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PROBLEMS IN THE ANALYSIS OF BREAKAGE EFFECTS:

DATA AGGREGATION AND COMMUNITY PERCEPTION\*

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A major trend in the study of political behavior in America has been the increased utilization of national probability samples, rather than samples drawn within a more limited geographical area. While early studies focussed on political behavior in the context of specific counties or cities,<sup>1</sup> more recent research has focussed on parameters of the national electorate, and on explanations of political choice that are not contingent upon locality factors.<sup>2</sup> One result of this trend has been a decrease in the amount of attention paid to the interpersonal dynamics involved in the partisanship decision. Thus, an important and well documented source of variation, the norms of primary groups, has been systematically disregarded.<sup>3</sup>

Berelson has suggested that when the primary groups to which one belongs do not provide an unambiguous definition of

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1. The classic studies in this tradition were done by the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. See especially Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), and Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
  2. The more important of these researches have been carried out by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. See Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, The People Elect A President (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Survey Research Center Series # 9, 1952); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row Peterson, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, Elections and Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966).
  3. See Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 22 ff.

the party one is expected to support, the dominant political climate in the community will attract the individual. Thus, the analysis of voting in a Republican town, Elmira, New York, in the 1948 election revealed that "the Republicans get more than their random share of the adjustment to a conflicting environment, because of the pervasive Republican atmosphere of Elmira that thus tends to perpetuate itself."<sup>4</sup> Such breakage effects are one example of a more general sociological concern with 'structural' or 'contextual' effects.<sup>5</sup> The relevant research question here is whether the attitudes and behaviors of an individual can be attributed to traits that he as an individual possesses, to characteristics of social collectivities to which he belongs, or to interactions between these two sets of variables.

Recent research on the breakage effect has raised the question of defining units of analysis. Putnam, using national survey data for the 1952 presidential election, operationally defined "local community" as county, and the political climate of the county was then indexed by the Democratic percentage of

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4. Berelson, et al., op. cit., p. 100.

5. See Hanan C. Selvin, "Durkheim's Suicide and Problems of Empirical Research," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 63 (1958), pp. 607-619; Peter M. Blau, "Structural Effects," American Sociological Review, vol. 25 (1960), pp. 178-193; James A. Davis, Joe L. Spaeth and Carolyn Huson, "A Technique for Analyzing the Effects of Group Composition," American Sociological Review, vol. 26 (1961), pp. 215-225; Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Jerald G. Bachman, "Structural versus Individual Effects," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 69 (1964), pp. 585-595.

the two-party vote cast for President in 1952.<sup>6</sup> These latter data were based upon voting returns. The breakage hypothesis was confirmed in that people scoring high on an index of social integration were shown to lean toward the partisan mode in their areas.

In another recent study, Segal and Meyer utilized voting wards in nine towns in the northeastern United States as units of analysis. Here, the wards were assigned collective socioeconomic status (SES) rankings (high vs. low) on the basis of the status characteristics of the respondents clustered within them. Assuming that middle-class individuals favor the Republican Party while working class people favor the Democratic Party, it was hypothesized that community SES would affect partisan choice above and beyond the effect of individual SES. Thus, among low SES respondents, those living in high SES areas would be more likely to vote Republican than would those in low SES areas. It was anticipated that the community effect would be less for high SES respondents, since they would be more likely to have social ties outside of the local community, such as voluntary association memberships, and these would influence

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6. Robert D. Putnam, "Political Attitudes and the Local Community," American Political Science Review, vol. LX, no. 3 (September, 1966), pp. 640-654.

their party choices. These hypotheses were borne out by the data.<sup>7</sup>

The utilization of counties or voting wards as units of analysis, however, is satisfying neither in terms of the assumptions of contextual analysis nor with regard to the assumed dynamics of the breakage effect. In general, the collectivities utilized in the study of structural effects should be more than arbitrary categories between which statistically significant differences appear. They should refer to social aggregates that are meaningful to the individual respondents. It is difficult to argue seriously that one's county or ward can universally be defined as a meaningful category in this regard. More specially, the breakage effect seems to be predicated upon social influence through interpersonal interaction.

Cox has in fact demonstrated that those people whose social and organizational contacts are within the community are more susceptible to contextual effects than are people whose contacts extend beyond the community.<sup>8</sup> This finding

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7. David R. Segal and Marshall W. Meyer, "The Social Context of Political Partisanship," in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968. Forthcoming). Note that Segal and Meyer were concerned with the social context, while Putnam was concerned with the political context. Cf. Philip H. Ennis, "The Contextual Dimension in Voting," in William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser, eds., Public Opinion and Congressional Elections (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 180-211.

8. Kevin R. Cox, "The Spatial Structuring of Information Flow and Partisan Attitudes," Paper delivered at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists (Purdue University, April, 1967).

resolves the major difference between Putnam's study and that of Segal and Meyer. Putnam found that social integration, measured in part by membership in voluntary associations, increased the contextual effect. Segal and Meyer, on the other hand, argued that membership in voluntary associations was an alternative to the local community as a source of political orientation. Since it is reasonable to argue that the voluntary associations in which people actively participate tend to be more territorially extensive than voting wards, but more intensive than counties, the contradiction is accounted for.

A third approach to the problem of breakage effects is to utilize areas defined as relevant by respondents as units of analysis, regardless of their correspondence to standardized units. Two techniques of measurement suggest themselves here.

On the one hand, one can focus on phenomenological definition of the situation, and accept the individual's perception of the community in which he lives as the independent variable. Alternatively, one can obtain from the respondent the boundaries of the local community as he perceives them,<sup>9</sup> and aggregate available survey data within such a community to estimate the social composition of that unit.

The tasks of the present study, then, are first, to determine the generality of the breakage phenomenon through replication, second, to compare the use of census data and

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9. For an example of this technique see Charles A. Goldsmid and Daniel H. Willick, "Perceptions of the Urban Community," Working Paper No. 65, Center for Social Organization Studies (University of Chicago, 1966).

aggregated survey data in estimating contextual parameters, and third, to compare the effects of real versus perceived neighborhood characteristics.

The data utilized in attempting to confront these issues were taken from a cross-section sample of the population of Wayne County, Michigan, in 1957.<sup>10</sup> In addition to collecting a wide range of political data, this study coded all respondents by census tract, voting precinct, congressional district and other residential units. Survey data could therefore be aggregated for each of these units, and for those units for which census data are available, data files could be mixed to ascertain the characteristics of the units independent of the respondents in this sample.

Table 1 presents the reported per cent of Republican party preference when individual SES and census tract SES are varied.

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Table 1. Per Cent Republican, by Individual SES and Census Tract SES (estimate from aggregated survey data).

		Tract SES	
		Low	High
Respondent's SES	Low	21.8	52.0
	(N)	(473)	(25)
	High	37.8	45.5
	(N)	(127)	(101)

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10. For a description of the area, the sample and the research instrument see Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), esp. pp. 24-44, 547-478.



The tract data here have been estimated by cumulating data for all respondents within each tract. The findings that appeared in the earlier studies are manifested here. Among low SES respondents, census tract differences are strongly related to party choice. The difference is much less among high SES respondents. Respondent SES also makes a good deal of difference within low SES census tracts. While the difference due to individual SES within high SES tracts is small and opposite in direction to what we would expect, we regard this statistic as having low reliability because of the small number of respondents in the low SES cell.

Table 2 presents these same data when census tract SES is measured by distributions reported in the 1960 census.

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Table 2. Per Cent Republican, by Individual SES and Census Tract SES (estimate from census data).

		Tract SES	
		Low	High
Respondent's SES	Low	22.8	30.6
	(N)	(413)	(62)
	High	32.5	44.3
	(N)	(114)	(122)

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The relative differences due to tract SES among low SES respondents, and to differences in respondent SES within low SES tracts are greatly diminished, but still apparent. The difference due to tract SES among high SES respondents is increased, and is in fact greater than that observed for low SES respondents.

While differences exist both with regard to total and cell N's and percentages, both tables support the hypothesis that party choice is related to community SES.

Of the 95 tracts in which respondents resided, 26 could be classified by either census data or aggregated survey data, but not both. The difference in cell N's is due to the fact that of the 69 tracts for which both census and survey estimates existed, the estimates differed in 6 cases--slightly less than 10 per cent of all cases for which both criteria were available. It appears then, that if sufficient respondents are clustered in a given geographical unit, survey data collected from those respondents can be used to estimate census parameters for the geographical unit.

Three important conclusions result from this analysis. First, we have replicated the study of northeastern towns and found that in Wayne County, community SES is a significant determinant of party choice. Second, we have shown that break-age effects, and, by inference, other structural effects as well, can be studied meaningfully by aggregating survey data to estimate characteristics of the structure involved. The condition suggested by the present data is that large N's must exist for all cells for the estimate to be considered reliable. Third, by validating this method, we have freed the researcher from working with censal or administrative units which may be phenomenologically meaningless to the respondent. Thus, local community areas, which may have very different boundaries from formalized units, may be utilized in the study of community effects.

We may now turn to the problem of community perception. While we do not have data on community boundaries as defined by our respondents, we do know how they perceive the political composition of their neighborhoods. Two questions are important in this regard. First, we are interested in how well individuals perceive the partisan composition of their communities. Here, we can only provide a basis for drawing weak inferences by comparing community perceptions with the partisan composition of arbitrary units. Second, we are concerned with the relationship between community perception and partisan choice.

As Table 3 shows, for those people who attribute a partisan character to their neighborhoods there is no relationship between such perceptions and the actual partisan composition of census tracts. We are unable to determine with the available data whether this is due to the lack of coincidence of neighborhood and tract boundaries or to misperceptions of partisan composition. It is clear, however, that people who feel that they live in Republican neighborhoods are at least as likely as those who think they live in Democratic neighborhoods to in fact live in preponderantly Democratic census tracts. The plurality of those who responded to the question perceive that they live in neighborhoods that are split evenly in partisan terms. The great majority of Detroiters, however, live in very strongly Democratic areas.

Table 3. Perceived Neighborhood Partisanship, by Census Tract Partisanship.

Per Cent G.O.P. in Tract	Perceived Partisanship				
	Strong Democrat	Democrat	50-50	Republican	Strong Republican
< 40	47%	71%	83%	70%	85%
40-60	6	14	22	22	12
> 60	47	14	5	8	2
Total	100%	99%	100%	100%	99%
(N)	(32)	(69)	(120)	(76)	(82)

Let us now turn to the impact of perception upon party choice. Fully 51 per cent of the respondents attached no partisan label to the neighborhoods in which they reside. This is especially interesting since almost two-thirds of the sample felt that they lived in socially homogeneous neighborhoods. Obviously, party choice is not an important factor in considerations of how similar or different people are.

As Table 4 demonstrates, for those respondents who perceive their neighborhoods to have a partisan character, the same pattern holds here as has been demonstrated above. Low SES respondents appear to be as sensitive to the perceived political context as they are to the actual social context. Of those low SES respondents who live in neighborhoods perceived to be Democratic one-quarter support the Republican Party, but fully half of those in neighborhoods perceived to be strongly Republican support the G.O.P. The effect of perceived community

partisanship is nowhere near as great for high SES respondents.

Table 4. Per Cent Republican, by Individual SES and Perceived Neighborhood Partisanship.

Respon- dent's SES	Perceived Partisanship				
	Strongly Democratic	Democrat	50-50	Republican	Strongly Republican
Low	25.4	25.0	16.9	43.2	50.0
(N)	(71)	(56)	(71)	(37)	(12)
High	45.0	44.4	36.8	42.4	55.6
(N)	(26)	(27)	(57)	(33)	(18)

Alternative explanations for differential responsiveness to either actual or perceived community context as a function of occupation may be derived from three different areas of research. First, it might be argued that high SES people are more likely than low SES people to belong to voluntary associations outside of the local community, which provide alternative political cues to those of the immediate territorial unit.<sup>11</sup> Second, alternative sources of political orientation aside, this pattern might reflect the well documented tendency for the flow of influence to parallel the status structure.<sup>12</sup> Were these dynamics operating, we would expect low SES people living in high SES communities to conform to the political choices of

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11. Segal and Meyer, op. cit.

12. See for example James C. Moore, Jr., "Status and Influence in Small Group Interactions," Sociometry (forthcoming).

their neighbors due to the recognized status differential. For exactly the same reason, we would expect high SES individuals in low SES neighborhoods not to conform to the local partisan mode. When we speak of perceived community partisanship rather than objective social status, the logic becomes less direct, but the model still applies. We assume that most people subscribe to the notion that the Republican Party represents the interests of the middle-class, while the Democratic Party is more of a working-class party. We further assume that individuals are more likely to perceive their neighbors in social status than in partisan terms. It follows then, that when respondents tell us that their neighborhoods are strongly Republican, what they mean is that their neighbors are middle-class, and they therefore assume them to be Republicans. This fact, coupled with the historical tendency for the Democratic Party to become more middle-class as the social structure of American society has shifted toward white-collar occupations, may explain why a larger proportion of Detroiters feel they are in Republican neighborhoods than there are Republican neighborhoods in Detroit. Indeed, this phenomenon would be expected to appear all over the country, since the American electorate has shifted toward the Democratic Party.<sup>13</sup> It is not important that perceptions of the social status of one's neighbors may be incorrect. Moore has in fact demonstrated that if two individuals are of the same objective status, the

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13. See David R. Segal, "Partisan Realignment in the United States: The Lesson of the 1964 Election," Public Opinion Quarterly (forthcoming).

direction of influence between them will be determined by perceived status differences.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, the observed pattern may be a result of selectively perceiving (or misperceiving) the partisan climate of one's community to support one's own partisan judgement.

The selectivity hypothesis itself may be based on two different, but related, bodies of social-psychological theory. On the one hand, theories of interpersonal attraction and attitudinal balance tell us that people are likely to choose as friends others who agree with them in the evaluation of salient objects.<sup>15</sup> From this point of view, if a person evaluated the Republicans positively and the Democrats negatively, and his party choice were important to him, we would associate with people who shared his evaluations of the parties. Since he is likely to judge the composition of his community on the basis of his own interpersonal contacts, he will see similarities between his own attitudes and those prevalent in his community.

On the other hand, arguing from the assumptions of cognitive dissonance theory, one need not postulate selective

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14. Moore, op. cit.

15. The most familiar of these are Heider's P-O-X and Newcomb's A-B-X models. See Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958), and Theodore M. Newcomb, "Varieties of Interpersonal Attraction," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., Group Dynamics (Second edition: Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1962), pp. 104-119. See also James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 11-12.

association. Dissonance theory holds that having chosen among alternatives, an individual will seek support for his decision. One mode of behavior is of course to associate only with people who agree with him. In this case the outcome will be similar to that described above. However, there are alternative means of achieving attitudinal consonance. Cooper and Jahoda, for example, discuss the misperception of information as a means of avoiding dissonance.<sup>16</sup>

There is little support for the selectivity hypothesis in either the literature on political attitudes and behavior, or in our own data.

The balance and dissonance models assume a coherent set of attitudes and/or object orientations such that knowing one or more elements in the set of attitudes facilitates the prediction of other elements. Converse, however, has demonstrated that with regard to political affect, at least, such coherent attitude systems are not characteristic of the general population.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, there is an implicit assumption underlying the selectivity hypotheses that it makes a difference which alternative is chosen. Most Americans make a rather minimal investment in politics, and Almond and Verba have in fact demonstrated that partisans in America describe the opposing party in much the same terms that they describe their own, and,

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16. E. Cooper and M. Jahoda, "The Evasion of Propaganda," Journal of Psychology, vol. 23 (1947), pp. 15-25. For a more general discussion see Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

17. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.



a perhaps more revealing test, are indifferent to their children marrying across party lines.<sup>18</sup>

Our own data also fail to provide support for the selectivity hypothesis, although we may disconfirm the hypothesis only by inference. A majority of our respondents reported that it didn't make any difference to them whether the Democrats or Republicans were in control of the government. Moreover, there is no evidence either that party choice was a criterion in choosing friends, or that the partisanship of one's friends was misperceived. In fact a majority of our respondents (53 per cent) reported that they did not discuss politics with their best friends, and 44 per cent were unable to state which candidate their best friend had supported in the last presidential election. A minority of our respondents (26 per cent) did in fact find that they disagreed with friends and acquaintances on party choice, but half of these said that they weren't bothered by the fact, and an additional 12 per cent thought that such disagreement was a good thing. There was no evidence of psychological distress resulting from such a situation. Indeed, these results seem to demonstrate, as earlier studies have shown, that contrary to the great amount of attitude change observed in social psychology laboratories under experimental conditions, relatively few people in the real world assign affect to political objects

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18. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 125, 135.

in ways explicable by balance theory or dissonance theory considerations--both perspectives which are found highly useful in the analysis of data gathered in laboratory situations.<sup>19</sup>

Let us now turn to the question of whether actual community composition, perceived community composition, and organization memberships can serve as alternative bases of party choice. In order to determine the interrelationships among these factors, the mode of analysis used here was the "tree" technique. This method reduces the unexplained variance in the dependent variable--here, political partisanship--through the progressive non-symmetric splitting of the sample on the basis of a series of predictor variables.<sup>20</sup>

In the first stage of the analysis, presented in Figure 1, the only variables input as predictors were the real political climate of the census tract in which the respondent resided, the perceived partisan composition of the neighborhood, and the respondent's occupation. These variables accounted for 15.9 per cent of the total variance in partisanship.

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19. See Carl I. Hovland, "Reconciling Conflicting Results Derived from Experimental and Survey Studies of Attitude Change," in Ivan D. Steiner and Martin Fishbein, eds., Current Studies in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, 1965), pp. 173-186.

20. The method is described in John A. Sonquist and James N. Morgan, The Detection of Interaction Effects (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1964). For an application in the study of political behavior, see Morris Janowitz and David R. Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 72, no. 6 (May, 1967), pp. 601-618.




Figure 1. First phase of "tree-analysis". Variance accounted for = 15.9 per cent of total sum of squares. Figures at each split represent the per cent reduction of the total sum of squares by that split.

The groups are numbered by the order in which splits occurred. The first split (groups 2 and 3), accounting for 8.4 per cent of the total variance, demonstrates the obvious tautology that Republicans tend to live in Republican areas and Democrats tend to live in Democratic areas. The second split (groups 4 and 5) demonstrates that while there is a significant class differential in party choice (20 per cent), a minority of white-collar workers who live in Democratic tracts consider themselves Republicans.

Groups 4 and 5 can be compared to the corresponding groups in Republican tracts, 16 and 17. Note that for these four groups, occupational differences account for an average difference of 21 per cent in Republican preference. The differences due to political composition of the tract, on the other hand, are more than double that figure. More than two-thirds of the blue-collar workers living in predominantly Republican tracts consider themselves to be Republicans.

The effect of community perception is apparent in the split from group 5. Among blue-collar workers in Democratic tracts, perceptions of the partisan composition of neighborhoods account for a 34 per cent difference in Republican preferences (groups 8 and 9). Half of the blue collar respondents in Democratic tracts who perceive their neighborhoods to be Republican are themselves Republican. While in this phase of the analysis, only one group was split on community perception, this variable accounted for only slightly less variance than did social class (2.0 as compared to 2.2 per cent).

In the second phase of the analysis membership in voluntary associations and, once again, perceived community partisanship, were used to explain the residual variance remaining in the final groups of phase I (groups 4, 7-11 in Figure 1). It was hypothesized that low SES individuals would be more responsive to perceived community partisanship patterns than would high SES respondents, and that organization memberships would emerge as an alternative source of partisan cues to those furnished within the local community.

We have seen above that working-class respondents in Democratic tracts who tend to vote Republican also tend to think that their neighborhoods are Republican. Regardless of the direction of causality, there is consonance between party preference and perceived social climate in this case. The second phase of the analysis failed to produce further meaningful splits in this segment of the sample, and groups 8 and 9 remained as final groups.<sup>21</sup>

Among high SES respondents in Democratic census tracts (group 4, Figure 1), we did achieve further specification on the basis of union membership and community perception. These data are presented in Figure 2. Union members in this group were more Democratic than were non-members, and the union members comprised a final group, with no further splits. Among those not associated with unions, a split emerged on the basis

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21. Meaningful splits were defined operationally as those reducing the original total sum of squares by .4 per cent or more.




Figure 2. Second phase of "tree analysis", plate 1. Variance accounted for = 1.6 per cent of total sum of squares.

of community perception that differed from the pattern observed above. Here, those people who perceived their communities to be Republican (perhaps because the communities were middle-class) tended to support the Democratic Party despite these perceptions. The fact that these middle-class people misperceived the local partisan context and then deviated from the perceived context supports our hypothesis that the middle-class is less susceptible to local community pressure. Within these same tracts, blue collar respondents who thought their neighborhoods were Republican were almost two times more likely to consider themselves Republican (Figure 1, group 8) than were white collar respondents. Our data also support our claim that, at least for the middle-class, community partisanship is not misperceived in order to support one's own party preference.

Group 14 in Figure 2 is somewhat misleading in its suggestion that middle-class non-union members in Democratic tracts who tend to vote Republican tend to perceive their neighborhoods as Democratic. In fact, of the 77 cases in this category, 42 were D.K. or N.A. responses on perceptions of neighborhood partisanship, and an additional 22 respondents thought the neighborhoods were about half Democratic and half Republican. Later splits, not reported here because of the minute amounts of variance accounted for, suggested that people who thought their neighborhoods were strongly Democratic were somewhat less likely to be Republican, and that Republican support was greatest when perception of community partisanship was not ascertained. The strongest statement that can be made at this point

is that middle-class people who live in Democratic neighborhoods and prefer the Republican Party tend not to attach a partisan complexion to the neighborhood. This may well be because they have limited involvement in the local community.

The relationship between perceived community partisanship, voluntary association membership, and party choice is suggested by the phase II analysis of those respondents who lived in dissensus tracts, or in tracts for which partisan composition could not be ascertained (Figure 1, group 7). These data are presented in Figure 3. Here, as in the above case, the first split was on union membership, with a 37 per cent difference in preference for the Republican Party between union members and non-members. Among non-members, there were then a series of splits on organization memberships, with members of nationality or race organizations preferring the Democratic Party,<sup>22</sup> and members of professional organizations or church connected organizations tending to support the Republican Party. Of the people in tracts characterized by political dissensus who were members neither of unions nor ethnic organizations nor professional organizations nor church connected organizations, there was a split on the basis of perceived neighborhood partisanship: people who thought their neighborhood were strongly Republican or Republican chose the Republican Party in 85.7 per cent of the cases, as

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22. Cf. Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review, vol. LXI, no. 3, pp. 717-726.






Figure 3. Second phase of "tree analysis", plate 2. Variance accounted for = 8.7 per cent of total sum of squares.

opposed to 52.2 per cent of the people with other views of neighborhood composition (Figure 3, groups 24 and 25). Moreover, at the next split, people who thought their neighborhoods were about evenly split or were Democratic chose the G.O.P. in slightly more than one quarter of the cases, while those people who did not know the political context of their neighborhoods (43 of the 50 cases in group 26 were D.K. responses) tended to choose the Republican Party.

Among union members in this phase of the analysis, membership in church-connected groups reduced the tendency to support the Democratic Party, while membership in veterans organizations strongly reinforced the tendency for Democratic preference.

The only other meaningful split that emerged from phase II of the analysis separated blue-collar workers living in Republican tracts on the basis of union membership. Non-members were more than twice as likely to support the Republican Party than union members were. These data are presented in Figure 4. However, the impact of the local context may be seen in the fact that despite blue-collar occupations and union membership, 40 per cent of the latter group preferred the Republican Party.

The tree analysis accounted for 27 per cent of the initial total sum of squares in party preference. The relative strength of the sources of variance is summarized in Table 5.




Figure 4. Second phase of "tree analysis", plate 3. Variance accounted for = .8 per cent of total sum of squares.

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Table 5. Sources of Explained Variance in "Tree-Analysis".

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Per Cent of Variance Accounted For</u>
Tract partisanship	11.7
Union membership	5.5
Perception of neighborhood partisanship	4.0
Membership in organizations other than unions	3.6
Occupation	2.2
Total	27.0 %

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Several conclusions may be drawn from this analysis. Beyond reaffirming the import of the local community in determining the party choice of working-class people, we have seen that working-class deviation from the local partisan norm can be accounted for in part by perceptions of the local context that differ from aggregate reality. We have no evidence to argue, however, that such people misperceive reality. Rather, they may well define neighborhood in terms that our operations do not tap. In addition, it should be noted that people living in tracts without clear cut partisan modes, who do not belong to voluntary associations, conform to their perceptions of community partisanship.

We have also seen that middle-class people are relatively unaffected by local contexts, and in fact tend not to perceive their local neighborhoods as having a definable

political climate. Where the neighborhood is viewed as partisan, this perception has little bearing on the middle-class individual's own party preference.

With respect to the relative effects of community and voluntary association memberships, we see here reason for taking issue with Cox' expectations. The intensity of extensity of membership does not necessarily affect conformity to the neighborhood political mode. The most impressive fact regarding organizational membership in the present study is the relatively small number of people who in fact belonged to organizations. Among those people who were members, organization membership seems to be an alternative source of partisan cues regardless of its territorial intensity. Thus, if one were a member of a territorially intensive organization that tended to support the Republican Party, e.g. a local businessmen's association, then even if the community within which the organization existed were Democratic, one would be expected to vote Republican.

It is important then, in studying the effects of organization membership and party choice, to note the nature of the organizations involved. Our present data suggest, not surprisingly, that labor union, and ethnic organization memberships are associated with Democratic preference, while membership in professional organizations and church-connected groups is indicative of Republican preference.