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THE ORGANIZATION CHILD:

PSYCHIATION IN A NURSERY SCHOOL

Rosabeth Moss Kanter
Department of Sociology
The University of Michigan

ABSTRACT

Children in a setting which provides a phenomenological experience similar to that of a bureaucracy may become bureaucratic in their orientation to their social world. This is an example of a more general concept, "psychiation," or experience-management -- the psychological, emotional, and experiential potential of social organization patterns, characterized in terms of their phenomenological impact.

The nursery school studied exists in a bureaucratic society in which neo-Freudian ideology guides child-rearing and, in fact, supports bureaucratic psychiation patterns. As a consequence of this, the structure and practices of the school are organized around "trauma reduction," an attempt to eliminate psychological irrationality through environmental control. Trauma reduction mechanisms limit uncertainty, strangeness, mystery, coercion, guilt, unpleasantness, and peer conflict; only a rational, routinized kind of experience is available.

The child found in such an organization behaves in a manner strikingly similar to adult "organization men." He is oriented toward reality, especially that of the organization; his play is highly routinized; he has little personal responsibility; and he develops manipulative techniques for the maintenance of ascendancy, including conversion, games of one-upmanship, and exploitation of democratic norms.

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PREFACE

This paper reports the results of six months of partici-pant-observation of a nursery school in an American university community, during the academic year 1964-65. The 62 children in the school came primarily from university and professional families; they are largely upper-middle class. The school was formally nondenominational but celebrated the Jewish holidays. Preference for admission was given to members of a local synagogue; only one of the teachers was Jewish, however.

The nursery school was divided into three classes accord-ing to age and time of attendance:

1. morning three-year-olds, Tuesday-Thursday, 18 children.

2. morning four-year-olds, Monday-Wednesday-Friday, 22 children.

3. afternoon four-year-olds, Monday-Wednesday-Friday, 22 children.

The morning classes were conducted by a professional teacher, a professional assistant, and, occasionally, student assistants from near-by universities. The afternoon class was run by a professional teacher and two student assistants.

Excerpts from field notes to appear in this report will be designated by class time and age (a.m. and p.m., three's and four's).

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF PSYCHIATION

This paper deals with social organization in its relation to personal experience--the emotional, psychological, and symbolizing nature of man; social organization as it manages experience. This is a somewhat neglected area of analysis. Often, the relationship between social organization and the individual is viewed as that of a formal system and a functional role, with the person resurrected as a psychological being only when it becomes necessary to explain deviations from the model. But individuals are not involved in social systems only as roles; they are also involved as "whole persons." Selznick indicated this in a theory of organizations:

> From the standpoint of organization as a formal system, persons are viewed functionally, in respect to their roles, as participants in assigned segments of the cooperative system. But in fact individuals have a propensity to resist depersonalization, to spill over the boundaries of their segmentary roles, to participate as wholes. The formal systems cannot take account of the deviations thus introduced, and consequently break down as instruments of control when relied on alone. The whole individual raises new problems for the organization, partly because of the needs of his own personality, partly because he brings with him a set of established habits....[1]

If the whole person must be brought back into sociology, then we should have theories about the relevant intersections of social organization and psyche, making assumptions about man's psychological involvement in the social world.

According to at least two sociologists, this is inevitable.
Inkeles writes,

> I would assert that very little sociological
> analysis is ever done without using at least an
> implicit psychological theory.[2]

And Wrong:

> ...I do not see how, at the level of theory,
> sociologists can fail to make assumptions about
> human nature. If our assumptions are left
> implicit, we will inevitably presuppose a view
> of man that is tailor-made to our special needs...[3]

If, then, some view of man is embodied in sociological
theory, it then becomes very important to ask about the ways
in which man's psyche is involved in social organization.
And it is possible to do this not on the level of individuals,
not analyzing personalities, but on the level of social organ-
ization itself. This paper proposes a concept by which this
may be done. It is an orientation to organizational analysis
which specifically asks how a system takes account of "human
nature" as it sees it, how a system shapes individual exper-
ience for its ends, and what impact this has on orientations
of individuals in the system. The concept is called "psychia-
tion." It refers, first of all, to aspects of organizational
structure which correspond to the phenomenological world of
the individual, his possible experience. It refers to the
mechanisms by which organizations potentially limit and con-
trol emotional or experiential variability in members. It
refers, finally, to the opportunities and limitations for
the emotional experience of individuals provided by social
structures. "Psychiation" implies the symbolic, emotional, or

experiential aspects of interaction patterns. It resurrects
the person in social organization.

Psychiation may be seen as the social organization of
personal experience. That is, particular kinds of phenomeno-
logical views are possible in particular social situations;
the psychiation question asks, first, about those aspects of
the situation corresponding to possibilities for individual
orientations and, secondly, about the behavioral or social
consequences of those orientational possibilities. One looks
for the experiential dimension of interaction patterns: the
emotions or experiences they might promote and those they might
preclude. One can then ask why the social system promotes and
excludes certain experiences and what the consequences of this
process of psychiation are.

Viewed in this way, we can see that sociological analysis
of psychiation content, although not particularly explicit,
is also not particularly new. Durkheim, first of all, can be
seen as employing this orientation in his analysis of suicide.[4]
The Durkheimian question might be phrased, "What social
patterns shape the phenomenological world of individuals so
as to dispose them to suicide?" In my terms, what are the
social patterns potentially corresponding to emotional states,
with the outcome of suicide? Or, in short, what psychiation
patterns correspond to high suicide rates? In particular,
anomy, the lack of social regulation of "normlessness," appears
to provide the opportunity for a wide range of emotional
experience of a thrill-seeking type and limit the possibilities

for other emotional experiences, such as security. Durkheim
writes of the "unleashing of passions" in societies character-
ized by anomy:

> From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is
> aroused without knowing where to find ultimate
> foothold...A thirst arises for novelties, un-
> familiar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of
> which lose their savor once known...[5]

Subsequent authors have brought anomy even closer to a
psychiation variable. Whereas Durkheim was primarily classify-
ing types of suicides, other writers have handled anomy in
terms of a type of social organization. Thus, because of the
opportunities and limitations for experience in a particular
type of social structure, many outcomes result, in addition to
suicide. Merton's articles on social structure and anomie[6]
are a good example. This is the intent of the concept of
psychiation--to characterize social structures in terms of
their potential for emotional or psychological experience.

Simmel, too, points the way toward a psychiation orienta-
tion:

> The objective structure of a society provides a
> framework within which an individual's non-
> interchangeable and singular characteristics will
> develop and find expression, depending on the
> greater or lesser possibilities which the structure
> allows.[7]

Simmel's essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life"[8] is a good
example of this analysis. He cites specialization, differen-
tiation, and impersonality in the city (what he calls "brevity
and scarcity of inter-human contacts") as having certain
psychological consequences. Again, subsequent authors have
furthered a psychiation analysis of the city and, in even

larger volume, mass society. The book Identity and Anxiety, edited by Stein, Vidich, and White,[9] is a good example. The theme running through the book is that on the one hand mass society provides so much opportunity for experience and so little limiting of human variability, that people have difficulty anchoring their identity within it. On the other hand, mass society limits the opportunities for certain kinds of emotional experience so drastically (e.g., love, compassion, etc.) that so-called human identity is not possible. Much analysis of mass society, in fact, has psychiation notions buried in it somewhere, in the emphasis on structural elements which have some implied impact on the phenomenological world of the individual, e.g., Simmel's "specialization, differentiation, and impersonality."[10]

Yet, it has never been made explicit that these writings (and others of the same sort) were actually analyzing psychiation, or that there even is such a way of linking social organization and the individual. This orientation appeared on only two kinds of occasions: when some more-or-less apparent connection existed between social structure and individual phenomenological experience (as in the case of crowds, religious movements, etc.) or when social problems involving individual psyches were under consideration (as in suicide, mental health in mass society, etc.). But these seem to be the manifest examples of a relationship of a more general type: that every social structure has psychiation patterns, offering opportunities for and imposing limitations on the

individual's possible emotional experience. In addition, some organizations seem to be explicitly designed for psychiation: mental institutions can be viewed in terms of this goal. The explicit concept of psychiation permits us to analyze this more general relationship; it opens new areas for sociological inquiry. For example, in addition to specifying the psychiation dimensions of social organization, it might even be possible to propose and construct a "sociology of the emotions," linking them to organizational psychiation patterns.

Psychiation patterns may be established deliberately, for a social system's psychological purposes, or they may be a latent consequence of other processes, as in the case of Durkheim's analysis of suicide. In cases in which psychiation is relatively deliberate, it is based upon some more or less explicit ideology about the nature of man--a theory of psychological functioning, for example. The ideology can serve as a guide for those establishing psychiation patterns: "The best way to handle children is..."; "People are better off when they are..."; "People should be made to feel...." Or, on the other hand, ideology can serve to justify existing arrangements: "Man is really like that"; "This is in his own best interests"; "You can't change human nature." The agents, of course, do not realize that they are organizing the world so as to prove a self-fulfilling prophecy--believing people are oriented a certain way, they provide experiences which themselves promote that orientation.

The place of psychiation in a social system may be illus-
trated in the following fashion:

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ DOMINANT SOCIAL──→ PSYCHIATION PATTERNS──→ ADAPTATION psycho- │
│ PATTERNS with      promotes certain        logical varia-    │
│ desired and un-    experiences and emo-    bility limited;   │
│ desired psycho-    tions; excludes         orientations in   │
│ logical orienta-   others                  terms of dominant │
│ tions                            ↗         social patterns   │
│   ┆              - - - Justifies,                            │
│   ↓          - -       supports,                             │
│ PSYCHIATION            and guides                            │
│ IDEOLOGY "the                                                │
│ nature of man"                                               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Psychiation is one link between social structure and individual
behavior.

I was led to develop this concept through this nursery
school study. Traditional strategies of organizational analysis
did not handle the observed phenomena adequately. The only
discernable goal of the school was a psychiation one: to control
the phenomenological world of the child. This was attempted
through particular social arrangements. The arrangements then
offered opportunities for particular kinds of orientations on
the part of the children and limitations on others.

The nursery school is primarily a psychiation organization.
I propose that the dominant social pattern in American society
is the large-scale formal organization that the psychiation
goal in such a society is eliminating irrational emotion, that
the ideology is primarily a neo-Freudian ethic[11] (defining
irrationality as anxiety), that the psychiation process is
primarily one of trauma reduction (the attempted removal of
anxiety-producing features of the social structures), and that

the result of this process may be termed the Organization

Child, because of what appears to be a remarkable adapta-

tion to bureaucracy. Thus:

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Dominant social ────→ Psychiation mech- ──→ Adaptive pattern:
pattern:  ORGAN-       anism:  TRAUMA         THE ORGANIZATION
IZATIONAL SOCIETY      REDUCTION              CHILD
psychiation goal:                 ↗
eliminate irra-              ──  ─
tional emotion        ── Justifies,
      │              ─   supports,
      │                  and guides
      ↓
Ideology:  THE
FREUDIAN ETHIC
irrationality
defined as
anxiety
```

This particular view of the nursery school is justified

by several striking features of the organization, which cannot

be explained by the use of a more conventional model. First,

the goal of the nursery school, as stated by the teachers and

echoed in remarks of parents, is to promote the healthy psycho-

logical development of the child. "Teaching" was minimal or

non-existent; there were few specific task goals for the

children. In fact, the morning teacher was replaced at the

end of the year because the school board and parents felt that

she was too "task-oriented"--she attempted to teach the children

specific things. This goal of psychological health can be seen

as a psychiation goal, since it is directed toward producing

and reinforcing the proper (i.e., "healthy") set of emotional

responses. Behaviorally, on the other hand, the goals of the

nursery school were minimal; there were few behavioral demands

made on the children. It was felt that if they were provided

with the right experiences, socially appropriate behavior
would follow. This is not to say that psychiation--the
structuring of experience--is identical with socialization,
however. On the contrary, the psychiation goal of psychologi-
cal health often directly opposed any socialization goals.
The teachers sometimes felt that to attempt to change a
child's behavior would interfere with the promotion of desired
emotional responses, disrupting psychological equilibrium.
Secondly, the organization's view of psychological develop-
ment was neo-Freudian. The child is seen as waging an
inevitable battle with a suppressing, disturbing environment.
Certain events or aspects of the environment are traumatic--
anxiety producing. And anxiety is the key to mental distur-
bance. Thus, to promote psychological health, the nursery
school sought, in these terms, to "reduce trauma" via the
practices and structural features instituted. Thirdly, the
kinds of psychiation or trauma reduction mechanisms present
in the nursery school closely resembled certain features of
bureaucracy. (In fact, the bureaucratic patterns could also
be justified on the basis of trauma reduction.) Further,
they resulted in a particular kind of response in the child.
His adaptive pattern bore some remarkable similarities and
analogies to the patterns of adults in bureaucratic settings
and in a bureaucratic society. Hence the name "Organization
Child."

Two questions emerge from this: 1. Why should psycho-
logical health be defined largely as adjustment or the

absence of anxiety?   2. Why should the nursery school and the
child bear similarities to bureaucracy and bureaucrats?

These questions can be answered by considering the social
context for the nursery school. The school can be considered
a psychiation agent, attempting to shape the child's phenomeno-
logical world to correspond to a rational bureaucratic society,
in which anxiety is irrational and disruptive. The neo-
Freudian ethic supports both bureaucratic psychiation patterns
and the view that these kinds of patterns in organizations
dealing with children are conducive to psychological health.
The ideology upon which the nursery school is based, then,
justifies practices assumed to limit anxiety but actually
accustoming the child to interaction patterns in organizational
society, so that he becomes an Organization Child, his behavior
attuned to bureaucracy. Whether or not anxiety is actually
limited, whether trauma is actually reduced from the environ-
ment, in fact, whether or not there actually are traumatic
events, are all practically irrelevant to this nursery school's
social functions.

These relationships will be spelled out in detail in the
rest of this paper. First, the larger social context of
the nursery school--the organizational society--will be exam-
ined briefly through the literature, with an attempt to show
the particularly good "fit" of neo-Freudian ideology with
patterns of bureaucracy. Then, in greater detail, the data
collected at the nursery school will be systematically
examined: first, the psychiation process of trauma reduction,

which serves to explain the structure and practices of the
organization; and then, the dominant pattern of orientation
to such an organization, the various aspects of the Organiza-
tion Child.   Trauma reduction acts as a psychiation mechanism
intervening between large formal organizations and new organ-
ization men.   It is therefore not surprising that children in
a setting with phenomenological similarities to "bureaucracies"
should develop bureaucrat-like orientations.

II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE FREUDIAN ETHIC

Many observers have noted that we live in an organization-al or bureaucratic society. Presthus, for example, in a book entitled The Organizational Society, documents the trend toward large-scale formal organizations in every aspect of American life.[12]

> Beginning about 1875, social, economic, and political trends in the United States prepared the way for the "organizational society," characterized by large-scale bureaucratic institutions in practically every major social area. The major trends included the separation of ownership from management; increasing size and concentration in business, industry, and even eleemosynary fields; the decline of competition; the development of a political economy; and the emergence of an employee society.[13]

Indeed, the fact of the existence of nursery schools themselves can be viewed in terms of this trend. The nursery school is a comparatively recent development; today, even the play of young children occurs in formal organizations.

Associated with this trend toward large scale organizations has been a decline in entrepreneurial activity (Presthus speaks of the decline in competition) and a rise in bureaucratic patterns of behavior. Whereas entrepreneurial activity puts its stress on individualistic enterprise and achievement, bureaucratic behavior emphasizes getting along with others, adjusting, accommodating, and adapting to the demands of specialized roles in organizations. Whyte[14] defines a "social ethic" in contemporary society legitimating the accommodation of the individual to the organization.

Whyte delineates this accommodation in The Organization
Man, proposing that it is representative of the mainstream
of organization life in America.

> No generaltion has been so well equipped, psycho-
> logically as well as technically, to cope with
> the intricacies of vast organizations...[15]

Riesman[16] has noted a similar pattern in the American social
character: the other-directed man, who is more interested
in what others think of him, in how he fits in, then in meet-
ing inner achievement needs.

Along with changes in society toward bureaucracy as the
dominant social pattern and the bureaucrat as the dominant
social type concomitant changes in child-rearing have been
observed, away from strict independence demands at early ages
to more permissive, "love-oriented" techniques.[17, 18, 19]
Miller and Swanson[20] tie these changes to the bureaucratic
as opposed to the entrepreneurial orientations of parents.
In their study, entrepreneurs were defined as people holding
jobs affected by the risks of the market place, with an
individual's income dependent on enterprise and judgment.
Bureaucratic jobs, on the other hand, are characterized by
lack of control of the means of production, specialization,
wages or salary, and relative security. For the bureaucrat,
then, innovation, independence, and risk-taking are no
longer salient features of adult enterprise. Miller and
Swanson found significant differences in the child-rearing
practices of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, indicating
lowered achievement, independence, and self-reliance training

for the children of bureaucrats, as well as increased permissiveness. The expectations held for the child's adult roles help shape his training:

> The confident, smooth relations of the great organizations of which he must become a part will require him to get along well with other people and to take their feelings into account with skill and confidence.[21]

Adjustment and "belonging" rather than competition are stressed.

The changes noted in child-rearing have also been incorporated into the school system. Whyte documents this emphasis in the schools to which the Organization Man sends his children, for example. These schools are marked by a noticeably permissive atmosphere, stress on adjustment, reduction of academic competition, and a parental desire to have their children taught to be good citizens who will get along well with other people.[22]

Again, competition has declined. LaPiere[23] finds similar and even sharper trends in the progressive school movement, which began

> in a small and insidious way with the 1930's discovery that the public school system of America was inadvertantly subjecting the youth of America to the antiquated values and practices of interpersonal competition.[24]

LaPiere terms the ideology informing these changes the "Freudian ethic"--Freud and the neo-Freudians as they have been translated and popularized.[11] On the other hand, the changes in child-rearing are also associated, à la Miller and Swanson, with the movement toward an organizational society, an increasing bureaucratization. These two trends:

bureaucratization and popularization of Freud, provide the
dominant tone for concepts of psychological health. Are these
trends mutually reinforcing? That is, does neo-Freudian
ideology serve to justify and guide the spread of bureaucratic
psychiation?

On a conceptual level, some of the dominant psychological
themes in bureaucracy and in neo-Freudian ideology exhibit
interesting similarities.

In a general sense, the goal of mature human development
for Frued's transformers is rationality. Man is inherently
irrational, but through various growth processes he can come
to know and control his unconscious impulses. By striving to
achieve mastery over his own irrationality, he can achieve a
kind of rationality. Bureaucracy, in much the same way, can
be seen as seeking to overcome irrationality through a combina-
tion of knowing (i.e., becoming aware of recurrent problems
and providing institutionalized means for their resolution)
and self control. Bureaucracy, of course, has as its defining
characteristics its emphasis on rational control. Here is
found a rational-legalistic basis of power, specific assignment
of responsibility, investment of power in roles rather than
persons, reliance on formal rules and procedures, and the bas-
ing of decisions on scientific and therefore standardized
principles. While individual role incumbents certainly bring
with them personal, emotional, and irrational considerations,
the structural arrangements are such that they presumably
have little effect on routine functioning.[25] Thus, the central

goal for both a healthy man and a "healthy" organization is rationality or rational control.

Neo-Freudian ideology also shifts responsibility from the individual to society in many areas. The neo-Freudians translate the basic antagonism between man's natural impulses and the requirements of civilized life noted by Freud,[26] into the responsibility of society. It is society's duty to replace man's unconscious antisocial impulses (which are no fault of his own) with civilized social tendencies. There are no intentionally bad children, only bad socializing agents: "Society has failed the neurotic, never vice versa."[27] Fromm even proposes that we consider societies "sick," instead of the people in them.[28] Personal accountability is thereby diminished.

At the same time, bureaucracy shifts much responsibility from the individual to the organization. For example, it uses tests to assign people to offices, so that failure in role performance becomes attributable to a mistaken assignment by the organization rather than the personal fault of the individual. Bureaucracy takes a statistical view of failure—that there will be a certain percentage of imperfect goods manufactured, a certain turnover rate, etc.; this is seen in being inherent in the organization. Bureaucracy limits the individual's sphere of decision-making, so that he is responsible only in a very narrow area of competence. It limits his personal accountability by giving him rules and routines to follow; mistakes can be attributed to poor rules set down by

the organization or to the fact that the rules do not take
certain situations into account, and not to the individual.
He is left with the option of saying, "I was just doing what
you told me." Since the organization makes rules to cover
every envisioned situation, it is taking responsibility for
the person's behavior out of his hands. Thus, behavior is
a function of the organizational setting in which one works,
just as certain other kinds of psychological behavior are
explained by the culture and social structure into which one
is born. The individual cannot be held completely accountable.

LaPiere proposes that the "magic word" in the neo-
Freudian view of existence is "security."[29] Only with the
knowledge that his world will stay fairly constant and predict-
able can man function as a "calm, complacent adult."[30] This
is, of course, connected with the notion that tension reduc-
tion is the primary motive in behavior. At the same time,
bureaucracy, to secure rational control and reliability, is
built on security, fixity of procedure, and constancy of
stimuli and response. By such procedures as the regulariza-
tion of promotion, the instituting of tenure and seniority,
and generally fixed wages and salary unrelated to financial
fluctuations and only slightly related to individual perform-
ance, the organization eliminates sources of uncertainty and
inconstancy. There are few risks for individuals associated
with the organization; bureaucracies, as well as this ideology,
find security a positive goal.

The neo-Freudian ethic considers individualistic, achieve-
ment-oriented people psychologically abnormal. As LaPiere writes,

> To Marx men of enterprise are the villains of
> history, the capitalistic exploiters of the down-
> trodden, productive masses. To Freud, on the
> other hand, men of enterprise are neither heroes
> nor villains--they are neurotic.[31]

Bureaucracy, concurrently, tends to devalue men of individual-

istic enterprise. The stress for appropriate bureaucratic

behavior is on reliability, rather than innovation. The

organization wants personnel who will faithfully perform the

jobs given them in the tried-and-true way rather than chal-

lenge the established procedures. The organization cannot

afford risk-takers; the immediate costs might be too great.

Freud himself theorized that there should be a balance

between external control and freedom with regard to man's

impulse life and, hence, his behavior. He writes in New

Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,

> The child has to learn to control its instincts.
> To grant it complete freedom so that it obeys
> all its impulses without any restriction is im-
> possible. The function of education therefore
> is to inhibit, forbid, and suppress, and it has
> at all times carried out this function to admi-
> ration. But we have learned from analysis that
> it is the very suppression of instincts that
> involves the danger of neurotic illness. Educa-
> tion has therefore to stem its way between the
> Scylla of giving the instincts free play and the
> Charybdis of frustrating them.[32]

Large formal organizations also in a sense attempt a balance

between control and freedom. On the one hand, control over

the individual's impulsive behavior is secured by some of

the rational means outlined earlier, and especially by un-

certainty reduction, giving the individual a fixed set of

expectations for his behavior. That is, behavior is restricted

and channelled in various ways. On the other hand, the

individual is relatively free from coercion; his commitment to the organization is a calculative one, balancing the gains against what he must give up. As March and Simon point out, people will continue to participate in the organization only so long as the inducements offered them are as great or greater than the contribution they are asked to make.[33]

In neo-Freudian ideology, interpersonal conflict, especially competition and rivalry is at the root of many neurotic difficulties from the Oedipal rivalry on. In a general way bureaucracy, too, must negatively evaluate competition. For the smooth running of the organization, team work and loyalty to the organization are stressed above individual rivalry, with system rewards often replacing individual rewards.

What emerges as the central psychological problem for both the neo-Freudian ethic and for bureaucracy is control of anxiety, the height of human irrationality. Sullivan writes:

> I believe it fairly safe to say that anybody and everybody devotes much of his lifetime and a great deal of his energy...to avoiding more anxiety than he already has, and, if possible, to getting rid of some of this anxiety.[34]

Thus, in an organizational society subscribing to neo-Freudian thought, the major psychiation goal becomes control of anxiety. Since we have already noted conceptual similarities in the ideology and bureaucratic patterns, it is not surprising that central sources of trauma for the ideology are antitheses of bureaucratic forms. That is, those conditions considered primary well-springs of eliminated in bureaucracy are the ones anxiety. For example, uncertainty or lack of security is a

major trauma for neo-Freudian thinkers; uncertainty <u>reduction</u>
is a major feature of bureaucracy. Following this reasoning,
we see that organizational rationalization is presumed to
make man more rational--both more mature and less anxiety-
prone. Therefore, adherence to a psychiation goal of trauma
reduction practically requires instituting bureacracy-like
patterns, which then promote behavior oriented to bureaucracy.
Anxiety is not necessarily eliminated in the process, but the
goal of reducing it justifies child-rearing practices, thera-
peutic styles, and human relations techniques all promoting
bureaucratic accommodation.* In the case of the nursery
school this becomes clear. Through the presumed reduction of
a dysfunctional emotion, the school secures a kind of adapta-
tion to prevailing social conditions. The school's manifest
goal is personal adjustment in neo-Freudian terms; the latent
goal is social adjustment--to the organizational society. By
defining adjustment according to the ideology, the school
establishes bureaucratic psychiation patterns.

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*In fact, whether or not psychiation actually works, whether
bureaucratic patterns indeed reduce anxiety, is a separate
question entirely, one irrelevant to the scope of this
paper. As long as the organization and the society act <u>as</u>
<u>if</u> psychiation works, and as long as psychiation mechanisms
promote social accommodation, we are not concerned with
its success or failure in individual psychological terms.

III. TRAUMA REDUCTION: PSYCHIATION PATTERN IN THE NURSERY SCHOOL

Trauma reduction, the predominant psychiation pattern in the nursery school, revolves around seven assumed sources of anxiety. According to ideology, these seven kinds of trauma will have disastrous psychological consequences if not handled properly. The school's problem, then, is to structure interaction so as to eliminate trauma from the child's experience. The seven sources of anxiety, psychiation dimensions, are all associated with general organizational considerations; in fact, they may be viewed as originating in questions of social organization itself. Uncertainty, the first dimension, is a problem associated with the quantity and clarity of behavioral expectations and role requirements. Strangeness is associated with the degree to which the culture emphasizes the known, the familiar, and the traditional. Mystery with cultural rationality. Coercion with the exercise of authority. Guilt with the handling of deviance. Unpleasantness with motivation and commitment. Conflict with competition for scarce resources.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping With Uncertainty

Uncertainty is related to a lack of clear knowledge of behavioral expectations and role requirements. The nursery school's ideology holds that people (and especially children) are more comfortable and less anxious in situations that are non-ambiguous with regard to appropriate behavior. Among these are situations in which decisions can be made on the

basis of precedent, in which there are formal procedures and orders of events, and in which relationships and roles are clearly defined. Uncertainty of various kinds is held to be undesirable from the point of view of the psychological makeup of the nursery school child. Fortuitously enough, it is also undesirable from the point of view of a formal organization, which is interested in reliable role performance and social control.

The organizational character of the nursery school is liable to uncertainty. It is maximally different, to the child, from his home, so that there are few precedents on which he can base behavioral decisions, so that the expectations for and limitations on behavior are unclear, and so that his relationship to the teacher and his peers is somewhat ambiguous. There are no particular formal tasks to be done, around which school can be structured. In fact, play can be as disorganized as a nursery school desires. Trauma reduction patterns help to eliminate these sources of uncertainty and also, as a bonus, to introduce the child to the uncertainty-free organizational society.

Uncertainty is handled by the provision of clear definitions of rules and procedures, routines, role relationships, and appropriate, proper, or expected ways of doing things. What is real and important to the organization is clearly underlined. This structures the behavior of the child; it removes the necessity of making individual decisions of various kinds by making readily apparent the organization's formal and informal expectations.

A major formal uncertainty-reducing pattern is a closely-followed routine. While this might seem an obvious feature of an organization, it is not at all obvious or necessary in the case of a nursery school. A nursery school could have loose and general expressive goals, since it has no legal responsibility (as do grade schools) for teaching the child anything at all. For example, it could serve as probably some nursery schools do, as nothing more than a playground, where mothers leave their children for loosely supervised free play, with no particular formal routines. But in the case of this nursery school, definite routines are instituted, in which certain activities regularly occur at the same approximate time every day, in which there is a definite order to events, and in which rooms and toys are available only at designated times.

The routine varied slightly from the morning to the afternoon classes. In the morning the following order of events ensued:

1. downstairs room - free play - various playground-like equipment brought out, e.g., slides, climbing apparatuses, tricycles, a rowboat, large wooden blocks, a puppet theater.

2. upstairs rooms - structured "artistic" kinds of activities, e.g., painting, playing with clay--as well as the availability of a doll house.

3. downstairs room - sedentary group activity, usually a story.

4. upstaris, one room - snack (juice and crackers).

5. outside when weather appropriate, otherwise downstairs
room for a nap or a group activity.

In the afternoon the routine consisted of:

1. upstairs rooms -

a. an all purpose room divided by a bookcase of blocks -
half the room for a sedentary artistic activity, the other
half available to play with blocks, train tracks, etc.

b. room with playhouse--half for playing in the playhouse,
the other half for a "measy" artistic activity, e.g., easel
painting, finger painting, etc.

2. downstairs room - free play on the equipment brought out.

3. upstairs, one room - snack.

4. downstairs room - sedentary activity, usually a story.

5. outside for free play on playground equipment when weather
appropriate, otherwise downstairs room for a group activity.

For all classes, piano chords signified that they were
to stop what they were doing and gather in front of it.

The routine, then, features: (a) specialization of
place, so that an expectation is created for the child that
certain events occur only in certain places; (b) specializa-
tion of time, a similar expectation with respect to events
and times; (c) structuring of behavior via the equipment
available only in certain places and times which suggests
what activities the children should be performing; (d)
reduction of uncertainty as to whether something will occur
or what to do next. Activities are thus clearly circum-
scribed in time and space; it is clear that they have spatial

limits, a definite beginning and ending, and are structured
with respect to the larger pattern of events in the organiza-
tion. This has important consequences for the child's play.
Play is circumscribed and placed clearly in the organizational
context. Thus, the teachers may support a play situation in
a context in which play is appropriate, but when the context
changes, it becomes readily apparent that the illusion is
no longer appropriate. For example, while in the sandbox
children often give one of the teachers a gift of a sand pie,
and the teachers always pretend to eat it, waxing ecstatic
over its deliciousness. But at snack time, when the activity
of eating is "real," supporting the child's make-believe is
no longer appropriate, and a similar act would be rejected.

Delineation of role relationships also show the child
his place in the organization. The important role distinc-
tion is between teacher and child. Teachers are socially
distinguished from children not only by their adult size and
status, but also by their control of certain resources and
their relative freedom with regard to participation in expres-
sive songs and games. The teachers themselves informally
distinguish their roles and status from the child's; for
example, they will generally use a different tone of voice
and vocabulary when speaking to a child than when speaking
to another teacher or adult, thereby emphasizing the differ-
ence between adults and children. Sometimes the teachers
say things to other adults they would not say to the children,
often in their presence, with the teacher's behavior obviously

implying that the children cannot hear or understand, or that it is unimportant even if they do. For example, at one class the children were mimicking every movement by the teacher leading an expressive game. Realizing this, and acting as if the children could not understand, she shouted to the assistant, "Too much direction. They're doing every-thing I do!" (a.m. 3)

The children are also encouraged to think of adults as qualifatively different from themselves because of the other roles adults play. The mother who brings juice for the snack is called the "Juice Lady"; a woman from the university's music school coming to play the guitar is called the "Music Lady." The teachers are referred to more frequently as Teacher than by their proper names, and all adults at the nursery school not specifically identified as parents are usually called Teacher by the children, with little effort by the teachers themselves to correct this misapprehension. This observer was known to the children as Teacher, and she was only once asked her proper name; this labelling as "teacher" occurred even though she deliberately remained on the sidelines and rarely engaged in teacher-like behavior.

Other informal means distinguish the teacher from children. While the teachers often perform the same activities as the children, and often without apparent skill differences, their position is maintained via a specialized type of role distance, i.e., showing that when they perform acts possibly associated with the child role or when they appear to support

the child's illusions, they are actually disassociated from
it, condescending to perform it because of their official
and appropriate role of teacher. The morning assistant
teacher did this with winks of the eye, to show observers
her non-involvement with the particular behavior she was
performing. The morning head teacher used smiles; she would
smile at the other adults when fingerpainting or dancing
around with the children, as if to say, "It's really pretty
silly, isn't it." This kind of distance was often implied
verbally also, for example:

> D. (male) is helping D. (female) with the puzzle
> on which she's working, which happens to be an
> extraordinarily difficult one for the children.
> When he doesn't accomplish much, he gets the
> teacher for her. The teacher comes, plays around
> with it for awhile, and directs the successful
> resolution. Then, in the children's presence,
> the teacher feigns wiping her brow and says to
> the observer: "Glad it wasn't any harder--phew!"
> (a.m. 4)

On another occasion:

> A girl has finished painting and wants to write
> her name on her work by herself (i.e., in her
> own writing, which really isn't writing at all).
> The assistant teacher says nothing to stop her
> and only, "Isn't that wonderful! Where did you
> learn to write your name?" with a pointed smile
> at the observer. As the girl turns to leave,
> the teacher turns the picture over and writes
> the girl's name on it, saying to the observer
> with a laugh, "Just so we'll know who she is in
> case we can't read her writing!" The teacher
> exhibited one response to the child and another
> to the observer; the child was present while she
> was being laughted at. (p.m. 4)

All of these kinds of interaction help to define the child's
place in the nursery school.

Another way in which uncertainty is reduced and structure
imposed is via models for some kinds of expressive behavior.

While the teachers emphasize somewhat that they want to pro-
mote "creativity" and remove "artificial" definitions of
"correct" ways of doing things, they still provide some
obvious models. If the children are performing a new
artistic activity, such as a cut-out or a fingerpainting,
the teacher will do one first, to show them "how it's done."
The fact that there are procedural rules to follow in the
nursery school seems to set up an expectation that there is
a "proper" way to do this particular thing, too, and the
teacher's model represents the proper way. For example, on
Halloween the children were making pumpkin faces on paper
plates with orange and black crayons; the teacher had made
one first. One child was told clearly and explicitly
several times could draw the face any way she wanted, that
she didn't have to copy the teacher's. Yet she continued
to do so. (a.m. 4)

The morning teacher went farther in this respect than
the afternoon, and with regard to some activities she
actually did attempt to teach a specific "proper" way. For
example, she tried to teach the children how to hold a paint-
brush "correctly"; she gave instructions as to what the
right motions were for fingerpainting. On an occasion when
the children were sponge painting, the following was noted:

> The teacher is somewhat concerned that the child-
> ren do things the "right way." She has a definite
> plan in mind when she directs a particular
> activity, and although she voices the ideal of
> free expression, rather than actually permit it,
> she expressly tells the children when they are
> doing something "wrong" and how to correct it
> (although she doesn't use the word "wrong"; she'll

say, "Why don't you try..."). For instance,
today they were sponge painting again, and some
children were sloshing full sponges all over
their sheets of paper, using the sponge like
a paint brush. She directed them to do it
"correctly"--squeeze out the sponge and pat it
on the paper. One girl painted the entire
piece of paper, until it was completely changed
in color. The teacher also told her she should
try it the other way. The fully colored page
could have been perceived as quite attractive,
but evidently the teacher was upset by this
misuse of the activity. The children passively
followed her directions.

Not only does the teacher's model serve a "normative"
function (the "proper" way to do something), it also serves
an "informational" function: if the child is at all uncer-
tain about what to do, all he has to do is watch the teacher.
This occurs often in participation songs. For example:

> The teacher plays a record called "Let's Play
> Zoo...Let's All Do What the Animals Do." They
> act out kangaroos hopping, etc. When the
> record comes to seals, the children are unsure
> of what to do. They wait for the teacher to
> begin some motion, and then imitate her care-
> fully and exactly, rather than initiating their
> own conception of what a seal might do. (a.m. 3)

> They are performing some kind of exercise.
> "Reach" high, touch the sky...(finally) and
> waddle as the old duck goes." They all waddle,
> including the teacher. When the teacher stops
> waddling, they all do, without even any echoes,
> because they had all been watching her intently.
> (a.m. 3)

The teachers also impose structure on the nursery school
situation in other ways, by the institutionalization of cer-
tain practices, by asking that things have names in the "real
world," and by attempts at organizing play. One such insti-
tutionalized practice (and possibly the most important) is
Clean Up Time. About a month after the nursery school term

began, the afternoon teacher announced that the children would help clean up after each activity by putting toys away and moving the equipment back. A student assistant explained that one day the practice was announced and the children started doing it; that's all there was to it. The morning teacher began it a short time later, with equal success. It quickly became known as Clean Up Time and was a regular part of the routine, a chord announcing it in the downstairs room for the morning class.

The teacher in the morning classes also imposed a certain amount of structure on supposedly free behavior by suggesting various ways that things must have names and "real" identities, subtly compelling the children to accept her definition of things.

> They are scarf dancing; while a record plays they dance around the room waving scarves. One boy wraps his scarf around his hand and says, "Look, I have a new hand." The teacher responds, "That looks like a bandage." He may have wanted to pretend it was a hand, but she is suggesting to him that it has to be something "real," and that her definition of reality is more appropriate than his. (a.m. 4)

> The teacher goes out and brings back a basket of books, puzzles, etc. Several girls decide to read (quote-unquote) books at one table. The teacher asks if this is the "book table." The girls, probably never having thought about it previously, say yes. Again, the teacher has subtly imposed a "reality" structure on the situation. A girl at another table then dubs hers the "playing games table." (a.m. 4)

Occasionally the teachers organized small games during free play, with routines, "rules," and structure, also serving an uncertainty-reducing function. These games generally did

not involve fantasy, role-playing, or make-believe. On one

occasion, when the children were playing on the slide, an

assistant placed her arm across it, getting them to slide

under her arm. She then changed the position of her arm on

every round. On another occasion:

> Some children are playing with the big blocks.
> They have the blocks in a circle forming a
> house. One child jumps into the circle, and,
> in doing so, knocks over some blocks. They all
> start to knock over blocks, chaotically destroy-
> ing the house. The assistant teacher transforms
> this into an organized game. She has the
> children line up and see how many blocks they can
> jump over without moving them; first two in a row,
> then three, etc. The most important rule is to
> stand in line. (a.m. 4)

Thus, the nursery school has a series of uncertainty-

reducing mechanisms with a distinctly bureaucratic flavor:

a formal and generally invariant routine; specialization of

activities with respect to time and place; delineation of

role relationships; models of appropriate behavior; institu-

tionalized and structured practices and procedures; and

imposition organization on even "free," expressive behavior.

These practices give the child a clear picture of

organizational "reality." They circumscribe his play and

place it clearly in an organizational context, as only an

aspect of the larger world of the organization, with a clear

beginning and an ending. But it should be noted that, in

general, the only kinds of rules provided by the organiza-

tion are procedural rules; rarely are they rules for indi-

vidual conduct, such as achievement demands. This becomes

important in the school's handling of other problems: coer-

cion, guilt, and conflict.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping with Strangeness

Strangeness is related to lack of experience with the content of events, their cultural referrent, while the uncertainty dimension refers to the form of events. Lack of security is tied to strangeness. Anything unfamiliar, changing the content of a child's situation, the particular stimuli, is considered a potential source of anxiety; the child is supposedly more comfortable with the traditional and the known. With the nursery school strangeness might stem from a variety of situations: the child's first introduction to school, moving him from one event or room to another, and getting him to participate in certain group activities, especially new ones.

Strangeness is handled in the organization by attempting to minimize change: easing the transition from familiar surroundings (the home) to initially unfamiliar ones (the nursery school), introducing any new or different routines, songs, and games slowly so as to avoid sudden intrusion of strange stimuli, and consistently and continually emphasizing the familiar aspects of the organization through ritual.

Traumatic aspects of coming to the nursery school are mitigated by allowing mothers to stay for the first week or so, until the children feel comfortable in the new situation, until it has become familiar. Any toys that the children bring from home may be kept with them for the entire session, if they desire. For example, one girl who entered the afternoon class at mid-semester came with a teddy bear her first session. She sat on the periphery of the group watching

and clutching the stuffed animal to her chest. No attempt
was made to get her to participate or to loose her grip on
the bear; it was felt that the familiar toy made it easier
for her to adjust to the strange surroundings. She kept
it with her during the next two sessions she attended. By
the fourth session, she brought the bear but put it down
and forgot about it in order to crayon with the rest of the
children. By the fifth session she was not even bringing
the bear. The organization tolerates this kind of behavior
in order to provide security.

Rituals of various kinds help to emphasize familiar
aspects of the organization. In fact, ritual is a major
trauma reduction mechanism; not only does it supposedly
eliminate anxiety by removing uncertainty as well as strange-
ness, but it also provides controlled means for tension re-
lease. Nursery school rituals involve doing familiar things
over and over without thinking about them; within the ritual
itself, key elements are repeated automatically. Rituals
often center around "participation stories," such as the
following, about a peddler:

> The peddler arises, dresses, and puts on his old
> brown cap. He puts on a red cap...(the teacher
> lets the class shout out various colors as she
> points to them).
> Then he goes down into the village, crying (and
> all cry with her): Caps for sale. Fifty cents
> a cap.
> But one day he couldn't sell a cap. Not even a
> red one. Not even a...(again she lets them shout
> out the colors as she points to them).
> So he goes to sleep under a tree. When he wakes
> up, all the caps are gone but his own brown cap.
> He looked to one side of him. Were the caps
> there? (All shout No!)
> He looked to the other side. Were the caps
> there? (All shout No!)

He looked in front of him. Were the caps there?
(All shout No!)
He looked in back of him. Were the caps there?
(All shout No!)
He walked all around the tree. He looked up, and
what do you think he saw? (All: Monkeys!)
You monkeys you, he said, shaking his finger,
give me back my caps! But the monkeys, they
shook their fingers and said, Tsk tsk tsk tsk tsk.
(The children are doing all the motions and say-
ing all the words.)
You monkeys you, he said, shaking his other finger,
give me back my caps! But the monkeys, they shook
their fingers and said, Tsk tsk tsk tsk tsk.
You monkeys you, he said, stamping his foot, give
me back my caps! But the monkeys, they stamped
their feet and said, Tsk, tsk, tsk, tsk, tsk.
You monkeys you, he said, stamping his other
foot, give me back my caps! But the monkeys,
they stamped their feet and said, Tsk, tsk, tsk,
tsk, tsk.
Finally, he got so angry he took his cap off and
THREW it on the ground. So the monkeys took
their caps off and THREW them on the ground.
The peddler puts on all the caps, one by one,
with the children shouting out the colors.
The peddler goes back to the village calling,
caps for sale. Fifty cents a cap. (The children
echo: caps for sale. Fifty cents a cap.) (p.m. 4)

This ritual features participation, repetition, and activity

and tentsion release. It bears an interesting similarity to

religious responsive readings, in which the leader makes a

programmed statement and the congregation chants the programmed

response.

Another ritual frequent in the afternoon class was the

game of going hunting, also with a highly repetitive character,

a great deal of participation, and the opportunity for tension

release in a controlled fashion. In this game, they act out

everything from putting on hunting clothes to riding in a car

to the airport, to flying to Africa, disembarking, creeping

through the grass, and stalking some big game (an elephant, a

lion, etc.). Then their bullet misses and they have to escape
quickly, so they reverse the sequence, doing all the motions
hurriedly.

Rituals such as these were not as frequent in the morning
class, although the teacher did provide some less elaborate
ritualized games, such as Jack-in-the-Box. The children
crouch down while the teacher chants, "Jack in the box, jack
in the box." Then she says, "Jack out of the box!" and they
all pop up screaming delightedly.

The familiar is also emphasized in other ways. Stories
that the children like are read over and over again, with
the children often anticipating the words and chanting them
with the teacher. Unimportant arrangements easily become
traditional, part of the "culture." Toys consist primarily
of familiar objects; a major play setting is the playhouse,
which carefully duplicates aspects of the familiar home the
child has left. Changes in routine are minimal. The child
can thus come to depend on and rely on the familiar and tra-
ditional.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping with Mystery

Mystery is related to a non-rational culture, so that be-
havior cannot be oriented in a "scientific" cause-effect manner.
Mystery, in fact, means not knowing; without knowing, control-
ling is hardly possible. The mysterious, magical, frighten-
ing, fantastic, the inexplicable, illogical, unknown--all are
thought to be potentially anxiety-producing. Trauma reduction

here is partly negative: eliminating these factors from the
child's world, making it eminently rational, eminently pre-
dictable, and eminently mundane.

Mystery might enter nursery school culture through
various entertainment media, e.g., books or records in which
unreasonable, frightening, supernatural, or magical events
occur. But this was not allowed to happen. The teachers
sought definite things in entertainment for the children,
particularly the absence of mystery. Fairy tales, for example,
are unquestionably "out," as are stories involving evil,
supernatural beings, or an overly great reversal of reality.
One teacher explained that three- and four-year-old children
would be too frightened by these things and would not know
how to cope with this kind of "disturbing information."
She could see no positive functions for fairy tales, anyway;
they do not portray the "real" world for the children. In
short, the most extreme reality reversal permitted was the
anthropomorphism of certain kindly animals in plot-less
stories. The one time a witch appeared she was quite ordi-
nary, pleasant, and un-witchlike, rather like a cute teen-
ager dressed in black; in fact, the point of the story was
that her magic did not work.

On the other hand, acceptable stories represent a prag-
matic, rational, and mundane extreme, often with a thinly
disguised pedagogical flavor. For example:

> The teacher plays a record about Muffin, a dog
> with a bandage over his eyes. He couldn't see...
> but he could hear. He heard...(appropriate sound
> plays). It was the window shade. Etc. After a

while the teacher has the children guess the
sounds. Then she reads them the story that goes
along with the record, called "Muffin's Indoor
Noisy Book, all about a black dog Muffin that
lives in the city." The story goes approximately
like the record: He heard a...(this time the
sound is named and the children make the appro-
priate noise). Sometimes the teacher goes first,
sometimes the children. The sounds are all
mundane household noises. (a.m. 3)

A book about painting: colors and kinds of pic-
tures. She gets them to respond to various ele-
ments: the color, the texture, the humor of the
picture, etc. (a.m. 4)

The story is, "What Shall I Put in the Hole that
I Dig?"--a lesson in botany for three-year-olds.
The general idea is to run through a list of
things, each colorfully pictured, with the
text reading, "Will that grow? and the children
shouting, "No!" Finally, the climax is reached,
a little corn kernel, and the question, "Will
that grow?" is asked. Both the teacher and the
children shout, "No!" because even the teacher
was caught in the repetitive contagion and
wasn't paying attention to the story. She
laughs a little embarrassedly and corrects her-
self, explaining to the children why the corn
kernel grows. (a.m. 3)

Other pedagogical-style books include such efforts as "The

Color Kittens, a child's first book about color," relating

how colors can be mixed to produce others, starting with

red, blue, and yellow represented by three kittens; and "A

Tree Is Nice," portarying what trees do for you, and vice

versa.

If not overtly pedagogical, other stories were also

fairly mundane and non-mysterious (with only a few exceptions,

like Dr. Seuss books, which are not mundane but also not

frightening either). For example, one book concerns Ogluk

the Eskimo, for all intents and purposes an American boy; he

just lives in a colder climate, that's all. Catching a cold,

he is sent to visit Aunt Hattie in Hawaii; she is not parti-
cularly ethnic, either. Another favorite was "The Most
Remarkable Cat," a record. The cat is owned by a mandarin
in China who wants to name it something appropriate to its
remarkableness. First, he names it "sky," because that's
over everything, then "cloud," because that hides the sky,
and so on by a chain of reasoning to "mouse." (At this point
in one playing a child echoed the observer's feelings by
saying, "This is getting silly.") Mice, of course, are
eaten by cats, and so the mandarin's cat is finally named
"cat." The moral, of course, is that things are best known
by their "real" names.

Objects of curiosity also stressed the pragmatic; for
example, a set of Negro and white dolls alike in every feature
and detail but the color. Stop signs resided in the big
downstairs room for use with the tricycles. For a time a
pregnant white mouse and her family lived in a cage upstairs.
On one occasion the children planted beans so they could watch
them grow. The effort here is not so much to teach the
children something specific as to present the world as a
logical, scientifically ordered, explicable and knowable
place, because mystery might produce anxiety.

For the most part the school succeeded in eliminating
mystery from its structure. Occasionally, however, for a
reason not anticipated in the organizational design, some-
thing out of the ordinary happened, something for which the
children might have no ready logical explanation: a missing

piano, an absent teacher, a child departing or entering, a
change in the routine. In these cases teachers would reduce
mystery by providing careful, deliberate explanations. One
time just before the winter holidays, for example, clay
figures the children had made for presents "disappeared."
The teacher patiently explained the entire procedure to them--
why they could not have the figures right away and where they
mysteriously gone: "They are saved one time to be painted,
then saved to be shellacked, then saved until they're dry."
(p.m. 4)

Throughout the nursery school culture, the world is
rational, logical, and mundane.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping with Coercion

Given the fact of a routinized structure with a rational
culture in which power is associated with certain roles, the
problem of the use of authority arises, for coercion, or
limiting an individual's freedom of expression and forcing
him to do things "against his will," is a source of anxiety
in the nursery school's ideology. Trauma reduction practices
are instituted to mitigate coercion while still minimizing
uncertainty. Coercion is eliminated from the organization
in two ways: (1) by permitting the child as much freedom of
behavior as possible within the general procedural rules and
routines, and (2) in those cases where it becomes necessary
to limit the child's behavior, by doing this in such a way
that it does not appear that coercive authority is being

exercised. (The latter is what the general public calls "psychological" techniques of discipline.)

Freedom for "individual expression" is provided in several ways. First, there are a wide range of alternative activities (although of the same general kind) within any time period and designated area. It appears that choice may be exercised. (There is only one exception to this availability of alternatives: when the entire group is brought together for some reason or for some regular group function.) During the sedentary activity periods in the upstairs rooms, for example, there is a choice of at least two artistic events (e.g., easel painting, finger painting, clay, play dough, crayonning, cut outs, etc.) as well as a playhouse, blocks, train tracks, dolls, picture books, and sets of simple games of various kinds. For a few months in the afternoon class, a group of five children was even permitted to play together in the downstairs room during this period, occasionally joined by other children, although the room was officially closed. In the downstairs room itself, a wide array of things to do existed: slides, tricycles, climbing boards, a rowboat, a puppet theater, some big stuffed animals, large blocks, etc.

Permitting non-participation in group activities also ensured freedom to express individual tendencies, as long as the group as a whole was not disturbed by it. For example, one boy who, according to the teacher, might have been somewhat retarded and was psychologically disturbed, preferred

not to participate in most of the activities of the school, generally sitting by himself in the corner, grinning. He would be gently encouraged to participate, but it was thought that to "force" him by any stronger urging or exercise of authority would be too traumatic. (Here the "psychiation" goal is distinctly opposed to any socialization goals the nursery school might have.) Likewise, in less dramatic cases, some children would rather sit on a couch at some distance from the group rather than join them. Often the non-participants would not even pay attention, even at more pedagogical times. This was usually tolerated, despite any instrumental purpose the teacher might have in bringing the group together, although when she did have such a purpose overtly in mind, she tended to be less lenient. (Teachers also tended to be less lenient if the non-participants distracted the attention of the rest of the group.) Occasionally, for example, a number of children decide not to participate while physically in the middle of the activity.

Freedom of expression is permitted in other situations. To parents and teachers alike a salient aspect of the nursery school is its emphasis on the "creative" development of the child. Thus, he should be free, as in the Freudian sense of impulsive freedom, to "explore" various art forms and find the best way to express himself. As we have seen, however, this is often in conflict with uncertainty reduction, and the teachers often impose a great deal of structure and direction on this supposed freedom. But on the other hand, they are

visibly disturbed if anyone else should "interfere" with the child's freedom. On one occasion this observer asked a boy what he was painting; he replied, "A picture." The teacher became obviously upset and explained that she wants to avoid that kind of question. She wants painting "abstract" and "looser," the child learning to use and be comfortable with the medium. (a.m. 3) There appears to be a kind of conflict between the teacher's own practices, concerned with uncertainty reduction, and her idealized practices, concerned with coercion reduction.

Verbalizing is considered another indication of the child's "creative" development, and thus it is an area in which he should not be limited with regard to freedom of expression. When children interrupt during group sessions-- usually with comments that bear no relation to anything else-- the teachers usually respond to the remarks as if they are desirable, rather than exercise authority and quiet the speaker. There is no such philosophy as "children should be seen and not heard" or discipline as a desirable end in itself; speaking out is an indication of the child's creative impulses and should not be stifled.

When it becomes necessary to the teacher to limit the child's freedom of behavior for some reason, she usually does it in such a way as to mitigate patently coercive elements, disguise the power that is being exercised, and minimize the extent to which the limitation forces the child to do something against his will. A major mechanism is the absence of access

to undesired behavior, a social control technique. There is
nothing considered anxiety-producing in this (i.e., no overt
coercion), yet whatever else the child wants simply isn't
available. The decision to deviate is thus taken out of the
child's hands; he doesn't feel coerced, there just seems to
be no other choices:

> Someone wants to easel paint. The teacher says,
> "No, today we're sponge painting." The girl seems
> disappointed and angry for a minute, but then she
> throws herself eagerly into sponge painting
> activity, for the easels are nowhere to be seen,
> and there is nothing to remind her of the choice
> she might have had. (a.m. 4)

The teacher did not appear to be exercising authority when
she said No; she seemed rather to be stating an undeniable
and irrefutable fact about the world. She was not limiting
the girl's freedom to easel paint; easel painting equipment
was just not present. In general, rooms are closed off when
not in use; inappropriate toys are put away. In the case of
activities for which the whole group is brought together and
maximum participation is desired by the teacher, no positive
alternatives are available; the child can either participate
or just watch. Lack of alternatives is considered a non-
traumatic way of ensuring the desired choice of behaviors.

Coercion is also minimized by giving the child an
acceptable ostensible reason for the limiting of his freedom;
e.g., the child should obey not because he is being coerced
by a powerful figure but because of some appropriate or
pleasurable reason that he would agree with theoretically.
The child is told to do things not "because I said so" but

"because it's good for you," "because it's fun," "because

you really want to," or "because it would be good for all of

us."

> The teacher reads them a story. She gets a group
> of children off the couch and onto the floor in
> front of her with the rest by telling them they
> can't see from there, and they wouldn't want to
> miss the story. J. says, "I can see from here."
> The teacher insists that he can't. Finally he
> joins the group. (a.m. 4)

The teacher's <u>real</u> reason for wanting the outsider to join

the group was because he was distracting the others; but she

phrased her request in terms of its benefits to the child,

minimizing coercive elements. Again,

> M. is making noise while a pedagogical record is
> being played on the record player, to which the
> teacher wants the children to listen. She tells
> him he is "having trouble listening," so that he
> will have to come sit next to her by the record
> player to make it easier for him to hear. The
> actual effect of this appeal to his own desire for
> fun is to isolate him from the group and to place
> him near her, so that he can't distract the
> others or fail to listen himself. (a.m. 4)

On another occasion, the same teacher isolated a child during

a story because he was squirming and noisy. Finally, when he

persisted, she sent him upstairs. She does this not by coer-

cing him but by giving him something enjoyable and desirable

to do instead.

> After several attempts to quiet P. down, the
> teacher asks him, "Do you want to go upstairs.
> and help the other teacher with the party?"
> Immediately, several other children volunteer
> to go upstairs and help. But just the same, it
> is P. that is sent. (a.m. 3)

In a sense, the child is not only free from concern, he is also

rewarded for his deviance.

Thus, obedience to authority or suppression by society is not emphasized; rather, obedience to the child's own wishes and desires is reinforced. The only rules he need conform to are procedural rules; there are few specific limitations on his conduct. A situation is created in which it seems not at all important what the child does, as long as he does it within the confines of the formal organizational structure; i.e., a situation in which there are no expectations for his behavior other than his adherence to routine.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping with Guilt

Not only does the nursery school believe that guilt is an unhealthy and unnatural traumatic emotion, but it also upholds the psychological notion that punishment is not necessary for and may even be detrimental to learning. In controlling deviance, the problem of guilt arises. It is handled, first, by defining as little as possible as deviant, and, second, by a set of interaction procedures for situations in which a child aggresses against another or breaks an important rule. In general, the child is not considered responsible for deviant or antisocial acts; they are attributed to unconscious impulses of some kind over which the child momentarily and unintentionally lost control. No child is labelled "bad" or considered in-tentionally deviant.

Aggression by a child against another (hitting, kicking, etc.) is attributed to <u>carelessness</u> or <u>accident</u>. For example, a child might kick another for some reason; the teacher might explain to the victim that the aggressor was not paying attention. On one occasion, N., an aggressive girl, pushed a boy out of the way so that she could be first in line on the jumping stand. The boy began to cry. The teacher, comforting him, warned N. only to "be more careful" in the future. (p.m. 4) Carelessness as the teacher's excuse for antisocial behavior occurred again and again, as in the following interchange: "She hit me!" "No I didn't!" (Teacher) "She'll be careful...Won't you?" (p.m. 4) There are many other examples:

> The teacher calls R. over to her. During the fight over S.'s hat, R. had pushed J., and J. had fallen to the floor, crying. The teacher had come in to see what was the matter. She says to R.: "It seems like J. feels very bad. Did you have something to do with it? Tell me what happened." R. replies that "it was an accident." The teacher turns to J. and says, "Did R. tell you he's real sorry?" And thus R. is absolved of blame. (p.m. 4)

When trouble or tangles develop between two children, the teacher solves the dispute by separating them or by offering a ready set of alternatives, rarely by admonishing them. For example:

> One of the student teachers sits down to "play" at the clay table.
> N. (female) reaches over and smashes her fist on the clay of the boy next to her.
> The teacher says, in a gentle tone of voice, "That wasn't very nice."
> N. replies, "Yes, but it was fun."
> The teacher then, without chastising N., redirects her behavior, saying, "If you want to smash one, smash mine." (p.m. 4)

In the same manner, rule breaking is not considered
deliberate but is attributed to <u>forgetting</u>. For example:

> L. is on his bike again on the forbidden side of
> the room. The teacher says, "I told you that any-
> one on the wrong side will have to give their bike
> up. I'm really sorry, L., but next time you'll
> <u>remember</u>, won't you?" (p.m. 4)

"Punishment" is confined to isolation from the group: no
other physical or deprivational measures were ever observed.
Isolation itself was usually intended more to ensure
social control vis-a-vis the rest of the group than to "teach
the deviant a lesson." Punishment is rarely defined as
such to the child; rather, he is given a measure of control
over his fate, so that is not subject to self-recrimination,
choosing, as he does, his own deprivation. This is, of
course, closely connected with coercion reduction. It
means, in effect, that when the child is punished it may
seem like a special treat to the other children and not a
negative sanction at all. This actually occurred many
times. For example:

> P. is misbehaving. The teacher disciplines him by
> placing responsibility for the discipline with
> him: "P. you're being naughty. Shall we sit you
> in a chair?" He replies, "No!" and nothing happens
> to him. Later she does ask him to sit in a chair
> by himself, but this is perceived as a special
> privilege rather than a punishment, and several
> other children go to sit with him. (a.m. 3)

Thus, there are only three situations in which the
problem of handling deviance arises: acts of interpersonal
aggression, breaking of procedural rules, and threats to
group control. In none of these does the child suffer
punishment or loss of esteem; he would seem to have little

reason, then within the nursery school, to experience guilt.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping with Unpleasantness

Unpleasantness refers to a motivational dimension: why
people do things. The nursery school takes a hedonistic
view of motivation; people do things because they find them
pleasurable. To do something that does not provide
gratification is traumatic; for children, the ideology goes,
the gratification should be fairly immediate. To maximize
motivation, then, the school must make everything "fun."
Trauma reduction for unpleasantness centers around an in-
sistence on the pleasurable aspects of everything concerning
the child and the manufacturing of "fun" for even unpleasant
events.

First, unpleasantness is handled by the teachers'
strategy of interaction with the children. A cheerleader -
Pollyanna role is played. By stressing how wonderful
everything about life, school, and the child is, the teachers
intend to generate a comparable enthusiasm for these
things on the part of the child. If he is told his artistic
output is wonderful, he will find it pleasurable and be
motivated to continue; if he is told life is wonderful, he
will find it non-traumatic. Only pleasant beliefs about him-
self and the world are encouraged; the child is never re-
quired to face unpleasant facts. (This is, of course, re-
lated to coercion and guilt reduction.) The cheerleader -
Pollyanna - like teachers show this almost universally,
even concerning unimportant matters. For example:

> Across the room E. is talking to a student
> teacher. E: "In our bathroom my mommy found
> a ladybug." The teacher replies,"A LADYBUG?
> Ladybugs are nice." E. says, "I have a ladybug."
> The teacher says, "You DO?" E. says, "Yeah."
> And the teacher repeats, "Ladybugs are nice."
> (p.m. 4)

Another teacher presented a similar kind of "fun philosophy"

at the clay table:

> N.: "It's so messy."
> Teacher: "Yes, but it feels so good."
> Later, the teacher says, "Isn't this fun?"
> A boy at the same table shouts, "Look at
> mine!" The teacher says, "Gee, isn't that
> **lovely? I wish I knew how to do that!**"
> (p.m. 4)

On another occasion a story is introduced by the teacher as

"the funniest thing I think I've ever read." (p.m. 4)

The child is never given any reason to doubt that he and

the world are wonderful. Every comment he offers, every

possession he exhibits, every artistic endeavor he per-

forms -- all are greeted with what might be conservatively

termed "gushing cries of approval" from the teachers.

"Isn't that marvelous?" and "Isn't that lovely?" are stock

comments. Negative evaluations simply do not exist.

In the same way, unpleasantness is eliminated from tasks

and demands by making them into games -- something fun -- with

pleasure again thought to be a primary motivating factor.

At least once in every session it was observed that a

teacher induced the children to do something by turning

it into a game. Clean Up Time was often turned into a

game of skill, for example: "See how many blocks you can

carry to the closet." "See how fast you can do it," etc.

The children might not want to go to the next event other-
wise. Examples of fairly elaborate transition games in-
clude:

> Tiptoe airplane. The teacher chants "Tiptoe air-
> plane, toptoe airplane" -- while they all hold out
> their arms and titlt them like airplane wings --
> "tiptoe airplane...Stop!" and then she whirls
> around to see if she can catch anyone moving.
> (p.m. 4)
>
> The bus song. It consists of repetitive verses
> about activities connected with a schoolbus. The
> last verse in the song is changed into: "The
> children in the school, they follow the teacher,
> follow the teacher, follow the teacher..." etc.,
> and thus, they are all moved outside. (p.m. 4)
>
> "Where - oh - where."
> The teacher starts the children on a song referring
> to the student teacher upstairs setting up the
> juice and crackers: "Where oh where is Mrs. Hays,
> where oh where is Mrs. Hays, where oh where is Mrs.
> Hays, way down yonder in the paw paw patch." She
> begins the next verse with, "Come on children let's
> go find her, come on children let's go find her..."
> and they all start moving upstairs singing, "come on
> children let's go find her..." (p.m. 4)

In other instances games are used to silence the children:

> To quiet the children down before the snack is
> served, the assistant teacher seats them all at
> the set tables and says: "Push the napkins away,
> put your heads down, and listen for little sounds;
> we want no talking at all. This is a listening story
> to listen for different noises." Outside the room
> the other teacher makes various familiar noises:
> knocking, rattling hangers, etc. The assistant
> asks them to raise their hands and tell what they
> heard. It seem to be an effective game, because
> they are all quiet. (a.m. 4)

Attention to stories is often secured, similarly, by

creating a pleasant game associated with them, primarily

guessing games, e.g., guessing the ends of lines in rhymed

stories, guessing what color the teacher is holding up, etc.

The pleasant aspects of certain tasks are emphasized in

other ways than by games. For example, holding the door
open for the rest of the group or carrying the wastebasket
around for children to deposit their snack napkins in are
called Special Honors. From the children's eagerness to
be chosen from such tasks, there seems to be a great deal
of enthusiasm for these generated.

Since practically everything the child is asked to do
is structured so as to maximize the "fun" or pleasureable-
ness involved, stressing coercion, guilt, and unpleasant-
ness reduction, the child is given no reason for making any-
thing but a hedonistic commitment to the school.

Trauma Reduction Mechanisms for Coping with Conflict

The nursery school brings together a group of children
of unequal skills and places them in a situation of
potential conflict over toys, recognition, and praise. At
home they may have had the exclusive use of toys and the un-
divided attention of mother, but at school there are
twenty-two children and only 2 or 3 teachers. The possi-
bilities for unhealthy competition are great. Trauma
reduction is introduced to remove conflictful elements from
the organization. In addition, it serves to prepare the
child for the bureaucratic world, in which cooperation is
presumably more important than competition.

Conflict and competition are definitely de-emphasized
in the nursery school. There are no gold stars, no prizes,
no winners. In fact, there are no "achievements" in the

nursery school which can be the basis of differential rewards, nor are there any sanctions to serve as dif- ferential punishments. Rather, there are explicit demo- cratic norms; sharing and equality. The organization is oriented around the idea that every child is just as good as every other, or, similarly, that no child is any better than any other. No opportunities are presented for status differentiations to arise. Every child is entitled to his turn as door-opener, wastebasket carrier, Farmer (in Farmer in the Dell), or "leader," in a game involving a leader. In fact, status-seeking may even keep a child from the temporary honor of being "leader." For example:

> M.B. gets up and wants to lead the next song. The teacher says that she doesn't think they need a leader. D. is quick to tell M.B. to sit down: "Sit down, M. No leaders." At the end of the song, D. stands up and says, "I'M going to be the leader." But M.R., in a non-pushy way, had also expressed a desire to be the leader, so the teacher chooses him. Next they play Farmer in the Dell, and all three boys want to be Farmer. The teacher chooses a girl. (a.m. 4)

When there is differential treatment, it is accorded to a role and not to a person. It is the role of "leader" or the role of Farmer that receives special privilege and not the person playing it. A certain amount of fuss is made over a child's birthday; his mother brings cupcakes and he is temporarily a special person. But the recognition can be seen as accorded to his role as Birthday Child and not to him as a person. This role is not only interchangeable daily with respect to occupants, but it is also equally available to everyone. A shy, withdrawn girl in the three-year-old

class who rarely played with the other children, was characterized by one of the teachers on her birthday as "acting the star quite openly." This behavior disappeared on subsequent days, when she was no longer the Birthday Girl.

Strict equality is maintained with regard to privileges (so far as the teachers know). For example:

> A girl asks the teacher, "Can I color?" The teacher replies, "Oh honey, I'm afraid we won't have time." The girl says, "Then how come they're doing it?" pointing to two children at the next table. The teacher quickly hands her a piece of paper and crayons. (a.m. 4)

Juice and crackers is also definitely an equalitarian occasion. There is a specific "fair" order in which graham crackers are passed out, and no one can have seconds until everyone has had firsts, no thirds until everyone has had seconds, etc. The child who waits the longest gets an extra measure of praise from the teacher, but the order in which the children are served is random from day to day.

By providing enough toys and activities for everyone, the nursery school hopes to eliminate conflict over scarce resources. The teachers do their best to avoid favoritism and show equal attention to all the children. Conflicts do arise, however, due to the fact that the school doesn't have one of every toy for every child nor is there room for everyone in every activity. These are handled by an impersonal principle, the norm of sharing. Toys are shared, turns are shared; there can be no monopolies on anything. Two girls in the afternoon class, for example, enjoyed playing the piano. They were both taking lessons, using this as an

opportunity to practice, and they played much better than the others. But they would continually be shooed away from the piano so that other children could have a chance to bang on it non-melodiously. There are many other examples of the use of the impersonal equalitarian principle:

> R. had a bike; L. got it because "we share." R. now wants it back. L. says he just got it. So the teacher says to L., "Once around the room and then give it back." L. replies, "But then I won't have a bike." The teacher's answer is, "Some days you do and some days you don't." (p.m. 4)

> L. took too many seconds on juice and crackers. The teacher says, "Some people are forgetting. Remember that if we take to much for seconds, then when someone else wants seconds there aren't any and they're sad. Aren't you sad when you can't have seconds?" (p.m. 4)

> and:
> Teacher: "The toys belong to all the children. If you weren't playing with it and he took it, then it's his turn to play with it." (p.m. 4)

To invoke the norm of sharing is almost an automatic response of the teachers to any potential conflict situation, even if sharing might not particularly be the issue. For example:

> L. has a dump truck (in the sandbox) and needs customers to give him sand to dump. He yells, "Who will give me dirt? Who will give me dirt? Who will give me dirt? Who will give me dirt?" L. replies in an answering chant, "Nobody, nobody, nobody, nobody!" L. whines to a near-by teacher, "He said no-body!" The teacher, without looking around, says to the children in the sandbox, "We must share." (p.m. 4)

The norms of equality and sharing are thought to lead very smoothly into healthy cooperation and adjustments to groups; the nursery school <u>officially</u> and <u>formally</u> minimizes peer conflict.

Thus, we have an organization with a particular psychiation goal handed down to it by the larger social system: to produce healthy psychological development through the organizational elimination of a non-functional emotion, anxiety, as defined by the neo-Freudian ethic. The organization attempts this via trauma reduction: eliminating or mitigating certain "traumatic situations." These situations defined by the ideology, are: (1) uncertainty -- limited by formal procedures and routines and the clarification of role relationships, as well as specialization of activity with respect to time and place; (4) coercion, limited by a lack of specific rules or behavioral expectations and a disguised use of power; (5) guilt, limited by not holding the child consciously or intentionally responsible for any antisocial or rule-breaking acts; (6) unpleasantness, limited by the attempt to provide a "fun" view of the world and by making games out of tasks or requests; (2) strangeness, limited by ritualistic emphasis on the familiar and traditional; (3) mystery, limited by presenting the world as rational, logical, understandable, and mundane; and (7) conflict, limited by the lack of opportunity for competition or differential achievement and an explicit democratic norm of sharing and equality.

What kind of orientations stem from such psychiation patterns? These can best be described by calling the collective product of this nursery school an Organization Child.

IV. THE ORGANIZATION CHILD

A composite picture of this nursery school's child is termed the Organization Child for several reasons: the ideal type represents an adaptation to a formal organization itself an adaptation to an organization society, via neo-Freudian ideology; he displays patterns of behavior well suited to some of the demands of organization life; and he exhibits a sometimes-remarkable similarity to organization men, even in play. Four aspects of the Organization Child may be delineated: reality-orientation, the routinization of play, the elimination of personal responsibility, and the maintenance of ascendancy. Each of the four patterns is associated with certain areas of trauma reduction: reality-orientation and the routinization of play with limiting of uncertainty, strangeness, and mystery; the elimination of personal responsibility with limiting of coercion, guilt, and unpleasantness; and the maintenance of ascendancy with limiting of conflict.

Reality-Orientation

The Organization Child is more concerned with the "real" things in his environment than with anything he may imagine or become individually involved in. Because mystery and un- certainty have been eliminated from the nursery school, the child has been provided with a particular definition of reality: reality is rationality; it is rules, structure, routines, and roles. Reality is what is "given" by the

organization. The organization has more reality than any individual; the organization is permanent whereas the individual is temporary; the individual must adapt to the reality of the organization. What the individual does by himself or for himself when the organization provides no particular expectations is less real than what is given by the organization. The child orients himself to this reality, then, and comes to feel more comfortable with things that are real in this sense than with things which are loose and flexible and which might require creativity, imagination, and innovation. The child exhibits a rationalization of his world analogous to the rationalization in bureaucracy.

Most of the children favored programmed activities, or ones in which structure could be maximized, over free play and fantasy. "Clean up time," for example, was a favorite of most of the children. They would often play rather listlessly during the free play session, but when the teacher would indicate it was time to put the toys away, they would throw themselves eagerly into the structured act of cleaning up. In fact, Clean Up Time even came to be anticipated by the children:

> Teacher plays a chord on the piano and there's
> a spontaneous yell of "clean up time!" But the
> teacher explains that No, we just wanted to count
> them. They appear disappointed. (a.m. 4)

> L. comes in to announce Clean Up Time. Teacher
> has to check. It isn't time yet. So L. runs
> around with another boy by the hand, shouting,
> "Clean Up Time is almost here! Clean Up Time is
> almost here!" They soon have the whole class
> chanting and actively engaged in cleaning up, even
> though it isn't time yet. (p.m. 4)

One group of aggressive children especially liked the Clean
Up Time, ritualizing it, attempting to control it vis-a-vis
other children, and drawing out the amount of time it took
them:

> Finally, it's clean up time. L., R., and E. love
> Clean Up Time -- they can now make lots of noise
> and destroy things (e.g. block edifices) and it's
> all legitimate. L. takes big blocks away from M.
> (a girl), saying, "I'll take this; it's too heavy
> for you." M. resists. The teacher then tells
> them they're taking too much time. L. replies,
> "We're taking a lot of time because we need a lot
> of time." (p.m. 4)

The desire for structure was also illustrated one
morning when the teacher changed her routine slightly,
so that the child had non-directed activity after the snack
instead of some directed group activity. The children appeared
listless and uncomfortable, some sitting on the couch or
floor without anything. The teacher commented, "They're
definitely floundering, because they had expected to be
directed at this time." (a.m. 4) The children are more
comfortable with what is "real" (as defined for them in this
particular situation by what is re-occurrent and given)
than with what is left up to their imaginations.

The children also seem cognizant of the greater
importance of actual role relationships than any roles they
might invent in play. Play is thus non-binding and
minimally involving, easily interrupted by the presence of
the teacher. Their relation to her is more important, more
real, than their relation to their own play. When a teacher
comes near a group or an individual engaged in some play

activity, the play was usually dropped in order to interact
with the teacher. Either the children would step out of
their play roles momentarily in order to point out to the
teacher what they were doing in the play, or they would begin
talking to her about something unrelated to their play and
play roles. This again is similar to an adaptation to
bureaucracy -- a bureaucrat should not get so involved in a
particular task of his own that he could not disengage him-
self from it in order to preserve his important role
relationships in the hierarchy of the organization. In the
nursery school, the child least committed to the success-
ful carrying out of the play activity is the most easily
distracted and disengaged, of course, while the leaders in
the play situation who are the most committed to it, are
the relatively least distracted by their real or external
role relationships.

On one occasion, for example, two girls were riding tri-
cycles around the big room, engaged in an extremely loose
play situation in which one was the mother and the other the
child, and the child was being threatened by a lion. The
actual activity consisted of riding the tricycles around
and around. When the teacher suggested a "boat ride," how-
ever, (i.e., rocking back and forth in a child-sized rowboat
in the room) both girls immediately got off the tricycles and
into the boat. (a.m. 4) This kind of occurrence has
several implications: it indicates both non-involvement in
their own play and preference for a structured activity
in which they can interact with the teacher -- a "real" role

relationship in the organization. The children often seek the teachers company, following her around, holding her hand, and attempting to sit next to her.

As would be expected from a reality orientation originating partly in the reduction of mystery, very little pretending actually occurred in play. The experimental world of the children as medicated by the nursery school has been presented as a rational, mundane place in which inexplicable things do not occur. Hence, pretending that things are other than they are in reality was not as common as would be expected in children of this age and not as frequent as the time available for it. Most play consisted of performing the activities directly suggested by the toys and equipment available: climbing on the climbing apparatus, sliding down the slide, riding a tricycle, painting, building with blocks, etc. What make-believe did occur in these situations was usually minimal and clearly subordinate to the real physical activity.

> Meanwhile, the climbing apparatuses are joined
> with a parallel board, which J. is striding
> across. He says to G.:"This is the sea and we'll
> get cut up by sharks." J. is among the most
> imaginative of the children. G. nods, but doesn't
> do anything about pretending, just continuing to
> walk across the board. Later, J. invents some
> pistols for them. But they don't really play,
> they're just climbing on the boards and being
> generally aggressive. (a.m. 4)

> Back downstairs, J., T., and G. are playing with
> puppet theater. They are hitting each other's
> puppets with their own; then, they begin to hit
> each other with the puppets. I tell them I want to
> see a show. They move the puppets by manipulating
> their hands a little, but without doing anything
> really analogous to activity or speaking. Finally,

> J. says, "Polly want a cracker" over and over.
> T. says, "Hello" in an imitation of a little squeaky
> voice. G. says nothing. G. says nothing. (a.m. 4)

Often when pretending or "make believe" did occur it

centered about real props, for example, in the doll house,

where there was a real sink with real dirty dishes, a

full sized cot, and much adult clothing that could be put

on. A girl deciding to be "mother," then, need not rely on

her imagination, or she need not perform unseen acts

challenging reality; she could actually wash dishes!

Even when there was some degree of reversal of reality,

the need for things to be reasonable was evident. The

following interchange indicates that the children do not

pretend at will; rather, the pretending must make sense in

terms of the game.

> M. says she doesn't want to be a dog. R. asks her
> what she does want to be. She says a human being.
> R. says she has to be an animal; she can't decide.
> Rabbit? Hamster? Guinea pig? Couldn't be a
> squirrel. Yes, I could but I'd have to be trained.
> P.: "Want to be a squirrel?" M.:"Squirrels run
> away, they're wild." P.: "You'll be a trained one.
> You'll obey us." M. says she wants to be something
> else. R.: "You've never been a pussycat! Hey L.
> you're taking some of our blocks and don't say
> you're not because you are!" P. fixes it: "L.,
> these will be ours. I like human beans betters than
> ANIMALS. M.: "I like guinea pigs better than
> human beans. R.: anyway, ships don't have animals."
> M.: "You could be taking them to the zoo." (p.m. 4)

The distinction between play and reality is very

apparent to the children, as a consequence of uncertainty

reduction, in which routines are well established and

activities clearly circumscribed in time and space. Play

is subordinated to the organization of the real world. In

order to adapt to the situation, then, the child must be
able to effect the transition easily and smoothly from one
activity with particular role expectations to another. He
must be able to drop his play at the end of a play period and
resume his role as a cooperating "child" in the nursery
school. Often, there is a sharp discontinuity between roles
adopted in play and role behavior expected in the real
situation. Hence, the less than total involvement in
play and its general non-bindingness is functional for
adaptation to the organizational world, where roles must be
dropped and picked up as the requirements of the organized
situation dictate. The transition of one child was recorded
in particular:

> When playtime is over, P., who was the leader and
> directed game activity, becomes just one more
> passive child following his teacher. He exhibits no
> conflict over this, no discomfort at having to play
> such a role, and he does not let his capacity to
> lead in one situation interfere with his capacity
> to follow in another. His leadership ability is
> held in abeyance, as it were until the appropriate
> time for its expression, i.e. another game when
> control is turned over by the teacher to the
> children. (p.m. 4)

The knowledge of the distinction between several roles
and the importances of each -- here the distinction
between play and reality -- is an important skill for an
organizational society in which an indivudal's roles are
often hierarchical and segmented.

The children's awareness of the distinction between
play and reality was evidenced again and again. For example,
on Purim (a Jewish holiday) the children were dressed in

costume, playing the part of characters in the Purim story.
The head of the nursery school committee came in to show
some slides. One girl runs up to her, introducing herself
with, "My name is Queen Esther. My real name is Annie...."
(a.m. 4) On another occasion:

> D. (male) and B. (female) are at a table. D is
> socking a small rubber mailman doll with a small
> doctor doll. B. is holding the nurse doll. She
> says she isn't fighting because she's a girl
> and likes to go walking. D., however, says he's
> trying to kill the mailman. He says that he
> isn't pretending, that he's really trying to kill
> him. B., on the other hand, explains to me: "He's
> really trying to kill him, but he's just pretending
> to really try to kill him." She indicates that
> she knows what pretending is and when it's done.
> So I ask her,"how does she know they're just
> playing?" And she replies, "Because it's rubber."
> (a.m. 4)

Knowledge of the distinction between play and reality,
as well as preference for structured situations and re-
lationships, is closely connected with the second aspect
of the Organization Child; the routinization of play.

The Routinization of Play

For children characterized by "reality" orientation on
the part of the children, it is not surprising that play it-
self becomes a matter of routine. Definite ways to play are
acknowledged. There are "rules" for procedural conduct of
play, just as there are rules in any organized situation.
There is a continuity of the roles adapted in play and a
persistence of structural patterns. It is important what
things are called, how things are allocated, and who is

"allowed" to take which play roles. That is, for a large number of the children in a large number of situations, the conduct of play and the adoption of roles are not considered a matter of personal preference; they are rather given by the particular organization of the play situation. This was made clear on one occasion in particular. Two girls were questioned about their game. One explained that the other is her child who died and turned into Mighty Mouse; the other added that she <u>didn't</u> die, but she <u>did</u> turn **into Mighty Mouse**. This observer asked Why? And the first child replied, "Well, because <u>that's</u> <u>how</u> <u>you</u> <u>play</u>." (a.m. 4) While this might seem like a perfectly reasonable and even somewhat obvious reply, it takes on importance in terms of the girl might have said. She might have attributed their behavior to personal preference or whim; e.g., she could have said, "This is what we like to do," or the common childhood reply, "Because." Again, she could have responded not to the "why" of the entire situation in general, but to a specific and particular "why" -- dying and turning into Mighty Mouse. Instead, she immediately attempted to explain the total activity, and she attributed it not to personal preference but to an institutionalized given --the way people play, the conduct of play.

The routinization of play involves the organized structuring of play activity. "How you play" is to name the play, designate objects in terms of the play, assign roles, and allocate various equipment, resources, and

territories. This organization becomes an end in itself, so
that it is unimportant what the specific play situation is
as long as it is set up properly. The children spend a
relatively great deal of time organizing and relatively
little time actually carrying out any activity for which they
have so carefully designed and organized a structure. For
example,

> The children are upstairs playing with games and
> puzzles. Two boys have the ten little rubber dolls.
> They spend 10 minutes arranging them so they get
> five apiece (one of each character: nurse, doctor,
> policeman, fireman, mailman; five Negro, five
> white), then lining them up and naming them by their
> role names, nurse, etc. Then, just as it would
> have seemed that they would have been ready to play
> with the dolls, they put them away. They've done all
> they wanted. (a.m. 3)

This aspect of the routinization of play is best
illustrated by a small group of five children in the after-
noon class (four boys and a girl, with a few occasional
joiners), who preferred to play together downstairs during
the first period rather than participate in the structured
artistic activity upstairs. This tradition was begun about
the beginning of the third month of nursery school, when the
teacher brought in some firemen's hats and asked if anyone
wanted to go downstairs to play fireman; these children vol-
unteered. For the next two-and-one-half months they would
play together for about thirty minutes downstairs, until they
were joined by the others for a free play session with all
the equipment. The group had access to big paper bricks
and wooden blocks and an occasional prop such as the firemen's

hats, but not the rest of the equipment and toys in the big room.

The group would spend most of its time getting organized. They first decided on a name for their play, what it would be; fireman, sheriff, castle, and ship were the typical ones. They would then designate who would be what in the situation -- the chief, the sheriff, the bad guys, the king, the princess, the guards, etc. Deciding on a play situation and on roles would often be lengthy and controversial, but it was one of the most important aspects of organizing and routinizing the play. The following inter-action occurred just before the time the children stopped playing together at every session. This situation well illustrates the amount of time the children spent just in structuring the play: allocating roles and getting organized. It was not enough to merely name the game and then start to play, with activity left to personal preference; roles had to be well defined, with the definitions rational and plausible. Structuring was important in itself. It went as follows:

> Downstairs, R. wants to play circus. P. doesn't
> want to play circus, he wants to play castle, be-
> cause, he says, "We only played castle once."
> They decide on castle. The components of the castle
> game are a princess, a king, a dungeon, and places
> to sleep. Not all of the roles or places have
> been labelled yet. They're building the castle
> now. R. puts a block down. M. says, "Don't push it
> into the dungeon!" R. says, "Oh, who cares!"
> (after all, it wasn't that game that HE wanted to
> play.) They build a secret passage. M decides she
> wants something to eat. R. suggests making a
> refrigerator. Finally, L., R., and E. get allo-
> cated roles as guards (P.'s the king, M's the

princess). R. says, however, "A real king only
has two guards. This is three." P. suggests they
be knights, with M. the princess. R. tells E. to
be a prince. P. says, however, to E., "If you
don't wanna, you don't needa." M. decides she
wants to play Cinderella. S. comes down and looks
longingly on the group. S. tells him to get out
of their way. The teacher (who wanders in and out)
tells P. to invite S. to play. P. lets him be a
prince or a knight, whichever he wants. An argument
ensues over whether E. is a guard. R. says yes,
and L. says no, there are only two guards. R.
says no, three -- "didn't you see Cinderella, Cuckoo?"
P. announces he's king again. M. says she's a
princess -- Cinderella. M. suggests S. take the
king (whatever that means). P. says, "No! I'm not
going to play! I'll go right upstairs and leave you
to clean up this." M. says angrily, "We all
built it." R. says, "This is not working out to
good, this game." P. suggests battleship. R.
says boat. P. says that a battleship is a kind of
a boat. R. insists, "I like boat BETTER." And
they start all over again choosing roles and de-
signating territories and things in terms of the
play. (p.m. 4)

Regardless of the name given to the play and to the

roles in it, the activity the group engaged in was remarkably

similar from session to session. They would spend most

of the time arranging blocks to form a "building" central

to the play (e.g., fire station, sheriff's office and jail,

castle, ship) and then endlessly rearranging them. They

would allocate territories within the "building" and spend

time fixing up their own. They would only occasionally run

around the room in the guise of whatever play situation it

was (going to put out a fire, fighting a war, chasing bad

guys, etc.) and then return to reorganize the building and

the game. The children were very concerned with organizing

things, getting them set up properly, and the organizing

elements of their play were nearly identical from session to

session. Regardless of what they were going to call it to-day, the structuring of the situation was the same. In fact, it was relatively easy for them to change the name of the play in the middle and still continue to carry out their organizing activities. (On one occasion the girl (M.) was asked what they were playing. She replied, "The same thing -- I forget the name of it." (p.m. 4) (Actually, they weren't calling it the same thing at that point.) All of their play situations operated on the same structural principles due to a kind of bureaucratic routinization. Sheriffs are no different from fire chiefs and captains in organizational hierarchies; fire stations are organized like ships and castles; chasing bad guys or fighting fires is similar organizationally to fighting wars. The important aspect here is the structural principle, not the specific name given to the play. This represents an important feature of bureaucracy: similarity of hierarchical positions across organizations, even though specific content of tasks may differ.

Playing is almost synonymous with organizing. The first time the active group played together, it was noted that after thirty minutes of officially playing fireman, all they had done was build a "station" that had desks and a refrigerator. The specific fireman aspect of the play was easily lost. A typical bit of organizing centers around places in the "building," a bureaucrat-like concern with the location and appointments of one's "office."

P. to L.: "Make me a typewriter desk... I got a
better idea. Let me make my own typewriter desk."
(It is interesting how the leadership role had
devolved on P. and how the first thing he wants is
a desk, a bureaucratic note.) L.: "I got a desk."
P. attempts to use L.'s desk (blocks) for a chimney.
L.: "Hey, that's my desk!" P.: "You don't need a
typewriter desk. Let's make a chimney." L. gives
in and replies: "I want to make a chimney." P.
points to a particular block and says, "No, this
is the chimney." At this point M. comes in and
says, "You have to make a place for me." R. echoes
her, "Make a place for me too." P. says to R.,
"No you get a fire engine" and pulls over a big
cart and to M. says, "That's your place, M." She
examines it and says, "I don't want that little a
place." P.: "Well, we'll make it larger." R.:
"Where's mine?" P.: "With M." R.: "I want mine
to be with L. P., can it be with L.?" P. replies,
"Yep." (p.m. 4)

Another type of organizing deals with roles and names:

Three girls go into the dollhouse and start to allo-
cate roles to play a game. M. is the big sister, H.
is the mother, and D. is M.'s twin. E. comes in
and asks if she can play, too. She wants to be the
little sister. M. says to D., "I'm fourteen. We're
both fourteen! What shall our names be?" P. comes
in and asks if she can play. M. decided to call H.
Patricia, "because that's my momm's name" (and H.
is the mother). M. decides her name will be
Michigan Linda." She says to D., "Sister, let's go
out and play." But D. is sweeping the floor, and H.
has picked up a doll baby. E. and P. are still
trying to think up names for themselves. Finally,
P. decides on John. L. then comes in and wants to
be Big Brother. (p.m. 4)

In the routinization of play the game becomes a kind of

institution. That is, personal preference should not be

exercised in play; approval for behavior, even if only the

most limited of gestures, must be obtained from the leader

or the person who founded the "institution." The structure

of the play has a kind of existence of its own, so that people

are no longer free to do anything they desire but must adjust

their behavior to the particular play situation already set

up. (Of course there were some exceptions to this.) For

example:

> A group of boys in the corner are playing with
> train tracks and cars. They have decided to use
> the tracks as a road. A girl comes over and tries
> to use trains on it. She is told, no trains on this
> railroad track today. Today this is a road. She
> accepts their dictum quite passively and brings a
> few buses. (p.m. 4)

Even the teacher seeks approval within the terms of play

for something she desires, such as having another child in-

cluded:

> A girl's feelings are hurt because L. and E. aren't
> letting her play. L. explains, "We're not letting
> her play because we're not having any trouble."
> The teacher points to a sign on the bulleting board
> and reminds them of the walk they took and how
> they saw a building being built and how many people
> were needed to help.
> L. says, "We just need two." and that ends the matter.
> (p.m. 4)

On another occasion the teacher told a child that if he

wanted to help, he would have to ask the child whose game it

was, "because he decided." The owner agreed, "I'm the one

who decided who is going to help me." (p.m. 4)

Play as a kind of institution is recognized to such an

extent that if a game is being played in a particular

territory, when other children enter that territory, they

often momentarily adjust their behavior to the game. This

occurred rather frequently. It was amazing how a particular

bit of imagery pervaded the entire group, no matter what

their activity. There seems to be an acceptance of the in-

dependent existence of an organized situation such that when

a child's activity intersects with the territory in which the

play was occurring, the child seems momentarily constrained

to accept the terms of the "organization" of the game. This

is especially true when children ride by a play setting on

bikes. When their activity crosses the game territory, they

momentarily participate in the game. This could be related

to an adjustment to the organizational world: people cannot

always exercise personal preference or the same behaviors

regardless of the setting; when they enter the realm of an

organization, they are, for the period of their stay, con-

strained to accept the organization's terms or definition

of reality and orient their behavior to it. A play

situation here is a kind of organization. This is the kind

of momentary adjustment to the play as institution that

occurred:

> T. has a big toy (i.e. non-working) hose at the door
> to the room, and he is talking about baths and
> showers. When M. walks past him, he takes on the
> game and terminology for the moment and participates
> in T.'s play, ducking the "shower" and saying,
> "Don't squirt me!" (a.m. 4)

> In the downstairs room, a boy drags out the stop
> signs and screams about them to the people of
> tricycles. From then on, whenever someone rides
> by, he stops in front of the stop sign. (a.m. 3)

> Three children go to play on the steps in the down-
> stairs room. They come into the territory of a
> fourth boy playing a lion; immediately, the games
> are merged, and the three run from the lion scream-
> ing in mock fear. (a.m. 3)

It is almost unimportant what particular behavior is

carried out, as long as it is justified in terms of the

organization of the play; it can never be justified on the

basis of personal preference. That is, behavior is justified

not "because I'd like it that way" but because "this can be

done within the play or is necessary for the play." Again,

even the teacher defers to the game:

> S. has been riding around the big room on the cart
> the play group has been using for a fire engine.
> P. notices and shouts, "Hey that's ours!" The
> teacher explains to him, "They went to put out a
> fire." L. replies, "But there's no fire and that's
> our fire truck!" The teacher finds another
> explanation in terms of the game: "They took it for
> and to get some gas." (p.m. 4)

On one occasion, the group that played together (mentioned

previously) was playing castle when the rest of the children

came downstairs and the equipment was brought out.

Evidently sliding on the slide seemed attractive to them.

But in keeping with the concept of play as institution,

they could not slide without first justifying it in terms

of their play, finding some rationale for it in terms of the

organization created. Finally,

> L., and R., and P. get the slide so positioned
> that they can consider it part of the castle game
> they had been playing; it is now proximate to the
> castle of blocks. They decide that water
> surrounds the slide and castle and that they must
> slide down the slide and swim back to the steps
> in order to get home to the castle. They now
> have a reason for sliding. They slide as they
> please and then justify it to the others in terms
> of the game, e.g., P. is now going up the slide
> instead of down because he's "swimming away."
> They are reluctant to let other children use the
> slide; after all, it has been incorporated into
> their game. (p.m. 4)

Even people cannot be included at whim, unless there is

some role for them within the play situation. One day, all

the castle game roles were allocated (king, princess, and

prince) but L. wanted to play, too. He could not play

unless there were some justifiable part for him to take.

Finally he arrived at a solution: he would be a "visiting

friend" who comes to live with them in the castle. (p.m. 4)

The following is another example of the necessity for

finding a rationale acceptable in terms of the established

play:

> By the playhouse, S. is picking up dolls. D. is
> fondling a man's tie and says, "I'll be the father."
> S. replies, "I don't want a father." (She is play-
> ing by putting the dolls in a carriage; that game
> doesn't require a father.) D. insists, "Yes you
> do." She asks, "Whose father will you be?" He
> says, "Yours." She replies, "I don't need a
> father." So he tries another tack: "You need a
> husband." She doesn't accept this because it doesn't
> suit her game. (a.m. 3)

Thus, the children can be doing almost anything at

all as long as some rationale can be found for it in terms

of the established and organized play:

> S. is riding around on a tricycle, something she
> particularly likes to do. A boy is playing a lion
> nearby, another a leopard. R. comes up to S.,
> saying, "Mother, there's a lion." S. puts her arms
> around R., then rides off on her bike. Later, R.
> calls to her, "Hey, Mother, the tiger's looking
> out." S., not coming near R., says, "Well, honey
> don't feel bad." R. runs away in "terror" and S.
> encourages her, saying, "Go go fast, honey, run,
> run ----- and I'll ride to work," giving herself
> some justification to ride the tricycle and dis-
> charging her "motherly" role while doing so.
> (a.m. 3)

If a particular behavior is set up for the play situation

that is unacceptable to an individual, he also must find

some rationale for not doing it in terms of the play. For

example, two girls, A. and N. were playing with dolls. A.

called out, "Nighttime!" indicating that the dolls should be

put to bed. N., however, did not want to put her dolls

away. But rather than state her personal preference, she

found a justification in terms of "night-time" for her to

keep her dolls: "Mine can stay up. They're eating supper."

(a.m. 4)

A final aspect of the routinization of play is the

continuity of play roles that is exhibited from one session

to another. Since the game is a kind of institution, roles

that are played are also fairly stabilized. There was

little recognition of the possibility that somebody could be

something one day and something widely different the next.

The general flavor of the role was preserved, if not the

specific character. In the downstairs play group, for

example, continuity was exhibited not only in the general

structuring of the games played but also in the roles taken

on within them: P. and R., the leader roles, L. the "sidekick"

or "second lieutenant" kind of role, E. a kind of quiet "third

lieutenant," and M. some kind of part that had to be taken

care of -- either a young animal such as a bunny or a

princess. Some other children exhibited an even more

remarkable continuation in the specific parts they took in

play, the two girls mentioned in the beginning of this

section in particular. For over three weeks they played some

very loosely defined variant on "Mighty Mouse," with N. as

Mighty Mouse and A. as Mighty Mouse's baby.

Although not acceded to by 100% of the children 100% of

the time, the notion of play as institution and the con-

tinuity of behavior within it was summed up as a general
principle guiding play be a remark of one of the children:
"Once you're making something, you can't change." (p.m. 4)

The routinization of play by the children is an indication
of potential for adaptation to the organizational society.
There is already a latent recognition that routinized
activities, such as in a bureaucracy, are more important
than personal preference; that things must be organized;
and that organization is an end in itself. To fit in, a
person must have a role in terms of the organization, he
must have a territory staked out and recognized by others.
The organization is permanent and stable and given; in-
dividuals are subordinate to it. Any behaviors that people
prefer must be justified in terms of the given, and any
unperformed organized expectations must also be explained in
terms of the givens of the organization. When an individual
enters an organization, he is constrained to accept its
terms. The children in the nursery school are becoming as
adept as bureaucrats at recognizing the importance of
routine and red tape, and at rationalizing personal
preference in terms of the organized set up. The latter is
also the kind of adjustment permitting the elimination of
personal preference and the maintenance of ascendancy.

The Elimination of Personal Responsibility

The aspects of trauma reduction concerned with the
elimination of coercion, guilt, and unpleasantness can be

associated with the next important aspect of the Organi-
zation Child: the elimination of personal responsibility.
In the structure of authority in this organization the
child is not coerced to do anything against his will, he is
not punished or chastized for deviant or antisocial acts
nor considered to have intended them, and he is not expected
to be motivated to do anything unpleasant. All of these
succeed in removing the source of responsibility for be-
havior from the individual and placing it squarely in the
hands of the organization. It is the organization's
responsibility to provide motivation by making things "fun,"
to ask for behavior of various kinds without coercion, and
to handle and control "mistakes" such as deviance. The
Organization Child, therefore need experience no inner
compulsions to be moral, to participate, to cooperate, to
keep the enterprise as a whole running smoothly; it's not
his responsibility. He must do only what is definitely
given by the rules and no more; he need do only what is
pleasing to him.

A major area in which the Organization Child does not
take responsibilityis for aggressive behavior. Since he
will not lose any esteem for it, and since the organization
absolves him of intention, he need experience no guilt. The
children quickly pick up the idea that their "wrongful" acts
are unintentional or in fact well-meaning, and used to
shed responsibility. For example:

L. and E. are playing the sandbox. E. begins filling

a truck that was sitting next to him. L. says,
"Hey, that was my truck." E. replies, "I just
borrowed it." (p.m. 4)

This lack of moral responsibility was even more

graphic in another situation:

R. and E. begin playing with blocks. One of R.'s
blocks falls over and smashes E.'s finger. R.
is quick to explain to E. and to all nearby: "I
didn't mean it, it was an accident, etc." When
teacher takes E. away, R. acts it out for P.,
laughing gleefully all the while. That is, he
topples the block, mimics E., etc. He shows P.
dramatically how funny it was, with no traces of
concern for E. and no guilt evident. (p.m. 4)

The children also exhibit little responsibility to

participate. They follow the general routine and rules of

the organization but seem to experience no need to do some-

thing unless they personally consider it fun. Thus, during

any story session there will usually be some children sitt-

ing apart from the other on the couch, not paying any

attention. They find that a legitimate response is "I

don't feel like it." When "what's in it for me" is un-

apparent or exhausted, they usually lose all interest and

withdraw from the situation. For example, one boy left the

group when it was having "show and tell." The observer

asked him why he didn't sit with the others and he replied,

"I've already had my turn." (a.m. 4) He saw no reason to

listen to the others - the only important thing was his turn.

The lack of moral compulsion to do anything more than

what is strictly given by the rules is similar to some

adult behavior in the organizational society: buck-passing

and alibing, for example, committing petty crimes such as

"borrowing" office supplies, doing just the minimum required
by a job. All of this is summed by the idea that the in-
dividual is not responsible to the organization; only vice
versa.

The Maintenance of Ascendancy

In the nursery school characterized by the reduction
of conflict and the elimination of situations in which
children can be superior to one another through the norms
of sharing and equality, how is it possible to establish a
superior social position if one has desires for ascendancy?
The Organization Child has adaptive techniques for the main-
tenance of ascendancy that again are remarkably similar to
adult patterns in the organizational society. These fall
roughly into four categories: "conversion," the game of
"one-upmanship," the valuation of private resources, and the
manipulation of the norms of sharing and equality.

"Conversion" refers to the taking over of attitudes
and perspectives of authority figures in the organization --
in the nursery school, the teacher. Since there are no
ascendant roles available for the child, he can identify
with the teacher and act as she would to the other children,
thus establishing a quasi-ascendancy. Conversion is a
pattern of adaptation originally noted by Goffman in total
institutions.[35] The fact that conversion occurs, although
not as a frequent pattern, in the nursery school is inter-
esting. It indicates that the elimination of conflict among
peers in a socializing organization may not only promote

cooperative enterprise but also produce identification with authority as a primary way of meeting ascendancy needs. Conversion applies to cases in which the children pointed out rules or correct ways to do things to other children, especially new ones. For example, the children are quick to point it out when the others take more than their share. On one occasion, the teacher had just finished indicating "the rules" of the sponge painting table to N. -- the yellow sponge goes into the yellow paint, etc. -- when a new girl arrived at the table N. then turned to the new girl and told her in a rather haughty manner what the "rules" of the table were. (a.m. 4) Another girl engaged in the same activity then exemplified conversion also, telling N. that she spilled some paint on the floor. Receiving no response, she told the teacher. (a.m. 4) The taking over of the teacher's perspective in order to gain ascendancy was occasionally even more obvious:

> Teacher tells them it's time to put the dominoes
> away. L.: "Hey, we have to put the dominoes back
> in the box. He directs the other children's play
> and makes a game out of putting them in the box.
> (p.m. 4)

R. in the afternoon class exhibited conversion more than any of the other children (he was one of the leaders in the downstairs play group) the teacher characterizes him an aggressive boy with leadership qualities, as "happy" when he's being the teacher." A typical example of R.'s conversion behavior:

> As the group settles down, he yells, "Would every-
> one please keep quiet!" Then he raises 2 fingers
> again. When there is some conversation, R. looks

around and raises 2 fingers. (p.m. 4)

A quite frequent ascendancy-maintaining pattern in the nursery school is the game of "one-upmanship." The children desire recognition of feats or possessions of various kinds. The important aspect of this is not achievement -- they do not seem to be attempting to meet internal standards -- but rather <u>recognition</u>, that someone, preferably an adult, give credence to their uniqueness and superiority. But it is important even to have this recognized by the other children. Activities would often turn into skill contests -- not particularly as attempts to beat the other children but as attempts to gain recognition of their own skills. For example, "Look how high I can jump!" "You know what I can do? I can...." 3) Times in which the whole group was brought together were usually occasions for the game of one-upmanship. Remarks would begin with "You know what I have? I have a ...." Another child would yell, "I have a ...." And soon the entire group would be revealing what they have. Similar interaction could occur over anything: activities, little brothers, cookies, pets. A frequent topic for one-upmanship was birthdays -- "My birthday is ...." "My birthday is ...." etc. When the teacher makes an announcement of some kind, this is also an occasion for one-upmanship. For example, one time before Christmas (Chanukah) the teacher announced that some of the children had made presents for their parents and that the rest would have a chance soon. Immediately a general cry arises, "I did!" "I didn't!" "When can I make one?" (p.m. 4) At the clay table one day,

for example, interaction consisted mostly of comparisons:
"Mine is creamier than yours." "Look at my hands." "Bet
you can't do that." (p.m. 4) One rather peripheral girl
sought recognition not to be one-up but to be anything at all.

> K. is still peripheral. She's next to me on the
> couch. She asks me, "Do you know me?" I say. She
> says, "Do you know Jonathon? (her baby brother,
> born recently). Do you know my mommy?" (a.m. 4)
> The ultimate in one-upmanship was exhibited by one
> aggressive boy.

> It's now group time. Carol has them sit in front of
> the piano and count, probably to calm them down.
> Competition grows around the counting however, and
> the kids are arguing about who can count higher
> than whom. "I can count to ...." etc. Finally J.,
> who has a remarkable store of adult concepts,
> settles it: "I can count to infinity!" (a.m. 4)

A corollary aspect of one-upmanship is not only the
attempt to gain recognition, but also not to lose "face" or
position when it is about to be established. For example,

> M. insisted a certain toy was called by a different
> name than one of the boys said. They argued it
> back and forth and finally M. said, "Well that's
> the way it is on MY T.V. You must have a different
> T.V. from me." (p.m. 4)

Protecting self as knower is also important. Typical
interactions of this sort include:

> Someone to L.: What are you making? L.: What are
> YOU making? 1st: "I asked you first. (p.m. 4)

> N. to girl next to her: "Do you know my name?"
> (they're at clay table) Girl: "Yes, but I'm not
> going to tell you (p.m. 4)

In the latter case, the girl not only saves face but moves
one-up by having a secret at all.

Associated with one-upmanship is the valuation of
private property, of territory, and of one's own niche in

the organization. The children's adaptation is analogous
to that of adults in the organizational society, via the
"consumption orientation" of the other-directed man[36] and the
concern with symbols of status noted in American society.
The routinization of play indicates the extent to which
territory, physical position, and associated symbol of
prestige are valued in the game. Just as for adults in
organizations and communities, the size and location of
one's "place" office, house, official parking space, opera
seat are symbols of prestige, means by which ascendancy can
be maintained. Not only is place a symbol of the belonging
and prestige of each child, but it can also be used more
directly to maintain ascendancy. In the group who was play-
ing together downstairs, for example, P. was usually the
leader for the first months. Often he would build a seat
for himself in the block building that was higher than any-
one else's. He would then remain in that seat for much of
the play, shouting orders and directing activity. Not only
was his place a symbol of ascendancy, he used it as the seat
of his authority. In addition to places in play positions
were also valued in other situations. The most desirable
places were usually the ones closest to teachers, at group
sessions, at juice, at naps and on walks. Here ascendancy
is maintained by a prestigious place and also by one associ-
ated with an authority figure. Jockeying for position would
often occur at thest times. It was desirable also to be
next to certain of the well-liked children or to one of the

child's own favorites. Saving seats at juice and places at naps occurred even at this age.

Because of the norm of sharing in the nursery school, a high value becomes attached to the only things which the children do not necessarily have to share: their own poss- essions brought from home. Such possessions are exhibited with pride and while the other children may be allowed to handle them temporarily, it is also clear that they belong only to their owner and are given only at his good grace. He may take them back at any time. For example:

> Dumbo is being played for the second time, and
> there is a small group standing around the
> the record player, listening. Except then the
> boy who brought the record "for the class to hear"
> decides he doesn't want it to play anymore! So
> he takes it off the record player. No teacher is
> nearby, and none of the children object. Tacit
> agreement that you're free with your own poss-
> essions.   3)

This handling of private property could be taken even further, so that the child not only retained control of his possessions and received credit for them, but he also gained ascendancy points "by giving up service to the norms of sharing and equality. This technique can be generally termed manipulation of the norms. The following is a striking illustration of the handling of valued property and norm manipulation to gain ascendancy. The interaction occurred among four girls. E. was a four-year-old who was more of a follower than a leader and longed for attention from the other children. One day E. brought some seashells from home. The girls were sitting on a mattress.

They have some small shells and a box of Kleenes
jrs. The shells and tissues are E.'s. E. is
giving orders. To L. folding the tissues, she says,
"Don't take too many." L. answers, "Yes, because
they're yours." E.: "Because I promised Mommy I
wouldn't take too many." M. tosses some of the
shells that she has been sorting. E. says, "Hey,
they're delicate!" Now they're picking out the
pretty ones. E. tosses some up in the air, saying,
"Happy New Year!" (NOTE that E. is now doing the
very thing she just told M. not to do.) They all
toss some up saying Happy New Year. But now E.
says, "Hey, they'll break!" (It's all right for her
to do certain things because the're hers, but it's
not all right for the others.) Then E. "dispenses
favor" -- she tells L. and M. that, well, it's
all right, you can play with them. K. who has been
watching on the sidelines, crawls next to E. and
picks up a shell (probably thinking E. has in-
cluded everyone when she said it was all right to
play with her shells). But E. makes her give it
back, and says something about K. bothering them.
K. goes back to the stuffed chair she had originally
been on, still watching them. Now E. gives one
shell to each of them to "keep." E. gives the shell
to L. with the comment, "It sparkles. That stone
sparkles." (As if to point out what a big favor
she's doing L. and how she has her best interests at
heart, but also making it clear that it's she, E.,
who's doing the selecting and dispensing.) But
L. points out another shell she rather have. E.
says, Okay. L. asks, "But what will you mommy
say?" E. answers, "Oh it's okay. This is only
PRETEND keep. Okay? If you really keep them my
mommy will be mad." M. jumps on the mattress and
it scatters the shells. She laughs. E. says, "Oh,
those are MINE!" and gathers them up. M. B. comes
over to E. to see the shells. She lets him, but
says that he can't keep them. (a.m. 4)

There are many interesting aspects of this interaction:

1. E. gains leadership position by virtue of possession of

resources. 2. She takes on a proprietary role, makes a

point out of letting them it's all due to her. She's

magnamimous, they can keep them, in order to tie them to her,

make them owe her something, allegiance, for instance. But

of course, it's only pretend keep, because of E.'s need to

answer to her mother. 3. She makes sure that all good
things that come from the shells are due to E. and her
generosity, and all bad things (i.e., can't throw them cause
they're delicate; can't keep them) are due to E.'s mother,
a perfect scapegoat (even though it's undoubtedly true
that E.'s mother gave her orders) because she is not present
in the situation, but is some unknown yet powerful force, as
a mommy is to other children. 4. E. emphasizes her pro-
prietary position by doing things herself with the shell
that she won't allow the other to do.

The sharing norm was often used for the best advantage
of the manipulating child in order for him to gain
ascendancy and control. The goal is not sharing but total
control or possession. Reference to the norm of sharing is
only a means to this end.

        L.: "Who will give me dirt?" (4 times)
        There's no answer.
        P.: "Let me decide."
        R.: "E., YOU'LL have to give him dirt."
        E.: "NO!"
        R.: "Want me to tell?"
        L.: "I'm going to tell."
        So E. reluctantly gives him some of his sand from
        his truck. (p.m. 4)

The children prey on others' acceptance of a norm in order
to maintain ascendancy.

In addition to manipulation of the norm of sharing,
there is also a manipulation of the norm of equality. This
norm is almost directly opposed to ascendancy. So the child
interested in superiority or domination plays up service to
the norm. Appears to be obeying it, but retains control in

subtle ways. That is, he must make it appear that every-
one is equal, make it appear that the norm is being upheld,
while still maintaining his own domination of the situation.
This is a rather subtle and adult-like technique. **It is not**
surprising that only a few children could use it. **The leader**
of the play group, P., for example, usually occupied **the**
official leadership position also. But this would **occasion-**
ally be disputed   other members of the group **who desired**
to exercise their equality. P. **would** have to handle **this**
situation -- officially bowing to the norm of equality **but**
unofficially maintaining ascendancy. The following **inter-**
action centered around playing battleship (Captain **is the**
official control position in a battleship):

        L.: "I'm the boss!"
        R.: "You were the boss last time.
        L.: "you were.
        R.: "Liar."
        M.: "There won't be a boss!"
        P. then solves the controversy:"R. you'll be in
        charge. L. will be the boss, and I'll be the
        captain." (p.m. 4)

Thus, everyone has an official leadership position, **but P.**
is still in actual control.

    R., an aggressive boy in this same group **whose con-**
version behaviors have already been mentioned, **was partic-**
ularly good at manipulating and getting around **the norm of**
equality to maintain ascendancy. For example, R. **would**
attribute any inequality to the game and not **to his own**
personal dominance; that is, things must be done **as R. says**
because that's the way it has to be in the game. **If a child**

wants to play, he must obey R. For example:

> Downstairs, R., L., E., and M. have built a
> structure of the two kinds of bricks and are
> engaged in building it up and kicking it down.
> R. tells M.: "You better or you'll be fired out
> of the game. (Note the word "fired," an occupation-
> ally-oriented word.) R. destroys the structure by
> kicking it and yelling Bingo! Another Bingo! All
> join in wildly. M. is dragging over some more
> bricks. R.:"M., you stop it -- we don't need
> stairs. Stop it or you're fired." When M. seems
> to be obeying him, R. says: "You can play again."
> (p.m. 4)

R. was also very good at taking over control of other

children's play -- i.e. substituting his own control for

theirs -- while still preserving the fiction of equality.

He would usually do this by asking them if they didn't

think it would be better to do it another way -- which of

course was R.'s way. He would continue to supposedly defer

to their wishes, when actually it would be R.'s wishes

being asserted. For example, one day R., with L. and E.

in tow, descends on J., playing with the small wooden blocks

and train tracks. R. takes over by initiating ideas but

referring to J. for approval, e.g. "Shall I put this here?"

Gradually it becomes R.'s game, so much that R. kicks over

what they have built and J. doesn't challenge his right to

do so. (p.m. 4) (R. of course used other leadership

techniques of a more direct and less manipulative nature,

such as physical force or its threat, and warmth and approv-

al.)

Thus, in an organization in which conflict, competition,

and achievement possibilities are particularly minimized,

the maintenance of ascendancy takes four bureaucrat-like forms: conversion, the game of one-upmanship, the valuation of territory and property, and the manipulation of norms of sharing and equality. Many of these techniques can be seen as an adaptation to organizational society, for they bear interesting similarities to some adult patterns.

V. BEYOND THE ORGANIZATION CHILD: CONCLUSIONS

A specific model has been proposed to account for the structure, practices, and product of an American nursery school:

THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY	THE NURSERY SCHOOL	THE ORGANIZATION CHILD
dominant social pattern-bureaucracy	psyciation pattern-trauma reduction	
psyciation goal - eliminate irrational emotion	limit uncertainty	reality orientation
	limit strangeness	routinization of play
	limit mystery	
	limit coercion	
	limit guilt	elimination of personal responsibility
THE NEO-FREUDIAN ETHIC	limit unpleasantness	
irrationality defined as anxiety, from trauma	limit conflict	maintenance of ascendances

Within this analysis, however, several things are deliberately not attempted. First, the model is analytic rather than descriptive; it portrays not a summation of the behavior of every child in every situation, but rather a conceptual child in a conceptual situation. Specific children may or may not conform to the patterns outlined, even though the patterns themselves exist. In fact, we would expect this, for many other influences besides the nursery school shape the empirical children's behavior, while our conceptual child exists on his abstract plane blissfully free from empirical contamination. For the same reason, it is difficult to make any predictions about the empirical children's adult behavior, for this depends on the extent to which later experiences are consistent with nursery school.

Second, the model is selective rather than comprehensive; it chooses only variable aspects of the child to analyze, variable in terms of dimensions depicting the school. For example, it is proposed that the organization child is un-imaginative and non-innovative in his play, play activity varying with nursery school structure. But this is not to say anything about his imagination or creativity in other areas, such as art; this is unrelated to dimensions select-ed for the school and therefore not an object of analysis. In fact, the child may be highly creative artistically and scientifically while just as non-creative organizationally; the two bear no necessary conceptual relation in terms of this paper's model. From this analysis, inference can be made only about elements variable in terms of a theoretical system. Third, the model is scientific rather than didactic; it avoids value judgments about the utility or the disir-ability of trends noted.

To report the discovery of "organization men" in nursery school is not the only intent, however. In so doing, this paper delineates behavioral patterns which may be generalized to other kinds of settings -- particularly the routinization of play and the maintenance of ascendancy. In accounting for the existence of the Organization Child, the analysis developed the concept of psychiation or experience-management as a way to characterize social structures with orientational consequences for individuals. If psychiation patterns in the nursery school are similar to those in bureau-

cracy, it is not surprising that the child should be oriented bureaucratically. Trauma reduction -- the elimination of irrational experience (such as uncertainty, mystery, guilt) -- can be viewed as a psychiation pattern associated with bureaucracy and thus used as a variable for further empirical investigation. The concept of psychiation in general can generate both theorizing and research. As the social organization of personal experience, the concept presents the possibility of analyzing social organization according to dimensions relevant to emotional experience. Psychiation analysis asks how social systems take account of the human properties of the people in them, and how human characteristics (emotion, psychological experience, symbolic meanings) are involved in social systems, by characterizing them in terms of potential personal experience. This creates the potential for a "sociology of the emotions" or a "sociology of personal experience." We might compare social systems according to the experiences possible in them and note the mechanisms by which certain kinds of systems shape the emotional potential of members. In addition, psychiation permits us to see individual involvement in social organization as concerning much more than roles. Here we may use not only roles as a unit of social structure but also human emotion and experience: particular organizational phenomena described by the kind of personal experience they make possible. Finally, for the study of socialization this paper indicates that it is

possible to analyze child behavior as a function of the
structure of social situations, without necessarily con-
sidering individual psychodynamics.

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4. Emile Durkheim, Suicide, translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951.

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8. Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in Kurt H. Wolff (editor), The Sociology of Georg Simmel, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 409-424.

9. Maurice R. Stein, Arthur J. Vidich, and David Manning
    White (editors), Identity and Anxiety, Survival of the
    Person in Mass Society, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press,
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10. Simmel, Ibid.

11. LaPiere calls this the "Freudian ethic." (Richard T.
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    thing of a misnomer, since Freud's own writings main-
    tain a radical bent and a skepticism about the ability
    of society to ever meet individual needs. (See
    Philip Rieff, Freud: the Mind of the Moralist, New
    York: The Viking Press, 1959.) Freud shows a fundamental
    ambivalence toward work, authority, etc. which do not
    quite approve of bureaucratic trends. (See David
    Riesman, Selected Essays From Individualism Reconsidered,
    Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, pp. 174-
    302.) It is rather the neo-Freudians (Horney, Fromm,
    Erikson, Sullivan, etc.) who transform this somewhat
    radical position into a more conservative acceptance of
    increasing bureaucratization, as pointed out by Wrong,
    op. cit., and Marcuse (Herbert Marcuse, Eros and
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    York: Vintage Books, 1962, pp. 217-251) For this reason
    the ideology will be termed neo-Freudian. Of course
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process of popularization.

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23. LaPiere, op. cit.

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25. For an important early theoretical statement of this, see Max Weber.

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