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Role Management:

A Programmatic Statement

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The document which follows is stimulated by a sense that current conceptual frameworks in sociology do not "cover" or adequately extend to a range of raw experience that we, in fact, very often struggle to discuss. Put very crudely, this raw experience concerns the organization of day-to-day dealings in natural settings. Despite the enormous amount of work generated under the small group rubric and kindred labels, one is left with the sense that he still knows very little about how people manage to operate in a world of mundane but fateful contingencies.

Perhaps sensing such a gap, we, as sociologists, oscillate between purely descriptive and unanalytic materials and very abstract statements.

The present document attempts to move somewhere between concreteness and abstraction, and toward a sociology of everyday life that embodies the virtues of both--substance and conceptualization--while avoiding their limitations--irrelevant, undisciplined detail and substantive vagueness.

THE PROBLEM:

ORDER IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Although phrased, perhaps even disguised, in a variety
of ways, one of the most popular but unapplauded and unap-
preciated concerns in sociology appears to be that of the
social order--social disorder continuum, conceived as a "de-
pendent variable." We find the social order--disorder prob-
lem posed at the level of total societies, institutions, com-
munities, organizations, groups, encounters and persons, and
it might, indeed, be said to be the central problem of soci-
ology. From the perspective of the sociology of knowledge
it is not peculiar that social scientists and others should
be so concerned for, at least in the Western tradition, order
has been, in fact, highly problematic.

The "problem of order" itself can be phrased in a vari-
ety of ways: what are the requisites of a social system;
what are the factors affecting order and disorder; how are
systems maintained; what are the sources, conditions and
types of social change in various kinds of units, etc.

The answers to these variously phrased questions have
tended to move in the directions said to have been enunci-
ated by Hobbes and Locke. Leaving aside the excess baggage
of that dispute, the contrast between the two and the tradi-
tions tracing themselves to these men, appear to revolve
around the degree to which order-disorder is postulated as
problematic. Locke begins with a state of nature in which

rational men apprehend their joint interests, so that order
becomes a marginal and solvable problem. Hobbes begins with
a state of nature in which selfish men act only for themselves,
so that order becomes a central and continuing problematic
matter.[1]

Skipping over the question of why order is more or less
problematic, we can focus on the directions that analysis
takes depending upon which degree of the problem one assumes.

One of the more prominent recent directions representing
a Lockeian stance can be seen in the work of those theorists
who have recommended as useful the concepts of social system,
social norm and social value and their combinations: the
norms of the system and the values of the system. Allied
recommended concepts have included socialization, social con-
trol and deviance; making possible such phrases as socializa-
tion to the norms and values and deviance from the norms and
values.

These and other notions are combined, then, into a con-
ception of a system maintaining its equilibrium. The ana-
lytic quest becomes that of isolating and examining components
of the system in terms of the contribution they make to its
equilibrium, whether this equilibrium is postulated as stable,
dynamic, moving, oscillating, unstable, partial, etc.[2]

The products of this quest give prominence to values
and norms as contributors to stability and to socialization
(inculcating commitment to values and norms) and social control

inculcating compliance to values and norms) as mechanisms
through which order and stability are accomplished. Indeed,
the problem of order seems essentially solved, or at least
rendered highly marginal, via the mechanisms of socializa-
tion to norms and values. Consider, for example, one of
the more recent statements of Professor Parsons, this one
on the stability of societies:

> The maintenance of a normative order requires that
> it be implemented in a variety of respects; there
> must be very considerable--even if incomplete--com-
> pliance with the behavioral expectations established
> by the norms and values. The most basic condition of
> such compliance is the internalization of society's
> values and norms by its members, for such socializa-
> tion underlies the consensual basis of a societal
> community.[3]

Problems of order that nonetheless occur, become strains
in the system which must be reduced, rechanneled or isolated
by various mechanisms, extant and generated. The existence
or persistence of "strain" has to do, in turn, with a lack
of "integration" of the system, as Professor Parsons tells us
again about societies:

> An intermediate society is [in Parsons' evolutionary
> scale], in a sense, equivalent to the integration
> of a large number of primitive societies into one
> societal system. This presupposes an integration at
> the cultural level...
>
> [In] the advanced intermediate empires..such integra-
> tions have been incomplete...In Rome and the Islamic
> empires,...ethnic and local particularities...
> especially failed to be fully integrated into the
> political and legal structure of the empires, either
> as effectively "dominated" or, still more, as autono-
> mously differentiated units.[4]

Integration itself appears, in significant measure, to refer to the degree of socialization to "the society's"[5] norms and values, bringing us full circle with these conceptions as a solution to the problem of order.

The peculiar feature of concepts like system, value, norm and the like, is the implicit, sometimes explicit, image they suggest of social relations as being ordered under an over-arching, embracing, clearly delineated scheme of shared and accepted understandings. The "system" becomes a kind of solid, albeit amorphous, object that operates in the manner of a mechanical or biological system. It is a set of parts, articulated as though designed, that carry out functions.

I should like to suggest that the Lockeian postulate and an answer like the one just sketched perform an unfortunate short circuit in sociological analysis. Note that I say short circuit, I do not suggest that they head off in the wrong direction. To be sure, there is a significant sense in which the problem of order is reasonably solved through a shared normative order to which participants are socialized and committed by the entanglements of social control.

All such devices, to the degree they exist, seem to me, however, at best, simply to set the stage or to provide a backdrop against which the problem of order as an unsolved, continuing issue is again posed. We need to quarrel with various answers along Lockeian lines to the degree that these formulations become, for us, a point

at which to rest our analytic efforts. The danger lies in such frameworks dulling our sensitivity to, and capacity for, dealing with problematic order of a character so spectacular and obvious and close to us that we may, like the famous fish who was the last to discover water, fail to see it at all.

Beginning, as Professor Parsons once did,[6] with a plurality of actors pursuing a variety of ends from behind a range of labels by means of which they identify and respond to one another, we may ask how their activities are integrated in such a way that something we can call an orderly character is produced.

Even assuming the existence of the fundamental determinants summed up under the rubrics socialization and social control, we have only laid down some conditions that make order possible, rather than certain or already determined.

We have only to examine the way action and order appear within the perspective of almost any set of fully socialized actors to find quite clearly that to them action and order are highly problematic. Despite their socialization and their apprehension of rules and controls, they, in a wide variety of situations, still perceive courses of action and situations as ambiguous and without sufficient guidelines. They display anxiety and consternation over exactly what step to take next, whether it be what to say next in an encounter (if anything); what to do

exactly in the next hour; how exactly to do it; or how to carve out the contours of a day, a week, a month. Experientially, action, and thus order, are problematic.

It is here, in the problematic character of action to actors in encounters, daily rounds, and social positions that we find the unsolved problem of order. We might call this the <u>proximate problem of order</u>, to distinguish it from the more encompassing variety so well pointed to by Professor Parsons and others.

The stunning miracle of daily social life is that somehow, most actors, most of the time, manage to muddle through, as it were, so that social life moves in a relatively ordered manner.

Again, to be satisfied merely to say that actors comply to internalized norms and respond to social control is to beg the question. There are many norms, many of which are contradictory, and there are a plethora of situations that have a moot relation to the best intended attachment to, and apprehension of, norms and controls. Social actors are jugglers in a frightening social game. Part of the job of the sociologist is to decipher the principles and patterns of this juggling by being attuned to the small but numerous occurrences of disorder and near disorder that constantly occur.[7]

It is in such a juggling game, too, that we can begin to see that norms and social controls are more points of reference, items to be taken into account in the

construction of action, than they are properties of systems
that determine action. They are, rather, statements and
arrangements which, expressing and serving some faction's
interests, are phrased as "system interests", more per-
suasively to promote claims for legitimacy.

*   *   *

A question of the magnitude of the order-disorder
problem, is not, of course, directly or easily amenable
to a meaningful or useful answer. Its proportions must
be reduced to manageable units and more researchable
patches of questions. Such reduction requires a set of
decisions pertaining to the specification of analytic
units and the operationalization of independent and de-
pendent variables.

AN APPROACH:

SOCIAL ROLE AS A POINT OF REFERENCE

It is by now conventional to enunciate laments over
that concept called role for having promised so much but
delivered so little. For many years social scientists,
almost across the board, have touted the notion as <u>the</u>
fundamental unit of social organization, as something
like the brick out of which the mansion of society is
to be constructed, and, as the crucial link between so-
cial organization and individual dynamics. They have
sensed, however, that the actual study of roles has
not added up to a constructed model of the social house.[8]
And, one might suppose that the disappointing pay-off

indicates the concept's limited usefulness.

I should like to suggest, however, that the concept's difficulties might reside in sociologists not taking the notion seriously enough while venerating it too much. Perhaps structurally and situationally-oriented investigators have allowed dispositionally-oriented workers to dominate its use, thus giving the literature its peculiarly psychological character, (e.g., role-perception, role satisfaction and the like). While acknowledging that social organization may be usefully conceived as a complex set of interrelated roles, in actually studying social organization the organizationally-minded sociologists have been, perhaps, too much in a hurry to build up portraits of social organization in terms other than role-units carefully conceived and closely scrutinized. The problem with the concept may not lie in the notion itself, then, but rather in the questions that have been asked in its terms.

The suggestion here is that sociologists view the concept in terms of the problem of order, a problem that has, as will be detailed, an organizational or structural character.

Given the plethora of definitions of role, what general meaning is useful to assign to it? We may provisionally conceive the concept as designating the set of all those linguistic terms which themselves designate patterns of individual activity or physical characteristics; on the basis of which actors centrally organize the manner in which they

organize their own action and their action toward one another.

Leaving aside the question of whether all roles are revealed in the vocabularies of participants, it is necessary to call attention to the fact that those terms that are points of centrally organizing action are, with very high frequency, labels appearing in the vocabularies of participants.

By recognizing this at the outset, we can not only explicitly exploit this recognition but by-pass those useless discussions of what roles "really are," which assume that somewhere--in the mind of God perhaps--there exists a pristine sociological conception.

Roles are <u>claimed</u> labels, from behind which people present themselves to others and partially in terms of which, they conceive, gauge and judge their own past, current, and projected action. And roles are <u>imputed</u> labels toward which and partially in terms of which, people likewise conceive, gauge and judge others' past, present and projected action.

Such a conception of role brackets together the standard array of ways in which people are aware of, and respond to, one another. These range from the ancient and sometimes felt to be fundamental labels based on sex, age, kinship, ethnicity, and territoriality over to designa-
tions felt to be of a more transitory sort, namely, organiza-
tional affiliations, organizational offices and occupations. We would want to include with the latter set the so-called argot roles that grow up in organizations and those loosely organized creatures called social worlds or social milieux

(e.g., the butch or femme of the lesbian world, among a multi-
tude of such names and worlds).

A conception of role as the fundamental unit of social
organization merely provides a global concept in terms of
which materials can be organized in a general way in order
to approach the proximate problem of order. At one level of
abstraction "above" role lies social organization per se,
considered as a system of interrelated roles. In order
meaningfully to accomplish that one step "up" in ana-
lytic level, let us consider first moving "down" one analyt-
ic level, a step that will allow us to consider roles in
more detail while retaining a focus upon organization. This
task becomes somewhat tricky because of the ease with which
one can fall into the pure social-psychology of roles, as
distinct from a concern with micro-organization. Our task
must be that of distinguishing smaller units of social or-
ganization as components of roles.

Adopting the perspective of someone, some place in
particular, behind a role label, the world stretches before
him in terms of the immediate present, in terms of the day,
and perhaps in terms of weeks and months. First and fore-
most, reality extends before him in terms of the immediate
present and the current day. From behind that label a
course of events must be constructed; other persons hiding
behind other labels must be dealt with and managed; an or-
derly flow of activity must be negotiated.

The concrete units of this negotiation for order seem usefully viewed in terms of the units phenomenologically problematic to label-wearers; namely immediate face-to-face co-presence or what we might loosely call encounters;[9] the daily constructed sequence of such encounters or the daily round; and activity in the perspective of weeks or months-- the more or less foreseeable future--which might be called positions.[10]

At any moment, conduct may be attuned to each of these three levels and judgments may be simultaneously made as to the repercussion for each of them. Each level reciprocally influences events at each of the other levels.

While larger and more long-term organizational policy or strategy (i.e., position management matters) may be the topics and themes of witnessed encounters and daily rounds and provide the substance of exchange and negotiation, such matters, it must be emphasized, are hardly the sole units of organization. Issues of formal organizational life, in particular, may color the labels that people wear and furnish topics of dispute, but they represent only one kind of problematic order and are perhaps only secondary, via their actual existence only in a multutide of encounters and daily rounds. It can indeed be suggested that the tendency for analysts of formal organizations to take the substantive issues of an organization (its position

management issues) as the primary focus of organization anal-
ysis has been a hindrance in coming to grips with organiza-
tions as forms of human association. The on-going overt (and
covert) disputes of formal organizations are so readily dis-
covered that it becomes all too easy to attend merely to mat-
ters of positional management to the exclusion of these other
fundamental units of organized and organizational action.

As a guide to studying social organization, the basic
units of data collection can be suggested as encounters, daily
rounds and positions. Formal organizations, in particular,
seem usefully conceived as a set of actors who see themselves
as reasonably carrying on relations under some common label
(the name of the organization), each of whom has encounters,
daily rounds and positions to negotiate and interdigitate with
other labels. By looking over everybody's shoulders simulta-
neously, so to speak, and deciphering the conditions which
make possible so many interdigitated and orderly managed
roles, we can perhaps begin to state the processual conditions
of the miracle of everyday social order.

THE ROLE-PROBLEM CIRCUIT

We began with the broad statement of a problem; namely,
the proximate problem of order. Proceeding then to take the
concept of role as a basic point of reference, some more de-
tailed units of analysis have been discriminated. Broadly
speaking, we have worked "down" from the most abstract of
concerns to somewhat "lower level" units of inquiry. We
shall now explicitly skip over the level of abstraction

just "below" encounters, daily rounds, and positions (i.e.,
strategies and tactics of role management) and move directly
to the most concrete and "lowest" level conceptual unit, "the
role-problem circuit."

In so skipping I do not mean to skirt any issue or to
sluff off a problem. Quite the contrary. The precise aim
of this document is to set forth a set of units that will
make possible the analysis of that never-never-land that
lies, conceptually, between encounters, daily rounds and
positions at one level of abstraction and role-problem
circuits at the lowest level of abstraction. The notion
of the role-problem circuit is hopefully a unit partly,
in terms of which, one can build up a picture of the sub-
stantive and formal character of the strategy and tactics
of role management.

The conception of the role-problem circuit may be
viewed, like Gaul, in three parts.

    1. Contingencies and problems flow toward role-
labels at a bewildering rate and in enormous variety. In
order to make sociological sense of this rate and variety
as it occurs in natural settings, one can adopt the induc-
tive strategy of initially cataloging what appear to be
"problems" and dilemmas in the phenomenology of label-bearers
(and within each of the unit levels). Such "close up" top-
ics might be called proximate role-problems. They form the
moment-to-moment, daily minutiae of social life upon which
the larger configurations of social organization rest.

Cataloging of this kind is of interest as the raw material from which structurally informed scrutiny can derive fruitful classes of role-problems to be employed in the broader analysis of order.

A comment must be made on the relation of "role-problems" and sociological problems. A first principle we should consider is that things considered problematic are somebody's role problems. Problematic affairs do not emerge pristine and in a vacuum; items are always a problem from some point of view and for somebody or some stratum. As noted above, the problem of order is hardly or simply an academic toy played with by professional intellectuals or sociologists. It is generated out of a tradition where order was, and is, a role-problem for powerful and would-be powerful persons, especially political leaders. It is justified as a sociological problem only to the extent that it is highly germane to everybody's roles and to the extent that it represents a very abstract statement of what almost everyone experiences in enormously more concrete ways.

The feature of interest about many so-called sociological problems is that they are some stratum's particular role problems that have been embraced by social scientists as their professional and scientific problems. The large literature on worker productivity, worker morale and organizational leadership, for example, represents a taking-on of managerial role-problems as scientific problems. This is

especially apparent in the interest shown by some sociol-
ogists in "increasing" each of the items just mentioned.

The point is obviously not, however, that sociol-
ogists should avoid studying role-problems. The moral
pitch is, rather, that they might avoid identification
of a role's problems as the perspective from which they
construct analysis. To identify role-problems is not
to identify with the problems of a role. Thus the study
of worker productivity, worker morale and the like, is
more properly the analysis of role struggles over them
rather than the production of designs for attaining
managerially desired states of affairs. It must be recog-
nized, of course, that insofar as what actually goes on
in the world reveals "effective" procedures, then knowledge
of this kind is a by-product.

2. The second third of the circuit concerns
the strategy used by the role-player as a device for coping
with a role-problem. The terms "strategy" and "coping" de-
note that class of actions intended to solve, contain, fore-
stall or master the role-problem. Again proceeding inductive-
ly and in conjunction with role-problems, one can aim for the
development of classes of strategies and their equivalence
or non-equivalence in the quest for order.

3. The final third of this circuit deals with
the actual order-disorder outcome of coping strategies.
Although I should like to avoid the terms "success" and
"failure" in this connection (because of their normative

The everyday practical practitioner of coping strat-
egies is, in his own way, much like a scientist in that he
is engaged in the continuous "testing" of propositions about
the order-disorder effects of coping strategies relative to
a given role-problem. (He is, however, unlike a scientist
in that he may confront a relatively narrow range of prob-
lems and evolve a narrow range of strategies and he may
not be as self-conscious and systematic in evaluating order-
disorder effects.)

At the level of encounters, the issue of order becomes
manifest on those occasions wherein persons experience
what we commonly label embarrassment, shame, humiliation,
"loss for words", being paralyzed, bewildered or flustered.
We see it also in experiences of consternation, confusion,
immobilization, guilt, indignation, shock, anxiety, astonish-
ment, uncertainty, anger, trauma (such as crying or acute
depression) or boredom.[11]

The occurrence of such states points not only to the
disordered terminal point following a role-problem and an
ineffective coping strategy, but also feeds back into the
interaction system as a new role-problem, itself to be
coped with, in the midst of a now rapidly disorganizing
encounter.

Such continuing feedback begins to suggest, also,
the potent possibilities for escalating disorder. The
others, from behind their labels, now have a role-problem,
posing at least the possibility of complete interactional

breakdown. That such escalating disorder is rare suggests only the effectiveness of the repertoire of strategies that actors can marshal.

At the level of <u>daily rounds</u>, the problem of order surrounds such matters as scheduling encounters and solitary activities such that obligations do not pile up, chaotically overlap, become either too brief, posing a problem of make-work (in occupational settings), or too extended, posing a problem of daily overload. Taking a cue from Goode,[12] it is reasonable to postulate that all roles are inherently over-demanding. Applied to daily rounds, we can postulate that people tend to perceive their days as requiring more than can be done in them, permitting the ever-present possibility that trying to do too much will lead to a sense of, and actual, disorganized activity.

At the level of <u>position</u> there are problems of aligning a role such that a sequence of encounters and daily rounds do not build up constellations of obligations and demands and possibilities, or lack of possibilities, such that action becomes completely blocked, or such that action possibilities become so numerous that the player cannot possibly simultaneously hold up his part in activity systems, which without him become disorganized.

Underlying or linked to order as a role issue, there lurk more general questions of how the occurrence of a

sense of unmanageability reflects upon actors *qua* compe-
tent role players. The expressive meaning of disorder
arises from actors' fears that it reflects upon them as
capable, adequate, competent participants in social life.
If micro-organizational analysis necessitates postulates
concerning the motivational economy of actors, a "master
motive" of appearing to be reasonably competent and ade-
quate in ordering activities would appear to be a suffi-
cient assumption.[13]

Proceeding in this way, there arises, of course,
the question of whose perception of order-disorder is
important: or more concretely, whose perception of a
management outcome is to be accepted as a criterion of
order? Since the analysis is initially phrased in terms
of an actor before others, do we look to "actor" and/or
to "other" in making a determination? It seems reason-
able to assume that most of the time "actor" and "other"
will have quite similar perceptions on how actor manages
some affair; they will agree on whether the outcome was
orderly or not. It is possible, however, for the actor
to view a role-problem circuit as having an orderly out-
come and for others to see it as disordered; or for the
actor to view an outcome as disordered and for others
to view it as orderly. While such possibilities occur
they seem quite marginal and more reasonably set aside
as topics of special analysis.

SOME ILLUSTRATIONS

What, more concretely, are the sorts of materials with which one would be concerned at each of these levels? Recognizing that any problem and strategy has significance for all three levels of management and order, let me provide some illustrations that relate primarily to each level.

My intent here is to be suggestive of possible <u>classes</u> of problems and <u>classes</u> of strategies in an informal and cursory way for the limited purpose of indicating a concrete direction rather than for the broader purpose of setting out a full-blown problem-strategy conceptualization and set of propositions.

1. At the level of encounters, we glance first at the police, where we find the recurrent proximate <u>problem</u> of calming down, containing and modulating what is defined as irrational and potentially threatening behavior on the part of some citizens. A seemingly effective response in such face-to-face engagements is the <u>strategy</u> of what, in another context, has been called normalization.[14]

In direct dealings with the patient the policeman tries to establish and maintain the pretense of a normal conversational situation. All of the patient's remarks, allegations, or complaints are treated in a matter-of-fact manner. Policemen do not attempt to suppress or eliminate the absurd and bizarre, but rather leave them aside while concentrating verbal exchanges on the ordinary aspects of things. By this method every situation acquires a certain sense of normalcy. For example, in one observed instance a middle-aged lady complained, in highly agitated panic, that she was pursued by neighbors with an unheard-of weapon. Without questioning the lady's beliefs about what is possible in the domain of weaponry, or what might be reasonably assumed about the motives of angry neighbors, the officers went through the motions of

dealing with the situation as if it involved a bona fide
complaint. They searched the premises for non-existent
traces of impossible projectiles. They carefully took
note of mundane particulars of events that could not have
happened and advised the lady to be on the alert for sus-
picious occurrences in the future. The intervention,
which lasted approximately one hour, terminated when the
lady came to equate her predicament with the predicament
of all other persons who were under some sort of threat
and who apparently survive under police protection. She
was visibly calmed and expressed the belief that the offi-
cers understood what she was facing and that it was within
their capacity to ensure her safety. In the end, the con-
versation turned to such practical matters as how to summon
the police quickly in situations of imminent danger and
how to make doubly sure that locks on windows and doors
were secure. Throughout the conversation the officers gave
no hint that they doubted any part of the story. They did
not challenge the statement that a projectile may travel
through walls, furniture, and clothes without leaving any
traces but be, nevertheless, fatal to persons. They also
took pains to convince the lady that it would be tactically
unwise and impractical to arrest or even interview suspect-
ed neighbors at this stage of the case. [15]

Another recurrent encounter _problem_, faced particularly

be the police, revolves around establishing initial control

over face-to-face engagements with citizens, particularly

when there is a crowd of on-lookers gathered on a public

thoroughfare. There is at least the fear, and perhaps the

real possibility, that bystanders will actively interfere

with police activity in such a site. The possible inter-

vention of bystanders poses the potent possibility of loss

of control over events, or, in fancier terms, a condition

of social disorder--from the police point of view. The

problem of possible interference is met by the _strategy_ of

physically changing locale, or the functional equivalent of

clearing the area of bystanders. Bittner reports that

> ...seasoned officers invariably remove the patient
from the immediate context in which they find him. In this
they merely follow good police practice in general, applicable

to all types of persons who attract police attention. The
object is to establish boundaries of control and to reduce
the complexity of the problem. When it is not feasible to
move the patient, the context is altered by removing others.
The result in either case is the envelopment of the subject
by police attention."16

Switching the role-labels somewhat, let us consider

two of the problems faced by conventionally oriented per-

sons who happen into encounters with radical religious

cultists. In attendance at a meeting of what are found

to be bizarre "religious kooks" with whom one drastically

disagrees, "conventional" persons confront the problem of

not "getting involved" in lengthy and angry debate and of

"getting by" without incident and of maintaining a modicum

of politeness. One strategy for preserving a polite kind

of order is the humoring process.

During study groups, conventionals typically projected
themselves as polite and neutral silent participants. They
read at their turn, asked few or no questions, and maintained
an emotional blankness. Neither approval or disapproval was
detectable. If a conventional happened to escape [the lead-
er's] sizing-up ceremony, he quickly withdrew after the meeting.

Most often such people did not get away so easily and
were forced to undergo queries as to who they were, what
they did, and, most important, their impression of what
they had just "studied." Typically, these ceremonies pro-
vided fascinating sociological studies in how people with
disparate world views manage to get along together, at least
for brief periods. Conventionals managed to exercise con-
siderable tact and to withhold their actual opinions and im-
pressions. In this way, the world was made safe for both
the [cultists] and themselves. Through innocuous, vague
remarks ("It's very interesting"), conventionals avoided
the embarrassment of appearing radically displaced in the
setting. In response to questions such as "Does this conflict
with your belief?" conventionals might reply, "Not overly,
no." This tact was perhaps a species of the humoring process
that sometimes obtains between people who are radically at
odds. One party simply goes along for the sake of getting
past an otherwise hopeless encounter. 17

During direct face-to-face engagements, some conventionals in the same setting experience the proximate problem of bursting out in laughter over the "ridiculousness" of the cultists and their beliefs. The propensity to "break up" or flood out is especially high among conventionals present together who tend especially to "break up" upon looking at one another. One strategy for coping with this kind of tension is to intently fix their attention upon the proceedings and the remarks of the speakers and to assiduously avoid catching one another's eyes. The practice might be called hyper-attentiveness and is perhaps the encounter version of the "more general strategy whereby exactly those who are furthest from a given reality feel most obliged to appear closest to it."[18]

Some final examples of encounter problems and strategies are not clearly empirical in content nor descriptive in phrasing. They are hypothetical (perhaps) and normatively stated, but so pungent and clear that they deserve mention in this context. They deal with the encounter problems and stragegies of professors, a dastardly group, much in need of close study. Three proximate encounter problems and associated possible strategies may be mentioned. First, there is the problem of getting "all balled up in a lecture" and beginning "to ramble on, talking without saying anything, and boring the students silly."[19]

The usual cause of this is that he did not
prepare adequately, or the lecture is so
old that he forgot what he had in mind when
he wrote it.[20]

One strategy for managing such a problem is

> to continue to ramble until at least half
> the class is either asleep, staring off
> into space, or writing letters. The pro-
> fessor should then stop in the middle of
> a sentence. The silence will arouse them
> all from the lethargy and once he has
> their attention he should, with a great
> display of self-control, gather up his
> notes and books. With his briefcase in
> hand, he then gives the class an icy stare
> and says, "I see that the profounder
> aspects of this subject bore you," or some
> such remark, and exits, not forgetting
> to shut the door with a resounding slam.
> If this departure is properly made, the
> professor will be guaranteed the undi-
> vided attention of his class for the
> next two weeks. [21]

This strategy is easily enough dubbed the indignant walk-

out and can conceivably be employed for problems other

than that of getting balled up in a lecture.

A second problem, especially for the new professor,

is ignorance of the answers to questions asked by the

students in class. One, among many strategies for manag-

ing this, is the use of the esoteric reference.

> When asked a question he cannot answer, the professor
> should immediately compliment the questioner for asking
> "an interesting question," a "very important question,"
> or a "question worth a good deal of consideration." This
> establishes rapport with the student and thwarts any at-
> tempt at baiting the professor.

> The second step is to turn the question back on the
> student. In a friendly, open-faced manner the professor
> asks, "Have you read Higgenbotham on this?" Since the
> answer will be no, the professor, now in a less friendly
> manner, follows with, "Surely you've read Lichenstein?"

Now the student is quite sorry he raised the question and
will be grateful if the professor will let him off the
hook, without further embarrassment. This the professor
does, getting himself off the hook thereby, by explaining
that the answer will be meaningless until the student has
a better grasp of the background of his question. One
final jab here is for the professor to tell the student
that he will look forward to discussing this matter with
him when he has done more extensive reading in this area. [22]

Among the extra-scholarly strategies used by students

to extract higher than deserved grades from professors is

that of the belligerent stance.

The belligerent student comes in waving his test
paper as if it were a battle flag. He spent long
hours in preparation, so obviously no fault lies with
him. The one other possibility is that he did not
understand what the professor wanted. His meaning is
that the professor obviously did not want clear,
intelligent, and critical answers to his questions, but
must have wanted more superficial, generalized, and
subjective answers. [23]

This strategy presents the professor with the proximate

encounter problem of maintaining the order previously im-

posed upon the relation in former encounters. One practical

strategy is the highly apologetic variation on the more gen-

eral "twist principle."

To counter this approach the professor must be almost
apologetic towards the student. He claims that he is sorry
to hear that the student put in so much time and labor in
preparation. In fact, he had hoped the student, for some
reason or another, had been prevented from making any seri-
ous preparation. Naturally the student is taken back by
this--deflated is a better word, because he does not yet
grasp the syllogism of which this is the major premise.

The professor then presents the minor premise, that
such lengthy preparation would naturally tend to bear
fruit in even a slightly fertile mind and such fruit would
have been in evidence on the test paper. Since no signs
of serious preparation were discovered on the paper, the
conclusion is obvious, but it is always wise to spell it out
for the student lest he miss the real beauty of this argument. [24]

2. At the level of daily rounds there arise issues
of scheduling, audience segregation, circulation among terri-
tories, contriving meetings and avoidances (especially avoid-
ances), and the like.

Of course, large segments of the population have their
daily round laid out for them and they have but to route
themselves through it. But for many, still, curiously at
the very bottom and top of the social order, (including also,
housewives) considerable leeway exists and therefore, also,
the possibility for considerable disruption or disorder. For
the fortunate (or unfortunate) top dogs and bottom dogs, there
are a plurality of territories to travel among, priorities
to arrange in such travel and co-presence to contrive and avoid.

It is in such terms that the Negro hustler assumes theo-
retical interest (as does the big business executive). The
hustler faces the generic <u>problem</u> of each day "being ready",
a problem requiring a particular kind of time and movement
<u>strategy</u>.

> A dude must be ready on short notice to move "where the
> action is." His internal clock may not be running at all
> when he is hanging on the corner and waiting for something
> to do. It may suddenly speed up by chance: Someone cruises
> by in a car and brings a nice "stash" of "weed," a gig is
> organized and he looks forward to being well togged-out and
> throwing a rap to some "boss chick," or a lame appears and
> opens himself to a quick "con." Chance as a determinant of
> personal time can be called more accurately <u>uncertain pre-
> dictability</u>. Street life is an aggregate of <u>relatively in-
> dependent events</u>. A dude may not know exactly what or when
> something will happen, but from past experience he can pre-
> dict a range of possibilities, and he will be ready, in
> position, and waiting.[25]

Time is alive when and where there is action. It picks up in the evening when everyone moves on the street. During the regular school year it may pick up for an hour in the afternoon when the "broads" leave school and meet with the set at a corner taco joint. Time may pick up when a familiar car cruises by and a few dudes drive down to Johnny's for a "process" (hair straightening and styling). Time is low on Monday (as described in the popular song, "Stormy Monday"), Tuesday, Wednesday, when money is tight. Time is high on Friday nights when the "eagle flies" and the "gig" begins. On the street, time has a personal meaning only when something is happening, and something is most likely to happen at night--especially on Friday and Saturday nights. Then people are together, and there may be bread--bread to take and bread to use.[26]

Drawing upon the experiences of a similar income level, we may note, too, the kind of "getting by" or getting through the day game once played by hoboes in and around Chicago's Main Stem. In what remains to this day the fundamental (if skimpy) work on daily rounds, Nels Anderson relates some strategies for meeting the very real problem of building a day so as to survive -- to eat, to be safe, and to sleep. We note here but one small tactic within the more general strategy of stealing.

> There are men who wander about the residential areas in order to steal from back doors. Some men follow the milkman as he goes from door to door delivering milk and cream, in order to steal a bottle when the opportunity offers. A quart of milk makes an excellent breakfast.[27]

As can be appreciated, each strategy and tactic involves the planning of a day, a scheduling of self-placement and intermeshing with other role's activities, with some subtlety, sophistication and skill. The problem of sleeping at night in the winter could become a matter requiring considerable ingenuity.

The best scouting qualities the average man can command are needed to get along in winter. There are many places to sleep and loaf during the day, but the good places are invariably crowded. For sleeping quarters police stations, railroad depots, doorways, mission floors, and even poolrooms are pressed into service. It is not uncommon for men who cannot find a warm place to sleep to walk the streets all night. This practice of walking the streets all night, snatching a wink of sleep here and a little rest there, is termed, in the parlance of the road, "carrying the banner." He who "carries the banner" during the night usually tries to snatch a bit of sleep during the day in places he does not have access to in the night time.[28]

3. As we extend the time span in terms of which the actor is gauging his conduct, forward, as it were, to the point of weeks and months, we begin more clearly to overlap with conventional concerns of fields such as organizational analysis. We reach, in other words, the level of positional management and the more or less standard materials centered upon concepts such as "administrative science", "organizational decision-making", "leadership", "supervision", and "worker adaptation."

While it is beyond the scope of this statement to review and reconceptualize this quite large body of materials, some general observations are nonetheless appropriate.

First, I must say again and even repeat it later, that studies of, and writings on, superordinate roles, which tend to be a major focus in organizational analysis, have had a peculiarly normative character; they are highly concerned with stipulating the correct and incorrect ways for superordinates (and subordinates, therefore,)

to act. Empirical materials seem marshaled to indicate
the "effective" and "ineffective" ways to execute positions.
Such an orientation seems especially prevalent in documents
directed to future business, educational and public adminis-
tration role-occupants. As a consequence, one receives a
clear sense of what should be done, in an author's opinion,
but little systematic sense of what people behind such la-
bels actually do in managing their positions.

Second, there would seem to be, among sociologists
at least, an overly strong tendency to accept the norma-
tive principles of position management evolved by oc-
cupants of highly prestigious and powerful roles, as, in
themselves, theories of organization or social organization.
I refer in particular to the acceptance accorded the posi-
tion management rhetoric of former telephone company presi-
dent, Chester Bernard. In the present view, Bernard's lec-
tures, published as Functions of the Executive,[29] are most
usefully regarded as one kind of very general strategic
conceptualization that occupants of highly superordinate
roles can evolve. That is, they can conceive their subor-
dinates as a "system" of "cooperative action" wherein the
"executive" functions to elicit and coordinate activity.
While I am not certain that sociologists should regard
such lines of thought as a theory of organization, I am
certain that they can usefully analyze them as the most
general principles of one man's position management strategies.

Put in more general terms, following Egon Bittner's important observations on the matter,[30] an important part of position management analysis is precisely the rhetoric of "organization" and its "needs" or "requirements" that persons in some positions use on occasion to formulate and explain the strategies of their position. The concept of organization is not merely a category in the vocabulary of social scientists, but a part of the ideology of certain patterns of interrelated roles.

A generalized theory of social organization must, of course, take as its data the folk theories of human associa-tion that role-players evolve. One trouble at the moment is that sociologists tend to be "taken in", so to speak, by the folk theories of business and other managers, accepting their ideas as properly sociological conceptual-izations of human collective action.

It is against such a background in the study of position management that works on the order of Melville Dalton's Men Who Manage[31] are a refreshing change and take on conceptually significant proportions. Although not executed in role management terms, as here conceived, Dalton's work is a virtual gold mine of suggestive material on what investigators should be sensitive to and the kinds of materials they should collect. To take but one small example, we find Dalton relating the staff-person's prob-lem of putting across, and winning acceptance for, ideas among foremen.

-32-

One of the staff specialists assigned to
Taylor's department devised what he regarded
as a survival technique for close living
with a line chief."

> "I never tell him anything point-blank.
> It doesn't pay to. I hint at something
> or give him a bare idea of what I have
> in mind. I may even joke about it as
> something too silly to consider--anyhow
> I don't bring it up again. Then he'll
> come around in a week or so and tell
> me the same damn thing in different
> words and ask me how I like it. I tell
> him I think it's a good idea. Then he
> says, "Let's go ahead with it." We
> both pretend it's his own idea but we
> both know it's not. On the other hand,
> sometimes I think he fools himself into
> thinking it's his. When you've got to
> live with a guy like that, what else
> can you do? [32]

As Dalton notes, the above technique is one version of
the rather common position-management strategy, practiced by
subordinates in all organizations, of "buttering-up."[33]

I will not resist the temptation to add a final norma-
tively-oriented example of position management drawn again
from the problems of professors. In planning their courses,
professors sometimes define as a problem, the task of es-
tablishing their offerings as extremely difficult undertak-
ings for students. Teachers may seek to bring about an order
between the positions of teacher and student wherein the
situation is defined as arduous and high grades are not to
be expected in spite of hard work. One positional strategy
for imposing such a definition is the use of an esoteric
bibliography.

A good bibliography passed out at the beginning of a course will get a semester off to a fine start. With a little effort a professor can work up a list of about twenty-five inspiring titles, none of which, of course, are in English. If a professor seriously expects the students to read any of the books, he should list works that are available in translation. These, however, should be kept to a minimum lest the tone of the course be lowered. Very effective in this regard is to have five of the titles marked with an asterisk which indicates that the reading of these works is absolutely crucial to the understanding of the subject matter. Works so marked should be collector's items and unavailable in North America, as students have been known to go to great extremes to acquire books. Suitable titles can be obtained from a list of the rare book holdings of the Vatican Library or the British National Museum. [34]

OTHER DISTINCTIONS

For purposes of actual and detailed analysis it may be necessary to distinguish important dimensions within the levels of encounter, daily round and position management. Although I prefer to consider it an empirical question, one can recognize, at the outset, the possibility that problems and strategies of role management may differ significantly according to the contexts in which they occur. I will here mention two such contexts that would seem initially crucial.

The first is the relation in which order may be problematic. By relation I have in mind a fundamental distinction that seems to appear in all human association. Role-labels are defined in large part in terms of their subordination, superordination or equality with other labels. The matter of being over, under or on a par with; above, below, or roughly equal to, other labels is among the most

basic distinctions made by human beings. We should expect, therefore, the problems, strategies and order outcomes of encounters, daily rounds and positions massively to reflect this fact. It may even be reasonable, initially, to regard materials in terms of the nine categories generated by cross-classifying encounters, daily rounds and positions with super-ordinates, subordinates and peers.

Along these same lines, a fourth relation should be mentioned as possibly a proper object of study in its own right. In a society of mass mobility and numerous contacts among strangers, there grows up a peculiar kind of relation among the mass of mixed and anonymous persons who are exposed to one another in public settings. These mutually witnessing but anonymous persons do not, in any conventional sense, have subordinate, superordinate or peer relationships with one another. Associations of this kind should perhaps be termed public relations and analyzed in terms of their distinctive characteristics.[35]

A second additional distinction that might be useful pertains to the level at which order may be problematic. Thus far the discussion has conduced a rather static view of social organization by emphasizing the efforts of actors to somehow get through the day without creating massive disorder. I have implied a rather cowering and crouching little creature, desperately fabricating an orderly interdigitation with others. In many ways such an image seems reasonable;

in many encounters, daily rounds and positions, actors may accurately be characterized as wearing

", a naked unsocialized look, a look of concentration, a look of one who is privately engaged in a difficult, treacherous task. 36

When actors are so oriented to micro-organization and, more importantly, conduct themselves so as to preserve, continue or protect an already existing order of affairs, we may, following Nels Anderson, refer to the role management practices of "getting by."[37]

Getting by as a level of role management may be distinguished from efforts evoking a more active image of man and oriented to bringing about a different, and relative to what exists, a new interactional order in encounters, daily rounds and positions. This may be generically designated by the well-known term for it: "making out."[38]

While actors may be classified in terms of their predominant practice of getting by or making out, and one can pursue the psychological characteristics of each (as is sometimes done under the labels entrepreneurial and bureaucratic), such a quest, it must be emphatically proclaimed, is of little interest to the sociologist qua social organizational analyst. What is of interest is the relation of practices to order and disorder as a structural matter, irrespective of the particular orientations of actors and their preferences for, and abilities to play, one or the other level of the order game.

In this context it is reasonable, additionally, to comment that the successful prosecution of micro-organizational

analysis must view persons as irrelevant in the convention-
al sense of warm and human flesh-bound objects with charming
or infuriating personal qualities or "personalities." Seen
social-organizationally, persons are merely energy nodes over
whom the tissue of social organization is laid. The tissue
itself and the vicissitudes of its fragile existence are the
objects of analysis.

As with the distinctions among relations, it may also
be of interest initially to sort out role management epi-
sodes in terms of getting by or making out. In combination
with the distinctions among relations, eighteen hopefully
manageable smaller patches of concerns are spawned.

The two mentioned dimensions might, of course, turn
out to be of little use in discriminating significantly
different role management practices and other distinctions,
unmentioned and undiscovered, may be found to form the
cutting edge of fruitful analysis.

NEIGHBORING ENTERPRISES

The set of concerns set forth here have a certain
affinity with, or resemblance to, at least two other kinds
of activities carried on by persons concerned with roles
and their performance. In order to avoid identification
or confusion with them, these neighboring enterprises
should be mentioned and distinguished.

There is, first, the well-known effort to explicate
the technical details of how to perform the operations

of a role. By technical, I mean the kind of knowledge that
is written up and followed in manuals of instruction, on,
for example, how to repair a given breakdown on a given
model automobile or how to administer an electrocardiogram.
Such manuals, or their equivalent instructional arrangements,
exist for a large number of roles, occupations in particular.

Facts of this technical variety become relevant for
role management during the process of execution or applica-
tion when it is inevitably found that the manuals fail to
specify a large range of necessary procedures and the role
players feel the necessity to improvise or "play it by ear"
in order to actually get a job done.

We can most clearly and pointedly perceive the dif-
ference between technical knowledge and role management
in those cases where role occupants come successfully to
perform roles for which they patently lack much technical
knowledge. Thus to find that Ferdinand Demara ("the great
impostor") could, by turns, perform as a medical doctor,
religious monk, college professor, prison warden and school
teacher, alerts us to the existence of a range of practices
that go into each of these role management shows that do
not derive from the technical manuals available to those roles.[39]

Role management, then, is in a significant sense con-
cerned with writing the unwritten part of the technical
manual.

Second, there have, of course, been some attempts to
explicate the "extra-technical" portions of role performances.

Perhaps the most famous and popular has been Dale Carnegie's
How to Win Friends and Influence People[40] and the most witty
and cynical Stephen Potter's "ship" series.[41] Although includ-
ing considerable technical instruction, Emily Post and Amy
Vanderbilt also explicate role management problems and strat-
egies for sociability roles. In the limited sense that these
people and others have made at least some kind of a try,
they have been ahead of sociologists in the understanding
of everyday life. Ironically, the fact that they have tried
has probably been a deterrent to sociologists and conduced
them to avoid such matters altogether.

The highly normative orientation of people like those
mentioned, and of some human relations social scientists
(in the recent climate of value-free sociology) has likely
served to bring the entire matter into disrepute. It would
seem to be another case of throwing the baby out with the
bath.

The bath should indeed be thrown out. It's undesir-
able contents include, first, an orientation to determin-
ing the "best" procedure in a morally laudable or cynical-
ly manipulative sense. It seems possible and preferable,
in contrast, simply to detail what people do with what
kind of consequences. Second, existing attempts at role
management manuals are not based upon carefully collected
and compared ranges of practices. Giant generalizations
rest upon very small sets of haphazardly-assembled empirical
materials. Third, their authors have not been self-con-
sciously analytic and have not aimed for interrelated con-
cepts of generalized applicability. It should be said in

defense of Carnegie et. al., that they have, nonetheless,
at least had appropriate kinds of sensitivity and that they
are not, after all, trying to accomplish sociological analysis.

FORWARD

To where, if any-place, can this set of conceptions
lead? There are, at least, three directions: one is
specific and two are general. Specifically, a set of
guiding directives and notions of this kind provides a
rudimentary scheme with which the more cogently and
systematically to observe what it is that people actual-
ly do in the roles they perform. A major roadblock in
the close study of roles en situ is what to "make of" or
"do with" a major share of those things that naturalistic
observers[42] see going on "out there." They write them
in their field notes, but a large portion of day-to-day
routine practices seem resistant to sustained conceptual-
ization. It is for this kind of reason, among others,
that the close case study of roles in natural settings
has dropped somewhat out of fashion.[43] Observers have
difficulty figuring out what to do with all that rich
observational material so that its usual fate is to lie
unused in files of field notes and to appear only furtive-
ly in research reports. The organizing construct posed
here is, hopefully at least, one way more meaningfully
to "bring back" that kind of data. Within the perspective
outlined, each close study of a role could, at least, be

an analytic manual of social order for a particular role.

Such manuals would have an obvious practical value for occupants and would-be occupants, but one can also look in a more generalized direction, toward the comparative analysis of generic role-problems and strategies and role-problem circuits. Tending somewhat to an inductionist view of inquiry, I would suggest that one cannot a priori sensibly suggest the substantive character of such a general theory. It seems most reasonable to wait and predicate any theory building efforts upon a range of more concrete studies, which are themselves oriented to something like "role management."

Bracketing role management within the broader perspective of social organization, we immediately observe that the present perspective conceives activity from the point of view of an actor peering from behind or through his role-label. The management of encounters, daily rounds and positions is based upon an imagery of persons plying their roles through the day, fretting over various problems and strategies at different levels of problematic order.

Roles are of course connected to other roles. A role-problem arises from the action, actual or anticipated, of a connected role. A strategic solution may then pose a role problem for another connected role. Circuits of reciprocating influence are thereby set in motion and create interaction in its most structural, concrete and meaningful sense.

We have only to multiply the number of roles considered simultaneously to arrive at a very complex imagery (and perhaps

eventually, model) of the process of social organization per se,
considered as a complex web of interrelated and interacting
roles. The proper study of social organization might then be
seen as the task of depicting how, at all these levels, roles
manage to be interrelated in an orderly way. If the understand-
ing of order from the vantage point of a single type of role is
itself highly complex, then how much more complicated is the
addition of other roles and the depiction of the interrelations?
It may be, despite optimism to the contrary, that we have hardly
begun to understand the operation of social organization.

Building upon an imagery of this character, it may even
some day be meaningful and substantive to speak of social or-
ganizations as social systems, a conception which is presently
more of a facile and unsubstantiated postulate, imposed without
warrant, than an empirically demonstrable phenomenon. The con-
cept of system demands determinate and fateful connection among
parts. Such image surely necessitates data strongly suggesting
coerced linkages. Some aspects of interrelated roles may even-
tually be shown to have this character.

It may also be the case that out of the determination of
fateful connections among these smaller units, more meaningful
conceptualization and comparison of the standard larger units
of social organization can be performed. To speak of an or-
ganization, a community, an institutional sphere, a society,
is to sum up, in a highly global way, patterns of encounters,
daily rounds and positions which are assumed to display certain

boundaries that make them isolatable as objects and comparable at their respective levels of abstraction. One empirical approach to their identification and comparison is in terms of units of micro-organization of the kind explored here. When we identify or bound one of these larger units with very abstract criteria, we may mean that certain types of micro-organizational role practices change at some point that defines a boundary. When we compare these larger units, we may mean that certain kinds of micro-organizational practices can be found in some and another kind in others. The analytic task is, of course, the specification of classes of role practices, or, as termed above, classes of role problems, strategies and typical role-problem circuits.

Such an approach is at least one kind of way out of the unfortunate reification that takes place in using these larger units or concepts of social organization. The phenomenological gap between simply "people" and units of social organization leads all too easily to thinking in terms of an organization or community "acting" or a society "thinking", "expecting", or "doing." None of these units, of course, does anything. Only people behind role-labels think, act or feel. A great many of them behind many labels may add up to something different, that these larger terms might properly denote, but never to something more to which personal qualities can be attributed. It is to be hoped that through units of micro-organization, we might fill the vacuum that leads us to believe too vividly that "people"

<u>sans roles</u> and "organizations" or "society" are fundamental

realities.

1.

I draw heavily here from Norton Long's very helpful
essay on the problem of order and from the Glaser and
Strauss commentary on Long's relevance to the study
of everyday life. See: Norton E. Long, "The Political
Act as an Act of Will," American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. LXIX (July, 1963) pp. 1-6; Barney G. Glaser and
Anselm L. Strauss, Awareness of Dying (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1965) pp. 13-15.

2.

Neil J. Smelser, "Functionalism and the Scientific
Analysis of Social Systems", ditto, n.d.

3.

Talcott Parsons, Societies, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1966) p. 14.

4.

Ibid. p. 114.

5.

It must be observed that Professor Parsons has a tendency
to identify as "the society" whatever powerful clique pro-
claims itself to be "the society." There is a significant
sense in which "society" means for Professor Parsons what
it means to people who read and write the "society" sections
of newspapers.

6.

Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1949).

7.

The general approach and many of the specific concepts
to be promoted and integrated here are deeply indebted
to Herbert Blumer and Erving Goffman. To Blumer, my
debt is in terms of charismatic sensitivity to an imagery
of social life. The present effort is, in a sense, an
attempt to translate that general imagery into a set of

working procedures. To Goffman, my debt is somewhat
similar but also considerably more specific. The con-
cepts of "management", "strategy", "encounter", etc.,
figure in Goffman's work with varying degrees of cen-
trality but are here made pivotal. Neither of these
men nor anyone else, save myself, is responsible for
the possible perversion or trivialization here per-
petrated.

It should be added that Blumer and Goffman them-
selves, of course work out of a long-standing tradi-
tion in sociology. This tradition is well depicted
in Walter Buckly, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967)
esp. pp. 17-23; 145-161.) The entire book is recom-
mended as a useful partisan guide to understanding
the background against which the concerns raised here
should be viewed.

I must also absolve a number of other people from
responsibility for what I have done to their works and
to their conversations or correspondences. Among these
are Lyn Lofland, Jerry Suttles and the Anselm Strauss
group, some of whose terms I have incorporated without
specific mention. See: Lyn H. Lofland, In the Presence
of Strangers, Working Paper #19, Center for Research on
Social Organization, The University of Michigan, 1966;
Gerald D. Suttles, Taylor Street: Identity and Conduct
in an Urban Slum (tentative title), (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, in press); Anselm Strauss, et. al.,
Psychiatric Institutions and Ideologies (New York: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); Barney G. Glaser and
Anselm Strauss, Awareness of Dying (Chicago: The Aldine
Publishing Company, 1965).

8.
See, for example, Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas, Role Theory: Concepts and Research, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966).

9.
Erving Goffman, Encounters, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1961).

10.
A fourth level of management adopts the longest biographical time perspective, the individual's projection of his life course and the consequences of present decisions and actions upon his long-term future, as seen against his entire past. This level might be designated career management. It is assumed here that time referents of this magnitude do not figure predominantly in the individual's total role management activities and need not be made a central focus. Career management as an object of overt concern likely emerges only sporadically and is itself bracketed by the actor as a special kind of problem "above" or "beyond" the constraints and demands of "everyday life" (i.e., encounters, daily rounds and positions).

11.
A number of these labels are drawn from Harold Garfinkel, "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities," Social Problems, Vol. II (Winter, 1964), pp. 225-250. Garfinkel has specialized in producing encounter disorganization or unmanageability.

12.
William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," American Sociological Review, Vol. 25 (August, 1960), pp. 483-496.

13.
A generalized rationale of fear of social disgrace or destruction as a "master motive" in human action is detailed in Ernest Becker, The Birth and Death of Meaning,

(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962). While some social theories rest upon a conception of Economic Man who covets wealth or Political Man who lusts for power, other theories assume a Social Man who fears disgrace.

14.
    M. Yarrow, C. Schwartz, H. Murphy, L. Deasy, "The Psychological Meaning of Mental Illness in the Family", The Journal of Social Issues, Vol. XI, (1955) pp. 12-24.

15.
    Egon Bittner, "Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons", Social Problems, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter, 1967, pp. 288-289.

16.
    Ibid., p. 288.

17.
    John Lofland, Doomsday Cult (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966) p. 164.

18.
    Ibid., p. 165.

19.
    Robert A. Preston, "Practical Principles for the New Professor", AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 52 (September, 1966) p. 319.

20.
    Ibid., p. 319.

21.
    Ibid., 319-320.

22.
    Ibid., p. 320.

23.
    Ibid., p. 321.

24.
    Ibid., p. 321.

25.
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