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THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION,
SOCIAL MOBILITY, AND THE STATUS INCONSISTENCY
ON THE
GERMAN POLITICAL PARTY INFRASTRUCTURE

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Studies of the social correlates of political party choice in the Western industrial nations have progressed from identifying zero-order main effects (e.g., the relationship between social class and partisanship assuming all other things to be equal), through identifying first- and higher-order main effects (e.g., partialling out the variance attributable to occupation, income, education, etc.), to the theoretical specification of statistical interaction effects among structural variables that have potential consequences beyond those predicted by an additive model dealing only with main effects. This newest class of models suggest unique effects on party choice of the configuration of a person's position on two or more structural variables. The primary purpose of this paper is to compare the efficiency of two such interaction models, social mobility and status inconsistency, for explaining the structure of political party support in Germany, as against the efficiency of additive models containing only main effects.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP IN GERMANY

The relationship between social structure and political partisanship in Germany has not been a stationary one over the last several years. It has been stable, however, in the sense that the same set of variables seem to consistently account for differences in voter preference for the two major parties. The factors that predispose an individual to support the Social Democratic Party (SPD) include: working class occupation; non-Catholic religion or non-practicing Catholic; trade union affiliation; identification with the working class; working class social origins. The factors that predispose an individual to support the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), on the other hand, include: middle class occupation; Catholic religion, particularly if practicing; no trade union affiliation; identification with the middle-class; middle-class social origins (Segal, 1967; Liepelt, 1968). Liepelt and Mitscherlich (1968) have suggested that these factors are indicative of the social networks that influence a person's political orientation.

Klingemann and Pappi (1970) note that voter alignments in Bundestag elections shifted through the 1960's in favor of the SPD, with the CDU suffering slight losses, and the small Free Democratic Party suffering the greatest losses, exceeding the 5 percent of the total vote needed for entry into the Bundestag by only .8% in 1969. The dynamic behind the growth of the SPD seems to be the decline of its image as a working-class party. Between 1965 and 1969, the SPD share of the white-collar vote increased from 28% to 45%. This embourgeoisement of the party of the left is not unlike the shifting base of support of the Democratic Party in the United States. The important question for our purposes is whether occupation still differentiates SPD from CDU supporters, albeit less strongly than before.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

While models dealing with the additive main effects of structural variables on partisanship are most frequently interpreted as reflections of static social cleavages, statistical interaction models tend to be based on assumptions of dynamic social processes. Models of the political effects of intergenerational social mobility are one class of such approaches. Lipset and Zetterberg (1956), and Bendix and Lipset (1959) suggest that Americans upwardly mobile into the middle-class become more politically conservative than non-mobile individuals born into the middle class. Upwardly mobile Europeans, however, are more politically radical than non-mobile people in their class of destination (Tumin, 1967: 64; Lopreato, 1967). The dynamic assumed to be operating is that upwardly mobile people seek acceptance by the higher status occupational group that they have entered through conformity to its norms. In the United States they are accepted, and indeed over-conform to the norms, but in the more status-rigid European societies they are not accepted in their new occupational class -- a fact that is subsequently reflected in their politics. Downwardly mobile individuals, by contrast, are expected to retain the conservative political orientation of their class of origin, and not reflect the occupational status of their class of destination.

The bulk of the empirical evidence, developed using crude two-class stratification models (blue-collar and white-collar) does not support this model. Rather, a series of studies have shown that in both America and Europe, the party choice of mobile individuals is intermediate between that of non-mobile people in the class of origin, and that of non-mobile people in the class of destination (Blau, 1956; Lopreato, 1967; Segal and Knoke, 1968; Thompson, 1971a, 1971b). The most parsimonious explanation for these findings was that the partisanship of the mobile individuals could be explained by a model including only the additive main effects of class of origin and class of destination. While the relative importance of these two components might differ from country to country, no assumption of statistical interaction was required to explain the findings.

Janowitz (1958) has demonstrated the high level of intergenerational mobility in post-World War II Germany. He found, using a four-class model of nonfarm occupational stratification, that in 1955, only 55.4% of his sample were in the same strata as their fathers had occupied. Interestingly, there was as much downward as upward mobility, although both the amount and direction of mobility were confounded by migration. More importantly, for our purposes, Janowitz found political consequences of social mobility in Germany. The small right-wing political parties had the highest concentration of downwardly mobile people, while the liberal FDP had an overrepresentation of upwardly mobile supporters. Unfortunately, Janowitz' data are not presented in a form that allows us to compare the main effects of strata of origin and destination with the effects of mobility.

STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

A second set of models, related to but conceptually distinct from social mobility, deal with the political consequences of status inconsistency. Here the concern is not with discontinuities between an individual's occupational status and his father's occupational status, but rather with the relationship between his occupational prestige and his concurrent status situation on other dimensions of the stratification system.

Briefly stated, the theory of status inconsistency argues that if an individual is of high status on one prestige dimension and of low status on

another, he will experience stress (Jackson, 1962). It is assumed that a person in such a situation will tend to define himself in terms of his higher status, and will expect deference on that basis (Lenski, 1966: 26). Other people, however, are likely to define him in terms of his lower status, frustrating his deference expectations, producing the hypothesized stress, and causing him to withdraw from social participation.

Recent research has thrown this assumed dynamic into question. Segal, Segal, and Knoke (1970) suggest that the status inconsistent individual does not define himself in terms of his higher status, and that other people do not define him in terms of his lower status. Laumann and Segal (1971), moreover, have shown that status inconsistency does not seem to be related to rates of social participation.

These findings notwithstanding, a large body of literature suggests that certain traits may be characteristic of status inconsistent individuals. Among these characteristics is support of left-of-center political parties. In an analysis of 25 national surveys of voting behavior in the United States, Canada, Britain, and Australia, Lenski (1967) found that in all of the Anglo-American democracies except Britain, inconsistencies between occupational class and socio-religious grouping increased liberal or left-of-center tendencies. In general, such results have been produced as the result of inconsistencies between a high achieved status (education, occupation, income) and a low ascribed status (race, religion, ethnicity).

Attempts to replicate Lenski's findings have placed important limitations on the generality of his results. In America, Segal (1969) and Laumann and Segal (1971) suggest that the status inconsistency model works only when the low-ascribed status is socially visible (non-white racial status; Jewish religion). In the Australian case, Broom and Jones (1970) find that inconsistency between a high achieved status (education, occupation, or income) and a low ascribed status is related to liberal political preference, and that the inconsistency model explains significantly more variance in partisanship than does a simple additive status model. However, the increase in the multiple correlation coefficient over a purely additive model including the effects of religion is only .002, and the authors note that much of the variance attributed to the inconsistency term is variance that is shared with the dummy religion variable.

In Canada, Segal (1970) has demonstrated significant status inconsistency effects on political partisanship. However, he has suggested that the statistical significance of the inconsistency coefficient was dependent on the large size of his case base. In terms of magnitude, the main status effects, and the effect of religion in particular, were of primary importance.

Two previous studies have explored the political consequences of status inconsistency in Germany. Stehr (1971), analyzing data from a Cologne sample interviewed in 1967, found no relationship between "objective" status inconsistency, as generally measured by social researchers, and "subjective" status inconsistency, as perceived by his respondents. He furthermore found no relationship between subjective inconsistency and measures of either social interaction or liberalism. It should be noted that the status measures used by Stehr included only achievement-oriented dimensions (occupation, education, income). Since the theory of status inconsistency in its current form stresses the importance of low ascribed status, we cannot discount the presence of status inconsistency effects in Germany on the basis of this study.

Maza (1970), on the other hand, recognized the importance of ascribed status in the inconsistency formulation. Using religion and sex as ascribed statuses in the German context, she re-analyzed the German data from the five-nation study of civic culture carried out by Almond and Verba (1963). Inconsistencies between the ascribed status variables and occupation, income and education were found to be significantly related to political frustration, and the effects tended to be greater than those predicted by a simple additive model. While we regard Maza's simple dichotomization of religious denominations as perhaps too simplistic, and the role of sex a confounding rather than a clarifying one, we believe that her results justify looking further at the consequences of the inconsistency phenomenon in the German case.

DATA

In the transitional period of women's liberation, as sexual equality is approached in the Western industrial nations, the social status of women is nonetheless difficult to estimate. They may inherit their status from their fathers, or, if married, share the status of their husbands, or, if employed, define their own position in the stratification system. To avoid these problematic aspects of stratification, we confined our analysis to male respondents. In order to attain sufficient cases to sustain analysis, we combined the samples of two surveys carried out by the Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft (infas) in April (no. 15a) and June (no. 21a) 1971, respectively. The two samples had been drawn on the basis of equivalent sampling frames, and represent cross-sections of the German electorate. Of the total 2,149 completed interviews, 1,052 were with male respondents.

The respondents were asked "which (political) party strikes you as the best at this time?" Responses to this question, scaled from the left to the right of the political spectrum, are presented in Table 1. Note that we place the FDP between the two major parties, reflecting the fluctuation of its policies along the liberalism-conservatism dimension.

Table 1. Distribution of Political Party Preference in Germany

<u>Party</u>	<u>No. of supporters in Sample</u>
DFU, DKP, ADF, SED	4
SPD	529
FDP	37
CDU/CSU	416
NDP	7
Other, none*	59

Total 1,052

*This category is omitted from the following analysis, leaving a sample of 993.

RESULTS

Our first analytical task was to ascertain the main effects of stratification variables on party choice. These effects were calculated using multiple classification analysis (MCA). MCA is a linear analysis model capable of handling missing data, non-linear data, and nominal independent variables, with the accuracy of least squares methods. It can be conceived of as a form of dummy variable multiple regression in which party choice is regressed on occupation, father's occupation, religion, education, and income. The coefficients obtained through MCA are analogous to those obtained through dummy variable regression. The coefficients derived from either of these techniques may in fact be easily converted to the other by the addition or subtraction of a constant for each predictor (Andrews, et.al., 1967). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Effects of Stratification Variables on Political Partisanship in the Federal Republic of Germany

	<u>Stratification Variables</u>				
	<u>occupation</u>	<u>father's occupation</u>	<u>education</u>	<u>income</u>	<u>religion</u>
eta*	.224	.215	.119	.130	.157
F test for gross effects	p<.001	p<.001	p<.01	n.s.	p<.001
beta	.189	.157	.097	.093	.151
F test for net effects	p<.001	p<.001	p<.05	n.s.	p<.001

n = 993

unadjusted multiple r^2 (proportion of explained variance) = .117

multiple r^2 adjusted for degrees of freedom = .096

*Eta measures zero-order relationships between specified predictor variables and party choice. Beta measures the partial relationships, when the effects of all other variables are controlled.

As these data show, social class, measured either by respondent's occupation

or by his father's occupation, was an important determinant of political party preference in Germany in 1971. The relationship between occupation and party choice seems to be less strong than it was in the early 1960's (cf. Segal, 1967), confirming the observations of Klingemann and Pappi (1970), and of Lipset (1964). At the same time, the relationship, although weakened, persists nonetheless. It is therefore premature to argue that the age of class conflict manifested through partisan politics has come to an end (Janowitz and Segal, 1967). Moreover, our analysis does not portend an age of consensus, for while social class differences between the parties are declining, religion remains an important plane of cleavage (cf. Lane, 1965).

The data in Table 2 suggest that occupation is the strongest predictor of party preference of the variables considered. To the extent that multicollinearity exists among our predictors, beta cannot be taken as a measure of the variance explained by each predictor, although it does indicate the relative strength of the partial relationships. In the current study, multicollinearity is to be expected, since elements of the stratification system are generally intercorrelated. In particular, in any study of social mobility, we would anticipate some degree of social immobility. Table 3 presents mobility data for 676 men in our sample who reported urban occupations for themselves and their fathers.

Table 3. Social Mobility in Germany, 1971

	<u>Occupation of Father</u>			Total
	(1) Self-employed, free professional, kindred	(2) Employees, officials, civil servants	(3) Workers	
Occupation (1)	40	29	20	89
of (2)	45	132	78	255
Son (3)	39	53	240	332
Total	124	214	338	676

Omitted from this table are 174 respondents who did not report their own occupations, or who reported occupations not classified here, 25 respondents

who did not report their father's occupations, 5 respondents who reported neither their own nor their father's occupations, and 113 sons of farmers.

The data indicate a considerable degree of immobility in the urban labor force. Seventy-one percent of the sons of workers are workers themselves, and 62% of the sons of employees and bureaucrats share their father's occupations. Only among the sons of the self-employed do we find mobility to be the modal pattern. Here, only 32% have inherited their father's occupations, while 36% have followed more bureaucratic callings. This reflects shifts in the structure of the labor force from an entrepreneurial to a bureaucratic orientation between the two generations represented here (see Segal, forthcoming, for an overview of these processes).

At the same time, it would be incorrect to characterize the German labor force as a stationary system. Rather, there seems to be a relatively stable level of intergenerational occupational mobility in Germany over time. Lipset and Bendix (1964: 17), reviewing data from the mid-1950's, suggest that in Germany between 26 and 30% of the sons of manual workers achieved non-manual positions. The figure in our 1971 data is 29%. With regard to downward mobility, 25% of the sons of bureaucrats, and 31% of the sons of entrepreneurs and free professional in our 1971 sample find themselves in manual positions. Again, these figures are similar to the range of 20 - 38% found by Lipset and Bendix in three sets of German data (cf. Kleining, 1971).

We used MCA to analyze the effects of respondent's occupation and father's occupation on partisanship for the 676 men in our sample for whom we had occupational data over two generations. With the case base reduced, and other variables excluded, the etas were reduced to .206 and .173, respectively, and the betas to .162 and .107. The unadjusted R^2 was .052, indicating that the additive mobility model explains more than one-half the variance accounted for by the full five variable model (Table 2). Occupational destination accounts for considerably more unique variance than occupational origin. However, an almost equal proportion of the variance explained is shared by origin and destination and cannot be apportioned.

One of the strengths of MCA is its assumption of additivity of main effects. By assuming only row effects and column effects in an $r \times c$ table, MCA utilizes only $r + c - 2$ degrees of freedom. Standard analysis of variance (ANOVA) would require examination of each category mean \bar{Y}_{ij} , utilizing $r \times c - 1$, and leading to rapid exhaustion of the data and unreliability. The argument regarding mobility effects, however, is rooted in the presence or absence of patterned statistical interaction effects (Blalock, 1967a). It therefore becomes necessary to measure departures from the additive model. Comparison of calculated with observed partisanship means for each cell ij in the origin \times destination table (Table 4) yields a set of cell mean deviations $(\bar{Y}_{ij} - \hat{Y}_{ij})$. The statistical significance of the deviations from additivity is evaluated using the F-test for interaction in ANOVA with unequal cell frequencies (Brownlee, 1960: ch. 19; Duncan, 1966). The sum of squares for the additive model, $\sum_{ij} n_{ij} (\hat{Y}_{ij} - \bar{Y}_{..})^2$, is subtracted from the observed sum of squares $\sum_{ij} n_{ij} (\bar{Y}_{ij} - \bar{Y}_{..})^2$, and this difference is tested for significance using the F-distribution as the criterion. Where the interaction term is significant, the additive model does not account fully for the observed cell variations. Alternative hypotheses can then be investigated in an attempt to relate the interaction systematically to mobility.

Table 4. Observed Partisanship Means, by Occupation of Father and Occupation of Son

Occupation (1) of (2) Son (3)	Occupation of Father			Total
	(1) Self-employed, Free professional, Kindred	(2) Employees, Officials, Civil servants	(3) Workers	
	3.450	2.828	3.200	3.191
	2.800	3.038	2.769	2.914
	2.872	2.755	2.550	2.620
Total	3.032	2.939	2.639	2.806

Our analysis of variance for mobility effects is presented in Table 5. Unlike our earlier analysis, here we find that only respondents' occupation (occupation of destination) has a significant main effect on party preference. There is no significant increment for father's occupation or for the interaction of origin and destination. Thus, our data go beyond the position taken by Hodge (1970) that "mobility" does not have an effect of its own, but rather represents the linearly additive effects of the variables used to define it. Not only do we fail to find "mobility effects", but under close statistical scrutiny, occupational origins fail to contribute a main additive effect. This finding bears a close parallel to the dominant pattern in the United States, both in terms of the absence of statistically significant interaction effects, and in the amount of variance accounted for in partisanship (4%) by current occupation (cf. Knoke, forthcoming).

Table 5. Analysis of Variance for Party Identification by Occupational Origins and Destinations

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Squares	F-ratio
Total (T)	651.62	675		
MCA origin, destination (A,B)	33.62	4		
Origin x destination(AB)	43.08	8		
Origin (A)	18.90	2		
Destination (B)	28.82	2		
<u>Tests</u>				
I. Increment for origin (A,B-B)	4.80	2	2.4	
Remainder (T)-(A,B))	618.00	671	0.92	2.61 n.s.
II. Increment for destination (A,B-A)	14.72	2	7.36	
Remainder (T)-(A,B)	618.00	671	0.92	8.00*
III. Increment for interaction (AB-A,B)	9.46	4	2.36	
Remainder (T)-(AB)	608.54	667	0.91	2.59 n.s.

*p < .001

The identification of status inconsistency effects is statistically similar to the identification of mobility effects (Blalock, 1966, 1967a, 1967b). There are conceptual differences with regard to the component status dimensions, however, that demand a somewhat different research strategy. Interpretation of the ascriptive status dimension (religion) is based upon the presence or absence of membership in the dominant religious group. Religious dominance, however, varies among the German states. We therefore carried out our analyses separately for those states with a Catholic majority (primarily in southern Germany) and those with a Protestant majority (primarily in the north). We recognize the existence of large Catholic enclaves in the Protestant states, and of large Protestant enclaves in the Catholic states. To some extent, therefore, by characterizing the states according to the nature of their religious majorities, we are committing an "ecological fallacy" (see Alker, 1969). We note here that it is a purposive "ecological fallacy", in that we assume that being a Protestant in a predominantly Catholic state is a meaningful social fact, even if the city in which one lives is predominantly Protestant. We acknowledge the existence of political influences of one's neighbors and associates -- the social networks within the territorial boundaries of one's neighborhood (Segal and Meyer, 1969; Segal and Wildstrom, 1970). We suggest that there may be an additional effect attributable to being a member of a religious minority in the context of the larger social milieu.

Our analysis of status inconsistency in the Catholic states included respondents living in Saarland, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Bavaria. Catholics were coded as members of the dominant religion. Non-Catholics (Protestants, those reporting other religions or no religion) were coded as non-members.

Table 6 presents mean partisanship scores by religion and by achieved status variables for respondents living in the Catholic states. As one would expect, Catholics are shown to be more conservative than Protestants in terms of political party preference. Similarly, conservatism increases with occupational prestige, and with education (with reversals among those with the lowest levels). Income, which displays several reversals, has

previously been shown not to have a significant main effect.

Table 6. Observed Partisanship Means in Catholic States: Religion x Occupation, Religion x Education, Religion x Income

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Non-Catholic</u>	<u>Total</u>
Self-employed, etc.	3.257	2.969	3.097
Employees, etc.	2.918	2.851	2.894
Workers	2.860	2.443	2.630
TOTAL	2.950	2.676	
<u>Education</u>			
College preparatory	3.118	2.892	3.012
Intermediate school	3.063	2.776	2.906
Primary school with apprenticeship	2.891	2.570	2.716
Primary school	3.348	2.750	3.036
TOTAL	3.032	2.678	
<u>Income</u>			
>1,800 DM/mo.	3.071	2.840	2.954
1401-1800 DM	2.917	2.369	2.612
1201-1400 DM	3.037	2.763	2.888
1001-1200 DM	3.020	2.581	2.784
801-1000 DM	3.205	2.500	2.743
601-800 DM	2.615	2.650	2.655
401- 600 DM	2.800	2.889	2.813
<400 DM/mo.	4.000	3.333	3.647
TOTAL	3.071	2.840	

Analysis of variance of these data indicated significant main effects attributable to education, occupation, and religion. The effect of income was shown once more to be statistically insignificant, and all tests for statistical interaction were insignificant. The ANOVA for main effects is presented in Table 7. The F-tests for the insignificant interaction model (AB) have been omitted in the interest of simplifying the table.

The analysis indicates clearly that the differences among means in Table 6 can best be accounted for by the additive main effects of the component achieved and ascribed status variables. While the sums of squares are slightly larger for the interaction than for the additive model, the differences are attributable to sampling error.

Table 7. Analysis of Variance for Party Identification in Catholic States: Religion x Occupation, Religion x Education, Religion x Income.

	<u>Occupation</u>		<u>Education</u>		<u>Income</u>	
	<u>ss*</u>	<u>df**</u>	<u>ss</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>ss</u>	<u>df</u>
Total (T)	423.76	443	509.32	527	471.34	493
Religion (A)	8.28	1	16.38	1	14.60	1
Achieved Status (B)	14.22	2	9.35	3	11.01	7
MCA (A,B)	21.59	3	25.69	4	25.70	8
Interaction (AB)	23.40	5	28.55	7	26.08	15
<u>Tests for Main Effects</u>						
	<u>Sum of Squares</u>		<u>Degrees of Freedom</u>		<u>Mean Squares</u>	<u>F-Ratio</u>
I. Occupation (A,B)-(A)	13.31		2		6.66	
Remainder T-(A,B,)	402.17		440		0.91	7.28****
Religion (A,B)-(B)	7.37		1		7.37	
Remainder T-(A,B)	402.17		440		0.91	8.09****
II. Education (A,B)-(A)	9.31		3		3.10	
Remainder T-(A,B)	483.63		523		0.92	3.37***
Religion (A,B)-(B)	16.34		1		16.34	
Remainder T-(A,B)	483.63		523		0.92	17.76****
III. Income (A,B)-(A)	11.1		7		1.59	
Remainder T-(A,B)	445.64		485		0.92	1.73n.s.
Religion (A,B)-(B)	14.69		1		14.69	
Remainder T-(A,B)	445.64		485		0.92	15.97****

*Sum of Squares. ss differs among the three analyses because of differing n's.

**Degrees of freedom

*** $p < .05$

**** $p < .001$

The analysis of status inconsistency in the Protestant states included respondents living in Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Neidersaxon, Bremen, and Hessen. The state of Baden-Wurtemberg also has a Protestant numerical majority. However, the margin was so small that we could not define either major religious group as dominant. We therefore left this state out of our status inconsistency analysis. In the Protestant states, Protestants were coded as members of the dominant religion, and non-Protestants (Catholics and those reporting other religions or no religion) were coded as non-members. Table 8 presents mean partisanship scores by religion and by achieved status variables for respondents living in the Protestant states. Occupation is once again seen to be related to conservatism, although only a trace of the relationship appears among the non-Protestant minority. Education, on the other hand, is more strongly correlated with political conservatism among non-Protestants than among Protestants. Income again has several reversals. Most interesting, perhaps, is that the greater conservatism of non-Protestants (most of whom are Catholic) is nowhere near as great in the Protestant as in the Catholic states. In only 7 of the 15 possible comparisons in Table 8 are the non-Protestants the more conservative of the two groups.

Table 8. Observed Partisanship Means in Protestant States: Religion x Occupation, Religion x Education, Religion x Income

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Non-Protestant</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Self-employed, etc.	3.586	3.000	3.460
Employees, etc.	2.873	3.000	2.899
Workers	2.531	2.933	2.641
TOTAL	2.838	2.965	
<u>Education</u>			
College preparatory	3.000	3.067	2.894
Intermediate school	2.841	2.944	2.888
Primary school with apprenticeship	2.952	2.667	2.863
Primary school	3.000	2.600	3.020
TOTAL	2.894	2.896	

Table 8. cont.

	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Non-Protestant</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Income</u>			
> 1,800 DM/mo.	2.914	2.888	2.909
1401-1800 DM	2.972	2.900	2.956
1201-1400 DM	2.973	2.875	2.956
1001-1200 DM	2.694	3.133	2.823
801-1000 DM	2.916	2.714	2.859
601- 800 DM	2.800	3.500	2.897
401- 600 DM	3.428	3.000	3.230
< 400 DM/mo.	2.666	3.000	2.714
TOTAL	2.895	2.955	

The ANOVA for main effects of occupation, income, and religion is presented in Table 9.

Table 9. Analysis of Variance for Party Identification in Protestant States: Religion x Occupation, Religion x Income

	<u>Occupation</u>		<u>Income</u>	
	<u>sum of squares</u>	<u>degrees of freedom</u>	<u>sum of squares</u>	<u>degrees of freedom</u>
Total (T)	230.91	234	277.64	285
Religion (A)	.71	1	.19	1
Achieved Status (B)	17.19	2	1.64	7
MCA (A,B)	19.54	3	2.44	8
Interaction (AB)	21.95	5	6.69	15
<u>Tests for Main effects</u>				
	<u>sum of squares</u>	<u>degrees of freedom</u>	<u>mean squares</u>	<u>F-Ratio</u>
I. Occupation (A,B)-(A)	18.83	2	9.42	
Remainder (T)-(A,B)	211.37	231	.91	10.35*
Religion (A,B)-(B)	2.35	1	2.35	
Remainder (T)-(A,B)	211.37	231	.91	2.57 n.s.
II. Income (A,B)-(A)	2.25	6	.38	
Remainder (T)-(A,B)	275.20	277	.99	.38 n.s.
Religion (A,B)-(B)	.80	1	.80	
Remainder (T)-(A,B)	275.20	277	.99	.81 n.s.

* p < .001

Again, the F- tests for the interaction model (AB) are omitted in the interest of simplifying the table. The interaction model did not explain significantly more variance in partisanship than did the additive model. Also omitted from this table is ANOVA and F- tests for education x religion. Because of statistical anomalies, the ANOVA sum of squares for these variables was greater than the MCA sum of squares, making analysis difficult, and results unreliable.

A somewhat different pattern appears here than was present in the Catholic states. Most strikingly, the religious differences do not approach statistical significance in the Protestant states. That religion operates differently in Protestant than in Catholic states suggests that we did well to look at the two types of geographical units separately since higher order interaction effects are indicated. It must be noted that they are not the interaction effects specified by the status inconsistency model.

Secondly, the effect of occupation on partisanship, observed for the Federal Republic as a whole and for the Catholic states, appears in the Protestant states as well:

Finally, income once again is shown to be unrelated to political partisanship.

DISCUSSION

This analysis has been concerned with three questions. First, does occupational class continue to be a basis of partisan cleavage in a society whose major party of the left has been undergoing an embourgeoisement in response to an expansion of salaried middle-class, relative to working class, strata. Secondly, what role does religion play in partisan differentiation in modern Germany. Third, do models of social structure that posit statistical interaction effects given us greater explanatory power than more parsimonious additive models.

The answer to the first question is clearly affirmative. Among the variables we have considered here, occupation stands out as the single strongest determinant of political party choice. Where the SPD in the past gained support from the geographical mobility of the labor force from agricultural occupations to urban working-class occupations, it seems to have

substituted support based on shifts from entrepreneurial to salaried middle-class occupations. In both fathers and sons generations, we see middle-class employees manifesting political preferences to the left of those of the self-employed. Similarly in both Catholic and Protestant states, this difference appears among middle-class members of the dominant (although not the subordinate) religious group. The important plane of cleavage for the dominant religion is still one of the employers vs. employees, but the distinction between blue-collar and white-collar occupations has diminished in import. For the minority religions, however, the blue-collar white-collar distinction remains primary.

The answer to our second question is also affirmative, but qualified. In the Federal Republic as a whole, we find religion to be significantly related to political partisanship. However, when we view Catholic and Protestant states separately, we find that the relationship holds true in the former, but not in the latter. We have no explanation to offer for this phenomenon. Indeed, we find it strange in view of the support that the electoral system gives to the association between church and party. Elections are held on Sunday in the Federal Republic and Catholics, at the very least, can generally expect to be reminded from the pulpit to remember their sectarian interests when they go to the polls. We would have expected, if any differences among states were apparent, that Catholics would more strongly pressed to differentiate themselves politically from Protestants in states where they were a minority than where they were dominant.

The third question receives an unequivocal negative response. The logical elegance of formulations that posit "mobility effects" or "inconsistency effects" fails to hold up under the weight of our German data. We find that additive models of the effects of social structure on German politics account most parsimoniously for the explained variance in political party choice.

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