

DITRANSITIVE PASSIVE IN PĀṆINI

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The terms *sakarmaka* “a verb with an object, transitive” and *akarmaka* “a verb without an object, intransitive” appear in Pāṇini’s grammar. While the later commentaries do use the term *dvikarmaka* “ditransitive verb”, the term does not itself appear in Pāṇini’s grammar. One can derive constructions with two or more objects in the case of causatives, with the so-called *akathita* “non-characterized” object, and with adverbial accusatives (the last one especially if one accepts the traditional dictum *kriyāviśeṣaṅānām karmatvam*). There are numerous syntactic issues relating to each of these constructions, and more so especially with their passives. In this paper, I wish to focus particularly on the traditional examples of *akathita karman* and discuss certain theoretical syntactic issues pertaining to their traditional explanation. A certain basic understanding of Pāṇini’s *kāraka* system is taken for granted.

1.2. The following rules in Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are relevant in this connection:

P.1.4.49 (*kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*): “That *kāraka* which is most desired to be attained (encompassed by the action?) by the agent is given the designation *karman*.”

P.1.4.50 (*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*): “That which is not desired to be attained (encompassed by the action?) by the agent, but which is related (to the action) in a similar way is also given the designation *karman*.”

P.1.4.51 (*akathitaṃ ca*): “That *kāraka* which is not particularly specified otherwise is also given the designation *karman*.”

Here I have given translations which are based on a general understanding of these rules. These rules are controversial, to say the least, and have generated a great deal of discussion in recent times, including proposals that rules P.1.4.50 and P.1.4.51 did not belong to the *Ur-Aṣṭādhyāyī*. I do not subscribe to this latter opinion, though it brings into focus the controversial nature of these rules. Again, I do not plan to deal with all these controversies at this time. I shall focus on P.1.4.51 (*akathitaṃ ca*) and its traditional examples.

1.3. Let us consider a typical traditional example to explain the functioning of P.1.4.51. Assuming that the situation to be described involves a person milking a cow, we have some of the following alternative possibilities. From the Pāṇinian point of view, both the cow and the milk may be considered to be *īpsita* “desired to be encompassed by the action”. However, both cannot be *īpsitatama* “most desired to be encompassed by the action”. The traditional choice for this status of “most desired” is the milk, rather than the cow. Thus, the milk can get the designation *karman* by the general rule P.1.4.49 (*kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*). If we consider only the cow, without bringing the milk into the situation directly, then the cow by default may also get the designation *karman* by the same rule. Thus, without any difficulty, we can get the following sentences:¹

- S1 *devadattaḥ payaḥ dogdhi* “Devadatta milks the milk.”
 S2 *devadattaḥ gāṃ dogdhi* “Devadatta milks the cow.”

1.4. A difficulty arises when one wishes to include both the cow and the milk as arguments for the verb *dogdhi*. Of these two arguments, as explained earlier, the tradition picks out the milk as the *īpsitatama* “most desired” argument, and hence it gets the designation *karman*. How about the cow? Even if it were *īpsita* “desired” in some sense, it is certainly not the most desired entity. Therefore, it cannot get the designation *karman* by P.1.4.49. The tradition considers the following alternative characterizations for the cow.²

- (a) **The cow as a non-*kāraka*:** One may simply construe the cow with the milk in a non-*kāraka* way of possessor-possessed relation as in “cow’s milk”. This gives us the genitive case for the cow.
- (b) **The cow as a specific *kāraka*:** The cow may be considered as a specific *kāraka*, such as *apādāna* “point of departure, source” for the milk. This would give us the ablative case for the cow.
- (c) **The cow as a non-specific *kāraka*:** In this configuration, the speaker does think of the cow as a factor involved in the production of action, and hence a *kāraka*, and yet does not specifically categorize it as an *apādāna* “point of departure, source” etc. Being left unspecified, no specific *kāraka* definition would apply to it. In this situation, P.1.4.51 (*akathitaṃ ca*) says that a *kāraka* which is not specifically categorized gets the designation *karman*. Thus, the cow gets the designation *karman* by P.1.4.51.

These three scenarios, respectively, account for the following three sentences:

- S3 *devadattaḥ goḥ* (Genitive) *payah* (Accusative) *dogdhi* Devadatta
 milks the milk of the cow.
S4 *devadattaḥ goḥ* (Ablative) *payah* (Accusative) *dogdhi* Devadatta
 milks the milk from the cow.
S5 *devadattaḥ gām* (Accusative) *payah* (Accusative) *dogdhi* Devadat-
 ta milks the cow the milk (?)

1.5. Of these constructions, the construction represented by S5 with two accusatives is the most difficult to translate in any literal way, and presents the most complicated syntactic and semantic issues. In terms of the conceptions in the Pāṇinian tradition, the milk is described as the *pradhāna-karman* “principal object” and the cow is described as the *apradhāna-karman* “non-principal, secondary object”.³ If this is taken to reflect a difference in the semantic importance between the two objects, then one wonders if S5 could be rendered in a way which gives prominence to the cow, or must it be rendered in a way which gives prominence to the milk.

1.6. Similar problems are encountered in modern linguistics as well. For instance, many linguists argue that a structure like S6 must be derived from a structure like S7 by a rule of dative movement (J. M. Anderson (1984: 37–38)):

- S6 Jay awarded Fiona the prize.
S7 Jay awarded the prize to Fiona.

On configurational grounds, for Katz (1972: 105, 298–299), the prize in S7 is the direct object, and Fiona is the indirect object. J. M. Anderson (1984: 38) argues: “We can define object in English, using Katz’s definition for direct object, but at some point in the derivation of a sentence like (S6) both N(oun) P(hrase)s will be objects and the P(repositional) P(hrase) in (S7) is not an object at any point in its derivation (and it is not clear how we can characterize it even as an indirect object)”. Do both the “objects” in S6 have the same status as direct objects, or is there any difference between them? A different kind of psycholinguistic insight into this process is offered by Osgood and Tanz (1977: 584). They assert that both untransitive and bitransitive (= ditransitive) clauses are cognitively tripartite structures. A untransitive nucleus such as *Adam shelled the peanuts* would consist of

Adam (M1 or “source of action”), *shelled* (—(M)→1), and *the peanuts* (M2 or “recipient of action”). In the bitransitive *John gave the book to Mary*, *John* is M1, *gave the book to* is —(M)→, and *Mary* is M2. From the above analysis, Blansitt (1984: 128) argues that “it would follow from the hypothesis that (what we normally call) the direct object forms a single constituent with the verb in bitransitive but not in untransitive clauses, and that (what we normally call) the indirect object is functionally equivalent to the untransitive (direct) object.” This is an interesting conclusion with regard to the English examples given above. However, such a distinction between untransitive and ditransitive clauses cannot be easily made in Sanskrit. In English, the sentences *John gave the book* and *John gave the book to Mary* seem acceptable, but *John gave to Mary* or *John gave Mary* would be unacceptable. In Sanskrit, we can have both S1 and S2 as grammatical untransitive constructions, along with the ditransitive construction S5. Thus, it is not immediately clear as to how one would deal with these sentences in light of the ideas in Osgood and Tanz (1977). Since both the objects can appear in untransitive constructions, it is not automatically clear as to which of these two objects would form a “single constituent with the verb” in the ditransitive construction. On intuitive grounds, some of the Sanskrit ditransitive constructions would seem to go against the above formulation. For most of the ditransitive verbs in Sanskrit, one would have to agree with Hock (1985) that they have two direct objects. However, some constructions seem to go contrary to the ideas found in Osgood and Tanz (1977). For instance, in a sentence like *devadattaḥ ajāṃ grāmam nayati* “Devadatta takes the female goat to town”, both *ajāṃ* “goat” and *grāmam* “town” appear in the accusative. It would seem intuitively appropriate to argue that *grāmam nayati* “takes to town” would form a single constituent, and yet we do not have in Sanskrit the untransitive construction **devadattaḥ grāmam nayati* “Devadatta takes to town.” Thus, it would seem that at least in some Sanskrit sentences, the object which does not appear in untransitive sentences, and appears only in ditransitive sentences forms “a single constituent with the verb”. Thus, this conception does not help us understand the behavior of the Sanskrit ditransitive constructions.

In the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, the following distinction is made: the *īpsitatama* “most desired” object is the principal object (*pradhāna-karman*), and the *akathita-karman* “the object with an unspecified *kāraka* role” is the secondary object (*apradhāna-karman*). Especially in the context of passivizing these constructions, the tradition offers us a list of verbs with two objects:⁴

NON-PASSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

VERB	PRINCIPAL OBJECT (Accusative)	SECONDARY OBJECT (Accusative)
<i>dogdhi</i> to milk	<i>payah</i> milk	<i>gām</i> cow
<i>yācate</i> to beg	<i>vasudhām</i> earth	<i>balim</i> Bali
<i>pacati</i> to cock	<i>odanam</i> rice	<i>taṇḍulān</i> rice-grains
<i>daṇḍayati</i> to fine	<i>śatam</i> a hundred	<i>gargān</i> Gargas
<i>avaruṇaddhi</i> to confine	<i>gām</i> cow	<i>vrajam</i> cow pen
<i>pr̥cchati</i> to ask	<i>dharmam</i> religious duty	<i>māṇavakam</i> boy
<i>cinoti</i> to collect	<i>phalāni</i> fruit	<i>vṛkṣam</i> tree
<i>brūte</i> to speak	<i>dharmam</i> religious duty	<i>māṇavakaṃ</i> boy
<i>śāsti</i> to teach	<i>dharmam</i> religious duty	<i>māṇavakam</i> boy
<i>jayati</i> to win	<i>śatam</i> a hundred	<i>devadattam</i> Devadatta
<i>mathnāti</i> to churn	<i>sudhām</i> ambrosia	<i>kṣīranidhim</i> ocean
<i>muṣṇāti</i> to steal	<i>śatam</i> a hundred	<i>devadattam</i> Devadatta
<i>nayati</i> to lead	<i>ajām</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village
<i>harati</i> to bring	<i>ajām</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village
<i>karṣati</i> to drag	<i>ajām</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village
<i>vahati</i> to carry	<i>ajām</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village

1.7. It is clear from the traditional discussions that the Sanskrit grammarians considered the objects listed in the second column as the principal objects

(*pradhāna-karman*) because these were the *īpsitatama* “most desired” entities.⁵ The other objects are not as much a focus of desire, and they could appear in other specific *kāraka* roles such as source and target, or in the simple relation of possession. Thus, these other objects are characterized as *apradhāna-karman* “secondary objects”.

1.8. A difficulty arises when one needs to passivize these constructions. Which of the two objects would get the nominative case and become the subject of the passive construction? Can we just say: Will the real object please stand up?⁶ The tradition claims that there is no uniformity in this regard and that for some verbs the principal object gets the nominative, while for others it is the secondary object which gets the nominative.⁷ No logic is offered to explain this difference of behavior, but we are simply given a list. For the last four verbs listed above, the principal object gets the nominative, while for the rest of the listed verbs the secondary object gets the nominative. The passive constructions are given below:

PASSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
Class A

VERB	PRINCIPAL OBJECT (Accusative)	SECONDARY OBJECT (Nominative)
<i>duhyate</i> to milk	<i>payah</i> milk	<i>gauḥ</i> cow
<i>yācyate</i> to beg	<i>vasudhām</i> earth	<i>balih</i> Bali
<i>pacyante</i> to cook	<i>odanam</i> rice	<i>taṇḍulāḥ</i> rice-grains
<i>dandyaṅte</i> to fine	<i>śatam</i> a hundred	<i>gargāḥ</i> Gargas
<i>avarudhyate</i> to confine	<i>gām</i> cow	<i>vrajaḥ</i> cowpen
<i>prcchyate</i> to ask	<i>dharmam</i> religious duty	<i>māṇavakaḥ</i> boy
<i>cīyate</i> to collect	<i>phalāni</i> fruit	<i>vṛkṣaḥ</i> tree
<i>ucyate</i> to speak	<i>dharmam</i> religious duty	<i>māṇavakaḥ</i> boy
<i>śiṣyate</i> to teach	<i>dharmam</i> religious duty	<i>māṇavakaḥ</i> boy

PASSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
Class A (Continued)

VERB	PRINCIPAL OBJECT (Accusative)	SECONDARY OBJECT (Nominative)
<i>jīyate</i> to win	<i>śatam</i> a hundred	<i>devadattaḥ</i> Devadatta
<i>mathyate</i> to churn	<i>sudhām</i> ambrosia	<i>kṣīranidhiḥ</i> ocean
<i>muṣyate</i> to steal	<i>śatam</i> a hundred	<i>devadattaḥ</i> Devadatta

Class B

VERB	PRINCIPAL OBJECT (Nominative)	SECONDARY OBJECT (Accusative)
<i>nīyate</i> to lead	<i>ajā</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village
<i>hriyate</i> to bring	<i>ajā</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village
<i>kṛsyate</i> to drag	<i>ajā</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village
<i>uhyate</i> to carry	<i>ajā</i> goat	<i>grāmam</i> village

1.9. Sanskrit grammarians resort to listing when they are unable to find a generalizable principle to describe the behavior of grammatical items, and therefore, it would be safe to say that the grammarians could not come up with a theoretical explanation of why the two classes of verbs behave differently. They could not come up with a common explanation for all cases of objects appearing in the nominative. To them, some of these *objects* were principal objects and others were secondary, i.e. some were the primary focus of desire and others were not.

2. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS IN SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

2.1. Now I would like to review some possible solutions to this dilemma. There are ideas scattered in the traditional commentaries which can be considered in a new light and extended to provide an explanation of the above seemingly anomalous situation. None of these ideas are fully devel-

oped in the tradition itself, but the seeds of these ideas are certainly present. It also shows that these ideas are potentially very powerful and are comparable to ideas developed by modern linguists like Hans H. Hock (1985).

2.2. *Ditransitives as Pseudo-Causatives*

2.2.1. Ramadeva Tripathi (1977: 519) suggests that, in a sentence like *ajāṃ grāmaṃ nayati* “He takes the goat to the village”, the verb *nayati* may be considered to have the same meaning as the causative *gamayati* “makes it go”. If such a suggestion is accepted, then the accusative *ajām* can be explained, in some sense, as referring to the causee (*prayojya-karṭr*) and hence being classified as a *karman* by P.1.4.52 (*gati-buddhi-pratyavasānārthasābda-karmākarmakāṇām aṇi kartā sa nau*): “For verbs of motion, thinking, eating, making sounds and intransitive verbs, that *kāraka* which is the agent of the pre-causative (*aṇi*, lit. non-causative) becomes the *karman* ‘object/patient’ of the causative”. It must be kept in mind that this suggestion is strictly speaking not a Pāṇinian procedure, because *nayati* is not a causative verb from the Pāṇinian perspective. However, its assumed equivalence with *gamayati* allows us to extend the theory.

2.2.2. A similar suggestion is seen in Kaiyaṭa’s comments on the *Mahābhāṣya* on P.1.4.51. This suggestion appears as a *prima facie* view (*pūrva-pakṣa*) and is eventually rejected. The argument goes as follows:⁸

Now, the meaning of the sentence *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* is as follows: The cow releases the milk and Devadatta makes the cow release the milk. Since the cow is encompassed by the action of the causative agent, her status as *karman* is established. That is not the case. In the case of causative verbs there is an awareness that someone possessed of a certain action is employed in that action. Such is not the meaning in this case, because even an inactive cow is employed in the action of milking.

2.2.3. Thus, it is not necessary that the cow be involved in any action. Similarly in the case of verbs like *nayati* “leads, takes”, *harati* “takes”, *karṣati* “drags” and *vahati* “carries”, it would be hard to argue that the entity being taken is in every instance a *prayojya-karṭr* “instigated agent”. In the case of *dogdhi*, even if it were semantically equivalent with *tyājayati*, one would not get the causee to be *karman* “object” by P.1.4.52, because the verb *tyaj* is not covered by the list in that rule. One would get exactly *devadattaḥ GAVĀ payas tyājayati* and not *devadattaḥ GĀM payas tyājayati*. Thus, this alternative of considering ditransitive verbs as some sort of pseudo-causatives does not work well.

2.2.4. This alternative of considering ditransitive constructions as pseudo-causatives is discussed at some length by Bharṭṛhari and finally given up. Kaiyaṭa's argument is based on Bharṭṛhari. The argument in Bharṭṛhari has caused some confusion. S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen (1975: 183) interpret a versified *Vārtika* in the *Mahābhāṣya* in a non-traditional way and conclude that by taking into account the linguistic facts of passivization etc. one must say that, in sentences like *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* and *gauḥ duhyate payaḥ*, the cow must be the principal object (*pradhāna karman*). Referring to *Vākyapadīya* III 7.73 and Helārāja's commentary on it, they say: (p. 183): "Bharṭṛhari maintains that *gauḥ* is the *pradhāna-karman*." This is somewhat misleading. In *Vākyapadīya* III 7.70–77, Bharṭṛhari elaborates two views. The first view argues that there are different types of objects (*bhinna-kakṣya-karman*). In this alternative, a gradation of objects such as principal and secondary is possible. In the second view presented in *Vākyapadīya* III 7.73, Bharṭṛhari argues that the ditransitive constructions are inherently like causative constructions (*antarbhūta-nījārthānām nījantavat siddham pūrveṇa karmanam*). Thus, the cow being treated as a causee (*prayojyakartr*) becomes a *karman* of the causative action in a normal way. In this view, then, there is no reason to propose gradations of *karman*, and therefore, both the objects in a ditransitive construction may be considered to be *pradhāna* or principal objects, one the object of the causative action, and the other the object of the pre-causative action. In this view, there is really no *akathita karman*.⁹ On the other hand, Helārāja proposes two separate notions of "principal" object. He says that from the point of view of the intended goal, the milk is the principal object. Yet the verb *duh* ultimately refers not to *kṣaraṇa* "flowing", but to *kṣāraṇa* "the action of causing the cow to yield the flow of milk", and hence, linguistically speaking, the cow must be the principal object.¹⁰ This view of Helārāja is not to be found in Bharṭṛhari's verse itself, which argues for a non-differentiated status of *karman*. This view of ditransitive constructions as pseudo-causatives is ultimately rejected by Bharṭṛhari himself in *Vākyapadīya* III 7.76–77. Bharṭṛhari points out that while the causee in a causative construction cannot be without action (*niṣkriya*), even an inactive cow can become an object of milking and an inactive goat can become an object of carrying. He finally concludes that verbs like *duh* and *nī* may be distantly paraphrased with causatives and yet are not real causatives. Since they are different word-forms (*śabdāntara*), they signify a unique type of action with two objects.¹¹

2.3. Object of Primary versus Secondary Access

2.3.1. Why is it that with the ditransitive use of *duh* "to milk", the passive

finite verb ending (*la*) expresses the secondary object, i.e. the cow, and not the milk? In the *Pradīpa* on *Mahābhāṣya* on P.1.4.51, we find a pair of verses:¹²

The suffixes called *l* (in passives of ditransitive verbs) are prescribed to express the secondary object. The first relationship is formed with the secondary object, because the person desiring to attain the principal object (such as the milk) certainly first makes an effort with respect to the cow. Thus, at the very beginning, the root *duh* by itself is brought into a relationship with the cow, prior to the connection of the verb *duh* bound to the cow with the milk. Therefore, the suffixes called *l* (in passive) are used to express the secondary object.

Kaiyaṭa paraphrases these verses and says:¹³

Since the person who wants milk first initiates his action with respect to the cow, therefore, by the reason of being relatively closer (to the initiated action of the agent), the secondary object is expressed by the verbal affix (rather than the primary object).

2.3.2. This is an interesting and important argument. It also suggests a distinction between the notions of *īpsitatama* “most desired” and “that which the agent first acts upon”. Semantically, these are distinct concepts and they seem to lead to different consequences. While, the milk is the “most desired” object, the agent must first act upon the cow in order to achieve the “most desired” goal. Thus in terms of the inherent sequence of access, the agent must access the so-called secondary object first, and only then can he acquire the primary object. Viewed in this light, the passives of most Class A verbs immediately make sense. Interestingly, this same logic also explains the passives of Class B verbs. One must first get hold of the goat before one can lead, take, drag or carry it to the village, and the village comes only at the end of these actions. Thus, the primary access is to the entity which is led, taken, dragged or carried, and not the target location to which it is taken. Here, of course, the item of primary access also happens to be the item categorized as “most desired” by the tradition. Thus, one may claim, at least in a preliminary way, that the object of primary access, whether or not it is “most desired”, is the one which gets the nominative in the passive. If this notion is accepted, then the distinction between Class A verbs and Class B verbs disappears and we can think of a uniform explanation.

2.4. *Affected versus Non-affected Object*

2.4.1. In Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* on P.2.3.5 (*kālādhvanor atyanta-samyoge*), we find another interesting idea, though here again it is placed in the mouth of a *pūrvaṅpakṣin* “upholder of a preliminary view”, and not as a final conclusion. The rule says that the second case ending is used for words standing for a unit of time or distance to indicate uninterrupted connection with an action or an

entity. For example, consider the sentence *māsam adhīte* “he studies a whole month”. Here, Pāṇini does not consider *māsa* “month” to be a *karman* at all, but merely prescribes the accusative case. Historically, this is the adverbial accusative usage. Kātyāyana, on the other hand, proposes that such time and distance words should be considered to be *karmavat* “like *karman*”, so that one could get passive sentences like *māsah āsyate* “a month is spent sitting”.¹⁴ After discussing the objectives of Kātyāyana’s suggestion, Patañjali questions whether such a separate statement needs to be made:¹⁵

Then, do we need to make this (separate) statement (that time and distance words under these conditions should be treated like *karman*)?

There is no need to make such a (separate) statement. Such (time and distance words) stand for just the normal *karman*, as in the constructions *kaṭam karoti* “he makes a mat” and *śakaṭam karoti* “he makes a cart”.

He (= Kātyāyana) (seems to) think like this: A really justifiable *karman* is that in which a certain difference (of state) is brought about by the action. No difference is brought about by an action (in *māsa*).

Such a view (of normal *karman*) is not tenable. (With such a view) one could not derive even these examples: *ādityam paśyati* “he sees the sun”, *himavantam śṛnoti* “he hears the (rumble of the) Himalaya”, and *grāmaṃ gacchati* “he goes to the village”. Therefore, (the time and distance words) are nothing but (instances of) normal *karman*, as in *kaṭam karoti* “he makes a mat” and *śakaṭam karoti* “he makes a cart”.

2.4.2. While Patañjali rejects the supposed view of Kātyāyana about *nyāyya karman* “really justifiable notion of *karman*”, that notion may have relevance in the present discussion of ditransitive passive. It is clear that Patañjali rejects this notion because it does not cover all instances of *karman*. In other words, in some instances of *karman* one sees the entity being affected by the action and that a change of state is brought about, while in other instances one sees no such change. One can also see in this notion of “affectedness” a scalar property. Some objects may be more affected than others. This notion of affectedness is clearly different from the notion of *īpsitatama* “most desired”. The milk is the most desired object, but the cow is the most affected object. Using this parameter of affectedness, one can see that it explains almost all the verbs listed above, i.e. Class A and Class B verbs.¹⁶ Therefore, this notion of affectedness is relevant not only semantically, but syntactically as well.

2.5. Agentive versus Non-agentive Object

2.5.1. Hans Hock (1985) suggests that of the two objects in a ditransitive construction, the object which is more agentive gets the nominative in the

passive construction. The Sanskrit grammatical tradition normally does not think in these terms. However, there is one context where one can test a notion of agentivity in relation to an object, i.e. the so-called reflexive passive construction. P.3.1.87 (*karmavat karmanā tulya-kriyah*) says that an agent (*kartr*) which is similar in its action to an object (*karman*) should be treated like an object. Normally, one says: *devadattaḥ odanam pacati* “Devadatta cooks rice”. This sentence ascribes the agency of cooking to Devadatta. However, if one wanted to say “The rice cooks well”, then, according to Pāṇini, rice becomes the agent (*kartr*) of the action of cooking, and yet its action (= participation in the action of cooking) is similar to that of a prototypical object. In a case like this, Pāṇini says that the agent should be treated like a *karman* for certain grammatical processes, such as getting the infix *-ya-* on the verb and the middle affix, i.e. *odanaḥ pacyate* “the rice cooks (itself)”. This type of construction is, for Pāṇini, an active voice (*kartari*) construction and yet has the morphological markings of a passive construction. Such constructions magnify and stress the role played by the prototypical object by promoting it to agent. What about a construction that has two objects? In *Vārttika* 14 on P.3.1.87 (*duhi-pacyor bahulaṃ sakarmakayoḥ*), Kātyāyana proposes that one could optionally get reflexive passive constructions with verbs *duh* “to milk” and *pac* “to cook, ripen”, if they are transitive (*sakarmaka*). In his discussion of this *Vārttika*, Patañjali offers the following example: *dugdhe gauḥ payaḥ (svayam eva)* “The cow milks the milk (by herself)”. The normal ditransitive construction would be something like: *devadattaḥ gāṃ payaḥ dogdhi* “Devadatta milks the cow (acc.) the milk (acc.)”. Of the two accusative objects, the object promoted to agency in a reflexive passive is the cow, and not the milk. The reflexive passive construction is considered to be a transitive construction, since it can still have one accusative object (*payaḥ*). This discussion implies that of these two objects, the cow is the more agentive object, and this agentive object gets the nominative in a ditransitive passive such as: *devadattena gauḥ payaḥ duhyate*. Again it must be pointed out that, in spite of this implication from this discussion, the tradition does not generalize this concept to claim that the more agentive object among the two objects of a ditransitive construction gets the nominative in the passive. However, such a potential is there in this discussion.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1. From the above discussion, it is clear that generally the traditional discussion of *karman* was guided by the parameters set by Pāṇini. Among

these parameters, the term *īpsitatama* “most desired (to be encompassed by one’s action)” was quite central. The tradition made strenuous efforts to dissociate this term from the connotation of “most desired”, and emphasized the basic verb root in this term, i.e. *āp*. The term was often glossed as *āpya* “entity to be encompassed by one’s action”. S. D. Joshi and Roodbergen (1975: 168ff.) completely reject the traditional interpretation of the terms *īpsitatama* and *anīpsita* as “most desired” and “not the most desired” respectively. They would rather have these terms mean “the object directly reached by action, direct object” and “the non-direct object”. Having thus removed the factor of “desire” completely, they argue that in the sentence *gaur duhyate payah*, “the word *go*, which refers to the direct object (*īpsitatama* item), is passivized, whereas *payas*, which refers to the non-direct object, is not passivized” (p. 169). With this new interpretation of these terms, they do recognize that the rule P.1.4.51 (*akathitam ca*) is not required (p. 170). In my opinion, any interpretation of Pāṇini which makes one of his rules vacuous is most unlikely to be historically a Pāṇinian interpretation. It may be theoretically more efficient, and yet historically un-Pāṇinian. On the other hand, it is historically more cogent to argue that Pāṇini’s grammar was based on prior cultural and ritual categorizations of action and hence gave a prominent role to the notion of desire. Ritual action must be prototypically voluntary action. This accounts for the fact that the first definition of *karman* refers to voluntary action of a sentient agent. Pāṇini, as a grammarian, was concerned with Sanskrit at large, and hence realized that there were other kinds of actions expressed in language which were not always voluntary or performed even by sentient agents. This extension was accomplished by P.1.4.50 (*tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*). Then, the remaining cases of grammatical object were taken care of by rules like P.1.4.51. Thus, it is not a misunderstanding of Pāṇini’s rules, as claimed by Joshi and Roodbergen, but as a sign of continuity in understanding, that the element of desire remained in the consciousness of the Pāṇinian grammarians, eventually yielding the distinction of *pradhāna-karman* “principal *karman*” versus *apradhāna-karman* “secondary *karman*”. These notions were implicitly based on the notion of “most desired object”, and they failed to achieve the maximal generalization in the case of ditransitive passive. The grammarians were ultimately forced to adopt the theoretically least preferable and uninformative method of listing verbs into two classes. Other notions such as “object of primary access”, “the affected object” and “the agentive object” did occasionally appear in discussions, but were unfortunately never used to make the necessary generalizations. On the contrary, these notions always remained hidden amongst the rejected views of the

Pūrvapakṣin. One could make at least a tentative guess as to why the notion of “desired object” remained prominent in Sanskrit grammar, but not the notion of “affected object”. If the emergence of Sanskrit grammar is viewed as part of a general religious/ritual scholastics, then it would seem natural that the semantic categories prominent in ritual contexts would continue to exert their influence on the semantic formulations in Sanskrit grammar. In Vedic ritual, the primary classificatory categories seem to be agent, instrument, location, object of desire, target of offerings, the oblations offered to the divinities etc. However, there is no clear notion of “affected object” involved in ritual. In Vedic ritual as formalized in the *Śrauta* literature and in Mīmāṃsā texts, the deity receiving the oblations offered is not viewed in theistic light, and becomes just one of the requirements of the ritual. It is not as if the deity is affected by the offering and then in return offers the desired result. The ritual act itself is perceived as yielding the desired result. With such a perception of ritual action, there is no notion of “affected object”. The Pāṇinian formulation of the notion of “object” can be conceivably linked to this prior cultural background. As we have seen, the conceptions of “affected object”, “object of primary access” and “the agentive object” do appear in the commentaries, though these are not taken seriously. However, these ideas can be taken out of these confines, and if properly tested may show the way to a better understanding of Sanskrit syntax within the Indian tradition.¹⁷

NOTES

¹ It is important to note that, for most verbs in Sanskrit which are ditransitive, one can have unitransitive usages with either of the two objects. This has led modern scholars to argue that the Sanskrit ditransitive constructions have two “direct objects”. Hock (1985) upholds this view, and reviews arguments adduced by Gaedicke (1880) in support of this view. One must keep in mind that the Sanskrit terms *pradhāna-karman* and *guṇa-karman* are not equivalents of “direct object” and “indirect object”. Even within the Sanskrit traditions, often there is no agreement on which of the two objects is *pradhāna* and which is *apradhāna*. While the grammarians generally argue that the milk is the principal object and the cow is the secondary object, one finds various diverse opinions mentioned in Gokulanāthopādhyāya’s *Padavākhyaratnākara* (p. 591ff.). Also see: Helārāja on *Vākyapadīya* III 7.73, p. 289.

² Other alternatives are discussed in texts like Gokulanāthopādhyāya’s *Padavākhyaratnākara* (p. 591ff.). For instance, Gokulanāthopādhyāya provides two alternative views. In the first view, the verb *duh* “to milk” conveys three meanings: action of the milkman (*puruṣa-vyāpāra*), flowing of the milk (*syandana*) and separation of the milk from the cow (*vibhāga*). Of these three meanings, the milkman’s action and flowing are viewed as being actions (*vyāpāra*), while flowing and separation are viewed as being results (*phala*). The locus of action (*vyāpārāśraya*) is the agent (*kartr*) and the locus of the result (*phalāśraya*) is the object (*karmān*). The controversial case is that of the milk which happens to be the locus of flowing, which is the result of the milkman’s action and an action in itself which results in the separation of the milk from the cow. Thus being the locus of flowing, both an action and

a result, there is a conflict between the milk being an agent and an object. Gokulanāthopādhyāya argues that the purpose of P.1.4.51 (*akathitam ca*) is to resolve this conflict. In the second view, the verb *duh* denotes only two meanings, i.e. the action of the milkman and flowing of the milk which causes separation of the milk from the cow. This separation of the milk is not considered to be a separate meaning, but a secondary aspect of flowing. The locus of this secondary aspect of the result of the milkman's action becomes the secondary object.

³ On the example *gām dogdhi payaḥ*, Kaiyaṭa says: *anena gām dogdhi payaḥ ity atra payasa upayujyamānatvāt īpsitatamatvam, gos tu payo'rthatvād apādānasyānīpsitatamatvam darśayati*/. *Pradīpa, Mahābhāṣya* on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 264.

⁴ The list given here is based on the list found in the *Siddhāntakaumudī*: (on P.1.4.51, p. 307)

*duh-yāc-pac-daṇḍ-rudhi-pracchi-ci-brū-śāsu-ji-math-muṣām//
karma-yuk syād akathitam tathā syāt nī-hṛ-kṛṣ-vahām//*

Pāṇini provides no such listing. The list first appears in the *Vārtikas* quoted by Patañjali on P.1.4.51. The *duhādi* list in the *Mahābhāṣya* (Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 264) includes: *duh, yāc, rudh, pracch, bhikṣ, ci, brū* and *śās*. Outside the *duhādi* list, the *Mahābhāṣya* (Ibid., p. 270) lists *nī, vah, hr* and verbs of motion such as *gamayati*. The various commentaries on the *Mahābhāṣya* and on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* discuss these and other verbs for inclusion in the *duhādi* and the non-*duhādi* lists. For a discussion on the inclusion of the verb *daṇḍ*, see Note 5. From these discussions, it is clear that there are verbs not listed here which also have ditransitive usages, and other verbs which are synonymous with the listed verbs which do not have ditransitive usages. A great deal of discussion relates to the question of how to define the specific semantic configuration of these verbs.

⁵ Cf. *tad yathā — gargāḥ śatam dandantām — iti/arthinaś ca rājāno hiraṇyena bhavanti/na ca pratyekam daṇḍayanti/Mahābhāṣya* on P.1.1.1., Vol. I, Pt. I, p. 112. “For instance, consider the example: “Let the Gargas be fined a hundred (coins)”. The kings are desirous of the gold. They do not fine each (Garga) separately”. On this passage, Kaiyaṭa argues that *śata* “a hundred (pieces of gold)” is the principal *karman*, because it is the most desired goal: *atra śatasypsitatamatvāt prādhānyam apādāna-sthānaprāptā gargā guṇakarma/Pradīpa* (Ibid., p. 112). Nāgeśabhaṭṭa disagrees with Kaiyaṭa and argues that the Gargas are the principal object (*pradhāna-karman*) and that the root *daṇḍ* should not be included in the *duh* class: *daṇḍeś ca sva-sampradānaka-dānānukūla-vyāpārānukūla-vyāpārah śāsana-rūpo'rthah/śāsanam niyantranam/tatra nyanta iva “kartuh . . .” ity ubhayoh karmatvam/kartr-pratyaya-samabhivivāhāre dhātṅ-ārtha-pradhāna-vyāpāra-viśeṣaṇa-phalāśrayatvena gargānām śābdam prādhānyam/tatraiva pradhāne karmāni lakārah/“pradhāna-karmanya ākhyeye lādin āhur dvikarmanām” ity ukteḥ/duhādiṣv asyāprāmāṇikah pātha iti vadanti/Ūddyota* (ibid., p. 112). The debate hinges on the difference between the notions of *ārtha-prādhānya* “intended primacy” versus *śabda-prādhānya* “literal primacy”.

⁶ For recent discussions on this specific issue, see: Osgood and Tanz (1977) and Hans H. Hock (1985).

⁷ One can also look at the patterns of usage for objective genitive in ditransitive constructions. For instance, one can certainly have *devadattaḥ aśvam sruḅnam nayati* “Devadatta takes the horse to Sruḅna”. If *nayati* is deverbilized into *netā* “leader, taker”, then which of the objects will appear in the genitive? Patañjali answers this question: *atheha katham bhavitavyam — netāśvasya sruḅnam iti/āhosvīt — netāśvasya sruḅnasyeti/ubhayathā gonikāputrah*/. “How should it be in this case? (Should it be): *netā aśvasya sruḅnam*, or *netā aśvasya sruḅnasya*? Gonikāputra (= Patañjali himself according to the tradition) says that one can have it both ways.” *Mahābhāṣya* on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 272. For some insightful discussion on this passage, see: Hock (1985: 61). He suggests that the less agentive of the two objects has the option of remaining in the accusative.

⁸ *nanu gām dogdhi payaḥ ity asyāyam arthaḥ — gauḥ payaḥ tyajati, devadatto gavā payas tyājayati/tatra prayojaka-vyāpārenāpyamānatvāt siddham goḥ karmatvam/naitad asti/yathā nyanṭeṣu dhātuṣu kriyāviṣṭaḥ prayujyate iti pratītiḥ tathā naivam iha, nīskriyasyāpi gavāder dohanādiṣu viniyogāt/Kaiyata on Mahābhāṣya on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 264.*

⁹ *siddhā nimitta-nimitti-bhāvāvasthitasyāpi sarvasya karmaṇaḥ pūrvenaiva yogena karma-samjñeti nāsty akathita-karmety ekiyāmatenopanyāsaḥ/Helārāja on Vākyapadīya III 7.74, p. 291.*

¹⁰ *yady api cārthena rūpeṇa payaḥ pradhāna-bhūtam, upāya-bhūtā tu gauḥ, tathāpy ābhidheyakena kṣaranopasarjanasya kṣāranasya śabdārthatvāt gaur eva pradhānam karmeti tatraiva lādayaḥ, Helārāja on Vākyapadīya III 7.73, p. 289.*

¹¹ *tasmān nātra ny-arthāntarbhāva iti kriyā-dvayāśrayeṇa api karma-viśeṣa-samarthanam a-samicinam/tad evam ekaiveyam vilakṣaṇā karma-dvaya-viṣayā kriyā iti/, Helārāja on Vākyapadīya III 7.77, p. 293.*

¹² *guṇa-karmaṇi lādi-vidhiḥ pūrvaṃ guṇa-karmaṇā bhavati yogaḥ/ mukhyaṃ karma prepsur yasmād gavy eva yatate prakḥ// tasmāc chuddhasya duher bhavati gavā pūrvaṃ eva sambandhaḥ/go-duhinā payas tu prakḥ, tasmāl lādayas tasmīn//Quoted in Pradīpa on Mahābhāṣya on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 268. Nāgēśabhṭta in his Uddyota attributes these verses to Bhartrhari. They are found quoted in Helārāja's commentary on Vākyapadīya III 7.70, but are not part of the Vākyapadīya itself.*

¹³ *yataś ca payo' rthi prathamam gavi pravartate tataḥ antaraṅgatvāt duhyādiṣu guṇa-karmaṇi lādayo bhavanti. Kaiyata on Mahābhāṣya on P.1.4.51, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 268. The same argument is found in Helārāja's commentary on Vākyapadīya III 7.77, p. 293: apradhānye' pi cākathita-karmaṇo' ntarāṅgatvāt prathamam kriyā-yogāl lādi-vidhir uktaḥ/nayaty ādau tu pradhānyam ajāder iti tatraiva lādayaḥ/nyante tu ny-arthasya pradhānyāt tenāpyamānatvāt kartaiva pradhānam karmeti tatraiva lādayaḥ/tataś ca*

*pradhāna-karmāny ākhyeye lādīn āhur dvikarmaṇām/
apradhāne duhādīnām ny-ante kartuś ca karmaṇaḥ//*

iti nyāya-siddham udāhṛtam/. It is important to note that this logic is offered as the justification for the choice of the object to be passivized by Helārāja and Kaiyata. This new justification is offered without getting rid of the traditional conceptions of principal object and secondary object based on the notion of "focus of desire".

¹⁴ *Vārttika 1 on P.2.3.5: atyanta-samyoge karmaval lādyartham.*

¹⁵ *tat tarhi vaktavyam? na vaktavyam/prākṛtam evaitat karma yathā kaṭam karoti śakaṭam karotīti/evam manyate/yatra kaścīt kriyākṛto viśeṣa upajāyate tan nyāyāṃ karmeti/na ceha kaścīt kriyākṛto viśeṣa upajāyate/naivam śakyam/iḥāpi na syāt/ādityam paśyati/himavantam śṛnoti/grāmam gacchati/tasmāt prākṛtam evaitat karma yathā kaṭam karoti śakaṭam karotīti. Mahābhāṣya on P.2.3.5, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 490.*

¹⁶ The verb *rudh* is a difficult case. The usage cited by the grammarians, i.e. *vrajaḥ gām avarudhyate* works well only on the hypothesis that the secondary object *vraja* goes in the nominative. None of the partial solutions above seem to explain it well. Hock (1985) argues that the object which is more agentive takes the nominative. This also does not seem to explain this usage, since *vrajaḥ* being inanimate is obviously the less agentive of the two objects. While this usage is cited by the grammarians, it is not attested independently in literature.

¹⁷ For a discussion of several related issues, see Deshpande (Forthcoming-a) and (Forthcoming-b).

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