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CHARISMATIC HEADS OF STATE: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT*

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CHARISMATIC HEADS OF STATE: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Abstract

Weber's concept of charisma is elaborated and refined with
reference to thirty-four heads of state who have held office
during this century. These leaders have been systematically
compared and ranked with reference to their level of charisma.
Situational variables are presented with a view to explaining
the presence of charisma. The important variables, conceptu-
ally and statistically, are isolated. Taken together, they
account for over half of the observed variance in charisma.

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INTRODUCTION

It is the intention of this study to attempt to move charis-
ma out of the category of theorizing on the one hand and case analy-
sis on the other. A recent and most useful study of charisma la-
ments that due to "...considerable variation in cultural definitions
of esteemed and extraordinary leadership qualities...it would seem
difficult to discern a set of attributes common to all or most char-
ismatic leaders which can be designated as a charismatic cluster."
(Willner, 1968:61)

The first task of this study will be the attempt to overcome
this "difficulty." However, the basic contribution this study
hopes to make to the knowledge of charisma is the attempt to iso-
late measurable characteristics of charisma, at least among heads
of state, and then to test this explanation through systematic
comparison of data for all thirty-four of the leaders studied.

This research concurs with Weber on the importance of char-
isma in understanding the processes of social change and develop-
ment.

> "Charisma is crucial to Weber's system of analysis
> as the basis for the explanation of social change...The
> problem for Weber was to account for large-scale social
> change and the concept of charisma provided what Bendix
> calls 'a sociology of innovation.'"
> (Friedland, 1964:19; see also Bendix, 1962:326)

Perhaps it is not surprising that the concept of charisma
has not been more central in the study of social change given
the stringent quantitative standards for current social re-
search. At the same time it would seem that it has been over-
used as well as misused. (Bendix, 1967:341, 351-2, and Willner
and Willner, 1965:78) But these drawbacks should not detract
from its conceptual value.

Charisma: A Definition

In social science analysis, the work of Max Weber is taken as the basis for the understanding of charisma.

> The term "charisma" will be applied to a certain
> quality of an individual personality by virtue of which
> he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed
> with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically
> exceptional powers or qualities. These are not accessi-
> ble to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of a
> divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them
> the individual concerned is treated as a leader...What
> is important is how the individual is actually regard-
> ed by those subject to charismatic authority, by his
> "followers" or disciples."...
>   It is the recognition on the part of those sub-
> ject to authority which is decisive for the validity
> of charisma. This is freely given and guaranteed by
> what is held to be a sign or proof, originally always
> a miracle, and consists in devotion to the correspond-
> ing revelation, hero worship, or absolute trust in the
> leader. (Weber, 1964:358-9)
>   His power rests upon this purely factual recogni-
> tion and springs from faithful devotion. It is devo-
> tion to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is
> strange to all rule and tradition and which therefore
> is viewed as divine. It is devotion born of distress
> and enthusiasm. (Gerth, 1958:249)

Weber suggests that most charismatic figures are either religious or political in nature. In the latter group much of his discussion is of hereditary charisma. This is the endowing of an office, rather than a person, with charismatic authority. The focus of this study is, however, with the other type of charismatic political figure. They are charismatic because of the allegiance their following gives to them rather than to their office.

The essence of Weber's definition still applies. Namely, it is important that the following recognize the leader's excep-tional powers or qualities. The charisma of a leader, formal-ly considered here as a head of state, is defined as:

> The level of support and belief conferred by his following
> on their leader. They believe in his extraordinary qualities
> and abilities. They are inspired to undertake acts of support
> for him.

Although Weber considered charisma in terms of an "ideal type" which would most likely lead to a dichotomy of the pre-sence or absence of charisma among leaders, "...the quality

of charisma is rarely, if ever, an absolute condition; nor
indeed is it likely to be entirely lacking." (Marcus; 1961:238)
This point should, however, be distinguished from Shil's argu-
ment of the presence of an absolute amount of charisma. (c.f. fn. 1)

THE SITUATIONAL EXPLANATION OF CHARISMA

The explanation of charisma offered here originally stress-
ed a social-structural explanation in contrast to an alternative
psychological explanation.[2] (Cell; 1969) A re-analysis of the
data suggested that psychological factors were more important
than expected. Further data collection and analysis has re-
sulted, however, in the integration of the psychological model
into the social-structural model.[3]

Five summary concepts have been isolated in the attempt to
account for charisma among the present sample. A discussion of
the conceptual background of each concept and its hypothetical
relationship to charisma follows.

National Social Crisis and Charisma

From a conceptual viewpoint, the first hypothesis is cen-
tral to the explanation of charisma. Its presence emphasizes the
situational (social structural and environmental) context within
which charisma is found. The original meaning of the word,[4] and
more traditional views of its use,[5] suggest charisma is granted
by some supernatural force. Although Weber is not clear, his
inability to come to a concise explanation of charisma leads one
to suspect that he ultimately understood charisma through the
existence of supernatural forces. However, Talcott Parsons
has pointed to the temporal, empirical quality of charisma.
Parsons suggests "...it is now possible to make a reinterpreta-
tion of charisma." He concludes that "....charisma is not a meta-
physical entity, but a strictly observable quality of men and
things in relation to human acts and attitudes." (1949: 668-9)

Most of the contemporary literature on charisma adheres to
this alternative view that charisma may be explained and under-
stood in terms of temporal phenomena.[6] In particular, this re-
search emphasizes as one component the importance of a national
social crisis or, more conventionally, a disrupted social order.

A cursory survey of the kinds of situations that have preceded the rise of charismatic political leaders examined in this study would indeed suggest that a major crisis is the necessary, if not sufficient, precipitant.[7]

Perhaps the most pervasive and dramatic social and psychological collective crisis is that of war.[8] (Willner, 1968: 41)

Weber does state that leaders "... in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious (and) political distresses ...have been holders of specific gifts of body and spirit, and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, and not accessible to everybody." (Gerth, 1958:245). Unfortunately, Weber does not elaborate on this point. Nevertheless, disruption of the national social order is accepted here as a necessary precursor to the emergence of charismatic heads of state.

Hypothesis 1: The level of a national social crisis contributes directly to the level of charisma of a head of state.[9]

Disrupted Youth and Charisma

It is in the context of a disrupted social order that persons will search for a new alternative "paradigm," (Kuhn, 1964) and hence be most susceptible to movements of change and charismatic leadership. A disruptive social order is also seen as a likely precursor for the emergence of a pattern of disrupted youth. Hence the integration of the psychological model into the social-structural model.

Prerequisite to having adopted a new paradigm is the rejection of the previous one which prevailed before these leaders came to power and which became the main target of the movement and the leader. The environment of the leader's youth should, if anything, have contributed to his rejection of the prevailing paradigm. This might occur either by emulation of a father or close elder (e.g. older brother or guardian) who had also rejected the paradigm, or it might occur by rejecting the family, particularly the father, and their representation of the established system. As indicated, this possibility is intensified by the presence of a national social crisis. Thus, the level of charisma is seen to be directly affected by the level of disruption in the normal patterns of family life in that society which the leader experienced as a youth. The most charismatic of leaders will totally reject the prevailing paradigm in favor of an alternative.

Hypothesis 2: The level of charisma of a head of state varies di-
rectly with the level of disruption the leader experienced as a
youth in the normal patterns of family life in the youth's so-
ciety.

Denial of Movement Access and Charisma

When a leader begins to articulate his alternative world view,
based on the rejection of the prevailing paradigm, he will come
into conflict with the established order. If the demands for
change are too severe to be accepted by the established order,
the attempt is usually made to suppress the alternative view
and its adherents. Leaders of the alternative view are prime
targets for suppression. In the political sphere this can take
the form of assassination, but if the following is already large
this is often risky. More frequently, the established group
arrests or confines the leader in the hope the movement will die
by denying the leader the right of access to his following. The
denial of the right of access is the attempt of the group in power
to persuade the leader's following to withdraw their support of
the leader, support based on their belief in him as a person who
can best articulate the aspirations of their movement. If there
is a sizeable movement for change, this attempt on the part of
those in power is based on fallacious reasoning. The leader is
articulating the aspirations of the movement. The temporary elim-
ination of the leader does not end the movement; rather, it often
increases the intensity of its demands and its desire for success.
(Toch, 1965:227) More important for this study, however, is
that this attempt at isolation often increases the drive of the
leader to intensify his efforts on behalf of the movement.

Hypothesis 3: The level of charisma of a head of state varies di-
rectly with the denial of access of the leader.

Pre-Power Following and Charisma

Tucker contends it is decisive to determine whether the leader
possessed a "pre-power following." (1968:740) Tucker suggests
this early identification is important in order to minimize the
risk of confusing the power of office with charismatic qualities.[10]

Hypothesis 4: The presence of a pre-power charismatic following
varies directly with the level of charisma of a head of state.

The methodological simplicity of this measure favored its inclu-

sion. Some skepticism remains about its power of explanation in the face of alternative explanatory measures. Specifically, within the society, a leader might have a very limited pre-power following (perhaps due to his geographical or political isolation). There is no reason why this could not be altered with his assumption of office. Nu of Burma is perhaps the best example of this. Moreover, it is not the pre-power following which actually makes him charismatic, rather it is the social-structural and personal characteristics which should actually account for the leader's charisma.

Nationalism-Nationalistic Movements and Charisma

From the outset of this research, a heavy emphasis has been placed on the presence of nationalistic movements in the explanation of charisma. The attempt to resolve a national social crisis often results in a concerted and dramatic drive of the collective whole toward a national unity or solidarity. This can be the basis for the resolution of the crisis. Tucker has stressed the importance of a social movement in this context. This follows from Weber's distinction of three types of authority, suggesting that "...charismatic authority repudiates the past, and is, in this sense, a specifically revolutionary force." (1964:362) When a charismatic leader is present Tucker terms it a "charismatic movement." (1968: 737-8) Young sees these phenomena as sub-classes of a more general phenomenon termed "solidarity movements" or "reactive sub-systems." (1966, 1970)

On a national level this drive for unity is a "nationalistic movement." It is defined as the process of a country or nation-state (taken as a collective whole) uniting for a period of time toward the achievement of common goals. This definition is similar to those of the three writers cited above, except, unlike Weber and Tucker it does not assume the presence of a charismatic leader. It is also limited here to movements involving the nation as a whole.

To suggest the involvement of the national collective whole as the basis of a nationalistic movement is not to suggest that every member of the society must be equally committed to the movement. The literature of social movements clearly distinguishes between levels of commitment. Moreover, on the national level, it is possible that some members are opposed to the movement to

the point of becoming enemies of the movement. Often they may become scapegoats for the movement. (Burke, 1957, 1965). The Jewish people in Hitler's Germany and the landlords in post-1949 China are two prominent examples. What is important here is that members of the society who oppose the movement once it has achieved power do not form a solidary movement of their own. Moreover, for a highly nationalistic movement, and especially one which is successful, it is expected that most members of the society will sustain some level of positive interaction with the movement in terms of both attitudes and actions. For some, these may be negative. However, the majority must maintain a positive relationship to insure the success of the movement.

The articulation of the content of these nationalistic movements is often done by a charismatic leader. Or, alternatively, "often a charismatic leader formulates the needed unifying principles." (Young, 1966:48) Or, in Kuhn's terms, he proposes an alternative paradigm or "world view." (1964: 110ff.) Thus, while the presence of a nationalistic movement may be a necessary condition for the emergence of a charismatic leader, the leader, once having emerged, can also attempt to serve as a catalyst to strengthen the movement. (Willner, 1948:48) However, since charismatic leaders do not emerge in all nationalistic movements, it is necessary to further specify the conditions under which they do emerge.

A leader will be accepted as charismatic only if his view of the problems and proposed solution(s), which may be embodied as end goals, is acceptable to a potential following, which in terms of heads of state is most likely to be found among the citizens of that country. Willingness to identify with a charismatic and his

views occurs in terms Cantril identifies as a "critical situation."
This arises "...when an individual is confronted by a chaotic en-
vironment which he cannot interpret and which he wants to interpret."
(1963:63) Alternatively, Shils suggests that an individual's need
for order may lead him to accept charismatic leadership.[11] (1965:
204) The leader's viewpoint must articulate widespread national
sentiment over inadequacies in order for hopes of change or im-
provement to become centered in this individual. In Hegel's words,
he "...has an insight into the requirements of the time -- what
was ripe for development." (Hegel, 1956:30) He becomes a symbolic
focal point for the articulation of problems and hopes for their
solution. This symbolism is often enhanced through a "martyr image"
which comes from the denial of movement access by the established
leadership. The degree to which followers maintain their belief
in him is reflected in his ability to become a symbolic focal point
in the unification of the country towards the solution of these
problems through the realization of end goals, although the final
solution of problems and achievement of goals is problematic. To
the extent he becomes this symbolic focal point, the leader becomes
charismatic, articulating the nationalistic movement of the country.

Nationalistic movements are limited in periods of time. They
are most likely to occur in response to a national social crisis.
Distinct from nationalistic movements is the traditional concept
of nationalism.[12] Nationalism includes such factors as a common
language, religion, cultural heritage and history. (Shafer, 1955:
3-5) These underlying and more permanent characteristics of a
country are seen to be distinct from nationalistic movements which
are often centered around more immediate aims of a state. For a

period of time these aims may bind together what in terms of national-
ism may seem to be rather disparate elements. Thus, a country may
have a very strong (or high level) nationalistic movement, but at
the same time possess low levels of nationalism. The converse may
be true. It is also possible that these two dimensions may be pres-
ent in the same direction at the same time. In short, there is
seen to be no certain relationship between nationalism and national-
istic movements except that they are two distinct dimensions.

Hypothesis 5a: Nationalistic movements and nationalism are two

distinct dimensions.

The difference between these two dimensions began to become
apparent in Florian Znaniecki's study. Znaniecki points to the
distinction between the political state and the cultural society.
(1952:1-21) Rupert Emerson concurred with Znaniecki, asserting
that there is a difference between the state (political) and
national (cultural) principle which increasingly seems to be diver-
gent. (1962:105) "The rising nations of Asia and Africa are
communities all too evidently headed in several directions at once,
built on national unity which often has in it more of diversity
than of oneness." (1962:209) Emerson was, however, at a loss to
suggest identifying indicators of this unity, limited in time
though it may be.[13]

In the original formulation of this research, nationalistic
movements were seen as more likely to explain the presence of
charisma. In fact, little emphasis was placed on nationalism as
a direct explanatory factor of charisma. However, it was felt
that there was an indirect relationship -- given the underlying
level of unity reflected in the concept of nationalism. Thus,
when both nationalism and nationalistic movements are present at

the same time, the actual level of the nationalistic movement will
be higher for a country with high nationalism (compared to a country
with a lower level of nationalism), even though the two countries
are ostensibly at the same intensity level of a nationalistic move-
ment. Nationalism is, therefore, interpreted as a basic level of
solidarity of a country. If a nationalistic movement develops with
this base, the expected result should be a greater level of solidarity
than if a nationalistic movement develops without a base of national-
ism.

Hypothesis 5b: Nationalism and nationalistic movements combined
vary directly with the level of charisma of a head of state.

Political Biography and Charisma

Several biographical factors, in additon to the character of
the leader's childhood relationships, were considered which might
potentially have some bearing on his level of charisma. Two in
particular were thought to have some relationship to his acquisition
of a new paradigm. These were the presence of early contact
(prior to leadership) with other social environments and/or foreign
experience.

Hypothesis 6a: The level of charisma of a head of state will vary
directly with his early contact with other social environments
and/or foreign experience.

Other factors have also been considered. These include birth
date, parental socio-economic background, amount of formal education,
marital status, number of children, age at assumption of office,
year last in office, means of taking office, and reasons for leav-
ing office. However, due to the absence of any conceptual associa-
tion, none of these factors were predicted to have any relationship
to charisma.

Hypothesis 6b: The level of charisma of a head of state does not

vary with his political biography (other than those factors

already considered).

In summary, it is the intent of this research to first measure

the level of charisma among thirty-four heads of state; and second,

to consider its situational context. Consideration of this context

will emphasize the measurement of the variables discussed above.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The Sample

The final sample consists of thirty-four heads of state, and

their countries, before and during the period they were in power.[14]

Data on nationalism and national social crisis contered on the per-

iod prior to their assumption of power. A head of state is

understood to be the individual with the greatest potential poli-

tical power in the country. This includes leaders who have as-

sumed full control as well as those who, at the outset of their

tenure, were still consolidating their power. The formal head

of state may be a person of royalty; but he may have little poli-

tical power. Britain is an example of this type. For this study

the Prime Minister would be considered the head of state. Another

example of a situation that calls for clarification is China.

Although Mao was head of state, after he relinquished his post in

1959 he was still Party Chairman and held the primary reins of

political power. Therefore, he is considered here as the effective

head of state.

Two essential limiting conditions were attached to the selec-

tion of the sample. Each member had to be a head of state and each

had to have held office during this century. The first requirement established a basis of comparability for the measurement of charisma. The second created the possibility of interviewing "key informants" as data sources.

In addition to these criteria, attention was given to the selection of the leader on the basis of whether he was or was not charismatic. Originally it was felt that a charismatic leader could be identified by the presence of a title of respect other than his formal position. This did not turn out to be true. In fact, this indicator is only marginally related to the scale of charisma (cf. fn. 34). Left with the lack of a single reliable differentiating indicator, the researcher was forced to fall back on the considerably weaker criteria of his intuitive judgement of whether or not a leader might be charismatic. In addition to the selection of leaders thought to be charismatic, five leaders (Adenhauer, Frei, Hirohito,[15] Hussein and Tojo) were selected as a control group.[16]

Leaders were selected from all major geographic areas and also from two time periods -- pre-World War II and post-World War II. Attention was given to selecting leaders from different types of government, although this criteria was more illusive because it became impossible to determine categories on either the basis of the country's professed type of government or on the actual type of rule.[17]

This constitutes only a purposive sample. The criteria used provide the groundwork for replicating the study with a much larger sample (see pp. 47, 48).

The Selection of Indicators

To measure the composite variables (charisma, national social

crisis, nationalism plus nationalistic movements, and disrupted youth) and to test the hypotheses, data were collected on a total of ninety-eight potential indicators.[18]

Undoubtedly the most important criterion for their selection, beyond their conceptual validity, is that each has an equal potential for being present or absent in any society. Although this was largely successful, it was found that some indicators had cultural restrictions (such as the display of pictures in public places in Japan and several Moslem countries).

The indicators were selected from background reading or in discussion with others prior to commencing data collection. No indicators were excluded even if for conceputal or practical reasons of clarity it was thought they would not be a useful or valid index of the variable. This meant that an unusually large number of potential indicators would probably have to be eliminated from the final scale.

The other two variables, denial of access and pre-power following, were measured as dichotomous categories. The first consisted of whether the leader had ever been detained or jailed by the opposing force due to his activities as a political leader (detention as a prisoner of war did not qualify). The second variable was measured by simply ascertaining, often somewhat subjectively, from sources whether the leader did or did not have such a following.

Data Sources

Two basic data sources were used. Biographies were read, and interviews were obtained from nationals of the country.[19] Most had lived in the country when the leader was in power. Over half

were at least fifteen years old when the leader came to power. In
all cases except four,[20.] two interviews were obtained for each
leader. In a few cases there was a third interview.

With seven exceptions,[21.] at least two biographical sources
were used and in some cases this number rose to five. Thus, the
number of sources used for each case (both leader and country) and
the potential number of responses to each indicator varied from
three to eight, with most having four (fourteen cases) or more
(ten cases).

In general, the low number of sources might be seen to seriously
hamper the reliability of a study and thus also lower its validity.
Although it is undoubtedly true that given more time additional
sources would have contributed to some higher degree of reliability,
this problem is seen to be marginal in this study. For the most
part, indicators tended not to be aggregate in character and re-
quired little summing up of the interviewee's information. Addi-
tionally, since the leader is quite well-known by the citizens
of the country, it is believed that these kinds of questions can
be asked equally well of most members of the country. This ap-
proach is based on the "key informant" technique. (Young, 1966:
49-50)

A record was kept to test the stability and reliability of
this technique. Any indicator with only a single response was
considered unstable and given a score of one. Indicators for which
there was disagreement between data sources were considered unre-
liable. If there were at least three sources for an indicator and
one disagreed, it was given a score of two. If there were five or
more sources with two disagreements, the indicator was given a

score of three. If, however, there were either two or four sources with split disagreement-agreement, scores given were five and six respectively. These last two scores were higher because they reflected the most serious level of disagreement and unreliability. The scores were then ranked as a percentage of the total potential error for each item (6 x 34 = 204).

The collection of data from biographies created few problems, although even for the most useful biographies information was available for only about half the indicators. The response level for the interviews was much higher, almost always over ninety percent and in many cases reaching one hundred per-cent. In the interviews as much care as possible was taken to assure an accurate and meaningful response. It was necessary to be continually on guard against the desire of the respondent to answer what he thought was wanted. Whenever possible, questions were phrased in "either-or" alternatives, giving the respondent two seemingly equal alternatives. Moreover, the category to be coded "present" was given as the second of the two responses. For example, to determine if the leader's speeches were usually long, the question was asked, "Were the leader's speeches generally short or long?"

Care was taken to assure relevance of the response to the time the leader was in power. For example, on the indicator concerning the lack of interest/understanding of economic affairs, the respondent may have replied, "Well, now that the leader has gone from the scene it is known that he didn't have much to do with economic affairs." If this happened, then the question was reasked, "Well, what did the people in general think of his interest/understanding while he was in power?" Reasking the question in this

manner is important since charisma must be considered more on the basis of the following's perception of the leader than on any "facts" which might not be generally known to the following.

The attempt was made to distinguish between cultural differences. For example, where tribal systems separated son from father as a matter of custom, this was not considered to be an indication of a disrupted family life. Note was also made when the respondent wished to distinguish between the early and later periods of the leader's tenure in office. (cf. p. 38)

Analysis Techniques

The indicators for the composite variables of charisma, national social crisis, nationalistic movements, nationalism, and disrupted youth were analysed with a view to building a Guttman scale for each major variable (Guttman, 1947).[22.] An attempt was also made to build a single scale for all indicators for nationalism and nationalistic movements to see if there was not one underlying dimension. Menzel's coefficient of scalability (Menzel, 1953) is used with his suggested minimum of .65 taken as the basis for a statistically acceptable scale. Each set of potential indicators was correlated with the final scale. This permitted an examination of the indicators which did not scale. Hypothesis five-a is tested by attempting to combine the two scales of nationalistic movements and nationalism. This and the other hypotheses are tested through correlations (tau$_b$ is used except when noted), and through the use of partials, linear regression, and path analysis (Pearson's zero-order r is used for these last three operations.).[23.]

DATA ANALYSIS: VARIABLE MEASUREMENT USING THE GUTTMAN SCALE

The Charisma Scale

This was the most difficult of the scales to construct. (cf. p.2.) Realizing the potential difficulty of this task, the present study included many more indicators than was believed would finally scale. It was, however, hoped that at least one-third of the indicators would scale. The final scale fell short of this desired margin by only one.

The twelve[24.] indicators of charisma which scaled do compose a meaningful and heuristic scale.[25.] The coefficient of scalability (.728) is acceptably above the minimum of .65[26.] Although the scalability could be further improved by eliminating one or two additional indicators, it was felt that the retention of these indicators would be more meaningful, as well as honest, in the analytic process.[27.]

(Scale 1 About Here)

In judging the validity of the scale, perhaps least important as a statistical figure is the subjective conception of how the leaders should rank, particularly the relationship of the control group to the others. Three of the five members of the control group (Hussein, Frei, Adenhauer) ranked on the two steps lowest on the scale. Only Khrushchev and Ben Gurion ranked at the same level. Khrushchev's position may be attributed to two factors. After having conducted the interview and read biographies, his original position, determined by subjective factors, is believed to be over rated. Also, there was only a single interview and it was the most difficult to conduct. The respondent had poor facility in English and, apparently for personal reasons, was not

Scale 1: Guttman Scalogram of Charisma

Indicators (legend: 0 = absent   1 = present   8 = data not available)

Leader	scale step	Females make sacrifices for leader	Sexual Prowess	Statue of leader in capital during tenure	Leader gives long speeches	Lack of interest/ understanding of economics	Lead country to military victory	People asked to follow new paradigm	People make sacrifices for leader	Leader's principles followed	Seen as uniting the country	Picture posted in public or homes
Hitler	(10)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Kenyatta	(10)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Mussolini	(10)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ataturk	(10)	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sukarno	(9)	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nkrumah	(9)	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Peron	(9)	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Bourguiba	(8)	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Ho	(8)	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mao	(8)	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Rhee	(8)	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
Tito	(8)	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ben Bella	(7)	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Castro	(7)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tojo	(7)	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Nu	(7)	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Magsaysay	(6)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Roosevelt	(6)	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
DeGaulle	(5)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
Jinnah	(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Kennedy	(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Nehru	(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Selassie	(4)	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Cardenas	(4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
Lenin	(4)	0	0	0	8	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
Nyerere	(3)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Chucrchill	(2)	0	0	8	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
Nassar	(2)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Hirohito	(2)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Khrushchev	(1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Hussein	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Ben Gurion	(0)	0	0	0	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Frei	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Adenhauer	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

0 = absent   1 = present   8 = data not available

inclined to respond readily to the questions.

Ben Gurion's position may be due, at least in part, to the younger age of the interviewees. This may have led them to emphasize Ben Gurion's later years when he faced greater division and less support than his early years of leadership.

Hirohito ranked at the step just above the other three members of the control group. Hirohito's position may be attributed to the problem of separating Hirohito's personality from the importance of the office, or, in Weber's terms, hereditary charisma. Certainly there was a high level of charismatic support for the office. "To die for the emperor" was the most noble of sacrifices. It made little difference that Hirohito was the emperor.

Of the control group, only Tojo failed to rank at the lowest steps. Tojo's position on the scale is certainly more difficult to understand. In retrospect, his original subjective placement in the control group perhaps reckoned without the intensity of the support for, and belief in, him during the war.

The top of the scale is quite satisfactory. Most of the first twelve leaders are obviously highly charismatic.[28] From a subjective viewpoint, of those who might be seen as highly charismatic, the scale excludes only Castro and Lenin from ranking among the first twelve leaders. It is difficult to arrive at explanations of their positions on the scale other than the possible lack of satisfactory interviews.[29] Certainly Castro is highly charismatic. Most who write about him refer at length to his charisma.[30]

Perhaps Peron, Bourguiba, and Rhee are less charismatic than the others at the top of the scale. However, it is important to

note that at least in the cases of Peron and particularly Rhee,

charisma may have decreased considerably after the leader had been

in office a number of years.[31]

All indicators which did scale did conceptually satisfy the

definition of charisma. The placing of pictures in public or

homes indicates some level of support for the leader, although its

strength as an indicator of charisma is low since it differentiates

at the lowest level.[32] It should be obvious that a unifier would

receive more support from the people. As indicated above (fns. 25,

26), the presence of the leader's statements developed as principles

for people to follow and the frequent exhortation by the leader to

to follow new ways (opposed to "traditional" ones) both indicate

the importance of an alternative paradigm. The use of long speeches

can also be seen in terms of a very dramatic medium to articulate

an alternative paradigm to a following as well as a symbolic

focus of the leader's position. The general willingness of people

to make sacrifices for the leader is direct, if rather general,

evidence of the people undertaking acts of support for the leader.

Leadership in a military victory (in the sense of a war

rather than just a battle) is a very visible and dramatic method

for a leader's abilities to be made known to a following. The

lack of interest and/or understanding of economic affairs was pre-

dicted by Weber. (Gerth, 1958:246-8) Of all the indicators in

the scale, the presence of a statue or bust of the leader, which is

prominently located in the capital while he is in power, is per-

haps the most susceptible to the question of whether it was put

there on order from the leader or whether it represents the genuine

support of the people. Nevertheless, its presence represents a very

symbolic focal point for the expression of support.

The most differentiating of the indicators are interrelated by their relationship between the role of women and the leader. They are the willingness of females--more than males--to make sacrifices for the leader, and the believed sexual prowess of the leader (operationalized as followers' belief in the leader's heterosexual appeal, including extra-marital affairs with women). That the role of women should play such an important part here might be attributed to their greater capacity to support causes one might consider expressive in nature although no less important.

It should be noted that the indicators which did scale were relatively stable and reliable. Most had low or average quotients of stability-reliability. This would tend to support the key informant technique.

Although many indicators did not scale, several came so close to scaling[33.] that they should be included in any future study.[34.]

The National Social Crisis Scale

Of the nine potential indicators, seven formed a minimally acceptable scale (scalability = .656).[35.] The threshold indicator, an economic depression or war, differentiated only one case, but had three additional errors. This indicator was retained, however, on the basis of Willner's assertion that a major crisis is the "necessary if not sufficient precipitant" for the emergence of a charismatic leader. (1968:41) All but two of the leaders with some measure of charisma came to power during, or experienced in office, a clearly identifiable crisis of major proportions.

The two exceptions, Nyerere and Kennedy, do cast some question on Willner's assertion "...that a major crisis is the necessary if

not sufficient precipitant (of charismatic leaders)." (Willner, 1968:41) Both leaders have, however, experienced crises during their tenure if not during their rise to power (Kennedy: racial, Cuban; Nyerere: economic, Zanzibar) which give them limited quali- fication to be included in the larger group. Perhaps even more important is the possibility that to the extent Kennedy and Nyerere are charismatic, they are charismatic more because of their own abilities to articulate an acceptable paradigm, than because of a crisis from which a charismatic type of leadership is more likely to emerge.

Other countries with the presence of a social crisis (e.g. Chile, and Jordan) have not produced a charismatic leader. However, this is not surprising since the presence of a social crisis is not con- sidered a sufficient condition for a charismatic leader to emerge. However, in terms of prediction, it would suggest that these countries would be fertile ground for the emergence of such a leader. Given the continuance of the Middle Eastern conflict, it is quite possible for a charismatic leader to emerge in Jordan, either Hussein him- self, his successor, or a leader of one of the Palestinian organ- izations. However, this is probably unlikely until the Arabs are "blessed" with some victories.

(Scale 2 About Here)

A declaration of war is seen as an indicator of a greater level of crisis than the presence of a war. Often a nation is involved in a military conflict of importance without a declaration. In fact, most conflicts begin this way and many end before there is a declaration.

Accusations against other countries form the middle range of the scale. It is interesting that all three have virtually the

Scale 2: Guttman Scalogram of National Social Crisis

Indicators

Countries	scale step	Economic depression or military conflict	Accuse major power	Accuse regional countries	Accuse neighbor countries	Measures against political groups	Declaration of war	Measures against ethnic groups
Japan I	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Germany I	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Italy	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Indonesia	(7)	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Argentina	(7)	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Turkey	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Cuba	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Jordan	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
China	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Egypt	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Japan II	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Russia I	(6)	1	1	1	8	1	1	0
Algeria	(6)	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
England	(6)	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Ethopia	(6)	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Israel	(6)	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
N. Vietnam	(6)	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Kenya	(6)	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
India	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Ghana	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
S. Korea	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Yugoslavia	(5)	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Tunisia	(5)	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Mexico	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
France	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Pakistan	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Philippines	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Germany II	(4)	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Russia II	(4)	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
America I	(2)	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
America II	(2)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	(1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burma	(1)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Tanzania	(0)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

1 = present   0 = absent   8 = no data available

same pattern. The elimination of the functional alternative, accusations against neighboring countries would have substantially improved the scalibility (raising it to .725). This indicator was retained to show the interrelationship of statements made against other types of countries.

The two remaining indicators, measures taken against political groups and measures taken against ethnic groups, are both extensions of Burke's concept of scapegoating. (1957:166-189; and 1965:284-89) Because of their actions (real or imagined) persons or identified groups are accused of disrupting the society and blamed as the cause of current problems. The desired purpose is to unite the majority of the population against a few who are used as scapegoats because they are taken to be the cause of problems facing the nation.

Since the top three indicators differentiate nearly six-sevenths of the scale, it is perhaps less acceptable than the other scales. However, given conceptual forethought, additional potential indicators could have been included.

The Successful Nationalistic Movements Scale

Fifteen indicators were thought to conceputally index a nationalistic movement. Ten of these fifteen produced an acceptable scale (scalability .65).[36] In understanding indicators for this scale, it is important to note that these events occurred at the time or after the leader assumed office. In this sense this scale may be interpreted as one of "successful" nationalistic movements.

(Scale 3 About Here)

The first two indicators, mass gatherings in the capital in support of the leadership, and a rallying slogan of unity, are very visible means of dramatizing support for the movement. The presence

Scale 3: Guttman Scalogram of Nationalistic Movements

Indicators

Countries	scale step	Mass gatherings of support in the capital	Rallying slogan of unity	Dominant national political party	Success struggle against aliens	Belief in a national ideology	Detention laws	Forceful expansion of territory	Political purges	Cell groups to study ideology	Public confession of error
Japan I	(10)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Japan II	(10)	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
N. Vietnam	(10)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
China	(10)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Russia I	(10)	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
India	(9)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Cuba	(9)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
Germany I	(9)	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Turkey	(8)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
Indonesia	(8)	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Italy	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
America I	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Israel	(7)	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Tunisia	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Kenya	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Ghana	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Tanzania	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Egypt	(6)	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
England	(6)	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Burma	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
S. Korea	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Argentina	(5)	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Algeria	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
Ethopia	(4)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	(3)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	(3)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	(2)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	(1)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Russia II	(0)	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Jordan	(0)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
America II	(0)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Germany II	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

0 = absent   1 = present

of a dominant political party (obtaining 2/3 of the vote or support
of the citizens), and the widespread belief in some form of a national
ideology, are both methods of circulating and strengthening adherents
for the paradigm being articulated by the movement and leader. The
presence of cell groups to study the ideology is an even more intense
method of articulating the nature and goals of the movement or para-
digm.

A successful struggle against aliens (winning a war or a struggle
for independence) and the forceful expansion of controlled terri-
tory are two very visible examples of a movement's ability to
achieve its goals and extend its area of control; in short, to be
successful.

The remaining indicators, detention laws, political purges,
and public confession of error, are all extensions of Burke's
concept of scapegoating discussed above. They are also attempts
of the leader to alter the situation to his advantage. To the
extent they succeed, it will enhance the position of the movement
as well as strengthen the leader's following because his viewpoint
or paradigm has prevailed over the "enemy" or scapegoats.

The Nationalism Scale

The range of studies on nationalism (fn. 12) suggested in
advance of the data collection that there was a common underlying
cluster of indicators. These indicators did form a satisfactory
scale (scalability = .677). Nearly half the indicators were in-
cluded in the final scale (seven out of fifteen). However, in other
respects it is not as satisfactory as the other charisma and na-
tionalistic movements scales. There are only seven indicators in
the scale. Moreover, the top three indicators differentiate three-

fifths of the scale (twenty-one out of thirty-four cases).

(Scale 4 About Here)

The indicators which scaled include the more obvious ones of a common language, religion, history and cultural heritage, and the recognition of a liberating heroic figure. Much less predictable is the presence on the scale of the indicators of the same style of dress and a federal form of government. However, a uniform style of dress, distinguishable from other nations, would seem to indicate a certain underlying uniformity. The presence of a federal form of government may be due to the greater flow of communication this type of system provides. (Young, 1967)

The indicators which scaled, with one exception,[37] are relatively stable and reliable--they had low (two indicators) or average (four indicators) quotients of stability-reliability.

Two of the other indicators were almost sufficiently high to be included, a recognized founding father, and a uniformly recognized political-economic center. The remaining indicators had little or no positive relationship to the underlying dimension of nationalism.[38]

The Combined Scale: Nationalistic Movements and Nationalism

The attempt to combine all the potential indicators of these two separate scales was, predictably, a basic failure. The result was another scale of nationalistic movements plus only one item from the nationalism scale. This was the presence of an appeal to a common national history. This type of appeal, however, may be undertaken in terms of acts of reinforcement of a nationalistic movement. Hitler, for example, did this very effectively. In this case it is less important whether there was really a common national history, or whether it was just widely held that there

Scale 4: Guttman Scalogram of Nationalism

Indicators

Countries		Single dominant language	Single dominant religion	Common cultural heritage	Common national history	Liberating heroic figure	Wear same style of dress	Federal form of government
America I	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tunisia	(7)	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Mexico	(7)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
America II	(7)	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
N. Vietnam	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
China	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Burma	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Ethopia	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Japan II	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Japan I	(6)	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Germany I	(6)	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
Kenya	(6)	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
S. Korea	(6)	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Indonesia	(6)	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
Turkey	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Algeria	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Cuba	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Italy	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Egypt	(5)	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Ghana	(5)	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Pakistan	(5)	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Israel	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
England	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
France	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Argentina	(4)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
India	(4)	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Chile	(3)	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Jordan	(3)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Philippines	(2)	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
Germany II	(1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Russia I	(1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Tanzania	(1)	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
Russia II	(0)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	(0)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

1 = present   0 = absent

was one. Perhaps the presence of an "appeal" should have been separated from the actual presence of a common heritage.

The inability to combine the two variables of nationalistic movements and nationalism into one single scale supports the prediction, hypothesis five a, that these two variables are basically separate dimensions even though they are closely related (cf. p. 10).

The Disrupted Youth Scale

The presence of a disruptive pattern of increasing intensity in a leader's early environment is perhaps not immediately apparent.[39] Yet, if a charismatic leader had rejected all (or part) of the prevailing system or paradigm as a youth (i.e. before the age of twenty), it is logical that he would have also experienced disruption in the most central part of his environment--his family. At the same time it should be expected that the leader had a difficult childhood (i.e. lonely or deprived). This type of youth disruption is more likely to be found in periods of national crisis. Those most effected by a crisis, at least at the outset, would seem to be those coming from the lower classes, although with the success of a movement, especially a revolutionary one, it is the upper classes who might be affected most. Thus, it would not be as likely for a child coming from a higher social class background to experience a disrupted family life as a youth.[40]

(Scale 5 About Here)

The conflict with father and the rejection of the prevailing paradigm indicator are closely interrelated. With two exceptions (Lenin and Castro), all those who experienced strong conflict with their father also came to see their father identifying with the prevailing system and thus, having rejected their father, found

Scale 5: Guttman Scalogram of Disruptive Youth

Leaders	scale step	Mother identity	Conflict with father	As a youth reject prevailing paradigm	Family life disrupted as youth	Family not high social class at birth	Difficult childhood (lonely-deprived)
Hitler	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ataturk	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nassar	(6)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mao	(6)	1	1	1	0	1	1
Lenin	(6)	1	0	1	1	1	0
Mussolini	(5)	0	1	1	1	1	1
Sukarno	(5)	0	1	1	1	1	1
Kenyatta	(5)	0	8	1	1	1	1
Bourguiba	(4)	0	0	1	1	1	1
Ho	(4)	0	0	1	1	1	1
Ben Gurion	(4)	0	0	1	1	1	0
Peron	(4)	0	0	8	1	1	1
Khrushchev	(3)	0	8	0	1	1	1
Nkrumah	(3)	0	8	0	1	1	1
Tito	(3)	0	0	0	1	1	1
Jinnah	(3)	0	0	0	1	0	1
Magsaysay	(2)	0	0	0	0	1	1
Cardenas	(2)	0	0	0	0	1	1
Frei	(2)	0	0	0	0	1	8
Adenhauer	(2)	0	0	0	0	1	0
Ben Bella	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hussein	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hirohito	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1
Tojo	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	1
Castro	(0)	0	1	0	0	0	0
Nehru	(0)	1	0	0	0	0	0
Nu	(0)	0	0	1	0	0	0
Selassie	(0)	0	0	0	1	0	0
Churchill	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0
De Gaulle	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kennedy	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nyerere	(0)	0	8	0	0	0	0
Rhee	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roosevelt	(0)	0	0	0	0	0	0

1 = present   0 = absent   8 = data not available

it natural to also reject the system he seemed to represent. However, in rejecting the prevailing paradigm as a youth, the relationship with the father (or with a guardian, uncle, or older brother in the absence of physical proximity of the father due to his death or the youth's schooling) could be just the reverse. In some cases the leader as a youth often strongly identified with his father, or the closest male elder, but the closest male elder had rejected the prevailing paradigm and was in some way engaged in the promotion of an alternative (e.g. he was a revolutionary leader). In this case, the basis of the youth's rejection of the prevailing system is the identity with the elder.

Although it is true that these two indicators are closely identified, it is also true that it is more disruptive for a youth to have rejected the prevailing paradigm as well as rejecting his father, or the closest male elder, than having made this rejection on the basis of maintaining a close relationship with his immediate elder.

The final indicator, mother identity, is an attempt to tap the source of a charismatic leader's ability to effectively fulfill both expressive and instrumental roles. Although there may be alternative ways to measure this quality of leadership, it would seem that only in the most disruptive situations does identity with the mother occur.[41]

The resulting scale included six out of the seven indicators originally used to construct this index.[42] The scalibility is an acceptable, .730.

DATA ANALYSIS: TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES

The intercorrelations of the scales and major variables are presented in the correlation matrix below.[43.]

(Table 1 About Here)

This matrix represents the first step in the test of the hypothesis.. The six scales and major variables correlate with the charisma scale between .255 and .386.[44.] This indicates that all of the variables proposed as possible explanatory factors do, in fact, have a positive relationship with the charisma scale. However, it is left to the remaining steps of the analysis (partials, regression and path analysis) to determine the strength of each relationship given the presence of the other major variables.[45.]

The relative contribution of each of the independent variables in the explanation of charisma can be represented by a path diagram. Given the nature of the data (cf. fn. 23), the limitations of statistical accuracy must be recognized in the use of this refined statistical technique.[46.] For the purposes of reflecting the relative strength of the paths they are divided into three groups based on t-score significance levels.[47.]

(Diagram 1 About Here)

Viewing the residual r_{6y}, it is clear that the explanatory variables in the model have accounted for about half the variance in the charisma among heads of states in the presented sample $(1.-.718^2 = .484)$.[48.] In view of the limited amounts of comparative research in this area, the amount of variance explained is considerable. It is also clear from the path values given in the diagram that the combination of nationalism and successful nationalistic movements and the denial of access of the leader are the two most

Table 1: Correlation Matrix (tau_b)

		1	2	3	4	5
National Social Crisis Scale	1					
Disrupted Youth Scale	2	.347				
Denial of Access	3	.184	.005			
Pre-power Following	4	-.023	.009	.311		
Nationalism plus Successful Movements Scale	5	.421	.179	.130	.049	
Charisma Scale	6	.314	.273	.386	.255	.382

Diagram 1: Path Diagram

$R_{2u}=.911$ $R_{4w}=.945$

$R_{5x}=.880$ $R_{6y}=.718$

.062

X_2 X_4

.412 -.097 .095 .177

.417 .230

X_1 X_5:383

-.052

.325 .066 .309

.184 .034

X_3 X_6

$R_{3v}=.986$

Variable numbers correspond to the tau_b matrix (p. 34)

$p < .05$

$p < .20$

other paths ——————

important variables isolated in the explanation of the leader's charisma. Although it is possible that one of the unexplained factors accounted for by the residual could be as strong as either of these two, it is probably just as likely that many additional factors are involved, none of which are as significant as the two already isolated.

Less important are the presence of a pre-power following and the experience of a disrupted youth. Although the value of the social crisis variable as a predictor of charisma is very low, it is of considerable importance (as a representation of the environmental or social-structural setting) in understanding the presence of a disrupted youth, the combined presence of nationalism and a successful nationalistic movement, and, to a lesser extent, the jailing of a leader, or the denial of access. All of the other paths have little explanatory value, except for the relationship between the denial of access and a pre-power following. However, except for this relationship, a pre-power following is not predicted by or predictive of the other variables in the model. In short, it adds little to the internal strength of the model and especially to the explanation of charisma. These findings are, with a few exceptions, supportive of the hypotheses examined in greater detail below.

National Social Crisis and Charisma

The first hypothesis predicts a direct contribuiton of national social crisis to the explanation of charisma. Statistical analysis suggests that the direct relationship is actually replaced by an indirect one. In addition to the results of the path analysis, this change is also reflected in the partials. When the four other

explanatory variables are controlled, the effects of a national social crisis partial out (reducing the original zero-order correlation with charisma from .349 to .039).

However, there is clearly an indirect contribution of a national social crisis to the presence of charisma through the disrupted youth and nationalism plus nationalistic movements variables and, to a lesser extent, through the denial of access variable. This specification of the hypothesis leads one to the conclusion that a national social crisis may play a necessary role in the emergence of charisma. It is not, however, a sufficient condition.

Disrupted Youth and Charisma

The correlation between these two variables is only partly reduced when the effects of the other variables are partialed out (.349 reduced to .279). The path value also lends support to the contribution of the disrupted youth variable in the explanation of charisma. Additional support for this hypothesis, especially the role played by rejecting the prevailing paradigm, is apparent by visually comparing the two scales. All but one of the charismatic leaders in the top two steps and three out of five in the next step had already rejected the prevailing paradigm as a youth. With only three exceptions, none of the eighteen leaders on the bottom six steps of the charisma scale had rejected the prevailing paradigm during their youth.

Nevertheless, this psychological variable did not contribute as heavily to the explantion of charisma as did two of the social-structural variables. This is perhaps suggestive of the subordinate role the psychological model plays, positioned within the structural model.

Denial of Access and Charisma

The denial of access interacts least with the other independent variables. Although the nationalism plus nationalistic movements variable is a stronger predictor of charisma, partialing has the least effect on the denial of access variable (.488 reduced to .372). These two structural variables account for .40 of the variance explained by the five explanatory variables in the model. (The other three add only another .08) In short, this hypothesis is supported by the data.

Pre-Power Following and Charisma

Although there was a positive relationship between these two variables (.321), when the preceding variable, denial of access, is introduced, only a weak path value remains between pre-power following and charisma (.177). When the effects of the other five variables are partialled out there is also some reduction (.321 reduced to .225). The increment of contribution the denial of access variable makes in the regression analysis is insignificant (.027). Nor does it add significantly to the explanation of the nationalism - nationalistic movement. It is not explained by any of the preceding, except to some slight degree by the denial of access variable. In short, the skepticism about the explanatory value of this variable seems to be supported (cf. p. 6).

Nationalism Plus Nationalistic Movements

Originally nationalism and nationalistic movements were seen as two distinct but related dimensions. The inability to combine the two scales (cf. p. 28) supported this distinction. Nationalism was seen as an underlying dimension. Nationalistic movements, more limited in time, were thought to be more closely related to charisma.

Nationalism proved, however, to be at least as strong a predictor of charisma as nationalistic movements. In the process of re-analysis this led to closer examination of the relationship between these two variables. Additive effects were indicated (cf. pp. 9-10). To develop a combined scale of these two different dimensions, the scale steps were simply added together to produce new rankings from 0 to 9.[49].

Although this additive model violates statistical assumptions for the use of ordinal data, these considerations were outweighed by the value of the new variable. This combined variable, along with others in the model, accounts for almost as much of the variance explained as when the two components were treated separately (.484 vs. .533). This small loss is offset by the greater single contribution and independence of the new variable. It shows a stronger relation to charisma and has a larger path value than any of the other explanatory variables. Alone, it accounts for over a quarter of the variance. Although partialing out other effects of the other explanatory variables in the model results in some reduction (.524 to .425), the remaining value is still higher than any of the other partialed values. Although these statistics are subject to inaccuracy due to the nature of the sample and, to a lesser extent, due to the data, the evidence clearly points to the relative importance of this variable in explaining the presence of charisma.

Reflecting for a moment on the original argument supporting this hypothesized relationship, it is recalled that Weber saw charismatic authority as a specifically revolutionary force repudiating the past. In economic terms this transition between "old" and "new" is usually couched in terms of developed and under-

developed or developing countries. However, if we examine the charismatic scale, there is virtually no difference between low and high charismatic leaders (division between steps five and six) and whether a country was more or less developed when a leader came to power. Geographical distinctions between the United States and Europe and other countries do not account for differences in levels of charisma. Leaders from the United States and Europe are equally divided between high and low charisma. The differences between the remaining countries are slight (thirteen high and ten low).

Alternatively, in political terms, there is a notable difference between high and low charisma and whether a leader came to power through established electoral processes or via new or extra-institutional means (e.g. independence or revolution).

(Table 2 About Here)

To the extent the means of taking office are a reflection of the presence of institutionalized changes, the relationship shown in Table 2 suggests that charismatic leadership is more likely to accompany periods of change or transition in the political struc-ture of the country. National social crisis and the attempts to resolve the crisis through a nationalistic movement are character-istic of periods of change or transition.[50]

Biographical Background and Charisma

The data revealed virtually no relationship between a leader's charisma and his early contact with other social environments (.05) and/or his early foreign experience as a youth (-.10). These low correlations led to their exclusion from the path diagram. Perhaps the process of rejecting the established paradigm and formulating a new one is undertaken through other means. Conceptually, however,

Table 2: The Means of Attaining Office x Charisma

Means of attaining office	Charisma		
	hi	low	
extra-institutional	69%	33%	(17)
institutional	31%	67%	(17)
	100% (16)	100% (18)	

there is still room to suggest that more refined measurements might yet show that either of these processes of differentiated exposure to alternative paradigms or to other areas of meaning or to different environments are important in understanding the sources of charisma.

With three exceptions, other biographical background factors, as predicted, revealed little or no relationship to charisma. They are birth date (early to late: -.03); parental background (homogeneous to heterogeneous: .07); years of formal education (low to high: -.06); number of children (none to many: -.19); age at assumption of office (young to old: -.05); number of years in office (few to many: -.19); year first entered office (early to late: -.05); year last in office (early to late: -.004). The remaining three variables, marital status, means of taking office, and reason for leaving office all had nominal categories. The for them is .84, .86, and 1.58 respectively. The contingency coefficient is .64, .65, and .85 respectively.

The only possibly meaningful tau correlations in this group are two of -.19, and even those are sufficiently small so that in the absence of any predicted relationship it is quite possible they might have occurred by chance. The first of these shows a slight reverse relationship between the number of children and charisma. Perhaps the lack of children produces a parallel downgrading of the leader's position as "father of all the people" since he is a "family man."

The other -.19 correlation showed an inverse relationship between the number of years in office and charisma. The nominal statistics on the reason for leaving office reflect the fact that

nine out of eleven of the most charismatic leaders (steps seven
to ten) who have left office (five are still in office) were forced
out by a coup or execution. (Claude has previously pointed to this
phenomenon--see fn. 8.) Although this relationship was not pre-
dicted, these two relationships would appear to be an indication
of the volatile nature of charisma and the difficult task a charis-
matic leader has in firmly establishing himself. Combined with
this is the slight tendency of the data to show that the longer
a highly charismatic leader stays in office the more likely his
charisma will decrease, even to the point of his being removed
from office by forceful means.

A first reaction to this might lead one to conclude that
this is an indication of Weber's concept of "routinization of
charisma," or of the "legitimation of power" found in more recent
writings (cf. fn. 8). But on deeper consideration, this asser-
tion would appear questionable. When a charismatic leader is
overthrown, most of his personal philosophy and ideas, not to
mention his ways and mannerisms, are often "purged." Thus, rather
than his charisma being routinized or legitimated, it is more
likely to be discarded as unworkable.[51]

The more likely explanation for this pattern comes in the
introductory pages of this study in the definition given of a
charismatic leader. "The degree to which followers maintain
their belief in him is reflected in his ability to become a
symbolic focal point in the unification of the country towards
the solution of these problems through the realization of end
goals, although the final solution of these problems and achieve-
ment of goals is problematic."

It would appear in many cases that the belief in the ability

of the charismatic leader to resolve problems is more imagined than real. Thus, when the leader takes power and his attempts to solve problems repeatedly fail, the result is often the withdrawal of charismatic support and belief, even, in many cases, to the point of being overthrown. Interviews for two leaders, in particular (Rhee and Nkrumah), indicated this point very clearly. The respondents continually qualified their responses by limiting many of the leader's attributes to the earlier period only.

CONCLUSION

This study is seen as a cumulative effort in the process of research on charisma. Several studies to date have discussed the meaning and significance of charisma with reference to one or perhaps a few cases. Some have begun to develop indicators that might differentiate a larger sample. Willner (1968) carried this process considerably farther by examining several leaders in terms of a number of different indicators. Her study did not, however, examine all the leaders across all the indicators presented.

In contrast, the present study has been fully comparative. Thirty-four heads of state and their countries have been examined for each of ninety-seven indicators (forty-two for charisma alone). In spite of the potential problems posed by cultural differences, it has been possible to build a cumulative scale of twelve indicators indexing the level of charisma of these thirty-four heads of state.

Acceptable scales were also constructed for national social crisis, nationalistic movements, nationalism, and youth disruption. These variables, along with two others deemed most relevant conceptually (denial of access and pre-power following), were sta-

tistically examined to ascertain the relative strengths of their
contribution to charisma. This resulted in support for five of
eight of the hypotheses and partial support for a sixth. The
validity of one of the two hypotheses not supported was questioned
from the outset. The analysis also indicated that the five major
explanatory variables together accounted for slightly less than
half the variance in the level of charisma among the present
sample. Their explanatory values ordered the variables as follows:
nationalism plus nationalistic movements, denial of access, dis-
rupted youth, pre-power following and a national social crisis.
The last two were noted to be particularly weak predictors in
the presence of the other variables, although the presence of a
national social crisis was shown to be of importance in explaining
other variables in the model. The analysis concluded with a dis-
cussion of the prospects for the "legitimation" of charisma.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR RESEARCH

The increments made by this study to the literature on charisma
are seen to be most helpful first in the area of social change and
comparative analysis, and, second, in the search for increased
power in the explantion of charisma. These increments are, not
surprisingly, paralleled by suggestions for additional research
in this area which can build on the work done to date.

If this study were to be replicated, there would be several
areas of improvement. Certainly a better measure might be de-
veloped to index the leader's exposure to differentiated exper-
iences and social environments. Additional sources, especially
interviews, might be used to further increase the already ac-
ceptable levels of stability-reliability. The indicators which
had little relation with their respective scales should be dropped.

However, indicators which nearly scaled should be retained. Others might be added (e.g., the leader's oratorical ability, great personal courage, celebration of his birthday, or a street, city or important center named for him). The pattern this research has established will now permit any group of heads of state to be selected without prior need to determine which may or may not be charismatic.

This type of replication, helpful as it might be, leaves unanswered one major difficulty. In selecting leaders from many different time periods, it becomes impossible to use most data already collected from other studies comparing nations, since most studies are conducted for a particular time period.

The identification of a cluster of indicators now makes it possible to select a time period, perhaps with a view to using data from certain other cross-national studies. Then each head of state, or a known probability sample, can be examined on the basis of the cluster of indicators used here to measure charisma. The same steps could be taken to measure nationalistic movements. Again, this cluster might be enlarged by a few indicators which almost scaled and perhaps by a very few additional ones which were not included in this study.

This research has done the work necessary for the next step described above. This step has greater heuristic value than a replication of the study, because it would represent another increment in the research literature on charisma.

Another research alternative would be a much more intensive study of the actual members of charismatic followings. Substantially greater inputs would be needed here since large numbers of

persons would probably have to be interviewed in many countries, first with a view to ascertaining their degree of support and belief in the leader, and second to understand the nature of that belief and support. This type of study would necessarily be limited in time since it would be increasingly difficult to re-construct a charismatic following as the leaders become more distant in the past. Political restrictions would also prevent access to a wide range of respondents in some countries. However, with the increasing number of data banks, such a large study might become possible. Certainly it would make a contribution in the fields of social movements and mass psychology.

In the meantime, small studies, such as the one suggested above, will problably be more likely to emerge as increments in the growing literature on charisma, its nature and causes.

FOOTNOTES

1. Although Willner (1968) came close to a comparative study of some fifteen leaders and as many indicators, she did not include a full comparison of all leaders on all indicators.

2. The original formulation of hypotheses was based on a sociogenic framework which suggest that social-psychological processes "...are embedded in the structural process." (Young, 1965: 162; see also Young, 1966)

3. I am indebted to David Segal for suggestions which led to this integration.

4. "...The Greek word charisma /was/ originally derived from the legendary Charis, wife of Hephaestus, the god of tools and metalworking. In the earliest legends she personified grace, beauty, purity and unselfishness. Later legends represented several graces of 'Charites' as the embodiment of grace and beauty. Hence the word came to mean distinct and attractive endowments of character, particularly grace, beauty, purity, and altruism." (Morton, 1965:5) "Weber borrowed the term from Rudolf Sohm, the Strassburg church historian and jurist, who used the term to mean gift of grace." (Gerth, 1958:52)

5. At least two students of government, Friedrich (1961:15) and Moore (1965:46), who accepts Friedrich's argument, have clung to the original understanding of charisma that it must be confined solely to its original usage in the religious sphere. Thus, it has no applicability to politcal figures. Friedrich bases his argument on what he contends is the confusion of structure (form) and content. He admits that Hitler, Christ, Mussolini and Moses all used the same form or method, but argues that their content is the essence of charisma. Thus, he rejects Weber's belief that " The concept of charisma is here used in a completely 'value-neutral' sense." (Gerth, 1958:245; see also Weber, 1964:359) In distinction to Friedrich, most contemporary writers have accepted, if not expanded on, Weber's usage of the term (see references, fn. 6).

6. Among the contemporary writers, see Bendix, 1962:300; Emerson, 1962:281; Friedland, 1964:23; Marcus, 1961:238; Rustow, 1968: 687; Tucker, 1968:738; and Willner, 1968:44.

7. Eisenstadt seems to question this view by speaking of the "...potentially continuous appeal of the charismatic in seemingly orderly and routine situations." (Weber, 1968:xxiv) Yet, Eisenstadt gives no examples to support his assertion. Thus, it is difficult to interpret his precise meaning. However, one suspects that, due to his emphasis on analysis by example, he has neglected the obvious fact that neither charisma, crisis, nor "routine situations" are dichotomies. Rather, they are always present in degrees. A small crisis situation, when compared to a major cirsis, may seem "orderly" and "routine." The essential point is that any process of social change may

result in some level of disruption, which may, in turn, lead to the emergence of a leader with some level of charisma.

8. There is, however, another path of analysis which considers charisma in the more limited area of its role in the "new states." Shils suggests that charisma is most useful in understanding how authority is transferred from traditional patterns of allegiance to the new state. (1958:284-5 and 1960) He was preceded in this view by Kahin (1955:1023). Apter takes a similar view in his book on Ghana. (1963:13) Although this may be one valid example of the attempted use of charisma during periods of crisis or rapid social change, A.K.E. Claude indicts Shils for the relevancy of "charismatic legitimation." This "...is the process of creating loyality for the new state through the personal influence of the charismatic leader." (Claude, 1966:1) Claude suggests this process of legitimation is an erroneous consideration for the simple reason that many of the leaders are overthrown. (cf. p. 43). Even more important is Shils' apparent failure to consider the role of charismatic leaders in "old states." One rather suspects he views the term as something to move from into the progression towards "modern" society and "rational-legal" forms of government. (Tucker, 1968:734)

9. The original formulation of "nationalistic movements" did not distinguish between "national social crisis" and a less refined scale of "nationalistic movements." In the quest for greater explanation of charisma, these two somewhat separate dimensions were found to be superior in both explanatory and hueristic value. Of the twenty-four**, a total of seventeen were used in the two alternative measures.

10. He goes on to suggest that both Stalin and Nkrumah are examples of leaders to whom charismatic qualities were falsely attributed. This may be true, but only beyond a certain point. It is argued below (p. 45) that charismatic political figures with their high control over resources of influence, run the risk of exceeding the parameters of the paradigm accepted by their following, thus losing its support. This makes them vulnerable to expulsion from office by a coup or other means. Thus, a more likely interpretation of Tucker's point is that Nkrumah and probably Stalin (who is not included in the present sample), were accepted as charismatic to a point but eventually exceeded the parameters of the accepted paradigm.

11. However, contrary to Shils' interpretation, when an individual can develop his own view of the situation which produces a sufficient level of order, it does not mean that charisma has been "dispersed." Alterntively stated, the presence of order should not imply the presence of "charisma" when the individual logically understands or matter-of-factly accepts the situation. Rather, charisma obtains when a "leader" can interpret a seemingly chaotic situation in a manner not fully understood by the follower, but in a way agreeable to the follower. Thus, the absolute amount of

**indicators proposed for the original measure, only nine were used. But of these same twenty-four

charisma available in the total social environment is not
fixed; it rises or falls with the situational context.

12. Several excellent studies on nationalism all tend to de-
lineate the same identifying indicators of nationalism.
(Kohn, 1955; King, 1935; Hayes, 1960; Schafer, 1955; Schafer,
1959; Snyder, 1954; Snyder, 1964) As early as 1935, King
successfully ranked six indicators for seven European countries.
(pp. 23-37) Curiously, to the present study, no known attempt
has been made to develop a ranking of nationalism on a wider
basis (both in terms of indicators and countries). Less
useful but still concurring in general with the above works
are Doob, 1964; Kedourie, 1960; Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1939; and Tagore, 1916.

13. "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is
that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation;
and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded
this will be the ultimate statement as well." (Emerson, 1962:
102)

14. Originally there were forty cases in the sample. Four (Ceau-
sescu, Kaunda, Sihanouk, Toure) were dropped due to inade-
quate sources, either persons available for interviews and/or
biographies. Two (Saud, and Pahlavki, Shah of Iran) were
eliminated from the control group because it was felt that the
remaining five members of the control group would be sufficient.

15. Data on Hirohito was gathered only up to 1945. Although there
was some uncertainty as to the strength of his political
power even to 1945, certainly after 1945 he had little poli-
tical power.

16. The introduction of bias into this sample is intentional in
order to concentrate on developing measures of charisma.
Concluding suggestions (p. 45) outline a follow-up study which
would eliminate this bias.

17. The former would result in non-exclusive categories. For ex-
ample, a parliamentary democracy could apply to India, Eng-
land, as well as Tanzania. Yet, Tanzania, Russia, Yugoslavia,
and China consider themselves socialist states. The latter
basis also becomes very confusing due to the presence of multi-
definitions of terms. Even a simple dichotomy such as one-
or two-party states breaks down. If the differentiating cri-
terion is the presence of a law prohibiting a second party,
for example, the countries without laws, such as Tanzania
and the United States, are grouped together. If one speaks
of an "effective dominant party" (e.g., with more than 65%
of the popular support), then the United States during most
of Roosevelt's tenure, and China, to name just two completely
different systems, are grouped together. On the related prob-
lem of identifying dictators and totalitarian systems, see
Tucker 1965:559.

18. Thirty-eight of these are used in the attempt to measure charisma. Friedland laments that "the dearth of such indicators in the literature of the behavioral sciences is quite remarkable." (1964:21-2) Hopefully, this study and the earlier one by Willner (1968) have remedied this situation. Nine potential indicators were used to measure national social crisis. Fifteen were used to measure nationalistic movements. An additional fifteen were used to measure nationalism. Seven were used to construct a scale of disrupted youth. (Four of these were gathered in the process of re-analyses after the presence of a psychological model had been established.) The remaining eleven were used to test the importance of biographical factors.

19. There were four exceptions. Four Americans were interviewed for foreign leaders. Two students seriously involved in Cuban studies, both of whom had been to Cuba, were interviewed. An American who had lived in Italy a number of years during Mussolini's tenure was interviewed. An American student studying the People's Republic of Chian was interviewed.

20. The exceptions are Lenin, Khrushchev, Hussein and Ben Bella.

21. Ben Bella, Churchill, Frei, Hirohito, Ho, Kennedy, and Mussolini.

22. The scalogram analysis program used here was written by Nancy Moxley, Office of Computer Services, Cornell University, and revised and adapted by the author for the Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell University.

23. Due to the limited number of cases and, more importantly, due to the lack of a random probabliity sample--or the use of the entire universe--there is only a marginal utility in the use of refined techniques such as regression and path analysis. There is a great probability that the statistics are inaccurate. However, these techniques are taken as a means to determining the relative magnitude of the contribution the variables make to the explanation of charisma. More reliable is the use of partial correlations. (Galtung, 1967:406-8) In essence then, regression and path analysis are used here as general validators in determining the relative power' of the variables in the explanation of charisma.

24. The first, pictures in homes or public, is a combined indicator.

25. This is a slightly improved version of the scale presented in the thesis (scalability .728 compared to .674). The denial of access, which is indexed by the leader having been detained or jailed by the opposing force, was dropped from the scale to insure its independence as a separate explanatory variable. The combined indicator of the leader's image on money or postage stamps was dropped for conceptual reasons. Those who learned of this study often asked to what extent this occurred

as a genuine reflection of the leader's charisma and to what
extent it occurred simply as a result of the leader's orders.
It became clear that the room for interplay between the leader
and the following was too limited for this indicator to remain
in the scale.

In place of these items three were added: willingness of the
people to make sacrifices for the leader; the leader's state-
ments being developed as principles for the people to follow;
and the leader exhorting people to adopt ways opposed to "tra-
ditional" patterns (i.e. to adopt a revised or new paradigm).
Although this latter item had the highest error ratio of those
in the scale, it was retained due to its high conceptual value
of indicating the importance of a new paradigm.

26. The second and third indicators are functional alternates
(i.e., they differentiate the same cases). Normally one of
the indicators is eliminated to prevent inflation of scala-
bility. (This would have lowered the scalability only .008
from .728 to .720.) However, the extra indicator was retained,
again for conceptual purposes of emphasizing the use of sayings
or principles in the development of an alternative paradigm.

27. The more steps there are to differentiate a sample, the
greater the possibility of lower correlations with other
variables.

28. At the outset of this study, ten leaders were thought to be
highly charismatic. The final scale confirmed this subjec-
tive judgment for six of the first eight (which comprise the
top two steps), and for Ho and Mao, who are also among the
first twelve.

29. There was only one for Lenin. The use of two Americans for
Castro who, although sympathetic to Fidel's revoluiton, might
not be the best sources.

30. At least one short study has been written entirely on this
subject. It cites evidence based on Weber's definition which
gives substantial support to the probability that Castro is
highly charismatic (Morton, 1965).

31. Churchill is the only other person who seems somewhat out of
place. Earlier scales placed him three steps higher, indicating
that the inclusion of one or two marginal indicators might
make a difference.

32. Willner suggests that since people often post pictures of many
figures in their homes, including ones who are not charis-
matic, the use of this indicator is questionable. (1968:24).
However, since most, if not all, of the indicators refer to
actions which also apply to others who are not charismatic,
this is not a sufficient reason to exclude this indicator. It
must be understood that what is important here is not the in-
dividual indicator; rather, it is what Willner calls the "cluster

of indicators" which, taken together, index charisma.

33. Most of these indicators have a direct conceptual relation to charisma. Two indicators, the followers' belief that the leader has suffered physical hardship and the performance of an heroic feat, an indicator suggested by Weber, both contribute to their belief that the leader has unusual abilities. The leader's making of promises to increase the well-being of the people is seen as an outgrowth of the leader's alternative world view of the situation. Two of these indicators seem to lack a strong conceptual basis. They are the presence of unusual eyes and the presence of ostentatious living habits. However, Willner included these among potential indicators because, in some way, she suggested they both make the leader appear different from the people and thus augment the following's perception of the leader's greater abilities. (1968:71, 84) In general, this group of five potential indicators is seen to have a conceptual baiss. Slight refinements in data collection procedures might well have resulted in their inclusion in the final scale.

34. Half of the potential indicators had little or no statistical relation with the scale. Although this might otherwise be seen as a large number, the original decision not to exclude any indicator meant there would by many indicators which would not scale.

However, of these twenty-one, three-fourths of them were excluded primarily because they did not differentiate between the control group and those leaders believed to be charismatic. In other words, most of the sample had most of these characteristics. These were a name of respect, father figure, striking physical appearance, escaped from an assassination attempt, struggle for leadership, writing of a book, knowledgeable and powerful mind, presence of mind in period of crisis, speeches denounce enemy, speeches appeal to cultural heritage, advocates slogan of unity, high degree of vitality, innovator, maintain personal power, and principled man. The last potential indicator had the least positive relationship of all to charisma, -.32. Perhaps this might be seen as a somewhat dubious reflection on the art of politics. Thus, while many charismatic leaders have these attributes, they are also generally found among the non-charismatic control group. From a conceptual point of view, the presence of two indicators in this group was disappointing. It was hoped that a name of respect would be the one differentiating indicator which could be used to select the sample (cf. p. 13). Four of the five in the control group did lack such a name but so did six of the others, although none of these six placed in the top three steps of the scale. Although it had an acceptable correlation with the scale, it had far too many errors to be included in the scale. The other indicator is the viewing of the leader as an innovator. Certainly this would have

been an additional indication of the presence of an alternative world view. But this was absent in only four cases of the entire sample, and only two of these were from the control group.

The remaining six all differentiate the sample at some level above the control group. However, they all have many errors. They are a statue following tenure in office; people wearing an insignia relating them to the leader; components of the leader's dress widely copied by the following; leader evokes association with cultural myth; leader experiences relationships with supernatural forces. This last potential indicator is directly relevant to the original definition of charisma, but the fact that the item did not scale is not surprising given the alternative definition of charisma. Also, if the leader advocates an alternative world view, it is not surprising that he would not evoke association with cultural myth. A leader who is too informal in his relationships perhaps cannot appear sufficiently different to draw respect (see fn. 33). It is not surprising that the presence of a statue following the leader's tenure in office is not related to charisma. Charisma often lasts only for a few years, and if the leader is eventually overthrown, one should not expect a statue to remain (see p. 43). On the other hand, the wearing of an insignia and the copying of the leaders's dress both seem to maintain some conceptual basis of the outward identification and support for the leader by the following. In this sense the lack of an acceptable pattern of the use of an insignia is puzzling. The lack of a pattern for the wearing of clothing may, on the other hand, be the result of the inability to generalize this phenomenon cross-culturally.

35. The "statements against any country" indicator almost scaled. It had a higher correlation with the scale (.36) than the item in the scale with the most errors (.19). However, since it included all but two cases, and since it was not seen to be as meaningful as the other categories of statements made against other countries, it was excluded. The other indicator, statements made against distant countries, included substantial overlapping with major powers. The fact that this indicator had such a high error ratio is perhaps reflective of the fact that major powers make better targets for accusative statements than do just any distant countries.

36. The five which did not scale are the presence of national day parades, military and non-military; the absence of major disputes between major cultural groups; the absence of internal riots causing death; and the armed defeat of an internal opposition. The first two indicators are perhaps too much a part of the normal activities of many societies to be a real reflection of a nationalistic movement. They differentiate only two and three cases respectively. The other three suggest there is perhaps an area between the presence of some disruption (either riots or some cultural

disputes) and the lack of severe disruption (armed insur-
rection) where successful nationalistic movements are more
likely to occur. The presence of some disruption is not sur-
prising given that a successful nationalistic movement is
trying to alter the patterns of a society and the use of
scapegoats in the process of alteration.

37. The recognized liberating heroic figure indicator showed
relatively poor stability-reliability. However, this is a
marginal indicator since any improvement in the scalability
would be best effected with the elimination of this item.

38. The only one which was originally thought to have some re-
lationship was the dominate labor or workers' union indi-
cator. However, this aspect of the economic sphere is ap-
parently not broad-based enough to serve as an index of
nationalism. The building, or group of buildings recognized
as a center of national focus, indicator was the most unstable/
unreliable on the entire data collection schedule, and thus,
it is not surprising that it did not scale. The other in-
dicators were included on the belief that they had little
relationship with nationalism and predictably did not scale.
(They are: national constitution or a set of uniformly
recognized laws; head of state nominally elected by citizens
or their representatives; a wholly elected functioning legis-
lature; and a single dominant race.) Although a common race
is often connected with nationalism, it is a concept that
turned out to be culture-bound having little meaning in many
of the Asian and African countries in this sample.

39. The original data collected included only four of the items.
When it became clear that these social-psychological variables
were important in measuring the leader's charisma, data on
three other variables were obtained (family life disrupted
as a youth, rejection of the prevailing paradigm as a youth,
and mother identity).

40. Goertzel and Goertzel make frequent references to the dif-
ficult childhoods of eminent leaders (1962: passim, but
especially pp. xii and 272-74). Their study did, however,
suggest that eminent leaders tended to come from the upper
classes. This difference may be due to the differences in
the sample. Most of the leaders in their sample were not
heads of state.

41. Segal, 1966:143. He has elaborated on this dimension in
class and in conversation with the author.

42. One additional item was originally included in the scale,
conflict with mother. Although it did fit within the ac-
ceptable limits of scalibility, it was eliminated because
it occurred in only one case (Mussolini).

43. For the purposes of statistical analysis, steps five and six are combined on the charisma scale and steps one and two are combined on the nationalistic movements scale.

All data analysis for this section was done on programs originally developed by the Institute for Social Research (ISR), the University of Michigan. They have been revised and extended by Interface, Inc., for the Highway Safety Research Institute (HSRI), the University of Michigan, for use on the University of Michigan's IBM Model 67 operating under the Michigan Terminal System (MTS).

44. The zero-order r ranges from .321 to .524. Gamma from .308 to .556.

Given the ordinal nature of virtually all the data, Kendall's tau $_b$ is perhaps the most accurate of all the statistics since it corrects for ties (Galtung, 1967:220-23). Except where cited, it is used throughout the analysis as the basic statistic. Although tau $_b$ generally gives a lower correlation than other statistics, if this is understood by the reader, the comparison between tau $_b$ can be a meaningful standard of the extent of agreement-disagreement of the data. One must be careful not to compare tau $_b$ in one correlation and gamma, or another statistic, in a second correlation since the difference between the two statistics generally invalidates the comparison. Gamma is often .10 to .30 higher than tau $_b$.

45. A very clear explanation of path analysis is found in an unpublished article by Stokes (1968). See also Land (1968) and Duncan (1966). The partials, regression and path analysis are based on the zero order correlation. The variable numbers for this matrix correspond to the tau $_b$ matrix.

2	.412				
3	.163	.024			
4	-.018	.030	.311		
5	.453	.242	.165	.110	
6	.349	.349	.438	.321	.524
	1	2	3	4	5

46. A major question is whether it is valid or meaningful to use these interval statistical techniques on ordinal data. Heise (1968:68), Land (1968:5), and Duncan (1966:2) all indicate that the presence of interval-level data is a necessary prerequisite. If this is true, one might charge that path analysis used here is an example of "misplaced mathematical elegance." But this charge can be substantiated only if this kind of analysis serves no useful function. Although it is certainly true that any particular value may be subject to fluctuation, the relative magnitude of the paths are more stable. As such, the path diagram serves

as a valuable function in summarizing a large amount of data as well as being a useful indicator of the relative strength in the explanation of one variable by others.

More recently, Boyle (1970) has carefully examined the errors which may result from using path analysis on ordinal data. " "The conclusion is that the empirical dangers of assuming equal intervals are not great." (461) Although his con- clusions are based on the careful analysis of only one set of data, he suggests that the magniture of error in assuming interval levels causes no appreciable distortion. Rather, it depends on "coincidences of more than one kind of error... The theoretical analysis concluded that regression and path coefficients are generally quite stable..." even if a full interval scale is lacking. (479)

47. $t = \frac{B - B_o}{s_B}$, where B-beta or the standardized path regression coefficient, B_o = the true population beta, and H_o is B=0.

48. The residual $r = \sqrt{1 - R^2_{1.jk...n}}$.

49. Some of the new ranks were combined to form the new scale steps: 15 and 16; 12 and 13; 5 and 6; 3 and 4; 0 and 1.

50. I am indebted to comments by Professor Gayl Ness which led to the sharpening of this relationship between the more charis- matic leaders and patterns of institutional change.

51. Eisenstadt asserts "...that the test of any great charismatic leader lies not only in his ability to create a single event or great movement, but also in his ability to create a single event or great movement, but also in his ability to leave a continuous impact on an institutional structure..." (Eisen- stadt, 1968:xxi) There, of course, remains the definition of a "great charismatic leader." Eisenstadt does not give examples or offer his own definition, but certainly it can- not be based on the leader's 'impact" lest his whole state- ment would be tautological! The view advocated here is that "great" leaders are simply those who are highly charismatic. But this would include those such as Hitler and Mussolini. Yet, who would contend that they have left a "continuous impact" on the institutional structure? However, it is probably true that they may have left some limited impact, if only in a negative sense.

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