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ENVIRONMENT AND ORGANIZATION:
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE POLICE

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Introduction

This paper presents a general perspective on the metropolitan police as an object of sociological research. The authors take the term perspective seriously. The paper is neither a detailed presentation of formal research hypotheses nor a presentation of research findings. An organizational perspective that focuses mainly upon the consequences of relations to the environing system rather than on internal structure is presented as an orienting image within which more specific theoretical and empirical work can proceed.^{1/} Several topics are selected to illustrate the general application of the perspective. The statements of fact are gleaned from general observation, research underway, and the literature on the police.

Police and the Environing System

The municipal police as an organizational system is especially adapted to an analysis that stresses its relations with the organized environment and boundary transactions and moves from these to consideration of internal differentiation and problems of integration, coordination, and control. All organizations can be so studied of course, but since Weber the broad fashion among sociologists has been to focus on the internal structure of organizations and on task differentiation as it is manifested within the organization. Unlike many organizations, however, the police have as their fundamental task the creation, maintenance of, and participation in, external relationships. Indeed, the central meaning of police authority itself is its significance as a mechanism for "managing" relationships.

Directing traffic, investigating complaints, interrogation, arresting suspects, controlling mobs and crowds, urging prosecutors to press or drop charges, testifying in court, participating with (or battling, as the case may be) probation officers in juvenile court, presenting budget requests to the city council, pressing a case with the civil service commission, negotiating with civil rights groups, defense attorneys, reporters, irate citizens, business groups, other city services, and other police systems-- even such an incomplete list indicates the probable values of a perspective that emphasizes transactions and external relationships. The list also indicates something else of considerable significance. All of these transactions can be and often are antagonistic ones. Because of the complexity of organizational relationships with the environment apparent from a partial listing of police activities, we have chosen to concentrate our discussion of the external environment of the police and its internal consequences by selecting a few basic environmental features. These are the nature of the legal system, the nature of violative activity, and civic accountability. They are brought to bear upon a variety of organizational transactions and internal processes, especially on problems of production, strategy and tactics, and command and control.

The basic social mechanisms available to the police all flow from their role in the legal system. Yet, the legal system broadly considered is the source of some of the most severe problems of adaptation faced by the police. Because of this dual involvement with law, much of our early discussion of external relations deals with the police and the legal system. The legal

system is not, however, a seamless web of tightly articulated rules and roles but a loose-jointed system held together at many points by microsystems of antagonistic cooperation and discretionary decisions.

Modern metropolitan police exist only in view of the fact that communities are legally organized.^{2/} The problem of the external parameters of police operation and organization, in its broadest sense, inheres both in the nature of the urban community and in the nature of the legal system. Indeed, the fundamental position of the police may be conceived as mediating between the two. On the one hand, the police are a fundamental representative of the legal system and a major source of raw material for it. On the other, the police adapt the universalistic demands of law to the structure of the locale by a wide variety of formal and informal devices.

Later in the paper we shall discuss several features of the modern urban community as they impinge on the social structure of law enforcement. In this section we concentrate on some key aspects of the legal system and the implications of the fact that the governance of communities is by legal rather than by some other means. The broad designation "legal system" may be broken into the "legality" component, and the "government" component.^{3/}

The value of these distinctions, perhaps, will be more apparent if we discuss first the one most familiar--the "legal content" component. By this we mean simply the actual content of laws. The importance for our purposes lies in the fact that even modern societies differ considerably in the substance of

the things they make illegal and violations under them differ considerably in their impact on police strategy and tactics. A prime example is the well known tendency of American society to make illegal many service crimes such as gambling.

By the "government" component we mean simply that the legal system is always organized politically into larger or smaller, more or less centralized, units. Even further, powers of government may be separated or combined in various patterns. Thus in the United States the police are organized to parallel the federal structure of local, state and national government. Although the matter of levels of government has been widely discussed as a central "problem" in police administration, we are not particularly concerned with the matter here since our focus is on the single community rather than intergovernmental aspects of the context of police operations.^{4/}

The third aspect of the legal system is the "legal order" component. By this we mean the complex apparatus involved in the administration of justice, especially those aspects with which the police are likely to come into contact routinely, such as the prosecutor and the courts. Because of the unique significance of this aspect of the legal system we will devote considerable attention to it.

Finally, the "legality" component to which we now give special attention refers only to the procedural aspects of the exercise of legal power.

Legality, Police and Community

The police, in a sense, provide the primeval social service-- protection for life and property. Unlike some other social

services, however, the existence of a public agency largely precludes the performance of the service on a private basis. The very existence of the modern police signifies that in the broadest sense the exchange of property and the infliction of injury may take place only under definite rules. Moreover, disputes arising out of property exchange or personal altercation may be resolved only with definite limits. The body of legal rules that specify the acceptable modes of procedures in the resolution of disputes may collectively be deemed the canons of legality. The basic elements of legality--objective definitions of right, "due process", notice, citizen compliance, and official accountability are primarily aspects of the ways citizens are treated rather than descriptions of specific statutes or judicial rulings. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the courts provide the primary definitions of legality in this sense with varying admixtures of legislative action and constitutional undergirding.

A society based upon such procedural and value premises, however, presents two closely intertwined problems. We can anchor the discussion of them by defining them very generally in terms of the sub-system relations involved. The first is the citizen to citizen relationship.

Within very broad limits, citizens generally avail themselves of police services rather than resort to "self-help" in dealing with problems of person or property. The existence of police symbolizes not only that the citizen will be protected from the violator but that the violator will be protected from the citizen. One way the police serve the cause of legality, therefore, is to assure by their presence and performance that a

set of rules prevails which make it unnecessary for the citizen to be continually prepared to defend himself or his property. We may in fact partly define the "maintenance of law and order" as the maintenance of a set of social conditions such that over the society as a whole, the expectation of attack on person or property has a probability below the level at which the citizenry resorts to "self-help". The maintenance of these conditions is always problematic, and in some localities of American society, "law and order" is sustained only with difficulty.

Comparison of the linkage among legality, police and community in criminal law areas with the corresponding linkage in the civil law is of sociological interest. The two great divisions of the law of civil wrongs--torts and contracts--involve much the same concern with the avoidance of "self-help" as a response to injury. Indeed the traditional distinction in jurisprudence between civil remedies and criminal sanctions, with the former accruing to the injured party and the latter to the "state", obscures similarities between the two areas.

In the area of civil wrongs, especially tort law, the law is reactive rather than proactive, i.e., the legal system does not patrol or search out wrongs and take action but rather leaves to private initiative the invocation of the legal process. Closely related to the reactive stance of civil law is a very broad presumption favoring the private ordering of conduct and even of the resolution of disputes.^{5/} Thus legal ethics seem clear. The lawyer may not behave like a patrolman and search out tort victims or sufferers from breach of contract to encourage civil suits. Compare this doctrine of legal restraint with the doctrine of

"aggressive patrol" which figures so prominently in modern police thinking.

On close examination many of the seemingly stark differences between the organization of civil remedies and the organization of criminal sanctions become less clearcut. They perhaps can be seen most clearly if we look from the perspective of the private arrangement system itself. The determinants of the decision to call the police, e.g., to deal with a neighborhood juvenile, are presumably complex but not totally unlike the decision to sue for damages.^{6/} A large part of police intervention is initiated by the victim. Moreover, the police have as one of their fundamental responsibilities the determination of when a "victim's" complaint in fact warrants formal action. No crime may have been committed or, if there is one, it may be so minor that department policy dictates only cursory attention. Like the civil lawyer, the policeman also becomes sensitive to subtleties of private vengeance masquerading as public duty.

Beyond these elements of "victims" initiating police activity, police "adjudication" policy, and their upholding of "disinterested" canons of legality, the operating procedures of police bear other similarities to civil procedure. Foremost among these is the tendency of police to let stand, or even to encourage, private settlement of disputes--even where violence may be present or likely. Among the "private arrangements" that the police may protect are their own relationships with categories of violators.

This aspect of policing is discussed in more detail later on, but at this point it is appropriate to indicate that the police in a sense are a service without clients. The police serve "the

public" as a collectivity rather than distributively.^{7/} Enforcement must be initiated where there is no personal victim or/and complainant. Given the lack of guidelines either from the "public" as client or from a specific victim or complainant as client, the police can become in effect their own clients. We take this to be one of the fundamental features in the oft mentioned tendency for the police to develop a supermoralistic perspective and to see themselves as engaged in a "private" war on crime. Of basic significance here is the fact that the courts and the police are in a relationship of "antagonistic cooperation" so that the legal order itself can be described only with difficulty as the "client" of the police.

Thus in many ways the respect for private ordering that is formal in civil law is informal in criminal law. Unlike the civil side, a large organized body of officials--the police--intervene between law and practice and may come to participate in such private arrangements themselves. From this perspective it is useful to see the police not as discretionless ministerial officers but as somewhat analogous to the practicing attorney whose roles as advocate, counselor and officer of the court are not totally dissimilar (though better legitimated) from the roles played by the policeman.^{8/}

Informal practice allows the police to vary their relationship to the many "private" dispute settling procedures available; hence, the degree to which formal legality is extended to (or imposed upon) different groups in the population varies considerably.^{9/} Among the private arrangements that the police may allow to stand is the use of violence among subordinate or peripheral

groups in the society. The most outstanding instance until recently has been the willingness of the American police to "respect" intra-racial violence among Negroes, thus implicitly defining the Negro population as in a sense "without the law". Correlatively the police established private arrangements with the Negro violator that included their extra-judicial use of force as a substitute for "due process". Whether such private adjudication is less predictable, less merciful, and less just seems open to dispute, but such arrangements clearly imply that a segment of the population is operationally treated as outside the pale of legality.

The broader problem involved here is of course, the central one of the conditions under which membership in the state supersedes membership in other collectivities as a determinant of both formal and operative rights. Historical developments for at least two centuries have tended to define state membership, i.e., citizenship, as prevailing over other statuses in determining individual rights. However, here as elsewhere there have been many "lags" between formal declaration and informal practice.^{10/}

Up to this point we have tried to establish a general perspective that emphasizes the similarities between civil and criminal legal operations. The key points here are (1) that many features that are formal in the civil law are "informal" in the criminal law, (2) that the relations between private ordering and public determination are important in both areas, (3) that large areas of police operation are closer to the reactive model of civil adjudication than to the generally held proactive model of criminal process, (4) that the maintenance of legality as between citizens always involves some balance of police willingness to "respect" or

to override private arrangements, and (5) that the conditions under which citizens invoke the criminal process may be profoundly determinative of the nature and boundaries of sub-system solidarity as well as of police behavior.

We purposely have emphasized the role of the police in securing as well as symbolizing legality as between citizens since this is a relatively neglected aspect of the larger problem. The other face of the legality problem is that of the relations between the citizenry and the police. Since this aspect of the problem has received much more attention, we will make only a few general remarks in the discussion of police in the legal order.

The Police in the Legal Order

Liberal democratic societies stemming from the English tradition formally organize enforcement of the law and the maintenance of order within the society in the military and the police, but principally in the police. The extension of the rule of law in legality, due process, the exercise of discretion, and the doing of justice when accusations or arrests are made is formally organized in the public prosecutor and the courts. This functional separation of powers where ordinarily the police are expected to enforce the law and the judiciary to determine the outcome of events creates problems for both organizations and appears to account for some aspects of police organization and work.

Although the police are formally organized to enforce the law and maintain public order, it is apparent they are involved at the same time in the doing of justice. It is important to note that all three key terms--order, legality and justice-- are terms

fraught with the ambiguities of value terms in any social system. But what philosophers, social scientists and lawyers have argued over for centuries, the police must do every day. The point requires little documentation. A policeman on duty, for example, when confronted with a situation of law enforcement or public order must make decisions about the evidence and whether the act violates the law. Decisions to hold for investigation, arrest or release, or to enforce order, likewise require the extension of legality. His decision may, and often does, involve him at the same time in dispensing equity. Police, in short, make important decisions that affect outcome. They either do justice or limit the judicial function of courts, particularly by determining the nature of evidence and who is to be held for adjudication.

Court decisions to dismiss charges are often viewed by the police as a rejection of their decisions. Such decisions may be particularly galling to the officer since he regards his rules of knowing as more valid than the court's rules of evidence in making a decision. Furthermore, court decisions to dismiss offenders or to return offenders to the community often affect police work as released offenders frequently create problems for continued law enforcement. The most obvious examples of this kind occur in police work with juveniles, vagrants and habitual drunks. Police dissatisfaction with rehabilitation workers such as probation officers likewise stems in part from the fact that they have been unable to control disposition of the case; today's probationers are not infrequently tomorrow's work.

Police dissatisfaction with the administration of justice by the courts results in their doing justice, a tendency to settle

things outside the courts to be sure that "justice is done". Nowhere is this more apparent than when police are expected to continue law enforcement involving violators that the court sends back to the community. The police then may "take the law in their own hands" and dispense justice, even if it means using violence. The continuing conflict between the police and the courts over admissibility of evidence, techniques of interrogation, the status of the confession, and the use of force, together with their separate definitions of justice, are likewise consequences of the separation of powers.

Transactions among police officers, public prosecutors and the judiciary not infrequently have the effect of subverting the goals of law enforcement since each is in a position to sanction the others behavior. That individual or collective sanctions do not always achieve the intended goal is clear when the effect of sanctions of one part on another is examined. A single example may serve as an illustration.

Judges often negatively sanction police officers for failing to develop cases that meet court standards. It is not uncommon for a judge to publicly criticize from the bench an officer new to the service with a terse statement that fails to explain the grounds constituting an effective case. This judicial practice leaves the young officer in a quandary that often leads him to turn to the informal police system for advice about responses to judicial practice that not infrequently leads to poor police technique and the development of cases where there is no intention to prosecute. Such responses lead to further judicial criticism that department administrators may ultimately perceive as an

unwillingness by the court to convict. At this juncture, however, police practice may have deteriorated to the point where the court could not convict, if it would. Negative sanctions by the court and prosecutors thus lead to a deterioration of police practice which subverts judicial goals.

There is no necessary reason why these systems must be related in a cumulative set of negative sanctions. Police, prosecutors and jurists sometimes take steps to cope with predicaments caused by negative sanctions, evolving practices that moderate these effects. They provide, for example, for prosecutors to advise officers prior to their appearance in court, though to be sure prosecutors may use officers for their own intended sanctions of judicial behavior. The conflict between police practice and legality stems in part, however, from the fact that American courts traditionally resist advisory opinion and from the fact that jurists and prosecutors, as lawyers, do not perceive that they have an educational obligation toward the officers or their clients in the situation.

The legally defined end of a police department is to enforce the law. The measure of success of a police department is presumably some measure of the degree to which it has in fact "enforced the law". There are two major ways that success gets defined for departments. The first kind is a measure of aggregative success, whether of a crime rate, arrests, crimes cleared by arrest, convictions, or value of stolen property recovered. The second is the success it has in meeting public demands to solve a particular crime problem as, for example, when a crime outrages the public conscience.

Police are relatively free to define their own criteria of success in crimes known to them, arrests made, and crimes cleared through arrest despite national attempts to standardize the criteria. They can determine a successful arrest per se and satisfy themselves when a case has been cleared by arrest. They can recover stolen property incident to arrest and clearance, or independent of it as is often the case for stolen autos. Their productivity record in these areas, however, can be compared with that of other cities through the uniform crime reporting system organized through the FBI. The media of communication hold the local police system accountable for its record in this system.

Police departments generally have a "low" success rate so far as the public is concerned in the proportion of crimes cleared through arrest. Only about one in four offenses known to the police is generally cleared by arrest.^{11/} Clearance through arrest is greater for crimes against persons than crimes against property and for misdemeanors such as vagrancy, drunkenness and disorderly conduct, though the latter bring few credits in the public ledger. The low success rate in crimes cleared by arrest creates a dilemma for the police administrators in their efforts to maintain a public image of themselves as productive in a market oriented society. It is neither sufficient nor publicly acceptable for American police to justify themselves by their roles as simple representatives of moral or legal order.^{12/} They are under considerable pressure from local organizations such as the newspapers and crime commissions, and from the FBI, who manipulate the statistics in relation to their own goals, goals that not infrequently conflict with those of the police department.

The dilemma created by the necessity to maintain a public image of success in the face of aggregative measures of lack of success can readily lead to the manipulation of the statistics to create a favorable public image. Police departments, in fact, build up their volume of production largely out of misdemeanors rather than felonies, out of crimes against property rather than against persons, and in these days from juveniles and traffic. Tradition oriented departments often artificially inflate their success rate by getting arrested persons to cop out to additional offenses, or by charging them off to an arrested person on the basis of a modus operandi.

The separation of enforcement from outcome creates additional dilemmas for the department in defining its success rate. Assuming legal police conduct, it is through convictions only that the penal sanctions presumed efficacious in reducing crimes can be forthcoming. And it is also through conviction only that the police sense of justice can be vindicated. The conviction rate however is subject to police control only within narrow limits. Both prosecutors and courts intervene. The courts do so with the avowed purpose of scrutinizing police conduct, especially when legality as well as violation of the law is defined as an issue. While department arrest figures may define the policeman's success, acquittals in court may define his failures.

These dilemmas in defining success are partially resolved by the development of a complex bargaining process between police and prosecutors, the shifting of departmental resources in directions of maximum payoff from a conviction point of view, the development of a set of attitudes that define the police as alone

in the "war on crime", and the elaboration of success measures that do not require validation by the courts.

All major metropolitan departments elaborate measures of success that they can manipulate independent of the prosecutor and the courts. Investigations of organized crime are publicized, though there is relatively little success in conviction in relation to effort expended. Arrests under public pressure of well known gangsters or crackdowns on prostitution, gambling or narcotics peddling have their symbolic public relations value even if it is difficult to secure convictions and they make undue claim on limited resources. Successful prosecution of the most serious or violent crimes against persons such as homicide, forcible rape, and aggravated assault likewise are used for their symbolic value, though they account for only a small volume of all crimes known to the police.^{13/}

Police concern for clearance of crimes through arrest is not infrequently a response to immediate public pressures that they maintain a safe community as well as the more general and continuing one that they are an effective and efficient department. The police, for example, may come under fire when a neighborhood is plagued by a series of assaults or strong-arm robberies, or when the "public" is offended by any specific crime. Police concern then shifts to clearing up these particular crimes so that they may reduce public pressure by announcement that the perpetrators have been brought into custody.

Police administrators are confronted with a dilemma in their effort to manipulate the image of crime in the community. To justify increases in manpower and budget before municipal agencies,

they are compelled to emphasize the high volume of crime in the community and the difficulties they face in meeting it with the resources available to them. At the same time, this emphasis can easily be interpreted as failure.

The individual policeman likewise is production oriented; his successes are arrests and acquittals are his failures. The successful policeman quickly learns what the police system defines as successes. These become his arrests. When he is not supported by the judicial system for what he regards as "right" action, he tends to take the law into his own hands, often by making a decision not to arrest, or by making an arrest where there is no intention to prosecute.^{14/} In this way the police officer sanctions the judicial system for what he defines as its failure to make him a success.

Separation of enforcement from outcome also has an effect on police attitudes. The refusal of the courts to convict or of prosecutors to prosecute may rest on what to the police seem the most artificial of formalities. Police are aware as well that this lack of support attributes failure to them. Their sense of justice may be outraged. Collective subcultural modes of adjustment are a common protective response to such dilemmas and contradictions. For the police this adjustment consists in part in the development of a collective identity wherein the police are viewed as the true custodians of morality and justice. In the words of one police administrator:

"Police get conditioned to the idea that we are the only people with our finger in the criminal dike in this country. They feel that everyone else 'lets him go'. Police differ from the D. A. The D. A. is satisfied with a conviction, finding him guilty. But

police want him punished. They become outraged when the result of their work is ignored. 'What if they let him off, I get him tomorrow: those bastards kiss him on the cheek and let 'em go', is their attitude of how the D. A. and the judge handle their cases.'

Thus the police want an outcome that signifies for them that their effort has been appreciated and that morality has been upheld. This for them is what is meant by justice being done.

Many police see two broad classes of violators--those who deserve to be punished and those who do not. For the police, justice is done by them when they let a man go; he does not deserve to be punished. But justice must be done by some other means when they arrest. This they regard as the moral obligation of the prosecutor and the courts.

Mention has been made that the separation of enforcement from outcome forces the police into a bargaining situation that includes violators, prosecutors, defense attorneys and courts. The public prosecutor is usually the central figure in this process. Bargaining relationships of the police are undoubtedly more complexly patterned and determined than current information allows us to assess. Three important points can be made here, however. The first is that the police are hedged about with officials whose formalized discretion is greater than their own. The second is that while the prosecutor and the judge are the traditional figures, the system of justice has come to include others such as probation officers and juvenile court officials with whom the police also must enter into a bargaining relationship. Finally, all of these bargaining relationships are ones in which the role incumbents are potentially hostile to the police. As Stinchcombe has recently noted, adjunctive

officials of the courts, particularly rehabilitation or welfare officials, are hired wholly or in part as a set of official opponents of the police.^{15/}

The formal linkage of the police to the prosecutor's office and the court has other implications for their adaptation. Interpersonal contact situations between police and court personnel involve both an inequality relationship and a reversal of roles. Normally, police are in a position of authority vis-a-vis the citizen; in a substantial number of situations, they are in a status superior position as well. When they are not, police use tactics to assert authority in the situation. Furthermore, police work generally places an officer in the role of interrogator, a role requiring that little information be given to suspects. Now in contacts with the courts, role situations are reversed. Police are generally below the status of officials they deal with in the courts, particularly with men of the bar and bench, and they are interrogated. Under certain circumstances, they are subject to cross-examination. This kind of contact situation brings with it all of the suspicion and hostility generated in situations between status unequals where roles are reversed and authority is displaced. The ambivalence of the police toward both the administration of justice and its role incumbents is further exacerbated under these conditions. This status reversal plus the generalized lower prestige of police when taken together with the institutionalized distrust of police built into the trial process creates a situation where the police not only feel themselves balked by the courts but perhaps, even more fundamentally, feel themselves dishonored.

The involvement of police in the legal order may also be looked at from the point of view of the legal remedies available in the event of illicit police conduct. For the citizen they are largely civil remedies as against the individual policeman. Broadly speaking the citizen does not sue the police department for false arrest, or battery; he sues the policeman. The officer's conduct, however, may have been well within the reasonable limits of departmental police or regulation. The relatively unpredictable and ex post facto nature of judicial decision may exacerbate the problem for the policeman, even though the usually broad wording of applicable provisions of the law of arrest afford the officer much protection. This anomalous disjuncture between authority and liability is presumably one of the sources of the oft-noticed solidarity of police systems. If effecting the department's mission lays the officer open to suit, clearly a norm of secrecy and mutual support is a highly likely result. The blue curtain descends between staff and line and the department and the outer world.

The balancing and correlative fact that police chiefs may be liable to sanctions by political and governmental officials even though immune from suit acts in much the same way. "Formal" informal mechanisms such as secret department trials, requests for resignation, and liability defense funds develop as ways of containing this dilemma.

While the civil suit is in principle available to citizens, it is rarely used. There seem to be several reasons for this in addition to the fact that policemen are usually not able to pay large judgments. The segments of the population most likely to

sue are (or were) least likely to be involved with the police. Those most involved with the police, the "depressed populations", are simultaneously unlikely to use the courts in general, fearful of police reprisal, and too impoverished to afford counsel.

The very structure of judicial control of the police means-- as in recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions^{16/} --that rulings about the illegality of police practices toward offenders must come in the form of upsetting the convictions of criminals. Judicial rulings that announce new procedural limitations on the police are of necessity ex post facto, and therefore difficult to predict. Given this situation, it is no wonder that in the system for maintaining "law and order", other people have the law while the police get stuck with the order.

Recent decisions of the Court also highlight basic differences between the police and the courts regarding their organizational requirements for the legality and legal content components and set the stage for organizational conflict. The police organization generally requires high specificity of the legal content component in the decision to arrest but relative ambiguity of the legality component in enforcement and processing situations. The courts, in contrast, insist upon high specificity of the legality component in their position of judicial control of the police (or the protection of citizen rights) while tolerating relative ambiguity in the statement of legal content in the interest of case law.

Violative Activity and Organizational Strategy and Tactics

Police departments are organized primarily to carry out a reactive rather than a proactive strategy. This is in sharp

contrast with some intelligence systems geared to a proactive strategy. A majority of the line in any major metropolitan police system is allocated to units that react to communications that the police are wanted at some time and place. The Communications Center is the heart of the modern operating system. Patrol is the single largest division. Geared essentially to react, patrol belies its name. To be sure, some units such as tactical patrol conduct both proactive and reactive operations, and others, such as vice control, are principally proactive, but on balance patrol is organized to respond to commands that are reactions to requests originating outside the department. To understand how it happens that police departments operate primarily with a reactive strategy, we must turn to the organization of the enviroing system and the development of police transactions with individuals and organizations beyond its boundaries.

Before the evolution of modern police systems, the citizen was paid for giving information on crimes and the whereabouts of criminals to proper authorities. But in Western societies there has been a gradual evolution from the citizen as paid informant and prosecutor to the citizen as a responsible complainant accompanied by a delegation of responsibility to the police for the enforcement of the law and the prosecutor for pursuing formal charges. As a consequence of these changes the social sources of information on violations have changed. Police strategy and tactics become proactive and special units, e.g., vice and traffic control divisions, are developed to deal with violations where the individual citizen is not directly threatened and hence does not mobilize the police.^{17/} Information on crimes of this nature:

must generally originate, therefore, with police work, including the use of the undercover agent and the otherwise abandoned practice of paid informants. Correlatively, where police rely almost exclusively on the citizen complainant for origination of information on crimes against a person or his property, their strategy and tactics are generally reactive. Patrol is the initial unit assigned to respond and the detective bureau follows.

Only in a superficial sense may police be said to solve crimes or to enforce the law. The organization of the society, the nature of violative activity, and the organization of a police department make it impossible to locate a population of subjects who have violated the law, or to solve most crimes.

The social organization of behavior that violates the law and of how it is communicated to the police when coupled with organizational problems in the allocation of limited resources to the solution of crimes makes it impossible for the police to generate most of the inputs they process. These conditions also largely determine the internal differentiation of the police department and the strategy and tactics each unit adopts to process violations of the law. We shall turn first to examine ways in which communications about violations of the law create problems for the police in solving crimes and how the police organization adapts to these problems.

In a democratic society, the major volume of police work derives from an external source, the citizen complaint, rather than from an internal organizational source, police detection of crimes committed. The major element occasioning a complaint by an American citizen is that he sees himself as a "victim"

experiencing a personal loss. Citizens are unlikely to mobilize the police or to report violations in which they are not actually a victim. In all other cases, the citizen tends to define enforcement of the law as a police responsibility. This means that many violations are known to citizens but not reported to the police because they lack direct personal involvement in the violative activity. Even when the person is a victim, he may not necessarily make his complaint known, since citizen complaint is responsive to public and police norms and expectations about communicating violations of the law.

Police definitions of the status of "victim" constitute one such set of expectations. Certain deviants, e.g., homosexuals, and prostitutes do not usually report crimes against themselves since they cannot afford to take the risk. In other cases, the citizen responds to collectively defined expectations of treatment by the police, as for example the Negro's response to expectations of "white man's" justice or police brutality. Indeed, much of the post World War II reported increase in crime in American cities may be due to the changing relationship between the Negro public and the police rather than to an actual increase in violative behavior. Negroes now seem more willing to report crimes against themselves.

There are a number of norms that govern the role of citizen as complainant. Beyond the fact that enforcement of the law is defined primarily as a police and not a citizen responsibility, there are powerful norms governing the role of informants in our society. Norms about "squealing" and "minding ones own business" control the reporting of citizen information about violations.

There are also norms about "not getting involved with the law" and general citizen distrust of involvement with interrogation by lawyers or policemen.

Indeed, the integrity of private systems and relations among them may require that citizens withhold complaint. Such matters as the protection of individual integrity, family honor, or the opportunity to continue in business have priority in the American normative system over obligation to report violations or violators to the police. Finally, though we rely in our society on self-enforcement of conduct, the normative system works against reporting ones own violations. Though the police are charged with the detection of deviation, they are least likely to be sought out for confession of deviation. Deviation from the law may be acknowledged to the self, to the cleric, lawyer, friend or therapist, but not to the police.

The nature of violative activity markedly affects the way police organization can cope with it. The popular image of how one effectively deals with crimes is through detective work. Yet, in a very important sense, police work does not rest on solving crimes through an inductive process of investigation beginning with evidence that leads ultimately to a violator. Rather crimes are most often solved through a process of attaching persons known as violators to known violations.

Police work in response to citizen complaint most usually begins and concludes solely as an intelligence operation; no arrest is made. The intelligence fed into the police system is on a crime that has been committed with, in many cases, little or no information on who may have committed it. The problem

seemingly is one then, as the public says, of solving the crime. Though a majority of crimes must remain unsolved, for reasons under discussion here, even among those solved, only a minority can be said to be cleared through the inductive work of the detective division.

A majority of the cases that are cleared by arrest may be said to solve themselves in the sense that the violator is "known" to the complainant or to the police at the time the crime initially comes to the attention of the police. Whether or not the prosecutor and the courts will concur is another matter, but there is little doubt that the policeman operates in such situations by having a citizen sign a complaint, or by making an arrest. Evidence technicians and detectives may work on such cases, but their task is one of linking the enforcement to the prosecution and adjudication systems by providing evidence, not one of solving crimes.

Though good data are lacking on the matter, there is good reason to claim that the second largest proportion of all crimes cleared by arrest is "solved" by arresting otherwise known violators. The arrest of an individual for a crime often results in the "solution" of other crimes known to the police since a major element of police practice is to utilize the arrested person and knowledge of his current offense as a means of "clearing" other crimes. Such well known police practices as interrogating the suspect to obtain confession to other crimes and presenting him for identification in a show-up are standard practices for clearing unsolved crimes as are less well known ones such as charging the violator with unsolved crimes or simply assigning them to him

in the department's records on the basis of a modus operandi. It is not uncommon to find that an arrest carries with it the "solution" to half dozen other crimes, particularly for crimes of robbery and larceny.

One of the major problems for a modern metropolitan police force, as it centralizes command and control and draws its personnel away from operations that are based in local areas, is to maintain adequate intelligence on potential or known violators. There is good reason to conclude that the pattern of crimes solved by arrest changes with centralization of command and control since it compels the department to place greater reliance on formal intelligence systems and means of crime solution.

The enforcement of the law is not simply a matter of maintaining an intelligence system on crimes and criminals and allocating organizational resources for dealing with them in response to either citizen mobilization or police work. The organization of the larger society affects the organization of operating police units and their strategy and tactics in yet other ways.

Society is organized so as to make the detection of some violative behavior and the location of some violators more difficult than others. Consider just the matter of how residential organization can affect the policing of the public. A public housing project with buildings twenty stories high, each containing several hundred families, poses somewhat different problems of crime detection and arrest than policing of the same area when it consisted of tenement houses.

Apart from considerations of the territorial and corporate organization of a population, the legal norms and order exercise

an enormous impact on the exercise of coercive authority. A distinctive feature of modern liberal states is their use of the monopoly of violence to guarantee the boundaries of small, autonomous social systems like the private place and the citizen's right to privacy in public places. Police access to private places is guaranteed by the right of surveillance when there is reason to believe that a crime has been committed and entry, search of the person and of places, and seizure of evidence are warranted under legally specified conditions. The right of the citizen to privacy and the right of State access to private matters forms one of the principle dialectical concerns in the organization of modern States and their police systems.

The laws defining police access to private places have consequences for the organization of staff and line units in police departments and in the strategy and tactics they adopt. Stinchcombe emphasizes that the differential distribution of crimes in public and private places when coupled with the greater legal accessibility police have to public as over against private places, affects both the volume of police work and structural differentiation within the department.^{18/} He argues that police are organized through patrol to operate in public places and therefore act much more on their own initiative in them; entry into private places is generally only on complaint or warrant.^{19/} It is true, of course, that police are in a better position to make an "on view" arrest in a public than in a private place because of norms governing their access to private places. But it is also true that police are more likely to respond to complaints in both public and private places than

they are to make an on view arrest. This fact stems primarily from two conditions, the nature of occurrence of crime, and the allocation of limited organizational resources.

Whenever the nature of the crimes is such that the police cannot readily forecast a high probability of occurrence in a particular public or private location at a particular time, they must be organized primarily as a reactive organization. Many crimes in public as well as private places are of this form. These crimes are most likely to involve coercion in private life and disorders and nuisances in public places. Whether they are homicides, assaults, robberies, burglary, larceny, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, collective disturbances or traffic accidents, police must in the nature of the case be organized to react to the occurrence of the crime when they are not present, for there is in general low predictability of occurrence of these types of crime, given the resources in manpower available.

A major problem police face in norms governing access to private places is the limitation it places on proactive strategies and tactics. Vice provides an excellent example. It operates "in the open" if a police department does not adopt a proactive strategy, since citizens who participate in such activities are unlikely to sign complaints that constitute a legal case. When, however, a department "puts the heat on", vice can retreat into private places. This then necessitates an alteration in police tactics for dealing with vice. Progressively, as the legally acceptable means for access to these places become operationally difficult, the police resort to undercover roles or to tactics designed to control public aspects of vice, e.g., harassment.

Police organization and work moreover is affected to a substantial degree by the ways in which the violation is socially organized. To oversimplify, we may say that the more organized the violative activity, the less effective police are in dealing with the violation. Modern metropolitan police departments are perhaps least effective in dealing with organized crime. The literature on police work and the public press emphasizes that this is largely a consequence of the territorial limitations on operations of a metropolitan police force. By simple deduction, it is assumed that a police force coextensive with the organized activity would "solve" the problem of organized crime. Stinchcombe argues that it is difficult to deal with illegitimate businesses and dangerous organizations because of the barriers of privacy.^{20/}

Though there is merit in both arguments, they oversimplify the problem. While a national police force may well be more effective in coping with organized crime, the fact of the matter is that organized crime is more difficult to deal with precisely because it is highly organized. Similarly, while access to private places limits police effectiveness in dealing with organized crime, even when access is gained, through warrant or other means, it generally fails because of the difficulty in attacking the higher echelon organization. Operations in private places may be closed only to reopen elsewhere or take to operating in public places since the criminal organization adapts its strategy and tactics to those of the police. For the intelligence and operating units of the police, one has the counter intelligence units of organized crimes.

We have noted that the more formally organized the criminal activity, the less effective police are in dealing with it. To this we should add that at the opposite extreme, the absence of informal organization of criminal activity, in at least its social patterning, also contributes to the problem of policing. The police are organized principally to respond to stimuli generated by citizen complaint and for surveillance in public places. Furthermore, many of their standard investigative techniques, e.g., informants and modus operandi files, presuppose an "underworld"--a loosely organized community of persons more or less habitually involved in committing crimes.

Police administrators face a major policy question of how available resources are to be allocated to inputs into the department and their processing within the department. Mention has been made of the fact that these problems place limits on the allocation of manpower to situations where crimes may occur and dictate a primarily reactive strategy even for occurrences in public places. The technology of policing now makes possible the mobilization of men to react quickly over relatively long distances so that where possible even foot patrol gives way to mobile patrol. Some police departments organize tactical units to deal with large public assemblies as they occur at various places and times, but on the whole most public as private places do not have police on duty. Most places of business, for example, are left without police on duty as are most public streets; rather, mobile units are assigned to territories to respond to situations requiring police as they arise in public or private places.

Similarly, in the organization's processing of information on crimes, the department faces an enormous problem of allocating scarce resources. A police department must on any day turn out a volume equivalent on the average to its intake. This means that on the average it cannot afford to allocate resources to very many cases on other than a routine basis. Every department will alter assignments within a detective bureau for a particularly "big case" that public pressure presses for solution. But, it cannot afford to so assign men for too long a period of time or for very many cases without leaving much other work undone.

While this is not the place to go into the matter, quite clearly both the volume of crime known to the police and the proportion cleared by arrest is some function of how much resources it takes to gain knowledge of a particular crime and clear it by arrest. No department can exceed its resource capacity. Since beyond a certain point, the amount of resource necessary to clear a crime exceeds the willingness of the society to allocate additional resources, it perhaps is not surprising that three out of all four crimes known to the police will in the nature of the case remain unsolved. One caveat, of course, must be entered to any such statement. There undoubtedly are, in the nature of the case, a large number of crimes that will remain unsolved regardless of the resources allocated to their solution since the information required to solve them never can become available in the police system. No police department can know more crime than its resources make possible for it to know in that given period of time nor solve more than its resources make possible. From a social organization point of view, the crime in any social system is a function of organizational capabilities to know it.

The heavily reactive nature of police operations not only means that the client-complainant system defines the conditions under which police are called at all, but also that the private system that includes the complainant, and in many cases also the offender, dominates the social stage upon which police intervention takes place. The police must react to calls for service by going out into every conceivable kind of social situation. Unlike many modern bureaucratic professions, the police must develop techniques for structuring these social situations over which ordinarily they have little control. The basic tactic for doing so is to "take charge", if only to freeze the situation before any escalation of the offense can occur or evidence of it can be altered. The basic instrument in this strategy is authority. Failing its effectiveness, the basic backstop is force.

Uncoerced responsiveness to police authority in the immediate situation, i.e., respect--uncoerced in the immediate situation at least--is the most valuable resource available to the police. Much excessive police coercion can be attributed either to the perception that respect must be reestablished in a situation where it has broken down or to building up future respect credits in populations where police expect disrespect as a routine matter.^{21/}

Citizen respect for police authority in this context corresponds to the patient's respect for medical competence in the doctor-patient relationship. Unlike medical practice in modern clinics and hospitals, however, many clients of the police on call are not preprocessed by the routines of admission or readmission; nor are the clients always ill in the sense that they are aware of need and dependent upon the physician. Perhaps the

proclivity of the police to prefer to deal with persons who have a prior arrest record arises from the fact that they are pre-processed. The use of force by the policeman in a sense is an attempt to create in his clients, usually in offenders, but sometimes also in complainants, the same capacity for subservience that the physician can count on due to illness on the one hand and office or hospital routines on the other.

We can discern here one of the fundamental sources of misunderstanding between police and rehabilitation personnel in the system for administering criminal justice. The police are the preprocessing agency that not only enforces the basic transition from independence to subservience but also deliver the newly processed clients to a social setting already dominated by rehabilitation.

Civil Accountability, Command, and Control

To our knowledge there is no detailed description of the nature of command processes in a police department. It is necessary therefore to rely largely on published discourses that give information on the rhetoric of command and control and that are of variable and unknown validity as descriptions of behavior.^{22/}

Police literature emphasizes the quasi-military nature of police command relations and casual observation in metropolitan police departments indicates that police officials are highly sensitive to "orders from above" and to probabilities of official disapproval of behavior. In principle and in rhetoric, a police organization is one characterized by strict subordination, by a rigid chain of command, and more doubtfully, by a lack of formal provision for consultation between ranks.

Before accepting this description of its structure uncritically, it is necessary to say that such statements are meaningful only by comparison. We have relatively little data comparing the operating as opposed to the rhetorical nature of command in different types of organizations. In many ways, policing is a highly decentralized operation involving the deployment of large numbers of men alone or in small units where control by actual command, i.e., by issuing orders, is difficult. Furthermore, evidence from the police literature itself suggests that the description is overdrawn, that both internal and external transactions structure the effective range of command and control. Moreover, as J. Q. Wilson points out, it seems quite clear that the variations between "system oriented" as opposed to "professionalized" departments includes fundamental differences in styles of control.^{23/}

In large police departments, the chief's power to command and control is limited by a complex system of "due process" that protects subordinates. This, of course, is true of all civil service organizations. The strong interest in keeping the police "out of politics" coupled with the interest of the rank and file in job security, however, creates a situation where formally at least the department head must contend with legally empowered authorities in the selection, promotion, and discharge of personnel. Even in matters of internal assignment and definition of task decisions may impinge on the civil service classification system. Police employee organizations likewise are quite effective in seeing to it that the system of "due process" continues to protect them. Likewise, the individual officer when accused of wrong doing or a

crime demands all the safeguards of due process, the very safeguards he may deny to those whom he accuses of committing a crime.

The police literature stresses command as the basis of control. Historical changes in the nature of police work and organization have increased the importance of more subtle and perhaps more important developments in methods of control, however. In the dialectic of dispersion versus centralization of command, every development in the technology for police control of the population is accompanied by changes in the capacity of the organization to control its members.

Originally the bell or rattle watches were limited in summoning help to the effective range of their "noise"; the addition of "calling the hours" served to monitor the behavior of the patrol (quite generally open to question). Here we see evidence of a classic and continuing dilemma in organizations--that to control subordinates, they must be required to make themselves visible. For the police, this means that when they become visible, they likewise become more calculable to potential violators. Control of the dispersed police was really difficult before the call box that simultaneously enabled patrolmen to summon help and enabled commanders to issue calls and require periodic reporting. The cruising car with two-way (now often three-way) radio enabled still greater dispersion and flexibility in the allocation of patrols while at the same time bringing the patrolman or team more nearly within the range of constant control. It is now a fundamental duty of the radio patrol officer to remain "in contact", i.e., controllable.

More important, perhaps, is the fact that radio communication coupled with the central complaint board makes it possible for top management to have independent knowledge of complaints and who is assigned to them before the patrolman or patrol team does. At least a minimum of centralized control then is available not by the direct issuance of commands from superior to subordinate but by means of a paper-matching process whereby the complaint board's written record can be matched with the written record the patrolman is required to generate. This pattern of control by centralized communication and internal organizational audit is highly dependent upon the distribution of telephones in the population. The citizen's telephone enables the police commander to enlist the complaint on a routine basis as part of the apparatus for control of the policeman. A citizen's opportunity to mobilize the police is intricately balanced with that of the commander.

Not all police operations are constituted in the fashion of this highly oversimplified picture of so-called routine patrol. Detectives, for example, are less subject to such control. But these considerations of due process bars to centralized command and historical changes in control procedures that rely less on command as a form of control while facilitating the dispersion of control, are intended to raise questions about the sociological meaning of the stress on command and to lay the ground for a somewhat more systematic analysis of it.

Forms of Legitimation

Thus far, "command" has been used in two senses. In one sense, "command" refers to a technique of control in organizations

that consists of "giving commands". The directive communication between superior and subordinate may be called "a command", or, if more impersonally clothed, "an order". In another sense, however, command means neither a specific technique of control nor an instance of its use, but something more general--a principle that legitimates orders, instructions, or rules. Orders then are obeyed because they are "commanded".

Sociologists are familiar, of course, with discussions of this type ever since Weber.^{24/} In Weberian terms the police department "as an order" is legitimated by the principle of command. Each form of legitimation, however, as Weber so clearly saw, has a correlative requirement of "attitude" on the part of those subject to its sway. In the case of "an order" legitimated by a rhetoric of command, the correlative expectation is "obedience"-- again not as a situational expectation in the case of a given specific command but as a principle relating member to organization. To be "obedient" in this sense carries the same general sense of principle as in the "poverty, chastity and obedience" of the monk's vow. In a system so legitimated, we can expect that commitment to obedience will be displayed as a sign of membership.

It is not surprising, then, that social scientists who are based in organizations where independence is legitimated, rehabilitation workers based in those where professional discretion is legitimated and police who are based in organizations where obedience is legitimated so often fail to communicate with one another when they are engaged in exchanges of ideologies. It is also no wonder that social scientists and rehabilitation workers

therefore find the police hierarchically oriented.

We may point out as well that in orders legitimated by command and exacting obedience, the classic status reward is "honor". The morale and public relations problems of the American police can be more clearly understood as an attempt to substitute public prestige sought in an occupational performance market for the Weberian status regard sought and validated in the "honor market". The American police are denied both, for the public seems unwilling to accord the police status either in the European sense of status honor as representatives of the State or in the more typically American sense of prestige based on a claim to occupational competence.

Command as a basis for legitimacy can be located under any of the three basic types of legitimation discussed by Weber--the rational-legal, the traditional and the charismatic. Inherently, however, command as a principle focuses on the commander, and the exact nature of the concrete "order" legitimated by the principle of command will depend on the role of the specific commander. Because of this commander focus, the command principle is likely to lead to a mystique of the personal commander and an organizational stress on legitimating specific orders or even general rules as emanating from him.

If the principle of command can vary as a function of the situation of the commander, then it is to the role of the commander that we must attend. In the case of the American municipality, police chiefs, at least traditionally, both at law and in practice, are politically accountable officials who ordinarily stand or fall with the fortunes of their civilian superiors (who are lodged in external systems). Given the often controversial nature of

police work, and the often "irrational" and unpredictable nature of political fortunes in municipal government, the American police chief who is responsible to a politically elected official comes close to the position of a "patrimonial bureaucrat" in Weber's terms. His tenure as chief, though not necessarily his tenure in the department, depends on continuing acceptability to the elected official (s).

The relations of police commanders to civil superiors are actually more varied and complex than that depicted above. We shall discuss briefly only the two most important dimensions of variation, the security of tenure of the Chief Commander and the degree to which he is held strictly accountable by a mayor. Given strict accountability plus insecurity of tenure, we can expect a kind of obsession with command and a seemingly "irrational" emphasis on the twinned symbols of the visibility of the commander and the obedience of the force. Some of the rhetoric of command in the police literature likely arises from an attempt to "protect" the chief by the compulsive effort to "overcontrol" subordinates, almost any of whom can get him fired. This amounts to saying that as civil superiors increase the formal accountability of the police chief without changing the tenure features of the role, the increasing bureaucratization of the police stressed by J. Q. Wilson leads to the development of an organization animated by a principle of the commanding person.^{25/} This "personalized subordination" to the Hero Chief can become an operating, if not a formal, principle of organization.

Increased professionalization can be another accommodative strategy in such a situation, but this time aimed not at control

of the Mayor by changing the grounds of accountability. One of the first jobs of the "professionalizing" police chief often is to convince his civil superior that "you can't win 'em all" and that it is irrational and "unprofessional" to dismiss a police chief or commissioner because of failure to solve some particular crime. Perhaps in the long run it is hard to have a professionalized police without a professionalized Mayor. Perhaps also this would lead us to expect different kinds of command styles where a professional city manager intervenes between the chief and the Mayor.

If the civil superior, for whatever reason, does not demand accountability from the chief, the quasi-formalized obsession with "command" as a principle of control may be replaced by a complex system of feudal loyalties. In this situation ties of personal political fealty between chief and Mayor--or between chief and the local "powers"--may become prominent and "keep your nose clean" the principle of subordination. When this trend goes beyond a certain point, the department is commonly described as politically corrupt. Finally, to the degree that the chief is secure in his tenure, we would expect the obsession with command and the emphasis on personalized subordination to decrease.

On the basis of this analysis of Command and the Role of the Chief we may distinguish the following four types of departments:

Relation to Mayor	Tenure of Chief	
	Secure	Insecure
Strictly Accountable	Command Bureaucracy	Personalized Command Bureaucracy
Feudal Allegiance	Command Feudality	Personalized "political"feudality

We have consciously chosen words such as "feudality" with outrageously large quotas of surplus meaning since the concern here is to direct attention to features of police organization that receive relatively little attention and to questions of fundamental differences in the consequences of organizational membership between police and other organizations.^{26/} Command, obedience, and honor ring strangely in analysis of organizational life in America, except, perhaps, for the military. Yet it seems to us that meaningful analysis of the police must touch upon them as well as upon duty and courage. The self-image of the police is different because of them. Finally, it is our judgment that some such analysis as this will permit sociologists to analyze implications of variations in the formal control of the police by civil authorities in different cities.

A word about two of these types seems in order. The command feudality type seems a contradiction in terms (and indeed derives from the cross-classification itself). Some small municipal and sheriff's departments where the tenure of the chief in the local "feudal" political structure is secure, may fall here. Because everyone is secure in a relatively nonbureaucratic system, the operating principle of subordination can be command. Such an arrangement possibly characterizes the exceptionally long-tenure chiefs discovered in Lunden's study in Iowa.^{27/}

The "personalized command bureaucracy" seems likely to occur where an insecure reform head is in office. To successfully reform he must bureaucratize and rationalize administrative operations. To do this against the inevitable internal resistance he must emphasize the principle of command. To make clear that status quo

oriented commanders have been superseded he must emphasize his command and his capacity to command. In short, he must exercise what Selznick defines as one of the crucial functions of leadership in administration. He must define the emerging character of the institution.^{28/} Perhaps to cynical ears both in and out of the police this sounds odd. It would certainly be embarrassing to the men concerned. Yet, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the fortunes of the American municipal police depend not only on the use of computer technology but on the personal "charisma" of police chiefs.

Conclusion

We have attempted to present a perspective on the metropolitan police that emphasizes the consequences of the external environment on police organization and operations. Such sociological study of the police may be of strategic value both for the sociology of law and of formal organizations. The police provide an unusual opportunity to develop and apply a transaction view of organizations since on the one hand police departments have clearly defined boundaries, and yet, on the other, they must continually engage in the management of highly contingent relationships that arise outside them. At the same time, an organizational perspective that views the legal system in terms of transactions among organized subsystems that include the police rather than mere formal imposition may make for a more viable sociology of law.

Our presentation concentrates heavily on a few broad environmental features and traces their significance for police operations. Inevitably important areas have been scanted. Among those on which

we would hope to concentrate more fully are those environmental features that affect the social sources and orientations of police personnel, the changing technologies of communication and intelligence, the increasing development and application of rational planning, and indeed, the potential impact of sociology itself on police organization and behavior. The rationalization of police systems together with an increased emphasis on professional competence provides opportunities for research on social organization and social order.

FOOTNOTES

1. We attempt to make explicit what is often left implicit in research programs--the generalized "image" out of which more specific work flows. See for example Daniel Glaser, "Criminality Theories and Behavioral Images," American Journal of Sociology, 61 (March, 1951), pp. 433-444.
2. Something like police can occur in societies that would ordinarily not be termed legally organized. See Richard D. Schwartz and James C. Miller, "Legal Evolution and Societal Complexity," American Journal of Sociology, LXX (September, 1965), pp. 159-169.
3. Except for the government component, the division follows closely that proposed by Roscoe Pound who also discusses the confusions centering around the various uses of the terms "law" and "legal". Roscoe Pound, "The Sociology of Law," in Georges Gurwitsch and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., Twentieth Century Sociology, New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945.
4. See the somewhat outraged treatment in Donal E. J. MacNamara, "American Police Administration at Mid-Century," Public Administration Review, X (Summer, 1950), pp. 181-189.
5. For a jurisprudential discussion of the significance of private ordering with a sociological case, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, Cambridge, Mass.: (tentative edition, mimeo) 1958, Chapter 1.
6. Or, indeed, the decision to be sticky about formal contractual provisions in business dealings. Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study," American Sociological Review, (February, 1963), pp. 55-59.
7. See the discussion of commonweal organizations in Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962, p. 54.
8. There is a considerable Law Review literature on police discretion and what we have termed private arrangements involving the police. Most useful for the sociologists is the work of LaFave. Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect Into Custody, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965. Also, Wayne R. LaFave, "The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law - Part I," Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1962, No. I

(January), pp. 104-137 and "The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law - Part II," Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 1962, No. 2 (March), pp. 179-239. See also Joseph Goldstein, "Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 69, No. 543 (1960), pp. 543-594, and Edward L. Barrett, Jr., "Police Practices and the Law - From Arrest to Release or Charge," California Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March, 1962), pp. 11-55.

9. Informal practice in the police area may often be highly "formalized". Indeed it may even be written down. Formal, written department policy and procedure may be considered "informal" with respect to "the law". Operating norms at all levels in police organizations may differ from either the law or department written rules. One of the more puzzling aspects of the control of police by the courts is the fact that the courts rarely take "judicial notice" of written police department rules and decide cases as though the individual policeman were a free agent. See the comparison of court rulings and police manuals in Goldstein, op. cit.
10. T. H. Marshall proposes a historical scheme from which much of the above has been drawn. He argues that the lower classes were first the recipients of civil legal status and then later welfare or social rights as adjuncts of citizenship. In the United States, at least, one can argue that large segments of the population had access to unemployment and old age insurance before developing any meaningful access to civil legality. This is true even in the formal sense for Negroes in the South, for example. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.
11. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports - 1963, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, Table 8, p. 93ff. A total clearance rate of 25.1% is reported for eight major crimes. Clearance rates varied from 91% for murder to 21% for larceny. Ibid., p. 21.
12. Compare Banton's analysis of the degree to which the police in Scotland justify themselves by simply existing as symbols or order. Michael Banton, The Policeman in the Community, London: Tavistock Publications, 1964.
13. Federal Bureau of Investigation, op. cit., p. 47. These three offenses accounted for 7.6% of the total number of Index crimes reported for 1963. The Index crimes are all major crimes. The annual report of any large city department will show that these "public outcry" offenses are quantitatively a much smaller proportion of all crimes known to the police.

14. See the sources cited in footnote 8, supra.
15. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "The Control of Citizen Resentment in Police Work," unpublished paper, no date.
16. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. (1963: Excobedo v. Illinois, 84 U. S. 1758 (1964).
17. As Skolnick notes, there are those violative acts where the individual citizen is directly offended; there is a crime against him as a private individual, or against his property. And, there are those violative acts where the citizen is involved only in the collective sense; there is some threat to the social order as defined by the legal norms. See Jerome Skolnick and J. Richard Woodworth, "Police, Suspects and Prosecutors", Paper read at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Los Angeles, California, September 2, 1963.
18. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Institutions of Privacy in the Determination of Police Administrative Practice," American Journal of Sociology, LXIX (September, 1963), p. 158.
19. Ibid., p. 152.
20. Ibid., p. 155.
21. William A. Westley, "Violence and the Police," American Journal of Sociology, 49 (August, 1953), pp. 34-41.
22. See for example, Bruce Smith, Police Systems in the United States, second revised edition, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960, esp. Chs. 7-9.
23. James Q. Wilson, "The Police and Their Problems: A Theory," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds., Public Policy, XII (1963), pp. 189-216.
24. Talcott Parsons, ed., Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 324 ff.
25. James Q. Wilson, "The Police and Their Problems," op. cit.

26. This discussion of command and control owes much to the analysis of labor unions in Harold L. Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956.
27. Walter A. Lunden, "The Mobility of Chiefs of Police," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 49, 1958, 178-183.
28. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957.