
To review this long-awaited volume is a delicate task. Full disclosure up front: I have known and liked Michael Wertheimer for more than 30 years, since I first began my own work on the history of Gestalt theory. I was privileged to work with the Max Wertheimer papers in the mid-1970s, when they were still stored in Michael Wertheimer’s home in Boulder, Colorado. At that time, Michael Wertheimer already planned to write a biography of his father. The finished book, written with the help of D. Brett King, can only be called a labor of love.

This is a fascinating, comprehensive, generally well-written, and, above all, warm-hearted volume. The authors make every effort to give both the person and his creation their due. As might be expected, Wertheimer’s family life gets detailed attention. The authors make judicious use of an extended interview with Max Wertheimer’s former wife and Michael Wertheimer’s mother, Anni Wertheimer Hornbostel, and other family documents, including a newspaper “published” by the Wertheimer children. And Michael Wertheimer contributes his own memories of his father, helping to make him come alive on the page.

Max Wertheimer’s relations with colleagues also come into play, including the co-founders of Gestalt theory, Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Koffka; sympathetic psychologists such as Alexander Luria; opponents of Gestalt theory such as Edwin Boring and Clark Hull, with whom Wertheimer conducted a surprisingly extensive and collegial correspondence; and members of the devoted circle of former and current students that assembled around him at the New School for Social Research during the 1930s and 1940s, such as Abraham Maslow, Rudolf Arnheim, and Solomon Asch.

The account is mainly chronological, beginning with Wertheimer’s roots in Prague and proceeding to his wanderings in Central Europe and the intellectual peregrinations in philosophy, psychology, and brain research that ultimately led to the fundamental insights of Gestalt theory. The story continues with his work with Erich von Hornbostel on the localization of sound during the First World War, his role in the establishment of the “Berlin school” of Gestalt theory, his late call to a professorship in Frankfurt, and his forced emigration from Germany under Nazism, ending with the final exciting but personally stressful ten years in New York. At each stage, the account of Wertheimer’s intellectual development is interwoven with the personal story. Very little is missing, though the authors might have said a bit more about the process that led to Wertheimer’s appointment in Frankfurt.

Of great importance is the detailed account of Wertheimer’s life and work in the United States, which forms the second half of the volume. The roles of many participants, especially Clara Mayer and Alvin Johnson at the New School, are clearly delineated. Wertheimer’s enduring awkwardness with English, his collegial relations with leading American psychologists and the respect they accorded him even when they disagreed with Gestalt theory, his active role in the New School’s General Seminar (both an academic and a New York cultural event), his participation in political debates in a time of world-historical crisis, and, above all, the more explicit statements of his own most deeply held commitments to truth, freedom, and ethical values in his later publications all come through well. The detailed account of Wertheimer’s struggle to complete the manuscript of *Productive Thinking* at the end of his
life, with the heroic assistance of Solomon Asch, and the multiple efforts to find a publisher for it is a human drama that fairly leaps off the page.

The book ends with an admittedly partisan, but nonetheless impressive account of the impact of Wertheimer’s thinking and of Gestalt theory in a broad range of fields, from cognitive and social psychology to progressive education. Perhaps the page-long testimonials from some authors might have been replaced with briefer quotations to make the same points more effectively.

But how can one criticize such a valuable and readable volume without appearing to be a curmudgeon? Unfortunately, some critical remarks seem necessary in a scholarly review. I conclude with three final points.

The accounts of Wertheimer’s early work consist mainly of pages and pages of flatfooted recitation from his publications, with little content analysis of the kind that would satisfy a philosopher or historian of science. Such analyses are available elsewhere but might have been integrated here. Readers interested, for example, in a detailed discussion of Wertheimer’s scientific research practices will have to look elsewhere.

The philosophical background of Wertheimer’s thought is also given short shrift. For example, there is no systematic discussion of Wertheimer’s relationship to the Brentano school, though Wertheimer’s primary teachers Christian von Ehrenfels and Carl Stumpf were plainly linked with that school, and the more orthodox disciples of Brentano in Prague, such as Oskar Kraus, may have been the greatest hindrance to his advancement early in his career.

Finally, Michael Wertheimer insists that an account of the Jewish shtetl called Life Is with People gives some insight into the essence of Max Wertheimer’s Jewish cultural background. Unfortunately, neither German-Jewish Prague nor Weimar Berlin bears much relation to the Jewish pale in Poland, Lithuania, and White Russia. The cultural distinction between “Lithuanian” (or Polish) and Galician Jews, so important to the Jews themselves, is ignored here. So, surprisingly, is Wertheimer’s own contribution to a slim volume entitled Das jüdische Prag. Wertheimer was never a shtetl Jew but one of many urban Jewish intellectuals trying to develop and live out a secular modern worldview without giving up their Judaism.

Lest I be misunderstood: I believe that paying more attention to such aspects of the story would have made a fine book even better. But it is a fine book, one of the best biographies of any psychologist that we have. I congratulate the authors, and especially Michael Wertheimer, for seeing this major effort through to completion.

Reviewed by MITCHELL G. ASH, Professor, Institut für Geschichte, University of Vienna.


In this groundbreaking book, Andrew Heinze addresses a gap in historical scholarship on the religious and cultural roots of American concepts of human nature. Historians have examined Protestant themes animating the popular psychology of such thinkers as William
James, G. Stanley Hall, and John B. Watson. Heinze contends, however, that the history of this “blend of science and inspiration” (p. 96) remains incomplete without a comparable examination of the work of popular psychologists from non-Protestant religious and cultural backgrounds. Particularly influential among these, he suggests, were thinkers of Jewish origin, whose emergence as popular psychologists early in the twentieth century reflected the rapid increase of the Jewish population in the United States in the wake of mass immigration from 1880 to 1920.

Observing the coincidence during this period between Americans’ growing concerns with national identity and their increasing preoccupation with psychological matters, Heinze notes that Jews became conspicuous both as subjects of public discussions of immigration and urbanization and as contributors to these conversations. The early chapters of the book illuminate two early trends that provided opportunities for Jews to participate in the “psychological shift of American culture” (p. 85) during the first half of the twentieth century; in nineteenth-century Europe, changes in Jewish intellectual and moral life turned many Jewish thinkers toward psychology, and in the United States, an early mass market for advice on how to live gave rise to popular psychology as “the great American synthesis of religion and science” (p. 87). Heinze examines predominant themes in the work of American psychologists of Protestant backgrounds who contributed to the “psychological shift”; along with an “evangelical spirit” (p. 98), these included a fascination with inner experience, an emphasis on self-reliant success, and a faith in the possibility of transforming human nature, either through tapping the spiritual powers of the unconscious (as in the transcendentalist tradition, exemplified by William James and proponents of New Thought) or through manipulating the environment to control emotional behavior (as in the behaviorist approach of John B. Watson).

Between 1890 and 1945, a growing number of Jewish thinkers made vital contributions to the public discourse on human nature. Heinze asks whether Jewish popularizers of psychology emphasized different issues than did their Protestant peers. Rather than simply identifying the Jewish origins of these figures, he links the content of their work to their experiences as immigrants and outsiders seeking a place in the New World and to the moral values imparted by their religious training and their family backgrounds. His collective biographical approach suggests that the first generation of Jewish “psychological evangelists”—psychologists Hugo Münsterberg and Joseph Jastrow, psychiatrists Boris Sidis and Abraham Myerson, and psychoanalytic psychiatrists A. A. Brill and Isador Coriat, as well as Alfred Adler and Walter Béran Wolfe—brought to their work a rationalist moralism and rejected beatific visions of the transformation of individuals and society. Highlighting specific themes of race, heredity, irrationalism, and evil, they overturned negative stereotypes of Jews, linked prejudice to psychopathology, rejected mysticism, and warned optimistic Americans of “the destructive potential of the irrational mob” (p. 165). Heinze illustrates vividly the sensitivity of Jewish psychiatrists to the experience of immigrants, not only in the form of quotes from their case studies, but also visually, in sharply contrasting photographs of Brill in modern dress and of the Orthodox father he left behind in Galicia upon emigrating to the United States at age 14. For psychologists Münsterberg and Jastrow, whose writings rarely mentioned Jewish issues, the links between their Jewish backgrounds and their work are not so explicit; this difference suggests a need for further exploration of diversity among Jewish popular psychologists—for example, the different professional contexts of Jewish psychiatrists and academic psychologists or differences in social class or degree of assimilation that informed their understanding and expression of Jewish values.

Extending his study to the postwar period, Heinze examines the contributions of a broad range of Jewish popularizers who shaped American views of human nature, including not only psychologists and psychiatrists, but also religious leaders, newspaper columnists, and
media personalities. A central figure of the early postwar era is Joshua Loth Liebman, a rabbi whose best-selling inspirational book *Peace of Mind* (1946) combined a modern Jewish theology with insights from Freudian psychoanalysis to promote self-knowledge, self-acceptance, and tolerance through “questing inward.” Liebman’s book also figures in Heinze’s examination of the “culture clash” between Jewish and Catholic responses to Freud.

Heinze concludes his book with a section on Jewish contributions to the search for meaning in the latter half of the twentieth century. A chapter on American humanism examines Erik Erikson’s work on identity and compares values informing the work of humanistic theologians and psychologists of Protestant origins (Paul Tillich, Rollo May, and Carl Rogers) with those of their Jewish counterparts (Martin Buber, Erich Fromm, and Abraham Maslow). Joyce Brothers, heretofore neglected by historians, is the focus of a chapter exploring contributions of Jewish women, including twins Esther and Pauline Friedman (who became columnists Abigail Van Buren and Ann Landers). A chapter on the impact of the Holocaust and of Hasidic thought highlights the work of Victor Frankl, Elie Wiesel, and Harold Kushner. Heinze also considers an impressive array of other postwar figures; surprisingly, however, his discussion of Jewish thinkers concerned with authoritarianism, conformity, and obedience makes only passing mention of *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, 1950), and omits Stanley Milgram, whose influential studies of obedience referred explicitly to the Holocaust (Blass, 2004).

Heinze presents an eloquent and convincing corrective to the “myth of Protestant origins” of popular psychology. Highlighting common themes in the work of Jewish thinkers, his book also suggests questions for further exploration of diversity among these thinkers. As his concluding comments suggest, this book is an important first step toward a richer understanding of the diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural sources that have interacted to inform modern American concepts of human nature.

**References**


Reviewed by Nicole B. Barenbaum, Professor of Psychology, University of the South, Sewanee, TN.


For decades now, euthanasia has been a highly contentious clinical, ethical, religious, and public policy issue, time and again capturing media headlines around the world. *Euthanasia* is taken from the Greek word for “good death,” and at present can refer variously to physician-assisted suicide, mercy killing, or the withdrawal of unwanted medical treatment. Whether it is Karen Ann Quinlan, “Doctor Death” Jack Kevorkian, or Terry Schiavo, the
media and public appear to have a never-ending fascination with “end-of-life” stories. The up roar over news out of New Orleans that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina doctors allegedly killed patients rather than leave them to die in agony as they evacuated area hospitals was a further reminder that, in the words of the British Broadcasting Corporation in 2003, the “euthanasia debate” is “sweeping the world” in the early twenty-first century.

The stories of euthanasia in storm-ravaged New Orleans remind us of the harrowing history of medical killings in Nazi Germany during World War II. Over the last two decades, historians such as Michael Burleigh, Paul Weindling, Robert Proctor, Richard Weikart, Henry Friedlander, and Hans-Walter Schmuehl have documented with increasing accuracy how and why between 1939 and 1945 German physicians, nurses, and other health care personnel murdered roughly 200,000 mentally and physically handicapped patients in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, until very recently historians have largely ignored the history of euthanasia outside Nazi Germany. However, in the last decade or so, this historiographic gap has begun to close. A handful of researchers have published the first scholarly monographs on the history of euthanasia in Great Britain, the United States, and other political jurisdictions (Dowbiggin, 2003, 2005; Filene, 1998; Kemp, 2002). Now add Shai Lavi’s The Modern Art of Dying: A History of Euthanasia in the United States to that list. Given the present-day debates swirling around euthanasia, it is unlikely that Lavi’s book will be the last word on the topic.

Lavi’s thesis is striking, to say the least. Unlike Peter Filene, whose In the Arms of Others: A Cultural History of the Right to Die (1998) tended to focus on events since World War II, Lavi argues that “continuity” rather than an abrupt shift around the 1960s dominates the history of euthanasia (p. 166). He questions the theory that the origins of the modern approach to euthanasia in the United States can be traced back to developments in population, medical technology, and cultural attitudes toward death during the post–World War II era. While not entirely discounting the impact of an aging society, health care economics, new life-prolonging treatments, and the popularity of claims to personal autonomy, Lavi contends today’s levels of public support for forms of euthanasia such as physician-assisted suicide can be best explained by going back to fundamental changes in the nineteenth century. It was during the course of that century that the “art of dying” that dated back to the medieval ars moriendi tradition first morphed into the Methodist approach to death, and then the medical approach, which has essentially dominated palliative care to this day. The ars moriendi tradition had emphasized death as “a bridge between this world and the world to come,” a set of deathbed rituals designed to prepare the dying for “their final journey into a better world” (p. 6). The context was overwhelmingly religious, with the paramount objective of saving souls. Lavi calls this the “Catholic” tradition and contrasts it sharply with the way the Methodists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century interpreted the final hours of life. To John Wesley and his followers, “[U]nderlying the art of holy dying lay the Methodist wish to gain mastery over death,” an “attempt to overcome death in this world” (his emphasis). According to Lavi, “this close affinity between art and technique . . . set the Methodist art of dying as a transitional moment in which dying transformed from an art to a technique. And it was on the basis of this transition that euthanasia, soon to be understood as the medical hastening of death, became possible” (p. 40). From there, Lavi concludes, it was a relatively small step to the modern view that a “good death” involves “technical mastery,” either through medically administered “lethal dosing” or assistance in suicide.

Lavi asks pointed and welcome questions about euthanasia, such as “Who have we become” in our seeming desire to master the world? Have we pursued mastery “for the sake of mastery alone”? The current-day demand for patient autonomy, when couched in terms of a
technical “death with dignity” may actually “undermine human freedom,” not expand it, he contends (pp. 169–171). Lavi is also right to highlight the significance of religion in the history of euthanasia. Questions about God have influenced society’s approach to the art of dying at least as much as questions about clinical medicine and public policy.

However, Lavi is incorrect to see the coming of Methodism as a great turning point. To Wesley and the Methodists, nothing was more abhorrent than suicide, especially as a way of avoiding the pain and agony of mortal existence. The Methodists may have depicted the last moments of life as a final triumph over the great evil, Death, and pain, the wages of sin, but it is highly misleading to say that this version of the deathbed experience paved the way for Kevorkian or Oregon’s 1994 assisted suicide law. Far more religiously consequential in shaping the modern art of dying has been the influence of the Unitarian-Universalist Association and its secular allies in the Ethical Culture movement, as I have pointed out in my own book on the history of the euthanasia movement. When, in 1948, 50 U.S. clergymen signed a petition calling for legalizing lethal injection for patients who request it, 20 were Unitarian pastors. Unitarians officially approved of legalizing physician-assisted suicide in 1988, the first (and only) major religious group in America to do so. Over the course of the twentieth century, it was Unitarians, not Methodists, who preached the message that medical assistance in dying was a personally empowering victory over the biological reality of death and represented the same kind of triumph over fatalism as the exercise of reproductive rights and sexual freedom.

Thus, Lavi is quite right to trace the modern history of euthanasia back to changes in the nineteenth century. But to credit (or blame) the Methodists for these changes is to mischaracterize history.

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Reviewed by IAN DOWBIGGIN, Professor of History, University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, PEI, Canada.


From amnesia, somnambulism, and sleepwalking to epileptic fits and fugue states, the suspension or automatism of free will and human agency became the legally contested authorship of unconscious crime, when “double consciousness” (the bifurcation of self) and the
“missing defendant” wandered haplessly into the Victorian era’s Old Bailey. If the Old Bailey represents eight centuries of crime, cruelty, and corruption in London (Murphy, 2003), what were nineteenth-century judges, attorneys, and lay juries expected to make of legally framing the exculpation of agency and purposeful resolve on the basis of “incommunicable consciousness” (Locke, 1690/1975, p. 342), the parsing of continuous consciousness from personal identity, and excusing “discontinuous selves” as bystanders in the commission of otherwise inexcusable crimes?

Although definitely not sensationalized in the psychological sense of Sybil, Joel Peter Eigen’s captivating and lurid exposé of splitting, automatism, and unconscious criminality traces the origins of the “missing defendant” by examining the complicated legal, medical, and social historical dimensions of courtroom dialogue in five Victorian trials heard at the Old Bailey and published in the Old Bailey Session Papers (OBSP). Through this invaluable archival source, the growing estrangement between the entrenchments of moral philosophy, common law, and burgeoning forensic medical testimony (physicians, surgeons, and mad-doctors) are captured in heated courtroom debates that stretched the imaginations and Victorian sensibilities of perplexed jurors and the already conterminous boundaries of insanity and criminal responsibility.

Eigen exhaustively examines the overwhelming judicial breadth of this pivotal courtroom polemic during the contentious expansion of the insanity defense by carefully intersecting detailed narrative accounts of mental absence, moral vacancy, and the macabre unconscious crimes of “alternate selves” that are revealed to the jury between the McNaughtan trial of 1843 and the verdict of “not guilty on the grounds of unconsciousness” in 1876. Most impressively, within the temporal span of 30 years, Eigen painstakingly reveals—although often in the form of legally dense script, laboring arguments, and abstract inferences—that from clinical to courtroom inquiry, from attorneys and judges to “witness-box” testimony, it is “the concept of the unconscious itself that underwent the greatest change in court” (pp. 33–34).

Eigen’s pre-Freudian casting of the unconscious in the novel exhibition of mental absence and inexplicable human behavior introduces the astute reader to the profound ambiguity of madness and the expansive formulation of the insanity plea by deftly emitting a curious sense of being privy to the extraordinary in the deliberations held at the Old Bailey. For example, while cogently conducting a compelling defense of mistaken identity to the charge of murderous assault, a gentlemanly Londoner, and by all accounts a person of great intellect, warmth, and Victorian probity, mentally unravels and disappears within himself. While shedding the shoal of the calm, coherent, and skillful courtroom defender, he shockingly reappears to frightened jurors with the wild possession and ravages of a murderous religious ranter intent on bloody vengeance.

Similarly, described in the courtroom as a diminutive young lady, a “blessing to humanity” and “kind to the extreme,” this physically unassuming, mentally unaccountable, homicidal nursemaid (with no memory of bludgeoning her elderly victim to death) alternatively appeared to her embarrassingly battered and beleaguered male captors to be under the frightening control of “automatic reflexes” and “quite mentally absent” as “she attempted to strike us.” Her belligerent behavior (determined not to be indicative of epilepsy because she did not froth at the mouth), tumultuous rancor (not conforming to medical testimonies of delirium), and unbridled apoplectic fits of dissociated character inspired the judge to ask: “Do you mean that the convulsive action nearly struck you, or that she had powers of mind about her, and intentionally struck you?” (pp. 62–63).

Moreover, contrary to every principle of English law, a precarious witness of questionable sanity (ironically deemed not competent, but credible) was allowed to testify in regard to...
the fatal assault on a fellow asylum inmate. In midcourse, he stammers and is abruptly interrupted with gaping mental lapses in memory, as various intruding spirits of Luther, Calvin, and the Queen are revealed with dramatic memories and experiences of their own. Indeed, the “star witness” at the Old Bailey was suffering from a particular new form of delusion (not your typical false belief or opinion) with a genuine difference (housing independently remembered experiences). After all, the psychological dissection of his memories betrayed the astonishing fact that he was actually unloosed as a “divided-being” (p. 104).

Along with two other luridly detailed cases of unconscious poisoning and the grotesque dismemberment of a trusting child’s arm at the cleaving hands of her mentally absent mother, ancillary trials that place unconsciousness on the stand explore the Victorian frailty of women’s biology in regard to defective or obstructed menstruation, puerperal insanity, and infanticide. Bewildered and aghast at their horrid actions, “Where is Charley?” mothers were likely to ask, “Who did this?” (p. 81).

Whether the exculpation of human agency is crafted by a defendant’s inability to understand moral harm, the invocation of inescapable delusion, irresistible impulses, or automatic reflexes, the post-McNaughtan medical imputation of “unconsciousness” legally served to bifurcate the unity of “self” from criminal responsibility. In turn, any distracted thoughts of malice and deranged memories associated with traditional concepts of madness were dissociated from the requisite elements of intention and resolve in otherwise heinous criminal deeds. In this respect, Eigen makes us keenly aware that criminal defendants “missing within themselves” marked a novel departure from traditional insanity trials held at the Old Bailey, because they challenged the fundamental tenets of criminal responsibility as responsible agency shifted from the impaired conscious acts of madness and the “distracted defendant” (from 1760 to 1843) to the unconscious acts of the “alternate self” or “missing defendant” (from 1843 to 1876).

Eigen should definitely be praised for offering an overly ambitious but abridged medico-legal history that is both narratively engaging for a general readership and adhering rigidly to scholarly methods or academic canons of intellectual history. However, his historical contribution to the Victorian era’s Old Bailey does not hit the cohesive mark as a stand-alone social history of forensic psychiatry and law and is best approached as an accompaniment to his earlier work in regards to mad-doctors and the origins of medical testimony (see Eigen, 1995). Taken together, the two books are best characterized as being “retrospectively prophetic” (Huxley, 1888, p. 128), inspiring the historical bud of new ideas (see Economou, 2003), and, in conjunction with the seminal work of Nigel Walker (1968), offering the quintessential entry point to the expansive interdisciplinary wealth of intellectual history waiting to be discovered within the pages of the OBSP.1

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1. This quasi-legal periodical is also known as The proceedings at the session of the peace and oyer terminer for the city of London and the county of Middlesex: Old Bailey Session Papers (100 v.). London: Cooper, 1733–1834.

For many years I avoided using the term “psychobiography” to describe my own efforts at psychologically informed biography. For me, the term carried too many connotations of the undisciplined or inappropriate application of psychological concepts to life history material, often to serve the vested interests of the self-proclaimed psychobiographers. My attitude began to change, however, following the appearance of Alan Elms’s *Uncovering Lives: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and Psychology* in 1994. Here, Elms laid down some very sensible guidelines for psychologically oriented biographers to follow and unabashedly labeled his own incisive efforts in that genre as psychobiography. Psychobiography began to seem not such a dirty word after all, and the term’s rehabilitation now receives another major boost with the publication of this large-scale *Handbook of Psychobiography*.

Edited by William Todd Schultz, a former student of Elms, the volume comprises 24 chapters by 17 authors, and is subdivided into four parts: “How to Write a Psychobiography,” “Psychobiographies of Artists,” “Psychobiographies of Psychologists,” and “Psychobiographies of Political Figures.” Most of the authors are members of the Society for Personology, an organization that for the past two decades has kept alive the tradition pioneered by Henry A. Murray—of a person-centered psychology based on the case study method. As befits a “handbook,” its coverage is broad and diverse, and few readers will devour it from cover to cover. Historians of the behavioral sciences will mainly be attracted to the first and third of the four parts.

Three of the eight chapters in the opening, how-to section are contributed by the editor Schultz, growing out of his experiences teaching an undergraduate course on psychobiography. His introductory chapter defines the field and then provides a set of “markers” for good versus bad psychobiographies. The former include such qualities as cogency, comprehensiveness, coherence, and a logical narrative structure; the latter an emphasis on pathography, reliance on single cues, excessive reductionism, and reconstruction of unverifiable psychological facts. Although mainly reflecting common sense, these principles have been violated often enough by some self-styled psychobiographers that they merit a review by professional scholars as well as by students. Schultz’s chapter entitled “How to Strike Psychological Pay Dirt in Biographical Data” coaches students on how to mine their raw biographical data for “indicators of psychological saliency” and to identify particularly important “prototypical scenes” in the lives of their subjects. His concluding chapter to the first section illustrates these main points in a case study of the photographer Diane Arbus.
Further suggestions in Part One are provided in Dan McAdams’s chapter entitled “What Psychobiographers Might Learn from Personality Psychology.” Borrowing from his own well-known personality texts, McAdams argues that individual lives can be most profitably approached and conceptualized at three separate but complementary levels: the first emphasizes relatively stable dispositional traits including the psychometrically validated “big five”; the second considers more particularized “characteristic adaptations” such as goals, motives, ideals, and values contextualized in the life experiences of the individual; and the third explores the individual’s “life stories,” focusing on narratives of the self that integrate and give meaning to the other material in terms of identity, unity, thematic consistencies, and so on.

Alan Elms contributes a more general discussion of the application of psychology to life history writing in his chapter, “If the Glove Fits: The Art of Theoretical Choice in Psychobiography.” Elms argues—and illustrates with several of his own previous case histories—that psychobiographers should not be shy in trying out varying theoretical approaches to their subjects, until they find one or more that fit their particular data most illuminatingly. This argument resembles one that I made several years ago (Fancher, 1998), suggesting that a psychologically oriented biographer must be “opportunistic” in the application of theory. In my studies of Francis Galton, for instance, the type of childhood data bearing on psychosexual development that would be most appropriate for standard Freudian interpretation was simply not available; on the other hand, there was considerable material bearing on his family position and his striving for academic superiority, quite nicely interpretable in terms of Adlerian theory. The mere fact that this selectivity seems necessary, of course, highlights the absence of a single overarching personality theory with universal applicability. Clearly, there is some art involved in tailoring the theoretical “gloves” to individual cases. There are also some dangers, as conscientious psychobiographers must ensure that the various “micro-theories” from which they choose have at least a degree of validity and are appropriate to the subject in question.

Historians of psychology will find particular interest in William McKinley Runyan’s chapter, “Evolving Conceptions of Psychobiography and the Study of Lives.” Runyan devotes part of his essay to describing personal encounters with several of the pioneers of the personological tradition, including Murray and his Harvard colleagues Gordon Allport and Robert White, and the hitherto underrecognized (by historians) Jerry Wiggins. Runyan’s brief accounts of these figures and their sometimes surprising interrelations are fascinating and tantalizing, and call to attention the desirability of a full-length history of personological psychology (hint, hint—who better to do this than Runyan himself?). In a further part of his chapter, Runyan promotes a new and enhanced status for the study of lives. He argues that Lee Cronbach’s famous postulation of the “two disciplines” of scientific psychology—the experimental and the correlational—should be expanded to include a third, historical-interpretive scientific discipline along lines suggested previously in the work of Steven Jay Gould. With such an expansion, psychobiographical investigation “can move from being seen as a predecessor or an adjunct to scientific psychology, to being seen as one of the ultimate objectives of an appropriately scientific and humanistic psychology” (p. 36). This suggestion—with its echoes of Wundt’s insistence that experimental psychology must be complemented by a historically based Völkerpsychologie—is another subject in this provocative chapter that calls out for fuller elaboration.

All historians of psychology are likely to find something of interest in the five insightful psychobiographical sketches of individual psychologists that constitute the Handbook’s Section 3. Here, Nicole Barenbaum examines Gordon Allport in light of his birth-order position as the youngest of four brothers; Kyle Arnold and George Atwood provide an analysis of Nietzsche’s madness; Irving Alexander mines the recent scholarship on Erik Erikson to pro-
vide new psychobiographical insights on that famous pioneer of psychobiography; and Ian Nicholson traces unsuspected links between psychophysicist S. S. Stevens’s rigid operationism and his Mormon background. The section also includes a reprinting of Alan Elms’s 1988 paper “Freud as Leonardo,” an analysis notable for drawing some positive lessons from Freud’s much-maligned first psychobiography, without ignoring its defects. Indeed, Elms’s chapter well reflects the overall message of this handbook writ small: psychobiography offers a fascinating and enormously promising approach to both psychology and history, but one that also presents many pitfalls and that must be followed with great caution and sensitivity.

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Reviewed by Raymond E. Fancher, Professor Emeritus of Psychology at York University, Toronto, ON, Canada, and the former editor of the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences.


Charting a “middle course” between two extremes in philosophy has not generally been very successful. The tendency has been to bring the confusions of each side to the center rather than isolating what is right about each extreme. Nevertheless, Haack has succeeded in charting such a middle course between cynicism and scientism and in so doing provided what should turn out to be a very fruitful way of thinking about what science is and is not, what science does and does not do.

The book ranges over a wide variety of topics central to the philosophy of science and focuses on both the power and limitations of science; in the natural and social sciences, in service to the law, and in debate with religion. But Haack’s core idea is that neither the position that defers to science (scientism) nor the position that is critical (and even openly hostile) to science (cynicism) have correctly characterized how science works. The deferentialists see science as proceeding with an epistemological authority that would eventually “get at the Truth” by accessing the Objective World. The cynics recognize that science is a social practice that human beings engage in and is subject to all of the traps and biases to which people are subject in every other aspect of inquiry. That these are incompatible sets of a debate suggests that only one can be right. Haack’s argument is that both are right—and wrong.

To some extent, Haack’s argument rests in a claim that both the deferentialists and cynics misunderstand science’s reach—what it is and what it can claim to do. They are both right in that scientific practice is subject to the political, social, historical, and personal pressures that exist and that science is extremely successful in helping us build bridges, aircraft, and automobiles. They are both wrong in thinking that either of these points are decisive in determin-
ing just how authoritative science really is. Haack’s middle course is what she dubs “Critical Common-Sensism.” It acknowledges “that there are objective standards of better and worse evidence,” but argues for a “more flexible and less formal understanding” of those standards and what they are. Similarly, her position recognizes that “observation and theory are inter-dependent, that scientific vocabulary shifts and changes meaning and that science is a deeply social enterprise,” but counters that these are not indictments of the truth and objectivity of the results of science or obstacles to understanding, but “part of that understanding” (p. 23).

Haack has written a book that is clear, witty, and insightful; develops and engages the most important arguments; and is helpful in understanding not only what the debate is about, but in seeing where the debate has gone wrong, if what we are after is putting the “science wars” behind us.

In the end, this is a book for philosophers and scientists alike; it provides a clarity to the tensions between scientism and cynicism that can facilitate an end to (at least) the most divisive aspects of the debate. This clarity allows us to see what science actually can do, what it cannot do for us, and what values science embodies. If there is a criticism to be made about the book, it might be that no definite positive advance to our understanding of the epistemology of science has been put forth. On the other hand, I am partial to the idea that clearing away the brush that prevents us from seeing problems clearly is itself a great advance over what we had.

Reviewed by NORMAN R. GALL, Instructor in Philosophy, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada.


There is a certain irony in the subtitle of this appreciation of Jaime de Angulo (1887–1950), since in so many ways he represented a counterexample of the professionalization of American anthropology in the first third of the twentieth century. Brilliant but maverick and largely self-trained, he existed on the fringes of disciplined ethnography and linguistics, more correspondent than colleague with the likes of Alfred Kroeber, Franz Boas, and Edward Sapir. More comfortable on a ranch in Big Sur than in the neighborhoods of Berkeley, de Angulo also created and endured the further complications of an unpredictable and non-conformist personal life, marked by the tragic death of his adored nine-year-old son, Alvar, in a car accident in 1933—an event that broke his spirit and effectively ended his fieldwork. At the peak of his working life, from around 1920 to the early 1930s, however, de Angulo showed considerable promise as a linguist of fading California indigenous languages—notably the Shastan family—and a collector of myths and stories among the Pomo and other groups.

This volume approaches de Angulo from several directions, reflected by a structure that is awkward and sometimes overlapping, but nonetheless enlightening. The author’s brief but helpful introduction to the professional trajectory of American anthropology after the first World War leads to the most successful section of the volume, a 70-page, straightforward ex-
position of de Angulo’s life in ethnography, linguistics, and, much later, in poetry. The biographical narrative is followed by a curious section on “key figures” in de Angulo’s life: Kroeber, Boas, Sapir, Paul Radin, Robert Lowie, and several others of minor importance to de Angulo. While these vignettes add little to our general knowledge of major “professional figures,” they come at an angle to reveal the often invisible but still real, and hardening, lines of professionalization in anthropology, as well as the subtle distinctions that Boas and Kroeber in particular drew between individuals based on both personal behavior (Kroeber) and utility to their larger programs (Boas).

The author’s analysis of de Angulo’s work, which constitutes Part II of the volume (and more than two-thirds of the work), will appeal primarily to readers with a specific interest in the indigenous linguistics of California; it adds much detail to de Angulo’s intellectual concerns and fieldwork and little to questions of professionalization. For those not already familiar with de Angulo’s more popular works of literature and radio, specifically Indian Tales and Old Time Stories, the discussion is frustratingly centered on their production rather than their content.

Reviewed by CURTIS M. HINSLEY, Regents’ Professor of History, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ.


Much of John Gunnell’s work has explored the ways political scientists, theorists, and philosophers go about their scholarly business, the contours and stakes of that business, and what it has to do with politics. So also in this impressive book, arguably Gunnell’s most important. Gunnell’s project is to show that the prevailing preoccupation of the study of American politics has always been how to understand the American polity. Polity is the only moderately uncontroversial term available for Gunnell: at issue is whether that polity is constituted by its people, its state, or its government; whether there is a people or a plural set of diverse interest groups; whether the polity is a democracy; and what democracy is. One general way of describing the debate is to say it has been between conceptions of monism—there is some “one American people”—and pluralism—that there are groups with diverse interests.

What makes the questions and political scientists’ attempts to answer them manageable is that they have taken very specific forms at various historical moments. That is the argument of the book. In the nineteenth century, students of American politics—spearheaded by Francis Lieber, whom Gunnell calls “the founder of American political science as a distinct discursive endeavor” (p. 16)—tried to understand democracy through the concept of the state, which might or might not contain in itself “the people.” In the twentieth century, theories of pluralism replaced state theorizing. But pluralism itself has come in historically contingent flavors and has been at times seen as constitutive of democracy and at times inconsistent with it, as a form of liberalism and as something opposed to liberalism.
In contrast to a Whiggish approach that interprets history in light of a current good state of affairs, or a critical unmasking that wants to reveal the muddy feet of that same current state, Gunnell is primarily interested in understanding historical and theoretical contingencies from the perspective that he too is an heir to this complex history. He calls this approach “internalist.” The label is somewhat lamentable, as the term already has a (very different) job in the nearby fields of epistemology and moral philosophy, but the approach is commendable, and commendably executed. He could have called the approach “genealogical”—and the book’s epigraph from Nietzsche suggests there indeed is an affinity between Gunnell and Nietzsche on method—except that that concept, too, now evokes a style of scholarship very different from Gunnell’s. Poststructuralist neither in style nor in method, Gunnell writes a straightforward history in which he approaches his subjects—concepts, ideas, and the scholars who expressed them—sympathetically, but with enough distance to see them in a broader context.

Gunnell does have a substantive position, though. The ways in which political scientists have helped shape the American polity haven’t necessarily brought greater clarity to the concept of democracy or helped realize democracy in America. Gunnell’s suggestion is to abandon the dichotomy between pluralism and monism and to look for something else (p. 252), both in the discipline of political science and, presumably as a result, in the polity.

The things that make the book great also make it demanding reading. The range of works and people Gunnell covers is breathtaking: from the Federalists to John Rawls and beyond, with literally hundreds of now partly forgotten scholars in between. Because of this, it can at times be hard to keep the cast of characters and even the specific points of contention in focus. Occasionally, too—particularly early on in Gunnell’s discussion of his method—the prose bogs down.

Still, Gunnell’s own task has been far greater than any he imposes on his reader, and anyone interested in either the disciplinary history of political science or, more importantly, the under-appreciated forces shaping American democracy, should be grateful to him for having done it.

Reviewed by MIKA LAVAQUE-MANTY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.


Interest in Freud’s fascination with antiquity is a central component of studies of his life and work and of the psychoanalytic movement for several reasons. First among these is Freud’s frequent use of (most prominently) Greece and Rome as cultural touchstones and validating metaphors for his theories. Those familiar with his life also know of his own collection of antiquities, which crowded his consulting room and occasionally played auxiliary roles in his analyses. This collection (housed at the Freud Museum in London) and Freud’s relationship with archeology has fascinated German- and English-language researchers since the
early 1950s (Bernfeld, 1951; Bowdler, 1996; Kuspit, 1993; Tögel, 1989). Museum tours of his collection have generated accompanying books (Barker, 1996; Gamwell & Wells, 1989; Gubel, 1993; Reeves & Ueno, 1996) filled with scholarly essays on Freud, archeology, psychoanalysis, and history.

Scholars from various fields have examined the vital role played by study of the ancients in nineteenth-century German-Jewish assimilation and identity construction (Gay, 1989; Gilman, 1993; Robert, 1976). Few, however, have come to the subject with the expertise of Richard Armstrong, associate professor of classical studies and director of the University of Houston’s Program in Classical Studies.

Armstrong divides his work into two parts, “Collision and Collusion in the Archives,” by which he means the cultural archive bequeathed to us by the ancients and our reading of it (not the Freud archives), and “Memory and History.” The former is historical and textual; in it, Armstrong seeks to situate “Freud’s compulsion for antiquity in relation to the ancient archive’s precarious placement in modern European thought” (p. 231) via analysis of Freud’s personal, analogical, and evidentiary heuristic modes of analysis as these relate to his personal life and scientific ambitions. The latter part, more philosophic and abstract, addresses the complex web of historical and psychological (self-)comprehension in Freud’s and our own time.

Armstrong’s focus on Freud’s “compulsion for antiquity” is a brilliant analysis not only of Freud’s use of ancient metaphors, but also of their complex, overdetermined, and conflicted history in central European history. His mastery of his field is superior, providing new insights into the various layers of meaning behind Freud’s citations, many of which are now lost to those of us whose Greek and Latin is wanting. More impressive still is his thorough reading of Freud and the massive secondary literature he has generated. While Armstrong gives too much credit to the field’s speculative and vindictive fringe, he has largely mastered the turbulent historiographic dynamics of psychoanalytic history.

To give an example of the former, Armstrong places the Oedipus myth within its original and received contexts, revealing that it served very different psychological purposes than those Freud assigned it. He observes that the Oedipus myth represented human nature in “the sense of a worst-case scenario, not in the sense of collective suffering” (p. 49). Freud employed the Oedipus myth to validate the universality of the psychological complex he identified. Armstrong’s analysis is cogent and critical: “Freud’s reading fundamentally shifts the evidentiary status of the figure of Oedipus from the ancient pattern of being a particularly egregious example of human calamity to being a paradigm of universal experience” (p. 48). The implications of this vital critique are profound. Armstrong evinces impressive narratological analysis and historical proficiency; his work is certain to influence subsequent research on this important topic.

Deftly avoiding the all-too-easy and well-traveled roads of indicating Freud’s errors (of which there were more than a few) or becoming another partisan in the Freud Wars, Armstrong instead seeks to situate “Freud’s compulsion for antiquity . . . historically and sociologically within the particular circumstances not only of his classical schooling, but more importantly within the explosive changes brought about by the Darwinian revolution, the growing visibility of ethnographic and anthropological discourse, the professionalization of historiography and archaeology, and the ever-expanding public appetite for sweeping historical narrative, all this against the background of an ancient archive already established as a locus of synaesthetic (and even sexual) understanding” (p. 31).

Excepting the curious and unhappy habit of beginning sentences with conjunctions, this is a well-written book; it is not only stimulating and didactic, but also occasionally quite hu-
morous. While deconstructing archaeology as decipherment, for example, Armstrong observes that Freud “appears to have suffered throughout most of his professional life from ‘spade envy’” (p. 112).

The book’s unstated leitmotif is Nietzschean, though whether this is indicative of the author’s partiality to Nietzsche’s ideas on the ancients or his conviction that Freud owes much more to Nietzsche than we generally credit (p. 236) is left for the reader to decide. Armstrong writes of “the will to history” (p. 12), arguing that “the will to power of psychoanalysis was originally a will to history at heart” (p. 132); he concludes with the observation that psychoanalysis’s “historical vision is the figural allegory of the death of God” (p. 251). Intriguingly, however, only half of his references to Nietzsche are indexed.

This is an important contribution to Freud/psychoanalysis studies and the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German(-Jewish) Bildungsbürgertum. In many ways, it is a superb example of a cross-disciplinary study, for it drives home that while we social scientists may well have gained much from specialization, those scholars able to breach modern disciplinary boundaries can reveal a great deal about our collective historical archive as well as our continuing interest in (the history of) psychoanalysis.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by DAVID D. LEE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
tion to this effort and brings together 15 papers introducing readers to Laing’s life, ideas, and therapeutic legacy. Many of the contributors are distinguished scholars of psychiatry and of Laing’s work—among them are Louis A. Sass, Daniel Burston, and Douglas Kirsner.

Salman Raschid’s introduction sets a clear direction for many of the contributors. He distinguishes between attempting to provide an etiology of schizophrenia and trying to understand the words and actions of schizophrenics. Laing, he insists, was concerned with the latter—with the “social intelligibility” of madness rather than “schizogenesis” (p. 25). This distinction between explanation and understanding is also affirmed and developed in essays by Douglas Kirsner, Eric Matthews, Roger Poole, and Richard P. Bentall. All argue that Laing’s enterprise can claim autonomy from the methods of the natural sciences.

While many will agree with this distinction, and it is the clearest avenue for a defense of Laing’s work, the exact nature of this contrast could do with greater development. The essays in this book still seem to be working within a “covering-law” or “nomological-deductive” model of science derived from logical positivism. Eric Matthews argues, for example, that “understanding” in other words is making sense by saying why someone did something: it does not presuppose any general laws, since the reason why person A did action X is not necessarily the same as the reason why other people do the same action in broadly similar circumstances” (p. 82). Perhaps more could have been done to revalidate the distinction between causal “explanation” and psychological “understanding” against the background of contemporary philosophy of science, which places less emphasis on covering laws, the symmetry of prediction and retrodiction, and the statement of sufficient or necessary conditions.

The remaining chapters show less thematic coherence, but among them are perhaps some of the strongest contributions. Louis A. Sass’s consideration of the schizoid character as the fundamental type of modern personality is immensely interesting and takes Laing’s work beyond psychiatry and into the sociological realms inhabited by the likes of Weber and Durkheim. There are also a number of essays that consider the therapeutic application of Laing’s theories. Many readers will find particularly welcome the inclusion of two papers on the Soteria Projects in the United States and Switzerland: these therapeutic communities for psychotic patients owed much to Loren Mosher’s experience of Laing’s work at Kingsley Hall in the 1960s.

However, despite its strengths, there are some aspects of this interesting volume that detract from its appeal. Even a casual glance reveals an unusually low standard of copy-editing and some problems with the formatting of the text. A higher standard of production would have made this volume rather more prepossessing—especially toward potential readers who might be skeptical about the professionalism of self-confessed Laingians. A more significant limitation is that a number of the essays are reworked material or have appeared elsewhere in substantially the same form: Sass’s essay, for example, is based upon a chapter from his Madness and Modernism (1992).

Overall, R. D. Laing: Contemporary Perspectives is a very useful orientation for those who might want to defend Laing against his detractors, but it is not itself that defense. However, the time for that great advance in Laing scholarship is surely nearer because of this book.

REFERENCE


Reviewed by Gavin Miller, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, University of Edinburgh.


Though both of these books focus their attention on the iconography of madness, in almost all relevant respects, they could not be more different. Gale and Howard have produced a useful book of modest ambitions. Scholars have long known that the Bethlem Hospital Archives contain an unusually rich array of daguerreotypes and photographs of many of the patients who thronged its wards in the nineteenth century, though Bethlem never made photographing patients an explicit part of its admissions process. A handful of publications have reproduced some of the early pictures, often misattributing them to Hugh Diamond, the superintendent of the Surrey County Asylum, and wrongly assuming that the portraits were of patients in the latter institution. Gale and Howard note that these earlier publications have treated these images as mere “examples of Victorian diagnosis and treatment” (p. 14) rather than as belonging to particular individuals. By contrast, their book identifies the patients whose pictures are reproduced in it with their real names, and links each photograph to extracts from the admissions certificates and case notes found in the hospital’s archives. By employing such a tactic, they argue, “we can correctly attribute [the individual patient’s] experiences and make them count for something” (p. 14).

Since Gale and Howard have chosen to reproduce images recorded in the period from the mid-1880s to the mid-1890s, they have not fallen afoul of the hundred-year rule that in Britain keeps patient identities confidential. But because they do not make any effort to link the asylum materials to extra-institutional records of any sort, there seems little reason to have used the patients’ “true names.” The accompanying case materials reveal the great variety of individuals who sought shelter in the asylum, or were compulsorily carried there, and the fates recorded there tend to call into question whether many of the patients were indeed as “curable” as the book’s title would suggest. Many were transferred uncured to private asylums or to the network of mammoth county asylums, and others still were returned to their families in little better state. Individually and cumulatively, however, the materials Gale and Howard reproduce begin to give the reader some sense of the heterogeneity of those who found themselves confined in what, by the late nineteenth century, was one of the smaller and more respectable Victorian bins. For the hospital had become a refuge for the respectable classes who were down on their luck but who viewed with horror the prospect of indiscriminate mixing with the officially stigmatized paupers—those who swarmed into the wards of the state-supported country asylums. With its slight but well-written introduction, *Presumed Curable* is a handy little volume, though both its images and the reproduced case notes are essentially left to speak for themselves, largely escaping editorial comment or interpretation.

Didi-Huberman’s *Invention of Hysteria* first appeared in French more than two decades ago. Judging by the opacity of much of its prose, its translator must have found herself facing a formidable task. The Gallic predilection for the oracular and the obscure,
the grand, sweeping phrase, and the recondite jargon as marks of, or substitutes for, profundity are fully on display here. Readers’ reactions to such stylistic tropes will vary along predictable lines.

Didi-Huberman’s focus is on the patients in an institution as famous in the francophone world as Bethlem/Bedlam is for the Anglophone: the vast mecca of the French Great Confinement that was the Salpêtrière. A hospital for women, or rather for the female dregs of society, it already contained some 3,000 inmates in 1690: epileptic, mad, demented, debauched, incorrigible, misshapen, vagabond—a stigmatized host cast out irretrievably from the ranks of respectable society. Subsequently the site of Pinel’s mythical unchaining of the insane in the Revolutionary era, the Salpêtrière became, in the late nineteenth century, the site of still another spectacle, the hysterical circus that had the eminent French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot as its ringmaster and Sigmund Freud as an occasional spectator.

Like Bedlam, the Salpêtrière gave birth to an iconography. Hysteria was a disorder inscribed on the body. It provided a “paradox of spectacular evidence,” for it was a mysterious condition “able to offer a total spectacle of all illnesses at once . . . an extraordinary bounty of symptoms . . . but these symptoms issue from nothing (they have no organic basis)” (p. 75). Its masquerades, its lies, its contortions, and its convulsions fascinated and repelled a whole generation of experts (the American neurologist, Weir Mitchell, preferred to call the disease, or whatever it was, “mysteria”), and they were repeatedly captured on camera. At the Salpêtrière, volumes of these pictures have been preserved, and they are a resource to which Didi-Huberman repeatedly returns, not just to illustrate his analysis, but to generate and reinvigorate it.

Where Gale and Howard are modest (reproducing images but scarcely interrogating or commenting upon them), Didi-Huberman is ambitious and wide-ranging. He examines the technical limitations of the photographer’s art in the late nineteenth century—the need to pose patients for seconds or minutes at a time, and the darkening of the images that flowed from the limitations of wet collodion plates, the artefactual creation of luminous or paraluminous halos around the subject. He interrogates the clinical gaze, examining Charcot’s and Freud’s divergent approaches to the hysterical body and elucidating the impact of hypnosis, as it produces and reproduces “all the states and postures of a body-machine” (p. 187) and, in the process, “confirms” one’s theories. He looks at the therapeutic staging at the Salpêtrière, the drama of Charcot’s demonstrations, and the theatrical language of gestures employed by patient and physician alike. Here was a magical transformation of fiction into reality, as hysterical symptoms shamelessly mocked anatomy and physiology, even as Charcot held fast to his somatic model of the disease he staged. The confusion and the catalepsy, the agony and the ecstasy, the contractures and distortions, the spasms and the suffering, the paradoxes and paralyses that marked this extraordinary era in the institution’s history are all fixed and displayed for us in the wealth of pictures extracted from the clinical records.

Didi-Huberman portrays the Salpêtrière as “a kind of feminine inferno . . . a nightmare in the midst of Paris’s Belle Epoque” (p. xi). Hysteria, he claims, is invented or reinvented here as a spectacular spectacle, and Charcot’s clinic constitutes something “I am nearly compelled to consider . . . as a chapter in the history of art” (p. 4). Many will find Didi-Huberman’s discussion of the events on this stage as fascinating, as daunting, as frustrating, and at times as impenetrable as hysteria itself. Others may be disposed to wonder if the author/emperor, like some of the patients whose images he reproduces, has any clothes.

Reviewed by ANDREW SCULL, Department of Sociology, University of California, San Diego, CA.

In telling the story of Thomas Willis and the collective investigations of body and brain in seventeenth-century England with tremendous energy and enthusiasm, journalist Carl Zimmer has written one of the best recent books of popular history of science. The full range of readers will be rewarded by Zimmer’s synthetic scholarship and his evident pleasure in the language of the primary texts. While he owes much to the work of Robert Frank and Robert Martensen in particular, Zimmer has negotiated a vast secondary literature on the major figures of early modern natural philosophy. His decision not to discuss scholarly controversy directly, but rather to give accounts of these people that were consistent with the current consensus (p. 304) is understandable given the mass market at which he has successfully aimed; yet such a voice would bring a welcome freshness to specialists’ debates.

As if in homage to eclectic early modern works, Zimmer includes a wide range of topics, allowing his narrative to lose focus as he digressively follows biographical and historical threads. Two introductory opening chapters give us the history of investigations into body, nerves, and spirits from the Greeks to Vesalius, and a potted account of the early “scientific revolution” from Copernicus to Descartes. Then he moves to England, weaving multiple narratives of Willis’s life, work, and times, of his colleagues, patients, contemporaries, and rivals—we get sketches of Charles I, Wilkins, Petty, Hobbes, Harvey, van Helmont, Cromwell, Hooke, Boyle, Wren, Lower, Charles II, Anne Conway, More, Locke, and Sydenham, among others—and of the experimental and conceptual challenges facing the “neurologie” and “psycheology” of the time.

Zimmer doesn’t always escape the bane of his genre—the quest for precursors. Phrases like “to create a scientific culture” (p. 93) and “relentless attention to scientific detail” (p. 142) are unnecessarily alien in this context: to say that Willis made the brain and nerves “a subject of modern scientific study” (p. 240) is unhelpfully to imply that Willis knew what “modern science” might be. But Zimmer is at least attempting something more deliberate with his creative anachronism, for he wants to use his historical eye to tell us something about the present, about our own “Neurocentric Age.” Sometimes, when talking Willis up and stressing his foundational role, Zimmer shares in contemporary neuroscientific boosterism: denigrating Locke’s skepticism about “the physical consideration of the mind,” for example, he argues that it would take neurologists 150 years to show that Willis was right, that studying the anatomy and chemistry of the brain can indeed reveal the workings of the mind, that they can “map the geography of passion, reason, and memory” (p. 255). Zimmer too often writes as if the “brain itself alone produces love and sorrow, . . . composes our thoughts” (p. 5), and unaided governs “everything in our lives” (p. 264), and his final chapter is a swift impressionistic romp across an assortment of topics in the neurocognitive sciences.

But in a more interesting and uncertain tone, Zimmer acknowledges science’s enormous ignorance about the brain and its functions, repeatedly comparing the pragmatic but ill-understood benefits of modern psychopharmaceuticals with the hopeful and fairly traditional treatments Willis recommended for his patients’ ills. As “a backward-looking revolutionary” (p. 152), Willis retained many of the remedies of traditional Galenic medicine even when couching his accounts of their (limited) efficacy in new chemical terms. Ordinary experience retained an appropriate place in explanation as well as therapy: even when his avowed aim...
was “to alter the corrupted corpuscles of the brain” (p. 240), Willis “did not try to reduce the psychological life to simple mechanics but tried instead to find a pattern of chemical events complex enough to match the complexity of people’s inner lives” (p. 228). The richly dynamic seventeenth-century schemes of leaping or wayward animal spirits, nervous ferments, cerebral folds, and distempered thoughts easily spanned the passions, mood, fantasy, and psychological confusion in ways in which later, more static visions of the nervous system could not.

The breathless heart of the book, however, lies in Zimmer’s rich evocation of the experimental thrill of the 1650s and 1660s when, working through the uncertain times with Lower, Wren, Boyle, and all, Willis “addicted [himself] to the opening of heads” (p. 174). With a fine nose for the oddest smells and stories from the period, Zimmer takes us through the work on fevers, blood, comparative brain anatomy, and cerebral pathology. He raises, without seeking to answer, some challenging historical questions about the activity of nervous matter, about what room Willis left for the rational soul, and about moral responsibility and self in that earlier Neurocentric Age. His book’s success is well deserved and can only encourage readers to wonder further about brains and history.

Reviewed by JOHN SUTTON, Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.


In the early twentieth century, the young social sciences of sociology and psychology found a means of quick and quantifiable application through the use of questionnaires. At the University of Missouri in 1929, young, popular sociology professor Harmon DeGraff was teaching a course named “The Family.” A component of the class was a group project open to any subject that related to course material. Senior psychology major Orval Mowrer headed a group of classmates in a project whose stated intention was to gauge the effect of economic independence upon women.

The questionnaire contained what, at the time, some considered to be morally incendiary topics (such as “trial marriages,” “illicit sex,” and “easy divorce”). The questionnaire was sent out to a random sampling of students, a handful of whom raised concerns about the tenor of the questions, sparking a controversy on campus and in the community. In less than a month’s time, DeGraff and psychology professor Max Meyer were dismissed and suspended from the university, respectively.

Lawrence J. Nelson’s Rumors of Indiscretion chronicles the events that unfolded after the distribution of the questionnaire in meticulous detail. The author calls on a wide array of source material to reconstruct the times, giving the reader a thoroughly rich perspective (at times exasperatingly so) as the story moves from the initial reactions on the campus and in the community at large to a history of the campus culture of the era, before addressing the wide-reaching fallout of the scandal.

Nelson’s research is remarkably thorough, and his methods of weaving this vast amount of material into the narrative are admirable in their detail but ultimately detract from the flow.
of the story. The material here provides for a compelling look at how most of academia and the populace at large were polarized on the issue of sex research, and the abundance of background material on the atmosphere of the time, as well as some of the minor players in the scandal, can be frustrating obstacles to a reader who wants the facts of the story delivered in a timely fashion. The opportunity to juxtapose the scandal with the evolving cultural landscape is touched upon, and it seems that Nelson wants to comment on this (as is hinted at by the book’s subtitle), but his voice is too often buried beneath his research to allow for it. Cutting some of the material that doesn’t directly relate to the storyline would have allowed space for social commentary of historical pertinence.

Nelson focuses instead on the impact that the furor over the questionnaire had on the campus, and how the scandal’s effects would affect the university’s future. This results in a startlingly clear appraisal of the event’s historical significance in regard to the city of Columbia as well as the university. As such, the book succeeds in giving a comprehensive view of the scandal and providing the reader with a “fly on the wall” perspective of all of the related proceedings that took place on campus.

The book does not disappoint the reader curious to know the details of the principal characters’ postscandal careers. Mowrer’s career trajectory was a steep rise to prominence, with a term of presidency of the American Psychological Association at its zenith. Nelson also reveals Mowrer’s lifelong struggle with depression and the religious zeal that influenced some of his late-career work. Mowrer’s suicide and the pragmatic logic attributed to his decision to take his life are deftly related. Meyer, whose connection with the questionnaire was largely limited to editing, is shown as the figure most adversely affected by the scandal, as he publicly railed against university administration and effectively destroyed any chance of returning to a faculty position at Missouri. He adopted a hermit-like existence, working with deaf children at the University of Miami, Florida, and with a salary that did not approach what he earned at Missouri, lived on the fringes of poverty. DeGraff went on to build a steady and rewarding career, eventually heading the sociology department at the University of Akron.

_Rumors of Indiscretion_ succeeds admirably in transporting the reader to the campus of the University of Missouri in the spring of 1929. The research necessary to confidently tell such a story weighs down the narrative at times but does clear away most questions that any reader might have about the assertions that Nelson makes and shows that political influence on college campuses is far from a recent phenomenon.

Reviewed by STEPHEN UNDERWOOD, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH.


Forces advocating the medicalization and criminalization of severe alcohol and other drug problems have coexisted and clashed in America over the past 40 years, leaving unanswered the question of whether the addiction treatment industry or the criminal justice system will achieve ultimate cultural ownership of these problems. Sarah Tracy offers historical
insight into the sources and solutions to alcohol-related problems by exploring an earlier period of similarly intense clashes.

_Alcoholism in America_ traces the evolving conceptualization of alcohol problems through their moral roots to the newly created diseases of “inebriety” and “dipsomania.” The heart of Tracy’s story begins with the founding of the American Association for the Cure of Inebriety (1870) and ends with the inauguration of American Prohibition (1920). Chapters span the rise of the conceptualization of chronic drunkenness as a medical disease through the rise and later fall of institutions for the social and medical treatment of the inebriate. While parts of this broad story have been explored before (Baumohl & Room, 1987; Baumohl & Tracy, 1994; Crowley & White, 2004; White, 1998), this book is at its very best in the chapters that detail the histories of inebriate asylums in the states of Massachusetts and Iowa, and in a chapter that uses patient correspondence to explore how people being treated in the inebriate asylums made sense of their own addiction and recovery processes. The details in these chapters break new ground regarding the history of addiction treatment and recovery in America.

This book will find many appreciative audiences, including those interested in the history of American medicine, the history of addiction treatment, and the way in which broad cultural and historical forces influence ideas, social policies, and social institutions. Those working in today’s addiction treatment facilities will also be transfixed by elaborate inebriate classification schemes and by the treatment methods used in these early institutions. All readers will appreciate the meticulous research upon which this book rests and the engaging language in which the central story is told.

The book concludes with a brief summary of the post-repeal rise of a modern alcoholism movement, the rebirth of addiction treatment institutions, and new resistance to disease conceptualizations of alcohol and other drug problems. As Tracy suggests, history doesn’t literally repeat itself, but it does come close.

Medical and criminal definitions of chronic drunkenness are often portrayed as dichotomous views out of which grow radically different institutions. What Tracy’s research reveals is that the earliest treatment facilities were really hybrid institutions, mixing moral, medical, and criminal views of drunkenness and mixing medical treatments with compulsory confinement and harsh punishments. Such hybridization left many inebriate asylums looking as much like prisons as hospitals. Today’s addiction treatment agencies, increasingly dominated by criminal justice referrals, will likely view this finding as a cautionary tale.

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Reviewed by WILLIAM L. WHITE, Senior Research Consultant, Chestnut Health Systems, Bloomington, IL.