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VIETNAM AND MICHIGAN: A Study of Faculty Opinion

by

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\*This study of the representativeness of the signers of the letter to the President was first suggested by Leslie Kish. Professor Kish also provided much help in the design of the sample and in other aspects of the study.

In February, 1967, 608 University of Michigan faculty members signed a letter to be sent to the President of the United States urging him "to announce at the earliest possible moment an unconditional halt to bombing raids [on North Vietnam]." The entire faculty had been mailed a request to sign this letter by 21 original sponsors, most of them well-known professors, and the 608 who responded with signatures constituted approximately one-fifth of the entire University of Michigan academic staff.

The Michigan letter to the President was restricted to the specific issue of bombing. But from a larger standpoint it was one of many actions protesting the course of official American policy on Vietnam, and so is related to the newspaper advertisements, public debates, petitions, and other expressions of academic concern over the Vietnam war that have occurred from time to time over the past two years. From the point of view of sociological study, the Michigan letter has special advantages, since it represented definite action by a self-selected sample from an important, clearly defined, and readily locatable population.\* By drawing a probability sample from the same population, one can determine how

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\*The original sponsors defined the population as consisting of all persons holding faculty positions of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, or Professor, plus all other academic appointments (e.g., Research Associate) where the holder had a Ph.D. The major group excluded were graduate students with part-time teaching positions. In this report we will treat the sampled population as the University of Michigan "faculty", although the term has a slightly more specialized meaning within the University administration.

representative the 608 signers were of the total University of Michigan faculty, as well as some of the reasons why 80% of the faculty members did not sign the letter. This is exactly what we did beginning on March 6, when we sent a brief questionnaire to a systematic random sample of 300 names drawn from the same list that the sponsors of the letter used in their complete mailing to the faculty.

We enclosed a note explaining the nature of our study, assured confidentiality and objectivity in analysis and reporting, and indicated that one of us was a signer and one a non-signer of the original letter. Our one-page questionnaire asked whether the respondent had signed the letter to the President; if not, he was requested to indicate his reasons by checking one or more of six alternatives and by adding any other explanations he wished. The alternatives were as follows:

\_\_\_\_\_ I would have signed the letter, but did not receive it.

\_\_\_\_\_ I would have signed the letter, but mislaid or forgot it.

\_\_\_\_\_ I did not sign the letter because I did not believe in the use of the name of the University of Michigan in this way.

\_\_\_\_\_ I did not sign the letter because I disagreed with its substance: I support present U. S. Government policy on the issue of bombing.

\_\_\_\_\_ I did not sign the letter because I disagreed with its substance: I favor more, rather than less, bombing of North Vietnam.

\_\_\_\_\_ I did not sign the letter because I have not arrived at a definite personal position on the issue of bombing North Vietnam.

\_\_\_\_\_ Other. Indicate below any reasons why you did not sign the original letter. If more space is needed, please use the back of this sheet.

Information was also obtained on each person's school or college within the University, his academic rank, and whether he considered himself primarily in the humanities, the natural sciences, or the social sciences.

Of the 300 questionnaires, 81% were returned--65% to our initial letter, 11% more to a follow-up, and 5% to a final request which, unlike the first two, purposely and explicitly did not include any means of identifying the respondent. A comparison of the 242 persons who returned questionnaires with the 58 who did not reveals very little difference by major college of affiliation. The College of Literature, Science and the Arts, for example, constituted 41% of the target sample and 39% of the obtained sample. Nor was faculty rank clearly related to cooperation with the study, although some connection will be pointed out later in another context. There is, however, association between broad areas of intellectual interest and willingness to respond at all to the questionnaire: 94% of the social scientists returned a completed questionnaire, but only 81% of the natural scientists and 72% of the humanists did so. Natural scientists certainly believe in measurement and humanists are often deeply interested in understanding human behavior, but there are undoubtedly members of both groups who are repelled by the social scientist's goal of applying the rigor of measurement to the study of human attitudes. Humanists in particular may be alienated or threatened by such attempts to quantify complex behavior.

Distribution of Positions

The main results of the survey are presented in the following table of the target sample of 300. The actual number of individuals is given in parentheses for each category.

	<u>% of 300</u>	<u>Number</u>
<u>Substantive Agreement with Letter</u>		
Signed letter to President.	17	(50)
Would have signed but did not receive.	5	(15)
Would have signed but mislaid or forgot.	3	( 9)
Did not sign because of procedural reservations, but agree with contents of letter.	3	( 8)
<u>No Substantive Position Stated, Procedural Objection to Letter</u>		
Object to use of University of Michigan name.	7	(21)
Other procedural objections.	1	( 3)
<u>Substantive Disagreement with Letter</u>		
Favors less bombing, but not unconditional cessation.	1	( 4)
Personally undecided on issue of bombing.	6	(19)
Supports present U. S. policy on bombing.	16	(48)
Favors more bombing than at present.	3	( 9)
<u>Substantive Disagreement with and Procedural Objection to Letter</u>		
Personally undecided <u>plus</u> Object to use of University name.	6	(18)
Supports present U. S. policy <u>plus</u> Object to use of University name.	6	(17)
Favors more bombing <u>plus</u> Object to use of University name.	3	(10)
<u>Not Classifiable</u>		
Prefers not to state position (e.g., not U. S. citizen).	4	(11)
Did not return questionnaire.	19	(58)
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	100	(300)

It will be noted that the results are largely summarized in terms of the alternatives that were printed in the questionnaire. This is not because respondents were too hurried to give their views, for the majority (60%) took the trouble to write out a note, often a long one, in addition to or instead of checking alternatives. Most of these notes, however, were elaborations of the fixed alternatives. The only significant new category to appear was one prompted by several responses calling for a reduction or temporary halt in the bombing but not for unconditional cessation; such a position, which comes close to that of Senator Kennedy's, would probably have attracted more responses had we listed it as an alternative.\*

The results in the above table can be interpreted to throw light on several issues. First, how much opposition to the bombing of North Vietnam is there among faculty members at the University of Michigan? One view has it that such faculty protesters constitute a tiny minority, vocal but without broad support in the academic community. An alternative view describes the opposition within the universities as massive, with every active protester matched by two or three

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\*One other addition made by a few respondents is of interest: a distinction between support of present policy as such and support of the Administration because it represents elected or expert judgement. The latter emphasis on support of the makers of present policy was usually accompanied by criticism of the signers of the letter as pseudo-experts or self-righteous spokesmen. In the present study we have not tried to distinguish these two positions but have classified both under "Supports present U. S. policy on bombing."

sympathizers who share his beliefs but are unwilling or unable to speak out. Our results challenge both pictures and indicate that at Michigan at least the opposition to the bombing can best be characterized as a "large minority". The same analysis, however, suggests that supporters of present United States policy on the bombing also constitute a minority or at most a bare majority of the University faculty population.

The original random sample of 300 included 53 actual signers (18% of the 300), while our final sample of returned questionnaires included 50 signers. Hence almost everyone who signed the original letter returned the questionnaire, and the non-returns consist almost entirely of non-signers. To determine how much basic support there is for the contents of the letter we can add to the 18% of the sample who were signers the additional 8% who say they would have signed but did not do so because they failed to receive the original appeal or forgot to reply to it. Another 3% of the population indicate agreement with the contents of the letter, but disagreement with the use of the University name or with some other procedural aspect. A minimum estimate therefore, of supporters of an unconditional bombing halt is that they make up 29% of the University of Michigan faculty.

What of the other 71% of the population? There are 22% of the total sample who did not sign the letter and who say they support present policy on the bombing (some 6% of them add a procedural objection to the letter as well). Another 6% favor even more bombing; these "hawks" or militants

represent disagreement of sorts with the current level of bombing; but from the standpoint of an unconditional halt they must be classified as supporting present U. S. policy. Thus a total of 28% of our sample of 300 are explicit supporters of the bombing of North Vietnam--almost exactly the same total as the opposition! (The standard errors of the two percentages are 2.5%, hence we can be confident that these sample estimates are within  $\pm$  5% of the figures for the total faculty population.)

In sum, nearly three-fifths of the faculty took an explicit substantive position either of clear support for or strong opposition to the call for an unconditional halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, with the result being an even split between the two positions. The 1% who favor less bombing but not an unconditional halt have also developed a meaningful substantive stand, and one which might be regarded as leaning toward the position of the letter insofar as an immediate change in U. S. action is called for. The 12% of the sample who report themselves undecided on the issue of bombing have stated a quasi-substantive position, though a conflicted one. This undecided vote can be placed at a "neutral" position on a pro-halt to pro-bombing scale.

The real unknowns in attempting to describe the full spectrum of faculty opinion lie with the 30% of the sample who rejected altogether the opportunity to take a stand on the issue of bombing: the 8% who offered only procedural reasons for not signing, yet did not indicate support for the

contents of the letter; the 4% "Other" group with miscellaneous reasons for not signing or stating a position; and the 18% who neither signed the letter to the President nor returned our questionnaire explaining their reasons for not signing. One might characterize all or part of this 30% as conflicted on the issue or as having no opinion, but this seems unrealistic. Since one of our interests in this survey has been to determine the maximum amount of support the letter had from the total faculty, it is useful to attempt to estimate what proportion of the 30% "non-respondents" might have sympathized with the contents of the letter.

The 30% could not have included any actual signers of the letter, since these have all been taken account of in previously mentioned results, but it could have included non-signing supporters of the letter and of course non-signing opponents of the letter. There were 32 individuals in the total sample who indicated support for the contents of the letter even though they had not signed it, as against 90 individuals who indicated that they had not signed the letter because they disagreed with its substantive contents (whether or not they also questioned the procedure involved). A reasonable approach then in dealing with the 30% of the sample about whom we have no substantive information is to apply to it the ratio 32:90. Such an adjustment, added to our previous results, gives the following final estimate of the percentage of Michigan faculty members who support the letter:

Signers of the letter	18%
Non-signers, but explicit supporters	11%
Application of ratio of 32:90 to 30% unknown	8%
Partial supporters, favoring "reduction" in bombing	1%

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Estimated maximum percentage of target sample who oppose present U. S. policy	38%
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By the most generous estimates, therefore, the opposition to the bombing can be said to represent something under 40% of the University faculty. Similar adjustments applied to the supporters (including "hawks") of the bombing yield a final estimated total of 50%, a bare majority of the academic community. Since we suspect on several grounds that the "non-respondents" are really more pro-Administration than our adjustments suggest, this 50% may well be a slight underestimate. We have left unallocated the 12% of the sample who characterize themselves as "undecided" since their position is apparently such that they would give passive support to a change either way in the amount of bombing of North Vietnam.

In conclusion, the best way to describe the University of Michigan faculty is to emphasize that it is seriously split on this issue, and presumably on the war as a whole. There is a good deal of support for Administration policy on the bombing, with supporters probably constituting the largest single "block" in the University. Our best estimate is that a referendum in February in which everyone voted would have yielded a slight majority in support of the bombing, and

we doubt that there would be much change today. At the same time, opposition to the bombing of North Vietnam is very strong, and when combined with those unable to make a decision it comes close to constituting half the University faculty. Indeed, the number who are undecided or who take a purely procedural stance is probably a sign of uncertainty about the war, for one doubts that during World War II there would have been any reluctance at all to register a clear vote in favor of the war effort. Thus, the basic fact about the University is that there is no real consensus for or against the bombing-- rather there are strong opposing views represented, plus an intermediate set of individuals who show the same conflict within themselves.

#### Location of Letter Signers and Supporters

To the general population an institution like the University may appear to be a unity, but members of the academic community have a different perspective and often anticipate variations in attitude by college, rank, and field. Thus although signers and explicit supporters of the letter to the President make up less than a majority of the University, it might be suggested that this is because active protest finds its natural home in the liberal arts disciplines, rather than in the professional schools. There is some truth to such a distinction, for signers and supporters of the letter do make up 35% of the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts sub-sample as against 29% for the University as a whole, while supporters of present U. S. policy drop from 28% to 25%. The

undramatic size of the change, however, seems more significant to us than its occurrence: clearly it is a mistake to picture the liberal arts college as a unified center of protest and the professional schools as bastions of the status quo on this issue.

The various professional school sub-samples are too small to allow much confidence in a series of separate breakdowns, but we should mention two important cases in particular that to some extent confound expectations. Signers and supporters of the letter constitute 17% of the Medical School sample (N=53) and 22% of the Engineering College sample (N=23). In fact, in Medicine and Engineering, more than one out of three persons indicating a substantive position signed or agreed with the letter to the President, with the balance supporting the bombing. Since these professional units also tend to be the locations of militant positions in favor of more bombing (the Medical School has 5 of the 19 hawks in the sample--one more even than the much larger L. S. & A. College), they clearly are diverse rather than monolithic in opinion. Indeed, of all the Schools and Colleges of the University, only the small Dental School sample of 11 cases was without significant internal division: all 7 of the individuals responding supported present bombing policy or an even more militant one.

The division is sharper by broad field of self-identification within the liberal arts college than it is between the College and the professional schools taken as a whole:

	<u>Signers &amp; Supporters of Letter</u>	<u>Supporters of Present Policy Plus Hawks</u>	<u>Procedural, Undecided &amp; Other</u>	<u>Non-return</u>		
Humanists	33%	19%	11%	37%	100%	(27)
Natural scientists	17%	23%	37%	23%	100%	(60)
Social scientists	60%	20%	16%	3%	100%	(35)
						<u>(122)</u>

$\chi^2 = 28.2, df. = 6, p < .001$

Most social scientists gave a substantive response to the questionnaire, and among those with a clear position the ratio is 3 to 1 in support of the letter. Humanists also tend to support the letter, but by a lesser proportion and with a large number of "abstainers". Finally, L. S. & A. natural scientists show the largest proportion of "abstainers", and among the opinion-givers a majority are against the letter. For the University as a whole, much the same pattern holds among those who identify themselves with one of the three areas. Unfortunately our sample is too small to allow an analysis of the location of attitudes within the various professional schools, but the scattered results suggest that such internal variations by field are substantial.

Faculty rank is frequently considered an important correlate of the expression of controversial views. Probably the most common belief is that it is the young Assistant Professors who are most likely to take controversial stands, because they are most in touch with student ideas, most critical of traditional forms, most able to bring fresh energy to new causes.

The explanatory factor in such cases is not rank, but rather age and generation. Studies such as Samuel Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties have documented similar effects over the American population as a whole, and it would not be surprising to find such trends within the academic world. On the other hand, one of the major justifications for the tenure system has been that it protects academic freedom, allowing a man to look critically at accepted priorities and beliefs without fear of retaliation from a more conservative or timid college administration. This view leads one to expect the tenure ranks of Associate and full Professor to produce the most independent critics of established policies, with Assistant Professors being too much concerned with their personal futures to risk displeasing those in higher authority.

If we attempt to combine these two different bases of prediction, we might hypothesize the major support for the Vietnam letter to come from the ranks of the Associate Professors--men young in spirit but secure in tenure. And in fact some of the most active faculty leaders of the first Teach-In, which was held at Michigan in the spring of 1965, were young Associate Professors. They were the colonels of the academic rebellion that swept the country, men confident in their own local positions but also eager to assert themselves for what they saw as high causes on the national scene.

The actual results by University faculty rank are shown below for the total sample:\*

	<u>Signers &amp; Supporters of Letter</u>	<u>Supporters of Present Policy Plus Hawks</u>	<u>Procedural, Undecided &amp; Other</u>	<u>Non-return</u>		
Professors	28%	30%	26%	15%	100%	(94)
Associate Professors	12%	26%	36%	26%	100%	(58)
Assistant Professors	44%	24%	19%	12%	100%	(72)
(Other Appts.)	(22%)	(28%)	(24%)	(26%)	100%	(76)
						<u>(300)</u>

Contrary to our expectations, Associate Professors are not the most but rather the least likely of any academic rank to support the letter to the President. In part this can be accounted for by a disproportionate concentration of Associate Professors in the natural sciences, but even when broad area of specialization is held constant there continues to be a trend for Associate Professors to be lowest in proportion of supporters of the letter. The highest support for the letter is at the Assistant Professor level, but simple interpretations of this in terms of youth or generation are made questionable by the fact that full Professors are second highest in their criticism of present American policy. (The "Other Appointments" category is

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\*Disregarding the "Other Appointments", a chi square test of this table (6 degrees of freedom) indicates that such a distribution is unlikely to have been obtained by chance

$$(\chi^2 = 20.0, df. = 6, p < .01).$$

probably young in average age, but its miscellaneous character in rank and college location makes difficult the placement of it in the regular ranking system.)

One other point should be noted about these results: variation by rank in support for the letter is not accompanied by similar shifts in support of the pro-bombing alternatives, but rather by variations in the statement of a substantive position at all. Associate Professors, for example, do not give more support than other ranks to the present policy on bombing; their lack of support for the letter is a function of a high degree of "non-response" in the form of indecision, procedural reasons, and failure to return the questionnaire.

Our sample is too small and our questionnaire too slight to allow for firm conclusions on the relation of rank to attitude, and it is probably pointless to attempt an elaborate interpretation of the odd but intriguing findings just reported. The data do suggest, however, the value of further study of academic rank as a variable and the likely complexity of the eventual results. Theories grounded in a purely "rational" emphasis on the security of tenure and theories that treat rank as simply an index of age or generation may both prove inadequate. Something more subtle, perhaps drawing on reference group perspectives, may be needed to account for the influence on attitudes of the role of the Associate Professor in a University like Michigan. One hint may be provided by a study of The Behavioral Sciences at Harvard (Report by a faculty Committee, 1954) which showed the average Associate

Professor to be more conscious of the difficulty in obtaining sufficient research funds than either lower or higher ranks. Secure in tenure and young in age, he may yet be subject to special social pressures (or opportunities) that lead to a distinctive position on policy issues.

#### Procedure and Substance

The original sponsors of the letter to the President noted that the "members of the academic staff do not in any way speak for the University but mention their University connection only for the purpose of identification." Yet clearly a major aim of the letter was to show that a substantial proportion of the faculty of a large and important national university was in favor of a specific government action on Vietnam. For many persons, both supporters and opponents of the letter, the line between official and unofficial use of the University name is a thin one. The general public can be expected to be even less sensitive to such a distinction, or to the routine disclaimer that University connections are shown for "identification" only. Thus the question of the right or at least the desirability of faculty members signing such a letter is to some persons a very real issue. We will not attempt here to consider the philosophic merits of the issue, but will simply report the degree and way in which it was raised by our sample and will speculate on the meaning of raising it. The latter speculations will be along social psychological lines, but in ignoring other considerations we do not mean to imply that procedural issues are not genuine and important in themselves.

We will use the term "procedural objections" to refer to questions about the use of the University name, since 9 out of 10 persons raising any procedural point did so with this reference.

The percentage of persons is surprisingly tiny (3%) who explicitly indicated that they agreed with the call for an unconditional halt in the bombing, but chose not to sign the letter for procedural reasons. A larger, though still unimpressive number (8%), gave only a procedural reason for not signing, without stating any personal substantive stand. From a literal-minded point of view one might argue that this 8% was in agreement with the position of the letter, since procedural reasons were the only ones cited for not signing it, but this would be a dubious assumption indeed. More likely "pure proceduralists" on our questionnaire were diverse in their substantive attitudes, but did not bother or preferred not to go beyond a minimum explanation of why they did not sign.

If we confine our attention to all non-signers who returned questionnaires, the following are the results put in procedural vs. substantive terms:

<u>Procedural Objections Only to Letter</u>	22
(a. Agreed with letter but objected to procedure--	4)
(b. No substantive position stated, but objected to procedure--	12)
(c. "Other" replies, mainly of a quasi-procedural nature--	6)
<u>Substantive Objections Only to Letter</u>	42
<u>Both Procedural and Substantive Objections to Letter</u>	23
<u>"Accidental" Reasons for not Signing (did not receive appeal or forgot to sign)</u>	12
	<u>99% (N=192)</u>

Even if we assume that all members in the first group agreed with the contents of the letter, only 22% of the non-signing respondents refused solely because of procedural objections to the form of this action. In fact, we think it likely that many of those who gave only procedural reasons had other substantive objections as well. Our guess is that at most 1 out of 10 non-signers took that course solely because of concern over the use of the University name. Thus, although procedural questions may play an important role in public criticisms of the letter, their practical importance in increasing or decreasing the number of supporters is probably much exaggerated. Many of the people (at least half in the above table) who raise procedural questions are clearly opposed to the contents of the letter in any case.

The fact that a substantial number of faculty members gave both procedural and substantive objections is not surprising. Our questionnaire invited a respondent to give all the reasons he wished for not having signed the letter. Yet an even larger number stated only a substantive objection. It is interesting to determine whether there is any tendency for particular substantive positions to stand alone, as against being combined with procedural objections. By rearranging our basic results in terms of this inquiry, we can see that such substantive-procedural affinities do exist:

<u>Substantive Objection</u>	<u>No. Giving that Substantive Objection Only</u>	<u>No. Giving that Substantive Plus A Procedural Objection</u>
Undecided on bombing	19	18
Support present U. S. policy	48	17
Favor more bombing than at present	9	10

Individuals who are undecided about the bombing or who take a "hawk" position are more likely also to register procedural objections than are individuals in the more intermediate position of supporting present United States policy.

( $\chi^2 = 7.82$ , df. = 2,  $p < .02$ ).

Our interpretation of this interesting difference must necessarily be speculative. We are inclined to regard the persons who are "undecided" as individuals in strong need of support for not taking any clear position on the issue. On a widely debated moral and strategic question such as the bombing of North Vietnam, it is difficult not to have a leaning in some direction, except as a result of severe internal conflict or external cross-pressures. The appeal to sign the letter to the President--or to explain why one had not signed it--places such an individual in a difficult dilemma: either he has to come down on one side or the other of the issue, or he has to admit his own inability to take a stand. A procedural objection to signing the letter relieves such an individual of the dilemma by allowing him to maintain a state of intellectual indecision without making this indecision

alone bear the whole weight of his inaction.

The tendency for "hawks" or militants to invoke procedural grounds is more difficult to explain. Like the "undecided" group, militants are taking what in the University community is an unpopular position, and procedural reasons might conceivably represent a secondary support, as it does for the Undecided. It is tempting to search for such theoretical symmetry. Yet the nature of the militant position is so clearly opposed to the purpose of the letter that it is difficult for us to see why such further indirect support should be needed. We are therefore inclined to regard the affinity between militant and procedural objections as due to a quite different process. "I did not sign the letter because I did not believe in the use of the name of the University of Michigan in this way" is more ambiguous than we intended. We meant to raise only the general question of whether the University name should be introduced at all into non-University political matters. But the statement can also be interpreted to refer to the particular letter under consideration, which used the prestige of the University name to challenge current national policy. In checking this alternative, the militant we suspect is not opposing the use of the University name in political-military affairs altogether, but rather its use in opposition to U. S. military pursuit of the Vietnam war. The "procedural rule" seen as being violated is not one that calls for non-participation of the University, but rather one that demands support of the national government in time of war by Universities along with all other important institutions. The

objection is to the involvement of the University name on the "unpatriotic" side of the issue.

### Conclusions

Separation of solid fact from suggestive interpretation is essential in a report of this kind, despite the relative nature of any such distinction. Our data are adequate for answering the question with which we began, namely, the amount of unvoiced support behind the 600 signatures on the Michigan letter to the President. To the original 20% of the University faculty who were reported to have signed the letter, another 10 to 20% may be added who are in agreement with the basic contents of the letter. But substantive support for the continued bombing of North Vietnam is at least as strong or stronger among Michigan faculty members, with perhaps as many as half the faculty willing to give clear support to current U. S. policy. About one-third of the persons returning a questionnaire objected to the use of the University name in connection with the letter to the President, but more than half of these individuals were against the letter on substantive grounds as well. Procedural issues alone seem to have played a rather small part in determining faculty members reaction to the request to sign the letter.

As expected there were variations within the University by field and school on this issue, with social scientists within the liberal arts college showing greatest support for the letter. But almost every unit of the University reflects within itself the larger split in opinion that divides the University. The relation between academic rank and position on the

letter is even more uncertain and does not lead to any simple interpretation. Here and for the other intra-University analyses, further data will be needed before the results reported can be fully interpreted.

There are two general issues not discussed here but of obvious importance in considering the implications of these results. One is the place of the University of Michigan among other universities. Despite the fact that Ann Arbor, was the site of the first "teach-in", it is not at all clear that opinion is more opposed to the war here than in Cambridge, Berkeley, Ithaca, or Madison. The University of Michigan may well be representative of other national universities, although probably it is high on the dissent side when compared to most local and provincial institutions. Possibly studies will be undertaken elsewhere which can provide comparisons with the present findings.

The other issue concerns change over time. Would the same results be obtained today (October, 1967), seven months after our study? National polls indicate a drop in support for the war, and it is probably simplest to assume a similar decrease on the part of the Michigan faculty. One might indeed expect a larger change at this educational level, since the faculty is more aware than the average citizen of recent problems connected with pursuit of the war. On the other hand, faculty members in Ann Arbor who supported the bombing in February had been exposed for nearly two years to counter-arguments from many colleagues; their resistance to these

arguments for so long may well indicate a more stable pro-bombing position than that held by the general population. Only another study at this point can tell whether faculty opinions on the bombing have changed faster or slower than in the general population. All we can report is that in February, 1967, the Administration in Washington could count on considerable support within the University of Michigan faculty for what is undoubtedly the most widely questioned action of the United States today: the bombing of North Vietnam.