book with a style that few, if any in our field or any field can match. It is only his interpretation of parts of the substance of the matter that evokes this reply.

RICHARD W. MORSHEAD

The University of Michigan, Dearborn Campus, on

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION:
LEARNING AND SCHOOLING

by DONALD ARNSTINE

Harper and Row, New York, 1967

As a rule, philosophers of education, especially those involved in ordinary language analysis, are not primarily noted for their work in aesthetics. This is not to say that they lack any genuine interest in the arts or that they are in particular need of cultural enlightenment. Nor, is it to suggest that, somehow, they are not intellectually or temperamentally up to dealing with the subject matter involved. Instead, it is merely to point up the unfortunate fact that many frankly do not see any real or tenable relation between inquiries into art theory and the explication of educational concepts. The two activities are viewed as being largely, if not totally, unconnected.

Now, whether this particular state of affairs merely reflects some generalized popular sentiment about the alleged frivolousness of artistic pursuits or, instead, represents a more carefully weighed and responsible determination, is difficult to say. In specific cases, I suppose, one argument could prevail over the other. Undoubtedly, there are those who simply have not put much thought to the matter, letting the zeal of certain highly vocal educational reformers carry the day. And with equal likelihood, there are probably others who, after serious consideration, still fail to discern any way in which inquiry into aesthetics could be of any substantial benefit to the clarification of educational theory. In either case, however, the result has been the same: the work of analytic philosophers of education has been remarkably lacking in its attention to the materials of aesthetics.

Of course, there are a few individuals who have persistently
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held out against this prevailing circumstance. Among them has been The University of Wisconsin's Donald Arnstine. In numerous articles and papers, over the last decade, he has repeatedly explored the possible role of aesthetic concepts in educational thought. This year, however, he has provided us with his first book, Philosophy of Education: Learning and Schooling.

In a variety of respects, it is a fine volume. Like many contemporary British philosophers, Arnstine writes about ordinary language in ordinary language. Considering the fact that many of the concepts with which he deals turn out to be rather complex, this is no easy task. Still, he brings it off nicely. His book is refreshingly readable. Throughout, he has included numerous summaries in an effort to enhance continuity at those points where there otherwise might appear to be some trace of disjointedness. And his use of examples and pictorial illustrations, especially when treating the more substantive materials of art criticism, is certainly valuable. Those individuals, then, having little more than a passing familiarity with art and art theory, need have no fear that they will not be able to follow the various arguments with relative ease.

But it would be a serious mistake to characterize this book as simply a text in aesthetics. Although ample space is devoted to the analysis and assessment of art theory, Professor Arnstine's chief aim in writing the volume is obviously much wider than this. Broadly, he has undertaken a critical examination of various teaching practices and the particular learning theories upon which they are said to be based. This, when taken together with his own proposals for the reconstruction of both theory and practice, then, provides the reader with a fairly comprehensive look at many of the issues currently attracting attention in philosophy of education.

II

Beginning with a systematic exploration of the concept of learning, Arnstine concludes that our customary ways of formulating it are seriously wanting. According to him, it is quite inappropriate for educators to identify learning with either changes in overt behavior or the acquisition of knowledge, skills, habits, and attitudes. (pp. 11-81) Although all of these, at times, may be involved, none of them, taken individually or collectively,

1 Several among these are Harry S. Broudy, Nathaniel L. Champlin, David W. Ecker, and Francis T. Villemain.
truly characterize the kind of outcomes aimed at in schooling practices. It is only when students alter or adopt dispositions, he argues, that we can legitimately claim learning has occurred. (p. 40) For him, then, learning can be most correctly thought of, in the educational arena at least, as dispositional acquisition.

Now, a disposition, as Professor Arnstine reminds us, is not a thing or an object of any sort. Nor is it a set of either overt or covert behaviors. Rather, in the case of human beings, it is a trait of character that is accorded to someone. It is, as it were, a tendency to act in a certain way. To ascribe a particular disposition to an individual is to make a prediction about the kind of behavior we can expect from him under certain conditions. (p. 32) It is, in the words of Ryle, a “law-like” principle. 2

But not all dispositions, warns Arnstine, are appropriate for schools to foster. Some may do more to incapacitate us than to assist us. Those that are desirable, on the other hand, allow us to provide for the continued acquisition of still more dispositions. Much like Dewey, then, Professor Arnstine is suggesting here that the ethical features of curriculum are to be largely shaped by the notion that learning ought to lead to more learning and that growth should occur for the sake of growth. (pp. 347-48)

If schools, however, are to effectively pursue this end, the theories of learning which support teaching practices must be appropriately suited to the task. Therefore, Arnstine argues, those learning theories advocated by various ego-psychologists, stressing the inherent growth potential of the self, are clearly inadequate. (pp. 86-87) Not only do they commit their adherents to an untenable mind-body dualism but they also provide little concrete help for the classroom teacher interested in achieving specific curricular objectives. Behaviorism, for all its virtues, fares little better in his view. Its emphasis upon operant conditioning not only fails to provide teachers with needed predictions for the selection of appropriate reinforcers but also tends to promote student conduct that is blindly habitual and quite similar to the behavior aimed at in indoctrination. Moreover, when taken as a generalized psychological theory, it is totally incapable of dealing with private events like pains and aspirations that no one else can observe. Either such events are reduced to statements about overt behavior or else they are considered scientifically useless. But, as Arnstine reminds us, to experience a report or a sign of pain is not the same as experiencing the pain itself. Any theory

which suggests that the two experiences are the same is clearly misleading us. (p. 98)

In order to properly explain learning, therefore, Arnstine proposes that we view human conduct as a product of environmental interaction rather than as the maturation of some internal ghostly entity or as the piecemeal accumulation of conditioned responses. Mind, for him then, is not an entity or a collection of molecular behaviors. It is an operation. It emerges whenever "... one set of events functions in such a way as to indicate, stand for, or point to some other set of events that is neither immediately present nor immediately forthcoming." (p. 114) Thus, any change in disposition involves, among other things, an active change in mind. This can occur, he contends, only as meanings, intentions and expectations also alter. In a manner of speaking, these constitute the "stuff" of mind. Whenever there is a modification of disposition, then, there must be a change in these.

Such changes are initiated, according to Arnstine, by the perception of discrepancies. (p. 313) They come about as we sense some emerging variation in our experience that challenges our expectations. If, however, the discrepancy from expectation is slight, it probably will go unnoticed and learning will fail to occur. If it is gross or extensive, on the other hand, it may only serve to shock and immobilize thought. Thus, not all perceived discrepancies are necessarily capable of instituting learning. Only those that fall someplace between these two extremes, Arnstine argues, are usually suitable for this purpose. (p. 300)

The perception of these intermediate discrepancies, we are then told, can give rise to learning under any of three somewhat different conditions. (p. 295) First, if an obstacle appears in the course of goal seeking conduct, its interference may bring about the beginning of problem solving activity. Second, if something novel is encountered within a familiar context, curiosity may issue and give rise to either speculation or scientific inquiry. And, third, if a patterned relation of sensuous elements is perceived, an aesthetic experience may result and be pursued to the point that it is finally appreciated. Although it may be rare to find any of these occurrences totally separated from one another in our everyday experiences, Arnstine indicates it is of value to analyze and understand each individually. This is especially true for the teacher, he says, because it is the teacher's responsibility to initiate and develop such discrepancy situations in his professional work. (p. 326)

However, in order to conserve space here, perhaps we can
capture the substance of these three conditions for learning, while not doing severe injury to Professor Arnstine's overall intent, by merely focusing our attention upon his analysis of discrepancy perception in aesthetic experience. Since, in his own view, there is a very close relation between any experience from which learning emerges and any experience which is aesthetic in quality, (p. 222) such an approach does not seem to be injudicious or out of order. Besides, this is one of the most interesting and rewarding analyses contained within his book.

For Arnstine, the perception of form is an intrinsic feature of any aesthetic experience. This is not to say, however, that form is to be taken as the single defining characteristic of an art object. Many such objects, paintings, and photographs for example, provide viewers with much more than simply this. They give us certain representations, often called "subject matter," that call to mind various experiences we have had with objects and events which are not literally in the artistic rendering itself. Nevertheless, the perception of form does play a significant role in any attempt to identify experience that is essentially aesthetic in quality.

When form is discerned, various ordered relations among the nonrepresentative elements of sensuous materials are perceived. But, according to Professor Arnstine, this is not all. The perception of form also involves the immediate arousal of emotion or affect. (p. 186) In fact, it is this instantaneous emotional impact that permits us to detect the presence of an aesthetic quality in our experiences. Aesthetic qualities, then, are not viewed by Arnstine as being properties of art objects. Instead, they are features of our experience. They are nothing other than directly felt perceptions of form.

Now, in saying this, Arnstine warns us that it is probably inaccurate to characterize such affective responses as emotions. Emotions, such as fear or anger, usually carry with them a qualitative content of their own and, in addition, are mainly directed toward specific entities or events. The experience of aesthetic quality, however, generally is not as particularized. Its impact is simply one of excitation. For this reason, then, he feels it is better to refer to such a response as "affect" rather than as "emotion." (p. 189)

Affect, he contends, accompanies all perceptions. It is as it were, as much a part of perception as is meaning. However, when something quite familiar is perceived, affect as well as meaning may be slight. But when that which is perceived is not
so well known, both affect and meaning are increased. This is because the occurrence of affect and meaning, as elements of perception, involve expectations about what might be perceived next. If a situation is somewhat unfamiliar in that expectations are delayed or otherwise blocked, affect increases while new meanings are sought. And, if the discrepancy between what is perceived and what is expected is not gross or extensive, the consequent affect can be positive in value. That is to say, it can be pleasant or satisfying. (pp. 202-10) The experience, then, is said to be prized for its own sake and is sought after and cherished.

When representation is present in an art object, say houses depicted in a painting, an additional dimension is included in our perception of the object. An element of some kind which functions by referring to something other than itself has been incorporated. Now, according to Arnstine, if this is all that occurs, aesthetic quality is not enhanced. But, if the representation makes us aware of events and values not in the object itself while yet allowing our attention to remain focused on the formal elements of the object, aesthetic quality is increased. (p. 219) This occurs because such "reflexive signs," as he calls them, make the impact of affect more pointedly specific. It begins to take on the features of emotion.

Although much of this might appear to be rather abstract, Arnstine argues that it can be of invaluable practical aid to the teacher. The dramatic increase in positive affect, or enjoyable involvement, that may attend the perception of form complemented by content, he points out, can give schooling practices a striking aesthetic impact. Lessons, lectures, and reading materials, if designed with an eye to the perception of both form (style) and content, rather than simply content alone, can bring about highly charged motivations on the part of the student. These, because they are intrinsic, can be expected to fare much better than extrinsic motivations, based upon such things as grades and threats, in facilitating dispositional changes. (pp. 227-56)

However, if teachers are to initiate such changes, Arnstine insists that they must be properly prepared and must be given the freedom to pursue the means that can achieve this end. Among other things, he feels this means that teacher education programs ought to provide unique courses in the arts that can assist in making prospective teachers more aware of the aesthetic potential of all that they undertake in the classroom. (pp. 258-59)
In addition, he believes that it is the teacher who ought to be designated as the one in the educational community to select and mold the content of the courses which are to be taught. (pp. 362-67) Much like Lieberman, then, he would place the larger part of responsibility for developing curricula in the hands of teachers. To recognize their authority in this matter, he concludes, is to recognize their importance in the schooling process. (p. 364)

III

It should be fairly apparent by now that in this book, Professor Arnstine has attempted to forge a new and distinctive concept of learning: one that will be of particular service and help to teachers. In doing so, moreover, he has attempted to steer a mid-course between ego-psychology and behaviorism. Yet, when he is through, I for one come away with the general conviction that, in this latter effort at least, he has not been altogether successful.

As I see it, Arnstine’s difficulties her stem from the fact that, in large measure, his conclusions concerning learning seem to be inconsistent with his categorical rejection of behaviorism. He feels that in treating learning as a change in disposition, he somehow has not treated it behaviorally. That is, he feels he has successfully avoided dealing with it in a manner which reflects the basic methodology of behavioristic psychology. In this, however, I believe he is thoroughly mistaken. Quite frankly, I do not really see where any empirical study of human dispositions, whether it be Arnstine’s or anyone else’s, can be anything but compatible with contemporary behaviorism.

As Professor Arnstine, himself, has so skillfully and carefully pointed out, dispositions are not independent entities. They do not have an existence of their own above and beyond that of human behavior. Instead, they are merely law-like statements that can be used in predicting and characterizing the kind of behavior we might expect from different people under different circumstances. That they may be used, on occasion, to forecast an experience for which an individual may show no overt signs, does not negate the point I am trying to make. The fact that a particular experience, a slight pain for example, is not publicly signaled, does not mean that, in principle at least, it would be impossible for us to provide the circumstances for the occurrence of such a signal.
The only way, therefore, to argue for Arnstine’s view, and conclude that learning is truly incapable of being handled within the theoretical framework of behaviorism, is to claim that there are experiences for which there never can occur any overt signals. This, however, would be a difficult claim to support. In order to test such an hypothesis, in any particular case, it first would be necessary to establish what telltale signals would appear in the event it were wrong. In doing this we would be denying the very thing we wanted to prove. We would have established that it is logically possible for the private event under consideration to be publicly signaled. The whole argument is clearly self-defeating.

This criticism of Arnstine’s approach, however, is not to deny the occurrence of private mental events. Nor is it to suggest that such events are always accompanied by overt signs or signals. Instead, it is merely to emphasize that there is nothing about such events that, inherently, precludes them from being signaled publicly and, likewise, nothing in dispositional statements, predicting the occurrence of these events, that necessarily calls for the blanket dismissal of behaviorism.

But it would be unfair for me to suggest that Professor Arnstine’s attitude toward behaviorism in psychology is totally unfounded. Those social scientists who would seriously contend that private mental events are either illusions or else are indistinguishable from overt acts, certainly deserve the treatment he gives them. For my part, I am quite pleased to see that he has so carefully exposed, for what it is, some of the naive mechanistic thought often found underlying various theories of operant conditioning and programmed instruction. However, in pursuing the shortcomings of these theories Arnstine seems to have made an error of his own. In fact, it is his central error. He has identified the logic of contemporary behaviorism with the logic supporting a kind of reductive materialism. He has erroneously concluded that since behaviorists study only behavior they must necessarily deny the occurrence of private mental events.

Such an outlook is simply incorrect. While it is true that behaviorists do not study private mental events, as such, there is nothing in their approach that prohibits them from taking either statements about such events or the behavior accompanying the events and using this as objective data. Since data of this type is no different in structure than any other data collected by behavioral researchers, it is of no less value in its importance. In this respect, then, it can be used with equal force in formulat-
ing psychological generalizations and hypotheses. In fact, of all the data we have concerning other individuals, it constitutes the sole source of information we have about their personally felt experiences. Thus, I fail to understand how the use of this data, in this manner, can be equated with a refusal to recognize the existence of private mental events. Nor do I see where it can be taken to imply a reduction of such events to some so-called “behavioral equivalents.”

It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that behaviorism as a methodological orientation (as distinct from behaviorism as some particular substantive theory of human behavior) is not inherently inadequate to the study of purposive human action, and that in consequence the repeated claims asserting the essential inappropriateness of a behavioristic approach to the subject matter of the social sciences rest on no firm foundations.3

The final observations I want to make here have to do with Professor Arnstine’s theory of art. It will be remembered that, for him, aesthetic quality is to be thought of as a directly felt perception of form. Because this always involves the arousal of affect, however, an experience having aesthetic quality always has an immediate subjective impact. In a sense, it is emotionally charged. And, as a result, it can begin to take on positive overtones when it is sensed to be pleasant or satisfying. If this occurs, the experience is viewed as being of worth and, in one way or another, it is desired or pursued.

With little doubt, some might find it very tempting at this point to characterize Arnstine as a hedonist. Certainly, some of that which he proposes does appear, upon first inspection, to support such a conclusion. His concern with pleasure and enjoyment, as elements of aesthetic experience, could easily be interpreted as features of a general hedonistic outlook. Nevertheless, I do not believe this charge, as such, can be legitimately directed toward him. Since his primary interest in this book is with theories of learning and schooling, his treatment of art reflects this and, as a consequence, does not extend directly to matters of art criticism. Thus, his rather detailed accounts of the emotion-like characteristics of aesthetic experiences do not necessarily constitute his criteria for the aesthetic appraisal of art objects. They are simply his explanations of the way in which experiences having aesthetic quality can be utilized in achieving dispositional changes.

This does not mean, however, that everything Arnstine has had to say about aesthetic quality is closed to question. Although he is certainly correct in contending that aesthetic quality is found only within experience, I think he is quite mistaken when he assigns such quality to the experiencing subject rather than to the experienced object. By placing it here, so to speak, he fashions a context within which the experiencing subject must be included as an object in the identification of any work of art. Attention, then, is shifted away from the art object, itself, and turned toward the various psychologically described responses of the perceiving subject. What began as an aesthetic analysis has now become a psychological inquiry of sorts. What is and what is not an art object, is left to a clinical assessment of an individual's emotional fancy.

Now, I am quite sure that Professor Arnstine is not unaware of this difficulty. Perhaps he has chosen to live with it, however, so that he would have some procedure at his disposal for clearly distinguishing those experiences that are aesthetic from those that are not. If so, I believe he has an entirely erroneous view of the way we ordinarily go about characterizing the qualities of our experiences. We label an experience "frightening," "happy," or "sad," for example, not because it is occasioned by some object or event we have encountered, but because we have actually been frightened, happy, or sad. That is, we have been in a given state, behaving and thinking in a particular manner, and have labeled the experience accordingly. The qualities of experience, then are not named after the objects we experience. Neither are they named after the various disciplines we pursue in our scholarly endeavors. Hence, it makes little sense to talk about psychological experiences, physics experiences, or history experiences unless, of course, reference is being made in some oblique way to an encounter with the theory, methodology, or practice of these fields. And, likewise, I would think, it makes just as little sense to speak of an aesthetic experience or an aesthetic quality of experience.

This, of course, is not to suggest that it is at all inappropriate to speak of experiencing certain qualities which we might want to label "aesthetic." Under such circumstances, however, the qualities involved would be assigned to the experienced object. They would be considered features of the art work. And as such, they would be qualities that are experienced rather than qualities of experience.

If, then, Professor Arnstine would have assigned aesthetic
qualities to the objects of experience instead of characterizing certain experiences as being aesthetic in quality, these difficulties may not have appeared. Such a tact, however, may have substantially altered his entire thesis. And this, he may feel, is not at all desirable.

To be sure, many would agree with him. Much that he has said, especially about ego-psychology and reductive behaviorism, has needed saying for far too long a period of time. His criticisms of various current school practices are to the point and well done. And, his contention that our customary ways of viewing learning leave much to be desired, is exceptionally well supported and most deserving of our attention. All this, and aesthetics too. Indeed, even with my own reservations about several of his arguments, how can I do anything but commend Professor Arnstine for giving us this very good book.

DONALD ARNSTINE'S
REPLY TO
RICHARD W. MORSHEAD

Richard Morshead has done in his review all that the most sanguine author could ask. He has read the book carefully, interpreted it in a manner sympathetic to the author's emphases, and has articulated his disagreements with clarity and with courtesy. For all this I am grateful. I shall try to respond in kind to what I take to be two salient criticisms discussed in section III of his review.

Professor Morshead writes that my discussion of learning as a change in disposition mistakenly tried to avoid employing the methodology of behavioristic psychology. In fact, he does not see "where any empirical study of human dispositions . . . can be anything but compatible with contemporary behaviorism." In support of his views, he has cited Ernest Nagel, who defends behaviorism as a methodological orientation ("as distinct from behaviorism as some particular substantive theory of human behavior").

Since, as Professor Morshead allows, a disposition is not
behavior at all, there seems to be something odd about a behaviorist studying dispositions. We can get to the bottom of this puzzle, and perhaps see more clearly whether and to what extent Professor Morshead and I disagree, by examining Nagel’s distinction between behaviorism as (a) a methodological orientation, and (b) a substantive theory of human behavior. This distinction is a false one, and it results in mischief for those who would keep their behavioral research “pure.”

One could, of course, be called a “behaviorist” if he simply limited his research to the study of that which is observable. In this broad (but unusual) sense of the term, there are more “behaviorists” in the field of education (including myself) than we know. But as the term, behaviorist, is normally used in educational and psychological discourse, it refers to that general psychological approach adopted by investigators such as J. B. Watson, Clark Hull, E. R. Guthrie, B. F. Skinner, and Kenneth W. Spence. For these men, no distinction can be found between behaviorism considered as a methodological orientation, and considered as a substantive theory of behavior. In observing men and animals, these investigators have assumed that the behavior observed is in fact a response to some stimulus. That is, it is presupposed that the occurrence of the action seen is to be explained as being contingent on some prior cue stimulus or some subsequent reinforcing stimulus. Yet despite such assumptions, behavior does not present itself to us with a label already on it. If it is to be called a “response” (with all that the term connotes), then that is the label the investigator gives to the behavior. It is not what he “finds.” Thus the “methodological orientation” (i.e., the study of contingencies holding between stimuli and responses) of the behaviorism of Hull, Skinner, Spence, et al., is very much a function of a particular substantive theory of human behavior (i.e., that the actions of men are responses contingent on specifiable stimuli).

In the stimulus-response view of human behavior, the acquisition of new behavior (learning) is a case of conditioning: a change in response strength or the acquisition of a new response. A habit is formed; that is, a particular response becomes contingent on a particular stimulus. The study of men’s habits is indeed important, but all human action is not just habitual. The behavioristic approach, then, is either limited to studying only one way in which humans behave, or it leads the investigator to insist that all human behavior is habitual. It must be concluded, then, that such an orientation is either inadequate for the study
of education (for habits are not all that it is hoped learners will acquire), or it is false (for habits are not all that learners can acquire).

In *Philosophy of Education: Learning and Schooling*, I tried to make explicit (pp. 26ff, 31-39) some important distinctions between the kind of behavior we call habitual and the kind we refer to as the exercise of a disposition. A disposition is not an action at all, but is, colloquially, a tendency to act in certain ways in certain kinds of situations. The exercise of a disposition includes a range of actions which can be characterized but never fully specified. In contrast, a habit is a particular response or set of responses that can be expected to occur in a given situation. The exercise of a disposition is not so predictable (indeed, some people are even characterized as "unpredictable;" so to describe a person is to ascribe a disposition to him). Since the behavior about which dispositional statements are made is not fully specifiable in advance, it not bound to specific stimuli, and is therefore markedly distinct from habitual behavior, it is not amenable to study or to being explained by methods which presuppose all human action to be wholly stimulus-bound and therefore habitual.

Behaviorism of the sort under consideration, then, cannot study dispositions, nor can it be of help in teaching, insofar as teaching is concerned with students' acquiring dispositions (and not merely habits). Instead, a behavioristic emphasis in teaching and in educational research tends to ignore the possibility and the value of dispositional changes in students, and emphasizes the development of habits and the use of conditioning techniques like programming and extrinsic rewards. Such an emphasis, which assumes that all children can acquire is habits, underestimates the capacities of children and may have disastrous social consequences.

It is because of an inability to deal with dispositions that behavioristically oriented psychologists and educators, when confronted with educational goals stated in dispositional terms, impatiently demand that they be "translated" into behavioral terms. They are stymied if asked how best to teach a child to be courteous, although they can offer specific techniques for teaching (i.e., conditioning) children to say "please" whenever they ask for something, and "thank you" whenever they receive something. Yet uttering such words on cue is not a translation of courtesy into behavioral terms. People's dispositions are formed as a concomitant of their interactions with (not reactions to) others, and they are either disposed to be courteous or they are not.
Only professional behaviorists or small children would recognize others as courteous or discourteous by the frequency with which they uttered “please” and “thank you.”

If, on the other hand, “behaviorism” is taken only to suggest a mode of understanding human behavior by the observation of what men do, and by limiting all explanations to what can reasonably be inferred from what has been observed, and to what has eventual reference to what can be observed, then I would surely endorse behaviorism. But it was not my understanding that this was ordinarily connoted by that term.

Professor Morshead’s reservations about the conception of art presented in Philosophy of Education: Learning and Schooling are different in kind from those discussed above. For while his discussion of behaviorism suggested inconsistencies in my thought, his suggestion that my views on aesthetics are mistaken appears to be based on an alternative aesthetic theory of his own. The various questions he raises in this area, then, all have a common focus which makes them particularly interesting to deal with. I believe they can all be tied together in the following sort of objection to what I have proposed: If aesthetic quality is to be ascribed to the experience of the viewer, then the identification of what is a work of art no longer is a matter of aesthetic analysis, but rather is a matter for psychological inquiry. Aesthetic qualities, on the contrary, belong to the object, and we may or may not experience them, depending on our training and sensitivity.

Professor Morshead’s objection is clearly put, but I find unconvincing the metaphysics on which it is based, and the practical consequences to which it leads. It is easy enough to assign simple qualities, like colors, to objects, although a change in lighting conditions would remind any observer that the color is as much a function of the light upon the object as it is of the object itself. An aesthetic quality would appear far more subtle than a simple one like color. Yet if the redness cannot simply be called a property that belongs (wholly) to the object, how could the “aestheticness” be? Again, I can paint a wall red. Can I as straightforwardly paint it “aesthetic”? Finally, the color

1 For similar reasons, John Passmore has observed that being critical — another kind of disposition — is more than uttering, “I question that!” to the assertions of others, and even more than being able to respond correctly to all the exercises in Max Black’s CRITICAL THINKING. See “On Teaching to be Critical,” in R. S. Peters (ed.), THE CONCEPT OF EDUCATION (New York: Humanities Press, 1967).
of an object in a given light can be ascertained with full agreement by all who investigate who are competent to do so. Can the aesthetic quality of an object be similarly ascertained? Not at all. John Canaday and Thomas B. Hess are both competent observers, but they decidedly do not find the same aesthetic qualities in the same objects.

If, as I have maintained, aesthetic quality is not a property of objects, neither is it simply in the eye of the beholder. Mr. Canaday's and Mr. Hess's judgments are not just the fortuitous outpourings of different personalities. In the book, I argued that aesthetic quality was a characteristic of the experience of the viewer, dependent both on his particular background and on describable (not mysteriously "aesthetic") features of that which he was perceiving. Does this mean, as Professor Morshead suggests, that aesthetic analysis is reduced to clinical inquiry? I think not. It is always necessary to ask, what were the features of the object with which the observer (on the basis of his background) interacted.

Aesthetic analysis is ill-advised to attempt to determine, for all time, which objects have what "aesthetic qualities." Instead, it will suffice to ask, what kinds of describable formal arrangements and symbolic associations will have an impact on peripients of a given degree of experience and familiarity? (This, I maintained, was a crucial question for effective teaching in any subject area.) If such an approach does not enable us to divide the furniture of the world into those things that are works of art and those that are not, then so much the worse for those whose labels are licked and have no place to paste them.

Whether or not we choose to call a thing a work of art (be it a wristwatch or a milk bottle drying rack), there is no reason why, under certain conditions, we should not be able to experience it aesthetically. As Professor Morshead reasonably says, this does not mean that we can label certain sorts of experience as "aesthetic" ones. But contrary to Professor Morshead's additional claim, it does not seem unreasonable to me to say that any experience may have, to a greater or lesseer degree, aesthetic quality.