CRITICAL NOTE

REPLY TO HUGLY AND SAYWARD

Hugly and Sayward [4] argue that a gbt cannot satisfy convention T. I agree.
So, I assume, would Hartry Field from whom I borrowed the concept [3].
The obvious reason for this, as Hugly and Sayward point out, is that a gbt
provides no machinery for moving from the likes of 'the predicate "is red"
applies to x' to the likes of 'x is red'. No machinery is provided because
'applies to' is taken as primitive in a gbt. To complain of the lack of machin-
ery is simply to complain that 'applies to' is undefined.

   So what I called an unsupplemented gbt – i.e., a gbt which takes 'applies
to' or some such as *primitive* – does not, of course, satisfy convention T. Nor
did I (or Field) claim it did.[1] What I did claim is that a gbt supplemented by
a general definition of application in, say, psychological terms, would satisfy
convention T. Suppose we have

   (A) x applies (in k) to y iff ϕxyk

where 'ϕ' is some predicate drawn from psychology. Then from

   (1)   '$\forall x \; x$ is red' is true in k iff $\forall x$ 'is red' applies (in k) to x

we have

   (1')   '$\forall x \; x$ is red' is true in k iff $\forall x \; \phi$ 'is red' xk.

Now since (A) is evidently acceptable only if we can move from the likes of
'ϕ 'is red' xk' to the likes of 'x is red', whatever justifies (A) will justify this
move. Or rather: part of the justification of (A) must be that this sort of
move is available. Any failure in such a move will disqualify (A). But the
move in question is just what we need to get from (1') to (2):

   (2)   '$\forall x$ is red' is true in k iff $\forall x \; x$ is red.[2]

   Of course, nothing answering to (A) is available for a natural language.
But then, as I pointed out in 'Truth and Logical Form' [1], neither is any-
thing like an fbt available for a natural language. My point was simply that
the possibility of a truth characterization of a natural language does not

presuppose the conditions requisite for an fbt, viz., representability in terms of a finite base.

A final comment: Hugly and Sayward point out that the definition of satisfaction in terms of application makes no real explanatory progress. Of course not. For most purposes, the shift to application simply marks a shift in terminology. My motivation (explicitly stated) was that application can be understood to relate tokens (or tokenings) of expressions on the one hand and objects on the other. One party to the satisfaction relation is always an infinite sequence. Thus application lends itself more readily to psychological explanation. (See [2], p. 116.)

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REFERENCES

[1] Cummins, Robert. 'Truth and Logical Form', This Journal, 4 (1975) 29–44.
[2] Cummins, Robert. 'The Philosophical Problem of Truth-of', *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy* V (1975) 103–122.
[3] Field, Hartry. 'Tarski's Theory of Truth', *The Journal of Philosophy* LXIX (1971) 347–375.
[4] Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 'Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives', this issue, pp. 349–351.

NOTES

[1] See [1] p. 33. There I point out that, unlike a theory satisfying convention T, a gbt does not eliminate 'satisfies' in favor of the non-semantic. Evidently, any theory satisfying convention T would (or could) do this.

[2] Hugly and Sayward may be worried about building in a formal guarantee of the move from (1') to (2). They needn't. Persuaded of (A), (1') and its ilk suffice to eliminate 'true in k' from cannonical contexts, and whatever persuades us of (A) will persuade us that the elimination is carried out correctly. What further purpose would be served a formal guarantee of the move to (2)? Why should we want or expect to be able to express the *psychological reduction* in the axioms of a truth characterization?