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CONTENT, CHARACTER, AND COGNITIVE  
SIGNIFICANCE

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Frege believed that any difference in the cognitive significance of two sentences must reflect an objective *semantic* difference. This view has in one form or another represented the received view in the philosophy of language since the appearance of 'On Sense and Meaning'.<sup>1</sup> But this, I want to argue, is a mistake — a mistake that has seriously retarded our understanding of the relation between thought and language. Although various linguistic phenomena, if carefully examined, would help expose the error in this view, I shall here concentrate on the evidence provided by the phenomenon of indexical reference.

Frege's puzzle about the potential informativeness of true identity statements is really an instance of what, for him, was a more general puzzle: How is it that two sentences can differ in cognitive significance when both sentences require, in order to be true, that precisely the same object or objects fall under precisely the same concept or relation? According to Frege, two sentences will differ in cognitive significance (express different *Gedanken*) just in case it is possible for a competent and reasonable speaker to believe what is expressed by the utterance of one while, without changing his mind, failing to believe (either disbelieving or suspending judgement on) what is expressed by the utterance of the other.<sup>2</sup> For Frege, the possibility that two sentences with the same referential content can nevertheless differ in cognitive significance indicated that there must yet be an objective semantic difference between those two sentences. How could there be a genuinely epistemically relevant difference that did not reflect a genuine truth value relevant difference? So if two sentences differ in their cognitive or epistemic significance, it must be because the two sentences, in virtue of graspable differences in their objective truth value relevant features, relate the speaker in different ways to the state of the world that must obtain in order for them to be true.<sup>3</sup>

The notion of sense was introduced to account for this difference. The puzzling differences in cognitive significance between two sentences are explained by the fact that structurally correlative, co-referential expressions in the two sentences have different senses. They make different contributions to the cognitive significance of the sentences containing them. The sense of a singular term, for example, will be the objective, cognitively relevant *mode of presentation* of the referent associated with and expressed by that term. Since two co-referential singular terms may present their referent to a speaker in cognitively distinct ways, counterpart sentences containing these two terms may differ in their cognitive significance.

Frege's puzzle is easily adapted to sentences containing indexical expressions. It should be obvious, for example, that one could demonstratively refer to the same individual on two different occasions, or under two different circumstances, and in such a way that it would be informative to be told that the object referred to on these two occasions was one and the same. So phenomena parallel to that which motivated Frege's theory of sense occur in cases involving indexicals. Indexical expressions, however, and the sentences containing them prove to be notoriously difficult to accommodate within anything like a traditionally conceived theory of sense and reference.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, recent philosophers continue to take seriously the need to provide a systematic *semantic* account of indexical reference capable of accounting for the cognitive significance of indexicals.

Of these philosophers, perhaps none has had more influence than David Kaplan.<sup>5</sup> His theory, which is designed to handle both "pure indexicals" such as 'I', 'here', 'now', etc. and "true demonstratives" such as 'this', 'that', 'these', etc., is aimed at providing a *unified* account of both the conditions which determine an object as the referent of an indexical on a particular occasion of use, and also the different cognitive significance of distinct uses of a given indexical to refer to the same object. Although he is critical of Frege's original theory for its inability to accommodate certain important aspects of the semantic behavior of indexicals, Kaplan's proposals reflect his acceptance of the Fregean view that differences in cognitive significance must mirror objective semantic differences.

In what follows, I examine certain aspects of Kaplan's theory,

focusing on his attempt to provide a semantic account of the reference of indexicals that is capable, at the same time, of accounting for their cognitive significance. I shall concentrate on Kaplan's treatment of demonstratives, for it is with respect to these that he explicitly commits himself to solving Frege's puzzle. My discussion, however, will inevitably have consequences for Kaplan's treatment of "pure" indexicals as well. In particular, I hope to expose the sort of distortion that commitment to Frege's direct connection thesis engenders in the case of demonstratives — how it leads to a failure to appreciate fully either the distinctive cognitive or the distinctive semantic features of these indexicals.

#### I. KAPLAN'S "CORRECTED FREGEAN THEORY OF DEMONSTRATIVES".

1. Indexicals are, for Kaplan, referring expressions the meaning of which provides a rule that determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the context in which it is used.<sup>6</sup> He first distinguishes between "pure" indexicals and "true" demonstratives. An indexical is "pure", in Kaplan's sense, when the context-invariable rule provided by its meaning fully determines the referent for each context of use. No supplementary actions, intentions, beliefs or perceptions are either needed or relevant to determining the referent. Competence with "pure" indexicals consists in the speaker's grasping this rule. The linguistic rule governing the use of 'I', for example, stipulates roughly that the referent of a literal and competent use of 'I' in a given context will be the speaker himself. Thus any competent speaker will refer to himself when he correctly uses 'I', and nothing about the way he or his surroundings appear to him in that context, no pointing to another or believing he is another or intending to refer to someone who is in fact another, will be able to defeat or in any way affect that reference. Likewise with 'here' and 'now'. The rules governing their use specify roughly that their referents in a given context of use will be, respectively, the place and time of that use; and again, nothing about how things appear to the speaker in that context, no pointing, no beliefs, etc., will be in the least relevant to determining their reference. In this way, then, the linguistic rule governing the use of a pure indexical is

complete and not in need of any supplementation by an associated demonstration.

It is not, however, plausible to hold that the context-invariable rule governing the use of a “true” demonstrative is likewise capable of autonomously determining the referent of that demonstrative for each context of use. The use of a demonstrative is incomplete without an associated *demonstration*, “typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing” [p. 9]. The demonstrative refers in a given context to that which the demonstration picks out in that context. Reference determination is a function of the context-invariable rule and the demonstration.

Perhaps the central claim in Kaplan’s theory is that all indexicals are what he calls “directly referential”. A directly referential term may denote different objects when used in different contexts; but when evaluating the truth value of what was said in a given context (the truth-evaluable propositional content) only *the object denoted in the context of use* will be relevant. Thus, if  $\alpha$  is directly referential, and if in a given context of use  $\alpha$  refers to  $a$ , then in evaluating the truth value of the proposition expressed by an utterance of  $\ulcorner\phi\alpha\urcorner$  in that context, with respect to a counterfactual situation, it will only be relevant whether or not, in that counterfactual situation,  $a$  (the object *originally* denoted) possesses the property expressed by  $\phi$ . This will be the case even if the counterfactual situation were such that had  $\alpha$  been used in that situation it would have referred to some different object.

The *content* of a sentence in a given context will be the truth-evaluable proposition determined in that context. It is what gets evaluated in circumstances of evaluation, either actual or counterfactual. The content of an expression is its contribution to the truth-evaluable propositional content of the sentence containing it. In the case of directly referring expressions, the content is intuitively the object denoted in a context of use. Formally, though, Kaplan represents the content of a directly referring expression as a constant function from possible worlds (circumstances of evaluation) to extensions. Indeed, in general, the content of any expression is formally represented as what would traditionally be called its *intension*. For most of our purposes, however, nothing will be lost if we simply talk as if the contextually determined designatum of a directly referring expression is itself the content. Kaplan himself often talks this way.

The *character* of a sentence is a function which determines its content in varying contexts. The character of a directly referring expression, then, will be a function that determines the referent of that expression for a given context. In the case of pure indexicals, the character is the context-invariable meaning rule which determines the referent for each context of use. Since the context-invariable meaning rule associated with demonstratives is not sufficient to determine a referent until supplemented with a demonstration, that rule by itself would seem to be incapable of serving as a complete character. Although Kaplan is not always clear on this matter, it seems to be his view that a demonstrative assumes a complete character only when supplemented by a particular demonstration.

Kaplan calls his overall theory of demonstratives the 'Corrected Fregean Theory of Demonstratives' [p. 57]. In it he hopes to incorporate what he takes to be the insights of a Fregean theory of demonstratives while at the same time avoiding some of its more obvious difficulties. In particular, he endorses what he takes to be a Fregean theory of *demonstrations*, demonstrations being, according to Kaplan, that feature of an act of demonstrative reference which, given the context in which the act was performed, determines both the demonstratum as well as the cognitive significance of the utterance involved. The "correction" of Frege's theory involves incorporating the fact that demonstratives are directly referring expressions. But, it should be emphasized, Kaplan accepts as essentially correct the manner in which the Fregean theory of demonstrations (as he understands it) accounts for how a given demonstration determines its demonstratum, and at the same time how *in virtue of this* it determines the contribution of that demonstration to the cognitive significance of the utterance of which it is a part. As Kaplan puts it:

The Fregean theory of demonstrations claims, correctly I believe, that the analogy between descriptions and demonstrations is close enough to provide a sense and denotation analysis of the 'meaning' of a demonstration. The denotation is the demonstratum and it seems quite natural to regard each demonstration as presenting its demonstratum in a particular manner which we may regard as the sense of the demonstration. [p. 36]

Now, while I am basically sympathetic with Kaplan's assessment of the problems he finds with the original Fregean theory of demonstratives, I believe that ultimately the kind of overall picture of

demonstrative reference that underlies his endorsement of the Fregean theory of demonstrations is misguided. It is misguided because it presupposes a kind of *direct* connection between semantics and cognitive significance that does not exist. By attempting both to account for how reference is secured by a given act of demonstrative reference and to account *thereby* for the differences in cognitive significance of different acts of demonstrative reference, the Fregean theory of demonstrations, even given its new “corrected” role, fails adequately to do either.

2. Kaplan suggests that for Frege the paradigm of a meaningful referring expression is the definite description which picks out or denotes an individual in virtue of that individual’s satisfying some condition C which the description (overtly) expresses.<sup>7</sup> The condition by means of which the description picks out its reference is the mode of presentation of the referent for that description. It is the speaker’s grasp or awareness of this condition that underlies its cognitive significance for him. And it is the fact that different descriptions can present the same individual to us, though in different ways — that is, in virtue of that objects satisfying different conditions — that we are able to solve Frege’s problem about the informativeness of true identity statements involving distinct (descriptive) referring expressions. In other words, according to Kaplan, it is the fact that certain definite descriptions which *in fact* are satisfied by the same individual, *might* nevertheless have been (or might reasonably *seem* capable of being)<sup>8</sup> satisfied by different individuals, that explains the possible informativeness of true identity statements involving distinct definite descriptions [cf. p. 52].

As Kaplan understands it, the Fregean theory of demonstrations is based on the exploitation of a (purported) analogy between descriptions and demonstrations. If we stress the analogy between the means by which a definite description presents its denotation and the means by which a demonstration presents its referent, we should be able to provide something like a sense and reference analysis of the “meaning” of a demonstration parallel to that of a definite description. According to this view, then, something like a sense is essentially associated with each demonstration, something that determines both the reference of the demonstration as well as its cognitive significance in a given context.

This analogy constitutes the basis of the Fregean theory of demonstrations. And, to repeat, Kaplan accepts it.

As I noted at the outset, an important aim of the Fregean theory of demonstratives is to enable us to account for the informativeness of true demonstrative identity statements, or, more generally, to explain the differences in cognitive significance between two identical demonstrative claims about the same object. If the theory can be developed in the way just outlined, it would provide just such an account, an account paralleling that available in the case of definite descriptions — i.e., in terms of distinct senses that are hypothesized to be associated with each of the distinct demonstrations such that, though they in fact pick out the same demonstratum, could have picked out distinct demonstrata. Since the conditions associated with each of the two demonstrations could have been (or might reasonably seem capable of being) satisfied by distinct objects, the identity claim made using these two demonstrations will be informative.

Insofar as the above theory seems coherent, it appears to solve our adaptation to demonstratives of Frege's puzzle. Unfortunately, as Kaplan points out, it does so at the cost of misrepresenting at least one important aspect of the semantics of demonstrative sentences. The trouble, according to Kaplan, is that the Fregean theory takes the analogy between descriptions and demonstrations just a bit too far. Definite descriptions, as normally used, are not *directly referential*. But Kaplan convincingly argues that demonstratives *are* directly referential [pp. 34–36]. The only object relevant to the truth or falsity of what is said on the occasion of uttering a demonstrative sentence is the object actually demonstrated; and this is true no matter what possible circumstances with respect to which one might be concerned to evaluate what was actually said. So here, at least, we have a significant disanalogy between ordinary definite descriptions and demonstrations.

Suppose, however, that it were possible for a speaker to use a description in such a way as only to *fix the reference*, in Kripke's favored sense of that phrase,<sup>9</sup> without the conditions expressed by the description entering into the content of what was said. If this were possible, the descriptive conditions could serve both to secure the referent on an occasion of use and account for the cognitive significance of the description on that occasion, while the description, so

used, would be directly referential. Well, is there anything to prevent us from using a description in precisely this way? We could — and, in fact, Kaplan does — easily introduce an operator into the language — Kaplan’s expression is “dthat” [p. 46]<sup>10</sup> — such that whenever we want to use a description merely to fix the referent, we would prefix the description with our new operator. Thus, for example, if I said,

- (1) Dthat(the inventor of bifocals) died at the age of 83,

and if someone wanted to determine if what I said would be true in some other possible world, he would have to determine whether in that world *Benjamin Franklin* died at the age of 83. It would be irrelevant to the evaluation whether in that world Benjamin Franklin (or, for that matter, anyone else) invented bifocals.

But now, as Kaplan would quickly point out, something very much like this seems to occur when we refer demonstratively. Whatever conditions an object must satisfy in order to count as the object being demonstrated on a particular occasion, those conditions, and thereby the demonstration, serve only to *fix the referent*. They are not included in the content of any sentence containing the relevant demonstrative that is uttered on that occasion.

The parallel is obvious. Indeed, Kaplan is so struck by the parallel that he concludes that for all theoretical purposes demonstrations may be assimilated to (dthat-prefaced) descriptions. He writes:

Since no immediate relevant structural difference has appeared between demonstrations and descriptions, I regard the treatment of the ‘dthat’ operator in the formal logic L.D. as accounting for the general case. [p. 56]<sup>11</sup>

Kaplan even (playfully?) envisions the possibility of adding to the syntax of his particular formal treatment non-logical demonstration constants which would play a syntactic and semantic role analogous to that of an ordinary descriptor. But is the nature and extent of the parallel in fact sufficient to justify Kaplan’s conclusion? Are there really no “relevant” differences between demonstrations and descriptions?

In showing that demonstratives are directly referential, what Kaplan has shown is that those features — *whatever they may be* — of the actual demonstratum that make it the reference of a demonstrative on a given occasion of use are never part of the truth-evaluable content



of the uttered sentence. But notice: nothing essentially involved in recognizing *this* necessitates the adoption of any particular account of demonstrative reference — let alone a (modified) Fregean one. It is important to see that Kaplan is not *required* to endorse the further assimilation between ‘dthat’-descriptions and demonstrations. In fact, all that Kaplan can legitimately claim is that what he calls the “directness” of demonstrative reference does not *preclude* it from being explained descriptively. Impressed, however, by his ‘discovery’ that direct reference to an object *can* be secured descriptively, Kaplan proceeds to suggest that the direct reference of demonstrations *is* secured in some significantly similar way.

## II. SENSE, CHARACTER, AND COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE.

1. While the *structural* parallel between Kaplan’s merely reference-fixing descriptions and demonstrations is indeed striking — i.e., demonstrations do seem only to fix the reference of their associated demonstratives — nothing in this suggests that the parallel extends beyond this in such a way that the kind of conditions by means of which an act of demonstrative reference fixes its referent should be thought of as operating in the same way as the (essentially attributive) kind of conditions by means of which a description fixes its referent. In the case of Kaplan’s ‘dthat’-descriptions, the relevant descriptors could, but do not contribute their satisfaction conditions to the propositional content of the sentences in which they occur. It is a serious question, however, whether in the case of demonstrations it is even sensible to suppose that the sort of conditions that are genuinely operative in fixing the referent could plausibly contribute to the propositional content which gets expressed on the relevant occasion of utterance. Only someone antecedently predisposed to the view that uniquely describing something is the paradigmatic or fundamental means by which we manage to refer would assume the parallel to extent in this way.

But what could possibly predispose one to this view? Well, the behavior of descriptions seems to fit in extremely well with the view that differences in cognitive significance must directly reflect objective semantic differences;<sup>12</sup> for it will seem obvious (at least to anyone influenced by Russell — as Kaplan plainly is) that the differences

in cognitive significance between different descriptions are a direct function of differences in the *satisfaction conditions* of the relevant descriptors. This being the case, the view that uniquely describing something is the fundamental means by which we manage to refer will seem very attractive, if not inevitable. The assimilation of demonstrations and descriptions is not far behind.

Even though Kaplan's semantical point about the directness of demonstrative reference can be made without committing oneself to any account of how reference gets fixed by means of acts of demonstrative reference, Kaplan nevertheless feels compelled to endorse the Fregean assimilation of demonstrations and descriptions. Why? Evidently because without it he sees no other way — consonant with his endorsement of Frege's view that differences in cognitive significance must directly reflect semantic differences — of handling Frege's puzzle as it applies to sentences containing demonstratives. After all, unless as a matter of established linguistic fact there will be associated with each demonstration on the occasion of its performance a set of *cognitively accessible conditions*, satisfaction of which by an object is necessary and sufficient if that object is to count as the demonstratum, how is the potential informativeness of true demonstrative identity statements to be explained? How else are we to explain the possibility of a speaker's rationally holding conflicting epistemic attitudes towards the contents expressed by distinct utterances of the same demonstrative sentence-type, when in each case the same thing is being predicated of the same object?

Kaplan's version of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the potential informativeness of identity statements involving descriptions plainly depends upon a certain (traditional) view of the nature and role of *sense* in determining the cognitive significance of a definite description for a particular speaker. It depends upon viewing the speaker's understanding of a given definite description as consisting in his knowing just those conditions which must be satisfied by an object if that object is to count as that description's referent. On this view, there will be a difference in cognitive significance just in case there is a difference in the satisfaction conditions conventionally associated with and expressed by each of the descriptions. These conditions and they alone are relevant to the (semantic) determination of the description's reference.

Consequently, the cognitive significance of the description is exhausted by an awareness of these conditions [cf. p. 43]. A competent speaker's intention to refer with a definite description will, consequently, be viewed as an intention to refer to whatever satisfies the conditions knowledge of which by him constitutes his understanding of and competence with the given description. If the parallel, as Kaplan wants to draw it, is to hold, then something similar must be the case for demonstrations.

Demonstrations, then, like descriptions, must have associated with them a sense or mode of presentation which specifies a *cognitively accessible* set of reference-fixing conditions such that it might have been the case that they be (or might reasonably seem capable of being) satisfied by different objects than they in fact are. Competence, then, with respect to the use of demonstrations will have to consist, at least in part, in the speaker's ability to discern (and express) these relevant conditions on given occasions of demonstrative use. He will count as demonstratively referring to that object on that occasion in virtue of his cognitive access to the conditions associated with a particular demonstration, and his intending to refer to whatever in the context satisfies them.

According to Kaplan's theory, then, the linguistic rules governing the competent use of demonstratives will require that some such sense-constituting set of conditions be associated with any given demonstration. Obviously, however, unlike the case with definite descriptions, these demonstrative conditions will not be antecedently determined by conventionally fixed, context-invariant semantic properties of the expressions making up some descriptor. Rather, they will have to be determined in some systematic or rule-governed way *on the spot*, as it were.

Plainly, before we can begin to evaluate whether or not this way of looking at things provides an adequate explanation of demonstrative reference, we need to be told something more specific about the nature of these demonstrative senses. How exactly are we to conceive of the conditions imposed by the sense of a demonstration? How are we to understand, in Kaplan's terminology, the (complete) *character* of a demonstrative on a given occasion of use?

Kaplan provides us with the following answer. He suggests that the

“standard form”, as he puts it, for the sense of a demonstration type will be given by something like,

(D<sub>k</sub>) The individual that has appearance *A* from here now. [p. 53]

Presumably, then, the “standard form” of the complete character of a demonstrative on a given occasion of use will be given by something like,

(DC<sub>k</sub>) Dthat (The individual that has appearance *A* from here now).

Kaplan goes on to explain that by “appearance” he means “something like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject.” Whatever questions of detail one might raise about how exactly one is to understand (D<sub>k</sub>), it seems fair to allow that if, following Kaplan, one accepts that demonstrations have senses analogous to those of descriptions, then these senses, these demonstrative modes of presentation, will have to be something very much like what (D<sub>k</sub>) represents them to be — at least in the case of perceptually presented demonstrations.

Now perhaps the first thing to strike one as potentially problematic about (D<sub>k</sub>) is the appearance therein of the *pure indexicals*, ‘here’ and ‘now’. Unless some account is offered of their contribution to the cognitive significance of demonstrations, (D<sub>k</sub>) can count at best as only partially characterizing the sense or character associated with competently used occurrences of ‘that’. For example, if their use in turn required the recognition of demonstrative senses — as would be the case if it were correct to analyze ‘here’ and ‘now’ respectively as ‘this place’ and ‘this time’ — then plainly (D<sub>k</sub>) would not only be incomplete, but would be inherently inadequate, either begging the question or leading to a regress of demonstrative senses.

For Kaplan, however, this particular problem should not arise; for ‘here’ and ‘now’ are *pure indexicals*. As such, their reference is supposed to be fully determined by their context-invariable character; no associated demonstration is required or relevant. And, moreover, competence with pure indexicals will involve grasping this fact. A speaker need only have mastered the character of a pure indexical in order to be able successfully to refer with it in a given context. Nothing else that he believes, or knows, or intends will be in the least relevant to determining the referent.<sup>13</sup>

But now how are we to understand the cognitive significance of one of these pure indexicals on a given occasion of use? How are we to understand their contribution, as represented in  $(D_k)$ , to the cognitive significance of a particular demonstration?

Kaplan's position seems to be that the cognitive significance of a referring expression is exhausted by what the speaker knows that is relevant to determining its reference (content) in a given context. This being the case, then, according to Kaplan's own principles, everything except its character should be irrelevant to the contribution made by a pure indexical to the cognitive significance of those statements, including demonstrative statements, made with their help. This follows directly from Kaplan's 'Epistemological Principle 2', which simply states: "Cognitive significance of a Thought = Character" [p. 60], and from his own principle of compositionality for characters:

- (F1) The character of the whole is a function of the character of the parts. That is, if two compound well-formed expressions differ only with respect to components which have the same character, then the character of the compounds is the same. [p. 26]

Thus, since  $(DC_k)$  represents for Kaplan the standard form of the complete character of a demonstrative in use, 'here' and 'now' will contribute just their characters to the character of any particular demonstrative in use. So, the presence of 'here' and 'now' in  $(D_k)$  contribute nothing contextually *variable* to the cognitive significance of a demonstration.<sup>14</sup>

Their presence then, it would seem, serves only to fix the context in which the condition, *having the appearance A*, is to apply. Consequently, it will have to be *having the appearance A*, that constitutes the *distinctively variable* cognitively significant part of any demonstration. So, if in a given context a demonstration  $D$  is mounted by which it is required that the demonstratum have appearance  $A$ , and if in another context a demonstration  $D'$  is mounted by which it is required that the demonstratum have appearance  $A'$ , then  $D$  and  $D'$  should be tokens of the same demonstration type just in case  $A = A'$ .

2. As an attempt to characterize the cognitive significance of demonstrations, Kaplan's proposal will not do. One obvious problem with  $(D_k)$

can be traced directly to Kaplan's relying on the character of pure indexicals to capture their cognitive significance. Plainly, different uses of the same pure indexical may differ in cognitive significance for a person despite the sameness of character on the two occasions.

Suppose, for example, that I am strapped to a chair in a controlled environment and a speaker in the room points to a particular object in the room and says to me.

(2) That is an *F*.

I believe him. During this time, I correctly believe myself to be in Ann Arbor.

Immediately after the demonstration, I am rendered unconscious. For whatever reasons — it doesn't really matter what they are so long as they are not unreasonable — I believe, when I wake up, that a great deal of time has passed, that I am no longer in Ann Arbor, and that I have been moved to Baltimore. I find myself, however, seated in the same place in a room exactly like the one I was in before. Beside me is the same man who was in the previous room. And before me is an object that looks exactly like the one I was shown in Ann Arbor. I think to myself: Ah, they're trying to fool me into thinking that we're still in Ann Arbor! In fact, we still *are* in Ann Arbor; and everything, including the object is exactly as it was before, and only seconds have passed. As soon as I regain consciousness, the man points at the object in exactly the same way as before and says,

(3) That is an *F*.

But for one reason or another, I do not believe that the object demonstrated in Ann Arbor was moved to Baltimore. This being the case, I do not believe what the man says. I believed what he said when he uttered (2), but, without changing my mind about that, I do not believe what he said when he uttered (3). Thus, (2) and (3) differ for me in cognitive significance.

Notice that in both cases the same object was presented to me in exactly the same manner. Not only is the demonstratum (as well as what was predicated of it) the same in both cases, but the qualitative way in which the demonstrated object appears to me in both cases is exactly the same. According to Kaplan's principles, then, my com-

panion will have performed two tokens of the same demonstration type. But from all of this it should follow not only that the truth-evaluable propositional content of the two utterances is the same, but that the cognitive significance of the two utterances is the same.

But as the example makes plain, this is not the case. If the demonstration accompanying the utterance of (2) and the demonstration accompanying the utterance of (3) were of equivalent cognitive significance for me, then it would be irrational for me to think that the two demonstrations referred to different objects. But plainly, there is nothing irrational in my doing so.<sup>15</sup>

It is a simple fact that any two demonstrations mounted by the same speaker (no matter how qualitatively similar their manner of presenting their demonstrata) *will* have been mounted at different times and *might* have been mounted from different places. Given the physical possibilities opened up by a lapse of time or, possibly, a change of place, this fact by itself suffices to ground the possibility of different objects being demonstrated by distinct demonstrations. And recognition by a speaker/auditor of these possibilities in turn suffices to ground the possibility that any two qualitatively similar demonstrations may differ in cognitive significance. Moreover, recognition of these possibilities is guaranteed by, indeed, partially constitutive of a speaker's special competence with demonstratives. No appeal to demonstrative sense or appearance is required to explain the potential differences in cognitive significance of acts of demonstrative reference.<sup>16</sup> Whether or not someone believes that two qualitatively similar demonstrations pick out the same object will importantly depend upon what the speaker believes about the time and place of the demonstrations and the reasonableness for him, *given these and his other beliefs*, of the demonstrata being different.

So far, the problem here lies with the inadequacy of any identification of the character of pure indexicals with their cognitive significance, or, more generally, with the inadequacy of Kaplan's Epistemological Principle 2. Plainly, "Here = *P*", uttered at  $P_1$  and "Here = *P*" uttered at  $P_2$ , where  $P_1 \neq P_2$ , will have exactly the same character but may differ in cognitive significance for me. So identity of character is insufficient for identity of cognitive significance. Even if the character *and* the content are the same, this will not guarantee identity of

cognitive significance. In the example above, suppose  $P_1 = P_2$ . Even so, it may be reasonable for me, given my extra-linguistic, collateral beliefs, not to believe that this is so. Consequently, the two utterances of “Here =  $P$ ” will differ in cognitive significance for me. No attempt simply to index characters with their contents will yield a satisfactory account (or formal representation) of the cognitive significance of these indexicals.

Importantly, Kaplan’s identification of character and cognitive significance fails not only for indexicals, but also for proper names and for predicates. In the case of names this is obvious. The character of a name (for Kaplan) will be a constant function from contexts to content. And, moreover, the content (intension) of a name will also be a constant function from circumstances of evaluation (possible worlds) to an object. But then plainly, different names with the same referent — say, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” — will have the same character, but may fail to have the same cognitive significance.

A similar possibility opens up for predicates, although here the issue may be more controversial. Since the character of a (non-indexical) predicate is also a constant function from contexts to content (intension), the problem will arise if there are two predicates that are, with respect to each possible world, coextensive, i.e., share the same intension, and yet are not cognitive equivalents. The following, it seems to me, would be precisely such a case; other examples should be easy to construct. Suppose there were a dialect of English in which someone who has dysentary was called “dropsical”. Moreover, suppose that most speakers of this dialect did not know the word “dysentary”. Tyler, however, a speaker of this dialect, comes to learn about a disease called “dysentary”, and, indeed, learns a lot about this disease. It is surely possible that Tyler fails to realize that having dysentary is the same as (in his home dialect) being dropsical. Suppose that all of Tyler’s *de dicto* dysentary-beliefs are true. This is surely compatible with his believing a number of false *de dicto* dropsical-beliefs. Plainly, then, there would be claims that Tyler would assent to in which *having dysentary* was predicated of individuals, while dissenting from the counterpart claims involving *being dropsical*. So “having dysentary” and “being dropsical” clearly differ in cognitive significance for him, though semantically, they ought to be represented as having the same intensions and characters.



Kaplan is right to insist that it is of the essence of a demonstration that it be mounted from some context or other, which is *at least* to say at some location and time, if it is to determine a referent, and that what referent is determined will importantly depend upon the context (the when and where) in which the demonstration is performed. Intent, however, on pressing the seductive analogy between demonstrations with descriptions, Kaplan seems to have failed adequately to appreciate the importance that certain of the speaker's or auditor's *extra-linguistic, collateral* beliefs will have on the cognitive significance that a demonstration has for him — especially those beliefs about the context in which the demonstration is mounted. Insofar as the context of a demonstration is relevant to what is demonstrated, the beliefs of a speaker/auditor concerning the relevant features of the context will inevitably affect the cognitive significance for him of a given demonstration. That the cognitive significance of a demonstrative in use should be sensitive in this distinctive way to the speaker's collateral beliefs about the context of use seems an obvious and inevitable feature of how demonstratives work.

Indeed, as our remarks about names and predicates above help suggest, it is generally the case that a speaker's extra-linguistic, collateral beliefs play an important and often ineliminable role in determining the cognitive significance for him of his own and other people's utterances. The meaning of a speaker's words is *not* directly determined by, nor does it determine (except, relative to his other beliefs), the cognitive significance of those words for the speaker. Indeed, in more or less significant ways, the loss or acquisition of collateral beliefs may occasion changes in the cognitive significance of a word for a person without our having to suppose a correlative change in meaning. This is especially clear in the case of utterances containing pure indexicals, though the point is general. According to Kaplan's own theory, a speaker's extra-linguistic beliefs ought to be irrelevant to the speaker's ability to use *pure* indexicals to refer. This may or may not be so, but they are plainly not irrelevant to the particular cognitive significance that utterances containing these indexicals have.

My point here is not that the notion of a character or some notion like it is irrelevant to semantics. On the contrary, I think that Kaplan has quite convincingly shown that some such notion (over and above extension and intension) is essential for any (model-theoretic) *semantic*

treatment of a language containing both modal expressions and directly referring expressions like indexicals and 'dthat'-descriptions. My point, rather, is that it is a mistake to think that there must always be some objective semantic correlate to the specific cognitive significance of an utterance. Character cannot play this role. In particular, whatever considerations go into determining the cognitive significance of a demonstration either for the speaker or his audience, it is a mistake — a mistake that Kaplan makes — to think that they are coextensive with what, for either the speaker or his audience, determines the referent of the demonstration.

### III. DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE AND COMMUNICATION

1. So far I have criticized Kaplan's identification of the cognitive significance of a demonstrative in use with its character. I have done so primarily on the grounds that this identification fails utterly for pure indexicals, and that the character of demonstratives is supposed (by  $(DC_K)$ ) to be partially a function of the characters of the pure indexicals 'here' and 'now'. Exposing this failure of  $(DC_K)$  showed how Kaplan's attempt to force a direct connection between the cognitive significance of demonstratives and their semantics led to a wholly unsatisfactory account of the cognitive significance of demonstratives. But this is not the only failure of  $(DC_K)$ . Kaplan's endorsement of the Frege direct-connection thesis about the relationship between cognitive significance and semantics also leads to an unworkable account of how demonstrative reference is secured and an unacceptable view about the communication and interpretation of demonstrative thoughts.

Kaplan claims that the referent of a given demonstration will be determined as that which satisfies the appropriate, instance, in the appropriate context, of the schema  $(D_K)$ : *the individual that has appearance A from here now*. But on at least one reading of  $(D_K)$ , this is plainly inadequate, for — to borrow a cliché — things are not always as they appear. This being the case, any proposal that the referent of a demonstration mounted in a context  $C$  will be the object in  $C$  that 'satisfies' or resembles the appearance will not do.

But in suggesting that the demonstratum of a given demonstration will be the individual "that has appearance  $A$ " in the context  $C$  in

which the demonstration was performed, Kaplan surely did not mean to suggest that the demonstratum will be whatever object in *C* *is as the appearance A presents it to be*. More likely, what Kaplan meant to suggest was that the demonstratum will be whatever object in *C* *appears* as *A* presents it, whether or not it in fact *is* as it appears to be. In effect, the suggestion here would be that the relevant appearance is, in some way, to be mentioned and perhaps characterized in the reference fixing description, but not used as we had previously supposed. On this interpretation of  $(D_k)$ , the demonstratum will be the actual object in *C*, if any, that in fact is appearing *A*-like to the relevant speaker/auditor.

But this interpretation of  $(D_k)$  is plagued with its own serious problems. Consider the condition of being whatever object, if any, is appearing *A*-like to the relevant speaker/auditor. Recall that an appearance, as Kaplan would have us understand this notion, is “something like a picture with a little arrow pointing to the relevant subject.” Needless to say, in referring demonstratively, I do not intend to be referring to everything that is perceptually presented to me at the time of the demonstration. Rather, there is some particular object (out of indeterminately many objects presented) that I intend to refer to. This, I take it, is what Kaplan’s talk of a “little arrow pointing to the relevant subject” is intended to take care of. But how exactly is this appeal to arrows supposed to work? Either the “arrow” is pointing to part of the picture, or the arrow is pointing (from part of the picture?!) to the object itself.

Take the first case. Is Kaplan’s talk of the arrow pointing to part of the picture merely to suggest that some particular item in the scene which appears is somehow more *salient* than the others?<sup>17</sup> But something can be a salient feature of my experience in a whole variety of ways: it can be the most colorful, the loudest, the most frightening, the most attractive, the one on which my attention is most strongly fixed, and so on. But now for any *non-question begging* way in which an item can be the most salient feature of my experience, I can easily imagine cases where I demonstratively refer to some object *a* despite the fact that the appearance of some distinct object *b* is the most salient for me in the relevant way on that occasion. Appeals to salience here are of no help.

In saying either that the arrow is pointing to part of the picture or

that it is pointing (from the picture) to the object itself, it seems that Kaplan is saying nothing more than that an act of demonstrative reference will involve either the intention to refer to whatever object is such that *this* part of my perceptual field (so to speak) is an appearance of it, or the intention to refer to *this* which is appearing *A*'ly to me. But if this is right, then in either case, Kaplan's "arrow" represents nothing more than a mental demonstration: in the first case, the demonstration of some dubious sense-datum-like appearance, in the second case, the demonstration of the object itself. In either case, the question is clearly being begged.

It begins to emerge that it is a mistake to try to understand demonstrative reference in terms of any even *quasi*-descriptive model, even if the relevant description is not assumed exhaustively to determine the cognitive significance of the relevant demonstrations.

The distinctiveness (both cognitively and semantically) of demonstrative reference from descriptive reference can be made even more evident. Consider again our original problem: the potential informativeness of demonstrative identity statements. Imagine a situation adapted from John Perry,<sup>18</sup> in which I and someone else are facing the U.S.S. Enterprise with its middle section obscured by a large building. Now suppose that, intending to say something informative, I utter an instance of

- (4) That [demonstratively referring to the ship as it appears to the left of the obscuring building] is identical with that [demonstratively referring to the ship as it appears to the right of the building].

How, on Kaplan's view, are we to explain how *my* statement is informative to some auditor/observer? It seems that if my statement is to be informative to someone else, then in some sense, I must be able, on Kaplan's view, to express the sense of my demonstration; or, rather, competently performing the demonstration would just have to count as expressing its sense. If my audience is to understand me, then, he must be able to grasp the senses of my two demonstrations, the senses I intended to express; for, presumably, it will be on the basis of his having grasped these senses, together with his awareness (or belief) that the conditions determined by them could be satisfied by two distinct

things, that make it possible for him to find it informative that they in fact are satisfied by the same thing.

But now what exactly is supposed to be involved in his grasping the sense of my demonstration? Well, in the first place, he will have grasped my demonstration only if he will thereby have been made aware of the object to which I was intending to refer. But how is this accomplished? With descriptions there would seem to be no particular difficulty. I express my intention to be referring to whatever object satisfies the conditions associated with a certain description by verbally uttering a token of that description. My auditor will grasp my intention if he grasps my words, recognizing that I intend to be using them literally. And he will grasp my words if, in virtue of his competence with those words, he recognizes the conditions associated with the relevant description. Thus he will grasp my intention to be referring to whatever satisfies these conditions.

Now, in the case of demonstrations, I express my intention to be referring to some object by performing an appropriate demonstration. My auditor will grasp my intention if, in some sense, he grasps the demonstration that I performed. But is it plausible to suppose, as it was in the description case, that his grasping my demonstration consisted in his recognizing, in virtue of his competence with demonstratives, some set of conditions I associate (semantically) with the demonstration, and thereby grasps my (purported) intention to be referring to whatever, from my perspective, satisfies them? But this is not what happens. Whatever resources I bring to bear in order to determine what object a speaker, on the occasion of his performing a particular act of demonstrative reference, intends to be referring to — including (essentially) my knowledge of the conventions governing demonstrative gestures and my beliefs about the speaker's beliefs and interests on the given occasion — I certainly do not attempt to grasp an expressed ( $D_k$ )-type sense, and then proceed to identify the object that satisfies it.

Even if (contrary to what I have just been arguing) the performance of a demonstration did, in some sense, involve the deployment of a ( $D_k$ )-type sense in the way Kaplan proposes, it is not at all clear that it would make sense to suppose that I (as audience) could grasp that sense — not, at least, in the way that I am supposed to grasp the meaning of his other words. Suppose, for example that under the

circumstances in which I uttered (4), the person I was addressing was situated some distance from me. Suppose that from his perspective, both perceptual and epistemic, the object to which I have demonstratively referred appears differently to him than it does to me. Overall, the cognitive significance for him of my demonstration may be quite different from what it is for me. But then how, given Kaplan's picture of things, did he grasp *my* demonstration, the demonstration I deployed in order to fix my reference and convey my information. Indeed, how did he manage to understand *what I said*? If Kaplan's account is correct, it is hard to see how he possibly could have. But the point, of course, is that he did. He understood what I said, including my demonstrations perfectly well. The trouble lies in supposing that what is involved in my competently demonstrating the object and his grasping that demonstration can be accounted for in terms of a theory of the sort Kaplan suggests.

Kaplan is, needless to say, not unaware of this problem, though I believe that he fails fully to appreciate the difficulties that it raises for his proposal. In response, Kaplan suggests that, perhaps, rather than admit that the same demonstration might have different senses — which would be disastrous for his proposal — we should say that a single performance may involve distinct demonstrations with distinct senses from the perspective of distinct audiences [p. 53]. It is difficult to know what precisely Kaplan has in mind here. If all this comes to is the claim that the cognitive significance of a given demonstration in use may be different for a speaker and his audience, conditioned in each case by their different epistemic perspectives, then plainly this provides no support for his view, but rather is a redescription of the problem his view must face. Whatever exactly Kaplan does have in mind, though, if his suggestion is to save him from the difficulties raised above, then it must be capable of sustaining the intuition that my demonstrative statement was fully understood. But how exactly is this supposed to work?

Presumably, a single demonstrative performance may involve distinct senses in the same way that a single utterance of a definite description might be ambiguous. But now suppose that I utter a sentence with what is in fact an ambiguous definite description in it, say,

- (5) Dthat(the *F*) is *G*.

Let 'the  $\phi$ ' and 'the  $\psi$ ' be the two possible disambiguous readings of 'the  $F$ '. Furthermore, assume that 'the  $\phi$ ' and 'the  $\psi$ ' are satisfied by the same object. Now suppose that when I uttered (5), I intended to be saying that

(6) Dthat(the  $\phi$ ) is  $G$ .

If my auditor takes me to have said (6), then plainly he will have understood my statement. However, if he takes me to have said that

(7) Dthat(the  $\psi$ ) is  $G$ ;

then — even though he will have correctly identified the truth-evaluable propositional content of what I said, he will not strictly speaking have fully understood my statement. It will be a happy accident that what he took me to be saying had the same content as what I in fact intended to say. Indeed, It is conceivable that his failure to understand what I said may go unnoticed, but it nevertheless would count as a *failure* to understand what I had intended to convey.

Since successfully grasping another speaker's demonstrative intentions does not in any plausible way depend upon having to grasp some condition-specifying sense, a speaker's intention to refer demonstratively to some object cannot correctly be explained in terms which require his having some condition-specifying sense in mind such that his referential intentions *just* is the intention to refer (attributively) to whatever satisfies those conditions in the relevant context. To suppose so would be to miss precisely what is distinctive about demonstrative reference.

2. This last point can be made in a way that drives home the essential irrelevance of condition-specifying senses for demonstrative reference. Suppose that I utter some demonstrative sentence, 'That is  $F$ '. Ask yourself, what is it that I as a competent user of the language literally meant to say. What thought did I mean to convey? For any non-question begging, condition-specifying sense  $C$ , suppose my auditor took me to have said 'Dthat( $C$ ) is  $F$ '. Will he have understood me? No matter what  $C$  is, the answer will be no. Even if, in fact,  $C$  characterizes as closely as possible the cognitive significance for me of my demonstration, the answer will still be no. In the first place, it should be

evident that, for any  $C$ , I *could* believe that  $D_{\text{that}}(C)$  is  $F$  without believing of the relevant object that *that* object is  $F$ , for it is always possible that I should fail to believe that *that* object is  $C$  (see below). And so it should also be evident that, for any  $C$ , my auditor could grasp the thought expressed by ' $D_{\text{that}}(C)$  is  $F$ ' without his grasping (*vis-à-vis* the object I demonstrated) that '*that* object is  $F$ ', where '*that*' occurs demonstratively. But plainly it is the content of the latter claim that he would have to grasp if he were to understand what I said. Of course, it doesn't matter in the least if in addition to believing "That is  $F$ " he also believes "That is  $C$ ". But if he does, then while  $C$  will be relevant to the cognitive significance of my claim for him, it will be no part of what I literally said.

To see this more clearly, let  $x$  be the object about which a speaker  $S$  makes the demonstrative claim: "That is  $F$ ." In making this claim,  $S$  will have intended *of*  $x$  that it be the subject of his claim. Now inevitably,  $S$  will have a number of beliefs about  $x$ , about *that* object there. He might, for example, believe of  $x$  that it is  $C$  or even that it is *the*  $C$ . It might even be the case that  $S$  intended to refer to  $x$  and say of it that it is  $F$  because he took  $x$ , *the intended object of his demonstrative reference*, to be  $C$  (or the  $C$ ). Indeed, we might suppose that had  $S$  thought at all that *that* object there,  $x$ , was not  $C$  (or the  $C$ ), he would never have intended to refer to it — he would never have intended to claim of it that it was  $F$ . In a certain sense, then, we might very well be willing to say of  $S$  that he intended to refer to a  $C$  (or the  $C$ ). But is this "referential intention" at all relevant to the success or failure of his intention to refer demonstratively to  $x$ , to *that* object there? Insofar as he intended to refer demonstratively to  $x$ , the answer is plainly *no*. It is only confusion to think otherwise. For suppose that in fact  $x$  is not  $C$  (or the  $C$ ). Now although it is true that in such a case we might be willing to say that *in some sense*  $S$  failed to refer to what he intended to refer to, this is true only with respect to an intention the failure of which does not defeat — indeed, is only explicable in terms of —  $S$ 's successful demonstrative reference to  $x$ . With respect to the relevant referential intention, the intention to say of *that* object there that it is  $F$ ,  $S$  will *not* have failed to refer to what he intended to refer to. This latter sort of referential intention must not only be recognized, but it



must be recognized to be the only sort of referential intention relevant to fixing the semantic reference of competently used demonstratives.

These last considerations show that for any proposed descriptive condition *C* (whether conceptual or perceptual, or infected with other indexicals), a speaker's intention to refer to what satisfies *C* will not count as successfully *demonstrative* unless there is some object such that he takes *that* object to be *C* and intends to refer to *that* object. But in this case — since he could after all be mistaken about that object's being *C* — satisfaction of *C* plays no direct role in the determination of his intended demonstrative reference, though it will doubtless contribute to its cognitive significance. The point is that the demonstrative here is ineliminable. The demonstrative way of referring to (and thinking about) objects, then, is evidently more distinctive, more primitive than Kaplan's views allow, and is not, as he supposes, reducible to or explicable by analogy with the descriptive way of referring to objects — even when the 'description' is supplemented, as in (D<sub>k</sub>) with context-fixing pure indexicals.

It follows from all of this that no sense of the sort that Kaplan wants to associate with demonstrations will be part of what gets expressed on the occasion of the utterance of a demonstrative claim. No such sense will satisfactorily account for the cognitive significance of a demonstrative claim. And no such sense will play the essential role Kaplan assigns it in determining the demonstratum of a given demonstration.

By now, it should be evident that the cognitive significance that a given demonstrative claim has for someone is not something that is directly determined by the semantic rules that govern the competent use and interpretation of demonstratives. It is no part of the "meaning" of demonstratives that on a given occasion of use they possess the particular cognitive significance that they in fact do — either for the speaker or the auditor. Rather, the particular cognitive significance that a demonstrative has on a given occasion of use will largely be a function of the speaker's or his auditor's distinctive extra-linguistic epistemic perspective — and not, directly at least, a function of any semantic rules. Rather, the semantic rules governing demonstratives (knowledge of which is required for competence with demonstratives) limit in distinctive ways the manner in which the cognitive significance

of a given demonstrative in use will be sensitive to the speaker's collateral beliefs. Nor does the cognitive significance of a given demonstrative in use play any direct and determinate role in fixing or determining the referent of that demonstrative. And though the correct interpretation of demonstrative claims may require the interpreter to share many and guess at other collateral beliefs of the speaker, the cognitive significance for the speaker of a given demonstrative is no part of what gets literally said, nor is it any part of what is taken to have been said insofar as the demonstrative claim is understood. Consequently, unlike what Kaplan supposes to be the case with definite description identity statements, demonstrative identity statements will not be informative to one in virtue of their expressed character (sense). Instead, they will be informative in virtue of the particular effect that grasping their content has on one's epistemic situation, given the differences in cognitive significance which one attaches to each demonstrative in use.

Kaplan is evidently attracted to his 'Corrected Fregean Theory of Demonstratives' for a number of reasons, but of central importance to him is the fact that "by incorporating demonstration types in its sentence types, such a theory *accounts for more differences in informativeness as differences in meaning (character)*" [emphasis added] [p. 58]. If I am right, however, this is precisely what we ought not to want to try to do, for this is explicitly to buy into Frege's view that differences in cognitive significance must directly reflect objective semantic differences, a view that I have tried to show to be mistaken. I have, in particular, tried to expose the sort of distortion that adoption of this view engenders in the case of demonstratives — how it leads to a failure to appreciate fully either the distinctive cognitive or the distinctive semantic features of these indexicals. But I hope that it is clear that the problems with this view are general and not merely limited to indexicals.

Finally, a *caveat*. I am not claiming that the semantic properties of sentences have no bearing on their cognitive significance — no more than I would claim that the semantic properties of sentences (the very sentences we use in the content clauses of propositional attitude

ascriptions) have no bearing on the beliefs or other attitudes a person may have and express using those sentences. If there were not deep and important connections between semantics and cognitive significance, the very possibility of interpreting others' speech, appreciating their propositional attitudes, and understanding and explaining their behavior in terms of these attitudes would seem an illusion or at best a total mystery. If, however, we are ever even to begin adequately to understand these complicated connections, we must first free ourselves from the overly simplistic view of them that we have inherited from Frege.<sup>19</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Gottlob Frege, *Collected Papers*, ed. by Brian McGuinness, Basil Blackwell, New York, 1984, pp. 157–177. Although “reference” and its cognates may not be the most felicitous translation of Frege’s *technical* uses of “Bedeutung” and its cognates, I find the now fashionable practice of translating “Bedeutung” as “meaning” even more unsatisfactory. Throughout the text, I adopt the more traditional, and to my mind less problematic rendering of “Bedeutung” as “reference”.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, ‘On sense and meaning’, pp. 157–158, ‘Function and concept’, p. 145, and ‘Thoughts’, p. 359, all in Frege, *Collected Papers*, *ibid.*; and especially Frege’s letter to Jourdain in Gottlob Frege, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, ed. by Gottfried Gabriel *et al.*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, pp. 78–80.

<sup>3</sup> “Objective semantic difference”, as I intend it, can be glossed as follows: Two expressions (on particular occasions of use) will differ in an objectively semantic way if (in virtue of being the expressions they are in the language to which they belong) they possess (relative to those occasions) features which enable them to contribute differently to the determination of the truth values of the sentences containing them.

The point here is not that the two sentences must differ in linguistic meaning. Frege is quite clear in allowing that two utterances of the same sentence with what we would call the same linguistic meaning may express different thoughts, as well as that two sentences with different linguistic meanings could express the same thought. “Today is Arbor Day” uttered on different days would be an example of the first case, while the pair “Today is Arbor Day” and “Yesterday was Arbor Day” could be an example of the second. But this does not preclude the linguistic meaning of an expression from being relevant to determining (perhaps, in some sense, contributing to) the sense — and thereby the reference — of that expression on an occasion of use. See ‘Thoughts’, *ibid.*, p. 358. The non-identity of sense and linguistic meaning is cogently argued for by Tyler Burge in ‘Sinning against Frege’, *The Philosophical Review* **88** (1979), pp. 398–432. Burge, however, seems to downplay the relevance of the possible systematic connections between the sense that an expression has on an occasion of use and the context invariant linguistic meaning of the expression used.

<sup>4</sup> For an especially clear diagnosis of some of the problems in this regard see John Perry, ‘Frege on demonstratives’, *The Philosophical Review* **85** (1977) pp. 474–497, and ‘The Essential Indexical’, *Noûs* **13** (1979) pp. 3–21. For a critique of Perry on

Frege on demonstratives, see Gareth Evans, 'Understanding Demonstratives', in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse, eds., *Meaning and Understanding*, De Gruyter, New York, 1981, pp. 280–303.

<sup>5</sup> See especially his unpublished but widely circulated monograph, *Demonstratives*, UCLA, March 1977. The central distinctions and technical apparatus also appear in his 'On the logic of demonstratives', *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 8 (1978), pp. 81–98.

<sup>6</sup> *Demonstratives*, p. 8 Henceforth, page references to this work will appear in the text between square brackets.

<sup>7</sup> I should not be taken in what follows to be endorsing Kaplan's interpretation of Frege's views. In some important respects I think it is mistaken, but Frege exegesis is not my principal concern. Nevertheless, Kaplan's views do, I believe, represent the dominant interpretation. And in any case, so far as I can tell, nothing essential to my argument against the Fregean direct connection thesis, using Kaplan's proposals about indexicals as a foil, hangs on Kaplan's exegetical discrepancies.

<sup>8</sup> Though Kaplan does not mention it, this qualification is essential, for otherwise, descriptions in terms of different uniquely identifying essential properties will count as identical in sense. Hence, identity statements in which they are used (e.g., 'The positive square root of four is identical to the only positive even prime', etc.) will count as uninformative — a result that Frege would plainly have rejected.

<sup>9</sup> Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980, see esp. pp. 15, 53–60.

<sup>10</sup> Also see Kaplan's paper, 'Dthat', reprinted in Peter French *et al.*, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977, pp. 383–400.

<sup>11</sup> The "formal logic L.D." referred to here is just the model theoretic semantic treatment of languages with indexicals and 'dthat'-descriptions published in 'On the Logic of Demonstratives', *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> As my brief discussion of predicates on page 176 will suggest, I believe that even here the fit is not nearly as snug as is generally supposed.

<sup>13</sup> In fact, Kaplan's way of understanding what is distinctive about these "pure" indexicals is not without problems. Typical uses of 'here' and 'now' are not as "pure" as Kaplan supposes. A given (non-demonstrative) use of 'here', for example, may have a variety of different referents depending upon the speaker's intentions on the occasion of use. He may be referring to the spot on which he is standing, the room he is in, the city he is in, the country, the neighborhood, or what have you. Likewise, 'now' might be used to refer to the present moment, the present hour, day, week, etc., depending upon the speaker's intentions. What intentions the speaker has will obviously impact on the cognitive significance of a given use of one of these indexicals. Even so, none of my criticisms in the text essentially depend upon an exploitation of this particular deficiency in Kaplan's account. I am especially indebted to David Sachs for discussions on this and other issues in this paper.

<sup>14</sup> But see Note 11, above.

<sup>15</sup> A similar story could be told, but where the object is in fact replaced by a qualitatively identical replica. The "appearance", i.e., the demonstration type, would still be the same. But now, obviously, demonstration types, as characterized by Kaplan, won't be anything like Fregean senses, since, for Frege, sameness of sense guarantees sameness of referent.

<sup>16</sup> This is not, of course, to deny that an appeal to something like a mode of presentation is never required in order to appreciate the *particular* cognitive significance that a given demonstration has for someone, or *particular* differences in cognitive significance that two demonstrations to the same object might have.

<sup>17</sup> Compare, for example, David Lewis's appeal to salience in 'Scorekeeping in the language game', in *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, esp. pp. 240–243.

<sup>18</sup> Perry, 'Frege on Demonstratives', *op. cit.*, p. 483.

<sup>19</sup> In addition to David Sachs, I would also like to thank George Wilson for his advice and encouragement.

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