The Power of Presence: Strategic Response to Displayed Emotions in Negotiations

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Abstract

This chapter extends research on strategic display of emotions (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006) investigates how negotiators can optimize both relational and economic outcomes through strategic response to displayed emotions. First, we consider what information can be gained from observing the emotional display of the other party. Next we review what the negotiation literature suggests one should do when faced with a party displaying emotion. We end by depicting a research program that accounts for both the behavioral tactics a negotiator employs and the personal qualities of the negotiator. We suggest that the recommendations in the existing literature overemphasize tactics and underemphasize the person employing those tactics. We argue that the success or failure of a strategic response to displayed emotions pivots on the responding negotiator’s ability to balance strategic tactics with his or her authentic presence.
Negotiators constantly manage emotions. They manage their own emotions – both those they experience and those they display – as well as emotions displayed by other parties. Emotions experienced by a negotiator may be integral to the given negotiation task or merely the result of an unrelated event whose emotional impact has spilled over to the current process (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Such emotions may emerge unintentionally and be displayed mindlessly. Alternatively, negotiators may consciously adjust their emotional display to serve their objectives, whether they amplify or suppress an authentically experienced emotion, or altogether feign a desired emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). A growing body of research has documented how displays of emotion influence both financial and relational outcomes in negotiations. However, the empirical literature has not addressed the choices negotiators face when responding to emotions displayed by the other party.

Whether integral or incidental, subconscious or mindful, authentic or feigned, emotions that have a strategic impact on the negotiation process and outcome -- strategic emotions -- can be advantageous or counter-productive to the party displaying the emotions (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). Strategic display of positive emotion helps the development of long-term integrative relationships and increases the likelihood of closing a favorable distributive deal. While pounding one’s fist on the table and displaying discontent and anger might lead the other party to make concessions (e.g., Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a), it may boomerang. For example, displayed anger may reduce the likelihood that an offer will be accepted and increase the likelihood of a spiteful response (e.g.,
Strategic Response to Displayed Emotions

Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Skilled negotiators therefore must consider not only their own strategic display of emotions, but also how to strategically respond to emotions displayed by the other party.

This chapter extends research on strategic display of emotions and investigates how negotiators can optimize both relational and economic outcomes through strategic response to displayed emotions. First, we consider what information can be gained from observing the emotional display of the other party. Next we review what the negotiation literature suggests one should do when faced with a party displaying emotion. We end by depicting a research program that accounts for both the behavioral tactics a negotiator employs and the personal qualities of the negotiator. We suggest that the recommendations in the existing literature overemphasize tactics and underemphasize the person employing those tactics. We argue that the success or failure of a strategic response to displayed emotions pivots on the responding negotiator’s ability to balance strategic tactics with his or her authentic presence.

Emotional Displays as a Source of Information

A negotiator can gain a number of important insights by observing and identifying the emotional display of the other party. Emotions are defined as relatively short-lived affective episodes – in contrast to moods, which are more general, stable, and diffuse – that are either triggered by an identifiable event or brought on as a means to achieving an aspired end1 (e.g., Barry, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). The ability to recognize both positive and negative displays of emotion in social interactions is considered an evolutionary adaptive human characteristic (Ekman, 1993), which can have strategic implications for negotiators. Research

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1 Due to the relative paucity of research on emotions in negotiation, we review both the literature on emotions and the literature on mood as it relates to the topics discussed.
suggests people across cultures recognize six basic facial displays of emotions: anger, disgust, fear, sadness, surprise, and happiness (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). In order to strategically respond to emotions, it is important not only to identify emotions displayed in negotiations, but to understand what information they convey.

A growing body of empirical research has documented the influence of emotions on negotiations (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Baron, 1990; Barry, 1999; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Kumar, 1997; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Sinaceur & Neale, 2005; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988; Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, , 2004b). Although negotiators may experience and display mixed emotions (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Peters, Burraston, & Mertz, 2004), the negotiation literature has predominantly focused on singular emotional displays and drawn a relatively sharp distinction between positive and negative emotions with specific emphasis on anger and happiness. Displayed emotions can provide insights about how the emotional party cognitively processes information, what the emotional party thinks about the situation, and the social relationships that develop between negotiators at the table.

How an Emotional Negotiator Cognitively Processes Information

How an emotional negotiator thinks has implications for both the negotiation process and outcome. Emotions influence what information a negotiator will cognitively attend to, what is perceived as important, and how much thought is exerted on a given task.

First, negotiators interpret information differently depending upon whether the information is congruent or incongruent with the emotion the negotiator is experiencing.
Information which is congruent with the emotion experienced will be processed more effectively. For example, sad negotiators will perceive arguments with a sad tone as more persuasive than arguments with an angry tone, which are incongruent with their personal reality (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004). Furthermore, they will identify sadness congruent words faster in a lexical decision task (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). Likewise, a negotiator experiencing positive emotion is more likely to notice and remember positive information, and may even interpret ambiguous information in a positive light (Bower, 1991; Forgas, 1995; Forgas & Bower, 1987).

When experiencing positive as opposed to negative emotions, negotiators may think and process information more broadly. Breadth of thought refers to what one sees as possible, the number of perceived alternatives, and level of creativity. From an evolutionary perspective, negative emotions are theoretically linked to narrowing in on specific behavioral options, which is necessary for survival in life-or-death situations (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990), whereas behaviors associated with positive emotions are relatively vague and underspecified. Positive emotions are more likely to occur when people feel safe and satiated (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Frijda, 1986). Consequently, negotiators experiencing negative emotions such as anger or disgust are likely to focus narrowly on information that relates to the source of the emotion (Daly, 1991). This reduces the negotiator’s ability to think broadly and generate a wide range of solution-oriented options, which may lead angry negotiators to achieve lower joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). In contrast, positive emotions increase breadth of thought, creativity, flexibility in ideas, innovative problem solving (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998), more integrative offers in negotiations (Fredrickson, 2001; Isen, 1987; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), and better joint outcomes (Hollingshead & Carnevale, 1990).
Finally, emotions influence not only breadth of thought, but also depth of thought, that is, how much cognitive effort is exerted on processing the current task. According to Tiedens and Linton (2001), the degree to which a situation is perceived with high certainty is particularly important for understanding how deep or superficial information is processed. Both anger and happiness are considered high-certainty emotions (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Thus, despite their differing valence, both anger and happiness lead to (Forgas, 1992) stereotypical information processing that relies on heuristics and scripts (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Forgas, 1992; Tiedens, 2001). Information processing under happy mood is not necessarily worse than under neutral mood but merely more script-driven, which under certain circumstances also can be beneficial (e.g., in multi-tasking situations where cognitive resources are limited; Bless, Clore, Schwarz, & Golisano, 1996; Forgas, 1998; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). In contrast to anger and happiness, sadness is a low-certainty emotion which leads to more careful information processing (Bless, Clore, Schwarz, & Golisano, 1996; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). It is interesting to note that both angry and happy negotiators may process information more deeply if aroused and motivated by the need to repair or maintain one’s mood (Wegener & Petty, 1994).

What an Emotional Negotiator Thinks About the Situation

Emotional display provides information, not only about the processing of information but also about the content of one’s thinking. According to appraisal theories (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), emotions result from immediate evaluations of a given situation. Thus, emotional display signals information about how an emotional party is interpreting the situation. Emotions can be differentiated along several appraisal dimensions such as ‘responsibility,’ ‘control,’ and ‘urgency’ (Ellsworth & Scherer,
2003). For example, emotions of anger, sadness, and happiness differ with regard to whom the emotional party holds responsible for the situation, how much personal control they feel, and whether they experience a sense of urgency to act.

Anger, which is an especially common and potent emotion in negotiations (e.g., Allred, 1999), has been the focus of more research than other negative emotions. Research suggests that angry people have a tendency to blame others (Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996) and are likely to attribute higher responsibility to other parties when situations are ambiguous and open to interpretation (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Disregarding the original source of their anger, they tend to evaluate others in a more negative light (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004) and view others as less trustworthy than happy or sad people (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Furthermore, angry negotiators may have a strong desire to take action against others (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), which may lead them to take punitive actions against others who may not be the source of their anger (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). Anger also is associated with a sense of personal control and high certainty about the course of events (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Studies show that angry negotiators are more likely to engage in risk-seeking choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), have a tendency to behave optimistically about the likelihood of future positive events, and perceive less risk of future negative events (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). In the negotiation context, angry negotiators are more likely to reject ultimatum offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), use competitive strategies (Forgas, 1998) and are likely to over-retaliate (Allred, 1999; Daly, 1991).

According to the Appraisal Tendency Framework (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000), emotions experienced in one situation can lead to appraisal tendencies that carry over to novel
situations and shape subsequent decision making. For example, the propensity for risk seeking can carry over to subsequent but unrelated situations (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) and is mediated by appraisals of control and certainty (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In negotiations, displays of anger can signal that a negotiator is certain about his/her position (Daly, 1991). Furthermore, a negotiator may have learned based on experience that displays of anger lead to concession – *the squeaky wheel often gets the grease* (Singelis, 1998); and these experiences may reinforce the negotiator’s display of negative emotions.

In contrast to negative emotions, a happy negotiator feels relatively certain about the course of events, feels in control, and may feel personal responsibility (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Thus, with respect to appraisals of control and to some extent certainty, happiness is similar to anger. It differs, however, with respect to the tendency to take action in that a happy negotiator would not attribute responsibility of the situation to others and may therefore sense little urgency for change. A happy negotiator also is less likely to take high risks (Isen & Patrick, 1983). Although there is no sense of urgent action, a happy negotiator is likely to engage in prosocial helping behavior (Batson, 1990; Batson, Coke, Chard, Smith, & Taliaferro, 1979). In negotiations, happy negotiators are more likely to share information and have an increased preference for and adoption of cooperative negotiation strategies (Baron, 1990; Forgas, 1998), which are associated with value creation and better joint outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986).

Insights about how negotiators appraise situations with respect to personal responsibility, control, and certainty thus can help devise a different strategic response to displayed emotions, which might be very different in case of negative versus positive emotions. It is interesting to note that similar appraisals occur whether emotional displays are experimentally manipulated or naturally felt (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993), which suggests that feigned emotional
display can lead to similar appraisals as authentic emotional display (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). Emotions are considered authentic when internally experienced and externally displayed emotions align (Coté, 2005). Likewise, both authentic and feigned emotions can directly influence the social dynamics between negotiators at the table.

How Do Emotional Displays Influence Interpersonal Dynamics?

Emotional display not only provides information about how and what the other party thinks, but also impacts the social relationship between negotiators. Negotiators unconsciously mimic and synchronize behavioral expressions of emotion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992), such that a smile will generate a smile in the other party. Likewise, negative emotion in one negotiator is usually responded to by negative emotion in the other negotiator. Thus, one negotiator’s emotion may reciprocally influence the other’s experienced and displayed emotion, whether or not the respective negotiators are mindful of these emotions – their own or others’. Such emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992) naturally occurs whether displayed emotions are authentic or feigned.

Emotional contagion impacts the rapport between negotiators at the table as well as the likelihood of developing a productive long-term relationship. Good rapport is essential in negotiation since it predicts mutual cooperation (Drolet & Morris, 2000). Experts suggest that “the first thing negotiators should address during the information exchange stage is the mood or atmosphere at the table – the rapport between the negotiators” (Shell, 2006, p. 140). In fact, it may be even more beneficial to establish rapport before negotiators actually meet. One of the central functions of pre-negotiations is to address the emotional and psychological barriers that impede official negotiations and create an atmosphere of common understanding (Gewurz,
During the negotiation, inappropriate expression of emotion – whether negative or positive – can destroy trust (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998) and harm rapport. Negotiations will consider emotional display as appropriate depending on their cultural background (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Rafaeli & Ravid, 2005) and the given professional context (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988).

In professional settings, display of negative emotions is often considered inappropriate; negotiators who display such emotions risk harming rapport. Because negotiators have biased perceptions of who instigated a conflict (Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997; Sillars, 1981), often blaming the other party and retaliating in response, conflict spirals are difficult to emerge (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). Displayed anger can lead to such negative spirals or vicious cycles (Kumar, 1997) that harm rapport and destroy trust. Consequently, anger decreases negotiators’ willingness to work together in the future (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997).

Happiness in contrast to anger can be beneficial for rapport since positive mood is associated with initiating conversations (Batson, Coke, Chard, Smith, & Taliaferro, 1979) and a preference for collaboration over avoidance (Baron, 1990). In negotiations, the display of positive emotion is associated with better rapport, as well as lower rates of impasse (Drolet & Morris, 2000; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). Cooperative behavior increases trust (Weingart et al., 1993), and trust is instrumental in enabling future interactions (Crosby, Evans, & Cowles, 1990). In fact, negotiators who strategically display positive emotion, in contrast to negative or neutral emotion, are more likely to include in their agreements provisions for future business relationships that increase joint outcomes (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006).
Tactics for Strategically Responding to Emotional Display

Recognizing an emotional display and understanding its likely influence on the emotional party’s mindset, appraisal of the situation, and the potential interpersonal dynamics can help a negotiator devise a strategic response that will optimize both the relational and economic outcomes of the negotiations. However, responding to emotions displayed in the context of negotiations is a complex and dynamic process. Noting this, Adler, Rosen, and Silverstein (1998) followed their recommendations for how to deal with emotions with the following disclaimer: “In some situations, the best course of action may well be to do the opposite of what we counsel. Because of the complexity of life and human interaction, the only rule that works in all instances is ‘it depends’” (p. 168). Despite this complexity, the negotiation literature has produced an array of strategic advice for responding to emotional display.

Responding to Negative Emotions

The most common advice for strategic response to negative emotions offered within the negotiation literature is: “Whether you’re negotiating with someone who is dangerously angry or only mildly annoying, the same skills are helpful in getting the results you want. Find out what your opponent wants... If you’re successful, you can turn your adversaries into your partners” (Hackley, 2004, p. 5; Ury, 1993). There are numerous ways to achieve this objective: allowing the other party to vent their emotions, taking a break in the process in order to cool down, shifting the focus toward non-emotional interest-based discussion, and going “into” the negative emotion in order for the party to recognize the unproductive consequences and shift their behavior. Regardless of the tactic, there is essentially one basic premise at the core of all these approaches. The underlying assumption is that to reach optimal outcomes negotiators must
overcome, one way or another, negative emotions (e.g., Fisher & Shapiro, 2005). This is premised on the assumption that positive emotions tend to enhance negotiators’ ability to develop trust, expand the pie, and build long-term relationships, whereas negative emotions are generally seen as a barrier.

One approach suggested in the literature for getting past unproductive negative emotions is to get the emotions out into the open. The idea is that once negotiators air out and vent hostility and tension, an interest-based solution is more likely to evolve (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1993), because “allowing the other party such a catharsis will clear the air and may permit negotiators to return to a calmer pace” (Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999, p. 415). For example, the literature on conflict management and conflict resolution suggests that hostility may diminish significantly if the aggrieved party vents his anger, resentment, and frustration in front of the blamed party (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1993). Research on procedural justice indicates that having a chance to express their disappointment often helps people take a significant step in the healing process (Lind & Tyler, 1988). The effectiveness of venting can be increased if the blamed party acknowledges the validity of these emotions or offers an apology (S. B. Goldberg, Green, & Sander, 1987). Ury, Brett, and Goldberg (1993) say that properly designed negotiations can structurally incorporate venting as a stage before actively engaging in other conflict management efforts.

For venting to be effective, negotiators must be able to remain unaffected by the other party’s display of negative emotions to avoid falling into a trap of emotional contagion and vicious cycles. In order to do so, negotiators may learn from the experience of mediators who are trained to do just that. To this end a mediator’s ability to anticipate anger is extremely valuable. When interviewed about how mediators handle anger at the table, Larry Susskind explained that
he actually expects an emotional blow up and plans around it: “I expect it to happen. I expect someone to blow up, even though blowing up at their ally is stupid, but they’ll do it anyway” (Forester, 1997, p. 350). Furthermore, mediators often absorb and deflect negative emotions: “The person will be glad you did it [let them vent], because they’ll be the first to tell you that emotion overwhelmed logic at the time. They won’t say it that way, but that’s what happens. They’ll say, ‘The guy just ticked me off.’ I expect that” (Forester, 1997, p. 350). Thus, the emotional party may appreciate the opportunity to vent, but it is important to carefully allow the party to subsequently save face.

Perhaps, as neutral third parties, it is easier for mediators to provide a stage for display of negative emotion because the emotion typically is not targeted at them. Nonetheless, like a mediator, a negotiator directly confronted with anger might imagine that the other party’s displayed anger is targeted at someone else, incidental to the current negotiation. Negotiators are sometimes coached to imagine an angry opponent is yelling at the wall behind them, not at them. Such metaphors or idioms like “let it slide off you, like water off a duck’s back” help negotiators deflect anger that may or may not be targeted at them. Thompson (2005) noted that it is important not to react instinctively or behave defensively, no matter how misinformed or wrong one believes the other party to be. Instinct-based responses may lead to emotional contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992) and escalation of conflict, whereas a more mindful and emotionally incongruent response could be more constructive. A negotiator also may need to strategically repeat his or her response. Because angry negotiators process information both in a superficial manner and in a mood-congruent fashion, it may take several statements until what is being said actually penetrates so that it can be heard in a neutral and well-intended way.
Although in some situations venting may be productive, Carver and colleagues (1989) caution that venting is not the best way to move beyond the displayed negative emotion. Focusing on the negative could serve to highlight the barriers to resolution, thus resulting in additional obstacles. Whether after venting or in its place, taking breaks in the process is another approach suggested for dealing with disruptive emotions in order to help parties reflect on their behavior. In negotiations between management and union, cooling-off periods are sometimes institutionally incorporated into agreements to help avert costly strikes (Ury, 1993). Likewise, in interpersonal conflict, cues can be adopted to signal that one party needs a ‘time-out.’ “In the Noel Coward play Private Lives, a bickering couple agrees that, whenever an argument threatens to get out of control, one person will shout ‘Solomon Isaacs,’ which will bring all conversation to a halt for five minutes while each tries to calm down” (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1993, p. 55). Eventually, rather than result in a cooling off period, the signal itself may have instantaneous calming effects or even transform into a cue for comic relief since it provides a mirror to how childlike the argument might seem to an outside observer. Indeed, the use of humor, whether a witty remark or a joke that brings on laughter, can be another way to reduce tension.

Whereas venting and breaks may keep the negative emotions from derailing the process, the negotiation literature suggests that what will ultimately propel the negotiation forward toward an optimal resolution is understanding the other party’s core concerns and “underlying interests.” Thus, when the negative emotion is perceived to be “the problem,” Fisher, Ury, and Patten (1991) would advise that it is necessary to separate the person from the problem in order to shift from positional negotiations to interest-based negotiations. Separating the person from the problem, as well as the emotion from the issue, allows negotiators to show respect, understanding, and empathy for the emotion without giving in or making unnecessary
concessions. It also transitions a negative negotiation process back to a more even-toned and rational process of information-exchange that can be leveraged to find win-win solutions.

In their comprehensive framework for dealing with emotions in negotiations, Fisher and Shapiro (2005) also suggest expressing appreciation for the core concern underlying the expressed emotions in order to get at the party’s underlying interests. “Rather than getting caught up in every emotion you and others are feeling, turn your attention to what generates these emotions” (p. 15). First and foremost, feeling appreciated is an important need that can be addressed by understanding the other party’s point of view, finding merit in what the other negotiator thinks, feels, or does. It is important to communicate one’s understanding of the merit a negotiator identified through words or actions. For example, “It sounds like you feel worried that if you sell your shares of stock, your relationships with other members of the board would be damaged” demonstrates understanding and can be followed by showing that the negotiator sees merit in the other party’s reasoning. “I can appreciate your concern, especially given that you want to keep working in this industry” (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005, p. 33).

Fisher and Shapiro (2005) point out that it is important to appreciate the emotional concern negotiators display; that is, address the concern, not the emotion. Addressing the core concerns will help stimulate positive emotions and overcome negative emotions:

The difference between having a core concern ignored or met can be as important as having your nose underwater or above it. If, for example, you are unappreciated or unaffiliated, you may feel as if you are drowning, alone, ignored, and unable to breathe. Your emotions respond, and you are prone to adversarial behavior. On the other hand, if you feel appreciated or affiliated, it is as if you are swimming with your head above water. You can easily look around, and are free to decide what to do and where to go.
Your positive emotions are there with you, and, as a result, you are prone to cooperate, to think creatively, and to be trustworthy. (p. 17-18)

According to Fisher and Shapiro, there are four concerns that stimulate emotions and must be appreciated: affiliation, autonomy, status, and role. The relationship between expressing appreciation and achieving results is simple and direct. If unappreciated, negotiators feel worse. If properly appreciated, they feel better. Fisher and Shapiro (2005) suggested that if affiliation is properly built, autonomy respected, status acknowledged, and a fulfilling role is chosen, then positive emotions will be stimulated and better agreements negotiated.

Thus, improving each party’s understanding of the other’s perspective through enhanced communication and establishing a common ground on which the parties can find a basis for agreement can help to rebuild trust and enhance the desirability of the options and alternatives that each party presents to the other. According to Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (1999), once tension has been reduced and the de-escalation of hostility has been managed, it is critical to control the number and size of issues in the discussion so that new issues are not added. This includes dividing large issues into smaller, more manageable ones in order to contain the negotiation and proceed toward resolution of the underlying interests. Thompson (2005) suggested a series of specific steps for repairing trust could help when responding to a display of negative emotions. These steps include suggesting a personal meeting, placing the focus on the relationship, apologizing, letting the other party vent, not getting defensive, asking for clarifying information, testing for understanding, formulating a plan acceptable to both sides, thinking about ways to prevent the problem in the future, and doing a relationship check. Once these issues have been addressed one can then return to the content of the negotiation itself.
The *breakthrough* approach (Ury, 1993) is a philosophically different and perhaps counter-intuitive approach to arrive at the same goal, getting beyond the barrier of negative emotions by encouraging their display. Instead of confronting the displayed behavior, a negotiator encourages the other party to delve deeper into the source of the negative emotion and explore the path that would result from engaging these to an extreme. This approach resembles *paradoxical therapy* (Weeks, 1991) in that it gets past the emotion, not by avoiding or just venting it, but rather by allowing the other party to go further into it. Though risky, making the consequences of the displayed behavior feel tangible, concrete, and explicit is intended to lead the other party to see the extremity of his or her own position and to lead them to take the first step in a different direction. Once the other party initiates a move that will help break through and circumvent the problem, the negotiator joins this path. Thus, Ury’s (1993) breakthrough approach to negotiations capitalizes on responding to negative displays of emotions by engaging them. It includes a five-step process: (1) Don’t react – go to the balcony; (2) Disarm them – step to their side; (3) Change the game – don’t reject, reframe; (4) Make it easy for them to say yes – build them a golden bridge; and (5) Make it hard to say no – bring them to their senses, not their knees. The approach sees obstacles set by the other party as challenges that can be addressed and transformed into a favorable negotiating environment.

The breakthrough approach may be successful because it generates even stronger negative emotions than those originally expressed by the party, thus highlighting the unproductive nature of the extreme emotion and motivating a paradigmatic change in strategy. This was among the strategies adopted by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 1978 during the Camp David talks between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. When negotiations appeared to be at a devastating impasse, Carter led Begin
to “the abyss,” generating extremely strong emotions by personalizing the stakes. Sadat and Begin were offered a token gift – a photo of the three leaders autographed by Carter. Begin received one for each of his grandchildren. As Begin looked down at the photo and saw his granddaughter’s name “he spoke it aloud, and then looked at each photograph individually, repeating the name of each grandchild I had written on it. His lips trembled, and tears welled up in his eyes… We were both emotional as we talked quietly for a few minutes about grandchildren and about war” (Carter, 1982, p. 399). The emotion in this case was associated with the bleak prospects that would result from an impasse, and provided a personal angle which strengthened Begin’s motivation to overcome the obstacles and reach a future-oriented peace accord. Perhaps, in the case of sadness and guilt, in contrast to anger, negative emotion actually can play a constructive role when channeled in the appropriate manner.

Regardless of the approach taken – whether one allows the other party to vent, takes a break in the process, tries to shift the discussion away from an emotion-based focus or face it straight on – it is important that the negotiator fully listens to the other party. Active listening can help this process (Rogers, 1961). To actively listen, one is advised to focus on showing attention verbally and non-verbally, to encourage the other party to continue, and to use restatement and paraphrasing to show understanding. A negotiator should express empathy in order to connect with both the words the other party is using and the emotions and mindsets that are reflected in their choice of language; and then use probes to draw the person out further and synchronize interaction (Yukl, 1990). Responses may include: “You see the facts this way,” “You feel strongly about this point,” and “I can see that if you saw things this way, you would feel threatened and upset by what I have said” (Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1999, pp. 415-416).
In this way negative emotions that are integral to the negotiation can be embraced, or at least acknowledged. Listening openly to someone express negative emotions “does not mean liking them or even agreeing with them, but it does mean acknowledging that you understand their [expressed] viewpoint” (Hackley, 2004, p. 5; Ury, 1993). Even if one does not agree with what the other party is saying, one might try to reflect on how they would react had they been in the other party’s shoes. Engaging in perspective taking (Drolet, Larrick, & Morris, 1998; Galinsky & Ku, 2004) or trying a role reversal can help engender a feeling at the table that emotions are being acknowledged and begin to shift the dynamic to one conducive to achieving a negotiated agreement.

Responding to Positive Emotions

The prescriptive negotiation literature generally suggests that positive emotions are linked with interest-based solutions and therefore should be embraced to enhance optimal agreements. Happiness, for example, is associated with cooperative tactics and creativity that can generate higher joint gains (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986). The empirical literature on decision making cautions that this may not always be the case. For example, happiness is associated with superficial processing of information and thus can be counterproductive when deep processing is necessary to reach a beneficial agreement. If it leads to heuristic behavior associated with a fixed pie perception, or if it leads negotiators to set less ambitious goals and be satisfied with less (Simon, 1955), a display of positive emotion actually can be detrimental to negotiations.

If so, how should a negotiator strategically respond when the other party expresses joy, happiness, and pleasure? The basic assumption in the negotiation literature is that only negative emotions are problematic and serve as obstacles to successful negotiations. It also indirectly
suggests that positive emotions indicate that the underlying concerns of the other party have been met. For example, of the elements addressed by Fisher and Shapiro (2005), it would seem that affiliation has been properly established, autonomy respected, status acknowledged, and a fulfilling role has been chosen. And therefore beneficial agreements are likely to follow. However, empirical research suggests that in some situations where these core concerns are met, such as when negotiating with friends, negotiators are less focused on expanding the pie because they are focused more on dividing resources equally (Messick, 1993; Thompson & DeHarppport, 1998). Their need to avoid relationship conflict (Jehn, 1995) may lead them to make a priori concessions and miss opportunities to discover task level differences in priorities that could be leveraged to expand the pie.

Whereas with negative emotions a negotiator affected by emotional contagion may get angry and walk away from a good deal, a negotiator facing positive emotions may be too eager to accept a deal and thus leave value on the table. Indeed, research has demonstrated that negotiators’ willingness to pay increases when they face a negotiator strategically displaying positive emotions, in contrast to a neutral or negative counterpart (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). If one sees the other party gloating toward the end of the negotiation (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995) or if the other party immediately accepts an initial offer, the negotiator may experience a sinking feeling in their stomach commonly associated with “the winner’s curse” (Akerlof, 1970; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). This bittersweet feeling of success can leave one feeling unhappy with an agreement they may otherwise have been satisfied with. In Ury’s (1993) terminology, one may need to go to the balcony and assess the situation before succumbing to it. It is usually not too late to reopen the discussion and explore alternative configurations of a deal to ensure a *fair* distribution of a truly expanded pie. One may need to
creatively craft a face-saving statement that enables both negotiators to reengage in the negotiation process.

A strategic response to positive emotions need not undermine the positive emotional tone at the table. To leverage positive emotions, a negotiator could simultaneously respond by: (a) reciprocating the positive emotion with the goal of building the relationship, acknowledging common goals, communicating trust, and building assurances that a win-win solution can be found; and (b) accompany this relational reciprocity with diagnostic questions that ensure the positive emotional display is leveraged toward value creation, rather than heuristic thinking and avoidance of task-conflict.

Discussion

As highlighted in this chapter, the negotiation literature suggests an array of coherent and insightful approaches on how to strategically respond to displayed emotions. Despite the fact that there has been relatively little empirical testing, experienced mediators and skilled negotiators have found these techniques to be useful for strategically responding to emotionally charged negotiation processes. Strategic responses such as venting and cooling-off periods and addressing core concerns often appear to move beyond negative emotions in order to achieve more collaborative and successful win-win negotiated outcomes and direct positive emotions toward constructive information exchange and mutually beneficial outcomes.

Although the recommendations in the literature provide useful insights, they fall short of explaining why these tactics are likely to work in some circumstances but not others. For example, one can imagine that even the intuitive advice to express understanding for the other party and find merit in their point of view, as suggested by Fisher and Shapiro (2005), can result
in increased animosity rather than a constructive process. More specifically, saying something like: “It sounds like you are frustrated that we haven’t yet come to an agreement. Given how much time you’ve invested in this new draft, I can understand why you feel like that” (Fisher & Shapiro, 2005, p. 153) does not necessarily result in the desired outcome of overcoming negative emotions. Instead, the emotional negotiator may feel patronized and reciprocate with even more aggression: “You have no idea what is really going on for me, you are just trying to be manipulative.”

A broader theoretical framework than offered in the current negotiation literature is necessary to understand such boundary conditions. We suggest that there is something else at play within the negotiation process, which is not about what tactics are employed but accounts for why these responses are sometimes successful and other times fail far short. The recommendations in the existing literature provide many tactical suggestions for what a negotiator should do when faced with an emotional negotiator and underemphasize the internal reality of the negotiator employing those tactics. That is, the underlying mechanism driving the success or failure of a strategic response to emotional display may have as much to do with the state of being of the responder while he/she is responding to the display of emotion as it does with the tactics used.

An effective state of being would need to balance attention to the self and other. Focusing exclusively on his or her own experience of emotion a negotiator can be swept away, with emotional contagion, and thus be unable to effectively address the other party’s emotion in a constructive manner. However, focusing all one’s attention on what to do about the other party who is displaying emotion can come across as tactical, disingenuous, and even patronizing.
There is a balance to strike between focusing on one’s own internal state of being and the external behaviors and language expressed to the other party.

We suggest that the success or failure of a strategic response to displayed emotions pivots on striking this balance through a negotiator’s authentic presence. Halpern and Lubar (2003) in their discussion of what they learned about presence from working with theater actors describe presence as “the ability to connect authentically with the thoughts and feelings of others.” Yet, paradoxically, they stress that “presence comes from within. It begins with an inner state which leads to a series of external behaviors” (Lubar & Halpern, 2003, pp. 3-4). Existing within this paradox of focusing fully on both self and other is authentic presence, which enables one to respond to displayed emotions in an effective manner. In this state, the strategic tactics would be a natural expression of the negotiator. There are, for example, people in whose presence it is difficult to be angry. Being in their company feels like looking in a mirror and noticing how silly, childish, melodramatic, perhaps unproductive one’s expression of emotion may be without feeling patronized or feeling the need to be defensive. It has the effect of deflating any negative consequences of displayed emotions and orienting negotiators back to the task at hand. It is this quality of being –authentic presence that we can all strive to develop – that may enable the successful adoption of the tactics suggested in the negotiation literature.
References


Strategic Response to Displayed Emotions


