Book Reviews


Those who take the role of policy scientist seriously are confronted sooner or later with the problem of promotion. One aspect of the problem is estimating the probable impact on the changing public agenda of decisions about the timing and representation of new policy initiatives. Even the best analytical work may be rendered inconsequential if it is introduced and promoted in such a way that it fails to engage the attention of the relevant public and public officials.

Although Cobb and Elder's book on the dynamics of agenda-building is essentially a contribution to modern democratic theory, it nevertheless sheds some light on this aspect of promotion. The authors have set themselves the task of developing a perspective "that focuses on the ways in which groups articulate grievances and transform them into viable issues that require decision-makers to provide some type of ameliorative response" (p. 13). This is an attempt to shift the emphasis from questions about influence over decisions to questions about "influence over the range and types of alternatives considered" (p. 6). Their procedure is to examine these questions from the viewpoint of several lines of inquiry in political science (the general systems approach, the "power" approach, decision-making, groups, conflict, and symbolic politics among others) and the secondary analysis of a few cases. The result is a summary of some of the literature having a bearing on agenda-building, an inventory of factors affecting the generation and evolution of issues, and a series of modest propositions on issue expansion.

For policy scientists, the inventory is a useful checklist for directing attention to the range of factors that are potentially important in shaping the evolution of an issue, and the summary of the literature contains references to strategies of symbol manipulation in the management of an issue. The general picture is rather simple. Issues arise from groups whose interests are in conflict.

To reach the formal agenda [of a governmental institution], an issue should evoke a response on the mass level, since visibility helps a dispute gain the attention of decision-makers. To attain such a position of public recognition, the issue should be defined or redefined . . . as ambiguously as possible, with implications for as many people as possible, involving other issues than the dispute in question, with no categorical precedence, and as simply as is feasible (pp. 161–162).
The expansion of the issue is affected not only by what is said, but also by the receptivity of the mass media and the exposure and predispositions of various audiences.

Beyond this, however, the relevance of the book to the promotion function is rather limited, since attention tends to be diverted to issue expansion. A theory of agenda-building and guidelines for promotion must take into account the competition between the symbols associated with one issue or one proposed policy initiative and other symbols at the focus of attention of the public. Each symbol of identification, expectation, or demand competes with all others as a focal point for the organization of a range of generalized concerns of the public and members of the media alike. Moreover, these generalized concerns, or moods, compete with each other in the sense that some are differentially intensified relative to others from time to time. The Watergate affair, for example, seems to have intensified a generalized concern for abuses of power and focused them on Richard Nixon and, to a lesser extent, the Presidency. Is it more than mere coincidence that the same concerns were focused on the C.I.A. only after the symbol of Nixon disappeared from the headlines? The theoretical basis for the efficient exploration of questions such as this already exists.*

What remains is to develop the instrumentation that will not only clarify the answers, but also clarify the shifting potentials for promotion as events unfold.

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Failure Has Many Fathers


The history of Pearl Harbor has an interest exceeding by far any tale of an isolated catastrophe that might have been the result of negligence or stupidity or treachery, however lurid. For we have found the roots of this surprise in circumstances that affected honest, dedicated, and intelligent men.

(Wohlstetter, 1962, p. 357)

Although written in reference to the staff of Admiral Kimmel, U.S. Navy commander of Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese surprise attack, this description seems to apply equally well to those advisors who helped lead: (a) President Truman to pursue North Korean forces to the Yalu River (and massive intervention by People's China); (b) President Kennedy to sacrifice 1400 refugees and American prestige on the beaches

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1 An abbreviated version of this review originally appeared in Hebrew in *Megamot,* 1974, 20: 325-328, and is reprinted with permission of the publisher, Szold National Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences.
of the Bay of Pigs; and (c) President Johnson to initiate a variety of devastating, but
unsuccessful escalatory acts in Viet-Nam. Why did “some of the most intelligent men
ever to participate in the councils of government” (p. 14) fail so miserably?

Professor Irving Janis identifies these decision makers and the nations they led as
Victims of Groupthink. “Groupthink” is defined as a “mode of thinking that people
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’
strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative
courses of action” (p. 9). Janis examines groupthink in case studies of the four
American strategic fiascoes noted above. The essence of groupthink is extreme pressure
to conformity. Three familiar expressions of this pressure are: ridicule, expulsion and
isolation of the non-conformist. As an example of ridicule, a favorite epithet for the
hesitant in the Johnson administration was “I am afraid he’s losing his effectiveness”
(p. 119). An example of expulsion is Johnson’s firing of Robert MacNamara for
publicly protesting the continued bombing of North Viet-Nam. For the edification of
his remaining associates Johnson ridiculed MacNamara, comparing him to the son
of a family trying to sell a house who “went to the prospective buyer to point out
that there were leaks in the basement” (p. 123). A sophisticated mode of isolation is
what Janis calls “docility fostered by suave leadership” (pp. 43–46), exemplified by
President Kennedy’s policy of “gently” dividing and conquering opposition by forcing
each member of his council of advisors to individually defend any consensus-
countering argument he might let slip. A fourth expression is the use of what Janis
calls “mindguards” (p. 41), in-group members who take it upon themselves to insulate
their leader from divergent views which might shake his confidence in time of crisis.

The outright stifling of opposing views often leads to the voluntary suppression of
personal doubts. For example, Arthur Schlesinger blames his failure to point out
follies in the Bay of Pigs plan (e.g., contingency plans called for the invaders to escape
to the Escambray Mountains—across 80 miles of impassable swamp and jungle) on
his desire to be “just as tough as the military men” at White House meetings and not
to act like a “soft-headed idealist” (p. 41). The resulting self-censorship often creates
an “illusion of unanimity . . . without (which) the sense of group unity would be lost,
gnawing doubts would start to grow, confidence in the group’s problem-solving
capacity would shrink, and soon the full emotional impact of all the stresses generated
by making a difficult decision would be aroused” (p. 205).

“Preserving the sense of unity . . . can (also) induce . . . an exhilarating sense of
omnipotence . . . with(in) a group that displays solidarity against an evil enemy and
complete unanimity about everything that needs to be done” (p. 205). This esprit
de corps encourages, among other things, what is called the “risky shift” phenomenon,
the tendency for groups to make riskier decisions than their members would have
made acting on their own. Such over-optimism helped Kennedy’s team believe that
1400 malcontent Cuban refugees would overthrow Castro’s military forces of 200,000—
without overt American support. It also led Truman’s advisors to believe that whereas
the U.S. found communists 8000 miles away in South Korea intolerable, People’s
China would passively accept troops led by General MacArthur on the Yalu River.

2 Unless otherwise noted, all page numbers refer to the book being reviewed.
Pressure to uniformity of opinion leads to the complacency and conservatism of groupthink. Good examples may be found in the incorrect and unquestioned assumptions which constituted the basis for the Pearl Harbor command's belief that "It couldn't happen here." Two of these assumptions were "the Japanese would never dare attempt a full-scale surprise assault against Hawaii because they would realize that it would precipitate an all-out war which the U.S. would surely win!" (p. 87), and "even with only ten minutes warning from radar, practically all attacking planes could be shot down" (p. 90). Confidence was so blinding that no one ever bothered to make certain that the radar was in continuous operation (it wasn't), or that it could guarantee the necessary ten minutes warning (it couldn't), or that an effective warning-transmitting system existed (it didn't).

According to Janis, such unchallenged in-group cohesion also encourages the pejorative stereotyping of the enemy as both evil and impotent (pp. 159-165). Such self-righteousness helped Johnson's Tuesday Lunch Group to pioneer its "euphemistic vocabulary of 'body counts,' 'surgical air strikes,' and 'pacification'" (p. 116). Together with over-confidence it helped the CIA to get away with depicting Castro as a "weak 'hysteric' leader whose army was ready to defect... so stupid that although warned by air strikes (the day before the invasion), he would do nothing to neutralize the Cuban underground" (p. 38). Similar misconceptions helped U.S. intelligence to consistently underestimate the capabilities of Japanese fighters and equipment.

A supposedly impotent enemy also allows a relaxation of vigilance. On December 7, the Pacific fleet was still on the "limited alert conditions that had prevailed in the fleet for several months" (p. 79). Normal peacetime leaves and liberties had been granted. "Not a single reconnaissance plane was sent out to the north of the Hawaiian Islands, allowing the Japanese to win the incredible gamble they were taking in attempting to send their aircraft carriers to within bombing distance of Pearl Harbor without being detected" (p. 92). Indeed, "Army officers shared the belief that the presence of the Navy at Pearl Harbor was sufficient guarantee of full protection for the Hawaiian Islands" (p. 95), and that the fleet was a deterrent and not a target.

One additional result of this stereotyping might be called the "illusion of initiative," the belief that time and initiative are on one's side, and that when taken, the initiative will work. This illusion frequently underestimates the enemy's capabilities and resilience. For example, President Johnson was astonished when the "punch he had been saving," the bombing of North Viet-Nam's industrial base (in operation Rolling Thunder) failed to turn the tide in America's favor. It seemed inconceivable that the North Vietnamese could absorb and adapt to such a "decisive" blow.

Groupthink is not, unfortunately, as readily eliminated as it is diagnosed. The conditions which increase pressures toward groupthink are almost exactly those sought for satisfying group life: internal cohesion, member-keeping power, active participation, security, and self-esteem. Janis' suggested remedies all recognize the need for that delicate balance which is probably the essence of all democratic life: encouragement of critical thought; adoption of a neutral posture by group leaders; and exposure to independent outside opinions.

Grounded as they are in common sense, sensitive observation and group dynamics research, most of Janis' conclusions seem above reproach. The impression is left,
however, both that they are not the entire story and that Janis fails to realize fully (or at least acknowledge) the limitations of his thesis. Specifically, it seems possible to account for many of the phenomena attributed to groupthink by other factors.

Nowhere does Janis seriously consider the cognitive difficulties confronting his decision makers in attempting to process the information relevant to their jobs. There is, however, an extensive literature (e.g., Slovic, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) showing that judges are prone to serious and systematic biases in processing complex and probabilistic information. Even the most efficient, enlightened, healthy and democratic group will fail in its appointed task if its members are unable to cope with the data with which they are confronted. Groupthink may alleviate, aggravate, or be irrelevant to these difficulties. Pressures to conformity might even be the result rather than the source of the group’s data-handling difficulties (and consequent frustration).

Examples of the difficulties encountered in probabilistic judgment may be seen in Janis’ own attempts to explain historical events. In our own work (Fischhoff, 1974; Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975) we have found that people consistently overestimate the predictability of past events once they know how they turned out. Upon examination, it seems likely that some of the wisdom of Janis’ hindsight is no more than that sophistry within reach of all post-facto second-guessers. For example, he blames “collective groupthink among interlocking groups” (p. 99) for “America’s astounding unreadiness at Pearl Harbor” (p. 100), after noting the extraordinarily clear intelligence picture which the U.S. had as a result of breaking the Japanese secret codes (known as MAGIC). Janis is not the only observer for whom, in the light of such abundant information, the catastrophic surprise raised suspicions of incompetence or worse. The U.S. Congress conducted 39 volumes worth of hearings into the events which preceded the attack. Like Janis, they found the conduct of the Pearl Harbor staff inexcusable.

Quite a different picture, however, emerged from historian Roberta Wohlstetter’s (1962) study of these same proceedings and other relevant materials. She concluded that it was highly improbable that any American military or political leader should have anticipated the “Day of Infamy” attack, considering the information at his disposal. Available information did contain many harbingers of the impending attack. The warnings, however, were buried in a mass of contradictory signals indicating that war was far from inevitable at that moment, and that if it came, it would begin elsewhere than Pearl Harbor. These signals were ambiguous as well as contradictory. As Janis himself noted, “for every signal that came into the information net in 1941, there were usually several plausible alternative explanations and it is not surprising that our observers and analysts were inclined to select the explanation that fitted popular hypotheses (none of which considered an attack on Pearl Harbor)” (p. 84).

The investigatory committee did find clear-cut instances of bungling and carelessness. For example, a radar report of the approaching Japanese air armada received a half hour before the attack was not transmitted because the duty officer was only a week-end fill-in and hadn’t been thoroughly briefed on his job. But it must be asked whether SNAFU’s wouldn’t be found by careful scrutiny of any military set-up, successful or unsuccessful. Before passing judgment, it may be worthwhile to consider
Wohlstetter’s finding that “Much of the appearance of wanton neglect that emerged in various investigations of the disaster resulted from the unconscious suppression of vast congeries of signs pointing in every direction except Pearl Harbor. It was difficult later to recall these signs since they had led nowhere. Signals that are characterized today as absolutely unequivocal warnings of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor become on analysis in the context of December, 1941, not merely ambiguous, but occasionally inconsistent with such an attack” (Wohlstetter, p. 387). Both for Pearl Harbor and the recent Yom Kippur War, hindsightful observers have been able to show “how it was all in the press,” i.e., how careful reading of pre-attack newspapers revealed clear indicators of the attack (Marcus, 1973). The same newspapers could, however, have been read to indicate the likelihood of no war at all, or an attack elsewhere, or war between Arizona and New Mexico, for that matter, with properly selective retrospection.

Hunting for scapegoats can be as unproductive as it is unfair. Wohlstetter’s summary recommendation is “to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. No magic in code or otherwise, will provide certainty, our plans must work without it” (p. 401). Some surprises are evidently to be expected, given the indeterminacy of available data, and when they happen, the improvement of standard operating procedures is likely to be a more fruitful step than the placing of blame.

There are other important factors to which Janis has given short shrift which we will consider briefly. One is the basic ideological perspectives of his decision makers. The most sophisticated group dynamics techniques cannot save leaders who fundamentally misunderstand the political realities of their opponents. A second factor is the technical difficulties inherent in complex organizations responsible for the provision of information and the execution of decisions. Much Pearl Harbor information was lost because of inadequate communications links between intelligence operatives spread around the globe. Improving understanding between people with no direct contact or personal acquaintance would seem to call for operations research or policy science rather than group dynamics techniques.

These organizational considerations were omitted by design (pp. 6-7) in order to restrict the scope of the study. Similar considerations may have led to the elimination of other relevant factors. The exclusion of factors is certainly a valid practice in scholarly work. One frequent psychological side-effect, however, is exaggeration of the importance of those factors which are included. Conviction that groupthink is at work in any given fiasco does not imply conviction that groupthink is all that is at work. It may, however, seem that way if groupthink is the only factor considered.

In recommending ways to overcome groupthink, Janis suggests the “presentation of multiple scenarios as a stimulant to the imagination of the members of policymaking groups which could arouse a state of constructive vigilance in an inert group that has been reposing in tranquil over-confidence” (p. 217). As a possible model for the presentation of multiple scenarios he offers the classic Japanese play *Rashomon* in which “four entirely different scenarios (are presented) successively, each explaining the same events (a sexual assault and a murder) in a different way, attributing entirely different motivations to the principals, yet accounting equally well for the known facts” (p. 217). The point of *Rashomon* is, however, that the facts of any given
historical episode are so ambiguous that they can be accounted for by a variety of contrasting explanations. Although the data in the cases studied by Janis can be interpreted to fit a groupthink explanation, other observers may reasonably find in them evidence of incompetence, conspiracy, or the hopelessness of standing in the way of world revolution. Whatever the insight it provides, any one-factor explanation should carry very clear indications of its limitations.

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REFERENCES


The Politics of Environmental Management


Since the modern Jeremiahs—Commoner, Erlich, Hardin, and Gofman/Tamplin—warned us that the planet earth is polluting itself out of existence, few political scientists have written “a coherent . . . book on environmental policy and administration” (p. xi). This is not to suggest, however, that none has ever ventured to focus their analytical and conceptual skills on environmental politics. For a good many of them—Caldwell, Davies, Rosenbaum and Garvey to mention just a few—have contributed to the increasing amount of literature on the politics of pollution. But Henning’s volume, aside from being the latest publication on the subject, is rather a class unto itself in that it is the only book which so far “helps the student and reader,” says Caldwell, “understand the complex overt and covert processes and institutions which underlie and shape environmental policy and its administration”
A review of related literature on this subject proved Caldwell to be correct. Undoubtedly, then, Henning deserves credit for his pioneering efforts in this area of public policy, but a number of assertions he made should not be uncritically accepted and go unchallenged until they pass the acid test of scholarly examination: his concept of environmental administration, his advocacy for an interdisciplinary approach to environmental management, and his pessimistic view of state governmental capacity for pollution control.

Scope and Nature of Environmental Administration

"In essence," says Henning, "environmental administration involves the management of natural resources or what is best for the . . . public interest" (p. 42). What Henning is saying in effect is that environmental administration is not only synonymous to but also identical with natural resources management which is not entirely true. Equating it as such seems to me to be an oversimplification of a complex subject in that it leaves out a number of environmental problems unrelated to the management of natural resources such as noise and nuclear pollution. It also leaves out "all the systems of air . . . water, energy and life that surround man". To ignore these areas in environmental policy making or barely scratch the surface of these subjects briefly in an article, monogram or book is like exchanging Aladdin's lamp for a few pieces of silver. Despite his narrow and limited view of environmental administration, however, Henning correctly describes the environmental policy process as a struggle among various groups and more than eighty federal agencies possessing "great influence upon decisions" (p. 22) not only of the national government but also of state and local governments. Understandably, systems analysts like Easton, Riggs, and Hughes as well as elitists like Mosca, Hunter and Dye will not accept this pluralist explanation of environmental policy making. At any rate, Henning's conceptual analysis of multiple-use policy in resource management and his analysis of brokerage politics in the implementation of the multiple-use policy (p. 21) are highly convincing and greatly persuasive to such an extent that neither systems analysts nor elitists could find a place to give Henning a whet.

Interdisciplinary Environmental Education and Administration

Like Nelson and Brademas on Capitol Hill, Henning favors an interdisciplinary approach to environmental administration (p. 66). Although he recognizes some limitations of this approach—"it is very much like an oil-water mixture" (p. 151)—he is sanguinely optimistic that the social sciences can help the natural and applied sciences in raising the level of quality of environmental management (p. 161). In theory, the concept of an interdisciplinary or multi-disciplinary approach in environmental education and administration looks great. So, too, are the advantages and benefits such an approach is capable of giving: "broad vision and scope, as well as

depth, and focusing on value spectrum” (p. 161) and enlarged “intellectual horizons and perspectives of techno-scientific students” (p. 66). In practice, there appear to be serious problems. The first problem, as Henning knows, is the reluctance of social scientists to join an interdisciplinary endeavor on the ground that it is too far from their own disciplines (p. 154). A second problem, as a geographer put it, is the effect of interdisciplinarianism upon the “autonomy and individuality” of the disciplines: “a rush of geographers to forsake [their] discipline in order to become [interdisciplinarians is] counterproductive” and eventually leads to “stagnation and erosion”.3 A third problem deals with organizational rivalry and competition.4 An environmental studies coordinator in Santa Barbara noted that “some of the departments view [the interdisciplinary team] as a threat to their own programs or standards”.5 The fury and intensity of departmental squabbles may be gleaned from the following exchange between a sociologist and a geologist when a general education oriented interdisciplinary environmental studies program was being proposed at a mid-western university:

Sociologist: “I feel that there is a need to ‘house’ this program in a department or college not merely for budgetary purposes but more importantly for systematic structuring and supervising purposes .... I will recommend that the program be ‘housed’ in one of the following departments—Sociology and Anthropology; Political Science; Biology; Geography.”6

Geologist: “You suggest that environmental studies should be placed under the wing of a particular department such as Sociology and Anthropology. Everyone realizes that Sociology makes exceptionally important contributions, especially in the environmental problems of industrialized urban centers and minority peoples, but you must admit that many disciplines are very important. Can we leave out geography, earth science, economics, biology, chemistry, political science, psychology, or park and recreation, just to name a few? I think not.”7

Sociologist: “... you suggest that all I want is to append this new program to Sociology and Anthropology without the possibility of ‘housing’ in other departments. Then you add: ‘can we leave out geography, earth science, economics, biology, chemistry, political science .... ’ My letter ... stated: ‘I will recommend that the program be ‘housed’ in one of the following departments—Sociology and Anthropology; Political Science; Biology; Geography.’ Under these circumstances, it is hard for me to make any sense of that paragraph of your letter.”8

In another setting and issue-area, two political scientists also raised the issue of how can an interdisciplinary program best be organized, how are intercollege and interdepartmental arrangements best effected, and what ought to be the interdisciplinary mixture in terms of personnel and curriculum. On these points a physicist felt that although not all problems have either a scientific base or will require scientific expertise, there are a significant number and thus a reasonable portion will be scientifically oriented. Along the same lines a public administration professor commented that interdisciplinary experience in the preparation of “102 impact statements” required by the NEPA of 1970 is like searching “for the Holy Grail... [which many believe] is findable...”. A final and related organizational problem is coordination. “Because of the traditional groupings of disciplines in American universities and colleges, reported a congressional committee, “interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary education, research and training in environmental sciences are difficult to coordinate and administer”. Two educational professors added that the problem lies also in the difficulty of synthesizing two or more disciplines, the impossibility of establishing common and acceptable terminology, and the rigidity in budgetary management. All of which makes a lot of sense and thus render interdisciplinarianism good on paper only but not in practice.

State Pollution Abatement

Henning has reason to doubt the effectiveness of state governments in pollution control (p. 100). The slow pace in which the states, especially those in the South, desegregate schools is well known. So, too, are the efforts of Northern States to bus Black children to White schools and White children to Black schools to achieve racial balance. Even in the fields of mass transportation, housing, and employment state performance in these areas leaves much to be desired. In recent years, however, state concern over environmental quality compares favorably with the efforts of national governmental agencies such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality in protecting the environment. In fact, some states like Illinois and Michigan have established their own versions of state EPAs patterned after the USEPA. Some of them have also set up their pollution boards (Minnesota and Vermont) while others have organized their departments of environment or natural resources as in New York, Wisconsin and Washington. Several states like Hawaii, Florida and Maryland have accomplished what the national government failed to do: the passage of state land use legislation “to prevent

10 Douglas W. Wylie, Letter to Dean A. Walter Olson, April 14, 1972.
pollution and destruction of open spaces and other environmental resources before these problems occur." To be more specific, in May 1969, the Pollution Control Board of the State of Minnesota entered the nuclear power controversy by issuing a waste discharge permit for the nuclear plant in Monticello (40 miles north of the Twin Cities). This permit "set more stringent regulatory standards than the federal government relating to radioactive discharges, and, in fact, the whole gamut of the environmental question." Although this permit was later declared unconstitutional on the ground of federal pre-emption of the states in nuclear matters, it demonstrated the fact that the states are not really as low in responding to environmental problems as Henning wants us to believe. Could there be any doubt that the State of Illinois—despite the rivalry, competition and jealousy between the State Attorney General and the Governor in environmental litigation—has made tremendous progress in protecting its environment with its environmental bill of rights and its $1 billion pollution bond issue approved by the voters in 1970? Could there be any question about the effectiveness of the strip mining law of the State of Ohio which has become a model for the states to emulate? What has the national government done in preventing the desecration of the landscape and in restoring the natural beauty of those areas scraped by giant bulldozers and mammoth earth movers? If one looks at the record, Congress was pressured to defeat what would have been a National Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act. This act, if approved according to Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, would have insured "that controls we already have truly consider social and environmental needs and not just cater to economic interests." Consequently, the failure of Congress to pass the bill placed in jeopardy the future of America's landscape and the shape of her cities and suburbs, the location of her factories and farms, and the preservation of her pristine lakes and verdant parks. Unless Congress undo what it has done any talk about environmental quality is nothing but an empty, shallow and meaningless rhetoric.

Conclusion

Let it be said in fairness to Henning that his volume is a lot better than many "Books of Reading" on pollution put quickly together by enterprising teachers and publishers who have joined the environmental bandwagon. His plea for a value-oriented administration of our natural resources is a refreshing voice that should not fall on deaf ears especially those charged with the duty of protecting the American patrimony

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15 Ibid., p. 169.
and heritage. Compared with the highly perceptive work of Davies\textsuperscript{22} the definitive piece of Rosenbaum\textsuperscript{23} and the imaginative contribution of Caldwell\textsuperscript{24} this volume stands as tall as each of them. Those interested in environmental quality, pollution abatement and environmental policy analysis should find the contents of this literature worthwhile to read and its proposals something to reflect on.

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