is to shape private development. Regulations control private development, a state of affairs that the city considers to be in private property owners’ best interests. In several cases, because of the privatization of property, the city has been forced to purchase land in order to preserve it for parks or other public use. For instance, privatization has put the city in a bind at the Botanical Gardens, where the descendants of the parks’ founder Konstantin Päts resent the public nature of what they would like to consider their private property. The city has even had to compensate private property owners in order to widen roads.

The 2000 Plan was intended to be flexible, but this could be a limitation:

*The Plan is not legally binding for private persons but is the basis for detailed planning... The Plan is very general in nature, reserving the possibility to react quickly and flexibly to changes in society.*

The risk remains that the 2000 Plan’s flexibility leaves the city vulnerable to reactive market forces, which push single-family housing with a single-mindedness reminiscent of post-WWII suburban development in the US. The echo from the 1950s is less surprising, perhaps, when one considers that WWII only recently ended for Estonians, with the final withdrawal of occupation forces in 1994. The American love affair with cul-de-sacs grew out of a post-WWII housing shortage coupled with the pressure of a cohort eager to produce a baby boom. Essentially, the lack of immediacy of war is what separates American cities from European ones. In contrast, Estonian suburbanization is unrelated to the immediate mass-production of offspring; yet the second primary goal of the 2000 Plan was to improve living conditions for children and young people.

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273  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning Office
274  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
275  Tallinna Üldplaneering 2000: 67
Balancing Social Infrastructure

Secondary goals touted by the 2000 Plan were: the need to balance the distribution of social infrastructure, diversifying residential structure, lightening auto traffic, and improving public transport. The inter-relatedness of these goals to the desire to improve living conditions for children and young people can be illustrated by the problematic shortage of daycare, which is privately funded.

In Tallinn, there are 500 families on the daycare waiting list, which translates to a 3-year wait (even for the mayor’s newborn daughter). Most daycare centers are small and household-based; although, with the successful introduction of a larger-scale daycare in Pirita, that trend may change (see Figure 178). Even when daycare does become available, it may mean – like much of life in Tallinn – driving across town.

With the separate school and social networks of Estonian and Russian families, young Russian-speakers complain they “don’t get a chance to practice Estonian.”276 One way to improve living conditions for young people would be to draw Estonian and Russian networks into more overlapping circles. To some extent, the city has started to do this with the addition of skate parks and other recreational facilities (see Figure 179-180). The city’s fondness for dropping new playground features into mysterious places (see Figures 181a-c) symbolizes the city’s desire for an equitable distribution of resources. However well-meaning, the city might consider more cost-effective improvements that better address Tallinn’s multi-ethnic youth.

As part of the call to diversify residential structure, the 2000 Plan suggested that summer cottage homes in popular suburbs be replaced with more compact reconstruction. This is similar to Swedish and Finnish infill suburban development in community garden areas and low-density residential areas. In Finland, for instance, extensive and continual redevelopment led one visitor to nickname Helsinki “the city with no history.”277

276 Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
277 Personal communication, Finnish citizen Jukka Karihtala
Restoring Historic Neighborhoods

The Plan also called for the protection of historic wooden suburbs. The 19th century wooden suburbs west of Old Town fetch high rents, due to their central location. Restoration of some buildings in the Põhja-Tallinn district is underway, but the neighborhood remains susceptible to fire (see Figures 182a-b). There are about 145 vacant, burnt-out units interspersed with inhabited row houses here and in the Kopli district, where homeless squatters often inadvertently set off new fires.278

The wooden row houses in Kopli were built for factory workers almost 100 years ago, but are now mostly boarded up and burnt out. Factories have closed down. Some of Tallinn’s worst crime happens in Kopli. Broken windows, gaping doors, and open dumping contrast sharply with expansive ‘million-dollar views’ of Tallinn’s bay. According to a city employee from the Public Relations department,

Those houses always belonged to the factories, until property restitution. The owners became the people living in them, and those people were seized by compulsion. The factories are all closed down, but these people have to stay... There are tens of thousands of people living in Kopli and the Paljassaare area, and no jobs... It’s an example of how property privatization has led to larger social problems.278

The situation is similar in other post-Soviet cities. According to post-Soviet urban researchers:

large industrial sites that were, during the socialist period, supposed to demonstrate economic strength declined in importance under the changed economic circumstances and are becoming increasingly derelict.280

Kopli, one of the poorest neighborhoods in Tallinn, occupies coveted waterfront land. The city is currently negotiating a proposal to allow new construction in the area, provided that the developer will take on the renovation of the wooden row houses.

278 Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
279 Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
Renovating Soviet-Era Housing

Planning for the renovation of neighborhoods is difficult. Property reform made most apartments the private property of their tenants. It is not uncommon to see completely renovated properties next to completely abandoned ones (see Figures 183a-d). Unclear property ownership can prevent restoration, as can residents who are unable or unwilling to organize. In order for a building to be renovated, owner-residents must first form a cooperative association, and then find a way to finance renovations.

Residents of the late 1960s district of Mustamäe, for instance, used a combination of private funds and bank loans to finance renovations, ambitiously hoping to transform their Soviet-era neighborhood "to the most prestigious multi-functional modern district of Tallinn." Renovations (at a cost of $141,000 - $179,000 per building) included changes to plumbing, insulation, external walls, windows, and district heating system. Technical problems accompanied the organization and financing of the project. According to the Chairman of the Tallinn-Mustamäe District Council,

... small incomes and rent arrears hinder the use of credit funds which are available to private owners. Social segregation... also appears as a serious problem because the different ethnic groups cannot easily arrive at a consensus for the renovation of their common housing buildings.
Even in the US, many high-rises have an expected lifespan of only 50 years. The rapid decay of Soviet structures built as late as the 1980s (e.g., Linnahall) brings into question whether demolition or refurbishment is the best choice for Soviet-era housing developments. Two design competitions for Lasnamäe have considered this question in Tallinn. A 1998 cooperation between Finnish and Estonian universities and ministries produced the neo-urbanist project, “Improvement of the Lasnamäe Residential District – Windows to the Future.” The winning entry of the 2003 European 7 international competition proposed “a daring new spatial order for all of Lasnamäe.” Unfortunately, these projects aren’t likely to inform municipal policy in the near future, given the city’s shortsighted tendency to rely on individual property owners to initiate change.

**Protecting Cultural Assets**

The 2000 Plan’s desire to improve the appearance of the city is interwoven with the city’s economic force: tourism. Tallinn’s Old Town is a bustling place where you know you ought to hang on to your wallet (see *Figures 184-187*). The disparity between Old Town’s tourist attractions and surrounding neighborhoods was succinctly summarized by one tourist, who asked in a back alley of the center city, “How do I get to Old Town – to the pretty part?”

The City Planning Office touts the effects of tourism as being entirely positive. Not only does tourism bring the city money, the Head of the City Planning Office Igor Volkov said, but there are an increasing number of “what we call quality tourists, those staying one night or more. It’s cultural tourism. The only real negative effect is that Old Town is completely full of tourists, making it crowded for our own people.”

The 2000 Plan recognized the importance of preserving cultural and historic assets that make Tallinn such a successful tourist attraction. The city claims fewer cars are allowed in Old Town than ever before, but since more Old Town residents own cars that number is likely
to increase. Historic preservation is controlled at both national and local levels (by the Muinsuskaitseamet [Historic Preservation Office] and Kultuurväärtusamet [Cultural Worth Office], respectively). District councils also enforce what buildings and structures must be preserved, and ensure that new construction does not detract from historic surroundings.

Furthermore, an archeological excavation is required for each new ground-breaking in the center city area. If excavation reveals findings of significant historic or cultural importance, construction must be stopped (see Figure 188). The city made a preemptive strike for preservation along Harju Street, prohibiting development over ruins from bombing during World War II. Construction was stopped for 10 years, during which time the presence of the ruins was explained to tourist passerby by a small, inconspicuous and rapidly rusting plaque.

The poignancy of collective memory faded, however, and Tallinners began to feel the ruins had been exposed for long enough. As plans for construction once again rushed to the fore, the city intervened a second time, this time by purchasing the property outright. The city drew fire for the great expense it incurred, but then hit upon a compromise. In June 2006, the city began covering the ruins back up again to use
the area as a park (see Figure 189). According to a representative of the PR office,

Not building in the area is a luxury, but a new prestigious park in Old Town is something that all citizens can appreciate.285

Promoting Investment

In another move calculated to both improve the appearance of the city and promote investment, the Plan proposed to relocate industrial shipping from the central city. Although the city’s view of port and rail transport might err in considering such traffic disruptive, broadening and diversifying the tourist zone could be beneficial. Within the next 6-7 years, city planners hope to move a portion of passenger ferry transport to what is now the industrial-shipping dock in Põhja-Tallinn. Presumably, channeling a portion of the city’s tourist traffic through this area (see Figure 190) could support new businesses in this area and help replace lost industrial jobs.

The 2000 Plan also targeted infill development of abandoned military and industrial sites, without explicitly addressing the mechanisms for financing remediation for brownfields (i.e., abandoned or under-used industrial or commercial sites that are contaminated, or perceived to be so). With the known history of contamination by Soviet military and industry, environmental concerns need to be more explicitly addressed.

Abandoned factories in Põhja-Tallinn attest to the de-emphasis of industry in Tallinn’s economy. Across Estonia there is a trend toward eliminating as many physical traces of Soviet rule as possible, as historic artifacts reflecting Communist rather than Estonian culture are not generally appreciated. The perception of contaminated land and industrial use as a Soviet after-product explains the eagerness to redevelop brownfield sites (see Figures 191a-b). City planners remain stymied by what to do with the industrial rail-yard in Haabersti, for instance, which introduces potentially dangerous quantities of chemicals and fuels close to Tallinn’s population center (see Figures 192-194).
Like abandoned industrial sites, demilitarized areas raise some concerns about possible contamination. Since the Soviet military mostly coastal open space areas, however, planners have worked to put these places back on the map of public space. This is in keeping with the final secondary goal of the 2000 Plan, the preservation and connection of green space.

One former military area is in Põhja-Tallinn, adjacent to several defunct industrial sites, and has been targeted for green space and for blue space. In Tallinn, parts of the demilitarized Paljassaaare have proved ecologically rich and of particular interest to ornithologists (see Figure 195). The area has been designated as a bird preservation area. (Tallinn’s other natural area is the Pirita River habitat preservation area.) With few open views of water available from the center of the city, the newly built public beach at Katariina Kai is a potentially important contribution to Tallinn’s park system.

Preserving Greenspace

Recently, a proposal was accepted to connect Pirta’s shoreline park with Kadrior, Lillepipark and green space further east to create a national park within the city. Tallinn’s Lahemaa Rahvuspark would be similar in scale to Stockholm’s National Urban Park (NUP), which connects 27 km² of greenspace through Ulriksdal-Haga-Brunsviken-Djurgården. Finland has similar NUPs in Hämeenlinna/Tavastehus and Pori/Björneborg, and another proposed for Helsinki (Helsinkkipuisto).

As many of the large-scale Communist collective farms have fallen out of agricultural use, the percentage of forest land-cover in Estonia has increased. Abandoned agricultural lands can result in reduced biodiversity, however, with the succession of weedy forest species, and in reduced “environmental and amenity value.” The Keskkonnaamet [Environment Office] is ultimately responsible for deciding what natural areas can and can’t be developed. The Keskkonnaamet brings environmental considerations into the

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286 Schantz 2006: 159
287 Schantz 2006: 159
288 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
289 European Commission 2002: 68
city’s masterplan, deciding when environmental assessments are necessary and identifying areas of particular ecological importance. The deputy mayor in charge of parks also influences which parks get renovated, and how.

In a sense, the preservation of green space has been one of the more easily implemented aspects of the 2000 masterplan. As a result of Soviet occupation, Tallinn’s pre-WWII park structure was essentially frozen in time: when property was privatized, areas that had been public in 1940 automatically became city property once more.

Emphasizing the preservation of coastal areas and parks, the 2000 Plan suggested that areas of ‘environmental conflict’ within the city also needed to be duly considered. However, the Plan targeted many potentially sensitive wetland areas for development (see Figure 196). With about one quarter of Estonia covered by wetlands and half by forest, this problem may have seemed almost unavoidable – as well as typical of the European condition. According to the European Commission,

\[ \text{a large percentage of all nature conservation sites in Europe can be considered at risk from new infrastructure development.} \]

**Improving Transportation**

The City Planning Office’s primary concern at present is transportation. In order to lighten auto traffic and improve public transport, the 2000 Plan called for existing bus and streetcar networks to be augmented by new streetcar lines and bicycle routes. However, it is unclear when these improvements will be built. More bicyclists brave the scenic highway route along the coast west of Tallinn than city streets and bike paths, despite the promise of new bike trails like the one being constructed along Lõuka Street linking Paldiski Mantee to the Vabaõhumuuseum. This is partly because Tallinn’s bike paths often coincide with major automobile routes, leading to conflicts of interest (see Figure 197). Pedestrians enjoy more rights than they do in some European streets, with perhaps one in five Estonian

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290 Personal communication, Tiina Tallinn, City Landscape Architect
291 European Commission 2002: 67
drivers remembering to stop for pedestrians at crosswalks. Nevertheless, negotiating traffic, even on foot, can be problematic.

The city needs 3 million EEK (\$242,000) to begin implementing planned expansions of public transit. The incredible rate of tourism seems like an obvious funding source for transportation infrastructure improvement, as tourists themselves would stand to benefit immediately. However, at present, money from tourism only benefits the city indirectly. Of the 3 million tourists who visit Tallinn each year, 1.4 million stayed at least one night in the city, and the average spending per tourist was 250 Euros (\$319), mostly on hotels, bars, casinos, and restaurants.

However, there remains no city or national tax or entrance fee that is extracted from tourists directly, even though the massive amount of tourism is bound to impact the city's historic assets over time. Improving transportation infrastructure in Tallinn would benefit both residents and tourists. When I asked the Head of the City Planning Office if he had considered an increased sales tax or an entrance fee to fund public transit, his response was, “That’s not a city planning problem. The Ehituseamet (Construction Office) deals with tourism.”

Because the hub of Tallinn’s industry was sited in a convenient location for the Russian tsars, all of Tallinn’s heavy transportation, both trucks and trains, get squeezed through the isthmus of the center city (see Figures 198a-c). “It’s almost impossible to strengthen the transportation infrastructure in this area: Lake Ülemiste is in the way,” the Head of the City Planning Office pointed out. Industrial shipping can’t be moved closer to the city’s drinking water reservoir because of environmental concerns, and private property owners south of the lake are determined to block a new railroad, in a perfect example of NIMBY-ism. (NIMBY stands for Not In My Back Yard.) While that rail line is drawn on the city masterplan, in practice the city will have to purchase the land and the dispute will probably take years.
Right-of-way corridors that have been left undeveloped, by definition, run through natural areas. The Head of the City Planning Office explained that Nõmme’s corridor cuts through:

where people want to ski. The city can’t do anything about it. It doesn’t matter where you want to build roads, there are always protests.

The cultural value attached to undeveloped, rural areas is significant, although sometimes not evoked until the first construction equipment appears on site. For instance, when a road improvement crew began work near Rapla, a neighbor came tumbling out of her house to stop it. The old woman protested that construction would disturb a pre-Christian sacrificial stone that apparently other locals had forgotten about. Authorities supported the pensioner’s account, and the crew modified construction plans in order not to disturb an object of such archaeological and cultural significance. This account demonstrates the importance of consulting with local residents well in advance of transportation improvement projects.

The national government does not help Tallinn fund its city transportation improvements. Similarly, funds from the EU are earmarked for more transportation at the regional level: “EU funding sources need to decide whether roads end in Tallinn or whether they end in the state.” Money has already been privately invested in Paljassaare’s redevelopment, which investors will want back if they can’t build. According to the Head of the City Planning Office Igor Volkov:

“Transit lines will have to be expanded, and the railroad will have to be moved... it should be the responsibility of the investors, to move people. They should have to pay for the road and transit improvements that make redevelopment possible…. That’s how they do it in Finland, Germany, and Holland. Developers must compensate the city for the new buses, tramlines, parks and roads that will be required by the people who live there.”

Estonia is “a small country, with small problems,” but also a country with limited financial resources. “For the city, it can be hard to get money together,”

296  Personal communication, Ain Haas
297  Personal communication, Igor Volkov, Head of the City Planning Office
298  Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
Volkov explained. By January 2007, the city will purchase 7 new trolley-buses and 20 ordinary buses, but the city needs about three times its current budget (4,500,000 EEK, $363,000) to make substantial transportation improvements. When asked which initiatives of the 2000 plan had been funded, the Head of the City Planning Office said, “There are so many to go, but at least the foundation is in place.”

Post-Soviet Public Policy and Urban Development

“A city’s masterplan is never a finished piece of paper.”

– Igor Volkov

On 19 May 2005, a new Regional Development Strategy for the greater Tallinn area came into effect. A refinement of the 2000 city masterplan, the 2005 Strategy addresses some unresolved questions in finer detail. The Strategy included new restrictions to control the height of buildings, more detailed plans for Paljassaare Reserve and Kakumäe Port, and sought to address parking and transportation problems. “The 2005 Strategy is just a continuation, a collection of documents which make the 2000 Plan more precise.”

New ‘community’ boundaries also break the city’s eight districts into more manageable pieces.

Tallinn’s 2005 Strategy

The main purpose of the 2005 Strategy was to guarantee “sustainable development for each region” through 2015. Identified goals included keeping the population of Harju County below 41% of Estonia’s total population; keeping Northern Estonia’s contribution to the national GDP less than 70%; maintaining an employment rate of at least 45% in all counties; and equalizing incomes so that the lowest living...
standard in any county is at least 61% of the highest county’s living standard.

As indicators of social cohesion and economic growth, these goals reflect some of the European Union’s measures of sustainable development. However, Estonia’s employment rate in 2004 was 56.8%: already in excess of the 45% goal, yet falling far short of the European Commission’s recommended 70% by 2010 and 75% by 2020. Similarly, in 2004 Harju County held 38.6% of the nation’s population and contributed slightly more than half of the nation’s GDP – i.e., well under the 2015 limits.

As for social cohesion, Harju County’s average monthly income was 17% higher than the national average in 2004 (at 3558 EEK / $287). Across Estonia, the wealthiest 20% of the population earned 6 times as much as the poorest 20%. This has implications for viability of rural life in Estonia, where the agricultural infrastructure, if typical of other accession states, “has suffered from many years of under-investment.” In Estonia, the poverty level was defined as a monthly income below 2161 EEK ($174) in 2004.

Focusing on these concerns, the Regional Development Strategy offers no additional provisions for long-term environmental protection. The European Commission recommended that local initiatives form integrated development strategies “for urban and environmentally sensitive areas.” It seems that, in face of burgeoning post-Soviet economic growth, Estonia has over-emphasized economic considerations in the sustainable development goals, which would reflect a bygone attitude in the rest of Europe. According to the European Commission, sustainable development used to be dismissed as a “luxury” that should not be bought at the expense of economic growth.

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305 measured as average household income divided by the number of household members.
306 Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 17
307 Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 17
308 European Commission 2002: 41
309 European Commission 2002: 82
310 Servinski & Kivilaid 2005: 13
311 European Commission 2002: 38
312 European Commission 2002
313 European Commission 2002
314 European Commission 2002

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Figures 162a-d
Pensioners have been hard-hit by market reforms.
Because of Tallinn's administrative structure, urban planning is influenced by the municipal government, district councils, and the City Council.

Figure 164
Tallinn is divided into eight city districts.
Public Participation

Sustainable development requires “good governance and active public participation.” However, Estonians during the Soviet occupation learned not to draw attention to themselves in the public arena. Many of the apartments in Tallinn date back to an era when an overheard conversation could spell arrest and deportation; consequently, apartment doors often feature padded insulation or an air space to deaden noise. During the Soviet occupation, according to the Financial Times Moscow bureau chief, social interaction was governed by a Soviet perversion of the Golden Rule: inform on your neighbor because he is certain to inform on you. The Soviet Union had been a culture of uravnilovka, literally leveling out, a term for the party’s policy of making sure no individual light shone too brightly against the backdrop of the collective.

With padded doors as an every day reminder of the dangers of sticking out in a crowd, it has taken time for public participation to redevelop in Estonia. Public participation has continued to grow, as a democratic process, particularly at the city district level and in the form of neighborhood associations. In neighboring Russia, the “lack of civil society” has been the “most poisonous [Soviet] inheritance.”

Urban Redevelopment

A high rate of public ownership of land can contribute to strong city control over the development process, as in Helsinki, where one half of the land is owned by the city. “Helsinki has it easier because the Swedish monarchy gave the city its public land as a present,” said City Landscape Architect Tiina Tallinn. According to one sociologist, Among the post socialist countries, Estonia is the only one with a really close connection with the Nordic countries, and this is likely to make local planning in Estonia different from the rest of Eastern Europe. As a paradoxical twist to the Scandinavian flavor, the Nordic style social
democracy is much criticized in political and business circles at present.\textsuperscript{321}

Urban redevelopment in Tallinn has so far been supported mostly by Scandinavian investment. Redevelopment is financed by a spectrum of public-private partnerships (PPPs), in which the city pays for planning and contributes a share to larger projects. The city also finances some new parks through public-private partnerships. Jüriöö Park, for instance, was initiated by a 1,000,000 EEK ($80,736) investment by a private developer, who made a municipal gift of the land across from his new hotel on the condition that it remains a park. The site turned out to have historic significance as a battleground from the 1918-1920 Estonian War of Independence. The city allocated 10,000,000 EEK ($807,363) to develop the park accordingly, and now the site serves as a kind of counterpoint to the 1918 Soviet memorial at Marjamägi (see Figures 199-200).\textsuperscript{322}

**Greenspace Expansion**

Lasnamäe, for example, has a shortage of useable green space despite the trampled areas left between buildings. In fact, the only community green space of note is near Sikupilli, which until last year served as an informal dumping ground for old tires and other trash. The area was preserved from development by an ordinance protecting sightlines to a neighborhood lighthouse. A recent clean-up has been successful, and while Lasnamäe residents already brave the polluted waters for swimming, the area has been slated for a more extensive clean-up and redesign (see Figures 201-202). A proposal is on the table to finance the project through a public-private partnership that would allow some new construction at the proposed Pae Park’s edges, in exchange for financing the costs of green space clean-up.

In another public-private partnership, the city solved the problem of how to fund 100,000 EEK ($8,073) renovations for Linnahall through an unusual agreement. A private developer will renovate Linnahall out-of-pocket, beginning in

\textsuperscript{321} Blom 1996, cited in Feldman 1999: 238
\textsuperscript{322} Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
While the city's masterplan dictates which natural areas are not suitable for development, the city usually must purchase these lands in order to create public parks. New park construction is an open, public process; the city collects construction bids and then enforces development according to the masterplan. The city considers four aspects when planning parks development and restoration: ecological/natural value, cultural value, stakeholder interests, and social factors. A fifth concern, economic viability, "really controls and combines the other aspects."

Proposed development along the Pirita River corridor, for instance, caught the city's attention due to the ecological importance of the area. The river corridor has since been designated as a nature conservation park. For the most part, though, the city's green space focus in the post-Soviet era has been on park restoration in the last five years. Working with existing public spaces, the city is developing an interconnected park system and expanding its bicycle trail network. Two greenways are proposed through Lasnamäe to increase access to Tondiraba Park.

Another municipal parks project involves the former military base at Aegna Island, less than 10 minutes from the mainland at Viimsi by motorboat. While Aegna Island has already been designated a national preserve, the city has recently stepped in. Aegna Island already accommodates a number of children's summer camps, and the city is renovating a building to serve as a community center (see Figures 203-205) to allow all of Tallinn’s schoolchildren to visit the island reserve in classroom groups.

Post-Soviet Population Change and Ethnic Relations

In 2002, the number of ethnic Estonians in Estonia remained lower than in 1939, and the life expectancy at birth remained no higher than
in 1957. Population losses from WWII and Soviet immigration left Estonians in 2004 at risk for disappearing altogether if fertility did not increase, according to the Statistics Office.

**Population Replacement**

In 1996, Estonia's infant mortality rate was twice that of Scandinavia, and the average life expectancy was still decreasing. The life expectancy in Estonia hovered 10 years lower than the European average (see sidebar). While Estonia's birth rate from 1975-1980 averaged 2.1 children per woman, the figure required for a stable population, by 2003 the birth rate fell to 1.2. Across the EU, falling birth rates were attributed to social and cultural change, and transitions were particularly rapid in Estonia.

Tallinn and other Estonian cities experienced the biggest change in fertility rates, leading to town planners' assumptions of little or no population growth. Slow generational replacement may have led to 'higher well-being' for individuals, but the decline in fertility jeopardized population replacement. According to Estonia's Statistics Office:

> The following three or four years will show whether the fall in fertility reflects an actual change in behavioural patterns or the effect of timing, i.e., fertility aging. Whatever the reasons, the trends have led to formation of a demographic wave, which will peak at the end of the 2010s, bringing about problems in all spheres of society.... It is up to the cohorts of the 1970s and younger to decide how serious of a blow the past decades have been to population replacement.

**The Gender Gap**

Lower birthrates could be related to increasing involvement (especially of women) in higher education. Employment is highly correlated

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325 Laar 2002: 37
326 Statistikaamet 2004: 16-17
327 Raukas 1996: 22
328 Freeland 2005: 16
330 Statistikaamet 2004: 13
331 Statistikaamet 2004: 15
with education in Estonia, where less than 6% of the unemployed had higher than secondary education. Over 30% of Estonian 20-somethings had obtained some 'tertiary' education in 2001, a rate significantly exceeded only by Finland, Sweden, and Latvia.

Women in particular are likely to find increased education to their advantage, as the wage differential decreases in occupations with a higher proportion of highly educated women (see Figure 206). One of the human-rights breaches identified by the Agenda 2000 of the European Commission was an "insufficient implementation of gender anti-discrimination laws." The wage difference is most extreme for unskilled laborers, where females earn 40% less than their male counterparts. According to Estonia’s Statistics Office,

Women seem to see higher education as a possibility for securing their participation in the labour force and diminishing differences at workplace and in pay that result from hidden gender discrimination.

**Ethnic Minorities**

Ethnic minorities also appear to be taking advantage of the higher educational system. Ethnic Estonians have a slightly lower education level than the national average, as Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Germans, and many minorities are more highly educated. Finns, Byelorussians and Lithuanians, however, have relatively low levels of education.

Only 53.7% of the population of Tallinn was ethnically Estonian in 2005 and in 2002 about 19% of the Estonian population remained non-citizens. Even in 2004, 35% of the population remained first- or second-generation immigrant. This proportion is remarkably high, when compared to other European countries.

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332 Statistikaamet 2004: 23
333 Statistikaamet 2004: 22. The increased interest in education may be a result of employers’ distrust of the newly shortened (3-year) baccalaureate programs.
334 Gelazis 2003: 65
335 Statistikaamet 2004: 23
336 Statistikaamet 2004: 23
337 Statistikaamet 2004: 23
338 Tallinn: Facts and Figures 2005
339 Jeffries 2004: 135
340 Statistikaamet 2004: 16
The large number of ethnic immigrants in Estonia, left behind by the withdrawal of the Soviet state, has the potential to help stabilize the population’s size and tax base and compensate for Estonians’ low birth rate and aging population. The post-Soviet condition in Estonia is unusual in that the Soviet source of ‘colonists’ essentially admitted the illegality of its actions when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was rescinded in 1991. Immigrants in Estonia found themselves on somewhat uncertain terms. The potential for violent inter-ethnic conflict was, for the most part, bypassed by Estonia’s relatively gentle transition to independence and ongoing wariness of ‘the eastern neighbor.’ Estonia’s policy towards Soviet-era settlers, however, was a major point of controversy during post-communist development. According to Estonia’s Statistics Office, this illustrates the underlying tension between the desire for membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions and the project of restoring a sovereign nation-state.341

Even though Soviet-era immigrants wanted to continue the use of Russian in schools, business and government, legislative changes in the 1990s persuaded many post-WWII settlers to learn the Estonian language and take on a mixed “Slavic-Esto identity.”342 Applicants for citizenship were required to prove basic Estonian language competency. Similar policies were adopted in Latvia and Lithuania. All three Baltic countries granted automatic citizenship to pre-occupation residents and their direct descendants, but set forth more stringent requirements for naturalization.343 During its accession negotiations with the European Union, Estonia was criticized for not adopting a more accommodating policy for ethnic minorities. According to one specialist,

The biggest question mark over Estonia’s future development relates not to internal affairs but to the external situation, most notably the country’s problematic relations with Russia. Domestic policy towards the Russian-speaking settler population, for instance, rests largely on the contention that the ‘Eastern Neighbour’ poses an active threat to Estonian independence.344

341 Smith 2002: xiv
342 Clemens 2003: 24
343 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/H5W-03.htm
344 Smith 2002: xiv


**Citizenship Requirements**

To obtain citizenship, applicants were required to pass an exam on Estonian laws and constitution, in Estonian; which only 90,000 of a possible 500,000 non-citizens did between 1992-1997.\(^{345}\) Only Soviet-era immigrants who could prove they had supported Estonia’s independence movement between 1989-1991 were given automatic citizenship.\(^{346}\) Language competency exams and the prohibition of dual citizenship drew international attention and criticism. Language had been such a sore point during years of Soviet occupation that policy-makers remained obstinate in the language requirements for citizenship. Estonia’s Integration Foundation drew fire for “focusing primarily on the language aspect,” to the detriment of other concerns like education and employment.

The Baltic States were able to defend their citizenship requirements based on the 'effective link principle,' which acknowledges the need for some kind of link (often of birth, domicile, or residence) between the state and would-be citizen. The effective link principle allows successor states to deny citizenship to individuals who supported the previous state politically or militarily. According to Nida Gelazis, a scholar of Eastern European studies:

> This principle banished any attempts to criticise Baltic citizenship legislation on the grounds that former Soviet army, state or KGB personnel were prohibited from gaining citizenship... Given the history of Russian aggression in the Baltic States, Estonia and Latvia may be justified in demanding that ethnic Russians not only break their political ties to Russia, but also demonstrate a commitment to their adoptive countries.\(^{347}\)

The linguistic requirement was intended to identify Russian-speakers willing to make this commitment, and to differentiate them from immigrants and military who came to Estonia as the 'Soviet West,’ because:

> Many of the second-generation immigrants do not seem to be better integrated into the society of their new homeland, compared with their parents.\(^{348}\)

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\(^{345}\) Jeffries 2004: 133  
\(^{346}\) Gelazis 2003: 53  
\(^{347}\) Gelazis 2003: 55  
\(^{348}\) Statistikaamet 2004: 16
In 2000, Estonia’s parliament instituted a new 2000-2007 program for integration to strengthen social harmony and promote better understanding of minority cultures. As of June 2005, 139,000 people remained stateless in Estonia – 10% of the population. Most of these have declined offers of citizenship from the Russian Federation, preferring the uncertainty of statelessness to possible expulsion to Russia. Most stateless individuals found it difficult to obtain the free Estonian language instruction needed to pass the citizenship exam. According to the Council of Europe Information Office,

In Estonia, the number of stateless people who have obtained Estonian citizenship has been steadily increasing, but Estonia has not developed a consistent policy aimed at bringing the Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities together.

In 2004, the Law on Citizenship was amended to make it easier for children under 15 and people with disabilities to secure citizenship. Russian elementary schools began to provide basic language education in Estonian and by high-school minority children were expected to follow classes taught exclusively in Estonian. Educational reform has mandated that, by 2008, 60% of subjects after 10th grade will be taught in Estonian at all state schools. A compulsory language exam in secondary schools now satisfies the requirements for citizenship, making it easy for Russian youth to obtain citizenship.

Through the expanded pre-accession program PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) and other initiatives since, the EU reimbursed language course fees for older Russian-speakers seeking to learn Estonian, although these classes remain over-booked. Universities even offer language-immersion programs, in which Russian-speakers can study in their mother tongue for the first two years and then, in their third year, learn Estonian. Estonia’s Integration Foundation was founded to help organizations write grants for EU funding, and mediates language training.

349 Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
350 www.coe.ee/eng/?op=news&NID=55
351 www.coe.ee/eng/?op=news&NID=55
352 www.coe.ee/eng/?op=news&NID=55
353 Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
Clauses were included in the 2004 Criminal Code and Law on Employment Contracts prohibiting "incitement to hatred and discrimination" and employment discrimination based on race or ethnicity.\footnote{354} Ethnic Estonians have repeatedly emphasized that migrant Russians are welcome to stay in Estonia, provided that they learn to speak Estonian. The knowledge of the official language is, after-all, a condition of higher employment. According to a city employee,

Russian-speakers have the same job prospects as Estonians, except for language. It's not uncommon to see someone who's very well educated in Russian have to take a menial job... Estonian and English are really essential for a successful career: You have to know the state language... The knowledge of language is a tribute you pay to the country that is your homeland.\footnote{355}

Non-citizens are permitted to participate in local elections. However, as one Estonian put it, "Russians seem content to stick to their own."\footnote{356} A young Ukrainian-Estonian explained,

Some young Russians have inherited the same condescending attitude towards Estonians that their parents had. That attitude won't be able to persist in light of economic progress. Estonia is a cozy, safe and economically stable place to live. If you ask Russian-speakers how they feel about living in Estonia, they might tell you that they miss their own culture. But if you ask them if they want to go back to Mother Russia, they say, 'No, are we crazy?'\footnote{357}

The situation in post-Soviet Estonia raises the unique question, of how to assimilate a minority that was on its way to becoming a majority. Theoretically, an ethnic minority's sense of belonging should be based on a shared political community; an evolving national identity should promote ideas of democracy, political community and citizenship.\footnote{358} During the Soviet occupation, Russian-speakers had been, by and large, content with the status quo; in general, it is the ethnic minority, or 'other,' that resists and seeks change
in balance. Doubts about long-term population stability and Estonia's Soviet history make ethnic relations a touchy subject, but Tallinn's history as an ethnically complex merchant city suggests it will be equipped to assimilate the long-term presence of minorities. One sociologist pointed out:

Over a decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we should remember that there is nothing new about national minorities presenting a sensitive issue for relatively young states in Central and Eastern Europe. A cursory glance at inter-war history reminds us both that the matter is well-established and that the region has responded to it with creativity.

Migrant Swedes and Finns set a long-standing historical precedent as proponents of Estonian independence, and some Russian-speakers supported independence and transitions in the early post-Soviet period.

The Finnish Influence

Today, the streets of Tallinn are as polyglot as they must have been when the city was part of the Hanseatic League. In Old Town, Finnish, Swedish, German, Danish and Norwegian are nearly as common as Estonian and Russian, and there is even an occasional smattering of Japanese. Young Estonians often choose not to learn Russian in high school, focusing instead on English and Finnish as more economically applicable in their everyday lives.

The everyday influence of Finland in Tallinn is increasing steadily. Each year, more than 1.5 million Finnish tourists visit Tallinn, and 60 passenger connections, including ferry and air travel, link Estonia to Finland each day. Finnish tourists are uniquely “cheap shoppers,” and come to Tallinn to buy a wide range products and services. Estonians and Finns both sometimes call Tallinn a suburb of Helsinki. Doctor visits, prescription glasses, cosmetics, and alcohol are much cheaper in Estonia than in Finland. The low ferry fare from Helsinki (about 20 Euros, or
$25) and newly relaxed regulations concerning the import of Estonian alcohol guarantee a continuing Finnish presence in the center city. The alcohol tax in Finland is high enough that many Finns choose to purchase liquor and beer in Estonia, where cheaper brands of beer can be had for less than a dollar a bottle. Laws concerning the public consumption of alcohol are either lax or non-existent, and many tourists can be seen wandering in parks or streets with a vodka cooler or gin ‘long drink’ in hand. The sight of a trunk-load of alcohol on the return ferry to Helsinki has also become quite common. While Finns are prohibited from importing alcohol for resale, the concerns of border guards can easily be alleviated by an explanation involving an upcoming party or wedding. The often overly relaxed and carousing behavior of Finnish tourists in Tallinn’s streets has led to the slightly pejorative nickname of ‘reindeer.’

Estonian as an Official Language

While Finnish pervades Old Town, Russian and Estonian blend into one another in the rest of the city’s streets. With their closely related languages, Finns and Estonians can more or less understand one another. However, Russians and Estonians don’t even share an alphabet. The public disappearance of Cyrillic was almost immediate in the early post-Soviet period, and likely required sudden adjustments on the part of Russian minorities. Street signs, for instance, are now almost exclusively written in Estonian; the only visible bilingual exceptions seem to be made for street names that are didactic in nature (see Figure 207).

Estonian, with its murmuring vowels, is not the kind of language a person learns through casual contact, as inter-ethnic marriages attest. (One American woman, who has been married to an Estonian since 1969 and has two bilingual daughters, still can’t say, “Pass the milk.”)

Publicly, as well as officially, the language is Estonian, but in practice the two polarities of language twist in and around each other. Employees are
expected to have sufficient grasp of Estonian to be able to conduct everyday business in the state language; in practice, however, neighborhoods are so separated that a person who speaks only Russian can probably get by in a menial job with a minimal understanding of Estonian. It seems the particular domain of older shopkeepers to insist on using Russian for their business interactions – even in the face of persistent Estonian dialogue. Some older Russians remain unable (or unwilling) to speak Estonian. The effect of revised educational policies over the last 15 years has been a minority youth that’s fluent in Estonian, but still sometimes reluctant to speak it. The situation mirrors conditions during the Soviet occupation: with some elders unable to speak the official language, and some youth refusing to. As Russians joke, bitterly, about the 1993 ‘Aliens Act’:

‘We are creatures from Mars.’ Russians don’t like to be called aliens. It’s an unfortunate translation.365

One City, Two Towns

Ethnicity may not be visibly manifest, as race is in the US, but the Soviet policy of separate suburbs for new immigrants has resulted in “one city, two towns.”366 A once preferential policy has left minorities at a disadvantage today: socially excluded and distanced from the economic opportunities and business networks prevalent in Tallinn’s city center.

Progress towards multiculturalism occurs over multiple generations. Becoming multicultural is a long-term process, and requires the implementation of a bureaucratic framework for citizenship legislation, new ways of living together, and new forms of spatial and social belonging.367

The historically bloody relationship between Estonia and Russia, however, is likely to require sensitive handling for some time. Research indicates the repressive measures of the Soviet occupation will likely carry psychological consequences not only for survivors, but also their children and grandchildren as well – disappearing only in 2030-2040.368

365 Personal communication, Oksana Otsinnik
366 Personal communication, Madis Pihlak
367 Sandercock 2003: 136
368 Noor 2006: 59
Fortunately, Russian-speakers who chose to remain in Estonia probably shared Estonia’s intention to ‘return to Europe,’ even if only economically. Some Soviet-era immigrants had a social or cultural tie to place, after living in Estonia for 50 years. In Estonia hopes remain high that integration could be achieved in the next 10 years. An employee of the city Public Relations Office explained,

All it takes is one generation…. Estonia’s biggest trump is its stability. It’s not a matter of buying affection, but Russian-speakers will realize this is their home. They may claim that Russia is their heart and culture but, anymore, they understand Estonia better than Mother Russia…. Russians who live in Estonia are different from other Russians. The prospects for integration are not that poor.369

A corollary could be drawn between the situation in Tallinn today and in American cities in the late 1800s. A rapid turnover of power between Irish immigrants and earlier European colonists led to ethnic scuffling for a generation or two, especially in New York, Boston, and Chicago. Today, the fierce ethnic Irish identity manifests most publicly as a vague affinity for St. Patrick’s Day, and in pinching miscreants who fail to respect the holiday by wearing green.

The multiculturalism of European cities has increased with the EU’s more permeable national borders. The result has been a struggle of nations to maintain their identity, and a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments is some EU countries. The rising problem of xenophobia in some countries clashes with historic traditions of tolerance toward political refugees. In Sweden, for instance, planners admit that one shortcoming of the excellent public rail systems, such as in Göteborg, is the isolation of ethnic minorities and new immigrants in satellite towns connected to Swedish town and cultural centers only loosely. As in other countries, lower-income immigrants “tend to cluster in cheap housing, often on outlying suburban estates.”370 The self-sufficiency of Swedish suburban developments means that many new immigrant communities interact with ethnic Swedes very little.

369 Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
370 European Commission 2002: 57
A parallel situation exists today in Tallinn as an inheritance of Soviet central planning. Separation does not facilitate understanding: some Swedes perceive a dilution of social services associated with the acceptance of political refugees, and young Russian-speakers lament the lack of opportunities to practice Estonian.

**Sensitive International Relations**

Few countries have embraced an ideology of multiculturalism. The best examples – Australia, Canada, Singapore, and Malaysia – hold political philosophies that contrast distinctly with the loss of cultural identity implied by the US ‘melting pot.’\(^371\) Estonia’s cultural ties to Scandinavia make tolerance and acceptance of ethnic minorities a logical matter of state policy. Indeed, Tallinn’s municipal government seems determined to respect the diaspora of ‘the eastern neighbor,’ perhaps because of the ongoing potential for international conflict. Similar to the first period of independence, maintaining relationships with Russia is vital. One European Studies scholar explained:

> As a great power, Russia considers itself .... entitled to certain spheres of interest, among which it counts also the Baltic States. This position is completely unacceptable for the Balts – a fact that has created a deep cleavage between Russia and the Baltic States.\(^372\)

According to a political scientist, because of the Russian Federation’s heightened sensitivity to Russian exclusion from EU institutions.... the unresolved questions of inter-ethnic relations and national identity could hit the surface in ugly ways, especially when economic rough patches are encountered.\(^373\)

Even more alarming is Russia’s tendency, even up to the present (2006) of denying “the aggression against the Baltic states and the existence of occupation.”\(^374\) This post-Soviet policy is a stark contrast to Germany’s attempts to compensate victims of the Holocaust.

In accordance with the continuing delicacy of relationships between Estonia and Russia, Tallinn’s
city planning needs to prioritize ways of bringing Russian and Estonian enclaves into common spheres of interaction. Fostering a sense of inter-ethnic cooperation is vital to preventing a minor ethnic scuffle from getting out of hand. According to a former employee of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union,

[Russian] policy is likely to snap at an unpredictable moment, perhaps with little apparent provocation.\textsuperscript{375}

Promoting Multiculturalism in Tallinn

The stranger, the outsider, the traveler, the trader, the refugee, the slave, yes, even the invading enemy, have had a special part in urban development at every stage.

– Lewis Mumford\textsuperscript{376}

The framework of a city's planning can reveal cultural biases acting as a form of majority rule, for instance by making implicit assumptions about what kind of spaces are appropriate for worship or recreation. Leaving ethnic mixing to housing and public spaces can be problematic; in order to promote multiculturalism, a city needs more active spaces that require and facilitate interaction between groups. To accelerate naturalization, potential mixing spaces might be associated with: workplaces, schools, childcare centers, clubs, youth centers, and colleges.\textsuperscript{377} However, open space plays a vital role in securing the right of ethnic minorities to difference, and to the city. According to urban and regional planning theorist Leonie Sandercock:

The right to difference means recognizing the legitimacy and specific needs of minority or subaltern cultures. The right to the city is the right to presence, to occupy public space, and to participate as an equal in public affairs.\textsuperscript{378}

\textsuperscript{375} Nikolai Sokov, quoted in Bresilaer 2003: 34  
\textsuperscript{376} The City in History (1961), quoted in Sandercock 2003: 109  
\textsuperscript{377} Sandercock 2003: 94  
\textsuperscript{378} Sandercock 2003: 103
Figure 195
An aerial photo from 2005 shows the newly designated reserve of Paljassaare (*), which was formerly used as a military area. The close proximity of largely abandoned industry and recent municipal investment at Katarina Kai (*) suggest that some industrial relics could be incorporated into a larger greenspace, similar to Gasworks Park in Seattle (at left).

Figure 196
Tallinn’s 2000 plan leaves several ecologically sensitive areas vulnerable to development. Ecological zones are marked in green hatch; larger woods in green and prospective development in red stippling.
Ethnicity and Open Space

Open space plays an important role in promoting urban multiculturalism as well as a public arena for conflict. In Tallinn, where ethnic minorities are often non-citizens, ethnic tensions play out in public spaces. The litany of forbidden items at Kadrioru Stadium is an impressive pictorial testimonial to the latent potential for conflict (see Figure 208).

One source of contention between ethnic groups is ‘Victory Day,’ the May 9th Soviet holiday commemorating the victory of the Soviet army over the Nazi Germans. The anniversary is a touchy subject for Estonians, as it coincided with the beginning of 50 years of Soviet occupation. In fact, May 9th is marked on the Estonian calendar simply as 'Europe Day.'

In the spring of 2006, the city announced its intention to relocate the Soviet Soldier Monument from Tõnismägi, which is a memorial to Soviet soldiers who died in World War II. The monument was not removed earlier, as it remains unclear whether unknown soldiers are buried at the site.379 Russian-speakers associate the statue with Victory Day, and Estonians see it as a symbol of the Occupation: even though the caption has been changed to read “For those fallen in World War II.” Local Russians place flowers at the monument to remember lost loved ones.380 By no accident, the Occupation Museum is located across the street from the Soviet Soldier monument.

On 9 May 2006, along with the expected EU flags, a few Russian provocationists brought Soviet flags to the annual Victory Day celebration at the Soviet Soldier Monument. Estonians, not to be out-done, staged a counter-demonstration with national flags, but were blocked by police for not securing the proper permits to demonstrate.

Soon after, the Soviet Soldier was defaced in the night with blue paint. Ethnic Russians, completely unable to understand Estonian sensitivity, launched a counter demonstration of

379 Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
380 http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee
their own. On 27 May 2006, Russians covered the monument commemorating Estonia's independence in front of the municipal government office with red and white carnations, the Russian national flower (see Figures 209-210). This led to an aggressively boisterous counter-counter faction of Estonians carrying national flags. The Russian group had registered for a permit at 11 am, and Estonians had a permit for the same place at noon; however, the police caught on and kept the two groups apart. While tension during the demonstration was thick, no outright violence ensued.

Since then, the city has been careful to provide surveillance protecting the Soviet Soldier Monument from further defacement. However, the media have played an unfortunate role in escalating the conflict, the most visible display of ethnic tension since the 1990s. As a Ukrainian-Estonian related:

> Journalists are doing nothing to pacify the people... When journalists interview, they seem to pick the angriest, least well-educated person. In their 5 minutes of glory, these people say the stupidest things. One drunk Russian said that if the city knocks down the statue, 'We'll give you another Chechnya.' I'm not at all for censorship, but I am for common sense.  

The antagonism between red and blue played out on a quieter but more personal level a few years ago, in Keila-Joa National Park, west of Tallinn. Keila-Joa features two suspension bridges, where newlywed couples traditionally secure locks engraved with their names (see Figures 211a-c). As a symbol of the permanence of their wedding vows, couples then throw the key to their lock into the Keila River. This custom is a long-standing one, and some of the locks are quite old. A few years ago, however, when one couple went to revisit the park on their anniversary, they found their lock completely gone. A friend related their story:

> Once they had gotten over the initial shock, they discovered that all of the locks with Estonian names had been cut off, but none of the Russian ones.  

Not to be deterred, Estonian couples since 2004

381 Personal communication, Oksana Otsvinnik, PR and International Relations
382 Personal communication, Karin
have returned with locks in such numbers as to overwhelm the Russian ones, which nevertheless remain unmolested. Estonian marriage locks have also appeared on a less secluded bridge in the new Pirita River Corridor Park, where they will presumably be less susceptible to vandalism.

Vandalism is a recurring theme in Tallinn’s parks. Last year, for instance, 50 shrubs at Viru Värava Mägi Park were stolen out of the ground the night after they were installed. The city can only afford to fix up two or three parks each year, and renovations do not always go smoothly. The city’s tendency to spend money on less stealable flashing colored lights, water features and grandiose statuary (see Figure 212) betrays the heat of new wealth, but draws people of all ethnicities into parks nevertheless (see Figures 213a-b). Park renovations in recent years have included fountains added at Kungla Park, lights along Haabersti’s Stroomirand shore, and a new rose garden within Kadriorg. Tallinn’s city government could further integration with a few changes to its program for public open space.

**Recommendations for Parks**

*Create small-scale places to promote interaction among ethnic groups.*

Tallinn’s parks should bring people together and provide places to practice language skills, especially for young people. One way that Swedes achieve this is with enclosed, more or less naturalistic areas within housing complexes, where young people can roam and interact within a safe space. Pocket parks in Nõmme, with their established trees, invite increased neighborhood social activities. Existing popular parks like Kadriorg could be retrofitted to promote more interaction among strangers.

The Tallinn Botanic Gardens currently suffers from a lack of a sense of ‘refuge’ – with an inventory-based approach to plants, the Gardens’ scattered exhibit of bushes does not invite visitors to linger or interact (see Figures 214a-c). The mayor’s call for new benches is a step in the right
direction, but a more comprehensive gathering space is in order. Parts of the Kadriorg grounds could be enhanced to encourage interaction at a larger than family-based level.

Create special parks for special activities.

Since different ethnic groups already interact well in workplaces, more small plazas and parks in the center city could lure office workers outside on their lunch breaks (see Figures 215a-c).

A number of other user groups are already inter-ethnic. Creating spaces that appeal to these groups is one way to stretch social boundaries. Dog walkers are one example of such a group. The under-used dog park at Politseiaed should be a lesson in what does not work: too small of a space, too artificially treated, guarantees canine and human boredom (see Figure 216). Less formal dog parks, however, could bring neighbors together. Places that make unpopular parks (see Figures 217-218) could be an instant hit with special users or enthusiasts of particular sports.

Bring patterns from the rural landscape into the city.

Using traditional fences in urban spaces is one way to emphasize layers of culture in open space. Local traditions are more meaningful than, for instance, European coppicing (see Figures 219-220). This approach would provide reassurance to Estonians that their traditions still matter in multi-ethnic communities. Midsummer fires for Jaanipäev are another rural landscape tradition that has been adopted in the city (see Figures 221a-b).

Offer more places to linger and interact in Tallinn's parks.

William Whyte’s research on urban plazas suggests the easiest way to get people to stop in a public space is to provide places to sit. Food and activity can also serve as ‘triangulations.’
The number of users at the Tallinn Botanic Gardens on a Sunday afternoon implies that the park has the potential to support a more formalized gathering space. Benches that are conversationally grouped (see Figures 222a-b) encourage spontaneous interactions among neighbors.

*Where there are people, provide places that promote interaction.*

Existing points of random contact, like bus stops and plazas, could be enhanced to invite social interaction and comment (see Figures 223-226). The overemphasis of monuments (see Figure 227) is a displacement of priorities. While new monuments have been installed near Merineitsi Kuu, Viru Hotel, Snell Pond, and in Mustamäe, what the city needs to do is create larger spaces that transcend ethnic and historic boundaries.

*Help (notoriously reserved) Estonians learn to talk to strangers.*

Community events like Old Town Days provide extreme situations that cannot escape comment. Spreading remarkable events like the Rat Race (see Figures 228-229) around the city could be another way to promote interaction among strangers.

**Recommendations for Neighborhoods**

*Help communities form more active neighborhood groups.*

The city could accelerate housing restoration by encouraging the formation of active neighborhood groups. Even a coat of fresh paint can make a difference to a worn-down building; bright colors help set one house off from another (see Figures 170a-b). The Lasnamäe streetscape is so monotonous that painting the bridges crossing Lagna Road and labeling them was considered a major way-finding improvement.

383  Personal communication, Tallinn Mayor Jüri Ratas
Community groups like Habitat for Humanity in the US have been quite successful in improving the quality of housing in low income communities. With more than 104,000 residents in Lasnamäe, the potential for pooling resources of labor is significant.

Introduce creative, concrete solutions to revitalize Soviet-era housing.

Without innovative solutions to the problems of Soviet-built housing, the housing vacancy rate is likely to broach a tipping point. While everything cannot be fixed at once, the involvement of community members at a larger than individual property scale is crucial. According to an Atlantic Monthly article,

A national [US] study found that the ‘tipping point’ in a neighborhood occurred when just three to six percent of the structures were abandoned. Vacant lots and empty buildings are more than just symptoms of blight — they are also causes of it. Central cities of metro areas that have aggressively expanded their borders face these problems too...

As residents tend to relocate to Tallinn’s single-family suburbs, the city needs to consider assuming ownership of long-abandoned properties to prevent the spread of blight. Such an approach is in place in US cities like Indianapolis; Indianapolis auctions off properties in low-income neighborhoods where owners have defaulted on taxes. At ‘tax sales,’ a vacant lot can occasionally be purchased for a few hundred dollars. A similar program for abandoned properties in Tallinn would draw the attention of Scandinavian investors very quickly. Alternatively, the city could acquire abandoned properties systematically in order to promote a higher degree of control over city planning (as in Scandinavian cities).


385 Personal communication, Shane Strodtman and Tricia Mera, Indianapolis tax sale veterans and owners of two formerly abandoned lots – and a $12,500 house.
Facilitate social interaction in Soviet-era housing open space.

The city should spearhead efforts to revitalize existing open spaces in Soviet-era housing developments. Already struggling to finance renovations, individual apartment owners are not likely to take on the redesign of communal space in any significant way. The city’s district councils, or even smaller community administrations, could help neighbors work together to improve the appearance of the spaces around their homes. Allotment gardens within large housing block areas could provide the means for residents to personalize their immediate community space.

Most immigrants housed in high-rise Soviet developments are distanced by LeCorbu’s ideal of the ‘city in the green’ from both city and green. Promoting a greater sense of community in these neighborhoods is the first step to creating a sense of belonging, and a sense of where to belong, for Russian-speakers in Tallinn.

Recommendations for Traffic

Work to reverse the trend of migration to the outer city.

As US cities learned the hard way after the ‘White Flight’ of the 1960s, crumbling inner city neighborhoods are more difficult to resurrect than they are to abandon. If Tallinn is exhibiting post-WWII symptoms belatedly, as a result of Soviet occupation, the center city ring of historic wooden housing is vulnerable to increasing problems. Older neighborhoods like Kopli are likely to remain undesirable without drastic intervention by the city to reverse urban sprawl. Center city living needs to be made more desirable, in the long-term, than a new single-family house in the suburbs. The tools the city can use to control growth will also help create new, vibrant, and ethnically mixed communities.
Prioritize immediate improvements in public transit.

The most important step to making the older neighborhoods more desirable to residents is to provide better public transit. The best way to encourage the autonomy, ethnic integration, and quality of life for Tallinn’s youth is to give young people ‘keys to the city’, in the form of easy, fast access between the city center and satellite districts. With the current crush of traffic at the center isthmus, the city is making a huge mistake to widen auto roads. To curb bilism and promote sustainable urban growth, the city should work instead to make public transit cheaper and faster than commuting by car. This means, first of all, separating tram and bus routes from regular traffic (see Figures 230-231); otherwise, no commuter stuck in traffic will watch a tram pass and feel jealous.

This approach has been successful in Chicago. The Elevated Rail (the EL) enjoys freedom of movement around the Chicago Loop, where cars get stuck for hours. Judging from the crowdedness of city buses during rush-hour in Tallinn, many trolleybus and bus lines could be switched over to trams. Buses, generally and perhaps rightfully perceived as slower and more lumbering means of transit, should be limited to areas with insufficient density to support rail. Tallinn needs to de-emphasize private automobiles to promote the well-being of its larger community.

Help tourists explore more of the city.

At present, it is difficult for casual visitors to the city to feel confident using public transit. One visiting historian from Canada, for instance, quickly gave up trying to decipher the tram route system: “It was easier to walk.” With about half of Tallinn’s tourists only visiting the city for the day, improving the legibility of public transit is crucial.

If tramlines connected Tallinn’s center to its most precious green spaces (e.g., the Botanic Gardens and the new Lahemaa Rahvuspark in Pirita), Scandinavian investors would follow.
What Tallinn lacks today, in comparison to other Scandinavian cities, is efficient public transit.

*Skip ahead to more ‘enlightened’ transit solutions.*

Much like Estonians skipped straight to Internet banking, the transportation crisis provides Tallinners the opportunity to bypass the mistakes of *bilism* that have ravaged the US. The sheer density of Soviet-era housing has, if nothing else, the ability to support efficient public transportation. The need to relocate industrial shipping could very also spur positive community change.

*Give bike lanes more breathing room from traffic and parked cars.*

Protecting bicyclists from smog could promote bicycle commuting. Larger, more separated bike paths could also prevent ‘dooring,’ the unfortunate result of a car door opening into the direct path of bicyclist.\(^{397}\) Since most places of work remain in the center city, a widened, ‘green fingers’ pattern would benefit all of Tallinn’s residents. Left unplowed in the winter, the same network of off-road paths could accommodate the city’s skiers.

*Don’t count paths along major arterial roads as greenways.*

Despite the attractive swaths of green in planning documents, the best greenways are those that separate users from the hustle and bustle of auto traffic. Most of Tallinn’s bike paths could be termed brownways, as they put bicyclists into regular conflict with automobiles (see *Figures 232-233*).

Greenways, in order to facilitate community interaction, need to be widened and connected by a second network of paths for exclusively non-motorized traffic. The existing road right-of-ways through natural areas like Harku Reba make an obvious first point of attack. The same right-of-ways that the city laments as undevelopable for
Auto traffic make perfect bike, pedestrian, and ski connections within the city.

Let pedestrians win over cars in everyday conflicts.

Pedestrians’ natural paths could be better considered. The city provides under- and overpasses at some intersections, but many places lack safe pedestrian connections (see Figures 234-235). Underground pedestrian crosswalks such as Viru Keskus and Vabaduse Valjak can be difficult for users with limited mobility to access (see Figures 236-237). Parks, in particular, seem often to lack safe pedestrian crossings. Pedestrians need better connections between the center city and Old Town (see Figures 238-239). At present, for instance, one intersection at Politseiaed Park requires pedestrians to negotiate three traffic lights in order to enter the park (see Figure 240). Politseiaed Park is very popular, yet several of the intersections at its borders lack safe (or even striped) pedestrian crossings. Requiring drivers to stop for a pedestrian on a crosswalk could change the status quo overnight.

Get prices right for car-commuters.

Contrary to Saarinen’s utopian vision of expansive avenues with no traffic, in today’s world, to create an asphalt space is to fill it with a car. Along with opening up Tallinn’s road grid to more small connections and alternate routes, the city should leverage its control over the price of downtown parking to promote and finance public transportation. ‘This is in keeping with the EU’s goal of ‘Getting prices right.’ Surface parking lots should not be considered the highest and best use of land in the city center, where high cost and a limited number of parking spaces could drive public transport improvements. A higher fuel tax also would not adversely affect tourism, and could be used to implement immediate infrastructure improvements.
Restrict the rights of cars in and around Old Town.

The tourist appeal of Old Town is its timelessness, but there is nothing like the squealing wheels of a resident commuter to dispel the medieval effect. While the external form of Old Town remains unchanged (see Figures 241a-b), at a finer resolution, the raised fortress of Toompea is an outpost in an increasingly car-dominated city culture (see Figure 242). The city aims to increase the supply of parking near Old Town to demand, but it would be better to improve alternative ways of getting downtown. Pedestrian routes around Old Town could make better use of the preserved greenbelt (and former promenade), even if that means reorganizing traffic.

Recommendations for Green (and Blue) Space

Find new ways to protect green space.

The city cannot afford to buy outright all properties that it would like to conserve. The transfer of development rights is one land use tool that the city might use to manage green space, particularly in cases where current residents would like to stay on their land but protect it for future generations (e.g., the Päts family at the Botanic Gardens). Another option to consider would be implementing a policy similar to Sweden’s allemansrätt, which specifies that everyone has the right to camp or hike in larger green spaces, provided that they cause no damage and respect a certain radius of distance from private residences.

Protect small pieces of nature in small ways.

Old trees are objects of cultural value. The critical root zone for a tree is more than 1.5 times the diameter of its canopy. Paving up to the trunk of an old tree is a sure way to kill it slowly, and
in such a way that it may not be obvious that
development was the cause (see Figures 243-
245). The city should expand its ordinances
protecting historic trees to reflect the need to
protect an area larger than the ‘drip line.’

Rethink turf grass.

Pedestrians make their own paths, and sometimes
these should be respected. At Politseiaed,
pedestrians make it painfully clear that the paths
are misplaced at the park’s corners (see Figure
246). Lawn should be reserved for places that
get walked on a little, and not used at corners
that are continually cut. Turf should also not be
attempted in places that never get walked on,
like roundabout medians, where spots of flower
color and ornamental grasses could brighten
traffic (see Figure 247).

Improve public access to blue space.

A shortcoming of Saarinen’s plan, which persists
today, is inadequate treatment of the area
between Old Town and the harbor. Linnahall
obstructs views to the harbor and could be
better blended into the landscape (see Figures
248-251). In the rush to destroy Soviet marks
on the city, the area adjacent to the passenger
ferry terminal was cleared in the 1990s. The
property awaits development proposals without
a clear planning vision (see Figures 252-253).

Much of the center city’s harbor space is, literally,
fenced off by border control (see Figures 254-
257), and the Pinta shoreline park is susceptible
to the disruptions of traffic. The best views of
the sea are from private high-rises. The city
plans to widen the waterfront, particularly near
the passenger ferry terminal Reisisadum and
Minisadam.\(^{389}\) The city should also work to
incorporate ‘million-dollar views’ into its public
spaces. Tramlines should extend to the most
scenic public areas, similar to Göteborg’s 20-
minute tram ride from the center of the Swedish
city to the archipelago of islands at Saltholmen
(see Figures 258-259). The new emphasis on
incorporating Aegna Island into elementary school
curriculum invites a rail connection through Pirita and Viimsi suburbs, and more formalized ferry access to the island.

*Evaluate the need for brownfield remediation more explicitly.*

Many of the former Soviet military and industry sites are contaminated brownfields. Putting people in contact with these places is not always the best option. Even sites that look natural may harbor potentially hazardous contaminants (see Figure 260). Without knowing the extent of fuel dumping and other environmental damages from retreating armies, the burden of investigation rests to some extent on the city.

*Come to terms with lost populations without aggravating ethnic tension.*

International organizations continue to criticize Estonia for not examining the full extent of the Holocaust that occurred under Nazi German occupation. Memorial markers at Kalevi Liiva and Klooga are a good start, but places of lost populations need to be more prominently acknowledged.

Close to 100,000 Estonians emigrated during WWII and never returned, but there is no indication of this at Tallinn’s passenger ferry terminal. Similarly, the mass deportations to Siberia via rail in 1941 and 1949 are not referenced in any way at the railroad station. Tallinn’s veiled history of war and occupation needs to be acknowledged in places throughout the city, and not just as an exhibit in the Occupation Museum.

**Conclusion**

Tallinn’s post-Soviet planning must be viewed in a larger context of rapid development, continuous change, and historic influence. Seven centuries of foreign occupation (by Denmark, Sweden, the
Teutonic Order, Germany, and Russia) have left a series of physical traces on the city.

The Old Town center of Toompea used to be an island and a Danish fortress in the 1200s, and Old Town developed as a Baltic German outpost. Kristiine was drained by the Swedish monarchy; its street grid and canals date to the 17th century. Nõmme was built as a summer resort when Tallinn was a popular holiday destination in the 1850s. Tsars left a Baroque stamp on the neighborhood of Kadriorg and established Tallinn's rail system and centers of industry. The haphazard proliferation of workers' housing in Põhja Tallinn in the early 1900s led the city to commission Eliel Saarinen to produce a masterplan for the city center. Many wooden neighborhoods burned after Soviets bombed the center city in March 1944, and Soviets built massive housing districts in Lasnamäe, Mustamäe, and Haabersti.

Surrounded by this conglomeration of influences, Tallinn's Old Town has become a UNESCO World Heritage Site due to its preserved medieval street layout. Old Town draws millions of tourists to Tallinn each year, and tourism is a powerful economic force in the city.

Tallinners since the early 1900s have embraced the center city medieval district as their own, although it was historically an occupation outpost. The medieval defense tower Pikk Hermann has become a symbol of Estonian independence. The physical traces of Soviet occupation, however, are likely to remain unpopular for at least another generation, as WWII had brutal effects in Estonia and caused a loss of one quarter of the nation's population. Integrating the abandoned industrial and military remains of Soviet occupation into the public landscape could speed the healing process, as well as create new spaces to help mix communities.

Estonia is a small country with a strong sense of national identity. The Metsavennad guerrilla movement and stubborn popular adherence to cultural traditions helped Estonia keep its identity through Soviet occupations. In the last 15 years, Estonia's strong identity has helped it assert independence and 'return to Europe.' Now that
Estonia is part of NATO and the EU, and feeling more secure, it can afford to turn more attention to its internal affairs.

In post-Soviet Estonia, 10% of the population has been left stateless; most non-citizens live in Tallinn. Relations with Russia remain delicate, and Estonia’s next step is to assimilate its ethnic minorities effectively. Promoting multiculturalism and integrating minorities will help integrate Estonia into the EU: “European cities generally exhibit a much higher level of mixing and integration of functions.” The structure of parks and public space in Tallinn can help promote integration, particularly among young people.

In a city with little population growth but rapid economic development, the structure of urban redevelopment is vital. Tallinn should consider sustainable city planning and ethnic integration as two further steps toward erasing the “corrosive legacy of the Soviet past.”

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Figures 223a-b
Near the Estonia Opera and Theater (*), along the axial park at Teatri Väljak (Theater Square), pedestrians would naturally prefer to walk along the edge of the lawn.

Figure 224
The bus stops are on the outside edges of the street.

Figure 225
In front of Saarinen’s Opera House, a row of bushes keeps bus stop users out of the park.

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390 Beatley 2000: 41
391 Freeland 2005: 77
Figure 227
Estonians try to reclaim Linnahall with a huge statue of Kalevipoeg, but the city needs more than monuments to promote multiculturalism.

Figure 228
For half a week out of each year, Tallinn’s Old Town Days draw a diverse suite of entertainments to the center city, including a bike race (above) and the Rat Race (below).

Figure 229
The Rat Race builds company camaraderie while gently mocking the fast pace and cellular dependency of contemporary business.

Appendix:
Population and Ethnicity Data

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<td>Pullat 1998: 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.00% Estonian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.60% Russian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.30% German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Pullat 1998: 146-147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.80% Estonian</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6.20% Russian</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5.60% German</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.60% Jewish</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Jeffries 2004: 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.00% Estonian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Tallinn: Facts and Figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53.70% Estonian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.50% Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.70% Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.00% Belarussian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures 230a-b
Tallinn’s crowded buses crawl through traffic like every other vehicle.

Figure 231
Separating tramlines from traffic jams along a parallel network of roads is a better choice.
### Estonia Ethnicity Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Ethnicity Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td><a href="http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/">http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/</a></td>
<td>88.00% Estonian, 8.23% Russian, 1.65% German</td>
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<td>1822</td>
<td><a href="http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/">http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/</a></td>
<td>87.70% Estonian, 8.23% Russian, 1.45% German</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/">http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/</a></td>
<td>88.20% Estonian, 8.23% Russian, 1.45% German</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>Alenius 2004: 34</td>
<td>88.00% Estonian, 8.23% Russian, 1.65% German</td>
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<td>1922</td>
<td>Alenius 2004: 34</td>
<td>87.70% Estonian, 8.23% Russian, 1.45% German</td>
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<td>1934</td>
<td><a href="http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/">http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/</a></td>
<td>88.20% Estonian, 8.23% Russian, 1.45% German</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Raukas 1996: 19</td>
<td>94.00% Estonian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Raukas 1996: 19</td>
<td>64.00% Estonian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Raukas 1996: 19</td>
<td>61.50% Estonian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Gelazis 2003: 50, <a href="http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/">http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/ethnic_minor/</a></td>
<td>61.50% Estonian, 30.34% Russian, 0.22% German</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>Jeffries 2004: 131, <a href="http://www.meis.ee/eng/">http://www.meis.ee/eng/</a></td>
<td>64.00% Estonian, 29.00% Russian, 0.20% German</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Jeffries 2004: 131</td>
<td>64.00% Estonian, 29.00% Russian, 0.20% German</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td><a href="http://www.meis.ee/eng/">http://www.meis.ee/eng/</a></td>
<td>67.90% Estonian, 25.60% Russian, 0.01% German</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td><a href="http://www.meis.ee/eng/">http://www.meis.ee/eng/</a></td>
<td>67.90% Estonian, 25.60% Russian, 0.01% German</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Figure 232**

Greenways often bring users into brown spaces. This awkward crossing near the passenger ferry terminal is considered part of a bike path.

**Figures 233a-b**

Accidental green spaces, like this one along Tartu Mantee, could be used to separate greenways from cars. There is already a pedestrian bridge over the highway here (Figures 235a-b).
References


The pedestrian tunnel at Vabaduse Väljak requires users to negotiate 25 approximately 14 cm steps, which could be problematic for users with reduced mobility. However, the above ground crossings at this intersection are unmarked (red circle, Figure 239).

To make up this difference in elevation would require a ramp of more than 42 m.


Feldman, Merje. Urban Regeneration in Eastern Europe: Waterfront Revitalization and Local Governance in Tallinn, Estonia. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for PhD in Geography in the Graduate School of Syracuse University. 1999.


Pedestrian and bike connections to Kaarli Boulevard’s median, for instance, could be improved. The amount of paving within the park could be reduced to allow for more places to sit, and pedestrian crossings (brown stripes) could be legitimized and made safer for people who are unwilling or unable to use the underground tunnel (red circles). The poorly defined surface lots at Vabaduse Väljak (purple, top right) are not the most effective use of land at present (see Figure 242).


Occupation Museum. muuseum@okupatsioon.ee, Tel. 66 80 250. Toompea 8, 10142 Tallinn, visited 15 June 2006.


Figure 246
Pedestrians are ruthlessly efficient at finding diagonals, and their ways should be respected.

Figure 247
Turf would be better replaced altogether in places where pedestrians should not go.


Even if Linnahall is protected as a historic site, it is a concrete scar on Tallinn’s shoreline.

Cars and helicopters can get closer to water than people can.

Linnahall’s only soft side is its rarely used northwest corner.

Incorporating generous green roofs into plans for Linnahall’s renovation could make a major contribution to green and blue space in the center city.


*Tallinn: A Medieval Pearl on the Baltic Sea.* Morgan Studio: Tallinn, 2005


Useful Websites:

Estonia’s security policy, NATO, 06/06:
http://www.vm.ee/eng/nato/kat_359/1006.html

Ethnic integration in Estonia, 05/06:
http://www.coe.ee/eng/?op=news&NID=55
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HSW-03.htm
http://www.mig.ee/est/kontakt/regionaalid/

EU Accession, 06/06:
http://www.fedee.com/accession1.shtml

Figures, 06/06:
www.ezilon.com/ map_of_europe.htm
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Tallinn_location.png
www.rre-sfe.ee/ ee/ee_ajalugu.htm

Figures, contemporary Tallinn, 06/06:
www.dickemauern.de/ tallinn_sm/grtallinn.htm
www.nicholashopkins.co.uk/ estonia.htm
www.respublica.ee/ ?id=1818

General information about Tallinn, 05/06:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tallinn
http://talesmag.com/rprweb/the_rprs/europe/estonia.shtml

History of Jews in Estonia, 08/06:
http://www.historycommission.ee/temp/conclusions.htm#crimiger1

Mustamäe Renovations, 06/06:
http://www.eaue.de/winuwd/156.htm

Figures 258a-b
Views like these of the Tallinn harbor should be accessible by public transport.
Occupation images, 1940-1991, 06/06:
http://amd.store20.com/gallery
http://www.estmonde.ch/kalenderblatt/inhalt/
estland/07.07.1941-09.19.1944/07.07.1941-09.19.1944.html
http://www.militaar.net/viewtopic.php?t=183&start=15&sid=c424d7f5a5b1c218cd0f891a3ca5a7f2f
users.tkk.fi/~andres/m44/m44defju.htm
users.tkk.fi/~andres/m44/m44ph_th.htm

Population Statistics, accessed 06/06:
www.estonica.org/eng/lugu.html?kateg=43&menyy_id=96&alam=61&leht=2
www.eki.ee/knn/ungegn/un7_gdl.htm
http://www.meis.ee/eng/

Post-Soviet St. Petersburg, 06/06:
http://www.ifl-leipzig.com/410.0.html

Soviet Occupation, 06/06:
http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee/fpage/explore/attractions/soviet

Soviet Soldier Monument, 06/06:
http://www.tourism.tallinn.ee/fpage/explore/attractions/soviet,

Saarinen’s Plan for Tallinn, 06/06:
http://www.library.cornell.edu/Reps/Docs/saarinen.htm
http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/tallinn-making-it-new/?page=3

Winter War between Finland & Russia, 05/06:
http://wwwa.britannica.com/eb/article-26104
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winter_War

Figure 259
The archipelago of islands at Saltholmen is a 20-minute tram ride from the Swedish city of Göteborg. Tram passengers can even transfer their ticket to ride public ferries out to individual islands.

Figure 260
Informal recreational use of a former industrial site might not be safe.