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THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE ELECTORAL MARKET*

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THE ELECTORATE AS A MARKET.

Much of the recent research on the spatial nature of party competition can be traced to the work of Hotelling (1929), who was concerned with the question of why two competing businesses are often in adjacent positions near the center of a spatial market. Kresge's and Woolworth's are not at opposite ends of Main Street, but rather are next door to each other.

Hotelling assumed that (1) there is a linear market bounded at both ends, (2) buyers of a commodity are "uniformly distributed" along the market, (3) the buyers' demand is constant, (4) consumers buy goods from whoever is closer (a rational calculation), and (5) each competitor will attempt to fix his prices and location so as to maximize his profits (another rational calculation). He showed that competing firms converge toward adjacent positions in the middle of the market, in the interest of increasing their share of that market.

Hotelling argued that by analogy, one could think of voters as consumers and political parties as firms. Like Kresge's and Woolworth's the Democrats and Republicans were in adjacent market positions, close to the center of the liberalism-conservatism spectrum, where the masses of voters were assumed to be.

Smithies (1941) amended Hotelling's assumption of inelastic demand. He suggested that demand is at least in part a function of price, and price in turn depends in part on

transportation costs. Since price increases with rising transportation costs, firms are not only under pressure to move toward the center of the market, but also under pressure to retain peripheral support. If a firm is too near the center, transportation costs to the hinterland rise, increasing cost and decreasing demand. In the electoral market, if both the major parties occupy central areas, voters in the "hinterlands" of the liberalism-conservatism spectrum will not pay the price of travelling the ideological distance between their own positions and the positions of the parties. Rather, they will stay away from the polls. The divergence of the parties from one another in order to attract and maintain hinterland support then, partly accounts for the bimodal characteristic of the party system that is absent from Hotelling's model.

Elements of both Hotelling's and Smithies' models of the market are found in Downs' (1957) Economic Theory of Democracy. Downs suggests that when the bulk of the electorate is located at the extremes of the dimension of political affect, the parties themselves will bifurcate ideologically. Where the distribution of political affect is normal, however, and therefore densest at the middle of the scale, there will be ideological convergence of political parties.

Stokes (1966) has suggested that most spatial interpretations of party competition have a "very poor fit with the evidence about how large-scale electorates and political

Leaders actually respond to politics." In particular he questions four assumptions in the Hotelling-Downs model, viz., (1) the unidimensionality of the left-right space, (2) the stability of the structure in which parties compete, (3) the existence of an ordered issue dimension, and (4) the common frame of reference of parties and electorate. Here we will investigate the first and last of these assumptions as the most fundamental since in fact they underlie and imply the second and third assumptions.

THE DIMENSIONALITY OF POLITICAL AFFECT.

Much research on political attitudes in the industrial nations of Europe and North America has assumed the existence of a liberalism-conservatism, or left-right continuum underlying political affect. Shils (1959) has suggested that this construct does not represent political reality in the twentieth century, and Lipset (1968) argues that if it is to be used, it must at least be defined in terms of general policy arenas, i.e., social welfare and civil liberties. Efforts by the staff of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan to define the structure of political attitudes have gone far toward the definition of such attitudes in terms of specific policy areas (see for example Campbell et. al., 1960). Reanalysis of Survey Research Center data, however, suggests that there is indeed a liberalism-conservatism dimension underlying, and cutting across, issue areas (cf. Segal and Smith, 1970).

Hotelling, Smithies and Downs all assume the relevance of the left-right dimension, and La Ponce's (1970) success in using this concept with college samples suggests that it is indeed meaningful, at least to educated subgroups. Moreover, Rice's (1928:275) earlier research suggests that for educated populations the distribution of this dimension may indeed be bell-shaped. We shall therefore focus on this construct in our own research.

One critical area in which we differ with previous researchers is in our rejection of their assumption that the electoral market is unidimensional. Rather, we suggest that these researchers are looking at only one of several bases of electoral choice, the remaining factors being left unidentified. In this particular study, we are concerned with how people relate to the two major American political parties, specifically with the extent to which people see themselves as more liberal than, or more conservative than, these parties. Linked with this concern is our interest in how individual positions and strength of party support correlate. From these data on individual perspectives, we shall be able to draw inferences regarding (a) the appropriate strategies for political parties to optimize their positions in the electoral market, and (b) the degree to which there is consensus on the relative ideological positions of the parties. In adopting this approach, we are attending to the criticisms raised by Stokes (1966) and by Buchanan and Tullock (1965) regarding the assumption of unidimensionality.

A TWO MARKET MODEL.

We also differ from the Hotelling-Smithies-Downs formulation in that we reject the common frame of reference of parties and electorate that they assume. Their formulation suggests that all members of the electorate are potential supporters of either of two major political parties. Each voter knows his own utilities and chooses the party that maximizes his gains, reasoning that the profits accruing from his choice exceed the costs inherent in this choice. Indeed, this notion appears in more recent formulations as well (cf. Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; Shubik, 1970).

Research in the field of political socialization, however, suggests that political party choice is most generally transmitted from parent to child, and that the child develops an affective attachment to his parents' party as a political object (Langton, 1969:53). Hess and Torney (1968:97) report that as children age, they believe less and less in family loyalty as an appropriate basis for deciding which party to support. However, even these authors concede that where the parents both agree on party choice, their children will follow their lead 75 per cent of the time. What makes this figure more remarkable is that family loyalty persists as a factor of central importance in the face of ideological differences between generations. What seems to happen is that the child, having developed an affective attachment to a party

as a political object, then derives from contemporary political events a series of justifications for his party choice (cf. Hyman, 1959:74). He therefore agrees with his parents' choice of political party, but has different specific reasons for that choice than they do.

The rarity of major political realignments in the American electorate attests to the strength of the ties between voters and their parties. While there is some ticket-splitting, and partisans of one persuasion sometimes vote for candidates of the other, one does not frequently find large numbers of voters severing their emotional links to one party, and establishing links with another. When such realignments do take place, moreover, they seem to occur over an extended period of time (Sellers, 1965). It appears to be easier for a Democrat to become a non-Democrat than for him to become a Republican. Thus, during realignment phases, third-party movements seem to play an important role as "half-way houses," giving ex-partisans of one major persuasion a political object on which to roost while getting accustomed to the idea of supporting the party that in their youth was defined as the opposition (MacRae and Neldrum, 1960; Alford, 1963:287-308).

Given the emotional ties that exist between voters and parties, elections tend not to be won on the basis of one party attracting supporters of the opposite persuasion to its cause (Segal, 1968). Rather, the electoral task of each party is to get its own partisans to the polls, and to maximize

its attractiveness to uncommitted or independent voters. Thus the parties operate in imperfect markets, in which significant blocs of consumers, on grounds that are largely emotional, will not buy their product regardless of what they do. In the current American electorate, the Democrats have a plurality, but due largely to socioeconomic differences, Republican voters are more likely to go to the polls. In our political system, the role of the independent becomes crucial.

THE MARKET POSITION OF INDEPENDENTS.

In Hotelling's model of a linear market, political independents are assumed to occupy a "zone of indifference" within which it is unimportant whether one votes Democratic or Republican since the costs are identical. In most studies of American political behavior, similarly, the independents are conceived as occupying the center of the spectrum of political affect.

This latter conceptualization is in large part a product of the particular questions and coding schemes used by academic survey organizations in the collection of partisanship data. The University of Michigan Survey Research Center, for example, asks respondents in its political behavior samples: "Do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or what?" People who claim identification with either the Democratic or Republican parties are then asked: "Do you consider yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican) or not a very strong (Democrat/Republican)?"

Individuals who declare themselves at the outset to be independent are asked whether they generally favor the Democratic or Republican party. Data collected by this series of questions are coded to produce a one-digit index of party choice, depicted in Figure 1. The hypothetical distribution of this index reflects both the Democratic plurality in the American electorate, and the relatively small proportion of Americans who regard themselves as political independents. While few researchers assume that this index represents an interval scale, the quality of ordinality has frequently been attributed to it. Thus, party choice is conceived of as a dimension bounded at the poles by the strong partisan positions.

In terms of the Hotelling-Smithies-Downs model, we would expect the parties to diverge ideologically if the distribution of political affect approximated the bimodal shape suggested in Figure 1. Yet the ideological similarity of the two major American political parties is more often noted than are any differences between them. Campbell and Valen (1966), for example, on the basis of a comparative study of the United States and Norway, point out that 40 per cent of their American sample thought that the two major parties were about the same, and an additional 8 per cent of the sample did not know if there were differences between the parties. The corresponding figures for the Norwegian sample were 11 per cent and 8 per cent.

If the distance between the parties is not great, then the distance between Democratic and Republican partisans is

not great either. We suggest that in fact the distribution of political affect is denser toward its center than is the case in Figure 1. We contend that a significant proportion of the independents and weak partisans occupy political positions more extreme than the Democratic or Republican parties, i.e., to the left of the Democrats or to the right of the Republicans. Thus, the parties must converge ideologically to maintain the support of their own partisans if indeed their partisans are at the center of the distribution. At the same time, they must diverge to appeal to independents who might, on the left, consider voting for the New Politics Party as an alternative to the Democrats, or on the right might consider voting for the A.I.P. or even joining the Minutemen rather than participating in electoral politics at all (cf. Garvey, 1966).

DATA.

The Sample

These concerns were explored using data collected by the Detroit Area Survey, University of Michigan, during the Spring and Summer of 1969. A multi-stage probability sample of dwelling units in that part of the Detroit SMSA that was tracted in 1950, plus some small additions made to include recent suburban population growth since 1950 was drawn to represent dwelling units containing at least

one white person (household head or spouse) 69 years of age or under. When only the household head was present, he or she was interviewed. When both the head and spouse were present, one was randomly selected for the interview. The final sample contained 640 interviews, representing 76 per cent of the eligible households sampled. Sixteen per cent of the households refused interviews, and 8 per cent were not completed because the respondent was not found at home or for other reasons.

Interview Items

Positions in the electoral marketplace were measured by 5 questions: 3 to define the respondent in terms of his party choice, and 2 to define him in terms of liberalism-conservatism.

Respondents were first asked: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or what?" Those who identified themselves as Democrats or Republicans were asked: "Do you consider yourself a strong (Democrat/Republican) or not a very strong (Democrat/Republican)?" Those who did not express a party preference were asked, "Do you generally lean more toward the Republican or Democratic Party?"

All respondents were then asked: "Do you think your own views are more liberal or more conservative than those of the Democratic Party generally, or would you say that

you're not sure?" and "How about the Republicans? Do you think your own views are generally more liberal or more conservative than those of the Republican Party, or would you say you're not sure?"

RESULTS.

Marginal Distributions

The plurality of our sample (44.6 per cent) identified themselves as Democrats. Only 22.4 per cent called themselves Republicans, while 31.1 per cent identified themselves as independents. Finally, only 2 per cent of the sample failed to answer the partisanship question.

The preponderance of Democrats in the sample is not surprising, given the role that labor unions play in Detroit politics. The proportion of independents in the sample is greater than comparable figures from previous surveys in the Detroit area. It is partly understandable, however, in view of the disruptive effect of the 1968 presidential election on members of the electorate who had affective ties to political parties, but were unhappy with the candidate of their particular party (cf. Converse et al., 1969). Indeed while the 1969 electorate can in no way be viewed as representative of the electorate in all years, it is especially well adapted to our purposes because of the size of the pool of independents that it allows us to analyze.

The weakening of partisan ties is not only reflected

in the increased proportion of independents in the electorate. As Table 1 shows, supporters of both parties were less likely to see themselves as "strong" than as "not strong" supporters of their party, and independents were most likely to see themselves as leaning toward neither major party.

Far fewer of our respondents were able to use the terms "liberal" and "conservative" to define their political positions. Of our 640 respondents, 260 or slightly more than 40 per cent placed themselves on a liberalism-conservatism continuum relative to each of the major parties. As can be seen from Table 2, most respondents answering this question did place themselves near the middle of the spectrum; i.e., more conservative than the Democratic Party, more liberal than the Republican Party.

Interrelationships Among Items

One of the questions that concerned us was whether there was consensus among our respondents that the Republican Party was more conservative than the Democratic Party. Of our 640 respondents, 313 compared themselves on the liberalism-conservatism dimension with regard to at least one of the parties. Sixty-three compared themselves to the Republicans but not to the Democrats, 53 to the Democrats but not the Republicans, and 197, or about 31 per cent of the total sample, related themselves to both parties. The data collected from these latter respondents are presented in Table 3.

The shaded area of Table 3 represents those positions that are logically possible if it is assumed that the Republicans are more conservative than the Democrats. Ninety-one per cent of the respondents appearing in this table fall into these positions, indicating a high level of consensus among those of our respondents who were willing to place themselves on the liberalism-conservatism dimension regarding the relative positions of the major parties. Figure 2 presents this distribution graphically. For the 177 people who apply the terms liberal and conservative consistently to themselves and to the two political parties (roughly 28 per cent of our total sample) there is clearly not a normal distribution of political affect. Rather, the distribution is trimodal and would suggest that the parties should be bifurcating in order to appeal to voters at the political extremes. Fully 55 per cent of these voters see themselves either more conservative or more liberal than both political parties.

The forces of divergence generated by these extreme positions, however, are offset at least to some extent by the 31 per cent of this segment of the sample that sees itself more conservative than the Democrats and more liberal than the Republicans. It is notable that only 14 per cent of these voters see themselves as occupying the same political position as either of the major parties. Presumably the position that the parties occupy is a result of trying

to appeal to constituencies on each side.

The relationship between the party identification and liberalism-conservatism of our respondents is presented in Table 4. Again, this table deals only with those respondents who rated both parties on the liberalism-conservatism dimension and agreed that the Republican Party was more conservative than the Democratic Party. These data suggest that strong partisans tend to be more extreme in their political views than are the parties they support, i.e., strong Democrats tend to be more liberal than the Democratic Party and strong Republicans tend to be more conservative than the Republican Party.

Weak partisans are less likely to see their political positions as similar to that of the parties they choose. Rather, they are either more liberal or more conservative than their party. In the aggregate, the leanings of weak partisans are in a conservative direction. Weak Democrats are more likely to place themselves in the middle of the spectrum, and in fact more likely to say they are more conservative than both parties than they are to say they are more liberal than both parties. Weak Republicans are about equally likely to see themselves as more conservative than both parties and occupying middle-of-the-road positions.

Independents who express partisan leanings similarly pull the market in a conservative direction. Those who lean toward the Democratic Party tend to do so from a middle-of-

the-road-position, and more than a third see themselves as more conservative than both parties. Those who lean toward the Republican Party are more likely to do so from the conservative than from the middle-of-the-road position. Finally, independents who state no preference tend to place themselves at the extremes, i.e., more liberal or more conservative than both parties.

These findings indicate that the distribution of partisan affect is much broader than the conceptualization presented in Figure 1, and that the strong partisan positions do not define the poles of this distribution. Rather, there are independents beyond these polar positions who, rather than being "floating voters" might be either excluded from the political system or serve as the bases of support of ~~extremist or third-party~~ movements. In addition, there are ~~independents with~~ partisan leanings, and there are weak and strong partisans, who occupy market positions beyond the perceived positions of the parties they support. These factors, based on the data presented in Table 4, serve as the course of the market distribution of the Detroit electorate presented in Figure 3.

You will recall that respondents were included in Table 4 under the constraint that they placed the Republican Party in a more conservative position than they placed the Democratic Party. The entries in Figure 3 assume an additional rational constraint, that people choose the political party whose

position is compatible with their own. Thus, entries in Figure 3 represent only those cells within the dark lines of Table 4, giving us a new N of 137. These people may be regarded as ideologues in the sense that they hold a position on the liberalism-conservatism dimension that seems to determine their party choice (cf. Shapiro, 1969). Partisans holding positions similar to or more extreme than the opposing party are excluded (N=34). Finally it is interesting to note that unlike the electorate as a whole, the ideologues are about as likely to be Republicans as Democrats, indicating the more general tendency toward ideological consistency among Republicans.

By making several assumptions regarding the market as defined in Figure 3 and the processes of electoral support, we can compute the maximum change in support that a party can anticipate through a change in its own ideological position.

Assumption 1. All voters within a partisan market who feel that they occupy the same ideological position as their party will be equally likely to vote for the party regardless of the strength of their partisan affect, i.e., regardless of whether they are strong partisans, weak partisans, independents leaning toward the party, or uncommitted independents.

Assumption 2. Among voters within a partisan market who see themselves occupying ideological positions different

from that of their party, the probability of turning out and voting for the party varies with strength of partisanship. Strong partisans will be most likely to turn out and vote for the party; uncommitted independents will be least likely.

Assumption 3. For purposes of estimating maximum change in the electoral market through ideological change on the part of the parties, we can assume that there is only one liberal position to the left of both parties, one conservative position to the right of them, and one middle-of-the-road position between them.

On the basis of assumption 1, we would expect that if the Democratic Party moved to the liberal position, all liberal groups would be aggregated to form a new Democratic organizational bloc (6% strong Democrats + 6% weak Democrats + 2% independent Democrats + 7% uncommitted independents = 21%). In line with assumption 2 the old Democratic organizational bloc would be differentiated by strength of partisan affect (5% strong Democrat + 1% weak Democrat + 1% uncommitted independent = 7%). The change in distribution of partisan support through moves to the left or the right on the part of either party is shown in Table 5.

Table 5 suggests that the Democratic Party can increase turnout within its share of the market (52% of the total) by moving either in a more conservative or a more liberal direction. The greatest gains, however, are to be expected with a move to a more conservative position, which concentrates

the largest share of the market in the "organization" and "strong partisan" positions. These are the points on the spectrum most likely to be associated with high turn-out and party support. Similarly, the Republican Party stands to gain by a move in either direction, and again, gains are maximized by a move to a conservative position.

The discussion to this point was based only on those voters whose party choices were logically consistent with their ideologies. We recall from Table 4, however, that a considerable proportion of potential Democratic supporters (particularly weak Democrats and independents with leanings toward the Democratic Party) felt that they were more conservative than both major parties. Although these voters are off the consistent left-right continuum, they would appear to accentuate pulls in a conservative direction on the Democratic Party.

The respondents who defined their market positions with regard to only one party, although few in number, should also be taken into account. The distribution of their positions is presented in Table 6. Interestingly, as these data show, such individuals were more likely to define their own position relative to their own party than they were to define it relative to the opposition party, but the differences were not great.

The distribution of Democratic identifiers vis-a-vis the Democratic Party was relatively flat, with some tendency

toward liberalism, thus exerting a potential pull on the party to the left. This pull is also reflected in the liberalism of Democrats who classified themselves only with regard to the Republican Party.

Among Republican identifiers, the distribution relative to that party was even flatter, although again some tendency toward liberalism was manifested. Most Republicans who classified themselves only with regard to the Democratic Party saw themselves as more conservative than that party. Independents who classified themselves with regard to only one party seem to be toward the middle of the spectrum, i.e., more conservative than the Democratic Party or more liberal than the Republican Party. Among these 124 respondents, those who identify with a party would probably find their parties more attractive if they occupied more extreme market positions. The independents in this group, however, would seem to exert a moderating influence.

One of the simplifying assumptions we have been making to this point is that persons of the same partisan persuasion will be equally likely to vote regardless of where they place themselves on the liberalism-conservatism dimension, other things being equal. Particularly, we have assumed that independents who are more liberal or more conservative than both parties will be equally likely to vote as middle-of-the-road independents. While we have no direct data on voting

turnout, we do have data on such socioeconomic variables as occupation, education, and income, and we know that voting turnout varies directly with occupational prestige level, education, and income. We compared middle-of-the-road independents with liberal and conservative independents and found no differences with regard to these variables. Insofar as we can tell, therefore, our simplifying assumption is justified.

Two noteworthy findings emerge from our analysis of socioeconomic status. First, respondents who placed themselves to the right of both parties, to the left of both parties, or in the middle-of-the-road were of higher educational, occupational and financial status than were respondents who felt that their political position was the same as that of one of the two political parties.

Second, in comparing our ideologues with the rest of the sample, we found the former to be of consistently higher status. Forty-two per cent of the ideologues were professional, technical and managerial, while only 26 per cent of the rest were in these high status occupations. Twenty-three per cent of the ideologues completed college, whereas only 5 per cent of the non-ideological group did so. Seventy-seven per cent of the ideologues had family incomes of \$10,000 or more, as compared to 53 per cent of the remainder. Given that Republicans tend to be of higher status than Democrats, these findings are compatible with the fact that the proportion of Republicans among our ideologues is greater

than the proportion of Republicans in the sample as a whole.

DISCUSSION.

We have suggested that for a considerable minority of the Detroit electorate, the liberalism-conservatism dimension is politically meaningful. In the perception of members of that electorate, the two major political parties do not represent the range of that dimension. In terms of the distribution of the electorate rather than the range, however, it would appear that both parties could profit electorally by moves in a conservative direction. This is consistent with research on the national electorate which indicates that "there are several times more votes to be gained by leaning toward Wallace than by leaning toward McCarthy" (Converse et al., 1969).

One can understand the tendency of the parties to opt for middle-of-the-road rather than extremist positions for three reasons. First, in the absence of viable alternatives, voters at the extreme are almost certain to support the party that is closest to them if they vote at all. Thus, the Republican Party, by maintaining a slightly more conservative image than the Democratic Party, can guarantee that if very conservative people vote at all, they will vote Republican. Of course the entrance of an extremist third party into the political arena requires the major parties to alter their strategies, as Wallace's candidacy in 1968 demonstrated.

Second, it is risky for either of the major parties to

move to a politically more extreme position without certain knowledge that the other party will do likewise. If the Republican Party moves in a conservative direction, for example, and the Democratic does not move at all, then the Democrats' share of the middle-of-the-road vote will increase automatically. The middle-of-the-road independents in fact comprise only 2 per cent of this sector of the sample. The balance of the ideological voters are so evenly split, however, that this "swing vote" is crucial.

Third, we must recognize that political parties do not exist merely to accumulate as many votes as possible. Party officials, and office-holders who were elected on the party ticket, hold certain issue positions that, in the aggregate, make up the position of the party. In seeking support for the party, these officials must adopt a minimax decision rule. That is, where necessary to gain the support they need to translate party positions into public policy, they will modify their positions. Once they have the necessary support, however, their commitment to their issue positions prevents them from further altering these positions in order to further increase their support. This strategy is reflected in our finding that there are positions on the liberalism-conservatism dimension that do not seem to be represented by our party system. Therefore, we must not focus our attention exclusively on those voters to whom the major parties appeal.

There is a contradiction between this kind of political

calculus and the functioning of democracy as a political process. Perhaps the primary function of politics and government is conflict resolution. The democratic process may be seen as one of collective bargaining, in which a series of interests are represented in an institutional arena that can make value-allocative decisions. The various interests, in turn, regard these decisions as binding because they have a means of making their claims within the political structure.

The chief, though certainly not the only linkage between these interests and the government are the political parties, which themselves must reconcile demands of several interests that at times are incompatible with each other. Where the range of interests is not represented by the parties (and this would seem to be the case in Detroit), these interests will seek alternate channels into the democratic process. To the extent that they fail to establish such channels or the governmental structure refuses to respond to their demands, the basis for the legitimacy that they grant to the government is eradicated, and, in their eyes, the established processes of politics come into question. Thus the political parties, by following their tendencies to seek satisfactory rather than maximal support, may precipitate a crisis of legitimacy by failing to represent a broadening range of political ideas.

Recall that in the analysis above, we have looked at only one plane of potential cleavage, liberalism vs. conservatism, and that this plane is relevant for only a minority of the

Detroit electorate. We believe that we must move beyond the simplified conception of our political system inherent in the traditional unidimensional approach to politics.

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Table 1. "Strength" and "Leaning" of Partisan Positions.

	Party Position							
	Republican		Democrat		Independent			
	%	(N)		%	(N)	%	(N)	
Strong	36	(50)	Strong	38	(106)	Republican	20	(38)
Not Strong	64	(92)	Not Strong	62	(176)	Democrat	35	(67)
						Neither	45	(89)
TOTAL	100%	(142)		100%	(282)		100%	(194)

Table 2. Positions of respondents on liberalism-conservatism relative to Democratic and Republican Parties (N=640).

	<u>More Liberal</u>	<u>About Same</u>	<u>More Conservative</u>	<u>Refused D.K., N.A.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Republican	21.7%	4.7%	14.2%	59.4%	100%
Democrat	11.9%	4.5%	24.2%	59.4%	100%

Table 3. Positions on liberalism-conservatism continuum relative to both parties (N=197).

		<u>Republicans</u>		
		More liberal	About same	More conservative
<u>Democrats</u>	More liberal	21%	2%	5%
	About same	5%	1%	1%
	More conservative	27%	8%	29%

Table 4. Political party identification, by liberalism-conservatism (N=171)

	Party Identification						
	<u>Strong Dem.</u>	<u>Weak Dem.</u>	<u>Ind. Dem.</u>	<u>Ind.</u>	<u>Ind. Rep.</u>	<u>Weak Rep.</u>	<u>Strong Rep.</u>
Liberal	38	22	12	47	7	17	8
Democratic Party	33	3		5	7		
Middle	14	43	46	16	29	37	19
Republican Party	5	3	4		21	7	27
Conservative	10	30	36	32	36	40	46
TOTAL	100%	101%	98%	100%	100%	101%	100%
n =	(21)	(37)	(24)	(19)	(14)	(30)	(26)

Table 5. Effects of an ideological shift on the distribution of support within partisan markets (N=137).*

	<u>Democratic Party</u>		
	<u>Current support</u>	<u>Effect of liberal move</u>	<u>Effect of conservative move</u>
<u>Organization position</u>	7%	21%	24%
<u>Alternative positions</u>			
Strong partisan	8%	7%	11%
Weak partisan	18%	13%	7%
Independent partisan	10%	8%	2%
uncommitted independent	9%	3%	8%
	52%	52%	52%
		<u>Republican Party</u>	
<u>Organization position</u>	8%	17%	26%
<u>Alternative positions</u>			
Strong partisan	13%	14%	9%
Weak partisan	17%	10%	9%
Independent partisan	7%	6%	5%
Uncommitted independent	6%	4%	2%
	51%	51%	51%

*The 2 per cent independent floating vote has been included in each column. Total is 52 + 51 - 2 = 101% due to rounding.

Table 6. Liberalism-conservatism of respondents who defined their political positions relative to only one political party (N=124).

	Political Position		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Ind.</u>
More liberal than Democratic Party	20	7	19
Same as Democratic Party	17	—	4
More conservative than Democratic Party	16	33	33
More liberal than Republican Party	30	22	22
Same as Republican Party	1	19	7
More conservative than Republican Party	16	19	15
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%
(N)	(70)	(27)	(27)




Figure 1. Hypothetical distribution of a population by the index of political partisanship.




Figure 2. Distribution of respondents who agreed that Republican Party is more conservative than Democratic Party (N=177).

Figure 3. Liberalism-conservatism and strength of party support.

